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Cross-cultural misunderstanding in the language of international diplomacy.

Al Mulla, Mohamed Ali A.

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CROSS-CULTURAL MISUNDERSTANDING IN THE
LANGUAGE OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

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by

Mohamed Ali A. AL MULLA

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University College of North Wales
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DEDICATION

To my family: my wife and my children for their suffering and patience.
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Inevitably, many people contribute to the writing of any thesis. I am indebted to many scholars and professionals whose works, assistance and guidance have helped me write this thesis.

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SUMMARY

Successful communication requires that the two parties involved in the activity acquire mutually shared socio-cultural background knowledge. The shared expectations, beliefs and cultural values enable the two parties to properly and correctly infer the intended meaning of each other's messages in order to respond or act accordingly and appropriately.

International diplomats, who use language at almost all times to conduct and negotiate international relations, belong to different cultures. This implies that they do not share socio-cultural background knowledge which is vitally crucial for any successful communication. The diversity of their expectations, beliefs and values causes interference between linguistic and socio-cultural meanings which leads to problems of misunderstanding and misinterpretation.

By applying sociolinguistics perspective in its holistic sense, the thesis investigated diplomatic communication events of personal experience of the 'diplomat-researcher' as well as self-reported events by the career diplomats who were interviewed and tape-recorded. The analysed diplomatic events were measured by quantitative data obtained from the questionnaire which was distributed among ambassadors around the world. The questionnaire results were corroborated by the results obtained from the events of personal experience as well as by the events reported by the career diplomats.
The verified results, which proved the thesis' hypothesis, explored the shortcomings of current diplomatic communication; misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misjudgement characterized the career diplomats' activities and eventuated undesired and unfortunate outcomes.

In order to overcome such unpleasant results and to minimize the effect of the diversity of diplomats' socio-cultural background the thesis proposed certain criteria which included elements of the language of diplomacy, qualities of good diplomats and principles of conducting successful diplomatic communication. By observing and satisfying the conditions of these criteria, future diplomacy is most likely to produce successful results.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declaration</th>
<th>i</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER

### 1 LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION

1.1 Language: Scope and Definition

1.2 Socio-cultural Aspects of Language

1.3 Communication: Definition and Scope

1.4 Intentionality and Communication

1.5 National vs. International Communication

### 2 DIPLOMACY: THE PROFESSION OF INTERNATIONAL LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION

2.1 Diplomacy: Scope and Definition

2.2 Diplomacy and Language

2.3 Diplomats as International Communicators - The Findings of the Basic Thesis

### 3 RESEARCH STRUCTURE AND FIELDWORK

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Gathering Sufficient Empirical Data

3.3 Classifying the Empirical Data

3.4 Analysing the Data

3.4.1 Establishing the UID

3.4.2 Determining the unit of analysis

3.4.3 Analytical composition of UID

### 4 THE NATURE OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT - DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 Stage One of the Empirical Data

4.2 The 'Preparatory-Essential Context' of Negotiation

4.2.1 Scene a: a pre-essential context

4.2.2 Scene b: the actual diplomatic negotiation

4.3 The Outcome of the Reykjavik Summit - Evaluation of the Primary Class of the Data
THE NATURE OF CURRENT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION
- DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Stage Two of the Empirical Data

5.2 Category B - Primary Class of the Data

5.2.1 Scene c: Arab-West Europeans' communication

5.2.2 Scene d: Arabic-African communication

5.2.3 Scene e: Indian-Arabic communication

5.2.4 Scene f: Chinese-Arabic communication

5.3 Category C - Primary Class of the Data

5.3.1 Scene g: Asian-Arabic communication

5.3.2 Scene h: Arabic-American communication

5.3.3 Scene i: Arabic-African communication

5.3.4 Scene j: European-Japanese communication

5.3.5 Scene k: Greek-Bangladesh communication

5.4 Secondary Class of the Data

5.5 Tertiary Class of the Data

CURRENT DIPLOMATIC SPEECH CHARACTERISTICS

6.1 Stage Three of the Empirical Data - Categories D and E

6.1.1 The Primary Class of Category D

6.1.1.1 Scene l: Arabic-French communication

6.1.1.2 Scene m: Arabic-European communication

6.1.2 Secondary Class of the Data

6.1.3 Tertiary Class of the Data

6.2 Category E of the Empirical Data

6.2.1 The primary class of the data - Scenes n and o

6.2.2 The secondary class of the data

6.2.3 The tertiary class of the data
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER 7</th>
<th>INTERCULTURAL MISUNDERSTANDING IN CURRENT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Recapitulation</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 The Findings</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1 The findings of the primary class data of the thesis' core point</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.2 The findings of the primary class data of the thesis' second point</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.3 The findings of the secondary class data</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.4 The findings of the tertiary class data</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 The Results</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1 The results of the thesis' core point</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.2 The result of the thesis' second point</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 The Significance of the Theory of IDC</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.1 The practical significance</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.2 The theoretical significance</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER 8</th>
<th>THE LANGUAGE OF DIPLOMACY - THE EFFECTIVE APPARATUS FOR DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Summary</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 The Criteria of the Language of Diplomacy</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.1 The elements of the language of diplomacy</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.1.1 The elements' classification</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.1.2 The elements' conditions</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.1.3 The elements' establishment</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.2 The qualities of diplomats</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.2.1 Writings in the area</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.2.2 Establishing the necessary qualities</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.2.3 Measuring the qualities</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.3 The principles of the language of diplomacy</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.3.1 General view</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.3.2 The four principles</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.3.2.1 The Principle of Formula</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.3.2.2 The Principle of Straight-forwardness</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.3.2.3 The Principle of Trust and Accountability</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.3.2.4 The Principle of Compromise</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Interview questions 296
Appendix 2 The questionnaire 298
Appendix 3 The primary class data of Category A about the Reykjavik Summit negotiation 308
Appendix 4 The primary class data of Categories B and C: the nature of current diplomatic communication 311
Appendix 5 Secondary class data of Categories B and C. Some of the career diplomats' responses on questions 4, 6 and 8 of the interview scheme 320
Appendix 6 The tertiary class data of Categories B and C. The quantitative data of part two of the questionnaire. The nature of the current diplomatic communication 328
Appendix 7 The primary class data of Categories D and E. Current diplomatic speech characteristics 330
Appendix 8 Secondary class data of Category D. Some of the career diplomats' responses on question 9 of the interview scheme 334
Appendix 9 The tertiary class data of categories D and E. The quantitative data of part three of the questionnaire. Diplomatic speech characteristics 339
Appendix 10 Measuring the elements of the language of diplomacy and the qualities of diplomats 341

REFERENCES 344

BIBLIOGRAPHY 350
CHAPTER 1

LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION

1.1 Language: scope and definition

In the basic thesis of *International Linguistic Communication* (Al Mulla, 1986) I attempted to set up an overall theoretical framework that language is not only linguistic as being regarded traditionally; rather it is both linguistic and sociolinguistic (in the sense of pragmatic and ethnographic approaches to language). That is, language consists of two major dimensions: linguistic and socio-cultural (see Osterloh, 1986: 77).

Linguistic dimension of language represents the knowledge of grammar and lexicon. This dimension is the structural facet of language which integrates phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics.

Phonology, as one area of the study and description of the linguistic system, deals with the sounds of language. These sounds are grouped as units (i.e. phonemes) according to their identifying-contrastive features. Morphology, as another area of the study and description of the linguistic system, deals with forms or morphemes (which can be considered the minimum meaningful units in language). These morphemes are 'part' of the lexical system of language and can be seen as the basic units of grammatical structure, 'internal grammatical structure'. Syntax, as the distribution of forms (or words), deals with the patterns of arrangements of morphemes into clauses and sentences. Sapir's description of language structure is that (1921: 24),
'If language is a structure and if the significant elements of language are bricks of that structure, then sounds of speech can only be compared to the unformed and unburnt clay of which the bricks are fashioned.'

Semantics, as the linguistic sense of sentences, deals with the literal meaning of utterances and their constituents (Katz, 1973: 36). This indicates that the meaning of a sentence depends, in part, upon the meaning of its individual forms or words; and the meaning of these individual forms depends upon what they name or signify (i.e. their referential meanings). In addition, the grammatical meaning of a sentence (i.e. the acquired knowledge of phonology, morphology and syntax) must be considered and included into the literal meaning of a sentence in order to account for the difference between sentences like,

'cats chase dogs'

and

'dogs chase cats' (Kempson, 1977: 7)

In sentences such as these, although the forms and what they refer to are identical in both sentences, the meaning of the two sentences is, of course, different, and the difference depends on the grammatical meaning (i.e. the distribution of the forms in both sentences is different).

In this perspective, the literal meaning of a sentence, according to 'Linguistic Semantics', is the product of both lexical (forms, words) and grammatical meaning (Lyons, 1981: 156). This perspective may explain why some scholars include 'Semantics' into the realm of 'grammar' (Katz, 1973: 36), although the referential
meaning of forms resides outside the realm of grammar. That is, what forms or words signify or name is not part of the grammar of language. The grammatical meaning of a sentence is different from its referential meaning; the former belongs to grammar whilst the latter belongs to Semantics. Both grammatical and referential meanings constitute the literal meaning of a sentence.

Grammar is then to be regarded here (and throughout this work) as the naturally and psychologically acquired knowledge of phonology, morphology and syntax by the native speaker of a language. Grammar describes the use, function, and distribution of the forms (or words) as they relate to each other within a sentence (i.e. the subject-verb-object relationship as in English, for example), whereas the Semantic sense of a form or word refers to the object or the thing the word stands for or names, and sentences of language are combinations of such names. This is a fairly broad description of grammar in contrast with that of some linguists who regard grammar within fairly narrow limits (Lyons, 1981: 100).

De Saussure (1916: 14) distinguished between 'Language' and 'Speaking'. In his view, language is systematic, conventional, and belongs to the psychological order, whereas speaking (or Parole as he called it) is wilful, individual and accidental. This notion of distinction between language and speaking has recently been observed by Chomsky (1965: 4) who distinguishes 'competence' ('the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language') from 'performance' ('the actual use of language in concrete situation'). In this distinction Chomsky regards grammar as a description of the 'ideal speaker-hearer's intrinsic competence'.
However, De Saussure's use of 'language' and Chomsky's use of 'competence' refer to the abstractly grammatical sentences which exist in thought or theory rather than in practical use (in speech situation) where people use language interactively to achieve their needs in daily-life affairs (see Thomas, 1983: 92). In such a context, the meanings of words lie not in what they refer to or signify but in how they are used in the speech situation. Rather, the meaning of an utterance lies in how it is used in a particular situation where its linguistic meaning (i.e. literal meaning) could be 'coloured' by social and cultural factors to suit the speaker's intentions. In other words, the meaning of an utterance in practical use may differ from its meaning in theory or thought since practical meaning may be dictated by a number of factors which include social variables, cultural interests, attitudes, values and traditional matters. Therefore, the distinction between 'language' and Parole on the one hand, and the distinction between 'competence' and 'performance' on the other hand would create, I would claim, a distinction between the literal meaning of a sentence (i.e. grammatical and lexical meaning) which belongs to linguistic theory and conveyed or intended meaning (i.e. according to situation, social and cultural factors) which belongs to the theory of language in the macro and holistic perspective. Literal meaning of a sentence is associated with, confined to, and derived from linguistic competence, whereas conveyed or intended meaning (performed according to situational, social and cultural factors) is associated with 'speaking' or 'performance', and belongs to sociolinguistics in its broadest sense. Linguistic and sociolinguistics constitute a theory of language as a whole.
However, literal meaning or linguistic meaning must be regarded as a pre-requisite to a conveyed or intended meaning since there is a special relationship between the two meanings which will be apparent in the due course of this chapter.

In this perspective, the theory of language may be regarded as integrating two major dimensions (as I stated earlier in this section): linguistic and sociolinguistic. The first dimension would account for literal meaning (derived from grammatical and lexical meanings), and the second dimension would account for conveyed or intended meaning (derived from pragmatic and ethnographic factors). Throughout this work I shall be dealing with these two dimensions in order to establish the special relationship between them. And, for the sake of clarity, I will call the linguistic dimension linguistic knowledge or the knowledge of grammar and lexicon, whereas the sociolinguistic dimension will be called socio-cultural knowledge.

Socio-cultural dimension of language, then, represents the knowledge of language in its pragmatic and ethnographic aspect.

Pragmatics, for Leech (1980: 33-81), is the study of the use of application of meaning in communicative situations. In this view 'Semantics' is the study of what a piece of language means while 'Pragmatics' studies what a piece of language means to a given interlocutor in a given speech situation. This indicates that the literal meaning of a sentence

'specifies what that sentence means as a structure in a given language in abstraction from the speaker and addressee; whereas pragmatics deals with that meaning as it is interpreted interactively in a given speech situation' (1980:80).
This parallels Thomas' (1983: 92) division of speakers' linguistic competence into 'linguistic competence', by which she regards as composed of grammatical competence ('abstract' or decontextualised knowledge of intonation, phonology, syntax, semantics, etc), and 'pragmatic competence' (by which she means the ability to use language effectively in order to achieve a specific purpose and to understand language in context) (Thomas, 1983: 92).

Lyons has adopted the view held by many linguists and logicians that sentence meaning falls within the scope of semantics whereas the utterance meaning is part of pragmatics (1981: 164).

Pragmatics is defined, by many scholars, as individual language use in a social context, or as the rules governing the use of language in context (e.g. Bates, 1976; Levenson, 1983; 6, 9). Seemingly, people use language according to certain implicit rules or factors which constrain what they say, or they unconsciously follow a large number of social and cultural rules which constrain their linguistic behaviour. Crystal (1971: 243) attempts to characterize pragmatics as that area of study which deals with the factors which govern individual choice of language. Such characterisation would imply that speaking a language depends on individual choice according to the various factors of a speech situation which dictate that choice. Pragmatics is, therefore, the study of situational, social or cultural factors which may affect (or 'colour') the literal meaning of an utterance in interactional activity. According to this definition, the study of the literal meaning of an utterance through these factors is the study of language pragmatics. The indication of this is that the meaning of an utterance is part of our life and has a relationship with the
manner of application and is determined through the totality of rules which are embedded in a comprehensive form of life (Wittgenstein, 1979: 115). This is mainly so because the spoken language does not exist for itself, as it were abstractly, but is part of an activity being conducted and shared by two parties. The use of certain words or expressions is part of that very activity which is related to specific situation. On this account, words and expressions play a vitally important role in our lives since their use depends to a considerable extent on our social and cultural background knowledge. The meaning of such words and expressions is not the experience of hearing or uttering the word or expression. Instead, it is something inherently implicit and lies in our cultural background, tradition and in our approach to life and other people. Words and expressions have goal and effect from-to interlocutors. In interactional activity, the use and interpretation of words and expressions have their meaning in the flow (Wittgenstein, 1979). The same words and the same expressions can have various meanings in various situations. And thus, the appropriate use and implications of utterances would be characterized not as a property of a literal meaning of the sentence itself, but as a presupposition (pragmatic presupposition) on the part of an interlocutor using that utterance (Kempson, 1977: 54).

The discussion above supports the claim (now stated) that any given utterance can have at least two types of meaning (or two readings): literal and conveyed (intended). Literal meaning depends upon the knowledge of grammar and lexicon whereas conveyed meaning is associated with various factors of a speech situation. The former is purely linguistic and the latter is pragmatic or
ethnographic, and is highly selective and dependent on socially and culturally bound meaning. This reminds us of our claim, stated earlier, that language (in its broadest perspective) consists of two dimensions: linguistic and socio-cultural (i.e. sociolinguistic).

Building on this perspective (that language is more than linguistic; it is linguistic and something else as well), I have defined language, elsewhere (Al Mulla, 1986), as a mental, social and cultural phenomenon. This definition appears to be encompassing two different approaches to language: 'formal' and 'functional'. According to the formal approach, language is viewed in terms of the forms of all the sentences that can be generated by the grammatical rules (Chomsky, 1957, 1965). In this approach, language is defined by its grammar (the linguistic faculty or the linguistic competence). That is, a sentence is a string of morphemes in which each morpheme consists of a chain of (human) sounds and follows a specific distribution within the string according to a systematic pattern for each language (i.e. each language has its own unique system of distribution, e.g. English, subject-verb-object vs Arabic, verb-subject-object ...). This means that morphemes are related to each other by means of grammatical rules. The string (the clause or sentence), on the one hand, must have a semantic representation (i.e. linguistic meaning) and, on the other hand, it must have a phonological realisation (a pronunciation, an acoustic shape) (Chomsky, 1957, 1965). This approach deals with the relations between various components and describes how the realm of sounds is related to the realm of meaning (Miller, 1973: 7). It seems that this approach views language 'internally' and deals with it as an 'object'.

8
The functional approach views language 'externally', (from outside inwards according to Halliday, 1978: 4), as a social and cultural instrument; as a socially and culturally shared means of expressing ideas, performing actions, and achieving goals (i.e. getting things done); as a means of social and cultural identification (Trudgill, 1974; Halliday, 1978; Gumperz, 1982; Fasold, 1973, 1984 among other scholars). In order to be able to perform all these functions effectively, we must have much more than linguistic knowledge (i.e. grammar and lexicon). Our conceptual knowledge about the world in which we live, our expectations, our system of values and beliefs are not really part of our linguistic knowledge,

'but they play a very important role in the way we understand language in actual use' (Miller, 1973: 8-9).

According to Halliday (1978: 2), language does not consist of sentences; it consists of interactional discourse. People exchange meanings in socially and culturally defined situations. When they speak to each other, they exchange meanings which reflect their feelings, attitudes, expectations and judgements. The context of speech, in which such social and cultural factors are exchanged, is itself, Halliday (1978: 2) alleges, a semiotic construct (having signs and symbols deriving from the culture) which contains a form that enables interactants to understand one another as they communicate.
1.2 Socio-cultural aspects of language

The view of looking at language formally or functionally; internally or externally; as object or instrument gives rise to the view that language consists of two types of content: overt and covert. The 'overt' content of language represents the linguistic knowledge; the knowledge of grammar and lexicon which constitutes the literal meaning of a sentence, whereas the 'covert' content mirrors the socio-cultural knowledge of language as it is used in real life situations by members of a community, sub-culture or culture (as a whole). Here language reflects the users' beliefs, values, wishes, expectations, and the like, in their interactional activities. This covert content of language constitutes the conveyed or intended meaning which is not a property of a sentence's meaning or its constituents, but is a by-product of a sentence's literal meaning being overlapped with the socio-cultural factors in the speech situation. Here the various factors of the speech situation would 'colour' the literal meaning of a sentence according to the interactant's purpose, interest or intention. In other words, the socio-cultural factors of speech situation would convert or alter the literal meaning (the overt content of language) to the conveyed or intended meaning (the covert content of language). The conveyed meaning is associated with most human activities and thus has been dealt with by many scholars of different disciplines (e.g. logicians, philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists) who share with linguists and sociolinguists their concern with the study of language that touches all aspects of human life (Miller, 1973: 6).
In the speech situation, and in the view of philosophers and logicians, speaking language is not merely uttering words or sentences or other linguistic devices, but in issuing utterances, interlocutors are performing actions (Austin, 1962; Wittgenstein, 1953; Anscombe, 1957; Searle, 1969, 1975; among other scholars). To understand the appropriate meaning of speech in given situations we must consider the total factors of the situation in which utterances are issued - the total speech act (Austin, 1962: 52). This meaning is not the property of the words or sentences being used; it is produced in relation to the interlocutor's feelings, attitudes and intention, and to the 'context of situation' (to use Malinowski's (1923, 1935) terms). In other words, this meaning is no longer purely linguistic and does not belong to semantics as being used traditionally. Instead, it is situationally, socially and culturally produced meaning (i.e. according to pragmatic and ethnographic factors).

Austin has suggested that in uttering a sentence, an interlocuter is generally involved in three types of action. Firstly, by saying something the interlocuter performs a 'locutionary act' which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with certain meaning (i.e. literal meaning). Secondly, in addition to saying something the interlocuter also performs 'illocutionary acts' such as informing, ordering, warning, promising or otherwise - the speech acts. The 'illocutionary acts' involve the production of an effect which amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the 'force' of uttering a sentence (i.e. the intended meaning). Thirdly, the interlocutor may also perform 'perlocutionary acts': effect he brings about or
achieves by speaking, such as convincing, persuading, surprising, among other things (Austin, 1962: 112). What this indicates is that a given sentence or utterance in a given speech situation can have three different senses or dimensions: literal meaning according to linguistic sense; conveyed meaning according to the interlocutor's 'intention' or purpose in using that utterance; and the achieving of certain effects caused by the force of illocutionary acts.

In the view of sociolinguists and ethnographers of speaking, language is tied up with the value systems of a society and its related culture. In accordance with such a view, different situations, uses, patterns and functions of speech can be evaluated and characterized in different ways (Hymes, 1962, 1974; Trudgill, 1974; Gumperz, 1982). Malinowski maintains that language as a cultural phenomenon stands in a definite relation to the life of the people who speak it and their attitudes. He states (1935: 11),

'... language is a cultural aspect in its own right, a type of human behaviour which fulfils not some sort of subsidiary function but which plays a part of its own unique and irreplaceable.'

The implication of this is that language is not merely 'linguistic clothing', so to speak, to wrap messages. Nor is it, as Malinowski (1935: 7) has put it, to express thought or to duplicate mental processes, but to play an active pragmatic part in human behaviour. People who use language, as Hymes (1974: 33) has noticed, differ in their ways of speaking. They show differences with regard to beliefs, values, reference group, norms and the like. All these differences feature significantly and fundamentally in their speech. In order to achieve their needs, people, in addition to transmitting
thoughts and ideas, convey social and cultural attitudes, customs and expectations which go far beyond the overt content of language (i.e. linguistic knowledge) and have roots in a people's cultural legacy and inherited traditions. Osterloh (1986: 77) states that, 'Language is not simply a formal system of sounds, words and syntactical structures; language also reaches into the domain of human interaction, which for its own part follows certain rules. Every native speaker assimilates individual social experiences characteristics of his own cultures. These experiences inhere in statements that obtain their communicative significance through interpretation ...

Within the context of situation, utterances are not to be judged only on the grounds of their grammatical or acceptable linguistic measures, but must also be assessed by the extent to which they are successful and appropriate to the speech situation (Hymes, 1971, 1974), and by the way in which they are effected as actions and with what results.

People use words when they mean to suggest the related action. For example, they issue a question such as 'Could you pass that ticket?', thereby requesting the counterparts to perform the action (i.e. to pass that ticket). As Malinowski has observed in the Trobriand Islands, people use language as an instrument of action. Their words in their primary and essential sense evoke actions: Do, Act, Produce and Achieve, because they are seen as part of their action (1935: 9).

The socio-cultural dimensions of language led Hymes (1962, 1974) to propose another descriptive science of language - the Ethnography of Speaking, concerned not simply with language structure but with language use; with rules of speaking; with ways
in which the interlocutors associate particular modes of speaking, topics, messages with a particular setting and activity. Hymes believes that the study of situations, uses, patterns and functions of speech as an activity in its own right would bridge the gap between what is usually considered as belonging to grammar (i.e. the purely linguistic knowledge) and what is usually considered as belonging to social and cultural rules for language use (i.e. the socio-cultural dimensions of language) (Hymes, 1962). Such a social and cultural approach to language is based on the concept of communicative competence (as opposed to linguistic competence, Chomsky, 1965) which describes the ability of individuals to interact with one another under situationally and normatively defined conditions (linguistic, psychological, social and cultural) (Hymes, 1971) (cf. Thomas, 1983: 91-92, who distinguishes between 'Pragmatic competence' and 'communicative competence'). This approach provides a particular perspective to the understanding of the general problems of language when it is used in socially and culturally related situations. The task of this perspective is to describe the various ways people choose language to examine the norms or criteria they employ in selecting one way of speaking rather than another, and also to consider what type of social and cultural meaning is involved in such selection (Sherzer, 1977; Gumperz, 1982).

Although the approaches (that we have dealt with so far) seem, at once, to be looking at language from very different perspectives (linguistic, sociolinguistic, philosophical, social and cultural), they all share a concern for viewing language in a real social and cultural context (Shuy, 1977). Language, according to all these
seemingly different approaches, is not just linguistic 'competence'; it is also 'performance' to the extent that it is tied up with the speech situation (Malinowski, 1923, 1935; Wittgenstein, 1953, 1979; Crystal, 1971; Halliday, 1978; Austin, 1962; Hymes, 1962, 1971, 1974; Trudgill, 1974 among other scholars). Linguistic competence and performance (or speaking) are firmly interwoven in the speech situation and are inseparable if we are to successfully interpret our partners' messages and appropriately understand and recognise their intentions (see Van Dijk, 1977b: 199; Thomas, 1983: 92). The conveyed meaning produced in such circumstances integrates all the social and cultural factors of the speech situation. Scholars, with such seemingly different perspectives have all said that the conveyed (or intended) meaning of an utterance in such a milieu is not necessarily the same thing as its semantic sense (Grice, 1957; Shuy, 1977). Thus the conveyed meaning of an utterance is to be properly understood when the interactants do have awareness of the different factors of the speech situation, and when they do share attitudes, expectations, beliefs and judgements (the socio-cultural background knowledge). Utterances are thus closely associated with the socio-cultural background knowledge of interactants, and their meanings are properly deduced, 'implicated', or 'postulated' according to the degree of awareness of the surrounding circumstances (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1975, 1979; Gordon and Lakoff, 1975; Sadock, 1974). The following exchange can be considered as a case in point:

(1) (After spending some time abroad, A to his friend B):

A  Hello ... and how are you? ...

B  Oh! Hello ... How are you? ... nice to see you back home!
A Oh! ... thank you ... Have you seen David (their close friend) lately?

B ... I am sorry Michael ... He ... he 'kicked the bucket' ...

In the exchange above B does not want to convey the semantic sense (i.e. the literal sense) of the sentence, 'He kicked the bucket'. Nor is the meaning a result of its individual constituents. Rather, he combines such words into such a specific string of morphemes to reflect some aspects of his socio-cultural background by which he closely relates himself to another member of his culture in this situation. The 'point' intended by this utterance can only be clear to a member of the same culture as the speaker. By issuing this utterance, speaker B conveys a particular message with a particular 'point', in speaking to a member of his culture (his counterpart) to convey his intimate involvement in this situation. Otherwise speaker B (who performed the earlier message) could easily obtain the same meaning by issuing a clearer and simpler sentence such as (2):

(2) He died.

The intended meaning of utterances like (1) cannot be adequately understood by merely the overt content of language (i.e. the linguistic knowledge of grammar and lexicon). There is no obvious relationship between the meanings of the individual words, or the semantic sense of the sentence and its conveyed meaning or 'point', or in Grice's (1957) terms, between 'natural meaning' in which direct telling was involved and 'non-natural meaning' in which
the speaker tried to get his counterpart to imply something as opposed to being told directly (Wright, 1975: 374). Understanding what particular message is expressed and the speaker's intention is a matter of knowing the factors related to the speech situation, and sharing socio-cultural knowledge. In the utterance considered here, the individual words selected by speaker B to convey specific point to his counterpart are his raw materials drawn from his culture (which is, in the meantime, the culture of his counterpart) to 'paint' a specific cultural scene.

The socio-cultural dimensions of language are indispensable 'ingredients' for identifying the exact message performed since they play a fundamental role in understanding people's speech.

An utterance may mean one thing as uttered while implying quite another thing as intended or understood. In such cases, what is meant is quite different from what is said. Consider the following move and its countermove:

(3) A  It is very hot in this room! ...
       B  (After switching on the air-conditioning device):
           Sorry about that! Actually, I have a severe cold!

In issuing the first utterance, speaker A does not intend to describe the actual temperature of the room. That is, he does not want to express the literal meaning of what he said (the direct meaning of the utterance according to its semantic representations). Rather, he conveys a particular message to his counterpart to do something about the situation in order to change the temperature of the room. That is, he performs a 'hidden' or underlying message which is equivalent to a request or command or otherwise to change
the situation which exists in the room; he conveys an 'indirect' meaning. It appears that it is not difficult for the counterpart (the addressee) to understand the conveyed meaning of the utterance and therefore he switches on the air-conditioning. This indicates that the counterpart recognizes the speaker's intentions by means of their mutual socio-cultural background and the knowledge of the situation (i.e. the temperature of the room is very hot and both partners know that there is air-conditioning in the room). This assists the counterpart to draw certain 'inferences' in order to obtain the appropriate message and grasp the intention of the speaker and so to act accordingly (i.e. by switching on the air-conditioning).

This process, the process of inference depending on factors of the speech situation, is what Grice (1975) describes as 'conversational implicature' which is basically that a speaker may express one 'explicit' meaning while implying or intending quite different one – an 'implicit' meaning (Wright, 1975: 379).

Conversational implicature is attainable by means of observing Grice's 'Co-operative Principle' (1975). That is, understanding what interactional activities are performed depends upon a co-operative role between the two parties involved in the activities. According to Grice, conversation (or communication) is a co-operative activity. Partners co-operate with each other when they communicate, just as they do in any other shared activity. They can assume of each other that they obey certain maxims which are derived from the 'Co-operative Principle',

'Make your conversational contribution such as required' (1975: 45).
With this, and with the aid of factors of the speech situation and socio-cultural background knowledge, the counterpart infers the indirect speech act which the partner intends to convey. The implication of this is that an utterance, its context, and the socio-cultural background knowledge of the two parties involved in the communication activity together allow the counterpart to recognize the partner's intentions and identify his intended message and act accordingly (Downes, 1984: 317).

This implies that to grasp the intended meaning of the message expressed by the partner is to recognize the 'intention' which led him to choose and convey that message to his counterpart. Intentions play a crucial role in any communication activity (this notion will be developed later on in this chapter, i.e. 1.4). Failing to recognize the partner's intentions would probably result in misinterpretation of his intended message and this, in turn, would affect both the continuation and the outcome of the communication activity.

1.3 Communication: definition and scope

Communication is essentially a social affair which renders human social life possible (Cherry, 1961: 3). The most frequent use of the word 'communication' is connected with human communication which calls to mind most readily the sending and receiving of linguistic signs and signals, or a conversation between two parties (Cherry, 1961: 5). Although speech and writing are by no means our only systems of communication (since there are other systems of communication such as habits of nods, smiles, hand shakes, etc.), most prominent among all systems of communication is, of course,
human speech and language (Cherry, 1961: 4). Human language is the most effective means of communication about which we know. It has an almost magical power to affect the minds and actions of those who use it (Miller, 1973: 8-12).

We, as partners in communication activities, in order to be able to use language effectively, must know, as mentioned earlier, much more than the overt content of language; much more than grammatical and lexical knowledge. The knowledge we must have is related to both our conceptual information about the world in which we live, and our socio-cultural background to which we relate, and is not just part of our lexical knowledge about the meanings of words. The critical factor in understanding, according to Morain (1986: 64), has to do with cultural aspects that exist beyond the lexical knowledge which include many dimensions of non-verbal communication. In order to understand our counterparts' messages and grasp their conveyed or intended meaning, we must recognize that they use their general conceptual information along with their socio-cultural background knowledge in addition to specific lexical information. And, in evaluating what the counterparts are saying, we appeal to our system of beliefs, values and attitudes. All these matters play crucial roles in linguistic communication (Miller, 1973: 9).

Linguistic communication means that our speech is passed from one place to another; from a source to a destination; from a partner to a counterpart (i.e. from speaker to hearer). Whenever linguistic communication occurs, a partner (speaker) issues a message to a counterpart (a hearer). This message, in order to be transmitted, must be encoded. That is to be put, or converted, into a code
defined as a systematic set of linguistic symbols (i.e. sounds of human voice) to be transmitted to a counterpart. The encoded message makes its way to the counterpart through a 'channel' defined as a carrier of the linguistic symbols (e.g. air). For the counterpart to understand his partner's message, he must decode it; that is, re-convert the message into its original code (i.e. into a more useable form) (Samovar and Mills, 1984: 4; Miller, 1963: 10). The processes of encoding and decoding between the partner and his counterpart (i.e. the human communication system) continues until the communication activity comes to a complete end.

Linguistic communication, then, is a two-way process, and always has two parties (individuals or groups) (Miller, 1963; Gumperz, 1982); partners initiate moves and counterparts produce responses (counter moves). When a partner issues a message, this message is associated with his conceptual information about the world as well as his socio-cultural knowledge on the one hand. On the other hand, his counterpart (the hearer) brings to the communication situation his own conceptual information about the world view as well as his socio-cultural background knowledge. Accordingly, the message conveyed could be affected either by the partner's background knowledge or by the counterpart's background knowledge. Within such a situation, how far does the counterpart understand the partner's conveyed message and adequately recognize his intention in order to appropriately form his response or perform his act? Whenever communication activity occurs, a partner presumably has a certain message with a specific 'point' to be conveyed to the counterpart. The act of communication continues and succeeds if, and only if, the counterpart understands the partner's
conveyed message and, further, recognizes the very 'point' (i.e. the partner's exact intention). In order for the counterpart to recognize and identify the partner's intended act, the conveyed meaning, he relies upon what is said by the partner. However, what is said by the partner does not always determine his intention or his conveyed meaning (as discussed earlier in this chapter). The partner may issue an utterance and mean not only what he says literally (the literal meaning according to linguistic knowledge) but mean something else as well (Searle, 1969, 1975; Grice, 1975; Back and Harnish, 1979; Gordon and Lakoff, 1975; Sadock, 1974). For example, the partner may issue:

(4) Could you come with me to the High Street to buy some clothes?

and mean not the literal meaning of the utterance, the question (i.e. yes-no question) but convey a request for the counterpart to do the intended act. That is, to accompany him to 'the High Street to buy some clothes'.

People, in order to achieve certain purposes (i.e. to get certain things done), tend to be polite in their communication activities (for one reason or another). They seem to assume a lower status or position than their partners (Lakoff, 1972: 909, 1973). For this contingent reason, they try to avoid using imperative utterances, so to speak, and use embedded imperative utterances instead (or, the so-called 'clothed imperative', to use Crystal's (1971: 17) expression) (see Goody, 1978; Brown and Levinson, 1978; Walters, 1979a; Leech, 1983: 174-; cf. Thomas, 1981: 61, 1983: 97-98). These embedded imperative utterances imply a request (or an
order, a command, etc.) without actually stating it, leading, in
turn, to problems of misinterpretation.

How does the counterpart understand the conveyed meaning (i.e.
the request or the order) when the utterance he receives is
literally a question (i.e. yes-no question)? How is it that an
utterance which appears to have one type of meaning turns out to
have a different type of meaning (or force) in the actual
communication? How is it, for instance, that the earlier 'question'
becomes, in practice, a request or command or otherwise? By what
means does the counterpart infer and identify the partner's
intention?

The basic unit of linguistic communication, according to Searle
(1969: 16-21) is 'speech act'. He suggests that there are a series
of analytic connections between the notion of speech act (i.e. what
the partner intends by his utterance) and the rules governing
linguistic elements. In his work of 1975, Searle develops a theory
of 'Indirect Speech Acts' to account for and explain the relations
between what is said and what is meant; between the literal meaning
of the sentence (the direct speech act which depends upon the
knowledge of grammar and lexicon) and its deep meaning (the indirect
speech act which is intended by the partner and associated with his
socio-cultural background knowledge in addition to various factors
of the communication situation). In this respect, Searle's
hypothesis is that (1975: 60-62; 1979: 32):

'in indirect speech acts, the speaker communicates to the
hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on
their mutually shared background information, both
linguistic and non-linguistic, together with the general
power of rationality and inference on the part of the
hearer.'
Along with such a line of thought, Bach and Harnish (1979) view linguistic communication as an 'inferential process'. That is, the partner, by what he says, provides a basis for the counterpart to infer what he intends to convey. The inference that the counterpart makes is based not only on what the partner says (i.e. the literal meaning of a sentence; the direct speech act) but also on the socio-cultural knowledge being shared by the two parties involved in the communication activity. They state (1979: 5),

'in general, the inference the hearer makes and takes himself to be intended to make is based not just on what the speaker says, but also on mutual contextual beliefs ...'

What these scholars are saying is that understanding the conveyed meaning of an utterance is dependent upon the process of inference. Each party, in order to grasp the counterpart's intention, must draw certain inferences relying on what is said (i.e. linguistic knowledge), shared background knowledge, and various factors of communication situation. This explanation appears to indicate that successful communication depends upon 'shared background information' as well as 'mutual contextual beliefs' of the two parties involved in the communication activity. It means that successful communication would be maintained as long as the two parties involved know each other's socio-cultural background. It means, further, that the communication activity would continue and produce a successful outcome if the two parties involved acquire knowledge of the covert content of language as defined by their mutual beliefs, shared expectations, attitudes and value system. This is mainly so because partners (in the actual
communication activity) unconsciously reveal their socio-cultural background knowledge which constrains both the form and the outcome of what is said (Gumperz, 1982: 154).

1.4 Intentionality and communication

The overt content of language (i.e. the linguistic knowledge) alone does not ensure successful communication and does not provide adequate means to assist the counterpart to recognize the partner's intentions. Understanding between the two parties in a communication activity depends on mutual recognition of each party's intention. Without this recognition communication activity would suffer serious difficulties. According to Miller (1973: 10),

'Most of our misunderstandings of other people are not due to any inability to hear them, or parse their sentences, or to understand their words, although such problems do occur. Our major source of difficulty in communication is that we so often fail to understand the speaker's intention.'

When two partners in a communication activity claim that they are using the same language they mean, as Crystal (1971: 14) suggests, a great deal more than that they are using the same grammatical and lexical knowledge. They imply that they have started to understand each other's conceptual information and background knowledge which both of them closely apply in the communication situation; they have begun to recognize each other's intentions.

Intentions, Wright (1975: 375) claims, are cases of communication as they are present, or at least relevant, to socio-cultural meaning (non-natural meaning in Grice's 1975, terms) and
not to linguistic meaning (literal meaning or natural meaning in Grice's terms). This appears to mean that there are elements of communication and of the socio-cultural background of the partners (other than linguistic elements) which are relevant to understanding what message is sent and what intentions the partner had in sending that message. These elements are an integral part of communication activity.

Clearly, intentions are the backbone of any communication activity. In developing this concept, we find that 'intentionality', as Searle's (1983: 1) preliminary formulation,

'is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.'

For example, belief, desire and intention are mental states (or states of mind). If a partner has a belief, then this belief must be about something; if he has a desire, this desire must be a desire to do something; and if he has an intention, such an intention must be an intention to do something.

The expression 'objects of an intention' refers to what a given intention is about or what is intended when a partner in a communication activity has a given intention. If the partner intends to resolve a dispute, for example, then the object of his intention is the 'action' of settling the dispute (Meiland, 1970: 35). In this case, we could describe that action as intentional, and we may also ask, with what intention the settlement of the dispute was carried out (Anscombe, 1957: 1).

Intending and intentions are just one form of intentionality among others (Searle, 1983: 3).
In communication, a correlation between intentional states and speech acts is at the heart of the matter. That is, each of which represents objects as well as states of affairs. If a partner makes a request (a speech act) of his counterpart to accompany him to the High Street, he may predict that the counterpart should accompany him to the High Street. The connection here is between the propositional content of the message expressed and illocutionary force; that is between the literal meaning and conveyed meaning of the message. In addition, the partner may have an intentional state (i.e. belief, desire or intention) which 'directs' the illocutionary force. The implication here is that any message expressed in communication activities may have three different things; propositional content (literal meaning), illocutionary force (speech act - request, order, promise, etc.), and intentional state which expresses the partner's wish, desire, belief or intention (i.e. the sincerity condition or condition of satisfaction of speech acts). The expressed intentional state is not just an accompaniment of the performance of the speech act, but actually 'directs' the performance. That is, the performance of the speech act is necessarily an expression of the corresponding intentional state (Searle, 1983: 9). Thus, the partner's wish, desire or intention (the intentional state) is satisfied if the request is fulfilled, and the order is obeyed and so on.

On this account, we ascribe success or failure of the speech act to match reality in the particular direction of fit provided by the 'illocutionary point'; the conditions of satisfaction or success. Therefore, the statement is satisfied if it is true, the order is satisfied if it is obeyed, and the promise is satisfied if
it is kept. This concept of satisfaction may also apply to intentional states as well. The partner's belief, wish, desire or intention is satisfied if it is fulfilled (Searle, 1983: 10).

By considering the following move (from our earlier example, i.e. (3))

(5) It is very hot in this room!

we find that this utterance consists of a propositional content (the literal meaning), an illocutionary force (speech act - request or order) and a state of mind (intentional state, intention). Now, if the counterpart recognizes the illocutionary point (the exact intended message or the intention) he will probably switch on the air conditioning. If this action is carried out, the speech act (the request or the order) will be satisfied. In addition, the satisfaction of the request (or the order) will simultaneously lead to the satisfaction of the partner's mental state (his desire, wish, belief or intention). If this happens, communication activity may well be very successful, but if not, communication activity may have serious difficulties.

Nevertheless, we need to have a clear distinction between representing a message and communicating that exact message. In issuing our earlier message, the partner both intends to represent some fact or state of affairs and 'intends' to communicate this representation to his counterpart. But as Searle (1983: 165) states,

'... his representing intention is not the same as his communication intention'.

28
Communicating, as in our example, is a matter of producing certain effects on the counterpart. This is not the case in representing a message. We, on some occasion, intend to represent messages without aiming to produce any effect on our audience. Therefore, there are two aspects of meaning intentions: the intention to represent and the intention to communicate (Searle, 1983: 165). The intention to represent constitutes no active role for the counterpart. It is a one-way process; that is whether the counterpart recognizes the partner's illocutionary point or not, the presentation will not be affected by such matters. On the other hand, it is the 'intention to communicate' which is the whole matter for any communication process because it depends on the active role of the other party. Indeed, the role of the counterpart in the communication activity is precisely 'intention recognition' (Wright, 1975: 375; Searle, 1983: 168). Only with this recognition can communication progress and reach its successful end.

Furthermore, the role of 'intention' in the communication activities is only merely 'co-operative' between the two parties involved; the partner directs the meaning of his message by certain intentions and the counterpart must recognize the exact intentions in order to 'digest' the partner's intended meaning and, then, respond or act accordingly. Therefore, the two parties in the communication activities must have a mutual recognition of each other's intentions.

However, mutual recognition of the other party's intentions in the communication activity requires that the two parties recognize each other's speech acts, specifically illocutionary points. The partner's mental states can only be satisfied if his request, for
example, is recognized and, further, carried out, his order is recognized and obeyed, his promise is recognized and then kept, and so on. All these moves proceed and progress if, and only if, the two parties in the communication (or negotiation) activity understand each other's socio-cultural background. Without such a pre-requisite, communication or negotiation is most likely to fall short.

Linguistic communication then is a mutual process between two parties (individuals or groups) in which each party of linguistic communication is both a partner and a counterpart (i.e. speaker and hearer, writer and reader) and which is characterized by concerted activities, shared socio-cultural background knowledge and mutual co-operation (Al Mulla, 1986). According to this definition, linguistic communication can have two facets: easy-going and problematic.

The easy-going facet of linguistic communication is achieved when the two parties involved in the communication activity share the socio-cultural background knowledge (i.e. the covert content of language). In this case, each party can easily infer the 'central point' of the other party's message - the specific intention, and respond or act accordingly and appropriately without missing or misunderstanding the crucial social and cultural clues of the communication situation. Each party clearly understands what is meant by the other party by means of drawing correct inferences, relying on the mutually shared socio-cultural background knowledge. In such a facet of linguistic communication, the mutual activity would go smoothly and without seriously noticeable problems which might render the activity useless and fruitless.
Nevertheless, when the two parties involved in the communication activity have acquired different socio-cultural background knowledge, the communication activity is much more likely to be problematic.

The essence of linguistic communication is the extent to which partners in the communication activity share mutual socio-cultural knowledge. If they do share a common background, they could and would achieve the desired outcome and fulfil their specific purposes easily since there is no interference from serious difficulties which would probably impede the recognition of other's intentions. However, when they do not share common expectations, beliefs, social attitudes, cultural values and wishes (i.e. the socio-cultural background knowledge), problems would begin to creep into the communication activity. The seriousness of such problems would be dependent upon the degree of difference in background between the two parties involved in the negotiation. Gumperz' assumption is that (1982: 2),

'... it is easier to get things done when participants share the same background. When backgrounds differ, meetings can be plagued by misunderstanding, mutual- misrepresentations of events and misevaluation.'

We must inquire as to 'how' and 'why' this happens. The answers to questions like these actually lie at the very heart of this present work which is entirely devoted to find out answers to Why and How. For the time being, however, it seems that the problem, on the one hand, lies in the fact that people tend to speak indirectly in their communication activity. And, as mentioned earlier, they do not express their intentions directly in plain
straightforward sentences. Rather, they wrap what they want to convey in utterances which contain more than one meaning (or double meaning); literal and conveyed. On the other hand, different words and different expressions have different connotations. Connotations, according to Crystal (1971: 18), are the individual feeling that partners have about the words or expressions. They arouse associations in people's minds which affect the way they communicate. As Malinowski has observed in the Trobriand Islands, people use language as an instrument of action. The primary and essential sense of their words and expressions tends to activate what they want to achieve (1935: 9). Such features of language use reflect general social and cultural properties as described by Gumperz (1982: 159):

'each culture has its own constraints not only on content but also on ways in which particular activities are carried out and signalled.'

1.5 National vs. international communication

Clearly such matters may affect both national and international communications. Nationally, although members of a given nation usually share certain properties of a single culture, yet this common background can only be regarded relatively. For many nations such as the Arab, America, Britain, India and Russia, for example, the cultural complexity is widely recognized. In each of these nations there are a number of sub-cultures, each of which might have specific norms or rules of conduct, certain social values, or uniquely sub-cultural attitudes and beliefs which might differ, slightly or sharply, from that of other groups. Accordingly, people who belong to a nation which includes diverse sub-cultures might
experience various difficulties in their communication activities with each other if they belong to different sub-cultures and have different 'social backgrounds'. Within the Arabic nation, no one I believe, can claim that an ordinary member of the GCC states (Gulf Co-operation Council) can communicate with an ordinary Moroccan or Algerian, although they all have Arabic culture in common, in the same manner and with similar ease as he can communicate with a member of his region. Similarly, within the British nation, Welsh people might communicate with each other more easily and in a more comfortable manner than they do with the English, Scottish or Irish people because of their different social backgrounds. But despite these sub-cultural differences which might cause constrained communication on some occasions, communication activities usually fulfil their goals successfully without seriously noticeable damage either to the activity itself or to the relationship between partners. However, the case of international communications, as we shall see in due course, is, by far, different in many respects.

In international linguistic communication (ILC), parties involved in the activity belong to different cultures. Each party has acquired a unique socio-cultural background knowledge which sometimes differs sharply from that of other parties. In other words, partners in international linguistic communication (or negotiation) do not share the same or even similar expectations, attitudes, beliefs and traditional matters. This is the case even for peoples of neighbouring countries, for example, those of Western Europe. The covert content of language (i.e. the socio-cultural dimension of language) which is central to successful communication is no longer present in the scene of communication. There is no
common socio-cultural background to assist those who are involved in
the activities to draw proper inferences which are the only means
available for understanding their counterparts' messages and
recognizing their intentions in order to respond or act accordingly
and appropriately. What is left for international partners to
conduct their activities is almost nearly the overt content of
language (i.e. the knowledge of grammar and lexicon) which is an
inadequate means for successful communication or negotiation.
People who are non-native speakers of English, for example, and
learn to speak the language (even to the point of mastering it),
actually learn (or master) the overt content of English, yet they
are far from knowing its crucial dimension, its socio-cultural
knowledge. Morain (1986: 64) states that,

'Those who interact with members of a different culture
know that a knowledge of the sounds, the grammar, and the
vocabulary of the foreign tongue is indispensable when it
comes to sharing information. But being able to read and
speak another language does not guarantee that
understanding will take place. Words in themselves are
too limited ... The critical factor in understanding has
to do with cultural aspects that exist beyond the lexical
aspects ...' (Morain, 1986: 64).

Language is a cultural instrument which has two ends; near and
farther. The near end of language (the overt content of it) can be
learnt and acquired perfectly well, whereas the farther end (the
socio-cultural dimension of it) is deeply rooted in the legacy and
tradition of the native speakers and can only be acquired by members
of the speech community, sub-culture and the 'mother culture'.

Consequently, partners dealing with international relations, or
negotiating international affairs (e.g. economy, trade and commerce,
politics, finance and the like) and using an international language
such as English, French, Arabic, Spanish, Chinese or Russian: any language in the world, in this sense, can be international if it is used by international representatives to negotiate bilateral or multilateral relations or affairs) would find the communication or negotiation process difficult and time-consuming because of the diversity, I claim, of the partners' socio-cultural backgrounds (these issues will be clear in due course). The diversity of the socio-cultural backgrounds of the negotiators would ramify the issues under discussion (or negotiation) according to each party's interests, beliefs, wishes, values, attitudes, and, in turn, would, sometimes, impede or block desired outcomes.

This is, partly, because, as Crystal (1971: 15) has noticed that many of the political and philosophical terms which describe Western ideals and norms of behaviour have different connotations when these very terms are used in Eastern countries. For example, terms like 'freedom', 'progressive', 'democratic', or 'communist' have good or bad or neutral connotation depending upon which part of the world a partner belongs to.

