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Philosophical history in Scott's Waverley novels

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Philosophical History in Scott's Waverley Novels

Youssef Sabbah


In fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

English Department

University of Wales, Bangor

2003

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Abstract

This study explores Scott's vision of historical progress and how its impact on various aspects of human life is reflected in his Scottish novels. Central to this study are civic and heroic virtues in the contexts of religion, family, nationalism, politics, economy, law and justice. It falls into an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion. The introduction sets these concerns in the context of Scottish philosophy and history and argues that Scott rejects Burke's absolutism but looks for a more flexible and rational evolution of the institutions and principles that make for social cohesion.

The first chapter argues that Scott's historicism is not the product of a mixture of Romantic and Enlightenment attitudes, of sympathy or nostalgia and rationalism or progressivism. Rather it is derived from the so-called "philosophical" historians of the Scottish Enlightenment. For these writers, the individualism of modern commercial society had been a problematic development, since unchecked individualism might ultimately undermine social cohesion necessary for all human flourishing. Scott is thus the inheritor of a rationalist, progressive philosophy of history, but one with well-defined reservations about progress and modernity.

The second chapter questions the traditional reading of *Waverley* as a mixture of Romantic nostalgia and Enlightenment skepticism about "primitive" societies. Scott's Highlanders, I argue, function not simply as colourful quasi-Romantic primitives, but as the embodiment of civic and heroic virtues, which renders the novel a Scottish Enlightenment parable on the indispensability of "civic virtue."

The third chapter deals with *Old Mortality*, a novel now often read as a sort of Hobbesian critique of the seventeenth-century British civil wars. Indeed, the civic virtue of the parties involved in the conflict is displayed in such a light that selfish individualism might seem preferable. But on comparing the novel's treatment of the civil wars to that of David Hume's *History of England*, I show that *Old Mortality* is a profound meditation on the fundamentally social constitution of human nature, and that it defends rather than belittles public-spiritedness.

In the fourth chapter I show how Scott undercuts the political conflict in *Rob Roy* by reducing it to a sort of clash of cultures which nevertheless share certain values. Using J.G.A. Pocock's seminal work, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, I suggest that Scott calls for an updating of civic virtue. Chivalric Honour mutates into Credit to meet commercial needs, and to define social relationships. Also, Scott attempts a synthesis of the otherwise antagonist principles of Burke and Paine concerning family affairs. The virtue of paternal piety, as a cohesive force, is redefined as mutual understanding rather than dictatorship. Scott recognizes the law of inheritance but submits it to civil law.

The fifth chapter deals with *The Heart of Midlothian*. The novel, I argue, gives civic virtue a religious dimension by making it providentially recognized. Skeptical of secular values in establishing the genuine civil society, the novel legitimizes a moral autonomy that derives from rational and progressive religion. Moral autonomy in this sense defines actions of mundane authority in whatever capacity, domestic, political, economical and judicial. Updating religion in one of its aspects, I show, aims at asserting Scottish national and cultural identity, given the fact that historically the Kirk has always been one of its crucial components. On the other hand, the novel attempts to define the tense relationship between Scotland and England within the Union in terms of moral values. Taken in the context of colonization, the novel focuses on vices infiltrating into English commercial society, which in a similar manner are transferred into Scottish society, and threaten the morality of the British nation at large.

The sixth chapter on *Redgauntlet* focuses on Scott's treatment of loyalty as a civic virtue in more than one context. In the context of law and justice, loyalty is modified to operate under the rubric of personal integrity and civil courage. In the political context, it is defined in terms of national consensus. In the economic context, it supports advancement as long as it operates within communal interest.

The concluding chapter uses *Guy Mannering*, *The Antiquary* and *The Bride of Lammermoor* to support the thesis that Scott's fictional dealings with history in the "Scottish" novels is directed to an accommodation of ancient virtues with present forms of society and nationhood.

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Introduction

This thesis is concerned with Sir Walter Scott's vision of historical progress and how its impact on various aspects of human life is reflected in his Scottish novels. My emphasis is on civic and heroic virtues in the contexts of religion, family, nationalism, politics, economics, law and justice. My argument will be primarily working within the field of intellectual history, or the history of ideas as applied to literary texts and involving literary/historical analysis of Scott's career. The suggestion that Scott's fiction involves some sort of insight into historical process is not new and was recognized by Scott's contemporary critics, Francis Jeffrey, T.B. Macaulay and William Hazlitt, but without identifying it with any systematic philosophy of history.¹ Perhaps Coleridge is the first writer to define the representation of history in Scott's novels in terms of a complete theory based on Scott's ambivalent attitude toward the past and the present. Scott's novels, according to this theory, dramatize two major forces that shape historical process: one is nostalgic and reflects the desire for permanence and continuity, while the second is progressive and reflects the natural passion for "progression and free agency."² Even twentieth-century "revisionist" critics of Scott, David Daiches and Georg Lukacs, employ Coleridge's thesis repeatedly in their attempt to explain Scott's novels in general, and his view of history in particular.³

On the other side, writers like Duncan Forbes and Peter Garside, guided by Scott's biographical links to various "philosophical" historians of the Scottish Enlightenment (which Scott himself acknowledges in the "Ashestiel" autobiographical fragment attached to Lockhart's *Life*) argue that Scott's writings breathe the philosophy of history and progress.⁴ Unfortunately, their argument is limited to Scott's non-fiction. This discovery led later literary critics, Avrom Fleishman, David Brown, Graham McMaster and many others to break with a longstanding tradition that Scott's insight into history is untouched by any sort of systematic philosophy, and to postulate that Scott's novels dramatize ideas latent in the Scottish Enlightenment.⁵ Although, like these writers, my approach in investigating the historicism underlying Scott's fiction follows the same trajectory of "influence hunting," yet my reading of Scott's novels does not converge with their views. The way they interpret the implications of the representation of history in the Scottish Enlightenment philosophy itself, as I attempt

to show, is misleading and projecting it on to Scott's fiction leads to faulty conclusions.

Scott's sense of history and progress and his understanding of human nature. I would argue, were the product of a complex of intellectual ideas, which he shared with the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, particularly Adam Ferguson, in a tradition basically influenced by Montesquieu to which Edmund Burke also adhered.⁶ The way these writers understood history, progress and human nature, provided them with a theoretical framework which prioritized the social-moral. They looked for what was in the public interest in a changing world and what was not, regardless of antiquity or modernity, conservatism or progressivism. In particular, I would like to situate Scott's writing within the debate between those who espoused the values of a modern commercial state and those who adhered to the older model of civic humanism, a debate intensified in the period of the French Revolution.

Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, David Hume, Adam Smith, William Robertson, John Millar and Adam Ferguson developed theories of social and economic progress in which they stressed the social and progressive nature of man and the natural evolution of his institutions. Yet the combination of liberal and conservative leanings that marked their writings show that they perceived of Progress as a Janus-faced process. Natural sociability, in their view, had produced the commercial society as the final stage of social evolution which contributed to materialistic advancement, the triumph of rationality and toleration over superstition and fanaticism, individual freedom and economic independence, justice, comfort, security and luxury. But it had also fostered selfishness, divisiveness, insubordination and lack of military and national vigour. From this perspective, commercial society was profoundly anti-social and anti-moral in that it was likely, especially in the context of the division of labour, to produce a way of life that would threaten the strength and cohesion of society and weaken civic virtues characteristic of primitive or semi-primitive societies. While Scottish writers merely registered these disturbing features of inevitable social progress or proposed ad hoc remedies, Burke staged a full defence of the civic virtues of former ages in the face of threatening radical French ideas preached by such writers as Rousseau and the later so-called English Jacobins, Thomas Paine and William Godwin. For Burke, an inherited monarchy and landed aristocracy based on martial virtues constituted a state sanctioned by religion with hierarchy and subordination dictating relations in society and family.

Scottish philosophers

The Scottish philosophers believed in the uniformity of human nature, at least at the level of passions. For them, the passion of selfishness had always been the driving force for progress and evolution, which are achieved despite their immediate motives according to the law of heterogeneity of ends. Many, with questionable consistency, contrived to criticize selfishness morally as a source of vice and social depravity. Only Smith robustly accepted the primacy of the selfish motive in economic and social progress, which he inherited from Mandeville. In Smith's view, the individual is "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his attention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he generally intends to promote it."⁷ Yet far from being absolute in his judgment, Smith draws attention to the fact that commercial ideas might lead to violating moral rules based on benevolence and sympathy. Smith writes of merchants as "an order of men...who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public."⁸ But his overall assessment of the negative aspects of selfishness associated with commerce seems to be far outweighed by the benefits. Commerce, Smith argues, "gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who have before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors."⁹

Economic independence in Smith's statement, taken within the context of J.G.A. Pocock's analysis of eighteenth-century polemics about the relationship between political economy and virtue, more likely relates to "commercial humanism" than the "civic humanism" intended in Ferguson's *Essay*, as I show below. As Pocock points out, the economic independence of the citizen, as a civic virtue in the classical republican sense, means "autonomy of real property" which is defined in terms of land ownership and the right "to bear arms in order to assure it to him." Following the ancient Roman tradition, this also enables the citizen to be "virtuous in his devotion to the public good" through his active participation in political affairs, that is, through his "engagement in relations of equality and ruling-and-being-ruled, but virtuous also in his independence of any relation which might render him corrupt."

In the commercial stage of society the criteria of wealth and property is no more solely anchored in the possession of land but also includes paper currency, stocks and shares which are recognized by government and warranted by law. It follows that the economic independence praised by Smith, according to Pocock, is “constructed within the law-centred paradigm,” and not the “paradigm of virtue and corruption,”¹⁰ as might be understood by Ferguson. It is also different from Burke’s version, which seems to limit economic independence to the aristocracy and landed gentry within his hierarchical model of dependence, as I show below.

In an attempt to contain or mitigate the impact of the selfish trend on moral values, it was necessary for thinkers in the Scottish School to adopt a philosophy which focuses on constructing what looks like a collective consciousness among members of a given society so that each member realizes that his/her interest is part and parcel of a whole. As a beginning they rejected contract theory not only on the grounds of it being bad history or bad anthropology—it considers society as a rational construct—but it was also, in their eyes, morally and politically dangerous. If men come to think of themselves as Lockean individualists, bound to society only by contract, what is to prevent them from breaching that contract when it no longer serves their private, selfish interests? In the event of an invasion, for example, what is to prevent an individual from cooperating with the enemy if by so doing he is better able to preserve his property? What, in short, becomes of the traditional notion of “public good”? From such doubts arose the “philosophical” historians’ vigorous attack on “selfish” or “licentious” moral systems, as well as the definitive defence of “civic virtue” for which they are probably best known.

Locke’s predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, had seemingly dealt the notion of civic virtue a death-blow in his *Leviathan* (1651). Earlier political philosophers, taking their cue from Aristotle, had believed that man is a “political animal”—one that flourishes, or realizes his true form, only in a *polis* or civil society.¹¹ They had therefore viewed the state (that is, government) as a moral tutor whose object is to guide its subjects toward the human ideal by inculcating political, or “civic,” virtues. Among these they had included domestic virtues like loyalty, dutifulness, and generosity, as well as more heroic virtues like courage and fortitude that could be of service in a society’s defence. Hobbes, however, was struck by the insight that this moral perfectionism, with its austere, aristocratic ideals, had been much to blame for the civil and religious strife that had plagued the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

He therefore proposed, as Locke did afterwards, to anchor political science in a strictly empirical study of man. Political science should begin, he argued, by asking not what men ought to be, but what they actually are—or would be, without the interference of the tutor-state.

By nature, Hobbes proposed, men are not moved by civic ideals; they are moved only by private appetites and aversions, the most obvious and basic of which are the appetite for continued life and the aversion to death. Consequently, the state can dispense with the quest for the "good life" and concern itself strictly with the preservation of bare life. Its only legitimate object is the reduction of strife among its subjects; the chief duty of the subjects is to avoid strife. Hobbes, in effect, reduced civic virtue to mere peaceableness. Every other form of human excellence ceased to be a virtue. In his view, the traditional civic virtues are simply additional "appetites," and often socially undesirable ones at that. Courage, for instance, is in one sense merely an appetite for self-preservation in dangerous situations. In another sense (here Hobbes uses the word "vainglory"), it is an appetite for fame and the spoils of war. In the latter sense, courage not only serves "no useful purpose,"¹² as Daiches would say, but is clearly dangerous to society in that it encourages disruptive aristocratic rivalries.¹³

The Scots generally accepted Hobbes' and Locke's empirical approach to political science, but they were deeply concerned about its moral implications. They were therefore compelled to fight the Englishmen on their own grounds—to seek empirical evidence that the traditional or "metaphysical" civic virtues were necessary and "natural" to human society.¹⁴ This project was one of the most important sources of the Scots' pervasive interest in the customs and social institutions of primitive peoples such as the American Indians and the Highlanders of their country. Their interest in the Highlanders had an immediate practical incentive, as well. The 1745 rebellion chronicled in *Waverley* had produced a sensation in Edinburgh at about the time Adam Smith and other "philosophical" historians were beginning their academic careers there. Philosophers and citizens alike were struck by the contrast between their own manners and way of life and those of the occupying Highlanders, whose hills were only a few miles distant. The progress of industry and urbanization among the Lowlanders had opened a much wider cultural gulf between them and their northern neighbours than anyone had previously imagined. If this discovery led in some quarters to self-congratulation, it led in others to more sober reflections.

John Millar was the most consistent Whig among the "philosophical" historians and, through his pupil James Mill, an ancestor of nineteenth-century Utilitarianism and British Liberalism generally.¹⁵ Commenting on the relationship between economics and morals, Millar observes that the virtues of rude nations are "diametrically opposed to those of a commercial people."¹⁶ Men in "commercial" societies have a far more acute sense of justice than their forebears; yet the Highlanders and other "rude" nations, who lack this sense, have much more exacting notions of loyalty, which sometimes make them capable of astonishing acts of generosity. As an illustration of this paradox, he cites an anecdote reminiscent of Scott's characterization of the Highlanders in *Waverley*:

In the highlands of Scotland, stealing cattle was denominated lifting; a term to which no blame appears to have been attached; and it is a well-known fact, that an inhabitant of that country, who, upon the suppression of the rebellion of 1745, had the Pretender under his protection, and who had not been tempted to deliver him up by the great premium offered by government, was at a subsequent period tried at Inverness, and condemned to a capital punishment for horse-stealing.¹⁷

Millar's prognosis for modern "commercial" societies that have dissolved the old personal loyalties in an impersonal "cash nexus" is surprisingly pessimistic for a Whig:

[I]n a country where no body is idle, and where every person is eager to augment his fortune, or to improve his circumstances, there occur innumerable competitions and rivalships, which contract the heart, and set mankind at variance. In proportion as every man is attentive to his own advancement, he is vexed and tormented by every obstacle to his prosperity, and prompted to regard his competitors with envy, resentment, and other malignant passions.¹⁸

For the Scots, the Hobbesian-Lockean state, where each man is left to pursue private interests, is not completely successful even in its own terms. Its object is peace; but lacking an adequate civic ideal, it merely replaces one form of strife with another at least equally destructive. Indeed, left to its own devices, such a state is in danger of self-destruction.

A particularly striking but not otherwise unusual affirmation of this thesis can be found in Adam Smith's *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (1766):

Another bad effect of commerce is that it sinks the courage of mankind, and tends to extinguish martial spirit. In all commercial countries the division of labour is infinite, and every one's thoughts are employed about one particular thing. A man has then time to study only one branch of business, and it would be a great disadvantage to oblige every one to learn the military art and keep himself in the practice of it. The defence of the country is therefore committed to a certain set of men who have nothing else to do; and among the bulk of the people military courage diminishes. By having their minds constantly employed on the arts of luxury, they grow effeminate and dastardly.

This is confirmed by universal experience. In the year 1745 four or five thousand naked unarmed Highlanders took possession of the improved parts of this country without any opposition from the unwarlike inhabitants. They penetrated into England and alarmed the whole nation, and had they not been opposed by a standing army they would have seized the throne with little difficulty. 200 years ago such an attempt would have roused the spirit of the nation.¹⁹

For Smith and his contemporaries, the '45 was not the "anachronistic and historically meaningless" affair that Daiches and literary critics in general have thought it.²⁰ It did anything but suggest that "military courage" now lacked a socially useful purpose.

In fact, the amazing success of the Highlanders was often pointed to by advocates of military reform, especially those interested in re-establishing local militias and resuming universal military training.²¹ The "philosophical" historians, not surprisingly, were active participants in the national debate on the Militia Issue.²² While many intellectuals supported reestablishment on the grounds that militias are less dangerous to civil liberties than standing armies, the Scots essentially supported reestablishment because they saw the militia as a means of inculcating civic virtue and combating the deleterious effects of Hobbesian-Lockean individualism. Ferguson illustrates this case in his 1750 pamphlet *Reflections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia*:

[National] self defence is the business of all: and we have already gone too far in the opinion that trade and manufactures are the only requisites in our country. In pursuit of such an idea, we labour to acquire wealth; but neglect the means of defending it. We would turn this nation into a country of manufacturers, where each is confined to a particular branch, and sunk into the habits and peculiarities of his trade. In this we consult the success of manufacture, but slight the honours of human nature: we furnish good work, but educate men gross, sordid, void of sentiment and manners, who may be pillaged, insulted, trod upon by the enemies of their country.²³

In *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith, similarly, argues that military exercises should be incorporated into public education; for even if martial spirit were of no use towards the defence of society, such exercises would still be a useful antidote to the "mental mutilation, deformity and wretchedness" that necessarily accompany the division of labour in a commercial society.²⁴ For both Ferguson and Smith, even modern government cannot dispense entirely with its role as moral tutor. Adroit intervention in the moral sphere is necessary if commercial society is to continue to thrive.

It is probably no coincidence that Scott, as a student of the 'philosophical' historians, served so eagerly as a quartermaster to a cavalry regiment in the restored Scottish militia during the Napoleonic Wars, when Scotland was threatened by French invasion.²⁵ Scott's *The Antiquary*, in fact, dramatizes an imagined French invasion and shows how citizens, in a quasi-militia, could gather to fight the enemy. Critics and biographers have sometimes dismissed this episode of Scott's life as yet another expression of his romantic longing for a return to the Age of Chivalry, or as an outgrowth of his Legitimist political philosophy. Yet romance and reaction played no part in the pro-militia arguments of Scott's mentors. John Robertson's comments on Ferguson's militia pamphlet are helpful here:

Ferguson is not simply claiming that commerce corrupts: his tract is not a fatalistic and indiscriminate jeremiad after the manner of the English patriot moralists. Rather Ferguson appears to be arguing that commerce and the military spirit can subsist together—If only they remain independent of each other. Thus the benefits brought by commerce in undermining the Gothic society of the past are to be welcomed, but they should not be allowed to alter men's continuing adherence to traditional martial values.²⁶

For the Scots, virtues like military courage are indeed alien to modern, individualistic societies; they normally arise and thrive only in traditional, hierarchical societies like that of the Scottish Highlanders. Wholesale restoration of the heroic virtues—a return to the Age of Chivalry—is therefore not only undesirable but perhaps also impossible. Nevertheless, historical experience suggests that such virtues cannot be discarded altogether, and the uniformity of human nature guarantees that they are at least in some measure always recoverable. With proper cultivation, then, such virtues can and ought to be made to coexist with their opposites. The

efforts of Scott's mentors to propagate "military courage" were thus, in their own view, entirely practical.

Among the "philosophical" historians, it is Ferguson who provides the most telling sociological insights into the contradictory tendencies and dangers of emerging commercial society; it follows that civic concerns are most pronounced in the works of Ferguson, the thinker to whom Scott has most often been compared.²⁷ Though he never studied under Ferguson, as he did under some of the other "philosophical" historians, Scott seems to have regarded him as an especial mentor. Ferguson (1723-1816) was a Perthshire Highlander by birth. Trained for the ministry like his father, he served as Chaplain to the famous "Black Watch" regiment of pro-government Highlanders during the '45. He never lost his use of the Gaelic language and retained many friendships whose devotion to the Good Old Cause he could not share. Ferguson's divided heritage, his unusual career, and his moderate politics are all oddly suggestive of the "middle-of-the-road" heroes of Scott's Scottish novels.

In his *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767), Ferguson speaks not of the Highlanders but of the Greeks and early Romans. Praise of these nations' civic virtues, perhaps, could have been the reason that led Hume to dislike the book and to describe it as "enthusiastic in its moral prescription."²⁸ In other words, Hume could have found in it a vision of an ideal society that heeds less what *is* and over-emphasizes what *ought to be*. However, a deep reading of the *Essay*, I would argue, reveals that Ferguson's invoking of past models does not imply an apology for old social and political establishments, but rather a way to analyze the ills of modern life. According to Ferguson, progress and luxury have substituted "external conveniences" for merit and virtue as objects of esteem and social honour, thus weakening the bonds of affection among individuals on the one hand and individuals and their commitment to their country on the other:

Men are so far from valuing society on account of its mere external conveniences, that they are commonly most attached where those conveniences are least frequent; and are there most faithful, where the tribute of their allegiance is paid in blood. Affection operates with the greatest force where it meets with the greatest difficulties: ... hence the sanguine affection which every Greek bore to his country, and hence the devoted patriotism of the early Roman. Let those examples be compared with the spirit that reigns in a commercial state, where men may be supposed to have experienced, in its full extent, the interest which individuals have in the preservation of their country. It is here indeed, if

ever, that man is sometimes found a detached and a solitary being: he has found an object which sets him in competition with his fellow-creatures, and he deals with them as he does with his cattle and his soil, for the sake of the profit they bring.²⁹

In the final section of the *Essay*, Ferguson reveals the practical or pedagogical purpose of such comparisons far more explicitly than Smith or Millar. Here Ferguson emphasizes the role of the individual as an active politician not distinct from the state and vice versa. For him, "if the object of policy" is to "secure the person and the property of the subject, without any regard to his political character, the constitution indeed may be free, but its members may likewise become unworthy of the freedom they possess, and unfit to preserve it." What concerns Ferguson, it seems, is not to reverse history, nor to attack the benefits of progress, but to prioritize "attention to the commonwealth" over the interest of the individual. If the "end of political struggles" is "securing to the individual his estate, and the means of subsistence," he argues, this "may put an end to the exercise of those very virtues that were required in its execution."³⁰

For Ferguson, a society of acquisitive individualists envisioned by Hobbes and Locke is necessarily a failure. Having abolished civic virtue, such a society grows incapable of maintaining itself and so undermines its own achievements in the realm of freedom and individual rights. Yet Ferguson reserves his strongest censure not for Hobbes and Locke, but for the Literati who followed in their wake. According to Ferguson, the eighteenth century was full of poets and critics who regarded the celebrated ardour, generosity, and fortitude of former ages as mere frenzy, and retirement from public affairs as virtue. Such writers, he asserts, "flatter their own imbecility under the name of politeness."³¹ Readings of the Waverley novels like that of Daiches who links them with such "imbecilities" seem to ignore Scott's relationship to Ferguson.

