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The Sino-Indian Border War and the Foreign Policies of China and India (1950-1965)

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The Sino-Indian Border War and the Foreign Policies of China and India (1950-1965)

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Abstract

There has been growing interest in the historical analysis of the Sino-Indian relations and the Sino-Indian border issue, yet little research has focus on the impact of two Government's foreign policies on the Sino-Indian border issue. This study examines the Sino-Indian relations, particularly the Sino-Indian border issue, Tibetan issues and China and India's foreign policies in the middle 20th century. This research will examine the origin and development of the Sino-Indian border issue and connections between and national diplomatic policies and the border disputes in China and India. More specifically, this research aims to illustrate the origins of the Sino-Indian border dispute, the role Tibet played in the Sino-Indian border issue, the impacts of their foreign policies on the Sino-Indian border issue from the 1950s to the 1960s, the measures both states took to ease boundary intension and conflicts, why the 1962 Border War happened, and what changes to foreign policies two governments made before and after the 1962 Border War. This study involves the collection and analysis of historical archival materials and official documents from both China and India.

Glossary

AD	Anno Domini
CCCPC	Central Committee of the Communist Part of China
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army
KMT	Guomintang (National Party of China)
NEFA	North-East Frontier Agency
NRA	National Revolutionary Army
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROI	Republic of India
ROC	Republic of China
TASS	Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union
UAR	United Arab Republic
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States of America
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Background

In 1947 and 1949, two newly independent governments were established in India and China respectively – the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Government of the Republic of India (ROI). The emergence of these two governments signified the rise of the new major powers in Asia. Since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1950, China and India's respective foreign policies have played an important role in the Sino-Indian relationships, and vice versa.

In the early 1950s, when the two governments had just established diplomatic relations, Sino-Indian relations experienced a period of development. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s forces – the People's Liberation Army (PLA) – marched into Tibet in late 1950 that harmed India's interests and privileges there, but Sino-Indian relations turned to the deterioration. The reason was that the two governments tended to solve the Tibetan issue by the peaceful approach. Therefore, the two governments signed an important friendly agreement, the *Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India*, which re-regulated India's interests in Tibet on 29 April 1954.¹ This agreement solved some issues which heretofore existed

¹ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India, pp.

between China and India, rather than resolving the border issue. Furthermore, it represented the peak of Sino-Indian cooperative and friendly relations in 1950s.

However, friendly relations between China and India suffered a crisis in the following months. In July 1954, two months after the signing of the 1954 agreement, the Wuje Incident occurred in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian frontier.² The Chinese Government believed that some Indian soldiers had passed through the Sino-Indian border and entered into Chinese territory, while the Indian Government considered the area, which the Indian forces patrolled, as Indian territory.³ Furthermore, the Indian Government also censured the Government of China in relation to some Tibetan officials that had tried to enter Indian territory. The Government of China considered the regions, through which the Tibetan officials passed, as Chinese territory.⁴ It was significant that this was the first time that military confrontation occurred between China and India, due to the Sino-Indian border issue, since the establishment of Sino-Indian diplomacy in 1950. From this point, the Sino-Indian border issue was the root of every military conflict between China and India from 1950s to 1960s.

With regards to the Sino-Indian border issue, it was indeed a complicated matter. Originally China, as a country, which had independent culture and a vast territory,

98-101; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 1-3.

² *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), p. 6.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-3; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 366-368.

⁴ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), p. 3 and p. 8 and pp. 12-13; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 368 and p. 373 and pp. 376-377.

barely had demarcation along its boundaries with its neighbours in accordance with traditional culture and the customary range of activity in the orient in ancient times. At that time, China determined its territory by rather the sphere of culture (sphere of influence) than demarcation with other countries. Thus, it hardly had any specific nor detailed boundaries until the 19th century. Additionally, while the western powers were influencing the whole world as well as China in the 19th century, sovereignty and demarcation among nations became important political concepts for modern European states, in order to delimit the territories of their colonies and their spheres of influence. Neville Maxwell, a famous Australian journalist and scholar, pointed out that ancient countries believed that frontiers were isolation zones among countries instead of borders among states, because the frontier would vanish when it was stretched to the uninhabited region.⁵ Additionally, Lord George N. Curzon, the viceroy of India from 6 January 1899 to 18 November 1905, stated, “The idea of a demarcated frontier is itself an essentially modern conception, and finds little or no place in the ancient world.” Moreover, he also pointed out that before the 20th century, “it would be true to say that demarcation has never taken place in Asiatic countries except under European pressure and by the intervention of European agents.”⁶ Therefore, when modern concepts from the west encountered traditional customs in the orient, conflict was going to be inevitable. This paved the way for the potential of conflict with regards to the Sino-Indian border issue.

The Sino-Indian border disputes include three regions – the western, eastern and middle sectors of Sino-Indian border. The western and eastern sectors are two main disputed areas for two countries. The disputes over the Sino-Indian border issue can

⁵ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1970, pp. 20-21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21; and Lord Curzon, *Frontiers*, Romanes Lecture of 1907, London: Oxford University Press, p. 49.

be dated back to the 19th century, when China was under the rule of the Qing Dynasty and India was a colony of the United Kingdom. Since the middle of 19th century, in order to determine the northern boundary of India (with Tibet, which was a part of the Qing Empire), British agents and the British Government unilaterally put forward a few lines of delimitation of the Sino-Indian border in the western sector of the frontier, to which Government of Qing Empire did not respond. In fact, the Government of China had not signed any border treaty and had not officially delimited the entire Sino-Indian boundary with India (or the British Raj). However, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, in letters to Zhou Enlai, the Prime Minister of China, in March and September 1959, insisted that the Sino-Indian boundary on the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontier had been delimited in accordance with the 1842 Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet, which related to an agreement in which each party should govern its own territory, but did not describe specific delimitation of the Ladakh-Tibetan boundary.⁷ Furthermore, the “determined” Sino-Indian boundary in the western sector that India insisted upon was similar to the most “radical” lines drawn by British – the “Johnson Line” and the “Ardagh Line” – which put the entire region of Aksai Chin, the main disputed region in the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontier, within Indian territory. However, the Government of China believed that the two governments had not bilaterally launched any negotiations nor reached any agreement with regards to the western sector of the Sino-Indian border yet. Once the Indian Government had information that China had built the Xinjiang-Tibet Road crossing into Aksai Chin in the second half of the 1950s, the border issue concerning the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontier became one of

⁷ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), p. 55; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September-November 1959, and A Note on The Historical Background of The Himalayan Frontier of India* (White Paper II), pp. 35-36; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 181 and p. 193.

severe importance.

In order to deal with this, the British Government decided to convene a three-party conference, which included the United Kingdom, China and Tibet, in Simla in 1913. The theme was the status of Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations. Colonel Henry McMahon, the British plenipotentiary, had secretly delimited an Indian-Tibetan boundary – the “McMahon Line” – on a map which was privately attached within the Simla Convention of 1914, which ended without the Chinese representatives signing or agreeing to the convention. However, after India gained independence, it regarded the McMahon Line as its northeastern boundary. In 1948, it started to dispatch troops to enter the region of the Assam Himalayas (which was called South Tibet by China), which is situated between south of the McMahon Line and north of the traditional customary line, and is approximately ninety thousand square kilometres in length. By 1951, India had control of most of the Assam Himalayas and had established an administrative district that year, which was called the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), in order to enhance its administration and security in there. Hence, the region of the Assam Himalayas from this point had become the disputed eastern sector.

The disputed border in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian frontier was situated between the southernmost point of disputed Sino-Indian frontier in the western sector and Nepal, and could also be described as the border between Ngari Prefecture (which was called Ali Area by China) of China’s Tibet and India. The boundary middle sector was the same as the rest of the boundaries along the Sino-Indian border, which was formed by traditional customary lines rather than the official border treaty. By 1954, only two places in the disputed territory in the middle sector were occupied by

the United Kingdom.⁸ However, after the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement, some places in this disputed region were gradually occupied by India.⁹ By then, the border issue in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian frontier was of concern to both countries.

As a result of major disagreements between China and India on the peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian frontier issue, the border crisis became fiercer in 1962. Eventually, the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War broke out in October of that year. The war made a huge influence on the two nations' foreign policies before and after the war that it resulted in Sino-Indian relations reaching their lowest point. The change of foreign policies of the two states and the war's influence will be mainly discussed in this book.

Literature Review

Furthermore, the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War was a milestone in Sino-Indian relations, especially the Sino-Indian border dispute. This war indicated that Sino-Indian relations had reached the worst point in the history of the two countries, and more and more research on the Sino-Indian border issue appeared after the 1962 Border War. This part will demonstrate the academic achievements of Western, Indian and Chinese scholars.

⁸ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September-November 1959, and A Note on The Historical Background of The Himalayan Frontier of India* (White Paper II), p. 29; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 186.

⁹ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September-November 1959, and A Note on The Historical Background of The Himalayan Frontier of India* (White Paper II), p. 31; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 188.

With the collapse of Sino-Indian relations in the 1960s, some western and Indian scholars began to study Sino-Indian relations and the border issue both before and after the Sino-Indian Border War. Because of the context of the Cold War in the world, and to some extent the strong anti-Chinese atmosphere in India, some of research achievements and publications had bias that not only censured the Chinese Government for betraying Sino-Indian friendship but also for invading Indian territories in the context of Chinese communist expansion. Moreover, they considered the Indian Government an innocent victim in this Sino-Indian border conflict.¹⁰

Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenback published a book, *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh* in 1963. The authors stated the Ladakh's history and the origin and development of the Sino-Indian (Tibetan-Ladakh) border dispute in the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontiers. Their views of point in this book are closer to the Government of India's contention. For instance, the authors thought the 1684 Treaty and the 1842 Treaty between Tibet and Ladakh had been delimited as the Indian Government insisted, but the Chinese Government suspected the authenticity of the 1684 Treaty and it also considered that the 1842 Treaty did not refer to the boundary delimitation.¹¹ When the Chinese Government presented a solution to the Sino-Indian border conflicts in November 1959, the author considered that the Chinese Government ostensibly presented a solution of the border crisis, whereas it only intended gain the military advantages in the eastern sector and obtain the interest in the Aksai Chin on the western sector.¹² Furthermore, when the representatives of two governments did the last effort to

¹⁰ Qiu Meirong and Cai Jian, "Zhongyin bianjie zhengduan yanjiu zongshu (A Summary of the Studies of Sino-Indian Border Disputes)", *Changshu gaozhuan xuebao* (Journal of Changshu College), Vol. 3, 1999, Nanjing: Nanjing University, p. 30.

¹¹ Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh*, New York: Praeger, 1963, p. 40 and p. 100.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

launch a series of talks about the Sino-Indian border disputes in the second half of 1960, with regards to the maps of disputed areas in the western sector of the Sino-Indian borders, the author believed that although the two governments hold their respective standpoints with evidence of maps, the Indian Government had more convincing evidence than the Chinese representatives.¹³ As for the divergences of the jurisdiction of administration, custom and tradition on the disputed territories in the western sector, the author believed that the Chinese evidence was more inconsistent and unreliable and the India's evidence was more convincing than the materials Chinese provided.¹⁴

A British scholar, Dr. Alastair Lamb, came up with a different point of view from those scholars above on the Sino-Indian border issue. In his 1964-published book, *The China-India Border: the Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, he collected and analysed a large number of archives and materials, particularly the British official records (pre-1913 archives were only available at that time) to study the origins of the various Sino-Indian border disputes from the nineteenth to the middle twentieth century.¹⁵

Dr. Lamb presented several points of view as to the origin of the Sino-Indian border dispute in this book. Firstly, he believed that Aksai Chin on the western sector was the most important disputed territory for both China and India. He suggested that the Chinese Government might accept the McMahon Line as the southern boundary on the eastern sector, but there was no chance that the Chinese Government would allow Aksai Chin to be included in the Indian territories after the completion of the Chinese

¹³ Ibid., p. 99-104.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 104-128.

¹⁵ Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1964, the Foreword page.

Xinjiang-Tibet road through Aksai Chin in the mid-1950s.¹⁶ Secondly, he considered the Macartney-MacDonald alignment of 1898-1899 a better, or at least most optimal, solution to address the Aksai Chin territorial dispute. This is because the Macartney-MacDonald Line ran across the Aksai Chin area. Not only did the line put the Xinjiang-Tibet Road on the Chinese side, but it also put the western part of Aksai Chin on the Indian territory, Dr. Lamb thought that the Chinese Government would rather accept this proposal than the Johnson Line which put entire Aksai Chin in Indian territory in the 1950-1960s.¹⁷ In addition, the Macartney-MacDonald Line went along the geographic watershed in that region, and that was the international convention to demarcate boundaries.¹⁸ Furthermore, that line ensured that the Chinese Government could retain its interest, the Xinjiang-Tibet road, which was the main reason as to why the Chinese had never given up Aksai Chin, so this made the Macartney-MacDonald Line an ideal solution on that premise.

Dr. Lamb expressed three points of view about the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian disputed border. Firstly, he thought that the validity of the McMahon Line could be accepted and acknowledged by people, because of two reasons. The first reason was the fact that British notes, exchanged with Tibet on 24-25 March 1914, had proved that the Tibetan Government possessed the authority and the sovereignty to sign agreements with other foreign governments by diplomatic approach. The second reason was that Chinese Government would probably accept a boundary with India on the basis of the McMahon Line by delineating the eastern boundary in a new negotiation to wipe away the shadow of the 1914 Anglo-Tibetan notes (which was regarded as an invalid agreement by the Chinese).¹⁹ Additionally, he believed that

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 173.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 173-174.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, p. 169.

there were some areas below the McMahon Line that should belong to Tibet. This was because, regardless of whether Tibet had interests or had administrated in these places by 1947, the year of the Indian independence from the United Kingdom, India had neither interests nor administrative capacities in those places before or after 1914, the year when the Anglo-Tibetan notes (with the McMahon Line) were exchanged.²⁰ Finally, he believed that the Chinese Government did not have the intention to claim all disputed territories south of the McMahon Line, and may perhaps even, to some extent, accept the McMahon Line under some conditions.²¹ That also proved his first point of view.

After Dr. Alastair Lamb, Neville Maxwell, a famous Australian journalist, published a book called *India's China War* in 1970. In his book, he emphatically stated that the Indian Government should take more responsibility for the 1962 Border War, which was a very different opinion from Indian and western academia at that moment.

Maxwell presented several perspectives based on Dr. Lamb's points of view of the Sino-Indian border dispute. Firstly, he mentioned an important Indian policy on the border — the forward policy — in his book, and implied that the forward policy was ridiculous and would irritate the Chinese and result in counterattacks towards India.²² Taking Aksai Chin for example, the forward policy meant that India sent patrolmen to venture across the de facto boundary to gaps in the Chinese military positions on the other side, and even built some small strongholds in regions behind the Chinese forces. Its aim was forcing the Chinese garrisons to retreat from Aksai Chin and providing clear evidence of the Indian presence in that area.²³ However, these actions

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 169-170.

²¹ Ibid., p. 170.

²² Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 176.

²³ Ibid., pp. 174-175.

would bring India under Chinese counterattack and escalate boundary conflicts, and finally, it would cause the border war to happen. Secondly, Maxwell considered that Nehru, the Indian Premier Minister, had misjudged the Chinese reaction to India's forward policy, because Nehru thought that the Chinese Government would never send troops to perform an extensive counterattack.²⁴ Even in September 1962, no less than one month before the Sino-Indian Border War, the Indian Government still believed that war would not happen between China and India.²⁵ Thirdly, Maxwell believed that the Chinese Government sought a solution to the conflict rather than the expansion of territory. He quoted words from Lord Caccia, the British former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, "the Chinese withdrawal to their original lines after a victory in the field was the first time in recorded history that a great power has not exploited military success by demanding something more".²⁶ Thus, Maxwell thought that the Chinese retreat was a means to find a solution rather than a demand for more territory. Finally, Maxwell believed that India's policy of not negotiating the boundary settlement with China resulted in leaving the border issue unsolved. Because the Indian Government considered the unsettled boundary with China as the legitimate boundary, they adopted a policy of refusing to negotiate with China about the boundary as their diplomatic strategy. Maxwell indicated that the Indian principle was to hold no negotiations with China about border issue, both pre- and post-war.²⁷

Indian scholars began to do research on the Sino-Indian border issue from the 1960s. Most of them had the perspective that China should take more responsibility for the border dispute and the 1962 Border War. However, Karunakar Gupta, an Indian

²⁴ Ibid., p. 178.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 256.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 419.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 423.

scholar, presents some different perspectives on the Sino-Indian border disputes and relations in his 1974 published book *The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier* in terms of a number of British and Indian archives he collected. He thought that the Indian Government needed to take responsibility for the settlement of the border issue with China and for providing misinformation of border facts to the Indian public. Specifically, he put forward four perspectives in the book. Firstly, Gupta thought that Gyalu Thondup, one of the 14th Dalai Lama's elder brothers should take responsibility for Tibetan unrest and the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations in the 1950-60s. More specifically, he believed that Gyalu Thondup was engaged in activities pursuing Tibetan independence in Taiwan, the United States of America (USA) and Europe, and especially in India; moreover, he also needed to take responsibility for the 14th Dalai Lama's political speeches in India after the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion. Both of those facts made the Chinese Government irritated and caused the deterioration of Sino-Indian relationship.²⁸ Secondly, Gupta considered that the Indian Government, after its independence in 1947, began to hide some notes about negating the Simla Convention and the McMahon Line from the Government of the Republic of China, in order to make the Indian people believe there was no problem in India's northeastern boundary.²⁹ Moreover, the Indian Government should take responsibility for misleading to Indian people. Thirdly, he considered that *Aitchison's Treaties* in the 1929 edition, was faked by the British in 1938 but imprinted in 1929. Furthermore, India believed that the Simla Convention and its attachment - the Anglo-Tibetan agreement - were valid from the faked *Aitchison's Treaties* edition.³⁰ Thus, the legitimacy and validity of the McMahon Line on the eastern sector was lost. Finally, he believed that not only did *Aitchison's Treaties* in the 1929 edition prove

²⁸ Karunakar Gupta, *The hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier*, Calcutta: Minerva Associates (Publications) PVT. LTD, 1974, pp. vii-viii.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

the invalidity of the McMahon Line on the eastern sector, but also *Aitchison's Treaties* in the 1931 edition proved the unsettled boundary in Aksai Chin on the western sector. *Aitchison's Treaties* in the 1931 edition say, "The northern as well as the eastern boundary of the Kashmir State is still undefined."³¹ Aksai Chin is located northeast to Kashmir.

Due to the classification of Chinese official archives and documents until the 21st century, only a few scholars and diplomatic officials had conditions to get access to those materials to do research on the Sino-Indian border disputes. From the 2000s, there were an increasing amount of scholars paying more attention to Sino-Indian border studies and more and more relevant publications as a result of this. Wang Hongwei and Yang Gongsu are two representatives of them.

Wang Hongwei, who was a scholar in the fields of oriental studies, South Asia Studies and the studies of Sino-Indian relations, published a book in 2009, *A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age*. In this book, not only did he share some perspectives with Yang but also put forward some of his own points of view on the Sino-Indian border issue. On the one hand, he believed that the entire scope of the Sino-Indian border disputes (including the west, middle and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary) came from British colonialism during the 19th century.³² Furthermore, the independent India's policy towards Tibet caused the McMahon line to become the fact on the ground from 1948 to 1954 – occupied ninety thousand square kilometres territory of south of the McMahon Line that caused profound influence on the Sino-Indian border issue.³³ On the other hand, Wang

³¹ Ibid.

³² Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House, 2009, pp. 149-155.

³³ Ibid., pp.109-110.

presented some objective viewpoints in his book. Firstly, he did not censure the attitude of no negotiations relating to the boundary settlement by the Indian Government, but instead analysed and concluded the reasons why negotiations nor possible settlement of the boundary disputes could not be in accordance with both countries' interests. He thought that the Chinese believed that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been aligned but India considered that the boundary was acknowledged by both sides and had already been demarcated on the ground. Perhaps this was the problem that resulted in the failure of negotiations to address the border issue before the war happened in 1962.³⁴ Secondly, Wang uses one whole chapter to analyse reasons why the Indian Government decided to adopt a hawkish and radical policy to deal with the Sino-Indian border issue from four aspects; the international background, the Indian interior, the wrong judgment of Chinese interior and Nehru's personal characteristics.³⁵ Finally, he put forward his point of view on the possible future settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue. He believed that the two countries would solve this border issue in future in the context of peaceful and reciprocal negotiations.³⁶

In addition, Yang Gongsu was a diplomat in People's Republic of China, and he was appointed by the Chinese Government as a diplomatic official in Lhasa to deal with Tibetan diplomacy in 1950s. He studied in the Tibetology and concluded his diplomatic experience and study in Tibet and thus published a book in 2001, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi* (Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet). His perspectives had obvious bias to censure British colonialism and an independent

³⁴ Ibid., p. 159.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 263-264.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 384-385.

Indian Government for the invasion and intervention in Tibetan affairs. Firstly, he believed that the British intervened and invaded Tibet during the Qing dynasty in the 19th century, and they even had the intention to separate Tibet from China during the regime of the Republic of China in the first half of the 20th century.³⁷ Secondly, he believed that the British conspired with Tibet to put ninety thousand square kilometres of territory into British-controlled India by a swindle in the 1913-1914 Simla Conference.³⁸ This became the origin of the Sino-Indian border dispute on eastern sector. Thirdly, he thought it was incorrect to define the relationship between inland China and Tibet as suzerainty. He considered that the terminology of sovereignty and suzerainty originated in the West in modern times, and this term was never used, nor existed, in Chinese imperial history. Although it is necessary to use these modern terminologies in contemporary politics or diplomacy, China had already possessed sovereignty of Tibet by its de facto administration there since the end of 18th century.³⁹ Finally, he believed that the 1962 Border War broke out because of India's wrong policies towards the border situation and the Chinese determination to war.⁴⁰

Research Questions and Structure of Thesis

Due to the different perspective, in order to study the border issue and their impacts on the Sino-Indian foreign relations, there are some important issues that need to be discussed and clarified in this thesis. The research questions could be as follows:

³⁷ Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi* (Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe (China Tibetology Publishing House), 2001, p.234.

³⁸ Ibid., 196.

³⁹ Ibid., 236.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 306.

What was the origin of the Sino-Indian border dispute?

What were the relationships between the Sino-Indian border issue and the foreign policies from both governments from 1950 to 1958?

What were attitudes of both countries toward the Sino-Indian border issue and their foreign policies?

Why did the border war happen in 1962?

What were changes of foreign policies from both countries after the 1962 Border War?

In order to examine and analyse above questions, this thesis will be constructed as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter establishes a context of the theme of this thesis and introduce the literature review concerning the field of the Sino-Indian border issue. It comes up with research questions and illustrates the methodology of this research. Additionally, the structure of this thesis will be taken on in this chapter. Finally, it states the main contribution to the research area.

Chapter 2: Pre-1950s: The Background of the Origin of the Sino-Indian Border Issue

This chapter looks back upon the relationship between inland China and Tibet chronologically, in order to enrich the background of the origin of the Sino-Indian border issue. It introduces the historical origin of the Sino-Indian border issue and analyses what problems caused the border disputes to happen.

Chapter 3: China and India's Foreign Policies and their impact on the border issue from 1950 to 1958

This chapter introduces the rapid development of Sino-Indian relations since they established a diplomatic relationship on 1st April 1950. It analyses how the change in Chinese and Indian foreign policies caused the gradual deterioration of Sino-Indian relations from 1954 to 1958.

Chapter 4: 1959: The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion and Its Impact on China and India's Foreign Policies and the Sino-Indian Border Issue

This chapter looks back upon the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion, an important historical incident in Sino-Indian relations. Furthermore, It analyses the reasons for the Tibetan Rebellion and its impact on China's India policy and the India's China policy, especially with regards to the changes to their respective border policies since 1959.

Chapter 5: 1959-1962: The Talk on the Border Disputes between China and India from 1959 to 1961 and the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962

This chapter examines why the border conflict began to escalate from 1959 and whether the two governments had respectively adopted any measures to contain the border conflicts since 1959. It will analyse why the peaceful settlement on the Sino-Indian border issue failed before the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War and why the border war inevitably broke out from the perspectives of the two states' foreign policies and policies to each other.

Chapter 6: 1963-1965: The Aftermath of the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 and the Changes of China and India's Foreign Policies in the Post-war Period

This chapter discusses the impact of the border war on Sino-Indian relations at low tide in the post-war period and it analyses what factors caused the changes to the foreign policies of the two countries and their influences on the South Asia continent and Sino-Indian relations.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This chapter makes a conclusion for the whole thesis and use Waltz's realist theory of international politics to analyse the historical incidents and China and India's foreign policies. It answers all the research questions, which come up in the introduction chapter with the international politics theory.

Research Methodology

This thesis will use the study methods of data collection and analysis. Evidence of documents in various periods as primary and secondary sources will be collected. In general, the primary sources include government archives and documents, diaries, memorandums, images, newspapers, scripts of treaties, scripts of notes, scripts of telegraphs etc., so there are government archives, documents, scripts of treaties and notes from the Indian Office Records and Private Papers, the British Library and the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China; and diaries and memorandums from libraries; and newspapers from the National Library of China, Beijing; and telegraphs between the British Indian Government and United Kingdom from the Indian Office Records and Private Papers, British Library; and finally telegraphs between the Tibetan authorities and the Government of the Republic of China from the Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing. Furthermore, there are some scripts of letters, treaties, notes, memoirs and newspapers

that are cited as secondary sources to support my thesis. Finally, this thesis collect and examine both Chinese and Indian (British) sources as well as critically use and analyse them in the thesis by an unbiased way.

Furthermore, in the basis of primary and secondary sources, this book applies Kenneth N. Waltz's neo-realism within the theory of international politics to analyse the essences and rules of China and India's foreign policies and their impact on historical events from a combined historical and international perspective. In this way to find out the inherent reason for why two states adopted such different foreign policies and how the foreign policies influenced the Sino-Indian relations and the border issue.

The neo-realist theory of Kenneth Waltz is also called as the structural realism by the academia. In order to realize this theory, it is important to understand the core of Waltz's neo-realism theory. Within the theory of neo-realism, the background of the world is the international politics for each country and the self-help system is the basic environment in international politics. International politics is not same as the domestic politics, which has a centralized and rigorous hierarchy, but instead is a decentralized and anarchic system. Due to the absence of centralized authority in international politics, states, which are regarded as basic units of international politics are relative equal units in general.⁴¹ States, which rarely cooperate among one another in order to reach goals in international politics effectively, are completely dissimilar to units and departments within a nation, which can interact and run smoothly in the hierarchic system.⁴² Units within a nation reflect integration, while

⁴¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Illinois: Waveland Press, 2010, p. 88.

⁴² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, p. 104.

units amongst nations show interdependence. In fact, integration is obviously closer than interdependence.⁴³ Furthermore, the anarchy of international politics shows two ways to restrict cooperation among nations in the above background. The first way is the inequality relating to potential gains that come about as a result of cooperation. A nation is always afraid of another party garnering more benefits as a result of cooperation. The second way is the issue of independence. A nation often worries about the damage to its independence from dependence through cooperation with another state.⁴⁴ Therefore, the environment of international anarchy which each state faces is that of a self-help system.⁴⁵ It is based on the difficulty of cooperation among nations in international politics within the theory of neo-realism.

In Waltz's neo-realism, there is a crucial concept that the priorities and most basic goals of a state in the anarchic system are its security and survival, and moreover, states have to protect their securities and survival from external threats independently rather than relying on other nations in the self-help system of international politics.⁴⁶ Thus, how a state could survive in anarchic international politics is an important question. Generally, a state will seek to increase its power as a reliable means to ensure its security and survival.⁴⁷ Han J. Morgenthau, the famous classical realist master, has divided power into material and immaterial sections. The material section includes force – military capability – and non-force – economic capability and others. The immaterial section includes four points and they are; the influence upon people's psychology, self-restrained morals, the world's public opinion, and international

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 104-105.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 106.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 91; and Wei-en Tan, "Research the Theory of Balance of Power: A Realist View", *Journal of International Relations*, vol. 22, Taipei: National Chengchi University, July 2006, p. 133.

⁴⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979, p. 107.

⁴⁷ Wei-en Tan, "Research the Theory of Balance of Power: A Realist View", *Journal of International Relations*, vol. 22, p. 137.

law.⁴⁸ More specifically, Waltz believes that there are three crucial concepts – capability, force and the balance of power theory that could influence the survival of nations in international politics.

First of all, capability is an important concept in the international political system of Waltz's neo-realism. States as units in the international system have undifferentiated goals as well as similar functions, but the differences among their capabilities reflect in the differences of the power of states in the international politics.⁴⁹ Moreover, the changes of the distribution of states' capabilities alter the structure of international politics system.⁵⁰

Secondly, force is another important concept in Waltz's realism. Because states have similar or common tasks and the absence of (centralized) government in the international system, conflicts will inevitably occur amongst states. In Waltz's words, "among states, the state of nature is a state of war."⁵¹ So, a state has to prepare to deal with the threat of the use of force from other states at any time. Because a state will rarely find cooperation with others for its security, force is a necessary and useful means for a state's survival and their basic demands. As Waltz says, "in international politics force serves, not only as ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one."⁵²

Thirdly, Waltz includes the balance of power theory of politics in his neo-realist theory of international politics. Because of the possibility for the use of the force in

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 141.

⁴⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979, pp. 96-97.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 97.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 102.

⁵² Ibid., p. 113.

the anarchic realm, some weak states may not have sufficient capabilities to preserve themselves. In order to survive, these states have to take measures to establish the environment of a balance of power amongst states internationally.⁵³ In the balance of power of international politics, states pursue the goal of balancing greater power rather than joining the side of the greater power. In Waltz's opinion, because the goal of any normal state is survival in the anarchic system instead of seeking to maximize their power internationally, it is sensible for states to balance the greater power.⁵⁴ In addition, the state of the balance of power naturally appears when two or more states exist together in the anarchic system instead of when they are pursuing the balance of power in the international politics.⁵⁵ Moreover, Waltz says that there is no assumption to indicate that states must have the rationality in their behaviour in the neo-realist theory of the balance of power.⁵⁶ Finally, he believes that a bipolar system is more beneficial for the steadiness of the balance of power in international politics.⁵⁷

It is necessary to explain the reasons for why this thesis chooses to apply Waltz's neo-realist theory to analyse the historical issues. The first reason is that foreign policy of each country in the world is preserving its national interest. When a nation makes its foreign policy, the foreign policy is bound to ensure its development of space and national interest, and the national security is the priority of the national interests for each state. In fact, the goals of foreign policies of China and India from 1950 to 1965 were protecting their respective national interests, especially the national security. In 1949, facing the western containment and military menace, in order to preserve the national security and development, the Government of PRC

⁵³ Ibid., p. 118.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 126-127.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 118.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Wei-en Tan, "Research the Theory of Balance of Power: A Realist View", *Journal of International Relations*, vol. 22, pp. 143-144.

joined in the bloc of the Soviet Union and the foreign policy of PRC became uniting the Soviet Union against the capitalist bloc. In addition, The Government of ROI adopted the non-aligned policy as the guideline of its foreign policy from its establishment. The non-aligned policy could make India avoid to antagonize any of two Great Power – the United States or the Soviet Union at that moment. It enhanced the India's national interest and security in 1950s. Through foreign policies of China and India in 1950s, it was clear to see that ensuring the national security was the core element of their foreign policies. In Waltz's neo-realist theory, a state's basic goal is the national survival and the national security is a reflection of the national survival. No national security means no guarantee for the national survival for each country. Moreover, the neo-realism emphasizes the importance of the national security for states in the anarchic system of the international politics in the world. Therefore, the theory is suitable for analysing the foreign policies of China and India from 1950 to 1965.

The second reason is that the Sino-Indian border issue relating to the national sovereignty was based on the national interest. The Sino-Indian border issue was the core problem of deterioration of the Sino-Indian relations from 1959 to 1965. Because the frontier problem was referring to the sovereignty of a country, both of Governments of China and India regarded it as matters which was relating to the national security. Therefore, after India occupied the disputed region – Assam Himalayas from 1948 to 1952 on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian frontier, the Government of India insisted on the proposition that the region of Assam Himalayas was no doubt India's territory and no any dispute in there. In 1954, the Government of India established the North-East Frontier Agency in the region of Assam Himalayas and enhanced the administrative authority and the frontier force in there. From 1954

to 1962, the Government of India did not put this disputed region on the table of talks of the border issue between China and India, because it considered that there was no frontier dispute on the eastern sector. When the Government of China presented the border issue on the disputed region of Assam Himalayas in 1959, the Government of India believed that China was going to damage India's sovereignty and national interest. Moreover, the national security of India would be under China's menace, if the Government of China insisted on the discussion about the disputed region on the eastern sector. Thus, it refused to discuss with Chinese Government about the border issue on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border. However, in order to preserve the national interest, the Indian Government presented the border issue on the western sector, especially in the region of Aksai Chin where the Chinese government had the de facto control. Regarding to the Chinese view, although China controlled Aksai Chin, it intended to launch a border negotiation with the Indian Government to discuss the entire Sino-Indian boundary and reach an agreement of delimiting the Sino-Indian border. The will of Government of China was also preserving its national interest. it considered that there would be no more threats around the Sino-Indian frontier if the Sino-Indian border issue could be solved by a new border treaty between the two governments. Therefore, it can be clearly seen that Waltz's neo-realism is suitable for analysing China and India's foreign policies on the border issue.

The third reason is that the Sino-Indian border clashes from 1954 to 1962 and the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War were a series of incidents of which two nations use the force to preserve their national goals and interests. Because of the different view on the Sino-Indian boundary and no any exist boundary treaty, when border guards of the two countries went on patrol around the border, there would be a possibility of the

encounter of the border guards of the two parties. At that moment, a party would believe that another party crossed the boundary and invade its own territory. In order to preserve the national interest and security, the force would a method for the two sides. Hence, it was inevitable for the both sides to make a clash. Although a series of border conflicts were the small scale by the autumn of 1962, the intention of the border guards of the two parties was using the force to protect their countries from another party's invasion. In addition, it could be also seen the capability – an important concept in the Waltz's neo-realist theory – in the Sino-Indian border clashes. The Indian Government adopted the forward policy on the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontier at the end of 1961. The Indian patrols crossed the boundary, which the Government of China regarded it as the customary line of tradition between China and India, and built dozens of military posts in Aksai Chin. It increased India's capability and decrease China's capability in there. The intention of India's forward policy was to establish India's existence in the disputed region which was controlled by the Chinese Government. Moreover, the final goal of the Indian Government was to force the Chinese personnel retreat from the Aksai Chin and to make India de facto control Aksai Chin as similar as the region of Assam Himalayas on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border. In Waltz's neo-realism, when a state has great capability, it is easy to build the influence in the international politics. In the autumn of 1962, in order to preserve the national interest and security, the Government of China launched a series of counterattacks to sweep away the Indian posts in the regions where it regarded the areas as the Chinese territories on the western and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border. The 1962 Sino-Indian Border War broke out. At that moment, the Chinese Government finally used the force to preserve its national interest and security. Therefore, it can be seen that neo-realism is suitable for analysing the Sino-Indian border clashes and the border war.

The fourth reason is that the Sino-Indian relationship from 1950 to 1965 was under the circumstance of the Cold War which was the bipolar system in the world at that moment. Because the Government of India adopted non-aligned policy as the guideline of its foreign policy, the foreign policy of India had relative independence on the context of the Cold War. Although the Government of PRC allied with the Soviet Union in 1950s, the Sino-Soviet split started in 1959. Hence, from 1959 to 1962, when the border issue became the major problem in the Sino-Indian relations, China's foreign policy had also relative independence. Thus, when the two countries made their foreign policies, especially China's India policy and India's Chinese policy, they had to consider the third party as a power and took it into the Sino-Indian relationship. The situation accorded the theory of balance of power in the neo-realism. When China and India faced the military menace of the other party, both of them sought the third power to contain the opponent. The Government of China enhanced the relationship between China and Pakistan and the Indian Government enhanced the Indian-U.S. relations and the Soviet-Indian relations. The Chinese Government intended to decrease India's capability by the Indo-Pakistani contradictions in the South Asia, while the Government of India was seeking the powers of United States and the Soviet Union to contain China's capability from the northern and the eastern side. This international situation was obviously clear in the post-war period, after the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. Therefore, it can be seen that the theory of balance of power is suitable for analysing the Sino-Indian relationship and their different foreign policies.

Overall, the Sino-Indian border issue and border conflicts were influenced by the foreign policies of two governments after 1950. Ensuring the national interest and national security was a crucial factor when the two governments made their respective

foreign policies and border policies. Thus, this thesis particularly examines the impacts of China and India's foreign policies on the border issue, the substantial reason of the outbreak of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, and the influences of the border war on the foreign policies of China and India by Waltz's neo-realism of the theory of international politics.

The major contribution in this research

The thesis examines the origin and development of the Sino-Indian border issue and the connections between the border dispute and the national diplomatic policies in China and India respectively. More specifically, it aims to illustrate what the origin of the Sino-Indian border dispute was, what role Tibet played in the Sino-Indian border issue, what the impacts of the Sino-Indian border issue were on the two countries' foreign policies from the 1950s to the 1960s, to what extent both of the two states took measures to ease boundary intension and conflicts respectively, why the 1962 Border War occurred and what changes to their foreign policies did the Chinese and Indian Governments make before and after the 1962 Border War. Moreover, this study collects and then analyses historical archives and official documents from both China and India in order to answer questions and illustrate my point of view in this thesis.

Furthermore, according to research achievements of other scholars, this thesis looks at the perspective of what the impact of the Sino-Indian border issue was on Chinese and Indian foreign policies and how their foreign policies reflected the border issue. It focuses on what influence the changes to China and India's policies towards each other after 1959 had on the escalation of border tension and conflicts. Additionally, in

order to analyse the historical documents and archives that it discusses within the chapters, this research uses the a international political theory – Kenneth N. Waltz’s neo-realism – to combine the historical documents in accordance with my point of view to make an analysis and conclusion in the last section of every chapter. Thus, it is significant for the research of the Sino-Indian border issue to apply this theory of international politics to clarify what impact the foreign policies of the two states had on the Sino-Indian frontier dispute from a new perspective of research.

Chapter 2: Pre-1950s: The Background of the Origin of the Sino-Indian Border Issue

Introduction

In order to examine the origin of the Sino-Indian border disputes, it is necessary to understand the historical background of origin of the border issue. This chapter will trace what causes led to the Sino-Indian border disputes. Since Tibet has played an important role in the Sino-Indian frontier issues, the relationships between inland China and Tibet and Anglo-Tibetan relations in the historical context will be analysed in this chapter.

China and India are two countries both ancient and modern, and they both have of long histories and distinguished cultures. Historically, China and India were two places of origin for ancient human civilization to greatly influence East Asia and South Asia respectively. They had relationships a long time ago. Sima Qian,⁵⁸ a famous historian and litterateur in Chinese history, created a work which was named *Records of the Grand Historian*⁵⁹, had some records about the Sindhu.⁶⁰ In the period

⁵⁸ Sima Qian (145 B.C. or 135 B.C. to 86 B.C.) was a historiographer in the period of the Emperor Wudi of the Western Han Dynasty.

⁵⁹ The historical document was the oldest history presented in a series of biographies. Most of Chinese historians give the greatest evaluations to his works in the historiography. Sima Qian, the author wrote a paragraph at the end of this book as a remark by himself about the book in the last volume of it: "...to discover the relation between the heaven and humans... to learn the change and regularity from the ancient to present... to form a doctrine..." See *Shi Ji* (Record of the Grand Historian), Sima Qian, *Records of the Grand Historian*, Vol.130: "Taishigong Zixu (the Autobiographical Afterword of *Records of the Grand Historian*)", Changchun: Jilin University Press, 2015, p. 897.

⁶⁰ Sindhu was the translated term with respect to the ancient India in Chinese Western Han Dynasty. It is cited from *Record of the Grand Historian*, Sima Qian, Vol.116: "Xinanyi Liezhuan(Treatise on the Southwestern Yi people)", p. 784.; and Fan Ye, Li Xian (Ed.) and Liu Zhao (Ed.), *Houhan Shu* (Book

of Emperor Ming of the Eastern Han, the Emperor sent Chinese officials who had been sent to India by the Emperor Ming, came back to China from India where he studied Buddhism.⁶¹ They translated some Buddhist lectures and the Emperor Ming instructed the officials to build Buddhist temples in Luoyang, which is the capital of the Eastern Han Dynasty.⁶² Buddhism began to spread gradually in China.

In the modern era, India and China, faced continual aggression from rising western colonial powers and they gradually became a western colony and semi-colony respectively. After the Age of Discovery⁶³, more and more western companies and fortresses were established by European colonists in coastal India. The East India Company was founded in 1600 and was supported by British royalty. Furthermore, it developed in the 17th and 18th century during the period of the Mughal Empire (1526-1857) in India. In this period, the Company defeated successively the Portuguese, Dutch, French colonists etc. The Mughal Empire terminated when Bahadur Shah II (1775-1862), the last Mughal emperor, was exiled by the British after the Indian Rebellion of 1857.⁶⁴ Moreover, the British Raj replaced it as a new empire to govern India.⁶⁵ From then on, India became completely a British colony

of Later Han), Vol.88: “Xiyu Zhuan (Treatise on Western Regions)”, Nanjing: Jinling Book Company, 1869 (the eighth year of Emperor Tongzhi’s reign), p. 8 (of Vol. 88).

⁶¹ Fan Ye, *Houhan Shu* (Book of Later Han), Vol.88: “Xiyu Zhuan (Treatise on Western Regions)”, p. 8 (of Vol. 88).

⁶² Seng You, *Hongming ji* (Anthology of propaganda of Buddhist Doctrine), Vol.1: “Muzi Lihuo lun (Mu’s Methodology of Clarifying Confusion)”, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2011, p. 47.

⁶³ The Age of Discovery also known as the Age of Exploration, was from the early 15th century to the early 17th century, which Europeans explored the world by sailing and mapped the earth. They had gained direct contact with Africa, America, Asia and Oceania. Furthermore, they established a trade route to India.

⁶⁴ Lin Chengjie, *History of India*, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2006, p. 263.

⁶⁵ The British Raj, also known as the British Indian Empire, was from 1858 to 1947. It indicated that India became British colony completely. After the last Mughal emperor was exiled by the British, on 2 August 1858 the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act, transferring all the authority of the East India Company to the British Crown. In India supreme authority was vested in the Viceroy, the title assumed by Governor-General Canning when Queen Victoria proclaimed these changes to the “Princes, Chiefs, and People of India” in November 1858. It cited from Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 103-104.

until its independence.

From the middle of the 18th and 19th century, the first Industrial Revolution occurred in the western Europe, especially in the British Empire, while during the reign of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) at the same time, China was still an autocratic monarchic agriculture country and had fallen behind in both technology and production. In the meantime, western countries set their sights on the huge market, rich natural resources and great labour force of China and decided to make China a place from which to export commodities through a military approach. With the failure of a series of wars with western countries from 1840, China had been gradually transitioning from a sovereign state to a semi-colony of western countries.⁶⁶

With the spread of the western influence in China in the 19th century, the United Kingdom began to regard Tibet as a crucial area to its security from the north menace of the Imperial Russia. Therefore, the British established influence in Tibet through military and diplomatic approaches in the late 19th century. Such as, *Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet* in 1890 and *Convention between Great Britain and Tibet* in 1904 which assured the British Government to establish its sphere of influence in Tibet. The origin of Sino-Indian border disputes was aroused almost along the Indian-Tibetan boundary. Hence, Tibet is a crucial factor in the Sino-Indian frontier issues. Some origins of border issues were produced in some treaties and agreement regarding the boundary between Indian and Tibet. Therefore, it is important to study whether Tibet had validity of diplomacy to conclude any treaties with other nations in some time. The first section of this chapter describes and analyses the relationship between inland China and Tibet until

⁶⁶ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 2.

19th century. The second section is relating to the relationship between the United Kingdom and Tibet from 19th century. The third section is the discussion of origin of the Sino-Indian border disputes.

The relationship between inland China and Tibet in history until the late Qing Dynasty

Tibet has been located in the central area between inland China and India throughout the ages, and most of the Sino-Indian boundaries are between India and Tibet. Therefore, the evidence to prove that Tibet belongs to China in the 19th century is significant for the legalization of the term “the Sino-Indian border issue” rather than “the Tibetan-Indian border issue”. In order to discuss the relationship between inland China and Tibet, it is necessary to describe the relations between inland China and Tibet throughout the ages historically.

People who were living in Inland China and the Tibetan region had established a few contacts and communications since before of the age of Christ. To the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the relationship between inland China and the Tibetan region had been enhanced greatly in fields of politics, economy and culture.⁶⁷ The most famous instances were intermarriages between the Tang royalty and the Tubo (the name for Tibet given by inland Chinese from the Tang Dynasty) royalty.

In the Chinese lunar calendar of October 640, Songtsän Gampo, the Tubo’s king, sent an envoy with 500 kilograms of gold and other implements to propose marriage to a member of the Tang royalty. Afterwards, in the Chinese lunar calendar of January 641,

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 1.

Tubo sent the premier minister, Lon Tongtsento greet the princess in Chang'an (the capital city in the Tang Dynasty). Furthermore, Wang Daozong, the Minister of the Ministry of Rites, took a decree from Emperor Taizong of the Tang to send Princess Wencheng to get married to Songtsän Gampo in Tubo.⁶⁸

In the Chinese lunar calendar of November 709, Tubo's Btsan-po⁶⁹ sent a minister, ShangTsento, to greet the princess in Chang'an.⁷⁰ In the January of next year, Emperor Zhongzong of the Tang sent Yang Ju, who was the Zuoxiaowei general and Heyuan Junshi,⁷¹ to escort Princess Jincheng to get married to Tubo's king, Mes-ag-tshoms, in Tubo.⁷²

In the Chinese lunar calendar of October 730, Bstan-po Mes-ag-tshoms sent his important minister with Huangfu Weiming to pay a call to Emperor Xuanzong of the Tang in Chang'an, and submitted a statement, "nephew is kin of pre-Emperor, and was granted to marry with Princess Jincheng. Therefore, we are one family between the Tang Dynasty and Tubo with all the people in the peace and happiness."⁷³

After several alliances between the Tang Dynasty and Tubo in the 8th century,⁷⁴ the

⁶⁸ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1963, p. 4.

⁶⁹ Btsan-po means the king in the unified Tubo from 7th- 9th century.

⁷⁰ Liu Xun (Eds.), *Jiu Tangshu* (Book of Tang) (Collection of Various Editions), Vol. 7: "Zhongzong Benji (Biography of Zhongzong)", Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1936, p. 8 (of Vol. 7).

⁷¹ Zuoxiaowei general was a title of generals in the Tang Dynasty. Heyuan Junshi was a military officer in Heyuan.

⁷² Liu Xun (Eds.), *Jiu Tangshu* (Book of Tang) (Collection of Various Editions), Vol. 7: "Zhongzong Benji (Biography of Zhongzong)", p. 9 (of Vol. 7).

⁷³ Ibid, Vol. 196 (I): "Tubo Liezhuan Shang (Biographies of Tubo I)", p. 8 [of Vol. 196(I)].

⁷⁴ *Cefu Yuangui* (Tortoise of the Record Bureau) records that the Tang Dynasty and Tubo signed covenants 5 times respectively in the Chinese lunar calendar of November 718, the Chinese lunar calendar of October 730, the Chinese lunar calendar of March 765, the Chinese lunar calendar of April 767, the Chinese lunar calendar of January 783. It Cited from Wang Qinruo (Eds.), *Cefu Yuangui* (Tortoise of the Record Bureau), Vol. 981: "Waichenbu Mengshi (Oaths of Alliance of the Ministry of Foreign Ministers), Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju (Zhonghua Book Company)", p. 7, 9, 11 and pp. 12-13 (of Vol. 981). Retrieved from

relationship between them was at its closest in the 9th century. On the Chinese lunar calendar of 10 October 821, an alliance was again signed in Wanghui Temple, west of Chang'an.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Tang-Tubo Allied Monument was established in Jokhang Temple, Lhasa on the Chinese lunar calendar of 14 February 823.⁷⁶ To this day, the monument is still standing erect in the square of Jokhang. It is not only historical proof of the close relationship between Han Chinese and Tibetan people, but also has witnessed their friendship them over millennia.

After the great unified Tang Dynasty, China divided and fell into chaos again. The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Periods replaced the Tang Dynasty in divided China since 907. At the same time, Tibet had been divided for approximately half a century since Langdarma, the last Bstan-po, died in 842.⁷⁷ Although both inland China and Tibet were in a divisive period of warfare, the two ethnic groups kept communications through traffics between inland dynasties and Tibetan tribes all the time.⁷⁸

While the establishment of the Song Dynasty marked the end of separatist regimes and forces in inland China in 960, contrastingly, Tibet was still a divided country. At that time, some Tibetan tribes enhanced their relationships with the Song Dynasty

[http://guji2.guoxuedashi.com/1404/\[国学大师 www.guoxuedashi.com\]15318 卷九百八十一~卷九百八十三.pdf](http://guji2.guoxuedashi.com/1404/[国学大师 www.guoxuedashi.com]15318 卷九百八十一~卷九百八十三.pdf)

⁷⁵ Ibid.; and, Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 16 and p. 18.

⁷⁶ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 18. Also see Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 1.