However, the prevailing problem in international communication is that of cultural differences. Nehru (the late Prime Minister of India) noted the influence of such problem. He had repeatedly called for a better understanding between people of different cultures in almost every speech he delivered either outside or inside his country. His realisation of the influence of cultural differences on communication was derived from solid background experience in international relations (Nehru, 1954). A case in point is his *Visit to America* in which he revealed a deep
understanding of how cultural background affects communication outcomes (Nehru, 1950: 58-59):

'It is not easy for a person of one country to enter into the background of another country. So there is great irritation because one fact that seems obvious to us is not immediately accepted by other party ... If we wish to convince them, we have to use their language as far as we can, not language in the narrow sense of the words, but the language of mind.'

People from different cultures differ in their approaches to life and in their ways of thinking and speaking. Every separate culture has its own values, interests and modes of thought. And because of problems of this nature, which are common to mankind, people from different cultures remain unable to communicate with each other with mutual comprehension (Oliver, 1962: X). According to Glenn (1959: 12-34), the problems arising in transmitting ideas from one cultural group to members of another cultural group are, in principle, problems of language. He has stated (1959: 13),

'The determination of the relationship between the patterns of thought of the cultural or national group whose ideas are to be communicated, to the patterns of thought of the cultural or national group which is to receive the communication is an integral part of international communication. Failure to determine such relationships, and to act in accordance with such determinations, will almost unavoidably lead to misunderstanding.'

In his Semantic Difficulties in International Communication, Glenn has attempted to provide examples of cases where words and expressions that have two sides of meaning, in practical use cause misinterpretation between international communicating groups. The implication of this, as it appears, is that each group's thought is,
to a considerable extent, a function of its past (i.e. its socio-cultural background (1959: 12-34).

The problems of misunderstanding or misinterpretation, caused by the different cultural backgrounds of partners in international communication, are not due to the overt content of language (i.e. the linguistic knowledge) since it is possible to analyse language in isolation, according to Lee (1967). It has been noticed that such problems arise in actual communication when people of different backgrounds conduct their activities. For their use of language must be considered in relation to other aspects of the communication situation.

Among such aspects are the partners' attitudes and expectations. Different attitudes and different expectations can contribute a great deal towards the final outcome of the communication or negotiation. They can create, intensify or impede agreement or disagreement. People's speech within the context of communication is loaded with judgements, as Burke (1967: 39-41) has alleged, and provides clues as to how partners should react towards certain objects. Words and expressions in actual communication contain concealed choices; they are not merely signifying or naming objects, rather suggesting desirable or undesirable objects; they are not naming things but a system of attitudes, of implicit exhortations. To call a person a 'friend' or an 'enemy', for example, is to suggest a procedure of action with regard to him. Attitudes and actions, which are usually associated with such words or expressions in communication situations, tend to re-enforce the actions themselves (Burke, 1967: 39-41).
Different aspects of international linguistic communication can lead to different inferences. According to Simpson (1962), when an international representative employs even his own language in a foreign country it ceases to be the same medium as at home. Instead, it becomes a foreign tongue since its words and phrases are uttered to a different people, with a different history, and different culture. Hence, misinterpretation and misunderstanding are likely to occur even in the use of his own language. However, when an international representative employs a language other than his own, then, Simpson argues, his difficulties multiply. To avoid such difficulties, he should know a foreign language not only extremely well but also should acquire knowledge of the shades of meaning which relatively few people recognize even in their own language (1962: 44-46).

The difficulties of international linguistic communication are, then, endless, and are growing steadily. The same words can mean different things from culture to culture, while expressions can have different speech acts according to the partners' intended meaning. Attitudes can play a very dramatic and drastic role within communication situation. Contextual factors may contribute to the suggestion of different interpretations while partners' cultural backgrounds can benefit from all these 'raw materials' and 'paint' their own unique pictures.

Almost every day brings new types of problems to every aspect of international affairs: diplomacy, politics, economics, commerce and trade, defence and other areas. International representatives who are unfamiliar with the nature of linguistic communication travel from one part of the world to another representing their
countries. They discuss the various aspects of relations between their countries and the countries they visit, and they negotiate the interests of their countries with representatives of other countries. They attended conferences which deal with crucial issues such as education, health, energy, law, agriculture, transports, among others. All these activities necessitate the use of language. In activities like business management or international relations, for example, it is speech which is golden whereas silence is anathema because it leads to ignorance which, in turn, leads to trouble (Crystal, 1971: 17). Those who have already been in these fields practicing such activities know perfectly well how big the problem is, and how much these representatives and their countries are suffering from difficulties related to language.

In the following chapters we will examine the most influential activity within international communication; that is, diplomacy in order to realize its relation to, and correlation with, language problems.
CHAPTER 2

DIPLOMACY: THE PROFESSION OF INTERNATIONAL LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION

2.1 Diplomacy: scope and definition

Diplomacy, according to The Oxford English Dictionary, is 'the management of international relations by negotiations; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist; skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse and negotiation.'

The various parts of such a definition reflect the complexity and wide range rather than assigning different tasks for diplomacy. Two elements in various parts of this definition are central to diplomacy; conducting and negotiating international relations between independent states.

The word 'diplomacy' has, in fact, many different meanings. It is used by different 'speakers' and 'writers' to mean what each of them intends at a given time - foreign policy, negotiations, international relations, or simply tact. Nicolson (1964) has mentioned five interpretations of the word 'diplomacy' which are used indiscriminately in English speaking countries (1964: 3). On the other hand, considerable confusion results from the tendency to equate diplomacy with a number of activities assigned to ambassadors, career diplomats or special envoys such as propaganda, espionage and so on which are not actually part of the process nor of the function of diplomacy. Furthermore, the tendency to equate diplomacy with foreign policy or foreign service has resulted in a
huge amount of literature in which the process of diplomacy itself tends to become lost (Encyclopaedia Britannica - Diplomacy).

According to Webster's Dictionary, diplomacy is 'the conducting of relations between nations.'

Although this definition has perhaps confined diplomacy to its usual process and function of conducting international relations, it does not reflect the whole range of diplomacy nor does it specify the means of conducting the activities. In addition, the word 'nation' (in the definition) is not a synonym for the word 'state' (Watson, 1983: 11). Diplomacy is to be conducted between independent states. For example, the Arabic Nation incorporates, at least, twenty-two states, all of which are members of the 'United Nations' and each of which is a sovereign state and has diplomatic relations with the other states. This example indicates that diplomacy is the conduct of relations between independent states but not nations since all the Arab states belong to a single nation.

Diplomacy also is not a system of moral philosophy; it is, as Sir Ernest Satow (quoted in Nicolson, 1964: 24) defines it, 'the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states.'

Nicolson has identified the process and the function of diplomacy as the management of relations between independent states by processes of negotiation (1964: 41).

Watson (1983) advances the scope of diplomacy by introducing the term 'dialogue' to the definition to characterize the nature of diplomacy. He distinguishes between 'foreign policy' and diplomacy.
in that foreign policy is the substance of a state's relations with other powers and agencies and the purpose it hopes to achieve by such relations whereas diplomacy is the 'process of dialogue' and 'negotiation' by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes. Thus, diplomacy for Watson is 'the dialogue between independent states' (1983: 11).

'Diplomatic channel' is widely used in the field of international relations and has come to mean 'diplomatic communication' between sovereign states. However, diplomatic channels are not merely used to mean communicating messages between states; they are also used to mean discussing, negotiating and assuming mutual commitments. The experience of taking part in a continuous communication of this kind, according to Watson (1983), itself influences the discussion and moulds the aims of the partners. The awareness of the intentions and capabilities of other states through diplomatic channels (i.e. diplomatic communication) provides the opportunities and sets the limits for every state's foreign relations, developing them from random thrusting and yielding to a systematic policy (Watson, 1983: 213). Diplomatic communication makes states aware of the wishes and objections of other states where consent is necessary to reach potential agreement in the hope of regulating differences, clashes or conflicts on national interests, values and other fundamental issues. In addition, diplomatic communications help states elaborate new and constructive arrangements to deal with serious difficulties and reach compromises.
Diplomacy, in the view of those who practice it in the field and have considerable experience (i.e. ambassadors or career diplomats), is rather different in its scope and function. Most career diplomats who kindly and amicably participated in answering the question, 'What is diplomacy from your viewpoint?' were very much aware of the definitions already mentioned, but, instead of quoting either definition, they preferred to consult their immediate experiences. The responses which indeed deepened our understanding of both the range and the function of diplomacy may be classified into the following three types. Firstly, 'diplomacy as an art of conducting, managing or negotiating international relations, or resolving disputes peacefully. Among the career diplomats who bestowed such responses were American, Austrian, Bangladeshi, Egyptian, Indian, S. Korean, Sudanese, and United Arab Emirate.

Examples of these responses are as follows:

(1) 'Well I think the diplomacy is the art of negotiation and it is the art of promoting relations between the countries of your own and the country to which you are accredited' (Y. Park, S. Korean Ambassador - interview).

(2) 'Diplomacy is an art of better communication to serve certain purposes either on bilateral basis or international basis, and this kind of diplomacy unless it will be based on best qualification and quality it could conduct to other results which a man who use this kind of art could have other way of results' (H. Mesharafa, Egyptian Ambassador - interview).

(3) 'Well, I think, generally speaking, diplomacy is the art of managing international relations in a positive constructive and mutual manner with the aim of reaching agreeable solution and amicable resolution of dispute' (Tag Elser Hamza - interview).
The second type of response regarded diplomacy as the 'technique of communication'. That is, diplomacy is essentially a technique, process or tool of communication. Among the career diplomats who bestowed such responses were Austrian, British, Egyptian, Indian, Russian and Sudanese. Examples of these responses are as follows:

(4) 'Well, diplomacy as I understand it is the process of communication between countries. It is a process which is bilateral and is multilateral; is the process which can be a mere exchange of views or it can be a negotiation. It can represent every form of conduct between states short of war. I don't think that it is the subject that it is easy to define because it does cover the whole realm of human contacts but of course I have tried to define it in what I have said already, and I think that, as this question already implies, the important aspect of diplomacy is that it is a form of communication between governments' (M. Tait, British Ambassador - interview).

(5) '... Diplomacy is a very specialized form of communication between nations because first of all it is official communication. It means that the main purpose of diplomacy is to maintain official contact between countries and nations ...' (A Russian career diplomat - interview).

(6) 'Well there are many definitions of diplomacy given in textbooks, but from my experience I would say diplomacy is essentially the management of relations between states and the most important element in the process is the technique of communication' (I. Aziz, Indian Ambassador - interview).

The third type of response looked at diplomacy from yet another direction. We may regard this type as an 'open-ended' response. The responses of this type reflected the unrestricted range of activity of diplomacy. It follows that almost any career diplomat could easily coin a definition on which he would leave his imprints.
according to his personality, experience, role and goal in the field. However, responses belonging to this type all had a common ground of conducting and managing foreign relations and implying communication processes. Among the career diplomats who bestowed such responses were Algerian, Argentinian, Austrian, Brazilian, Indian, Italian, Romanian, Sudanese, UAE and Yugoslav. Examples of these responses are as follows:

(7) 'The scope of diplomacy is the way to realize the foreign policy of a government trying to get the most of the target objectives with the minimum costs, this is generally speaking. Diplomacy means also try to avoid clash, reducing the friction, find a way of getting along underlying what is common, what is unifying ... trying to reduce the impact of what is in contrast and create arguments and friction between two countries. This is basically diplomacy' (Italian career diplomat - interview).

(8) 'Diplomacy is, according to my opinion, the hands and the foot(s) of the country. With those hands and feet(s) you can express yourself, and you can move around' (Austrian career diplomat - interview).

(9) 'Well, it's very difficult to answer what is diplomacy rather I would say what is the work of a diplomat(s) which is to my mind it is to promote the interest of your country to the other country and to prevent any negative development between your ... the relation between the two countries. And if you are in international, you are to work for peace and prosperity. That in short is what diplomat works for' (Indian career diplomat - interview).

Diplomacy, then, and according to all these responses, is the technique of international communication. It is the art of resolving international disputes peacefully. It is also a process of managing international relations in a positive and constructive manner.
Building on all these insights, I will define diplomacy as the art of international communication by which independent states as well as international institutions conduct mutual relations and disputes in a positive, constructive and friendly manner with the aim of reaching a compromise for the prosperity of mankind. This definition implies several crucial points. Firstly, the domain of diplomacy is regarded here (in this work) in a much broader sense. As is often done, diplomacy is restricted to resident embassies which represent just one facet of conducting diplomatic communication (Watson, 1983: 11). However, there are many other institutions which deal with international affairs and yet they are not part of (or belong to) these embassies. Examples of these are EEC (European Economic Community); GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council); Arab League; OAU (Organization of African Unity); OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries); Organization of Islamic Conference; UNO (United Nation Organization) and its various organizations such as UNESCO and UNICEF. All these, among other international institutions, deal with international affairs as well as world wide problems. Members belonging to these institutions are typically diplomats (in our broad sense of diplomacy) although they are not working for the various embassies.

Secondly, diplomacy is not to be equated with either foreign policy or foreign service. Instead, it is a technique by which these activities are to be conducted. It is a process of communication by which international relations and world problems are to be managed, tackled or solved.
Thirdly, the aim of diplomacy is that states in a system conduct their relations, preserve their interests and values, manage their problems and conflicts by means short of war. That is, means of communication or negotiation by which they may reach a compromise. The goal of diplomacy, as a Russian career diplomat put it, is very noble. Diplomatic activity must be to maintain friendly relations between nations, and avoid misunderstanding, conflicts or the deterioration of relationships between nations.

2.2 Diplomacy and language

Diplomacy therefore is the art of communication between sovereign states and between states and various international organizations. It is the art of using language positively and constructively by representatives of independent states to conduct, manage and negotiate foreign relations, international affairs and world problems.

Diplomacy, accordingly, is above all else a profession of language. Limb (1962) suggests that diplomacy should be listed among the categories of the literary and oratorical professions (1962: 29). Within the same direction, Simpson alleges that diplomacy has primarily relied upon speech not only in the conduct of negotiations but also in the preparation for missions and in the justification of their results (1962: 38).

Independent states must conduct their foreign relations with one another. They must manage their differences in national interests and other fundamental issues. Also, states must negotiate problems and conflicts which rise intermittently between (or among) them, and between them and different international institutions. In
all these matters they must reach agreeable solutions on conflicting national interests and values by means of negotiation if they choose means short of war.

Nevertheless, negotiations may involve proposals (from the two parties of negotiation processes) in which interests are very conflicting. The aim of negotiation is to work to reduce the conflict or the tension between both sides, in the first place, and then to proceed to reach an agreeable solution, an agreement (Ikle, 1964). Thus the function of negotiation process is to combine the divergent values and interests into an agreed decision or resolution (Zartman and Berman, 1982).

However, diplomatic negotiation is not always successful. In fact, it is often problematic and time consuming, and its results are usually hopeless and fruitless. Examples of these are endless. We still recall the failure of the Reykjavik Summit (held in Iceland on 11-12 October 1986 between the two superpowers) which resulted in the expulsion of diplomats from both sides (i.e. American and Russian) instead of reaching an agreement on nuclear disarmament as the two parties were preaching before the meeting. The Guardian's report was that,

'The Iceland Summit collapsed last night within sight of 'extremely important potential agreement' ... (The Guardian, 13 October 1986, p. 1).

whereas The Daily Telegraph reported that,

'After the talks broke up, Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev blamed each other for the outcome' (The Daily Telegraph, 13 October 1986, p. 1).
As a further example the ambiguous language of the Security Council Resolutions 242 on the Middle East resulted in the Arab-Israeli conflict which began in 1967 (Zartman and Berman, 1982: 183).

In the two examples above (representing the sort of results of current diplomatic negotiation) the problem lies, to a considerable extent, in the actual use of language in the negotiation situation. The first example represents the spoken language of negotiation, whereas the second exemplifies written language - the language of the agreement which was the outcome of difficult negotiation.

If the two parties of diplomatic negotiation choose peaceful means to manage their conflicting interests (i.e. means short of war) and this is indeed what diplomacy is all about, then they must pursue these means through diplomatic channels, through diplomatic communication or negotiation, through a positive and constructive use of language.

As a result, language is a necessary means of diplomatic communication. It follows that a diplomat, in order to communicate effectively, must be able to use the language of the country in which he is accredited (or the language of the ongoing activity of the negotiation processes). Lacking such a skill, he is forced to negotiate through an interpreter, with the consequence of decreasing both mutual certainty of meaning and understanding (Al Mulla, 1986).

Nonetheless, knowing foreign language(s) does not ensure an understanding of the counterpart's messages (see Morain, 1986: 64). As we noticed in Chapter 1, mutual socio-cultural background knowledge is a very crucial element in order to gain understanding. Thus, in the case of international diplomacy, certain background knowledge of the country, people and issues is fundamentally crucial.
and must be acquired by international representatives. A lack of such knowledge may cause serious political shortcomings which may result in certain serious political consequences.

International diplomats, according to a distinguished Indian Ambassador, should, above all, acquire the art of communication. They should cultivate a sense for words and images and their nuances. It is not enough for a diplomat to have a mastery of language. It is equally important to have the ability to understand people whether individually or collectively. A diplomat should be able to understand a wide range of emotions so that he can interpret the personalities of the people with whom he communicates. Diplomats consequently encounter new problems as well as new situations where approaches are more important than knowledge. In these situations, different cultures and ethos between diplomats create problems as well as challenges. Therefore, diplomats must be aware of the background, the history, the culture and the temperament of the people they are amongst in order to achieve the proper wave length and evoke the correct response. Thus, diplomats who experience a spectrum of human emotions can communicate with a wider range of people and elicit the correct responses from them. Such diplomats are more successful in diplomacy than others (I. Aziz, Indian Ambassador - interview).

However, regardless of the sort of training international diplomats have acquired, the cultural background always influences their way of thinking, their way of expressing their views and their way of dealing, in all matters, with diplomats belonging to different cultural backgrounds (Tag Elser Hamza - interview). To support this view, Tag Elser cited the following two examples:
'I remember I attended a meeting for International Law Commission, a very important forum belonging to the United Nations, a forum where a very distinguished lawyers representing a number of states, ... to discuss important international matters with the main purpose of codifying international law, and it is very interesting, in fact, to attend a meeting of forum where you can really see lively manifestation of difference of cultures and how they communicate. I remember there was a sort of debate on the word Organization (international organization, in this sense). The American delegate (...) spelt out his views in the meaning of the 'organization' and what should it be, what its purpose and so forth. On the other hand, the Soviet delegate (...) expressed his view in this respect. And there was very clear divergence between the two, and both of them dialogue for a number of hours without reaching a middle ground. In the end the American delegate said 'I and my counterpart looked to 'organization' from different philosophies'. And this shows how cultures can differ in spite of the apparent simplicity of the subject ...'

Another example could be cited from the experience of the United Nations Organization itself (Tag Elser continued),

'In the earlier times nearly the 50s and 60s, a sharp difference arose as to the question of membership. The article, I think 3, which talks about that provides that all states could be members of the organization. Apparently, the word State didn't or shouldn't give rise to a difference. The word State is indicated what's a state means; an independent territorial entity, raising a flag ... and so forth. But when it came to the question of membership of organization, a very sharp difference arose between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. Each advanced views on the interpretation of the word 'state' and they failed to reach an amicable settlement in the 'General Assembly' mainly because of the different philosophies and the different cultural backgrounds and of course different political stands ...' (Tag Elser - interview).

According to Shams Ul-Alam (a Bangladesh Ambassador), knowing cultural background is a very important matter in diplomatic communication:
'because when (a diplomat) talks to his counterparts he must know their likes and their dislikes, their aspirations, their heroes. So one must know the social background, the culture, the music, the songs, the poetry and so that you can come to an understanding. So to me to sum up, diplomats must know history as well as languages and most important the socio-cultural background of the host country' (Shams Ul-Alam, Bangladesh Ambassador - interview).

2.3 Diplomats as international communicators - the findings of the basic thesis (previous work)

Diplomacy, as is clear from our discussion, is then above all else, both in the written and spoken form, a profession of international linguistic communication. Diplomats, as the 'elite of international communicators', are the channels of communication between the governments of independent states conducting foreign relations as well as international affairs, and resolving disputes between nations in order that the people of the world can be productive and continue a harmonious life together. In order to attain such goals, diplomats communicate and negotiate at all times. In addition to their routine tasks, they communicate at formal assemblies of the United Nations, at international conferences and at official meetings. They also communicate informally; they speak to small delegations that visit their offices; on radio and television, and when they attend formal dinners or cocktail parties and so forth (Limb, 1962: 36-). These activities obviously require a combination of certain special qualities which are not always to be found in the ordinary man, nor even in the ordinary politician (Nicolson, 1964).
Nevertheless, there are all sorts of difficulties which characterize current diplomatic communication and impede diplomacy from being persuasive, positive and productive in order to fulfil its supreme goal as stated above. Firstly, as stated in Chapter 1, diplomats of different cultures (as international communicators) remain unable to communicate with each other in mutual understanding (Oliver, 1962). Their inability to grasp what is meant by what is said in communication situation is not due to linguistic knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of grammar and lexicon), the overt content of language but rather to the diversity of their socio-cultural background (i.e. the covert content of language) (cf. Miller, 1973: 10; Gumperz, 1982: 2; Thomas, 1983: 91; Morain, 1986: 64). Such cultural features lead to different interpretations which, in turn, lead to misunderstanding which, on some occasions, causes miscommunication or collapse of the ongoing activities.

Secondly, some current diplomatic speech is extremely likely to provoke disputes as well as conflicts between independent states as it contains aggressive and offensive elements. Such speech may be considered as having military characteristics reflecting attacking attitudes, and lacking tact and politeness, the hallmarks of international diplomacy. Oliver (1962: 11) states that:

'Perhaps it is impractical to produce experts in speech who are also experts in international relations; if so the converse is probably true. Certain recent world events appear to indicate that our success in the use of diplomatic speech has been less than the situation demands.'

Thirdly, problems related to current diplomatic speech increase: debate instead of negotiation, propaganda instead of quiet
diplomacy, a rapid surprise attack instead of diplomatic persuasion. In such occurrences, instead of employing diplomacy as an 'art' of communication in order to build confidence between sovereign states, other means are used to evoke 'tensions' as well as 'cold war'. Again Oliver (1962: 9) advises diplomats that they must avoid what he calls 'war mongering' or 'reckless speech' which provokes war.

Fourthly, the tendency to break up diplomatic relations between nations has increased in the current practice of diplomacy. Certain incidents which can possibly be resolved by negotiation in a friendly manner, with positive attitudes along with good intentions have fairly recently caused the breakdown of diplomatic relations between a number of countries. Such 'business' also affects a number of international organizations.

All these difficulties, unfortunately, handicap international diplomacy and consequently reduce the chance of potential peace among nations.

This thesis is concerned especially with the first point; the role and effect of the socio-cultural background of international diplomats in conducting their activities, and how the diversity of backgrounds causes cross-cultural misunderstanding in the language of international diplomacy. To a lesser degree, this thesis will deal with the second point (i.e. aggressive or undiplomatic speech), raising the claim that what appears to be aggressive and offensive speech may be regarded, to a certain extent, as a result of judging the so-called aggressive speech from the point of view of different cultural backgrounds.
In order to elaborate the main point of this thesis which is, cross-cultural misunderstanding in the language of international diplomacy because of the diversity of diplomats' cultural backgrounds, let us in the first place consult the findings of *International Linguistic Communication* (Al. Mulla, 1986), then proceed to establish the necessary methodological issues within which the thesis will be examined thoroughly against various levels of empirical data.

The central argument of *International Linguistic Communication* (ILC), which was intended to be the basic thesis to the present one, was that international linguistic communication may be problematic as it involves partners (of different cultures) who have their own, different cultural backgrounds. The interpretation of this argument is that when communication activities take place, socio-cultural dimensions of language (the covert content of language) interact with linguistic knowledge (i.e. the overt content of language) and problems of misunderstanding and misinterpretation occur. In accordance with this argument, which was supported by the literature of the field, and in order to explain how international partners in the communication activities use their socio-cultural knowledge in the interpretation of the messages and intentions of their counterparts, and how this affects the outcome of communication, a systematic analysis was indispensable. Therefore, a systematic hypothesis was established. The hypothesis is as follows:

'When international linguistic communication takes place, misunderstanding, misinterpretation or miscommunication is likely to happen due to the fact that each party in the communication activity has different socio-cultural background knowledge rooted in its deep past, which interferes with linguistic knowledge and impedes successful communication.'
In order to account for the 'explanatory-interpreted' research, the method of 'interviewer-partner-eyewitness' was explored. Also, to meet the requirements of the research, and to explain the various points of misunderstanding or misinterpretation in the scenic units of the empirical data (the whole communication scene was regarded as the unit of analysis and was called the 'scenic unit'), special apparatus was constructed (Al Mulla, 1986, chapter 2).

The empirical data was gathered from real situations of international linguistic communication (as normally organized activities) and classified into scenes which were then arranged into three groups according to very specific factors.

The partners who participated in the activities belonged to twelve different cultures and sub-cultures (i.e. African, American, Arab, Bahraini, British, Egyptian, Chinese, Korean, Pakistani, Tanzanian, UAE and Welsh).

Throughout three broad stages of comprehensive analysis (Chapter 3, 4 and 5) the three groups of empirical data were investigated and the hypothesis underwent copious and abundant tests.

In stage one, group one of the data comprised two scenes A and B. The analysis of scene A illustrated how the international linguistic communication (ILC) collapsed, mainly because of 'misculturality'; that is, the primary factor that affected the outcome of the communication activity in this scene was the interference between the cultural background of the Arabic partner and the Tanzanian partner, and their use of the overt content of language, the linguistic knowledge.
The analysis of scene B showed how the cultures of the African man and the Welsh lady were very different, and conflicted. This conflict obscured and reduced the clarity of the overt content of language, and led to the breakdown of the activity. In other words, the interference between the two cultures and the use of language, was the major factor that produced the unpleasant outcome of the communication.

In stage two, group two contained three scenes; C, D and E. The analysis of scene C revealed that 'misintentionality' (i.e. the inability of the partner to understand what is meant by what is said) (see Miller, 1973: 10, quoted earlier in Chapter 1; Thomas, 1983: 91, has given the term 'pragmatic failure' to such a problem of misunderstanding) was the major factor in causing the collapse in the activity. The Korean girl was unable to understand the message and the intention of the Egyptian man because of the cultural barrier between them. What was intended as advice by the Egyptian was taken by the Korean as criticism or scorn.

The analysis of scene D disclosed that the Pakistani partner misinterpreted the intention of the Bahraini partner, due to different cultural backgrounds. The communication activity folded because of the inability of the Pakistani partner to understand what was meant by the Bahraini partner.

The analysis of scene E showed how far the cultural background of the Korean student played an active role in changing the modal 'might' to 'can', and then how the cultural background of the Chinese partner played a part in altering the message of the Korean partner. The Chinese partner's misinterpretation of the Korean's intention resulted in the American professor denying the Arabic
student a new result. This, in turn, led the Arabic student to leave the University and seek a place elsewhere.

In stage three, group three consisted of two scenes, F and G. The analysis of scene F showed the 'misculturality' (the clash between the two cultures in the activity) took place in the communication between the American professor and the Arabic student. However, although the misculturality had occurred, the collapse of the communication did not emerge. In spite of suffering from the 'misculturality', the two partners kept negotiating the points of misunderstanding until they were able to bridge the cultural gap and arrive at the desired result. The communication activity in this scene continued, and the relationship between the two partners was greatly enhanced.

The analysis of scene G revealed that although the initial misunderstanding had taken place, the communication activity progressed. Furthermore, the analysis of this scene suggested that, if the quiet negotiation had not been pursued between the Arabic and the British partners, then the termination of the communication and the business deal would have occurred.

The final results of the investigation were regarded from two points of view. Firstly, by considering the point of misculturality or misintentionality as the dividing line between successful and unsuccessful communication then the hypothesis was confirmed and validated by 85.7 per cent. Secondly, by considering the worst outcome of communication, the collapse of the activity, then the hypothesis was confirmed and validated by 71.4 per cent. This percentage was regarded as high enough to confirm and validate the hypothesis. However, to allow for any human error I suggested the
result of the second view (i.e. 71.4 per cent) in testing the hypothesis.

Consequently, the results of the investigation confirmed and validated the hypothesis and thus the Theory of International Linguistic Communication was firmly established. The theory of ILC gave rise to one major deduction, namely that ILC is problematic. The three pillars of this characteristic are misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscommunication.

The thorough and detailed investigation of the empirical data showed that there was a correlation between ILC and misunderstanding or misinterpretation. The primary cause was the diversity and discrepancy of the cultural backgrounds of the partners in the communication activities. The socio-cultural dimensions of language played an active role in the communication of the international partners, and reduced the chances of reaching successful results. Consequently, most scenes in the empirical data had unfavourable, undesirable and uncomfortable outcomes. In other words, the investigation of most of the scenic units, derived from real communication, revealed the shortcomings of current international communication. The distinct cultural backgrounds of the partners interfered with the use of linguistic knowledge of the shared language (i.e. English in the work) and created problems of misunderstanding and misjudgement.

The investigation of the empirical data revealed that partners in the communication activities were closely associated with their cultural backgrounds which functioned as assets for them. The language used in the activities represented a cultural instrument with two ends. The partner used it for the fulfilment of his
purposes and it was also a representation of his culture and tradition. Both ends were important in the actual communication activities. This revealed how the two contents of language, the overt and the covert, interlocked and overlapped in the activities. The partners in such situations were seeing and hearing the communication activities through the eyes and ears of their own cultures. Their communication represented vivid and alive pictures which were derived from their cultures. What appeared obvious to one partner was not clear to his counterpart who might have been going through the same process, yet in his own culture. Each partner was thinking that his counterpart had undergone a certain misunderstanding, since neither of them could penetrate the cultural background of the other.

In the various scenes of ILC presented in the work, partners were from different cultures, dealing with different business matters. They were highly educated with extensive experience, knowledge and practice in various fields.

Building on these premises, diplomats, as international communicators, are not more fortunate than the partners in the activities in the work already presented. It follows that 'they are in the same boat'. In other words, when diplomats of different cultures negotiate international relations, a great misunderstanding is likely to happen due to the fact that what seems obvious and clear to one party is not immediately so to the other party because of the diversity of their socio-cultural backgrounds.

Surprisingly enough, given the crucial role diplomacy plays internationally, as discussed earlier in this chapter, research on
diplomatic communication has always been descriptive, or as Limb (1962: 32) put it,

'the serious study of diplomatic speech is still, unfortunately, in its infancy ...'

Systematic research dealing either with diplomatic communication or diplomatic language, if there is any, has not yet penetrated the 'heart' of the matter: 'How' and 'Why' has international diplomatic communication, on some occasions, failed to produce (or reach) a successful outcome?

As Gumperz (1982) has realized the existing body of research has been primarily descriptive (cf. Thomas, 1983: 95). The procedure of the treatment of factors influencing communication situations (i.e. partners' personal background knowledge, their assumptions concerning role and status relationships, their social values and interests associated with the various components of the message transmitted) has been to identify or list what can potentially affect interpretation. And, 'with rare exceptions' (Gumperz, 1982: 153-54):

'no systematic attempts are made to show how social knowledge is used in situated interpretation ... It follows that analysis of such ongoing processes requires different and perhaps more indirect methods of study which examine not the lexical meaning of words or the semantic structure of sentences but interpretation as a function of dynamic pattern of move and countermoves as they follow one another in ongoing conversation'.

However, the field of international diplomacy is very sensitive and too delicate and therefore requires special qualifications. To know how diplomats conduct their communication is to be with them, in the field. Nevertheless, to be in the field is one thing, while
to deal with problems of language and communication is yet another thing. To put the argument in a clearer context, we may say that recognizing the field work is to be there, in the field, practising diplomacy, while dealing with the problems of language and communication is to be trained in linguistics and sociolinguistics. Acquiring both skills is a matter of fortune and is rarely attained by a single researcher.

This work will carry out this task. It will investigate current diplomatic communication in order to arrive at an understanding of the reasons behind unsuccessful activities of international diplomacy. The thesis' working hypothesis is that, 'misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscommunication are very likely to characterize the language of current international diplomacy because of the diversity of diplomats' socio-cultural backgrounds'.

Related to the hypothesis, the following claim may be in order. What appears to be undiplomatic or aggressive speech which, on occasions, evokes tensions and conflicts between parties, is, to a certain extent, I shall argue, a result of misjudging the other party's intentions; a matter of interpreting messages from the point of view of one's own socio-cultural background.

The focus of investigation will be concentrated on the problem of 'How' socio-cultural background knowledge of diplomats overlaps with linguistic knowledge, and 'Why' this overlapping creates misunderstanding or misjudgement, resulting, sometimes, in impeding the progress of communication, and leading, on still other occasions, to the collapse of the activities.
As may be clear throughout Chapter 1, as well as the last section of this chapter, the method of investigation will follow the macro view of the sociolinguistic perspective as specifically employed by Hymes (1974) and Gumperz (1982) where socio-cultural background knowledge is viewed as revealed in the actual speech of communication activities and characterized by specific cultural norms and values which constrain both the form and the outcome of what is said.

It is hoped that this work will disclose the actual shortcomings of current trends of diplomatic communication in order for international representatives to avoid potential problems caused by their communication. Also it will explore the problem of how the socio-cultural background knowledge of diplomats interferes with linguistic knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of grammar and lexicon). This creates problems of misunderstanding and misjudgement of messages and intentions which, in turn, impede the progress of diplomatic activities and lead to unsuccessful outcomes. This work will also suggest ways and principles by which international diplomacy may benefit in order to effectively pursue and fulfil its goals.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH STRUCTURE AND FIELDWORK

3.1 Introduction

As mentioned in the last section of Chapter 2, the main task of this work is to reach an understanding of the reasons behind unsuccessful activities of international diplomacy. That is 'how' and 'why' international diplomatic communication, on some occasions, fails to reach (or produce) a successful outcome. In other words, the focus of investigation of this work will concentrate on the problem of 'how' the socio-cultural backgrounds of international diplomats overlap with linguistic knowledge (the knowledge of grammar and lexicon), and 'why' such an overlapping creates misunderstanding or misjudgement, sometimes resulting in hindering the progress of the communication or negotiation, and leading, on still other occasions, to the breakdown of the activities.

This appears to indicate that the bulk of the investigation will focus on social and cultural situations where diplomats, as international communicators whose cultures are enormously different, reveal their socio-cultural background knowledge (i.e. interests, values, attitudes, beliefs, desires and intentions) in the actual speech of their activities which characterizes their cultural norms and values and constrains both the messages and the outcomes of their communication.

In order to implement such a task, a researcher must directly involves himself in the activity and play an active role in the communication processes in order to be able to give a first hand account of what actually happens. However, since, as mentioned in
Chapter 2, diplomacy is a very delicate and sensitive field, it is merely fancy if a researcher thought for a moment that he could, in the normal course of events, attend a diplomatic communication or negotiation in order to tape-record the ongoing activities between the two parties involved. Probably the only way of attending this field of activity is to be a diplomat, and not just any diplomat, but one of the participants in the ongoing communication or negotiation. And in such a context, of course, there is no room for tape-recording or otherwise recording the activities. After all, even to think of such things is, far too, unrealistic.

Nevertheless, current diplomatic communication as described in the previous chapters would appear to be in dire need of scientific investigation in order for diplomats to have a clear understanding of the shortcomings of their communication which affect both their relationships with each other and the relations of their respective countries. In turn, this creates more tensions and disputes instead of reducing, if not resolving, the world's problems, which is the main function and purpose of international diplomacy.

Therefore this kind of situation cannot be tolerated any longer and research must be carried out in order to collect empirical data which gives access to diplomatic communication activities.

An awareness on the one hand of the complexity of the field of which the present researcher was a part, and an awareness on the other hand of the requirement of the scientific research, especially in the way of gathering empirical data, imposed a heavy burden on the researcher and necessitated carrying out a preliminary thesis namely *International Linguistic Communication* (Al Mulla, 1986). In this work the researcher examined real scenes of international
communication activities where all partners belonged to different cultures and had extensive knowledge and experience of international affairs, as mentioned in the last section of Chapter 2. The findings and the experience of the basic (the preliminary) thesis would guide the present analysis and direct the way the researcher would follow in the investigation of diplomatic communication.

In addition, the present work's empirical data, which was not derived from the researcher's personal experience in the field of diplomacy, would undergo a special treatment to match the scientific research's requirements. That is, the investigation would include, as a primary source, that part of the data which would have a direct relation to the researcher's immediate experience, or background knowledge of the cultures with which he was associated or a correspondence to the data presented in the basic thesis (Al Mulla, 1986).

This practice, while it cannot guarantee optimal results, might safeguard the analysis and eliminate any shortcomings of the investigation processes.

Fortunately, this research would have little to do with non-linguistic devices (such as facial expressions, eye contact, habits of body gesture and the like) which would require the availability and involvement of the researcher in every single scene of the communication in order to notice, observe and see every single occurrence and motion in that particular communicative event which would have a direct influence on the outcome.

Nevertheless, the role of intentional states as well as speech acts would be far more important than anything else. The correlations between the overt content of language (the knowledge of
grammar and lexicon) and the covert content of language (the socio-cultural knowledge); between literal meaning and conveyed (or intended) meaning; between the propositional content of messages and their illocutionary acts (or force) would be more central to this work. An understanding of such correlations could be achieved by several means. Having certain knowledge of the cultural backgrounds of the two parties in the activity is one means whereas questioning one or both parties involved (where this practice is possible), and gathering information from them about their messages, intentions and the sort of situation in which they conducted their activity would be yet another means. In the tape recorded interviews, for example, certain diplomatic events or stories which were reported by ambassadors (or career diplomats) were known perfectly by the researcher either because he had been a partner in that very activity or he knew the two parties involved and had access to both of them by virtue of their availability within the same country. For example, most of the diplomatic events or stories which were reported by the career diplomats and tape recorded in Abu Dhabi (of UAE) were of this kind.

As a general principle, unless the researcher had a clear background knowledge about the diplomatic events or stories (reported by the career diplomats) and their surrounding circumstances, the events and stories which were derived from tape-recorded interviews would be considered as a 'secondary source' of the empirical data which would then be used to corroborate the 'primary source' of the empirical data.
All these necessary and precautionary measures along with the researcher's experience in the field of diplomacy (since 1972) and his knowledge of linguistics and training in sociolinguistics would inevitably control the present analysis and eliminate any potential deficiency in a research of this kind in order to achieve as valid and reliable results as possible.

The present thesis would have a three-step structure as follows:

1. Gathering sufficient empirical data
2. Arranging the empirical data, and
3. Analysing the data

3.2 Gathering sufficient empirical data

The data to be investigated in this work was obtained from various sources. The bulk of the empirical data was gathered from field work. Part of the empirical data (i.e. diplomatic communication or negotiation) was drawn from the media (newspapers, magazines, radio and television) through which almost any diplomatic event is reported.

Reporters scatter worldwide to any place where they can take advantage of an event or news story. And nothing is more attractive to them than diplomatic occurrences. The important thing when obtaining data from the media is that a researcher, with the intention of closely following a certain diplomatic incident or event can benefit from seeing, hearing and reading about the event from different viewpoints. Thus, given the opportunity that a certain occurrence happened to be reported by the various means of the media then the realization of the scientific approach of
gathering empirical data may well be perfectly achieved. The Reykjavik Summit, for example, was a crucial diplomatic event in 1986 (held on 11-12 October 1986) in which the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR) negotiated one of the most fundamental issues of world peace, namely, nuclear disarmament. This event was widely and thoroughly covered by all the means of the media. Reporters who belong to every single means of the media (e.g. newspaper, radio and television) were directly and lively reporting every happening or performance from Reykjavik (the capital of Iceland where the summit was held) to all parts of the world. Through the media, reporters made it possible for interested and professional people to follow the activities minute-by-minute and build a conspicuous picture of the summit and its surrounding circumstances.

Part of the Summit's diplomatic communication, which will be investigated in this work, was drawn from British newspapers such as The Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Independent and The Guardian. Through BBC Radio 4 and television news on BBC1, BBC2's Newsnight as well as ITN, the happenings and circumstances surrounding the Summit were listened to and watched and notes were taken. As far as the diplomatic communication of the Summit is concerned, another part of data was obtained from official texts such as Official Text, published by the US Embassy and Soviet News, published by the Soviet Embassy in London. A further part of data associated with the Reykjavik Summit was provided by a number of ambassadors (some of whom attended the Summit) through the fieldwork. The investigation of the Summit's diplomatic communication will benefit from all these parts of data in order to secure the analysis as much as possible.
The bulk of the empirical data which will be analysed here (in this work) was obtained from field work.

One method of the field work by which data was obtained was via a 'diplomatic diary', that is the researcher's record of diplomatic events and general thoughts related to such events. This source provided data from the researcher's personal experience in the field of diplomacy. In the diplomatic communication of this source, the researcher was an active partner in the activity where the events normally occurred as part of regular diplomatic communications or negotiations.

Another method of the fieldwork, whereby empirical data was gathered for this work, was 'tape-recorded interviews'. These interviews were conducted in several capitals of the world in the period between November 1986 and May 1987. The capitals, where the interviews were conducted and tape-recorded were mainly Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates), Khartoum (Sudan), London (UK) and Washington DC (USA).

Most of the participants in these interviews were ambassadors as career diplomats; that is, they were professional diplomats whose careers were entirely in the service of international relations whether bilateral or multilateral. In this respect, 55 career diplomats of different socio-cultural backgrounds were interviewed. However, of this number only 25 career diplomats agreed to be tape-recorded whereas the remaining 30 agreed to be interviewed without being tape-recorded. An additional number of career diplomats initially agreed to meet the 'diplomat-researcher' but then certain circumstances intervened and impeded the meeting for various reasons.
In short, the business of interviews may be arranged into the following three categories:

Firstly, career diplomats who agreed to be interviewed and tape-recorded. Those career diplomats were from the following countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States of America.

Secondly, career diplomats who agreed to be interviewed but not tape-recorded. These were from the following countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Central Africa, Finland, Greece, Morocco, Netherlands, Somalia and Yugoslavia. The reason for not being tape-recorded were different, but the main one was that some of the career diplomats had instructions not to involve themselves in such activities.

Thirdly, career diplomats agreed to meet the 'diplomat-researcher', however, after visiting their respective embassies according to the fixed appointment provided by them the researcher returned to his embassy empty-handed for one of two reasons. Firstly (after a generous hospitality widely known between diplomats), the career diplomats insisted on having copies of both the interviewer's questions and the questionnaire and promised to provide written answers. However, these answers never reached the researcher. Career diplomats in this category were from the United States of America, Denmark, Nigeria and Romania. Secondly, the time provided by the career diplomats for the meeting was not honoured as the career diplomat left his respective embassy shortly before the due time. Such incidents involved career diplomats from China, German Democratic Republic and Jordan.
Nevertheless, the reasons behind such behaviour were well understood and acknowledged accordingly. The sensitivity and the delicacy of diplomacy has always exposed career diplomats to considerable pressures in conducting their activities or duties. An unexpected summons as well as an urgent demand for certain duties might have been the case in such occurrences. In addition, certain career diplomats had had general instructions which did not permit their involvement in activities other than the routine ones. As one career diplomat stated in his reply,

'I regret to inform you that general instructions do not permit me to engage myself in questions of this nature'.

Such a response might explain the reasons behind the apologies of many career diplomats of not being tape-recorded, or the unwillingness of many more career diplomats who did not even bother to respond to the request made of them.

However, the message behind mentioning such happenings is two-fold; firstly, to provide an indication of the scheme planned to obtain as much tape-recorded interviews as possible in order to safeguard the analysis from any potential shortage, and secondly, to reveal the circumstances involved in the process of obtaining empirical data from the most sensitive activity of its kind, diplomacy. Both folds are vitally important to mention in order to provide a clear picture of what happened during the period of conducting the fieldwork, and what difficulties were involved.

A third method of the fieldwork, through which the empirical data was gathered, was via a 'questionnaire'. This questionnaire was distributed to career diplomats through the United Arab
Emirates' embassies in a number of the world's capitals. In addition to Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates), the questionnaire was distributed in Delhi (India), Islamabad (Pakistan), Khartoum (Sudan), London (United Kingdom), Paris (France), New York and Washington DC (United States of America) and Tokyo (Japan).

From December 1986 (the starting date of distributing the questionnaire) until August 1987, only 44 copies had been collected. Interestingly (or perhaps painfully), two-thirds of the 44 copies were distributed and collected in person by the 'diplomat-researcher'. This is mainly because of the same problems mentioned earlier in dealing with the interview business.

The tendency of career diplomats to provide information was that if they agreed to do so they would prefer not to write down the information needed unless they felt a strong basis of trust between them and the researcher, because as one ambassador asked,

'How do I know that you will not use the information against me?!!'

Thus, the availability of the 'researcher' to deal (face-to-face) with the career diplomats was a very crucial element in order to explain and discuss the issues with them personally - the matter that no single researcher can afford to travel to all the capitals mentioned earlier unless being provided with enough time and other means of support.

The interviews' questions as well as the questionnaire's were, to a considerable degree, similar ones. This was intentional in order that both groups of the questions (in both the interview and
the questionnaire) would have a mutual nature of testing and supporting each other.

With regard to the interview, eleven questions were delivered to the career diplomats in order to obtain a wide range of information necessary for the present research. These questions, which were not equally important, were arranged into three categories, A, B and C (Appendix 1). Each category was meant to serve a specific yet inter-related function. That is, although each category, designed to serve a specific function, the information provided by each category would serve as the necessary condition for obtaining information from the next category. In other words, the three categories were logically organized in which each category would lead to the next, and that the information needed from the following category was dependent upon the information already deduced from the preceding one.

The first category, A, dealt with the nature of diplomacy; its scope and instruments, and contained three questions, 1, 2 and 3.

The second category, B, presented the nature of current diplomatic communication and comprised five questions, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

The third category, C, was intended to represent the characteristics of current diplomatic speech, and was composed of three questions, 9, 10 and 11.

The central category to the thesis of this work would be the second category, B. The questions in this category were intentionally arranged in a logical order to detect as much valid and reliable data as possible. That is, if the career diplomats answered question 4 (the first question of this category) in a
positive manner then he should (if not must) answer the following questions in the same manner (i.e. positively). This means that if some of the career diplomats, for some reason (and indeed these were many), attempted to conceal the appropriate answer that would coincide or match the answer of the following questions then such attempts would indeed become very conspicuous. In other words, the deliberate chronological order of the questions in category B, the core category of this work, was meant to serve as a 'built-in test' to secure the answers provided by the career diplomats who were asked sensitive questions about the most sensitive activity of its kind. That is, once a career diplomat provided a certain answer (i.e. either positive or negative) to question 4, namely

'By definition diplomats belong to different cultures, do you feel that this fact can affect the outcome of their communication?'

then he must (rather than should) follow the same pattern of answers (i.e. either positive or negative) with the remaining questions of this category (i.e. questions 5, 6, 7 and 8), otherwise he would be deemed to conceal the appropriate answers for one reason or another. In this case, the deviant answer to any question in the order would be judged in accordance with the first question, 4 (whether positive or negative). And further, if the answer of question 4 was evasive or undetermined or not clear then this answer would be considered as negative and so would the following answers in order to secure our potential results.

As to the questionnaire's items, they were also arranged in a similar logical way like those of the interview. Therefore, what
was intended in the construction of the interview's questions was actually intended in the questionnaire's items.

The questionnaire was organized in a way that could reflect what might be termed an 'Agreement Scale' (following Henerson et al., 1978). It comprised five parts or categories as follows (see Appendix 2):

**Part one** sought private and confidential information about the career diplomats such as name, position, country of citizenship, previous experience, languages acquired and so on.

**Part two** dealt with the nature of current diplomatic communication, and comprised five main items (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). This part of the questionnaire and its five items corresponded to category B of the interview scheme and its five questions 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

**Part three** dealt with the characteristics of diplomatic speech and was comprised of 4 main items, 6, 7, 8 and 9. The last of these items, 9, contained a real piece of current diplomatic speech, and comprised five adjectives as follows:

1. Desirable
2. Acceptable
3. Aggressive
4. Rude, and
5. Undiplomatic

These adjectives sought to describe and test the kind of diplomatic speech used by the career diplomats. That means, the career diplomats were given an opportunity to characterize and measure one piece of their colleague's speech.
Part four sought to explore the necessary elements for the language of diplomacy. This part of the questionnaire had just one item, 10, which comprised six adjectives to be judged by the career diplomats, as potential/necessary elements to what might be considered as the language of diplomacy. These adjectives were:

1. Formal
2. Accurate
3. Precise
4. Informative
5. Constructive, and
6. Polite

Part five of the questionnaire searched for certain qualities which make a good diplomat. This part had the last item of the questionnaire, 11, which comprised seven sub-items. In this part, career diplomats were invited to assess certain qualities which were strongly believed to be an integral part of any good diplomat.

Like category B, which was central to the interview scheme, Part two was central to the questionnaire. Both category B and part two were crucial to this work and were constructed in such a way that the two mutually tested and supported each other.