Notwithstanding his vehement defence of traditional civic and heroic virtues, Ferguson does not encourage us to overlook the moral failings of past societies. As a historian, he is actually something of a hanging judge. In his *Essay*, for instance, Ferguson spends as much time criticizing the classical world's unthinking acceptance of slavery and its subjugation of women as he does praising its devoted patriotism. Ferguson associates slavery with epithets like "avarice," "lucrative property," "injustice," "servility," "profit," "luxury," "corruption" and "mercenary."³² If these

are to be regarded as moral and social failings in ancient societies, they are equally moral and social defects in the present society and, perhaps, still worse in the context of colonization. Scott, similarly, touches upon the issue of trade in slavery in the West Indies colonies and connects it with "avarice" and "luxury" in more than one place in his novels. In *The Heart of Midlothian*, for instance, Scott attempts to show the impact of trade in slavery on morals and how by colonial infection it spoils character in the mother country.

Throughout the *Essay*, past and present are judged by the same standard of human flourishing, external to either, though present in part in both. Ferguson offers a succinct summary of his position toward the end of the *Essay*:

The manners of rude nations require to be reformed. Their foreign quarrels, and domestic dissensions, are the operations of extreme and sanguinary passions. A state of greater tranquility hath many happy effects. But if nations pursue the plan of enlargement and pacification, till their members can no longer apprehend the common ties of society, nor be engaged by affection in the cause of their country, they must err on the opposite side, and by leaving too little to agitate the spirits of men, bring on ages of languor, if not of decay.³³

Ferguson, in short, is no historicist or cultural relativist. Though he never, perhaps, defines the ideal society in any detail, the notion of an ideal toward which all societies strive is as central to his political philosophy as it is to Plato's. Several of the passages I have cited here have also been cited by previous critics in attempt to compare Scott with Ferguson. Similarity between the two can certainly be found, but it has often been misunderstood. The strong moralizing strain in Ferguson's *Essay* should not be understood as simply engaging in a relativistic appreciation of past cultures, as some critics have suggested.³⁴ At the same time, Ferguson's practical orientation, his desire to apply the lessons of the past to the present, indicates that he was not exercising some "nostalgic sense," either. If Scott is like Ferguson, as critics have argued,³⁵ it makes no sense to go on speaking of his "relativistic" or "nostalgic" attitude toward the past, nor of an unchecked complacency toward the present.

Critics who seem to be less certain of Scott's progressive attitude prefer to interpret Scott's historicism in terms of Burke's conservative philosophy. Scott, in other words, is a reactionary who idealizes the past order as an attempt to support the status quo as a natural evolution of that order. According to Leslie Stephens, Burke, in the name of prescription, rejected all reformation that would touch upon inherited establishments and beliefs and so did Scott, who "stirred...when any sacrilegious reformer threatened to sweep away any part of the true old Scottish system. And this is, in fact, the moral implicitly involved in Scott's best work."³⁶ But by the time Scott was writing his novels, Burke's legacy as an extreme conservative had few followers, even though anti-Jacobins invoked his support of tradition and the status quo. Therefore that Scott was a furious anti-Jacobin, like Burke, is not a strong reason to ascribe to him Burkian sentiments indiscriminately. Ferguson was also conservative and perforce anti-Jacobin but no one can say that his understanding of history, based on stages of progress, converges with Burke's, although their divergent arguments and objectives rest on the same assumptions. For instance, both postulate that man by nature is a social and progressive creature. Also, as a corollary, they believe in the fundamental sociological concept that views society as a spontaneous outgrowth of human affection rather than a rational construct. But when it comes to defining the means by which to preserve naturalness and virtue against the depredation of artificiality and corruption in the course of historical change, the disparity becomes quite clear between Burke on one side and the speculative historians and Scott on the other side.

I would suggest, the main disparity between the two stems from the fact that Burke tends to define all change that had occurred or should occur in the future as rooted in long inherited traditions. A central idea in Burke's *Reflections* is that change is only "reparation" or restoring and continuing a relatively unchanging tradition. By contrast, Scott's novels seem to approach change in a dynamic, progressive, or pragmatic way. One reason for this variance could be seen as a natural reflection of their different historical experience. Scott is affected by Scotland's turbulent history that had witnessed dramatic changes in its social, economic and political structure, while Burke is affected by the essentially unchanging nature of British society and politics. The dethronement of the Stuarts was of greater moment in Scotland than the

“glorious Revolution” in England—it paved the way for two major uprisings, the ‘15 and the ‘45. Scott was aware of the violence it provoked and its connection with the Union and the passing of an older way of life in terms of culture and national identity. As a result, he could not insist as strongly as Burke did on constancy in political, economical and social affairs. Instead, I would argue, his novels grappled with these tensions as he tried to find a basis for the unity of society in tradition. To confront the emerging tensions of the nineteenth century it was necessary for him to work out more modern approaches to economic and political change, the defence of an established church, social mobility, family ties and the claims of tradition itself.

In political theory, Burke talks in his *Reflections* (1790) about the necessity of a means of progression: “a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation.”³⁷ But, ironically, his conservatism makes it clear that political evolution of the Constitution is a necessity up to 1688 but no further, since, for him, “its fundamental principles” were “for ever settled.”³⁸ Scott’s political journalism also engaged in polemics from the conservative side, and Hazlitt put the case for seeing his novels in a Burkian framework. But Hazlitt acknowledged that his novels gave “fair play” to opposing forces, in fact opposing ideologies.³⁹ To Hazlitt, as to many modern commentators, Scott’s novels could give feelings of nostalgia for the days when political conflicts gave rise to high heroism. This leads to a “profit and loss” approach to what is presented as modern prosaic but more humane and just dispensation.⁴⁰ Further, they can be seen as separating old “romance” from modern “reality” too absolutely in a didactic effort to naturalize the status quo and suppress dissent by aesthetic means. But I would argue that though Scott’s political impulse certainly was not democratic, it could not be viewed as prejudiced, either. Rather it is compromising and reconciliatory, as I show, in the course of this thesis.

Similarly, in social theory Burke seems opposed to the social evolution welcomed by the Scottish School and Scott because his philosophy makes the political and the social look like mirror images and both operate in accordance with constant ideas, most prominently the law of inheritance. The compromising spirit in his statement, “in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete,” within the context of his fixed hierarchical model of dependency in all social institutions, could be seen as a subtle argument to mask restrictions on any real modifications that might allow social mobility, as well as flexibility in religious and familial issues.⁴¹ Burke’s ideas of dependency, prescription, strict inheritance,

paternal authority, and reliance on the wisdom of ages are stated absolutely in the *Reflections* in accord with his vision of an organic society. Burke's idea of the organic society seems to be based on his belief that all aspects of social life affect one another and change continuously and therefore they must be well suited to each other, so that no really deep-seated tensions and conflicts can arise in the national course of social development. Institutions and prejudices grow together and so must be mutually compatible.⁴²

Scott indeed shares this view with Burke as he does with Ferguson with its emphasis on the interrelation and continuity of human activities rather than on separation into spheres of interest, each governed by its own laws, in opposition to the selfish and individualistic disposition dominant in Locke's philosophy. He also shares the implications that each mind is a particular growth conditioned by the rest and incapable of fully living if it detaches itself from the rest; the notion of gradual progress as against radical changes, and consensus as opposed to individual judgment, as we shall see in *Redgauntlet*. But for Scott, as for the "philosophical" historians, it remains hard to accept many of Burke's conditions for maintaining the organic society, his insistence on maintaining "a condition of unchangeable constancy," given the former's contention that the nature of progress and evolution demands devising new conditions and new values for organizing social life.⁴³

In *The Antiquary* and *Guy Mannering*, Scott supports but redefines the idea of the organic society in an attempt to find a basis for the unity of society in tradition. Besides their emphasis on human affection as a natural bond that ties people together, the two novels present the new social relationships as based on mutual moral responsibility and functional interdependence. Most importantly, they present status, rank and virtue as no more defined mainly in terms of inherited privileges as Burke suggests but also in terms of personal merit. The hero rises socially and owes his success to his superior talents, merit, and honest exploits; then afterwards he is re-established as an aristocrat.

Burke's criticism of the new rebellious commercial spirit, guided by some abstract theory of the universal rights of man, and its social-political-economical implications in terms of virtue and social cohesion resonates in Ferguson's *Essay* which attacks the idea of society as being a rational construct, and correlates the decline of civic virtue with the emerging commercial spirit. But Ferguson employs this criticism not in favour of a specific social class, as a more eligible agent in maintaining the organic

society and in practising virtue, but rather seems to address all citizens in a given community as patriots, economically independent, and equally committed to public good through their active and responsible participation in political affairs. Burke, as I show below, employs his criticism in defence of a small segment of society, the aristocracy and landed gentry to whom he entrusts economical independence and political activity and by doing so he undercuts virtue.

In fact, the target for Burke's criticism is the emerging middle class, whom he proposes to suppress by keeping it under the patronage of the traditional aristocracy. For Burke, as Pocock points out, the emerging middle class is a threat because "its agents were literati, bureaucrats and technocrats, and the form it took was 'energy', 'talent', 'a new, pernicious, desolating activity.'"⁴⁴ With these characteristics, and as upstarts who lack the hereditary aristocratic "manners," members of this class are expected to do anything amoral to promote their status economically, socially and politically. It is true that Scott's novels critique upstarts, who employ commercial amoral means in promoting themselves and praise committed and virtuous aristocrats but, in the meantime, they do de-emphasize heredity as the sole criteria for status and virtue. His novels show that not all members of the middle class are morally bad and not all aristocrats are morally good. If Scott aligns with Burke in his rejection of democracy, his novels present him as at least an advocate of social mobility. This is no surprise, for Scott's "literary ambitions" as Leith Davis points out, "are directly connected to his class ambitions." Davis quotes Carlyle's opinion, which presents Scott as a suburbanite who aspires to aristocratic heights: "Walter Scott, one of the gifted of the world, must kill himself that he may be a country gentleman, the founder of a race of Scottish lairds." Davis interprets Carlyle's notion of the "country gentleman" as implying Scott's "middle-class."⁴⁵ Scott's own personal experience offers good reason for us to believe that he, unlike Burke, not only legitimizes crossing social boundaries but also has faith in the middle class in terms of virtue.

Under the impact of the French Revolution, Burke's historicism seems to politicize almost every thing in defence of his conservative ideology. Thus, throughout the *Reflections*, he never ceases to remind us of "jobbers," "usurers," "atheists," and the "monied interest" and their role in destroying ancient institutions under the mask of progressivism and reform. Such selfish interests, Burke argues, best thrive when the social-moral heritage of a given society, as a binding force, is swept away and individuals exist in a state of disharmony and are alienated from each other even in

the same family. In his view, that is what precisely the above coalition did in France in order to accelerate the revolution and seize power: a systematic digging at the root of family structure, religious establishment and virtue. For him, the construction of family, traditionally and naturally, rests on interrelated foundations: hierarchy, "natural feelings" or "paternal affection" and religion. Duties and rights whether between parents and children or between husbands and wives, socially and morally, are defined by and established on these conceptions. Operating outside these conceptions infects social-moral and political life with anarchy, individualism, and paves the way for corruption.

Burke regards Rousseau—and implicitly such English Jacobins as Thomas Paine and William Godwin—as instructors in the "*ethics of vanity*."⁴⁶ He argues that in the name of "universal benevolence," natural rights of man, egalitarianism and absolute liberty for the individual, Rousseau has rendered the virtue of paternal piety and a wife's obedience to her husband a sort of bondage, "natural feelings" as some thing artificial, and social hierarchy a contrivance to legalize inequality.⁴⁷ According to Burke, this rebellious education "vitiat[e]s the whole community"; it "subvert[s] those principles of domestic trust and fidelity, which constitute the discipline of social life."⁴⁸ It "propagate [s] principles by which every servant may think it, if not his duty, at least his privilege to betray his master." Finally, by this education "every considerable father of a family loses the sanctuary of his house."⁴⁹

The tensions in Scott's formulations of the domestic and paternal relationships and the way he proposes to solve them show that he resists Burke's idea of "feelings" that underpin absolute loyalty and obedience (thus also underpinning absolute loyalty to the monarch) but also rejects the absolute rational individualism of Godwin. In seeking to resolve this tension perhaps he approaches the "contractualism" suggested by Mary Wollstonecraft in maintaining the right to revolt when paternal (or spousal or monarchical) authority becomes obviously tyrannical. Yet Scott never presents a contract of mutual respect for the others' interests as a wholly rational procedure but one that expresses an original bond of feeling involving not only interest but identity also. Many of the plots of the novels, especially in *Rob Roy* and *Redgauntlet*, explore this tension and move towards the reestablishment of a different kind of paternal authority and filial respect.

Burke, analyzing French affairs, shows how the efforts exerted to destroy the family were equally accompanied by efforts to destroy religion, which he describes as

the "basis of civil society, and the source of all good and comfort."⁵⁰ According to him, "the literary cabal," Rousseau especially, "had some years ago formed something like a regular plan for the destruction of the Christian religion."⁵¹ This plan reached its climax when the land of the church was expropriated. Burke's account of the process by which Church property was first confiscated and then fed into the market reveals how much he was appalled to see that the power of money could determine the future of a whole nation. The few, "economists and calculators," who possess the money are now the real authority on all levels.⁵² They, directly or behind the scene, can appoint clergy, steer the economy, engineer politics, invent laws, and introduce new social-moral values in a way that serves their own individual interests at the expense of public interest. Robbing the Church of its means of financial independence (independence is a key word for civic virtue) exposes the whole institution to the "depredation of the market."⁵³ It is clear that while Burke presents religion as a source of moral values he does not deal with any progression in religious views. Ironically, he neglects the expropriation of Church lands under Henry VIII which founded the Church of England, something that might spring to mind in connection with the French disestablishment of the Catholic Church. Burke's defence of the Church seems to be only instrumental and does not reflect a serious willingness to give the Church a sort of political power, though apparently it seems to have a role in supporting the status quo. By the time Burke was writing, the Church itself as a political force had already become marginalized, as Musselwhite points out. For Musselwhite, Burke, like Coleridge, defends the Church as a notion or "Idea...of a kind of civic institution responsible for welfare and learning," and as "some kind of bastion against the unbridled materialism which he sees coming into being with the French Revolution."⁵⁴ In this sense, it could be argued that Scott converges with Burke in his recognition of the role of religion in social-moral affairs but, unlike Burke, his view of religion is critical and progressive, as we shall see in the chapters on *Old Mortality* and *The Heart of Midlothian*.

It is not unnatural to argue that unbridled materialism in economy is like "fanaticism" in religion. Both operate according to wild inhumane passions and lead to the destruction of natural society. Pocock finds a similarity between Burke's usage of the term "energy" in dealing with hard commerce, speculation in the public credit and selling and buying bonds and stock shares, and Hume's view of the term "enthusiasm" in dealing with religious fanaticism. Both passions suspend "all the

normal relations between effects and their causes which accounted for social behaviour.”⁵⁵ “Neither David Hume, Adam Smith, nor Burke,” according to Pocock, “was free of the nightmare that multiplying paper credit might end by destroying the value and even the meaning of property, the foundation alike of virtue, manners and natural relations of society.”⁵⁶ If Scott suggests in *Old Mortality* a dose of toleration as a way of curbing fanatic passions in the religious sphere, Burke proposes, in Pocock’s view, a strategy based on refining and polishing “manners” for controlling the explosive “energy” in the economic sphere under a rubric of “commercial humanism.” But even here Burke’s paradigm of “commercial humanism” seems to take a bent different from that of Hume or Smith. Burke invokes Chivalric manners associated with ecclesiastical and aristocratic ideals, for its foundation. According to Pocock, Burke asserts that commerce “can flourish only under the protection of manners, and that manners require the pre-eminence of religion and nobility, the natural protectors of society. To overthrow religion and nobility, therefore, is to destroy the possibility of commerce itself.”⁵⁷ Hume and Smith understand the relationship between manners and commerce the other way round. The nature of commerce, in their view, imposes new values that determine morality and shape social relationships in a way that makes, for instance, credibility, punctuality, and abiding by terms of contracts, no less committing than the notion of honour as employed in the chivalric sense.

Chivalry in Burke’s lexicon is in the main employed to support his overall ideology which at least in the case of France rests on exempting kings and queens, aristocracy, priests and magistrates from any accountability for their misconduct. In this sense, the “age of chivalry is gone” indeed.⁵⁸ But if he means by chivalry a code of virtue: helping the weak against oppression and cruelty, generosity, loyalty and so on, then Burke’s argument is ambiguous—the French Revolution could be considered, perhaps, an act of chivalry when it alleviates the oppression, grievances and deprivation exercised by king, queen, nobility, priest and magistrate imposed on the majority of poor people.

Scott’s novels pose the question of chivalric virtues in a different way in that he works out compromises and reinterpretations that would keep their positive values intact. He approaches chivalric virtues not in terms of the Middle Ages, but rather attempts to transfer them to the present context (often using anachronisms as in *Rob Roy* or *Redgauntlet*) and extends them to all members of a given society so that it

becomes a code of social-moral behaviour in which all individuals, regardless of status and rank, are bound to behave honourably to each other. The villain in Scott's novels is the one who violates this code. While in some cases magistrates, priests and even queens are presented as dishonest, in other cases ordinary people are presented as symbols of chivalry. Scott, unlike Burke, is not a political theorist but rather a social and moral scientist whose philosophy is based on close observation of the workings of historical forces in shaping and reshaping culture in its entirety.

Scott and Nation

For Scott, Scottish history is a vital resource, as a kind of laboratory specimen of cultural change. It can display the integrity of a national tradition, giving a guide to values which English society is in danger of losing itself and destroying in Scotland by "colonial" assimilation. In this aspect Scott is linked to writers like Robert Burns and James Macpherson, who "create" Scotland's national identity during the eighteenth century. These writers stress that the British nation is not homogeneous. Their writings present a complicated view of the divisions between Scottish and English identity, showing the existence of difference within an ostensible picture of national unity. Given such complication, Scott's model of history and progress, unlike Burke's, suggests that the English model alone is not an ideal which deserves hegemony, at least in terms of culture and virtue, over the British nation. Scott's experience of the way of life of the Borderers enables him to offer a more practical model for the British nation based, in Leith Davis's words, on "an ideal mixture of unity with diversity."⁵⁹

Union with England for the Scots, separatists and pro-unionists, was most often viewed as problematic when it comes to Scotland's real representation at the level of nation in terms of identity, culture and interest. Murray Pittock points out that while "Passionate anti-Unionists" viewed the Union as "an act of slavery, which cut their country adrift from its past, and bound it to English ends," pro-Unionists "were conscious of its dual interpretation: in Scotland, a partnership; in England, possession."⁶⁰ Despite Scott's pro-Union attitude, in the tradition of the Scottish Whigs, Smith, Hume and Millar, Scott's awareness of this dual interpretation surfaces in almost all his novels in the form of resistance to English cultural pressure to assimilate Scotland. Leith Davis shows that Scott's work, both his poetry and novels,

follow the trajectory of writers like Robert Burns and James Macpherson in this respect. These writers, according to Davis, display resistance to the idea of Britain as represented by one ethnic group, the English, but view the British nation as an invention, which should recognize the heterogeneity of cultures and histories of its component nations. “Inventing” Britain on this basis, they suggest, could be achieved through a continuous process of cultural “Dialogism” or “negotiation.” Their writings struggle with finding a way in which “to simultaneously acknowledge and also downplay internal difference.”⁶¹ In fact, the relationship between Bailie Nicol Jarvie and Rob Roy in one of its parts serves this “Dialogism.”

Yet, as Davis points out, Scott’s method and intention in inventing the Scottish cultural identity and presenting it to the British nation show differences between him and his predecessors. Macpherson’s *Ossian*, a bold forgery, highlights “the impressive spirit of chivalry of the Scots” but lacks “accuracy.” Burns, on the other hand, offers an authentic image of Scotland but lacks the “chivalrous feeling” and “the masculine energy which Scott wanted to associate with the Scottish nation.” Scott’s model of a national identity “combined masculine chivalry with authenticity.”⁶² While the first reveals Scott’s interest in the values connected with heroic and civic virtues, the second reveals Scott’s scientific approach in the tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment in tracing cultural change especially in his novels that deal with Scottish-English conflict, most prominently in *Waverley*. If we are allowed, using Edward Said’s rhetoric, to draw an analogy between the effort exerted by the Orientalists to present the Orient to the Occidental world as they wanted it to be for ideological reasons, Scott’s representation of Scotland to English readers could be seen as confronting rather than serving their prejudices.⁶³ Ideologically, Scott’s realism contributes to Britain’s present in two ways. In one way, it can give a guide to the process of change itself, “mirroring” contemporary experience and suggesting ways of containing the anarchic forces threatening both realms. In another way, “writing the Union,” Scott attempts complex acts of reconciliation in a literary anticipation of future joint progress, most obviously in the conclusion of *The Heart of Midlothian*.

Scott, in short, seems to suggest that recognition of cultural heterogeneity and partnership rather than a sense of prejudice and superiority can be a source of richness and complementation in an imagined Britain, instead of being a source of division or conflict. The exploits of the Highland troops in the later eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries, as Pittock points out, “provided the seed corn for a resuscitation of the Jacobite ‘patriot Highlander’ motif in the guise of the adoption of tartan by lowland Scots who would have despised it and its wearers 50 years earlier.”⁶⁴ The military prowess of the “patriot Highlander,” although it uniquely refers to an ethnic culture, is defined in terms of and contributes to the British nation as a whole.

Prospectus

The first chapter argues that Scott’s historicism is not the product of a divided personality: a mixture of Romantic and Enlightenment attitudes, of sympathy or nostalgia and rationalism or progressivism. Rather it is derived from the so-called “philosophical” historians of the Scottish Enlightenment. For these writers, individualism of modern commercial society had been a problematic development, since unchecked individualism might ultimately undermine social cohesion necessary for all human flourishing. Scott is thus the inheritor of a rationalist, progressive philosophy of history, but one with well-defined reservations about progress and modernity. To support my argument I attempt to investigate Scott’s view of history and progress in his non-fictional *Tales of a Grandfather*.