⁷⁷ *Zizhi Tongjian* (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government) records, “In the 4th day of December (of 842)... Chang'an heard Btsan-po Langdarma's death...” See Sima Guang (Eds.), *Zizhi Tongjian* (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government), Vol. 246: “Tang Ji 62 (Biography of Tang 62)”, Beijing: Beijing United Publishing Co., Ltd., 2016, p. 2948; and Liu Xun (Eds.), *Jiu Tangshu* (Book of Tang), Vol. 196 (II): “Tubo Liezhuan Xia (Biographies of Tubo II)”, p. 16 [of Vol. 196 (II)]

⁷⁸ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 22.

actively and accepted official positions given by the Song Dynasty. Moreover, some of them even paid allegiance to the dynasty with their people and lands.⁷⁹

Around the Qinfeng province (which is approximately where the southern Gansu province is located at present), the Tibetan leader in Qinzhou, Shang Bo Gan, paid his allegiance to the Song Dynasty with people and lands in the autumn of 961 as did Ma clan in Qinzhou, 990.⁸⁰ In Xiliang Fu (located approximately in parts of Gansu and Ningxia provinces presently), Tibetan tribes requested the Song Dynasty to send an official to govern their areas of residence in Liangzhou, 996. Afterwards, the Song Emperor instructed Ding Weiqing as the official in Qinzhou.⁸¹

Among numerous Tibetan tribes, the most powerful kingdom, Gyalse Kingdom, was established by Gyalse in Miaochuan (approximately where a part of the present Qinghai province is located).⁸² In the Chinese lunar calendar of August 1032, the Song Emperor conferred the titles of Ningyuan general and Aizhou Tuanlianshi upon Gyalse.⁸³ The Song Emperor instructed the son of Miaochuan leader Gyalse, Dong Zhan, as Huizhou Cishi.⁸⁴ At the time, Dong Zhan was only nine years old.⁸⁵ On the Chinese lunar calendar of 18 January 1041, the Song Emperor instructed his aides to confer the titles of Jianxiao Taibao and chongbaoshun Hexijun Jiedushi upon

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp.23-24.

⁸⁰ Toktoghan (Eds.), *Song Shi* (History of Song) (Collection of Various Editions), Vol. 492: “Tubo Zhuan (Biography of Tubo)”, Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1937, p. 2 (of Vol. 492).

⁸¹ Ibid, pp. 4-5 (of the Vol. 492).

⁸² Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 24.

⁸³ Toktoghan (Eds.), *Song Shi* (History of Song), Vol. 10: “Renzong Benji er (Biography of Emperor of Renzong II)”, p. 1 (of Vol. 10). Moreover, Ningyuan General was a title of general in the Song Dynasty and Tuanlianshi was a military officer from the Tang Dynasty to the Yuan Dynasty.

⁸⁴ Cishi was a title of official in ancient.

⁸⁵ Li Dao, *Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian* (Sequel of Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government Compilation), Vol. 127. Retrieved from <http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/57m/141637h.html>

Gyalse.⁸⁶

There were lots of tribes and kingdoms in divided Tibet during the Song Dynasty, but this proved not obstruction to the contacts and communications that existed between the Han Chinese and Tibetan people at that time. Furthermore, the relationship between them was still close and continued to evolve after the Tang Dynasty.

The Yuan Dynasty the successor to the Song Dynasty as the unified Chinese Dynasty in the 13th century. At the time, Tibet had reunified under the Yuan's help since the 9th century. Therefore, the relationship and connection between inland China and Tibet was enhanced substantially by the Yuan's succession. The specific detail embodied in this enhanced connection was that Tibet was now governed by the central government as an administrative region officially.

In the early 13th century, the Mongol ethnic group started rising in northern China. The Western Xia Dynasty was perished as a result of the attack of Mongolian troops in 1227, and this incident intensely influenced for administrative and religious leaders in Tibet.⁸⁷ Moreover, Tibet was still divided at that moment. In 1246, the Tibetan religious leader of the powerful Sakya,⁸⁸ Sakya Pandita, took his nephew, Chögyal Phagpa on invitation to Wuwei, Gansu. They met Khuden, the son of Emperor Taizong of Yuan, Ögedei Khan, and agreed on submitting to the Mongolian regime.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Xu Song, *Song Huiyao Jigao* (Song Dynasty Manuscript Compendium), "Fanyi No. 6 (Foreigners and barbarians VI)". Retrieved from <http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/6224d/86643c.html>

Moreover, Jianxiao means deputy; Taibaochongbaoshun was a official in the Song Dynasty; Jiedushi was a official in charge of military and administrative affairs in the province, but its duty was weakened substantially in the Song Dynasty.

⁸⁷ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 41.

⁸⁸ Sakya was the one of four mian schools of Tibetan Buddhism.

⁸⁹ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 1.

In 1271, the Mogolian regime named Yuan as the title of reigning dynasty in Dadu (also known as Khanbaliq, which is Beijing now). Moreover, the Yuan Dynasty unified the entirety of China in 1279, and Tibet became part of the governing system of Chinese central regime as one of administrative districts in the Yuan Dynasty.

The Central Government of the Yuan Dynasty set up Xuanzheng Yuan⁹⁰ to deal with military, administrative, and even religious affairs in Tibet.⁹¹ Moreover, Xuanzheng Yuan had a right to punish Tibetan officials directly who transgressed the regime and law.⁹² *Yuan shi*⁹³ records,

“Xuanzheng Yuan, ranks deputy First Pin,⁹⁴ and it is a ministry to govern Buddhist affairs and monks as well as administrative affairs in the area of Tubo. When Tubo meets incident, the branch ministries will be working with official seals. If there is a great warfare in Tubo, officials will discuss and determine together in Xuanzheng Yuan. Furthermore, Xuanzheng Yuan has authority to select its officials from whoever soldiers, civilians or monks are.”⁹⁵

Tibet was reunified under uniform Government of the Yuan Dynasty, which ended its division for 400 years. Furthermore, a theocratic regime was established in Tibet for the first time. In the Chinese lunar calendar of December 1260, Emperor Shizu of Yuan conferred the title of Imperial Preceptor upon Chögyal Phagpa with the jade official seal and gave him governance over the Tibetan Buddhism.⁹⁶ Afterwards,

⁹⁰ Xuanzheng Yuan was a important ministry of Tibetan governance in the Yuan Dynasty.

⁹¹ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 46.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ *Yuan Shi* is History of Yuan authored by Song Lian (Eds.).

⁹⁴ First Pin was the first grade of nine-rank system, which it was a civil service nomination system in the feudalist Chinese officialdom including nine grades divided into the regular (Zheng) and deputy (Cong) grade.

⁹⁵ Song Lian (Eds.), *Yuan Shi* (History of Yuan) (Collection of Various Editions), Vol. 87: “Baiguan Zhi San (Biographies of officials III)” Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1935, pp. 8-9 (of Vol. 87).

⁹⁶ Ibid, Vol. 4: “Shizu Benji yi (Biography of Emperor Shizu I)”, p. 12 (of Vol. 4).

every teacher of the emperor was appointed by the Yuan emperor and he implemented orders from the central government and governed administrative affairs in Tibet as an official in the central government.⁹⁷

The Yuan Central Government enhanced substantially the connection between inland China and Tibet, and set up a powerful ministry to govern administrative and religious affairs directly in Tibet. What critical factors led to the process of changes to Tibetan status? The answer is that cultural communication and national amalgamation between inland China and Tibet resulted in those changes gradually.

With the end of Yuan Dynasty, the Tibetan region, as an administrative region of China, was governed by the Central Government of Ming Dynasty instead of the Yuan Dynasty. The Central Government of the Ming Dynasty established military administrative institutions in some minority regions, such as Yunnan, Sichuan, Huguang, Guangxi, etc. as well as Tibet. It set up Xingduzhihui Shisi (Itinerant High Commandery) in Mdo-khams and Dbus-Gtsang, and they were governed by the Xian Xingduzhihui Shisi. Moreover, entire Tibetan officials were appointed, removed, promoted, and replaced by the Central Government of Ming Dynasty.⁹⁸

In the Chinese lunar calendar of February 1373, the Emperor Taizu of Ming set up the Dbus-Gtsang and Mdo-khams Weizhizhi Shisi (former Itinerant High Commandery), two Xuanwei Si (Pacification Commissioner's Office), one Yuanshuai Fu (Marshal Office), four Zhaotao Si (Expedition Commissioner's Office), thirteen Wanhu Fu (Wanhu Office) and four Qianhu Fu (Qianhu Office), and appoint the former Duke

⁹⁷ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), pp. 46-47.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

Nange Sidanba Yijianzang and others, totalling sixty Tibetan people, in all the stations of officials above.⁹⁹

In the same year, an official named Xu Yunde, was sent by the Central Government of Ming Dynasty to Tubo as the envoy that instructed chiefs of tribes in Tibet on behalf of the Ming emperor to select former Yuan officials and let them go to the Ming capital for new pending appointments. Afterwards, the former Yuan Imperial Preceptor, Namkha Palzangpo led Nange Sidanba Yijianzang and others to go to Nanjing, the Ming capital city at the time, in order to take the new appointments. Then, the Emperor Taizu of Ming appointed Namkha Palzangpo as the Zhisheng Fobao Guoshi (Great Buddha State Tutor) with the jade official seal, and nominated Nange Sidanba Yijianzang and others as military and administrative officials in Mdo-khams and Dbus-Gtsang with official seals.¹⁰⁰

In the Chinese lunar calendar of July 1374, Emperor Taizu of Ming established the Xian Xingduzhuihui Shisi in Hezhou, and promoted Wei Zheng, the Hezhou Weizhihui Shi to Duzhihui Shi governing Hezhou, Mdo-khams and Dbus-Gtsang, as well as Mdo-khams and Dbus-Gtsang Weizhihui Shisi to Duzhihui Shisi.¹⁰¹

Following the establishment of Tibetan caesaropapism in the Yuan Dynasty, it was inherited by the Ming Dynasty, and moreover, Emperor Chengzu of Ming formulated the priestly official system further. Priestly officials were divided by grades –Fa Wang (Princes of Dharma), Wang (Princes), Xitianfo Zi (Sons of West Buddha), Da

⁹⁹ *Ming Shilu* (Emperor of the Ming Dynasty Record), “Mingtaizu Shilu (Emperor Taizu of the Ming Dynasty Record)”, Vol.79. Retrieved from

<http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/5675n/66982b.html>

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., Vol.85. Retrieved from

<http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/5675n/66983f.html>

Guoshi (Grand State Tutors), Guoshi (State Tutors), Chanshi (Zen Masters), Dugang, and Lama. Fa Wang and Wang were supreme officials in Tibet and appointed by the Central Government of Ming Dynasty. Furthermore, Fa Wang had no right to appoint or promote inferior priestly officials in Tibet, and only had authority to govern local administrative affairs after they accepted commands from the Central Government of Ming Dynasty.¹⁰²

In the Chinese lunar calendar of March 1406, Emperor Taizong of Ming sent envoy to appoint Zhusibar Gyaincainin Lingzang as the Lingzang Guanding Guoshi (Lingzang Clairvoyance State Tutor).¹⁰³ In the Chinese lunar calendar of March 1407, (Emperor Taizong of Ming) conferred the title of Zanshan Prince (Promotion Prince of Virtue) upon the Lingzang Guanding Guoshi, Zhusibar Gyaincain, with the golden official seal and imperial mandate.¹⁰⁴ In 1425, (Zanshan) Prince (Zhusibar Gyaincain) died, and his son, Namge Gyaincain inherited the title of nobility.¹⁰⁵

Following the Yuan's rule in Tibet, the Ming's Central Government inherited the previous dynasty to govern the political and religious affairs in Tibet. When the Qing Dynasty became the governing dynasty in China instead of the Ming Dynasty, the administration of the Chinese Central Government to Tibet was enhanced, and the Tibetan political and religious institutions governed under the Qing Central Government were established gradually.

Since the end of Ming Dynasty, the force of Mongolian Güshi Khan entered Tibet,

¹⁰² Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 53.

¹⁰³ Zhang Tingyu, (Eds.), *Ming Shi* (History of Ming), Vol. 331: "Xiyu Liezhuan San (Biographies of Western Regions III)", Changsha: Yuelu Shushe (Yuelu Press), 1996, p. 4926.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

and moreover, Tibet contacted the Qing Dynasty through Mongolia. In 1639, the Emperor Taizong of Qing epistolized to Dalai (Lama) that it claimed the Qing Dynasty had a policy to respect Buddhism.¹⁰⁶ Since then, The Qing Dynasty began to establish an official relationship with Tibet.

In the Chinese lunar calendar of November 1652, the Fifth Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso arrived in the Qing's capital, and his audience with the Shunzhi Emperor was in Nanyuan. The Shunzhi Emperor gave the seat and the feast to the Fifth Dalai Lama, and the Fifth Dalai Lama paid tribute to the Shunzhi Emperor.¹⁰⁷

In the Chinese lunar calendar of February 1653, the Shunzhi Emperor commanded Heshuo prince Chengze Shuosai, Gushan Beizi Guermahong and Wu Dahai to escort the Fifth Dalai Lama to Daiga region on his return journey.¹⁰⁸ In the Chinese lunar calendar of April, the Shunzhi Emperor sent envoys with the Golden tome and seal to confer the title of “Dalai Lama, Overseer of the Buddhist Faith on Earth under the Great Benevolent Self-subsisting Buddha of the Western Paradise” on the Fifth Dalai Lama in Daiga Region.¹⁰⁹ In the Chinese lunar calendar of January 1713, the Kangxi Emperor instructed Lifan Yuan¹¹⁰ on the following, “...Taking for example of conferring the title upon Dalai Lama, give seal and tome and confer a title of Panchen Erdeni (or Panchen Lama).”¹¹¹ Since the titles of Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni

¹⁰⁶ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 87.

¹⁰⁷ *Qing Shilu* (Emperor of the Qing Dynasty Record), “Qingshizu Shilu (Emperor Shizu of Qing Record)”, Vol.70. Retrieved from <http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/5710a/77989y.html>

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Vol.72. Retrieved from <http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/5710a/77989y.html>

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., Vol.74. Retrieved from <http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/5710a/77989y.html>

¹¹⁰ Lifan Yuan was a department in the Qing Dynasty to govern Mongolian and Tibet affairs, and it had the authority to appoint Ambans (the senior official of the Central Government of Qing in Lhasa) in Tibet.

¹¹¹ *Qing Shilu* (Emperor of the Qing Dynasty Record), “Qingshengzu Shilu (Emperor Shengzu of Qing

were conferred, they have been confirmed by generations.

In 1709, the Qing Central Government sent a vice minister Heshou to govern Tibetan affairs in Tibet.¹¹² In 1727, the Yongzheng Emperor sent a Neige Xueshi (cabinet scholar) Sengge and Fu Dutong (Deputy Lieutenant-General) Mala to garrisoned as Ambans in Tibet.¹¹³ Since then, the regulation that two Ambans should deal with Tibetan affairs was confirmed.¹¹⁴

From 1788 to 1972, Gurkhas launched two invasion of Tibet when the British influence had not entered in Nepal. When the Tibetan local authority requested the Qing Central Government to sent troops to help local Tibetan for resisting Gurkhas' aggression, the Qing troops began to engaged in the battle against Gurkhas and finally gained the military victory to Gurkhas twice. Afterwards, the Qing Central Government believed that it was necessary to establish an effective system to reinforce the administration of the Central Government in the Tibetan region. Therefore, in 1973, the Qing Central Government introduced *Twenty-Nine Regulations for Better Government in Tibet* to strengthen its administration. The new regulations related to the various aspects that included the new politics and revenue system, Tibetan soldier institution and religious regulation. The most important regulation was that the reincarnation of Dalai Lama must be supervised by Ambans and used a gold bottle, which was awarded by the Qing Central Government, to draw lots to determine the candidate of next Dalai Lama. Furthermore, Ambans had an

Record)", Vol.253. Retrieved from
<http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/5707h/77821g.html>

¹¹² Ibid, Vol.236. Retrieved from
<http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/5707h/77820r.html>

¹¹³ *Qing Shilu* (Emperor of the Qing Dynasty Record), "Qingshizong Shilu (Emperor Shizong of Qing Record)", Vol.52. Retrieved from
<http://www.guoxuedashi.com/a/5709y/77877x.html>

¹¹⁴ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 88.

authority to take charge of the enthronement ceremonies of Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni.¹¹⁵ The issue of *Twenty-Nine Regulations for Better Government in Tibet* indicated that it had the peak authority for the Chinese Central Government to administrate the Tibetan region. Since then, the Chinese Central Government had the official administration in Tibet legitimately.

The administration and involvement of the Chinese Central Government on political and religious affairs in Tibet has gradually formed an official institution in history. Until the period of Qing Yongzheng Emperor, Tibet had been a part of Chinese territories after titles of Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni and the institution of Ambans were confirmed. The Qing Central Government became involved in more and more political and religious affairs of Tibet, and regarded Tibet as a part of territories of its empire.

The British invasion of Tibet

With the outbreak of the First Opium War in 1840, the Qing Empire entered its later stages, when the Qing Central Government was losing control gradually in aspects of economy, politics and military as a result of intrusions from western influence. Furthermore, following the failure of more and more wars against western countries which resulted in the cession of territories and the payment of indemnities after the First Opium War, the Qing Central Government began to weaken. The British invasion of Tibet was concluded in the context of the situation in China.

With regard to the reason being the British invasion of Tibet, the British intended to

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 118.

consolidate their Indian colony and sphere of influence, and maintain distance from Imperial Russian influence in South and Central Asia. Furthermore, the British frontier reached the connected place of the Hindu Kush and the Karakoram mountains in the northwest Sino-British Indian border; in the meantime, Imperial Russia also almost arrived in the line from the north.¹¹⁶ Moreover, there were relative small and independent regimes as buffers existed in the northwest and the northeast Sino-British Indian border.¹¹⁷ Lord Curzon, the viceroy of India from 6th January 1899 to 18th November 1905, expressed this kind of British strategic action,

“...We do not want to occupy it, but we also cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes. We are quite content to let it remain in the hands of our allies and friends, but if rivals creep up to it and lodge themselves right under our walls, we are compelled to intervene because a danger would thereby grow up which might one day menace our security...”¹¹⁸

Therefore, a buffer between the United Kingdom and Russia had to be founded for the British to contain the advancing Russian influence. Furthermore, Tibet, which adjoins both central Asia and south Asia, was undoubtedly a more suitable region to become a buffer for the British defence of the region.

In order to ensure this achievement, the British needed to increase British influence and decrease Chinese influence on Tibet, while the Qing Government continued to administrate and control politics in the region. Since the Sino-Nepalese War,¹¹⁹ the

¹¹⁶ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 19.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 21

¹¹⁹ The Sino-Nepalese War was a war which the Nepalese Gurkha dynasty invade Tibet from 1788 to 1792, and the Qianlong Emperor sent Fukang'an with Qing Army to beat the Gurkha troops and expelled them from Tibet in 1792.

Qianlong Emperor adopted a series of measures to consolidate the frontier defence in Tibet, and the road from India to Tibet was blockaded against the British.¹²⁰ Therefore, the British adapted their tactics to control the Himalayas between the Indian plain and the Tibetan plateau in preparation for the encroachment of British influence into Tibet. Therefore, they aimed to invade three countries in the Himalayas – Nepal, Dremojong (Sikkim), and Bhutan.

The British had started to invade Himalayas' countries one after the other in the first half of 19th century, and they controlled the region basically in the 1860s. After that, they cleared the barriers for advancing upon Tibet. In the beginning of trials, the British intend to access to Tibet through an economic approach. In the meantime, Darjeeling, which belonged to Dremojong, had been leased to the British since 1835,¹²¹ and it had formed a trading place from management for years, so they tried to establish an official trade relationship with Tibet. Consequently, The Qing Government expressed its attitude that it could discuss the trading problem with the British on the premise that they could not harm Chinese national interests. Moreover, some government officials had other considerations. Wenshi, who was the amban of Tibet from 1885 to 1888, presented his own opinion, which was that the Qing Government could establish a trading relationship with the British in Darjeeling, depending on the circumstance, "there are a number of foreigners, Tibetans as well as Han people around Darjeeling recently. Foreigners, with some maneuvers, treat Tibet enthusiastically and Han people take second place. Moreover, some foreigners lend money to Tibet, and others lend commodity to Tibet, so Tibetan people are all going

¹²⁰ Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi* (Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe (China Tibetology Publishing House), 2001, p. 37.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

to there...”¹²² Furthermore, he also observed, “There is indeed evidence that some private trades exist around Indian-Tibetan boundaries. However, people who advocated these trades were Han rather than Tibetan. Some inland corrupted officials dealt with inland merchants (in Indian-Tibetan boundaries) to gain profits and some Tibetan profiteers who also imitating Han people trade there later...”¹²³ Thus, Darjeeling had become a trading center between India and Tibet. Besides, Wenshi also had another consideration for promoting the establishment of a trading relationship with India in Darjeeling:

“The British occupied India as their colony, and managed profits of tea and mulberries. In addition, they founded railway and made trains reach to Darjeeling, thus their purpose, which was an intent to trade with Tibet, was premeditated, and we can hardly keep them from reaching their aim...because the British are engaged in an expansion of their commerce, and have no other intentions at present...right now, as a result of the defence in the interior region, we object to the British encroachment into Tibet in order to not scare the Tibetan people; as a result of the restriction for the British, we allow them to trade with Tibetan people out of boundary so that foreign affairs may improve...furthermore, the mutual trade is power tactics of the stability in the boundary as well...if we let profiteers trade privately, it would be easy to cause disputes and conflicts; if we establish mutual trades in somewhere, Tibet and India would gain profits and would the guarantee the safety of the inland region. Furthermore, the British would pay attention to gain benefits and expand trading

¹²² Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Ding Baozhen Zoudu* (Ding Baozhen's Memorials to the Throne), vol.1, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing's Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, Guoli Beiping Yanjingyuan Shixue yanjiuhui, (National Institute of Beiping History Study Society) and the Commercial Press, 1938, p. 45. Quoted in Ibid, p. 67.

¹²³ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi's Memorials to the Throne), vol.1, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing's Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, pp. 5-6. Quoted in Ibid, p. 68.

markets and cities, so they will not aggress Tibet...”¹²⁴

However, Tibetan people did not come to the same consideration as the Qing court when they witnessed what the British had colonized India and invaded several Himalayas’ countries. Consequently, both the Kashag¹²⁵ and the three great monasteries¹²⁶ stoutly objected to the establishment of a trading relationship with the British. We can find out their attitudes from Wenshi’s memorial to the throne below:

“...Nowadays, according to Tibetan people’s words that there has been trading between Tibetan people and the British in Darjeeling the around Indian-Tibetan boundary, if (we) allow the British to establish the trading relationship (with us), the British would never enter into Tibet. Darjeeling, which was the land administrated by Dremojong in the past, was recently leased by the British. Though Dremojong’s People gained land rents, this place seemed to be trespassed. The British built new markets unscrupulously such that Tibetan people who lived around the Indian-Tibetan boundaries, Indian people, Khams Pa¹²⁷, monks and lay people began to sneak out there audaciously to conduct unauthorized trade... at the moment, the foreigners are insatiable in that they not only built new roads and bridges repeatedly with an intention of carrying out occupation of the lands, but also sent Indians to trade with Kham Pa peddlers around Darjeeling, so we had to forbid them to go across the boundary...from then on, Tibetan people did not wish to establish a trading

¹²⁴ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi’s Memorials to the Throne), vol.1, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing’s Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, pp. 31-33. Quoted in Ibid.

¹²⁵ The Kashag was a government council in Tibet during the Qing Dynasty and Republic of China. In 1751, the Qing Government established Kashag to issue orders in this office. There were four supreme officials called as Kalon in the Kashag. It cited from Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p.2; see also Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 97

¹²⁶ The three great monasteries are three Gelukpa monasteries with huge influences in Tibet that they are Ganden, Drepung and Sera Monastery.

¹²⁷ Khams Pa was people lived in Xikang (Kham).

relationship with people who have an absolutely different temperament, and that is a fact. Furthermore, they made a serious determination. They built barriers and stationed troops in every strategical and dangerous terrain...anyway the event, in which Tibetan people mutually traded with foreigners in Darjeeling, is not relieved...entire Tibetan merchants, who went across the boundary to Darjeeling, should ever be forbidden to do this.”¹²⁸

Therefore, there was a difference of opinion between the Qing Government and the Kashag about the trading issue. The Qing court considered that Tibet should build a trading relationship with the British in Darjeeling, however, the Kashag not only forbade common people to trade there, but also built fortifications and stationed troops in strategical and dangerous terrains to cut down the relationship with the British. The basic cause of this difference was the cognition for the British invasion. On one hand, the Qing Government believed that the trade between Tibet and the United Kingdom was British's sole intention and as soon as this trade was established somewhere outside Tibet, such as Darjeeling, the British influence would not advance into Tibet. On the other hand, Tibetan people had recognized the United Kingdom's true intent of plunder and invasion, when they witnessed the British colonizing India and their invasion of several Himalayan countries, especially in Dremojong and Bhutan.¹²⁹ Besides, the Tibetan local authority stoutly objected to trade with the British in order to protect their religion.

When the Qing Government and the Kashag came into dispute over about the trading

¹²⁸ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi's Memorials to the Throne), vol.2, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing's Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, pp. 15-17. Quoted in Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) p. 69.

¹²⁹ Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) p. 69.

issue, the British took Dremojong as a base of preparation for their military advance into Tibet. The British dispatched foreign officials and sent troops to some new military bases in Darjeeling.¹³⁰ Moreover, in order to open up the way to Tibet, they built roads, bridges and post houses.

In 1885, the British Raj sent a delegation led by Colman Macaulay, who was the finance minister of Bengal, to negotiate with the Qing Government in Beijing. They demanded that the Qing Government agree to allow the British exploration in Tibet. Because Zongli Yameng¹³¹ had recognized the anti-British attitude from Tibetan authority and Tibetan people, it was unwilling to comply. However, according to another special negotiated article of the Chefoo Convention (also known as the Treaty of Yantai)¹³², it had issued passports to the British and give them permission to organize a trade delegation to access Tibet through the Tibetan-Indian border, though Tibetan people objected to that.¹³³ In 1886, Macaulay's delegation came to Gampa Dzong, but the dzongpon¹³⁴ refused to let them advance and move into Tibet.¹³⁵ The Kashag and the great monasteries expressed their anti-British attitude in their memorials to the throne, "If foreigners move into Tibet, whichever directions they come from, (we should) persuade them to leave here by kind words. If they cannot obey us to leave, although our Tibetan monks and lay people all die, we would defend

¹³⁰ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi's Memorials to the Throne), vol.3, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing's Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, p. 23. Quoted in Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) p. 72.

¹³¹ It was the department of foreign affair in late Qing Dynasty.

¹³² The Chefoo Convention was an unequal treaty between the Qing Empire and the British Empire in 1876. Moreover, other special negotiated article regulates that allow the British to enter into Tibet from inland China or India through the Indian-Tibetan border. It cites from Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 151 .

¹³³ Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) p. 65.

¹³⁴ Dzongpon was the governor in the Dzong, which the district of grass roots in Tibet in Qing Dynasty.

¹³⁵ Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) pp. 65-66.

and prevent them from moving into (our territory), with no other ideas.”¹³⁶ In the meantime, the British Empire was engaging in its annexation of Burma, while the Tibetan people were standing out against the British move into Tibet. Therefore, in order to the safety the Qing Government demands, being that “China allows the United Kingdom to control the regime in Burma at present”,¹³⁷ the British agreed with the Qing Government on not sending personnel to move into Tibet. Regarding the affair of “sending personnel to move into Tibet” in the other special negotiated article of the Chefoo Convention, “the British Empire allowed (the Qing Government) to stop it immediately. With regard to the affair that the United Kingdom would like to trade in Indian-Tibetan borders, it should be depending on China. If it is workable, (we) would negotiate specific articles; if it is unworkable, the United Kingdom would not urge to ask.”¹³⁸

Afterwards, the British went across the Mountain Lingtu without permission after they employed local vagrants as the guide, and then, they built the road beyond the other side of Lingtu. Consequently, in order to defence themselves, the Tibetan Kashag built barriers and sent troops in defence of the Lingtu in 1886.¹³⁹

In this circumstance, Sir John Walsham, who was the envoy extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary from the United Kingdom to Imperial China, presented comments and demands on this affair in the Chinese lunar calendar of 29 November 1886:

¹³⁶ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi's Memorials to the Throne), vol.2, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing's Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, p. 7. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 66.

¹³⁷ *The Burma Convention, Waijiao Cankao Ziliao* (Diplomatic Reference Materials), Vol.2, Department of Foreign Affairs of Central People Government Publish, 1950. Quoted in Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) p. 66.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*.

¹³⁹ Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) p. 72

“Because (the Tibetan people) heard of that the British had stopped their advance into Tibet, they built barbettes which were 50 kilometres far away from Darjeeling, outside of the boundary, to stop (British) trade. It is not so difficult for the United Kingdom to destroy them, but my own country would not like to meddle in that. Furthermore, please inform Ambans to tell Tibetan (Kashag) that they must not let anything like this happen anymore.”¹⁴⁰

However, the Tibetan people believed that their behaviours which built barriers in Lingtu were reasonable. The Tibetan authority stated their consideration in the memorial to throne:

“Darjeeling is a place in the territory of Dremojong actually, but the British not only occupied the place, but also found markets and built new houses, roads and bridges, crossed the boundary time and time again, and their behaviours were rough and extremely unbridled. Furthermore, in last year, (they) continued provocation such that the Tibetan people were united to discuss and determined to prevent the British from crossing the boundary forever. Therefore, they deployed troops in some houses and forts that were built in some strategical and dangerous terrains, and ordered entire dzongpons to administrate this with local common people...due to the last year’s report from two Pagri’s dzongpons who gained the information from the Dremojong minister and the chieftain, that the British proposed to worship Buddhas in Tibet with a definite time, and informed us that we could not prevent them from this journey. If we could do it, there would be not any dispute; otherwise, they would move into Tibet

¹⁴⁰ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi’s Memorials to the Throne), vol.2, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing’s Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, p. 3. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 73.

with troops immediately. Therefore, (we) report this emergency.”¹⁴¹

As a result, with the increase of antipathy and alertness towards the British from the Tibetan people, the Tibetan authorities considered that they had no responsibility to what the British had censured:

“Nowadays, we build house and walls for people, who were in charge of preventing the British, in the Mountain Lingtu inside the Tibetan Rena prefecture. Moreover, we would deploy troops and defense to guard our territory. Lingtu is not only non-belonging to the Indian territory, but also far away from Darjeeling. We did not build any house and walls inside 50 kilometres around Darjeeling, and did not cross the boundary to stir up troubles further. Therefore, the incident, in which we built new barbettes away from 50 kilometres around Darjeeling, and which the British had reported, inculpated our Tibetan people apparently.”¹⁴²

As a result, in order to prevent the British from provoking and moving into Tibet with troops, the Tibetan people believed their building of barriers in Lingtu was legitimate. However, when the United Kingdom’s criticisms of Tibet’s attempts to prevent them from trading were not solved, the situation began to get worse over the course of the next year. In the Chinese lunar calendar of 10 May 1987, when Sir John Walsham presented a note once again, he indicated, “with regard to the incident in which Tibetan soldiers were stationed and guarding in the Sikkimese locality, the Chinese court seems to be indifferent, so we were going to only send troops to expel them

¹⁴¹ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi’s Memorials to the Throne), vol.2, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing’s Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, pp. 7-8. Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁴² Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi’s Memorials to the Throne), vol.2, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing’s Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, p. 8. Quoted in Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), pp. 162-163.

from Sikkim.”¹⁴³ Furthermore, he expressed the British requirement in the note, “...if the (Qing) honorable minister of the prince has not given us a guarantee that Tibetan soldiers would not be stationed in any places outside the boundary definitely, the minister myself would not ask for British troops to suspend (a move into Tibet) without the authoritative permission.”¹⁴⁴ The British indicated definitely that Tibetan soldiers were stationed in Sikkim, and required the Qing Government to enforce a prohibition on Tibetan soldiers stationed across the boundary. But, at the stage the Qing Government was still investigating the geopolitical location of Sikkim, having not even realised that it was a part of Dremojong, and thusly expressed its consideration to the United Kingdom, “with regard to whether Sikkim is Tibetan dependency or not, (we) must investigate it to uncover evidence to prove whether Tibet could station troops in there or not”.¹⁴⁵

With regards to the question of whether Dremojong was a Tibetan’s dependency or not, it was not only confirmed by the Tibetan Kashag, but also agreed by the later Amban Shengtai, “in fact, Dremojong and Bulukeba¹⁴⁶ are Tibetan dependencies. At the end of every year, two chiefs from there must report affairs with Tibetan Ambans and Ambans give rewards to them as the return. In Tibet, there would be rated presents from the Dalai Lama and his subordinates to them, and the Kashag rewards some satins, silvers and tea as well. Moreover, letters between Tibet and the two places are sent to let Ambans examine and approve before replies can be issued. If Dremojong and Bulukeba meet any arguments, officials from Tibet will deal with it

¹⁴³ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi’s Memorials to the Throne), vol.3, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing’s Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, p. 5. Quoted in Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) pp. 73-74.

¹⁴⁴ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Wenshuo Zoudu* (Wenshi’s Memorials to the Throne), vol.3, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing’s Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.1, p. 5. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 74.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁶ Bulukeba was the name of Kingdom of Bhutan that it was called by the Qing Government at the time.

as well. Thus, that is the situation that Dremojong and Bulukeba are Tibetan dependencies.”¹⁴⁷

Due to the pressure from the British, the Qing Government decided to order ambans to withdraw troops from the Mountain Lingtu, but this order was objected firmly by the Kashag and Tibetan officials.¹⁴⁸ Faced with situation that Tibetan troops did not withdraw from Lingtu, the British troops began to prepare to attack there. On the Chinese lunar calendar of 7 February 1888, British troops started to attack Lingtu, and then they occupied the Mountain Lingtu, Natang, and Mountain Zelila one after another.¹⁴⁹ However, The Qing Government dismissed Wenshi and appointed Shengtai as the new Amban to execute the order of retreating troops to avoid any conflict with the British.¹⁵⁰ After the British troops took the advantage on the battlefield, Shengtai intend to negotiate with the British firmly.

Thus, *Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet* was signed between China and the United Kingdom in 1890. Three articles from the fourth to sixth article relating to the trade, pasturage and the method in which to conduct official communications between British and Tibetan authorities would thereafter be discussed and arranged.¹⁵¹ Therefore, in order to solve subject articles, Regulations Regarding Trade, Communication and Pasturage was appended to the

¹⁴⁷ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Shengtai Zoudu* (Shengtai's Memorials to the Throne), vol.1, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing's Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.2, p. 5. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 75.

¹⁴⁸ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 8.

¹⁴⁹ Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlue Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi* (Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) pp. 80-81.

¹⁵⁰ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 8.

¹⁵¹ Sir Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W., 1910, pp. 439-440. Also see Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), pp. 173-174.

Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890.¹⁵²

Through both convention and regulations, the United Kingdom had reached two goals: on one hand, Dremojong became a British dependency, and on the other hand, the boundary between Dremojong and Tibet was delimited by British intention.

However, the British did not regard this as satisfactory since they had gained a commercial advantages from the 1890 agreement, thus they intended to seize more advantages of commerce. In the end of 1903, the British commenced another invasion of Tibet. In August 1904, British troops led by Colonel Francis Younghusband occupied Lhasa after a series of failures on the part of Tibetan military and the Chinese central court's negotiations.¹⁵³ Then, the British forced Tibet to sign the *Convention between Great Britain and Tibet* on 7 September 1904. Provisions of the convention include ten articles:

"I. The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article I. of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II. The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade-marts, to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade-mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese

¹⁵² Sir Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, pp. 440-441. Also see Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), pp. 178-180.

¹⁵³ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp.12-13.

Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade-marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade-marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III. The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV. The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V. The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyantse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade-marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent, who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. Tibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications, and for the transmission of replies.

VI. As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the

dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escorts. The Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of pounds five hundred thousand – equivalent to rupees seventy-five lakhs – to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual installments of rupees one lakh each on the 1 January in each year, beginning from the 1 January, 1906

VII. As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfillment of the provisions relative to trade-marts specified in Article II., III., IV., and V., the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade-marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII. The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa.

IX. The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government, —

- (a) No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation to any Foreign Power;
- (b) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs;
- (c) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet;

(d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(e) No Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power.

(X). In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.”¹⁵⁴

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa this 7th day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the 27th day of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

After the convention was signed by the Tibetan, the British still intended to let the Chinese Central Government recognize it.

However, in the terms of the ninth article, the United Kingdom would control to a large degree most of the political and economic privileges in Tibet, so the Chinese Central Government could not accept it because it believed that this article severely damaged its sovereignty in Tibet. On the Chinese lunar calendar of 21 August 1904, the Chinese department of foreign affairs telegraphed to Youtai, who was the Amban in Tibet, and ordered him to not sign this convention”

¹⁵⁴ Sir Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, pp. 441-443. Also see Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), pp. 229-232.

“...the convention of ten articles which the British proposed damaged (our) sovereignty...this affair should be contracted between the Tibetan in Chinese supervision and the British, rather than the Tibetan and the British directly. You are sure not to sign in the convention...”¹⁵⁵

We can see from the telegram to Youtai that not only did the Chinese Government consider the convention unacceptable because of their sovereignty of the region, but also believed that Tibet did not have the right to sign any convention with the United Kingdom independently.

Thus, the Chinese Central Government sent Tang Shaoyi, Zhang Yintan and Liang Shiy to negotiate this convention with the British Government in Calcutta, India, February 1905. The ninth article of convention was key point in the negotiation, so Tang Shaoyi laid down that it should be removed and its words appended to “the United Kingdom does not have any intention of invasion to Tibet”,¹⁵⁶ but the British refused that, and as a result Tang Shaoyi was determined to not sign the convention. Tang Shaoyi insist from his standpoint that China had the sovereignty of Tibet, but the British only recognized that China owned the suzerainty of Tibet. Therefore, this negotiation remained at an impasse when Tang Shaoyi returned to Beijing. In 1906, negotiation between both sides was carrying out in Beijing. After both sides made concessions to the opponent partly, the new *Convention between Great Britain and China* was signed by both sides on 27 April 1906.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ Wu Fengpei (Ed.), *Youtai Zoudu* (Youtai's Memorials to the Throne), vol.1, *Qingji Chouzang Zoudu* (Qing's Memorials to the Throne of Administrations in Tibet), vol.3, p. 26.

¹⁵⁶ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p.15.

¹⁵⁷ Sir Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, p. 443.

In this convention, first three articles are significant. The first article regulates:

“The Convention concluded on the 7 September 1904, by the United Kingdom and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to present Convention as an annex, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the Declaration appended thereto, and both of High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfillment of the terms specified therein.”¹⁵⁸

It means that the Chinese Government recognized officially the 1904 Convention between the United Kingdom and Tibet.

The second article regulates:

“The Government of the United Kingdom engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.”¹⁵⁹

And the third article regulates:

“The concession which are mentioned in Article IX. (d) of the Convention concluded on the 7 September, 1904, by the United Kingdom and Tibet are denied to any State or to the subject of any State other than China, but it has been arranged with China

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 444. Also see Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang Difang Lishi Ziliao Xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 229.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

that at the trade-marts specified in Article II. Of the aforesaid Convention the United Kingdom shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.”¹⁶⁰

As we can see, from the second to third article, China gained not only the British guarantee to not annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet, but also ensured China’s right in the Article IX. of the 1904 Convention between the United Kingdom and Tibet. Although this convention does not include that China own the sovereignty on Tibet, the British also did not use the words “suzerainty” of China on Tibet in the convention. Therefore, this convention was more advantageous to China in comparison with the 1904 convention.

Since the 1880s, eventually, the British had established their influence in Tibet completely in 1906. Before and after these years, some British adventurers entered into areas around the north of Indian and Tibetan border and that produced some frontier issues between China and India in the 20th century.

The Origins of the Sino-Indian Border Disputes

The Sino-Indian border issue mainly relates to two disputed territories—Aksai Chin in the western sector and South Tibet (the name of the territory to China, also called the Assam Himalayas by India) in the eastern sector.

Because of the oriental custom about the border, the divergence of opinion on the Sino-Indian boundary for the two countries originated in the fact that neither China nor India demarcated or delimited any exact boundaries until the 19th century.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

In the western sector, W. H. Johnson, who was an officer of the Survey of India, presented a boundary of the western sector between China and India in 1865.¹⁶¹ According to his proposed boundary, the entire Aksai Chin and a tract of territories to the north of the Karakorum were drawn into Kashmir (the British territory).¹⁶² Because “the Johnson Line” was too radical to let Chinese Government accept that, the British Government has never put forward “the Johnson Line” as the western boundary line to the Chinese Government officially.¹⁶³ Since the end of the 19th century, the Chinese Government had begun to realize the importance of western territory, so the Chinese set up a boundary stone at the Karakorum Pass in 1892;¹⁶⁴ moreover, the Chinese Government also proclaimed that Aksai Chin was a part of Chinese territories at that time.¹⁶⁵ In order to delimit a western boundary with China around the Karakorum and Aksai Chin, George Macartney improved “the Johnson Line” by conceding a part of Aksai Chin to China so that it was easy to let Chinese Government accept the new proposed boundary. Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister in Beijing at that moment, finally presented this proposed boundary, known as “the Macartney Line” to the Chinese Government officially on 14 March 1899. The significance of this proposal was that it was the only one boundary proposal presented by the British Government to the Government of China.¹⁶⁶ British scholar Alastair Lamb and American scholars, Margaret W Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenback clearly expressed their opinion in their books that most of Aksai Chin Region (including the Xinjiang-Tibet Road) would belong to China according to the 1899 British proposal.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶¹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp.26-27.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁶⁷ Alastair Lamb, *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*, Canberra: Australian National Press, 1973, p. 6; and Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian*

However, the Chinese Government never responded to this boundary proposal.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, with no response for the proposal of the delimitation of western boundary with the British Indian Government, the western sector of Sino-Indian boundary has been never delimited by both China and India. Yet, the republic of India has regarded Aksai Chin as part of their territories since 1954,¹⁶⁹ although India did not send any troops or administrative staff to guard, administrate or even patrol there. Therefore, the dispute of the western sector of the Sino-Indian border has occurred since then.

In the eastern sector of Sino-Indian border, the disputed territory is Assam Himalayas, which is a territory between Tibet and Assam State of India. Moreover, this dispute originated from secret notes exchanged between the United Kingdom and Tibet during the 1913-1914 Simla Conference. In 1911, the 1911 Chinese revolution overthrew the last imperial administration—Manchu's rule in China, and a new republic regime gained power—the Republic of China has been established since 1912. With the alteration of Central Government in Beijing, the power of control of Chinese central regime in Tibet began to weaken. The British Government caught this opportunity to present a memorandum to Beijing Government of China on 17 August 1912.¹⁷⁰ The main purpose of this memo was discussing the Chinese status in Tibet between the United Kingdom and China, so a tripartite conference participated in by the United Kingdom, China and Tibet was necessary. Finally, the conference was held in Simla, October 1913. At its commencement, the Tibetan representative put forward an independent purpose of Tibet to the conference, but the Chinese did not agree with that and presented their different proposal that emphasized Tibet was part of Chinese

Rivalry in Ladakh, p. 69; and Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, pp. 173-174.

¹⁶⁸ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 33-34.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁷⁰ Alastair Lamb, *The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations between India China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966, p. 434.

territory.¹⁷¹ Afterwards, Sir Henry McMahon, the British plenipotentiary and president of conference, in the name of mediator, stated in conference on 18 November, that the priority in the discussion should delimit the Sino-Tibetan boundary, and then, other problems would be addressed naturally.¹⁷² Thus, it took a lot of time to study how to limit the boundary for both China and Tibet during the conference. After both sides prepared their own statements of delimitation for almost three months, McMahon, on behalf of the British Government drew the Inner and Outer Sino-Tibetan border—divided Tibet into Inner and Outer zones—by Chinese and Tibetan evidence respectively and then provided a series of statements of agreement for both China and Tibet by 17 February 1914.¹⁷³ In this draft agreement, the two most important terms—“Tibet is a state under suzerainty, but not sovereignty of China” and the division of Tibet as Inner and Outer zones—were not accepted by the Chinese.¹⁷⁴ However, under the British pressure, Chen Yifan, the Chinese premier representative, initialed the draft agreement and the map (of division of Tibet) in his personal name on 27 April 1914.¹⁷⁵ In fact, before Chen put his “initial” on the draft, he stated that it was only “on the clear understanding that to initial and to sign them were two separate actions”, which was accepted by the British.¹⁷⁶ Afterwards, the Chinese Government refused Chen’s initial on the draft and the attached map on 29 April, and informed Sir John Jordan, the British Minister Plenipotentiary in Beijing that the Chinese Government did not accept Chen’s personal behaviour and was not prepared to sign the agreement and map officially.¹⁷⁷ Eventually, Chen on behalf of the Chinese Government did not sign the final treaty in the last tripartite

¹⁷¹ Ibid, pp. 478-480.

¹⁷² Ibid, p. 480.

¹⁷³ Ibid, p. 494.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 495 and 497.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 504-505.

¹⁷⁶ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 48.

¹⁷⁷ Alastair Lamb, *The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations between India China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914*, p. 505.

meeting on 3 July 1914.¹⁷⁸ Although there was any validity on the draft with Chen's initial, it has become invalid since the British amended the draft at the same day of 3 July.¹⁷⁹

In addition, discussing the Chinese position in Tibet and delimiting the Sino-Tibet boundary should have been the entire content in the Simla conference. A collection of all treaties of India was published in 1929, which described the Simla conference as follows:

“In 1913 a conference of Tibetan, Chinese and British Plenipotentiaries met in India to try and bring about a settlement with regard to matters on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier: and a Tripartite Convention was drawn up and initialled in 1914. The Chinese Government, however, refused to permit their Plenipotentiary to proceed to full signature.”¹⁸⁰

It was proven that the theme of Simla Conference was only discussing the Sino-Tibetan boundaries. It had no any results or treaties concluded by the tripartite parties prior to the end of the conference, because the Chinese Plenipotentiary did not proceed with his full signature on any accords or treaties within the period of the Simla Conference.

However, the United Kingdom and Tibet secretly exchanged notes of an agreement regarding the McMahon Line as the Tibet-Assam boundary (a part of Tibetan-Indian frontiers) without Chinese involvement on 24-25 March 1914 during the Simla

¹⁷⁸ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 32.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.; and Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 48.

¹⁸⁰ C. U. Archibson, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XIV, (The TREATIES, &c., RELATION TO Eastern Turkistan, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Siam. Revised and continued up to 1929 by the authority of the Foreign and Political Department), Calcutta: GOVERNMENT OF INDIA CENTRAL PUBLICATION BRANCH, 1929. It is archived by the India Office records and Private Papers, British Library, IOR/V/27/271/60: 1929-1938.

conference.¹⁸¹ In this agreement, both sides accepted the Tibetan-Assam boundary—the Tibetan-Indian boundary—laid out by the McMahon Line, despite McMahon drawing the line in a fashion that put Tawang, an important town administrated by Tibet on the Assam side.¹⁸² Furthermore, the British secretly put the McMahon Line on the map that Chen initialled on 27 April 1914. However, because of the inconclusive end of the Simla conference—with no final and official signature of the Chinese Government on the Simla Convention, the validity and legitimization of the Simla Convention as well as the secret Anglo-Tibetan notes (including the McMahon Line) would be suspected.

Although the British Government did not put the secret Anglo-Tibetan agreement and the McMahon Line into the official collection of India's treaties in 1920s, it changed its attitude in 1930s. In order to achieve the validity of McMahon Line in the Indian-Tibetan frontiers, the British Government revised and republished the 1929 Architson collection of treaties in 1938, and it also retrieved and destroyed the 1929 edition of copies and made the 1938 edition become the only official publication.¹⁸³ It was added some paragraphs of words in the 1938 edition to ensure the benefit of the McMahon Line for the British Government:

“In 1913 a conference of British, Chinese and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries was convened in Simla in an attempt to negotiate an agreement as to the international status of Tibet with particular regard to the relations of the three Governments and to the frontiers of Tibet both with China and India. After prolonged negotiations the conference under

¹⁸¹ Alastair Lamb, *The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations between India China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914*, p. 530.

¹⁸² Ibid, pp. 554-555.

¹⁸³ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 55; and Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 37.

the presidency of Sir Henry McMahon drew up a Tripartite Convention between the United Kingdom, China, and Tibet, which was initialled in Simla in 1914 by the representatives of the three parties. The Chinese Government, however, refused to ratify the agreement, by their refusal depriving themselves of the benefits which they were to obtain thereunder, among which were a definite recognition that Tibet was under Chinese suzerainty, and an agreement to permit a Chinese official with a suitable escort not exceeding 300 men to be maintained at Lhasa. The Convention was, however, ratified by the United Kingdom and Tibet by means of a declaration accepting its terms as binding as between themselves.

A new set of trade regulations between the United Kingdom and Tibet was concluded under this Convention to replace the earlier regulations of 1893 and 1908.

The Convention included a definition of boundaries both on Sino-Tibetan and the Indo-Tibetan frontier. On the Sino-Tibetan frontier a double boundary was laid down, the portion between the two boundaries being spoken of as Inner Tibet and the part of Tibet lying west of the westerly boundary as Outer Tibet. Owing to the failure of the Chinese Government to ratify, these boundaries however remain fluid. The other frontier between India and Tibet on the Assam and Burma borders, which has been accepted by His Majesty's Government and the Tibetan Government was laid down between the eastern border of Bhutan and the Isurazi Pass on the Irrawady-Salween water-parting. West of the Brahmaputra bend this frontier for the most part follows the main axis of the Himalayas and east of that point includes all the tribal territory under the political control of the Assam and Burma Governments. This frontier throughout stands back some 100 miles from the plains of India and Burma"

It was clearly seen from the paragraphs that the British Government first time showed

the secret Anglo-Tibetan agreement and the McMahon line in the official collection of treaties. The agreement was a bilateral accord concluded in a conference of tripartite parties, and China, as a party did not even know the bilateral agreement and a part of delimited Indian-Tibetan frontiers, before and after the Government of China refuse to proceed the full signature on the Simla tripartite accord. It was hard to not oppugn the validity of the bilateral agreement and the McMahon Line. Furthermore, on 3 July 1914, after the Chinese Plenipotentiary refused to proceed the full signature on the treaty, China claimed “formally, emphatically and repeatedly at the time that she would not recognize any bilateral agreement between Tibet and the United Kingdom.” Simultaneously, the Chinese Plenipotentiary in London made the same statement to the British Government. This was the origin of the McMahon Line as well as the frontier disputes on the eastern sector of Sino-Indian border in the middle of the 20th century.