Similarly, category C of the interview corresponded to part three of the questionnaire, and these also test and support each other. Also, to some extent, parts four and five of the questionnaire related to Category A of the interview. In short, as we shall see in due course, the function of the questionnaire was two-fold; to double-check the outcome of the interview as well as the outcome of the other sources of the empirical data, which would
be regarded as a 'qualitative analysis', and to serve as a 'quantitative analysis'. Both types of analysis, the qualitative and quantitative, would be indispensable to the present work.

3.3 Classifying the empirical data

The empirical data, which was gathered from the sources and methods described earlier (in the first section of this chapter) will be organized into three broad stages. Each stage (of these) will be arranged into categories in which empirical data will be further classified into classes.

Unlike stage one which will deal exclusively with the diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit and therefore has only 'qualitative' data, stages two and three will contain quantitative as well as qualitative data. (The concept of qualitative versus quantitative data will become clearer during the course of the next section of this chapter and also as we continue our investigation of the empirical data in the following chapters.)

As already mentioned, stage one will deal with the Reykjavik Summit's diplomatic negotiation and will comprise one category with two classes of data. The first of these classes will be termed the 'primary class' of the empirical data while the second one will be called the 'secondary class' of the empirical data.

Stage two will contain two categories of empirical data. The first category will deal with the 'diplomat-researcher's' personal experience (i.e. the diplomatic diary) whereas the second category will deal with diplomatic communications derived from reported diplomatic events or stories which were known to the 'diplomat-researcher' by virtue of his availability in some of them or of his
knowledge of the two parties involved in the others. The first
category of stage two will have only one class of empirical data
(primary class), whereas the second category will comprise three
classes of empirical data (primary, secondary and tertiary).

Stage three will contain two categories of empirical data and
will deal with the so-called 'aggressive' or 'undiplomatic' speech.
The first of these categories will contain data from the personal
experience of the diplomat-researcher, the diplomatic diary as well
as experiences of other career diplomats which were known, as
mentioned above, to the diplomat-researcher, whereas the second
category will comprise data from magazines such as Time. Both
categories will comprise primary, secondary and tertiary classes of
empirical data.

In all categories of the three stages, the empirical data of
the 'primary class' will be classified into 'scenes'. Each scene
(of these) will represent a unique event of diplomatic
communication, and will be termed a 'scenic unit' (see the next
section of this chapter).

The empirical data of the secondary class in all categories of
the three stages will represent the career diplomats' reported
diplomatic events (other than that mentioned in the primary class of
data) which were unknown directly to the diplomat-researcher, and
also will represent the career diplomats' evaluation according to
their practical field experiences. This kind of empirical data (the
data of the secondary class) will serve as the first 'check-point'
of the empirical data of the primary class. This indicates that the
secondary class of empirical data will provide the initial support
and corroboration to the preceding class of data.
The tertiary class of the empirical data will provide a 'double-check' for the preceding two classes of empirical data. This indicates that such data will verify the empirical data of the secondary class and will also, in turn, verify the data of the primary class. This data was derived from the questionnaire.

The overall classification of the empirical data can be viewed as follows:

Stage one with one category (i.e. A) will deal with the diplomatic negotiation of the 'Reykjavik Summit' and will comprise two classes, primary and secondary (i.e. 1 and 2). The empirical data of the primary class will include the following two scenes:

(a) the scene which I will term the 'Preparatory-Essential Context'. This kind of scene will become clear in the next chapter

(b) the scene of diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit

The empirical data of the secondary class will contain tape-recorded evaluation by the career diplomats on the outcomes of the diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit.

Therefore

![Diagram]

Stage one

Category A

Class 1

Scene a

Class 2

Scene b

evaluation of class 1
Stage two will comprise two categories, B and C, which belong together, and will deal with diplomatic communication from the 'diplomatic diary' and tape-recorded interviews.

Category B will only have a primary class of data which will contain the following four scenes:

(c) a scene of negotiation of a ministerial joint commission
(d) a scene with an African diplomat after the final session of an Afro-Arab symposium
(e) a scene with an Indian diplomat in the context of invitation.
(f) a scene with a Chinese diplomat in the context of preparation for an official visit

Category C will contain three classes of empirical data, primary, secondary and tertiary. The primary class will comprise the following five scenes:

(g) a scene at the United Nations where an Asian career diplomat communicated a message to an Arab counterpart
(h) a scene in which an American career diplomat negotiated a bilateral consular convention with an Arab government
(i) a scene where an Arab career diplomat negotiated a loan with African senior officials
(j) a scene where a European career diplomat misinterpreted a message from a Japanese counterpart
(k) a scene where a Greek and a Bangladesh career diplomat had mutual misunderstanding in an informal situation
The secondary class (of category C) will contain tape-recorded diplomatic events other than that of the primary class as well as evaluations reported by the career diplomats.

The tertiary class will comprise empirical data from the questionnaire, that is, the quantitative data. The empirical data of the secondary as well as the tertiary class will provide supportive evidence for the empirical data of the primary class of both categories B and C. Therefore,
Stage three will comprise two categories, D and E, and will deal with current diplomatic speech.

Category D will have three classes of data, primary, secondary and tertiary. The empirical data of the primary class of this category will include the following two scenes:

(l) a scene in which two diplomats, French and Arab, negotiated in Paris some affairs of their countries
(m) a scene in which a European career diplomat visited an office of an Arab Foreign Minister

The secondary class of category D will include tape-recorded evaluations made by the career diplomats whereas the tertiary class will comprise quantitative data from the questionnaire.

Category E will contain data from Time magazine and will include three classes of empirical data, primary, secondary and tertiary. The empirical data of the primary class will have the following two scenes:

(n) the scene from Time magazine, 'Growling across the Atlantic'
(o) the scene from Time magazine, 'An Ambassador blunders'

The data of the secondary and tertiary classes will include evaluations of these two scenes from tape-recorded interviews as well as the questionnaire. The second scene of category E (i.e. scene o) will receive special attention since it was introduced (in the questionnaire) to the career diplomats for evaluation as we shall see later. Therefore,
3.4 Analysing the data

The empirical data which was classified in the preceding section will be analysed according to the order mentioned there (i.e. the above order). The three broad stages will represent three broad chapters of analysis in which each chapter will integrate as many types of data as possible in order to avoid (if at all possible, or at least to minimize) the subjective analysis. That is why this work insists of including quantitative data alongside the qualitative data.

As mentioned in section one of this chapter, the questionnaire was constructed in five parts, each of which would serve a specific function. Therefore, excluding part one of the questionnaire which provides personal and private information about the career diplomats, the function of part two is to control and monitor the qualitative data derived from the diplomatic diary as well as that of the tape-recorded interviews (consult Appendix 1 and then Appendix 2). Similarly, part three of the questionnaire is to control and monitor the qualitative data of the diplomatic diary, of tape-recorded interviews as well as of *Time* magazine. In the following analysis it will be clear that the classes of data, whether within the same category or as an overall categorial order, are meant to support and corroborate the preceding ones.

3.4.1 Establishing the unit of international diplomacy, UID

As indicated earlier in section two of this chapter, the empirical data of the primary class of all five categories, A, B, C, D and E, will be classified into 'scenes'. Each scene of the data of the primary class (there are fifteen scenes in all, a, b, c ...
n and o) will represent a unique event of diplomatic communication which will be termed a 'scenic unit'. The scenic unit of international diplomatic communication (SUIDC) or simply the 'unit of international diplomacy (UID) is to be regarded as different from other kinds of unit or discourses derived from interviews or other means of gathering empirical data in which the active roles in the communication are not 'mutually and freely shared' by the two parties involved. The implication of this is that the UID is to be regarded as the unit in which the two partners of diplomatic communication or negotiation (individuals or groups) are mutually interacting, both of them are actively taking part in the communication or negotiation, each of them can freely play both roles; a speaker and listener, a diplomat and counter-diplomat (i.e. a partner and a counterpart).

This unique and distinctive feature can, perhaps, differentiate UID from the existing models of discourse such as that of class-room discourse (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975) where a teacher is usually the one who controls a lesson, transactions, exchanges, moves and acts, or a therapeutic discourse in which a therapist normally controls the setting of the interview (Labov and Fanshel, 1977). Furthermore, UID is to be regarded as different from political television interviews which would discuss international issues and can be seen for example in Nightline and This Week on the American ABC's network, or This Week Next Week and Newsnight on British television's BBC1 and BBC2 respectively. In these, as well as in similar programmes, the discussion is normally controlled by one side. The interviewer (or the presenter) is the one who holds the right to control the discussion, to move (i.e. to ask questions) or
to initiate the exchange in a sequence of question/answer, whereas the counterpart(s), the interviewee(s), taking into account the various sorts of pressure on him (or them) can only usually answer the questions that are delivered to him in an unnaturally/unfreely controlled situation or setting in comparison with the diplomatic communication or negotiation situation.

Having established and confined UID to the active, vivid and shared roles played by international diplomats in the setting of communication or negotiation, then it is perhaps possible to define UID as the scenic unit which comprises a chain of exchanges being freely generated in an uncontrolled setting of mutually shared communication, by international diplomats, who have distinct socio-cultural backgrounds.

3.4.2 Determining the unit of analysis

Whenever research involves a large, diverse set of empirical data, the problem develops as to how such a set of data is to be tackled in order to find its salient points. Vygotsky (1962) advised that the most critical aspect of data analysis is to provide an appropriate unit of analysis.

Scholars in various research have treated such an issue in different ways. The determination of a unit of analysis differs from research to research. This determination may well be due to the fact that each research project has a unique method of analysis as well as a distinct problem to be addressed. What could be an appropriate and adequate measurement for analysing a certain problem may be inadequate for another. What determines the appropriate unit of analysis for a specific research is the kind of data to be
analysed, the method of analysis to be applied, and the problem to be addressed (Al Mulla, 1986).

For ethnography of communication, the communicative event is central, whereas for ethnography of speaking, speech event and speech act are central (Hymes, 1974). Shuy (1982) has treated topic as a crucial and appropriate unit of analysis to address the problem in a criminal law case, whereas Saks, Shegloff and Jefferson (1974) have considered utterance as the basic unit for their analysis in the study of the organization of turn taking in conversation. And, as crucial to their analysis, Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) have relied on exchange and move to tackle the model of classroom discourse.

The present work will follow the practice of Al Mulla (1986) in treating the scenic unit as the crucial and essential unit of analysis for international diplomatic communication. The indication of this is that in order to account for, explain and interpret the reason for misunderstanding or misinterpretation in international diplomatic activities, anything within the scenic unit, the unit of analysis, will be regarded as an integral part, crucial and subject to analysis.

3.4.3 Analytical composition of UID

The scenic unit, or UID, will be considered as comprising two types of compositions: overt and covert. The 'overt' composition is associated with the external configuration of the scenic unit, whereas the 'covert' composition is related to the internal pattern of the UID.
(1) The overt composition of UID will have the following structure:

Scenic unit &rarr; + Exchange +/- Exchange(s)
Exchange &rarr; + Move + (+/- Counter Move)
Counter Move &rarr; (+/- Response (+/- Act))

The interpretation of this format is that the scenic unit, the unit of analysis, is composed of a chain of exchanges. The number of exchanges available in any scenic unit of diplomatic communication or negotiation is dependent on the actual data at hand. The least number of exchanges required in any scenic unit, as indicated in the overt composition of the formula above, is one exchange. The sign + is to be interpreted that the exchange is compulsory for the scenic unit, whereas the sign +/- is to be interpreted as that the exchange is optional, that is to account for scenic units that have more than one exchange. Generally, a scenic unit can have as many exchanges as the communication activity requires, or as many as the two parties need to eventually reach an end of their communication or negotiation activity. In other words, the least number of exchanges for any diplomatic communication is one exchange as we shall see in our data (i.e. scene K), however, the total number of exchanges in diplomatic communication or negotiation is unspecific or infinite. The infinity of the number of exchanges is indicated in the formula above as ('+/- exchange(s)') where the sign '+/-' is meant to be an optional exchange and sign '(s)' is meant to indicate a boundless number of exchanges.
An exchange (in the next line of the formula) comprises two things; a Move and a Counter Move. A 'Move' (from a diplomat who initiates an exchange) is to be regarded as mandatory for an exchange; for if there is no 'Move' there is, in turn, no exchange, and thus it is preceded by the sign '+'. However, the Move can be initiated from any diplomat in UID.

A 'Counter move' (from a counter-diplomat, a counterpart who receives a diplomat's message) is to be considered 'optional', and therefore is preceded by the sign '+/−'. In other words, there are cases, in diplomatic communication or negotiation, as we shall see, in which an exchange has a move but for which there is no linguistic counter move. However, there can be a non-linguistic counter move in response to a diplomat's move such as carrying out the act requested, or simply, nodding, smiling, gazing at, or other habits of body gesture. In general, a counter move, when it is present in an exchange of UID (line three in the formula above), can be either a verbal response (i.e. literal or linguistic response to a diplomat's message) or an act (i.e. co-operation with a diplomat's intended message) or both, a linguistic response as well as an act. These issues will become clear during the analysis of the empirical data in the following chapters.

(2) Covert composition of UID

The internal composition of the UID will contain four components which have relevant consideration in dealing with the covert, sequential structure of UID. These components are meant to highlight points of the interference between socio-cultural background of the two parties involved in the diplomatic
communication and their use of linguistic knowledge, the knowledge of grammar and lexicon. Such components are as follows:

1. Initial point
2. Central point
3. Result
4. Effect

1. The initial point can be regarded as a point where an implicit socio-cultural factor just begins to creep into the communication situation and interfere with an element or feature of the overt content of language such as a vowel, a morpheme, a word, or phrase and causes a feeling that something unusual may happen. The socio-cultural factor may be triggered by something related to the culture of either of the two parties involved in the diplomatic communication such as the situation or the setting of the activities, the topic of discussion or something associated with it, the way in which either party negotiates, behaves or acts such as attitudes, body gestures or the like. In this case, something barely noticeable may occur, and if it occurs then it will gradually increase by the use of certain linguistic, or non-linguistic devices until it becomes clearly noticeable and hence may lead to the second point (i.e. the central point).

2. The central point is the point where one may feel explicitly that something wrong is taking place, and inevitably it begins to touch upon and affect the activity of the communication or negotiation. I have termed such a matter (Al Mulla, 1986) 'Misculturality' in some situations where misunderstanding or miscommunication might occur because of a direct cultural clash or
interference of socio-cultural backgrounds of the two parties involved in the communication or negotiation, and 'Misintentionality' in other situations where misinterpretation or misjudgement of diplomats' messages or intentions, rather than misunderstanding, would happen. However, it should be clear that both Miscultrality and Misintentionality would be the result of the diversity of socio-cultural backgrounds of the two parties involved in the communication.

3 Result is a product of the central point. That is when the central point reaches its climax it will, in most cases, inevitably lead to 'result'. At this point, one explicitly sees the 'product' of misunderstanding or misinterpretation; that is, the breakdown of the diplomatic communication or negotiation activity.

4 Effect is a product of the preceding point, result. If the product of 'result' is somewhat heavy or severe on one party (or both in some cases, as we shall see in the diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit) then 'effect' will take a very clear place in the activity, otherwise effect can hardly be seen in UID. Effect may be seen as damage to a friendship, or a relationship of the two parties of diplomatic communication after a severe result took place. A clear example of this point may be seen in scene K. In this scene, as we shall see, the influence of the situation on the relationship of the two career diplomats affected the relationship of their wives.

Nevertheless, the four components of the covert composition of UID (i.e. initial point, central point, result and effect) while they are not absolute in every single scene, they are, at least, so in some scenes of diplomatic communication or negotiation.
Furthermore, in some cases the demarcation lines between the initial point and central point is not all that clear, at least for some readers; that is the two points can arguably be one point. Moreover, the availability of any point of the four will absolutely depend on the preceding one; that is, 'result' will follow the 'central point', for example, but a preceding point does not automatically produce the following one; it may do so but not in all cases. That is, the availability of 'result' does not ensure the production of 'effect'. The implication of this is that the availability of some or all of the components of the covert composition of UID depends almost entirely on the intensity of the preceding points as well as on the situation of diplomatic communication or negotiation.

The components of the overt composition as well as the components of the covert composition of UID will only be applied to the scenes of the 'primary classes' of the empirical data whenever and wherever this application is possible. This depends on the specificity of knowledge of the 'diplomat-researcher' about the scenes as we mentioned earlier.

In the following three chapters of analysis the two kinds of composition of UID will be considered as a special apparatus to highlight points of the interference between socio-cultural dimensions of language and the knowledge of grammar and lexicon, the linguistic knowledge (the most relevant points of the empirical data) to the points made in the analysis will be underlined throughout this work). Also, such an apparatus will be used to illuminate the probable correlation between misunderstanding or misinterpretation and the socio-cultural backgrounds of the two parties involved in the diplomatic activities.
CHAPTER 4
THE NATURE OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT
DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 Stage one of the empirical data

This chapter will investigate diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit. As mentioned in section two of Chapter 3, stage one of the empirical data contains one category (i.e. category A) which includes two classes; primary and secondary. The primary class of data comprises two scenes (a and b). The first (scene a) is what I propose to term 'the Preparatory-Essential Context' which took place long before the actual communication of the Reykjavik Summit, and the second (scene b) is associated with the actual communication between the leaders of the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR). The secondary class of data contains tape-recorded evaluations of the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation provided by career diplomats from different parts of the world.

The aim of this chapter is to present a specimen of diplomatic communication which exists in the current practice of negotiation; what kind of results it produced and why such results happen. This means that the only aim of attempting to investigate the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation is to know how far language, culture, and communication relate together (see Valdes, 1986: 1) and how much this relationship affects the processes of negotiation, and what kind of outcome produces, 'how' and 'why'. Therefore, the reason and the goal are purely scientific and no other reason whatsoever is involved.
Communication or negotiation, as already discussed in section four of Chapter 1, has an essential element which is the 'Intention' of achieving certain purposes. Therefore both parties to the negotiation presumably approached Reykjavik with something in their minds (i.e. certain mental or intentional states). It is the belief of the present researcher who has every reason to believe this, as we shall see shortly in this chapter, that the two respected leaders went, in the first place, to Iceland in order to reach a certain agreement that is if not an elimination of nuclear weapons, then it could, at least, be a reduction in the arms race between the two superpowers. Such an agreement was expected by both leaders themselves. This actually was a fact rather than an assumption of the meeting at Reykjavik. It was, and has been, understood among career diplomats that no two leaders, especially of superpowers, meet, when they do so, to negotiate issues in detail. Unless something unusual would happen as in the case of the Reykjavik Summit (when new proposals were introduced), they meet to agree on something, whatever that thing might be, even if they agree on the basic framework for starting a new round of negotiation in Geneva. However, what happened at the Iceland’s Summit, between the two superpowers, was something totally unexpected.

It is perfectly understood that, in addition to the different ideologies, the two parties of negotiation (the Americans and the Russians) had a diversity of national interests, values as well as different political stances according to their visions of the world at large and the roles they were supposed to play. These matters, in themselves, could do a great deal in complicating the negotiation processes, decreasing the chances of reaching a certain outcome, or
hindering the progress of the activities. However, these differences did not stem from a vacuum or had no roots. Indeed, they did have roots in the two parties' legacy, tradition and culture. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this work, different cultures mean different ways of thinking, different approaches of looking at things and different behavioural patterns in dealing with certain issues. In negotiation, these matters could intensify or prevent or deteriorate an agreement. If one party to the negotiation was not aware of the role and function of these differences then the probable miscommunication or, even, breakdown of the negotiation could be the result not because one or both parties want such a result but because most often it imposes itself on them or on their activities against their wishes.

Diplomatic communication or negotiation is full of indirect speech acts (e.g. request, demand, apology, promise, advice, etc.), which go side-by-side with the intentional states of the negotiators who perform the propositional contents of the messages which they communicate to their counterparts. These intentional states (e.g. desires, wishes, intentions) control and monitor the indirect speech acts (the illocutionary force of the message). In such a context, if the counterpart did not recognize the indirect speech act of the partner and did not act in accordance with that act (the request, demand or the promise) then the intentional states of the partner would be unsatisfied and here the activity of communication or negotiation would be subject to risk since the conditions of satisfaction (or the sincerity conditions) have not been met or satisfied (see Searle, 1983: 10). Therefore, if the two parties of the negotiation were unaware of, or ignored, the indirect speech
acts of each other then a failure of producing appropriate results would be likely to follow.

4.2 The preparatory-essential context

Diplomatic communication or negotiation, in general, does not emerge from a vacuum. There are almost always crucial elements which precede any actual negotiation event. These elements, which I have already termed 'the Preparatory-Essential Context' or 'the Pre-Essential Context' of negotiation or communication, can be linguistic as well as extra-linguistic (or non-linguistic). The linguistic elements may take different configurations such as floating well-intended messages or allowing personal opinions to reach the other party or, even, making certain recommendations and so on. The extra-linguistic elements can be of various features such as taking actions or reacting towards national or international events related to the forthcoming negotiation, certain attitudes as well as gestures which have, explicitly or implicitly, a correlation with the approaching negotiation or other matters. In fact, the pre-essential context of negotiation can, sometimes, be useful, if it is directed in a positive and constructive method such as, 'to test the water for the temperature of the other side's position without necessarily making any commitments' (Zartman and Berman, 1982: 223),

or if the side, who exploits it, is well aware of the potential political or diplomatic consequences which will presumably follow. Otherwise, it can be very risky and problematic. The reason for this is that such a kind of context can have a significant influence on the outcome of the actual negotiation. Any action taken, or
comments given before the actual meeting will inevitably cast light or shadow on the actual negotiation and will certainly affect the final outcome positively or negatively.

4.2.1 Scene a: the pre-essential context

As far as the 'Preparatory-Essential Context' of the diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit (scene a, see Appendix 3) is concerned, the diplomatic as well as political atmospheres before the Summit (in Iceland on 11-12 October 1986) were not in favour of successful negotiation. This means that the pre-essential context of the communication was misconducted and mismanaged.

On the part of the Americans (partner one) only a few days before the event, the US administration described many members of the Soviet Union's Mission at the United Nations as KGB intelligence officers (i.e. the Secret Police of the USSR). The Americans' report said:

'the KGB has succeeded in infiltrating its officers into the UN bureaucracy, with some reaching positions of authority ... (The Times, 9 October 1986, p. 7).

The conveyed message of the report was suggesting that the members of the Soviet's Mission at the United Nations were not really diplomats as they were supposed to be, rather they were KGB officers engaged in spying activities against the US government. The accuracy of this report is not important to this work; what is actually important is the kind of language used at such a critical time in the message which was floated to the Soviet Union (partner two) a few days before the Reykjavik Summit. This message had, at least, two sides of meaning; literal (being represented by the
propositional content of the report which denoted that KGB officers had succeeded in reaching positions of authority at the United Nations), and intended (being suggested by the illocutionary acts of the message of the report which connotes that the Soviet members of the United Nations were not diplomats as they were supposed to be but rather, they were spies; that is, 'accusation' against the Soviet government). That indicated that the Americans accused the Soviet government of causing great damage to the US government by sending spies to the Mission at the United Nations instead of diplomats. As a consequence they ordered 25 Soviet diplomats to leave the country.

On the part of the Soviet Union (partner two) there appeared that there was no immediate counter move to the partner one move; that is, the partner one's move provoked no obvious counter move from partner two. This did not imply that partner two accepted partner one's move, the 'accusation', but seemingly they preferred not to react immediately and reserved their reaction until, or after, the event of the Reykjavik's negotiation as we shall see later in this chapter.

Another incident of floating messages prior to the Reykjavik Summit could be regarded in the following exchange of messages (see Appendix 3):

(3) Amer 'Human rights were 'right up at the top of our agenda'.

(4) Sovi ... (Act, the Soviet officials confirmed that the dissident Poetess (Irina) was unconditionally released)
Amer 'We are always pleased to receive word that someone who applied has been given permission to leave. But this is only a symbol of a very broad and deep concern' (The Times, 11 October 1986, p. 5)

Sovi 'We are prepared to look for solutions to the burning problems which concern peoples all over the world, and among them, with first priority, to take the decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war and which would allow us to tackle thoroughly the problem of disarmament' (The Times, 11 October 1986).

The Americans' move (line 3) appeared to state their position in an explicit message that 'human rights' would be their first priority in the negotiation at Reykjavik. They repeatedly regarded human rights as extremely crucial for the negotiation with the Soviets. In the Americans' account, the rapport of human rights would build trust and accountability between both sides which they always considered as the key element for successful negotiation. However, the Americans' move (the message above) did have another implicit speech act (an indirect illocutionary force); that is, a 'demand' or an 'order'. And if such an illocutionary force was taken by the other side (the Soviet) as the 'intended message' from partner one to them, then this interpretation would hardly be acceptable to partner two and therefore, it might provoke an unpredictable reaction.

In the case of diplomatic negotiation, such as the one at hand, the two parties to the negotiation belonged to two independent states. This means that both states had a sovereignty and therefore they were equal partners (in the sense of having diplomatic parity) in the negotiation process. This, further, means that partner one's 'demand' or 'order' would not be accepted by partner two because it
would indicate that partner one had more power and by virtue of this power could impose instructions (or provisions) upon partner two. And if such a practice would usually be rejected by other independent states, then it would be unlikely to be accepted by any of the two superpowers, given the history of sensitivity between them.

Furthermore, the Americans' message above could in the 'deep indirect speech act' have a third intended meaning (i.e. illocutionary force); that is, an accusation which could be interpreted as,

'We Americans had numerous evidence, whether from inside the USSR or from Afghanistan, which allowed us to accuse you (Russians) of neglecting human rights and repressing the dissidents, and therefore, we demanded that you refrain from such practice prior to our negotiation of more complicated matters which required much more trust and accountability'.

Moreover, the phrase 'of OUR agenda' in the Americans' message above (line 3) appeared to imply that the Americans' agenda (because of the use of OUR, the possessive determiner or adjective, Halliday and Hassan, 1976: 43) was different from that of the Soviets. If this were the case then it would be highly unlikely to be suitable or acceptable for a summit between two leaders of the two superpowers. The usual practice in any summit, whether between superpowers or otherwise, is that the meeting must rely on a well-prepared and agreed agenda between both sides prior to the meeting. Otherwise the meeting might not be carried out properly, and because of an inevitable digression and ramification of the discussion, the results could be fruitless.
The Soviet's countermove was non-linguistic. At the time, they said no word. However, they did perform an 'Act'; that is they released some dissidents including the Poetess, Irina. Such an act was a very powerful 'message' to partner one's move (lines 3 and 4) yet it was a very implicit or indirect message. It suggested that the Russians had understood and recognized the Americans' move about the 'demand' of negotiating human rights in the first place at the Reykjavik Summit. Therefore, the release of the dissident poetess in itself had a number of implications which were forwarded indirectly to the Americans. Firstly, as we shall see shortly, the Russians rejected the Americans' 'demand' of giving human rights the first priority in negotiation because, as the Russians implied by their 'act' they were observing human rights exactly like the Americans and thus they did not want to receive lessons from others. Therefore, they denied the Americans' demand of considering human rights 'at the top of the agenda' of the negotiation at the Reykjavik Summit. On the other hand, since the Soviet Union was the negotiator who initiated the Reykjavik meeting (according to a Soviet career diplomat - interview) their delegate brought to Reykjavik a package of suggestions which comprised three essential elements all of which dealt with the elimination of nuclear arms and none of them dealt with human rights and therefore the main theme of the summit, in partner two's viewpoint, was nuclear disarmament. Secondly, the Soviets, by performing such an act, were rejecting the Americans' accusation of having denied or neglected human rights. Thirdly, partner two sent a clear 'message' to partner one suggesting that partner one forget or, at least, set aside the so-called human rights. These implications were indirectly and
implicitly conveyed by the Soviets to the Americans along with certain intentions and desires that the Americans recognize the intended message.

It appeared that the Americans, although they were pleased by the release of some dissidents, did not actually acknowledge the Soviets' act - the observation of human rights. In fact they regarded what the Soviets had done as 'only a symbol of a very broad and deep concern (move 5). That is, partner one was looking not only for improvements in the human rights of individual cases but also in the whole area of the repression of dissidents. Moreover, the use of the conjunctive morpheme But (in the Americans' message), could convey the Americans' disapproval of the Soviets' act in the humanitarian area because But, according to Halliday and Hassan (1976: 237, 250), is a conjunctive element which contains within itself the logical meaning of 'and', and expresses an 'adversative relation' which is 'contrary to expectation'. Therefore the Americans' pleasure expressed earlier in the message (after the Soviets' release of some dissidents) was contrasted by their dissatisfaction of the same act. In other words, the Americans' use of But indicated that they no longer held their pleasure; on the contrary, they disapproved of the act.

As repeatedly mentioned, if the message of the counterpart did not meet the conditions of satisfaction or success in communication, that is, if did not satisfy the partner's intentional states a (e.g. desire, belief and intention), then the activity in progress could be affected by such circumstances. This might justify the following countermove from the Soviets (line 6):
'We are prepared to look for solutions to the burning problems which concern peoples all over the world and among them, with first priority, to take the decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war and which would allow us to tackle thoroughly the problem of disarmament.'

It appeared that each word and each phrase of the Soviet's leader in the message above were intentionally calculated to serve specific purposes; to 'hit back' indirectly at the earlier Americans' messages. The overt content of this message represented the linguistic meaning (i.e. the literal meaning according to the linguistic semantics) whereas the covert content of the message suggested its illocutionary force, the intended meaning and therefore the message was a chain of 'demands' (if not warnings) of what the Soviets wanted to achieve from the Summit; and if the Americans did not realize or recognize such demands and, in turn, satisfy them, then the Summit could be at risk. Therefore, as the Soviets put it before the Americans, the Reykjavik Summit, as being initiated by them, would

'look for solutions to the burning problems which concern peoples all over the world'

rather than (by implication) human rights, as being demanded by the Americans, which concerned only

'part of the people of the world'

In addition, the 'first priority' of such a summit would be

'to take the decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war ...'
rather than discussing human rights which would not, by comparison, mount to cause nuclear war (as if we were saying 'If your house is burning save it first, then you will have enough time to blame the household for the causes). The Soviets, according to the message above, considered the Reykjavik Summit to be a Summit of 'the decisions' and not as 'a base-camp' as being considered by partner one. Likewise, this message involved an indirect speech act. In addition to the propositional content (the literal meaning), the message contained intended meaning according to the socio-cultural dimensions of language (i.e. pragmatics and speech acts in nature); that is, a criticism (or even accusation) that the Americans downgraded the meeting, or did not regard the opportunity seriously. Such a reaction from the Soviets provided clues about their dissatisfaction or dismay which suggested that the Americans' message (line 7, scene a, Appendix 3) had not met the Soviets' expectations or wishes with regard to the nature of the Summit. This was the reason that led partner two to describe partner one's earlier remarks as providing 'not a little foundation' to start a meeting (line 8, scene a, Appendix 3).

In fact, this kind of communication continued between the Americans and Russians prior to the actual negotiation event in Iceland. Partner one initiated a new yet far-reaching move as follows:

'The US had 'nothing in its pocket' to put before the Russians ... 'The only thing I have in my pocket is my hotel key' (line 9, scene a, Appendix 3).
This message had taken place in the most critical moment of the event. It had been revealed shortly before the two delegations agreed to conceal the details of the negotiation. Obviously, the overt content of the message (the literal meaning according to the linguistic semantics) was not the one which was intended. Certainly, the Americans did not approach the Reykjavik Summit empty-handed, so to speak, with the ultimate purpose of staying in one of the most famous 'hotels' in Reykjavik. Had this claim been incorrect then the message above would have contradicted the earlier messages which were revealed by the Americans, especially the message of human rights which was 'at the top of the Americans' agenda' (line 3, scene a).

However, even if we considered the indirect speech act of the message, its indirect illocutionary force, as that the Americans actually came to the Reykjavik Summit with no 'specific' proposals to put before the Russians, or no 'offer' to provide, or no 'compromise' to reach (or to accept) especially in the area of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI, the so-called Star Wars), the covert content of the message would still be that the Americans must have had 'something' in 'their pockets' in addition to their hotel keys, such as certain agenda, proposals or, at least, certain suggestions. Otherwise, there would be no point in attending the Summit on the one hand, and on the other hand, the message floated would contradict, as we mentioned, the Americans' previously revealed messages.

The key words in the above message that caused such an ambiguity was the use of the noun-substitute, '_nothing_' which is composed of the two morphemes: _No_ and _Thing_ and would mean 'not any
thing' (Palmer, 1959: 199). The sentence (the message), with its two contents (the overt and covert) could be regarded linguistically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>overt content</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>verb</th>
<th>object</th>
<th>prepositional phrase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'The US had nothing in its pocket'</td>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td><strong>verb</strong></td>
<td><strong>object</strong></td>
<td><strong>prepositional phrase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>covert content</td>
<td>Benefactive</td>
<td>verb</td>
<td>object</td>
<td>locative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Americans possessed not any thing with them</td>
<td><strong>Benefactive</strong></td>
<td><strong>verb</strong></td>
<td><strong>object</strong></td>
<td><strong>locative</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, the 'message' (the sentence) could be read as that, 'the US possessed not anything in its pocket'. This would exclude every possibility that we suggested earlier in accordance with the Americans' explicit position with regard to human rights, among other things on their agenda. The message then, because of its ambiguous nature, could be interpreted by partner two as that the Americans would attend the negotiation at Reykjavik with an intention of not becoming a 'full active partner' who would participate in every aspect of the negotiation in order to reach a sort of agreement or compromise, but rather they would attend the Summit to receive proposals from partner two and discover new directions which could give impulse to negotiators for new round in Geneva. In addition, the phrases underlined above, which were revealed by a member of the American delegation, might intensify speculations about the real intention of partner one in attending the Summit (The Times, 11 October 1986, p. 5).
The situation, then, was ambiguous. On the one hand, partner one attended the Reykjavik Summit with the determination to negotiate human rights, and on the other hand, they (the Americans) approached Reykjavik with 'nothing', in their pockets, hands or minds, related to or associated with the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation. This indicated that they attended the Summit to 'receive something' but 'offer nothing'.

This was the political and diplomatic atmosphere before the actual event of the Reykjavik negotiation. The 'Preparatory-Essential Context', as we noticed, was full of indirect speech acts. The messages as well as the actions taken were performed to serve specific intentional purposes and desires which were intended and directed by each party. Given that the two parties belonged to different cultures, political stances and ideologies, the mutual understanding between them would be dependent upon the recognition of the covert content of the messages performed (the indirect speech acts) and, in turn, the fulfilment of the intended acts. Any misunderstanding of the messages, and misconduct or mismanagement of the intended acts would certainly result in dissatisfaction, which would significantly influence the next stage of the negotiation.

4.2.2 Scene b: the actual diplomatic negotiation

When the actual diplomatic negotiation started in Iceland (on Saturday, 11 October 1986), the two leaders (President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev) met on their own for slightly more than an hour. In this first session, President Reagan disclosed his views on linking the Strategic Defence Initiative (the SDI, the so-called Star Wars) with a phased elimination of ballistic missiles. On the other hand, Mr
Gorbachev, instead of complaining against the SDI, startled President Reagan by reverting to a proposal to cut strategic nuclear weapons by 50 per cent during the next five years, and eliminate them altogether over 10 years.

On Sunday 12 October, the two parties; the Americans (partner one) and the Soviets (partner two) extended their meeting. The dominant theme of this section revolved around the ABM treaty (Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty). The discussion concentrated on one phrase of this treaty, 'Laboratory-testing'. Partner two's interpretation of this phrase was that the treaty would not permit any experiment of space weapons outside the Laboratory, the so-called narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty. Contrariwise, partner one opted for the 'wide' interpretation which claimed that full-scale development and testing of space weapons would be legally permissible. After about four hours of sharp confrontation, the two delegations failed to reach a solution and therefore they surrendered. Partner one admitted that they were tired and had no ability and desire to continue 'fighting about one word - laboratory-testing'. As a result, President Reagan told the Soviet leader (see scene b, Appendix 3):

(1) Amer: 'I am disappointed that from the very beginning you had come to Reykjavik with no willingness to reach agreement.'

Partner one's move (above) reflected the outcome of the actual diplomatic negotiation between the superpowers and indicated several crucial steps which eventuated such an outcome. The American leader was 'disappointed' because the Soviet leader 'from the beginning had no willingness to reach agreement'. Recalling the covert
composition of UID, discussed in Chapter 3 (i.e. 3.3.3) and its four components: initial point, central point, result and effect, it would be useful to trace them in order to understand the reasons behind such an outcome (that is, how and why this outcome happened). The initial point (the point of initial interference between the two socio-cultural backgrounds of the partners) could be seen in the first session of the negotiation between the two leaders. In this session partner one formulated his views on the link of SDI with a phased elimination of ballistic missiles; however, partner two, instead of complaining (as is the usual practice against the SDI), startled partner one by reverting to a proposal to cut strategic nuclear weapons by 50 per cent during the next five years, and eliminate them altogether over ten years. In such a practice, it was widely believed that there were two different patterns of negotiation involved each of which reflected the cultural behaviour of the negotiator. Partner one, since he belonged to the American culture, used the 'formula-pattern' or the deductive approach to negotiation. That is, the Americans, as is the usual practice at the beginning of negotiation, attempted to formulate their views and left the details to follow as the negotiation progressed. They provided their agreement, in principle, on what they believed to be the essential issues and left the details to come later according to the progress of the negotiation. Partner two, on the other hand, since he was a member of the Russian culture, employed 'the detail-pattern', or the 'inductive approach' to negotiation. That is, the Russians as is their usual practice, preferred, from the beginning, to work on a detailed level, starting high and progressing until reaching concessions (see Zartman and Berman, 1982: 224-229).
With this information at hand, partner one after having formulated his views about the essential issues of the meeting, expected his counterpart to do the same in order to find a mutual ground on which the negotiation would proceed. However, partner two did not satisfy partner one's expectation since, in his own way, he went on to introduce his first proposal. Such a situation provided the opportunity for the initial point, the point of the initial interference between the two cultures in the negotiation, to take place.

Partner two, since he was the initiator of the Summit, brought to Reykjavik a package of suggestions comprising three essential elements, all of which related to partner two's consent to bring about the elimination of all nuclear weapons, conventional armaments, and a compromise-deal of the armaments of outer space. According to the Russians' negotiation pattern, mentioned earlier, partner two, certainly, would proceed to introduce and discuss the three elements of the package. This practice actually surprised partner one and therefore he spoke of 'unexpected proposals'. In order to negotiate the unexpected proposals (from partner one's view, of course), the two parties needed more time, and therefore, they extended the meeting on Sunday 12 October for more than four hours (see scene b, Appendix 3). The major theme negotiated in the extended time (session) was the third essential element of the Russians' package, namely the compromise-deal on the armaments of outer space (i.e. the SDI). At this stage, several crucial points emerged as the negotiation of the SDI continued.
Firstly, it appeared that partner one misinterpreted partner two's intention with regard to the Strategic Defence Initiative. That is, since partner two didn't complain about SDI in the first session of the negotiation, partner one must have thought that partner two had been less strident about the SDI and thereby the issue could be unrevealed at least until the next full-scale Summit in the United States (as previously agreed by the two leaders). However, after it appeared that partner two persisted in negotiating the SDI (since this element was one part of the Russian package), partner one appeared to have felt that he had miscalculated partner two's resistance to SDI and therefore, the 'central point', the point of misunderstanding or misinterpretation, occurred.

Secondly, the disagreement between the two parties on the interpretation of the phrase 'Laboratory-testing (whether or not the SDI's test and development be permitted outside the laboratory) impeded the progress of the negotiation. This, in turn, resulted in partner one's 'disappointment' which was very explicit from his message (in line 1, scene b, Appendix 3). This indicated that 'Result' (the third component of the covert composition of UID) took place; that is, the collapse of the negotiation happened.

Thirdly, in addition to the cultural behaviour of negotiation, another crucial factor might be involved, which led partner two to propose, in the first session of the negotiation, his first proposal (i.e. elimination of all nuclear arms) instead of formulating his views as did partner one. That factor was the 'Effect' of the preparatory-essential context, (discussed in the first section of this chapter), on partner two. The indication of this is that, unlike partner one who regarded the meeting as 'a base-camp',
partner two considered it as a 'decision-taking Summit'. This consideration, in addition to the diversity of the two leaders' views on the priority of the Summit's major theme (i.e. human rights vs. nuclear arms elimination), led partner two to the high start by introducing the first proposal, referred to earlier, as an indication of the seriousness, as well as a signal for what partner two considered to be the main theme of the Summit. If this were a valid interpretation then partner two, by what he performed, must have been 'disappointed' by the outcome of the Preparatory-Essential Context.

This kind of outcome led the two partners to mutual accusations. Each partner thought that the counterpart was responsible for the unfavourable outcome. It was clear from the message above (line 1, scene b) that partner one explicitly accused partner two of having 'no willingness to reach an agreement'. The covert content of this message, according to the socio-cultural dimension of language, suggested that partner one accused partner two of being responsible for the undesired outcome which was reached; that is, the failure of reaching an agreement.

The counter accusation emerged from the counter move of partner two which was:

(2) Sovi 'They wanted me to assent to a burial ceremony for ABM treaty.'

Such a message suggested two different meanings; overt and covert or literal and intended. The overt meaning of the message was denoted by its linguistic semantics which read, 'partner one attempted to obtain partner two's approval to bury the ABM treaty', whereas the
covert meaning, which was connoted by the message's illocutionary force, conveyed a counter accusation to partner one. That is, partner one, on his persistence in developing and testing the SDI in outer space, not only prevented the Summit from reaching a favourable result, but also killed the ABM treaty itself.

The accusation and the counter accusation proved that the Summit's outcome dismayed and disappointed both partners, and indicated that this outcome did not meet with their satisfaction. This demonstrated that both leaders attended the Summit with the intention of reaching an agreement. As a result, unlike partner two, whose intention was clear from the very beginning, partner one, although they concealed their real intention (as we saw from the discussion earlier), attended the Summit for the same goal as that of partner two; that is to reach agreement (whatever that agreement might be).

However, the concealment of partner one's real intention under various configurations, as we mentioned in the previous section of this chapter (i.e. scene a) contributed heavily to the Summit's final outcome. Consider the following exchange:

(3) Amer 'In the end we are deeply disappointed with the outcome'

(4) Sovi 'This has been a failure, and failure where we were very close to an historic agreement. All of the arms race might begin with unpredictable military and political consequences'

In the exchange above, the two partners openly and explicitly confirmed the sad and the 'unexpected' outcome they reached and, therefore, they expressed the deep sorrow and regret over the final
'result', the collapse or the breakdown of the diplomatic communication. The obvious indication of such a feeling is that neither of the two partners expected such a result. They approached Reykjavik to fulfil one supreme principle; that was to find a 'solution to the burning problems which concern people all over the world, and to take decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war'.

However, the efforts fell short of the high expectations. And, as a consequence, the intended acts went unfulfilled, and the intentions and desires passed unsatisifed and therefore certain significant implications would follow, that was 'Effect', the product of 'Result' - the fourth component of the covert composition of UID.

The sort of 'Result' of the Reykjavik's diplomatic negotiation was, as we noticed, severe and heavy on both sides of the negotiation activity and therefore 'Effect' would certainly take place in such a kind of communication. Unlike 'Effect' of all other diplomatic communications or negotiations, 'Effect' of the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation, since it was a product of the collapse of the two superpowers' negotiation, had significant influence which took several ramifications each of which had far-reaching implications.

The first influence of the breakdown of the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation was clear form partner two's message above, 'All of the arms race might begin with unpredictable military and political consequences'. The overt content of this message expressed a possibility; that is, because of the use of the 'modal auxiliary verb 'might' (= it is possible ...), the literal meaning of the message (according to linguistic semantics) would be it is possible
that arms race begin...'. However, taking into account all the circumstances in which such a message was expressed, the message could convey another meaning, the intended meaning according to the speaker's intention which associated with his socio-politico-cultural background. In this circumstance, partner two performed an illocutionary force (an indirect speech act) that is, 'warning'. Thus, partner two, because of the failure of the Summit's negotiation, 'warned' partner one that 'All of the arms race would be permitted now to begin...'. The modal auxiliary verb 'may/might' according to this interpretation, could have another meaning which was permission (see Leech, 1971: 67).

The second influence of the collapse of the Reykjavik negotiation was that the failure of reaching an agreement between the two leaders broadened and deepened their mutual suspicion, distrust and dishonesty. Such an influence was obvious from the following messages from the two partners (messages 5 and 6, scene b, Appendix 3).

(5) Amer 'Late this afternoon I made a new proposal to the General Secretary, a ten-year delay in deployment of SDI in exchange for the elimination of all ballistic missiles. The General Secretary agreed, only if I would sign an agreement that would deny to me and future Presidents, for ten years, the right to test and develop the best defence against nuclear missiles. This we could not and will not do' (The Daily Telegraph, 13 October 1986).

(6) Sovi 'How can we proceed with our talk of abolishing nuclear weapons if the US continues by testing to try and perfect them? How can there be a threat to the United States, if we are keeping our promise to scrap our nuclear weapons?' 'This means that their SDI is of an offensive military character, aimed at achieving nuclear superiority' (The Guardian, 15 October 1986).
The problem of mistrust, as we mentioned earlier, revolved around the ABM treaty's phrase 'laboratory-testing' with its two different interpretations. Partner two's interpretation was that the SDI's testing would only be permitted inside the laboratory according to the American officials who drafted and negotiated the treaty (The Guardian, 14 October 1986, p. 6), whereas partner one's interpretation was that the SDI's testing and development would be legally permissible in 'outer space' (outside the laboratory). Given these two positions with regard to the ABM treaty, partner two preferred to sign an agreement for 'a binding undertaking' to maintain the 1972 ABM treaty for ten years. This request was 'rejected' by partner one. In this very position, partner two performed two indirect speech acts; a request and a promise. This indicated that partner two (the Russians), when he performed such acts, had a desire as well as an intention; a desire for recognizing his request and then implementing its intended act (i.e. to sign an agreement), and an intention to keep his word (i.e. the promise). If these two acts passed unfulfilled then partner two would be psychologically unsatisfied. However, in order for these two acts to be fulfilled they must be performed in a normal situation and usual circumstance, on the one hand, and the other hand the counterpart, for whom the request and the promise were performed, must, in addition to being heard and understood, take them seriously (Austin, 1962). In the case at hand it appeared that partner one (the Americans) had no trust in partner two. This was implied from partner one's description of the SDI as '... the best defence against nuclear missiles' (e.g. the Russians ballistic missiles, line 5, scene b). Therefore partner two's request and promise
passed unacknowledged by his counterpart, and, as a consequence, unfulfilled. This action would certainly dismay partner two and, as a result, would invite (or attract) his reaction (line 6, scene b):

'... How can there be a threat to the United States, if we are keeping our promise to scrap our nuclear weapons. This means that their SDI is of an offensive military character, aimed at achieving nuclear superiority'.

This response reflected the psychological state of partner two as his intended acts passed unrecognized and unfulfilled. The promise he intended to keep (following the saying 'our word is our bond'), was not recognized by partner one as being so, and therefore his intentional state passed unsatisfied (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1983). This is why he developed suspicions of partner one's SDI.

The third influence resulting from the collapse of the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation was the suspension of the Summit to be held in Washington upon which the two leaders had previously agreed. This was clear from the following exchange, which needs no further explanation:

Amer 'I think you didn't want a Summit.'
Sovi 'Well, there is still time.'
Amer 'No, there isn't'. (The Guardian, 15 October 1986, p. 6)

The fourth influence, that had far reaching implications for superpower relations at an intensely sensitive time in arms control negotiations following the collapse of the Reykjavik Summit, was the retaliatory expulsion pattern of diplomats (the so-called tit-
for-tat diplomatic expulsion). Exactly a week after the breakdown of the Reykjavik Summit over the SDI issue the USSR expelled five American diplomats. The act was seen as a direct retaliation by Moscow for an earlier USA decision to expel 25 members of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations (mentioned in scene a, first section of this chapter). Tass, the official Soviet newsagency, reported,

'The attention of the US Embassy was 'again' drawn to facts of the continuing use of American diplomatic missions in the USSR for illegal activities against the Soviet Union, and the demand was made that appropriate measures be taken for stopping them' (The Times, 20 October 1986: 1, 24).

Following this, the USA ordered 55 Soviet diplomats to leave the country. The American State Department accused all of the 55 of 'activities inconsistent with their diplomatic status', the standard euphemism for spying (The Times, 22 October 1986: 1).

Certainly there were fundamental differences between the two parties. Differences in ideological matters, in political, economic and military roles as well as in national interests, wishes and values. However, these differences were perpetual between them before the meeting at Reykjavik in Iceland, and would remain so for ever without necessarily causing a damage like that of the Reykjavik Summit negotiation. In fact, including the two parties, no one expected such a severe 'result' which was followed by an undesirable 'effect' which imposed itself on the two leaders, who went to Iceland, in the first place, to minimize their differences, to better understand each other and, as was the goal and intention of both leaders, to reach certain agreement on nuclear disarmament.

120
However, instead of blaming the two parties for such a sad outcome which affected not only the relationship between the two superpowers but also influenced the entire world, there were a number of factors which caused such an outcome and ought to be blamed. From the viewpoint of International Linguistic Communication (ILC) (Al Mulla, 1986), sketched in the last section of Chapter 2 of this work, the diversity of the two parties' socio-cultural backgrounds was the main reason for what happened. The investigation of scenes a and b indicated that the different approaches of negotiation between the two parties, the diversity of their views on the nature of the Summit, the different interpretation of the 'linguistic phrase' and above all else the mutual unrecognition and misjudgement of the intended messages and acts were, among other things, behind the unsuccessful negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit. The overlapping between these factors reduced the chances for successful negotiation and created a context of misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misjudgement which eventuated the collapse of the diplomatic negotiation and what followed.