The second chapter questions the traditional reading of *Waverley* as a mixture of Romantic nostalgia and Enlightenment scepticism about “primitive” societies. According to this reading, Edward Waverly, through his participation with a Highland clan in the doomed Jacobite insurrection of 1745, learns that the heroic virtues of the past, though “valid” in their own day and still emotionally attractive, are no longer viable and must give way to the duller but more civilized values of the present. Scott’s Highlanders, I show, function not simply as colourful quasi-Romantic primitives, but as an embodiment, in certain respects, of civic virtue. *Waverley* himself, I argue, is not the hero of a conventional bourgeois *Bildungsroman*, but a representative modern type, the post civic Man of Feeling, targeted by the cultural criticism of the Scottish Enlightenment. Taken as a whole, the novel could be seen as a Scottish Enlightenment parable on the indispensability of “civic virtue.”

The third chapter deals with *Old Mortality*, a novel now often read as a sort of Hobbesian critique of the seventeenth-century British civil wars. Indeed, the civic virtue of the parties involved in the conflict is displayed in such a light that selfish individualism might seem preferable. But on comparing the novel’s treatment of the

civil wars to that of David Hume's *History of England*, I show that *Old Mortality* is a profound meditation on the fundamentally social constitution of human nature. Scott's derisive treatment of the Puritans and mildly preferential treatment of the Royalists is not motivated by some Tory bias, but, as with Hume, by an intense distrust of radical Protestant individualism. Scott is in fact defending rather than belittling public-spiritedness.

In the fourth chapter dealing with *Rob Roy*, Scott, I argue, undercuts the Jacobite-Hanoverian political conflict by reducing it to a sort of clash of cultures, which nevertheless share certain values. The contrast highlights the merit of civic virtues, loyalty and altruism, and calls for updating and integrating them in the present. Using Pocock's seminal work, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, I show that the novel attempts a combination of Honour and Credit within a legal and humane framework to meet commercial needs, mitigate hard commerce and define social relationships. Through the hero and the heroine, Scott attempts a synthesis of the otherwise antagonistic principles of Burke on the one hand, and Paine and Godwin on the other, concerning domestic and filial affairs. The virtue of paternal piety, as a cohesive force, is redefined as mutual respect for one another's interest not on a wholly rational basis but according to the original bond of feeling. By the same token, Scott recognizes the law of inheritance but submits it to civil law.

The fifth chapter deals with *The Heart of Midlothian*. Unlike *Old Mortality*, it calls, through the enlightened minister, David Butler, for regenerating the establishment of religion on a rational, progressive and humane basis for ideological reasons connected with civic virtue, Scottish identity, and contemporary debate envisaging a resolution for social and economical problems. Scott, through the heroine, Jeanie Deans, who guided by religious teachings in developing moral autonomy, proposes to define virtue in terms of religious piety instead of relating it to economic independence. The novel, I show, treats mundane authority, unified and fragmented, as fragile in terms of virtue and humanity and falls short of maintaining justice unless it is guided by moral autonomy. Through his pedagogical-ideological project, Scott, I argue, establishes a sort of dialogue between Scotland and England in a literary anticipation of future joint progress, most obviously in the conclusion of the novel. This dialogue displays the integrity of a national tradition, giving a guide to values, which English society is in danger of losing itself through luxury and trade in slavery and destroying in Scotland by "colonial" assimilation.

The sixth chapter on *Redgauntlet* attempts to seek an answer for Scott's return to the subject of Jacobitism. The major answer, I argue, reflects Scott's interest in highlighting the social and moral values of ancient virtues, particularly the notions of loyalty and honour, and how and why they become problematic in the process of cultural transformation. The novel, I show, suggests that total abandoning of such virtues in favour of excessive individualism, as the hero, Darsie Latimer does, is no less alienating and unacceptable than Redgauntlet's literal adherence to old principles. In order to solve this paradox, the novel transfers the spirit of these virtues to the present, extending it to various contexts. In social relationships loyalty is defined as behaving honourably by others regardless of affiliation, while in the context of law and justice, it is modified to operate under the rubric of personal integrity and civil courage. In the political context, it is determined by national consensus. In the economic context, it supports advancement as long as it operates within communal interest.

The concluding chapter uses *Guy Mannering*, *The Antiquary* and *The Bride of Lammermoor* to support the thesis that Scott's fictional dealings with history in the "Scottish" novels is directed to an accommodation of ancient virtues with present forms of society and nationhood.

Notes: Introduction.

1. Francis Jeffrey, *Edinburgh Review* 24 (1814), *Scott: The Critical Heritage* (Edinburgh: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); T. B. Macaulay, Review of Henry Neale's *The Romance of History*, *Edinburgh Review* 47 (1828), *Scott: The Critical Heritage*; William Hazlitt, "Sir Walter Scott," *The Spirit of the Age, Or Contemporary Portraits* (London: Aldine Press, 1967).
2. *Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism*, ed. Thomas Middleton Raysor (Folcroft: Folcroft Press, 1969), 341-342.
3. Georg Lukacs, *The Historical Novel*, trans. Hannah & Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 1962), 22-26; David Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," *Etudes Anglaises* 24 (1971); Daiches, "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist," *Scott's Mind and Art*, ed. A. Norman Jeffares (Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd, 1969).
4. Duncan Forbes, "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," (1953), ed. Harry Shaw, *Critical Essays on Sir Walter Scott: The Waverley Novels* (G.K. Hall, 1996); also Forbes' essay "'Scientific' Whiggism: Adam Smith and John Millar," *Cambridge Journal* 7 (1953-54); Peter D. Garside, "Scott and the 'Philosophical' Historians," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36 (1975); also Garside's essay "Scott, the Romantic past, and the Nineteenth Century," *Review of English Studies* 23 (1972).
5. David Brown, *Walter Scott and the Historical Imagination* (London and Boston: Harvard University Press, 1979); Avrom Fleishman, *The Historical Novel: Walter Scott to Virginia Woolf* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1971); Graham McMaster, *Scott and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
6. See F. P. Lock, *Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 13. Also see, Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), xiii.
7. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, 2 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1: 456.
8. Smith, *An Inquiry... Wealth of Nations*, 1: 267.
9. Smith, *An Inquiry... Wealth of Nations*, 1: 412.
10. J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History, Essays on Political thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 48.
11. For the Aristotelianism of the Scottish Enlightenment, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 209-240.
12. Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," *Etudes Anglaises* 24 (1971), 475.
13. My account of Hobbes' critique of civic virtue refers mainly to Part I, Chapters VI & X-XV, of *Leviathan*. My interpretation of Hobbes is based largely on that of Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 166-202.
14. Adam Ferguson, who withheld full endorsement of empiricism, is an exception to the general trend. Ferguson, unlike his compatriots, was far more worried by the apparent logical difficulty that has plagued all empirically grounded moral and political philosophies—that is, how to derive a prescriptive "ought" from a descriptive "is." For a discussion of Ferguson's various attempts to solve this problem, see David Kettler, *The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965), 107-137.

15. For Millar's connection with Mill, see William C. Lehmann, *John Millar of Glasgow, 1735-1801: His Life and Thought and His Contributions to Sociological Analysis*, ed. A. K. Cairncross (Cambridge University Press, 1960), 151-53.
16. John Millar, "The Effects of Commerce and Manufactures, and of Opulence and Civilization, upon the Morals of a People," appended to *An Historical View of the English Government, from the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Revolution in 1688* (London: J. Mawan, 1803), 4:239.
17. Millar, "The Effects of Commerce... upon the Morals of a People," *Historical View*, 4: 240. It seems that Scott himself knew this anecdote, alluding to it in his account of the '45 in *Tales of a Grandfather*. See *Miscellaneous Works of Sir Walter Scott, Bart.* (Edinburgh: Charles & Adam Black, 1870-71), 26: 374-375.
18. Millar, "The Effects of Commerce... upon the Morals of a People," *Historical View*, 4: 248.
19. Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (1762-1763, 1766), ed. R. L. Meek et al., *The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 5: 540-541.
20. Daiches, *The Paradox of Scottish Culture: The Eighteenth Century Experience* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 18.
21. J. R. Western, *The Scottish Militia in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 107.
22. See John Robertson, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd. , 1985). Robertson argues that Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* is an outgrowth of his participation in the debate on the Militia Issue (200-209). Similarly in the Introduction to Ferguson's *Essay*, Fania Oz-Salzberger asserts that Ferguson was a "central figure in the militia agitation...he was deeply convinced of the importance of a Scottish militia for the moral and social cohesion of his countrymen within the British State." xii-xv.
23. Adam Ferguson, *Reflections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia* (1750), quoted in Robertson, 89.
24. Smith, *An Inquiry ... Wealth of Nations*, 2:787.
25. For the details of this episode, see Edgar Johnson, *Sir Walter Scott: The Great Unknown* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), I: 131-134.
26. Robertson, 90-91.
27. See John Small, "Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson," *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh* 23 (1864), 665. Though he never studied under Ferguson, as he did under some of the other "philosophical" historians, Scott seems to have regarded him as a special mentor. As a poet, Scott was chosen by Ferguson's family to compose the philosopher's epitaph. The import of the epitaph itself does suggest the strong impression that Ferguson's lifelong defense of civic ideals had made upon his younger friend, Scott. In it, Scott commemorates both Ferguson's own "perseverance in the practice of public virtue" and "the eloquence with which he inculcated the precepts of morality, and prepared the youthful mind for virtuous action." Also see *The Letters of Sir Walter Scott*, ed. H.J.C Grierson (New York: AMS, 1971), 4:181-182. His comments, in a letter to one of his friends, on hearing of Ferguson's death, reveal Scott's regard for him as a thinker. In it, Scott speaks of Ferguson as "my learned and venerated friend...whom I have known and looked up to for thirty years and upward." Later he adds: "The monuments which he has left behind him of his philosophical and historical researches will protract his memory long after we and ours shall be as he now is."
28. Ferguson, *Essay*, xvii.

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28. Ferguson, *Essay*, xvii.
29. Ferguson, *Essay*, 23-24.
30. Ferguson, *Essay*, 210.
31. Ferguson, *Essay*, 242-244.
32. Ferguson, *Essay* 176-177.
33. Ferguson, *Essay*, 208.
34. Brown, 202.
35. See Fleishman, 42-46.
36. Leslie Stephens, "Sir Walter Scott," *Hours in a Library* (London, 1892), I:163, 165.
37. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution & Other Essays*, ed. Ernest Rhys (London: J. M. Dent & Sons LTD., 1940), 19-20.
38. Burke, 15.
39. Hazlitt, 231.
40. See Gary Kelly, "Romantic Fiction," *The Cambridge Companion to British Romanticism*, ed. Stuart Curran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 213.
41. Burke, 32.
42. For the notion of the organic society, see Burke, 31-32.
43. Burke, 32.
44. Pocock, 288.
45. Leith Davis, *Acts of Union: Scotland and the Literary Negotiation of the British Nation, 1707-1830*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 166.
46. Burke, 264.
47. Burke, 264-265.
48. Burke, 268.
49. Burke, 268.
50. Burke, 87.
51. Burke, 107.
52. Burke, 73.
53. David Musselwhite, "Reflections on Burke's Reflection, 1790-1990," *The Enlightenment and its Shadows*, ed. Peter Hulme and Ludmilla Jordanova (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 155.
54. Musselwhite, 154 -155.
55. Pocock, 203.
56. Pocock, 196.
57. Pocock, 199.
58. Burke, 73.
59. Davis, 155.
60. Murray G. H. Pittock, *Inventing and Resisting Britain: Cultural Identities in Britain and Ireland, 1685-1789* (USA: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 59.
61. Davis, 4.
62. Davis, 148.
63. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, Vintage books, 1979), 3.
64. Pittock, 156.

Chapter One
Scott's Historicism

In his 1992 article in *The New Republic*, Irving Howe remarks that for a century Sir Walter Scott

not only remained the great favourite of the reading public but also exerted a major influence on writers in Europe and America. But then—it's hard to give an exact date—something remarkable happened. Scott lost his grip on the imagination of the public, and except in schools, where *Ivanhoe* was still wearily assigned, he came to be treated as a worthy historical relic.¹

What can explain this fall from canonicity? How could a writer freely coupled with Shakespeare for much of the nineteenth century have been reduced to a footnote in the twentieth? Howe's answer reflects what has long been and perhaps is still the prevailing view of Scott among Anglo-American readers:

At first, the culture of romanticism welcomed his gift for the picturesque; but then that culture came to favour a complex psychology of character that was quite beyond Scott's reach. Dickens and George Eliot borrowed here and there from Scott, but they also left him far behind.²

The values that determine canonicity, however, have to a great extent swung back to those of the nineteenth-century, though with far greater critical rigor and self-consciousness. Individual psychology and "character" have given way to larger ideas of nationalism and colonialism, while interest in Gothicism and romance has reopened discussion of Scott's technique³.

Now Scott is the subject of an increasing number of books and articles, the evident aim of which is to carve out a place for him at the centre of contemporary literary and cultural studies. Scott seems to be of special interest to critics of a new-historicist or cultural-materialist bent. Marlon Ross, for example, has suggested that Scott's medievalism provides a key to the ideological structure of British Romanticism—that Scott, for so long excluded from the company of his "High Romantic" contemporaries is in certain respects the archetypal Romantic Tory, indulging in unchecked nostalgia for a romanticized past.⁴ It is worth noting here that Ross is writing about Scott's poetry rather than his novels; and therefore, his characterization of Scott is deeply problematic at least from the perspective of other "revisionist" criticism that has generally rebutted charges such as Ross's and has differentiated sharply between

Scott's Toryism, grounded, at least in part, in eighteenth-century rationalism, and the misty organicism of the Lake School and other Romantic converts to the right. In *Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries*, for example, Marilyn Butler couples Scott with Maria Edgeworth as an Enlightenment intellectual, socially conservative but reformist in principle. Despite the avowed Toryism of his real-life politics, she argues, "Scott in his writing is less clearly sectarian"; his novels, in fact, "read like those of an out-and-out liberal."⁵ Given the Marxist cast of Ross's essay, it is surprising that he is silent about Lukacs, probably the most important of Scott's "revisionists." When Ross claims that Scott is "rewriting history as a romance,"⁶ or distorting the past for right-wing ideological purposes, he is simply recapitulating the view of Scott that Lukacs dismissed over fifty years ago as "vulgar sociology."⁷ A full discussion of the intellectual basis of Scott's politics will be conducted in the course of this chapter.

Other critics have made even more startling revisionist claims, transforming Scott from the patron saint of *Biedermeier* to an early post-modernist. For Bruce Beiderwell, Scott's novels anticipate Foucault, "both comment [ing] upon and represent [ing]...the shift from thinking of punishment as the infliction of pain to thinking of punishment as part of an elaborate machinery of control."⁸ Judith Wilt, meanwhile, offers us a Derridean Scott, who "dramatizes in ways that seem quite recognizable to contemporary thought the victory of two linked modern principles, male rationality and textualized language, over their progenitors, female enchantment or mystery and performative speech." Lest we mistake Scott for a phallogocentrist who might welcome this victory, Wilt hastens to assure us that *The Author of Waverley* was all along "lay [ing]...mines under history, rationality, knowability, textuality, the novel, and himself."⁹ James Kerr, similarly, presents Scott as a radical historicist and precursor of Hayden White:

Scott constructed his fictional project around the relationship between the language of fiction and historical reality, the possibility of grasping the movements of history in the language of fiction, and the denial of that possibility. ... "Fiction" and "history" are verbal worlds for Scott, forms of understanding that appear at one moment radically disparate, at another virtually indistinguishable.¹⁰

Given this revival of interest in Scott, we might consider turning Howe's question on its head: Why has Scott, left for dead for the better part of a century, been resuscitated

by a generation of critics who have set themselves the task of laying so many other "worthy relics" of the nineteenth century to rest?

Luckily, this question does not require us to navigate any impassable critical gulfs. "Revisionist" criticism of Scott is not a sudden growth. In fact, the current revisionism grows out of an earlier revisionist episode that began as early as the 1950's, when Scott's reputation had reached its nadir. This episode was initiated largely by David Daiches' essay on "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist" (1951) and Georg Lukacs' laudatory treatment of Scott in *The Historical Novel* (first available in English translation in 1962). Books and articles followed through the '60's and '70's, so that by the mid-1980s, when the second wave of revisionism began to advance, there was already a solid body of work at hand, much of it purporting to show that Scott was, if not post-modern, at least profoundly modern. The first wave made the second plausible and perhaps inevitable.

Both waves of revisionists attempted to save Scott for the twentieth century by making him into a novelist of ideas. This transformation may have been necessitated by a growing awareness of the artistic deficiencies noted by Howe, but it was successful (at least where it was not ignored) because the ideas attributed to Scott were attractive to contemporary readers. Here again, the first wave anticipated the second, focusing on Scott's treatment of history and cultural change. Edgar Johnson, Scott's chief modern biographer, summarizes the new view with the help of G. M. Trevelyan, one of its earliest exponents:

What Scott does—and for the first time in either fiction or history—is to dramatize the basic processes of history. He created a revolution, Trevelyan notes, by being the first to show that "thoughts and morals vary according to the period, the province, the class, the man. "...Without Scott to have shown the way, Carlyle, Macaulay, Parkman, Motley, Prescott, Froude, Michelet, Taine, Greene, Trevelyan, Bryant, and even Toynbee could hardly have achieved their triumphs.¹¹

To this impressive list Hugh Trevor-Roper adds Leopold Ranke, who claimed that reading *Quentin Durward* was the crucial event in his career as a historian.¹² For the first revisionists, then, Scott, was no longer a hack novelist, a century out of date, but a man ahead of his time: the father of the "historical school" and the first historicist historian.

Much of the first revisionist criticism was dedicated to elucidating the nature and implications of Scott's supposed historicism. For Trevelyan, Scott's historicism seems to have consisted mainly of determinism—the notion that individual behaviour is dictated by varying historical, social, or economic circumstances. Other revisionists, however, claimed to see an even deeper historicism. Scott, in their view, was the first imaginative writer to abolish the transhistorical "Man" of the Enlightenment and earlier ages, the first to see that not just the outward forms of behaviour but even human nature itself is subject to historical change. Like Hegel, he saw that each nation and period of history is a unique and incommensurable being, with its own *Zeitgeist* (soul). Like Herder, he saw that each nation and period expresses its unique being in an equally unique *Weltanschauung* (world-view), its own set of morals, political, aesthetic, and perhaps even scientific "truths." Scott, in short, was an intuitive cultural relativist, who recognized and affirmed the equal validity of incommensurable cultures. This advance, revisionists argued, is what made Scott the first real historical novelist, since it allowed him to treat pre-modern characters both more realistically and more fairly than his predecessors had. He understood that pre-modern men must be expected to act and think differently from modern men and that it was useless to blame them, as Enlightenment historians so often had, for doing so.

Thus, when the second wave of revisionists had appeared on the scene, they found a Scott already palatable to a post-modernist sensibility. In other words, Scott had somehow learned to "historicize" everything—or almost everything. All that was left was for Scott to historicize the intellectual operations by which he had arrived at his supposed historicism—to lay mines under history, rationality, and knowability. Past cultures would then be not simply incommensurable with modernity but actually unintelligible to it; history would become just another kind of fiction, a *tabula rasa* waiting for the impress of some contemporary ideology. Having just taken this last step themselves, perhaps Scott's critics thought it churlish to leave their author behind. At any rate, Scott now appears to have graduated from the historicism of Herder and Hegel to the radical historicism of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and their French disciples.¹³

While I agree with both waves of revisionists that Scott's understanding of history is profound and worthy of study, I would argue that the first wave erred in finding historicism as the basis of that understanding and that the second wave has simply compounded the error. Lack of space makes this and the following sections mainly concerned with the argument of the first wave, which I take to be more plausible and

probably more durable than its successor. Further, the second wave's argument is logically and genealogically dependent on the first wave's; if the former argument falls, so does the latter. For if Scott is not a historicist at all, he can hardly be a radical historicist. In the first section of this chapter I will first attempt to show how Scott's first revisionists arrived at their answer, in which they refer the origin of Scott's alleged historicism to a tale of two Scotts, and to suggest why they are mistaken. I will then open the main argument of the following sections: that Scott's treatment of history is best understood not in the light of nineteenth-century Continental philosophies of history but in the light of a philosophy of historicism much nearer to home—that of the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment.

For many of the first revisionists, the case for Scott's historicism rests on his apparent rejection of the Enlightenment notion of historically uniform human nature. As Donald Davie remarks, "it is...one of the most serious questions that can be asked of the whole *Waverley* series, whether in these novels Scott believes in a constant 'nature' in this sense, or not."¹⁴ Davie and a majority of other revisionist critics believe that he does not. Whatever conviction this view of Scott carries, it carries mainly because of his representations of character and event, not because of any authorial comments on the "historical process." As Georg Lukacs argues, Scott's alleged predecessors generally failed to see their characters "historically." Thus Lesage, for instance, was "able to transfer his highly truthful pictures of the France of his day to [medieval] Spain and still feel quite at ease."¹⁵ In Scott, on the other hand, we have characters like Baron Bradwardine in *Waverley*, whose insistence on removing the boots of Prince Charles after the Battle of Prestonpans seems inexplicable except in historical terms—in this case the mixture of chivalry, pedantry, and family pride that constituted the culture of an eighteenth-century Scottish aristocrat. In their thoughts and actions, Scott's great characters really do differ from us, and in a way that clearly reflects their different cultural inheritances. Such characters are certainly more historically realistic than those of earlier historical novelists, and perhaps even more than those who peopled the genuine histories of David Hume and other Enlightenment historians.

But no number of examples to this effect would be sufficient to prove Scott a historicist.¹⁶ One of Lukacs' virtues as a critic of Scott is that his understanding of intellectual history prevents him from making such an argument, as literary critics

who admire Scott have so often done. "When analyzing the prehistory of the historical novel," he writes:

One must break with the Romantic-reactionary legend which denies to the Enlightenment any sense or understanding of history and attributes the invention of the historical sense to the opponents of the French Revolution: Burke, de Maistre, etc. One need only think of the extraordinary historical achievements of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Gibbon, etc. , in order to cut this legend down to size.¹⁷

While retaining the idea that human nature is at some level uniform, the historians of the Enlightenment were nevertheless perfectly aware that the Greeks or Romans or medieval men they wrote about were not simply modern French or Englishmen in fancy dress, and that earlier peoples' habits of feeling or thought were not always identical to their own.¹⁸ Nevertheless, for the Enlightenment, all such differences were adventitious, mere accidents of history in no way affecting essential human nature. It therefore remained possible for a Hume or a Gibbon to examine and criticize the beliefs and institutions of past societies according to what he believed to be transhistorical standards. Some beliefs and institutions allowed human nature to flourish; others merely corrupted it. The "historical sense," as Lukacs understood it, preceded historicism proper. It is therefore difficult to locate a historicist idea or intention behind Scott's novels, however clearly they illustrate their author's remarkable "historical sense." Scott might simply have been improving on the Enlightenment's historiographical techniques without departing from its basic belief.