The origin of Sino-Indian border issue was complicated. Not only did it become a popular research subject but also it casted a shadow over the perspective of Sino-Indian relations and the Sino-Indian border situation in the middle of the 20th century. The border disputes became a sharp thorn within the Sino-Indian friendly period in 1950s and it pushed the deterioration of the Sino-Indian foreign relations to advance around 1960.

Conclusion and Analysis

To discuss the Sino-Indian border issue is to talk about the Tibetan-Indian border on the map or on the ground, with the United Kingdom, China, and Tibet being the three parties involved in the origin the Sino-Indian frontier issue from the end of the 19th

century. Their policy-making is clear when using Kenneth N. Waltz's neo-realism to analyse this period.

Within Waltz's neo-realism, the United Kingdom and China are regarded as two actors on the -stage of international politics. Because the Chinese have always believed that Tibet has been a part of China from the end of the 18th century, Tibet cannot be considered to be such an actor. Each actor wants to strive for its security and survival and more power in the anarchic system of international politics.

For the British side, the priority of the British Raj was the security and survival of its Indian colony. Although China as a great power in the East Asia had been weakened when the European countries became more powerful through the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, it was still regarded as a powerful state by the British. In addition, Imperial Russia had taken a tract of territory from China in northwestern China when Russia's sphere of influence got close to Tibet from the northwest in the second half of the 19th century. The Russian menace was greater than the Chinese one for the British Indian colony at that moment. In order to prevent Russia from approaching the South Asian continent for India's security, a buffer zone between the British Raj and Imperial Russia was an effective strategic goal for the British. The geographic region of Tibet was an ideal choice to be a buffer zone between the British and the Russia. Therefore, the British Government planned to impose its influence and decrease the Chinese influence on Tibet so that this goal may be achieved.

In addition, the British Government had advantageous capabilities compared with Tibet, Himalayas states and even China in the 19th century. It possessed great economic capability, advanced military equipment and widespread colonies in the

world at that time. The powerful strength of the United Kingdom created the conditions with which it could achieve its objective, which was to make Tibet a buffer zone between India and Russia. It accords that a state with strong capability will gain more power in anarchic international politics in Waltz's neo-realism theory.

Moreover, advanced military armaments, which the British owned in that era, created a scenario wherein the British could use force to enter the Himalayan states and Tibet. First of all, the British Government used force to control the Nepalese Government in the first half of the 19th century, and then, it also put Dremojong and Bhutan under its sphere of influence through military threat in the 1860s. Afterwards, the British began to consider establishing its influence in Tibet from the end of the 19th century. Firstly, the British Government imposed the *Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet* on China through its 1888 military victory against Tibet in 1890. Secondly, the Tibetan authorities were forced to sign the *Convention between Great Britain and Tibet* with the British in 1904. Afterwards, the Government of China and the British Government signed the new *Convention between Great Britain and China*, which includes that the Chinese Government recognized the validity of the 1904 *Convention between Great Britain and Tibet*, in 1906. Until then, the British Government used force as a useful means to impose its influence on Tibet.

Furthermore, the British invasion of Tibet could also be interpreted by examining the balance of power theory of Waltz's neo-realism. The United Kingdom is a great power in the 19th century. Moreover, China and Tibet, which had not developed industrialised economy yet, did not have enough capabilities with which to threaten the British Indian colony in the South Asian continent. The British regarded the British Raj as a comparatively weak party when compared with Imperial Russia. Thus,

in order to secure the security of the British Indian colony, it was crucial to win over Tibet, -situated as it was in a location between the British and Russian spheres of influence -for the British side against the Russia's potential menace. In other words, in Waltz's balance of power theory, British India, the comparatively weak party and Tibet, another weak party, united together could confront the Great Russian threat from the north.

For the Chinese side, the Qing Empire regarded Tibet as a part of the empire since the end of the 18th century. But, with the decay of entire empire from the 19th century, the Qing's Central Government no longer had the capability to effectively control the huge empire and its territories. Hence, the Chinese de facto control on Tibet was weakening gradually in the 19th century, though the Chinese Central Government had never recognized that it only had suzerainty rather than sovereignty over Tibet. When the British Government was focused upon entering into Tibet in order to establish its sphere of influence there, the Government of China had to prevent the British invasion of Tibet in order to preserve its security. Therefore, the Sino-British conflict was potentially on the verge of outbreak.

First of all, although the Chinese Central Government did not intend to let the British establish its sphere of influence over Tibet, it did not possess enough capabilities to prevent that from happening. More specifically, the economic system of China was a backward agricultural economy that was inferior to the British Empire's mature industrialism. In addition, China did not have enough force to wield against the British invasion of Tibet. Most of the Chinese military were still equipped with old weaponry – spears, bows and arrows, while the British troops had been using regular firearms and cannons in the 19th century. China's backward economic system did not

allow it to engage in an official war with the United Kingdom over Tibet. Moreover, due to the disadvantages in terms of armaments and military training, it had little prospect to defeat the British troops. Therefore, China as a weak party was in an inferior position in the confrontation with the British in the anarchic international system at that moment.

Furthermore, under the circumstances of the imperialistic era, China could not find a reliable great power such as Imperial Russia to contain the British expansion in Tibet. China also had no opportunities to ally with Himalayan states - which had been under the British sphere of influence since the end of the 19th century - against British invasion of Tibet. Within Waltz's balance of power theory, when a weaker actor encounters a greater actor, which is regarded as a menace for the weaker actor, in the anarchic international system, it had better balance the greater actor's power no matter whether it relies on its own power or it unites other actors. However, at that moment, not only did China not possess enough capabilities with which to prevent the British military invasion of Tibet, but it also had no chance to unite other countries to balance the British power. Therefore, the British invasion of Tibet was an inevitable and unstoppable process.

Overall, in order to protect the British Indian colony from Imperial Russia's menace, the British Government needed to establish its sphere of influence in Tibet, and hence engaged in the invasion of Tibet. Under this circumstance, the Chinese Government and the Tibetans had to fight against the British invasion. Due to the inferior economic and military capabilities of China and Tibet and a lack of allies, the British achieved their goals relating to Tibet. With the weakening of de facto control of the Chinese Central Government and the enhancement of British influence over Tibet, it

gave the British an opportunity to delimit the Indian-Tibetan boundary in accordance with the western modern concept of sovereignty, but without discussing it first with the Chinese Central Government or the Tibet authority. Similarly, the disputed boundary in the eastern sector – McMahon Line was created for the British India's security. It was drawn by the principle of watershed as similar as most other delimitation among nations. Yet. The priority of consideration of the line was for decreasing the menace from the north of the Himalayas. That created the issue of the Sino-Indian border disputes that would become a main barrier in the development of Sino-Indian relations in the 20th century.

Chapter 3: 1950-1958: China and India's Foreign Policies and their impact on the border issue

Introduction

This chapter will focus on studying the influences of foreign policies from China and India on the Sino-Indian relations and their border issue from 1950 to 1958. There are four questions that need to be answered. Firstly, In order to understand the China and India's foreign policies since 1950 when the two governments established an official diplomatic relationship, it is necessary to examine what situations of China and India in the context of the Cold War since 1947. Secondly, it will analyse what impact of foreign policies of two countries on the Sino-Indian foreign relations. Thirdly, since it was crucial for China and India in relation to the geographic location of Tibet where it situates between China and India, the policies toward Tibet of two courtiers had influences on their foreign policies and the Sino-Indian relationship, so it will demonstrate what influence of Indian and Chinese policies toward Tibet on their foreign policies. Finally, it will find out what role of the Sino-Indian border issue played the in China and India's foreign policies from 1950 to 1958.

China and India in the outset of the Cold War

India and China gained complete independence from the United Kingdom and the West respectively at the end of the 1940s, and the ROI and the People's Republic of China were established separately in South Asia and East Asia. Concurrently, a

significant event was gradually forming in the global political and economic sphere — the Cold War, one of the 20th century's most important events.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, the paths of development for both countries after their independence would be affected by the Cold War in the global sphere. Furthermore, the background of the Cold War is very crucial for them.

With the end of WWII, the old system of international relations, in which Europe was regarded as the centre of world, had been gradually changing to a bipolar system of competition and antagonism between the United States and Soviet Union.¹⁸⁵ In 1945, the last years of WWII, when it became apparent that there would be an inevitable allied victory, the Crimea (Yalta) Conference and the Potsdam Conference were held in February and July-August respectively by the heads of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. This was done in order to thoroughly defeat the fascist countries, facilitate as fast a victory as possible and discuss post-war global affairs. The conferences established the bipolar system of international relationships post-war —The Yalta system.¹⁸⁶ The Soviet Union achieved interests in Eastern Europe; especially in relation to the Soviet-Polish border issue, and special rights in the Far East and China in the Yalta Conference.¹⁸⁷ However, the Soviet Union was forced to leave the talks in order to fully participate in the war against Japan.¹⁸⁸ Stalin left Yalta undoubtedly believing his allies had at least acquiesced to his domination over Eastern Europe.¹⁸⁹ In the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union also achieved interests in relation to the Soviet-Polish Border, the German the war reparations

¹⁸⁴ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, The University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p1.

¹⁸⁵ Liu Jinzhi, *History of Cold War*, World Affair Press, 2003, p2.

¹⁸⁶ Liu Jinzhi, *History of Cold War*, World Affair Press, 2003, p3.

¹⁸⁷ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences : documents*, Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1969.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008, p16.

etc.¹⁹⁰ The Soviet Union gained a number of interests in the sphere of Eurasia through both conferences which negotiated with the United States and the United Kingdom. In other words, its status as a superpower had been accepted by the West. On the other hand, the United States intended to establish the international hegemony, and did not admit that the Soviet Union challenged its interests and authority,¹⁹¹ when the power of Soviet Union gradually increased in the Europe. Therefore, the contradiction and conflict of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the world pattern changing gradually to a bipolar system.

The three pre-war great powers in Europe, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, were declining without exception during the war.¹⁹² In contrast, the power of the United States of America had rapidly expanded through World War II. This was partly because the American mainland was never attacked by the Axis troops in the war because of its advantageous geographic environment which is isolated by the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean far away from the Eurasian landmass. Additionally, due to the advantageous peaceful environment in the mainland of the United States, American industry still kept its rapidly developmental trends through its powerful industrial productive potential and rich natural resources, especially its speedily expanded war production capabilities, which soared from 2 per cent of total output in 1939 to 40 per cent in 1943.¹⁹³ During the war the size of the productive

¹⁹⁰ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences : documents*, Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1969.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² The loss of the United Kingdom: over four hundred thousand people died and One-fourth of the national wealth was destroyed by the war; the income of investment abroad declined to an half than prewar. The loss of France: approximate sixty hundred thousand people died and left six million people homeless; over two million building were destroyed by the war and fifteen million hectares' lands desolate because of longtime conflicts. The loss of Germany: the military expenses during the war was 622 billion Deutsche Mark, 15 per cent of the national income; the national income and GNP in 1946 less than one-third of 1938 because the national economy was broken by the war; furthermore, Germany was occupied by allies and afford a great number of reparations. It cites from Liu Jinzhi, *History of Cold War*, World Affair Press, 2003, pp. 8-11.

¹⁹³ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p358.

plant within the country grew by nearly 50 per cent and the physical output of goods by more than 50 per cent.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, in the years 1940 to 1944, the industrial expansion in the United States rose at a faster pace--over 15 per cent a year--than at any period before or since.¹⁹⁵

The United States Dollar (USD) replaced the British Pound as the ubiquitous hard currency in the post-war world when the Bretton Woods System of monetary management worldwide was founded from 1944 to 1945,¹⁹⁶ thus the USD established a hegemony in the international monetary system.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, the U.S was in a monopolistic position in world trade at that moment. In addition, American military strength was greatly enhanced in the war, and American troops not only went into the European continent, but also occupied a lot of strategic points throughout the world.¹⁹⁸ In 1946, American troops were still stationed in fifty-six countries and on every continent. By 1949, America was said to have a lien on some four hundred worldwide naval and air bases.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, the U.S became a major military power with the most deterrent force since it had monopolized nuclear weapons for these years.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁴ W. Ashworth, *A Short History of the International Economy Since 1850*, London, 1975, p268. See also the figures in Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939-1945*, Berkeley, University of California, 1979, p63.

¹⁹⁵ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p357-358.

¹⁹⁶ The Bretton Woods System was an international system postwar in the fields of international economy, currency, commerce and finance. From June 1st to 22nd 1944, there was a the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, which it also known as the Bretton Woods Conference in history, holding at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States; and 730 delegates from 44 countries were presented at this conference. It promoted to establishment of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which is part of the World Bank Group at present and approve an agreement that the USD hooked up with the gold (35 USD equal to 1 ounce) and exchange rates of the rest of currencies hooked up with the USD.

¹⁹⁷ Liu Jinzhi, *History of Cold War*, World Affair Press, 2003, p35.

¹⁹⁸ Liu Jinzhi, *History of Cold War*, World Affair Press, 2003, p16.

¹⁹⁹ David Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam: American foreign policy in the Cold War*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967, p81-82.

²⁰⁰ Wang Shengzu, *The history of international relationships*, Vol. 7, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1995, p. 4.

Except for the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) across the Eurasia arose to be a first-rate great power during WWII, with European great powers gradually declining at the same time. Though the Soviet Union suffered the most serious loss amongst the Allies in the war and would face an extremely difficult task in rebuilding its homeland,²⁰¹ it was the principle force responsible for the defeat of Fascism and its status as a great power was also admitted to by the United Kingdom and the United States. Furthermore, the Red Army had moved into the European interior from the territory of Soviet Union and become a very powerful military force, to which no countries in Western Europe could compare. The Soviet Union regarded national security as its primary mission because of the historic lesson evident to them from the last two world wars.²⁰² It was inevitable that the Soviet Union wanted to consolidate the Red Army's victorious achievements and wished countries in Eastern Europe to stand on the side of the Soviet Union. Hence, it was decided that countries in Eastern Europe would be forced to adopt the type of socialist system propagated by the Soviet Union as their regime post-war. In other words, the Soviet Union established a buffer zone that consisted of socialist countries in Eastern Europe for its national security. Therefore, the Eastern Bloc which consisted of Soviet Union and its satellite states, was formed after WWII on the basis of nine countries in Eastern Europe. It included the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, the Romania People's Republic, the Socialist Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the People's Republic of Poland, the Czechoslovak Republic, the People's Republic of Hungary, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and the

²⁰¹ The conflict destroyed 1700 towns and 70,000 villages and left 25 million homeless. Twenty to thirty million died; 600,000 starved to death at the single siege of Leningrad. It Cites from Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008, p20.

²⁰² It means: Russia Civil War (1917-1923) occurred in the former Russia Empire fighting for the political power of Russia at the end of World War I (WWI). The main fighting happened between Bolshevik Red Army, which was led by Bolshevik Party and the force of White Army, which was led by the anti-Bolshevik force, united Western European countries' troops attack from west to Russia. Although the Red Army gained the final victory, the loss of Russia was momentous that approximate 15,000,000 people dead during the civil war and the economy of Russia suffered destructive hit.

People's Republic of Albania governed by Communist Parties. Since then, it formed the bipolar pattern in the world, when the United States and the Soviet Union, the two great powers had significantly influenced the global affairs.

The American Government had to consider whether they could terminate their traditional policy of isolationism²⁰³ in order to enhance American power and influence and to proceed in large-scale interventions in Europe in order to avoid the occurrence of serious political and economic turmoil as a result of the expansion of the Eastern Bloc, led by the Soviet Union, which could threaten the global capitalist system. Therefore, the contradictions and confrontations in Europe between national interests of the United States and the Soviet State seemed inevitable and irreconcilable. The outset of the Cold War was launched in 1947.

In order to understand China's foreign policies in the 1950s, it had to examine China's situation in the end of WWII and the outset of the Cold War. There was a divided situation in China after Japan's official surrender. While the Kuomintang (KMT) Government was the legal government that was governing most of the regions in southwest China and some of northwest China directly, the CCP that was the local regime with armed forces ruled most of the countryside areas in North China.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ It means: the 28th President of United States of America Woodrow Wilson attended the Paris Peace Conference to discuss what the new world pattern was postwar with Allies after WWI, but the United State Congress rejected President Woodrow Wilson's condition of the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations which was put forth by him, because the isolationist sentiment, which a large number of American consider that American should stay away European affairs and conflict, and make decision about peace on their own, existed in American foreign policy. Since then the United States adopted isolationist policy until being attacked on Pearl Harbor by Imperial Japanese Navy on December 7th 1941.

²⁰⁴ In the Second Sino-Japanese War, the KMT Government, as the official government owned the regular army in China, gradually retreated from the East China to the Southwest China under the military pressure of the frontal attack of the Japanese army. In contrast, the CCP insisted to the guerrilla warfare in the Japanese occupied zone, especially the North China and the East China.

When Japan surrendered, there were a great number of Japanese troops and the collaborationist Chinese army with their arms stationed at the Japanese occupational areas in wartime. It was beneficial for both the KMT Government and the CCP regime to enhance their military capabilities, if one party could accept the surrender of the Japanese and collaborationist Chinese army and capture their arms. Therefore, who had the qualification to accept their surrender between the KMT and the CCP regime would become a very important issue.

On 10 August 1945, Zhu De, the commander in chief of the CCP's armed forces, announced the order of counterattacking to the Japanese army. He commanded all of CCP's forces to advanced speedily in different areas, capturing enemies' arms and accepting their surrender, furthermore, exterminating determinedly all enemies who refused to surrender.²⁰⁵ Because most of the KMT's troops were stationed in the "Great Rear"²⁰⁶ at that moment, the National Revolutionary Army (NRA), the name of the army of the KMT Government, hardly accepted the surrender of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and the collaborationist Chinese army in the East, North and Northeast China earlier than the CCP's forces. According to this disadvantaged situation, Chiang Kai-shek, as the supreme commander in the Chinese Theatre, announced a series of orders to restrict the CCP's forces from continuing to advance and prevented the IJA and the collaborationist army to surrender to them. On 11 August, He sent the following command to Zhu De, "All units of the Eighth Route Army should stay at their stations, until they get further orders and cannot act without

²⁰⁵ Mao Zedong, "Chiang Kai-shek is provoking the Civil War" (August 13th, 1945), *Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong)*, Vol.4, Beijing: People Publishing House, 1965 and 1977, pp. 1139-1140.

²⁰⁶ Under Japan's military pressure, after 1938, Jiang (Chiang Kai-shek) and the KMT Government moved to Chongqing, a city in the inland Sichuan province. During the war years, Sichuan and several neighbouring provinces in south western China had since been called the "Great Rear" (Da houfang). It cites from Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 293.

permission” to the IJA and the collaborationist Chinese army.²⁰⁷ In the meantime, he gave orders the collaborationist army, stating that they were in charge of keeping the local peace, and that they should resist surrendering to CCP’s Army.²⁰⁸ On 23 August, He Yingqin, the commander in chief of the NRA, gave an order to Yasuji Okamura, the commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army. It declared that the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army led by the CCP were illegal armed forces and demanded that the IJA was in charge of efficient defense against accepting surrenders to them. With regard to areas which had been accepted in their surrender to the CCP’s forces, the IJA should be in charge of “recapturing them” and give them to the NRA.²⁰⁹

In the meantime, there were two important foreign influences in China – the Soviet Union and the United States. Both of them had great influences on the KMT Government and the CCP regime. On one hand, according to the Yalta agreement, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August. It rapidly beat the Kwantung Army²¹⁰ and occupied Northeast China, which was one of the most important reasons in making Japan submit its unconditional surrender to Allies.²¹¹ On the other hand, American influence was increasing in China during the war through a great number of loans and military aids to China,²¹² especially a particular allied relationship

²⁰⁷ Mao Zedong, “Two Telegrams from Commander-in-chief of the Eighteenth Group to Chiang Kai-shek” (August, 1945), *Mao Zedong Xuanji*, Vol.4, pp. 1141-1146

²⁰⁸ Tao Wenzhao, *The History of Sino-American Relation*, Vol.1, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2004, p.286.

²⁰⁹ *The History of Sino-American Relation*, Vol.1, p. 286.

²¹⁰ The Kwantung Army (1906-1945) was an army group of Imperial Japanese Army. After the IJA invaded the Northeast China, the Kwantung Army was stationed there until the Japan’s surrender in August 1945.

²¹¹ According to Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s research, the decisive factor to induct Japan to unconditional surrender was the Soviet invasion even more than influence of two atomic bombs on the Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan*, Massachusetts: the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005, p. 298.

²¹² On March 31st 1942, the KMT Government signed a loan agreement which amount 500.000.000 USD with the American Government. It cites from Tao Wenzhao, *The History of Sino-American Relation*, Vol.1, p.222.

established with the KMT Government in the Far East at wartime.²¹³ By the end on WWII, Sino-U.S. relations had been close for years. Chiang Kai-shek needed plenty of American aids to compete the domination of China by the CCP after the victory to Japan, while the American Government was intending to make China as a pro-American country to expand its influence in East Asia. The aim was restricting the development of communist in China, even in the Far East.

The common interests that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union against the Axis powers in wartime did not exist post-war. Moreover, the Yalta system had been beginning to generate gradually. Therefore, the contradictions that existed between the two great powers were generally in regard to the partition of the sphere of influence and the so called “national security interests” in different ideologies. Hence, the American Government decided to comprehensively assist the KMT Government in dominating the whole of China in a situation that avoided the intervention of American troops, in order to avoid a situation in which China might fall under Soviet control after the CCP consolidated power in the country.

The American President Truman said, “It was perfectly clear to us that if we told the Japanese to lay down their arms immediately and march to the seaboard, the entire country would be taken over by the Communists. We therefore had to take the unusual step of using the enemy as a garrison until we could airlift Chinese National troops to South China and send Marines to guard the seaports.”²¹⁴

²¹³ President Franklin D. Roosevelt looked forward to having China’s political support against other Pacific Powers, namely, the United Kingdom, Russia and ultimately a resurgent Japan. During and immediately after the war, he counted on China’s backing in potential political disputes with the United Kingdom and Russia over Pacific affairs. It cites from Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 429.

²¹⁴ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and hope, 1946-1952*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956, P. 66.

Hence, both the KMT Government and the Allies promulgated that the Japanese troops only surrendered to the KMT Government rather than the CCP in some occupied areas. Afterwards, the American Government assisted the KMT Government with a lot of American military supplies and equipment costing hundreds of millions of dollars and loans of hundreds of millions. Furthermore, KMT troops were airlifted rapidly by the American air force to large cities in East China and North China, while CCP troops were going into and occupying some regions except for large cities in the Northeast China helped by the Soviet Red Army.²¹⁵ Though it was acknowledged that the KMT Government was the leader of China's legal government in the Sino-Soviet treaty.²¹⁶

A peaceful negotiation was held in Chongqing by the two parties from 28 August 1945 to 10 October 1945. Both leaders, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong participated in the negotiation. Both the KMT and the CCP emphasized the importance of peace, and established some agreements called "the Double-Ten Agreement".²¹⁷ However, the negotiations did not contain any agreement with regard to a few concrete issues including the issue of the legal position of liberated areas and

²¹⁵ A series of agreements were established by the CCP and the Soviet Red Army in the Far East on September 14th 1945: While the CCP troops in the Northeast would not enter big cities there, the Soviets would allow them to occupy the countryside and some small and midsize cities. When the Soviet troops had withdrawn from the Northeast, they would not automatically hand over areas under their occupation to the GMD, but would "let the Chinese solve the matter by themselves". It cites from Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 30.

²¹⁶ The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed between the KMT Government and the Soviet Union on August 14th 1945. It regulates: The Soviet Union agreed to respect Jiang's position as the leader of China's legal government and acknowledged that Jiang's troops had the right to take over China's lost territory, especially that in the Northeast. It cites from Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 27, See also the figure in Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and, U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 71.

²¹⁷ The double-Ten Agreement mainly contains three points. First is that China should be rebuild a independent, free and strong state by methods of peace on the basis of foundational principles of peace, democracy, unity and unification. Second, there would be held a Political Consultative Conference as soon as possible in order to discuss how to start a new congress and enact a new constitution. Third, Chinese Communist Party recognized the legal headship position of the Nanjing Nationalist Government (KMT) for China. It cited from Mao Zedong, "On the Chongqing negotiations" (October 17th 1945), *Mao Zedong Xuanji*, Vol.4, pp.1163-1164.

the issue of the reorganization of the People's Liberation Army led by CCP.²¹⁸ A series of conflicts even occurred in some frontiers areas that were contested between the KMT and the CCP during the course of the negotiations.²¹⁹ At that moment, the American Government appointed General George Marshall as the President Truman's personal envoy instead of General Patrick Hurley who mediated the two Parties in the Chongqing negotiations at the end of 1945. Afterwards, both sides signed a truce on 10 January 1946.

However, China's Civil War happened inevitably in June 1946, because of the huge divergences in a few unsolved issues in a series of negotiations between the two parties. The development of the civil war from 1946 to 1949 was beyond expectations of Chinese and Americans. The continuous military defeat of KMT since 1947 forced the American Government to reconsider its relationship with the KMT Government even with the CCP regime, the potential new regime instead of the KMT regime in China. It would make an influence on new regime of the CCP's foreign policy toward the United States of America.

With the end of the China's Civil War, while the KTM Central Government was continuously moving south from Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China, the American Government was starting to change its attitude a bit between the KTM and the CCP. It had seen the NRA's frequent military failures in the field, despite their

²¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 1164-1165.

²¹⁹ On September 20, in the middle of the negotiation deadlock, Chiang Sent a secret order to the commanders of the commanders of the KMT army, asking them to "successfully attack the CCP troops," so that the KMT negotiators would be "in a stronger position." On October 6, the news came to Chongqing that the CCP forces, under the command of Liu Bocheng-De Xiaoping, defeated eleven KMT divisions of 35,000. Public opinion in urban China overwhelmingly condemned the KMT's military attack on the CCP areas. Chiang had been "independently" launched "without my knowledge in advance." To win back public support in urban centers, Chiang informed the CCP that the KMT delegation was "ready" to sign the Double Ten Agreement, also known as the Chiang-Mao agreement. It cites from Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies – Visions of Modernity, Identity ,and, U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960*, p. 323.

advantage in both troop number and equipment against the fewer, more poorly equipped, People's Liberation Army,²²⁰ because of corruption and struggles for power inside the Party and government.²²¹ A series of failed behaviors and the serious corruption of the KTM resulted in the disappointment of the American Government. The American ambassador John Leighton Stuart, who was a strong advocate for Chiang Kai-shek's regime, said as far back as 1948, "Any effort to keep Chiang in power through American aid would not only be undemocratic but would also arouse greater sympathy for the Communist cause and create violent anti-American feeling."²²² Afterwards the American State Department published a document named *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*, which also was known as the China White Paper, in August 1949. It states that the end of China's Civil War was beyond the capability of American Government's control, and American intervention in China would be failure.²²³ Hence, some American officials considered that it was very important to maintain contact with the CCP in order to keep American privileges in China as well as preventing a new regime led by the CCP from going into the socialist camp and become a new communist threat in East Asia in the same vein as North Korea.²²⁴

That was little possibility of variation emerging in the American diplomatic

²²⁰ In July 1946, the comparison of the number of Troops (soldiers) between the CCP and the KMT was 1,200,000: 4,300,000. It cites from Hu Qiaomu, *Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong* (Hu Qiaomu Remembers Mao Zedong), Beijing: People Publishing House, 2003, p. 76.; and Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies – Visions of Modernity, Identity, and, U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960*, p. 87.

²²¹ Department of State U.S. and Lyman P. Van Slyke, *The China White Paper 1949*, (Originally Issued as *United States Relations With China With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*, Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30), California: Stanford University Press, 1967, pp. 338-351.

²²² Memo, John Leighton Stuart to the State Department, December 1948, in "Summary of Telegram", December 23rd 1948, Naval Aide files, box 21, HST. (Read this from Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies – Visions of Modernity, Identity, and, U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960*, p. 96).

²²³ Department of State U.S. and Lyman P. Van Slyke, *The China White Paper 1949*.

²²⁴ The Huang Hua-John Leighton Stuart Contact (the Huang-Stuart Contact) was an evidence to indicate that it existed a potential possibility. Although it changed its attitude toward the CCP finally, American Government would establish a relation with the CCP regime after it had given up the KMT Government in 1949. It cites from Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, pp. 41-43.

relationship with China as at the moment it was very transient. However, the antagonism between capitalism and socialism was a theme in the background of the Cold War, thus the American Government judged that a new regime led by the communist party would be a new communist threat absolutely. The American Government decided to adopt a hostile attitude and containment policies for a forthcoming communist regime in the Mainland China.

Regarding to the India's situation in the outset of the Cold War, it had to understand the relationship between the United Kingdom and India since the modern time. India has a long history and prosperous culture, as a one of the origins of human civilization in the world. After the Age of Discovery²²⁵, more and more western companies and fortresses were established by European colonists in coastal India. The East India Company was founded in 1600 and was supported by the British royalty, during the later period of the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526) in India. Furthermore, it developed in 17-18th century during the time of the Mughal Empire (1526-1857). In this period, it defeated successively the Portuguese, Dutch, French colonists, etc. The Mughal Empire collapsed when Bahadur Shah II (1775-1862), the last Mughal emperor, was exiled by the British after the Indian Rebellion of 1857.²²⁶ Moreover, the British Raj replaced it as a new empire to govern the India.²²⁷ From then on, India became a British colony until its independence.

²²⁵ The Age of Discovery also known as the Age of Exploration, was from the early 15th century to the early 17th century, which Europeans explored the world by sailing and mapped the earth. They had gained direct contact with Africa, America, Asia and Oceania. Furthermore, they established a trade route to India.

²²⁶ Lin Chengjie, *History of India*, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2006, p. 263.

²²⁷ The British Raj, also known as the British Indian Empire, was from 1858 to 1947. It indicated that India became British colony completely. After the last Mughal emperor was exiled by the British, on 2 August 1858 the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act, transferring all the authority of the East India Company to the British Crown. In India supreme authority was vested in the Viceroy, the title assumed by Governor-General Canning when Queen Victoria proclaimed these changes to the "Princes, Chiefs, and People of India" in November 1858. It cited from Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 103-104.

With the end of the Second World War, European capitalist states became extremely weak and lost control of their Asian colonies. At the meantime, nationalism had been awaking gradually in British India.

In 1945, after the suffering of WWII, the United Kingdom was forced to let its South Asian colonies go from the British colonial rule, because it could not efficiently control events there, especially the nationalist movement in India. There was a naval mutiny in Bombay in February 1946. It indicated that the allegiance of the subordinate services could no longer be relied upon.²²⁸ Even in the elite Indian Civil Service,²²⁹ one in every two Indians had begun to look ahead to service under a national government in 1945.²³⁰ By 1946, all that the United Kingdom could hope to do, as men like Wavell realized,²³¹ was to arrange a transfer of power to those whom “the Indian people have chosen for themselves”.²³²

At the meantime, there were a few critical problems inside India as the nationalist and independent movements were rising. The most serious problem was the religious issue — the antagonism between Hinduism and Islam. In the field of politics, this was embodied in the different beliefs of the two parties and their struggles against one another. The most famous conflict was the antagonism between the Indian National Congress (the Congress) and the All India Muslim League (the Muslim League). They stood for the rights and interests of Hindus and Muslims separately.

²²⁸ Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, p. 212.

²²⁹ The Indian Civil Service was the civil service of government under the British colonial rule in India after India became the British colony.

²³⁰ Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, p. 212.

²³¹ Archibald Wavell was the 23rd Indian viceroy and Governor-General of India. He was in office from Oct 1st 1943 to February 21st 1947.

²³² Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, p. 212.

Facing these facts, the new British Government, which was led by a Labour ministry under Clement Attlee (who replaced Winston Churchill as the new Prime Minister in July 1945),²³³ put forward a plan to preserve British interests for an extended period in India even if India were to become independent country. It sent a high-level Cabinet mission led by Pethick Lawrence to India in March 1946, in order to solve the situation of India's two antagonistic parties, and to try to create some form of agreement between them.²³⁴ Furthermore, the Cabinet mission proposed a British plan for Indian independence. Its proposal for an independent India involved a complex, three-tiered federation, whose central feature was the creation of groups of provinces. Two of these groups would comprise the Muslim majority provinces of east and west; a third would include the Hindu majority regions of the centre and south. These groups, given responsibility for most of the functions of government, would be subordinated to a Union Government controlling defence, foreign affairs and communications.²³⁵ In this scheme, the British were trying to be a mediator to solve the deadlock in Indian politics. Its opinion was not only in securing a united India as desired by the Indian National Congress, but also for preserving the substance of Jinnah's demand for a "Pakistan".²³⁶ The Muslim League accepted the proposals finally, whereas the Congress disagreed with it, because the centre would be too weak to achieve the goals of the Congress under the Cabinet mission's proposals. Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of the Congress, intended to possess a strong central government that could direct and plan for India, free of colonialism, and that might eradicate its people's poverty and grow into an industrial power;²³⁷ rather than a three-tiered federation without a powerful central government. In a provocative

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Lin Chengjie, *History of India*, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2006, pp. 379-380.

²³⁵ Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, p. 215.

²³⁶ Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) was the key Muslim political leader by the time of independence. It cited from Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, p. 165, p.215.

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 216.

speech on 10 July 1946, Nehru refused the conception of compulsory grouping of provinces to Jinnah's "Pakistan". He said, Provinces must be free to join any group, or none.²³⁸

Due to the bifurcation that existed between the two parties hampering the way towards Indian independence, the Cabinet mission proposals was failed to be realised. Afterwards, The Muslim League advocated "direct action" to realize the independence of Pakistan.²³⁹ However, the affair led to riots and massacre between Hindus and Muslims in India from 1946 to 1947. On account of the chaos in India, the British Government was stimulated to rapidly transfer national power to successor governments who had the capability to impose order. On February 1947, British Prime Minister Attlee appointed Lord Mountbatten as the last viceroy in Raj. Mountbatten brought with him instruction to transfer power by June 1948.²⁴⁰ His plan was the balkanisation of India, but this was denied by the Congress. Nehru got Mountbatten to agree to hand over power directly on the basis of the 1935 Act, to two dominions, who would remain in the Commonwealth in order to smooth the transition.²⁴¹ India became independent in August 1947, after a long though largely nonviolent freedom movement,²⁴² but it was divided to two states. The Secular Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan, two new independent countries, were established on 14 and 15 August 1947. On 26 January 1950, the Indian Government announced that it would become a republic named as the ROI. Subsequently, the Pakistan Government established a republic named the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on 23 March 1956.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 217.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 218.

²⁴¹ Ibid., p. 219.

²⁴² Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, *China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 10.

Though the partition of India designed by the British avoided more riots, massacres and possible even a civil war in India, it left behind a few issues and unstable factors in troubled areas between India and Pakistan.

India achieved independence in the context of the Cold War, so it has an important international significance. Indian victory was seen as a good example for Asian and African colonized countries and sparked nationalist movements and struggles against western colonist states. While the U.S.-Soviet antagonism was forming post-war, independent India adopted a non-aligned policy in the process of their bipolarization of the world. It showed a new road in which they could develop without participating in any political and military blocs for new nations. Afterwards, India's non-aligned policy influenced a lot new independent states in Asia and Africa and they became a third major force alongside the United States and Soviet Union. Furthermore, they played a crucial role in maintaining peace and stability in various regions in the Cold War.

India's Foreign Policy after Their Independence

When India was ruled by the British Raj before independence, India's foreign policy was closely aligned with the United Kingdom's. For instance, India directly joined the war against British enemies when the United Kingdom declared war during WWI and WWII, at a time when the Government of British India did not take into consideration the will of the Indian people. Therefore, the Indian Government pursued an independent diplomatic road after getting rid of British colonial rule. As the first Prime Minister in the ROI and the most important figure in Indian contemporary history, Jawaharlal Nehru was the founder of India's foreign policy after

independence, and his diplomatic opinions deeply influenced the country's diplomatic road and their non-alignment policy in international affairs.

As far back as the 7 September 1946, the sixth day after the establishment of the Indian Interim Government,²⁴³ Nehru, the leader of the Congress at that moment, gave an address to convey thoughts about India's independence and freedom to Indian civilians, and put forward the non-aligned theory:

“We propose to function so as progressively to achieve that independence in action both in our domestic affairs and our foreign relations. We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation. We hope to develop close and direct contacts with other nations and to co-operate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom. We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.”²⁴⁴

In this speech, he firstly mentioned how important to not align with any power politics of groups it was. Afterwards, he emphasized repeatedly this theory of non-alignment and India's non-aligned diplomatic policy on different occasions. To debate the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly on 22 January 1947, he said, “India, in so far as it has a foreign policy, has declared that it wants to remain independent and free of all these blocs and that it wants to co-operate on equal terms with all countries.”²⁴⁵ It emphasized that the key point of Indian foreign policy was

²⁴³ Lin Chengjie, *History of India*, p. 372.

²⁴⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru, *FUTURE TAKING SHAPE (September 7th 1946), India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1961, p.2.

²⁴⁵ Ibid, *WE WISH FOR PEACE (January 22nd 1947)*, pp.10-11.

remaining independent and free. On 4 December 1947, Nehru gave a speech named *Non-Alignment* in the Constituent Assembly. In this speech, he conveyed the key thought of India's foreign policy of independence. He said, "We have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other."²⁴⁶ And he also said, "We intend co-operating with the United States of America. We intend co-operating fully with the Soviet Union."²⁴⁷ We can find out what Nehru considered in regard to the direction of Indian foreign policy – that India was never to join any blocs or cooperate with countries at different blocs as much as possible. On 12 June 1952, Nehru mentioned directly the terminology of "non-alignment", when he debated foreign affairs in Lok Sabha,²⁴⁸ "So far as our policy is concerned, in spite of the fact that we deal largely with the United Kingdom and the United States—we buy our things from them and we have accepted help from them—we have not swerved at all from our policy of non-alignment with any group."²⁴⁹ It indicated that Nehru's theory of non-alignment influenced deeply India's foreign policy in the early independent India.

As for the reason why Nehru chose the theory of non-alignment as the basis of Indian foreign policy, it was in order to link with the world situation at that moment. The year of establishment of the ROI was the same year as beginning of the Cold War, and two great blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union were gradually amassing in the world. Their antagonism and clash seemed to be inevitable worldwide. Facing the international situation, Nehru had his own foreign strategy for independent India. He talked about the world war that might break out and how to avoid it in his

²⁴⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, *NON-ALIGNMENT*(December 4th 1947), *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, p.25.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, *NON-ALIGNMENT*(December 4th 1947), p.28.

²⁴⁸ The Lok Sabha is the House of the People in India.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, *THE LARGER SCHEME OF THINGS* (June 12th 1952), p.63.

opinion during the course of his speech to the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1949, “The supreme question that one has to face today in the world is how we can avoid a world war. Some people seem to think that it is unavoidable and, therefore, they prepare for it and prepare for it not only in a military sense, but in a psychological sense and thereby actually bring the war nearer. Personally, I think that is a very wrong and a very dangerous thing.”²⁵⁰ Furthermore, he considered that India should keep going in a special way to avoid war. He said, “I feel that India can play a big part, and perhaps an effective part, in helping to avoid war. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be aligned with any group of powers which for various reasons are full of fear of war and prepare for war.”²⁵¹ We can see by Nehru’s speech that he vehemently denied the viewpoint that one must prepare for war in order to avoid it. Therefore, a kind of non-interventional policy was generated in India, and that was the basic premise of the non-aligned policy.

Despite this, Nehru considered that the national security was a priority, and India should protect its national security by policy rather than the force.²⁵² The non-aligned policy could increase the possibility that India would be in an advantageous position to avoid any attack from another bloc or group. Besides, the non-aligned policy consolidated India’s independence through diplomacy, and marked the Indian foreign policy of independence. Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948, “What does joining a bloc mean? After all it can only mean one thing: give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party’s view on that question in order to please it and gain its favour. It means that and nothing else as far as I can see, because if our view is the view of that party, then there is no giving up and we do go

²⁵⁰ Ibid, *FRIENDLY CO-OPERATION*(March 8th 1949), p.40.

²⁵¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *FRIENDLY CO-OPERATION*(March 8th 1949), *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* , p.40.

²⁵² Lin Chengjie, *History of India*, p. 372.

with that bloc or country. The question only arises when we are opposed to it on that point; therefore we give up our viewpoint and adopt the other one in order to gain a favour.”²⁵³

Nehru believed that India could participate in international affairs as an independent nation. He said, “The non-aligned are not the non-choice, but we choose the non-choice.”²⁵⁴ Finally, the economy is always a crucial factor which impacts upon foreign policy.²⁵⁵ Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948, “Even in accepting economic help, or in getting political help, it is not a wise policy to put all our eggs in one basket.”²⁵⁶ Therefore, India kept good relations with the United States or the Soviet Union as far as possible, though it did not align with either side. As a result, India gained a great number of aids from both sides. For instance, until 1963, India gained economic aid totalling almost 4 billion USD from the United States, and it was 60 per cent of total foreign aids. From 1954 to 1965, India gained economic aid cost over 1 billion USD from the Soviet Union, the most given by the Soviet Union to any non-socialist state.²⁵⁷

The non-aligned policy was positive for India’s development at the beginning of its independence, and created a peaceful and relaxing international environment for India. That was very important for a new independent country. However, the India’s non-aligned policy from the 1940s to 1950s was not same as the main ideal of the emerging Non-Alignment Movement in 1960s. Firstly, at the beginning of India’s

²⁵³ Jawaharlal Nehru, *WE LEAD OURSELVES*(March 8th 1948), *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* , p.36.

²⁵⁴ Lin Chengjie, History of India, p. 372.

²⁵⁵ Lin Chengjie, History of India, p. 373.

²⁵⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, *WE LEAD OURSELVES*(March 8th 1948), *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* , p.35.

²⁵⁷ Lin Chengjie, History of India, p. 373; and Zhou Weiping, *A Century of China-India Relations*, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2006, p.142.

independence, Indian Government did not frequently use the terminology of “non-alignment”²⁵⁸, but maintained that the change in terminology does not reflect any change in policy.²⁵⁹ Secondly, the non-alignment of 1960s is primarily a policy for the Third World, a defensive policy for small states.²⁶⁰ But Indian non-aligned policy at that moment was quite different in its premise. In Nehru’s early speeches, with respect to characterizing “non-alignment”, there were always aggressive tones that do not fit with subsequent ideas of non-alignment.²⁶¹

On 4 December 1947, Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly, “We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else.” Then, he said, “We are not going to join a war if we can help it; and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice.”²⁶² Furthermore, he stated a situation, in which small countries always yield to great powers, in the world at that moment, “I can understand some of the smaller countries of Europe or some of the smaller countries of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down before some of the greater powers and becoming practically satellites of those powers, because they cannot help it. The power opposed to them is so great and they have nowhere to turn.”²⁶³ However, he did not believe that India would behave in the same way as those small countries. He said, “I do not think that consideration applies to India. We are not citizens of a weak or mean country and I think it is foolish for us to get

²⁵⁸ The term “independent policy” was more frequently employed during the period 1946-50; the term “peace area approach” was preferred during the period 1950-58 and the term “non-alignment” came more into vogue after 1958. It cited from Devdutt, “India, National Interest”, in Karunakaran, op. cit., p.65, quote the secondary source from Peter Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance*, London: Frances Pinter Ltd., 1982, p.5.

²⁵⁹ Peter Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance*, p.5.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p.6.

²⁶² Jawaharlal Nehru, *NON-ALIGNMENT (December 4th 1947), India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, p.24.

²⁶³ Ibid., *WE LEAD OURSELVES (March 8th 1948)*, p.32.

frightened, even from a military point of view, of the greatest of the powers today.”²⁶⁴ Peter Willetts argues “India’s independent policy of deciding issues based on their merits alone while being a component of non-alignment is adopted mainly because it conforms to India’s role of being a special type of Great Power.”²⁶⁵ The following speech by Nehru indicated this viewpoint, he said, “If we had been some odd little nation somewhere in Asia or Europe, it (our independent policy) would not have mattered much. But because we count... everything we do becomes a matter for comment...we are potentially a great nation and a big Power.”²⁶⁶ It could be seen that in Nehru’s opinion, India would be a great power in the world, so it showed his and India’s ambitions.

Overall, India’s foreign policy of non-alignment during Nehru’s tenure as Prime Minister was not the same as the rising Non-Alignment of the 1960s, but included India’s independent policy and the potential of its aggressive ambition. In order to achieve the objective of making India be a great power, it would sweep any barrier to assure its national interests and development. That paved the way by which the Indian Government would adopt a more aggressive foreign policy to small countries around the Himalayas and Tibet and inherit many of the interests and goals of the previous British Raj.

Chinese Foreign Policy after the Establishment of the PRC

Chinese foreign policy after the establishment of the PRC was to engage in the development of relationships with any countries who recognized the new Chinese

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Peter Willetts, *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance*, p.6.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

Government, especially their immediate neighbouring states. The spirit of Chinese foreign policy resulted in the evolution of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence gradually in the early 1950s.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence have been considered by both China and India as an approach and a spirit to deal with international affairs at present. They originally included:

- “1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful co-existence.”²⁶⁷

We can see elements of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence in India’s initial independent foreign policy. India’s non-aligned policy indicated that India opposed alignment among great powers and antagonism among different political and military blocs, but agreed to adopt independent foreign policy at the same time towards each country. It reflects parts of the spirit of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Moreover, it was also the key point of the PRC’s independent foreign policy.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁷ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India, p. 98; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 1.

²⁶⁸ The *Common Program* was adopted, as the interim constitution of the PRC, by the First plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing, on September 29th 1949. The Article 54 regulates, in the CHAPTER VII FOREIGN POLICY, “The principle of the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war.”

The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence was put forward initially by Zhou Enlai, Chinese premier minister and foreign minister, in 1953. In order to solve the issue of Sino-Indian relations regarding Tibet, there was a negotiation held by Chinese and Indian delegations in Beijing from 31 December 1953 to 29 April 1954.²⁶⁹ During the first day of the negotiations, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier minister, received the Indian delegation and presented the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. He said:

“We believe that Sino-Indian relations will get better every day. Some mature and pending issues must be solved successfully. The new China has established principles to deal with Sino-Indian relations. Those are principles of mutual respecting for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. According to these principles, any matured and pending issues can be negotiated.”²⁷⁰

The Five principles of Peaceful Co-existence and its spirit were welcomed by Nehru, so the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were first formulated in the preamble to the *Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India*, which was signed on 29 April, 1954.²⁷¹ That was the product of the negotiations.

Nehru stated in his writing, *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September*

²⁶⁹ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p.88.

²⁷⁰ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp.88-89.

²⁷¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *THE CONCEPT OF PANCHSHEEL* (September 17th 1955), *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, p.99.

1946-April 1961, “These principles, which later came to be known as Panchsheel, are: 1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2. mutual non-aggression; 3. mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4. equality and mutual benefit; and 5. peaceful co-existence.”²⁷² The Chinese Government made an agreement with the Indian Government to adopt the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence in the aspect of foreign affairs.

Furthermore, Nehru conveyed his support to the Five Principles in his speech in Lok Sabha on 17 September 1955, and considered that peace was the best way to solve issues. He said, “I think that the biggest idea that has gradually evolved in people’s minds all over the world is the futility of war—that war does not solve any major issues and that, therefore, all problems, however difficult and intricate, should be approached peacefully.”²⁷³

The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were not only a symbol of friendship in Sino-Indian relations, but also formed an important part of the spirit of India’s foreign policy. This made India contribute towards the world’s peace on some international issues. For instance, the India Government gave aid to China and North Korea throughout the Korean War, and opposed American policy during Korean War.²⁷⁴

However, when issues related to India’s national interests, the Indian Government changed its foreign policy that it, on other occasions, insisted upon. Nehru said, in the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948,

²⁷² Jawaharlal Nehru, *THE CONCEPT OF PANCHSHEEL (September 17th 1955), India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, p.99.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age)*, pp. 82-83.

“It is certainly true that our instructions to our delegates have always been to consider each question first in terms of India’s interest and secondly on its merits—I mean to say if it did not affect India, naturally, on its merits—and not merely to do something or give a vote just to please this power or that power, though, of course, it is perfectly natural that in our desire to have friendship with other powers, we avoid doing anything which might irritate them.”²⁷⁵

Nehru’s thoughts on foreign policy were reflected through the varying changes that occurred in Indian foreign policy when the country was confronted with issues directly related to its own national interests. Therefore, when the Sino-Indian border issue was emerged, the Government of India must firstly consider about its vested interests in the disputed territories.

Indian Policy toward Tibet

Although India’s foreign policy had been independent from the British in 1947, its policy towards Tibet and countries around the Himalayas never changed from the period of the British Raj to its independence. Therefore, India considered it of great importance that it be able to inherit the British privileges in Tibet after its independence.

In May 1947, Hugh Edward Richardson,²⁷⁶ the Indian Interim Government’s

²⁷⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru, *WE LEAD OURSELVES*(March 8th 1948), *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* , p.33.