4.3 The outcome of the Reykjavik Summit - Evaluation of the primary class of the data

The outcome of the Reykjavik Summit underwent evaluation by career diplomats. As a part of the fieldwork of this thesis, the career diplomats were asked to evaluate the diplomatic communication of the Reykjavik Summit and its results. The question which was put before the career diplomats was,

'Mr Ambassador; do you have a word to say about the Reykjavik Summit: its communication and outcome?'
The responses, which were provided by the career diplomats and
tape-recorded, concentrated, in general, on one area; that is, the
Reykjavik Summit's negotiation was a mixture of misunderstanding,
miscommunication and misconduct of communication, and the outcome
was a product of these elements.

According to an Indian career diplomat, the great opportunity
which could reduce the tensions in this world was lost. His views
on the outcome are as follows:

All I can say is that a great opportunity was missed
which could have reduced tensions in this world and would
have been a step, however small, in the direction of
making this a safer world. This is all I can say with
certainty. I have been reading whatever has appeared,
and it seems to me that there was not adequate prepar-
ation for this Summit and that is a part of lack of comm-
unication actually. There are ways of looking at things.
Some people think if big leaders meet they are able to
cut across so many small things with which bureaucrats
are concerned, that is not so. I am a believer of a
careful preparation before people at a very high level
meet because when they meet and don't produce results it
has the other effect; people suddenly think that, you
know, get more depressed than what they should. So, I
would say that, to me, it seems, because I cannot find
any other explanation, there was a lack of communication
which resulted ... in this, as I said, an opportunity
which missed, the great opportunity to reduce tensions
and to make this world safer for all of us, I think that
everything is in God's hands, but otherwise we are not
doing enough to make this a safer world' (Ishrat Aziz, an
Indian Ambassador - interview).

In the view of an Austrian career diplomat it is only dangerous
to raise expectations too high for the general public when a Summit
takes place and afterwards if the result is not as high as the
expectations raised then it will become problematic, and thus the
general public was a little bit puzzled and sought about what was
happened at Reykjavik:
'Yes, in a sense you might say it was misunderstanding, but I wonder whether so much in the language or in the different cultures, but just in the unexpected proposal from one side on the other. Certainly this is due to cultural differences, but then there were different techniques of negotiation, and I wonder that those techniques were built on the cultural background, or if they were not, the individual, who negotiated, he developed certain techniques to negotiate. It can be said that it is connected with the cultural background of the person concerned, but I think there was a lot of individuality in the negotiation' (an Austrian career diplomat - interview).

The diplomatic communication of the Reykjavik Summit was extremely confusing, according to a British career diplomat. His response to the earlier question was as follows;

'Well, to tell the truth, I found the Reykjavik Summit extremely confusing myself, and I was not sure at the end of the day exactly who was standing where, and there were a lot of redefinitions of what the President had meant.'

'That's right, yes. So a lot of people were saying, and they were goodness me, the American expression, 'He is giving way to the storm'. You know what I mean, this like the shopkeeping in a bad negotiation ... But I think what is bad about that sort of exchange is that it is undermined trust, and if two leaders are involved in a situation in which neither trust the other an inch, and then after each meeting, because of misunderstanding in communication or may be misunderstanding in briefing, but any way, whatever the misunderstanding is ..., I think it is the process of diplomacy that is serious because it means that the basis of trust for the future has been eroded and it is more difficult to make progress in the future than it would have been if the meeting had never taken place' (M. Tait, a British Ambassador - interview).

The problem of mistrust between the two superpowers was repeated by an Italian career diplomat. He argued that people would be naive enough if they demanded too much from the two superpowers with their fundamental differences in the way of life and in their visions of the world and the role they are supposed to play. Whether the Reykjavik Summit's outcome was a failure, or a complete
failure, this would be left for history to decide. He stressed several points as follows:

'Let us say that this is a fact of course of Western and Pro-western that the problem of the two countries in capacity, at least for the moment ... is that they don't trust each other. America doesn't trust the ... what Russia is going to do because may be can't think that let's say is that Mr Gorbachev is open now but he is the leader for the country. This is the big question mark! ... Is the Russian army supposed to do that? ... Each one accuses the other ... you know it is difficult to say a thing ... To men like President Reagan and First Secretary Gorbachev they cannot meet to discuss, they are going to meet to sign. They cannot solve to ours what the diplomacy under their direction is being able to suffer. Yes, knowing each other is good but pretending on the knowledge that they can demilitarize and finally love ... and so removing all the problems, it would be naive ... it is out of reality ... it is a dream and not politics ... correct!' (an Italian career diplomat - interview).

A Korean career diplomat believed that poor diplomatic communication would lead to some unwelcome, unsatisfactory or undesired results. With perhaps clear initial hesitation to answer the question, he replied:

'I haven't, I cannot say for sure why (the Reykjavik Summit) failed. I can (can't) say for sure the Reykjavik Summit failed because of the poor diplomatic communication. There might have been some other factors that affected the outcomes. But, in general, as a principle, of course, poor diplomatic communication can cause misunderstanding' (a South Korean career diplomat).

In the view of Tag Elser Hamza, the Reykjavik Summit's outcome might be connected with the earlier agreement between the two countries where there were differences between the present American government and the Soviets on the last treaty of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). And therefore the Reykjavik Summit,
'Would be an extension of this situation where each side takes the matter in a certain sense, the other side considered it otherwise, and there was this failure of the right conducting of communication between them. So, certainly, the failure of the Summit is the matter of communication to a large extent, it is a question of communication. Of course we take the other consideration, the earlier thing referred to, the question of cultural background and so forth. Also, we cannot exclude the role of the allies of each side and this could be positive sometimes and could be passive sometimes. They could distort or they could help. And, as you know, it led to ugly consequences, to the unfortunate consequences ... And I hope this will be contained soon to a limited extent and I hope that both sides will resume the dialogue' (Tag Elser Hamza - interview).

However, it is not meant to exhaust all the possibilities of the data. The intention was to represent some examples of the career diplomat's view on the outcome of the Reykjavik Summit. In fact, almost all the career diplomats, who were interviewed and asked to evaluate the outcome of the Summit's negotiation, shared the same or similar views as those presented above. However, it would perhaps be appropriate to consider some views from American and Russian career diplomats since they were representing the two countries involved in the negotiation activity.

An American career diplomat provided a general view in an obvious attempt to avoid commenting on the Reykjavik Summit specifically. However, such views were clear indicators of the effect of diplomatic communication on the outcome of the Reykjavik Summit. And since the response was given on the occasion of the Summit's negotiation, then part of this response, at least, would reflect the career diplomat's views on the negotiation activity of the Reykjavik Summit:
'Well I think that sometimes before I get to the Iceland Summit, and I am not sure that I will want to comment on that specifically, sometimes interests are in fact contrary and intractible. And I think we have to recognize that sometimes desirable outcomes in the sense of nice, clean solutions are just not obtainable. Sometimes damage control is the best you can hope for, keeping a bad situation from becoming worse too fast. So one had to analyse the situation and determine what kind of outcomes are realistic. But I agree that very, very often, perhaps in a great majority of the cases either sides or at least one side fail to understand where the areas of accommodation are possible. I think it is a common human belief that one side's gain is the other side's loss. I think this is a primitive notion that all of us grow up with. And sometimes one does have intractable interests and more often than not, there are large areas of neutral interest where accommodation is possible if both sides recognize these areas and work in a practical way towards them' (an American career diplomat - interview).

On the other hand, a Russian career diplomat, instead of commenting on the outcome of the diplomatic communication of the Reykjavik Summit, attempted to provide the direct cause, from the Soviet's point of view, of course, of the failure of the negotiation between the two superpowers. The response to the earlier question was as follows:

'The answer is very clear, the answer is very clear. The Soviet Union was a negotiator initiating this Summit meeting, and being initiated this Summit's meeting, Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik a package of suggestions which comprised of three essential elements. The consent of the Soviet Union to bring about the elimination of all nuclear arms by the end of the century. (this is) one. Second, to eliminate the armament race including limitation in Europe zero-option for the rockets of medium-range. The consent of the Soviet Union to limit and to diminish the level of the military confrontation through limitation of conventional forces, arms forces, conventional arms forces. But there was a third essential element of this package, a compromise-deal, that is the prevention of the armaments getting into outer-space. It is a vital thing to stop the armament race in space because if we limit or destroy nuclear arsenals on earth and bring the same nuclear armament into space there is no logicalness to start a new round
of the arms race into space while destroying rockets and nuclear armaments on earth. We see no logicalness, and our attitude is that Americans must abandon their conception of the 'Star wars' and they must accept our conception of 'Star-peace'. It means a comprehensive arrangement including all the elements of disarmament including prevention of realization of plans of the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative. If Washington accepts this position and we agree with the Americans on the prevention of the armament race in space, then it is possible to realize the agreements which were really near in Reykjavik on the first two main points about nuclear armaments and conventional armaments because two leaders agreed upon two points and they disagreed on the third one. The absence of agreement on the third point was a stumbling block preventing positive results of this Summit in Iceland. That is the answer' (a Russian career diplomat - interview).

Nevertheless, those were the views of the career diplomats on the negotiation's outcome of the Reykjavik Summit. The intention, as mentioned earlier, was to present some views of the professional diplomats who dedicated their entire lives in the service of international relations on a bilateral as well as a multi-lateral basis. These views were derived from long experience in the field of diplomacy, diplomatic communication and negotiation. Therefore, it was widely believed that they would be the right people to judge and diagnose the present situation, which was actually part of their profession. Having acknowledged their experience in the domain of international diplomacy, the evaluations, which they provided, were meant, in general, to corroborate and support the findings of the investigation of scenes a and b of the empirical data which was obtained from the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation, and to establish the assumption that the undesired results and the unfortunate effects of the Summit's diplomatic negotiation were, to a large extent, due to the misconduct of diplomatic communication. The
mismanagement of the 'Preparatory-Essential Context' influenced the actual negotiation of the Summit and affected the final outcome. The unawareness, or unrecognition of the counterpart intended messages and acts, and the implementation of those acts resulted in the dissatisfaction of the intentional states of the counterpart. These, in turn, generated psychological factors, which crept into the activity and eventuated the damage that neither one expected.

All these matters, as repeatedly mentioned in the previous chapters, and which shall become clearer in the following ones, were related to and associated with the diversity of the socio-cultural backgrounds of the two parties involved in the negotiation activity. In such an activity, socio-cultural backgrounds would play an active and vivid role of overlapping between the overt and covert contents of language and cause misunderstanding and misinterpretation.
5.1 Stage two of the empirical data

In stage one of the empirical data (Chapter 4) the focus of analysis concentrated on a highly special occasion of diplomatic negotiation where the two parties in the negotiation activity had intractable proposals. The analysis of the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation between the two superpowers, America and Russia, as we saw, revealed how the socio-cultural backgrounds of the two parties interfered with the overt content of language (the linguistic meaning of messages) and created misunderstanding and misinterpretation of messages and intentions which resulted in the collapse of the negotiation and eventuated the unfortunate consequences.

This chapter will deal with the empirical data of stage two. As we may recall, stage two comprises two categories B and C, which belong together, and contain three different yet related classes of data, Primary, Secondary and Tertiary. The primary class of the empirical data will include nine scenes (i.e. scenes c, d, ... j and k) each of which represents a unique diplomatic event. The secondary class of the empirical data will provide self-reported diplomatic events as well as evaluations. These events and evaluations, which were tape-recorded, represented the experience of the career diplomats who reported them. The tertiary class of the data will include quantitative data which was obtained from the questionnaire and would provide supportive evidence for the preceding two classes of data.
Unlike the diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit, which was described earlier as a special event since it contained different proposals from both sides, diplomatic communication of this chapter will include a variety of diplomatic events each of which represents a specific occurrence in a particular situation. All the events in the following analysis are examples of daily conduct between career diplomats pursuing routine duties and implementing foreign relations of their countries with others.

5.2 Category B - the primary class of the data

As far as the primary class of the empirical data of category B is concerned, the analysis of the following four scenes (i.e. Scenes c, d, e and f) will focus, as is the practice throughout this work, on the social and cultural situations of the diplomatic events. It will highlight the inference between the overt and the covert contents of language in order to show 'how' and 'why' such an interference creates problems of misunderstanding and misinterpretation which hinder the progress of diplomatic communication, impede reaching desired results and eventuate the breakdown of the activity in a large number of cases.

The analysis of these scenes will heavily rely upon the special apparatus (discussed in the last section of Chapter 3); that is the analytical composition of UID with its two facets, the overt and the covert, in order to detect the areas of overlapping between the socio-cultural background knowledge of the partners involved and their use of linguistic knowledge (the knowledge of grammar and lexicon).
5.2.1 Scene c: Arabs and West Europeans' communication

The first scene of Category B (i.e. Scene c, see Appendix 4) occurred in an Arabic country where two delegations (parties, partners), Arabs and West Europeans, in a ministerial joint commission, negotiated the mutual relations of their countries. After welcoming remarks from both sides, the Arab delegate (partner one) initiated the following exchange:

(1) Arab 'We are pleased with our progress in a number of areas that we have dealt with in the past two years, and we hope to maintain a similar progress in our co-operation in the area of ... especially ... (eh ... (long (pause)) (...) (2) Euro ... (overlapping) ... (a European member started to laugh and continued to laugh loudly ...)

(3) Arab And I would like, if I may, (...) to know your stance on these areas where we have mutual interests.

(4) Euro (...) We understand the reasons for this ... and also we realise the importance of our co-operation in those areas you mentioned, your excellency, and therefore, I would like you to suggest establishing sub-groups from our two delegations to discuss those areas in detail ... 

It is common practice when two high ranking delegates (as in the case at hand where the two delegates were State Ministers for Foreign Affairs) meet to negotiate certain interests of their countries, that they begin, in the first session, to highlight the main points of the prepared agenda for the meeting. The professionals from both sides then meet in groups (depending in the nature of the themes of the agenda) to detail the points mentioned by the two delegates in their first session in order to reach certain agreement for the benefit of both sides. The points of
agreement would then be finalized in a certain communique which needs to be agreed upon and signed by the delegates of both sides in the final session of the meeting.

In the scenic unit of diplomatic communication above, the two delegations met, as is the usual practice, with the intention of following the long-acknowledged routine of official meeting. However, shortly after the start of the meeting, a certain problem interfered and impeded the continuation of the routine processes of the first session of the meeting. For some reason, what was believed by partner one to be the most important points (or areas of interest) were unintentionally omitted in the course of presentation. Partner one, after he began to initiate the first move in the negotiation process (Line 1, scene c, Appendix 4), a high ranking member of the European delegation (partner two) started for some unknown reason, to laugh and continued to laugh loudly. There might be a certain reason which led this member to behave in such a way, however, whatever the reason, it would not justify such behaviour in such a highly official meeting. Partner one, since he was a member of the Arabic culture whose norms would not permit any of its members to laugh, without a clear and defined reason being known to all members of the meeting, was utterly surprised by the sudden laughter. The act of laughing came exactly at the time when partner one was about to mention (or numerate) the areas that he considered the most important elements for the relations between the two countries in the negotiation activity. Such a circumstance led him to pause and, for some time, gaze astonishingly at the member. When he resumed his speech, instead of naming the areas of mutual interest between the two countries, he employed the phrase 'the
area' (line 3) to which there was no 'referent' in the preceding lines of his move. The overlapping of the laughter with his speech caused him to think that he had already mentioned those areas. This situation indicated that the 'Initial Point', the point of initial interference between the two socio-cultural backgrounds of the two parties involved in the activity, had already taken place and led, in turn, to the 'Central Point', the point of misculturality (or misunderstanding or misinterpretation). The Initial Point actually occurred when the European member (of partner two) began to laugh in a situation where every single feature should be regarded seriously and dealt with sensitively. Therefore the laughter, in this very situation, was considered by partner one as highly strange, wild and impolite according to his cultural norms. The effect of such behaviour on partner one invited the Central Point where misunderstanding and misjudgement would take place in the meeting. On the one hand, partner one omitted naming the areas of interest, the key point of the meeting. And, on the other hand, partner two (the European delegate) had no idea what partner one had had in his mind.

Such a situation (the misunderstanding or misjudgement) was reflected in partner two's countermove (i.e. line 4, scene C). Partner two's message was ambiguous since it could have more than one interpretation. On the one hand, his message, 'We understand the reason for this', could mean an understanding of the reason for the laughter, especially when we take into account partner two's gazing at the member next to him. Within this interpretation, the message could suggest a performance of indirect speech act connoting a 'criticism' or even a 'warning' to the member to stop his act and
respect the meeting or at least the cultural norms of the people of the host country. On the other hand, the same message could be an indication of understanding of partner one's reason of omitting 'the areas of interest'. Within this interpretation, the message also could connote an implicit (or an indirect) speech act, according to the socio-cultural dimension of language (i.e. the covert content), which could suggest an acceptance of, or an excuse to, partner one's omission of numerating the areas of interest between the two countries, the backbone of the meeting for which the European delegate came to negotiate.

However, the ambiguity of partner two's message was a direct result of two things. Firstly, the sudden and the unreasonable laughter from a member of his delegation meant to him so many things. In addition to his embarrassment, he felt that the responsibility for what happened would, in the first place, rest on him as he chose to include this member in the delegation. His facial expression as well as his gaze at the member, when he was performing the message, were clearly indicating an acceptance of such a responsibility. Secondly, the situation in which partner one was involved which resulted in the omission of the vitally important information on which the countermove of partner two would depend.

Given the long and mutually respected relationship between the two Ministers (the two partners), partner two in a very polite and friendly manner attempted to bridge the gap in the communication which resulted from the behaviour of one member of his delegation (move 4, scene c, Appendix 4).
Nevertheless, the Result, the fourth point of the covert composition of UID took place in this activity. This indicated that this event of diplomatic communication did not produce the expected outcome regardless of the role played by partner two. The reason was that the 'target' member of the European delegation (of partner two) was the key person in the negotiating group. However, the unexpected outcome of diplomatic communication of this unit was indeed better rather than worse, as we shall see in the following analysis.

5.2.2 Scene d: Arabic-African communication

The diplomatic communication of the second scene of Category B (i.e. scene d, Appendix 4) involved two groups, Arabs and Africans, in a conference on Afro-Arab relations. After the final session of the conference, a group of participants from both sides, were evaluating the final outcome of the conference. An Arab diplomat initiated the following exchange:

(1) Arab  'Some of the members were saying the conference was successful ... what do you think?'
(2) Afri  'Believe me I am very happy of attending this conference' (...)

The Arabic partner (partner one), since he was a member of the organizing body of the conference, would certainly be pleased to receive any kind of positive remarks concerning the way in which the conference was organized, and the materials as well as the facilities which were provided since these matters, among other things, were crucial for any conference to succeed and reach the
desired results. As mentioned, partner one was somewhat pleased with the news he had received, and for some reason he attempted to seek further information from the opposite number of the participants. The message he expressed in order to achieve this intention was linguistically one of four types of question in English, namely open-ended question, WH-question (i.e. information question), yes/no-question, and tag-question (see Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 208). The direct function of the second type of question (i.e. WH-question) would usually be to provide new, or unknown, information or clarification for the one who asked the question. However, partner one did not intend to obtain any kind of information, rather he sought a specific piece of information by which he could satisfy his desire and intention. In other words, the intention of partner one behind asking the WH-question (line 1, scene d, Appendix 4) was not to obtain information that he did not know, rather to obtain 'an assurance' or 'confirmation' of his suggestion (to his counterpart) that 'the conference was successful' according to some participants.

However, understanding the literal meaning of the question, according to the overt linguistic knowledge (the knowledge of grammar and lexicon), would be one thing, and grasping the intended act (the illocutionary force of the message), which was associated with socio-cultural factors of the covert content of the message used by partner one, would be yet another thing. The recognition of the African partner (partner two) to the act performed in the message of partner one would depend on his countermove.
Although partner two's countermove (line 2) expressed his happiness of attending the conference, it was neither a direct answer to partner one's move (the question) nor did it have a correlation with the expected response (i.e. the intended act). Yet, such a countermove appeared to tantalize partner one and thereby he believed it was a step forward, from which the expected answer would follow. This could explain the reason for his smile and nodding, before his attempt to elicit the desired answer, 'Yes, but what about the outcome?'. This suggested that partner one understood 'the happiness' expressed by partner two's message as a partial response to the expected answer; that is, since partner two was 'very happy of attending the conference', then the conference must be successful, and so, 'what about the outcome?'

Partner two, however, instead of clarifying his intention about the conference and the outcome, converted the theme of the communication by issuing a new move which was a yes/no-question, 'Is there any bank nearby?' (line 4). Although this question required a yes/no-answer, partner one's response was not a direct answer to the question (i.e. either yes or no). This appeared to reflect partner one's dissatisfaction. However, partner one attempted to follow the new course of the communication, even though he was still waiting to receive an appropriate answer to his previous move, and therefore he asked, 'but why?' Such a counter-question (WH-question) suggested that partner one started to astonish partner two's attitude of communication. The reason was three-fold. Firstly, the use of a 'plain imperative' utterance, 'Tell me first ...' which indicated a direct demand or order to his counterpart within the context of diplomatic communication. Secondly, the insertion of a new theme in
the activity, 'a bank', which explicitly, or implicitly, had no correlation with the original theme of the diplomatic activity (i.e. the success of the conference). Thirdly, his obvious interest in the 22-carat-gold coin, which was in his hand at the time, playing with it, gazing at it and above all else ignoring, because of it, partner one's first move (see scene d, Appendix 4). Such a situation invited the Initial Point, the point of the initial inference between the cultures of both partners.

Partner one, being driven by the situation, swiftly related all these factors together, and sought an acceptable explanation for such a happening. Apparently, considering these happenings together, the earlier happiness of partner two at attending the conference could not be related to the success of the conference as previously understood by partner one, rather it could be due to the 'piece of gold' he received which was still in his hand. Such implications crept into partner one's mind, because, according to the Arabic cultural norms, it would be considered impolite, first of all, to openly deal with a gift granted in such a way before the grantor, and secondly, it would be inappropriate, by the same cultural norms, to ask the host for help to sell the gift which he granted only minutes earlier. Hence the situation, for partner one, was not totally clear, instead it was a mixture of 'believe-it-or-not' acts and intentions and therefore 'Central Point' occurred. This indicated that misunderstanding and misjudgement took place in the activity (line 7).

This situation explained 'why' partner one misunderstood partner two's repeated 'demand' (line 4) and request (line 6). The earlier yes/no-question, 'Is there any bank nearby?' was not meant
by partner two to be understood 'literally' as demanding a yes/no-answer. Actually, it appeared later, it was intended to be recognized as a request to accompany him to a bank to sell the gold coin (i.e. the gift he received). When the demand passed unrecognized by partner one, partner two repeated it in different kind (or type) of speech act which was a request, 'Could you do me a favour?' (line 6). Partner one, because of the 'product' of the Central Point (i.e. misculturality), which took place earlier in the scene, was unable to understand partner two's request simply because the situation, as well as the acts performed by partner two, were not perceived by him. Such interpretation was implied by partner one's countermove (line 7) which was again a WH-question which indicated that partner one was still unable to recognize the real intention of partner two. This time, partner two's response to partner one's question was delivered very plainly, 'To show me a bank!' (line 8). At this point, everything became clear to partner one and therefore the clash between the two partner's socio-cultural backgrounds occurred. This indicated that the 'Result', the product of the 'Central Point' took place, and therefore, the diplomatic communication activity between the two diplomats (the Arabic and the African) collapsed. Such a breakdown of the activity was clear from partner one's final move to his counterpart:

(9) Arab 'Excuse me now, I am very busy, but I will see you later.'

The implication of this was that partner one terminated the communication activity in a friendly manner and promised to see his counterpart, as a friend rather than as a counterpart in a
communication, as soon as he became free from the effect of the situation.

In summary, what happened in the above unit of communication was that, since the two partners belonged to different cultures, each partner's cultural background interfered with that of the other. Such interference created a situation of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of messages and intentions. As a result, the two contents of language, the overt (i.e. the linguistic knowledge according to the knowledge of grammar and lexicon) and the covert, the socio-cultural dimension of language (derived from pragmatics, speech acts and cultural norms of communication) overlapped with each other and eventuated the unexpected result.

On the one hand, partner one, after spending days and nights in organizing the conference, was in a desperate need to hear some good news about the success of the conference. This desire was partially fulfilled by some participants of his side. However, his desire was not completely satisfied, and therefore he sought some members of the opposite side. The main priority here was to obtain certain assurances to confirm the success of the conference.

On the other hand, partner two, having a different priority from that of partner one, was not concerned too much about the success of the conference. His desire was to obtain a certain amount of money in return for selling the gold coin (a part of the gift he received as a thank you for his participation in the conference) in order to fulfil some urgent needs. Perhaps there would be nothing unusual for partner two to do what he intended to achieve following his cultural attitudes. Also, had he chosen a different person, or a different time, the situation might have been
less inappropriate than asking for help from the grantor almost immediately after receiving the gift.

However, both partners were disappointed by the nature of their communication as their intentions went unrecognized and their desires passed unfulfilled. Partner one, since he was a member of the Arabic culture, was unable to accept, or perhaps to tolerate partner two's attitude which, according to his cultural norms, appeared very awkward. In addition, the shift of the theme, which, in turn, changed the course of the communication (from the success of the conference to selling the gift), resulted in ignoring his request for some confirmation concerning the success of the conference. Also, because of the nature of current practice of diplomatic communication, the ignorance, or the shift, of the theme of the ongoing activity could mean that the counterpart did it intentionally (i.e. on purpose). It would either indicate that the counterpart did not want to deal with the theme introduced, or it could simply signify a negative response (because one would never know precisely the real intention of his counterpart, especially if the response would be negative). These factors involved partner one in a very unfortunate context of communication in which every single occurrence was incompatible with his cultural norms, and therefore such circumstances tied partner one up with his culture. Everything seen and heard by him in the situation was judged in accordance with his cultural norms, values and attitudes. Hence he was unable to recognize what was intended by partner two's messages as they were inconsistent with his socio-cultural background. As a consequence, he could not fulfil partner two's intended acts, the demand and the request.
Partner two, on the other hand, urged perhaps by the necessity, desire or otherwise, needed some money to purchase certain commodities from a free-market where everything was available and accessible. Therefore, he asked his counterpart to help him find a bank to sell the gold coin (in addition to perhaps other things), which he did not intend to keep as a souvenir. Having acknowledged such circumstances, partner two was unable to pursue the course of communication which was initiated by partner one, and therefore he converted the course of the activity to harmonize with his desire and intention. This behaviour was not inconsistent with his cultural norms. In addition, nothing appeared to him to be incompatible with the circumstances, surrounding the activity. Given these factors, including the fact that partner two was communicating with partner one calmly and in a friendly manner, it could be suggested that he was deeply involved with his culture and communicated in accordance with its norms of conduct. And therefore, he was unable to recognize or realize his counterpart's intention or desire which is, by far, the most essential factor for any successful diplomatic communication.

As a consequence, his behaviour and attitude resulted in partner one's dissatisfaction and disappointment which, in turn, eventuated the termination of the diplomatic activity (by partner one). This happened before either of the two diplomats achieved his goal.
Scene e: Indian-Arabic communication

The diplomatic communication of the third scene of Category B (i.e. scene e, Appendix 4) occurred in an invitation situation between two diplomats, Indian and Arabic.

The Indian diplomat (partner one) invited the Arabic counterpart (partner two) to a small family party. The two families were close friends and so, without too much formality, partner one initiated the invitation in a simple yet friendly style as in the following exchange:

(1) Indi 'We will have a small family party and we hope you can come.'
(2) Arab 'Well, I would like ... but ... I ...

Although it was perfectly understood by partner two that the two families were friends and therefore there was no need for formality in the method of invitation, he was hesitant to accept the invitation because of partner one's style of invitation. The expression 'We hope you can come', which was used by partner one, although it was a perfectly polite way of inviting people, partner two was unable, at first sight, to comply with the invitation for certain cultural rules (or norms) and values. Firstly, according to the Arabic cultural norms, Arabs cannot usually comply with an invitation, or an offer in general, at once. They would normally exhibit a reluctance. And most often they would answer the invitation or the offer by a negative linguistic means (i.e. No, we are busy; No, thank you; No, there is no need ... etc.). It is not because they do not want to accept, or like to reject, the invitation but simply because they are constrained by certain
cultural norms and values. In fact, in order for members of the Arabic culture to comply with the invitation or the offer, these acts ought to be performed insistently and repeated emphatically for one, two or more times until eliciting an acceptance or compliance which would be most likely to happen eventually (these issues were discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3 in Al Mulla, 1986). Secondly, the utilization of the two morphemes (in partner one's move above); the verb hope and the modal auxiliary verb can expressed no insistence on partner two - the crucial element for any invitation according to Arabic culture, as mentioned above.

The verb hope, in partner two's view, expressed partner one's feeling and desire in a relaxed manner without exhibiting enthusiasm or insistence for attending the party. The modal auxiliary verb can, although it encouraged the ability to, or capability of, attending the family party, it did not express (or connote) any emphasis or demand such as, for example, the modal auxiliary verb should or ought to or even must. Therefore, partner one's message, 'We hope you can come' seemed to partner two to provide no real 'intention' or 'sincerity' which would constitute the invitation. Therefore, partner two's countermove expressed a certain reluctance to accept the invitation. This was clear from the use of well and but.

The utilization of well as a discourse marker initiating partner two's utterance (the countermove, line 2) seemed to bracket the 'next step' and provide him with the time needed to think about the next step of the response (Al Mulla, 1982). Well, according to Halliday and Hasan (1976: 269), typically occurs at the beginning of a response in communication, and indicates that what follows is in
fact a response to what preceded. Therefore, it would indicate in
the above countermove that the counterpart, in acknowledging his
partner's move, would provide a 'considered answer', and thus the
function of well, as an initiator of the countermove of partner two
would be no more than an exhibition of his reluctance (see

Such a function of well explained partner two's hesitance as he
was unable to give an immediate answer to partner one's move (i.e.
the invitation) which, in turn, indicated that he needed some time
to think about the appropriate answer. 'The next step, after the
utilization of well was, '..., I would like ... but ... I ...' (line
1 2 3)
which meant that he was eager to accept the invitation unless he
was confined forcibly by his cultural norms and values. This
justified the use of But which initiated a second yet an 'embedded'
countermove and expressed an adversative relation (an adversative of
sequential contrast) which was contrary to the expectation (Halliday
and Hasan, 1976: 237, 250; Al Mulla, 1982: 28, 1986; Schiffrin,

The use of But, in addition to the three pauses in the above
countermove (indicated by the '...' sign) reflected partner two's
confusion and embarrassment as he was unable to follow his desire in
complying with the invitation because of his confinement within the
Arabic cultural norms and values. The initial interference between
the Inidan and Arabic cultural norms in the context of the
invitation provided an opportunity for the initial point to occur.
However, the overt content (the literal meaning) of partner two's countermove signified a clear message to partner one that his counterpart was very busy and, accordingly, unable to attend the party (rather than he was culturally constrained and waiting for the invitation to be repeated emphatically to release him from his perplexity).

Unfortunately, instead of having him released from his cultural imprisonment, partner one, relying on his understanding of the literal meaning of partner two's countermove, involved his counterpart deeply with his culture by the use of the new move (line 3, scene e):

(3) Indi 'Try to come if you are free.'
(4) Arab 'I will try ... but ... I think ... we ...'

Actually, to express your desire towards an Arab counterpart in an invitation context employing the underlined expression in the above countermove would clearly be an indication that you did not want him to come, and so you would never expect him to face you at the dining table. Therefore, the above move would not help partner two to avoid resisting the invitation simply because, according to the Arabic cultural norms and values, the expression used was impolite and did not mount to display a real intention or 'warm sincerity' by which a member of the Arabic culture could recognize the intended act (the invitation).

Therefore, partner two's countermove (line 4 above) revealed a great deal of hesitation and confusion which indicated that the Central Point, the point of misculturality (the explicit point of
the cultural interference of the two partners' socio-cultural backgrounds) happened and began to affect the communication activity negatively.

At this point, it appeared that partner one had suffered enough from the counterpart's overt rejection of his invitation which so far had been repeated two times, and yet his counterpart was still refusing the invitation. This led him to the final move by which he could detect partner two's final position regarding attendance of the party:

(5) Indi  'If you are very busy then you don't have to come.'

(6) Arab  '... ... Alright ... thank you any way!'

Partner one's move (line 5) revealed his understanding of the overt content (the literal meaning) of his counterpart's previous message which, in turn, suggested that he was unable to recognize his real intention which was associated with the socio-cultural background (the covert content of the message). That means, partner one understood, as suggested earlier, that his counterpart was very busy and could not express this state to his friend (i.e. partner one). Otherwise, there would be no reason to justify the repeated rejection and recurrent hesitation.

However, partner one's move appeared to damage any hope that partner two could attend the party. The expression 'You don't have to come', which was used in the above move, was actually contrary to what was supposed to be utilized in this context 'if' the Arabic cultural norms and values would be observed. Had partner one expressed such an emphatic message yet in a positive utterance,
namely 'You have to come; you must come!', then the expressive necessity and the mandatory meaning of the modal auxiliary verb would have released his counterpart immediately from the cultural situation, and as a consequence, he swiftly would have accepted the invitation. Nevertheless, partner two's countermove revealed his deep disappointment in the style of invitation which was employed by partner one, and sadly accepted the final decision expressed by partner one's above move which was understood in relation to his cultural background; as 'Don't come'. This indicated that the result, the termination of the communication happened.

In brief, the UID which was analysed above involved diplomats from different cultures each of which had its own unique norms and values for extending an invitation.

On the one hand, partner one, who was a member of the Indian culture, eagerly attempted to invite his friend (partner two) to a small family party. Complying with his cultural norms in this context, he initiated the invitation by utilizing a message which was normally employed in this context by many cultures including Indian. The countermove he received was a mixture of reluctance and confusion which, according to their face value, denoted that the counterpart (partner two) was 'very busy' and therefore he was unable to attend the party. Such a literal meaning of the message, however, dissatisfied partner one's intentional state (i.e. his desire) since it implied a rejection of his invitation, which would be highly unlikely to happen among diplomats. For some reason, partner one repeated the invitation, suggesting to his counterpart to 'try to come if he would be free'. This act reflected partner one's desire to have his friend participating in the party. Again,
the message received from partner two was not much different from
the previous one whose overt meaning was full of hesitation and
counter-expectation. For the second time, partner one suffered from
the refusal to his invitation which was implied by the overt content
of partner two's message. Given all possibilities of the fulfillment
of partner one's desire (including the friendship and the membership
of the diplomatic corps between the two partners), the refusal of
the invitation this time involved him in a different situation which
resulted in a misunderstanding of the real intention of his
counterpart. On the one hand, he was disappointed as he repeated
the invitation two times, each of which was rejected by partner two.
On the other hand, his counterpart's messages did not express any
clear answer whether negative or positive. Led by these
circumstances, partner one, in attempting, for the third time, to
detect his counterpart's real intention, utilized a message (line 5,
scene e) which for him was normal, given all the circumstances.
However, this very message was, for partner two, given his cultural
norms and values for invitation, very impolite, and therefore its
effect on him was severe and thus eventuated the termination of the
diplomatic activity.

On the other hand, partner two, who belonged to the Arabic
culture, was eager to comply with partner one's invitation, but,
being confined to his cultural norms, he was unable to accept the
invitation at first sight. For him, the invitation ought to be
repeated emphatically and expressed enthusiastically. However,
partner one did repeat the invitation, but in his own style and
according to the Indian cultural norms and values. As a result,
misculturality occurred in the activity. The reason was that each
culture had different norms and values for initiating and constituting an invitation. While Arabic culture would regard politeness in insisting on the partner being invited, Indian culture would consider politeness in exactly the other way. That is, Indians would usually say in this context, 'Come if you are free!' The reason, according to them, would be to allow people to refuse if they are very busy. Therefore, partner one was behaving according to his cultural norms. However, his linguistic behaviour (or style) repeatedly disappointed partner two, as he judged it through the Arabic cultural norms, and this led to a breakdown of the diplomatic activity.

5.2.4 Scene f: Chinese-Arabic communication

In the fourth scene of Category B (i.e. scene f, Appendix 4), the diplomatic communication happened between a Chinese diplomat and an Arabic counterpart while they were preparing an agenda for an official visit.

The Chinese diplomat (partner one) initiated the following scenic unit:

(1) Chin  'Can I get some water, please?'
(2) Arab  'From my eyes!'  
(3) Chin  'What? ... ...'
(4) Arab  'What what?'
(5) Chin  'I asked for water to drink!'
(6) Arab  'OK ... OK ...'
This unit of diplomatic communication began when partner one initiated a request for some water. Given the surrounding circumstances that the weather was so hot and the room where the meeting was held had only a ceiling fan, the Arabic counterpart's (partner two) response was a fixed expression derived from Arabic culture. Linguistically, it is clear that there was no correlation between partner one's question (i.e. yes/no-question which required a yes/no-answer if we considered the overt content of it) and the response expressed by his counterpart, since it did not include either yes or no. Pragmatically, there was still no obvious relationship between the move of partner one and the countermove of partner two if we considered the covert content of partner one's move as conveying an intended message (i.e. a request) especially when the 'polite tag', which was attached to the question, namely please, was considered. In such a case, the answer of the request would normally be either a yes/no-answer (i.e. a verbal response) together with implementing the act being requested (i.e. bringing a glass of water) or doing the act exclusively (without a verbal response, as discussed in the last section of Chapter 3).

After all, partner two's countermove was indeed a response to partner one's move (the question or the request). However, it was a fixed expression which was deeply rooted in the culture of partner two (i.e. Arabic culture); that is, an irony. The connotation of such an irony was that partner two gave a very high consideration to partner one's request which was regarded as precious in his eyes. The situation in which the meeting was held, and the effect of the hot weather which involved both partners in a very intimate situation, was the main reason that urged partner two spontaneously
to express such a 'deeply indirect' speech act. Such an expression would be widely used among members of the Arabic culture when the relationship between them would be extremely close.

Partner two, therefore, understood the intended message of partner one (i.e. the request for water), and the related answer he performed was a very complimentary one from the viewpoint of partner two.

However, partner one, angrily and with a sharply rising intonation, expressed his second move which was a WH-question, 'What?' This utterance could be interpreted in the following complete sentence:

What did you say?

Certainly partner one had the right to become angry, provided the circumstances surrounding him and the response he obtained. Actually, there was no way for him to recognize the act performed by his counterpart (i.e. the intended message - the irony). Neither was he a member of the Arabic culture nor had he an appropriate means by which he could draw certain inferences in order to grasp the intended meaning. The linguistic knowledge he acquired (the knowledge of grammar and lexicon) provided him with a 'non-sense meaning' with regard to what he asked for (i.e. something like 'tears') which no one could or would drink, being a 'sort of salty water'. Therefore, misculturality, the clash between the two partner's cultural backgrounds occurred by which both partners suffered a great deal of dismay.
Partner two, however, received the great bulk of disappointment. On the one hand, he was still deeply tied up with his cultural norms which dictated to him the use of the most polite and precious expression in such a context. In return, instead of receiving gratitudes as usual, he was encountered by a grim face and anger. On the other hand, he was unable to detect the reason why 'his guest' (the Chinese diplomat - partner one) was so angry. Also, in addition to being a counterpart in a diplomatic activity, he was a host. Considering these circumstances, partner one's behaviour would be totally unexpected and unacceptable. These factors, which caused a critical misunderstanding between the two partners (i.e. beyond the central point), led partner two to an unintentional reaction by which he expressed the countermove (i.e. line 4, scene f), 'What, what?' Partner two's utterance could be interpreted as in the following two utterances:

(1) What (was your) What (for)?, or
(2) What (was the reason for your) What?

The intimate atmosphere between the members of the diplomatic activity was changed rapidly. This was reflected in the next exchange between the two partners (lines 5 and 6) which was followed by a suggestion for a lunch break. This meant that the 'Result' took place in this activity.

Briefly, the change of the intimate atmosphere in the above UID, which resulted in the unexpected outcome, was purely due to a cultural matter, namely misculturality. Partner two's utilization of a fixed expression (i.e. formulaic expression), which was
directly derived from his culture to which partner one had no access to its intended meaning, was the absolute obstacle that hindered the natural progress of the activity. The socio-cultural meaning of the expression (i.e. the covert meaning) which was associated with partner two's socio-cultural background had no relation whatsoever with its overt meaning (the linguistic meaning which related to the knowledge of grammar and lexicon). However, the blame for the unfortunate result was attributed to the surrounding circumstances in which the communication activity took place, including the hot weather which urged partner two to convey a highly friendly yet culturally-constrained message which eventually disappointed both partners.

5.3 Category C: the primary class of the data

As far as the empirical data of stage two is concerned, we have dealt so far with the scenes of the primary class of Category B. As mentioned in Chapter 3, these scenes were derived from the immediate experience of the 'diplomat-researcher' (i.e. from the diplomatic diary).

Category C of stage two contains three classes of data, as mentioned before, namely Primary, Secondary and Tertiary. The empirical data of the primary class, which will be dealt with in the following analysis, consists of five scenes (i.e. scenes g, h, i, j and k). The diplomatic activities of these scenes were known to the diplomat-researcher, as discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3, and represented the experience of some of the career diplomats who were interviewed and tape-recorded.
5.3.1 **Scene g: Asian-Arabic communication**

The first scenic unit of diplomatic communication of Category C (i.e. scene g, Appendix 4) occurred between two career diplomats (Asian and Arabic) at the United Nations where both career diplomats were permanent representatives for their countries.

The Asian representative (partner one) sought for an appropriate method that could convince the Arabic representative (partner two) to vote in favour of a resolution which concerned his country. Having reached a decision, from his own viewpoint, partner one approached partner two and initiated the following UID (see scene g, Appendix 4):

(1) Asia 'I would be pleased if you accept this small gift (...)'

(2) Arab 'Is that some money?'

(3) Asia 'Yes ... eh ... because we couldn't buy a gift for your family, we said he might have time to ... to buy a gift with this small amount of money'.

(4) Arab 'How can you do this with me?'

(5) Asia 'It is not a big thing ... it is just ... we were very busy and couldn't buy a gift for your family ... that's all!'

(6) Arab ... (after returning the envelope, he angrily said) 'Don't do this with me again!'

Partner one urged by the need to obtain enough votes for a resolution concerning his country, believed that by using money he could obtain as many votes as needed. He politely made a request of his counterpart for accepting a 'small gift'. It would be common practice among representatives at the United Nations, on some
occasions, to give or receive a gift of a traditional object. Such a souvenir would be perfectly acceptable, and in fact desirable, in order to, exclusively, fortify the friendship between diplomats.

Partner one's message expressed a request of his counterpart for accepting his offer (i.e. the small gift). This suggested that partner one had an idea about the attitudes of members of the Arabic culture in dealing with request as well as offer (discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3, (Al Mulla, 1986)). That is, according to the Arabic cultural norms, Arabs would be unable to reject a request, and, in the meantime, would be unable to accept an offer unless expressed repeatedly and emphatically. In the message at hand (i.e. the above message), partner one 'well wrapped' his offer in a very polite request:

(1) Asia 'I would be pleased if you accept this small gift'

Partner two, having received the envelope noticed that the contents were 'papers'. This raised some doubts, and in order to clarify the matter, he expressed the countermove (line 2, scene g), 'Is that some money?', which was a yes/no-question. The need for such a clarification emerged because of the occurrence of the Initial Point, the initial interference between the two partners' cultural backgrounds. Partner one, after providing a yes-answer which confirmed partner two's suspicion, attempted to explain the reason behind the action in order to ease the matter on partner two. Contrariwise, the matter became very difficult and confused. The explanation (or the confirmation) that the 'so-called gift' was actually a certain amount of money, which, by any means should not
be offered in such situations, involved partner two in an intractable situation which invited misculturalility, that is, the central point which indicated that a critical misunderstanding occurred between the two partners. The immediate reaction to this situation was obvious from partner two's countermove (line 4, scene g), 'How can you do this to me?'

At this stage, several points could be considered. Firstly, it was clear for partner two that the covert meaning of partner one's message (to accept the gift) was not actually a request, instead it was a 'bunch of lies' which was unacceptable behaviour among highly professional diplomats. Secondly, the so-called gift which turned out to be 'money' was actually a polite 'linguistic clothing' for a bad illocutionary act (i.e. offering a bribe). Partner two was a member of the Arabic culture as well as a member of the Islamic culture. On the one hand, Arabic culture, as well as many other cultures, would regard bribery as an act of moral depravity; that is, an act of corruption and wickedness. On the other hand, Islamic teachings prohibited any sort of 'bribe' (money or otherwise) thereby, a good Muslim must not offer or receive such a thing, must not deal with bribes of any kind. In following the norms of Arabic culture, or the rules of Islamic teachings, partner two ought not to receive an inducement (especially money offered to him to procure an illegal or dishonest action or decision in favour of the giver). Thirdly, partner two realized that partner one was actually 'fishing' for votes in favour of a resolution concerning his country, and therefore, he interpreted partner one's act (offering money) in accordance with his needs (i.e. receiving votes); that partner one offered partner two the money because he wanted to

157
obtain his vote (i.e. a relation between cause and effect). Fourthly, partner two in addition to his highly-paid profession, was a citizen of a member of GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) states, a country of prosperity, and hence did not need to receive 'a thousand dollars' in return for dishonest action or decision.

All, or at least some of, these points ought to be acquired by partner one in order to estimate or predict the probable outcome of his move according to the usual practice of diplomacy. However, partner two was disappointed by his counterpart's message, act and behaviour. These circumstances led partner two to express the following 'performative utterance':

(6) Arab 'Don't do this with me again!'

The linguistic dimension of this message explicitly denoted a direct speech act (i.e. an order). That is, the message, according to its linguistic shape, was an imperative utterance since it started with an imperative verb do attached to the negative morpheme not which would rarely be utilized in normal circumstances of diplomatic communication. However, the covert content of such a message connoted an indirect speech act; that is 'a warning'. Diplomats, since they would be representatives for their countries, their 'warning' could harm either the personal relationship or the relations of their countries. Therefore, partner two's message, in its covert meaning, warned partner one that if he repeated what he had done with his counterpart, then their relationship or the relations between their countries would suffer a certain amount of damage. As a consequence of such a communication, the Result
occurred. This indicated that the communication activity prematurely reached an end. In other words, the diplomatic activity collapsed prior to reaching partner one's desired outcome.

Unfortunately, the result of this scene produced 'Effect', the fourth component of the covert composition of UID. That is, 'Result' was somewhat heavy on partner two, and therefore it produced 'Effect', the direct result of the collapse of the communication activity. The effect in this activity affected matters beyond the relationship of the two partners.

As a usual practice in diplomacy, career diplomats would customarily (if not continuously) inform the authorities in their countries about their activities. Following such a practice, partner two reported the incident to his superior (the Minister at the time). Coincidentally, it happened that a delegation from the country of partner one was visiting partner two's country and was hoping to see the Minister. However the Minister refused to meet with the delegation as a consequence of what happened.

In summary, in the UID which was analysed above, both partners suffered from the result of their communication.

Partner one, on the one hand, by ignoring fundamental matters of his counterpart's culture and country, attempted to induce partner two to change his vote by offering him a certain amount of money. The means which was used by partner one (linguistically and non-linguistically) to implement his desire was totally unacceptable by partner two's cultural background norms and values. As a consequence, partner two was disappointed.
On the other hand, partner two was unable to answer the request which was made by partner one to accept the amount of money. In returning the money, partner two rejected the offer. This act certainly disappointed partner one as his intended act was refused and his desire was unsatisfied. In addition, the 'plain' imperative utterance used by partner two, which terminated the diplomatic communication between the two partners was severe on partner one since it conveyed a strong warning of affecting both the personal relationship and the relations between the two countries. The final results was, by all means, unfavourable for both partners.

5.3.2 Scene h: Arabic-American communication

The diplomatic communication of the second scenic unit of Category C (i.e. scene h, Appendix 4) happened between two governments, namely Arabic and American, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arabic country and the Embassy of the United States of America in that country.

The Arabic government (partner one), through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent a text of what they considered as a model of a consular convention. The text, which was sent to the American government through its Embassy in the country (partner two) was the kind of bilateral consular treaty which partner one had reached with other governments.

Partner one's message, implicitly, conveyed several intended acts to partner two as follows:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very grateful to propose the enclosed model of bilateral consular convention that it reached with other governments. It would be very kind of the respected Embassy of the United States of America if it forwards the enclosed text to its government as being convenient for the bilateral relations, and provide this Ministry with the appropriate response ...

By sending the text, partner one conveyed a concealed request (i.e. an indirect speech act) alongside a desire that partner two would recognize the intended message and accordingly accept the enclosed text as being a draft of a bilateral consular convention since it reflected a shared interest between the two partners, and by which certain perennial consular disputes would be resolved in an easier and more predictable manner on the one hand, and on the other hand, the text enclosed was actually the kind of bilateral consular 'treaty' that partner one had reached with other governments, which implied that partner two would probably accept such a treaty.