Recourse to Scott's discursive prose does not help to clarify his position, at least to the satisfaction of those who wish to place him among the fathers of historicism. In fact, the relevant statements, though few, are well known and cannot in any way be construed as favouring the historicist position. The *locus classicus* is the introductory chapter of *Waverley* itself, where Scott discusses the difficulties of dealing with events "Sixty Years since":

Considering the disadvantages inseparable from this part of my subject, I must be understood to have resolved to avoid them as much as possible, by throwing the force of my narrative upon the characters and passions of the actors;—those passions common to men in all stages of society, and which have alike agitated the human heart, whether it throbbed under the steel corslet of the fifteenth century, the brocaded coat of the eighteenth, or the blue frock and white dimity waistcoat of the present day. Upon these

passions it is no doubt true that the state of manners and laws casts a necessary colouring; but the bearings, to use the language of heraldry, remain the same, though the tincture may not only be different, but opposed in strong contradistinction. The wrath of our ancestors, for example, was coloured *gules*; it broke forth in sanguinary violence against the objects of its fury. Our malignant feelings, which must seek gratification through more indirect channels, and undermine the obstacles which they cannot openly bear down, may be rather said to be tintured *sable*. But the deep-ruling impulse is the same in both cases; and the proud peer who can now only ruin his neighbour according to law, by protracted suits, is the genuine descendant of the baron who wrapped the castle of his competitor in flames, and knocked him on the head as he endeavoured to escape the conflagration. It is from the great book of Nature, the same through a thousand editions, whether black-letter, or wire-wove and hot-pressed, that I have venturously essayed to read a Chapter to the Public.¹⁹

"This," as Donald Davie points out, "constitutes a plea for the thoroughly neoclassical principle that the business of the artist is with 'nature,' meaning by that the constant elements in human nature to be detected beneath the adventitious distinctions of period, race, trade." At the same time, Davie rightly reminds us, the quoted passage comes from one of the chapters of *Waverley* written in 1805, before Scott turned novelist in earnest, and does not necessarily apply to the rest of the novel, which was written about seven years later.²⁰ For David Devlin and many others, the "understanding of history" demonstrated there and in the following novels was possible only when Scott "began to qualify the Enlightenment view that human nature was unchangeable."²¹ We are once again thrown back on our interpretation of the novels themselves: as Lukacs says, "Scott ranks among those great writers whose depth is manifest mainly in their work."²²

The apparent circularity of this reasoning might tempt us to argue that Scott's most important revisionist critics, beginning with Lukacs, have been historicists themselves, and that they have simply read their own historicism into Scott in their efforts to save him for modernity. But I do not think that this is the case. Scott's critics have turned him into a historicist not by wilfully misreading his novels, but by over-emphasizing a misleading psycho-biographical subtext in them. Scott, in this view, has no conscious philosophy of history, so it is useless for us to expect him to articulate one in either his fiction or his non-fictions. The basis for his treatment of history is to be sought not in some idea or theory underlying his novels, but in his complex, ambivalent attitude toward his historical subject matter. Scott has thus been made into a novelist of ideas at the expense of his own.

Scott's ambivalence about the past has always been recognized. Even Lockhart, for example, noted the telling passage in Scott's letters where he declines to write a biography of Mary, Queen of Scots because "his opinion" of her, as an enlightened modern historian, is "contrary to his feeling" as Scotsman.²³ Another letter, to a Miss Clephane, apparently conveying Scott's attitude toward the Jacobite rebellion depicted in *Waverley*, is cited at some point in nearly every full-length study of his novels:

Seriously I am very glad I did not live in 1745 for though as a lawyer I could not have pleaded [Prince] Charles's right [to the throne] and as a clergy man I could not have prayed for him yet as a soldier I would I am sure against the convictions of my better reason have fought for him even to the bottom of the gallows.²⁴

Virginia Woolf was on the same track in her review of the *Tait* edition of Scott's *Journal*, where she singles out the incident of his installing gas lighting in relic-filled Abbotsford as deeply characteristic of the Author of *Waverley*.²⁵ Scott, in short, was a "divided personality." On the one side, he was a reactionary, longing for the past; on the other, he was a progressive, pleased with the present and certain that the past was beyond recall.

The first writer to translate this biographical subtext into a complete theory of Scott's novels seems to have been Coleridge. According to Coleridge, the *Waverley* novels embody

the contest between the two great moving principles of social humanity[:] religious adherence to the past and ancient, the desire and admiration of permanence, on the one hand; and the passion for increase of knowledge, for truth, as the offspring of reason—in short, the mighty instincts of *progression* and *free agency*, on the other.²⁶

Twentieth-century revisionists have echoed this argument repeatedly, explaining Scott's novels in general, and his view of history in particular, in terms of tension or conflict between two "mighty" but opposite "instincts."

The first revisionist to derive Scott's view of history from his temperament was Lukacs, whose rigorous materialism compelled him to reject all attempts to locate textual sources for Scott's historicism.²⁷ For Lukacs, Scott was a great historian because his personal honesty compelled him to see and represent the world as it really is; his "realistic mastery" of his material allowed him to escape the "personal views

and prejudices" he may elsewhere have entertained²⁸ But paradoxically, Lukacs adds, "this objectivity" is actually

heightened by Scott's conservatism. His world-view ties him very closely to those sections of society which had been precipitated into ruin by the industrial revolution and the rapid growth of capitalism. Scott belongs neither with the ardent enthusiasts of this development, nor with the pathetic, passionate indicters. ...Scott ranks among those honest Tories in the England of his time who exonerate nothing in the development of capitalism, who not only see clearly, but also deeply sympathize with the unending misery of the people which the collapse of the old England brings in its wake; yet who, precisely because of their conservatism, display no violent opposition to the features of the new development repudiated by them.²⁹

Scott's native conservatism thus seems to have pulled him two ways at once, enabling him to see the past more clearly and more favourably than "ardent" bourgeois progressives did and yet preventing him from falling into the "passionate" reactionaryism of the Romantic Tory. In a sense, Scott carried on with himself the debate that Robert Southey and T. B. Macaulay were to carry on in public, and from it emerged a more subtle understanding of history than either public debater could claim. For Lukacs, the key to Scott's novels is not some overt philosophy of history but their author's "divided personality."

The classic "divided personality" formula was established by David Daiches in his seminal essay on "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist" and a later essay on "Sir Walter Scott and History." In the latter essay, however, Daiches appears to be less adverse to the notion of influence-hunting than Lukacs, and refers Scott's personal ambivalence back to the two ways that Scots in general learned to cope with the absorption of their once independent kingdom into Great Britain. On the one hand, he argues, were Anglicizing philosophers and economists like David Hume and Adam Smith, who proudly emphasized the rapidity of their country's modernization since the Union, and tended to look patronizingly on its past. On the other hand were the poets and antiquarians, such as Robert Burns and Allan Ramsay, who "tried to compensate" for Scotland's loss of political independence "on the cultural level" by reviving interest in old poetry and in the now debased Scots English dialect in which it had been written.³⁰ According to Daiches, Scott "drew equal nourishment" from both the "progressive" and the "nostalgic" movements of his era.³¹ Or, as Daiches suggests in

his Introduction to Scott's *Heart of Midlothian*, Scott was a man whose "head urged the necessity of coming to terms with progress, with commercial civilization, with the non-heroic modern world," while "his heart yearned for the 'crowded hour of glorious life' which only the old way of life could provide."³²

This "dual vision" is probably most apparent in those novels which deal with the Jacobite cause, often thought of as the last grasp of the old romantic Scotland.³³ "Underlying... these novels," Daiches argues in his first essay on Scott: "is a tragic sense of the inevitability of a drab but necessary progress, a sense of the impotence of the traditional kind of heroism, a passionately regretful awareness that the Good Old cause was lost for ever and the glory of Scotland must give way to her interest."³⁴ Scott, in other words, understood the ambiguities of progress. He accepted both the complacent superiority of the economists and the sentimentality of the poets; he saw with the "nostalgic" movement the value of the old ways, and with the "progressive" their inevitable obsolescence. Thus, although "there is no overt philosophy about the meaning of history in Scott's novels," they do "attain to a fresh and deeper reading of the events" they deal with than history books had in the past.³⁵

This "fresh and deeper reading," I would argue, amounts to a sort of makeshift, sub-philosophical historicism, although Daiches never actually calls it that. When he attempts to characterize the intellectual concerns that emerge from Scott's emotional ambivalence, Daiches maintains that Scott is above all interested in the viability of an older social code. Through the chivalrous Baron Bradwardine in *Waverley*, for instance, Scott exposes the danger and absurdity of clinging to a code which has outlived its purpose and no longer operates usefully in society. At the same time, by developing sympathy for characters who cling to such codes, he suggests that "though progress is inevitable and desirable, the agents of progress are not always morally good nor are its victims morally bad."³⁶ Scott's mix of "nostalgia" and "progressivism" thus leads him to adopt an essentially historicist outlook: past social codes are no longer valid; yet they are not to be judged in hindsight by current standards or by some absolute, transhistorical standard like "nature," as the Enlightenment thought, but on their own terms—that is, by their fitness or viability with respect to the specific historical situations in which they originally arose. Thomas Crawford draws the conclusion toward which Daiches' argument naturally leads when he writes that history in Scott, as in Hegel can be understood as a "war of

good against good," as a constant struggle between a social code relative to a passing historical situation and a code relative to an emerging one.³⁷

Later revisionist critics have been less conservative than Daiches in inferring historicism from Scott's emotional ambivalence. In his own essay on "Sir Walter Scott and History," the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, for example, argues that Scott, "more than any other writer, forced the transition from the 18th-century philosophy of history...to the 19th-century philosophy of history." The weakness of the earlier historians, says Trevor-Roper, was their "lack of sympathy with the past," their insistence on measuring the past by the present, "as if the values of the present were absolute."³⁸ Scott, like these historians, remained committed to the present:

Where he differed from his predecessors was in his sympathy. Admitting the advantage, or necessity, of progress, he nevertheless sought to appreciate a different form of society within its own context: to allow that the past is autonomous, that it is not to be judged by the present, that its values are its own and having their own coherence, are as legitimate as ours.³⁹

This sympathy, according to Trevor-Roper, is "essentially 'romantic'." Thus, although Scott's "sympathy was controlled by his understanding" and his historical "imagination" governed by his reason,⁴⁰ he

was also, in some sense, a romantic: a part-time romantic perhaps...but a genuine romantic still—a romantic in the style of Herder. It was from this combination—this unresolved conflict, perhaps—of romanticism and modernity that he drew his peculiar historical philosophy.⁴¹

In short, romantic sympathy with the past plus Enlightenment rationalism and belief in progress equals historicism.

The longstanding conception of Scott as a divided personality and the possibility of biographical interpretation of his novels need not be debunked; yet I would simply like to dispute the link that I have been attempting to expose between that conception of Scott and a particular interpretation—the historicist interpretation—of his novels. The biographical information upon which the historicist interpretation is built is much less telling than we might like to imagine. No one would call Dr. Johnson, for example, a historicist, though he, like Scott, was a notoriously divided personality in his attitude toward the past. We know, for instance, that he both recommended

Jacobitism to pretty girls and accepted a pension from the Hanoverian government.⁴² We know too that he both held that the first Whig was the Devil and scoffed at the idea, common among Jacobites and Tory diehards, that history was all downhill.⁴³ Even Johnson's attitude toward Scotland seems to have been affected by this "dual vision": thus, although he often made merry at the expense of the coarse, oat-eating Lowland Scots, he was also one of the first Englishmen to travel extensively in the truly backward Highlands and became a great admirer and defender of the Highland character.⁴⁴ In some cases, there is such a striking similarity between Johnson's opinions and Scott's that we may suspect that Scott is unconsciously echoing the *Ultimus Anglicorum*.⁴⁵ Compare, for example, Scott's oft-quoted letter to Miss Clephane with Johnson's comment to Boswell "that if holding up his right hand would have secured victory at Culloden to Prince Charles's army, he was not sure that he would have held it up."⁴⁶ It follows that if we are unwilling to impute historicism to Johnson on the basis of such anecdotes, we should be less willing to impute it to Scott.⁴⁷

Again, even granted that Scott was a "divided personality," his personal ambivalence certainly did not always issue in a "double vision" of history. Several of the original revisionist critics broke ranks with orthodoxy for that reason. Take Robert Gordon, for instance, who focuses on Daiches' own favourite "problem of heroic action" in the unheroic modern world, a problem with which I will deal at length in individual novels.⁴⁸ Scott, according to Daiches, admired the heroic ideals of pre-modern cultures and regretted their disappearance, but he also saw that a virtue like "military courage" could serve "no useful purpose" in the present.⁴⁹ As Gordon remarks, Scott often seems to express precisely the opposite view outside his novels—particularly in his historical works like *Tales of a Grandfather* (a series of semi-scholarly histories of England, Scotland, and France), *The History of Scotland* (a short lay history written for Lardner's *Cabinet Cyclopaedia*), and *The Life of Napoleon Buonaparte*.⁵⁰ Here Gordon points to dozens of passages, much of which were written after he turned to the novel, in which Scott the historian refers repeatedly to a "problem of heroic action," but for him the problem is not that heroic action lacks a useful purpose in the modern world, but that the modern world produces too little heroism. In his *Life of Napoleon*, for instance, Scott argues at length that the backward Spanish and Russian peasants, in whom traces of old heroic codes had survived, had offered much more successful resistance to French imperialism than the

more modern, bourgeois populations of the Netherlands or Germany.⁵¹ For Scott the historian, Gordon suggests, "a people persistently militant may well be persistently valuable," whatever sentimental interest their way of life may evoke.⁵² Gordon, a former subscriber to the "divided personality" theory, thus challenges us to reread Scott's historical fiction in light of his historical non-fiction.⁵³

A more significant challenge to the prevailing wisdom has come from intellectual historians. Duncan Forbes, a Scottish historian of ideas, was the first writer to break with a longstanding tradition that, as a writer, Scott was at best a gentleman amateur, his view of life untouched by any sort of systematic philosophy. According to Forbes, Scott was in fact "equipped...with presuppositions, a manner of thinking and a historical method" that descended to him from Montesquieu through the so-called "philosophical" historians of the Scottish Enlightenment, a group including Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, William Robertson, and even, in some respects, David Hume.⁵⁴ Forbes' work, though it preceded the first burst of revisionist criticism in the 1960s, has had a little impact on the course that criticism has taken. In truth, the classical revisionist formula, with its emphasis on Scott's "divided personality," carried on with the view that Scott was basically unphilosophical.

The problem is not that Revisionist critics have not recognized some connection between Scott and the Scottish Enlightenment, but that they have failed to explore its implications. David Daiches, as we have seen, traces Scott's "rational" or "progressive" tendencies, but not his overall understanding of history, to Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like Smith and Hume. More recent critics, who have been willing to accept the possibility that Scott derived a fully-fledged philosophy of history from the Scottish Enlightenment, have often identified "philosophical" history as a sort of proto-historicism, thus confirming their view that Scott was an early historicist. Forbes, however, wrote his essay in part to refute G. M. Trevelyan's claim that Scott was a historicist.⁵⁵

In fact, several aspects of Forbes' argument have a direct bearing on the issues raised by the revisionist reading of Scott's novels. Firstly, as Forbes suggests, the "philosophical" historians developed a profound "historical sense," the result of their fascination with the study of pre-modern "states of society," not only in Europe but also in Asia and America. They did not, however, depart from the first principle of all Enlightenment historians:

Ultimately, the rationalist historians of eighteenth century Scotland were interested in "states of society" because they were students of human nature. They viewed the world as a vast laboratory in which an original element—human nature—was variously conditioned by different social states. In order to discover the real, abiding nature of man, it was necessary to make a comparative study of these various social compounds and to observe any "experiments" which history had to offer.⁵⁶

According to Forbes, then, what Scott got from the "philosophical" historians is not some sort of proto-historicism, but rather a comparative sociology premised on the Enlightenment doctrine of the uniformity of human nature. The "great book of Nature" passage in the introductory chapter of *Waverley* might thus be read as a brief "philosophical" history of the British aristocracy, consistent with Scott's overall understanding of history, rather than a blind recital of "neoclassical" principles that he had come to reject.

Although the "philosophical" historians shared with the mainstream Enlightenment historians the belief in human uniformity, yet their understanding of the past differed in some important ways; for instance, unlike Voltaire or Gibbon, they generally did not view the past patronizingly or with contempt.⁵⁷ While they saw progress as desirable and are now well known for attempting to work out the "laws" of progress, the "philosophical" historians nevertheless found virtues in pre-modern societies corresponding to what they saw as deficiencies in the modern bourgeois societies that had replaced them. Adam Ferguson, for instance, never "tired of ...demonstrating from history the dangers in an advanced state of civilization, especially the retreat of patriotism and civic virtue before selfishness and political quietism."⁵⁸ Even the unromantic Adam Smith, as Forbes points out in his essay on "'Scientific' Whiggism," never failed "to emphasize the very grave disadvantages that the progress of society brings with it," particularly "the selfish narrowness of the 'commercial spirit'" and "the extinction of martial ardour and the nobler virtues."⁵⁹ Such views, in fact, correspond exactly with those we find Scott expressing in his historical writings particularly the *Tales of a Grandfather*. The *Tales* is a work not only about progress and civilization but also a series of parables of civic virtues, as I show later.

In short, it may be possible to dispense with the "divided personality" theory, according to which Scott's "nostalgic" and "progressive" sides combine to produce an intuitive historicism; and instead we may hypothesize that Scott's treatment of history is the product of a more or less unitary philosophy of history derived from the

"philosophical" historians. Such a hypothesis would enable us explain more and ignore less in Scott's work. Firstly, it would explain why Scott, who never read Herder or Hegel and who never alludes to or expresses a historicist idea or opinion, nevertheless has a much stronger "historical sense" and a much less patronizing attitude toward the past than mainstream Enlightenment historians. Secondly, it will allow us to explain how Scott's strong "historical sense" could coexist with equally strong belief in the historical uniformity of human nature. And it would allow us to explain how his intense admiration for the past could coexist with equally intense belief in progress. Consequently, Scott would cease to be a paradox or "great unknown," belonging neither to the eighteenth or the nineteenth century and therefore largely ignored by scholars of both periods. He would appear, instead, to fit into an unambiguously eighteenth-century context—albeit one with which we are not now generally familiar. Finally, Scott would cease to be, as Daiches puts it, half "prudent Briton" and half "passionate Scot."⁶⁰ He would be simply a Scot, neither less prudent nor more passionate than others who shared his cultural background.

In the following section I will continue the exploration of Scott's connection with the "philosophical" historians of the Scottish Enlightenment with particular attention to Scott's connection to Adam Ferguson, his early friend and mentor. Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) anticipates the critique of modern society that, as we have seen, runs through Scott's non-fictions. Though Ferguson, in typical Scottish Enlightenment fashion, argues that progress is a law of history and attempts to elucidate its workings among peoples, his *Essay* is also a reflection on the destructive effects of progress on "civic virtue" and a powerful brief for the deliberate cultivation of old-fashioned virtues in the modern world.

The discovery of Sir Walter Scott's connection with "philosophical" historians of the Scottish Enlightenment came as a surprise to mid-twentieth century literary critics, who were accustomed to thinking of him as the least philosophical novelist. But they need not and should not have been so unprepared. In the "Ashiestiel" autobiographical fragment attached to Lockhart's *Life*, Scott himself had acknowledged the importance of the Scottish school to his own development as a thinker. Of his boyhood rambles in the Border country of his ancestors Scott writes:

The philosophy of history...was...a sealed book at this period of my life; but I gradually assembled much of what was striking and picturesque in

historical narrative; and when, in ripen years, I attended more to the deduction of general principles, I was furnished with a powerful host of examples in illustration of them. I was, in short, like an ignorant gamester, who kept a good hand until he knew how to play it.⁶¹

The "philosophy of history" that was later opened to Scott was that of his professors at Edinburgh College who formed the second-generation "philosophical" historians. Scott mentions that he "made some progress in Ethics" at the hands of John Bruce, read an essay before William Robertson, and "was farther instructed in Moral Philosophy at the class of Mr. Dugald Stewart."⁶² Scott later studied law under Baron David Hume, whose lectures were modelled on the approach of the "philosophical" historians. Hume, says Scott, was not "satisfied with presenting...laws in their present state, but combining the past state of our legal enactment with the present, and tracing clearly and judiciously the changes which took place, and the causes which led to them."⁶³ As a student at Edinburgh in the eighties and nineties, Peter Garside argues, "Scott would have been soaked with 'philosophical' history."⁶⁴

Even Scott's nineteenth-century biographers and critics had pointed to such connections. An early *Life* of Scott, for example, spoke of his debt to Dugald Stewart, in whose lectures Scott had "found a principle which breathed a living soul into his hitherto desultory studies, and gave the results form and consistency."⁶⁵ Much later in the century, Walter Bagehot of the London *Economist* observed that Scott's analysis of the "political economy" of the Highlands in *Waverley* was closely akin to Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*.⁶⁶ Yet even among critics who did not know of (or did not mention) Scott's intellectual connections, there was little doubt that his treatment of history was at least intellectually respectable. Among Scott's contemporaries, Whigs like Francis Jeffrey and the historian Macaulay, and even liberals like Hazlitt, all regarded the Tory Scott's novels as worthy of serious consideration as historical novels. In a review of *Waverley* for the *Edinburgh Review*, Jeffrey praises Scott for presenting "a faithful and animated picture of the manners and state of society that prevailed in the northern part of this island, in the earlier parts of the last century."⁶⁷ In a discussion of the ideal historian, Macaulay praises Scott for his use of "those fragments of truth which historians have scornfully thrown behind," for constructing "out of their gleanings works which, even as histories, are scarcely less valuable than theirs."⁶⁸ For Hazlitt, meanwhile, Scott "is only the

amanuensis of truth and history."⁶⁹ Hazlitt maintains that, in his Scottish novels, in particular, "the candour of Sir Walter's historic pen levels our bristling prejudices...and sees fair play between Roundheads and Cavaliers, between Protestant and Papist."⁷⁰

Nor did the idea that Scott was intellectually respectable disappear overnight. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Leslie Stephen saw that the apparent conservative bias of the novels had a sophisticated theoretical basis, though he found it in the writings of Edmund Burke rather than in those of the Scottish school.⁷¹ As late as the 1940s, older historians like G.M. Young and G.M. Trevelyan were claiming that Scott was a major influence on nineteenth-century historical writing.⁷² But by this time Scott's own intellectual roots were forgotten; meanwhile, literary critics had begun to regard *The Author of Waverley* as a hack romancer who indulged in nostalgia and pageantry, not in real history.