²⁷⁶ Hugh Edward Richardson, who had been a British trade representative in Gyangzê, was a British mission chief in Lhasa from 1934 to 1940. He became the mission chief in Lhasa after the India Interim Government led by the Congress in 1946 once again. After India’s independence on August 15th 1947, the British mission in Lhasa became officially the Indian representative institution. Moreover, Richardson became the chief representative of Indian mission chief in Lhasa. Please see Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the

representative in Lhasa, put forward a memorandum to the Tibetan Kashag on behalf of the Indian Government. It expressed that the Indian Government intended to inherit and preserve British privileges and interests in Tibet. The Tibetan authority on the other hand believed that Tibet should rid itself of British privileges in the same fashion as India had casted off the British administration. Therefore, the Tibetan authority negotiated with India in order to attempt to amend the Anglo-Tibetan treaty signed between the United Kingdom and Tibet and to establish a new Indian-Tibetan relationship.²⁷⁷ In October 1947, the Kashag wrote to the United Nations to seek support on this matter, and to Nehru to request the return of Tibetan territories from Ladakh to Assam, including Darjeeling and Sikkim, which were invaded and occupied by the British Raj.²⁷⁸ However, Nehru had no response for this.

On 13 January 1948, Richardson was negotiating on behalf of the Indian Government with the Tibetan original “foreign bureau”. He claimed that the Tibetan authority should give a clear response whether Tibet would comply with the bygone Anglo-Tibetan treaty or not.²⁷⁹ Richardson said:

“India had obtained all of rights of the United Kingdom’s signed treaties respecting India. It asked the Tibetan authority to respond to the question of complying with the treaty out of the kindness. If the authority did not respond... that would make the Indian Government feel displeased and bring harms upon Tibet. Furthermore, if Tibet did not comply with treaties between India and Tibet, it would have not any

Present Age), p.56.

²⁷⁷ See *Archives in the Kashag’s Original Foreign Bureau*; and Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Xizang defang de shewai wenti* (foreign issues in China’s Tibet), Chengdu: Southwest Minzu University Printer, pp. 28-29. Quoted in *ibid*, p.57.

²⁷⁸ See *Archives in the Kashag’s Original Foreign Bureau*; and Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Xizang defang de shewai wenti* (foreign issues in China’s Tibet), p. 30. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 58. Also See Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 75.

²⁷⁹ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p.58.

documentary evidence as a state, and I still hope you consider this.”²⁸⁰

The Tibetan authority still insisted upon the return of its territory from India in its reply in March, regardless of the threat from India. The main points of the reply were: “Regarding to whether Tibet complies with the Anglo-Tibet treaty or not ... should return lands, villages and citizens no doubt belong to Tibet but fallen into India’s control successively in the Tibetan-Indian boundary. (With regard to those territories), Tibetan people are distressed extremely and feel as if they are on tenterhooks. Thus, if (India) could return territories belong to Tibet to the Tibetan authority, it would relieve the Tibetan people anxieties. I still hope you reply to this clearly. Then, we would negotiate regarding the past issue of treaties...”²⁸¹

In November 1948, Richardson informed the Tibet authority once again:

“The Indian Government has inherited rights and duties for Tibet from (the British King) His majesty’s Government. Moreover, it would continue to abide by existing treaties until two sides wish to a new deal.”²⁸²

It could be seen that so long as the Indian Government does not agree to deal a new agreement, Tibet would comply and bear these unequal treaties signed with the British Raj previously. He also threatened that “if Tibet does not comply with the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty and Indian inherited interests, all traffics between India and

²⁸⁰ See *Archives in the Kashag’s Original Foreign Bureau*; and Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Xizang defang de shewai wenti* (foreign issues in China’s Tibet), p. 30. Quoted in Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 58.

²⁸¹ See *Archives in the Kashag’s Original Foreign Bureau*; and Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Xizang defang de shewai wenti* (foreign issues in China’s Tibet), p. 30. Quoted in *ibid*.

²⁸² Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p.58.

Tibet would be stopped soon.”²⁸³

The Indian Government adopted the power approach to threaten the Tibetan authorities so as to achieve its interests and rights inherited from the British Raj in Tibet. If the Tibetan authorities did not agree with it, India would blockade Tibetan-Indian traffic and transportation. This was a critical point for Tibet. Because traffic was very inconvenient in Tibet at the time, human communications between the Central Government of China and the Tibetan authorities always passed through India. Therefore, facing this realistic situation, the Tibetan authority had no other choices, and just shelved the issue provisionally.²⁸⁴

It could be seen that the Indian aspirations to inherit British interests and unequal treaties in Tibet cause them to diverge from their prior policies of peaceful-coexistence and mutual non-aggression. In order to inherit those interests in Tibet, the Indian Government paid quite a lot of attention to the unequal treaties between the United Kingdom and China regarding Tibet so as to assure the immutability of them.

In 1943, because of that and the demand of fighting against Japan together, China and the United Kingdom signed *Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters* on 11 January. The treaty regulates that all treaties signed between China and the United Kingdom which influenced the integrity of Chinese sovereignty in the past should be renegotiated between Chinese

²⁸³ See *Archives in the Kashag's Original Foreign Bureau*; and Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Xizang defang de shewai wenti* (foreign issues in China's Tibet), pp. 30-31. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁸⁴ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp. 58-59.

and British representatives under recognized international laws and conventions.²⁸⁵

The Chinese Government believed that the *Agreement between Great Britain, China and Tibet Amending Trade Regulations in Tibet, of December 5, 1893* was no doubt belonging to one of those treaties, and it should be abolished.²⁸⁶ Because its sixth term regulates:

“...One-half of each rest-house will be reserved for the use of the British officials employed on the inspection and maintenance of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier and for the storage of their materials... the United Kingdom is prepared to consider the transfer to China of the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to Gyantse when telegraph lines from China reach that mart, and in the meantime Chinese and Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by the line constructed by the Government of India. In the meantime China shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering in any way with them or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished by the local authorities.”²⁸⁷

Furthermore, the eighth term regulates:

“The British Trade Agents at the various trade marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transmission of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the local authorities whose districts

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p.60.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Great Britain Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Paper, 1907-1908, Vol. CI (101)*, p. 173.

they traverse and shall be accorded the same protection as the persons employed in carrying the despatches of the Tibetan Authorities. When efficient arrangements have been made by the China in Tibet for a postal service, the question of the abolition of the Trade Agents' couriers will be taken into consideration by the United Kingdom and China. No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Chinese and Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from all lawful taxation.”²⁸⁸

Therefore, the above terms can show that the British and Indian people owned extraterritoriality in Tibetan marts. The evidence for this can be found in the fact that they owned the rights to establish the telegraph line and post service.²⁸⁹

In the *Agreement between Great Britain, China and Tibet Amending Trade Regulations in Tibet, of December 5, 1893*, there was a term to regulate how to revise or abolish the agreement. The thirteenth term regulates:

“The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries as well as by the Tibetan Delegate; but if no demand for revision be made by either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.”²⁹⁰

²⁸⁸ Ibid, pp. 173-174.

²⁸⁹ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p.19.

²⁹⁰ Great Britain Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Paper, 1907-1908, Vol. CI (101)*, p. 175.

The agreement was signed on 20 April 1908, and the fourth decade was on 20 April 1948. According to this regulation of the agreement, the Government of the Republic of China demanded the abolishment of this agreement from the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan on 9 October 1948.

British forces have departed from the Indian subcontinent at the time, and have overseen the transition of the regime towards two dominions, India and Pakistan. Therefore, the British Government claimed that China should negotiate directly with Indian and Pakistani Governments regarding Tibetan issues from now on.²⁹¹ The Pakistani Government expressed its complete agreement with the Chinese demand in the reply message. Furthermore, it claimed that it might establish a friendly relationship with China, and assured its cooperation with China so as to enhance relations for each other.²⁹²

However, the Indian Government's response expressed a difference. This was expressed in two main points of importance. First, the Indian Government believed that it should inherit all of the rights and obligations of the treaties between the British Raj and Tibet from its establishment. Second, the relationship between India and Tibet should conform to the Simla Convention (the *Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet, Simla*) in 1914 and its trade regulations. With Regard to the *Agreement between Great Britain, China and Tibet Amending Trade Regulations in Tibet, of December 5, 1893*, this has been ended earlier.²⁹³ Therefore, it could be seen that the reply message expressed the consistent standpoint of the Indian Government from its establishment—that the relationship between India and Tibet should conform

²⁹¹ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 60.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid.

with the Simla Convention in 1914 and its trade regulations. However, the Simla Convention in 1914 was an agreement put forward by the United Kingdom, which had never been officially approved by China, who even went as far as to refuse to recognize its legal validity.²⁹⁴ Thus, the Indian Government's attitude towards Tibet paved the way for the deterioration of the Sino-Indian relationship.

In July 1949, a critical incident took place in Tibet, involving the exile of the Han people who lived there, as the Chinese civil war entered its latter stages. On 8 July, some officials led by three Kalöns of the Kashag invited Chen Xizhang, who was the secretary and deputy chief of the Tibetan office of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in the Republic of China, to have a conversation. They consider when the Chinese civil war had escalated at that moment, and that the CCP would follow KMT's troops and officials everywhere. Because they had fears of that the communist influence would be towards Tibet, they could not take responsibility for the safety of the KMT's personnel of the Republic of China.²⁹⁵ Furthermore, the Tibetan civilian congress passed a resolution, stating that "the Tibetan authority would cut off the political relationship with the KMT Government temporarily. Please tell other offices to prepare to leave for India in two weeks...there are some communists hidden in Han people and people of the Kham, and we cannot distinguish among them. But Tibet is the holy land of Buddhism so as to not allow communists exist here absolutely."²⁹⁶ It meant that the Tibetan authority would exile all Han people whoever work or live in Tibet, in order to avoid the communist infiltration in Tibet.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 61.

²⁹⁶ *Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji* (Selected works of the Literature and History), Vol. 79, Beijing: Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe (Literary and Historical Materials Press), 1982, p. 144. Quoted in Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 61.

In late of same day, the Kashag sent Tibetan soldiers who besieged the Tibetan office of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, sealing up broadcasting stations belonging to the central units of the Republic of China (ROC), and dismantling generators. On 11, 17 and 20 July, all Han personnel of Chinese Central Government in Lhasa, including the radio crew and staff who worked in the Tibetan office of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and the primary school and the climate measuring institute, were delivered by the Tibetan soldiers to the inland China via Sikkim and India three times.²⁹⁷ It was called the “incident of exiling the Han people”.

Facing the incident, Richardson, the Indian representative in Lhasa, said, “(With regards to the incident,) the action was rapid and secret, and the Indian representative in Lhasa had no idea before it happened.”²⁹⁸ However, there were some contradictions and connections between the incident and Richardson. Lawudare Tudengdanda, who was the bodyguard monk officer to the Tibetan authority, described some details about Richardson in this incident. He said, “(Richardson) gave ideas to the director of the Kashag’s Foreign Bureau Liuxia Tudengtaba and Zhasasuokang Wangqincideng that there were a lot of communists in Lhasa, and if you leave them here, they would become spies to lead the PLA to come.”²⁹⁹ Afterwards, two dza sags felt surprise and inquired into some specific details about that.³⁰⁰ Thus, Richardson told them some names and addresses. They reported it to the Kashag and the regent, so some alleged

²⁹⁷ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 61.

²⁹⁸ Guo Guanzhong, *Yijiusijiunian qiyebari Xizang “Quhan Shijian” Yuanwei*(the reason and result of the incident of expelling the Han people in Tibet on 8th July 1949), (the mimeograph draft), 1988, p. 60. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 61.

²⁹⁹ Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlu Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) p. 233; and, Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 61.

³⁰⁰ Dza sag means the senior official in the Kashag.

communists and personnel of the Tibetan office of the ROC were exiled from Tibet by the Tibetan authority before a deadline soon.³⁰¹

Furthermore, Richardson not only instigated the Tibetan authority to launch the incident of exiling the Han people, but also supported and participated in the incident. After the Kashag sealed off the transceiver in the Tibet office and cut off the relationship with the national government, the transceiver was working between Sikkim and Lhasa. As a result, Richardson contacted the Indian Government by this channel to report this incident, and asked to the Indian Government to accept exiled “Chinese.”³⁰²

With regards to the China’s position in Tibet, Nehru said in Parliament, 1950:

“We did not challenge or deny the suzerainty of China over Tibet...Prof. Ranga seems to have been displeased at my occasional reference to Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Please note that I use the word suzerainty, not sovereignty...It is a historical fact, and in the context of things it is perfectly true that we have repeatedly admitted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet just as we have laid stress on Tibet’s autonomy.”³⁰³

From his speech, it could be seen that he prefers to use the term “suzerainty” rather than “sovereignty”, because he believed that in fact China only had the suzerainty over Tibet. As the Indian premier minister, the supreme officer, his words held influence in the country, and in a way, they stood for more or less the will of the

³⁰¹ Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo Fandui Waiguo Qinlu Ganshe Xizang Difang Douzhengshi*(Struggle History of China Against Foreign Invasion and Intervention to Tibet) p. 233; and, Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp. 61-62.

³⁰² Ibid, p. 62.

³⁰³ Jawaharlal Nehru, “*Liberation*” of Tibet(December 6-7th 1950), *India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* , p.302.

government as well.

After the incident of exiling the Han people in July, India's news agency declared, "Tibet has never recognized Chinese suzerainty."³⁰⁴ This showed the media of India's attitude to Tibet in that it obviously hoped and incited that Tibet would extend its autonomous region, or even seek a true independence; the worst needed to keep the current status of Tibet at the time at least – China had only "suzerainty" rather than "sovereignty" over Tibet as admitted to by Nehru.

With regard to India's Tibet policies from 1947, the Chinese civil war was a critical factor. The ROC was engaging in the war against the CCP in the interior of China, so it could not pay more attention to Tibet and offer support against India's infiltration in the area of South Tibet. Although the Tibetan authority had proposed requirements, which abolished British privileges in Tibet in terms of the unequal treaty, to the Indian Government in 1947, it had to accept the fact that this had been refused by the Government of India because it was without any support from the Chinese Central Government.

Overall, India's Tibetan policy after its independence concerned two main points. Firstly, the Indian Government insisted on inheriting the entirety of the British privileges and interests in Tibet, including the legality of the McMahon Line recognized by the Indian Government, and refused any negotiation with the Tibetan authority for the new Indian-Tibetan relationship. Secondly, the Indian Government was engaging in keeping the Tibet's status away from the powerless Chinese central

³⁰⁴ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 71. See also Guo Guanzhong *Yijiusijiunian qiyebari Xizang "Quhan Shijian" Yuanwei*, p. 61. Quoted in Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 62.

administration since 1910s. Moreover, the Indian Government desired to let Tibet obtain “independence”, and has never recognized China’s sovereignty but rather its suzerainty over Tibet. Its aim was weakening the China’s influence in Tibet alongside enhancing India’s influence to preserve Indian interests in Tibet and the Himalayas.

Chinese Policy toward Tibet

After the PRC was founded in 1949, the ROI was the first non-socialist country to establish a diplomatic relationship with the PRC in the context of the Cold War. It meant that they recognized the importance of diplomatic relations for them. As two new states in Asia, they needed to support and cooperate mutually to develop and raise their international standing in the world.

On one hand, there were some supports and cooperation between China and India. With a terrible famine in India from 1950 to 1951, the Chinese Government supplied India with 666,500 tons of grain by six contracts, when there was not enough grain for Chinese domestic demands. But the United States refused to supply India with much-needed wheat at that moment.³⁰⁵ In return, India asserted that the PRC should represent China in the United Nations, rather than the ROC. Moreover, it supported Chinese in some issues with regard to the Korean War in the international sphere.³⁰⁶

However, on the other hand, the disputed border issue and the Tibetan issue were

³⁰⁵ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp.82-83.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 83.

shadows for the relationship between the two countries. The Tibetan issue arose as a result of the Chinese Central Government having less and less capacity to administrate in Tibet from the termination of the Qing Empire in 1911, and of the chaos from the politics and wars during the regime of the Republic of China from 1911 to 1949. Furthermore, some Tibetan separatists wished Tibet to achieve the independence from China.

However, Tibet's status would be changed with the end of the Chinese civil war and the beginning of a new republic. A new Central Government of China, the PRC, established in Beijing On 1 October. In order to reunify China, on 20 January 1950, the Chinese Government demanded the Tibetan authority send a delegation to come to negotiate Tibet's peaceful liberation in Beijing.³⁰⁷ But the Tibetan authority was silent on this demand, and sent a delegation to India rather than Beijing to seek to military support from the United States and the United Kingdom; moreover, it appealed to the United Nations. Additional, the Tibetan delegation presented a negotiation with the Chinese Ambassador, Yuan Zhongxian in India. On 12 August 1950, the Indian Government cooperated with the delegation and contacted China's department of foreign affairs, noting, "the Indian Government has never held any political or territorial ambitions, until now." Furthermore, on 26 August, it continued to note:

"The Indian Government hopes sincerely that the forthcoming negotiation would make Tibet in regard to legal demands of the autonomy in China's sovereignty coordinate harmoniously.³⁰⁸ The Indian Government has no desire to gain new

³⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 75.

³⁰⁸ There was a strange phenomenon with regard to notes between China and India in 1950. The word "suzerainty" is used in India's released notes, but in reverse, the word "sovereignty" appears instead in China's released notes. The Australian journalist Neville Maxwell put forward three assumptions. First,

privileges for itself or its civilians in Tibet. Furthermore, what the Indian Government cares about are India's rights that we produced from customs and agreements, and rights that have close cultural and commercial relations should keep going on in Tibet. Simultaneously, boundaries between India and Tibet that have been agreed upon should not be invaded.³⁰⁹

But the Chinese Central Government expressed its firm and unequivocal attitude that the Tibetan representatives must come to Beijing rather than other places to negotiate and they could not be in the name of another state's representatives. Moreover, it demanded the Tibetan delegation come to Beijing by 20 September.³¹⁰ As a result of the clear reply from the Tibet authority, the Chinese Government proclaimed that the army would be marching into Tibet in October.³¹¹ The government wanted to use this as a message, and sent a telegraph to the Tibet authority to send representatives to negotiate with the central government as soon as possible in Beijing. Moreover, it demanded that the Tibetan authority must contact the marching headquarters of the

did the Indian Government modify the term for consumption at home, where its Tibet policy was already under attack? Second, as later widely suspected in India, did the Indian Ambassador, K M Panikkar, substitute "sovereignty" for "suzerainty" before delivering the note in Beijing? Third, did the Chinese change the word before releasing the text of the Indian note? Finally, he considered that the last explanation would seem to justify a strenuous Indian objection, which was not forthcoming. But in August 1950, Mao Zedong directed that because "India has announced that it admitted to regard Tibet as China's territory, we hope that it would be solve peacefully without the force", therefore the central government "is adopting a policy that endeavour to the Tibetan representatives come to Beijing and make Nehru decrease the fear." It quoted from Mao Zedong, *Jianguo Yilai de Mao Zedong Wengao* (Mao Zedong's Drafts since the State Established), vol.1, Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe (Central Party Literature Press), 1987, p. 475; and quoted in Dai Chaowu, *Yindu waijiao zhengce, Daguo guanxi yu 1962nian ZhongYin bianjie chongtu* (India's Foreign Policies, Relations of Great Powers and the Sino-Indian Border Conflict in 1962), Niu Dayong Shen Zhihua, *Lengzhan yu Zhongguo de zhoubian guanxi* (The Cold War and China's Neighbouring Relations), Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2004, p. 507. This directive can prove that the third assumption was wrong. But the puzzle remains unsolved until the emergence of some new archives about that. See Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 71.

³⁰⁹ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 75.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 70. See also Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 75.

PLA.³¹² It could be seen that the Beijing Government still intended to launch a peaceful negotiation with the Tibetan authority prior to the military attack.

At the time, Tibetan separatists wished to avoid the PLA's march on Tibet and pushed Tibet towards achieving independence. On 13 August, They colluded with a British special agent, Robert W Ford, to kill the Living Buddha Geda, who he had attempted to poison. Afterward, they massed Tibetan troops and garrisoned them in Chamdo. In this circumstance, peaceful negotiations could not work, thus the PLA attacked and finally occupied Chamdo on 19 October.³¹³

The military action resulted in the Indian Government feeling like its influence in Tibet was under threat. Therefore, the Indian Government protested diplomatically. In an Indian diplomatic note to the PRC, the Indian Government warned the new Chinese Government that Chinese military action in Tibet would jeopardize the efforts to support the PRC in mainland rather than the ROC in Taiwan to represent China in the United Nations.³¹⁴ But China's reply was firm that the PLA would be marching into Tibet. As India's response, the government used an angrily worded protest, deploring the "invasion" of Tibet and China's use of force to settle the question of its relationship with the Tibetans. Furthermore, China replied, "Tibet is an integral part of China and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China."³¹⁵ China proclaimed that it wished to continue peacefully negotiating with the Tibetans—and blamed India for detaining a

³¹² Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 75.

³¹³ Ibid, p.76.

³¹⁴ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 70.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

Tibetan delegation bound for Peking—but warned that no foreign interference would be tolerated.³¹⁶ Regarding India's threat of the supporting the PRC in the United Nations, the Chinese Government replied that if unfriendly governments used the exercise of China's sovereign rights in Tibet as a pretext for further obstruction of its U.N. membership, that would only be another demonstration of their hostility.³¹⁷

On 26 October, India's diplomatic secretary K. P. S. Menon met Shen Jian, the political counselor of the Chinese embassy in India, and expressed that the Indian Government deeply deplored the fact that the PLA had marched into Tibet. Moreover, he submitted the Indian Government's copy of note with regard to the Tibetan issue to the Chinese Government. Shen Jian indicated that he had always seen words such as China "invades" Tibet in India's newspapers; in addition, they were used in the Indian note, and the usage was not correct. What the Chinese army did, on entering the Chinese territory of Tibet, was no different than Indian armies entering into Indian United provinces or Bombay, and as such was not an act of invasion. Menon said that India hoped that China solved the Tibetan issue with the peaceful approach. As the reply, Shen Jian expressed that the Chinese Government wished throughout to solve the Tibetan issue by the peaceful method, but it did not mean that Chinese Armies could not enter Tibet.³¹⁸

Although faced with firm and unequivocal responses from China, the Indian Government still put pressure on China in the aspect of diplomacy. On 28 October 1950, the Indian embassy in Beijing conveyed a note from the Indian Government,

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Texts in *Indian Press Digests*, No. I, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956, p. ix. Quoted in Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 70.

³¹⁸ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan* (Mao Zedong on Diplomacy), Beijing: Central Party Literature Press and World Affairs Press, 1994, pp. 620-621.

“in this international circumstance, the Chinese army’s actions in the invasion of Tibet have come to be known as deplorable.” Moreover, the Indian Government indicated in a note on 1 November 1950:

“The changes in the situation in Tibet recently has affected these relations (between India and China) and peaceful interests of the entire world...Unless the Chinese Government considers that it could order its troops to cease to march into Tibet and give the opportunity to negotiate peacefully, the Indian Government would not persuade the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing.”³¹⁹

In its replies, the Chinese Government considered it as the interference in the internal affairs of China and China refuted India’s viewpoints in notes to the Indian Government twice on 30 October and 16 November and manifested the Chinese standpoint. *People’s Daily* published an editorial titled as *It Cannot be Interfered in that Chinese People’s Government liberates Tibet*. It indicated that Tibet is territory of China. The Central Government of China has a sacred duty to liberate and defend Tibet, and any states which respected China’s territory and sovereignty should not interfere in such pure Chinese domestic affairs. Furthermore, it pointed that the Tibetan issue and the problem of entering the U.N. of the PRC were two unrelated problems.³²⁰

With this, the Chinese Government noticed the attitude of India towards the marching of the PLA to Tibet, so it ordered its troops to postpone the advance after the battle of Chamdo. Simultaneously, the Indian Government no longer kept the Tibetan

³¹⁹ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 77.

³²⁰ Ibid.

delegation staying in India and let it leave for Beijing. Finally, all Tibetan representatives arrived in Beijing, April 1951. The formal peaceful negotiation between the Central Government of China and the authority of Tibet started in Beijing on 29 April. The Chinese Central Government signed formally *The Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet* (which was also called as the Seventeen Points Agreement because there were seventeen terms in the treaty) with the Tibetan delegation in Beijing on 23 May. It clearly stipulated the relationship between Tibet and the inland China. For instance, it stipulated that the Tibetan people would come back to the great family of the PRC; an autonomy would be implemented by the Tibetan people under the lead of the central government; the local Tibetan authority would assist the PLA entering into Tibet for the defense of frontier; the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama would still preserve their status and rights of politics and region in Tibet; it would reorganize the local Tibetan troops to the PLA for the defense of frontier; the central government would not force Tibet to do take part in the reforms, whereas, the Tibetan Local Government should reform with both intentions of it and Tibetan people; the central government would establish a Committee of military and politics and a headquarter of military region in Tibet.³²¹ Therefore, it could be seen that the Seventeen Points Agreement ended the de facto independence of Tibet since 1912, and the Central Government of China achieved the objective of the de facto return of Tibet to China.

Although there were some differences of the opinion on the border issue between China and India, both of governments endeavoured to make both sides sign the *Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on*

³²¹ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang difang lishi ziliao xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), pp. 402-403.

Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India on April 29, 1954.

Regarding the border issue, the Beijing Government considered that it should be shelved before the emergence of a better and mature opportunity, but the Indian Government believed that the Beijing Government recognized the status quo of the Sino-Indian boundary. Therefore, despite the progress made in Sino-Indian relations regarding Tibet, this lack of agreement relating to the border foreshadowed the later deterioration of Sino-Indian relations as tensions regarding the frontier problem rose.

The Role of the Sino-Indian Border Issue and the Foreign Policies Between China and India

In the context of the development and prosperity of the Sino-Indian relationship in early 1954, the signed agreement showed that this was the peak of the Sino-Indian friendly relationship at the time. However, threatening situations to the good relations continued to exist around the Sino-Indian boundary. Some border incidents were continuous breaking out around the eastern and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian borders in the first half of 1950s.

On the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian frontiers, As far back as 1948, the new independent Indian Government was taking part in a series of incidents to occupy some regions where Tibetan officials were administrating in the south foothills of the Himalayas. Te Rang rdzong and sTag Lung rdzong were occupied with force by India in 1948. Moreover, the Indian Government sent troops led by Major Ralengnao Khathing to go across the Sela Pass and occupy Tawang in 1951.³²² This behaviour went against the British Raj Government's promise which leaves Tawang to Tibet in

³²² Ibid., p. 109; Also See Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 89.

1940.³²³ The Local Government of Tibet conducted a negotiation with the Indian official in Sikkim to protest this activity and deal with it, but the Indian official ignored the reasonable demand.³²⁴ Afterwards, the Indian Government almost controlled all regions south of the McMahon line by 1954. Furthermore, the Indian Government renamed these areas it controlled as the NEFA and regarded such areas as Indian Territory, which was recorded in the 1950 constitution.³²⁵

Furthermore, a border incident – the Wuje incident – broke out in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian boundary on 29 June 1954 when the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954 had been signed for just two months. The outset of the Sino-Indian border dispute on the middle sector thusly began. The border disputes in the middle sector of Sino-Indian frontiers referred to nine different areas as following: Chuva, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-Sumdo, Wuje, Sangcha and Lapthal.³²⁶ Prior to the border incidents, the Tibet local authority administrated these areas and allowed Tibetan people to graze their cattle and sheep there.³²⁷

However, thirty-three Indian soldiers invaded Wuje areas (which was called Barahoti by the Indians) on 29 June 1954. When the Chinese Government has presented two notes to protest to the Government of India on 17 July and 13 August, the Indian Government replied a note to respond the Wuje incident on 27 August. It refused to

³²³ Indian Office Records, British Library: Pol. (External) Dept.: Collection 36/ File 23, Register No. P. 2. 5515/1940. Also See Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 109

³²⁴ Yang Gongsu, *Foreign Issues of China's Tibet*, Chengdu: Southwest Minzu University Printing Plant, 1985, p.93.

³²⁵ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 89.

³²⁶ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959-March 1960* (White Paper III), Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India, p. 69; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 253.

³²⁷ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 86.

admit the act of intrusion by the Indian soldiers and it considered the Barahoti area was belong to the Territory of India so that the Indian soldiers was patrolling in their own territory. Moreover, the Indian Government had a protest to censure some Tibetan officials intruding Barahoti areas. In this note, it also hoped that the Chinese Government could restrain the Tibetan local authority and forbid the Tibetan people to intrude the Indian Territory.³²⁸ After that, from 1954 to 1958, two governments started to debate the ownership of Wuje and negotiate the settlement. During this period, both parties were sending military personnel to enter into Wuje area every year to insist on their different standpoints. The Wuje crisis and protest of intrusions were frequently referred in the exchange of notes between the two governments during the period. In order to solve the Wuje problem, the Chinese Government presented two advices. Firstly, launching a joint investigation of two parties to the Wuje area on 8 June 1956. Secondly, both parties did not send military personnel to the Wuje area prior to the settlement of Wuje issue.³²⁹ The Government of India completely accepted the second advice in the note on 3 October 1956.³³⁰ In February 1957, the two parties agreed to not send any military personnel into the Wuje area in 1957. Although conference referring to the Wuje issue was launched in New Delhi in April 1958, the two Parties did not reach the settlement of Wuje problem. Yet, the two governments agreed to not dispatch any military personnel before the settlement of Wuje problem.³³¹

³²⁸ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India, pp. 1-3; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 366-368.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 377.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 382.

³³¹ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 115.

In addition, besides the Wuje area, India occupied some other disputed areas on the middle sector of the Sino-Indian boundaries. It occupied Puling-Sumdo in 1955, Sangcha and Lapthal in 1956, Shipki Pass in 1957, Chuva and Chuje in 1958.³³² In order to understand the reason for the acts of Indian Government since the summer of 1954, it was necessary to examine the India's foreign policy on border issue with China. When the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement signed, Nehru believed that the agreement was bonded with the Sino-Indian border issue.³³³ In the memorandum from Nehru to the ministries, he mentioned that the north boundary was settled and the Indian Government would not discuss it with anyone so that it was necessary to establish checkpoints around the frontiers, especially in the disputed areas.³³⁴ Therefore, in 1954, the Indian Government established increasing checkpoints which was closer to the actual frontier with China in the middle sector and eastern sector of the Sino-Indian borders.³³⁵ It was no doubt that the act of establishing more and more checkpoints in the disputes areas would bring the border crisis and border tension. Therefore, some border incident and small scale of military stalemate occurred in different disputed areas on the middle sector of the Sino-Indian border from 1954 to 1958.

However, in general, the Sino-Indian relations were situated in a period of the cooperation and friendship from 1950 to 1958. The foreign policies of the two governments did not pay more attention on the border issue but on the foreign affairs with other countries in the third world in terms of their respective diplomatic spirits. The cooperation and development were the main theme between China and India in

³³² Ibid., p. 152.

³³³ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 80.

³³⁴ Ibid; and D.R. Mankekar, *The Guilty men of 1962*, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 138.

³³⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations*, Vol. 1: Indian Parliament: Part I, New Delhi: External Publicity Division: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1961, p. 386.

this period. Although some border incidents and crisis happened around the eastern sector and middle sector of the Sino-Indian borders, two governments insisted on keeping communications and talks to solve these problems. There were not any great scale of military conflicts happened around frontiers in these years. China and India's friendly foreign policies render two countries to maintain friendly relation from 1954 to 1958. Moreover, the existed unsettled border issue was covered by both governments.

However, the unsettled border issue could be a potential threat for the Sino-Indian friendly and cooperative relationships. The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion became a blasting fuse to make two governments focus on the Sino-Indian border issue.

Analysis and Conclusion

After the two new regimes established in the late 1940s, China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and India's non-aligned policy rendered them have the friendly relations in the international stage in the early 1950s. However, the Tibetan policies of two countries produced a negative influence and a potential of conflict between them, because both nations intended to preserve their respective interest in Tibet. Furthermore, the border issue became another crucial factor to negatively influence two nations' friendly relationships since the summer of 1954.

Since Governments of the PRC and the ROI were established in the context of the outset of the Cold War, their respective foreign policies had particular characters at that time. These characters made the two states achieve some measure of success in international affairs in the background of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

For the Indian side, Jawaharlal Nehru, as the first foreign minister of the foreign affairs of the Government of India and the designer of India's foreign policies, considered that the Government of India should adopt a particular foreign policy which could preserve the accomplishments and interests of Indian independence and its survival in the context of the Cold War. In other words, India's foreign policy must comply with the national interest of India as well as increasing India's influence and power in the world.

Nehru's foreign policy for India was a special non-aligned policy for the two blocs – the capitalist and communist camps – in the context of the Cold War. As a newly independent developing country, India did not possess powerful capabilities in comparison with great powers such as the United States or the Soviet Union at the time. Thus, it would be better for India to adopt a sort of neutral policy to preserve itself in the background of the confrontation of two blocs. In addition, Nehru regarded national security as the priority for the foreign policies of India. That accords with the core concept of the Waltz's neo-realism – the survival that is the priority for the each state in the world. Nehru believed that national security was better protected by policy than force. He pointed out that India's policy of non-alignment instead of force would leave India able to avoid involvement in a possible world war if one ever occurred between the two blocs. Moreover, he also believed that the non-alignment policy had an independent spirit at that time. This could increase the influence of India in international affairs. Furthermore, the power of India would be enhanced gradually in the international anarchic system and then India would establish a strong basis as a great power in the world. What Nehru designed for India's foreign policies after its independence was to achieve a goal that India, as a potential great power, would appear on the international stage in the coming future. By then, India would have the

power to own the speaking right in international affairs.

In addition, India's non-alignment policy can be interpreted by the balance of power theory of Waltz's neo-realism. The balance of power theory indicates that a weak party can hardly rival with a powerful party in the archaic system of international politics and it is more dangerous for the weak party to adopt the strategy of bandwagon rather than the balance of power. In fact, India was a weak party compared to the United States or the Soviet Union at that moment certainly, so it did not intend to adopt the strategy of the bandwagon either for the capitalist bloc or for the socialist bloc. India liked to be a watcher in the confrontation of the two blocs in the Cold War and did not participate in conflicts between the two blocs, which might have caused India to become involved in local wars or even a general war between the two blocs, such as the Korea War and the Vietnam War. With the increasing of India's influence in Asia, it became a powerful party which the two blocs intended to win it over at that time. By then, India's foreign affairs had a positive position in the Indian-Soviet and Indian-U.S. relations. If one party might threaten India's security, India would ally with another one to balance it. With the balance of power, India was always in a relatively safe position in international politics during the Cold War.

For the Chinese side, the PRC's foreign policies had some particular characteristics in the Cold War. National security and development were the priority when designing the foreign policies of the Government of the PRC. The Central Government of the PRC was established on the 1 October 1949, when the previous official regime – the Government of the Republic of China, which was the military ally of the United States – lost most of territory in Mainland China. Although the United States was supporting the KLM Government since the Second World War, the serious situation

of severe corruption within the government and the military troops of the KLM and its rapid successive military failures made the American Government reconsider its relationship with the Government of the Republic of China. *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*, which was issued by the American Government in August 1949, reconsidered American foreign policy in China and the U.S. – KTM Government relations from 1944 to 1949 and made a conclusion of giving up support for the KTM Government at that time. It also gave an opportunity for the CCP Government and the American Government to establish a contact. However, under the circumstances of the confrontation between the West and the East in the Cold War, the contact was never established. Thus, the hope that the Government of the PRC and the American Government could establish a common diplomatic relationship for the first time became a dream. The failure of diplomatic works of the Sino-U.S. relationship made China be under a threat of United States and its allies in the context of the Cold War. Thus, the Communist Government of China must find another great power to balance the American menace for preserving its national security.

Afterwards, the CCP Government adopted a pro-soviet foreign policy and participated in the socialist bloc against the United States and its capitalist camp. Furthermore, not only did the Chinese Communist Government confront the hostile capitalist camp but it also directly participated in a local war – the Korean War. In Waltz's neo-realism, China as a weak and inferior country did not possess the capabilities to preserve its own security and survival when the western countries blockaded the Chinese economy and set an embargo on commodities to the Mainland China at that time. This left China unable to protect its security and development, and as a result China had to ally with other countries to balance the power of western courtiers. Hence, it was

inevitable for China to join in the socialist camp to gain development space of itself.

On the other hand, China's foreign policies had a particular character that compared with foreign policies of other Eastern European countries in the socialist camp at that moment. Although China participated in the socialist camp that regarded the Soviet Union as the leader, China did not adopt the strategy of bandwagon accordingly. The PRC Government had its own principles of the foreign policy – the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. This independent foreign policy would help China to increase its influence and power in the international affairs. According to the spirit of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Government of China has established diplomatic relationships with many Afro-Asian countries since 1950s. That rarely related to the foreign policies of the socialist camp. With the increase in the number of countries that established a foreign relationship with the PRC Government, China enhanced its power in the international anarchic system. Afterwards, when China was confronted with some troubles in its international affairs, it could solve issues with the support of other friendly countries. For example, China gained support from many Afro-Asian countries for the Sino-Indian Border War in 1962 and the United Nations recovered the PRC's legal seat in 1971. Especially, in 1971, China achieved a great success to gain the legal seat in the U.N. by using its support to balance the power of its opponents. Although China was a country in the socialist bloc during the Cold War, the spirit of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence advocated by China allowed it to win over a large number of independent Afro-Asian countries. That put China in an advantageous position in the international politics of the Cold War.

Due to their foreign policies in 1950s, both China and India had gained some achievements in the international stage so that their powers and influences increased

at the same time. It accorded two nations' strategies that enhanced their powers and gain more interests in the anarchic world of international politics.

However, it was significant that the Tibetan issue and the border issue become two crucial factors to make the negative influences on the friendly Sino-Indian relations. The India's Tibetan policy signified that it intended to preserve its national interest in Tibet, particularly to protect its already obtained interests in Assam Himalayas that was the disputed region on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian frontiers. When Tibet had been administrated again by the Chinese Central Government in 1951, in the northern and the eastern frontier, India faced a potential of menace from another great power – China rather than Tibet, which had no enough capabilities to make any threat to India before 1951. In order to defend the national security, India adjusted its policies to the change of situation beyond the boundaries. In 1954, the Government of India established the NEFA, which was equivalent the administrative district of the Pradesh, in the Assam Himalayas where was the disputed region recognized by the Chinese Government. It enhanced local administration and military defence to mean that it increased the India's force in the south of Himalayas and it began to accumulate the strength to show the rival beyond the Himalayas. It also made a preparation for the potential of threat from the north of Himalayas. Yet, the actions of Indian Government in the disputed areas made a potential of conflict with China on the eastern sector of Sino-Indian borders.

China's Tibetan policy indicated that it intended to preserve its sovereignty over Tibet since the Qing Empire, because every Chinese Central Government in the 20th century has never recognized the de facto independence of Tibet since 1912. The Seventeen Points Agreement signified that Tibet was administrated by the Beijing Government

since then. Furthermore, the Sino-Indian 1954 agreement cancelled previous British privileges in Tibet. Both of them were significant for China to protect its national interest in Tibet. In order to maintain its national interest and security in Tibet, the Chinese Government began to construct roads and set up the patrolling inside the boundaries. The Xinjiang-Tibet road was built across the disputed region – Aksai Chin on the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontiers. Actions of China enhanced its force along boundaries and it was benefit for the national security, but it paved a way to make a potential controversy of the border disputes with India on the western sector.

In order to protect their national interests and security, the Tibetan policies of two nations rendered them increased their capabilities to deal with the potential of threats beyond the boundaries. Although the entire frontier disputes had not been exposed before 1958, their Tibetan policies made a negative influence on the potential of the border controversy and the border conflicts in future. The development of their Tibetan policies pushed the disclosure of Sino-Indian border disputes and it increased the potential of the number and the scale of the border conflicts on the ground between two countries.

Overall, China and India had different and particular foreign policies after the establishment of new governments in the end of 1940s. These policies worked to preserve their security and survival in the anarchic system of international politics. While the countries experienced early friendly and cooperative relations in the first half of 1950s, the border issue, which would harm their security and sovereignty to some extent, would be a severe issue for two countries from 1954. Regarding their national security, the two states would enhance their power to balance the power of

their opponent in the anarchic system of the international politics. Therefore, the border issue would be an eternal issue unless China and India found a way to solve this problem in a way which would avoid harm to both of national interests and securities.

Chapter 4: 1959: The Tibetan Rebellion and Its Impacts on China and India's Foreign Policies and the Sino-Indian Border Issue

Introduction

With the occurrence of border issues on the ground in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian boundaries around Sino-Indian boundaries, the formerly friendly and cooperative Sino-Indian relationship had begun to worsen. Although the border issue had already been recognized as the main potential threat for the Sino-Indian relationship, the boundary conflicts did not increase and escalate until 1959. In that year, an important event – the Tibetan Rebellion – produced profound impacts on the Sino-Indian relationship when it took place at Lhasa in March. The direct consequence of the event was that the 14th Dalai Lama and his followers fled from Tibet to India. But, in addition to this, there were some complicated consequences in both Chinese and Indian sides after this rebellion, particularly in the changes to policies of China and India. Those consequences paved the way for the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, which resulted in the Sino-Indian relationship reaching its lowest point in history. Therefore, it is important to recognize the relationship between the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion and the changes of foreign policies from two countries.

In order to illustrate the propositions, this chapter will present evidence to demonstrate four aspects of the topics below. Firstly, this section will clarify the

causes and results of the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion. Secondly, this chapter will find out the changes of Chinese foreign policy towards India after the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion. Thirdly, It will find out the changes of Indian foreign policy towards China after the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion. At lastly, it will examine the impact of the changes of foreign policies of two countries on the Sino-Indian border issue and the occurrence of the border tensions after the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion

Causes and Results of the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion

The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion was not an isolated and sudden incident, and its occurrence was based on a complicated historical background. The background consisted of two main parts – Beijing’s policy towards Tibet and the independent intention of the Tibetan elites. This section will examine the causes and results of the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion by the historical materials and memoirs of people who involved in the important incident.

Regarding Beijing’s policy towards Tibet, it is necessary to look back upon historical affairs from 1951. On 23 May 1951, the Beijing Government and the Tibetan delegation signed *The Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet* in Beijing. It was the crucial connection for the Beijing Central Government and the Tibetan local authority and it regulates the responsibilities and obligations of the politics and economy of the two parties. The agreement stipulates two key points about the Tibetan political institution. First, the central government would not change the current political institution nor after the Dalai Lama’s status and power in Tibet. Second, with regards to the Tibetan reforms (about current social, political and monastics system), the central government would not force Tibet to do take part in

them; moreover, the Tibetan Local Government should reform with both it and Tibetan people's intentions.³³⁶ These two points showed that although China had sovereignty over Tibet as outlined by the *Seventeen Point Agreement*, the Chinese Central Government made a promise of allowing Tibet to reserve its theocratic system and the Dalai Lama's leadership in the politics and the religion of Tibet. However, this promise did not allay the Tibetan people's (particularly the Tibetan elites') fears that if the Chinese Central Government took over administrative power in Tibet, it would bring damage to the local existing political and religious system; additionally, a large number of Tibetan elites were not content with the *Seventeen Point Agreement*. Thus, some marches led by Tibetan elites took place in Lhasa from late March to early April 1952.³³⁷ This illustrated that there have been some unrest in Tibet since China had sovereignty over Tibet and held administrative power there. In order to solve this issue, Mao Zedong gave internal instructions to the CCP on 6 April 1952. Mao indicated two important points about the work in Tibet in the coming years. The first point was that the CCP needed to make the united front policy of uniting the majority and isolating the minority work in the upper class of Tibetan elites, and gain the support from Tibetan common people. Thus, the minority would not dare to stage rebellions. The second point was that the CCP needed to assure they would defeat possible rebellions led by those who were bad elites in the Tibetan minority. Thus, with the failures of the military and the rebellion of the Tibetan minority, the CCP and the PLA would have more reasons to control Tibetan military.³³⁸

Therefore, the Beijing Government informed the 14th Dalai Lama of restraining the

³³⁶ Department of History of Beijing University, *Xizang difang lishi ziliao xuanji* (Portfolio of Tibetan Historical Data), p. 403.

³³⁷ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol.8, No.3, Summer, 2006, p. 62.

³³⁸ Mao Zedong, "The CCP Central Committee Regarding the Policy of the Work in Tibet" (6th April 1952), *Mao Zedong xuanji* (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 5, Beijing: Remin chubanshe (People Publishing House), 1977, pp. 62-63.

behaviours of Tibetan elites and forced him to dismiss Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi from Siluns (the Prime Ministers). They were regarded by the CCP as the organizers of marches in Tibet.³³⁹ Nevertheless, the Beijing Government instructed their administrative staff and military officers to not provoke the Tibetan elites and the masses on aspects of local politics and religions.³⁴⁰

Because the support from the Dalai Lama and his elites was important for China's administration in Tibet, it is obvious that the Beijing Government intended to avoid conflicts between Tibetan elites and staff assigned by Beijing from the moment Tibet returned to China. Although there were some conflicts, and even rebellions led by a minority of the Tibetan elites who were against the *Seventeen Point Agreement* and Beijing's administration in the Tibet, the Beijing Government united the major Tibetan elites and the Dalai Lama to fight against the minor rebels. Under this circumstance, the Beijing Government insisted on its promise that it was not carrying out reform in Tibet in terms of the *Seventeen Point Agreement*, although Mao was determined that these reforms would nonetheless be completed sooner or later.³⁴¹ It seemed that the Tibetan situation would be stable under the *Seventeen Point Agreement* from then on, but with the occurrence of the overwhelming socialist transformation and the agrarian reform in inland China, the crisis of democratic reform happened in 1956.

In April 1956, the Beijing Government established the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region in Lhasa for the preparation of democratic reforms.³⁴²

³³⁹ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 62.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 63.

³⁴² Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan* (Mao Zedong's Selected Works on Tibetan Affairs), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe (Central Party Literature Press) and Zhongguo

In May, the CCP Central Committee made a policy of carrying out the reforms in a trial around a few marginal areas of Tibet from late 1956 to early 1957, and then endeavoured to spread these reforms to the rest of Tibet.³⁴³ With a large number of Han-ethnicity CCP members entering Tibet as well as more Tibetan people participating in the CCP as Party members, the process of the reforms began to launch in a few marginal areas of Tibet. Afterwards, the responses of most Tibetans were severe, and there was some unrest and revolts in Lhasa and other places of Tibet at that time.³⁴⁴ In order to address this problem, Mao told the Dalai Lama in a letter that “the time now is not ripe to carry out reforms in Tibet” on 18 August.³⁴⁵ Mao recognized the seriousness of carrying out the reforms in Tibet earlier without the support of Tibetan people. Therefore, in the 11th (enlarged) session of the Supreme Conference of National Affairs on 27 February 1957, Mao presented that it had been decided that the reforms (in Tibet) were not to be carried out during the second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962), and he also mentioned that it will depend on the situation as to whether the reforms would be carried out during the third Five-Year Plan.³⁴⁶ This statement showed that the promise of not introducing the reforms in Tibet during the second Five-Year Plan to the Dalai Lama had been a policy of China at that time.

However, the following incident of the Dalai Lama’s seeking asylum in India in late 1956 and early 1957 caused another potential storm for the Tibetan situation. In November 1956, the Indian Government informed the Beijing Government of inviting the Dalai Lama and the Panchen to participate in a ceremony to celebrate the 2500th

zangxue chubanshe (China Tibetology Press), 2001, p. 141.

³⁴³ Chen Jian, “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 64.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

³⁴⁶ Mao Zedong, “Regarding Issue of How Correctly Managing the Contradictions within the People” (27th February 1957), *Mao Zedong xuanji*, p. 387.

anniversary of the birth of Gautama Buddha in order to ask for the permission of the Beijing Government to let the Dalai Lama go to India. Besides, the Indian Government also informed the Dalai Lama of this invitation directly.³⁴⁷ Some of the CCP staff in Tibet did not agree with allowing the Dalai Lama to leave for India, because they worried that the Dalai Lama might take this opportunity to live in India rather than return to Tibet.³⁴⁸ Mao indicated that the CCP should allow the Dalai Lama to participate the ceremony in India, because even if Dalai Lama might choose to leave in India, there would be some possibilities. The first was that he censured the invasion of the CCP to Tibet; the second was that he claimed the independence of Tibet; the third was that he instructed some Tibet elites to organize rebellions in Tibet. But, China was not afraid of that. Mao also instructed that China needed to prepare for potential rebellions in Tibet and the country should rather wait for an opportunity to strike back than launch an offensive actively in Tibet.³⁴⁹ It illustrate that Mao considered that the Chinese Government could solve this problem though the Dalai Lama would choose to remain in India.

After the ceremony concluded, the Panchen returned to Tibet in January 1957, but the Dalai Lama was thinking about whether to return to Tibet or not, and instead remaining in India at that time. The Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai came in person to India and met with the Dalai Lama to persuade him to go back to Tibet. Zhou repeated Mao's promise to Tibet, "the reforms in Tibet would not occur during the second Five-Year Plan; after six years, if it will be possible, you can make the decision (on whether to launch the reforms or not) in terms of the situation and the

³⁴⁷ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 152; and Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 124.

³⁴⁸ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 66.

³⁴⁹ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 152.

conditions at that moment.”³⁵⁰ In addition, Zhou also persuaded the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa on the grounds of him being the Dalai Lama. Zhou said that the Dalai Lama should devote himself to his political and religious causes in his motherland rather than a foreign country.³⁵¹ Finally, the Dalai Lama went back to Tibet in February 1957. This is a crisis of the first time of that the 14th Dalai Lama left Tibet and might remain in India. Under the Beijing Government’s endeavour, what the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet was an ideal consequence for both two parties. The result did not intensify the contradictions and tension between the Dalai Lama and the Beijing Central Government caused by the democratic reforms around the Tibetan region.

Although this crisis involving the Dalai Lama incident solved, a seed of leaving gradually grew in the heart of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan elites. Yet, the Beijing Central Government could not allow the independence of Tibet. The contradictions and conflicts between the Beijing Government and Tibetan elites were gradually emerging. These are the main reasons of the outbreak of the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion.