In response, partner two expressed a positive attitude towards partner one's message. This was reflected in partner two's agreement 'in principle' to what partner one proposed. However, partner two, instead of accepting the enclosed text, commenting on its content, if necessary, or suggesting ways of negotiating it, proposed another text; that is, a counter-text. Partner two considered partner one's text as 'inconsistent' with the kind of text that could be acceptable under their laws (see scene h, Appendix 4):
The State Department agreed in principle to have a consular convention, but would like to add that the text proposed by the Ministry would be inconsistent with the kind of text that can be acceptable under the United States laws since it would require confirmation and have to meet certain standards, therefore, the State Department would like to propose the enclosed counter-text which would be compatible with its laws and would be subject to negotiation ...

On the linguistic level (i.e., the overt content of language), partner two's message explicitly denoted a rejection to the proposal made by partner one. On the one hand, such a message downgraded partner one's text as it was inconsistent with partner two's laws and standards. Diplomatically, these allegations by themselves would raise certain questions about the reason of 'how' and 'why' the proposed text was not apt to meet partner two's standards. Partner two's remarks could have been less offensive if he had negotiated the text with partner one in order to single out the non-standard or inconsistent points.

On the other hand, these remarks indicated that partner two did not recognize or realize partner one's intended act; that is the request (the indirect speech act). This, in turn, would disappoint partner one since their desire passed unsatisfied and their intended act went unfulfilled. In addition, the proposed counter-text by partner two, according to the Arabic cultural norms, conveyed an implicit message to partner one that partner two was actually unwilling to have a bilateral consular convention, and thereby partner two actually provided partner one with a no answer to the request.
As a result, partner one, according to the Arabic cultural norms in such a context, realized that there was no need to provide partner two with a response to their counter-proposal since, by implication of their counter-text, they chose to terminate the communication on this very subject. Therefore, as far as the bilateral consular convention was concerned, partner one considered that the negotiation between them came to an end though an undesirable one. On the other hand, if partner one had chosen to respond to the counter proposal made by partner two, they would have had to respond negatively. And since Arabs, according to their cultural norms and values, would be unable to say no for a request because they would consider such a negative response rude, impolite, and would upset the counterpart, partner one preferred not to respond. In fact, partner one thought that partner two would eventually recognize the real answer (i.e. the negative one). This suggested that partner one (i.e. the Arabs) was judging people of other cultures (including partner two) from the point of view of their cultural background, because the absence of a response in such a case would be interpreted, by the Arabic cultural norms, as a negative answer.

However, since partner two was not a member of the Arabic culture, they had no means by which they could draw a conclusion that the absence of a response would mean no. As a consequence, partner two, in considering the decision of partner one concerning the consular convention, waited for a response. However, the wait turned out to be a perennial one. The situation between the two partners was that partner two, since he would like to have a bilateral consular convention with partner one kept waiting for a
response, and therefore they were periodically enquiring about partner one's decision whereas partner one, in order to avoid saying no were repeatedly responding in a polite manner that they were 'reviewing partner two's text with the competent authorities'. After almost a year of periodical inquiry about the progress in considering the consular convention, partner two regarded the matter as that the host government (partner one) 'was just being very, very slow, to the point of being negligent, in negotiating the issue which partner two wanted to solve'. Eventually, a career diplomat from partner two's embassy in the host country had a serious communication with a high ranking person in the government who told him that they actually did not want to proceed with the issue in question.

In brief, in the above UID, the different cultural styles and values regarding 'how' and when one would say no and 'how' and when one would say yes was the key problem which resulted in the undesired outcome of the activity although, as the analysis indicated, both partners were eager to reach a favourable solution as the issue was beneficial for both countries involved.

Partner one had reached an agreement with other governments in a bilateral consular convention which would resolve certain perennial consular disputes in an easier and more predictable manner. The text (i.e. the draft) of such an agreement was proposed to partner two in order for both partners to benefit from its advantages. In proposing such a text to partner two, partner one made a request which was accompanied by a desire that partner two would accept to reach an agreement with partner one on such a matter.
However, partner two was a government of a legalistic society which would insist on having very many details carefully defined in writing before it would reach a final agreement. Everything would have to undergo certain legislative approval at least by the Senate since it would require confirmation and meet certain standards. Such a process would seem very frustrating and discouraging, particularly for governments of another culture, such as the case in question (i.e. an Arab government). This circumstance, since it would be very difficult and time consuming, would often involve an impression of a negative answer. In order to avoid such unnecessary criteria, partner two provided a counter-text which was prepared in accordance with the American standards which, although it seemed to achieve the basic objectives, it differed radically in language and in certain essential respects.

Given that the two partners belonged to different cultures and acquired very diverse cultural background knowledge (i.e. the covert content of language), partner one, according to their usual cultural attitudes, regarded the rejection of their proposed text as a negative answer which invited misculturality (i.e. the clash between the two cultures involved in the activity). According to the Arabic cultural norms, it would be considered impolite to reject a request by simply saying no, and therefore partner one found it unnecessary to respond negatively in order not to disappoint partner two. In doing so, partner one thought that partner two would eventually recognize that the answer provided was actually no without expressing it flatly (this is actually the task of career diplomats working for partner two's embassy in the host country).
However, partner two, since they had not received an answer in a reasonable time, thought that partner one actually agreed on the counter-text (i.e. said yes), and they probably needed enough time to consider the matter carefully (exactly as partner two would usually do as mentioned above).

Nevertheless, the fact of the matter was that neither partner one nor partner two was the cause of what happened. Rather, the diversity of their cultural backgrounds, their cultural attitudes and beliefs (the covert content of language) played their active role and affected the final result of the diplomatic communication. The precise linguistic meaning of the two morpheme yes (as a positive answer) and no (as a negative answer) became ambiguous in the activity since the covert content of language overlapped with the overt content and caused misunderstanding and misinterpretation which eventuated the unfortunate result between the two countries.

5.3.3 Scene i: Arabic-African communication

The diplomatic communication of the third scene of Category C (i.e. scene i, Appendix 4) involved an Arab career diplomat and an African senior official. The two partners negotiated a financial matter.

The country of the Arabic career diplomat (partner one) granted a loan to an African country, and the duty of partner one was to follow up the loan and arrange its reimbursement. After having difficulty tracing the man who was in charge of the loan, partner one thought that the Minister of Finance (partner two) would be the right one who knew about the loan. After several exchanges between
the two partners as protocol requires, partner one asked partner two about the loan (scene i, Appendix 4):

(3) Arab 'I am sorry ... I could not understand ... my question is not about the wealth of the country or the wealth of the president but it is about the loan ... where is the loan?'

(4) Afri 'Actually ... eh ... the wealth of the country is the wealth of the president ... and you know ... it is the wealth of our president ... is the most important than anything else.'

Although partner two was not the man who was in charge of the loan as it appeared later that the Governor of the Central Bank was the man who provided partner one with the reference, partner two, from the beginning of the negotiation, politely attempted to inform partner one about the situation (i.e. the loan's story). He was repeatedly advising partner one about the loan, yet in terms of his cultural background. The message that partner two attempted to convey to his counterpart was that what partner one considered as a loan was added to the wealth of the president. That is, from the viewpoint of partner two, the loan was no longer considered to be so, rather it became a part of the wealth of the president according to the country's cultural rules. It was not strange in this African culture that the president would consider all the resources of the country to be his own personal wealth.

Given such clues of cultural background, partner two conveyed a very implicit message (i.e. an indirect speech act) to partner one alongside a desire or belief that partner one would understand and recognize the intended message depending on his understanding of the culture of the country in which he was stationed. The indirect
speech act, which was performed by partner two was an advice to partner one. That is, partner two, by terming the loan as the wealth of the country or the wealth of the president, was actually advising partner one to forget the whole matter and not to disturb or disappoint himself by pursuing the so-called loan since it became a part of the president's assets.

However, it appeared, as the scene indicated, that partner one was repeatedly unable to understand or recognize the intended act performed by his counterpart. This caused a great misunderstanding (i.e., misculturality) between the two partners. What was meant socio-culturally by partner two (according to the factors of the covert content of language) was misinterpreted and misunderstood by partner one who continuously understood the overt content of the message; that is, the literal meaning of it (according to the knowledge of grammar and lexicon). This was clear from the repetition of the same question, 'Where is the loan?', throughout the scenic unit despite the answer which was provided repeatedly.

As a consequence of partner one's misunderstanding of partner two's intended message, Result took place in the communication activity. That is, partner two, after acknowledging the circumstances and finding himself unable to provide more information or explain himself more explicitly, issued his final message (line 6, scene i, Appendix 4):

(6) Afri 'Well, I have told you everything that I know ... and frankly I don't have more information to add ... Sorry Mr Ambassador ... sorry ...  
(7) Arab OK ... thank you ... ...
Briefly, what terminated the diplomatic communication in the above scene was the diversity of the two partner's socio-cultural backgrounds which caused the unfortunate result.

Partner one, who belonged to the Arabic culture, was repeatedly unable to understand or grasp the intended message (the covert content of the message) which was performed by partner two who belonged to the African culture. The repeated message, 'the wealth of the country is the wealth of the president', performed by partner two actually disappointed partner one who asked specific information about the 'loan' in order to fulfill his duties and become free of any annoyance.

Partner two, who was deeply involved with his cultural attitudes and norms was unable to become free from these cultural matters in order to tell his counterpart that they were actually negotiating the same issue yet with different terminologies (i.e. the loan vs the wealth of the president). The result was undesirable for both partners and somehow heavy on partner one.

5.3.4 Scene j: European-Japanese communication

The fourth scene of diplomatic communication of Category C (scene j, Appendix 4) involved a European career diplomat and a Japanese counterpart. The European career diplomat (partner one) visited the Japanese career diplomat (partner two) in order to mutually exchange viewpoints concerning a number of international issues which concerned the countries of both partners. At the end of the meeting, partner one initiated the following exchange (scene j, Appendix 4):
(1) Euro 'Do you have extra copies of the last EEC Summit's communique?'
(2) Japa 'Yes ... yes!'
(3) Euro 'Could you send me a copy or two?'
(4) Japa 'Yes ... yes! ...'

After partner two's confirmation of having additional copies of the communique of the last European Economic Community Summit (lines 1 and 2 above), partner one made a request of his counterpart for having a copy or two of the communique (line 3 above). Partner two answered his counterpart's request positively (i.e. yes ... yes). That indicated that partner two would send the copies to partner one.

A week later, since partner one had not yet received the requested copies of the communique, he telephoned partner two in order to know the reason of the postponement. His move to his counterpart was as follows:

(5) Euro '... my friend, you have promised to send me copies of the communique of the last EEC Summit, but I haven't received any yet.'

The earlier positive answer provided by partner two (i.e. line 4, scene j) was understood by partner one as a 'promise'. In fact, partner two did repeat the positive answer two times (i.e. yes ... yes). However, in considering the utterance a promise or otherwise, the total factors of speech situation (the total speech act) in which the utterance was expressed must be considered. That is, the circumstances in which the 'yes ... yes' were uttered ought to be, in some respects, appropriate (Austin, 1962: 9-11). On the one
hand, in considering the earlier positive answer as a promise, partner two must utter the 'yes ... yes' seriously (normally with physical or mental actions or uttering further words) as a confirmation of having a certain intention to keep his word (i.e. his promise). On the other hand, partner one must hear, recognize and understand the positive answer as to seriously mean a promise. This indicated that a promise would be a two-way intention recognition and conception.

In the case at hand, what was 'linguistically' uttered by partner two was taken or understood by partner one as a real promise. That indicates that, in the view of partner one, partner two must keep his word and fulfil the promise (i.e. to send copies of the EEC Summit's communique to partner one). Nevertheless, as partner two had not sent the requested copies of the communique, partner one telephoned his counterpart in order to remind him and to implicitly signal the annoyance which was caused by the postponement. The answer he received startled him:

(6) Japa 'Me ... me ... I didn't promise ... oh my friend sorry ... I didn't mean it sorry ... I don't have them.'

According to partner two's countermove, the positive answer he provided to partner one was not a promise. He did not mean that the earlier 'yes ... yes' answer was a promise. Furthermore, he did not even have copies of the last EEC Summit communiqué. This indicated that his previous answer that looked like an agreement that he had copies of the communiqué (i.e. 'yes ... yes', line 2, scene j), that answer too was not a real agreement (i.e. not a real yes-answer). What was it then? Actually it was no more than a 'feed-back noise'.

171
According to Japanese, yes would be used instead of no in the context of request. Since it would be impolite, according to Japanese cultural norms, to answer a request by using no, they would always avoid utilizing no in such a context and try to find another means to convey their negative response. This would be one thing about Japanese yes (i.e. Hi or Hai in Japanese language). The other thing would be that when Japanese utilized yes, in a context other than that of a request, they would not usually mean that they agreed or expressed a positive answer, or would do or fulfil the thing being asked for. Rather by uttering yes they created a 'specific linguistic means', which was culturally bound, to inform their opposite numbers that they would follow, listen to, and hear them without necessarily agreeing with them. According to diplomats who served in Japan, (some of them interviewed and tape recorded for the purpose of this thesis, e.g. an Austrian career diplomat), this yes caused a great deal of difficulty for people of different cultures.

Indeed, and a case in point was the one at hand. Partner one, since he belonged to the West European culture understood partner two's first 'double-yes' as indicating an agreement that partner two did acquire copies of the communique whereas the second 'double-yes' was understood by him as conveying a promise by which partner two would fulfil partner one's request in order to satisfy his intentional states (i.e. desire, belief and intention). However, what happened was contrary to partner one's expectation, attitudes and cultural norms.

According to partner one's culture, and to West European culture, in general, if a partner expressed a yes-answer the opposite number would expect that he would act accordingly. In this
case, by saying *yes* (i.e. expressing a positive answer) a partner would actually regard (or place) himself under an obligation to implement the act concerned, at least morally. If he did not carry out the act he could be challenged by the opposite number (i.e. his counterpart) (an Austrian career diplomat-interview). This could probably be the reason behind the evasive answers (i.e. perhaps, may be; I think so; and so on) which would sometimes be provided by West-European counterparts in order to avoid unnecessary trouble.

In the light of such an explanation, partner one was severely disappointed by the misintentionality that happened between the two partners as a result of their different socio-cultural backgrounds. The diversity of the cultural attitudes and norms between partner one (the West-European partner) and partner two (the Japanese partner) resulted in a critical misinterpretation on the side of partner one. That is, partner one was unable to understand partner two's message and intention. This circumstance invited Result to take place in the diplomatic activity which implied that the collapse of diplomatic communication occurred.

In brief, in the scenic unit of diplomatic communication which was analysed above, two career diplomats belonged to different cultures, negotiated certain issues which had mutual interest for the benefit of their countries. The key problem which intervened in the activity was the different usage of *yes* (i.e. the linguistic morpheme indicating a positive answer) in the two cultures involved (i.e. West-European and Japanese). The overlapping between the linguistic knowledge of *yes* as a morpheme expressing a positive response to a yes/no-question according to the overt content of language and a socio-cultural knowledge of *yes* as a 'cultural
device' used by Japanese to fill a cultural gap of a polite negative response (instead of using no) in answering a request, or as a merely feed-back noise to inform partners in communication activity that their counterparts would actually be following and listening to what partners were saying without necessarily agreeing with what they said. Such an overlapping created problems of misinterpretation and misunderstanding for partner one which caused him dismay and eventuated the breakdown of the diplomatic activity.

5.3.5 Scene k: Greek-Bangladesh communication

The diplomatic communication of the last scenic unit of Category C (scene k, Appendix 4) occurred between a Greek career diplomat and a Bangladesh counterpart. After playing tennis, a number of career diplomats had an informal discussion in a club. While the Greek career diplomat was taking his turn in the discussion of British history and talking about Alexander-the-Great, the Bangladesh career diplomat (partner one) gazed at the Greek career diplomat (partner two) and said:

(1) Bang 'Look, Alexander was great to you but to me he was Alexander the invader. And here, he had no business to come to my country without an invitation'

(2) Gree ... ... ... ...

It appeared that partner one, in the above move, was evoked by the way and attitudes of partner two while he was talking about the Greek greatest hero, namely Alexander-the-Great. The situation and the attitudes of partner two triggered partner one's past and invited his socio-cultural background (i.e. belief, value and
traditional matters). These factors reminded partner one of the deep past and related him to the ancient history where he remembered a traditional anecdote about the invasion of his country by Alexander-the-Great whom partner two spoke of as the greatest hero. Such a situation invited the Initial Point, the point of initial cultural interference between the socio-cultural backgrounds of the two partners. Although the situation of the discussion was very intimate, and a number of career diplomats were participating in the discussion, the situation urged partner one, and probably spontaneously and without any intention to disappoint his friend (partner two), to initiate the above move with certain excitement which was dictated by the situation as well as the socio-cultural factors.

In fact, partner one had a great respect for the Greek civilization, and he regarded Greeks as the most civilized people in the Western world of whom Alexander was one of the greatest heroes of his time, and he was so to everybody whether in the Western world or elsewhere. However, as mentioned above, partner one's message, although it was delivered among friends in an informal discussion, caused a great misunderstanding between the two partners and thereby partner two was disappointed.

At linguistic level (at the level of the overt content of language according to grammatical and lexical knowledge), partner one's message was a 'statement'. It stated a piece of historical information of which the conditions of satisfaction (whether it was true or false) rested with the very deep past; with ancient history. Whether Alexander was the invader of partner one's country, or he visited (or invaded) his country with or without an 'invitation',

175
was already left to ancient history to decide. Unless something else influenced the diplomatic activity, these matters by themselves might not constitute a basis for dispute, and inspire misunderstanding or misjudgement between the two partners. In fact, the cultural attitudes and beliefs of both partners in dealing with this very theme was at the heart of the matter. The informal discussion and the intimate atmosphere turned out gradually to a sort of competition between the two partners in which each partner, driven by his cultural attitudes, attempted to 'score a point against the opposite number'. That is, each partner, given their different beliefs and values, tried to 'defeat' his counterpart.

Partner two, by integrating all factors of the situation, regarded the discussion as a 'humiliation' of his culturally-fundamental matters. In this respect, the 'purely linguistic' meaning of the phrases in partner one's move was no longer seen by partner two as merely having literal meaning. Rather, their overt contents were 'coloured' by the social and cultural factors of the situation which 'converted' the literal meaning of those phrases to socio-cultural meaning (i.e. according to the covert content of language). That is, the overt content of the message was influenced by the socio-cultural background of partner two.

The first part of partner one's above message, 'Alexander was the invader' was 'covertly' interpreted by partner two as an accusation that the Greek civilization was a civilization of invasion of other countries as Alexander was one of the greatest heroes of that civilization who made history. Whereas the other part of the message, that Alexander 'had no business to go to partner one's country without invitation, was understood by partner two as a
criticism (at best) and as a humiliation (at worst) to the Greek cultural attitudes and values which constituted the Greek's fundamental matters. As a consequence, partner two broke down the diplomatic communication with partner one without issuing a countermove (see line 2, scene k, Appendix 4). That is, partner 2 did not respond to partner one's move since he left the discussion swiftly and angrily. This indicated that Result occurred which meant that the collapse of the activity happened.

Unfortunately, the outcome of this scenic unit of communication was severe on partner two and therefore it produced 'Effect'. The effect of such an activity deteriorated not only the relationship between the two partners (i.e. the two friends) but also the relationship of their wives! The influence of the outcome of this activity on partner two proceeded significantly to affect his wife's relationship with partner two's wife. This was by all means an unfortunate 'effect' which was unexpected from a friendly, intimate discussion whose consequence led other participants to laugh.

In summary, the UID analysed above involved two career diplomats from different cultures who had mutual misunderstanding of the situation, messages and intentions.

Partner one, who belonged to the Bangladesh culture, was drawn by the surrounding circumstances (e.g. the cultural attitudes of his counterpart) and uttered a message which had two contents; overt and covert. The overt content of the message denoted the literal meaning which was produced by its linguistic shape (i.e. a statement). Linguistically, the proposition of this statement was either true or false depending on the situation which had deep roots in ancient history. The covert content of the message, which was
associated with various social and cultural factors of the situation and participants, connoted a number of indirect (implicit) speech acts including accusation and criticism (as discussed above).

Unlike partner one who stated what he felt as historical facts yet he probably unintentionally misused the occasion and mismanaged the situation, partner two, who was a member of Greek culture, misunderstood and misinterpreted partner one's message as if it conveyed an accusation and criticism to his culture. Such a misunderstanding, unintentionally, involved partner two in an intolerant position as his cultural beliefs, attitudes and tradition were attacked, and his civilization was criticised. However, instead of rejecting or wisely challenging what he mistakenly understood and judged as an accusation and criticism, he preferred not to utter a word as a counter accusation or otherwise as his civilization was in no need to be defended.

The final outcomes of the activity in question were the collapse of the diplomatic communication, deteriation of the two partners' relationship and, as an effect, damage to the relationship of the two partners' wives. All these unfortunate consequences happened as a direct result of the diversity of the two partners' cultural background knowledge (i.e. the covert content of language which interfered with the overt content of language and eventuated the severe results.

5.4 The secondary class of the data

The empirical data which was analysed in the previous sections belonged to the primary class of Categories B and C. That means, as mentioned in Chapter 3, it was the data which was derived from the
immediate personal experience of, or known to, the diplomat-researcher.

This section will deal with another kind of empirical data which belongs to the secondary class of Category C. Such data was drawn from the experience of the career diplomats who worked in the field of international diplomacy. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 25 out of 55 career diplomats, who were interviewed, agreed to be tape-recorded. The evaluation which they provided as well as the self-reported diplomatic events and incidents would increase our understanding of the nature of current diplomatic communication and provide supportive means to the data being already presented and analysed (the data of the primary class of Categories B and C), throughout the previous sections of this chapter.

Five questions, which belonged to Category B of the interview scheme (see Appendix 1), were asked to the career diplomats in order to detect the problems of misunderstanding and misinterpretation which diplomats encounter in conducting international diplomacy. The key of these five questions was question 4. 'By definition diplomats belong to different cultures, do you feel that this fact can affect the outcome of their communication?' Most of the career diplomats who were interviewed answered the question positively (i.e. yes, very much so; well yes I do; no doubt about that; of course; not merely can affect but does affect; for sure; and so on). Only four of the total number mentioned above 'attempted' to avoid answering the question in a straightforward manner. Of these four, two, at least, unintentionally surrendered their previous position and revealed positive answers. For example, an Indian career diplomat answered the above question evasively. His answer was:
'Differences of cultures and ethos between the diplomat and those with whom he communicates create problems as well as challenges ...' (an Indian career diplomat - interview)

And in answering question 6, 'Throughout your diplomatic communication have you ever been in a situation where you misunderstood your counterpart's message or intention?', he responded negatively. His answer was:

'Well I am embarrassed to say that this has never happened ...'

However, as the discussion progressed, he recalled and reported a number of incidents which had happened to him personally and resulted in mutual misunderstanding with his counterparts. To mention only one of these incidents, the Indian career diplomat reported:

'And, another example, we had a meeting and the person was inviting me, and of course you expect the person to say that 'We hope you can come', and so on. And probably that was what he wanted to say, but he used the word and said to me, We expect you to come! Now then, there is a very clear example of wrong use of language, because when you say, 'We expect you to come' to a person it is an order, and you don't give an order to your own chief guest.' (an Indian career diplomat - interview)

However, this very incident actually caused a critical misunderstanding between the Indian career diplomat and his partner (i.e. the host) who was a member of the Arabic culture. As the analysis of scene e (in this chapter) has demonstrated, members of the Arabic culture would regard and realize an invitation in accordance with their cultural norms; that is in the context of insistence and emphatic repetition. These cultural norms would be
considered as the conditions of a 'real invitation' and would be observed in offering or receiving an invitation. Therefore, when the Indian career diplomat was invited by an Arab partner, the expression being used, 'We expect you to come', was actually demonstrating the Arabs' real invitation and showing their generous hospitality. This expression, however, was misunderstood and misinterpreted by the Indian career diplomat as an order and described by him as a wrong use of language as he judged it by his own cultural norms in such a context, namely the context of invitation in which Indian would use expressions such as 'We hope you can come', or 'Come if you are free' as discussed in scene e of this chapter, which would be regarded by Arabs (according to their cultural norms) as impolite expressions to initiate an invitation. The expression 'We expect you to come' (or even 'You must come' or otherwise) was not an order in this context as interpreted by the Indian career diplomat. Rather it was the most polite expression for an invitation according to the Arabs' cultural norms. It would mean that the person being invited would be regarded as the chief guest of the party which originally initiated in his honour.

Another example of those career diplomats who attempted at first sight to avoid answering question 4, in a forthright manner and then shifted their position was a Syrian career diplomat who answered the question almost negatively. His response was:

'I don't think that the cultural background has a tremendous effect when the diplomat has the right characteristics' (A Syrian career diplomat - interview)
Proceeding in the discussion about the effect of the cultural background, he slightly changed his initial position by saying:

"Undoubtedly the question of language and the cultural background have a great effect upon diplomatic contacts" (A Syrian career diplomat - interview)

In answering question 6 (which was stated above, also see Appendix 1), he said:

"This is an important problem which can occur between diplomats, but it has not happened to me so far, because when I don't understand the other party, I try twice and three times until I do - unless he does not want to understand" (A Syrian career diplomat - interview)

Having asked about a specific incident, the Syrian career diplomat replied:

"I do not recall such an incident, but it is likely to occur because of the inability of realizing the meaning of some of the expressions used. However, those also can be overcome. Sometimes the other party understands what I meant and sometimes he doesn't, but we overcome that."

Having asked about the means of overcoming misunderstanding, the Syrian career diplomat added:

"We overcome that by postponing the meeting because of the need of more clarifications of the subject under discussion and negotiation, and that is why there was no progress and no results" (A Syrian career diplomat - interview)

These two examples could imply that some of the career diplomats might not realize how far the diversity of socio-cultural backgrounds could affect the outcome of their diplomatic
communication. And therefore, they might consider the impediment of any progress in the activity or the absence of any results as normal happenings in diplomatic communication or negotiation which can be taken for granted irrespective of the causes.

Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats, who were interviewed and tape-recorded, answered the above question positively, in a straightforward manner and provided clear examples derived from their immediate experience in the field of international diplomacy which demonstrated the inevitable effect of the diversity of socio-cultural backgrounds of international diplomats on their activities.

In order to mention some examples without, by all means, exhausting all the possibilities of the tape-recorded empirical data, let us consider here excerpts from the responses which were provided by the career diplomats in answering the three main questions of Category B of the interview scheme (i.e. questions 4, 6 and 8, see Appendix 1, for examples of the career diplomats' responses see Appendix 5).

Michael Tait, a British ambassador, answered these questions (which will be considered in order) as follows:

A4 'Yes I think it can indeed affect the outcomes in the communication, I don't think it needs, and if the diplomat is aware of the differences between cultural background in his country and the cultural background of the country with which he is trying to deal, he will avoid getting a wrong message, but sometimes it is quite difficult whether it is in the form of language used or whether it is in the actions of the people concerned, both in the linguistic sense and in the behavioural sense. I think that the diplomat does have to be well briefed' (M. Tait - interview)
A6 'Well, I think to claim that I had always understood what was being said to me may be the claim of excessive pride could not be sustained. But I can't remember when I had a gross error about understanding. And I think that the greatest error of understanding, the greatest problems about misunderstanding arise where we have a different style of address and communication because of cultural differences ...' (M. Tait - interview)

A8 'Well, I think yes. Sometimes there has been a difference of understanding. Quite obviously sometimes we have conversation in Arabic, the last reflection on my own inadequacy in that difficult language, and there is a recent case where I think I misunderstood a message, not tragically, but you know the emphasis was wrong. It was an error and the error was on my part because the discussion was in Arabic and I didn't quite get it right ...

An American career diplomat provided the following answers (A4 and A6):

'Well, yes I do. And let me say in what sense I think that is true. Communication is not in words only but it also has to do with attitudes, misconceptions and personal prejudices and cultural prejudices which can affect understanding. I am sure that if I could take the time to reflect further on this I could think of incidents in my own career where I have misunderstood the message that some other diplomat was trying to send to me and therefore proceeded on an erroneous notion ...' (An American career diplomat - interview - see Appendix 5 for his entire responses).

An Austrian career diplomat provided the following answers:

A4 'I strongly agree with you because different cultures make also different education and different viewpoints. So sometimes when one is talking the same language but the meaning in the words can be (...) different. For example, we in Austria, as a neighbouring country of the Eastern Europeans, we speak quite often the same language ... but we feel that their use of German is little bit different from ours. So we feel that there are some problems in understanding' (An Austrian career diplomat - interview)
'Not in official discussion, but in private discussion often! But I can't recall a specific example. I should or I must think about it!'

'Yeah. I think it is in the last time I was in Mexico that I was, according to my opinion, I had a positive attitude to some projects, problems or whatever. And I was trying to express this positive attitude but it was understood as a negative one, so completely the other way around. It was stand basically for a language problem because my origin - my Spanish was Spanish, Spanish and this was a South-American diplomat and there is some different ... just about different. They misunderstood me because my Spanish like my wife's Spanish [his wife was from Spain], so I speak Spanish quite well but in Spanish way and not in South American way' (An Austrian career diplomat - interview).

Ambassador Young Woo Park, a South Korean career diplomat, answered the earlier mentioned questions in the following way:

'Yes, diplomat, unless he spent, I think each diplomat, ... good part of his life usually most of the diplomats upon in his own country and different cultural background he live abroad in the foreign land where there is also different cultural, social and the background different, background and also different tradition, they come across with the encounter, different cultural values and different ways of expression and different communication - forms of communication. Therefore, when you are among different, among diplomats with different cultural backgrounds there are the possibilities and rooms for certain misunderstanding or lack of the identical views' (Y. Woo Park - interview)

'Well, I think in a couple of occasions where I was engaged in the certain negotiation of the issue of the conflicting interests between his own home government and the country of his counterpart that the misunderstanding occurs about the interpretation of the real intention of your counterpart, the sincerity, sometimes I think mistrust coming from, based on the different expressions' (Y. Park - interview)
'Yes, it was ... It had happened, I think the ... when I want to say a certain meaning, the meaning of expression in English but the meaning was, meaning of certain words in English was misunderstood by the counterpart ... that is purely that means that caused the misunderstanding of my intentions, what I really meant to say ...' (Y.W. Park, A South Korean ambassador - interview)

A Russian career diplomat provided the following responses:

'A question of culture, different cultures, of course are bringing and being brought in certain particular circumstances ... with certain cultural, religious, linguistic background of course it cannot but affect the mentality and political and other use of certain particular diplomats, or the whole diplomatic service ... of course, it may cause in certain circumstances ... it may cause even serious political shortcomings and mistakes and errors. It may bring about certain serious political consequences ...' (A Russian career diplomat - interview)

'Oh! of course one may remember this. I think in every diplomatic service, one has, for instance, a diplomatic life more than thirty years, of course one may recall situations like that. Sure ... sure. Sometimes even there are linguistic misunderstanding which may have certain unpleasant consequences' (A Russian career diplomat - interview)

'Not personally, but there were cases of serious misunderstanding due to very poor knowledge of foreign languages. One may remember a case when a wrong translation of a certain proverb led to very high spirits of a certain leader and nearly broke certain conversation ... wrong translation. When the ... it means that responsibility rests, of course not with leadership but with junior translator who made a mistake ...

Though I must say, sometimes linguistic difficulties may lead to very serious consequences. For instance, there is the famous Resolution 242 which was accepted by Security Council after the Israeli aggression of 1967. The linguistic ... interpretation of definite or indefinite article in one paragraph [the ambassador referred to the expression of Israel's withdrawal from The occupied Arab territories versus occupied territories] always meant a lot ... meant a lot because boiled down to, you know, very serious political misinterpretation of the whole thing by Zionist government of Israel' (A Russian career diplomat - interview)
These examples clearly disclosed the problem of misunderstanding in the activities of international diplomats, and demonstrated 'how' much career diplomats would suffer in conducting their activities and fulfilling their duties due to the diversity of their socio-cultural backgrounds. All the examples presented revealed one common feature; that is, the diplomatic communications resulted in disappointment of the partners involved and, as a consequence, produced no results but misculturality and misintentionality between the partners, and the collapse of their activities. The reasons for these consequences, as being revealed by the career diplomats, who conducted the activities presented here, were the differences in the socio-cultural backgrounds. That is, the covert content of language played its vivid role in the activities, as mentioned in the analysis of the earlier sections of this chapter, which interfered with the overt content of language (i.e. the linguistic knowledge) and created the undesired results despite the fact that these activities were conducted by highly experienced and knowledgeable career diplomats in the realm of international diplomacy.

5.5 The tertiary class of the data

The empirical data of the tertiary class of Category C was derived from the questionnaire which was discussed in Chapter 3. As repeatedly mentioned there, this data would provide a quantitative evidence to support the results of the analysis of the empirical data of the primary class as well as the data of the secondary class which was presented in the previous section of this chapter (i.e. the data derived from tape-recorded interview). That is, the data,
which was analysed in the primary class and the data presented in the secondary class of Category C, would be measured by the quantitative data of the tertiary class which was derived from the questionnaire. The intention behind such a practice would be to provide a supportive evidence to what was previously analysed (i.e. empirical data of the primary and secondary classes) by calculating the number of responses, which were obtained from international career diplomats in responding to the questionnaire's items which concerned the effect of different cultural backgrounds of career diplomats on the outcome of diplomatic communication, and representing them in percentages.

Part two of the questionnaire, since it dealt with the nature of current diplomatic communication, would concern us in this chapter. This part contained five main items (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 A and B) which corresponded with the five questions (4, 5, 6 7 and 8) of Category B of the interview scheme as mentioned in Chapter 3 (see Appendices 1 and 2).

The career diplomats were provided with a 'five-point scale' to measure each item and sub-item of the questionnaire. The five point scale was either:

- Strongly agree (SA)
- Agree (AG)
- Strongly disagree (SD)
- Disagree (DA)
- Uncertain (UC)

or:
Almost all time (AT)
Often (OF)
Sometimes (ST)
Never (NE)
Uncertain (UC)

By successively calculating the five items of part two of the questionnaire according to the five-point scale, each item scored the following percentages (i.e. %, see Appendix 6) which would be presented in tables and shown in diagrams.

**Item 1** 'In conducting international relations, diplomats of different cultures encounter difficulties in understanding the exact meaning of messages of their counterparts.'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>DA</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 indicated that the assumption in Item 1 received the highest percentage (i.e. 65.9%). By integrating the first two points, in Table 1 above (i.e. SA and AG), as opposed to the next two points (i.e. SD and DA) then the final results of Item 1 would become 72.7% in favour of the assumption as opposed to 22.7% which would be against the assumption.
Diagram 1 would represent the ratios of the responses which were provided by the career diplomats concerning Item 1 according to the five-point scale:

![Diagram 1: Difficulties in understanding messages](image)

Diagram 1  Difficulties in understanding messages

Item 2  'When diplomats of different cultures negotiate international relations, misunderstanding or misinterpretation of intention is likely to occur.'

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>DA</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>20.45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 indicated that the assumption in Item 2 received the highest percentage (i.e. 75%). By integrating the percentages of the first two points (i.e. SA and AG) as opposed to the percentages of the next two points (i.e. SD and DA) then the final result of Item 2 would become 77.3% in favour of the assumption as opposed to 22.7% against the assumption.

Diagram 2 would show the ratios of the responses of the career diplomats with regard to Item 2 according to the five-point scale:

![Diagram 2](image)

Diagram 2  Misunderstanding or misinterpretation between career diplomats in diplomatic communication
Item 3  'Concerning your diplomatic career, have you ever felt that you misunderstood the intentions of other diplomats?'

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AT</th>
<th>OF</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>72.72</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 indicated that the assumption in Item 3 received the highest percentage (i.e. 72.72%). By adding the percentage of the second point (i.e. OF) to the percentage of the third point (i.e. ST), the final result which supported the assumption of this item would become 81.8%.

Diagram 3 would exhibit the ratios of the career diplomats' responses as to Item 3 according to the five-point scale:

Diagram 3 Partners' misunderstanding of their counterparts' intentions
Item 4 'When you discuss international relations with diplomats of different cultures, have you ever felt that they misunderstood your intentions?'

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>OF</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>13.63</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 indicated that the assumption in Item 4 received the highest percentage (i.e. 75%). By adding the percentage of the second point (i.e. OF) to the percentage of the third point (i.e. ST), then the final result which supported the assumption of this item would become 84%.

Diagram 4 would represent the ratios of the responses of the career diplomats concerning Item 4 according to the five-point scale:

Diagram 4 Counterparts' misunderstanding of their partners' intentions
Item 5A: 'In dealing with international relations misunderstanding between diplomats of different cultures can lead to:

A Unsuccessful results

Table 5A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SA</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>DA</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>79.54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The result of item 5A clearly reflected the absolute agreement of the assumption that misunderstanding between international diplomats would lead to unsuccessful results (i.e. 79.54). Adding the result of the first point in the above table (i.e. SA) to the results of the second point (i.e. AG) the final result would represent the absolute agreement (i.e. 95.45%). Although there were two responses (i.e. 2/44 = 4.54%) which showed an uncertainty, or, as in the diplomatic practice, cautiousness of two career diplomats, remarkably enough there was no single response against the assumption of Item 5A.

Diagram 5A would show the ratios of the responses of the career diplomats with regard to item 5A according to the five-point scale:
Diagram 5A  Unsuccessful results of diplomatic communication activities

Item 5B  'Breakdown in the communication activity'

Table 5B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>DA</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>45.45</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>22.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5B indicated that the point which received the highest percentage was AG (i.e. agree, 45.45%) whereas the counterpoint DA (i.e. disagree) received 27.27%. This indicated that the majority
of the responses were in favour of the assumption. This would imply that when misunderstanding occurred in diplomatic communication, the breakdown of the activity would be most likely to follow. That is, in the case at hand, the ratio between the occurrence of the breakdown of the activity to the absence of it would almost be 2 to 1 (i.e. 2:1). By adding the first point (SA) to the second point (AG), and the third point (SD) to the fourth point (DA), the final result of this item would become 47.72% in favour of the assumption whereas 29.44% were against the assumption.

Diagram 5B would represent the ratios of the career diplomats' responses as to Item 5B according to the five-point scale.

Diagram 5B  Breakdown in the communication activity
CHAPTER 6
CURRENT DIPLOMATIC SPEECH CHARACTERISTICS

6.1 Stage three of the empirical data - Categories D and E

The analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 dealt with the core of this thesis, namely the role and effect of the socio-cultural backgrounds of international diplomats in conducting and managing their activities, and exhibited the problem of how the diversity of cultural backgrounds caused cross-cultural misunderstanding in the language of international diplomacy. The analysis of the empirical data of stage one, Category A dealt with the nature of diplomatic negotiation of Reykjavik Summit (Chapter 4) whereas Stage Two, Categories B and C dealt with the nature of current practice of diplomatic communication (Chapter 5). As analysed in the mentioned chapters, the inability of the career diplomats to grasp what was intended by what was expressed in various communication situations, was not due to linguistic knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of grammar and lexicon, the overt content of language) but rather to the diversity of their sociocultural background (i.e. the covert content of language). Such a cultural matter led to different interpretations due to the overlapping between the overt and the covert contents of language and caused misculturality or misintentionality which eventuated the unfortunate results.

This chapter will deal with the second point of the thesis which was stated in section 3 of Chapter 2. That is, some current diplomatic speech would be extremely likely to provoke disputes as well as conflicts between career diplomats and their independent countries. As we shall see and deal with in this chapter, the
aggressive linguistic speech elements used by some career diplomats would reflect what might be considered as 'attacking attitudes'. Such a style of speech would require tact and politeness, the corner-stone of international diplomacy. However, it could be argued, to a certain extent, that some of these unpleasant features which characterized current diplomatic speech might be attributed to misculturality or misintentionality. That is, what would appear to be aggressive, offensive or undiplomatic speech could be regarded as a result of judging the so-called aggressive speech from the point of view of different cultural backgrounds.

6.1.1 The primary class data of Category D

As stated in Chapter 3, stage three would consist of two categories of empirical data (i.e. D and E), each of which would have a correlation with the so-called 'aggressive' or 'undiplomatic' speech. The first of these two categories (i.e. Category D) would contain data from the personal experience of the diplomat-researcher (i.e. the diplomatic diary) as well as experience of other career diplomats which were known to the diplomat-researcher. The second category (i.e. category E) would comprise data from magazines such as Time. Each of the two categories would have three classes of data; primary, secondary and tertiary. The empirical data of the primary class of Category D would comprise two scenes, namely 1 and m.

6.1.1.1 Scene 1: Arabic-French communication

The diplomatic communication of scene 1 (see Appendix 7) occurred between a French career diplomat and an Arabic counterpart.
while they were in Paris, negotiating certain mutual affairs for the benefit of their countries. After dealing with several issues, the Arabic partner (partner one) initiated the following move to his French counterpart (partner two):

(1) Arab 'You know we have hoped we can participate in similar cultural activities here this year!'

(2) Fren 'Do you think that you're capable of doing so!!

In order to understand the above exchange, some background information should be noted. Since 1971, partner one's country has initiated two lengthy seminars each of which would last for months with the primary aim of exchanging knowledge and experience with scholars and professionals from different countries so that people could have mutual understanding in order to minimize the differences between them when they meet, to learn about each other's culture or to benefit from the other's advanced knowledge. The first of these two seminars would deal with a highly specialized field of diplomacy and related themes (such as politics, economics and law) and therefore it has been termed 'The Diplomatic Seminar' (in the sense of 'diplomatic season' as it lasts between three and four months each year in the winter whereas the second one, which has been called 'The Cultural Seminar' (also in the sense of 'cultural season'), would deal with a variety of human knowledge and activities including literary, historical and religious matters. Including those who participated in the two seminars, a number of French scholars and professionals were invited to participate especially in the 'Diplomatic Seminar'.

199
At the linguistic level, partner one's move (line 1, scene 1, Appendix 7) denoted that he was still hoping to be permitted to participate in 'similar activities in Paris'. However, the same message, according to the covert content of language, conveyed an indirect speech act, namely a request (or a polite demand if we considered the reciprocal principle between diplomats in the sense of diplomatic parity). The implication of the covert content of partner one's message is that partner one made a request of partner two for 'inviting' professionals from his country to participate in the French cultural activities in order to present part of their cultural activities to the French people. This request was certainly accompanied with an intentional state (i.e. a desire, belief or intention) that partner two would recognize the request made and fulfil the intended act (the invitation) in order to satisfy partner one's intentional state.

Partner two's countermove, according to the overt content of language (the linguistic knowledge) was a yes/no-question. However, the embedded clause in this countermove (i.e. That-clause, 'that you're capable of doing so') did connote an implicit message. Partner two, according to the embedded clause, was actually questioning the ability or the capability of partner one as to whether he could participate in French activities or if he 'had the qualifications' which would allow him to do so. This embedded clause could probably be reconstructed as follows:

'Are you capable of participating in French cultural activities?'
Given the equality (i.e. the mutual status) between the two partners in the negotiation, partner two's message was very strange and 'impolite' in the view of partner one as he interpreted its covert meaning in relation to his sociocultural background (i.e. Arabic cultural background) as a scorn. That is, the message conveyed by partner two, given the context and factors in which it was expressed as mentioned above, would be used by members of the Arabic culture to convey a scorn. Therefore, partner one regarded partner two's countermove as conveying a contemptuous response. This situation cleared the way for the Initial Point to take place in the communication activity.

However, partner one, attempting to minimize the effect of partner two's countermove on him, issued his second move which was, in fact, a response to partner two's 'allegations' that partner one would be unable to participate in French cultural activities. This response explained the reason behind partner one's desire or intention to participate in the French activities:

(3) Arab 'We will try ... we are so interested in introducing our cultural aspects to the French people.'

(4) Fren 'Do you think that you will satisfy our people?'

(5) Arab 'Well, ... we hope we can present something attractive to them, at least from our Folkloric activities which French people like so much!'

Clearly, partner two's previous countermove changed the course of the communication activity as well as partner one's style and 'tone'. Although partner one was the initiator of the scenic unit of diplomatic communication in question (line 1, scene 1), the style
and attitude of partner two put him 'in the defensive position' as his people's ability to participate in the French cultural activities was criticized and his culture's role in attracting people was minimized by his counterpart. And despite his disappointment which was caused by partner two's scorn and which was repeated twice (lines 2 and 4, scene 1), partner one, in resisting his counterpart's attack on his people and culture, continued his defence calmly and in a friendly manner in order to achieve his objectives and to convince his counterpart of his people's ability and capability of 'attracting French people, at least, in the realm of 'folkloric activities' which French people like so much' (lines 3 and 5, scene 1). There was a very crucial element that urged partner one to pursue such a style in his communication with partner two. In addition to being a member of the Arabic culture, partner one was a Muslim. And if he wanted to properly maintain his religious duties he must follow the Islamic teachings concerning the way and manner Muslims must pursue in the communication with the People of the Book (i.e. Jews and Christians). According to the holy QUR'AN, if Muslims wanted to communicate with the People of the Book 'they would not be allowed to argue with them except in a kind way and friendly manner unless the dispute would involve those who would inflict wrong or treat unjustly ...' (The holy QUR'AN 29: 46). Because partner two was a Christian (i.e. a member of the People of the Book), partner one did not attempt to argue with him. Rather, he dealt with him, as far as he could, in a friendly manner by using appropriate means of conduct and persuasion in order to comply with the Islamic teachings (e.g. see his response to partner two's scorn, lines 3 and 5).
Nevertheless, instead of mutual respect and persuasion, partner two appeared to exploit the friendly manner of his counterpart and increased his 'attack' by issuing the following unamicable utterance:

(6) Fren 'Can I take this as a joke?!
(7) Arab 'Well ... I ... I don't think we have been joking ...!'

At this stage of the communication activity, misculturality (i.e. the Central Point, the point of critical clash between the two partners' socio-cultural backgrounds) emerged. On the one hand partner one felt that he really involved himself in an unfortunate situation. His counterpart, by his style and attitude was not helping him pursue his friendly manner in dealing with the issue at hand in order to reach an amicable outcome which concerned both partners' countries. All the expressions used by partner two, especially the third one (line 6, scene 1), were totally unacceptable by any means, since they reflected partner two's pretentious superiority over his counterpart, because he belonged to an advanced country whereas the counterpart belonged to a third-world country. Therefore, partner one regarded partner two's usage of language and attitudes as outrageous, offensive and aggressive in respect to his socio-cultural background as well as to the Islamic teachings which he was following in the negotiation with his counterpart. The expression 'Can I take this as a joke?', which was used by partner two (line 6, scene 1) irrespective to the formal context of negotiation between two international diplomats (each of whom was representing his country) affected partner one. Such an
expression was to partner one, beyond toleration since it conveyed an insult not only to himself but to his country.

On the other hand, partner two, for some reason, appeared very excited. This suggested that he was disappointed by partner one's responses which did not meet with his expectations. Partner two thought that his style and attitudes would make partner one inferior and, as a consequence, surrender and accept his counterpart's views about the matter under discussion. However, since partner one persisted in negotiating the matter in a persuasive manner, partner two was unsatisfied and accordingly disappointed. This could explain his final countermove by which he reached the 'peak' of insulting partner one:

(8) Fren 'Monsieur! ... you invited French professionals because you need to learn from them ... but you have nothing ... your little country have ... has nothing to add to French knowledge!'  
(9) Arab 'Merci Monsieur ... Merci beaucoup ... and thank you so much!'

Clearly, every phrase in partner two's countermove above (line 8, scene 1) was offensive, aggressive and certainly undiplomatic. Such linguistic behaviour of partner two led partner one to eventually terminate the diplomatic negotiation with his counterpart. This implied that the Result had taken place in this scenic unit of diplomatic communication.

Briefly, the above scenic unit of diplomatic communication involved two partners belonging to different cultures. They negotiated a number of cultural matters which had relevant
consideration to both sides. However, when the two partners had reached the point of examining the mutual goodwill, which would practically verify the result that had been reached, the negotiation collapsed.

On the one hand, partner one, in issuing his first move, made a request of his counterpart for participating in the cultural activities of partner two's country. Instead of receiving an appropriate/straightforward answer to his request, the message he received was a yes/no-question which had, at least, two contents; overt and covert. The overt content of the message denoted its linguistic meaning according to the knowledge of grammar and lexicon (i.e. the literal meaning of the yes/no-question) whereas the covert content of the message conveyed a scorn as understood by partner one. This scorn, which was escalated in every proceeding message of partner two, reached an unacceptable and intolerable level in which it turned out to be an insult and humiliation to partner one. At this stage partner one preferred to terminate the conduct with his counterpart in order to avoid further offensive or aggressive actions.

On the other hand, partner two, for unknown reasons, appeared to be disappointed by partner one's first move during which he made a request of his counterpart for an invitation to participate in the cultural activities in partner two's country (line 1, scene 1, Appendix 7). The request for the invitation seemed to violate partner two's instructions or cultural norms and practice. And, as it appeared later, this request was something which was totally unexpected by him. However, instead of using persuasive language to escape from the situation in which he was involved, his
disappointment led him to utilize an insulting and offensive style of language. The escalation of his aggressive style was the main cause of the collapse of diplomatic activity. This collapse affected what had been reached in the preceding issues.