In 1953, with his essay "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," Duncan Forbes re-established Scott's intellectual merit. Despite ranking Forbes' work with that of Lukacs and Daiches, its overall impact on our understanding of Scott remains less profound. The reason is that Forbes and a later scholar, Peter Garside, who wrote two follow-up essays, focus primarily on the relationship of "philosophical" history to Scott's non-fictions and on Scott's biographical links to various "philosophical" historians.⁷³ The three essays were limited to influence study, thus leaving detailed examination of Scott's fiction to literary critics, as Garside points out.⁷⁴ But the literary critics who acknowledged Forbes' work had only a second-hand knowledge of the "philosophical" historians, almost all of it derived from Forbes' own brief summary of their leading ideas.⁷⁵ Consequently, it was easy for them to jump from the notion that Scott's view of history had an intellectual basis to the unwarranted assumption that this view was akin to that of contemporary intellectuals—that is, to historicism. In the course of the following section I will be concerned to rectify some of the mistakes these critics have made and examining in details several features of "philosophical" history that are significant to Scott's novels.

The "philosophical" historians, with Vico and Hegel, as many critics have urged, thought that temporally and geographically diverse cultures advance through the same set of historical stages or "states of society," and that this process is governed by intelligible "laws of history." They were also deeply interested in the structural and epistemological differences between these stages, and in the ways these differences

were conditioned by material circumstances. For instance, John Millar devotes the first chapter of his work *Origin of Ranks* (1806) to exploring the evolution of the social status of women. In the hunting-and-gathering economy of a "rude" or "barbarous" society, according to Millar, child-bearing women are dependent on men and so reduced to almost complete servility. But as the society progresses through its pastoral (nomadic), its agricultural, and, finally, its commercial stage, economic scarcity gives way to "opulence," and increasing importance is attached to intellectual refinement (that is, technical skills and "elegant arts"). As a result the gap of distinction between the sexes gradually narrows, and women begin to approach men in terms of rank. For Millar, the social status of women is thus directly related to the structure of a society's economy and its degree of material improvement. *The Origin of Ranks*, in fact, is often regarded as one of the origins of modern sociology.⁷⁶

Yet despite their interest in cultural change and cultural differences, the "philosophical" historians did not deny the Enlightenment doctrine that human nature is always and everywhere the same. As I have pointed out earlier, Forbes, denying Trevelyan's assertion that Scott was a prototype of the nineteenth-century "historical school," had assumed Scott's affiliation with the Scottish branch of the Enlightenment. Literary critics succeeding Forbes seem to have ignored or misunderstood this point. Thomas Crawford, one of the first literary critics to make significant use of Forbes' observations, points out to Scott's inheriting "that historicism which was one of the greatest achievements of eighteenth-century Scotland."⁷⁷ After Crawford, Francis Hart, having discovered that the historical thought of the Enlightenment was not uniformly "anti-historical," took it for granted that he could speak of an Enlightenment "brand of historicism" and attribute it to Scott.⁷⁸ This was an important step in the reconstruction of the "historicist" Scott's intellectual genealogy, since no one really supposed that The Author of *Waverley* could have read Hegel. More recently, Avrom Fleishman and David Brown have made systematic attempts to trace Scott's historicism back to Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson.⁷⁹ Brown, at least, puts historicism in quotation marks, as if he were aware that he is using the word imprecisely. Lukacs is almost alone among Scott's critics in avoiding such imprecision.⁸⁰

In spite of Scott's critics, it should be emphasized that the historical uniformity of human nature was essential to the thought of the "philosophical" historians. Adam Ferguson, whom Fleishman and Brown consider as the closest philosophically of this

group to Scott⁸¹, argues in the opening pages of his *Essay on History of Civil Society* (1767) that the study of man in history has often "served to mislead our attention":

We observe the progress [mankind has] made; we distinctly enumerate many of its steps; we can trace them back to a distinct antiquity: of which no record remains, nor any monument is preserved, to inform us what were the openings of this wonderful scene. The consequence is, that instead of attending to the character of our species, where the particulars are vouched by the surest authority, we endeavour to trace it through ages and scenes unknown; and, instead of supposing that the beginning of our story was nearly of a species with the sequel, we think ourselves warranted to reject every circumstance of our present condition and frame, as adventitious, and foreign to our nature⁸²

In fact, Ferguson's argument presents a refutation of Rousseau's claim that we can know about men in the state of nature from the analogy of other animals, for instance, orang-utans. Unlike Rousseau, whose *Second Discourse* offers a vague "perfectibility" as the only generally human characteristics, Ferguson devotes the entire first part of his essay to enumerating "the General Characteristics of Human Nature."

The Scottish school's boldest claims concerning the uniformity of the human nature came from its greatest sceptic, David Hume, who asserts it at the level of the passions:

It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have ever been observed among mankind⁸³

In accounting for the conduct of his subjects, the historian can therefore discount, to a large extent, adventitious cultural characteristics:

Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter.⁸⁴

This suggests, as Forbes puts it, that history is only a "laboratory," that helps the social scientist "discover the real abiding nature of man" by studying a variety of social "experiments."⁸⁵ Or as Hume argues more explicitly:

Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour.⁸⁶

Such views represent a complete rejection of the historicism then emerging in Continental thought.

Comparing Hume's argument with the much-debated "great book of Nature" passage in the introductory chapter of *Waverley* reveals that both writers concede that the specific forms human behaviour takes can vary widely from time to time and place to place. In the meantime, both insist that all human behaviour springs from the same basic motives or "passions," and is therefore intelligible, at least in principle, to men of different times and places. In other words, social paradigms are not absolute. When Scott declares that he throws the force of his narrative on "those passions common to men in all stages of society," he believes that he can overcome the conceptual difficulties inherent in writing historical fiction. To put it rather differently, without that uniformity of passions, the past would be unintelligible and therefore unrepresentable. Hume describes this dilemma more forcefully in his question: "What would become of history had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience we have had of mankind?"⁸⁷

An important difference for our purpose between the "historical school" and the "philosophical" historians is connected with the notion of "cultural relativism." I would argue that the "philosophical" historians were not what we could call "cultural relativists." Scott's critics usually miss this point. For instance, Avrom Fleishman views the social evolutionism of the Scottish school as a sort of Hegelian dialectic in which the values of past societies are "fulfilled and outlived," and in which "no political or social group can make an unqualified claim to credence, though they may temporarily stand for progress."⁸⁸ Such a view is a perverse reading of the "philosophical" historians, who deliberately set out to combat the incipient relativist tendency they perceived in the writings of their English predecessors, particularly

Mandeville and Hobbes. Fear of this tendency and of its moral consequences may well be thought of as underlying their historical production.

In his essay on Scott, Forbes, in fact, points to the notion of social evolutionism, or the belief that the progress of society is a "law" of history, as the "leading principle" of the "philosophical" historians.⁸⁹ He also remarks that this belief was a prop, not an impediment, to their moral concerns. For the Scots, he contends, "The idea of the progress of society did not abolish *naturrechtlich* thinking ... but perfected it."⁹⁰ John Millar, for instance employs the notion of progress of society through different stages "requiring different laws to account for those 'diversities of laws which must otherwise have appeared irreconcilable with the idea that there is anything stable or precise in the moral sentiments of mankind."⁹¹ Millar believed that many apparent divergences could be reconciled with the law of nature by considering the different moral import of the same action under different economical conditions. In a primitive society like the Tahitians', he observed, men's wants are few and well supplied, so that most thefts there cannot be regarded as serious crimes.⁹² The sort of sociological analysis that we have seen in Millar's *Origin of Ranks* is thus employed as a weapon against what we could call "cultural relativism." Versions of Millar's project are amply apparent in the writings of the "philosophical" historians. Scott's college philosophy professor, Dugald Stewart explains the variations in moral judgement in terms of "the unequal degrees of civilization" which different societies have attained, and for the "diversity of their speculative opinions, arising from their unequal measures of knowledge or of capacity."⁹³ The discovery of "natural right," presupposes the development of reason, which in "savage" societies is incomplete.⁹⁴ Scott's explanation of the anachronism of Macpherson's *Ossian* follows the same tradition of the "philosophical" historians: "The passions and feelings of men in a savage state are as desultory as their habits of life; and a model of perfect generosity and virtue, would be as great a wonder among them, as a fine gentleman in a birthday suit."⁹⁵ In short, "progress" for the "philosophical" historians is not understood in terms of mere technological advancement, but rather, and perhaps more importantly, in terms of improvement in man's moral judgement.

Notwithstanding the apparent similarity between philosophical history and historicism, it should be owned that the "philosophical" historians are not historicists: although they did, for instance, presuppose a kind of cultural determination of individual thought and behaviour. Let us consider Ferguson's most famous dictum:

Mankind are to be taken in groups, as they have always subsisted. The history of the individual is but a detail of the sentiments and thoughts he has entertained in the view of his species: and every experiment relative to this subject should be made with entire societies, not with single men.⁹⁶

What seems to be a cultural determinism here is only used as methodological principle rather than an absolute doctrine. The "philosophical" historians always thought that men lived in groups, and to study the solitary individual, as Rousseau in a certain sense had done, would mislead the "student of human nature." Even though cultural determinism is employed by the "philosophical" historians as a method, yet this determinism is tempered by a recognition of the great diversity within a given culture. Consider Ferguson himself:

Every nation is a motley assemblage of different characters, and contains, under any political form, some examples of that variety, which the humours, tempers, and apprehensions of men, so differently employed, are likely to furnish. Every profession has its point of honour, and its system of manners...Every station, age, a dress, a ceremonial, by which it is distinguished, and by which it suppresses the national character under that of rank, or of the individual...A rude or simple observer would remark the variety he saw in the dwellings and in the occupations of different men, not in the aspect of different nations. He would find, in the streets of the same city, as great a diversity, as in the territory of a separate people.⁹⁷

Nonetheless, Ferguson warns modern historians and social scientists not to fall in the trap of making a generalization:

It belonged to the constitution of Athens, to have produced a Cleon, and a Pericles; but all the Athenians were not, therefore, like Cleon, or Pericles. Themistocles and Aristides lived in the same age; the one advised what was profitable; the other told his country what was just.⁹⁸

Ferguson's history, then, is indeterminist, open-ended. That the majority in a particular culture are expected to think and act in a certain way or style is not a sufficient evidence that could be extended to apply to all individuals. The fact that there are individual differences should not be ignored. Such notions could be discerned in Scott's works, though some critics, David Brown, for instance, sees the contrary. Brown, following Lukacs, who emphasizes the notion of determinism in the Waverley Novels, cites Scott's heroine in *The Fair Maid of Perth*: "men rarely

advance in civilization or refinement beyond the ideas of their own age.”⁹⁹ But does the word “rarely” imply “never”? Between the meaning of this and the meaning of that, in fact, lies an important distinction between Scott and the “philosophical” historians on the one hand and the heirs of the “historical school,” on the other.

Another important point that characterizes the “philosophical” historians and distinguishes them from the mainstream Enlightenment that prevailed in the eighteenth century is their account of historical change. Historians of the Enlightenment, generally, explain history in idealistic terms. They attribute all changes in social institutions to deliberate, rational and pre-determined actions on the part of individuals. It was just such an interpretation that allowed Condorcet, for example, to speak of history as a grand March of Mind. On the other hand, “philosophical” historians, given their scepticism about social contract theory, developed what Duncan Forbes calls an “anti-rationalistic insight into historical happening.”¹⁰⁰ It is not surprising, then, that Ferguson also questioned the notion of human-directed rational progress. Here, Ferguson not only diverges from the Philosophes and Libertines who prepared for the French Revolution, but perhaps anticipates Burke. Ferguson describes the so-called law of “the heterogeneity of ends” or ‘unintended establishments,” as “like the winds, that come we know not whence, and blow whithersoever they list, the forms of society are derived from an obscure and distant origin.” For Ferguson:

Every step and every movement of the multitude, even what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design. ... They proceed from one form of government to another, by easy transitions, and frequently under old names adopt a new constitution. The seeds of every form are lodged in human nature; they spring and ripen with season.¹⁰¹

The anti-idealistic insight, especially as applied by Smith and Ferguson to economic history, anticipates and was by Marx's own account an eminent influence on the theory of historical materialism.¹⁰² This explains why a Marxist critic like Lukacs, though he lacked the knowledge of any connection between Scott and the “philosophical” historians, was the first to show how their insight operates in Scott's novels. Where Scott the historian is most like Marx—in downplaying the Great Men of History and concentrating on the petty hopes and fears of ordinary men and

women—he is simply following his own and Marx's Scottish teachers. Yet none of this makes Scott an historicist in the sense I have been using the word here. The "philosophical" historians did not, as I have shown, believe that all thought was historically determined; they simply limited the role of thought, or rationality, in the genesis of human institutions.

Nor does Scott's reading of history prove him a closet leftist, as Lukacs seems to suppose. We should recall that Scots' anti-idealistic reading of history typically led them rather to the right than to the left of their idealist contemporaries. Hume is a case in point. In fact, Hume's understanding of existing institutions as "unintended establishments" made him deeply resistant to all attempts to reconstruct them along purely rational lines. This conservative attitude is reflected in Hume's essay "of the Original Contract" (1777):

Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another succeed, as is the case with silk-worms and butterflies, the new race, if they had sense enough to choose their government, which surely is never the case with men, might voluntarily, and by general consent, establish their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or precedents, which prevailed among their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform themselves to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of their fathers, had marked out to them.¹⁰³

For the same reason, Hume took a decidedly dim view of all revolutions: "more ill than good is ever to be expected from them."¹⁰⁴ If magnificent human institutions had been the gradual creation of complex, irrational forces, the Scots argued, it was mere hubris to suppose that a generation of philosophers could do much to improve upon them. Conscious planning, in other words, might do more damage than good. The adherents of Scottish philosophy thus gravitated toward what is probably the central tenet of modern conservatism.¹⁰⁵

As we have seen, Scott has often been understood as a paradoxical mixture of left and right, of progressive Enlightenment thought and a native temperament that favoured romantic conservatism. Yet insofar as Scott is like the speculative historians, such understanding is obviously inadequate. The speculative historians were on the whole Enlighteners and Whigs; yet, as I have just suggested, their

philosophy of history has a strongly conservative tendency. William C. Lehmann highlights this point through his comparison of Smith and Ferguson:

The student familiar with [Smith's] writings...will find in many features a remarkable similarity with Ferguson, worked out with a detail and a logical consistency not always found in the writings of the latter. There is, with all his individualism, ...the same organic conception of society, the same impatience with attempts either to explain the state as an artificial construction or to reconstruct its institutions on purely rational patterns in defiance of sentiment, custom, and the deep roots of centuries of intertwining, the same sense of the sway of custom and fashion in tastes and morals, the same insistence on the "instinctive," the unreflective, the uncontrived, the same radical denial of the hegemony of abstract reason as the arbiter of life and the sole principle of scientific analysis.¹⁰⁶

The similarity between Smith and Ferguson in these respects is not very much different from that between them and their contemporary Edmund Burke,¹⁰⁷ although Avrom Fleishman is at pains to win Scott away from the "conservative" school of Burke, in which Leslie Stephen had placed him. Fleishman's attempt to relate Scott solely to the more progressive school of the speculative historians is therefore misleading.¹⁰⁸ If Scott is like Smith and Ferguson, as Fleishman maintains, he is also perforce like Burke. In short, Scott's ambivalence cannot be easily distinguished. His allegedly romantic conservatism was as much a product of the Enlightenment as the progressive tendencies attributed to him. However, once we understand the relationship between the speculative historians and the Enlightenment in general perhaps it becomes easier to understand Scott's vision of history as applied in his novels in his treatment of civic virtues and social, moral, economical, and political issues. In what follows I will attempt to highlight this relationship in a way that serves our purpose in discussing Scott's Scottish novels.

Among Scott's recent critics, only Graham McMaster in *Scott and Society* (1981) seems to have understood that to link Scott with the Scottish Enlightenment is to set him apart from nineteenth-century historicism. McMaster, however, fails to realize some of the positive implications of this connection and, as a result, tends to underestimate the scope of Scott's debt. His thesis, in fact, is that while *Waverley* "exemplifies textbook doctrine," the later novels represent a steady retreat from Scottish Enlightenment thought.¹⁰⁹ In the later novels, he argues, Scott came more and more to doubt the Enlightenment belief in progress, progress in the sense that life

itself is constantly improving in terms of individual satisfaction, not merely changing. Even here, he admits that Scott "was to a certain extent developing ideas that had been latent in the Enlightenment itself."¹¹⁰ The point that McMaster misses and that I will attempt to clarify here is that the ideas which he describes as "latent" in the Enlightenment are, in fact, manifest in the Scottish Enlightenment. In Ferguson's work such ideas are central and in Smith's they are expressed openly and often.

It could be argued that the Scottish Enlightenment was in some aspects a sort of reaction against the French and English philosophers, particularly toward their notion of human nature. For the English and French philosophers, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, man originally or by nature is solitary. Consequently, they consider civil society as only a convention, the product of an agreement or "contract" among solitary individuals. For them, therefore, "nature" and "society" in a certain way stand in opposition, though Locke, at least, tended to mitigate the stark contrast drawn by Hobbes. The speculative historians rejected this opposition altogether; civil society is itself "natural" to man. The opening pages of Ferguson's *Essay*, for instance, are a spirited attack on the Enlightenment notion of a state of Nature. "In framing our account of what man was in some imaginary state of nature," Ferguson complains, "we overlook what he always appeared within the reach of our own observation, and in the records of history."¹¹¹ But this is to distort the facts for the sake of theory. For him, "the society appears to be as old as the individual." And "if there was a time in which he had his acquaintance with his own species to make, and his faculties to acquire, it is a time of which we have no record, and in relation to which our opinions can serve no purpose, and are supported by no evidence."¹¹² For the speculative historians, then, human nature is not only uniform, but also uniformly social. In this respect their views go back to pre-Hobbesian political science—to the Aristotelian and classical conception of man as a *Zoon Politikon*, or "political animal."¹¹³ The immediate source of their views, however, was the embryonic anthropology of Montesquieu, whose famous dictum the "philosophical" historians quote repeatedly: "Man is born in society, and there he remains."¹¹⁴

This premise directed the way Montesquieu's Scottish disciples read history, especially very early history. The Enlightenment philosophers had supposed that as one went back in history, one after another layer of human society would be sloughed off—or as Ferguson ironically put it, that "the most common establishments of human society" could be "classed among the incroachments which...busy invention [had]

made upon the reign of nature."¹¹⁵ In this way, the speculative historians argued, their Enlightenment predecessors had inadvertently undermined their own belief in the uniformity of human nature. For man in a primitive or relatively "natural" society would be little like modern man, the product of a complex and highly "artificial" social environment. But if man is naturally social, as the "philosophical" historians believed, the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" societies collapses. Ferguson underlines this point most eloquently when he says:

If we ask therefore where the state of nature is to be found? We may answer, it is here; and it matters not whether we are understood to speak in the island of Great Britain, at the Cape of Good Hope, or the Straits of Magellan. ...If the palace be unnatural, the cottage is so no less; and the highest refinements of political and moral apprehension, are not more artificial in kind than the first operations of sentiment and reason.¹¹⁶

It is clear that the speculative historians rejected the temptation to historicize human nature and that they were able to see complexity and sophistication in earlier social organizations, where the Enlightenment has seen only chaos and grim barbarism.

Nor do the "philosophical" historians agree with the Enlightenment's conception of society itself. Ferguson, Smith, Millar, and Hume all rejected the "social Contract" theory, particularly as posited by Hobbes and Locke, according to which society had been instituted by a special agreement among solitary individuals in a state of nature initiated primarily for private selfish reasons. According to Locke, "Men" are "by Nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent." And when men agreed to give up their natural liberty and put "on the bonds of Civil Society...and unite into community," Locke argues, it was "for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it."¹¹⁷ In other words, beside man's absolute freedom, he also lived in a state of what Hobbes called the war of all against all that demanded the emergence of civil society. Civil society, therefore, is merely a rational vehicle for the efficient pursuit of each individual's private, essentially selfish ends or interests. It promotes no higher ends other than those that had already existed in the assumed natural state.

For the Scots, all the evidence suggests that society was with man before the development of his rational powers. Society cannot, therefore, be attributed to any

deliberate, rational consideration of private interests. Nor can it be attributed to contract, since a man incapable of considering his own interests cannot in any meaningful way consent to a contract. The real basis of society, the Scots reasoned, must therefore lie elsewhere. Ferguson's explanation is once again typical:

In accounting for actions we often forget that we ourselves have acted; and instead of the sentiments which stimulate the mind in the presence of its object, we assign as motives of conduct with men, those considerations which occur in the hour of retirement and cold reflection. In this mood frequently we can find nothing important, besides the deliberate prospects of interest; and a great work, like that of forming a society, must in our apprehension arise from deep reflections and be carried on with a view to the advantages which mankind derive from commerce and mutual support. But neither a propensity to mix with the herd, nor the sense of the advantages enjoyed in that condition, comprehend all the principles by which men are united together. Those bands are even of feeble texture, when compared to the resolute ardour with which a man adheres to his friend, or to his tribe, after they have for some time run the career of fortune together. Mutual discoveries of generosity, joint trials of fortitude, redouble the ardours of friendship, and kindle a flame in the human breast, which considerations of personal interest or safety cannot suppress.¹¹⁸

For Ferguson, as for the conservative Burke, society is not a rational construct but a spontaneous outgrowth of ordinary human affection. With this vision of history, progress, human nature and the evolution of man socially, politically, economically and morally, the "philosophical" historians called for an education that embodies this vision: an education that lays emphasis on civic virtues and altruism as a foundation for strengthening social ties and moral values in its various forms and in various spheres—family, community and nation. Scott, in his non-fiction, presents the same vision.

Scott's non-fictional history of Scotland in his *Tales of a Grandfather*, not only reveals him as a "philosophical" historian, but also guides us toward the sorts of things we should look for in his Scottish novels, particularly those connected with civic virtues. The *Tales* is replete with historical parables designed to illustrate the continuing necessity of civic virtue very much akin to those we have seen in Ferguson's *Essay* and in Smith's *Lectures on Jurisprudence*. Both early and recent criticism remark that the *Tales* is not only serious history; but it is also probably the most "philosophical" piece of history that Scott ever wrote. For instance, the *Westminster Review* compares Scott with Hume, "whose history [of England] the

author may be presumed to have had frequently in his hands of late."¹¹⁹ The title of Chapter 34—"Progress and Civilisation in Society"—is enough to suggest roots in Scottish Enlightenment thought. Duncan Forbes, for instance, describes this chapter as "pure 'conjectural' history."¹²⁰

In tracing the "progress of Civilisation," Scott, much like Adam Ferguson, begins with the family as the smallest society whose individuals are connected to each other by the "love and affection between the offspring and the parents." Scott attributes such affection to the unusual length of human childhood. Thus, while affection "among the brute creation is the produce of mere instinct, and continues for a very short time," it "becomes in the human race a deep and permanent feeling." As a result human children "feel no desire to desert their parents, but remain inhabitants of the same huts in which they were born."¹²¹ This pattern multiplies and several families are combined to form a tribe and several tribes become a nation. In short, Scott would say, society is not the outgrowth of a "contract" or considerations of private interest; nor does it progress, at least at first, by deliberate innovation.

