The effect of CEO power on bank risk: Do boards and institutional investors matter?

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygladolygiad gan gymheiriaid

Crynodeb

We test for a link between CEO power and risk taking in US banks. Banks are more likely to take risks if they have powerful CEOs and relatively poor balance sheets. There is little evidence that executive board size and independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs.
Iaith wreiddiolSaesneg
Tudalennau (o-i)101202
Nifer y tudalennau1
CyfnodolynFinance Research Letters
Cyfrol33
Dyddiad ar-lein cynnar4 Meh 2019
Dynodwyr Gwrthrych Digidol (DOIs)
StatwsCyhoeddwyd - Maw 2020

Ôl bys

Gweld gwybodaeth am bynciau ymchwil 'The effect of CEO power on bank risk: Do boards and institutional investors matter?'. Gyda’i gilydd, maen nhw’n ffurfio ôl bys unigryw.

Dyfynnu hyn