6.1.1.2 Scene m: Arabic-European communication

The diplomatic communication of the second scenic unit of the primary class of category D (i.e. scene m, Appendix 5) involved a European career diplomat and an Arabic counterpart. When the European career diplomat (who had an appointment with an Arab State Minister for Foreign Affairs) entered the front office of the Minister, the head of the office (partner one) rose, with his usual broad smile on his face, and welcomed the European career diplomat (partner two) and said (see scene m, Appendix 7):

(1) Arab 'The Minister will be with you in about five minutes time ... Please have a seat.'

(2) Euro (with his face became grim) 'No, I must meet him now ... it is exactly 9 o'clock now ... my appointment!' 

In the above exchange, partner one made a request of partner two for waiting for some minutes until the Minister returned to his office, as he had been summoned by the President of the country. The request was met by an immediate No-answer from partner two who ought to observe the cultural norms of the country in which he was stationed. As repeatedly mentioned in Chapter 5, members of the Arabic culture would not utilize the morpheme No to answer a request as it would be regarded, by their cultural norms as rude and, as a consequence, it might disappoint the opposite number. By the same
cultural norms, the morpheme No ought not to be used with members of the Arabic culture in the context of request, such as the case at hand, for the same reason. However, partner two, in addition to utilizing the morpheme No to answer the request of the Arabic counterpart (partner one), employed inappropriate clauses and phrases for diplomatic communication. The use of the sentence, 'I must meet him now!' (line 2, scene m), after the use of No which expressed a refusal to partner one's request, would be considered impolite for the context in which it was expressed since it was incompatible with the diplomatic practice and convention. Partner two, by such linguistic behaviour, appeared to mismanage the situation and misuse the diplomatic convention. The modal auxiliary verb Must, which expressed an obligation or compulsion, ought not to be used in such a context. Partner two, by imposing such an obligation to his counterpart (who was still rising and smiling to him) was certainly not making a request of partner one for meeting the Minister but rather he was conveying an order to his counterpart (or probably he warned him, given his facial expressions - see scene m) to 'bring the Minister back immediately!' That means, the use of Must imposed an obligatory burden on partner one as if he were responsible for the absence of the Minister and therefore he was obliged to bring him back immediately to meet partner two (see Leech, 1971: 71).

Nevertheless, partner two had an appointment with the Minister at 'exactly 9 o'clock'. Therefore he expected, according to his cultural norms, to meet the Minister at that very time. However, although he was absolutely right according to anybody's cultural rules in normal circumstances he should have acknowledged the urgent
duties of the profession of which he was a member (i.e. diplomacy).

This situation was about to be explained by partner one:

(3) Arab (still smiling) 'You're right, but the Minister ... ... 
(4) Euro ... ... (overlapping) ... I can't wait ... I am so busy ... and I must see him now.'
(5) Arab 'But he is not in his office now ... He was summoned by the president for consultation in a very serious matter and he will be with you in just five minutes ... he just rang me and asked me about your appointment.'

The problem arising here was that partner two was unable to wait in the front office until the Minister could come. He believed that a person like him (i.e. as an Ambassador in the country) should be awaited in spite of the situation in which the opposite number was involved. This conception prevented partner two from listening to partner one's explanation of what happened. Therefore, he repeated what he had said before, 'I must see him now!' (line 4, scene m). This suggested that he might have believed that the Minister had been inside his office. Such a circumstance put partner one in a very embarrassing situation. On the one hand, he knew that the Minister was not in his office and, on the other hand, partner two was insisting on meeting him immediately. In acknowledging partner two's position, partner one calmly attempted to explain to his counterpart why the Minister was absent by providing him with the complete 'story' of the unexpected event which had caused the absence of the Minister (line 5, scene m). However, this attempt, although it was made in such detail, failed
to convince partner two and, therefore, the No-answer emerged again in partner two's countermove followed by the clause 'I must leave' which contained the modal auxiliary verb Must which again at the overt content of language expressed an obligatory reason for his leaving, whereas at the covert content of language expressed an obligatory reason for his leaving, whereas at the covert content of language conveyed an indirect speech act, namely an accusation that partner one (and certainly his Minister included) did not respect the appointment which had been made for him. Such behaviour terminated the diplomatic communication between the two partners. The result was disappointing for all partners concerned including partner two who angrily left the office of the Minister without achieving his goal on the one hand, and on the other hand, as a consequence of his unamicable behaviour could harm his relationship with senior officials of the country in which he served.

As the analysis demonstrated in the above scenic unit of diplomatic communication, the use of language should be appropriate to the context of situation as well as to the cultural norms of the parties involved. Deviation from these conditions would almost invariably (as discussed in the earlier analysis) result in the breakdown of diplomatic activities. Such a result might eventuate a far reaching outcome which would not be unlikely to occur in the realm of diplomatic relations (e.g. including a breakdown of diplomatic relations between two countries).

The request which was made by partner one, after welcoming partner two, passed unrecognized and unfulfilled accordingly as partner two rejected such a request by the use of the 'No-answer' which reflected an ignorance to partner one's cultural norms (in the
context of request) which ought to be recognized and observed in
dealing with the people of the host country. This would be the very
basic task of any diplomatic representative if he had ambitions to
deal with them effectively in order to achieve his country's
objectives.

However, partner two was disappointed when he arrived at the
front office of the Minister and received 'undesired information'
that the Minister had an assignment for some minutes and would
return shortly to meet with partner two. Having had certain
conceptions and attitudes related to his cultural norms, partner two
conceived that it would be improper, with respect to himself, to
wait beyond the assigned time of the appointment (i.e. 9 o'clock)
and therefore he was not ready to accept any explanation from
partner one and 'had to leave'. Had partner two acknowledged the
urgent circumstances, which were unseen when the appointment was
established (which could happen to almost anyone serving in the
field of diplomacy including partner two), and dealt with the new
situation appropriately and amicably, the activity between the two
partners would not have deteriorated and collapsed.

Nonetheless, the utilization of terminology which reflected
necessity, obligation or compulsion would require a careful
'calculation' in order to harmonize the type of the context existed.
Different contexts would require different terminologies. The
morphemes Must or Have to and Now or Immediately, which were
employed by partner two in the context of request (as opposed, for
example, to the context of offering or invitation, as discussed in
scene e, Chapter 5 according to the Arabic culture), would be
diplomatically considered rude and impolite and would frequently
mirror aggressive attitudes of the user and could probably eventuate unfortunate results such as the case at hand.

6.1.2 The secondary class of the data

The empirical data of scenes 1 and m which were analysed in the previous section of this chapter constituted the data of the primary class of Category D which was obtained from the diplomatic diary (i.e. the record of the immediate experience of the diplomat-researcher as mentioned in Chapter 3).

This section will deal with the data of the secondary class of Category D which was derived from the experience of the career diplomats who were interviewed and tape-recorded (as discussed in Chapter 3, see also Section 2 of Chapter 5). The evaluation which the career diplomats provided would enhance our understanding of current diplomatic speech and characterize the way and methods in which they speak to each other. Such evaluation was meant to provide supportive evidence to the data of the primary class which was presented and analysed in the earlier section of this chapter.

Three questions, which belong to Category C of the interview scheme (see Appendix 1, see also Chapter 3) were delivered to the career diplomats in order to detect the attitudinal aspects of current diplomatic speech. The key question which we concern ourselves with in this section would be question 9, 'Do you feel that diplomatic communication, nowadays, works to enhance the relations between nations?' This question was meant to be as general as possible in order that the answers of the career diplomats could provide a general picture about not only the
diplomatic speech but also the attitudes and behaviours of both diplomats and their governments when they communicate with others.

As the practice throughout this work, the data of the secondary class of all the categories would be presented in examples which would reflect the long experience of those who served in the field of international diplomacy and were intended to serve as a first 'check-point' for the data of the primary class which was analysed in the previous section. Therefore and without exhausting all the possibilities of the recorded data of this class, the following excerpts from the career diplomats' responses would describe the situation existed in current practice of diplomatic speech and attitudes on the two levels, namely diplomats as individual representatives and their governments (see Appendix 8 for examples of the career diplomats' responses).

In answering the above question (i.e. question 9), a UAE career diplomat provided the following response:

'The diplomatic communication, I don't think so! It is not because of the communication itself, it is because of the intention behind it. The misuse ... intentionally misuse of words from those who conduct the foreign diplomacy makes it very difficult to enhance the communication between nations because every one of them speak $\text{S}$ of his own interests and how he achieves such interests neglecting or intentionally avoiding to touch upon the parties' interests ...' (Fawzi Abdullatif, a UAE career diplomat - interview)

A Syrian career diplomat answered the above question as follows:
But sometimes incidents happen which do not facilitate good relations among nations. I know of some diplomats who have the ability of offending others by their way of talking, and their diplomatic contacts which I really suffered from. For after such contacts with these, the result at meetings were unpleasant because of their offending methods, where hard words and severe expressions were used as well as a kind of superiority in understanding ...' (Syrian career diplomat – interview)

Ishrat Aziz, an Indian Ambassador, answered the above question as follows:

'I am afraid that enough is not being done to promote understanding between people and I think to my mind that the first job of a diplomat, in the present day context, should be to constantly promote the feeling everywhere that we are living in one world ... Co-operation will increase if there is understanding, better understanding means better communication. Better communication means better diplomacy, but the first thing is the diplomats must realize what their first duty is, and that is why I said in the world today there is not enough understanding through diplomatic channels ...' (Ishrat Aziz, Indian Ambassador – interview).

The response of a Russian career diplomat to the question stated above was as follows:

'Of course the answer is that not all depends upon diplomatic services, and diplomats as servants of their governments because the conditions, unfortunately and conflicts, they are the phenomena of every day life – political life of the globe. Sometimes the reality is different very much from idealistic picture. When the United Nations – Organization of the united Nations has been created in the post-war period, everyone, or school of good intentions and good hopes, everyone was thinking that this organization would be really play a role of stabilizing the situations in the world and bring about universal peace. Unfortunately, this is not the fact and who is to blame? Of course, all the governments are to blame for this that they did not learn enough from previous experiences to be more reasonable, be less egoistic and to pursue the line of common goodness ...' (Russian career diplomat – interview, see his entire response in Appendix 8)
In presenting one more example, a Sudanese career diplomat answered the above question, which concerned the effect of diplomatic communication on the relations between nations, as follows:

'I think it needs more work, and it needs to be put in a way that would be acceptable and understandable to everybody. That is, I mean we have to sit down and work a language - a diplomatic language that would not be aggressive to others, or I mean bring out the bad side of everything. What we are going to in diplomacy is how to bring people together, and the art of togetherness in that sense it means ... it really to work for suitable language that would serve every purpose ...' (Sudanese career diplomat - interview)

The examples presented above described and characterized the current usage, attitude and behaviour of diplomatic speech and conduct as were seen and experienced by those who were in the field, practising diplomacy. The picture which was depicted by the career diplomats, in the above examples, involved not only individual diplomats but also countries and their governments. As discussed in Chapter 2, diplomacy has been conducted between independent states and between states and various international organizations by diplomats who have been representing their governments. Therefore, both diplomats (as individual representatives) and their governments have been interchangeably reflecting and representing same foreign policies. That is, the speech, attitude and behaviour, as described by the career diplomats, in the above examples, would characterize the current trend of both the governments and their representatives as probably clear from the following example which was provided by a British career diplomat:
Diplomats are servants of their governments. And if a government wishes to take an aggressive attitude towards another government it would tell its diplomat to use aggressive language. It is not what I call diplomatic language and has nothing to do with the business of resolving disagreements between nations or states ...” (British career diplomat - interview)

6.1.3 The tertiary class of the data

As repeatedly mentioned in Chapters 3 and 5, the empirical data of the tertiary class was derived from the questionnaire and would provide quantitative evidence to the results obtained from the analysis of the data of the primary class as well as the data of the secondary class which was derived from the tape-recorded interview. That is, the data belonging to the primary class and the data belonging to the secondary class of category D would be measured by the quantitative data of the tertiary class which was derived from the questionnaire. The intention behind such a practice, as mentioned before, would be to provide supportive evidence to what was previously analysed (i.e. the empirical data of the primary and secondary classes) by calculating the number of the responses, which were obtained from the international career diplomats in responding to the items of part three of the questionnaire which concerned the characterization of current diplomatic speech.

Part three of the questionnaire (see Appendix 2) comprised four main items of which the first three (i.e. items 6, 7 and 8) would be considered in this section. Such items would correspond to the main question of Category C of the interview scheme as mentioned in Chapter 3 (i.e. question 9, see Appendices 1 and 2).
By consecutively calculating the responses of the career diplomats to the items of part three of the questionnaire according to the five-point scale, following the practice of presenting the data of the tertiary class as mentioned in the last section of Chapter 5, each item scored the following percentage (i.e. %, see Appendix 9) which would be presented in tables and shown in diagrams.

**Item 6: 'Current diplomatic speech provides bases for starting conflicts between nations':**

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<th>AT</th>
<th>OF</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>15.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 indicated that the assumption of item 6, that 'current diplomatic speech provides bases for starting conflicts between nations', received the highest percentage (i.e. 59.0 per cent). By adding the percentages of the first two points (i.e. AT, 4.54 per cent and OF, 11.36 per cent) to the percentage of the third point (i.e. ST, 59 per cent), the final result that supported the assumption of item 6 would become 75 per cent. This indicated that the majority of the career diplomats agreed that current diplomatic speech provides bases for starting conflicts between nations.

Diagram 6 would exhibit the ratios of the career diplomats' responses to item 6 according to the five-point scale:
Diagram 6  Current diplomatic speech provokes conflict between nations

Item 7  'Current diplomatic speech contains aggressive elements'

Table 7

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<th>ST</th>
<th>NE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>15.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 clearly showed that the assumption of item 7, that 'current diplomatic speech contains aggressive elements', received the highest percentage (i.e. 77.27 per cent). By adding the percentage of the second point (i.e. OF, 15.90 per cent) to the percentage of the third point (i.e. ST, 77.27 per cent), the final result which supported the assumption of this item would become
93.18 per cent. This meant that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats agreed that current diplomatic speech contains aggressive elements.

Diagram 7 would depict the ratios of the career diplomat's responses to the assumption of item 7:

Diagram 7  Aggressive elements in current diplomatic speech

Item 8: 'Current diplomatic speech is highly unlikely to be a means for bringing about peace among nations!' 

Table 8

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
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<th>SD</th>
<th>DA</th>
<th>UC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>40.90</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>31.81</td>
<td>20.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the unusual assumption of item 8, that 'current diplomatic speech is highly unlikely to be a means for bringing about peace among nations', Table 8 exhibited that the point of the highest percentage was in favour of the assumption (i.e. AG, 40.90
per cent in contrast with DA, 31.81 per cent). By integrating the percentages of the first two points (SA, 2.27 per cent and AG, 40.90 per cent) as opposed to the percentages of the next two points (i.e. SD, 4.54 per cent and DA 31.81 per cent), the final result of item 8 would become 43.18 per cent in favour of the assumption as opposed to 36.36 per cent against the assumption.

Diagram 8 would show the ratios of the career diplomats' responses to the assumption of item 8 according to the five-point scale.

Diagram 8  Unlikeliness of current diplomatic speech for world's peace

6.2 Category E of the Empirical Data

As mentioned in Chapter 3 as well as in the first section of this chapter, stage three of the empirical data comprised two categories, D and E. Like Category D with which we have already dealt, Category E, which we deal with in this section, comprised three classes of empirical data, primary, secondary and tertiary (see Chapter 3).
6.2.1 **The primary class of the data - Scenes n and o**

The empirical data of the primary class of Category E, which was obtained from *Time* (the American magazine), contained two scenes, n and o. The common factor between these two scenes would be that both of them involved American partners and West-European counterparts, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, they reflected far-reaching reactions due to the nature of the language they expressed (see Appendix 5).

Unlike all the scenes of the primary class of the empirical data which were analysed thoroughly in Chapters 4, 5 and in the first section of this chapter, scenes n and o do not need to receive analysis in the same way as that of the earlier mentioned scenes for a number of reasons. Firstly, the two scenes were included here to provide additional examples to support the assumption of those scenes which were analysed earlier in this chapter, namely scenes l and m in order to clearly exhibit the nature of current diplomatic language (that it would contain aggressive or undiplomatic elements which would stimulate sharp reactions which could, in turn, provoke tensions, disputes or conflicts between the two sides of diplomatic communication). Secondly, both scenes had a self-analysable nature; that is, the actions, which were performed by the partners (i.e. American partners in both scenes), and the reactions, which were expressed by the counterparts (West-European in both scenes), were very clear due to the explicit speech acts that both sides conveyed (e.g. accusations from the partners and criticism from the counterparts). Thirdly, as we shall see in the next two sections of this chapter, the career diplomats, who were interviewed and those who answered the questionnaire's items, were invited to evaluate,
judge and describe the diplomatic language used in such scenes. The reason for this conduct was that the career diplomats had more experience in such matters since they were in the field, practising diplomacy and, therefore, they were more capable of carrying out such a task than others.

The career diplomats were asked, in the first place, to evaluate current diplomatic language, such as that of scenes n and o, in general way through answering the question which will be introduced shortly in the next section. And, in the second place, they were provided with the specific scene (i.e. scene o) and asked to 'measure' and describe its language. This shall be dealt with in the later section of this chapter.

6.2.2 The secondary class of the data

As the practice throughout this work, the empirical data of the secondary class of Category E would be presented in examples which consisted of evaluation provided by the career diplomats who were asked to judge current diplomatic language such as that of scenes n and o. The question which was delivered to the career diplomats was, 'In considering the fieldwork on diplomatic communication, it appears that some diplomatic speech lays bases for starting conflict between the two parties in the communication activity since it contains aggressive elements. Would you please reflect on this issue and provide certain examples?'

The answers which were provided reflected the career diplomats' general opinion on the issue. As usual, and certainly in certain sensitive issues such as the one in question, career diplomats would avoid being specific or forthright. The question which was
introduced to the career diplomats actually invited them to
criticise the language which some of them normally or intermittently
used. However, the responses which were obtained were formidably
depicted the current usage of diplomatic language as undiplomatic,
offensive or as a 'gun diplomacy'. Some examples of these responses
were as follows:

An Egyptian career diplomat described current diplomatic
language, such as that of scenes n and o, as undiplomatic. His
response was that:

'It will not be what you can call it diplomatic language.
But it is a language used by certain politicians
sometimes and they mean from using this language, you
know, to convey a message to the other partner in a very,
in a shorter way, and they meant to use this language.
It means exactly what the either ... they use this
language but in the reality they don't mean what the
other partner understood, or they meant it. In any way
it is better that these kind of messages to be clarified
in order to avoid any kind of confusion' (Egyptian career
diplomat - interview)

An Austrian career diplomat preferred to call such a language
an offensive. He answered the above question in the following way:

'During my career, I have noticed that vocabulary in dip-
lomacy has changed considerably. And I might add, as a
purely personal remark, I don't think it was for the
better. I am of the opinion that you can tell your
partner or your opposite member where ... whatever you
like to call him ... can say to him anything, the only as
the proper wording without being offensive and so forth.
But in this field [the field of diplomacy] a lot of sins
have been committed that the French are saying, 'C'est le
tone que le fait le music', 'it's the tone which makes
the music'. So It is very important, and particularly if
you want to stick with the idea of diplomacy to solve the
problems by peaceful means not to offend the other one
whatever the outcomes might be. If you just get only a
bad language bag, or if you offended him so much that you
would draw further conclusion and consider further
action' (Austrian career diplomat - interview).
The type of diplomatic language such as that of scenes n and o was described by an Italian career diplomat as a 'gunship-diplomacy' or as a 'gun diplomacy'. His answer to the earlier question was:

'Well, certainly. We earlier started with the point what is diplomat? Diplomat is a man that try to create links between two countries under the direction of his own political leaders. Well ... eh ... if a diplomat has the disadvantage ... I mean to work for the dictatorship or for some leadership that pretend to reach targets unacceptable for a world peace. Certainly his work becomes much harder and much more difficult. He has sometime to bent to use words just as utterly corresponding to the feeling and the meaning of his prediction by such a case is a deep ... and so-called ... is the aim of the diplomacy that means practically is a sort of gunship diplomacy ... is a gun diplomacy ... is a way I don't think in a way that cannot be done depends ... on the objectives of your work and the ... your government work ... Alas, you know examples from all over the world at the moment ... it's difficult ... using aggressive words is a way sometimes to convey a message. Also, dear, sometimes aggressive words - the most aggressive words can be better than the most peaceful shotgun we can say ... better to speak than to shoot ...' (Italian career diplomat - interview).

The above examples, in addition to those mentioned in section 2 of this chapter, clearly reflected the career diplomats' dissatisfaction towards current style of diplomatic language which was used by their colleagues.

6.2.3 The tertiary class of the data

The diplomatic language of scene o, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, was intentionally introduced to the career diplomats through the questionnaire. Item 9 of the questionnaire was actually an example of diplomatic language used by partner one in scene o (see Appendices 7 and 9). The career diplomats were asked, in this item, to evaluate and describe the diplomatic language of their
colleague (i.e. partner one in scene o, Appendix 7). In order for the career diplomats to answer the request made in item 9, they were provided with five descriptive sub-items along with the five-point scale (mentioned earlier in Chapter 5 and in this chapter in dealing with the empirical data of the tertiary class).

By using the five-point scale, each of the five sub-items, which was 'measured' by the career diplomats, scored the following percentage which would be presented in tables and shown in diagrams (see Appendix 9):

Item 9: 'The language of the Ambassador is'
A: 'desirable for diplomatic communication'

Table 9A

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SA</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<th>UC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>43.18</td>
<td>38.63</td>
<td>11.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9A indicated that the majority of the career diplomats were against the assumption of item 9A that the language used by the Ambassador in scene o would be desirable for diplomatic communication. The two points that received the highest percentages are respectively SD, 43.18 per cent and DA, 36.63 per cent. Both points reflected the career diplomats' disagreement on the assumption of item 9A. By integrating the percentages of the two points of disagreement, the final result against the 'desirability' of using the Ambassador's language in diplomatic communication would be 81.81 per cent. In translating the result of item 9A into plain
language, the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats (81.81 per cent) described the language of scene 0 as undesirable for diplomatic communication.

Diagram 9A would depict the ratios of the career diplomats' responses to the assumption of item 9A according to the five-point scale:

Diagram 9A  The Undesirability of the language used in scene 0 for diplomatic communication

Item 9B 'Acceptable (for diplomatic communication)'

Table 9B

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<tr>
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<th>SA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.68</td>
<td>43.18</td>
<td>45.45</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Table 9B exhibited that the vast majority of the career diplomats were against the assumption of item 9B that the language of the Ambassador in scene o would be acceptable for diplomatic communication. The two points that received the highest scores were successively SD, 43.18 per cent and DA, 45.45 per cent. Both points mirrored the disagreement of the career diplomats on the assumption of item 9B. By integrating the scores of both points of disagreement, the final percentage against the 'acceptability' of using the Ambassador's language for diplomatic communication would be 88.63 per cent. The indication of such a high percentage would be that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats (88.63 per cent) described the language of scene o as unacceptable for diplomatic communication.

Diagram 9B would show the ratios of the career diplomats' responses to the assumption of item 9B according to the five-points scale.
Table 9C showed that the majority of the career diplomats were in favour of the assumption of item 9C that the language used by the Ambassador in scene o would be aggressive for diplomatic communication. The point which received the highest percentage was AG, 54.54 per cent. By integrating the two points of agreement (SA, 29.54 per cent and AG, 54.54 per cent), the final result would indicate that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats (84 per cent) described the language of scene o as aggressive for diplomatic communication.

Diagram 9C would depict the ratios of the career diplomats' responses to the assumption of item 9C according to the five-point scale:
Diagram 9C  Agressiveness of the language used in scene o for diplomatic communication

**Item 9D** 'Rude (for diplomatic communication)'

**Table 9D**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>50.0</td>
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<td>11.36</td>
<td>15.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9D showed that the majority of the career diplomats were in favour of the assumption of item 9D that the language used by the Ambassador in scene o would be rude for diplomatic communication.
The point which received the highest percentage in the above table was AG, 50 per cent. By integrating the two points which reflected the career diplomats' agreement on the assumption of this item (i.e. SA, 22.72 per cent and AG, 50 per cent), the final result of this item would indicate that the vast majority of the career diplomats described the language used in scene 0 as rude for diplomatic communication.

Diagram 9D would exhibit the ratios of the career diplomats' responses to the assumption of item 9D according to the five-point scale:

![Diagram 9D Rudeness of the language of scene 0]

**Item 9E 'Undiplomatic'**

**Table 9E**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9E exhibited that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats were in favour of the assumption of item 9E that the language used by the Ambassador in scene 0 would be undiplomatic. The two points of agreement in the above table equally received higher percentage (i.e. SA, 45.45 per cent and AG, 45.45 per cent in contrast with the two points of disagreement (i.e. SD, 0 per cent and DA 0 per cent). By integrating the two points of agreement on the assumption of item 9E, the final result of this item exhibited that the absolute majority of the career diplomats (90.90 per cent) described the language used by the Ambassador in scene 0 as undiplomatic. That is, the type of language used in scene 0 should not be utilized in diplomatic communication.

Diagram 9E would depict the ratios of the career diplomats’ responses to the assumption of item 9E according to the five-point scale:

Diagram 9E  'Undiplomaticity' of the language used in scene 0
As it may be clear, the empirical data of the tertiary classes of both categories D and E of stage three (i.e. Chapter 6) which was presented in tables and diagrams provided a supportive quantitative evidence to the data of the secondary class of both categories which, in turn, corroborated the empirical data of the primary class of the same categories. Such data depicted the current trend and usage of the so-called diplomatic language.

As mentioned in section 2 of this chapter (i.e. Chapter 6), the diplomatic language of scenes n and o was intentionally presented to the career diplomats to receive pragmatic analysis, evaluation, and description in order to obtain the most reliable picture of the situation existed from the practical point of view of those who were an integral part of the field of diplomacy. The career diplomats, therefore, were more capable of depicting valid picture of current usage of diplomatic language.

However, it could be argued that the socio-cultural backgrounds of the career diplomats might play a part in the process of the evaluation. That is, with regard to the diplomatic language of scenes n and o, the judgement of the career diplomats could be 'coloured' by their own socio-cultural backgrounds since, as discussed in Chapter 1 and analysed in Chapters 4 and 5, people would regard certain matters from different points of view according to their beliefs, values, attitudes and expectations. According to this argument, which could be regarded as a possible hypothesis, what was viewed or regarded by the partners in scenes n and o, according to their practice, as appropriate and acceptable was not appreciated by the career diplomats as being so according to their
socio-cultural tradition. This point will receive a further elaboration in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7
INTERCULTURAL MISUNDERSTANDING IN CURRENT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION

7.1 Recapitulation

The earlier work of Al Mulla (1986), which was mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis, has demonstrated that, in the actual communication, language is tied up with the situation which produces it. This is because that partners, who are involved in the activities are closely associated with their cultural backgrounds which function as assets to them. Language in such a situation represents a social and cultural instrument with two dimensions. The partner uses language for the fulfilment of his purposes and it is also, a representation of his culture and tradition. Both dimensions are crucial as they interlock and overlap in the actual communication activity.

Accordingly, successful communications, which produce desired outcomes, depend on effective use of language which takes into account all social and cultural factors of the situation in which they occur. That is, in order to achieve such type of communication, the correlation between the overt content of language, the linguistic knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of grammar and lexicon) and the covert content, the situational, social and cultural knowledge must be observed and satisfied.

However, successful communication is achieved when the two parties involved in the communication activity share the socio-cultural background knowledge, the covert content of language. For each party can easily infer the intended meaning of the opposite number's message in order to respond or act accordingly and
appropriately. Each party can clearly understand what is meant (or conveyed) by what is said (or expressed) by the opposite numbers by means of drawing correct inferences relying on the mutually shared socio-cultural background knowledge. With this prerequisite factor linguistic communication would probably continue and progress towards the achievement of the desired outcome without seriously noticeable problems which may render the activity useless and fruitless.

International diplomats (or diplomats) use language, both in the written and spoken form, at almost all times in order to conduct, manage and negotiate international relations. However, diplomats, as the elite of international communicators, belong to different cultures which indicates that they acquire distinct socio-cultural background knowledge.

As assumed, international diplomatic communication (IDC) could probably be problematic as the two parties involved in the negotiation activity acquire diverse socio-cultural background knowledge which sometimes differs sharply from that of the opposite number. Partners in IDC do not often share the same or similar expectations, attitudes, beliefs, values and national interests, the factors that constitute the covert content of language, which are central to successful communications as they assist those who are involved in the activity to draw proper inferences by which they grasp the counterpart's messages and recognize the speech acts in order to 'mould' the appropriate countermove which can satisfy the intentional states (i.e. belief, desire or intention) of their counterparts.
Building on the findings of International Linguistic Communication (ILC) (Al Mulla, 1986) that misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscommunication characterize international linguistic communication because of the diversity of partners' cultural backgrounds, it was assumed that, although diplomats are highly selected, educated and experienced people, they could not be more fortunate than the partners in the activities of International Linguistic Communication, 'they would probably be in the same boat'.

In order to scientifically prove the above assumption, the systematic working hypothesis was established as follows. 'Misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscommunication are very likely to characterize the language of current international diplomacy because of the diversity of diplomats' socio-cultural backgrounds.'

In order to examine the hypothesis the empirical data, which was gathered from various sources of fieldwork by different means, was obtained from those who practised diplomacy (i.e. career diplomats). The means by which the empirical data was gathered included the diplomatic diary of the 'diplomat-researcher', tape-recorded interview, questionnaire, newspapers and magazines.

Such empirical data was arranged in three broad stages which then organized in five categories (i.e. A, B, C, D and E) and classified in three types of class, primary, secondary and tertiary. The empirical data of the primary class, which was derived from, or associated with, the immediate experience of the 'diplomat-researcher', or the career diplomats, was classified in scenes (they were fifteen scenes in all, a, b ... n and o). Each scene of diplomatic communication represented a unique yet related scenic
unit of diplomatic activity and, on the whole, was dealt with as the unit of analysis in which every single matter was regarded as an integral part and subject to analysis.

The data of the secondary class, which was provided by the career diplomats by means of tape-recorded interview, represented the career diplomats' experience and, therefore, provided supportive evidence to the analysis of the primary class data. Whereas the data of the tertiary class, which was derived from the questionnaire and presented in tables and diagrams, represented a quantitative supportive evidence to the data of both classes, the primary and the secondary.

The empirical data, mentioned above, was thoroughly investigated and the hypothesis underwent copious and abundant tests, and the findings demonstrated the following.

7.2 The Findings

7.2.1 The findings of the primary class data of the thesis' core point

With regard to the primary class of the empirical data, scenes a and b of stage one dealt with the highly special event of diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit (which was held in Iceland, 11-12 October 1986) between the two superpowers, America and Russia. The analysis of this event revealed that the negotiation activity between the two parties resulted not only in the breakdown of the activity but also in a number of far reaching implications which were produced by the collapse of the negotiation including the retaliatory expulsion pattern of diplomats (the so-called tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsion). Such results were
unexpected and, therefore, disappointed both respected leaders who expressed the deep sorrow and regret over the final outcome of their activity.

This outcome happened irrespective to both leaders' intentions and desires to fulfil their supreme principle which was to find a 'solution to the burning problems which concern people all over the world, and to take decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war'. The unfulfilled intended acts and the unsatisfied desires of both leaders activated and promoted what happened beyond the breakdown of the negotiation activity.

The investigation of scenes a and b demonstrated that, among other things, the different approaches of negotiation between the two parties, the diversity of their views on the nature of the summit, the different interpretations of linguistic phrases especially with regard to the ABM treaty (e.g. laboratory-testing), and, above all else, the mutual unrecognition and misjudgement of the intended messages and acts were behind the unsuccessful negotiation. The overlapping between these factors reduced the chances for successful negotiation and created a context of misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misjudgement which eventuated the collapse of the activity and what followed.

Categories B and C of stage two comprise nine scenes, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j and k. The analysis of scene c exhibited that the efforts of the two ministers (Arabic and West-European), who negotiated the mutual relations of their countries (in a ministerial joint commission) fell short of reaching the desired outcome. The major factor of such a consequence was the overlapping between the
The strange behaviour (i.e. the laughter) from the high ranking member of European delegation in such a highly official meeting was unacceptable behaviour according to the Arabic partner's socio-cultural norms and therefore caused him to unintentionally omit the key point of the meeting. The act of laughing came exactly at the time when the Arabic partner was about to mention what he considered the most important elements for the relations between the two countries in the negotiation activity. Such a situation resulted in an ambiguous linguistic situation and obscure activity which eventually impeded the desired outcome.

In scene d, the analysis showed that the diplomatic activity between the Arabic diplomat and the African counterpart in a conference on Afro-Arab relations collapsed before either of the two parties achieved his goal. While the Arabic partner was eager to receive an appropriate response to his move (i.e. question) concerning the success of the conference the African counterpart, probably unintentionally, converted the theme and the course of the communication by issuing his unrelated countermove (i.e. response), 'Is there any bank nearby?' The major factor of the collapse was the different cultural norms, attitudes and styles of conduct. As the two partners belonged to different cultures, each partner's cultural background interfered with that of the other and created a situation of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of messages and intentions. Accordingly, the two contents of language, the overt
and the covert, overlapped with each other and eventuated the unfavourable result.

The analysis of scene e illustrated that the cultural norms and values for extending an invitation were sharply different between the Indian career diplomat and the Arabic counterpart. While the Indian partner used the expressions, 'We hope you can come' and 'Try to come if you are free', to invite his counterpart, the Arabic partner, although he was eager to comply with the invitation, he was unable to accept it since it was not expressed emphatically and enthusiastically according to the Arabic cultural norms in the context of invitation. Such a cultural factor produced misculturality, the interference and clash between the two partners' socio-cultural backgrounds, which resulted in dissatisfaction and disappointment for both partners and eventuated the breakdown of their diplomatic activity.

As the investigation of scene f revealed, the major factor which invited the unexpected outcome to the activity of the Chinese career diplomat and the Arabic counterpart was purely cultural matter, namely misculturality. That is, the absolute obstacle that hindered the natural progress of the diplomatic activity was the clash between the two partners' cultural backgrounds. The utilization of the Arabic partner of the culturally fixed-expression, which was invited by the socio-cultural factors of the situation, was the main reason for misunderstanding. The Chinese career diplomat was unable to grasp (or 'digest') what was intended (the deeply indirect speech act) by what was expressed (the literal
meaning of the expression according to its grammatical and lexical knowledge).

The analysis of scene g, which depicted the diplomatic activity of the Asian permanent representative and the Arabic counterpart at the United Nations Assembly demonstrated that the activity prematurely reached an end because of critical misunderstanding. That is, the diplomatic activity collapsed prior to reaching the desired outcome. Moreover, since the outcome of this activity was somewhat heavy on the Arabic partner, it produced 'Effect', the direct result of the collapse of the communication activity, which affected the relationship between the two partners. The message, act and behaviour of the Asian partner by which he attempted to bribe his counterpart, were completely unacceptable to the Arabic partner according to his socio-cultural norms as well as to the Islamic principles and teachings, and therefore he was severely disappointed. This was the major factor that led the Arabic partner to terminate the diplomatic communication.

The analysis of scene h disclosed mutual misunderstanding and misinterpretation of messages and intentions between the Arabic authority and the American counterpart concerning a bilateral consular convention which reflected a shared interest between the two parties and by which certain perennial consular disputes would be resolved in an easier and more predictable manner. The different cultural styles and values regarding 'how' and 'when' one would say No and 'how' and 'when' one would say Yes was the key problem which resulted in the termination of the diplomatic communication. And
although, as the analysis illustrated, both parties were eager to reach a favourable solution as the issue was beneficial for both countries involved, mutual misintentionality, the inability to understand the other sides' indirect speech acts and intentional states (the intended meaning and desires), was the main barrier which 'blocked' the desired outcome.

The investigation of the diplomatic communication of scene i, which involved an Arabic career diplomat and an African senior official negotiating a loan, demonstrated that the Arabic partner was constantly unable to understand (or recognize) the intended act performed by the African partner because of the cultural barrier. What was conveyed socio-culturally by the African partner (according to the factors of the covert content of language) was misinterpreted and accordingly misunderstood by the Arabic partner who continuously understood the overt content of the messages (the literal meaning according to the knowledge of grammar and lexicon). This caused misunderstanding between the two partners which eventually folded the activity. The unfavourable result which took place in the diplomatic communication of this scene was mainly due to the diversity of the two partners' socio-cultural backgrounds.

The analysis of the diplomatic communication of scene j, which involved a European career diplomat and a Japanese counterpart, revealed that the key problem which intervened in the activity and created misinterpretation was a cultural one. The different usage of Yes, the linguistic morpheme expressing a positive answer, between the two partners of different cultures was the major factor
which led to the breakdown of the diplomatic communication. While the West-European partner understood *Yes*, which was expressed by his counterpart, as conveying a *promise* by which the counterpart would fulfil the request made of him, the Japanese counterpart employed *Yes* not as a positive answer to fulfil the West-European's request but rather as a *feedback noise* to inform his counterpart that he was following and listening to what he was saying. The diversity of the socio-cultural backgrounds between the two partners resulted in misinterpretation on the side of the West-European partner since he was unable to properly understand the Japanese partner's usage of *Yes*. The misunderstanding produced by such a situation caused the West-European partner a severe disappointment and accordingly terminated the diplomatic communication between the two partners.

In scene k, the investigation of the diplomatic communication which involved a Bangladesh career diplomat and a Greek counterpart in an informal discussion uncovered that the mutual misunderstanding of situations, messages and intentions between the two partners was the major factor which caused the unfortunate result and what followed in the activity. The results produced by such misunderstanding included the collapse of the diplomatic communication, deterioration of the two partners' relationship and, as an effect, damage to the relationship of the two partners' wives. The unfortunate consequences happened as a direct result of the diversity of the two partners' socio-cultural background knowledge which led to the overlapping between the covert and the overt contents of language and created the unexpected results.
7.2.2 The findings of the primary class data of the thesis' second point

Categories D and E of stage three contained four scenes, l, m, n and o. The diplomatic communication of these scenes dealt with the second point of the thesis, the nature of current diplomatic speech, and 'why' such a style of speech provoked (or motivated) disputes and conflicts between career diplomats and their respective countries.

The analysis of scene l illustrated that the diplomatic communication activity, which occurred between the Arabic and French partners who negotiated certain mutual affairs for the benefit of their respective countries collapse because of the style and attitudes of the French partner. Instead of using persuasive and polite style of language, the French partner employed insulting and offensive style along with aggressive attitudes which caused the breakdown of the diplomatic activity. The reason which urged the French partner to negotiate by such style and attitudes was a cultural one. His realization that he belonged to an advanced country (i.e. developed) while his counterpart (the Arabic partner) belonged to a third-world country (i.e. developing) motivated him to create a peculiar style for conduct in order to make the opposite number inferior and minimize his role in the negotiation activity accordingly. Such behaviour and attitudes resulted in unfortunate outcome.

The investigation of the diplomatic activity of scene m, which involved an Arabic and a West-European career diplomats, manifested that the major factor which resulted in the breakdown of the
communication activity was the inappropriate use of language and improper attitudes to the context of request in which the activity occurred as well as to the cultural norms of the opposite number. The use of terminology such as **Must, Now, and No**, which were inappropriately employed by the West-European partner in the context of request, reflected aggressive attitudes which disappointed the Arabic counterpart and harmed the conduct. The request made by the Arabic partner passed unrecognized and accordingly unfulfilled because it was rejected by the West-European partner by the use of **No-answer**. This behaviour mirrored an ignorance of the cultural norms of the Arabic partner in the context of request which ought to be recognized and observed in dealing with the people of the host country. In addition, the West-European partner, because of certain conceptions and attitudes related to his cultural norms, conceived that it would be improper, with respect to himself, to wait beyond the assigned time of the appointment irrespective to the urgent circumstances which were unseen when the appointment was established. All the social and cultural factors played active roles in the diplomatic communication and caused the collapse of the activity.

The career diplomats' special analysis of the diplomatic communication of scenes n and o, which both involved American partners and West-European counterparts, revealed that the major factor, which caused miscommunication, was the unacceptable style and behaviour of the American partners in depicting their counterparts pejoratively.
The American partners' style of language which was regarded by the West-European counterparts as offensive and reflecting aggressive attitudes, created critical misunderstanding and misjudgement between all partners in the activities and resulted in the unfavourable outcome.

7.2.3 The findings of the secondary class data

As to the secondary class of the data, the self-reported diplomatic incidents as well as the evaluation provided by the career diplomats demonstrated the problem of misunderstanding and misinterpretation in the activities of international diplomacy, and revealed 'how' much the career diplomats suffered as a result of conducting their activities and fulfilling their duties. The major factor of such a problem, as being manifested by the career diplomats who were interviewed and tape-recorded, was the diversity of their socio-cultural backgrounds.

'Oh! that happens frequently, and it is something that we all seek to avoid, but it is inevitable if you are talking across, as I said, a cultural divide ...'
(British career diplomat - interview)

All the examples reported by the career diplomats disclosed one common feature. The diplomatic communication caused disappointment to the partners involved and, as a consequence, produced no results but misculturality and misintentionality between the partners which eventually led to undesired results.

As the analysis explored, the social and cultural factors of the covert content of language in the actual diplomatic communication played an active and vivid role in the activities
which interfered with the overt content of language (the linguistic knowledge) and created misunderstanding and misjudgement of messages and intentions which eventuated the undesired results despite the fact that the activities were conducted by highly experienced and knowledgeable career diplomats in the field of international diplomacy.

7.2.4 The findings of the tertiary class data

Concerning the empirical data of the tertiary class, which was derived from the questionnaire, the quantitative analysis provided a conspicuous supportive evidence to the findings of the earlier two classes, namely the primary and secondary as we shall see shortly in the following results.

7.3 The Results

7.3.1 The results of thesis' core point

Having examined the core point of the thesis hypothesis, cross-cultural misunderstanding in the language of international diplomacy, the results obtained exceeded what was expected (or assumed).

In considering all the scenes of the primary class of the data, the findings demonstrated that fourteen out of fifteen scenes of diplomatic communication evidenced misunderstanding, misinterpretation or miscommunication. This indicated that the validation of the hypothesis was almost absolute (i.e. 14/15 = 93.33 per cent).

Concerning the data of the secondary class, the findings revealed that almost all the career diplomats uncovered that misunderstanding, misinterpretation or miscommunication had taken
place in the activities of their own or that of their colleagues. However, in order to secure the result of this class of data, the career diplomats who, at first sight, provided evasive responses were excluded from the result irrespective of their subsequent acknowledgement of the happening of the problem in their activities as the discussion progressed (i.e. 4 out of 25). Thus the neat result obtained from this class of the data was 84 per cent (i.e. 21/25). This result indicated that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats were in favour of the assumption (that misunderstanding, misinterpretation or miscommunication had taken place in their diplomatic activities) and therefore the hypothesis was validated and confirmed by 84 per cent.

With regard to the empirical data of the tertiary class, the quantitative data of the questionnaire which was meant to provide the 'necessary' supportive evidence to corroborate the findings of the previous two classes and to safeguard the results from any improper subjective analysis, the final calculation of the career diplomats' responses concerning item 2 of the questionnaire, 'misunderstanding or misinterpretation of messages and intentions' between diplomats of different cultures while negotiating international relations, was 77.3 per cent (i.e. 34/44). This indicated that the majority of the career diplomats were in favour of the assumption that misunderstanding and misjudgement would characterize the activities of diplomatic communication of diplomats of different socio-cultural backgrounds. As a consequence, the hypothesis, according to this result, was validated and confirmed by 77.3 per cent.
Clearly, the hypothesis was validated and confirmed by three different results (i.e. 93.33 per cent, 84 per cent and 77.3 per cent). The reasons of this could be attributed to the different types of the empirical data as well as to the different means of the analysis. The data of the primary class was derived from 'unmonitorial' activities which were conducted naturally, spontaneously and without an interference of any kind whatsoever. The means of the analysis, however, was subjective. Whereas the empirical data of the secondary and tertiary class was somewhat 'monitorial'. The career diplomats was conscious of the surrounding circumstances whether in the tape-recorded interview (secondary class) or in responding to the questionnaire items (tertiary class). Also, the means of the analysis in both classes was different. While the analysis of the secondary class data was somewhat subjective, the analysis of the data of the tertiary class was probably objective (or, at least, the least subjective of the other two classes).

However, subjective analysis was inevitable in such a kind of study in which the activities and the analysis were produced by human beings. Hence, in order to satisfy such an awareness and to allow for any human error, we consider the least subjective result of the three, 77.3 per cent, to validate and prove the hypothesis. The interpretation of such a result means that the probability of the occurrence of misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscommunication in the activities of international diplomats would be 77.3 per cent. This gives rise to the theory of 'International Diplomatic Communication', IDC. The three characteristics of such a
theory would be misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscommunication.

Astonishingly, the findings of the analysis exceeded what was hypothesized. In addition to proving the hypothesis, the findings of the analysis revealed that misunderstanding or misinterpretation resulted in unsuccessful results. Most of the scenes of the primary class of the empirical data produced unsuccessful, undesired or unfortunate results (i.e. scenes b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m and o, 13/15, 86.66 per cent).

Such unpleasant outcome was confirmed by the diplomatic incidents and evaluation of the career diplomats through the tape-recorded interview. According to a Syrian career diplomat:

'... it is likely to occur because of the inability of realizing the meaning of some of the expressions used. However, these also can be overcome ... by postponing the meeting because of the need of more clarifications of the subject under discussion and negotiation, and that is why there was no progress and no results' (Syrian career diplomat - interview)

Also the questionnaire results validated such a point. Item 5, 'In dealing with international relations, misunderstanding between diplomats of different cultures can lead to, (A) unsuccessful results?' revealed the career diplomats' absolute agreement, 95.45 per cent (i.e. 42/44, Appendix 6).

Furthermore, the analysis of the primary class of the data demonstrated that most of the diplomatic activities resulted in the collapse of the communication. This result was, at least, evident
in scenes b, d, g, h, i, j, k, l and m (i.e. 9/15, 60 per cent). Item 5B of the questionnaire, 'Breakdown in the communication activity', indicated that the majority of the career diplomats' responses were in favour of the assumption of this item. That is, the two points of agreement on the assumption (i.e. strongly agree and agree) as opposed to the two points of disagreement (i.e. strongly disagree and disagree) were 47.72 per cent to 27.27 per cent (i.e. almost 2:1).

The thorough investigation of the actual activities of the diplomatic communication of the primary class, which was substantiated by the analysis of the data of the secondary and tertiary class, revealed that there was a correlation between international diplomatic communication and misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscommunication, and subsequently the unsuccessful results which eventuated the breakdown of the diplomatic activities. The primary cause was the diversity of the career diplomats' socio-cultural backgrounds which intervened with the overt content of language (i.e. the linguistic knowledge according to grammar and lexicon) and created problems of misunderstanding or misjudgement which resulted in the unfortunate results.

The analysis illustrated 'how', in the actual communication, the career diplomats were tied up with their socio-cultural backgrounds which played an active role in the activities and functioned as assets to the partners involved. The language utilized in the activities represented a socio-cultural instrument having two dimensions. The diplomats employed it to fulfil their
purposes and achieve their goals (the overt content of language) and it was also a representation of their culture and tradition (the covert content). Both dimensions were crucial in the communication of international diplomats. As the investigation manifested, the two dimensions (or contents of language) interlocked and overlapped as soon as the activities occurred and motivated diplomats to judge the happenings through their own cultural norms and values. This matter affected both parties involved since what appeared clear to one party was not obvious to the opposite number who might be going through the same process yet in his own culture. Such happening led each party to blame the other for the unfortunate consequences as neither party could enter the cultural background of the other in order to grasp the real reason for what happened.

7.3.2 The result of the thesis' second point

In considering the thesis second point, the investigation of scenes 1, m, n and o of the primary class of the data, in addition to exemplifying the problem of misunderstanding and miscommunication, demonstrated another problem of current diplomatic communication. In conducting the activities, misuse of language was utilized by the partners in the diplomatic communication. The findings of all these scenes evidenced the use of aggressive and offensive speech and attitudes which resulted in unsuccessful communication.

The data of the secondary class disclosed the career diplomats' assertion that aggressive language and attitudes were frequently used by certain diplomats in the diplomatic communication.
In measuring the findings of the primary class as well as that of the secondary class data by the quantitative data of the tertiary class, Item 7 of the questionnaire, 'Current diplomatic speech contains aggressive elements', exhibited that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats were in favour of the assumption (i.e. 93.18 per cent). This score represented that 15.9 per cent of the career diplomats' responses regarded the occurrence of this problem as often whereas 77.27 per cent considered the occurrence as happening sometimes (see Appendix 9).

The above result was substantiated by introducing scene o to the career diplomats in order to evaluate its language - the diplomatic language used by one of their colleagues. The results obtained were as follows (Appendix 9). The language of scene o, which was employed by the Ambassador, was undesirable for diplomatic communication by 81.8 per cent, unacceptable by 88.6 per cent, aggressive by 84 per cent, rude by 72.7 per cent and undiplomatic by 90.9 per cent.