Scott exposes the stages of progress of society and its institutions, in a way much similar to that of a "philosophical" historian. As an assembly of family groups expand and their affairs grow more complicated, it becomes necessary to choose a chief to be the "arbiter of their disputes in time of peace and their leader or captain when they go to war." (23:223) The tribal society, however, is still largely egalitarian or, as Scott puts it, "republican." As Scott comes to speak about the development of ranks as a result of the division of labour, he seems to make an abstract from the first three chapters of *The Wealth of Nations*.¹²² The division of labour begins with the transition from a simple hunting and agricultural economy, where each man's subsistence depends on his "personal skill" at hunting or farming, to the more "convenient" barter economy, where each man becomes more specialized, that is, "following a separate occupation" in which he excels and trades for those goods he no longer produces on his own. (23: 225-226) When man discovers that barter itself does not solve the problem of the surplus produce, the introduction of currency becomes more convenient to accrue surplus wealth. This surplus in turn allows some men to "hire the assistance of others to do their work," thus sinking them "to the capacity of servants" and is therefore regarded by Scott as the origin of ranks in society. (23: 227-228) Scott summarizes the stages of progress in a way that reveals his overall philosophical orientation in the following passage:

In this way the whole order of society is changed, and instead of presenting the uniform appearance of one large family, each member of which has nearly the same rights, it seems to resemble a confederacy or association of different ranks, classes, and conditions of men, each rank filling up a certain department in society, and discharging a class of duties totally distinct from those of the others. The steps by which a nation advances from the natural and simple state which we have just described, into the more complicated system in which ranks are distinguished from each other, are called the progress of society, or of civilisation. It is attended, like all things human, with much of evil as well as good; but it seems to be a law of our moral nature, that, faster or slower, such alterations must take place, in consequence of inventions and improvements of succeeding generations of mankind. (23: 228-229).

Scott, like his mentors, believes that progress is a "natural law" of human history, something inevitable as a result of our social nature and not a product of rational artifice. Finally, progress, though a law, is still an object of moral concern since, potentially, it carries within its folds "evil" effects. Here, it becomes clear that if Scott tends to do justice to earlier stages of progress, it is not because he views them on a ground of "feeling for 'relativism'," as some critics have suggested; but because, like Ferguson and, and to some extent, even Smith, he does not believe that progress—economic progress, at least—is an absolute good but also has evil repercussions.

Although he does not discuss the "evils" attendant upon progress, Scott does call attention to the impact of progress/commerce on martial spirit through his comments in the section about "The Fall of Edinburgh." Although the city was able to muster a volunteer defence force to face the attack of the Highlanders under the leadership of Charles I, the city was not quite willing to send its men into battle: "the relatives of the volunteers crowded around them, weeping, protesting, and conjuring them not to expose lives so invaluable to their families to the broadswords of the savage Highlanders." (26: 124-25) Scott's description of the morale of the citizens in Edinburgh and the excuses of both the officers and the volunteers to avoid the combat demonstrates the limit of courage in a relatively civilized society: "In some companies, the men said that their officers would not lead them on; in others, the officers said that the privates would not follow them." (26:125) Scott's account of the fall of Edinburgh comes to the same conclusion which Adam Smith made in describing the same events: "commerce sinks the courage of mankind, and tends to extinguish martial spirit."

Like the "philosophical" historians, Scott treats the decline of "military courage" as a serious social problem. Examining a number of similar passages in the *Tales* and elsewhere contrasting the bravery of the Highlanders with the cowardice of their more civilized opponents, Robert Gordon argues that Scott appears to be a Legitimist, a defender of backward "patriots" against degenerate cosmopolitanism.¹²³ But this is an overstatement. Like Ferguson in his 1750 militia pamphlet, Scott is far from presenting a jeremiad against modernity. His interest seems mainly to focus on finding some means of accommodating martial virtues within the context of modern society. Thus, in his last chapter on the '45, Scott praises "the genius of the Earl of Chatham," William Pitt the Elder, who enrolled the Highland clans in regular army regiments, officered by their former chieftains, thus opening "a fresh career to the martial spirit of the Highlanders." (26:429) The whole chapter, in fact, could easily be read as a sort of parable on the decline of civic virtue, especially of "military courage" and its revival.

Ample episodes are found in the *Tales* that highlight the merit of civic virtues. The chapters on the '45 are no less suggestive than the earlier chapter on the fall of Edinburgh in this respect. For instance, Scott's account of Prince Charles's escape from Scotland after the defeat at Culloden is intended to underline the merit of the virtue of loyalty motivated by the notion of honour in the chivalric sense:

During his wanderings, the secret of the Adventurer's concealment was intrusted to hundreds of every sex, age, and condition; but no individual was found, in a high or low situation, or robbers even who procured their food at the risk of their lives, who thought for an instant of obtaining opulence at the expense of treachery to the proscribed and miserable fugitive. Such disinterested conduct will reflect honour on the Highlands of Scotland while their mountains shall continue to exist. (26: 374-375)

Perhaps it is no coincidence that Scott alludes in this passage to the same anecdote of the loyal cattle-thief that John Millar employed to demonstrate the contrast between virtues in the "rude" and "commercial" societies. For Scott, as for Millar, such an episode was no mere *curiosum*. Of course such virtues of the past, though attractive, are outmoded in the present, according to Millar, yet the absence of personal loyalty, he thought, would make commercial society vulnerable to "envy, resentment, and other malignant passions." Scott, in the same manner, suggests that loyalty in the "rude" society is always associated with the notion of honour, which even the thief is

committed to despite necessity. Here, the merit of loyalty becomes apparent especially when we recall that in a "commercial" society the thoughts of "obtaining opulence" are not so easily resisted.

Perhaps the purport of the above passage becomes more forceful when we take it in the context of Scott's account of the '45. If we juxtapose the Highlanders' conduct toward Charles with the recommendations and expectations of Robert Walpole, the genius of that "commercial" age, described at the outset of his account of the '45, we understand the sharp contrast between the two cultures, one quasi-primitive and the other commercial:

[T]his great statesman was a man of a coarse mind, who altogether disbelieving in the very existence of patriotism, held the opinion that every man had his price, and might be bought if his services were worth the value at which he rated them. His creed was as unfavourable to the probity of public men, as that of a leader who should disbelieve in the existence of military honour would be degrading to the character of a soldier. The venality of Sir Robert Walpole's administration became a shame and a reproach to the British nation, which was also burdened with the means of supplying the wages of the national corruption. (26: 53-54)

In short, the Jacobite Highlanders, may have acted against the progressive political and economical rhetoric of their age; but they also acted against what Scott saw as its regressive moral tendencies, especially the one Millar, Smith, and, above all, Ferguson had attacked and warned against—the encroachment of some detrimental commercial values on inappropriate spheres of life. Indeed, Scott's *Tales of a Grandfather* is, like Ferguson's *Essay*, broadly didactic. This makes us expect that his Scottish novels will also embody the notion of historical progress and its impact on moral values and civic virtues in various aspects of human life. The next chapter examines Scott's first novel, *Waverley*, in the light of these considerations.

1. Irving Howe, "Falling out of the Canon," *The New Republic* (August 17, 1992), 35.
2. Howe, 36.
3. For an early, classical version of this critique, see E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York: Harcourt, 1927), 51. Forster says of Scott: "his reputation in his day—that is easy to understand. There are important historical reasons for it, which we should discuss if our scheme was chronological. But when we fish him out of the river of time and set him to write in that circular room with the other novelists, he presents a less impressive figure. He is seen to have a trivial mind and a heavy style. He cannot construct. He has neither detachment nor passion, and how can a writer who is devoid of both, create characters who will move us deeply? ...[H]e only has a temperate heart and gentlemanly feelings, and an intelligent affection for the countryside: and this is not basis enough for great novels."
4. Marlon B. Ross, "Scott's Chivalric Prose: The Function of Metrical Romances in the Romantic Period," *Genre* 18 (1986), 267-297. In the same vein, Gary Kelly points out that Scott's concern is with "social conflict and compromise [and] the relation of the individual to historical change." *English Fiction of the Romantic Period 1789-1830* (London: Longman, 1989), 142.
5. Marilyn Butler, *Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries: English Literature and its Background, 1760-1830* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 109.
6. Ross, 278.
7. Lukacs, 48.
8. Bruce Beiderwell, *Power and Punishment in Scott's Novels* (Athens, GA & London: University of Georgia Press, 1992), vii.
9. Judith Wilt, *Secret Leaves: The Novels of Sir Walter Scott* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 17.
10. James Kerr, *Fiction Against History: Scott as Storyteller* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1. See also Richard Waswo, "Story as Historiography in the Waverley Novels," *English Literary History* 47 (1980), 304-330, probably the first piece of post-structuralist Scott criticism. Focusing on Scott's compulsive use of authorial personae, Waswo argues that for Scott "history is not a given 'reality' or universally agreed upon set of 'facts'" to be "dramatized or given rhetorical clothing by the artist"; rather, "the mode of dramatization or narration itself constitutes the history." (304).
11. Edgar Johnson, *Sir Walter Scott: The Great Unknown* (London: Macmillan, 1970), 2:160.
12. Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Sir Walter Scott and History," *The Listener* 86 (1971), 230.
13. For a deliberate attempt to bridge the gap between first and second-wave revisionism, see Waswo, 322. Waswo draws an analogy between the historicism (i.e. cultural relativism) attributed to Scott by first-wave revisionists and the radical historicism that he himself would like to attribute. Scott the historicist, he argues, shows that values and institutions "are not 'natural' but historical," that they "are always changing, since their real authority is derived only from social assent and is always threatened by dissent." Just so does Scott the radical historicist show that "history" itself is historical and derives its authority only from "the conferral of value by a social nexus of interpretation"—that is, from public assent to the conventions of the genre in which the historian (or historical novelist) is working. This radical historicism, in Waswo's view, explains Scott's contemporary mockery of novelistic

- conventions and, in particular, his use of contending authorial personae, who repeatedly undercut each other's version of the "facts."
14. Donald Davie, *The Heyday of Walter Scott* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), 26.
 15. Lukacs, 19-20.
 16. Except, perhaps, in the limited sense of historical determinist (as Trevelyan has suggested.) Even there, however, we should still have doubts. The fact that Scott showed that much thought and behaviour are historically determined is not a proof that he thought that all thought and behaviour are. In fact, there are explicit statements to the contrary in his works, as I shall show in the course of this chapter.
 17. Lukacs, 20.
 18. For a thorough refutation of "the popular error concerning the unhistorical and anti-historical spirit of the eighteenth century," see Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (1932), trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln & James P. Pettegrove (Princeton University Press, 1951), 197-233. See also Isaiah Berlin, "Herder and the Enlightenment," *Aspects of the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Earl Wasserman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 47-53.
 19. Sir Walter Scott, *Waverley* (1814), ed. Claire Lamont (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 5.
 20. Davie, 26. However, see the "Dedicatory Epistle" to *Ivanhoe* (1819), ed. A. N. Wilson (Harmondsworth, U. K. : Penguin Books), where Scott attacks the practice of contemporary historical novelists for focusing exclusively on the exotic or unfamiliar in their representations of the Middle Ages: "The passions, the sources from which [sentiments and manners] must spring in all their modifications, are generally the same in all ranks and conditions, all countries and ages; and it follows, as a matter of course, that the opinions, habits of thinking, and actions, however influenced by the peculiar state of society, must still, upon the whole, bear a strong resemblance to each other." (528) Alexander Welsh, one of the few critics to reject the historicist reading of Scott, remarks, "Scott hesitates, in this last sentence, as if he was aware of the impending surge of historicism." See *The Hero of the Waverley Novels* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 87. Scott, in short, appears to have clung to his "neoclassical principle" long after finishing *Waverley*.
 21. David Devlin, *The Author of Waverley: A Critical Study of Walter Scott* (London: Macmillan, 1971), 40.
 22. Lukacs, 31.
 23. J. G. Lockhart, *The Life of Sir Walter Scott* (1839), Edinburgh Edition (New York: AMS Press, 1983), 9:230.
 24. *The Letters of Sir Walter Scott*, ed. H. J.C. Grierson (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 3:302.
 25. Virginia Woolf, "Gas at Abbotsford," *Collected Essays*, ed. Leonard Woolf (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), 1:134-139.
 26. *Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism*, 341-342.
 27. For Lukacs' argument against source-hunting, see *The Historical Novel*, 22-26.
 28. Lukacs, 31.
 29. Lukacs, 11.
 30. Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," 460-63.
 31. Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," 463.
 32. Daiches, Introduction to an edition of *The Heart of Midlothian* (New York & Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1948), vi.
 33. Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," 474.

34. Daiches, "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist," 24.
35. Daiches, "Scott's Achievement," 29. Daiches is paraphrasing but contradicting Sir Herbert Grierson's argument that Scott's novels are basically unphilosophical.
36. Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," 470.
37. Thomas Crawford, *Walter Scott*, rev. ed., Scottish Writer Series, ed. David Daiches (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1982), 63.
38. Trevor-Roper, 226.
39. Trevor-Roper, 228.
40. Trevor-Roper, 227, 228.
41. Trevor-Roper, 226.
42. Both anecdotes are from *Boswell's Life of Johnson* (1791), ed. R. W. Chapman (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 304-305.
43. For the diabolic origins of Whiggery, see *Boswell's Life*, 973. For an interesting discussion of Johnson's rejection of the idea of historical decline, see Walter Jackson Bate, *The Burden of the Past and the English Poet* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 61, 67-68 & 77-78.
44. Johnson's observations of the Highlands are recorded in *A Journey to the Western Isles of Scotland* (1775), a work that frequently waxes rhapsodic. In one much repeated passage, for example, Johnson draws a portrait of a Highland clan as "a little nation gathering its fruits and tending its herds with fearless confidence, though it lies open on every side to invasion, where in contempt of walls and trenches, every man sleeps securely with his sword beside him; where all on the first approach of hostility come together at the call of battles, as at a summons to a festal show." See *The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1958-90), 9: 91.
45. During an illness in his later years, Scott himself was unable to distinguish between his own career and Johnson's, claiming as his own Johnson's famous reply to James Macpherson's threats at the height of the "Ossian" controversy. See *Edgar Johnson*, 2:1229.
46. Boswell, 304. Daiches himself actually refers to the similarity between these cagey remarks but does not consider the implications of that similarity for his argument that we can infer Scott's view of history from anecdotal evidence about his feelings toward the past.
47. A. O. J. Cockshut, however, suggests that Johnson's "divided personality" makes him a historicist too. See *The Achievement of Walter Scott* (London: Collins, 1969), 78-79. Scott's revisionists, as I have suggested, have a penchant for confusing personality types with philosophical positions.
48. Daiches, Introduction to *The Heart of Midlothian*, vii.
49. Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," 475.
50. See Robert C. Gordon, "Scott and the Highlanders: The Nonfictional Evidence," *Yearbook of English Studies* 6 (1976), 120-140; and "Scott among the Partisans: A Significant Bias in his Life of Napoleon Buonaparte," *Scott Bicentenary Essays: Selected Papers read at the Sir Walter Scott Bicentenary Conference*, ed. Alan Bell (Edinburgh & London: Scottish Academic Press, 1973), 115-133.
51. Gordon, "Scott Among the Partisans," *Passim*. In a second letter to Miss Clephane, Scott even thanked Napoleon for rescuing the British People from an excessive commercialism (*Letters*, 3: 447).
52. Gordon, "Scott and the Highlanders," 121.
53. Although Gordon challenges Daiches' "divided personality" theory, he continues to view Scott as Daiches does—as a historicist or cultural relativist. In fact, he

concludes from Scott's defense of backward, "militant" peoples that he was a Legitimist or right-wing Herderian ("Scott among the Partisians," 128-133; "Scott and the Highlanders," 134.) But as Gordon himself shows, Scott's argument is not that the old heroic code is valid for pre-modern cultures, but that it is equally valid for modern Europe and in need of deliberate cultivation. For Gordon's former adherence to the "divided personality" theory, see *Under Which King? A Study of the Scottish Waverley Novels* (Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd, 1969), 10.

54. Forbes, "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," 85.
55. Forbes, "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," 94.
56. Forbes, "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," 93.
57. Daiches and others miss this point when they attempt to derive the "rational" or "progressive" side of Scott's "divided personality" from his Scottish Enlightenment connections.
58. Forbes, "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," 86.
59. Forbes, "'Scientific' Whiggism: Adam Smith and John Millar," *Cambridge Journal* 7, No. 1 (October 1953), 650.
60. Daiches, "Scott's Achievement," 92.
61. Lockhart, *The Life of Sir Walter Scott* (New York: AMS Press, 1983), 1: 38. It was Duncan Forbes who first called attention to this passage. See "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," 87.
62. Lockhart, 1:44. For a discussion of Stewart and Bruce as "philosophical" historians, see Garside, "Scott and the 'Philosophical' Historians," 499-500, 502-503.
63. Lockhart, 1:61. For a discussion of Baron Hume as a "philosophical" historian, see Garside, "Scott and the 'Philosophical' Historians," 500-502.
64. Garside, "Scott and the 'Philosophical' Historians," 504.
65. George Allan, *Life of Sir Walter Scott* (Edinburgh, 1834), 85. Quoted by Garside in "Scott and the 'Philosophical' Historians," 504.
66. Walter Bagehot, "Mr. Macaulay," *The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot*, ed. Norman St. John-Stevan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965-86), 1:418.
67. Francis Jeffrey, *Edinburgh Review* 24 (1814), *Scott: The Critical Heritage*, 80.
68. T.B. Macaulay, Review of Henry Neale's *The Romance of History*, *Edinburgh Review* 47 (1828), *Scott: The Critical Heritage*, 309.
69. Hazlitt, 229.
70. Hazlitt, 231.
71. Leslie Stephens, 1:163.
72. G.M. Young, "Scott and the Historians," *Sir Walter Scott Lectures 1940-48*, ed. W.L. Renwick (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1950), 79-107; G.M. Trevelyan, "The Influence of Sir Walter Scott on History," *An Autobiography and other Essays* (London: Longmans, Green & Co. , 1950), 200-205.
73. In addition to "Scott and the 'philosophical' Historians," Garside's contribution includes a second essay on "Scott, the Romantic Past, and the Nineteenth Century," *Review of English Studies* 23 (1972), 147-161, in which he furthers Forbes' argument that Scott's "rationalistic" approach to the past differs from the "romantic" or nostalgic approach of other nineteenth-century writers.
74. See Garside, "Scott and the 'Philosophical' Historians," 512.
75. See Garside, "Scott and the 'Philosophical' Historians," 497.
76. Millar, *The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks: Or, an Inquiry into the Circumstances which Give Rise to Influence and Authority in the Different Members of Society* (1806; rpt. , Bristol, U.K: Thoemmes Antiquarian Books Ltd., 1990), V.

77. Thomas Crawford, *Scott*, ed. David Daiches (Edinburgh & London: Scottish Academic Press, 1982), 10.
78. Francis P. Hart, *Scott's Novels: The Plotting of Historical Survival* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966), 181-82.
79. Fleishman, 37-50; Brown, 95, 205.
80. Unlike Lukacs, Graham McMaster recognizes and deals at length with Scott's connection to the Scottish Enlightenment, coming to conclusions similar to my own, though not as broad in scope. For his treatment of the issue of the uniformity of human nature, see *Scott and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 55-57. My differences with McMaster will be dealt with when I come to discuss the relationship of the "philosophical" historians and the Enlightenment in a later section of this chapter.
81. Fleishman, 42; Brown, 199, 202.
82. Ferguson, *Essay*, 10-11.
83. Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1777), ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge & rev. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 83.
84. Hume, *Inquiries Concerning Human Nature*, 83.
85. Forbes, "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," 33.
86. Hume, *Inquiries Concerning Human Nature*, 83.
87. Hume, *Inquiries Concerning Human Nature*, 90.
88. Fleishman, 90. Brown, similarly, speaks of Scott's inheriting from Adam Ferguson "a feeling for 'relativism,' the attempt to evaluate historical societies without debating them through hindsight." 199.
89. Forbes, "The Rationalism of Sir Walter Scott," 27.
90. Forbes, "'Scientific' Whiggism," 645.
91. Forbes, "'Scientific' Whiggism," 645.
92. Millar, "The Effects of Commerce and Manufactures, and of Opulence and Civilization, upon the Morals of a People," appended to *An Historical View of the English Government, from the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Revolution in 1688* (London: J. Mawan, 1803), 4:239.
93. Dugald Stewart, *The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man* (1828), ed. James Walker (Philadelphia: E. H. Butler & Co. , 1870), 136, 137, 147.
94. Leo Strauss makes the same argument in his natural-right Classic, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 9.
95. Scott, Review of the *Report of the Highland Society upon Ossian* and of Laing's Edition of Macpherson, *Edinburgh Review* 6 (1805), 447. Quoted by Garside in "Scott and the 'philosophical' Historians," 512.
96. Ferguson, *Essay*, 10.
97. Ferguson, *Essay*, 180.
98. Ferguson, *Essay*, 183.
99. Scott, *The Fair Maid of Perth* (1828), intro. Willaim L. Parker (New York & London: Dent & Dutton, 1906), 236. Quoted by Brown in *Walter Scott and the Historical Imagination*, 200. Through it Brown attempts to demonstrate Scott's belief in the cultural determination of thought, ignoring the important qualifier "rarely."
100. Forbes, "'Scientific' Whiggism," 654.
101. Ferguson, *Essay*, 119-120. One particularly striking application of this insight is John Millar's account of Magna Carta. Millar makes an audacious assault on the traditional view that the formers of the Magna Carta intended to establish "the rights of Englishmen." In other words, the unexpected liberal results, "The Rights of

- Englishmen," produced by the Magna Carta are "unintended establishment"—a fortunate historical accident rather than the accomplishment of heroic statesmen. See John Millar, *An Historical View of the English Government from the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Revolution in 1688* (London: J. Mawan, 1803), 1: iii, iv, 2:80-81.
102. See William C. Lehmann, *Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), 239.
 103. Hume, "Of the Original Contract," *Essays Moral, Political and Literary* (1777), ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985), 476-477.
 104. Hume, "Of the Original Contract," 477.
 105. For a detailed discussion of the conservative implications of the law of the heterogeneity of ends, see Forbes, "'Scientific' Whiggism," 649-654.
 106. Lehmann, *Adam Ferguson*, 208.
 107. For a direct comparison of Ferguson and Burke, see Lehmann, *Adam Ferguson*, 224-226. For a comparison of Smith and Burke, see Friedrich Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, 2nd. Ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), 113. For Hayek, Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and Burke's *Reflections* stand together as the masterpieces of the anti-idealist school of historical interpretation and the anti-rational school of political philosophy.
 108. Fleishman, 46-49.
 109. McMaster, 59.
 110. McMaster, 51.
 111. Ferguson, *Essay*, 8.
 112. Ferguson, *Essay*, 12.
 113. For the Aristotelianism of the Scottish Enlightenment, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 209-240.
 114. See, for example, Ferguson, *Essay*, 21. For the original, see *Montesquieu's Persian Letters* (1721), trans. Christopher Betts (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), 175. Rousseau parodied the same dictum in his famous opening line of *The Social Contract*: "Man is born free, but is everywhere in chains." See Lester G. Crocker, *Rousseau's Social Contract: An Interpretive Essay* (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1968), 55.
 115. Ferguson, *Essay*, 7.
 116. Ferguson, *Essay*, 12,14.
 117. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (1698), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 348-349. (Second Treatise: Ch. VIII).
 118. Ferguson, *Essay*, 22.
 119. Westminster Review 19 (1829), 257. Cited by Graham McMaster, *Scott and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 61.
 120. Forbes, *The Liberal Anglican Idea of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 8.
 121. Sir Walter Scott, *Tales of a Grandfather*, First Series (1827), *Miscellaneous Works of Sir Walter Scott, Bart.* (Edinburgh: Charles & Adam Black, 1870-71), 23: 221. All further quotations of the *Tales* will be from *Miscellaneous Works*. Citation will be in the form of page notes referring to volume and page number in this edition.
 122. See McMaster, 60. According to him Scott's account of the division of labour was actually "inspired" by Smith's. Another probable source is Ferguson's *Essay*. Karl Marx, as a matter of fact, accused Smith himself of "plagiarizing" this piece of speculative anthropology from Ferguson. See Lehmann, *Adam Ferguson*, 235.