Regarding the independent intention of the Tibetan elites, there were four factors to push them towards having the idea of seeking independence of Tibet. The first factor was the negative impact of the agrarian reforms in Tibetan-inhabited regions outside Ü-Tsang³⁵² (e.g. in Sichuan and Xikang provinces) in 1955. Looking at an example of the incident of Garzê clarifies this issue. The Chinese Government carried out agrarian reforms in Garzê (a Tibetan-inhabited region), Xikang province, which was

³⁵⁰ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 127.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ü-Tsang is one of three parts of Tibet. In tradition, the general Tibet consists three parts: Ü-Tsang (it is approximately equal to Tibet during the period of the Republic of China), Amdo (it is approximately equal to Qinghai province) and Kham (it is approximately equal to Xikang province during the period of the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China).

east to Tibet. Prior to the land reforms, the local government had reached an agreement on the reforms with the upper stratum of local Tibetans. However, some Tibetan elites regretted this agreement after the outset of the land reforms, so they launched a rebellion in Garzê. Finally, the CCP Government sent troops to crush those revolts, but at this point the Tibetan elites including the Dalai Lama started to be afraid of the agrarian reforms.³⁵³ Furthermore, the Great Leap Forward, which had been launched since 1958, forced an even larger number of lower strata to revolt and fight against local Government.³⁵⁴ This was another factor that created friction and disagreements between the government and the Tibetan people. Therefore, a sense of mistrust formed in their hearts, something which would be a terrible influence in later revolts around many Tibetan-inhabited regions both out- and inside Ü-Tsang.

The second factor was that a large number of Tibetan elites (of the upper stratum) in the Tibetan-inhabited regions outside Ü-Tsang intended to preserve their authority and privileges in relation to politics and religion. It is evident that the most of initiators of the revolts were from the upper stratum of Tibetan people rather than the local masses. Because the CCP's reform would threaten their privileges, they had to launch rebellions to fight against the local Government of China.³⁵⁵

The third factor was that some overseas influential Tibetan elites had always devoted themselves to the cause of the independence of Tibet. As early as 1950, Tsepon Wangchuk Deden Shakabpa, the Finance Minister of Tibet, was head of Tibetan Trade Mission, and his mission visited India, the United Kingdom and the United

³⁵³ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 142-143.

³⁵⁴ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 68.

³⁵⁵ Wang Lixiong, *The Destiny of Tibet*, Taipei: Locus Publishing Company Ltd., 2009, pp. 186-187.

States etc. to seek finance assistance for Tibetan independence. When Tibet returned to China in 1951, he chose to remain in India since then. Afterwards, he devoted himself to overthrowing the Chinese administration in Tibet. In addition, two brothers of the 14th Dalai Lama, Gyalo Thondup and Thubten Jigme Norbu (titled as Taktser Rinpoche), went from the United States to India in the mid-1950s. From then on, three of them got together in Kalimpong to scheme plans for the independence of Tibet. Particularly, they took part in persuading the Dalai Lama to stay in India rather than return to Lhasa in late 1956 and early 1957.³⁵⁶ In 1958, the Tibetan overseas elites established some organizations in Kalimpong, such as Tibetan Liberty League, Tibetan Welfare Association and Buddhist Association to organize some activities supporting Tibetan independence, and they also published and distributed an anti-Chinese paper, *Tibetan Mirror* in Tibet. Kalimpong became the clear headquarters of the overseas movement for Tibetan independence.³⁵⁷

The fourth factor was that the support of foreign influences pushed Tibetan elites to have more ambitions for Tibetan independence. From 1958 on, the American military supported the launch of Tibetan guerrilla actions in Kham at first, and then in Tibet. The guerrilla group consisted of Tibetan people living in Kham, an area which, along with the rest of China, was subjected to the “Great Leap Forward” campaign. Therefore, some Tibetan elites led Tibetan people to revolt against this campaign and the Chinese local governments. They established a guerrilla group named “Four Rivers and Six Ranges” and rebelled in various locations around Tibet.³⁵⁸ The United States of America not only gave military support to the guerrilla groups, but also since

³⁵⁶ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp. 125-126.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 129; and Yang Gongsu, *Zhongguo fandui waiguo qinlue ganshe Xizang difang touzhengshi*, pp. 286-287.

³⁵⁸ Chen Jian, “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 68.

October 1957 gave them training at the hands of the CIA, and then inserted them into Tibet using airdrops to fight against the Chinese Local Governments and the PLA.³⁵⁹

Consequently, under these circumstances, a potential rebellion organized by the Tibetan elites was mustering force in Tibet in early 1959. A conflict between the Tibetan elites and the Beijing Government seemed to be inevitable at that moment, but both the Tibetan elites and the Beijing Government had been preparing responses for a potential rebellion in Lhasa before it happened in March 1959.

According to the Chinese official documents, as early as 7 February 1959, when the Dalai Lama met with General Tan Guansan – who was the political commissar of the Tibetan Military Region in that time – during the celebration of the end of the Male Earth Dog Year, the Dalai Lama expressed a intention to Tan about watching a dance show organized by the Tibetan Military Commission of the PLA at the Lhasa auditorium of the PLA's Tibetan Military Region. Tan agreed with the Dalai Lama's intention and confirmed 10 March 1959 as the date of the Dalai Lama's visit. However, Tibet explained this incident by another way, claim that the Dalai Lama was invited by the Chinese to the PLA headquarters in Lhasa.³⁶⁰ On 9 March 1959, the day before the rebellion, a rumour was rising in the Lhasa city – the Dalai Lama would be arrested by the PLA leaders if he went to the PLA headquarters in Lhasa on 10 March 1959.³⁶¹

Therefore, a large number of Tibetan masses gathered around the Dalai Lama's

³⁵⁹ John Garver, "India, China, The United States, Tibet, and The Origins of the 1962 War", *India Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology, 2010, pp. 13.

³⁶⁰ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 71.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

residence, Norbulingka in the morning of 10 March including, In fact, some soldiers of the Tibetan army who had been organized by the Tibetan elites to be in the crowd of protesters. They tried to stop the Dalai Lama from going to the auditorium in the PLA Military Region, and then the assembly gradually developed into escalating unrest around the city of Lhasa. Tibetan protesters lifted the banners of “independence for Tibet” and “Chinese go away” to attack Chinese Han people, Tibetan communist cadres and pro-Chinese Tibetan people. Particularly, the insurrectionists killed Sampho Tenzin Dhondup, the member of Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and injured Khundhung Sonam Gyamtso, the associated commander of the Tibetan Military Region.³⁶²

Under this circumstance, the CCP Tibet Work Committee reported Lhasa’s situation to the Beijing, that the insurrectionists prevented the Dalai Lama from the presence of the theatrical performance in the PLA headquarters.³⁶³ In fact, the Beijing Central Government had given clear instructions to the Tibetan Work Committee since April 1952. The instruction was that all affairs concerning the Tibetan side must be handled by the Beijing Central Government rather than the Tibetan Work Committee so the Tibetan Work Committee needed to report everything concerning the Tibetan side to the central government according to the facts.³⁶⁴ Afterward, Mao stressed this instruction to the officials and the PLA leaders in Tibet twice again in 1952.³⁶⁵ It was evident that the actions of the Tibetan Work Committee in Tibet were instructed directly by the central government in the same fashion as Mao’s instructions.

³⁶² Ibid., p. 71; and Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 130.

³⁶³ Yang Shangkun, *Yang Shangkun riji* (Yang Shangkun’s Diaries), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe (Central Party Literature Press), 2001, p. 363.

³⁶⁴ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 65.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 83 and 92.

Facing revolt in Lhasa, the Beijing Government began to make policies to solve the crisis. Its policy-making had a process of development.

Sooner after receiving the report about the Tibetan revolt from the Tibet Work Committee, Liu Shaoqi, who was the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress at that moment, assembled and conducted a meeting of the CCP leaders in Beijing, while Mao was in Wuchang and not in Beijing.³⁶⁶ The participants in the meeting were Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Peng Dehuai, Chen Yi, Yang Shangkun, Xu Bing, etc.. In this meeting, the Beijing Government reached a decision and instructed to the Tibetan Work Committee that Tibet was a place of China forever and any reactionary movements could not change this fact; if the reactionists betrayed China, the central government would take determined measures to suppress them; and regarding the Dalai Lama, the government should work on winning him over, but understood that they did not need to be concerned if he was kidnapped by reactionaries; if the enemy did this, whether as part of the Dalai Lama's own intentions or not, it would not disadvantage the Chinese Government in any way.³⁶⁷

On 12 March, the senior meeting was taking place in Beijing. The subject of this meeting was military deployment in Tibet.³⁶⁸ Finally, the central government gave an instruction Tibet Work Committee, "(we) should take all necessary measures to hold our own ground while staying on the defensive and being prepared to repulse the

³⁶⁶ Wu Lengxi, *Yi Mao zhuxi* (Remembering Chairman Mao), Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe (Xinhua Press), 1995, p. 119; and Liu Chongwen and Chen Shaochou (Eds.), *Liu Shaoqi nianpu, 1898-1969* (A Chronological Record of Liu Shaoqi), vol.2, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe (Central Party Literature Press), 1996, p. 453.

³⁶⁷ Yang Shangkun, *Yang Shangkun riji*, p. 364.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

enemy's offensive at any time."³⁶⁹ Moreover, the central government also stated that we should let the insurrectionists open fire first rather than the Chinese force so that it would expose them to the world.³⁷⁰ In the meanwhile, Mao sent cables to Beijing from 12 to 15 March, stating that the policy of the central government was completely correct. In addition, Mao also suggested that China should take a defensive position militarily as well as taking the offensive strategy politically so that it would be possible for China to achieve the positive results of dividing the Tibetan upper stratum and educating the Tibetan lower stratum.³⁷¹ Particularly, Mao emphasized the issue of how to deal with the Dalai Lama with regards to his potential flight, "if the Dalai Lama and his entourage flee (the Tibetan capital), our troops should not try to stop them. Whether (the Tibetans) are heading to southern Tibet or India, just let them go."³⁷² This shows that Mao was prepared for the possible flight of the Dalai Lama in this Lhasa incident.

The instructions of the Beijing Central Government have been confirmed as above, but what was the situation of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa in this moment? What were the Tibetan elites of the upper stratum doing then? There were three rounds of letter exchanges between Tan Guansan and the Dalai Lama from 10 to 16 March, and these gave some clues as to the situation of the Dalai Lama and what his attitude was concerning this Lhasa incident. All six letters were published in *People's Daily* on 27 April 1959.

As early as 10 March, the date of the beginning of the Dalai Lama incident, Tan

³⁶⁹ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 73.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Yang Shangkun, *Yang Shangkun riji*, p. 364.

³⁷² Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 74.

Guansan sent a letter to the Dalai Lama by Gyastoling Rinpoche, who was an attendant of the Dalai Lama.³⁷³

Tan's first letter mentioned, "due to the difficulty brought by the reactionaries, you do not have to come (to attend the scheduled performance in the PLA headquarters) temporarily."³⁷⁴ In the Dalai Lama's letter in reply in 11 March, he wrote:

"I decided to watch the theatrical performance in the PLA headquarters, but because of the incitement of a few bad people and the misunderstanding of monks and laymen who were following (bad people), I was indeed restricted from visiting there... the reactionary bad elements are engaged in activities to jeopardize me while using the pretext of protecting my safety. Thus, I am thinking about solutions for this now..."³⁷⁵

After Tan received the Dalai Lama's first letter, he wrote the second letter to the Dalai Lama about Lhasa's situation in the same day:

"At present, the reactionary elements are engaged in military provocation without scruple nor modesty. They have built fortifications along the national defense road (north to Norbulingka). They have prepared a large number of machine guns and garrisoned armed reactionary elements (in there)... the Tibetan Military Region... told reactionary elements to dismantle all fortifications and ask them to retreat from the road. Otherwise, they must be responsible for the consequences..."³⁷⁶

³⁷³ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp.133-134; and *People's Daily*, 8th April 1959.

³⁷⁴ *People's Daily*, 30th April 1959.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

The Dalai Lama wrote the second letter in reply in the following day, and he mentioned:

“... The unlawful actions of the reactionary clique make me infinitely sad. Yesterday, I informed the Kashag that the illegal People Congress must be dismissed and that the reactionary elements garrisoned in Norbulingka in my name must be retreated. I am doing my best to handle yesterday and today’s incidents, which were severe incidents, and which alienated the central government from the (Tibetan) local government in the name of protecting my safety. Some Tibetan soldiers suddenly fired a few shots around the Qinghai-Tibetan Road at 8.30 am Beijing Time, but this did not cause much turmoil. Concerning the problems which you mentioned in the letter, I am going to educate and enjoin several subordinates...”³⁷⁷

On 15 March, Tan wrote a third letter to the Dalai Lama with regard to the attitude of the central government towards this Lhasa incident. He mentioned:

“... The treasonous activities involving some reactionary elements in the Tibetan upper stratum have developed into an intolerable situation. These people have colluded with foreigners to undertake treasonous activities for a long time. The central government was tolerant and asked the Tibetan Local Government to deal with (this issue), but the Tibetan Local Government was adopting a duplicitous policy which was beneficial for traitors’ activities. That caused today’s severe situation. At present, the central government still hopes that the Tibetan Local Government changes its wrong attitude (to the right way), and that it can take the responsibility for suppressing the rebellion and punishing traitors severely. Otherwise, the central

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

government will take measures to maintain the solidarity and the unity of the motherland. In your previous letter, concerning that ‘I (the Dalai Lama) am doing my best on handling yesterday and today’s incidents, which were severe incidents, alienated the central government from the (Tibetan) local government in the name of protecting my safety’... we welcome your attitude. We are very caring for your situation and safety. If you consider it necessary to resolve the dangerous situation in the event that you are kidnapped by the traitors, we will do so. Furthermore, if it is at all possible, we warmly welcome you and your entourage to come to the PLA headquarters for a short-term period. We would like to take the responsibility for your safety completely. Insofar as how (you) deal with that, (we) are listening for your decision...”³⁷⁸

The Dalai Lama wrote his third letter in reply on 16 March, and he mentioned:

“... I have great gratitude for your concern to my safety (in your letter). Thank you. The day before yesterday, 5 February in the Tibetan Calendar (14 March in the Western Calendar), I have educated more than 70 governmental officials. I asked them to seriously think about the current and future situation and quiet down, otherwise my life must be hard to guarantee. As a result of this serious criticism, the situation was getting a little better. At present, I am using an artful method to distinguish a boundary between the progressivists and the counter-revolutionists. Once (I) gain some power I can trust in a few days, (I) will go to the PLA headquarters using a secret way. I will send you a letter in advance at that moment that it is necessary for you to take reliable measures (to give me a shelter at that time).”³⁷⁹

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

This letter was his last letter Tan received before the Dalai Lama fled to India, and the Dalai Lama admitted in India later that he wrote these three letters by himself.³⁸⁰ In these letters written by him as above, there are a number of his words which reflected his attitude and emotion at that time. For instance, "... they are indeed restricting me from visiting there..." and "... the reactionary bad elements are engaged in activities to jeopardize me..." and "... the unlawful actions of the reactionary clique makes me infinitely sad..." and "... which were severe incidents, alienated the central government from the (Tibetan) local government in the name of protecting my safety..." and "... once (I) gain some power I can trust in a few days, (I) will go to the PLA headquarters using a secret way..."

Further evidence, which could prove the Dalai Lama's attitudes in that time, was the memory of a witness. Thubten Damba, who was the Khenchung in Lhasa, participated in the meeting held on 14 March, while the Dalai Lama was advising an education to governmental officials.³⁸¹ According to his memory, the Dalai Lama said in that meeting, "Some of people might consider that it is beneficial for me to move to India, but that only can fulfill (my) personal peace and happiness. I have been to Yatung before and been to India in the year before last year. It does not work (if I) live in there and I intend to enjoy cause and effect only in my land."³⁸²

So, it was evident that no matter what the Dalai Lama was thinking about, he was not very satisfied with the restrictions on his personal liberty from the Tibetan elites and the flight to India. Furthermore, he also acknowledged that he had no strong

³⁸⁰ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 137.

³⁸¹ The Khenchung was an official position; see *ibid.*

³⁸² *People's Daily*, 28th April 1959.

intentions to leave for India in his published book, *Freedom in Exile*.³⁸³ However, why did he finally choose to flee from Lhasa to India under this attitude of dissatisfaction towards the Tibetan elites and general reluctance towards leaving Lhasa? Was it his intention or rather kidnapping by the Tibetan elites? In order to find out the truth, it is necessary to realize exactly what happened in Norbulingka before his flight to India.

In fact, according to the Dalai Lama's memory, he mentioned that he made his decision to leave Lhasa due to a specific reason. This reason was that two artillery cannonballs exploded around Norbulingka on 17 March, the day after the Dalai Lama's last letter to Tan.³⁸⁴ That might have forced him to leave Lhasa, because his life was under threat. With regards to who launched these two artillery shells in that time, it was neither an order from Beijing or the PLA headquarters in Lhasa, because the central government and Mao had reiterated many times to instruct the Tibetan Work Committee and the PLA headquarters that they must keep a defensive position militarily and should not open fire first. It was impossible that the PLA headquarters in the Tibet Military Region ordered the PLA to fire in the direction of Norbulingka where the residence of the Dalai Lama was situated at that moment. The PLA commanders in Lhasa would not take such a severe risk to violate the instructions from the central government and Mao. In addition, in terms of the military common sense, it was impossible that the PLA troops would only have shot two shells, even if the PLA headquarters commanded an attack on Norbulingka. Finally, under the circumstances that the Dalai Lama mentioned in his last letter – that he would look for an opportunity to go to the PLA headquarter using a secret way – it was impossible

³⁸³ The Dalai Lama, *Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990, pp. 135-138.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

that the PLA headquarters in Lhasa ordered its troops to fire upon Norbulingka at that moment.

Therefore, who was responsible for the shelling incident? According to the CCP's Tibetan source, Zeng Huishan, an economic police officer in a transportation station north to Norbulingka, fired a 60mm Mortar twice without any upper command to counterattack the rebels while they were attacking his station in a barrage consisting of over 30 shells.³⁸⁵ Consequently, two artillery shells fell and exploded around Norbulingka, forcing the Dalai Lama to make a decision to leave Lhasa.

According to Mao's instruction, "the best result was keeping the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, but even if he intended to leave, it was not a severe matter."³⁸⁶ Therefore, the Dalai Lama and his followers did not encounter any resistance from the PLA, so they moved to India in safety. After the departure of the Dalai Lama, the revolt in Lhasa developed into a severe large-scale rebellion on 19 March.³⁸⁷ Under these circumstances, the PLA headquarters in Tibet held a meeting at 5.00 a.m. on 20 March. After being informed of the central government's instruction and undertaking a discussion about the matter, the PLA headquarters prepared to launch the counteroffensive from 10.00 a.m.³⁸⁸ In the afternoon, the PLA controlled some important places in Lhasa and blockaded the city of Lhasa from the outside.³⁸⁹ Finally, the PLA controlled the whole city of Lhasa and suppressed the rebellion in

³⁸⁵ The CCP History Material Collection Committee in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, *Zhonggong Xizang dangshi dashi ji, 1949-1966* (Important Events in the CCP history in Tibet, 1949-1966), Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe (Tibet People's Publishing House), 1990, p. 89.

³⁸⁶ Wu Lengxi, *Yi Mao zhuxi*, p. 120.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.; and Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 77.

³⁸⁸ The CCP History Material Collection Committee in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, *Zhonggong Xizang dangshi dashi ji, 1949-1966*, p. 91; and Wu Lengxi, *Yi Mao zhuxi*, p. 120.

³⁸⁹ Yang Shangkun, *Yang Shangkun riji*, p. 367.

the city in the morning of 22 March.³⁹⁰

The possibility of the flight of Dalai Lama was presented by Mao before the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion. He believed that it was a good opportunity to place the Tibetan elites and the Dalai Lama into a position of the national traitors, so the CCP could stand on a moral high ground in putting the *Seventeen Point Agreement* aside and instead carrying out the designed democratic reforms with regard to the Tibetan politics and old army. During the period of the Dalai Lama's residence in Norbulingka after 10 March, Mao reiterated the emphasis on his opinion to the CCP Central Committee that (they should) not be afraid of a situation wherein the Dalai Lama would leave Lhasa because it would be beneficial for us if the Dalai Lama did that.³⁹¹ In addition, the CCP leaders reached an agreement in a CCP Politburo meeting on 17 March that the departure of the Dalai Lama was not a big deal (for them).³⁹² The benefit Mao mentioned was the launch of the democratic reforms in Lhasa after the flight of the Dalai Lama. There is evidence that can prove Mao's opinion. In the 17 March CCP Politburo meeting, Mao had an instruction that (the CCP) did only discuss the suppression of the Tibetan rebellion, rather than the reforms in Tibet. Regarding the relationship between the suppression of the rebellion and the reforms, he mentioned that it should be carried out in such a way that the reforms came first when the rebellion came first, and the reforms came later when the rebellion came later, and the reforms did not happen if the rebellion did not happen.³⁹³ It was obvious that Mao bound the reforms with the rebellion in his mind, and the opportunity would come after the leaving of the Dalai Lama.

³⁹⁰ The CCP History Material Collection Committee in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, *Zhonggong Xizang dangshi dashi ji, 1949-1966*, p. 92.

³⁹¹ Yang Shangkun, *Yang Shangkun riji*, p. 364.

³⁹² Wu Lengxi, *Yi Mao zhuxi*, p. 120.

³⁹³ Yang Shangkun, *Yang Shangkun riji*, p. 366.

The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion was concluded by the departure of Dalai Lama and his adherents from Tibet to India and the failure of Tibetan armed revolts in Lhasa and the rest of Tibet. The causes of the rebellion were based on internal influences and external influences. The 14th Dalai Lama was afraid of losing his power as a leader of religion and politics in Tibet and some of the Tibetan elites were afraid of losing their privileges through the democratic and agrarian reforms by the Beijing Government. When they saw negative influences of agrarian reforms carried out in the Tibetan-inhabited regions outside Ü-Tsang, they felt the huge threat for their vested interests. Thus, some of Tibetan elites had intentions to cast off the Beijing Government's administration in Tibet. These were the internal influences. In addition, the external influences reflected in that some overseas Tibetan elites devote themselves to cause of the independence of Tibet and the foreign influences to help Tibetan separatists. These influences intensified the contradictions between the Beijing Government and the 14th Dalai Lama and the conflicts between the Beijing Government and the Tibetan upper stratum. Finally, it caused the 1959 Tibetan rebellion to break out. The direct consequences of the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion were the 14th Dalai Lama remaining in India to seek for a political asylum and the launch of the CCP's proposed democratic reform in Tibet.³⁹⁴ Furthermore, all of that resulted in the change of China and India's policies towards one another. The two governments had paid more attention to the Tibetan-Indian frontiers.

Changes of Chinese foreign policy towards India after the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion

The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion was the primary reason for changes in Chinese foreign

³⁹⁴ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 73 and pp. 78-79.

policy towards India. When the Indian Government gave warm welcome and a political asylum to the Dalai Lama after his arrival in the Indian interior in April, the Chinese Government began to adjust its foreign policy towards India.

In the beginning, the Indian Government was unwilling to believe in the Chinese denouncement and suppression of the Tibetan Rebellion. India thought that the Chinese Government brutally suppressed the Tibetan crowd who were presenting normal concerns in Lhasa. Furthermore, Nehru even had a suspicion with regard to three letters written by the Dalai Lama, when the *People's Daily* published them on 30 March. Nehru expressed his suspicion of them in his statement at Lok Sabha the same day. He suspected that the circumstance at that moment forced the Dalai Lama to write the letters, and he even went so far as to suspect whether the Dalai Lama wrote the three letters by himself.³⁹⁵ But, the Dalai Lama confirmed that three letters were indeed his writing when Nehru visited the Dalai Lama in Mussoorie, not far from Delhi, on 24 April.³⁹⁶ Even so, the Indian Government and Nehru still supported the Dalai Lama's cause in India, because maintaining Indian influence in Tibet was a key point for the security of Northeast India. Furthermore, in addition to the Indian politicians, the Indian masses also had great sympathy towards the Tibetan people when confronted with information about the rebellion as supplied to them by the Indian media.³⁹⁷ That finally became a huge censure to the Chinese Government for its outrage towards the Tibetan people. India's anti-Chinese atmosphere would become a reason to force the Chinese Government to adjust its policy towards India.

³⁹⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru, The Clash in Tibet (30th March 1959), *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*, p. 315.

³⁹⁶ Wu Lengxi, *Yi Mao zhuxi*, pp. 124-125.

³⁹⁷ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 84.

Regarding India's domestic anti-Chinese atmosphere, the Beijing Government believed that the Indian media must be directed by the Indian Government and Nehru, so the CCP leaders judged that the Indian Government must be involved in the Tibetan Rebellion – treason for China – which the rebellion might cause Tibet separating from China. As early as in the 17 March Beijing Politburo meeting, Zhou Enlai expressed his viewpoint on the impact of foreign influence in this Tibetan Rebellion, that the Indian Government actively involved in the Tibetan Rebellion under the support of the United Kingdom and the United States, and the commanding center of the rebellion was in Kalimpong, India.³⁹⁸ This was simply the first step in Beijing's denouncement of the Indian Government's purported involvement in the Tibetan Rebellion, followed by their reaction to a severe incident that they believed happened the day after the Dalai Lama fled to India.

On 18 March, when the Dalai Lama and his adherents crossed the Sino-Indian boundary and entered into Indian territory, he made a statement with the India's help. In this statement, he clearly expressed his aspirations for the independence of Tibet, his intention to leave Lhasa and his gratitude to India's asylum.³⁹⁹ The Chinese leaders suspected that this statement was written by India rather than the Dalai Lama, because it mentioned in particular a specific place on the McMahon Line, Khinzemane, where the Dalai Lama crossed the Sino-Indian border and entered into India. However, the Tibet did not recognize the McMahon Line before the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion.⁴⁰⁰ Thus, when this place (on the McMahon Line) was mentioned in the Dalai Lama's first statement abroad, it let the Chinese to suspect who the real author of the statement was. Whoever wrote this statement, the Indian could be

³⁹⁸ Wu Lengxi, *Yi Mao zhuxi*, p. 120.

³⁹⁹ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, pp. 86-87.

⁴⁰⁰ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 105.

involved in it. As a result, the Chinese began to denounce the Indian Government's involvement in the Tibetan Rebellion.

On 25 April, Mao Zedong instructed that the Chinese Government should openly denounce the British and Indian Governments, "the British imperialists and Indian expansionists collude with each other to intervene in Chinese domestic affairs, in order to separate Tibet from China."⁴⁰¹ These fierce words revealed a Chinese Government adjusting its foreign policy with India from friendship towards hostility gradually.

Furthermore, the Beijing Government issued an essay, "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy" in the *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily) on 6 May 1959. This essay had been discussed between Mao and the CCP politburo for ten days before it was composed and issued.⁴⁰² In this essay, the Chinese Government emphasized several points. The first point was that the Tibetan people desired to reform the Tibetan serf system, which was barbaric and backward. The second point was that Nehru intervened in Chinese domestic affairs with a signboard of sympathy concerning Tibetan race and religion. The third point was that the Indian Government harboured ambitions to intervene in the Tibet region of China, including its intervention in the 1950 Liberation of Tibet and the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion; moreover, the Indian expansionists inherited the legacy of invading to Tibet from the British imperialists. The last point was that it was necessary to indicate Nehru's self-contradictions in his speeches. He recognized Tibet as a part of China sometimes, but he regarded Tibet as a buffer zone between China and India. On the one hand, he advocated the Panchsheel together with China. On the other hand, he intervened in Chinese domestic affairs

⁴⁰¹ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 186.

⁴⁰² Wu Lengxi, *Yi Mao zhuxi*, pp. 125-127.

under the pretext of other intentions.⁴⁰³ This essay in *Renmin ribao* exposed the divergence between China and India to the world.

Therefore, the incident of the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion, especially the India's granting of asylum for the Dalai Lama, made the Chinese Government rethink Chinese policies toward India and Sino-Indian relations. Afterwards, Chinese policy towards India started to change from friendship to tension.

Although some boundary incidents happened around the middle and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border between 1954 and 1958, the policy of the Beijing Government was trying to maintain friendship and cooperation with India diplomatically. In 1956, the Beijing Government retreated over 30 thousand CCP cadres from Tibet, out of the 50 thousand cadres stationed there.⁴⁰⁴ This measure could be regarded as an intention on the part of the Beijing Government to decrease military pressure on the Lhasa elites and the border tension with India. However, with the occurrence of the large-scale rebellion in the spring of 1959, the Beijing Government decided to deploy a large number of PLA troops in Tibet again.⁴⁰⁵ Furthermore, the Beijing Government sent more PLA troops to garrison the Sino-Indian borders against the flight of Tibetan rebels and the infiltration of anti-Chinese foreign agents after the Indian Government gave the Dalai Lama asylum with a warm welcome in late March.⁴⁰⁶ Thus, the actions undertaken by the Chinese had the potential of inciting border tension and conflicts between the Chinese and Indian Governments.

⁴⁰³ Wu Lengxi, *Yi Mao zhuxi*, pp. 127-128.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 126; and Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 195.

⁴⁰⁵ Yang Shangkun, *Yang Shangkun riji*, p. 366.

⁴⁰⁶ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 79.

Changes of Indian foreign policy towards China after the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion

With the outbreak of the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion, the Indian Government had begun to change its policy toward China. First of all, India gave up its publicly friendly diplomatic relationship with China. Specifically, the Indian Government gave shelter to the 14th Dalai Lama and helped him to make a declaration in which he called upon Tibetan people to gather to promote Tibetan independence. These actions resulted in the Chinese Government having reasonable arguments to publicly condemn the Indian Government's involvement in the Tibetan Rebellion and interference with China's internal affairs in a "counteroffensive article" toward India.⁴⁰⁷

In addition, the Indian Government started to adopt a radical policy called the forward policy from 1960,⁴⁰⁸ and it was produced in the context of Sino-Indian border disputes at the time. The forward policy meant that India sent patrolmen in gaps among Chinese military positions and even built some small strongholds in regions behind Chinese forces. Its aim was to force Chinese garrisons to retreat from Aksai Chin and to establish the presence of Indian forces in that area.⁴⁰⁹ In 1960, Sino-Indian border disputes were embodied in two controversial regions – Aksai Chin in the western sector of the boundary and a tract of land appropriately ninety thousand square kilometres south of the McMahon Line (called Assam Himalaya by India, and called South Tibet by China) in the eastern sector of the boundary. Aksai Chin was held by China and claimed by India; whereas, the Assam Himalaya was ruled by India

⁴⁰⁷ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, pp.87-88; also see, "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy," *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily), 6th May 1959, pp. 1-2; and for the English translation of the essay, see *Concerning the Question of Tibet*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1959, pp. 239–276.

⁴⁰⁸ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 173.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 174-175.

and claimed by China.⁴¹⁰ In fact, Zhou Enlai presented a solution to these border disputes wherein the two countries accepted a de facto boundary and controlling areas by the two sides.⁴¹¹ However, Nehru objected that proposal and said, “If I give them that I shall no longer be Prime Minister of India – I will not do it”,⁴¹² because he believed that Aksai Chin was undoubtedly a part of the territory of India; and as such, it should be return from China to India.⁴¹³ Hence, facing such a border situation, especially in Aksai Chin, the Indian Government adopted its forward policy to strive for de facto control of that region.

However, Nehru and the Indian Government underestimated the Chinese determination in protecting Aksai Chin from Indian forces. Because a part of Xinjiang-Tibet Road among the region of Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang region and Tibetan region had strategic significance for China, the Beijing Government would not give it up Aksai Chin or not leave Aksai Chin alone when it was under any potential of threat. While the two sides were involved in increasingly frequent encounters in the region, conflicts seemed to be inevitable.

Occurrence of Sino-Indian Border Tensions since 1959

Owing to the policies changes of the two respective governments towards each other after the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion, the military deployment of the two governments made the Sino-Indian boundaries tensional. For the Chinese side, the Chinese army followed orders to repress Tibetan rebels from Lhasa to the Sino-Indian boundaries

⁴¹⁰ Steve Hoffmann, “Rethinking the Linkage between Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 177.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 161.

⁴¹³ Ibid., p. 173.

and enhance the frontier security. For the Indian party, the Indian troop sent more patrols and built more posts along the Sino-Indian frontiers to answer the moves of Chinese military near the boundaries. Under this circumstance, the two critical border conflicts happened around Sino-Indian boundaries in August and October of this year.

In order to suppress the Tibetan rebels who were in Shannan Prefecture (also known as Lhoka Prefecture), which is situated in the area between Lhasa and the McMahon Line, the Beijing Government and the Tibetan Military Region deployed four regiments in this area to repress the Tibetan rebels and prevent them from crossing the de facto boundary and fleeing to India.⁴¹⁴ Meanwhile, the Indian troops also advanced forward to the de facto boundary, regardless of the military pressure on the Indians of the PLA's deployment close to the northern section of the de facto boundary. Furthermore, a portion of the Indian patrols even crossed the de facto boundary, the McMahon Line, which the Indian Government has been insisting on regarding as the settled East boundary with China since the independence of ROI.⁴¹⁵ These trends increased the potential of a military collision between China and India along the McMahon Line.

When the Chinese thought that India had violated international law in crossing the McMahon Line, the boundary the Indian Government insisted as the settled Sino-Indian boundary, India might not have believed that they crossed the McMahon Line. Because the misunderstanding between the two countries came from an unquestionable truth, which both countries respected – the McMahon Line was never demarcated on the ground by China and India together.⁴¹⁶ It was only a line drawn by

⁴¹⁴ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan*, p. 195.

⁴¹⁵ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 107.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

Colonel McMahon in a map in 1919 so two governments had divergences in understand where the McMahon Line exactly goes on the ground.

First of all, the Chinese side had never admitted to the legality of the McMahon Line and, for the Indian side, they always regarded the McMahon Line as the legal and settled boundary with China. Hence, China and India never demarcated together the boundary along the McMahon Line on the ground. The demarcation of a boundary is a bilateral work rather than a unilateral work. Hence, under this circumstance, in which the Chinese Government did not regard the McMahon Line as the legal boundary, the Indian Government had to demarcate the boundary on the ground in 1959 unilaterally.

In addition, an issue emerged when the Indian Government was demarcating the McMahon Line on the ground unilaterally. When the Colonel McMahon drew the McMahon Line on the map in 1914, he had considered some specific details. One was that he drew the McMahon Line based on the highest ridge in the mountain areas. Another was that he put some important places in Tibetan territory north of the McMahon line, Migyitun being one such village which McMahon left on the Tibet side of the map in 1914. When India surveyed the topography in this area, they found that it was better to put the boundary close to the south of Migyitun, rather than put the boundary as it was in the McMahon Line drawn on the map. Thus, India put the de facto boundary 2 miles north of the McMahon Line.⁴¹⁷ As a matter of fact, when the boundary on the ground is being demarcated, there are always differences between it and the boundary delimitation on the map. This is why demarcation must be worked upon by the bilateral involvement rather than unilateral work. When India surveyed

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

and demarcated the boundary on the ground in this area, they did not tell or present a note to the Chinese Government. Hence, when the Indian army moved to the south of Migyitun, Longju village, the collision with the Chinese garrison in Migyitun seemed to be inevitable.⁴¹⁸ Because the Chinese insisted in its belief that India crossed the de facto boundary they regarded as the settled boundary with China. This was the reason for the outbreak of the Longju incident.

A border conflict occurring at Longju, which was situated along the McMahon Line on the boundary of the eastern sector on 25 August 1959. Afterwards, on 21 October, there was another border conflict at the Kongka Pass on the boundary of the western sector.⁴¹⁹ That indicated the end of the friendly and cooperative relationship between these two great powers in Asia and the commencement of serious border conflicts between them. Furthermore, the two countries' foreign policies towards each other changed from laying border issues aside to paying more attention to the controversial boundaries. And then, those changes caused implementation of specific actions with hostility, so the Sino-Indian relationship began to deteriorate substantially after 1959.

In fact, China and India had strived for figuring out boundary disputes, but the two sides had their own strong standpoints in protect the de facto territory they had gained, even territory they did not control. Hence, any peaceful solutions to Sino-Indian border issue were fruitless. Furthermore, with the repeated failure of negotiation and escalation of border conflicts, it was ineluctable for both sides to progress along the path towards the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., p. 109.

⁴¹⁹ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 89.

Conclusion and Analysis

It is evident that the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion was a critical incident in the Sino-Indian relationship, and it had serious consequences for China and India, especially to the foreign policies of the two governments. In Waltz's neo-realist theory, changes to their foreign policies accorded with their own national interests.

For the Chinese side, the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion no doubt was a crucial incident for China's foreign policy, especially for its Indian policy. Although the incident was an internal affair for the Government of China, both the flight of the 14th Dalai Lama to India and the Indian attitude, which gave political asylum to the Dalai Lama, made the Chinese Government reconsider its foreign policy towards India. The Government of China may not have thought that the Indian Government would publicly support the Dalai Lama and give him political asylum. The attitude of the Indian Government touched an interest of China – the Tibetan issue, and moreover, the issue related with Chinese national security, which was the basic interest of a state within the international politics theory of Waltz. By then, the Government of China began to regard India as not only a friend but also a potential threat for its national security. Hence, China's foreign policy towards India gradually changed since then.

It was obvious to see that the changes to China's Indian policy resulted from two causes. Firstly, the Chinese Government believed that if the Indian Government became involved in the Tibetan rebellion it would be a critical menace for Chinese national security. Except for the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, the Government of China believed that it was more serious that there was a connection between the rebellion of Tibetan elites and the support of India. With Kalimpong, a territory in

India used as the base of Tibetan insurgents and foreign support, the CCP believed that the Indian Government must be involved in the Tibetan rebellion giving support to the Tibetan insurgents. The Government of China regarded the Tibetan rebellion as only an internal affair, but when a foreign influence became involved in it, that made the situation complicated. The Chinese Government believed that the Government of India helped the Tibetan insurgents to fight against the rule of the Beijing Government and planned to separate Tibet from the P.R.C. Therefore, the Beijing Government had grounds to think that their sovereignty and national security were under threat from both Tibetan insurgents and Indian influence. With their national security facing distinct danger, in order to preserve their survival in the anarchic system of international politics, China's foreign policy towards India began to change from friendship to a more antagonistic stance.

Secondly, the Indian Government's support of the Dalai Lama and their granting him political asylum in India made the Beijing Government displeased. The Government of China thought that the attitude of Indian Government to the Dalai Lama and his adherents proved that the Indian Government would continue to intervene in the Tibetan issue of China; moreover, it also considered that any actions to harm China's sovereignty and the integrity of its territory was unacceptable and would not be tolerated by the Chinese Government. Because of those situations, the Beijing Government decided to adjust its Indian policy and prepared to contain any menace from India towards Tibet. In order to deal with the potential Indian threats, the CCP Central Government deployed more PLA frontier troops to patrol along the Sino-Indian boundaries. This accorded with Waltz's theory of neo-realism. When a state faces an external threat from other countries, it only can rely on its capability in the self-help system of international anarchy and force is a useful means to preserve

its national security. The deployment of Chinese troops along the Sino-Indian boundaries not only suppressed the rest of the Tibetan rebellion but also protected the Chinese territory from the potential Indian threat.

For the Indian side, the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion was an opportunity for the Indian Government to establish its influence in Tibet in order to preserve India's interests and national security. There were two main reasons that caused a change in India's foreign policy towards China from friendship to tension.

Firstly, both the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion and the flight of the 14th Dalai Lama to India gave India an opportunity to rethink Indian-Tibetan and Sino-Indian relations. When the Government of India gave the 14th Dalai Lama political asylum in India after the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion, it was not only them sympathising with the Tibetan religious leader but also a desire to establish influence among the Tibetan people through the Dalai Lama. There was a reason the Indian Government wished to do this. India sent troops and administrative officials to occupy a tract of land to the south of the McMahon line (the Assam Himalayas) when they were administrated by the Tibetan officials from 1948 to 1952. Afterwards, the Indian Government established a quasi-Pradesh called the NEFA in that area, though both the Beijing Government and the Tibetan authorities did not recognize this. The Government of India intended to turn the occupation of that region into the de facto situation. Moreover, it regarded the NEFA as the de facto territory of India since it occupied there. Hence, the protection of the NEFA from external menace accorded with India's interests and national security in the international politics theory. Therefore, the Indian Government would like to help the Dalai Lama and win over the Tibetan people from China regardless of China's reaction and any diplomatic issues with China. Both China and India were

two great powers in Asia at that time. In Waltz's theory, in order to protect the territory of the NEFA from China's menace, it was necessary for the Indian Government to enhance its capabilities and use force to preserve that. Furthermore, India also could establish influence in Tibet and win over the Tibetan people to balance the Chinese Government, though the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion failed.

Secondly, except for preserving the territory and national security on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundaries, the Indian Government also intended to unilaterally establish an advantage on the ground on the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundaries with the Chinese competition in the Sino-Indian frontier disputes. As the specific implementation, the Indian Government decided to adopt the forward policy in 1960. After the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion, when the Governments of China and India had a divergence on the suppression of the 1959 Tibetan rebellion and when military tension increased along the Sino-Indian frontiers, the Sino-Indian border issue appeared in diplomacy between two governments. Under the circumstances, in order to protect Indian interests and national security, the Government of India began to implement the forward policy, sending patrolmen to infiltrate into regions which the Chinese de facto controlled on the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontiers. The actions of the Indian Governments showed that India as a state used force to establish an advantage on the ground against the Chinese frontier troops in order to preserve its own interests. It accorded with a key concept of Waltz's neo-realist theory. When a state always relies on its own capability in the self-help system of international politics, force is a useful means to help the state enhance its power with competing opponents.

Therefore, the Government of India changed its foreign policy towards China from

friendship to tension as a means of protecting its interests and national security from the Chinese territorial demands, while the Chinese Government also was facing the Indian menace and military infiltration on the ground at the same time. A solution through peacefully diplomatic talks and negotiations was a better option for both governments to solve the Sino-Indian border issue and the boundary tensions. However, it was not easy for the two governments to solve the frontier issue for quite some time, because of the divergences in the views and policies of the two governments with regards to the Sino-Indian border issue.

Chapter 5: 1959-1962: The Talks on the Border Disputes between China and India from 1959 to 1961 and the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War

Introduction

The 1962 Sino-Indian Border War was a significant incident in the modern Sino-Indian relationship. The border war that broke out on October 1962 was not an accident at the time. The changes of the foreign policy and (towards the) border from both countries, the failure of diplomatic dialogues on the Sino-Indian border issue, and the escalation of border conflicts pushed the two countries towards a dangerous circumstance in which war was plausible over time. There was a strong possibility that, if the policy makers misjudged and underestimated an opponent who had power and ambition similar to themselves, it may lead to tragedy.

This chapter will firstly examine tentative measures the two states took to alleviate the border tension to avoid the war; and will analyse the reasons for the failure of diplomatic dialogues between China and India; and will demonstrate the changes of foreign policies from two countries towards the border issue during the pre-war period; and will examine its impact on the border tension. Finally, it will examine reasons for causing the border war broke out in 1962.

The failure of diplomatic dialogues on the Sino-Indian border issue

Although the 1962 Border War was not an accidental event, the path to the war was a long-term journey. The failure of diplomatic dialogues between China and India on the Sino-Indian border issue had a major influence in pushing China and India towards the brink of war.

The Sino-Indian diplomatic dialogues from the late 1950s to the early 1960s on the Sino-Indian border issue included three important factors. The first factor was the two countries' different cognitions on the border issue. The second factor was exchange of letters between Nehru and Zhou Enlai. The third factor was the reason for the failure of a diplomatic settlement on the Sino-Indian border issue between the Governments of China and India. Each of these had great influence on the other factors. So, the failure of the Sino-Indian diplomatic dialogues on the border issue was caused by the interaction between these three forces.

The first important factor affecting the Sino-Indian diplomatic dialogue was that India had a different opinion and cognition on the Sino-Indian border issue from China. With the India's independence in 1947, there was no difference between the policies towards Tibet and the Himalayas of the Indian Government, and the British Raj – with India inheriting the British sphere of influence in that area. Thus, when the Indian Government dealt with the Indian boundary with Tibet, they regarded the boundary the British made from 1860s to 1910s as the de facto boundary as well as the settled boundary with Tibet, particularly the McMahon Line.

Nehru, as the Prime Minister of the Indian Government mentioned that the McMahon

Line was the settled Indian-Tibetan boundary many times. As early as November 1950, Nehru expressed his opinion on the McMahon Line as the Indian-Tibetan boundary in the Parliamentary debate. He said:

“Tibet is contiguous to India from the region of Ladakh to the boundary of Nepal, and from Bhutan to the Irrawaddy/Salween divide in Assam. The frontier from Bhutan eastwards has been clearly defined by the McMahon Line which was fixed by the Simla Convention of 1914. The frontier from Ladakh to Nepal is defined chiefly by long usage and custom.”⁴²⁰

This speech clearly showed Nehru’s thoughts in 1950. He believed that the McMahon Line was unquestionably the Indian-Tibetan boundary but the western and middle sectors of Indian-Tibetan boundary had not been confirmed. In addition, when Parliament members asked about the different boundary drawn on the Chinese map as opposed to the Indian map, Nehru emphasized, “Our maps show that the McMahon line is our boundary and that is our boundary-map or no map. That fact remains and we stand by that boundary, and we will not allow anybody to come across that boundary.”⁴²¹ This statement clearly demonstrated Nehru’s thoughts – that the McMahon Line was India’s boundary with Tibet, no matter whether China or Tibet recognized that or not. In fact, India’s border policy, particularly regarding the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary, was influenced greatly by Nehru’s opinions, so much so that it paved a way for the failure of negotiations on the border issue.

Facing a determined attitude from Nehru and the Indian Government with regard to

⁴²⁰ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 75; and Parliamentary Debates, Lok Sabha, 20th November, 1950, Vol. V, No. 4 cols. 155-156.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

the border issue, the Chinese CCP leaders presented their perspectives on the matter. Zhou Enlai, as the Prime Minister of the Communist Chinese Government and the first minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, had always openly expressed his opinion on the Sino-Indian border issue. In September 1951, in a conversation about dealing with the issue of the Tibetan boundary between Zhou Enlai and the Indian ambassador in Beijing, Zhou expressed his intention that China, India and Nepal should have a discussion (in a meeting or negotiation) to solve the issue of the Tibetan boundary. In addition, he also indicated that there was no territorial dispute between China and India.⁴²² This demonstrated that, at that time, the Beijing Government was not as vocal in its rejection of the McMahon Line as the Tibetan-Indian boundary on the eastern sector. However, Zhou also clearly expressed the approach the Beijing Government intended to use in order to solve the boundary problem – he believed it must be solved by a negotiation in a diplomatic meeting. This was an important point, one which the Indian Government always neglected. This would have severe consequences – the Indian Government thought that it was not necessary to hold a negotiation about the boundary issue with China, because Zhou always expressed his opinion of that there was no territorial dispute between China and India, when the Chinese Government intended to solve the problem of the Sino-Indian boundary through a diplomatic meeting or negotiation in future years.

However, there was no any talks or discussion on the Tibetan frontier with the Government of India in the following years of the 1951 conversation, though Indian Government expressed that they welcomed the negotiation Zhou proposed in 1951. In order to search for the reasons, it was necessary to examine from two parties. For the Indian side, Nehru had indicated why the Indian Government did not hold a meeting

⁴²² Jawaharlal Nehru, *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations*, Vol. 1, New Delhi: Government of India, 1961, pp. 184-185.

with China to negotiate with the boundary issue. He thought that the Indian Government did not agree to initiatively hold a formal meeting in order to negotiate the boundary because the Indian believed that their boundary with Tibet was clear.⁴²³ For the Chinese party, the Government of China also did not present any further talks or negotiations on the border issue to the Indian Government after the 1951 conversation, regardless of whether they considered that the negotiation should be presented by India or whether it was not a good time to talk about the boundary issue.

Afterwards, the 1954 *Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India* was the second chance to discuss and solve the border issue for both China and India. However, the two countries did not put the border issue on the table and discuss it during the negotiation when they were discussing the specific items in the 1954 Agreement. The reasons why the two sides did not discuss the border issue were based on their own different considerations and cognitions of the border issue.

It will be clearer to see the reasons from two parties. For the Chinese side, as early as the first day of the Sino-Indian negotiation, 31 December 1953, Zhou Enlai expressed the Chinese standpoint to the Indian delegation. He mentioned that while some problems must exist between China and India; any issues could be discussed and negotiated in accordance with Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.⁴²⁴ Zhou believed that China and India should discuss and solve long-standing issues between the two countries, but that the border issue was not yet a mature enough for the

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (The CCP Central Literature Research Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC), *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan* (Selected Diplomatic works of Zhou Enlai), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe (Central Party Literature Press), 1990, p. 63.

Chinese.⁴²⁵ The Sino-Indian border issue was not an urgent problem for the Government of China when it compared with problems of the Tibetan status and Indian privilege in Tibet.⁴²⁶ Thus, the Chinese side did not present the Sino-Indian border issue as a topic of discussion during the negotiation.

For the Indian side, it was simple to understand why the Indian delegation did not present the border issue during the negotiation, because the Indian delegation followed Nehru's opinion on the McMahon Line and the entire boundary with China. That was there is no any territorial disputes between China and India.

In fact, as early as 1952, when the Nehru asked K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing to reply to Sir G. S. Bajpai, the first Secretary-General of the ROI about the issue of the McMahon Line, Nehru put forward his standpoint once again that it was not beneficial for India's interest if the Indian side presented the issue of the McMahon Line.⁴²⁷ Furthermore, Panikkar also explained Nehru's consideration on the matter. If the Indian side presented the issue of the McMahon Line and the Chinese Government refused to recognize it as a legitimate boundary, it would be harmful to the India's interests. Otherwise, India would take advantage and refuse to discuss this issue of the McMahon Line if the Chinese introduced this question of the McMahon Line.⁴²⁸ This dialogue demonstrated Nehru's opinion on the issue of the McMahon Line once again – it was not presented by the Indian side and the Indian refused to negotiate about the border issue with the Chinese. This attitude influenced India's foreign policy towards the Sino-Indian border issue until

⁴²⁵ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp. 157-158.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁴²⁷ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 76-77.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

the outbreak of the border war in such a fashion that it set up the barrier for the boundary negotiations between China and India. Therefore, the Indian side also did not introduce the question of the McMahon Line into the negotiation.