As the results clearly indicated, aggressive or undiplomatic speech was used in diplomatic communication. The above characteristics of current diplomatic speech provided bases for starting conflicts and disputes between the partners involved in the activities and provoking tensions between their governments. This assumption was confirmed by the career diplomats by 75 per cent according to item 6 of the questionnaire (Appendix 9).

Nevertheless, in order to advance the argument raised in Chapter 6 concerning the use and/or the judgement of aggressive speech and attitudes, such behaviour could probably be culturally-specific. That is each party in a given activity of diplomatic
communication acquires different style of conduct and approach of practice which harmonize with its cultural attitudes, values and practice. Accordingly, what is viewed or considered by one party as appropriate and acceptable use of language is not regarded or appreciated by the other party as being so. For example, as discussed in scene e (Chapter 5), the use of 'emphatic expressions' in the context of invitation was regarded by members of the Arabic culture as a polite way for extending an invitation whereas considered by members of the Indian culture as being 'wrong use of language' (see Appendix 4, scene e). The reason, as mentioned earlier, is that each party in the diplomatic communication is attached to its belief, value, expectation and national interest, and has no access to grasp that of the other party because of the diversity of the socio-cultural backgrounds.

The diplomatic communication of scenes 1, m, n and o could be regarded from this respect. For instance, the partners in the diplomatic activities of scenes n and o were Americans and the counterparts were West-Europeans. The American partners belonged to a legalistic society in which any act from any member should be compatible with the law, the USA's foundation and guiding principle by which the act would be judged. Whereas the West-European counterparts belonged to a community having long history and tradition which guide their acts and behaviours. This fact was made clear in discussing what was known as The Iran-Contra Affair where a distinguished European Ambassador asked a meeting of American Congressmen and journalists why the country had become fixated on 'arms-for-hostages deal' when there was so much else to do. 'The Americans' answer was that unlike Europe, with its long history,
tradition and sense of identity to guide it, America has only the law as its foundation and guiding principle. Once an administration broke the law, the body politic had to go on to the bitter end, whatever the cost, to redress the wrong (The Times, 26 February 1987: 12). Such a practical-cultural difference between the two societies might contribute not only to the understanding of the linguistic behaviour between the Americans and West-Europeans, in the diplomatic activities such as that of scenes n and o, but also to the related attitudinal aspects (e.g. offensive and insulting attitudes). For example, when Watson and Lippit (1958) evaluated the effect of the United States of America on six female and twenty-three male German visitors (i.e. West-Europeans), after a period of six months or a year, they found that the Germans viewed Americans as being materialistic, superficial and politically naive (1958: 62). This suggested that the German visitors evaluated and judged Americans from the point of view of their culture.

However, the reason for the use and practice of aggressive speech and insulting attitudes which employed by the partners in diplomatic communication such as that of scenes l, m, n and o cannot be adequately explored here. Further systematic attempts are needed to support any hypothesis. Future research may take up the issue and provide solutions which can either justify or falsify the claim.

7.4 The Significance of the Theory of IDC

7.4.1 The practical significance

Practically, the results of the investigation of the international career diplomats' actual activities clearly manifested the shortcomings of current diplomatic communication. Whether the
reason was the diversity of the career diplomats' socio-cultural backgrounds, the lack of appropriate style or misuse of diplomatic speech and attitudes, most of the activities analysed and the results deduced demonstrated unsuccessful communications which resulted in undesired or unfortunate outcome.

As revealed in the actual analysis, career diplomats, because of different cultures, have different beliefs, attitudes, values, expectations and national interests. The realization of such socio-cultural factors is indispensable element for any successful communication. The recognition of the partners' intended messages as well as their cultural norms and attitudes depends to a considerable extent on observing those factors. Deviation from such a rule, or lack of such an ability, will result in unsuccessful communication activities as demonstrated. As the investigation disclosed, the reason for this is that these factors overlap with the use of the overt content of language and constrain the linguistic knowledge, the style and the behaviour of the partners in the diplomatic communication. This overlapping creates a context of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of messages and intentions which eventually invited the unhappy results.

Undoubtedly, the career diplomats, who kindly participated in this work through their invaluable experience, were highly select, knowledgeable and professional and yet, the diplomatic activities they conducted produced unsuccessful results. This reveals that high levels of education and mastering two, three or more foreign languages in themselves, although they are pre-requisite means for those who conduct diplomatic activities, do not secure successful diplomatic communication. The awareness of the opposite number's
social and cultural norms and attitudes is, by far, the most crucial factor to be observed, and it is at the heart of international diplomacy.

However, having a course or two in the language and the cultural background of the host country, although they are necessary for any diplomat becoming a practical member of the diplomatic service, cannot be adequate means for bridging the social and cultural gap between the two sides of conduct. Other means, such as acquiring the necessary elements of the language of diplomacy, the qualities of a good diplomat and the principles of conducting diplomacy, which will be dealt with in the next chapter, must be acquired by international diplomats if they wish to conduct successful activities and achieve desired results which benefit and satisfy their respective governments. These elements, qualities and principles were deduced from the investigation of the career diplomats' activities whose absence from the activities was the main factor that eventuated the unsuccessful outcome. By acquiring the elements, the qualities and the principles of the language of diplomacy, misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscommunication, which were caused by the different socio-cultural backgrounds of the partners, could easily be overcome and the activities progress towards successful outcome. Therefore, we must be sure to benefit from the shortcomings of career diplomats in order to enhance and secure the forthcoming diplomatic communications. This is the only way to acknowledge the career diplomats' participation and appreciate their contribution to our understanding.
7.4.2 The theoretical significance

The theory of IDC provides a theoretical framework by which forthcoming research can be carried out. Such a framework can also be exploited to investigate certain problems related to international communication or explore specific themes or issues. One of the most important issues in such domain is the problem of aggressive speech and attitudes in diplomatic communication of which the existence and occurrence was proved earlier in this chapter. However, in order to understand the causes which urge certain diplomats to employ such a style of language, additional systematic research is required to investigate the problem in order to explore its reasons and motives. A possible hypothesis was provided. That is, the use (or the judgement) of aggressive speech (or language) and attitudes by certain international diplomats are culturally-specific behaviour. Alternatively, the aggressive style of diplomatic communication could be a power-related behaviour. Indeed, the investigation of such a problem will be in the spirit of this work.

The thesis which explored the theory of International Diplomatic Communication (IDC) used various sources of empirical data to test the hypothesis. The results obtained have, however, validated the results of the previous work, International Linguistic Communication (Al Mulla, 1986).

Apart from the validity of the theory of IDC, it is a human work. As is the case of all human work, this theory is not exceptional and therefore it might not be free of human error. As a result, provided other scholars and researchers of both linguistics
and diplomacy disciplinary fields have the knowledge, the training and experience, they are invited to reexamine the validity of the theory.
8.1 Summary

The results obtained from the theory of IDC, which proved the correlation between socio-cultural backgrounds of international diplomats and misunderstanding and misinterpretation, explored the shortcomings of current diplomatic communication. As the analysis of the actual diplomatic activities demonstrated, most of the international diplomatic communications were unsuccessful. The results which diplomats achieved, instead of fulfilling the tasks they aimed at and promoting better relations with each other, were undesired and unfortunate.

However, as the investigation of the actual diplomatic activities revealed, the reasons for such intolerable outcomes arose, as a direct result, from the discrepancy of the socio-cultural backgrounds of international diplomats as they belonged to different cultures. The different factors of socio-cultural backgrounds, such as different beliefs, attitudes, values, expectations as well as different national interests, played an active and vivid role in the actual communication activities and caused overlapping between the overt content of language, the linguistic or literal meaning of messages and the covert content, the conveyed or the intended meaning. Such an overlapping (given the highly sensitive situation of diplomatic communication) created a context of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. The reason for this is that the meaning of diplomats' messages became fundamentally ambiguous for both parties of negotiation. On the one hand, each
party in the activity was associated with its socio-cultural background factors which 'monitored' and directed the happenings and, on the other hand, as a consequence, these factors 'coloured' the meaning of messages received from the other side of diplomatic communication. Michael Tait, a British Ambassador, who has been in the foreign service for more than twenty-five years, depicted this picture in his own way as follows:

'... the process which I normally use, if there is any doubt, is to reformulate the proposition in different way ... because if the proposition is based on his language that might not be clear to you in your language, what it is therefore if he says to you, 'Do you agree with that X?' you might say, Well, I am not sure that I do but I agree with Y.' ... and in the same way if someone says 'My view is as follows' then you can seek clarification after the discussion or after the exchange by saying, 'I see, If I have understood you, your view is as follows'. So what you are doing really is a sort of cultural jump and rephrasing out what the man has said to you in a way which is like a confirmation and is like a redefinition of his point of view in terms of which that is totally clear to you whereas to his the expression was not totally clear' (Michael Tait, a British Ambassador - interview)

A Syrian Ambassador, quoted earlier in the work, provided the following picture which represented his long experience in the field of diplomacy:

'... sometimes the other party understands what I meant and sometimes he doesn't, but we overcome that ... by postponing the meeting because of the need of more clarifications of the subject under discussion or negotiation, and that is why there was no progress and no results' (Syrian Ambassador - interview)
The 'product' of all situational, social and cultural factors intensified the ambiguity and caused critical misunderstanding and misjudgement as diplomats and their counterparts were culturally unable to grasp or detect the conveyed meanings or the intended acts performed by the other party. As a consequence, this led to unfavourable and unfortunate outcome (e.g. premature ends of the activities or breakdown of diplomatic communication).

The major factor which caused misunderstanding or misinterpretation, which then produced undesired or unfortunate consequences in the diplomatic activities of stages one and two (which dealt with the nature of current diplomatic communication, Chapters 4 and 5), was the diversity of diplomats' socio-cultural backgrounds. On the one hand, the use of culturally related messages whose meanings were deeply rooted in the culture of the user to which the counterpart, by definition, had no access to their intended meanings (e.g. scene f, where the Arabic partner utilized a formulaic expression which was directly derived from his culture to which the Chinese partner had no access to its deeply indirect meaning), was one factor that intensified misunderstanding and misinterpretation and worsened the communication activities. On the other hand, the deep involvement of some diplomats in their cultural values and norms (e.g. scenes e, g, i and k where, in scene e, the Indian and the Arabic partners had different expressions for initiating an invitation) was yet another factor which sharpened misunderstanding and misinterpretation which then deteriorated the diplomatic activities. Also, the devotion of certain partners to their cultural background, which led them to convert the generally
acknowledged literal meaning of some linguistic morphemes (e.g. Yes and No) to a deeply implicit meaning to suit certain contexts (e.g. a context of request or offering) in order to maintain certain cultural norms and values (e.g. scenes h and j where the Arabic culture in scene h, and the Japanese culture in scene j utilized Yes instead of No for the reason of not offending the other parties), was still another factor which widened the gap of misunderstanding and misjudgement between the parties in the diplomatic communication and invited unfavourable outcomes to the activities.

The main reason that led to misunderstanding and misinterpretation in the diplomatic activities of stage three (Chapter 6, scenes 1, m, n and o) was the use of the undiplomatic style of language, the so-called aggressive speech, along with offensive attitudes. The utilization of such type of speech and attitudes, by certain diplomats irrespective of the highly sensitive context of diplomatic communication and regardless of the position of the counterparts who represented their independent countries, created a context of disputes and conflicts between the two sides of the communication and eventuated the unfortunate results.

Consequently, all the undesired or unfortunate outcomes that resulted from diplomatic communication could be ascribed to the misuse of one of the three related criteria of managing diplomacy; the language (the instrument) used in conducting diplomacy, the diplomat (the user of the instrument) and the manner (the method or mode) through which the user used the instrument.
8.2 The Criteria of the Language of Diplomacy

Whenever the expression 'Language of diplomacy' or 'diplomatic language' is used in writings in diplomacy it usually denotes a specific language which was, or has been, universally used as the language of diplomacy, in both spoken and written discourse. Latin was the common medium for diplomatic communication until the eighteenth century. By the middle of the eighteenth century when French had become the language of educated Europeans, it replaced Latin and firmly established itself as the official language of diplomacy. In 1919, when Versailles Peace Conference took place in Paris, English acquired approximate equality with French as the language of diplomatic communication (Nicolson, 1964: 124; Encyclopaedia Britannica - Diplomacy). Recently, French, English, Arabic, Chinese, Spanish and Russian are used at the United Nations as official languages for diplomatic communication.

As I indicated in section 5 of Chapter 1, any actual language in the world can be considered international language for diplomatic communication if it is used by international diplomats as a 'shared medium' to negotiate bilateral or multi-lateral relations. However, the term 'language of diplomacy' is employed in this work not to mean a specific language such as French, English or Arabic but rather to refer to a highly specified variety of these languages (or of any international language in the broad sense adopted in this work) to be employed by international diplomats as a 'shared medium' in conducting their diplomatic communication or negotiation. More specifically, the term 'language of diplomacy' is employed in this work to refer to a variety of any international language which comprises certain special criteria that when being fully recognized,
observed and satisfied, can compete with the effect of the socio-cultural background factors and overcome their influence over the diplomatic activities. The criteria of such a variety of language, which I will propose, will characterize the shared medium of diplomatic communication and become the hallmark of the language of diplomacy. Indeed, since diplomats are a highly select, knowledgeable and experienced group of people, the variety of language they use should harmonize with the qualities just mentioned in order to mirror their highly respected profession. Therefore, it is not unattainable that diplomats acquire a special variety of language, the language of diplomacy, and satisfy its special criteria which include the elements, the qualities and the principles with which we will deal from now on.

8.2.1 The elements of the language of diplomacy

8.2.1.1 The elements' classification

As part of the fieldwork for this thesis, I proposed to the career diplomats the following elements to be considered as potential constituents of the language of diplomacy. The elements include the following six adjectives:

1. A  Formal
2. B  Accurate
3. C  Precise
2. D  Informative
3. E  Constructive
4. F  Polite
These adjectives (the elements) can be classified into three groups. The first group contains the first three adjectives (i.e. A, B and C) which will control the accuracy of the messages to be communicated. The second group comprises the next two adjectives (i.e. D and E) which will monitor the quality of information to be provided to the opposite number. The third group consists of the last adjective (i.e. F) which will maintain the cultivated style of diplomatic communication.

8.2.1.2 The elements' conditions:

As to the elements of the first group, which are meant to control the accuracy and the precision of diplomats' language, the term *Formal* (language) is to be regarded here as that style of language that is used in accordance with rules or conventions in order to harmonize with the formal context of diplomatic communication or negotiation. That is the exchange of messages in diplomatic communication should follow and observe the rules and conventions of the language concerned. The term *Accurate* is to be regarded here as synonymous with definite or outspoken. That is the exchanged messages in diplomatic communication should arise from careful thought and effort and be performed conspicuously and correctly as the result of care in order to approximate to the standard variety of the actual language used as the shared medium in the diplomatic communication. Whereas the term *Precise* is to be considered here as synonymous with exact. That is the messages in diplomatic communication should be expressed in exact and definite statements.
By carefully observing and satisfying the conditions of the three elements of the first group, diplomats can probably 'decontextualize' the variety of language used as the shared medium in their communication from situational, social and cultural factors which affect diplomatic activities and produce unsuccessful results. Consequently, the variety becomes highly explicit as the messages and expressions exchanged become independent of situational, or socio-cultural background knowledge. The variety of language we arrive at approximates to what Bernstein (1964) has termed 'the elaborated code' of language which is used by middle and upper class speakers as opposed to 'the restricted code' which is a context-based use of language involving formulaic expressions and cliches as well as implicit or presupposed information. Such a style of language is used by speakers of lower or working class (Bernstein, 1964). The variety also assimilates to what Kay (1977) has termed as 'autonomous language' to refer to a language that neither depends on contextual information nor contribution of socio-cultural background knowledge on the part of the opposite number.

With regard to the elements of the second group which are intended to monitor the quality of information to be delivered to the opposite number, the term Informative is to be regarded as synonymous with instructive or enlightening whereas the term Constructive is to be considered as tending to form basis for positive and helpful ideas which enable the counterpart in the communication activity to easily detect the partner's intended meaning and, in the meantime, assist him to construct the countermove. Both terms (elements D and E) are intended to provide
diplomats with a useful strategy for exchanging informative-constructive messages in order for both sides to benefit from the communication activity as both parties presumably attend the meeting to achieve certain goals.

Concerning the elements of the third group, which is meant to maintain the cultivated style of diplomatic communication, the term Polite (element F) is to be understood in the sense of refined speech and attitudes. This means that the language of diplomacy must be free of defects such as aggression, scorn or criticism (see Leech, 1980, 1983; Enright, 1986). That is the messages exchanged must be stated in refined and friendly manner and must be characterized by elegance. The reason for this is that diplomats are representatives of independent states and therefore they are equal and having symmetrical statuses in the communication situation irrespective to the size, power or wealth of the country to which the partners belong.

The conditions of messages' accuracy, information quality and style refinement which constitute the elements of the language of diplomacy should be observed altogether and applied satisfactorily in order for diplomats to achieve successful communications.

8.2.1.3 The elements' establishment

As mentioned above, the elements of the language of diplomacy, which were deduced from the investigation of the diplomatic activities, were proposed to the career diplomats in order to be considered as potential constituents of the language of diplomacy. The six elements were introduced to the career diplomats through
item 10 of part four of the questionnaire (Appendices 2 and 10). The career diplomats were asked to 'measure' each of the six elements by using the five-point scale (mentioned in Chapters 5 and 6, and will be mentioned shortly). By calculating the career diplomats' responses to item 10 of the questionnaire, the following tables will consecutively represent the results of each element according to the five-point scale.

Item 10 'The language of diplomacy should be formal'

Table 10A

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<thead>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 10A exhibits that the majority of the career diplomats' responses were in favour of the element A (AG, 63.63 per cent). That is the language of diplomacy should be Formal. By integrating the two points of agreement (SA, 22.72 per cent and AG, 63.63 per cent) as opposed to the two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 9.0 per cent), the final results shows that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats (86.36 per cent) regarded that the element A should be considered one of several constituents of the language of diplomacy.
**Item 10B  'The language of diplomacy should be Accurate'**

**Table 10B**

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<tbody>
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<td>40.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Table 10B indicates that the two points which received the highest percentages were SA, 59 per cent and AG, 40.9 per cent. This means that the absolute majority of the career diplomats agreed that the language of diplomacy should be **Accurate**. By integrating the two points of agreement (SA, 59 per cent and AG, 40.9 per cent) as opposed to the two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 0 per cent), the final result (100 per cent) displays that all the career diplomats considered element B (i.e. Accurate) as an obligatory constituent of the language of diplomacy.

**Item 10C  'The language of diplomacy should be Precise'**

**Table 10C**

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<td></td>
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<td>40.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

269
Table 10C displays that the two points of agreement (SA and AG) received the highest percentages. The indication of this is that the great majority of the career diplomats agreed that the language of diplomacy should be **Precise**. By integrating the two points of agreement (SA, 50.0 per cent and AG, 40.9 per cent) as opposed to the two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 2.27 per cent) the final result indicates that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats (90.9 per cent) regarded element C (i.e. Precise) as a compulsory constituent of the language of diplomacy.

**Item 10D** 'The language of diplomacy should be Informative'

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<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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</table>

Table 10D exhibits that the two points which received the highest percentages were the points of agreement (SA and AG). This indicates that the vast majority of the career diplomats considered that the language of diplomacy should be **Informative**. By integrating the two points of agreement (SA, 45.45 per cent and AG, 45.45 per cent) as opposed to the two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 2.27 per cent) then the final result discloses that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats (i.e. 90.9 per cent) regarded element D (i.e. Informative) as a required constituent to the language of diplomacy.
Item 10E  'The language of diplomacy should be Constructive'

Table 10E

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>38.63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 10E shows that the two points of agreement (SA and AG) received the highest percentages. That is the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats agreed that the language of diplomacy should be constructive. By integrating the first two points of agreement (SA, 50.0 per cent and AG, 38.63 per cent) as opposed to the next two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 2.27 per cent) then the final result (88.63 per cent) exhibits that the vast majority of the career diplomats considered element E (i.e. Constructive) to be an integral constituent of the language of diplomacy.

Item 10F  'The language of diplomacy should be Polite'

Table 10F

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63.63</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

271
Table 10F indicates that the two points of agreement received the highest percentage (SA, 63.63 per cent and AG, 34 per cent). This means that the great majority of the career diplomats agreed on the assumption of item 10F that the language of diplomacy should be Polite. By integrating the two points of agreement (SA, 63.63 per cent and AG, 34 per cent) as opposed to the two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 2.27 per cent) the final result (97.72 per cent) represents the absolute agreement of the career diplomats that element F (i.e. Polite) must be regarded as a mandatory constituent of the language of diplomacy.

In considering the above results concerning the elements proposed as potential constituents of the language of diplomacy, all the six elements received remarkable confirmation from the career diplomats who evaluated them. Such results, apparently, provide the elements with extreme consideration and, therefore, they establish themselves as an integral part of the language of diplomacy.

8.2.2 The qualities of diplomats

The second criterion of the language of diplomacy, that is related to the users of the elements of the language of diplomacy, is the qualities of diplomats.

8.2.2.1 Writings in the area

Writings in diplomacy have cast light on several aspects of diplomats' qualities. Most writers in this area have devoted much space to discussing the necessary qualities which a successful
diplomat has to possess. Nicolson (1964), for example, has dealt with seven essential qualities which a diplomat should acquire. The qualities, which Nicolson has associated with the 'moral influence' include truthfulness, precision, calm, good temper, patience, modesty and loyalty (1964: 55-67).

Zartman and Berman (1982), who rightly argue that negotiators, or diplomats in general, are made and not born, cite a number of crucial qualities which diplomats should possess. Such qualities, which were obtained from experienced negotiators in interview setting, include integrity, empathy, trust or credibility, patience, self-assurance, ingenuity and honesty.

8.2.2.2 Establishing the necessary qualities

Building on such insights, two steps were carried out in order to establish the minimum necessary qualities needed to be acquired by any professional diplomat. Firstly, the career diplomats who were interviewed and tape-recorded for the purpose of this work, were asked about the qualities that diplomats should acquire (question 3 of category A of interview scheme, Appendix 1). Secondly, certain qualities were introduced in the questionnaire as potential qualities necessary for any practical diplomat. By providing the five-point scale, the career diplomats were asked to measure the imperative need of each of these qualities.

As to the first step, almost all the career diplomats answered question 3 of category A of the interview scheme:

'What qualities should a diplomat acquire?'
by stressing that diplomats should be well-educated, knowledgeable and knowing foreign languages. The career diplomats emphasized that diplomats should possess a wide range of knowledge which include knowledge of history, international relations, politics, economics, international law, diplomatic history, as well as social and cultural matters. As an Italian Ambassador put it, the knowledge which diplomats should know is the maximum possible of all things - past and present. They should also have the capacity to anticipate the future problems (Italian career diplomat - interview). This means that diplomats, according to the British Ambassador, need to have certain special skills over the ordinary communicators or negotiators. They also need to acquire some awareness of the cultural differences which means that they need to possess:

'Knowledge of language habits and modes of speech'
(Michael Tait - interview)

In addition to the versatility of knowledge that diplomats should acquire, the career diplomats emphasized that diplomats should know foreign languages. According to an UAE Ambassador, diplomats should first of all be well-educated and should speak as many languages as possible, or at least two or three foreign languages (United Arab Emirates career diplomat - interview). The knowledge of foreign languages, according to an American career diplomat, while it is not absolutely essential for all diplomats, is a tool which, at least, some of them must possess in order to enable normal communication among nations to proceed in a smooth manner (American career diplomat - interview).
Many other qualities, which diplomats should acquire, were mentioned by the career diplomats. They include flexibility, consideration, truthfulness, straightforwardness, kindness, honesty and integrity. Tag Elser expressed some of these qualities as follows:

'We 11 , to start with, he must be well educated. He should be trained in a way designed for diplomats, also to acquire some experience before he get in serious responsibilities. He should be in a way eloquent, of agreeable manner at least, to say the least, of good appearance and of honesty and integrity' (Tag Elser Hamza - interview)

With regard to the second step, the career diplomats were asked to consider and measure seven potential qualities to be acquired by international diplomats as being regarded as essential and crucial to any professional diplomat on the practical and virtuous basis. Item 11 of part five of the questionnaire includes these qualities as follows:

Item 11 'A diplomat should
a be highly educated
b know foreign languages
c communicate in a friendly manner
d be honest
e be sincere
f be truthful
g be calm'
The seven qualities can be classified into two groups of which the first represents the knowledge-related qualities and the second deals with the moral-based virtues.

The knowledge-related group contains the first two qualities, a and b. However, being highly educated does not, by all means, indicate that a professional diplomat has to have a higher degree of education such as master or doctorate but a university first degree should be the minimum qualification to be acquired by any diplomat in order to enable him to establish the sort of knowledge that his profession requires as indicated above by the career diplomats. In addition to the general knowledge, specific social and cultural knowledge about the country to which a diplomat is to be appointed has to be sufficiently acquired in order for the diplomat to deal with the authority and the people of the host country effectively and appropriately. However, such a task requires diplomats to master foreign languages. Including the mastery of the host country's language, diplomats need to master at least one or two of the six official languages employed at the United Nations (mentioned earlier in this chapter) of which English and/or French should be imperative because of the universal status of each.

The moral-related qualities, which a good diplomat ought to possess, include the next five qualities (i.e. qualities, c, d, e, f and g). Qualities c and g (i.e. 'communicate in a friendly manner' and 'be calm') deal specifically with a diplomat's behaviour and attitudes. A successful diplomat would be the one who is respectable, considerate and patient with his counterpart. The other three qualities (d, e and f), which would be used here in their normal and literal senses, are moral qualities which a
diplomat as a humanitarian should possess. In this sense, the function and the role of the professional diplomat, or 'the Ambassador', would be totally different from the role and function of 'the man',

'... who was sent to lie abroad for the good of his country' (The Oxford English Dictionary - Diplomacy)

which lasted for a long time and still has some trace in current use of diplomatic communication as we shall encounter some examples, in the next section of this chapter, which were reported by the career diplomats.

8.2.2.3 Measuring the qualities

The seven potential qualities of a good and reasonable diplomat were considered and measured by the career diplomats. The results obtained, which would be presented in tables according to the five-point scale, were as follows (see Appendix 10):

Item 11A 'A diplomat should be highly educated'

Table 11A

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<th>SD</th>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

277
Table 11A indicates that the two points which received the highest percentages were the points of agreement (SA and AG). By integrating the percentages of the first two points of agreement (SA, 61.36 per cent and AG, 34 per cent) as opposed to the next two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 0 per cent) the final result reveals that the absolute majority of the career diplomats (95.36 per cent) agreed on the assumption of Item 11A that a diplomat should be highly educated.

**Item 11B 'A diplomat should know foreign languages'**

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11B exhibits that the two points of agreement were the only points which received scores. This indicates that the agreement of the career diplomats on the assumption of item 11B that a diplomat should know foreign languages is absolute. Furthermore, the great majority of the career diplomats were in favour of the first point of the above scale (SA, 70.45 per cent) rather than to the second point (AG, 29.54 per cent). By integrating the two points of agreement, the final result (100 per cent) represents the career diplomats' absolute agreement that a diplomat should know foreign languages.
Table 11C indicates that the two points which received the highest percentages were the points of agreement (SA and AG). By integrating the percentages of the first two points of agreement on the assumption of item 11C (SA, 72.72 per cent and AG, 25 per cent) as opposed to the percentages of the next two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 0 per cent) the final result becomes 97.72 per cent. This result reflects the absolute agreement of the career diplomats on the assumption of item 11C that a diplomat should communicate in a friendly manner.

Item 11D 'A diplomat should be honest'

Table 11D
Table 11D displays that the two points of agreement received the highest percentages (SA and AG). The indication of this is that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats were in favour of the assumption of item 11D. By integrating the first two points of agreement (SA, 59 per cent and AG, 34 per cent) as opposed to the next two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 2.27 per cent) then the final result becomes 93.18 per cent which mirrors the agreement of the vast majority of the career diplomats on the assumption that a diplomat should be honest.

Item 11E 'A diplomat should be sincere'

Table 11E

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</table>

Table 11E shows that the two points which received the highest percentages were the points of agreement (SA and AG). This reflects the career diplomats' agreement on the assumption of Item 11E. By integrating the first two points of agreement (SA, 54.54 per cent and AG, 36.36 per cent) as opposed to the next two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 4.54 per cent), the final result (90.90 per cent) clearly displays that the overwhelming majority of the career diplomats were in favour of the assumption of Item 11E that a diplomat should be sincere.
Item 11F 'A diplomat should be truthful'

Table 11F

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<td>6.8</td>
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</table>

Table 11F reveals that the two points of agreement (SA and AG) received the highest percentages of the career diplomats' responses to the assumption of Item 11F. By integrating the first two points of agreement (SA, 50 per cent and AG, 38.63 per cent) as opposed to the next two points of disagreement (SA, 0 per cent and DA, 4.54 per cent), the final result (88.6 per cent) clearly represents that the vast majority of the career diplomats agreed on the assumption of Item 11F that a career diplomat should be truthful.

Item 11G 'A diplomat should be calm'

Table 11G

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</table>

281
Table 11G discloses that the two points which received the highest percentages were the points of agreement (SA and AG). This reveals that the career diplomats were in favour of the assumption of Item 11G. By integrating the first two points of agreement (SA, 68.18 per cent and AG, 29.54 per cent) as opposed to the next two points of disagreement (SD, 0 per cent and DA, 0 per cent), the final result exhibits that the absolute majority of the career diplomats (97.7 per cent) agreed on the assumption of Item 11G that a diplomat should be calm.

What the above results reveal is that each quality of the seven received very clear agreement from the career diplomats who evaluated and measured them. The implication of such results is that the seven qualities have established themselves as a set of necessary and essential virtues which a professional diplomat ought to possess in order to be a good and reasonable communicator with his counterpart.

8.2.3 The principles of the language of diplomacy

8.2.3.1 General view

Whenever principles, norms or rules of language use (for useful distinction between these terms, see Barsch, 1987: chapter 4: 150-), are to be discussed, the classic work of Grice (1975) comes to mind. In his Logic and Conversation, Grice established the first framework for the theory of pragmatics, the theory which deals with utterance's meaning in context (see Downes, 1984: 317). In such a theory, Grice introduced and emphasized the notion of 'Conversational Implicatures'. The implicatures are connected with
certain features of discourse which Grice has termed the 'Cooperative Principle, 'Make your conversational contribution as is required' (1975: 45). The Cooperative Principle comprises four categories each of which has certain maxims. The four categories include Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner.

The Quantity's maxims comprise the following:

1. 'Make your contribution as informative as is required',
2. 'Do not make your contribution more informative than is required!' (See sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 of this chapter for related information.)

The Quality's maxim contains the following supermaxim, 'Try to make your contribution one that is true'.

The Relation's maxim is 'Be relevant'.

The Manner's maxim comprises the supermaxim 'Be Perspicuous' and includes:

1. Avoid obscurity of expression
2. Avoid ambiguity
3. Be brief, and
Grice's theory is referred to in most works that deal with pragmatics, indirect speech acts and constructing rules or norms for discourse. Wilson and Sperber (1981: 155-78) argue that Grice's maxims are not all independently necessary for the generation of implicatures. Therefore, they suggest that these maxims can be reduced to, or replaced by, a single principle which they have termed the 'Principle of relevance', a relation between the proposition expressed by an utterance, on the one hand, and the set of propositions in the hearer's (counterpart's) accessible memory on the other hand' (1981: 170; see Al Mulla, 1986, chapter 6 for related argument).

Leech (1980) holds the view that the indirect speech act is uncooperative in terms of Grice's maxims and it can only appear cooperative if a maxim of politeness is added to these maxims. The maxim of politeness, 'Do not cause offence', according to Leech (1980: 13), can extend the rhetoric of conversation beyond Grice's maxims. He describes such a maxim, which he has termed the Tact maxim, as an equal or perhaps more powerful maxim than Grice's (1980: 94). Leech argues that the tact maxim outweighs the cooperative maxims since the function of such a maxim is to maintain friendly peaceful relations which are a 'prerequisite to cooperative communication' (1980: 15).

According to Lakoff (1973: 292-305), since, at times, a choice has to be made between 'Be clear' and 'Be polite' then Grice's maxims of the 'Cooperative Principle' are maxims of clarity. Therefore as the maxims seem to better suit formal situations, she calls for an improved definition of these maxims in terms of the
real worlds of partners and counterparts. Lakoff proposes certain rules of politeness which include:

1. Do not impose
2. Give options
3. Make A (the addressee or the counterpart) feel good - be friendly

Based on Grice's notion of Cooperative Principle and its maxims, the work of Al Mulla (1986) proposes four principles representing a strategy for conducting successful international linguistic communications. The four principles, which were deduced from the analysis of the actual communication activities being conducted naturally, include:

1. The Principle of **Humanity**, 'Be human with your partners in the communication activity'
2. The Principle of **Clarity**, 'Be clear in your communication'
3. The Principle of **Honesty**, 'Be honest in your communication'
4. The Principle of **Sincere Negotiation**, 'Negotiate all points of misculturality or misintentionality in a friendly manner'

The first of these principles, 'the Principle of Humanity', which, it has been claimed, can integrate the principle of relevance and the maxims of politeness, comprises the following four maxims:

1. show better quality of man
2. be compassionate and merciful
do not cause offence, irritation or aggression, and
avoid humiliation, prejudice or discrimination

The Principle of Humanity was inspired from God's saying in the holy QUR'AN (49:13):

'O mankind! We created you from a male and female, and made you into nations and tribes in order that you know each other. Verily, the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah (God) is the most righteous of you. And God has full knowledge of everything.'

The second principle, the 'Principle of Clarity', includes the following four maxims:

1. communicate your needs clearly, accurately and precisely
2. avoid obscurity, ambiguity and vagueness
3. do not use expressions directly related to your culture
4. endeavour to explain any uncertain points

The third principle, the 'Principle of Honesty', contains the following four maxims:

1. have a cheerful disposition and conduct
2. be straightforward
3. avoid lying and cheating
4. be sincere, truthful and candid

The last principle, the 'Principle of Sincere Negotiation', which represents a superprinciple, includes the following maxims:

1. sincerely, negotiate all points of misunderstanding
2. loyally, negotiate all points of misinterpretation
3 honestly, negotiate all points of misjudgement
4 with kindness, keep negotiating all points of discomfort

By observing and satisfying the conditions of these principles, it has been argued, international linguistic communication activities would progress despite the influence of the different socio-cultural backgrounds of international partners and, as a result, the desirable outcomes would be very likely to follow (1986, chapter 6).

8.2.3.2 The four principles

In virtue of the above view, the four principles of the language of diplomacy, which will be introduced shortly, can be regarded as a useful strategy to be observed in diplomatic communication in order to cope with the effect of the diversity of international diplomats' socio-cultural backgrounds. As we saw in the analysis of the negotiation activity in scene b (Chapter 4, which dealt with the diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit), in addition to the different styles and approaches, the absence of trust and accountability and the unwillingness of compromise between the Americans and the Russians increased the degree of misunderstanding and widened the gap of misinterpretation between the two parties which then eventuated the collapse of the negotiation. In other words, the absence of a shared strategy, which could probably overcome the social and cultural differences between the two partners in the negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit, caused the undesired outcome and the unfavourable consequences. For the same reason, other diplomatic communication activities
eventually resulted in unhappy outcomes. A case in point was the negotiation of bilateral consular convention between the Arabic government and the American counterpart (scene h, Chapter 5). The inattention of such a strategy, especially the absence of one of its principles, namely straightforward exchange of messages and intentions between the two governments, cleared the way before the social and cultural factors to intensify their active roles which deepened the mutual misunderstanding and misjudgement between the two parties and consequently impeded the desired outcome which both parties earnestly awaited.

Nevertheless, in order to clear diplomatic communication or negotiation from such unsuspected 'pitfalls' or difficulties, a shared strategy between both parties of the activity is then very crucial to avoid inconvenient outcomes. Therefore, the strategy, which I would propose, consists of the following four principles, the principles of the language of diplomacy:

1. The Principle of Formula
2. The Principle of Straightforwardness
3. The Principle of Trust and Accountability, and
4. The Principle of Compromise

8.2.3.2.1 The Principle of Formula

'Formulate what you wish to achieve clearly and positively', means that, at the very beginning of the first session of negotiation, each party needs to explicitly formulate (or outline) the main points to be discussed and detailed later with the other
party. What this implies is that, at the very start of the negotiation process, the key issues to be negotiated should deductively be expressed in a very brief, clear and precise manner despite the prepared agenda (if there is one) in order that each party clearly understands the other side's goals, desires and intentions. The need for the principle of formula, which is the first step in the four-step strategy, comes from the fact that people of different cultures approach negotiation situation with different views and negotiate with different methods and approaches. As mentioned earlier, the two parties in scene b negotiated the issues in different approaches; while the Americans negotiated deductively the Russians negotiated inductively, the formula approach versus the detail negotiation approach. Such different approaches to negotiation caused mutual uncertainty of the real intentions which eventuated disappointment for both partners (scene b, Chapter 4). The problem which arose between the two partners was not attributed to the type of approach used by each party but rather to the different approaches used in the same negotiation. If any of these two approaches had been shared by the two parties, the negotiation activity might not have collapsed. However, the formula approach seems to better suit diplomatic communication or negotiation as it, early on, provides each party of negotiation with a clear idea about the other party's goals and intentions. Such prior information is very crucial to both parties in order that each one of them can modify its position to harmonize with the real needs of the situation which might differ slightly, or sharply, from the already acquired view or instructions (this situation will be further explained in dealing with the fourth principle).
8.2.3.2.2 The Principle of Straightforwardness

'Avoid being evasive or convoluted', means that, from the beginning of the diplomatic communication or negotiation onward, partners should be frank, forthright and decisive. Such gestures, from both sides, are capable of evoking confidential atmosphere which encourage both parties to cope with the influence of the diversity of their socio-cultural backgrounds. Michael Tait, a British Ambassador advises:

'... I was always very forthright in the way I express myself because I think it is best to be a forthright although I am a diplomat I like to be as forthright as I can since I am trying to avoid giving offence that I will turn down what I want to say I don't want to offend the other person because that going to make react badly to what I am saying but I think it would be good to get him understand very clearly what my point of view is and what my government point of view is. Therefore, I don't hold with some of my European colleagues who always express themselves in a very convoluted way ...' (M. Tait - interview)

However, those diplomats, who 'always express themselves in a very convoluted way', and, unfortunately, there are many of them in current practice of diplomacy, still believe in the bygone era diplomacy when a diplomat was strictly instructed to be evasive, indirect and not to tell the truth as it was believed that a good diplomat would be the one who could keep everything in secrecy. Fortunately, with the help of modern technology and satellite, the secret deal or practice in diplomacy is gradually disappearing and thus it cannot any longer be maintained. A case in point which could validate such a claim was the secret deal between the USA and
Iran which was known as 'the arms-for-hostages deal', the so-called 'Iran-Contra Affair'.

In addition to being forthright, neither party in diplomatic communication should digress or ramify the issues under negotiation. Rather they ought to straightforwardly develop the main points which were introduced in the beginning of the first session. The need for straightforwardness in diplomatic communication, or negotiation, is very crucial. As we saw in the analysis of the activities of scenes d, h and i, for example, the absence of such a principle helped to intensify misunderstanding and misjudgement between the parties involved and impeded the desired results from taking place. The diplomatic activity of scene i, for instance, in which the Arabic career diplomat and the African senior official negotiated a loan, terminated without producing any obvious result because of inattention of the principle of straightforwardness.

8.2.3.2.3 The Principle of Trust and Accountability

'Achieve mutual care and reliance', means that both parties in the communication activity should exhibit serious attention and real concern to what the other side is trying to convey in order to gain their trust and confidence. This implies that each party should carefully listen to the other party, endeavour to understand their objectives, facilitate their positions and sincerely work to remove any obstacles from hindering the achievements. Such friendly gestures would undoubtedly be appreciated by the other party which would then reciprocate with the same gestures. The mutual reciprocity is indispensable to any successful diplomatic communication since the achievements of it would be advantageous for
both parties. However, the situation where the principle of trust and accountability is absent would undoubtedly be different. According to an experienced career diplomat, some career diplomats make diplomatic communication very difficult:

'because every one of them speaks of his own interest and how he achieves such interest neglecting or intentionally avoiding to touch upon the other parties interests ... to give an example here, is the situation in the Middle East, it is not lack of communication but it is interest which has contributed very strongly into deepening this problem' (Fawzi Abdullatif, UAE Ambassador - interview)

The absence of trust and accountability from the diplomatic activities in scenes b, g, k, l, m and n, for example, allows the diversity of the diplomats' socio-cultural backgrounds to play its part and deteriorate the communication activities. In scene b, for example, the lack of this principle is obvious from the Soviet's move (see move 6, scene b, Appendix 3):

'How can we proceed with our talk of abolishing nuclear weapons if the US continues by testing to try and perfect them?
'How can there be a threat to the United States, if we are keeping our promise to scrap our nuclear weapons?'
'This means that their SDI is of an offensive military character, aimed at achieving nuclear superiority.'

8.2.3.2.4 The Principle of Compromise

'Settle the dispute by mutual concession' is the superprinciple for any successful diplomatic communication or negotiation. Unless the negotiating activity involves fundamental objectives such as seeking freedom, retrieving occupied territory or recovering dignity, the principle of compromise has to be present in the mind of both parties who involve themselves in the negotiating activity.
As it is a shared activity between independent states, or between their respective representatives, diplomatic communication or negotiation should produce reciprocal or compensatory outcomes which benefit all parties involved. The reason for this is that, according to common practice, there would be not party who would attend the meeting unless they find it beneficial to them. Therefore, it is unattainable for one side of the negotiation activity to obtain everything while the other side loses everything. In other words, the dichotomy of total winning and total losing does not exist in diplomatic communication. Both sides lose and gain by virtue of 'give and take' processes of diplomatic communication activity. That is each side should relinquish some of what they consider their right in order for both sides to reach mutual amicable solutions by observing and satisfying the conditions of the principle of trust and accountability. Furthermore, both sides should understand that the authorized instructions they have already acquired cannot totally be 'survived' in the actual context where different views as well as proposals would interfere and confuse with the situational, social and cultural factors which would produce new proposals and positions. Therefore, in virtue of the new circumstances, flexibility and modifications in the already acquired instructions have to be considered by both parties in order to arrive at a middle position which would be acceptable to both parties. This situation harmonizes with Tag Elser's definition of diplomacy (or conducting international relations), which quoted earlier in Chapter 2 as:
'... the art of managing international relations in a positive constructive and mutual manner with the aim of reaching agreeable solution and amicable resolution of dispute' (Tag Elser Hamza, UAE Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser - interview)

However, in current practice of diplomacy, many parties still do not believe in mutual agreeable solution and shared amicable resolution of dispute. According to an Indian Ambassador:

'... each group thinks that I can gain if I somehow put the other group down. Why can't we move together? ... Why are we fighting? What are we fighting about? ... This is the basic problem which we are facing today? (Ishrat Aziz, Indian Ambassador - interview)

As the investigation of negotiation activity of scene b reveals, the absence of the principle of compromise on Strategic Defence Initiative, SDI (the so-called Star Wars) prevented the agreement between the Americans and the Russians in the Reykjavik Summit negotiation (Chapter 4). The two sides, after they agreed on several issues of nuclear disarmament, disagreed, according to a Russian career diplomat, on the third essential element of the Soviet Union's package - compromised deal which was the prevention of the armaments getting into outer space (i.e. Star Wars). The absence of compromise on this point was,

'... the stumbling block preventing positive results of this summit in Iceland. That is the answer' (Russian career diplomat - interview)

The absence of compromise also impeded the diplomatic negotiation activity of scene h from reaching the desired outcome. The negotiation between the Arabic and the American governments on
bilateral consular convention, which was proposed by the former government to the latter one, failed to produce a result because of lack of compromise on the proposed text (scene h, Chapter 5).

In order to overcome the effect of the diversity of socio-cultural backgrounds of international diplomats as well as the unpleasant styles and attitudes of speech so that diplomatic communication can successfully be productive, I have proposed and discussed the criteria of the language of diplomacy which includes the elements of the language of diplomacy, the qualities of diplomats and the principles of conducting diplomacy. These elements, qualities and principles, proposed as constituent of the language of diplomacy, are meant to form an effective apparatus by which new trends of diplomatic communication or negotiation activities can be carried out in order to allow the chances for reaching peacefully agreeable resolutions of any conflict or contradiction of national interests among nations.
APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Mr Ambassador:

A 1 From your viewpoint, what is diplomacy?
2 Who is a diplomat?
3 What should he acquire?

B 4 By definition, diplomats belong to different cultures, do you feel that this fact can affect the outcomes of their communication?
5 In what sense?
6 Throughout your diplomatic communication, have you ever been in a situation where you have misunderstood your counterdiplomat's message or intention?
7 How? (what happened?) ...
8 Have you ever been misunderstood by your counterdiplomat?

C 9 Do you feel that diplomatic communication, nowadays, works to enhance the relations between nations?
10 How?
11 In your judgement, what prevents diplomatic communication (negotiation) from bringing about desirable outcomes and peace between nations? Or alternatively, in considering the field work on diplomatic communication, it appears that some diplomatic speech lays bases for starting conflicts between the two parties in the communication activity since it contains aggressive elements. Would you please reflect on this issue and provide certain examples?
APPENDIX 2

THE QUESTIONNAIRE
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to certify that Mohamed Al Mulla is a full-time postgraduate student in the Department of Linguistics in the University College of North Wales, Bangor.

Mr Al Mulla is a candidate for the degree of PhD, and is preparing a thesis on 'The Language of Diplomacy: a Sociolinguistic Analysis of Current Diplomatic Speech'. In this connection, he is gathering examples of usage in diplomatic language for the purpose of bona fide academic research. Full confidentiality will be accorded to the sources of all data.

Signed:

Alan R. Thomas
(Professor in Linguistics and Research Supervisor)
20 November 1986

Dear Mr Ambassador and/or Career Diplomat

May I take minutes of your precious time and learn from your broad experience in the field of international relations?

The inclusive questionnaire is designed and intended to detect and examine aspects in current diplomatic communication. The information you would provide, Mr Ambassador, shall be put to serve the needs of scientific research which will use a sociolinguistic perspective to investigate current diplomatic speech. Your contribution might lead to a better understanding in conducting international relations and will be highly regarded, appreciated and acknowledged.

Yours sincerely

Mohammed Al Mulla
The researcher
Part One: Private and Confidential Information

1 Name:  
2 Age: 
3 Position: 
4 Country of Citizen: 
5 How long in the position as an Ambassador: 
6 Countries to which you served before: 
7 Languages you speak: 
8 If it is necessary for the accuracy, is it possible to refer to your name in the study:
   ☐ Yes  ☐ No

Part Two  The Nature of the Current Diplomatic Communication

1 In conducting international relations, diplomats of different cultures encounter difficulties in understanding the exact meaning of messages of their counterparts:
   ☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
   ☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
   ☐ Uncertain

2 When diplomats of different cultures negotiate international relations, misunderstanding or misinterpretation of intentions is likely to occur:
   ☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
   ☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
   ☐ Uncertain
3 Considering your diplomatic career, have you ever felt that you misunderstood the intentions of other diplomats:

☐ Almost all times ☐ Often ☐ Sometimes

☐ Never ☐ Uncertain

4 When you discuss international relations with diplomats of different cultures, have you ever felt that they misunderstood your intentions:

☐ Almost all times ☐ Often ☐ Sometimes

☐ Never ☐ Uncertain

5 In dealing with international relations, misunderstanding between diplomats of different cultures can lead to:

A Unsuccessful results:

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree

☐ Strongly disagree ☐ Disagree

☐ Uncertain

B Breakdown in the communication activity:

☐ Strongly agree ☐ Agree

☐ Strongly disagree ☐ Disagree

☐ Uncertain
Part Three  Diplomatic Speech Characteristics

6  Current diplomatic speech provides bases for starting conflicts between nations:

□  Almost all times  □  Often  □  Sometimes

□  Never  □  Uncertain

7  It contains aggressive elements:

□  Almost all times  □  Often  □  Sometimes

□  Never  □  Uncertain

8  It is highly unlikely to be a means for bringing about peace among nations:

□  Strongly agree  □  Agree

□  Strongly disagree  □  Disagree

□  Uncertain

9  In a 75-minute interview on French radio, an Ambassador to France candidly expressed his opinion on French Communists as that a Communist is 'a poor Frenchman who went wrong' (and) 'Every one knows very well that the French Communist Party has a special relationship with the Soviet world'.

(Time, 13 February 1984, p. 31)

The language of the Ambassador is:
A desirable for diplomatic communication ...

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree

☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree

☐ Uncertain

B acceptable ...

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree

☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree

☐ Uncertain

C aggressive ...

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree

☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree

☐ Uncertain

D rude ...