123. Gordon, "Scott and the Highlanders: The Non-fictional Evidence," *Yearbook of English Studies* 6 (1976), 120-140.

Chapter Two
Waverley (1814)

In the last sentence of the "Introductory" chapter of *Waverley*, Scott speaks of the novel's "moral lessons," which, he says, "I willingly consider as the most important part of my plan."¹ When critics have not dismissed this sentence as an afterthought or a bow to convention, they have generally thought it quite clear what these "moral lessons" are. Scott's historicist understanding of history, critics argue, led him to an anti-heroic moral theory. David Daiches argues that the novel's main lessons are associated with "the impossibility of the older heroic way of life" and the alternative is to accept a "drab but necessary progress" instead.² In the same direction, David Devlin asserts that "the aim of the whole book" is "to recognize the worth of old-fashioned heroism and to look away from it to the 'quiet virtues' ... which alone are required in the present."³

However, the novel's epigraph provided a good reason for twentieth-century reading to be not merely historicist. The emphasis of this reading is generally guided by the supposed progress of Edward Waverley, the novel's young protagonist, brought up with history and fiction, from a "romantic" to a "realistic" view of life, a progress complicated by his engagement in the romantic Lost Cause of the '45 rebellion. Support for such a reading can no doubt be found in a number of passages that undeniably reflect the *Bildungsroman* tradition:

And it was in many a winter walk by the shores of Ulswater, that he acquired a more complete mastery of a spirit tamed by adversity, than his former experience had given him; and that he had felt himself entitled to say firmly, though perhaps with a sigh, that the romance of his life was ended, and that its real history had now commenced. He was soon called upon to justify his pretensions to reason and philosophy. (283)

Now, how changed, how saddened, yet how elevated was his character, within the course of a very few months! Danger and misfortune are rapid, though severe teachers. "A sadder and a wiser man," he felt, in internal confidence and mental dignity, a compensation for the gay dreams which in his case experience had so rapidly dissolved. (296)

However, to explore the "moral lessons" by applying the *Bildungsroman* approach or any other approach remains a controversial issue. In his treatment of *Redgauntlet*

and *Waverley*, Devlin points out that these two novels "are Scott's most successful attempts to define his feelings towards the old Scotland and the new..." and "Scott's attitude to this past and to the less glamorous present is what gives pressure to all his finest Scottish novels."⁴ On the other hand, Graham McMaster argues that the "moral lessons" to be derived from *Waverley* on the basis of *Bildungsroman* reading is not convincing and even do "not seem very real or very interesting, and certainly not absorbing enough," to provide the foundation for not just one but ten novels, as Devlin and others suggest. Yet, McMaster is ready to accept Devlin's view if it is framed by a social, political and economic conflict, in a sense such that, "within this political drama is the personal story of a young man who must choose between past and present."⁵

The above argument raises another question that has to do with the unity of the novel. This issue had been touched upon by Stewart Gordon in his article "*Waverley* And The 'Unified Design'." Gordon's argument endeavours to show that the lesson to be learnt from the novel is only associated with the protagonist's narrative, thus reducing "the whole movement of the novel" to "one of progressive enchantment and disenchantment" with the heroic way of life displayed by the Jacobite rebels, particularly the Highlanders.⁶ Yet, in the end, Gordon finds himself forced to admit that the most striking episodes which conclude the novel, the trial and execution of Fergus and Evan Dhu, do not fit "this reading of the work."⁷ This means that the *Bildungsroman* reading which attempts to see the narrative of Edward Waverley as the sole unifying design of the novel is bound to fail.

On the other hand, it seems that neglecting the protagonist's experience and approaching the novel on a purely historical basis makes the whole novel look like a book of history which narrates the stages that led to the defeat of the Jacobite rebellion. For it is only through the protagonist's background and its bearing on his narrative that the narrator is able to reveal and dramatize how history works on people in terms of social and historical forces. That is why a Marxist critic like David Brown who proposes to emphasize the historical side of Scott's "historical romance," reaches more or less the same conclusion:

Considering *Waverley* as a whole, a common movement can be seen in both the "private" and "public" histories which the novel narrates. On the private scale, Edward Waverley's youthful romanticism and idealism is progressively destroyed by the rationalism and common sense necessary for

survival in the "civilized" society to which he finds he ultimately belongs. On the public scale, the heroic culture of clanship and of the feudal aristocracy comes to appear, through the events of the rebellion, hopelessly unrealistic and inopportune when confronted by the new order in Lowland Scotland and England, to which it finally gives way. The movement in both plots is to some extent analogous, provoking the same, contradictory responses from the reader, and this is largely the reason for the formal unity and cohesion of the novel.⁸

The "to some extent" in the last sentence is an indication that attempts to identify the nature and extent of the analogy between the "private" and "public" plots remain unresolved.

It is worth observing, however, that nineteenth-century readers had no such problems. They even seem to have taken the novel's disunity for granted, and tended to denigrate Waverley's private experience. Take John Croker, for instance, writing for the *Quarterly Review* shortly after the novel's publication in 1814:

We shall conclude this article by observing what, indeed, our readers must have already discovered, Waverley, who gives his name to the story, is far from being its hero, and that in truth the interest and merit of the work is derived, not from any of the ordinary qualities of a novel, but from the truth of its facts, and the accuracy of its delineations.⁹

Croker's review seems to reduce the novel to a series of episodes "valuable as specimens of national manners."¹⁰ An anonymous reviewer in the *British Critic* wrote about *Waverley*: "We are unwilling to consider this publication in the light of a common novel...but as a vehicle of curious accurate information [that delineates] the history and manners of a very, very large and renowned portion of the inhabitants of these islands"; of Waverley himself, he says "we shall say but little, as his character is far too common to need comment."¹¹ For Francis Jeffrey, "the object" of the novel is "evidently to present a faithful and animated picture of the manners and state of society" that once prevailed in Scotland; however, the novel's early chapters, which are allocated to Waverley's private experience, are "the worst part of the book by far."¹² This particular complaint is echoed even by Lockhart, Scott's biographer.¹³ In short, and apart from whatever interest nineteenth century readers had in Edward Waverley's private experience, they emphasized the historical aspect of the novel. Consequently, they did not preoccupy themselves with seeking or demanding any connection or analogy between the two.

These views of nineteenth-century critics are consonant with what Scott himself says of his work. In his "General Preface" to the 1829 edition of his works, Scott admitted that in writing *Waverley*, he had sacrificed plot unity to historical and geographical detail:

And here I must frankly confess that the mode in which I conducted the story scarcely deserved the success which the romance afterward attained. The tale of *Waverley* was put together with so little care, that I cannot boast of having sketched any distinct plan of the work. The whole adventures of *Waverley*, in his movements up and down the country...are managed without much skill. It suited best, however, the road I wanted to travel, and permitted me to introduce some descriptions of scenery and manners to which the reality gave an interest which the powers of the author might otherwise have failed to attain for them. (354)

Elsewhere, Scott expresses a view of Edward *Waverley* compatible with that of most nineteenth-century critics:

The heroe [sic] is a sneaking piece of imbecility and if he had married Flora she would have set him up on the chimney-piece as Count Boralaski's wife used to do with him.¹⁴

Combining the two quotations I would argue that Scott was not all that interested in writing a *Bildungsroman*. In other words, a "unified design" connecting *Waverley*'s private experience and the novel's historical material was eventually beyond his scope. If this is the case, why, then, do modern critics who emphasize the historical implication of the novel find it impossible to abandon the *Bildungsroman* interpretation? The reason could be that, if *Waverley*'s private experience were left out altogether, the interpretation of the novel's "moral lessons" would collapse, lessons which could be supplied by Hobbes' *Leviathan*:

The vain-glory which insisteth in the feigning of abilities in our selves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories, or Fictions of Gallant persons; and is corrected often times by Age, and Employment.¹⁵

The equation which Brown establishes by drawing an analogy between "the heroic culture of clanship" and "youthful romanticism and idealism" has no logical foundation. For instance, that *Waverley* perceives the "heroic culture of clanship" in a

youthfully romantic and idealizing way does not make that culture itself in any sense "romantic" or "idealistic." The culture is there with or without Edward Waverley's imagination. To put it another way, there seems to be a wide gap between history as the narrator himself represents it and history as experienced by the protagonist.

Historically-minded critics tried to bridge this gap by dealing with it under the old formalist rubric of "appearance vs. reality." Episodes like Waverley's first foray into the Highlands provide the grist for this mill. Following Evan Dhu in search of the cattle-thief Donald Bean Lean, Waverley is temporarily left to himself on the benighted shores of a Highland loch, where he soon begins to romanticize his situation, imaginatively substituting Robin Hood for the shabbier Donald. Scott, however, punctures these fantasies with satire:

What a variety of incidents for the exercise of a romantic imagination, and all enhanced by the solemn feeling of uncertainty, at least, if not of danger. The only circumstance which assorted ill with the rest, was the cause of his journey—the Baron's milk-cows! This degrading incident he kept in the background. (78)

Consider how Brown deftly reads the satire:

[Waverley] fails to perceive that, far from being just a romantic "incident," the *creagh* is an integral part of the economic system that supports the Highland clans. It is highly significant that the first contact we see between the Baron of Bradwardine and Clan Ivor is antagonistic, for the only way Fergus can provide for the huge number of clansmen in his "tail," while keeping up the hospitality displayed at the feast Waverley attends, is if the clan survives at the expense of estates like Tully-Veolan, either by raiding them or blackmailing their owners. Milk-cows, in other words, instead of being "incidental," are the main means of subsistence, and the prime cause not only of Waverley's journey but of much of the Highland way of life.¹⁶

If the above episode served Brown to apply his "analogy" by juxtaposing Waverley's romantic perceptions with the concrete reality of the social and economic backwardness of the Highlanders, other episodes show that it is not always the case. In other words, there are episodes in the novel that would suggest that Scott's aim is to debunk the Highlanders, if he were to imply an "analogy" between Waverley's youthful romanticism and the supposedly outmoded virtues of Highland culture. Yet the implied message is the opposite. The episode of Waverley's disillusionment upon

getting a "near view" of the Jacobite army the day of the march to Edinburgh, is a case in point:

A near view, indeed rather diminished the effect impressed on the mind rather by the more distant appearance of the army. The leading men of each clan were well armed with broadsword, target, and fusee, to which all added the dirk, and most the steel pistol. But these consisted of gentlemen, that is, relations of the chief, however distant, and who had immediate title to his countenance and protection. *Finer and harder men could not have been selected out of any army in Christendom; while the free and independent habits which each possessed, and which each was yet so well taught to subordinate to the command of his chief, and the peculiar mode of discipline adopted in Highland warfare, rendered them equally formidable by their individual courage and high spirit, and from their rational conviction of the necessity of acting in unison, and of giving their national mode of attack the fullest opportunity of success.*

But, in a lower rank to these, there were found individuals of an inferior description, the common peasantry of the Highland country, who, although they did not allow themselves to be so called, and claimed often, with apparent truth, to be of more ancient descent than the masters whom they served, bore, nevertheless, the livery of extreme penury, being indifferently accoutred, and worse armed, half naked, stunted in growth, and miserable in aspect. (213-214, emphasis mine)

This passage is fit to be read according to the "appearance vs. reality" model. Yet in the midst of it, Scott, intentionally, presents some details about the Highlanders. These details could have been omitted, or at least, articulated with less emphasis, if the passage were solely intended to contrast the reality and the original appearance of things to Waverley. It is quite evident that the italicised information in the above quotation is dissociated from what Stewart Gordon refers to as Waverley's experience of "progressive enchantment and disenchantment." In truth, such details recall the "philosophical" attitude and appraisal of the Highlanders that we find in Adam Smith's account of the fall of Edinburgh in his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* or in Scott's own account of that event in *Tales of a Grandfather*. This amounts to the assumption that Scott may have two contrasts in mind. The explicit one has to do with the contrast between romantic "appearance" and bare "reality" and an implicit contrast between the Highlanders and opponents who lack their "rational conviction of the necessity of acting in unison." Waverley is not aware of this second contrast, if intended, because what concerns him from the episode is the sense of disparity between his first romantic and second realistic impressions.

This, and many other similar passages in the novel are significant for two reasons. First, they allude to an eighteenth-century military debate in which Scott's "philosophical" mentors had engaged.¹⁷ Further, the Highland charge was, in fact, much feared by the English army and gave rise to specialized bayonet drills to withstand its fury. Scott perhaps evokes this fear in the passage. Second, they suggest a disjunction, more radical than most critics have allowed, between the protagonist's experience of history and Scott's own vision of it. This disjunction brings to the foreground the question of whether or not history mediated in the novel need be interpreted as Waverley himself sees it, as a conflict between a romantic but obsolete way of life and a realistic Hobbesian prudence of the present. If not, the "moral lessons" that Scott speaks of in his "Introductory" chapter are not so clear as Daiches and many critics have assumed. Such assumption suggests that these lessons may never find their way into the consciousness of the hero. They may be intended for the reader.¹⁸ Hence it is not surprising, that early reviewers of the novel, as we have seen, paid less attention to Waverley's story and concentrated instead on episodes illustrating "national manners." Jeffrey's review could be regarded as the most striking in this respect. For him, Scott's distinction lies in his choice of subject for his narrative; since the 1745 rebellion afforded him "a fair opportunity for bringing out all the contrasted principles and habits which distinguished the different classes of persons who then divided the country, and formed among them the basis of almost all that was peculiar in the national character."¹⁹

Adding a twist to Jeffrey's suggestion, James Buzard, in a recent study, reads the novel as a "fictional auto-ethnography of Scotland and an important rehearsal for the intertwined ideals of *culture* formulated later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."²⁰ According to Buzard, Edward Waverley's excursion into the Highlands is the "ethnographer's double journey," that enables him and the reader, as well, to understand an "alien culture." In this light, the novel's generic status of Bildungsroman is not at issue. He goes on to suggest: "the culturing of Edward as a mature English landlord is inextricably bound up with ethnographic romance of definitively apprehending 'Scottish culture.' Waverley's (and *Waverley's*) progress is not from romantic fancy to sober fact, but rather from fragmented to unified vision, from ethnocentric first impression to ethnographic total view."²¹ Buzard finds in the cultural project embodied by the novel a sort of "fictional translation of Scotland's

Gaelic culture" within the context of "internal colonization" in the course of Anglo-British national consolidation.²²

Once again, however, if we are to ignore, temporarily, Waverley's personal experience of history, then where do the novel's "moral lessons" lie? The last sentence in the "Introductory" chapter guides us to the answer:

Some favourable opportunities of contrast have been afforded me, by the state of society in the northern part of the island at the period of my history, and many serve at once to vary and illustrate the moral lessons, which I would willingly consider as the most important part of my plan; although I am sensible how short these will fall of their aim, if I shall be found unable to mix them with amusement,—a task not quite so easy in this critical generation as it was "Sixty Years Since." (5)

Scott's statement above is a clear indication that the "moral lessons" he proposes to inculcate are not to be sought in the private romance of the protagonist but rather in the narrative's cultural "contrasts." It is what we might call lessons in comparative anthropology, for which Waverley's experience provides a framework. To put it more succinctly, Scott acts not only as a moralist and nationalist but also as a social scientist.²³

Waverley's presence in episodes that imply anthropological lessons is crucial. It is through him that the reader is able to explore these lessons. Scott's skill in the technique of argument among his characters serves this purpose. As Waverley lacks knowledge about the Scottish "manners," he therefore needs to ask questions, the answers to which help in revealing the nature of these "manners." Here, we discern that the dialogue structures most often employed in the novel take the form of what might be called the "catechism." When Waverley beholds any behaviour which seems odd to his culture, he never hesitates to ask for explanation. Usually, a knowledgeable Scot provides a short and pithy answer. The first lesson the reader learns through these "catechisms" takes place the morning after Waverley's night in the cave of the Highland bandit Donald Bean Lean, when Waverley expresses his regret for the "perilous and dismal life" of Donald's daughter Alice:

"Oich! For that, " said Evan, "there is nothing in Perthshire that she needs want, if she ask her father to fetch it, unless it be too hot or too heavy."

"But to be the daughter of a cattle-stealer—a common thief!"

"Common thief!—m no such thing; Donald Bean Lean never *lifted* less than a drove in his life."

"Do you call him an uncommon thief, then?"

"No—he that steals a cow from a poor widow or a stirk from a cotter is a thief; he that lifts a drove from a Sassenach Laird is a gentleman-drover. And, besides, to take a tree from the forest, a salmon from the river, a deer from the hill, or a cow from the Lowland strath, is what no Highlander need ever think shame upon."

"But what can this end in were he taken in such an appropriation?"

"To be sure he would *die for the law*, as many a pretty man has done before him."

"Die for the law!"

"Ay, that is, with the law, or by the law, be strapped up on the kind gallows of Crieff, where his father died, and his goodsire died, and where I hope he'll die himsell, if he's not shot or slashed in a creagh."

"You hope such a death for your friend, Evan?"

"And that I do e'en; would you have me wish him to die on a bundle of wet straw in yon den of his, like a mangy tyke?" (85-86)

It is conspicuous that besides the *Bildungsroman* reading of this passage a sort of sociological and anthropological inquiry is embedded in it. In this respect, a reader needs to bypass the idea that Scott is simply doing to debunk the Highlanders for Waverley's benefit. Focus should be on his attempt to juxtapose the "dismal life" of Donald Bean Lean's cave with the Highlanders' acceptance of robbery and glorification of daring and valour. By doing so, Scott is establishing a relationship among the material circumstances, cultural institutions, and moral values of the Highlanders. Scott wants to explain this courage which makes a Highlander take the risk of losing his life in the act of robbing his neighbour in terms of economic circumstances. In such circumstances the equation is reduced to: not to steal to secure a living is to live and die like a dog "on a bundle of wet straw." It follows that robbery must be institutionalized as a profession; consequently, it is legitimized. Evan's emphasis that Donald is no "common thief" but a "gentleman-drover," and that he "lifts" property rather than steals it means in a sense that he is doing an honest job.

However, I do not think that Scott employs the observed differences in moral ideas and practices in the above anecdote as an argument for the cultural relativity of morality, but rather, like similar passages in the works of the "philosophical" historians, to show that even seemingly exotic ideas like those of the Highlanders are derivations from normative moral ideas. Thus, Evan's argument for "lifting" is not an

arbitrary assertion of new moral definitions, but of a narrowing of the commonplace moral definitions he and Waverley hold in common: "he that steals a cow from a poor widow or a stirk from a cotter is a thief; he that lifts a drove from a Sassenach laird is a gentleman-drover." In the first case the act is unrespectable and shameful; whereas in the second, it is exceptional and that "no Highlander need ever think shame upon." When Evan argues that "lifting" is not theft, meanwhile accepts the proposition that the "lifter" should "die for the law," he emphasizes the notion of honour rather than denying the moral authority of the law. Evan admits that "lifting" is "an offence that carries the death penalty, and therefore has the same honourable character as war or duelling."²⁴ So, in his view, it is better for Donald to die risking his life, like his ancestors, than to die at home in bed. Moreover, a thief might do the job of stealing with less risk, but with more inhumanity. Stealing from poor people aggravates their misery, "lifting" does not seriously affect the lairds economically. Evan's argument brings Donald to a situation close to an honourable rebel that matches Robin Hood. Such implications of the passage are not apparent to Waverley, nor do they seem to have any direct bearing on his supposed progress from "romantic" delusion to "realistic" prudence. In the end, Waverley belongs to a different culture.