The Chinese and Indian delegates did only discuss the issues of the Tibetan status and the India's privileges in Tibet and the trade and intercourse between Tibet region and India during the negotiation, and signed the 1954 Agreement together to show the friendship and cooperation between the two countries to the world.⁴²⁹

However, India believed that because the Chinese did not raise the border issue, it meant that the Chinese acquiesced to the status of the McMahon Line which had become the settled boundary between China and India.⁴³⁰ As a result of this, Nehru further developed his standpoint of the border issue between China and India in a memorandum in July 1954. He mentioned:

“Both as flowing from our policy and as a consequence of our agreement with China, this (northern) frontier should be considered a firm and definite one, which is not open to discussion with anybody. A system of check posts should be spread along this entire frontier. More especially we should have check posts in such places as might be considered disputed areas.”⁴³¹

This memorandum clearly shows that Nehru's ideas concerning the Sino-Indian border issue have developed since 1950. At this moment, he believed that not only

⁴²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960* (Collection of the Exchanged Documents of China and Indian on the issue of Relations between Two Countries in Tibet Region of China, the Issue of the Sino-Indian Relations and the Other Issues), Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 1960, pp. 1-3.

⁴³⁰ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 79.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80; and D. R. Mankekar, *The Guilty Men of 1962*, p. 138.

was the McMahon Line (the northeastern boundary with China) confirmed but also the rest of northern border (the western and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary) was settled. This opinion was completely different from what he said in the Parliament in November 1950, “the frontier from Ladakh to Nepal is defined chiefly by long usage and custom.”⁴³² – The western and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary were not settled by the Indian and Chinese Governments together officially.

Furthermore, Nehru did not allow anybody to discuss India’s belief that the western and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary had been confirmed and settled as well as the McMahon Line in the eastern sector. However, the situations in the western and middle sectors of the boundary were more complicated than the McMahon Line, particularly on the western sector. After all, there was no proposed boundary on the western sector as similar as the McMahon Line which was drawn in the Simla Convention of 1914. Although the British proposed the Macartney – MacDonald Line to the Beijing Government as part of a plan to officially discuss the western boundary between the Chinese and British Governments in 1899, the Qing court ignored and never gave a reply to this proposal of negotiations for the western boundary. However, the Macartney – MacDonald Line divided a big part of Aksai Chin, which was the most disputed region in the western sector of the boundary in 1950-60s and included areas that the Chinese built Xinjiang-Tibet Road in the middle of 1950s, into the Chinese territory.⁴³³ In addition to this proposed alignment, the Johnson Line and the Ardagh Line, which divided Aksai Chin into the Indian territory, had never been presented officially by the British as a part of negotiations about the

⁴³² Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 75; and Parliamentary Debates, Lok Sabha, 20th November, 1950, Vol. V, No. 4 cols. 155-156.

⁴³³ Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 174.

western boundary with the Chinese Central Government.⁴³⁴ However, the Government of the ROI did not follow the Macartney – MacDonald alignment on the western sector and regarded Aksai Chin as a part of India's territories.⁴³⁵ In fact, there was no one particular alignment to divide the Sino-Indian boundary on the western sector. There were eleven changes of the alignment in the western boundary in the era of the British Raj and they could be concluded as the three basic alignments.⁴³⁶ Yet, the Indian Government chose one of them which could not be accepted by the Beijing Government. The Beijing Government regarded the western boundary with a firm attitude, because it considered the Xinjiang-Tibet Road in the region of Aksai Chin as a crucial national interest. Even if the Chinese Government might put the McMahon Line as a weight into a negotiation of the Sino-Indian frontier, it would not give up the region of Aksai Chin because of its national security and strategy. When the Indian Government presented that the Sino-Indian boundary on the western sector was settled (by the Indian intention – put Aksai Chin into the Indian territory) as same as the frontier on the eastern sector and there was no any room to discuss it, the Government of China would not accept it. Therefore, a dispute and a potential of conflict occurred afterwards.

Under these circumstances, the Chinese Government was as unlikely to accept the India's territorial demands on the western sector as different as they were to possibly accept the McMahon Line on the eastern sector. Additionally, there were three more reasons why the Chinese Government could not accept India's claim on the western sector.

⁴³⁴ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 33-34.

⁴³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 293; and, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India, p. 26.

⁴³⁶ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 81.

The first reason was that the Indian Government did not appoint any administrative officers or troops to Aksai Chin, which was “bleak and difficult terrain for any traveller”, to administrate there before 1958 as different as they did in the NEFA below the McMahon Line in the early 1950s.⁴³⁷ The reasons for this were not solely limited to the barrenness of Aksai Chin a barren land, but also due to its location, which proved hard to access from the Indian side. The Karakoram and Ladakh mountains on the west, and the Changchenmo valley on the south were three crucial passes which connected the rest of India to Aksai Chin, but all of them were difficult to go through.

The second reason was the geographic importance of the location for China. In contrast to the difficulties facing the Indians, it was more easy to reach Aksai Chin from the Chinese side. Because Aksai Chin is situated in a region between Xinjiang and Tibet, there was an ancient trade route across Aksai Chin.⁴³⁸ Moreover, there were no any mountains and rivers to restrict people from the Chinese side to Aksai Chin. In addition, the location of Aksai Chin, which connected Xinjiang and Tibet, was important for the Chinese.

The third reason was that the Indian Government had never presented openly the official announcement of claim of Aksai Chin to the Chinese Government until 1958 when the Indian Government found out a Chinese road across the region of Aksai Chin, although it believed that Aksai Chin was a part of the Indian territories.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁷ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 86.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 88; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 293; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959 (White Paper I)*, p. 26.

Consequently, when the Chinese Government built a strategic road connecting Xinjiang and Tibet across the east of Aksai Chin in the middle 1950s, the Indian Government knew nothing about it, because it did not deploy any garrison to go on patrol in the region of Aksai Chin at that time. Subsequently, when Nehru became aware that the Chinese built a road across Aksai Chin in 1958, he presented his protest to the Chinese Government then.

In summation, when Nehru insisted upon regarding the McMahon Line as the settled Sino-Indian boundary and presented his opinion to the Chinese Government at first, Zhou Enlai did not refused this standpoint immediately and might even have agreed to the McMahon Line. However, Zhou's attitude was built upon new official frontier agreements between the two new governments – the Government of the PRC and the Government of the ROI, rather than the previous 1914 Simla Convention, which it was not recognized by every Central Governments of China from 1914. When both countries had the intention to not carry out the negotiations on the Sino-Indian boundary before 1954, any potential settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute was lost. When Nehru developed his standpoint of the Sino-Indian border dispute from the McMahon Line to the entire north border and when the Chinese Government built a road connecting Xinjiang and Tibet across Aksai Chin, the potential for border conflicts in the west sector of the Sino-Indian border in future was a possibility. As such, the two leaders, Nehru and Zhou, began to exchange letters on the Sino-Indian border issue to try to solve this issue, prompted by Nehru's initial letter to Zhou on 14 December 1958.⁴⁴⁰

⁴⁴⁰ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), p. 48; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 172.

The second important factor affecting the Sino-Indian diplomatic dialogue was the letter exchanges between Nehru and Zhou from December 1958. The two Prime Ministers on behalf of their governments communicated and discussed in the border issue through letter exchanges from 1958 to 1960. Although these letter exchanges should be no more than personal letters, within them the policy changes of two governments over different period can be seen.

The first round of letter exchanges on the Sino-Indian border issue started from a letter from Nehru to Zhou Enlai on 14 December 1958. Nehru used a large number of words in the letter to show his standpoint on the Sino-Indian border issue – there was no disputes or problems on the Sino-Indian border and the boundary was clear and settled between India and China. Nehru emphasized three points on the Sino-Indian border issue in this letter. Firstly, Nehru thought that the border issue was regarded as a settled problem and was further discussed by the both Chinese and Indian delegations in the 1954 negotiation, so he believed the border issue should be not included in the unsettled issues they were not discussed in the 1954 negotiations. Furthermore, he believed that “in fact we thought that the Sino-Indian Agreement, which was happily concluded in 1954, had settled all outstanding problems between our two countries.”⁴⁴¹ Therefore, Nehru emphasized that the Sino-Indian border had no issues or disputes in his first point.

Secondly, Nehru quoted a section of what Zhou Enlai said in a dialogue with Nehru at India’s Bhakra-Nangal at the end of 1956. Zhou said that he would like to acknowledge a part of the McMahon Line on the Indian side as the boundary as well as saying he had already recognized a part of the McMahon Line in the Burmese side

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

as the Sino-Burmese boundary in a separate Sino-Burmese negotiation. Nehru considered it as a little border problem rather than the border dispute between China and India. Additionally, they reached an agreement that this little problem should be solved in a conference in which both Chinese and Indian representatives participated. However, the conference negotiation did not obtain any result.⁴⁴² In Nehru's second point, he stressed that Zhou had promised him that he would recognize the McMahon Line, though the following conference about the "little" border issue did not obtain any results.

Thirdly, Nehru considered a Chinese map published in a Chinese magazine, *China Pictorial*, a few months ago as an incorrect map with the wrong Sino-Indian boundaries, particular in the NEFA of India. He also mentioned that the two governments had already discussed this map. The Chinese replied that the current published Chinese map was in accordance with the maps published in the period of the Republic of China, and the current Chinese Government had not prospected and surveyed its boundary, so they would not change its border without consultation with the relevant countries.⁴⁴³ Furthermore, Nehru raised his question on this Chinese reply:

"I was puzzled by this reply because I thought that there was no major boundary dispute between China and India. There never has been such a dispute so far as we are concerned and in my talks with you in 1954 and subsequently, I had stated this...

⁴⁴² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 173-174; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), pp. 49-50.

⁴⁴³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 174-175; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), pp. 50-51.

there can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries...⁴⁴⁴

In Nehru's third point, it is proven that he once again stressed that the Sino-Indian boundary was settled and there were no any problems of frontier between China and India; moreover, he was confused with the reason, which the Chinese Government gave, of why the Chinese Government considered the Sino-Indian border was unfixed. Because he held the precondition that the Sino-Indian border was settled and there was no border dispute between China and India, whether the Chinese Government had already surveyed the Chinese boundaries or not.

Overall, this letter from Nehru to Zhou Enlai was written in both friendly tone and words, but Nehru had already manifested his standpoint of the Sino-Indian border issue. This also formed the basis of India's border policy towards China in the following years.

Zhou Enlai replied to Nehru's letter on 23 January 1959. He stressed five crucial points about the Sino-Indian border issue in this reply. Firstly, he indicated that the two governments had never delimited and never demarcated the boundary on the ground, and that China and India had never concluded any treaties or agreements concerning the Sino-Indian border; furthermore, the two governments had some differences of opinion on the Sino-Indian border issue. In addition, Zhou presented an

⁴⁴⁴ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), p. 51; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 175.

instance of the dispute of Aksai Chin to prove that the territorial dispute did exist.⁴⁴⁵ These points showed that Zhou's opinion on the Sino-Indian border issue was dramatically opposed to Nehru's standpoint of the border problem. Nehru considered the Sino-Indian boundary as a settled and unquestionable boundary, whereas Zhou believed that the official delimitation of the Sino-Indian boundary between the two governments had never been carried out.

Secondly, Zhou considered that the condition of discussing the Sino-Indian border issue was not mature when the two governments negotiated the *Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India* in 1954, thus the Chinese Government did not put forward the border issue for negotiation at that moment. As well as this, he believed that the frontier problem would be solved by the friendly negotiation in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence between the Governments of China and India.⁴⁴⁶ Zhou explained the reason as to why the Chinese Government did not raise the issue of the Sino-Indian border during the negotiation in 1954.

Thirdly, Zhou talked about the issue of the McMahon Line. There were three crucial points he mentioned in this part of letter. The first point was that the McMahon Line was the product of the incursive policy of the British colonialism of the Tibet Region of China, and the Chinese people were angry with it. The second point was that all

⁴⁴⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 177; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), pp. 52-53.

⁴⁴⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 177; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), p. 53.

previous Governments of China did not recognize it because of its illegitimacy in law. Although the representative of Tibet Region of China signed the relevant document, the local authority of Tibet was not satisfied with this boundary, having been delimited by the British unilaterally. The third point concerned the attitude and policy of China in relation to the McMahon Line. On the one hand, the Chinese Government considered that it was necessary to adopt a realistic respective towards the McMahon Line, because India and Burma, which were inexorably linked with the McMahon Line, had become independent and friendly countries to China. On the other hand, the Chinese Government believed that it would take time to look for the method to solve the problem of the McMahon Line.⁴⁴⁷ Zhou raised two standpoints concerning the McMahon line. On the one hand, the McMahon Line was an illegal boundary to China. On the other hand, the Chinese Government would like to accept this as the de facto boundary between China and India after the two governments came to a settlement about the historical issue of the McMahon Line.

Fourthly, Zhou explained the issue of the Chinese map to Nehru. Due to the unsettlement of the Sino-Indian border and the divergences of the cognition of the border between China and India, one could clearly understand the reason as to why the maps issued in the two countries were different. Additionally, the Chinese boundaries with their neighbours in the current Chinese map followed previous maps issued in the period of Republic of China. Although the Chinese Government did not consider that every part of this boundary on the Chinese map had enough evidence, it was not reasonable that the Chinese Government would change the Chinese boundary on the Chinese map if they did not conduct surveys on the ground and nor undertake

⁴⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 177-178; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), p. 53.

discussion with the relative countries. Furthermore, if the Chinese Government changed china's boundaries on the Chinese map, it would raise queries from the Chinese people. In fact, they had already demand the Chinese Government ask the Indian Government about the Sino-Indian boundary, particularly the western sector of the boundary, on the Indian map, because they were astonished at the Sino-Indian boundary on maps issued in India. Finally, the Chinese Government believed that the Sino-Indian boundary issue on the map would be settled by a survey on the ground and bilateral negotiation between the Government of China and the Government of India.⁴⁴⁸ It was evident that Zhou insisted upon adopting a settlement which included a survey on the ground and the negotiations with the Government of India in order to address the issue of the Sino-Indian border.

Finally, Zhou offered some suggestions on the avoidance of border incidents and conflicts. First of all, the two governments should retain the current status of the Sino-Indian border. In addition, the two governments could solve the divergent problems by consultations and negotiations, such as the negotiation on the Wuje incident. Finally, Zhou expressed his hopes that the Indian Government could accept the advice of retaining the status quo of the Sino-Indian border.⁴⁴⁹ Clearly, Zhou's intention was to solve the border issue through bilateral negotiations between China and India once again.

From Zhou's reply to Nehru in the letter exchanges between two Prime Ministers, it

⁴⁴⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 178; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), pp. 53-54.

⁴⁴⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 178; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), p. 54.

was clear that Zhou answered and explained what Nehru had asked and was confused about in relation to the Sino-Indian border issue and the border policy of the Chinese Government. In addition, Zhou also emphasized that the settlement of the border issue should be carried out under bilateral negotiations between China and India. Finally, what Zhou expressed in this letter was the scope of China's border policy and the Chinese Government followed the ethos in dealing with the border issue with India in the following years.

After that, there were five more rounds of letter exchanges on the Sino-Indian border issue between the two Prime Ministers from 22 March 1959 to 19 March 1960.⁴⁵⁰ They stressed constantly their different opinions on the border issue and the border policies of each government on the basis of the content of the first round of letter exchanges. The letter exchanges were another unofficial diplomatic way to discuss the Sino-Indian border issue between two governments besides the official note exchanges of government. Although the letter exchange did not achieve the settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue, it was beneficial for the two countries to realize the standpoints from the opposite side and promote diplomatic dialogues between the two governments.

The third important factor affecting the Sino-Indian diplomatic dialogue was the reason of the failure of a diplomatic settlement on the Sino-Indian border. After the

⁴⁵⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 180-233; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), pp. 55-57; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September-November 1959* (White Paper II), pp. 27-52; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959-March 1960* (White Paper III), pp. 45-99; *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: March 1960-November 1960* (White Paper IV), p. 6.

1959 Tibetan Rebellion to the 1962 Border War, there were several rounds of letter exchanges between the two Prime Ministers and hundreds of note exchanges between the Governments of China and India, but the diplomatic approach failed to prevent the border war. The reasons as to why the diplomacy could not solve the Sino-Indian border issue and of why diplomacy between two countries failed to reach an agreement on the border issue are the questions it intends to answer in this part of the chapter.

These reasons will be considered under three points: the misunderstandings of words in the letter exchanges between the two Prime Ministers, the different attitudes on the negotiation of the border issue between the two Prime Ministers, and the conflicts of the border policies of the two governments. The first reason for the diplomatic failure of the Sino-Indian border issue was the misunderstanding of the words in the letter exchanges between the two Prime Ministers. The misunderstanding concerned suggestions Zhou put forward to Nehru about alleviating the border tension and solving the border issue gradually.

With regards as to which suggestion caused a misunderstanding, it occurred in the letter from Zhou to Nehru in the second round of letter exchanges between the two Prime Ministers. As it mentioned above, Zhou Enlai replied to Nehru's letter in the first round of the letter exchanges between two Prime Ministers on 23 January 1959. The two Prime Ministers expressed clearly their cognitions to Sino-Indian border disputes but without evidence to prove their different opinions. Thus, in order to refute Zhou, Nehru started the second round of the letter exchanges on 22 March 1959, during the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion. In this letter from Nehru to Zhou, Nehru used certain pieces of evidence, which included governmental agreements and treaties, in

order to support his opinion on the Sino-Indian border dispute with the determined attitude.⁴⁵¹ He emphasized that the western and eastern boundary were settled by the two different treaties – the 1842 treaty between Kashmir and Tibet for the western sector and the 1914 Simla Convention attaching the McMahon Line for the eastern sector.

With regards to the 1842 treaty between Kashmir and Tibet, both of two contracting parties expressed their intention to maintain the boundary of Ladakh and Tibet in the script of the treaty. The Tibetan authority made a promise to authorities of Kashmir and Ladakh:

“We shall neither at present nor in future have anything to do or interfere at all with the boundaries of Ladakh and its surroundings as fixed from ancient times and will allow the annual export of wool, shawls and tea by way of Ladakh according to the old established custom.”⁴⁵²

The authority of Kashmir and Ladakh also promise Tibetan authority:

“We shall remain in possession of the limits of the boundaries of Ladakh and surrounding dependencies, in accordance with the old custom, and there shall be no transgression and no interference beyond the old, established frontiers. We shall remain within our own limits and boundaries.”⁴⁵³

⁴⁵¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 180-182; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: 1954-1959* (White Paper I), pp. 55-56.

⁴⁵² *Report on the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question*, New Delhi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of India, 1961, p. 53.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

It can be seen clearly that the two parties only promised to comply with the old and established frontier between Ladakh and Tibet but it was not mentioned where the boundary was exactly. Neville Maxwell considered that the 1842 treaty in fact was a non-aggressive treaty and it did not delimit a Ladakhi and Tibetan boundary.⁴⁵⁴ He also believed that it showed that Ladakh and Tibet were neighbouring but not adjoining and there were a tract of “mountainous no-man’s-land” between their limits.⁴⁵⁵ Thus, the old and established frontiers should not stand for a boundary between Ladakh and Tibet delimited by the modern concept. In addition, Lord Hardinge, who was the governor-general of India from 1844 to 1848, had unilaterally cancelled some pieces of 1842 treaty which he believed that it harmed to the British interests; and moreover, his action meant to abolish the 1842 treaty.⁴⁵⁶

Because of the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion and the democratic reform in Tibet, Zhou’s letter in reply to Nehru was written on 8 September 1959. In this letter, Zhou did not talk about whether or not the Chinese Government might accept the McMahon line as a part of the Sino-Indian boundaries under certain conditions, but did cite evidence to prove that there was never any delimitation between the Governments of China and India around the Sino-Indian border, and to prove the Sino-Indian boundary drawn in the Chinese map was followed by the traditional customary limit on the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. Moreover, he also stressed with supporting evidence, which the Chinese representative did not sign on the Simla Convention, that the McMahon Line was invalid in law.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁴ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 24.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 185-188; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September 1959- November 1959* (White Paper II), pp. 28-31.

In the forepart of this letter, Zhou officially present the first suggestion:

“The Chinese Government has consistently held that an over-all settlement of the boundary question should be sought by both sides, taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the Five Principles, through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way step by step. Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing status quo of the border, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, even less by force.”⁴⁵⁸

The words written by Zhou included two crucial points. The first point was that the first part of letter included an ideal settlement on the Sino-Indian border issue for the Chinese Government – namely that the Sino-Indian border issue should be solved in an over-all settlement (including the western, middle and eastern sectors of the boundary) rather than only a part of settlement, such as the McMahon Line on the eastern sector of the boundary. This spirit of settlement was what the Chinese Government was insisting on all the time.

The second point was that the latter part of the letter contained crucial words that caused a misunderstanding between the two Prime Ministers. The words; of “the two side should maintain the long-existing status quo of the border” became the words that caused a divergence. When Zhou wrote of “maintain(ing) the long-existing status quo of the border”, he meant the border situation in the last decade or the previous years – with the Indian Government maintaining its administration in the NEFA

⁴⁵⁸ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September 1959- November 1959* (White Paper II), pp. 27-28; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 184-185.

below the McMahon Line on the eastern sector of the border, whereas the Chinese Government would keep its governance in Aksai Chin on the western sector of the border.

However, when Nehru saw this part of the letter, according to Neville Maxwell's research, Nehru considered the "status quo" (of the border) was controversial.⁴⁵⁹ He thought two sides should maintain the border situation before the Chinese entered into the region of Aksai Chin on the western sector of the border and after India administrated in the region of the Himalayas below the McMahon Line on the eastern sector of the border.⁴⁶⁰ Neville Maxwell's research also proved this point of view.⁴⁶¹

Evidence as to the misunderstanding of "the status quo of the border" between Nehru and Zhou can be proven by the texts in the third and fourth rounds of the letter exchanges between the two Prime Ministers. In the letter from Nehru to Zhou in the third round of letter exchanges on 26 September 1959, Nehru completely agreed with what Zhou said about maintaining the status quo of the border.⁴⁶² It seemed that Nehru agreed with Zhou's opinion on the alleviation of the border tension. However, when Zhou sent a letter in reply to Nehru on 7 November 1959 and presented a suggestion on what specific measure could be taken in order to alleviate the border tension, Nehru put forward alternate advice.

⁴⁵⁹ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), p. 50; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 217.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶¹ Neville, Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 137-138.

⁴⁶² *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September 1959- November 1959* (White Paper II), p. 45; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 203.

Zhou presented a suggestion in the letter on 7 November 1959:

“... The armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometres at once from the so-called McMahon line in the east, and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order. This proposal is in effect an extension of the Indian Government’s proposal contained in its note dated September 10 that neither side should send its armed personnel to a proposal to separate the troops of the two sides by as great a distance as 40 kilometres. If there is any need to increase this distance, the Chinese Government is also willing to give it consideration...”⁴⁶³

Zhou’s suggestion seemed to look beneficial for the two countries, particularly in the unarmed areas around the McMahon Line on the eastern sector of the border and the line of actual control on the western sector of the border. However, in the letter from Nehru to Zhou in the fourth round of letter exchanges on the 16 November 1959, Nehru stated that he did not agree with Zhou’s suggestion completely. He separated the western sector from the eastern and middle sectors of the disputed border as part of his discussion in this letter. ⁴⁶⁴

With regards to the eastern sector of the boundary, Nehru believed:

⁴⁶³ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), p. 46; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 213.

⁴⁶⁴ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, pp. 137-138.

“... There should not be the slightest risk of any border clash if each Government instructs its outposts not to send out patrols. It is only when armed patrols go out in these difficult mountainous areas that there is likelihood of clashes taking place... It would be extremely difficult in practice to establish a new line of outposts in the rear, whether they are to be ten or twenty kilometres from the international boundary. The risk of border clashes will be completely eliminated if our suggestion is accepted by your Government.”⁴⁶⁵

It is evident that, although Nehru's suggestion differed from Zhou's suggestion that the armed forces of both countries should withdraw to a distance 20 kilometres from the McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the border, Nehru agreed that the armed forces of the two sides should not encounter one another along the boundary. To this extent, there was no divergence of opinion about the settlement of the border tension on the eastern sector of the border between Nehru and Zhou. As to the middle sector of the border, Nehru also considered to take the same measures as taken in the eastern sector of the border. He stated:

“I presume that your suggestion for a zone of withdrawal is intended also to apply to the Sino-Indian border in the middle areas... If, therefore, we observe the precaution which I have mentioned above, all risk of border clashes will be eliminated in this sector of the frontier also.”⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁵ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), p. 49; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 216.

⁴⁶⁶ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), p. 49; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 217.

However, with regard to the western sector of the border, Nehru presented an opinion, which was completely different from Zhou's suggestion on this part of the border on 17 November. He stated:

“... In the Ladakh area, both our Governments should agree on the following as an interim measure. The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which so far as we are aware, are their latest maps. Similarly, the Chinese Government should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India in their earlier notes and correspondence and shown in their official maps. Since the two lines are separated by long distances, there should not be the slightest risk of border clashes between the forces on either side...”⁴⁶⁷

The text seemed to look logical and reasonable for the two sides. But, if you put Nehru's suggestions on the western, the middle and the eastern sectors of the border together, they actually reveal two crucial points. On the one hand, on the eastern sector of the border, the two governments could not deploy any forces close to the McMahon Line so it made the McMahon Line the de facto boundary between China and India. On the other hand, on the western sector of the border, there was no such limit as the McMahon Line on the eastern sector of the border. So, according to the Nehru's suggestion, the Chinese Government had to withdraw forces and personnel from the region Aksai Chin as well as the Xinjiang-Tibet Road to the east of the

⁴⁶⁷ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), p. 50; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 218.

international boundary on the Indian map, whereas the Indian had only to withdraw from Demchok in the southeast of Ladakh, which was the only small area controlled by Indian forces in the region of Aksai Chin,⁴⁶⁸ to west of the international boundary on the 1956 Chinese map. In other words, Nehru's suggestion meant that both governments should withdraw from Aksai Chin, when the Chinese controlled the major regions of Aksai Chin at that moment, and as a result this would make Aksai Chin become an unoccupied region for both sides. Consequently, this suggestion could not be accepted by the Chinese.

To sum up, what Nehru suggested was far away from Zhou's suggestion of maintaining the status quo of the border. Zhou considered that the two governments should withdraw their forces 20 kilometres from regions where the other side was de facto controlling – the Chinese forces withdrew 20 kilometres from the McMahon Line on the eastern sector, whereas the Indian forces withdrew 20 kilometres from the western frontier of Aksai Chin on the western sector. However, Nehru believed that two forces should not contact along the McMahon Line on the eastern sector, whereas Aksai Chin should be an unoccupied area – the Chinese should withdraw from Aksai Chin. In other words, India could maintain their vested interest – the NEFA below the McMahon Line, whereas the Chinese had to give up its vested interest – Aksai Chin, particularly the Xinjiang-Tibet Road. This was the crucial misunderstanding of Nehru's concerning Zhou's suggestion of maintaining the status quo of the border. Zhou considered that the two sides could keep their vested interests, but Nehru thought that only the Indian could maintain the vested interest, whereas the Chinese must give up their vested interest, because he believed the region of Aksai Chin

⁴⁶⁸ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September 1959- November 1959* (White Paper II), p. 48; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 206.

belonged to India, no matter whether or not it was controlled by the Chinese Government. However, did Nehru ever consider if the Chinese also use the Indian's logic to consider about the Sino-Indian border disputes on the eastern – which China did ignore the India's administration in the NEFA (the South Tibet) of the controversial territory below the McMahon Line and India must give it up, because the Chinese did insist upon that this disputed region belongs to China, where was a road to the efficient solution for the frontier disputes? Consequently, the misunderstanding between the two Prime Ministers forced the discussion on settlement of the border tension to come to a dead end.

The second reason of the diplomatic failure of the Sino-Indian border issue was the different attitudes on the negotiation of the border issue between the two Prime Ministers. This reason was a more important factor than the first reason concerning the misunderstanding between the two Prime Ministers to result in the failure of a diplomatic solution to the Sino-Indian border issue.

In fact, the attitude of the Chinese Government on the negotiation of the border issue has never changed. As it mentioned in the previous text, Zhou had expressed his intention of solving the Sino-Indian border issue by bilateral negotiations in the letter from Zhou to Nehru on 8 September 1959.⁴⁶⁹ He also reiterated this intention many times in the letter exchanges between the two Prime Ministers after that, and this attitude did not change concerning what he believed to be the best opportunity to solve the Sino-Indian border issue from 1959 to 1960.

⁴⁶⁹ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September 1959- November 1959* (White Paper II), p. 27; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 185.

However, India's attitude was such a polar opposite to Zhou's that it made bilateral negotiations very difficult to achieve. It can be seen clearly the attitude of Nehru to negotiations on the Sino-Indian border issue. Nehru's attitude experienced a change in stages from 1959 to 1960. In the beginning, he had a firm standpoint on the Sino-Indian border issue – there was no any border dispute between China and India, and the Sino-Indian boundary had been settled. It is mentioned in the previous text that Nehru has put forward that the McMahon Line, which was regulated by the 1914 Simla Convention, was the settled boundary between China and India at parliament in November 1950.⁴⁷⁰ In other words, he believed that the northeastern boundary with China was firmly established. Afterwards, Nehru expressed his thoughts that the northern border was settled and unquestionable like the McMahon Line in a memorandum on July 1954.⁴⁷¹ It was obvious that he developed his idea from the northeastern border (the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border) to the entire northern border (the western and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian border). From then on, Nehru believed that the Sino-Indian border was settled and unquestionable. It also is mentioned in the previous text that this standpoint made him refuse to negotiate on the border issue with the Chinese.

Nehru regarded the McMahon Line as the settled boundary on the eastern sector, so he did not allowed negotiations on that with the Chinese. Moreover, on the western sector of the border, Nehru expressed another attitude. When Nehru replied to Zhou's letter on 26 September 1959, he talked about the negotiations on the western sector in the letter in reply that "no discussions can be fruitful unless the posts on the Indian side of the traditional frontier now held by the Chinese forces are first evacuated by

⁴⁷⁰ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 75; and Parliamentary Debates, Lok Sabha, 20th November, 1950, Vol. V, No. 4 cols. 155-156.

⁴⁷¹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 80; and D. R. Mankekar, *Guilty Men of 1962*, p. 138.

them and further threats and intimidations immediately cease.”⁴⁷²

Evidently, Nehru was of the opinion that a Chinese withdrew from Aksai Chin region was a necessary precondition to carry out the negotiations on the western sector of the border. However, Nehru’s attitude made the negotiations difficult to carry out, because Nehru’s precondition was similar with that the Chinese demanded that India should unilaterally withdraw from the NEFA for China. Since India would not withdraw from the NEFA, Could the Chinese accept Nehru’s demand to withdraw from Aksai Chin and give up the Xinjiang-Tibet Road? The answer would be negative probably, because the Chinese Government would be hard to unilaterally yield prior to the negotiation of the Sino-Indian border issue.

Because the negotiations on the border issue was not carried out between China and India in October after this round of letter exchanges between the two Prime Ministers, another border clash after the Longju incident on the eastern sector of the border – the Kongka Pass incident – took place on the western sector of the border in late October. The Sino-Indian border conflict was the third reason for the diplomatic failure of the Sino-Indian border issue. During two days from 20 to 21 October, two conflicts between the Chinese frontier troop and the Indian armed personnel happened in the area of south of KongKa Pass where was regarded as a part of Tibet by the Chinese and regarded as a part of Ladakh by the Indian. During the clash, there were casualty figures of two parties. After the conflicts, the ten Indian armed personnel were taken as prisoners by the Chinese soldiers. The Chinese Government pronounced that the Indian armed personnel illegally invaded into the Chinese territory where the Chinese

⁴⁷² *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September 1959- November 1959* (White Paper II), p. 45; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, p. 204.

frontier force stationed, whereas the Government of India proclaimed that the Indian policemen who were in their patrol in the territory of India had been suddenly attacked by the Chinese army. Both of the two parties refuted each other that the opposite side had not described a truth.⁴⁷³ In addition, when China discussed the matter concerning returning prisoners of war with India, the two parties insist upon their own arguments on the issue of the treatment of Indian prisoners in Chinese camp. The Chinese presented some statements and signatures of Indian prisoners that showed they had a good treatment in the Chinese camp, whereas the Indian Government believed that in such environment the contents of statements of the Indian prisoners were not believable enough and Indian prisoners actually were in the state of the ill-treatment in the Chinese camp.⁴⁷⁴ The incident of Kongka pass was the second clash between China and India around the Sino-Indian frontier in the second half of 1959. It deepened the estrangement and misunderstanding between China and India.

After that, Nehru presented his precondition of bilateral negotiations, which all Chinese personal should withdraw from the region of Aksai Chin, in a letter on 16 November 1959. Additionally, as expected, in the letter in reply from Zhou to Nehru on 17 December 1959, Zhou refuted Nehru's suggestion on the western sector of the border and stressed his standpoint that Aksai Chin was a part of Chinese territories and was situated on the Chinese side of the traditional line between China and

⁴⁷³ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: September 1959- November 1959* (White Paper II), pp. 13-18; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti*, *Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 297-304.

⁴⁷⁴ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), pp. 1-44; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti*, *Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 310-355.

India.⁴⁷⁵ Therefore, the two Prime Ministers constantly adhered to their respective standpoints in their letter exchanges in 1959, so it resulted in the divergence between them growing larger and the opportunity to solve the issue through negotiations grow smaller.

In addition, because of the divergence, Zhou Enlai put forward a suggestion to carry out talks between the two Prime Ministers in a letter as early as the 7 November 1959. Although Nehru did not refuse this suggestion, he mentioned that the talks should be held at a proper place and time in a letter of reply from Nehru to Zhou on 16 November 1959. However, after Zhou refused Nehru's precondition on the western sector of the border, Nehru also refused Zhou's proposal of the meeting between the two Prime Ministers on 26 December 1959, and he considered that the great divergence in opinions made it impossible for the two sides to reach an agreement.⁴⁷⁶ Consequently, what Nehru insisted still was that the border issue could not be negotiated.

Afterwards, Nehru's attitude changed in early 1960 after the Chinese Government presented an official note to the Indian Government on 26 December 1959. The Chinese Government put forward three questions on the Sino-Indian border issue and the approach to the border issue.⁴⁷⁷ Although Nehru still insisted on his standpoint

⁴⁷⁵ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), pp. 53-54; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 221-222.

⁴⁷⁶ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), p. 58; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 226-227.

⁴⁷⁷ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), pp. 60-82; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 244-266.

that no negotiation would be held on the basis of the viewpoint that the Sino-Indian border had never been delimited, he suggested that they could meet in Delhi in the second half of March 1960.⁴⁷⁸ After several letter exchanges between the two Prime Ministers, the time of meeting was chosen as the 19 April 1960.⁴⁷⁹ This meeting between the two Prime Ministers looked beneficial for the two sides to solve the border issue, but there were no agreements or significant results achieved in this meeting. Furthermore, the letter exchanges between the two Prime Ministers, which comprised such a good diplomatic method besides official notes, were terminated. The border tension was progressing towards a dangerous situation after the failure of the negotiations between the two Prime Ministers.

The Escalation of the Sino-Indian Border Crisis and the 1962 Border War

In addition to the failure of the Sino-Indian negotiations on the border issue, the escalation of the Sino-Indian border crisis was another reason and the main reason in causing the 1962 Border War to break out. The escalation of the border crisis consisted of two main parts – the two governments' border policies and their foreign policies.

The first factor to intensify the border crisis was the two governments' respective border policies. Because the Indian Government insisted that the border issue could

⁴⁷⁸ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1959- March 1960* (White Paper III), pp. 228-229; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 83-84.

⁴⁷⁹ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: March 1960- November 1960* (White Paper IV), pp. 6-7; and, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *Zhongguo he Yindu guanyu liangguo zai Zhongguo Xizang defang de guanxi wenti, Zhongyin bianjie wenti he qita wenti wanglai wenjian huibian: August 1950 – April 1960*, pp. 83-84.

not be negotiated between China and India, after the last opportunity in the two Prime Ministers' summit between China and India was lost in April 1960, the Indian Government started to prepare to adopt the Forward Policy to deal with the Sino-Indian border issue, particularly in the disputed region on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border – Aksai Chin which had been controlled by the Chinese since the end of 1961. The Forward Policy of the Indian Government was put forward officially in a minister meeting at the Prime Minister's office on 2 November 1961.⁴⁸⁰ The Forward Policy was summarized by three instructions as below:

“1. So far as Ladakh is concerned, we are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the international border. This will be done with a view to establishing our posts which should prevent the Chinese from advancing any further and also dominating from any posts which they may have already established in our territory. This must be done without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese, unless this becomes necessary in self-defence.

2. As regards U.P. (Uttar Pradesh, i.e. the middle sector) and other northern areas there are not the same difficulties as in Ladakh. We should, therefore, as far as practicable, go forward and be in effective occupation of the whole frontier. Where there are any gaps they must be covered either by patrolling or by posts.

3. In view of the numerous operational and administrative difficulties, efforts should be made to position major concentrations of forces along our borders in places conveniently situated behind the forward posts from where they could be maintained logistically and from where they can restore a border situation at short notice.”⁴⁸¹

The spirit of the Forward Policy of the Indian Government was deploying patrols to

⁴⁸⁰ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 221-223.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 221-222.

go forward towards the de facto control line and cross it and set up posts in the regions occupied by China but claimed by India, no matter whether they might be controlled by the Chinese forces or not.⁴⁸² Because the Chinese only occupied the major region of Aksai Chin (1. the Indian Government considered the region of Aksai Chin as a part of Ladakh of India. 2. Demchok, which situates at the southwest of Aksai Chin was controlled by India at the time) and India controlled the disputed territories on the middle and eastern sector of the border, the Forward Policy was mainly aimed at wresting control of more lands from the Chinese in the region of Aksai Chin in the western sector of the border. However, the potential threat of the border conflict was realized when the Indian patrols met the Chinese military positions or the Chinese patrols encountered the Indian posts in Aksai Chin – the disputed territory between China and India.

In addition, It was obvious that the first paragraph of quotation was an instruction to adopt the Forward Policy in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border; the second paragraph was an order to adopt the Forward Policy in the middle sector of the border; the third paragraph focused on how to avoid and address the problem of the lack of the force and the logistic issue when the Forward Policy was implementing. Moreover, the third paragraph was more crucial than the first two paragraphs, because it was a precondition for the success of the Forward Policy, particularly in the western sector of the border – a wide range of barren and deserted lands.

However, when the Indian Army Headquarters gave the official order to begin the implementation of the Forward Policy to the Western and Eastern Command on 5 December 1961, the instructions to concentrate their forces were omitted, though the

⁴⁸² Ibid., pp. 173-175.

instructions regarding the logistical problems existed in the order.⁴⁸³ Therefore, the lack of forces was one reason for India's military failure in the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, particularly in the western sector of the border.

Since the Forward Policy was adopted by the Indian Army from the end of 1961, India began to patrol more and more regions and built up many posts in Aksai Chin. Moreover, they even established many posts which were able to look upon to the Chinese positions and which were on the back roads with their flanks behind the Chinese positions.⁴⁸⁴ The aim of the Indian patrols was forcing the Chinese to retreat from their positions, but this action would bring serious consequence. If the Chinese did not retreat, the potential for conflict between the two forces would arise.

As a matter of fact, the Chinese started to counterattack on the ground of the western sector of the border from the beginning of 1962. The Chinese troops built up many posts around the Indian posts which intended to restrict the Chinese positions.⁴⁸⁵ In the meanwhile, the Chinese Government gave an official note to the Indian Government on 30 April 1962. In this note, the Chinese Government presented a protest to the Indian Government concerning the Indian patrols, the established posts and the invasion to the Chinese territory. In addition, the Chinese Government also claimed that in this circumstance the Chinese troops had restarted their frontier patrols, which had ceased under the Chinese Government since 1959, from the Karakoram Pass to the Kongka Pass on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, this was because the Indian Government did not adhere the Chinese proposal of 1959, which advised that both sides should retreat their military personnel 20 kilometres from the

⁴⁸³ Ibid., pp. 222-223.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 235.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 263.

boundary, and was instead engaging in the provocative military action by intruding into Chinese territory. Furthermore, if the Indian Government continued this kind of military action to threaten Chinese territory, the Chinese Government would resume the border patrol around the entire Sino-Indian border.⁴⁸⁶

However, the Indian Government did not pay attention to the Chinese note and warning, and instead continue to implement the Forward Policy in the western sector of the border. Therefore, with the escalation of border tensions, some border conflicts, such as the Galwan Valley incident and the Chip Chap Valley incident happened in the summer of 1962. Principally, there was the first armed conflict which occurred in the Chip Chap Valley incident after the 1959 Kongka Pass incident. On 21 July, from 19:00 hour, the Indian armed force began to attack with gunfire to a Chinese post in the Chip Chap Valley where it was a part of China's Xinjiang region but was claimed as a part of Ladakh by India.⁴⁸⁷ It was called by the Chip Chap Valley incident. In addition, the Galwan Valley incident happened in the south of Galwan Valley where it was claimed by both of parties on 19 July. The Indian troops built entrench and shot at the Chinese frontier guards nearby.⁴⁸⁸

Furthermore, the Chinese Government gave an official protest note to the Indian Government on 21 July 1962. In the note, the Chinese Government claimed that the Chinese Government border troops would take some measures when they faced the danger the intruders brought. If the Indian Government did not listen this warning from the Chinese Government, the Indian Government must be responsible for all

⁴⁸⁶ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1961- July 1962* (White Paper VI), p. 39

⁴⁸⁷ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: July 1962- October 1962* (White Paper VII), p. 1.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

consequences.⁴⁸⁹

The Indian Government gave a note in reply to China on 26 July 1962. In this note, the Indian Government believed that clashes were caused by the situation of that there were Chinese military posts in the India's territory.⁴⁹⁰ In addition, it also mentioned a settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue. If the present tensions could alleviate and a suitable atmosphere could be created, the Indian Government would discuss the border issue on the basis of the report of officials in 1960.⁴⁹¹ In other words, the Indian Government regarded that the Chinese retreated from the region of Aksai Chin claimed by India as the precondition of the border talk or negotiation.

However, this precondition for resuming the talk or border negotiation between China and India was unacceptable for the Chinese. As early as in an official note from China to India on 30 November 1961, the Chinese Government expressed its opinion on the rejection of the India's precondition for border negotiations. The Chinese Government proclaimed, "If the Indian Government's above logic should be followed, the Chinese Government would have every reason to send troops to cross the so called 'McMahon Line' (on the eastern sector of the border) and enter the vast area between the crest of the Himalayas and their Southern foot."⁴⁹² These words meant that, because the Indian Government considered Aksai Chin as part of the Indian territory, it put forward that the precondition for the border talks or negotiations was the Chinese withdrawal from Aksai Chin. If this was to be the case, would it be any different than the Chinese Government entering into the NEFA of India and forcing India to retreat

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., p. 4.

⁴⁹² *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1961- July 1962* (White Paper VI), p. 4.

from that region, because it regarded the territory of the NEFA below the McMahon Line as Chinese territory – being South Tibet. Therefore, the Indian Government's opinion, which was refusing to conduct border talks or negotiations before the Chinese withdrew from Aksai Chin, was not objective.

Hence, the Chinese Government expressed its rejection for India's precondition in a note to the Indian Government on 4 August 1962. The Chinese Government claimed that it agreed with the further discussions on the border issue based on the 1960 officials' report. But it rejected India's precondition. The government also stated that the border discussion should not have any preconditions; if India did not move forward into the Chinese territory, then tensions would ease.⁴⁹³ However, India's standpoint never changed, so neither border talks nor negotiations were launched in the summer of 1962.

After that, facing the deterioration of the border crisis and India's Forward Policy and unchangeable standpoint, the Chinese Government raised a strong and menacing warning in a note from China to India on 13 September 1962:

“The Indian Government should be aware that shooting and shelling are no child's play; and he who plays with fire will eventually be consumed by fire. If the Indian side should insist on threatening by armed force the Chinese border defence forces who are duty-bound to defend their territory and thereby arouse their resistance, it must bear the responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom.”⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹³ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: July 1962- October 1962* (White Paper VII), p. 18.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

Until this, from 1961 to the summer of 1962, Governments of China and India did not make an agreement on the border issue and the peaceful diplomatic approach hardly solved the Sino-Indian border issue, so an intensified border war seemed to be inevitable.

The second factor in amplifying the Sino-Indian border crisis was the government's two respective foreign policies.

For the Chinese side, the diplomatic activities which greatly influenced the Sino-Indian border issue were that the Chinese Government signed boundary treaties with Burma and Pakistan respectively in the early 1960s. Because the Government of China had not signed any border treaties with most of its neighbouring countries in modern times, it intend to solve its border issues in such as a manner with not only the Government of India, but also the Governments of Burma and Pakistan and others from the late 1950s to 1960s.

Regarding to the Sino-Indian boundary treaty, the Governments of China and Burma made a boundary agreement on 28 January 1960 and signed a boundary treaty to officially demarcate the Sino-Burmese boundary in October 1960. From then on, the Sino-Burmese boundary was settled by the official treaty. In addition, the two sides recognized that the west sector of Sino-Burmese boundary was in accordance with the eastern part of the McMahon Line on the 1914 map. This measure did not go unnoticed by the Government of India. The Indian Government believed that the Chinese Government had acknowledged the entire McMahon Line since it recognized a part of McMahon Line in the boundary treaty between China and Burma.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹⁵ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 213-214.

Therefore, the Sino-Burmese boundary treaty enhanced India's argument that the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary had been settled and no further border negotiations between the Governments of China and India would be held.

With regards to the Sino-Pakistani boundary treaty, it referred to the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. In fact, the Sino-Pakistani boundary treaty was signed in 1963, but continued to have a baleful influence on Sino-Indian relations and the Sino-Indian border issue when the discussion on the delimitation of boundary between China and Pakistan started in May 1962. The Indian Government presented a protest to the Government of China on 10 May 1962 when the Chinese Government claimed that it had discussed the boundary delimitation with Pakistan in official communiqué on 3 May 1962.⁴⁹⁶ The reason of India's protest was that the Indian Government believed "there is no common border between Pakistan and the PRC."⁴⁹⁷ Moreover, it also considered that the border which the Governments of China and Pakistan discussed – Kashmir Region – was a part of State of Jammu and Kashmir of India.⁴⁹⁸ In other words, India believed that there were some parts of the Sino-Pakistani boundary in the India's territory, because both China and Pakistan had territorial disputes with India. Prior to solving the border issues between China and India and between India and Pakistan, the signing of Sino-Pakistani frontier treaty was no doubt harmful to India's national interest.

However, the Chinese Government believed that the Government of India was intervening in Chinese diplomacy. In a note from China to India on 31 May 1962, the Government of China stated:

⁴⁹⁶ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: November 1961- July 1962* (White Paper VI), p. 96.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

“Now the Indian Government not only refuses itself to negotiate a settlement of the boundary question with China, but object to China’s negotiating a boundary settlement with Pakistan. Does it mean that the Indian Government, after creating the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, wishes to see a similar dispute arise between China and Pakistan?”⁴⁹⁹

Furthermore, the Chinese Government also raised the question that it could not understand why the Indian Government did not intend to carry out border negotiations with China:

“Since the Burmese and Nepalese Government can settle their boundary questions with China in a friendly way through negotiations and since the Government of Pakistan has also agreed with the Chinese Government to negotiate a boundary settlement, why is it that the Indian Government cannot negotiate and settle its boundary question with the Chinese Government. Such a common-sense query is indeed rather embarrassing...”⁵⁰⁰

Thus, the Sino-Pakistani border discussion was another diplomatic affair which led to the deterioration of the Sino-Indian relations.

For the Indian side, the Government of India was gradually giving up its Non-Aligned policy in order to get close to the two opposing Great Powers – the United States of America and the Soviet Union. With regards as to the reason for Indian-U.S. and Indian-Soviet cooperation, on the one hand, the Korean War and the Beijing’s

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 99-100.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 101.

communist revolutionary policy drew the support of the United States against China, being that the United States was the biggest opponent to the PRC since its establishment in 1949; on the other hand, the Sino-Soviet split had become gradually larger since the beginning of 1960. Therefore, at that time both the U.S or the Soviet Union intended to contain and restrict the PRC at all costs.

More specifically, from the 1947 to 1959, American monetary assistance to India was less than 2 billion U.S. dollars in total, but the amount of American assistance was over 5 billion U.S. dollars from 1959 to 1962 while Sino-Indian border tensions were growing vigorously.⁵⁰¹ It was obvious that Indian-U.S. cooperation was getting closer from 1959 to 1962.

In addition, the Soviet Union provided a large amount of assistance to India at that time. According to China's statistics, the Soviet Government offered 5 billion Rupees in total to the Government of India up to 1963.⁵⁰² The Soviet Union did not only provide economic assistance to the Government of India, but also supported India with military aid. The Soviet Government provided a number of transport planes to India as below: "24 II-14 transport planes in 1960 and 10 Mi-4 helicopters and 8 AN-12 heavy transport planes in 1961 and 16 Mi-4 helicopters and 8 AN-12 transport planes in 1962."⁵⁰³ All of these transport planes could transport troops and supplies from the western and southern States of India to the mountain and valley region of Aksai Chin. In addition to this, the Soviet Union and India made an agreement in which the Soviet Government would provide India with MIG-21 supersonic fighter-inceptor aircraft and establish equipment factories in India in 1962, though the

⁵⁰¹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 270.