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree

☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree

☐ Uncertain

303
Part Four  Elements of the Language of Diplomacy

10 The language of diplomacy should be:

A Formal
[ ] Strongly agree  [ ] Agree
[ ] Strongly disagree  [ ] Disagree
[ ] Uncertain

B Accurate
[ ] Strongly agree  [ ] Agree
[ ] Strongly disagree  [ ] Disagree
[ ] Uncertain
C  Precise
☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
☐ Uncertain

D  Informative
☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
☐ Uncertain

E  Constructive
☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
☐ Uncertain

F  Polite
☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
☐ Uncertain

305
Part Five  Qualities of Diplomats

11 A diplomat should:

A  be highly educated

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree

☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree

☐ Uncertain

B  know foreign language(s)

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree

☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree

☐ Uncertain

C  communicate in a friendly manner

☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree

☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree

☐ Uncertain
D  be honest
☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
☐ Uncertain

E  be sincere
☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
☐ Uncertain

F  be truthful
☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
☐ Uncertain

G  be calm
☐ Strongly agree  ☐ Agree
☐ Strongly disagree  ☐ Disagree
☐ Uncertain
APPENDIX 3
THE PRIMARY CLASS DATA OF CATEGORY A
ABOUT THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT NEGOTIATION

Scene (a) The 'Preparatory-Essential Context'

(1) American 'The KGB has succeeded in infiltrating its officers into the UN bureaucracy, with some reaching positions of authority ...' (The Times, 9 October 1986, p. 7).

(2) Soviet ... ... (no obvious countermove) ... ... 

(3) American 'Human rights were 'right up at the top of our agenda'. (The Times, 11 October 1986, p. 5)

(4) Soviet ... (Act, the Soviet officials confirmed that the dissident Poetess (Irina) was unconditionally released) ...

(5) American 'We are always pleased to receive word that someone who applied has been given permission to leave. But this is only a symbol of a very broad and deep concern' (The Times, 11 October 1986, p. 5)

(6) Soviet 'We are prepared to look for solutions to the burning problems which concern peoples all over the world, and among them, with first priority, to take the decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war and which would allow us to tackle thoroughly the problem of disarmament' (The Times, 11 October 1986).

(7) American The Summit, as President Reagan put it, is 'a base-camp' (The Independent, 13 October 1986, p. 1).

(8) Soviet Mr Gorbachov said the remarks made by Mr Reagan earlier provided 'not a little foundation' to start a meeting (The Times, 11 October 1986)

(9) American The US had 'nothing in its pocket' to put before the Russians ... 'The only thing I have in my pocket is my hotel key' (The Independent, 11 October 1986)
'On Saturday morning October 11th, 1986, the two leaders met on their own for about an hour. President Reagan unfolded his views on linking a missile defence system, SDI (the Strategic Defence Initiative, known as Star Wars) with the phased elimination of ballistic missiles. Mr Gorbachov, during that first Saturday session, did little to disabuse President Reagan. Instead of complaining about SDI, he startled President Reagan by reverting to a proposal to cut strategic nuclear weapons by 50 per cent during the next five years, and eliminate them altogether over 10 years. However, by lunch time on Sunday 12th October, when Reagan and Gorbachov extended their meeting, the atmosphere had soured as everything Mr Gorbachov was offering was conditional on a US commitment not to test space weapons for at least 10 years. President Reagan offered to go part of the way by accepting Mr Gorbachov's proposal for a binding undertaking to maintain the 1972 ABM Treaty (Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty). Here the two leaders could not agree on the interpretation of the ABM treaty's one phrase, 'Laboratory-testing'. The Soviet leader's interpretation was that, according to this phrase, the treaty would not permit any experiments in the new space technologies, outside the laboratory, whereas President Reagan opted for the 'wide' interpretation which claimed that full-scale development and testing of space weapons would be legally permissible' (The Guardian, 14th October 1986, p. 6).

After about four hours of sharp confrontation between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachov, they gave up. The Americans admitted that they were tired and had no stamina left to continue fighting about 'one word - laboratory-testing', then President Reagan told the Soviet leader:

(1) American
'I am dissappointed that from the very beginning you had come to Reykjavik with no willingness to reach agreement.'

(2) Soviet
'They wanted me to assent to a burial ceremony for ABM treaty.' (The Guardian, 14 October 1986, p. 6)

(3) American
'In the end we are deeply disappointed with the outcome' (The Independent, 13 October 1986, p. 1)
(4) Soviet  'This has been a failure, and failure where we were very close to an historic agreement. All of the arms race might begin with unpredictable military and political consequences' (The Daily Telegraph, 13 October 1986, p. 1)

(5) American  'Late this afternoon I made a new proposal to the General Secretary, a ten-year delay in deployment of SDI in exchange for the elimination of all ballistic missiles. The General Secretary agreed, only if I would sign an agreement that would deny to me and future Presidents, for ten years, the right to test and develop the best defence against nuclear missiles. This we could not and will not do' (The Daily Telegraph, 13 October 1986).

(6) Soviet  'How can we proceed with our talk of abolishing nuclear weapons if the US continues by testing to try and perfect them' 'How can there be a threat to the United States, if we are keeping our promise to scrap our nuclear weapons?' 'This means that their SDI is of an offensive military character, aimed at achieving nuclear superiority' (The Guardian, 15 October 1986, p. 1 and back page).

(7) American  'I think you didn't want a Summit', Reagan said (The Guardian, 15 October 1986, p. 6)

(8) Soviet  'Well, there is still time' (Gorbachov replied, same source)

(9) American  'No, there isn't', Reagan replied (The Guardian, 15 October 1986, p. 6)
Scene (c)  A Scene of Negotiation of a Ministerial Joint Commission

The Arab delegate neglected mentioning one member of his delegation in his introductory remarks. Such behaviour raised certain suspicions among members of the two delegations; Arabs and Europeans. After welcoming remarks from both delegations (parties) the Arab delegate initiated the following exchange:

(1) Arab 'We are pleased with our progress in a number of areas that we have dealt with in the past two years, and we hope to maintain a similar progress in our co-operation in the area of ... especially ... (eh .. (long pause) (...)

(2) European ... (overlapping) ... (a European member started to laugh and continued to laugh loudly ...)

(3) Arab And I would like, if I may, (...) to know your stance on these areas where we have mutual interests.

(4) European (...) We understand the reasons for this ... and also we realize the importance of our co-operation in those areas you mentioned, your excellency, and therefore, I would like you to suggest establishing sub-groups from our two delegations to discuss those areas in detail ...
Scene (d) A Scene with an African Diplomat After the Final Session of an Afro-Arab Conference

After the last session of a conference in Afro-Arab relations, 22 carat-gold coins, among other things, were distributed among the participants as souvenirs. A group of members, from both sides, was evaluating the conference outcome:

(1) Arab 'Some of the members were saying the conference was successful ... what do you think?'

(2) African 'Believe me I am very happy of attending this conference' (...)

(3) Arab (smiling and nodding) 'Yes, but what about the outcome?'

(4) African 'Tell me first ... Is there any bank nearby?'

(5) Arab 'I think so, but why?'

(6) African 'Could you do me a favour?'

(7) Arab 'Wha ... what?'

(8) African 'To show me a bank!'

(9) Arab 'Excuse me now, I am very busy, but I will see you later.'
Scene (e) A Scene with an Indian Career Diplomat in an Invitation Context

The two partners, an Indian and an Arab, were friends. The Indian said:

(1) Indian 'We will have a small family party and we hope you can come.'

(2) Arab 'Well, I would like ... but ... I ...'

(3) Indian 'Try to come if you are free.'

(4) Arab 'I will try ... but ... I think ... we ...'

(5) Indian 'If you are very busy then you don't have to come.'

(6) Arab '... ... Alright ... thank you any way!'
Scene (f)  A Scene with a Chinese Diplomat in the Context of Preparation for an Official Visit

In an informal meeting, diplomats (Chinese and Arabs) were preparing an agenda for an official visit. The weather was so hot and there was just a ceiling fan:

(1) Chinese  'Can I get some water, please?' 
(2) Arab  'From my eyes!' 
(3) Chinese  'What? ... ...' 
(4) Arab  'What what?' 
(5) Chinese  'I asked for water to drink!' 
(6) Arab  'OK ... OK ...'

The intimate atmosphere rapidly changed and some members suggested to have a break for lunch.
Scene (g) A Scene at the United Nations where an Asian Career Diplomat Communicated a Message to an Arab Counterpart

At the United Nations, an Asian representative tried (using his own means) to get an Arab representative to vote in favour of a resolution which concerned his country:

(1) Asian 'I would be pleased if you accept this small gift (handing to him an envelope containing amount of money notes).

(2) Arab 'Is that some money?' (noticing some papers inside the envelope).

(3) Asian 'Yes ... eh ... because we couldn't buy a gift for your family, we said he might have time to ... to buy a gift with this small amount of money'.

(4) Arab 'How can you do this to me'

(5) Asian 'It is not a big thing ... it is just ... we were very busy and couldn't buy a gift for your family ... that's all!'

(6) Arab ... (after returning the envelope, he angrily said) 'Don't do this with me again!'
Scene (h)  A Scene in which an American Career Diplomat Negotiated
a Bilateral Consular Convention with an Arab Government

(1) Arab

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very grateful to propose the enclosed model of bilateral consular convention that it reached with other governments. It would be very kind of the respected Embassy of the United States of America if it forwards the enclosed text to its government as being convenient for the bilateral relations, and provide this Ministry with the appropriate response ... ...

(2) American

... And concerning the text of bilateral consular convention, the Embassy of the United States would like to inform the Ministry that the State Department agreed in principle to have a consular convention, but would like to add that the text proposed by the Ministry would be inconsistent with the kind of text that can be acceptable under the United States laws since it would require confirmation and have to meet certain standards, therefore, the State Department would like to propose the enclosed counter-text which would be compatible with its laws and would be subject to negotiation ... ... The Embassy would be very grateful if the Ministry provides the Embassy with its comments concerning the counter-text ... ...

(3) Arab

... ... ...
Scene (i)  A Scene Where an Arab Career Diplomat Negotiated a Loan with African Senior Officials

The career diplomat's country granted a loan to an African country and his duties were to follow up the loan and arrange its reimbursement. He had a very hard time to trace the man who was in charge of that loan. Finally he thought that the Minister of Finance was the right one, and so he approached him and asked:

(1) Arab  'Do you know anything at all about the loan ... ...'

(2) African  'You know ... the wealth of the country ... eh ... the wealth of the president to us is the wealth of the country ... eh ... ...'

(3) Arab  'I am sorry ... I could not understand ... my question is not about the wealth of the country or the wealth of the president but it is about the loan ... where is the loan?'

(4) African  'Actually ... eh ... the wealth of the country is the wealth of the president ... and you know ... it is the wealth of our president ... is the most important than anything else.'

(5) Arab  'I am sorry ... I still want to know more about the loan'

(6) African  'Well, I have told you everything that I know ... and frankly I don't have more information to add ... sorry Mr Ambassador ... sorry ...'

(7) Arab  OK thank you ... ...
Scene (j)  A Scene where a European Career Diplomat Misinterpreted a Message from a Japanese Counterpart

After the two career diplomats talked for about an hour in various themes including economics, the European career diplomats, in the end of their meeting, asked the Japanese counterpart:

(1) European 'Do you have extra copies of the last EEC (European Economic Community) Summit's communique?'

(2) Japanese 'Yes ... yes!'

(3) European 'Could you send me a copy or two?'

(4) Japanese 'Yes ... yes! ...'

(5) European (almost a week later telephoned) '... my friend, you have promised to send me copies of the communique of the last EEC Summit, but I haven't received any yet.'

(6) Japanese 'Me ... me ... I didn't promise ... oh my friend sorry ... I didn't mean it sorry ... I don't have them.'

(7) European (The European career diplomat angrily sought copies from another career diplomat) ... ... ...
Scene (k)  A Scene Where a Greek and a Bangladesh Career Diplomat had Mutual Misunderstanding in an Informal Situation

In this scene a Greek career diplomat and a Bangladesh career diplomat were having an informal talk in a club after playing tennis. They were discussing the British history and the Bangladesh career diplomat said:

(1) Bangladesh 'Look, Alexander was great to you but to me he was Alexander the invader. And here, he had no business to come to my country without an invitation'

(2) Greek ... ... ... ... ...
    (he swiftly left his friend, and never talked to him (to the Bangladesh career diplomat)).
APPENDIX 5
SECONDARY CLASS DATA OF CATEGORIES B AND C

SOME OF THE CAREER DIPLOMATS' RESPONSES ON QUESTIONS 4, 6 AND 8 OF THE INTERVIEW SCHEME
(For the questions, see Appendix 1)

Michael Tait, a British ambassador, answered these questions (which will be considered in order) as follow:

A4 'Yes I think it can indeed affect the outcomes in the communication, I don't think it needs, and if the diplomat is aware of the differences between cultural background in his country and the cultural background of the country with which he is trying to deal, he will avoid getting a wrong message, but sometimes it is quite difficult whether it is in the form of language used or whether it is in the actions of the people concerned, both in the linguistic sense and in the behavioural sense. I think that the diplomat does have to be well briefed' (M. Tait - interview)

A6 'Well, I think to claim that I had always understood what was being said to me may be the claim of excessive pride could not be sustained. But I can't remember when I had a gross error about understanding. And I think that the greatest error of understanding, the greatest problems about misunderstanding arise where we have a different style of address and communication because of cultural differences. Thus the differences with the Americans and West Europeans, I think, arise less frequently, but differences between ourselves and Eastern Europeans I think because they are Slav people and different from the cultural background of the Western Europeans, I think they do sometimes arise and there again differences between British people - Europeans and Arabs with whom I have some experience, are also very considerable' (M. Tait - interview)

A8 'Well, I think yes. Sometimes there has been a difference of understanding. Quite obviously sometimes we have conversation in Arabic, the last reflection on my own inadequacy in that difficult language, and there is a recent case where I think I misunderstood a message, not tragically, but you know the emphasis was wrong. It was an error and the error was on my part because the discussion was in Arabic and I didn't quite get it right. But I think the most part, if it is a very key word question, the process which I normally use is if there is any doubt is to reformulate the proposition in different
ways. So by reformulating the proposition according to your language then you get a very clear idea because if the proposition is based on his language that might not be clear to you in your language, what it is therefore if he says to you, "Do you agree with that X?" you might say, "Well, I am not sure that I do but I agree with Y. So you reformulate in a way which you can give a definite answer and in the same way if someone says, "My view is as follows", Then, you can seek clarification after the discussion or after the exchange by saying, 'I see if I have understood you, your view is as follows. So what you are doing really is a sort of cultural jump and rephrasing what the man has said to you in a way which is like a confirmation and is like a redefinition of his point of view in terms of which that is totally clear to you, whereas to his the expression was not totally clear.' (M. Tait - a British ambassador - interview)

An American career diplomat provided the following answers (A4 and A6):

'Well, yes I do. And let me say in what sense I think that is true. Communication is not in words only but it also has to do with attitudes, misconceptions and personal prejudices and cultural prejudices which can affect understanding. I am sure that if I could take the time to reflect further on this I could think of incidents in my own career where I have misunderstood the message that some other diplomat was trying to send to me and therefore proceeded on an erroneous notion. Certainly it has been my experience, for example, that in the area of the world where I have most of my service in the Arab world very often the absence of a negative answer, the absence of a clear no means the decision has been taken against proceeding along a given course. This is very often misunderstood by people who are new to the Arab world because certainly in my own culture when a person wants to say no and wants and, when a person does not want to follow a certain course of action and when a person disagrees with a proposal they are expected to say no and to say so rather clearly. And this is very consistent with our culture and norms in the United States. On the other hand, in other cultures including the more certainly most Arab societies, I believe, it is considered rude to simply tell somebody flatly no that is a bad idea or no I would never be willing to do such a thing and so very often one will be told the matter is not timely or it has been referred to the competent authorities. The number of times that I have been told that a certain issue has been referred to the competent authorities it is a res-
pense I have had many times and it is very important for a diplomat, based on his understanding of the specific country and of the specific issue involved to be able to detect when that answer means no. But you don't get that purely from language, you get that from understanding of the culture and sometimes from the expression on the face of the person who is talking to you or the expression in his voice. Insha'Allah [if God would] can mean I certainly hope so and certainly expect that would be done within 24 hours. Insha'Allah can mean don't wait for that to happen because it could be a very, very long time indeed, And this kind of understanding that a diplomat has to develop and this is where communication became an art that goes way beyond words. 'American career diplomat - interview)

Yes, in fact I think perhaps very often our procedure is to agree among ourselves. My government very often when it receives a proposal from a foreign government will consider it in principle and will reach a conclusion internally that we agree with the proposal and that we are happy we would like to do it and there is a shared interest between us and the government making that proposal. On the other hand, because we are a rather legalistic society and insist on having very many details, carefully defined in writing before we reach a final agreement we were very often then needed to undertake a process which the other government, particularly if it is a government of another culture, let say an Arab government, will find very discouraging and very frustrating and they may often interpret that process as a negative answer because it seems to be so difficult and time consuming. Let me give a specific example. One country where I worked proposed to us a bilateral consular convention. They even sent us a text of what they considered to be a model consular convention. It was the kind of bilateral consular treaty which they had reached with other governments, and my country - the Embassy where I was at the time working, recommended to the State Department that we proceed to negotiate a consular convention; we said that this would be good for the bilateral relations and it would also enable us to resolve certain perennial consular disputes in an easier and more predictable manner. The response we got from the State Department was yes we agree in principle, we should have a consular convention but you should tell the host government that the text they have proposed would not be acceptable to us because it is inconsistent with the kind of texts that we can accept under our laws and since it would require a legislative approval at least by the Senate, it would require confirmation, it will have to meet certain standards. And then they provided a countertext, which although, if you analysed it carefully, it did seem to achieve the
basic objectives that the other government had in mind it goes radically different in language and radically in certain essentially minor respects. When we presented this text to the other government they were dismayed and they felt it was really an attempt on our part to avoid having a consular convention and even though we told them that our text was subject to negotiation and that our government agreed with the principle of having an agreement, they found that the prospect of trying to negotiate an agreed text from such different starting points was entirely would be too difficult and therefore the fact that we had made such a suggestion indicated that we did not want to have an agreement. So instead, this language at the foreign ministry for months they had decided as I look back upon this that we had given them a No. And their position was that they were not willing to accept negotiation upon our text. On the other hand, they would not tell us that our text was unacceptable because they felt this would be rude and would upset us. So we spent almost a year in which we would periodically enquire about their decision and they would say very politely that they were reviewing our text with the competent authorities. So the impression that our people in Washington received, because they would inquire periodically and they would send a cable and they would say what is the progress in considering the consular convention and the impression in Washington was that the host government was being just very very slow to the point of being negligent in negotiating this issue, an issue which we wanted to resolve. This was the case of great misunderstanding. Until finally I had a serious talk with a high ranking person in the government who said to me, 'You know we really do not mean to proceed with this' and that cleared the air because although it would have been desirable it was not absolutely necessary to our relations and the fact I was able to report back to the State Department that in the end that although they had not communicated this to us in writing we realize that the government here is not prepared to negotiate a consular convention and we should get back to doing things in a practical way under the status quondam. And this cleared the air and it was not longer an issue between us. But the different styles, different cultural styles regarding how one says no and how one says yes, because in this case we had said yes and they had said no, they believed we had said no and we believed that they were still considering the issue' (American career diplomat - interview).
Shams Ul-Alam, a Bangladesh ambassador, answered the previous questions as follows:

**A4** 'Very much so. In the Arab world I found in Abu Dhabi, (UAE), and in Saudi Arabia also, I found that it is very difficult for them to say no. They always say Na Am, Na Am, 'Yes', unless you find out when it is a real Na Am, 'yes'. So it is really one of perception and I am coming to your central theme of misunderstanding language. You have to understand your counterparts, you have to understand their culture, to understand their historic perception and then only you will know when he is talking to you he is also seeing you as a brother and how can he say no to his brother, and so, he is trying to say yes because he cannot say no. So, there is a lot of etiquette, cultural practice and diplomacy all become a mixture, and one must understand that. But the same point when a German ambassador would come he would react in a different way and that's exactly what happened in the occasion of gaining a contract for building roads and houses - a multimillion dollar contract. A senior official met all the ambassadors for the same request and he was polite with each one, and to each he said, 'yes'. But other ambassadors did not understand the cultural rule and I understood because I am nearer to him. German ambassador was unhappy with that because he misunderstood the senior official's message or intention. So, one should try to understand the mind of the people, try to understand their culture. So culture is very important, that is what I am coming to' (Shams Ul-Alam - interview).

**A6** 'Yes, in Indonesia when I went there to negotiate, about twenty years ago, I found that when they were discussing, and it was Indonesian Foreign Minister (...) and he didn't want to sign a document, and I said, 'No, they must sign it was a co-operation between our two countries.' And he didn't want, and I was then the number two person and the senior person said to me, 'There is no use to persuade the Indonesians, they would never do it so stop it'. I said, 'No, it is not use then from coming all the way, either do it or what is the use of taking a piece of paper'. So finally I suggested, They said, 'yes!' And said for the Minister, 'sign!' But they never did it. It was till then a piece of paper. They could easily say No, but they cannot say no. So I also learnt that the Indonesians don't push them because they are so kind, so polite. They say as brother has come all the way how can you say no, to something they cannot implement because of their policy. So I misunderstood them because they would say yes always but they would not do it' (Shams Ul-Alam - interview).
'Yes, in a particular country ... I was in Romania, and I found that ... I am trying, for example, to negotiate a particular project for poultry farm ... I thought this one little thing we can do is in the poultry business. And even there I found that at every stage's a normal negotiation. When our engineers are talking to their engineers because what he says, one in Japan would have talked in a different way, but a Romanian was talking because he had that ideological communist background and had to get the money, and he wants everything in cash and they don't want in goods. And our argument was that if we are buying your machinery which is a second grade and paying in cash - in dollars, why we don't get from France or US or Britain, why should we get it from you, and hey knew that a lot of money was being given by the Arabs and the Western countries, so why don't you buy in cash with that dollars ... So you see, it is basically, I would not say misunderstanding but fundamental difference of approach of the national interest and I will say it is not so much of culture but it is the clash of interest in a way it is culture because ideologically it is different because we believe in certain way, we believe in faith of the Almighty and they don't believe in that. And that I think comes to the different cultures. So you see it is national interest, clash of national interest basically, but again, national interest also emerges from culture and ideology' (Shams Ul-Alam, Bangladesh ambassador - interview).

An Austrian career diplomat provided the following answers:

Yes 'I strongly agree with you because different cultures make also different education and different viewpoints. So sometimes when one is talking the same language but the meaning in the words can be (...) different. For example, we in Austria, as a neighbouring country of the Eastern Europeans, we speak quite often the same language ... but we feel that their use of German is little bit different from ours. So we feel that there are some problems in understanding' (An Austrian career diplomat - interview)

'Not in official discussion, but in private discussion often! But I can't recall a specific example. I should or I must think about it!'
'Yeah. I think it is in the last time I was in Mexico that I was, according to my opinion, I had a positive attitude to some projects, problems or whatever. And I was trying to express this positive attitude but it was understood as a negative one, so completely the other way around. It was stand basically for a language problem because my origin - my Spanish was Spanish Spanish and this was a South-American diplomat and there is some different ... just about different. They misunderstood me because my Spanish like my wife's Spanish [his wife was from Spain], so I speak Spanish quite well but in Spanish way and not in South American way' (An Austrian career diplomat - interview).

Ambassador Young Woo Park, a South Korean career diplomat, answered the earlier mentioned questions in the following way:

'Yes, diplomat, unless he spent, I think each diplomat ... good part of his life usually most of the diplomats upon in his own country and different cultural background he live abroad in the foreign land where there is also different cultural, social and the background different, background and also different tradition, they come across with the encounter, different cultural values and different ways of expression and different communication - forms of communication. Therefore, when you are among different, among diplomats with different cultural backgrounds there are the possibilities and rooms for certain misunderstanding or lack of the identical views' (Y. Woo Park - interview)

'Well, I think in a couple of occasions where I was engaged in the certain negotiation of the issue of the conflicting interests between his own home government and the country of his counterpart that the misunderstanding occurs about the interpretation of the real intention of your counterpart, the sincerity, sometimes I think mistrust coming from, based on the different expressions' (Y. Park - interview)

'Yes, it was ... It had happened, I think the ... when I want to say a certain meaning, the meaning of expression in English but the meaning was, meaning of certain words in English was misunderstood by the counterpart ... that is purely that means that caused the misunderstanding of my intentions, what I really meant to say ... ' (Y.W. Park, A South Korean ambassador - interview)
A Russian career diplomat provided the following responses:

"The question of culture, different cultures, of course are bringing and being brought in certain particular circumstances ... with certain cultural, religious, linguistic background of course it cannot but affect the mentality and political and other use of certain particular diplomats, or the whole diplomatic service ... of course, it may cause in certain circumstances ... it may cause even serious political shortcomings and mistakes and errors. It may bring about certain serious political consequences ..." (A Russian career diplomat - interview)

"Oh! of course one may remember this. I think in every diplomatic service, one has, for instance, a diplomatic life more than thirty years, of course one may recall situations like that. Sure ... sure. Sometimes even there are linguistic misunderstanding which may have certain unpleasant consequences" (A Russian career diplomat - interview)

"Not personally, but there were cases of serious misunderstanding due to very poor knowledge of foreign languages. One may remember a case when a wrong translation of a certain proverb led to very high spirits of a certain leader and nearly broke certain conversation ... wrong translation. When the ... it means that responsibility rest, of course not with leadership but with junior translator who made a mistake ...

Though I must say, sometimes linguistic difficulties may lead to very serious consequences. For instance, there is the famous Resolution 242 which was accepted by Security Council after the Israeli aggression of 1967. The linguistic ... interpretation of definite or indefinite article in one paragraph [the ambassador referred to the expression of Israel's withdrawal from The occupied Arab territories versus occupied territories] always meant a lot ... meant a lot because boiled down to, you know, very serious political misinterpretation of the whole thing by Zionist government of Israel" (A Russian career diplomat - interview)
In conducting international relations, diplomats of different cultures encounter difficulties in understanding the exact meaning of messages of their counterparts:

| Strongly agree | 3/44 | 6.8% |
| Agree          | 29/44 | 65.9% |
| Strongly disagree | 3/44 | 6.8% |
| Disagree       | 7/44  | 15.0% |
| Uncertain      | 2/44  | 4.5% |

When diplomats of different cultures negotiate international relations, misunderstanding or misinterpretation of intentions is likely to occur:

| Strongly agree | 1/44 | 2.27% |
| Agree          | 33/44 | 75.0% |
| Strongly disagree | 1/44 | 2.27% |
| Disagree       | 9/44  | 20.45% |
| Uncertain      | 0/44  | 0%    |

Considering your diplomatic career, have you ever felt that you misunderstood the intentions of other diplomats:

| Almost all times | 0/44 | 0% |
| Often            | 4/44  | 9% |
| Sometimes        | 32/44 | 72.72% |
| Never            | 7/44  | 15.9 |
| Uncertain        | 1/44  | 2.27% |
4 When you discuss international relations with diplomats of different cultures, have you ever felt that they misunderstood your intentions:

Almost all times 0/44 0%
Often 4/44 9%
Sometimes 33/44 75.0%
Never 6/44 13.63%
Uncertain 1/44 2.27%

5 In dealing with international relations, misunderstanding between diplomats of different cultures can lead to:

(a) Unsuccessful results:

Strongly agree 7/44 15.9%
Agree 35/44 79.54%
Strongly disagree 0/44 0%
Disagree 0/44 0%
Uncertain 2/44 4.54%

(b) Breakdown in the communication activity:

Strongly agree 1/44 2.27%
Agree 20/44 45.45%
Strongly disagree 1/44 2.27%
Disagree 12/44 27.27%
Uncertain 10/44 22.72%
Scene I  A scene in which two diplomats, French and Arab, negotiated, in Paris, some affairs of their countries

After negotiating several issues, the Arab diplomat said:

(1) Arab 'You know we have hoped we can participate in similar cultural activities here this year!'

(2) French 'Do you think that you are capable of doing so!'

(3) Arab 'We will try ... we are so interested in introducing our cultural aspects to the French people ...'

(4) French 'Do you think that you will satisfy our people?'

(5) Arab 'Well ... we hope we can present something attractive to them, at least from our Folkloric activities which French people like so much.'

(6) French 'Can I take this as a joke?'

(7) Arab 'Well! ... I ... I don't think we have been joking!'

(8) French 'Monsieur! ... you invited French professionals because you need to learn from them ... but you have nothing ... your little country have ... has nothing to add to French knowledge!!'

(9) Arab 'Merci Monsieur ... Merci beaucoup ... and thank you so much.'
Scene m  A scene in which a European career diplomat visited an office of an Arab Foreign Minister

After a member of a protocol department, accompanying a European career diplomat, entered the front office of an Arab State Minister for Foreign Affairs, the head of the office rose with the usual broad smile on his face and welcomed the European career diplomat and said:

(1) Arab 'The Minister will be with you in about five minutes time ... Please have a seat.'

(2) European (with his face became grim) 'No, I must meet him now ... it is exactly 9 o'clock now ... my appointment!'

(3) Arab (still smiling) 'You're right, but the Minister ... ...'

(4) European ... ... (overlapping) ... ) I can't wait ... I am so busy ... and I must see him now.'

(5) Arab 'But he is not in his office now ... He was summoned by the president for consultation in a very serious matter and he will be with you in just five minutes ... he just rang me and asked me about your appointment.'

(6) European 'No, I can't wait for five minutes ... I must leave ... (and he left the office with murmuring sound).
The US undersecretary for political affairs told a foreign policy conference:

(1) American

'We have seen a more and inner-directed Western Europe, more and more concerned with its own problems, more and more concerned with its economic difficulties, less and less in tune with the US. It is ever more difficult to get Western Europe to look outside its own borders.' He described Western Europe's attitude as 'almost a contemplation of the nave &l;

(Time, 13th February 1984, p. 31).

(2) European

(British official) 'It doesn't help us achieve a clearer understanding of each other's problems, does it?'

(German diplomat) 'Unfortunate, ill timed and wrong'.

(Italian official) 'We were rather surprised. We would like to react, but it is wiser that we don't'.

(British official) 'How can any one in Washington charge Europe with ignoring American interests, when we British, the Germans and Italians have just deployed US medium-range missiles in the face of much domestic opposition?'

(Time, 13th February 1984, p. 31).
Scene o The scene from Time magazine, 'An Ambassador blunders'

(1) American (In a 75 minute interview on French radio, an American Ambassador to France candidly expressed his views on French communists as that a communist is 'a poor Frenchman who went wrong'. 'Everyone knows very well that the French Communist Party has a special relationship with the Soviet world'. (Time, 13th February 1984, p. 31).

(2) French The French press and Communist Party blasted the Ambassador, who then spent much of the week trying to clarify the remarks:

A high rank French official summoned the Ambassador to his office 'to signify the unacceptable character' of the Ambassador's remarks. (Time, 13th February 1984, p. 31).
APPENDIX 8

SECONDARY CLASS DATA OF CATEGORY D
SOME OF THE CAREER DIPLOMATS' RESPONSES ON
QUESTION 9 OF THE INTERVIEW SCHEME
(See Appendix 1 for this question)

Ambassador Fawzi Abdullatif, a UAE career diplomat, provided the following response:

'The diplomatic communication, I don't think so! It is not because of the communication itself, it is because of the intention behind it. The misuse ... intentionally misuse of words from those who conduct the foreign diplomacy makes it very difficult to enhance the communication between nations because every one of them speaks of his own interests and how he achieves such interests neglecting or intentionally avoiding to touch upon the parties' interests. What we can make, to give an example here, is the situation in the Middle East, it is not because of lack of communication but it is interest which has contributed very strongly into deepening this problem' (Fawzi Abdullatif, UAE career diplomat - interview).

A Syrian career diplomat answered the above question as follows:

'Diplomatic contacts have a vital effect on consolidating world peace and even regional peace. For without contact the other party does not know you, and people become enemies when they don't know each other. The more they know each other the more the level of dealing between them increases. But sometimes incidents happen which do not facilitate good relations among nations. I know of some diplomats who have the ability of offending others by their way of talking, and their diplomatic contacts which I really suffered from. For after such contacts with these, the result at meetings were unpleasant because of their offending methods, where hard words and severe expressions were used as well as a kind of superiority in understanding. I remember an example on such an occasion. I talked with an Ambassador about subjects relating to Arab questions. He wasn't listening, and whenever I tried to explain my views, he interrupted me. Then he started talking about theories as if he is a theorist. I felt that silence was the best course, and I was forced to listen for an hour or so
without saying a word. My impression upon the end of that encounter was that understanding contact and co-operation with him were impossible because he wanted to impose his views without listening to the others. He became isolated from the other Ambassadors. Unfortunately, I observed such cases in the many states in which I had served, and one always notices that such an Ambassador is isolated more to himself, a situation which hardly can contribute to the improvement between two states. And I think that the above behaviour stems largely from the cultural background. On the other hand, there are some Ambassadors who boast about their education, knowledge and degrees, even if the latter does not usually affect the level of personal knowledge. (Syrian career diplomat - interview).

Ishrat Aziz, an Indian Ambassador, answered the above question as follows:

'I am afraid that enough is not being done to promote understanding between people and I think to my mind that the first job of a diplomat, in the present day context, should be to constantly promote the feeling everywhere that we are living in one world. But unfortunately what is happening is that the human mentality remains the mentality of an era when we did not have enough or when either you 'had the cake or I had the cake'. If a third person came the share of the cake went down. The fourth came it went down further. Now, today, it is very easy with science and technology to increase the size of the cake. So with co-operation everyone can survive in a much better way. I know the reality very well. It is extremely difficult to change people. As a diplomat, I have been dealing with people and I know how hard it is to change one individual leave alone billions of people which exist on this globe and with their mentality of the past. There are various categories of people; there are people that are educated, there are people who are uneducated, even amongst the educated there is still a mentality of the bygone era. This mentality has to change as with science and technology we can all live much better than we ever did in the past. As I said, many people forget it. They think that if I want to have more it can only be if someone else has less! We can all have more, there is no need for us to have vast numbers of have nots. They can also become haves. This is a very major problem. This something which diplomats should give attention because - not because of idealistic reasons no - because the world is fast reaching a stage when unless independence is recognized, unless the need for global co-operation is recognized that we will sudd-
only come to a disaster ... Co-operation will increase if there is understanding, better understanding means better communication. Better communication means better diplomacy, but the first thing is the diplomats must realize what their first duty is, and that is why I said in the world today there is not enough understanding through diplomatic channels ...' (Ishrat Aziz, Indian Ambassador - interview).

The response of a Russian career diplomat to the question stated above was as follows:

'Of course the answer is that not all depends upon diplomatic services, and diplomats as servants of their governments because the conditions, unfortunately and conflicts, they are the phenomena of every day life - political life of the globe. Sometimes the reality is different very much from idealistic picture. When the United Nations - Organization of the united Nations has been created in the post-war period, everyone, or school of good intentions and good hopes, everyone was thinking that this organization would be really play a role of stabilizing the situations in the world and bring about universal peace. Unfortunately, this is not the fact and who is to blame? Of course, all the governments are to blame for this that they did not learn enough from previous experiences to be more reasonable, be less egoistic and to pursue the line of common goodness. Unfortunately the world is more cruel; there are economic contradictions, ... ideological contradictions, political contradictions, differences between political and social systems which prevent the family of nations to live in really without war and conflicts, without trouble, without clashes of interests. Unfortunately, the situation remains explosive, very difficult. Besides the armament race, besides squandering of national wealth for arms - new and new cycles of arms, besides the splashes of international terrorism even of states' terrorism, besides the examples of unreasonable behaviour of certain countries such as South Africa or Israel, for instance, which pursued the line not of good neighbourhood policy but the policy of territorial expansion of disregards of interest of neighbours - neighbouring countries. Besides that, unfortunately, there are other examples of sharpening or worsening of international situations of raising of international tension. The reason for that are various and different. I don't like, because I am a professional diplomat, to blame any single country or single nation, to put all these responsibilities on one single factor ..., no there are many factors ... many factors. There are for instance, local conflicts, local clashes and even local arm conflicts such as Iraqi-
Iranian war, for instance. The causes of these are deep, and I don't like to touch on the causes of these conflicts, but these conflicts poison the atmosphere in the Middle East and Near East as well as the Arab-Israeli conflict which goes on because of the absence of solution of Palestinian's problem and so on. There are many other examples of tension and insecurity which are caused, for instance, by very difficult problems of different levels of economic and social development. The big growing gap between North and South, between developed countries and developing nations, the problem of international debt, the problem - unresolved problem of famine and the absence of social and political security and so on and so on. But this rather gloomy picture of situation in the world does not mean we must be by necessity fatalistic. We should not be fatalistic because if we are fatalistic then it means that the worst expectations may be ... may become true. We have to be optimistic. We must believe in good faith and reasons ... and we are believers that with good diplomacy, good communication - diplomatic communication included, there are chances of survival or surviving ... there are chances of resolution of any conflict and contradiction by political means, by peaceful means through understanding, through arranging modest prevention among nations. That would be all I think' (Russian career diplomat - interview).

In presenting one more example, a Sudanese career diplomat answered the above question, which concerned the effect of diplomatic communication on the relations between nations, as follows:

'I think it needs more work, and it needs to be put in a way that would be acceptable and understandable to everybody. That is, I mean we have to sit down and work a language - a diplomatic language that would not be aggressive to others, or I mean bring out the bad side of everything. What we are going to in diplomacy is how to bring people together, and the art of togetherness in that sense it means ... it really to work for suitable language that would serve every purpose ... What I mean by aggressiveness is, for example, if you know that your counterpart is coming from developing country, for example, and say, for example the speech of the ... I mean if we have two different diplomats one from high developed country and another is from a developing country and ... speaking to each other, it would be aggressive if the one coming from highly developed country is speaking about how poor the other country is,
how the fact that people do not know this and this civilization and so on. It would not be aggressive if he shows that he feels the difficulties of the other country, and if he shows that there is a certain acceptability in his country to help the other country or other developing countries and so on' (Sudanese career diplomat - interview).
APPENDIX 9

THE TERTIARY CLASS OF DATA OF CATEGORIES D AND E
THE QUANTITATIVE DATA OF PART THREE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
DIPLOMATIC SPEECH CHARACTERISTICS

6 Current diplomatic speech provides bases for starting conflicts between nations:

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
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<td>11.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>26/44</td>
<td>59.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>4/44</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>7/44</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 It contains aggressive elements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost all the time</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>7/44</td>
<td>15.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>34/44</td>
<td>77.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>1/44</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>2/44</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 It is highly unlikely to be a means for bringing about peace among nations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>1/44</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>18/44</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2/44</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>14/44</td>
<td>31.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>9/44</td>
<td>20.45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 In a 75-minute interview on French radio, an Ambassador to France candidly expresses his opinion of French Communists as that a Communist is 'a poor Frenchman who went wrong' (and) 'Every one knows very well that the French Communist party has a special relationship with the Soviet world' (*Time*, 13th February 1984, p. 31).
The language of the Ambassador is:

(a) desirable for diplomatic communication:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>1/44</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2/44</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>19/44</td>
<td>43.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>17/44</td>
<td>38.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5/44</td>
<td>11.36%</td>
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(b) acceptable ...

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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>3/44</td>
<td>6.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>19/44</td>
<td>43.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>20/44</td>
<td>45.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>2/44</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
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(c) aggressive ...

<p>| | | |</p>
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<tbody>
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<td>13/44</td>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>24/44</td>
<td>54.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>0/44</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2/44</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5/44</td>
<td>11.36%</td>
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(d) rude ...

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>10/44</td>
<td>22.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>22/44</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>7/44</td>
<td>15.90%</td>
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</table>

(e) undiplomatic

<p>| | | |</p>
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<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>4/44</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX 10
MEASURING THE ELEMENTS OF THE LANGUAGE OF DIPLOMACY
AND THE QUALITIES OF DIPLOMATS

Part Four  Elements of the language of diplomacy

(10) The language of diplomacy should be:

(a) Formal  38/44 = 86.36%

Strongly agree 10/44  22.72%
Agree 28/44  63.63%
Strongly disagree 0/44  0%
Disagree 4/44  9%
Uncertain 2/44  4.54%

(b) Accurate  44/44 = 100%

Strongly agree 26/44  59.0%
Agree 18/44  40.9%
Strongly disagree 0/44  0%
Disagree 0/44  0%
Uncertain 0/44  0%

(c) Precise  40/44 = 90.9%

Strongly agree 22/44  50.0%
Agree 18/44  40.9%
Strongly disagree 0/44  0%
Disagree 1/44  2.27%
Uncertain 3/44  6.8%

(d) Informative  40/44 = 90.9%

Strongly agree 20/44  45.45%
Agree 20/44  45.45%
Strongly disagree 0/44  0%
Disagree 1/44  2.27%
Uncertain 3/44  6.8%
(e) Constructive 39/44 = 88.63%

- Strongly agree: 22/44 = 50.0%
- Agree: 17/44 = 38.63%
- Strongly disagree: 0/44 = 0%
- Disagree: 1/44 = 2.27%
- Uncertain: 4/44 = 9.0%

(f) Polite 43/44 = 97.72%

- Strongly agree: 28/44 = 63.63%
- Agree: 15/44 = 34.0%
- Strongly disagree: 0/44 = 0%
- Disagree: 1/44 = 2.27%
- Uncertain: 0/44 = 0%

Part Five Qualities of diplomats

11 A diplomat should:

(a) be highly educated 42/44 = 95.45%

- Strongly agree: 27/44 = 61.36%
- Agree: 15/44 = 34.0%
- Strongly disagree: 0/44 = 0%
- Disagree: 0/44 = 0%
- Uncertain: 2/44 = 4.54%

(b) know foreign language(s) 44/44 = 100%

- Strongly agree: 31/44 = 70.45%
- Agree: 13/44 = 29.54%
- Strongly disagree: 0/44 = 0%
- Disagree: 0/44 = 0%
- Uncertain: 0/44 = 0%
(c) Communicate in a friendly manner  
\[43/44 = 97.72\%\]

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<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>25.00%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0/44</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>0/44</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>1/44</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
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(d) be honest  
\[41/44 = 93.18\%\]

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<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>2.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.54%</td>
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(e) be sincere  
\[40/44 = 90.90\%\]

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2/44</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>2/44</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
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(f) be truthful  
\[39/44 = 88.6\%\]

<table>
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<td>50.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>17/44</td>
<td>38.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>0/44</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>2/44</td>
<td>4.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3/44</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
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(g) be calm  
\[43/44 = 97.7\%\]

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>2.27%</td>
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343
REFERENCES

References contain two main parts A and B. References of Part A comprise two groups, 1 and 2. Group A1 displays the first hand references, which represent the career diplomats who were interviewed and/or 'questionnaired' by means of direct contacts. Whereas Group A2 exhibits the second hand references which represent the printed materials. References of Group A2 would be further classified into the following classes:

A2a Dictionaries and encyclopaedia
A2b Newspapers and magazines
A2c Special texts and reports

With regard to references of Part A, group 1, two notes should be considered. Firstly, the expression 'x career diplomat' would be intermittently employed in lieu of the real names in order to comply with the request of the career diplomats to conceal (or disguise) the identities. Secondly, the career diplomats' real, or disguised, names along with the essential related information would be presented according to the following pattern; the career diplomat's real, or concealed name followed by his age, position, country of citizen, foreign languages he speaks and countries in which he has already served (so long as the information is freely available).

References of Part B display the Bibliography.
**References**

Abdel Ghaffar Mohammed; 43; Minister/Counsellor; Sudan; Arabic, English and French; Romania, Uganda, Belgium and Nigeria.

Abdel Hadi El Siddig; 42; Minister; Sudan; Arabic, French and English; Lebanon, USA and Algeria.

Ali Al Mansoori; 40; Charge d'Affairs; United Arab Emirates; Arabic, English and French; France and United Kingdom.

'American career diplomat'; 48; Ambassador; USA; English, Arabic and French; Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon and Tunisia.

'Argentinian career diplomat'; 42; Head of Section; Argentine; English, French and Spanish; United Nations and United Kingdom.

'Austrian career diplomat'; 44; Charge d'Affairs; Austria; English, Spanish and German; USSR, Mexico, India and Sudan.

A van der Willigen; 62; Ambassador; Netherlands; Dutch, English, French and German; Tanzania, China, Canada and France.

'British career diplomat'; 45; Counsellor; Britain; English, Arabic and French; ... Sudan ...

Bruno Bottai; 58; Ambassador; Italy; English, French, Spanish and Italian; Tunisia, Belgium, EEC, United Kingdom and Holy See.

Carlos Fernandez Espeso; 62; Ambassador; Spain; Spanish, English and French; Puerto Rico; Dominican Republic, United States, France, Finland and Belgium.

'Egyptian career diplomat'; 54; Ambassador; Egypt; Arabic, English and French; ...

El Tayib Hummaida; 56; Ambassador; Sudan; Arabic, English and French; Yugoslavia; Somalia, South Yemen, Egypt, Tchad, Mali and Algeria.
Erich M. Schmid; 59; Ambassador; Austria; German, English, French and Spanish; Netherlands, Panama, Thailand, Indonesia and India.

Fatma S. Elbeely; 44; Minister/Counsellor; Sudan; Arabic and English; Lebanon, Egypt and United States

Fawzi Abdullatif; 46; Ambassador; United Arab Emirates; Arabic and English; United Nations and Zaire.

'Finn career diplomat'; 54; Ambassador; Finland; English, French, German and Swedish; Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden and Greece.

Hussein A. Mesharofa; 55; Ambassador; Egypt; Arabic, English, French and Spanish; Spain, Singapore, United Nations, Tunisia and Sudan.

Ilkka Pastinen; 60; Ambassador; Finland; Finlandian, Swedish, English and French; Sweden, China, United Nations and Britain.

Imhasly, B.; 42; First Secretary; Switzerland; English, French, German, Italian and Spanish; Britain and India.

'Indian career diplomat'; 50; Ambassador; India; English, Japanese and Hindi; Japan, Nigeria, Egypt, United Nations and Sudan.

'Indonesian career diplomat'; ...; Ambassador; Indonesia; ...

Ishrat Aziz; 48; Ambassador; India; English, French, Arabic, Hindi and Urdu; Iraq, Morocco, Lebanon and United States.

'Italian career diplomat'; 60; Ambassador; Italy; Italian, French, English ... Afghanistan and Sudan ...

'Italian career diplomat'; 63; Ambassador; Italy; Italian, French, English, Spanish and German; United States, France, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and India.

'Japanese career diplomat'; 56; Charge d'Affair; Japan; English, Thai and Japanese; USA, Australia, Canada, Thailand and Sudan.
'Liberian career diplomat'; 48; Ambassador; Liberia; English and French; India, ...
Michael L. Tait; 52; Ambassador; United Kingdom; English, Arabic, French and German; Bahrain, Jordan, Iraq, Spain, France and Yugoslavia.

'Palestinian career diplomat'; 46; Ambassador; Palestine; English, romanian, Urdu, ... Pakistan; Romania, ...

'Russian career diplomat'; 58; Ambassador; USSR; Russian, English and French; Sudan, Panama, Iraq, Syria, South Yemen ...
Sadok Bouzayen; 54; Ambassador; Tunisia; Arabic, French, English and German; USA, France, Austria, Togo and Niger.
Shams Ul-Alam; 55; Ambassador; Bangladesh; Bengali, English, French, Turkish, Urdu and Hindi; United States, France, Pakistan, Turkey, Switzerland, UAE and Britain.

'Somalian career diplomat'; 52; Ambassador; Somalia; Arabic, Somali, English, French and Italian; France, Britain, South Yemen, Iraq, Iran, China, Uganda ...

'Spanish career diplomat'; 47; Ambassador; Spain; Spanish, French, English, Italian and Portuguese; Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina and France.
'Sudanese career diplomat'; 51; Ambassador; Arabic, English and French; Egypt, Libya, UAE ...
'Sudanese career diplomat'; 46; Ministger/Counsellor; Sudan; Arabic, French and English; Uganda; Tunisia ...
'Syrian career diplomat'; 55; Ambassador; Syria; ...
'Syrian career diplomat'; 57; Charge d'Affairs; Syria; Arabic, English and French; France, Argentina, Pakistan, Poland, Morocco ...

347
Tag Elser Hamza; 51; United Arab Emirates Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser; Sudan; Arabic, English, French; ...
'Tanzanian career diplomat'; 49; Ambassador; Tanzania; English, Kiswahili; ...
'Turkish career diplomat'; 55; Ambassador; Turkey; Turkish, English, French and Italian; Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, ...
'UAE career diplomat'; 52; Ambassador; United Arab Emirates; Arabic, French, English, United Nations, Syria, ...
'UAE career diplomat'; 42; Ambassador; United Arab Emirates; Arabic, English, French; Geneva, United Nations, ...
'Ugandan career diplomat'; 52; Ambassador; Uganda; English ...
Young Woo Park; 55; Ambassador; South Korea; Korean, English, Japanese and French; Turkey, United States, Malaysia, Denmark, Sudan, ...
Yousef Al Hassan; 45; Counsellor; UAE; Arabic, English; Egypt, United States, ...
'Yugoslav career diplomat'; 60; Ambassador; Yugoslavia; English, Russian, ...; Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan, ...
A2 References

A2a Dictionaries and encyclopaedia

Encyclopaedia Britannica
The Merriam Webster Dictionary
The Oxford English Dictionary

A2b Newspapers and magazines

The Daily Telegraph, October 1986
The Guardian, October 1986
The Independent, October 1986
The Times, October 1986
Time, American Magazine, 13th February 1984

A2c Special texts and reports

B Bibliography


358

359