⁵⁰² *Peking Review* (Beijing zhoubao), 8th November 1963.

⁵⁰³ V.B.Singh, *Indo-Soviet Relations: 1947-1977*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers PVT LTD, 1978, p. 69.

Government of India gave up this project under American pressure.⁵⁰⁴

Therefore, the Government of India was in contact with the two Great Powers frequently in the early of 1960s. A prominent work of the foreign affair was described by that a nation's foreign policy must be obeyed its national interest. It was beneficial for the Indian Government that it utilized the poor relationship between China and the Soviet Union and the hostile relation between China and the United States to enhance its relationships with the two great powers – the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The direct benefit for India was that it gained the military aids from both of countries that made India increase its military power against the potential of military threat from China. However, due to the poor Sino-U.S. and Sino-Soviet relations, the frequently contacts between India and the two powers and the military aids forced the Sino-Indian relationship to deteriorate further in 1962.

In September 1962, when it was at the eve of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, both the Governments of India and China had made some measures on the ground. When the Chinese troops resumed their patrols along the McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the border, they found that Indian forces had went across the McMahon Line to build up some posts along the southern bank of the Kechilang River (which India called the Namka Chu River) in the Che Dong Region (know to India as Dhola). Hence, the Government of China raised a protest to the Indian Government about it on 16 September 1962.⁵⁰⁵ However, the Government of India did not give a positive response to the Chinese side, and instead assigned more patrols to enhance the defence of the Indian posts. On 21 September, the Indian troops opened fire upon the

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: July 1962- October 1962* (White Paper VII), p. 74.

Chinese border guards. The Chinese Government presented a protest to the Indian Government once again in the same day.⁵⁰⁶ But, the Indian troop still continued to attack the Chinese posts with the gunshots, hand grenades and artillery shells from 22 to 24 September and it caused five casualties within the Chinese border guards.⁵⁰⁷ After that, the Government of China proposed to carry out a discussion on the Sino-Indian border issue as soon as the 3 October.⁵⁰⁸ However, the Government of India considered that it would not hold any discussions before the Chinese troops retreated from their positions which were north of the McMahon Line on the 1914 map.⁵⁰⁹

Under this circumstance, after the last opportunity for peaceful discussion on the Sino-Indian border issue was lost, the 1962 Sino-Indian General Border War broke out on 20 October 1962. In the same day, the PLA launched counterattacks from the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border respectively.

On the eastern sector of the border, the Chinese troops annihilated the Indian troops stationed in the southern bank of the Namka Chu River in one day, and additionally, Brigadier Dalvi, who was the chief commander of the 7th Brigade, was taken prisoner by the PLA on 22 October 1962. After that, the PLA went across the McMahon Line in the same day and occupied Tawang by the 25 September.⁵¹⁰ On the western sector of the border, the PLA attacked and almost annihilated 37 Indian posts in Aksai Chin in a period lasting until the 25 September.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 84.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 88.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 98.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 102.

⁵¹⁰ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 221.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., pp.221-222.

This concluded the first stage of the Chinese attack. The Chinese troops had achieved its military goals – the dislodgement of the Indian troops from Chinese Territory. Hence, on 24 October, Zhou Enlai proposed three suggestions to solve the Sino-Indian border issue:

“1. Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw twenty kilometres from this line and disengage.

2. Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, through consultations between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, i.e. the traditional customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.

3. The Chinese Government considers that, in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.”⁵¹²

⁵¹² *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: October 1962- January 1963* (White Paper VIII), p.1; and Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 373.

The three proposals seemed to be beneficial for two sides, but the Government of India did not agree with that. The Government of India issued a declaration in the same day, the 24 October. The declaration emphasized that the Chinese troops must “go back at least to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to 8 September, 1962”, before two sides held discussion or talk on the border issue.⁵¹³ However, the line of actual control the Chinese Government believed to be true was the alignment between China and India before November 1959, when India had not invaded into Aksai Chin in the western sector and did not go across the McMahon Line in the eastern sector.⁵¹⁴

Because of the divergence, the Governments of China and India did not sit around the table of negotiation. With the beginning of opening of fire between the two forces in the eastern sector on 14 November, the second stage of the border war was launched. After the Indian Army was defeated in the Se La Pass (Xi Pass called by the Chinese) and Bomdila campaign, the greater war was concluded in the eastern sector. In the meantime, the PLA wiped out 43 Indian strongpoints in the western sector on 20 November.⁵¹⁵ At that point the Chinese forces controlled the entirety of South Tibet (the NEFA) in the eastern sector and Aksai Chin in the western sector.

After that, the Government of China issued a statement for cease-fire on 21 November 1962. Although the Government of India did not proclaim that it accepted the Chinese proposal for cease-fire, it gave an order to the Indian Army to cease-fire.

⁵¹³ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: October 1962- January 1963* (White Paper VIII), p.6; and Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 375.

⁵¹⁴ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: October 1962- January 1963* (White Paper VIII), pp.7-8; and Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 376.

⁵¹⁵ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp. 223-225.

At this point, the border did end finally.

The consequences of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War was the military victory of China and the military failure of India, but the Chinese still retreated from South Tibet and India went back the NEFA – making it appear as if no wars had occurred in that region. Although the border war ended, the Sino-Indian border issue has never been solved further.

Conclusion and Analysis

The 1962 Sino-Indian Border War was no doubt a significant incident for Sino-Indian relations in the 20th century and it also greatly influenced China and India's foreign policies in 1960s. However, the border war was only a slight part of the competition between the two countries in terms of diplomacy, military, and politics. There could have been opportunities to avoid the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War and solve the Sino-Indian border issue for both countries when they were discussing the solution of the border issue through diplomatic means in in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, the peaceful solution to the Sino-Indian border issue failed in the summer and autumn of 1962 and then the border war occurred. It will analyse the failure of the Sino-Indian diplomatic dialogues concerning the solution of the Sino-Indian border issue before the border war through Waltz's neo-realism theory of international politics.

In Waltz's neo-realism, capability is the basic element for every state within the anarchic system of international politics. Both the PRC and the ROI were two independent and adjoining countries which had ambitions in Asia. They believed that they had capabilities to protect their sovereignties and national interests from external

threats. Hence, neither power was willing to concede nor reach any agreements on the territorial issues in order to try to maximise their own national interests.

In order to clearly analyse the attitudes and opinions of the two states concerned in the Sino-Indian border issue, it will divide the Sino-Indian frontier into an eastern sector and a western sector. The middle sector was rarely as important or pivotal when compared with the sections to the east and west.

Regarding the eastern sector, the Indian Government insisted that the McMahon Line, which was based on the Simla Convention of 1914, was the settled Sino-Indian boundary. Whereas, the Government of China believed that the McMahon Line was not legitimate, because the Chinese Government did not sign the Simla Convention of 1914. Hence, the border issue on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border arose. The Indian Government had a determined attitude concerning the eastern sector of the border. Its attitude was based on India's national interests and security. The Assam Himalayas, which is called South Tibet by China, is situated in the north of the Assam Valley and the Brahmaputra Plain within Assam Pradesh. If Tibet or China controlled the Assam Himalayas, at the southern foot of the Himalayas, the gate of Assam Pradesh to India would face the potential northern menace. In contrast to that, if India governed the Assam Himalayas and enacted the McMahon line, which was delimited by the principle of watershed, as the Sino-Indian boundary, the northern threat towards Assam Pradesh would be negligible for India. Although Tibet would face a menace from the south in this way, this region was insignificant for the Chinese Government at that time. The Assam Himalayas, which therefore concerned India's national security, was a basic interest for the government. Therefore, the Indian Government deployed troops to occupy that region and sent administrative officials

there from 1948 to 1953, and then established the NEFA in the Assam Himalayas in order to enhance administration and defence. Additionally, it was one of reasons as to why the Indian Government insisted upon that the McMahon Line was the boundary of the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian frontiers.

For the Chinese Government, it always believed that the McMahon Line was illegitimate, because the Chinese representative Chen Yifan never signed the Simla Convention of 1914. Although China did not recognize the McMahon Line as the boundary of the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian borders, it never refused to use this boundary as the Sino-Indian boundary. As it state above, South Tibet (Assam Himalayas) was not a strategic region for the Chinese Government, and Zhou Enlai expressed many times that he hoped that two countries could carry out negotiations concerning the Sino-Indian border issue on the basis of the line of de facto control of two states at that time. Thus, it can be seen that the Chinese Government did not intend to take South Tibet back from India. However, the Chinese Government wanted to use this concession of South Tibet to gain India's concession on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. That was the reason as to why the Chinese Government always proposed negotiations concerning the entire boundaries of Sino-Indian border in that time. What the Chinese Government was concerned about was its national security and national interests in the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontier.

With regards to the greatest disputed border on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, China called it the region of Aksai Chin and India called it the region of (a part of) Ladakh. Aksai Chin is a tract of barren land of almost thirty thousand square kilometres, which is situated in the southeastern part of the Karakoram Range and the

Chip Chap River, the northeastern part of Kongka Pass and the southwestern part of the Kunlun Range. As early as 1892, the Chinese Government had set up a boundary stone in the Karakoram Pass, which was the northwestern corner of the Aksai Chin, thus China always believed that Aksai Chin belonged to the Xinjiang province of China. Although Aksai Chin is a tract of barren land, it had a strategic significance for China. First of all, the Chinese Government built up a Xinjiang-Tibet Road which was a strategic road and it connected between Xinjiang and Tibet in 1957. It was one of few roads connecting Tibet and the rest of China, thus it was important for the Chinese Government. Secondly, it is difficult to reach from Jammu and Kashmir Pradesh of India but easy to arrive from Xinjiang of China. Additionally, India did not send patrols or administrative official to the Aksai Chin before the Xinjiang-Tibet Road was built up in that region in 1957. When the Indian Government presented a protest for the Xinjiang-Tibet Road within Aksai Chin later, the border dispute in Aksai Chin began. However, due to Aksai Chin concerning China's national security and national interest, the Chinese Government never made any concessions in that region on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. Consequently, the Indian Government believed that the boundary on the eastern sector of the border was settled and the Chinese Government would not make concessions in Aksai Chin on the western sector. The stalemate of the Sino-Indian border issue occurred then.

The failure to find a peaceful settlement for the Sino-Indian border issue originated from the failure to carry out border negotiations between China and India. Because China could make a concession in terms of South Tibet on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, it intended to carry out border negotiations, which included the entire Sino-Indian border, with India. In order to preserve China's national interest in Aksai Chin on the western sector, the Chinese Government might even make

concessions on the middle and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border. However, the Indian Government objected to this proposal of border negotiations. It insisted upon two principles concerning the border talks. Firstly, it believed that the McMahon Line was the settled boundary on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border and no negotiations could be carried out to discuss it. Secondly, with regards to Aksai Chin, the disputed border in the western sector, it set a precondition to the border negotiations that there would not be any border negotiations between India and China unless the Chinese personnel were evacuated from Aksai Chin.

India insisted that the boundary of eastern sector must be settled for its national interests, whereas China left space to carry out negotiations for the entire border and the Chinese Government did not state that the boundary of the western sector had been settled as the line of de facto control of China for its national interests. However, the preconditions of the Indian Government were impossible for China to accept. It was as if China presented a precondition to the border negotiations that Indian personnel must be retreated from the NEFA, something to which India would object flatly. In this way, there could not be any further talks nor negotiations concerning the Sino-Indian border issue to carry out between two countries. Consequently, the Government of China did not give up its national interests and accept the preconditions of border negotiations as presented by India, and official negotiations had never been carried out between the two countries before the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War.

The escalation of Sino-Indian conflict was another significant factor in making the border war happen. In Waltz's neo-realist theory of international politics, force is an important means for states to achieve goals and protect themselves. When a state with

powerful capabilities encounters another state with weak capabilities in the anarchy of international politics, it is a good means for the powerful state to use force in order to reach its goals and preserve its national interests. However, when two powerful states foregather and both of them use force, it is inevitable for them to engage in a general war. The greatly increasing Sino-Indian conflicts since the summer of 1962 were consequences of the two countries using force to protect their national interests and sovereignties from threats. Consequently, small border friction gradually turned into larger border conflicts and finally resulted in the border war. Although China was the offensive party in the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, Indian patrols initially went cross the de facto line of control and built up posts among and behind the Chinese positions in accordance with the Forward Policy of India since the end of 1961. The greatly increasing military threats and conflicts forced the Chinese Government to decide to launch an entire counterattack along the whole Sino-Indian boundary. Consequently, the Sino-Indian Border War broke out at the end of October 1962.

Facing the huge potential threat of military from China, the Government of India had to seek for external assistance and allies against China, in order to achieve the basic goal of balancing power which existed in the international anarchic system. Therefore, it accepted military aid and monetary assistance from the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom from the early 1960s and the following years.

In contrast to India, China had no further options to balance India's power at that time. On the one hand, the Government of PRC was the greatest communist enemy in the Asia, and vice versa. On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet split had occurred in 1959, and the Chinese Government presented protests many times to the Soviet Government that the Soviet Union stood by the Indian Government when there were Sino-Indian

disputes and conflicts. Therefore, China could not find a great power to balance India's increasing power along the Sino-Indian boundary at that time.

Additionally, although the Chinese Government obtained military victory along the Sino-Indian frontiers, it did not gain more political interests or influence from this border war. The escalation of the Sino-Soviet split and Indian-Soviet friendly relations at that moment forced the Government of China to start to consider its influence in the South Asia Continent in order to balance India's power and contain India's menace towards the Chinese border. Therefore, the complicated Sino-Indian-Pakistani relations began to form after the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962.

Chapter 6: 1962-1965: The Aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War and the Changes of China and India's Foreign Policies in the Post-war Period

Introduction

This chapter will examine the relationship between changes in foreign policies of two countries and the border issue in the post-war period. Firstly, in order to study the situation of the Sino-Indian border in the post-war period, it will examine impact of China and India's foreign policies on the ceasefire around the entire boundary. Secondly, it will analyse changes of India's foreign policies in the post-war period. Thirdly, it will study the changes of China's foreign policies in the post-war period. Finally, it will demonstrate the impact of the foreign policies of China and India on the border issue and the influences on the border issue was reflecting in their foreign policies in the post-war period.

Although the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War only lasted one month, it produced greatly influence on the Sino-Indian relations in 1960s, particularly on the Sino-Indian border issue. The most important point was that the border war did not address the border problem and did not settle the Sino-Indian boundary. On the one side, the victor of the border war – China did not obtain the victorious fruit of the territories it occupied during the border war, because the Chinese proclaimed and implemented unilaterally their withdrawal from their occupation zone in the wartime to the north (Chinese side) of the 7th November 1959 line of actual control on the

eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border in the end of 1962. Moreover, the Chinese only destroyed all posts built in the region, which were inside the boundary the Chinese claimed on the western sector, rather than those which crossed the boundary and occupied the Indian Territory. On the other hand, the loser of the border war – India did not lose any territories it had before the border war except the posts and positions built by the implementation of the Forward Policy. When the Chinese retreated to the north of McMahon Line, the Indian moved gradually back to the NEFA on the eastern sector of the border. The only loss for India was the all posts established in Aksai Chin after the implementation of the Forward Policy in the end of 1961. However, this loss seemed to be negligible, when compared to the responsibility the loser would need to take in their defeat. One interesting consequence of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War can be seen in the words of Lord Caccia, the British former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. He stated that “the Chinese withdrawal to their original lines after a victory in the field was the first time in recorded history that a great power has not exploited military success by demanding something more.”⁵¹⁶

In fact, through the military victory of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, the only accomplishment the Chinese achieved was maintaining the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959. And, the India did not have to afford any compensation to China because of the military failure. However, this was far away from a complete settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute and issue. The two governments have changed their foreign policies to meet their national security and strategies since the border war of 1962.

⁵¹⁶ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 419; and *The Sunday Times*, 12th June 1966.

The Ceasefire

With the end of the large-scale war on both the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian border, the Government of China proclaimed the unilateral ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border from 00:00 hours on 22 November 1962.⁵¹⁷

Furthermore, the Chinese Government announced the withdrawal schedule:

“Beginning from 1 December, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959... In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the line of actual control, that is north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometres back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometres from the line of actual control.”⁵¹⁸

In the following text of the announcement, the Chinese Government indicated that it hoped that the Government of India would also retreated 20 kilometres from the line of actual control. Moreover, the Chinese Government maintained the right of self-defence, if the Government of India did not to do that.⁵¹⁹ The words seemed to

⁵¹⁷ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between The Governments of India and China: October 1962 – January 1963 (White Paper No. VIII)*, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1963, p. 19; and Jawaharlal Nehru, *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace: Letters of the Prime Minister of India*, New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of Government of India, 1962, p. 42; and Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 226.

⁵¹⁸ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 417; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between The Governments of India and China: October 1962 – January 1963 (White Paper No. VIII)*, p. 19; and Jawaharlal Nehru, *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace: Letters of the Prime Minister of India*, p. 42.

⁵¹⁹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 418.

be the only condition that the victor imposed on the defeated side.

Although the Chinese Government had declared the unilateral ceasefire, the Government of India did not accept or respond officially to the Chinese ceasefire announcement at that time. Indian politicians refused to follow the Chinese ceasefire and considered that it was actual surrender if India accepted the Chinese ceasefire announcement.⁵²⁰ However, senior officials in the military had given orders to the Indian armed forces to hold fire if the Chinese did not attack them, no matter whether the Indian politicians believed that the ceasefire meant the surrender to the Chinese.⁵²¹

Furthermore, for Nehru, the reason of why he and the Government of India did not accept the Chinese ceasefire announcement officially was simple – he could not agree with retreating to the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959. What he intended to recover was the ideal boundary of actual control as of 8 September 1962. He emphasized this Indian demand in Lok Sabha on 21 November 1962 after he received the Chinese ceasefire announcement, “Our position in regards to any negotiations continues to be what we have previously stated, that is, that the position as it existed prior to 8 September, 1962 shall be restored.”⁵²² The border situation on 8 September 1962 was the largest accomplishment for India achieved by the implementation of the Forward Policy on the Sino-Indian disputed border.

Although the Chinese Government has withdrawn to the Chinese side of the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959 and the Indian troops also avoided contact with the Chinese armed forces, the Government of the India did not declare whether it

⁵²⁰ Ibid., pp. 420-421.

⁵²¹ Ibid., p. 419.

⁵²² Jawaharlal Nehru, *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations*, Vol. 1: Part II, New Delhi: External Publicity Division: Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India, 1963, p. 196.

accepted the Chinese ceasefire announcement or not. That meant the war did not end completely and officially for both countries. Therefore, it was necessary for the two governments to reach an official ceasefire agreement as early as possible.

In fact, as early as the beginning of the Chinese counterattack at the end of October 1962, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic (UAR) intended to call in some Afro-Asian countries to settle the Sino-Indian border problem in a international conference, one to which both of China and India agreed with intermediation to address the Sino-Indian border issue. As a supporter of India's standpoint in the Sino-Indian border war, President Nasser put forward the Four-Point scheme to resolve the Sino-Indian border war on 26 October 1962. The Four-Points scheme consisted of the ceasefire, the delimitation of the demilitarized zone, the negotiation and the withdrawal of two armed forces to the line of actual control as of 8 September 1962. As the Government of China could not accept the fourth point, the Chinese rejected the Four-Point scheme. Furthermore, other Afro-Asian countries barely supported and followed the scheme and the border war was proceeding at that moment.⁵²³

When it seemed to be difficult to reach an agreement for the official ceasefire between China and India, there was an opportunity to settle this awkward situation in the end of 1962. After the failure of the Four-Point scheme, governments in the Afro-Asian world began to present their different schemes to try to solve the Sino-Indian issue. Afterward, the scheme from Mrs. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon was responded to by other Afro-Asian countries. Finally, through Mrs. Bandaranaike's organization, a total of six Afro-Asian countries participated in the

⁵²³ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp. 236-237; and Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 428-429.

Afro-Asian country conference in Colombo on 10 December 1962.⁵²⁴ When the Government of India had not officially accepted the Chinese ceasefire announcement, the Colombo Conference was undoubtedly a good approach to make two opposite governments reach an agreement on the Sino-Indian ceasefire and the settlement of Sino-Indian border issue.

In the beginning of the Colombo Conference, the delegation of the UAR presented a proposal in accordance with India's position, which was restoring the line of actual control as of 8 September 1962. Because of the obvious bias to India in this proposal, it finally was rejected by other countries.⁵²⁵ After that, no bias to either the Chinese and Indian Governments was established as part of the spirit of the Colombo Conference.

Two days into the discussions, the Colombo Conference presented a proposal to promote the Sino-Indian official ceasefire and border negotiations. The substantive content in the Colombo Proposal had three suggestions with regard to the three sectors of the Sino-Indian disputed borders as follows:

“1. (a) With regard to the Western Sector, the Conference would like to make an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20 kilometres withdrawal of their military posts as has been proposed in the letter of Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru of November 21 and November 28, 1962.

(b) The Conference would make an appeal to the Indian Government to keep their

⁵²⁴ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 237; and Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 429; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: January 1963- July 1963* (White Paper IX), p. 184.

⁵²⁵ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 238; and Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 429.

existing military position.

(c) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawals will be demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon with prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area.

2. With regard to the Eastern Sector, the Conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognized by both the Governments could serve as a ceasefire line to their respective positions. Remaining areas in this sector can be settled in their future discussions.

3. With regard to the problems of the Middle Sector, the Conference suggests that they will be solved by peaceful means, without resorting to force.”⁵²⁶

As indicated in three suggestions on three sectors of Sino-Indian disputed borders, with regard to the eastern and middle sectors of the Sino-Indian disputed borders, two suggestions looked like they contained no bias to either sides but lacked specific details of the measures to be implemented. However, regarding the western sector, the first suggestion seemed to be obviously prejudicial toward the Chinese Government, because the first suggestion only asked the Chinese Government to comply with the withdrawal in the Chinese ceasefire declaration on 21 November 1962, while the Government of India did not have to take measures to withdraw from the same disputed region.

When Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike brought the Colombo proposal to New Delhi on 12 January 1963, the Indian Government considered that the three suggestions from the Colombo Conference were not clear, so they demanded its to

⁵²⁶ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: January 1963- July 1963* (White Paper IX), p. 185.

announce a clarification drafted by the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India in relation to these three Colombo suggestions.⁵²⁷

Hence, Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike announced a clarification of the Colombo proposal on 13 January 1963. It was written clearly and specifically to explain the three suggestions in the Colombo Proposal as follows:

“Western Sector

The withdrawal of Chinese forces proposed by the Colombo Conference will be 20 kilometres as proposed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21 November and in Prime Minister Chou En-lai’s letter of 28 November, 1962, *i.e.* from the line of actual control between the two sides as of 7 November, 1959, as defined in map III and V circulated by the Government of China.

The existing military posts which the forces of the Government of India will keep to will be on and upto the line indicated in (i) above.

The demilitarized zone of 20 kilometres created by Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of both sides. This is a substantive part of the Colombo Conference proposals. It is as to the location, the number of posts and their composition that there has to be an agreement between the two Governments of India and China.

Eastern Sector

The Indian forces can, in accordance with the Colombo Conference proposals, move right upto the south of the line of actual control, *i.e.* the McMahon Line, except for

⁵²⁷ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 430; and *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: January 1963- July 1963* (White Paper IX), p. 186.

the two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right upto the north of the McMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Colombo Conference proposals, arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China, according to the Colombo Conference proposals, are Chedong or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area, in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between two Governments.

Middle Sector

The Colombo Conference desired that the status quo in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the status quo.”⁵²⁸

This clarification only gave more details to administrate the demilitarized zone formed by the Chinese withdrawal in accordance with the suggestion for the western sector in the Colombo proposal, so the Indian forces could remain in their positions rather than withdraw. It did not match the proposal presented by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai on 7 November 1959 which was the 20 kilometres withdrawal of both of two forces from the line of actual control at that time (the Chinese claim line). Thus, the situation on the western sector was not beneficial for the Chinese side in the Colombo Proposal and its clarification.

Afterwards, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai expressed that he agreed in principle with the Colombo Proposal as the preliminary of the officials meeting between China and India in a letter of reply from Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike on 19 January 1963. Moreover, he hoped that the Colombo Proposal

⁵²⁸ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: January 1963- July 1963* (White Paper IX), pp. 185-186.

would promote the stable ceasefire, the military disengagement and the Sino-Indian direct negotiation for the Sino-Indian border issue.⁵²⁹

However, when Prime Minister Zhou Enlai announced his acceptance in principle of the Colombo Proposal, he also put forward two interpretations to the Colombo Proposal. The first interpretation was that the Government of India should also take such obligations while the Chinese Government was fulfilling the regulations of the Chinese ceasefire declaration in November 1962. Thus, the Government of India should retain Indian forces on the eastern sector as well as the western sector. The second interpretation was that the Chinese Government could never allow any Indian personnel, no matter whether they were military personnel or civil personnel, to reenter the region on the western sector which infiltrated by India's Forward Policy. If India reentered the region, it would be "tantamount to recognizing as legitimate the Indian armed invasion of this area and its setting up of forty-three strongpoints there between 1959 and 1962."⁵³⁰ In addition, the Chinese Government also agreed with withdrawing all military posts and civil checkpoints from this region.⁵³¹ Furthermore, Zhou did not regard his two interpretations as the precondition of the talk or negotiation. He considered that any divergences would be solved in the talk or negotiation, if two governments were sincere in their upholding of the ceasefire, military disengagement and the peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue.⁵³² On 13 January 1963, in the letter from Prime Minister Nehru to Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike, Nehru expressed that the Government of India had accepted in

⁵²⁹ *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan* (Selected works of Zhou Enlai on diplomacy), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe (Central Party Literature Press), 1990, p. 542.

⁵³⁰ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 430; and Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 239; and *People's Daily*, 28th January 1963.

⁵³¹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 430.

⁵³² *Ibid.*; and Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 239.

principle the Colombo Proposal on the basis of its clarification.⁵³³ By 19 January 1963, both governments had accepted in principle the Colombo Proposal, and it seemed to be a settlement of the Sino-Indian border war and the border issue.

However, the contradiction between two governments and their diplomatic conflict never stopped, when Sino-Indian negotiations were not launched after the issuance of the Colombo Proposal. There were two barriers to talks and negotiations that occurred between the two governments after the issuance of the Colombo Proposal. The first barrier was that the Government of India set up a precondition for the talks and negotiations between China and India. In fact, as early as the end of 1962, Prime Minister Nehru expressed his positive attitude for the talks with China in that he would talk “even to an enemy in the midst of war.”⁵³⁴ But, after the two governments had agreed to carry out talks on the basis of the Colombo Proposal, he put a barrier to talks between the Governments of China and India about the divergence of opinion on the clarification of the Colombo Proposal.

When the Chinese Government announced that it would accept in principle the Colombo Proposal in the letter from Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike on 19 January 1963, in another letter from Prime Minister Nehru to Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike on 26 January 1963, Prime Minister Nehru expressed that the Government of India accepted completely the Colombo Proposal with its clarification issued by Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike on 13 January 1963. Furthermore, he also stated that the direct talks and discussions between the Governments of China and India could happen only after the Chinese Government

⁵³³ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: January 1963- July 1963* (White Paper IX), p. 186.

⁵³⁴ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, p. 431; and *The Times*, 8th December 1962.

accepted completely the Colombo Proposal and its clarification.⁵³⁵

This attitude of Prime Minister Nehru seemed to put a barrier to the Sino-Indian talk or negotiation on the ceasefire and border issues. There were two main reasons to explain it. The first reason was that the Chinese Government did not accept the clarification of the Colombo Proposal but the Government of India regarded Chinese acceptance of the clarification as the precondition of talks and negotiations between India and China

The second reason was that the Colombo Proposal and its clarification were only suggestions rather than a complete resolution. Since the Chinese Government had accepted in principle the Colombo Proposal and had agreed to carry out the Sino-Indian talks and negotiations in accordance with the Colombo Proposal, the two governments should have started to launch the talk or negotiation to solve the problem of the ceasefire and border issues. However, when the Government of India made the acceptance completely with the Colombo Proposal and its clarification as the precondition of talks and negotiations between China and India, it was tantamount to forcing the Chinese Government to change its position on acceptance in principle of the Colombo Proposal and on the Sino-Indian border disputes. Therefore, this demand of the Government of India was unrealistic. Yet, the Chinese Government did not intend to change its position on the acceptance in principle of the Colombo Proposal and on the Sino-Indian border disputes, so in the opinion of other countries, China was the government who was reluctant to talk or negotiate about the Sino-Indian border war and border issue with the Government of India.

⁵³⁵ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: January 1963- July 1963* (White Paper IX), pp. 186-187.

The second barrier was that Prime Minister Nehru had always had an intention to submit the Sino-Indian border disputes to the International Court of Justice at Hague. In fact, previously he did not consider the arbitration on the Sino-Indian main border disputes as a good avenue. As early as 4 September 1959, in the Lok Sabha, he had stated his opinion that he intended to accept the arbitration on the minor interpretations of the Sino-Indian disputed areas rather than big chunks of territories i.e. the Region of the NEFA after the Chinese Government accepted the McMahon Line as the Sino-Indian boundary.⁵³⁶ Furthermore, in 1961, Prime Minister Nehru expressed firmly his rejection of the arbitration for the Sino-Indian border dispute in the Parliament on 7 August 1961. He said, “Arbitration was not considered a suitable method for settlement of the dispute over 51,000 square mile of Himalayan border land facing Tibet.”⁵³⁷

However, Prime Minister Nehru changed his attitude about the arbitration of the Sino-Indian border disputes after the end of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. He stated in Lok Sabha on 10 December 1962, “I am prepared when the time comes, provided there is approval of Parliament, even to refer the basic dispute of the claims on the frontier to an international body like the International Court of Justice at The Hague.”⁵³⁸ Furthermore, he also cited this suggestion to the Government of China in a letter from Prime Minister Nehru to Prime Minister Zhou Enlai on 5 March 1963.⁵³⁹ However, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai explained Nehru’s attitude change in a letter from Zhou to Nehru on 20 April 1963 as concealing the fact that the Government of

⁵³⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations*, Vol. 1: Part I, New Delhi: External Publicity Division: Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India, 1961, p. 119.

⁵³⁷ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: January 1963- July 1963* (White Paper IX), p. 12.

⁵³⁸ Neville Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 431.

⁵³⁹ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: January 1963- July 1963* (White Paper IX), p. 6.

India rejected negotiations with China.⁵⁴⁰

In fact, this suggestion could not be accepted by the Parliament of India as well as the Government of China, because both the Governments of China and India could not submit the issue of the sovereignty and territory to the arbitration of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, because of the Chinese representative delegated by the Government of the Republic of China (in Taiwan) in the United Nations (U.N.) and the International Court of Justice at that time, the PRC would never submit the Sino-Indian border issue to International arbitration.⁵⁴¹ The Sino-Indian border disputes could only be solved between the Governments of the PRC and India. The suggestion presented by Prime Minister Nehru seemed to put pressure on the Chinese Government on the diplomacy to show India's positive attitude of trying to solve the Sino-Indian border issue to the rest of countries.

Under this circumstance, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai expressed his opinion on India's attitude about the Sino-Indian border talks and discussions in a letter from Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Prime Minister Nehru on 20 April 1963. In the beginning of the letter, he expressed his regret in relation to India's rejection of direct negotiations on the ceasefire and the border issue with China. Then, he also indicated that the Government of India interpreted the Colombo Proposal with its clarification as the restoration of the border situation prior to 8 September 1962.⁵⁴²

Then, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai expressed his opinion on India's attitude on the Colombo Proposal and its clarification and on the talks or negotiations with China. He

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁴¹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 431-432.

⁵⁴² *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Government of India and China: January 1963- July 1963* (White Paper IX), pp. 10-11.

stated:

“It is the Indian Government’s persistent demand for so-called restoration of the state of the boundary prior to 8 September, 1962 that gave rise to the dispute concerning certain areas in the cease-fire arrangement. But in your letter, you described this disputed between China and India concerning certain areas as one between the Chinese Government and the Colombo Conference nation. This attempt to cover up the fact of Indian Government’s holding to its unreasonable stand by means of such misrepresentations will not succeed. The Colombo proposals are a recommendation made by the six Asian and African countries to China and India to help our two countries settle our dispute through direct negotiations. China and India may each have its own view about the Colombo proposals. Taking an honest attitude, the Chinese Government accepted the Colombo proposals in principle as a basis for direct Sino-Indian negotiations, and at the same time presented its differing opinions as its own interpretation, but reserved them for discussion and resolution in the negotiations, without making acceptance of China’s interpretation a pre-condition to the opening of direct Sino-Indian negotiations. The Colombo Conference nations deemed this to be the Chinese Government’s positive response to the Colombo proposals. They did not hold that direct Sino-Indian negotiations can be started only when both China and India accept the Colombo proposals in toto. But the Indian Government, while trying to turn the Colombo proposals into an adjudications, attempts to present India’s interpretation of them as clarifications by Colombo Conference participants, and to force it not only on the Colombo Conference nations, but also on China. This is a dishonest approach, which also shows that India has no intention whatever to hold negotiations.”⁵⁴³

⁵⁴³ Ibid., p. 11.

At last, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai described his attitude on future negotiations between China and India:

“... I urge you once again to consider the proposal that two sides accept in principle the Colombo proposals as the basis for negotiations and start negotiations immediately on the stabilization of the cease-fire, disengagement and the peaceful settlement of the boundary question, reserving their different interpretations of the Colombo proposals for settlement in the negotiations... If the Indian Government, owing to its internal and external political requirements, is not prepared to hold negotiations for the time being, the Chinese Government is willing to wait with patience.”⁵⁴⁴

Through this letter, it was evidently that Prime Minister Zhou Enlai on behalf of the Government of China clearly expressed his opinion that the Chinese Government intended to carry out the talks and negotiations with the Government of India in spite of their divergence on the border issue and the Colombo Proposal. Furthermore, the Chinese Government considered the peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue by negotiation as the only method. However, the Government of India did not respond positively on the Sino-Indian talks and negotiations about the ceasefire and border issues. Therefore, the Sino-Indian border issue was not solved after the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, and it greatly influenced the foreign policies of the two governments in the post-war period.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

India's foreign policies in the post-war period

Regarding India's foreign policy, the Sino-Indian border tension was undoubtedly a crucial factor in driving India's foreign policy to change in the year of 1962. As early as the 1950s, what the Indian Government advocated was the Non-Alignment policy in their external affairs. Under the circumstances of the Cold War – in which India's stance was to unite major developing countries rather than to depend on the military blocs of the United States and the Soviet Union – it helped India to gain a large amount of support from Asian and African developing countries. In fact, in the early stage of the independence of the ROI, Jawaharlal Nehru as the first Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs came up with the viewpoint of Non-Alignment in the Indian external affairs in 1947. He made a speech titled *Non-Alignment* in the Constituent Assembly On 4 December 1947. In this speech, he stressed a diplomatic idea for the Government of India—India would not join in any special political groups or military blocs.⁵⁴⁵ After that, he emphasized again that India would not participate in any blocs in the speech at the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948.⁵⁴⁶ Nehru as “the planner” of the foreign policy of independent India has put the Non-Alignment idea into the India's external affairs and maintained this policy in the 1950s throughout. In his statement made in Lok Sabha on 9 December 1958, he stressed the Non-Alignment policy, which was not dependent on any one bloc against another bloc was core of the India's foreign policy.⁵⁴⁷

However, due to the deterioration of Sino-Indian relationship and the Sino-Indian border tension, the Government of India was gradually getting closer to two Great

⁵⁴⁵ Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946—April 1961*, p. 24.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s.

According to the instances it have been written in the Chapter IV, entering into the 1960s, the assistance of US dollars from the United States to India was increased sharply over three years. Furthermore, at the same time, the Soviet Union provided a number of helicopters and transport planes to the Government of India for its military actions in Ladakh. In fact, most of the assistance from the two Great Powers was provided after the commencement of the Sino-Indian border dispute and the military conflict at Longju and the Kongka Pass in 1959. That means the Government of India had initiated preparations to meet the menace of China by seeking assistances from the two Great Powers after 1959.

In addition to the relationships between India and the two Great Powers, the Indo-Pakistani relationship was another important external affair for the Government of India. As the matter of fact, the Sino-Indian deterioration also greatly influenced the Indo-Pakistani relationship.

Due to the Kashmir disputes between India and Pakistan, the relationship between the two countries was not friendly since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Moreover, in order to meet the global strategy in the context of the Cold War, the United States reached a military pact with Pakistan, and the two governments officially announced the American military assistance to Pakistan in February 1954.⁵⁴⁸ The move provoked the Government of India, thus the Indo-Pakistani relationship did not improve and the Kashmir dispute was not solved in the 1950s.

⁵⁴⁸ Anand Shankar Mishra, *India's Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1982, p. 72.

However, the commencement of the Sino-Indian border dispute brought an opportunity to improve the Indo-Pakistani relationship, and even to solve the Kashmir dispute. The President of Pakistan, Mohammad Ayub Khan published an article titled “Pakistan Perspective” in an American journal – *Foreign Affairs* in July 1960. In this article, he expressed his intention of establishing a joint defence between India and Pakistan in the South Asia subcontinent for resisting the threats from the outside.⁵⁴⁹ But, based on two concerns, Nehru rejected President Ayub’s idea. The first concern was India’s Non-Alignment policy of external affairs. Because of the military alliance between Pakistan and the West, if the Government of India built a joint defence with Pakistan, it would mean that India stood in the side of the West against the Communist Camp in the context of the Cold War.⁵⁵⁰ That violated the India’s Non-Alignment policy and moreover, that would push India to participate in the Cold War – joined in a military bloc against another one. The second concern was the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Prime Minister Nehru did not make any concessions on the Kashmir issue, but the Government of India might have to yield some interest in Kashmir in the context of the joint defence between two governments in the South Asia subcontinent.⁵⁵¹

After that, two leaders of Government of India and Pakistan met and talked in September 1959 and 1960, and, moreover, the two governments signed an Indus Water Treaty and issued a joint communiqué to express the intention to solve the Kashmir problem.⁵⁵² However, the two governments had a big difference of opinion on how to settle the Kashmir issue. In order to address the Kashmir dispute, the

⁵⁴⁹ Ayub Khan, “Pakistan Perspective”, *Foreign Affairs*, New York, Vol. 38, no. 4, July 1960, p. 556; and Anand Shankar Mishra, *India’s Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, pp. 99-100.

⁵⁵⁰ Anand Shankar Mishra, *India’s Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, p. 100.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid..

⁵⁵² Ibid..

Government of India preferred to only adjust the ceasefire line in accordance with the previous agreement between the two governments.⁵⁵³ Yet, the Pakistani Government intended to make a thorough settlement on the Kashmir disputes. Therefore, the divergence forced the Government of Pakistan to make a decision of submitting the Kashmir issue to the Security Council of the United Nations in the early of 1962. However, the Government of India opposed the discussion on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council, because Nehru believed that the issue of sovereignty could only be discussed between two parties – India and Pakistan.⁵⁵⁴ Until then, the opportunity of solving the Kashmir dispute and establishing a closer relationship between the two powers in the South Asia subcontinent was lost. Thus, under the circumstance of deterioration of the Sino-Indian border tensions, the changes to the Indo-Pakistani relationship became a crucial part of the India's external affairs and it significantly influenced India's foreign policy.

There were two main causes for the deterioration of the Indo-Pakistani relationship in the 1960s. The internal cause was the unsettled Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, and the external cause was the military assistance from the United States and the United Kingdom to India after the outbreak of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. Furthermore, the external cause was an important factor in making the Kashmir issue unsettled between two governments. Therefore, the Anglo-American assistance to India of 1962 played a significant role in the Indo-Pakistani relationship.

After the Government of Pakistan appealed the Kashmir issue to the Security Council, the British Government was making an effort to mediate the Indo-Pakistani disputes. Thus, Patrick Dean, the British delegate in the UN had done his best to advocate the

⁵⁵³ Ibid., p. 101.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 101-102.

direct negotiation between the Governments of India and Pakistan since May 1962.⁵⁵⁵ After a series of the debates and meetings in the Security Council of the UN, Patrick Dean finally agreed with the Irish resolution on the Kashmir, which was that the direct negotiation between India and Pakistan on Kashmir issue would be under the auspice of the Security Council of the United Nations. But, when the Soviet delegate objected to this resolution, it failed to pass.⁵⁵⁶

Due to the failure of the UN mediation, the Government of Pakistan started to consider another approach to solve the Kashmir issue with their interests at the fore. The 1962 Sino-Indian Border War was an opportunity for the Pakistani Government. With the official military confrontation between China and India, the Government of Pakistan considered that it could utilize the Chinese pressure to force the Government of India to compromise on the Kashmir issue.⁵⁵⁷ At this moment, in 1962, the balance among China, India and Pakistan was changing gradually. After the failure of the Indo-Pakistani military alliance presented by President Ayub and the failure of the UN mediation on Kashmir, the Government of Pakistan had begun to consider the Chinese-Pakistani alliance as a mean to preserve their interests in Kashmir against India.

By 1962, when the border tension developed into a most dangerous stage, the Government of India started to consider long-term military assistance from the West in order to resist the attack of the Chinese. After the outbreak of the general Sino-Indian Border War in October 1962, the Indian Government needed urgently the military assistance from the West to meet Chinese attack. The attitudes of western

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 102.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 103.

⁵⁵⁷ *New York Times*, New York, 28th June 1962.

countries are clear and certain. Duncan Sandys, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, published an announcement to condemn the Chinese attack to India and support the Government of India in the Sino-Indian disputes.⁵⁵⁸ Afterwards, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan expressed his personal sympathy to Prime Minister Nehru.⁵⁵⁹ On 25 October, Prime Minister Macmillan stated that the British Government would provide any help that the Government of India requested.⁵⁶⁰ Although the British Government fully supported the Government of India in defending itself against the attack of the Chinese, they regarded the Chinese aggression not only as the menace for India but also as a threat for the entire South Asia subcontinent.⁵⁶¹ Therefore, the British Government intended to unite the Governments of India and Pakistan against the Chinese aggression.

However, the Government of Pakistan had a different perspective on the Chinese invasion from the British. They regarded the Chinese invasion only as an attack upon the northern border of India rather than a threat for the entire South Asia subcontinent. Therefore, Pakistan believed that the Chinese military pressure on India was a good opportunity for them to win over China's support on the Kashmir dispute.⁵⁶² It was evident that the Kashmir problem was a core interest for the Pakistani Government, no matter when they presented the Indo-Pakistani military alliance against China or when they intended to form the Sino-Pakistani alliance against India. So long as Pakistan could retain their interests in Kashmir, they would ally with any side against the other one in the tripartite relations. Although President Ayub expressed his friendly concern to India when Prime Minister Nehru sent messages to Pakistan and

⁵⁵⁸ *The Times*, London, 23rd October 1962.

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 26th October 1962.

⁵⁶⁰ UK, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 1961-62, Vol. 664, 25th October 1962, col. 1063.

⁵⁶¹ Anand Shankar Mishra, *India's Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, p. 105.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*

friendly countries to seek “‘sympathy and support’ in India’s hour of crisis” on 27 October 1962, the Government of Pakistan also had no intention to establish an Indo-Pakistani defence alliance in the South Asia subcontinent.⁵⁶³

In the meantime, the British Government tried to mediate the Indo-Pakistani tentional relationship. They had inquired of Mohammed Ali, the Pakistani Foreign Minister about whether the Government of Pakistan allowed the Indian Government to retreat their troops from Kashmir to meet the Chinese attack.⁵⁶⁴ The British inquiry also expressed another meaning which was the de-escalation of the Indo-Pakistani military tension in Kashmir. The response of Pakistani Government was that if UN troops entered into Kashmir instead of the Indian troops, the Pakistani troops would not go forward in Kashmir.⁵⁶⁵ This statement seemed to accept the withdrawal of the Indian troops from Kashmir but in acutally was not like that. The Government of Pakistan preferred only the withdrawal of the Indians from Kashmir so that the balance of power would lean towards Pakistan in Kashmir. That would be revealed in the statements of Pakistani diplomats. Lieutenant-General Mohammad Yousuf, the Pakistani High Commissioner in London, and Aziz Ahmad, the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington expressed the intention of the Government of Pakistan—the Pakistani Government was reluctant to give support to India, and moreover, it was displeased to see assistance from the West to India.⁵⁶⁶ Furthermore, Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali conveyed some clear words that the Government of Pakistan would rethink the military agreement and the alignment between Pakistan and the West, if the American Government decided to provide military assistance to India. It was evident that the Government of Pakistan opposed clearly the western military

⁵⁶³ Ibid., p.106.

⁵⁶⁴ *The Times*, London, 31st October 1962.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Anand Shankar Mishra, *India's Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, pp. 106-107.

assistance to India. What was the main reason for that? It becomes apparent upon viewing the words of Pakistani President Ayub. He expressed the similar concern for the western military assistance to India in a few days later. He stated that the Pakistani people had a serious concern in the fact that weapons provided by the West might be used to meet them before the thorough settlement of the Indo-Pakistani disputes.⁵⁶⁷ Therefore, what the Government of Pakistan worried about was the main barrier for the plan of united defence in the South Asia subcontinent.

Although the Pakistani Government had no interest on the British proposal of a defence alliance in the South Asia subcontinent at that moment, the British and American Government also intended to win Pakistan over against China by the resolution of Kashmir issue. Therefore, the British and the American Governments respectively sent superior missions to India in November 1962. The assignment for the Anglo-American missions was mediating the Indo-Pakistani disputes and settling the Kashmir issue.⁵⁶⁸

In addition, the Anglo-American mission had another important task that was signing agreements on military assistance with the Government of India. The military assistance agreements were even regarded as the most important task, rather than the mediation between India and Pakistan. Finally, the American Government signed an agreement of military assistance with the Indian Government on 14 November 1962 and the British Government and the Government of India signed together another military assistance agreement on 27 November 1962.⁵⁶⁹ Although the Anglo-American mission achieved its goal of giving military assistance to India, not

⁵⁶⁷ *The Hindu*, Chennai, 7th November 1962.

⁵⁶⁸ Anand Shankar Mishra, *India's Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, p. 109.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

only did they restrict the use of the military assistance to only meet the Chinese but also they gave pressure to the Government of India to make a concession on the Kashmir issue in response to the protests of the Pakistani Government.⁵⁷⁰ It was clearly that the Anglo-American mission did not intend to give up the blueprint of the Indo-Pakistani alliance in the South Asia subcontinent to meet China after the accomplishment of the military assistance from the West to India.

Under this circumstance, consequently, the Government of India and Pakistan finally published a joint communiqué, which was a sign of the friendly relationship between two countries on 29 November 1962. Afterwards, the Governments of India and Pakistan held six rounds of talks to try to solve the Kashmir dispute from December 1962 to October 1963. However, three irreversible factors affected the two countries so that the two governments neither reached a settlement on the Kashmir issue nor made a military alignment.

The first factor was that the recognition of the Governments of India and Pakistan about the Kashmir disputes and the Indo-Pakistani relations were different. The Kashmir issue was the origin of tension within Indo-Pakistani relations, but the two governments had different opinion on that. Both parties intended to press for their own maximal interests in Kashmir. For the Indian side, Nehru expressed his emotional opinion on the Kashmir issue and the forthcoming talks between the two parties in a crucial moment when it was the day after the issuance of the Indo-Pakistani joint communiqué. He stated in the Parliament on 30 November 1962:

“The question of our relations with Pakistan was raised. The question of Kashmir was

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

referred to... Anything that involved an upset of the present arrangements would be very harmful to the people of Kashmir as well as to the future relations of India and Pakistan. I explained to them our basic principles and how it was not possible for us to bypass or ignore them.”⁵⁷¹

It was obviously that Prime Minister Nehru considered that the talks between India and Pakistan would cause harm to the people of Kashmir. He did not think that the talks would benefit India in relation to the Kashmir dispute. That Nehru’s statement displeased the Government of Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani talks would launch as planned, after the issue of Nehru’s public explanation for his statement.⁵⁷² For the Pakistani side, who sought to increase their interests in Kashmir, the Government of Pakistan constantly came up with more demands for territory in the region of Kashmir during the Indo-Pakistani talks.⁵⁷³ The uncompromising attitudes of the two parties on the Kashmir dispute became a potential factor to force the Indo-Pakistani settlement on the Kashmir issue to fail.

In addition, Paul Gore-Booth, the British High Commissioner in India, indicated that there was a psychological problem in relation to the Kashmir issue between the Governments of India and Pakistan. In his opinion, the Pakistani Government insisted that there would no more disputes between India and Pakistan after the settlement of the Kashmir issue; whereas the Government of India believed that even if the Kashmir issue could be solved successfully by the two governments, more issues would be revealed which would lead to the deterioration of the Indo-Pakistani relations.⁵⁷⁴ Although Anand Shankar Mishra, an Indian scholar believed that this

⁵⁷¹ India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, Series 3, Session 3, vol. 10-11, 30 Nov. 1962, cols. 3973-3978.

⁵⁷² Anand Shankar Mishra, *India’s Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, p. 115

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

psychological problem between the two government did not exist any more when the Anglo-American mission came to India and Pakistan to mediate the Indo-Pakistani relations, the divergences of opinion of two parties on the Indo-Pakistani relationship still played an important role in the following talks between two governments.⁵⁷⁵

The second factor was that the Pakistani Government was dissatisfied with the actions of the Anglo-American military assistance to India. Due to that, the Government of Pakistan considered that its national security might be under the menace of the Indian military force. Thus, it began to consider ways to resist the increasing Indian military force. On 26 December, at the outset of the Indo-Pakistani talks, the Government of Pakistan declared publicly that Pakistan and China had already come to an agreement in principle for the Sino-Pakistani border, which includes a part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan. The Indian Government protested that immediately and stated that Kashmir was a whole region so Pakistani Government had no right to give a part of Kashmir to China.⁵⁷⁶ However, the Governments of China and Pakistan finally signed the *Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement* in March 1963 during the period of the Indo-Pakistani talks.⁵⁷⁷ The Sino-Pakistani border settlement brought negative influence on the Indo-Pakistani talks on the Kashmir issue. The positive change in Sino-Pakistani relations became a potential crisis for Indo-Pakistani relations and it paved a way for the failure of the Indo-Pakistani talks in the coming future.

The third factor was that six rounds of the Indo-Pakistani talks failed to solve the Kashmir issue as well as ease the Indo-Pakistani tensional relations. During the period of the Indo-Pakistani talks, the Anglo-American representatives positively

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 119.

⁵⁷⁷ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 255.

participated in the talks. Except for the discussion between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute, the British representative also came up with a solution to address the Kashmir issue. At that moment, the difficulty that the two parties faced in relation to the resolution of the Kashmir issue was the partition of the Kashmir Valley. For the Indian side, the Indian Government had to keep the Srinagar in the Kashmir Valley, because the only road to access Ladakh was in Srinagar and Ladakh was a crucial region for the Government of India to contend with China. For the Pakistani side, the Government of Pakistan also intended to gain the region of Srinagar to assure its control in the Kashmir Valley.⁵⁷⁸ Thus, this issue seemed to be unsolved and that would negatively influence the Indo-Pakistani talks on the Kashmir solution. In the meantime, Paul Gore-Booth, the British representative, presented an approach to possibly solve this problem. The solution was to internationalize the Kashmir Valley and establish a condominium regime under the UN's supervision.⁵⁷⁹ However, when he presented this proposal during the fourth round of the Indo-Pakistani talks, the John Kenneth Galbraith, who was the American Ambassador to India, rejected this solution.⁵⁸⁰ In addition, the Government of India also opposed this proposal. The reason was that it believed that it could not establish an effective defence in the Kashmir Valley after the establishment of a mix regime in Srinagar.⁵⁸¹ Afterward, throughout the following rounds of the talks, the Governments of India and Pakistan did not reach an agreement on the solution of the Kashmir disputes. Finally, the six rounds of Indo-Pakistani talks ran into a dead end, though the Anglo-American representatives made efforts to hope that the talks would produce some achievement on the solution of the Kashmir issue.

⁵⁷⁸ Anand Shankar Mishra, *India's Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, p. 120.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁰ John Kenneth Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal: A personal Account of the Kennedy Years*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969, p. 556.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid.

Therefore, the failure of the Indo-Pakistani cooperation and a sustainable solution in relation to the Kashmir dispute was influenced by those three factors. In addition, the Government of Pakistan intended to seek for a lever to use against the increasing Indian military force in the South Asia subcontinent after the extension of the long-term military assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States to India.⁵⁸² Furthermore, there was one more important factor for the Government of Pakistan. Both the British and American Governments claimed that the Kashmir solution was not the premise of their extension of long-term military aid to India.⁵⁸³ That forced the Pakistani Government to pay more attention to its security when the Indian military force was expanding.

Overall, the Government of India has changed gradually its foreign policies since 1962. That was reflected in its acceptance of military assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and in not reaching an agreement on the Kashmir issue with the Government of Pakistan. Although India gained more powerful military arms from great powers to meet the Chinese menace, the unsettled Kashmir dispute and the increasing regional tension between India and Pakistan forced the Indian Government to pay more attention to its neighbour in the South Asia subcontinent.

China's foreign policy in the post-war period

The escalation of Sino-Indian border tensions and the outbreak of the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 greatly influenced China's foreign policies, especially in relation to its foreign policy towards Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Due to the thorough

⁵⁸² Anand Shankar Mishra, *India's Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, pp. 122-123.

⁵⁸³ India, Lok Sabha, *Debates*, series 3, session 4, vol. 18, 7th May 1963, col. 14197-14198.

breakdown of Sino-Indian relations in the late 1962, the Chinese Government had to look for another partner in the South Asia continent. Pakistan, which also had a territorial dispute with India, became an ideal target for China. Furthermore, although the Sino-Soviet alliance has split since 1959, the Government of Soviet Union preferred to support India in the South Asia continent to maintain its influence there; moreover, the Soviet Union also intended to restrict the Chinese impact in international affairs. Therefore, China's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was influenced by the context of the deterioration of the Sino-Indian relationship and the friendly relationship between India and the Soviet Union. In addition, with regard to China's foreign policy towards the United States and United Kingdom, because the Government of China regarded these two governments as the imperialism in the context of the Cold War, the military assistance from the two governments to India did not obviously change China's foreign policies towards the United States and the United Kingdom.

Regarding the change in China's foreign policy towards Pakistan in 1962, one has to look back to 1954. At that moment, in February of that year, during the honeymoon period of the Sino-Indian relationship, the Government of Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Programme with the American Government. This defence and assistance agreement was a regional defence pact which helped the American Government to establish its influence in the South Asia affairs.⁵⁸⁴ In addition, this Pakistani-US military alliance had an obvious goal in containing the spread of communism in Asia.⁵⁸⁵ Thus, the Sino-Pakistani relationship was not as friendly as the Sino-Indian relationship at that time.

⁵⁸⁴ Anand Shankar Mishra, *India's Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, p. 72.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

However, although the China's foreign policy towards Pakistan did not harbour any intention of pushing their relations in the direction of friendship or even active cooperation, the Chinese Government also wanted to establish a common diplomatic relationship rather than a hostile relationship with Pakistan, because the Government of China did not intend to make more enemies in the neighbouring countries around itself. The Bandung Conference of 1955 created an opportunity to the Chinese Government to establish a normal relationship with the Government of Pakistan. During the Bandung Conference, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai expressed a kind signal between China and Pakistan that the two countries had a mutual understanding and that neither regarded the other party as the enemy.⁵⁸⁶ This was the first understanding between the Governments of China and Pakistan after the establishment of the Pakistani-US military alliance. In addition, the Chinese Government insisted on a neutral stance regarding the Indo-Pakistani Kashmir issue.⁵⁸⁷ The Chinese posture provided a possibility of change for Sino-Pakistani unconcerned relations.

On 23 November 1962, the second day after the overall ceasefire of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, implemented by the Chinese Government, there was an editorial published in *Dawn*, a famous Pakistani newspaper. The editorial expressed a point of view about the Chinese ceasefire, saying that the Chinese Government's statement should be praised, because never before had there been a country to make such posture on account of principles and a peaceful policy in its history, when that country had already gained a military victory in its opponent's lands.⁵⁸⁸ This sort of article in the Pakistani newspaper implied that the relationship between China and

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 98-99.

⁵⁸⁷ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 255.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 229.

Pakistan might be getting better, because of the Sino-Indian border war. In fact, China and Pakistan had undertaken efforts to establish a more friendly relationship with each other than before since the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962. The Governments of China and Pakistan reached an agreement in principle on the demarcation of the Sino-Pakistani frontier at the end of 1962.⁵⁸⁹ Furthermore, China and Pakistan signed three agreements in the following year. The two governments signed the first Sino-Pakistani Trade Agreement in January 1963. Moreover, they also signed a Boundary Agreement on China's Xinjiang and the Adjacent Areas whose defence was under the Actual Control of Pakistan in March 1963. In addition, the two governments also signed the Sino-Pakistani Air Transport Agreement in August 1963. Afterwards, in 1965 the two governments signed together an economic and technical agreement in February and a cultural agreement in March.⁵⁹⁰ Those agreements between China and Pakistan created a friendly atmosphere for the two governments and the people of both countries. Thus, the Government of China intended to establish a better relationship with the Pakistani Government after that. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 gave an opportunity to the Chinese Government to establish a strategic partnership in the Government of Pakistan.

Regarding the changes in China's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in 1962, one should go back to the year 1959. Although the Sino-Soviet split had begun to reveal itself in a series of incidents since 1958, the divergence between China and the Soviet Union about the Sino-Indian border issue appeared when Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) First Secretary Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev visited Beijing to participate in the celebration of the PRC's tenth anniversary from 30

⁵⁸⁹ Anand Shankar Mishra, *India's Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction*, p. 119.

⁵⁹⁰ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp. 255-256.

September to 4 October 1959.⁵⁹¹

On 2 October, the incident of the Sino-Indian border conflict at Longju in August and the incident of the Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 were brought up by Khrushchev during a seven hours meeting between the Sino-Soviet senior leaders.⁵⁹² Then, the Sino-Indian border issue became the focus of quarrel between the two parties. The Chinese leaders insisted on that the Government of India should take the responsibility of the Sino-Indian border clash, while Khrushchev believed that the Chinese Government should compromise to India and unite India so as to win India over against the West.⁵⁹³ Moreover, the Chinese leaders considered the Soviet TASS (Telegraph Agency of Soviet Union) statement of 9 September 1959, which was proclaiming a neutral stance on the Sino-Indian border conflict, as an actual bias towards the Indian side.⁵⁹⁴ Because Chinese leaders believed that both China and the Soviet Union were communist countries, the Soviet Union should have supported the Chinese side against its opponent. Although Khrushchev did not agree with the Chinese belief that the Soviet Union stood with India, he emphasized consistently the importance of uniting India for China.⁵⁹⁵ In addition, Khrushchev also criticized the Chinese decision of allowing the 14th Dalai Lama to escape from Tibet, but the

⁵⁹¹ A series incidents which made the Sino-Soviet split from 1958 to 1959 include the incident of the Soviet Union's proposals of setting up the long-wave radio transmitter in China and the establishment of a joint fleet between China and the Soviet Union, the incident of the CCP leader's order to shell to Jinmen Islands, the incident of the resolution of the Soviet Union to terminated to offer the nuclear assistance (including the producing data and the sample of nuclear bomb) to the Chinese Government, and the incident of the Soviet criticism of the Chinese movements of the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune. See Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 101; and Shen Zhihua (Ed.), *Zhongsu guanxi shigang: 1917-1991 (A Historical Outline of Sino-Soviet Relations: 1917-1991)*, Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2007, p. 237.

⁵⁹² Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 95.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.; Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age)*, pp. 266-267.

⁵⁹⁴ Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, pp. 93-94.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 95; Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age)*, pp. 266-267.

Chinese leaders considered the Tibetan affairs as their internal affairs and so believed Khrushchev should not bring it up at that moment.⁵⁹⁶ The consequence of the quarrel was that no agreements were reached by two parties and it also harmed the personal relationship between the senior leaders in both parties.⁵⁹⁷ Thus, it pushed the Sino-Soviet split to further.

After that, the Soviet Government continued to criticize the Chinese policy on the Sino-Indian border disputes in the following years. Although it pushed the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet-Indian relationship was grabbing the opportunity to develop further in this period.⁵⁹⁸ Specifically, the Soviet Government sold a number of military devices – ninety-four military airplanes and six jet engines –to India from October 1960 to May 1962.⁵⁹⁹ In the summer of 1962, when the Sino-Indian border tension was continuing to deteriorate, the Soviet Government was still providing transport airplanes to the Government of India. Even in August, the Soviet Government sold MiG-21 fighter aircrafts to India.⁶⁰⁰ This series of incidents made the Sino-Soviet relations worse on the basis of the Sino-Soviet split.

Yet, the Soviet Government shifted suddenly from its consistently neutral stance to side with China on the Sino-Indian border issue in October 1962. On 14 October, at a banquet for the outgoing Chinese Ambassador Liu Xiao, Khrushchev expressed his opinion on the Sino-Indian border issue, proclaiming that the Soviet Union was siding

⁵⁹⁶ Chen Jian, “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, p. 95; Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p. 267.

⁵⁹⁷ Chen Jian, “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union”, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, pp. 95-96; Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), p.267.

⁵⁹⁸ Wang Hongwei, *Dangdai Zhongyin Guanxi Shuping* (A Critical Review of the Sino-Indian Relations of the Present Age), pp. 266-267.

⁵⁹⁹ Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu dang’an guan (Archives in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) (Ed.), *Archives*, 50/3/62, p. 89.

⁶⁰⁰ *Renmin Ribao*, 18th August 1962; Shen Zhihua (Ed.), *Zhongsu guanxi shigang: 1917-1991*, p. 326.

with China on the Sino-Indian border disputes; moreover, he also indicated that the Soviet Government would stand with China if a war against China broke out unfortunately.⁶⁰¹ Even the day before the banquet day, Khrushchev expressed a friendlier attitude towards the Chinese Government. He said to Liu Xiao, “(I)n relations between us there is no place for neutrality. This would be a betrayal... we shall always be in one camp and share joys and sorrows.”⁶⁰² Afterwards, with the outbreak of the Sino-Indian Border War and the appearance of the Chinese proposal for a ceasefire with India, the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* issued an editorial whose title was “for the interests of all nations, for the common peace” on 25 October. In this article, the Soviet side supported manifestly the Chinese proposal for the ceasefire and peaceful settlement on the Sino-Indian border issue.⁶⁰³

The reason why the Soviet Government suddenly stood with the Chinese on the Sino-Indian border issue in Chinese leaders’ opinion was that Khrushchev hoped that the Soviet Union’s support of China on the Sino-Indian border issue could bring Chinese support to the Soviet Union on the Cuban issue.⁶⁰⁴ At that time, in October 1962, apart from the Sino-Indian border tension, people all over the world were focused on the Caribbean Sea that, in that crucial moment, was in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In fact, as early as June 1962, the Soviet Government had begun to deliver underground short-range and medium-range missiles to Cuba successively. After the American Government gained this information, it orchestrated a blockade of the sea around Cuba on 22 October, and the shadow of nuclear war

⁶⁰¹ Wang Taiping, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi: 1957-1969 (The Diplomatic History of the People’s Republic of China: 1957-1969)*, vol. 2, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1998, p. 249.

⁶⁰² Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967*, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009, p. 29.

⁶⁰³ *The Pravda*, Moscow, 25th October 1962.

⁶⁰⁴ Shen Zhihua (Ed.), *Zhongguo guanxi shigang: 1917-1991*, p. 326.

hung over the world.⁶⁰⁵ On 25 October, the same day that the *Pravda* issued the article supporting China on the Sino-Indian border issue, the Chinese Government also announced that it stood with the Soviet Union completely.⁶⁰⁶

However, both the Soviet Union and the United States did not intend to launch a nuclear war. Thus, Khrushchev wrote to American President John F. Kennedy to bring up a proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Cuban Missile Crisis on 27 October. He expressed that the Soviet Government would withdraw all of missiles and relative devices and he also hoped that the American Government could withdraw missiles and relative devices in Turkey. In the same day, the American Government replied to the Soviet Government and indicated that it agreed with the Soviet proposals and conditions and it would withdraw the blockade of Cuba and withdraw the missiles in Turkey secretly. In addition, the American Government also promised to the Soviet Government that it would not invade Cuba. After Khrushchev received the American reply with an agreement, the Soviet Government started to withdraw missiles from Cuba on 28 October.⁶⁰⁷ Therefore, the Cuban Missile Crisis was ended by the withdrawal of the Soviets and their missile from Cuba. Yet, due to the American agreement with the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey, as a matter of fact, the Soviet Government gained a benefit from the Cuban Missile Crisis.

However, because the Government of China did not know anything about the U.S.-Soviet secret agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Chinese senior leaders were shocked and believed the Soviet Government made a

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 321.

⁶⁰⁶ Zhou Wenqi and Zhu Liangru, *Teshu er fuza de keti – Gongchan guoji, Sulian he Zhongguo gongchandang guanxi biannianshi* (*The Special and Complicated Subject – A Chronicle of the relations among the Communist International, the USSR and the CCP*), Wuhan: Hubei People's Press, 1993, p. 533.

⁶⁰⁷ Shen Zhihua (Ed.), *Zhongsu guanxi shigang: 1917-1991*, pp. 321-323.

great concession in its confrontations with the western imperialism.⁶⁰⁸ Therefore, the CCP began to use the propaganda method to condemn the CPSU throughout the whole country from the beginning of November 1962.⁶⁰⁹

In the meantime, the Soviet position on the Sino-Indian border issue appeared to shift slightly in the direction of neutrality. *The Pravda* issued an article which used a neutral tone to remark upon the Sino-Indian border conflict on 31 October 1962.⁶¹⁰ As expected, this change in the Soviet standpoint irritated the Chinese senior leaders. It enhanced the Chinese leader's common recognition of Soviet's support to China on the Sino-Indian border issue as quid pro quo for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu made a criticism about the Soviet Government at a national foreign affairs working meeting on 7 November. He said, "Why has it changed from 25 to 31 (October), in only five day? It was because on the 25 (October), the situation in Cuba was very intense... Khrushchev was scared to death... (T)herefore Khrushchev cheated on us. (He) is truly a pragmatist."⁶¹¹ Moreover, Secretary of Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee Kang Sheng also accused Khrushchev, "(He) is a pragmatist, (so he) can change his stand constantly and his words can not be trusted."⁶¹² Therefore, the CCP has given Khrushchev a verdict: "Pragmatism is revisionism. When (Khrushchev) wants to make (compromises) with the United States, increase his bargaining chips, and thus needs us, he treats you a bit 'well', but when (he) no longer needs (you), in the end he slaps your face."⁶¹³ Therefore, it was evident that the CCP senior leaders had extraordinary

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 323.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid, pp. 323-324.

⁶¹⁰ Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967*, p. 33.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² Shen Zhihua (Ed.), *Zhongguo guanxi shigang: 1917-1991*, p. 327.

⁶¹³ Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967*, p. 33.

dissatisfactions with Khrushchev and what he had already done in relation to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Indian conflict.

With the Sino-Soviet split, the CCP had begun to fight for the leadership of the international communist movement from the revisionist CPSU since the end of 1962. The CCP leaders believed the one of biggest mistakes Khrushchev made was that he betrayed Marxism-Leninism to pursue a peaceful coexistence with western imperialism.⁶¹⁴ But, the CCP considered that the revolution and the struggle with imperialism and revisionism was pure Marxism-Leninism.⁶¹⁵ Thus, at the national foreign affairs working meeting in November 1962, the CCP officially came up with “a issue of struggling for the leadership from the revisionism in the international struggles”.⁶¹⁶ Therefore, the CCP started to unite left-wingers in Communist Parties in the rest of world against the revisionist CPSU from then on.⁶¹⁷ Furthermore, the CCP launched a series of fierce criticisms towards the revisionist CPSU at that moment. The outset was the *Renmin ribao*’s editorial, which was titled as “Workers of All Countries, Unite to Oppose Our Common Enemy” on 15 December 1962.⁶¹⁸

After that, a letter from the CCP to the CPSU on 14 June 1963 became a trigger to push Sino-Soviet polemics to their zenith. That day, the CCP sent a letter to the CPSU and published the letter in the *Rimin ribao* as well. The title was “Proposal Concerning the General line of the International Communist Movement”.⁶¹⁹ The CCP brought up 25 questions on the principle of the international communist

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., 25.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., Shen Zhihua (Ed.), *Zhongsu guanxi shigang: 1917-1991*, p. 332.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., p.331.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 333-334.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid., p. 335; Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967*, p. 43.

⁶¹⁹ Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967*, p. 58; Shen Zhihua (Ed.), *Zhongsu guanxi shigang: 1917-1991*, p. 336.

movement and came up with a different design for the general line of the international communist movement that differed from the Soviet design.⁶²⁰ Afterwards, the CPSU launched a fierce counterattack for this letter. On 14 July 1963, by Khrushchev's command, the CPSU issued an "Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" which criticized strongly the CCP's letter in June.⁶²¹ Consequently, the CCP decided to launch a comprehensive counterattack towards the CPSU. From 6 September 1963 to the 14 July 1964, the CCP published nine articles, which were the famous "Nine Commentaries on the Open Letter of CPSU Central Committee" in the *Renmin ribao*.⁶²² During this period, the Sino-Soviet split had formed publicly. Chinese foreign policy stood in two major directions – anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism.

After the collapse of Khrushchev's authority in the Soviet Union in October 1964, the Sino-Soviet split had still not been reconciled. When the last chance of Sino-Soviet rapprochement was lost at Chinese premier Zhou Enlai's visit to Moscow in November 1964, the Sino-Soviet split was doomed in the following decade.⁶²³

The ceasefire of the short border war, which lasted a month from October to November 1962 between China and India, deteriorated their relations comprehensively rather than achieving a settlement for the Sino-Indian border issue. Instead, the two governments began to adjust their foreign policy to meet internal and external needs at that moment.

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967*, p. 62; Shen Zhihua (Ed.), *Zhongsu guanxi shigang: 1917-1991*, p. 337.

⁶²² Shen Zhihua (Ed.), *Zhongsu guanxi shigang: 1917-1991*, p. 337.

⁶²³ Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967*, p. 163.

The Indian Government started to accept a large amount of military assistance from both the West and the Soviet Union. It also signed two agreements for long-term military aid with the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, the British Governments and the United States also intended to solve the Indo-Pakistani dispute in Kashmir so as to establish a united front against China in the South Asia Continent. However, because of the fear of the Pakistani Government about the increase of Indian military force, they considered the relationship with India cautiously, rather than establishing an alliance with India under Anglo-American mediation. Because the Government of India did not intend to make a bigger concession with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, the united front did not form in the end. Unfortunately, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 based on the Kashmir dispute resulted in an Indo-Pakistani alliance against Chinese menace in the Indian continent becoming nothing more than a dream.

However, the Government of China took this opportunity during Indo-Pakistani disputes to start to establish friendlier relationship with the Government of Pakistan from the early 1960s. The Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 did not arouse Pakistani worry towards a possible Chinese threat and moreover, the Government of Pakistan considered China as a potential ally against India, which was regarded as a potential opponent by the Pakistani people. The outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 helped China and Pakistan to establish a strategic partnership against India in the South Asia continent.

In addition, the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 also greatly influenced the Sino-Soviet relationship. Although the Sino-Soviet split, which did not relate to the Sino-Indian border issue, had begun to appear since 1958, cooperation and a friendly

relationship between India and the Soviet Union in the meantime made Chinese quite dissatisfied. Moreover, when Khrushchev criticized the Chinese border policy towards India in 1959 and he constantly expressed his neutral stance on the Sino-Indian border disputes in the following years, the Sino-Indian contradictions started to appear because of the Sino-Indian border issue. Furthermore, when Khrushchev's stance shifted quickly from supporting China to keeping a neutral attitude on the Sino-Indian conflict from October to November 1962, it was not difficult to irritate the Chinese senior leaders and make them reconsider the foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. The approaches adopted by Soviet Government to deal with the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 became the crucial factors in driving the CCP leader to accuse Khrushchev and the CPSU, because the Chinese leaders believed that Khrushchev and the Soviet Union betrayed them as a fraternal country for a friend – India. Although Sino-Soviet polemics from 1963 to 1964 were the major reason in causing the Sino-Indian split, the influence Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 was one of the most important factors to render the outset of the Sino-Soviet polemics. After that, the Sino-Soviet fraternal relations collapsed, and moreover, a border conflict between the two countries occurred in 1969. Therefore, the Chinese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union never changed until the 1980s.

Conclusion and Analysis

This chapter relates to the changes to India and China's foreign policies after the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. The above text has shown the history of that, and the paragraphs below will analyse the two states' foreign policies within the theory of neo-realism, which is one of theories of international politics. Moreover, it is clearer

to see the reasons for the changes to the foreign policies of the two nations after analysing those histories with Kenneth N. Waltz's neo-realism theory.

It is more clear to see the changes to the foreign policies of both India and China after the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War by analysing them within Waltz's neo-realism theory of international politics. For the Indian side, on the one hand, it utilized political methods in order to increase its power to offset as much as possible the negative influence of its military defeat along the Sino-Indian frontiers by achieving the balance of power in the international politics. There was a sort of negative phenomenon in New Delhi after the military defeat of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. It is obvious to see that the Indian Government had lost confidence in defending against the Chinese military offence from its own forces. When the Indian Government faced the problem of barely protecting its security and survival from the Chinese military menace in the self-help system of international politics, the importance of the balance of power was reflected greatly at that moment. Because India became a weaker actor while China was a stronger actor during the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War in the international political sphere, the Government of India naturally sought to increase its power against the Chinese threat in order to achieve balance in the Sino-Indian conflict.

More specifically, in order to increase material power, the Government of India, which did not possess enough forces to ward against the Chinese military threat after its military defeat, sought external military assistance from the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union and established long-term military cooperations with them. In addition, in order to increase immaterial power, the Indian Government utilized the media to win over world public opinion to support India for censuring the

Chinese as the invader. Not only people around the world, but also most of the western countries, expressed their support for India. The Government of India won the political battle after its military defeat through the increase of power in international politics. Furthermore, it was as a weaker actor in the Sino-Indian conflict to win over support from the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, which reflected naturally the balance of power in this incident. Whatever the Chinese Government intended through the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, it had to take into consideration the attitudes and influences of those three powers when it dealt with the Sino-Indian border issue and the Indian affairs from that point onwards.

On the other hand, in order to preserve security as the basic interest from another threat in the north, the Government of India lost an opportunity to make their potential rival (even enemy) become a virtual friend in the South Asian continent. Because of India's increase in terms of material power, Pakistan, its neighbour, which became the weaker actor in the Indo-Pakistani relationship, felt uneasy and regarded India as its greatest menace in international politics. The United Kingdom and the United States initially intended united India and Pakistan against China in this region. However, the Kashmir issue was similar to the Sino-Indian border issue, which was the main conflict between the two states, and was concerning India's security and sovereignty, so the Government of India did not make any concessions in the Kashmir issue with Pakistan in order to protect India's basic interests. The goal of the Anglo-American mission, which established a united front against the Chinese threat in the South Asia continent, was never achieved. Therefore, this gave China a chance to win over Pakistan as a cooperative partner against India in the South Asian continent.

For the Chinese side, although the Government of China gained victory in terms of a

military aspect, it lacked the capabilities to continue the border war or respond to instant frontier conflicts. That reflected a sort of descent of the power of China, though the military victory still showed China as the stronger actor in the Sino-Indian conflict. In order to increase their power, the Chinese Government undertook a series of efforts in international politics after the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War.

First of all, the Government of China intended to retain the advantage of its power in the Sino-Indian conflict in the self-help system of international anarchy. Under the circumstances of being incapable of increasing their forces and of gaining external assistance, the ascent of immaterial power was a useful way for the Chinese Government to keep its power advantage. Thus, no matter whether during the ceasefire announcement, the active ceasefire action or the positive military disengagement, a series of measures were carried out to demonstrate Chinese morals even in the wartime and to portray a positive influence on others in order to win over more states' support in the Sino-Indian conflict. The behaviour of Chinese Government gained support from some Afro-Asian countries. The Chinese Government positively agreed in principle with the Colombo proposal and its clarifications, and it also did its best to facilitate official talks and negotiations between the Governments of China and India to settle the Sino-Indian border issue and the post-war issue, while the Chinese Government was censuring the Government of India claiming the Indian Government seemed to be reluctant to launch talks or negotiations with them. The actions of the Chinese Government attracted more states and people as world public opinion turned to support the Chinese. China's diplomatic tactics were fairly successful, because most Afro-Asian states understood and supported Chinese behaviour during and after the wartime.

In addition, the Government of China sought to increase its power in international politics. It grabbed the opportunity to improve and enhance the relationship with Pakistan before and after the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. The better Sino-Pakistani relationship rendered a negative influence on Indo-Pakistani relations and it even became a crucial factor to prevent the settlement of the Kashmir issue between the two states in the South Asian continent. In the meantime, although the Chinese Government did not gain any external assistance to increase its military forces or economic capabilities while the Government of India was enhancing its force as a result of western and soviet military assistance, the Sino-Pakistani cooperation and the Indo-Pakistani hostility meant that the Chinese Government still had enough power to wield against India in this region of the South Asian continent.

However, the Chinese Government had not maintained a fraternal relationship with another communist great power, the Soviet Union, which became fragmented when China felt the possibility that its security might be damaged by Soviet attitudes and behaviours. Communist China always considered the Sino-Indian border dispute as an important issue with regard to its security and sovereignty. Whereas, the Soviet Government begun to take a neutral position, which was regarded as a bias for India by the Chinese, in the Sino-Indian border issue and conflict since 1959. When the Chinese Government believed that Soviet attitudes and behaviours had harmed Chinese interests and security, the Indian Government grabbed this opportunity to improve Soviet-Indian relations greatly. It is obvious to see the effect of the balance of power in the changes to international relations between the Sino-Soviet split and Soviet-Indian cooperation in the early 1960s. With the complete Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, this shift of power had a great influence on Chinese foreign policies. The Government of China began to seek opportunities to attempt to recover the

relationship with another great power – the United States – so as to preserve its security and survival from the Soviet threat.

Overall, it is clear to see that Waltz's neo-realism is more than capable of analysing and explain the changes to the foreign policies of India and China after the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. Moreover, the balance of power theory is able to interpret the changes of power amongst nations in the Sino-Indian conflicts of the 1960s. Finally, the balance of power amongst states is beneficial for preventing another serious border war between China and India, and it had a positive effect on maintaining the stability of the region as well as it opened a door to figure out the border issue for the two states in the future.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The PRC and the ROI established the official diplomacy in 1950. From 1950 to 1965, the Sino-Indian relations experienced a transition from friendship to hostility. The major reason for the change was the Sino-Indian border issue and the alterations of foreign policies of the two countries. In the friendly period, both governments intentionally avoided discussing the Sino-Indian frontier problem for the benefits of cooperation and preserving the India's right of trade in Tibet. However, the outset of the split to Sino-Indian friendly relations was due to the border tensions and frontier disputes in the late 1950s.

This thesis applies Waltz's neo-realism of the theory of International politics to analyse the entire historical issues and incidents. The theory emphasizes that there is a decentralized and anarchic system for the international politics in the world. Each country is in a system of self-help in the international politics. Thus, in order to reach the goals in the international environment, a state is hardly cooperating with other countries effectively. There are two reasons that can explain that. Firstly, a state will worry about the issue of the uneven distribution of gains or interests through the cooperation with other countries. The second reason is that a state will consider about the possibility of that its sovereignty would be damaged by the cooperation with other nations. Thus, in a self-help system of international politics, the basic goal of each country is the survival, and moreover, preserving its national interest and security are prerequisites of the survival for each state. There are three major elements – the capability, the force and the balance of power – that can be the approaches to help

states to reach their basic goals in the theory.

When a state intends to survive and ensures its national security and interest, increasing its capability becomes an effective method. The great capability will bring the huge influence in certain regions and it can decrease even avoid the influence of other countries to ensure the national security and interest in there. Once a nation has enough capability, the force becomes a effective approach to protect the national security and interest from the external threats. Finally, when a state with not enough capability faces a menace from another nation with great capability, it is better for the state to balance the great nation's power rather than to participate in the side of the great power. The specific approach is that the state can ally with other countries to balance the great power. It is not difficult to understand the reason. If the state with not enough capability jumps on the bandwagon of the great power, its internal and external affairs will be forced to follow the guideline of policies of the great power. Moreover, it will harm the state's independence of policy even the sovereignty of the nation.

This chapter of conclusion will use the theory of Waltz's neo-realism to analyse the foreign policies of the United Kingdom and the Qing Government of China since 19th century, to analyse the origin of the Sino-Indian border issue, to analyse the foreign policies of China and India from 1950 to 1965, and to analyse the impact of the foreign policies of the two Governments on the Sino-Indian border issue in this period. It will broad the horizon of the historical research by the trans-disciplinary study.

With regards to the Sino-Indian border issue, it must be dated back to diplomatic affairs between the Qing Empire and the British Raj in the 19th century. In order to

establish a buffer zone with which to resist the north Russian menace towards India, the Government of British India intended to impose its influence on Tibet so that it could use it as the buffer zone between India and Russia. The priority of the British was India's security and survival space, so Tibet was an ideal buffer zone. Furthermore, the boundary delimitation between China and India was a crucial affair for the British Government to preserve India's interests and security at that moment. No matter whether the British Governments ambitions included conquering Tibet or maintaining a favourable Sino-Indian boundary delimitation, its priority was India's national security in the international anarchic system. Therefore, some British adventurers and officers has made surveys on the ground in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border; the so-called "Johnson Line", "Ardagh Line" and "Macartney-MacDonald Line" were delimited by the British unilaterally.

However, in the meantime, in Tibet, the Chinese Government confronted the British menace which not only threatened Tibetan but also Chinese security. Therefore, in 1899, when Sir Claude MacDonald presented the so-called "Macartney-MacDonald Line" for delimiting the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary, the Chinese Government had no response for that. What the Chinese Government considered was that it was afraid the British Government would take advantage of the boundary delimitation to grab more interests from China, similar to what the western countries did in previous treaties with China in the 19th century. Because the Chinese Government was concerned with its national interests and security, any chance of an official boundary negotiation between China and India was lost. Facing this situation, the British Government had to put the delimitation plan aside at that time, but it had buried a root of trouble for the Sino-Indian border issue.

With regards to the origin of the Sino-Indian border dispute on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian frontier, it also was the result of the game between the great powers. The 1913-1914 Simla conference was a tri-party conference that the United Kingdom, China and Tibet attended. The theme of the conference was to discuss the status of Tibet and delimit the boundary between inland China and Tibet. However, in order to delimit the eastern Sino-Indian boundary for British national interests and India's security, Colonel Henry McMahon privately drew a line in accordance with the principle of the watershed. Therefore, the McMahon Line, which became the disputed boundary between China and India on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border in the middle of the 20th century, was drawn by the British unilaterally in 1914. Although the Chinese representative did not officially sign the Simla Convention that attached the map with the McMahon Line, the Sino-Indian disputed boundary in the eastern sector became an issue after that point.

The origin of the Sino-Indian border issue was the conflict between a western modern concept – “sovereignty” and “demarcation” and a traditional oriental custom – which never emphasised border demarcation among countries historically; it also was a conflict resulting from a game between the great powers for their own national interests and security. In fact, the direct reason for the Sino-Indian border dispute was the fact that China and India, in modern times, did not delimit the boundary in accordance to an international treaty through official bilateral negotiations bilaterally.

Since the establishment of the two new governments – the Government of the PRC and the Government of the ROI in 1950, both of them had adopted particular foreign policies, which were suitable for their respective national circumstances. Although, in the context of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War, no matter what India's

non-aligned policy and China's foreign policies in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence set out to achieve, their foreign policies were designed for their own national interests and survival in international politics.

India's non-aligned policy was a wise foreign policy to adopt in the particular period of the Cold War. It left India in a neutral position, when they engaged in international affairs in the context of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. In the interpretation of Waltz's neo-realism, because India did not jump on the bandwagon of either the United States nor the Soviet Union, India's foreign policy was free to adjust in accordance with its national and international circumstances instead of following two bloc's foreign policies. Additionally, India also was not afraid of a dilemma wherein one bloc would restrict or be hostile towards it, due to India participating in another bloc. Therefore, India's non-aligned policy preserved the independence of its foreign policy, as well as its national security, from either bloc's menace, leaving India time and space to better develop itself in this period.

China's foreign policy has emphasized the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence since the establishment of the Government of the PRC. Although the Chinese Government participated in the Soviet Union bloc during the Cold War and engaged in direct confrontation with the western bloc during the Korean War, its foreign policy still had some space to adjust for its own development in the international anarchic system. In order to protect national development and security from the capitalist bloc and preserve the relative independence of its foreign policy from Soviet influence, the Chinese Government positively established friendly and cooperative relations with the newly independent Afro-Asian countries without the two blocs on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Through this foreign policy,

China gained support from those Afro-Asian countries and strengthened its capabilities in international affairs. Therefore, Chinese influence increased in both Asia and Africa.

In general, China and India had a friendly and cooperative relationship before the late 1950s. In April 1954, the two governments signed *Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India* to solve the issue of India's privileges in Tibet. It re-regulated and assured India's legal rights in Tibet, and the Indian Government also recognized Tibet as a part of China's territory. The 1954 agreement was the peak of Sino-Indian friendly relations. However, there was a hidden danger between the two countries, namely that the two governments intended to avoid the Sino-Indian border issue during the negotiations for this agreement. This frontier problem would gradually erode Sino-Indian friendly relations after that.

Although a small scale of the Sino-Indian border conflicts had occurred since the summer of 1954 in the middle sector of the Sino-Indian frontier, the relationship between the two countries still kept well in the following years. In the meantime, the two countries tried to solve the border dispute through bilateral negotiations from 1954 to 1958, but the result was not as expected. In fact, the Sino-Indian border dispute did not have a great influence on the foreign policies of the two governments in this period. The reason was that the border conflict seemed to be a risk for both countries' national security but the two parties intended to preserve the friendship because cooperation between the two countries would allow them to gain more interests than risks which might harm the national security to some extent in this period. The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion was a significant incident for Sino-Indian

relations in the 1950s, which finally meant that the Sino-Indian dispute was brought to the table by two governments.

In order to preserve their respective national interests, both China and India adjusted their foreign policies from friendship to tension after the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion. For the Chinese side, the Tibetan issue had always been a sensitive problem for the Beijing Government since the Chinese Government recovered its administration in Tibet in 1951. Because of the information of that the Tibetan rebels had engaged in revolting activities in India's Kalimpong for a long time before the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion, the Beijing Government believed that the Indian Government more or less supported or was involved with the Tibetan revolts. If the suspicion was true, Tibet, a part of China's territory, would be threatened seriously. In addition, the Indian Government gave political asylum to the 14th Dalai Lama and his followers who fled from Lhasa to India during the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion. The Chinese Government considered this behaviour a provocation to China's sovereignty and internal affairs. Therefore, facing the situation that its national security was under severe risk, the Chinese Government began to adjust its foreign policy and border policy towards India. More Chinese troops started to deploy around the Sino-Indian border. This accorded with Waltz's theory that force is a useful means with which to assure national security and show one's capabilities in the international anarchy. Furthermore, the border tension resulted in the Chinese Government considering that it was the time to discuss the border issue with the Indian Government.

For the Indian side, when the outbreak of the 1959 Tibetan Rebellion and the visit of Dalai Lama created the Sino-Indian border tensions, what the Indian Government was initially concerned about was India's national security and interests. At that time, the

Indian Government had set up the quasi-Pradesh – the NEFA in the disputed region, the Assam Himalayas (South Tibet), which was occupied by India from 1948 to 1953. The Tibetan incident and the deployment of the PLA around the Sino-Indian border forced the Indian Government to begin to consider its security in the NEFA. It did not intend to risk India's security because of the Tibetan revolts and the reforms. Thus, in order to ensure border security, the Indian Government also deployed more troops to the frontier; moreover, it adopted the radical forward policy on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, because it believed that the region of Aksai Chin, currently occupied by China, was India's territory. Thus the Indian Government decided to use a more radical policy to preserve its national security and survival in international politics. The implementation of the forward policy results in the military conflicts becoming more frequent than before. The forward policy could only be terminated in two ways. One was the success of the Sino-Indian border talks for peaceful settlement and bilateral boundary agreement, and another was a larger scale border conflict, and perhaps even a general border war between China and India.

With regards to the bilateral negotiations between China and India for the Sino-Indian border issue, there were two important factors that resulted in its failure. The first factor was that two parties had different opinions and foreign policies relating to the Sino-Indian border disputes. Regarding the situation of the disputed territory on the ground at the end of 1959, in the eastern sector, India occupied the Assam Himalayas and had set up an official administrative district there since 1953. In the western sector, China started to send troops to patrol in the region of Aksai Chin, the westernmost region between the Xinjiang and Tibet; moreover, the Chinese Government finished the Xinjiang-Tibet road through Aksai Chin in 1957. In the middle sector, the previous British Indian Government and the independent Indian

Government occupied some areas one after another.

The Chinese Government considered that the entire Sino-Indian border had never been delimited by a bilateral boundary agreement in modern times. Thus, no matter what the boundary was demarcated as on the eastern sector, the middle sector and the western sector of the Sino-Indian frontiers, they were disputed. However, the Xinjiang-Tibet Road had strategic significance for connection and transportation between Xinjiang and Tibet, which were two huge autonomous districts in the west of China; moreover, the region of Aksai Chin and most of the rest of the disputed areas were under China's de facto control at that time. Thus, the Chinese Government believed that the Sino-Indian border negotiation must be carried out and the border issue would be solved when the two parties reached an agreement on the delimitation of the entire Sino-Indian boundary. Even so, in order to protect the more significant national interests in Aksai Chin, the Chinese Government was prepared to give way in some respects to India, making concessions in South Tibet on the eastern sector and some disputed areas on the middle sector in exchange for gaining India's concession on the western sector. In fact, what the Chinese Government pursued in regard to border issue was through the approach of border negotiation of entire Sino-Indian boundary, no matter whether China would gain more or less interests by the border negotiation. It was China's foreign policy to the Sino-Indian border issue.

However, the Indian Government had another opinion and foreign policy on the Sino-Indian border issue. It believed that the boundary on the eastern sector was delimited by the 1914 Simla Convention so it had been undoubtedly settled, whereas they shared the Chinese opinion that the boundaries on the middle sector and the western sector were indeed disputed. Hence, the Indian Government did agree with

the boundary negotiation with regards to the western sector rather than the entire Sino-Indian boundary. The foreign policy of India insisted upon that there was no any territorial dispute on the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian frontier. Even if there would a boundary negotiation in future, it should not mention the boundary of the eastern sector. The divergence of opinion on the Sino-Indian border issue made it difficult to carry out the boundary negotiation.

The second factor that resulted in the failure of the boundary negotiation was that India set up two preconditions for the talks to take place with China. Firstly, that the boundary on the eastern sector would be settled and not negotiable. Secondly, that all Chinese personnel must retreat from the region of Aksai Chin and the rest of the disputed areas on the western sector before the launch of the official boundary negotiations between China and India. However, the two preconditions for the frontier negotiations were not accepted by the Chinese Government. They believed that they were not fair to China, because the Indian Government would object to a precondition for the Sino-Indian border negotiations if that prediction was to ask Indian personnel to retreat from the NEFA in the region of South Tibet.

Therefore, according to the above two factors, the boundary negotiations between China and India were unable to take place. If we look for the reason, the respective national interests and security were the most important factors. During the process of the discussions for the possible boundary negotiations, both of the two Governments intended to grab the most important national interests in order to establish an advantage to any possible frontier negotiations in the future. For the Chinese side, the government had already implied that it would make a concession if it could gain the region on the western sector in the negotiation. Because the Chinese Government

believed that Aksai Chin was more significant for China than South Tibet, as long as it gained the region through border negotiations, it achieved maximum success for China's national interests and security. For the Indian side, the Indian Government considered that, no matter what, the disputed territory on the eastern and western sectors of the Sino-Indian frontiers belonged to India historically. Thus, an unwillingness to compromise their national sovereignty accorded with India's national interests and security in international politics.

In addition, the boundary negotiations between China and India were unable to take place while the Indian Government implemented its forward policy in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, and while the Chinese Government deployed troops close to the de facto boundary on the ground. Therefore, the escalation of the border conflicts was inevitable in 1962. Frontier conflicts broke out frequently on both the western and eastern sectors from the summer of 1962. According with Waltz's theory, the two governments used force to preserve their national interests, security and survival space, thus when peaceful settlement could not be reached, the frontier conflicts would eventually evolve to general war.

Additionally, under the circumstances that China possessed greater forces, the Indian Government had to consider that they alone might not be able to resist the Chinese military threat. Thus, India balanced China's power through asking for external assistance, including economic and military assistance, from both of the two blocs. In the meantime, the Chinese Government could not find any external assistance, even from the Soviet Union on account of the Sino-Soviet Split. With the increase of the economic and military capabilities of India, the decision-makers in the Indian Government generally considered that China would not launch a large-scale attack

against India, despite the fact that India's military actions on the ground had harmed China's national security and interests.

Finally, facing India's radical forward policy and their provocative actions across the de facto control line on the ground, in October, the Chinese Government decided to launch a general counterattack against India along the entire boundary. Although China achieved military victory in the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, it soon gave up the disputed regions that it occupied during the border war. China seemed to gain neither lands nor political influence in the disputed territories through the border war. However, the Chinese Government used force to show its capability during the war, and this was effective to deter India's provocations on the ground in the following years. China gained what it intended to achieve before the border war, to protect its territory from external menace. In addition, India as the defeated party in the border war, did not lose any lands nor influences in the areas which were occupied by the Chinese troops in the border war. Furthermore, the Sino-Indian border war forced the Indian Government to recognize the great threat of the Chinese military. Thus, in order to balance China's power, the Government of India enhanced its relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States. Under this circumstance, the Chinese Government also started to reconsider how to restrict India's influence in the South Asian continent as a means to preserve China's interests and national security.

It was clear to see that the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War greatly influenced China and India's foreign policies in the post-war period. With regards to the Indian side, the Indian Government recognized that it was a weaker actor than China through its military failure during the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. Moreover, it was difficult for India to resist China's military menace through reliance on its own capabilities.

The self-help system would not work in this particular situation. Thus, in order to preserve India's national security from the Chinese threat, India had to use the help of external powers to balance China's power. Firstly, the Indian Government increased its material capabilities through external assistance from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in the post-war time. Secondly, the Indian Government also increased its immaterial capabilities through the use of media propaganda. As a victim of Chinese aggression, India gained the sympathy and support of both the governments and the public from the western world and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the India increased its power through a series of successful diplomatic activities in the post-war time. Furthermore, it also garnered the help of the two great powers to contain the Chinese threat in the South Asian continent.

However, with the increase of India's capabilities, especially its military power in the South Asian continent, Pakistan became a weaker actor in the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Moreover, the Government of India did not intend to make any concessions to Pakistan in the Kashmir territorial dispute. This situation forced the Pakistani Government to rethink its national security. Hence, it had to find an actor to balance the increase of India's power in the international anarchic system. The Sino-Indian hostility gave an opportunity to Pakistan at that time. Therefore, the Government of Pakistan gave up possible cooperation with India and instead established closer relations with China.

For the Chinese side, although the Chinese Government gained a military victory on the ground during the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, there was no way for China to increase its capabilities by external assistance like India was able to. Thus, the Chinese Government had to seek for some sort of immaterial capabilities from other

nations. China's ceasefire announcement, positive ceasefire and military disengagement were a series of actions to show the China's intention of ceasefire. Furthermore, the fact that the Chinese troops gave up occupied regions taken during the border war and retreated to Chinese side of the de facto control line that existed before the war demonstrated that China had no territorial ambitions with regards to India, even in relation to the disputed territories which were administrated by the Indian Government. China's behaviour won over support of a large number of Afro-Asian countries in the Sino-Indian border issue and border war. In addition, the Chinese Government supported in principle the Colombo proposal and its clarifications. China's attitude of positively seeking for a way to negotiate with the Indian Government on the Sino-Indian border issue and other post-war affairs was welcomed by many Afro-Asian countries. This support from other nations increased China's capabilities and to some extent balanced the power of India and its alliances.

Additionally, the Chinese Government grabbed the opportunity to establish strategically cooperative relations with Pakistan in the post-war period. The Sino-Pakistani cooperation restricted the increase of India's power in the South Asian continent. The cooperation also balanced India's influence in the South Asian continent, forming a three-way balance in the continent.


In addition, the Sino-Soviet split and subsequent Soviet-Indian cooperation forced the Chinese Government to reconsider its foreign policy. Because of the serious deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, China had to make a significant adjustment to its foreign policy. The Soviet Union's great power and military menace forced the Chinese Government to find a way to try to recover its relationship with the United States. If the United States gave support to China, the Chinese Government would

have enough capability and power to preserve its security and interests from the Soviet threat.

Although Sino-Indian relations deteriorated as a result of the Sino-Indian border issue and border war, no other general frontier war has occurred since 1962 as a result of the balance of power among China, India and Pakistan. The Sino-Indian border issue indeed greatly influenced both of China and India, and the foreign policies of the two countries have adjusted and changed in accordance with the border situation since the 1950s. No matter how their foreign policies changed, the goal of diplomacy was to preserve their national security, interests, survival, and developmental space. The relationship among the countries will always change in accordance with their respective national interests and security in the anarchic system of international politics. Therefore, when China and India adjust their foreign policies to find a way to preserve the common interest between two countries, there will finally be an opportunity to solve the Sino-Indian border issue thoroughly.



Appendices

Maps




1. Current Boundaries (between China and India)⁶²⁴

⁶²⁴ Current Boundaries [Image], 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/node/16843717>



2. India Map-Disputed Areas⁶²⁵


⁶²⁵ Planemad, *India Map-Disputed Areas* [Image], 2006. Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India_disputed_areas_map.svg



3. Aksai Chin – Sino-Indian border⁶²⁶



⁶²⁶ The Discoverer, *Aksai Chin – Sino-Indian Border* [Image], 2013. Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aksai_Chin_Sino-Indian_border_map.png

China-India Border: Eastern Sector




4. China-India Border: Eastern Sector⁶²⁷

⁶²⁷ Central Intelligence Agency (Ed.), *China-India Border: Eastern Sector* [Image], 1988. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:China_India_eastern_border_88.jpg



5. McMahon Line Simla Accord Treaty 1914 Map 1⁶²⁸

⁶²⁸ Simla Accord 1914, *McMahon Line Simla Accord Teaty 1914 Map 1* [Image], 1914. Retrieved




6. McMahon Line Simla Accord Treaty 1914 Map 2⁶²⁹


from

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:McMahon_Line_Simla_Accord_Treaty_1914_Map1.jpg

⁶²⁹ Simla Accord 1914, McMahon Line Simla Accord Teaty 1914 Map 2 [Image], 1914. Retrieved



7. Simla Accord Treaty 1914 Map 1⁶³⁰



8. Simla Accord Treaty 1914 Map 2⁶³¹

from

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:McMahon_Line_Simla_Accord_Treaty_1914_Map2.jpg

⁶³⁰ Simla Accord 1914, *Simla Accord Treaty 1914 Map 1* [Image], 1914. Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Simla_Accord_Treaty_1914_Map1.jpg

⁶³¹ Simla Accord 1914, *Simla Accord Treaty 1914 Map 2* [Image], 1914. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Simla_Accord_Treaty_1914_Map2.jpg

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