Scott reveals more aspects of the Highlanders' culture in the episode in which Callum Beg, Waverley's Highlander page offers to kill Ebenezer Cruikshanks, whom Waverley has hired to guide him back to Edinburgh, assuming that he is a Hanoverian spy. In this episode, Scott's concern seems to be in demonstrating not only the strength of clan ties in the Highland culture and their bearings on moral ideas, but also to show how the notion of loyalty works in this milieu. Waverley, as an English gentleman, has nothing in common with Callum both culturally and in blood yet the latter is prompt to kill in favour of the former. This commitment to sacrifice is only because Callum has been assigned to Waverley by Fergus and instructed to protect and obey him, so that Waverley now stands in the place of Callum's chief. Even this is temporary tie, cemented by a gratuity, of course, is sufficient to motivate Callum to assassinate a stranger on Waverley's behalf. The notion of loyalty in the Highlander lexicon is not a universal absolute, that is, a philanthropic characteristic but rather takes the form of concentric circles where the chief is at the centre. Hence, the more remote the object of loyalty is from the centre the weaker the strength of the bond of loyalty will be. This episode thus prepares us for Callum's later attempt to assassinate Waverley himself for his perceived effrontery to Fergus, and for the great scene at

Fergus's trial where Evan offers to fetch six Highlanders including himself to die only to save his chief's life. In this scene Scott is interested in showing the limitations of Waverley's England's 'equal law' applied to men from a culture with different conceptions of justice and morality. This is clear from Evan's reply when the English jury laughed at the offer: they "ken neither the heart of a Hielandman, nor the honour of a gentleman." (320)

A reader of the quoted passage above might conclude that it aims to represent such fierce loyalty as a culturally unique moral value yet I think that Scott's aim is to represent it as a modification of normative values. Callum puts it clearly that he is not going to kill Cruikshanks because the latter has done him any harm, but only because of respect for Waverley, his acting chief. What is important here is the odd way he reacts to this insult that could have ended in an unjustified violence. Waverley's response to the incident takes the form of a shock and horror at the *strangeness* of Callum's views; while Scott, echoing the "philosophical" tradition, invites the reader to see their ordinariness—that is, to see them as the products of a uniform human nature in eccentric social conditions. Thus, the incident, while retaining its anti-idealizing force, becomes at the same time part of the way in which conventions unfamiliar to modern European societies but authentic in their own contexts, feature in this book. Readers in many parts of Africa are likely to grasp Scott's point. In other words, individuals in similar historical epochs under the same circumstances behave in the same way. It is the same human nature in similar stages in the line of historical progress. William Robertson expresses this with particular clarity:

The characters of nations depend on the state of society in which they live and on the political institutions established among them; and...the human mind whenever it is placed in the same situation will in all ages the most distant and in countries the most remote assume the same form and be distinguished by the same manners.

If we suppose two tribes, though placed in the most remote regions of the globe to live in a climate of the same temperature, to be in the same state of society and to resemble each other in the degrees of their improvement, they must feel the same wants and exert the same endeavours to supply them...the disposition and manners of men are formed by their situation and arise from the state of society in which they live.²⁵

Thus, with the notion of the uniformity of human nature in mind, Scott and the reader are not astonished when Callum talks about dirking Cruikshanks, but Waverley

comparing it to an English boy planning to raid an orchard is. It is no coincidence, then, that in the novel's "Introductory " chapter Scott speaks of cultural "contrast" at the end of the same paragraph in which he develops the metaphor of the "great book of nature, the same through a thousand editions." For Scott, as for the "philosophical" historians, the more contrasting cultures one observes, the more likely one is to grasp the real, abiding human nature. In short, "the dynamics of human nature are thus supposed to be the constant of history."²⁶

Scott's interest in the anthropological and social analysis is not always mediated through the "catechism" device. There are instances where he articulates this interest directly while Waverley himself is reduced to a silent, passive observer. Chapter 20 provides a good deal in this respect. Take, for instance the episode of the Highland feast at Glennaquoich in which Scott draws a connection between the "organically constituted Highland order," and the awareness of the Highlanders' historical inheritance: "what its codes and traditions are--in a word, of what it culturally is."²⁷ The reader is made very conscious of this when Mac-Murrough, "the family bhairdh," gives his recital of Celtic verses:

He seemed to Edward, who attended to him with much interest, to recite many proper names, to lament the dead, to apostrophise the absent, to exhort, and entreat, and animate those who were present...the ardour of the poet appeared to communicate itself to the audience. Their wild and sunburnt countenances assumed a fiercer and more animated expression: all bent forward towards the reciter, many sprang up and waved their arms in ecstasy, and some laid their hands on their swords. When the song ceased, there was deep pause, while the aroused feelings of the poet and of the hearers gradually subsided into their usual channel. (98)

The passage is not meant to give merely romantic details, but to show the "corporate nature" of the clan which is the product of history. The role of the poet is to activate this history, to make it present such that the identity of each individual is the identity of the whole. This identity is nothing more than the common culture with all its dimensions.

In the same chapter, Scott goes farther in his social analysis. In the scene of the feast, he depicts a picture of Highland society in which he demonstrates that although it is a hierarchical community, yet the stratification of men into distinct orders and functions forms a composite whole. Scott develops the scene in cinematic detail:

At the head of the table was the chief himself, with Edward, and two or three Highland visitors of neighbouring clans; the elders of his own tribe...sat next in rank; beneath them, their sons, nephews, and foster-brethren; then the officers of the chief's household, according to their order, and lowest of all, the tenants who actually cultivated the ground. Even beyond this long perspective, Edward might see upon the green, to which a huge pair of folding doors opened, a multitude of Highlanders of a yet inferior description, who, nevertheless, were considered as guests, and had their share both of the countenance of the entertainer, and of the cheer of the day. (96)

Provision of meat and drink is made for each group of guests according to their rank:

Nor did this inequality of distribution appear to give the least offence. Every one present understood that his taste was to be formed according to the rank which he held at table; and, consequently, the tacksmen and their dependents always professed the wine was too cold for their stomachs, and called, apparently out of choice, for the liquor which was assigned to them from economy. (96)

Once again, Scott's aim is not to debunk the Highlanders and the details here have nothing to do with Edward's history of disillusionment with an "older heroic way of life." Apart from the sting of irony in the tacksmen's profession that wine is "too cold for their stomachs"; the overall intention of the passage is to highlight the homogeneity and close-knit texture in a patriarchal society, as Buzard puts it: "positing an absolute concord of personal desire and social order."²⁸ Scott here emphasizes the importance of two points in cementing the bonds in such a community: the economic factor and a sort of paternalism, which softens the authoritarianism of patriarchal societies. Fergus alludes to these points during the feast in an aside to Waverley:

"these stout idle kinsmen of mine," he said, "account my estate as held in trust for their support; and I must find them beef and ale, while the rogues will do nothing for themselves but practice the broadsword, or wander about the hills, shooting, fishing, hunting, drinking, and making love to the lasses of the strath. But what can I do, Captain Waverley? Every thing will keep after its kind, whether it be a hawk or a Highlander." (97)

According to Scott, then, clanship was, to some extent, a *model of civic virtue* where he asserts that "though despotic in principle, its duties were reciprocal."²⁹ This reciprocity is what he saw regrettably absent from modern life. A "moral lesson" thus

begins to emerge from Scott's anthropological inquiry. This lesson is best sought in the episode which occurs during the march of the Jacobites on Prestonpans when Waverley comes across an enemy wounded soldier and hurries to aid him. Before we know all the details about the event, we immediately tend to appreciate his humanity:

"for the love of God," said the wounded man, as he heard Waverley's step, "give me a single drop of water!"
"you shall have it," answered Waverley, at the same time raising him in his arms, bearing him to the door of the hut, and giving him some drink from his flask. (217)

but, then, this appreciation is shaken, when we realize that the wounded man is Houghton, a tenant at Waverley-Honour who recruited with the "young squire" and accompanied him to Scotland, only to be deserted there. Graham McMaster's treatment of this passage is striking:

Although the deed itself is a worthy one, we are made to feel in an instant that Waverley himself is not worthy of the action, that he is reprehensible and contemptible. "'I should know that voice,' said the man; but looking on Waverley's dress with a bewilderment look--'no, this is not the young squire!'" The implications of this, in their dramatic way, are obvious; it is the person of the young squire, but he is not playing the part as he should. He has, as both squire and captain, shamefully betrayed his charges to "that fiend of the pit, Ruffin." His justification sounds pathetically weak: "I assure you Houghton, you have been vilely imposed upon." It is strongly contrasted with the sergeant's rejoinder, with its uncomprehending, matter-of-fact despair: "I often thought so ... though they showed us your seal; and so Tims was shot, and I was reduced to the ranks." Waverley's failure to look after his men makes doubly ironical the opinion of clan MacIvor that "Waverley's conduct was that of a kind and considerate chieftain who merited the attachment of his people."³⁰

According to McMaster, the "moral lesson" to be derived from this episode is represented in the "dramatic confrontation"(or "contrast" to use Scott's word) between Waverley and the Highlanders. It gives a reader an insight into the limitations of "bourgeois individualism." McMaster, I would argue, is correct in his reading, as far as it goes, and in his observation that the episode is "close to the novel's center."³¹ Yet I believe he has failed to exhaust that episode's anthropological riches. Fergus is impatient with the delay and is only reconciled to it by the knowledge that Houghton is Waverley's "follower." Both Fergus and Callum

Would not have understood the general philanthropy which rendered it almost impossible for Waverley to have passed any person in such distress; but as apprehending that the sufferer was one of Waverley's following, they unanimously allowed that Waverley's conduct was that of a kind and considerate chieftain, who merited the attachment of his people. (217 - 218)

The last sentence in this passage is revealing. Scott's "contrast" goes farther than that between "bourgeois individualism" and clan communalism. It is a contrast between the extensive but weak social morality of modern England, which mediates itself as "general philanthropy," with the narrower but much stronger social morality of clanship. Chris Jones, in the introduction to his *Radical Sensibility* (1993), highlights this point in terms of the contention between radical and conservative discourses in the 1790s. According to Jones, both camps emphasize the merit of benevolence as a natural social feeling that characterizes man as a social animal. Yet they differ in their vision of the limit to which the passion of benevolence might be extended without the loss of the emotional charge which keeps the social bonds strong enough.

Radicals or Jacobins believed, as Jones points out, that men's rational and social capacity qualifies them to seek the "widest communal good" not merely through narrow allegiance to family and local connections, but also through extending their allegiance to wider spheres through universal benevolence or general philanthropy. Such an argument, as Jones maintains, affirmed "the authority of personal experience over precept and custom" on the one hand and the authority of reason over natural feelings on the other. The reaction came from the conservatives in the light of the outcome of French Revolution, which seemed to have belied the notion of universal benevolence in fulfilling its morality. Thus, Burke and the "philosophical" historians recognized benevolence as a natural feeling but rejected the radicals' attempt to rationalize natural feelings by extricating them from the sphere of the instinctive and innate and employing them in the abstract as a foundation for creating the ideal society in which private 'partiality' gives way to public good in the name of universal benevolence or general philanthropy. For the conservatives, then, moral behaviour can be sought only within providential design of human passions as they are and not by submitting these passions to reason and reflection. Jones summarizes the conservatives' view as follows:

To those like Smith and Burke who apparently believed that passions which lead men to action are divinely implanted instincts which ensure the good, and specially the stability, of the whole, little reflection on individual acts is required. Man's natural reverence for his superiors and partiality towards his family and immediate circle are justified by Providential scheme whereby this unthinking loyalty is made the means of sustaining the whole system of society. It is even blasphemous to imagine that humanity can improve on this universal administration and extend beneficence to those whose situation excludes them from private partiality.³²

If Scott's contrast above is viewed in the context of the debate in the 1790s, the contrast, then, cuts both ways; yet it does, as McMaster observes, articulate a sort of warning to modern society. The passage as a whole is a dramatization of one of the lessons from Ferguson's *Essay*:

In proportion as territory is extended, its parts lose their relative importance to the whole. Its inhabitants cease to perceive their connection with the state, and are seldom united in the execution of any national, or even of any factious, designs. Distance from the seats of administration, and indifference to the persons who contend for preferment, teach the majority to consider themselves as the subjects of a sovereignty, as the members of a political body.³³

The problem for Scott, as for Ferguson, is not so much the rise of "bourgeois individualism" as the decline of civic virtues as a result of a society outgrowing its clan and feudal origins. The technique of "contrast" which Scott had employed in his anthropological and social analysis reflects a realistic approach that elucidates the relation of individuals to history: man is the product of the conventions, customs, religion, economy and politics around him, all these forces that shape his culture. In Scott's contrast, the effect is neither to dismiss pre-modern societies as barbarous and irrational, nor to defend them on relativist grounds, but to indicate in their way of life, at that stage of progress, something lacking but necessary in ours—what the philosophical historians called *civic virtue*. Therein lies the "moral lesson" of *Waverley*. Hence the notion of loyalty and honour forms one of the major issues mediated in the novel. This notion is presented and tested in close relationship with the problem of choice. It is a hard choice in a historical moment, when two cultures clash in the light of new facts, new circumstances and new social and political norms. In this context, I would suggest that Scott's novels attempt to investigate the problems

of a proto-colonialist union of nations and the possible substitutions in an advanced nation for the unifying bonds of a pre-commercial state.

In 1814 Scott was concerned for the British nation. The threat of nationalism was felt from abroad and domestically. Napoleon's conquest of nations gave rise to the need for stronger feelings of patriotism. This was to be sought in the nation's history, invoking its customs and habits which provide a people with a sense of pride. Scott believed that in doing so he would limit uprisings which grew from discontentment with harsh economic conditions. The apparition of the French Revolution loomed on the horizon of every small outbreak of unrest, reminding the establishment of what the continent endured. Why then would Scott choose this time to remind the British of another period of unrest, the Jacobite insurrection of barely a generation before? It was clearly not, as many critics would have it, to remind readers of the greatness of the past. If this were all, why not choose a more distant past and one not quite so controversial? Instead, Scott took the opportunity to present for readers civic virtues that existed in the Jacobites, and that he wished to translate them into modern terms so that they could be accommodated in the modern world. Scott does not expect, or even want the loyalty exhibited by the Highlanders duplicated in the present. *Waverley* clearly emphasizes this. This loyalty dies with Evan Dhu, being dependant on particular historical and cultural conditions. But loyalty, Scott insists, in a varied form, must exist if society is to exist, as we will see in the course of this thesis. In fact, his employment of characters that bridge the worlds of past and present serve this purpose. Scott regards the element of loyalty crucial not only as an effective cause in insurrections, but also in creating extreme political and religious fanaticism, as it is obvious from *Rob Roy*, *Redgauntlet* and *Old Mortality*. By and large, whatever the theme embodied in Scott's novels is, the element of civic virtues remains central in the process of historical change. It determines the various relationships: the relationship between members of the family, the individual and his tribe, the individual and his country and the individual and his political and religious affiliations.

Hence, despite the disjunction between *Waverley's* experience of history and Scott's view of it, I do not think that we can simply consign *Waverley* to oblivion. Though the novel is not "unified" in the way critics have generally argued, neither does it break neatly into public history and private experience. Yet *Waverley's* private experience is called into question by the "moral lessons" of history as Scott the

"philosophical" historian sees them. In this sense, we have to attend to the Bildungsroman tradition which critics generally adopt in interpreting Waverley's experience. It is undeniable that Waverley is an object of Scott's criticism, yet I would argue that this criticism is primarily not on account of his being a developing character, but rather on account of being a *type*. When Waverley "by the shores of Ulswater," announced that "the romance of his life was ended and that its real history had now commenced," Scott tells us that he was deep in "reveries." This casts suspicion on Waverley's seriousness concerning his change, best reflected in Scott's comment at the end of the same paragraph: "he was soon called upon to justify his pretensions to reason and philosophy." (283) When he returns to Tully-Veolan in the aftermath of the uprising, he is described, with allusion to Coleridge's "Rime," as a "sadder and wiser man." (296) Yet, unlike the Wedding Guest returning to the feast after hearing the Mariner's tale, or Wordsworth returning to *Tintern Abbey* as an older man, Waverley, in the last instance, is returning to a changed environment—the ruins of Baron Bradwardine's mansion—rather to an unchanged environment to be viewed from a changed mental perspective. This leads us to ask whether and to what extent Waverley's mental perspective has changed. Is he really in any respect comparable to Wordsworth or the Wedding Guest?

In support of my claim that Scott intends us to view Waverley as a *type* and not as a character who has recovered from his "romantic delusions," let us consider Flora's MacIvor's often-quoted prophecy about Waverley's adult life:

He would never have been his celebrated ancestor Sir Nigel, but only Sir Nigel's eulogist and poet. I will tell you where he will be at home, my dear, and in his place,—in the quiet circle of domestic happiness, lettered indolence, and elegant enjoyments, of Waverley-Honour. And he will refit the old library in the most exquisite Gothic taste, and garnish its shelves with the rarest and most valuable volumes; and he will draw plans and landscapes, and write verses, and rear temples, and dig grottoes,—and he will stand in a clear summer night in the colonnade before the hall, and gaze on the deer as they stray in the moonlight, or lie shadowed by the boughs of the huge old fantastic oak;—and he will repeat verses to his beautiful wife, who will hang upon his arm;—and he will be a happy man. (250)

This passage is usually quoted with approval even by critics who follow the Bildungsroman interpretation of the novel and see a significant change in the protagonist's outlook and behaviour. Donald Davie, for instance, argues that Flora's

critique of the mature Waverley is but a representation of an emerging historical type, which is the product of dictated circumstances: the eighteenth-century "man of feeling," for whom "barbaric honour" has been supplanted as a moral criterion by "the intensity of one's emotional reactions."³⁴ David Brown supports this view, describing Flora's words as "shrewd prophecy," and that "Waverley's future position is not that of the feudal aristocrat—it is nearer to the way of life of Jane Austen's leisurely, upper-middle-class world."³⁵ Steward Gordon, approvingly, discerns in Flora's speech a sign of Edward's "true character," which begins to emerge in contrast with that of Fergus.³⁶

But if Flora's account is trustworthy, then the change in Waverley's life would not be conceived of as a radical change; that is, a change from youthful romanticism to a "prosaic" adulthood, but rather from one sort of romanticism to another dictated by the new changes in the social and political trends. As J. H. Raleigh points out, Waverley's new life would be a retreat to the "withdrawn romanticism" of his boyhood at Waverley-Honour.³⁷ In fact, it is a natural conclusion for Waverley to follow this path after experiencing the inexorability of real history. In other words, Waverley is no longer interested in exchanging the vicarious pleasures of the imagination for a real-world adventures. Waverley's new life, in which "barbaric honour" has given way to the virtues of peace and prosperity, might still be thought of as an enactment of the novel's supposedly Hobbesian "moral lesson"; yet that life appears trivial, and those lessons problematic. It is the human psyche that finds happiness more in engagement with than in withdrawal from the affairs of life, as Ferguson puts it: happiness "arises more from the pursuit, than from the attainment of any end whatever."³⁸ In this respect, one might argue that Flora is presenting what could be regarded as a "philosophical" critique of Waverley, as a representative modern type. In this sense she echoes what the "philosophical" historians had warned of—the disappearance of the traditional civic virtues. What supports this view is the striking similarity between Ferguson's depiction of the modern man and the emerging Man of Feeling delineated by Davie. Consider what Ferguson says:

The period is come, when, no engagement remaining on the part of the public, private interest, animal pleasure, become the sovereign objects of care. When men, being relieved from the pressure of great occasions, bestow their attention on trifles; and having carried what they are pleased to call *sensibility* and *delicacy*, on the subject of ease and molestation, as far as

real weakness or folly can go, have recourse to affection, in order to enhance the pretended demands, and accumulate the anxieties, of a sickly fancy, and enfeebled mind.

In this condition, mankind generally flatter their own imbecility under the names of *politeness* ...they congratulate themselves on having escaped the storm which required the exercise of ... arduous virtues; and with the vanity which accompanies the human race in their meanest condition, they boast of a scene of affection, of languor, or of folly, as the standard of human felicity, and as furnishing the properest exercise of a rational nature.³⁹

Through Flora Scott is able to mediate his "philosophical" ideas in two ways. First, Flora's loyalty to her cause is pure and constant to the point that some critics described her as idealist. Here she contrasts with Waverley who, influenced by his early education, never thinks in terms of public interest. This type of Flora's loyalty devoid of any self-interest is one of the civic virtues that Adam Ferguson, in particular, and the "philosophical" historians in general had emphasized as one of the victims of modern society. Second, in certain instances, Scott makes Flora speak for him in such a way that her language and sentiments make her sound "Augustan," thus, echoing eighteenth-century Scottish moralists. This is reflected in her hopes for Scotland that anticipate the "Age of Improvement" that will change Scotland forever:

"But let us hope that a brighter day is approaching, when a Scottish country-gentleman may be a scholar without the pedantry of our friend the Baron; a sportsman without the low habits of Mr. Falconer; and a judicious improver of his property, without becoming a boorish two-legged steer like Killancureit."

Thus did Flora prophesy a revolution, which time has indeed, but in a manner very different from what she had in her mind. (111)

Flora's sentiments are based on the civic virtues that represent the elevation of public concerns above "private interest and animal pleasure." She is described in the narration as being "prepared to do all, to suffer all, to sacrifice all. Her loyalty, as it exceeded her brother's in fanaticism, excelled it also in purity." (100) With these qualities, Flora cannot but be consistent with herself in contrast with the wavering self of the protagonist. This provides her with insight where Waverley is most blind. The two characters are in fact complementary, each provides a commentary on the other. Scott uses them to evoke a morally suggestive "contrast" parallel to those evoked by the novel's anthropological episodes. The passage in which Flora rejects Waverley's

marriage proposal conveys an explicit contrast between Flora's doctrine and Waverley's view of life:

"I dare hardly," she said, "tell you the situation of my feelings, they are different from those usually ascribed to young women at my period of life; and I dare hardly touch upon what I conjecture to be the nature of yours, lest I should give offense where I would willingly administer consolation. For myself, from my infancy till this day, I have had but one wish—the restoration of my royal benefactors to their rightful throne. It is impossible to express to you the devotion of my feelings to this single subject; and I will frankly confess, that it has so occupied my mind as to exclude every other thought respecting what is called my own settlement in life. Let me but live to see the day of that happy restoration, and a Highland cottage, a French convent, or an English palace, will be alike indifferent to me."

"But, dearest Flora, how is your enthusiastic zeal for the exiled family inconsistent with my happiness?"

"Because you seek, or ought to seek in the object of your attachment, a heart whose principal delight should be in augmenting your domestic felicity, and returning your affection, even to the height of romance. To a man of less keen sensibility, and less enthusiastic tenderness of disposition, Flora Mac-Ivor might give content, if not happiness; for were the irrevocable words spoken, never would she be deficient in the duties which she avowed." (135)

Waverley represents the Man of Feeling, for whom the quality of private life or domestic life is given the priority. As a modern man, his credo embodies a retirement from public affairs and real indifference to what lies beyond his domestic sphere. On the other hand, Flora represents the old classical type who perceives of man as essentially a political animal, and, therefore, she refuses to separate her private life from her public concerns. With such public-spirited loyalty, she represents, in some respects, a model of the civic virtues whose absence in Scotland she deplures.⁴⁰ For Hart, Flora's critique of Waverley should not be understood as reflecting the narrator's view. If so, "here is a rhetorical flaw" because Flora's "tragically limited vision could not possibly allow her to judge Waverley fairly." According to Hart, her idealism is "self-petrifying," and she is the "nun-bride of her political idealism; all her pleasures and passions are ideal, indistinguishable from duty."⁴¹ It is a fact that her views are extreme and narrow. She not only devotes her private life to public concerns, but she actually refrains to give private concerns any weight at all; in this respect, she elevates the public self above the private self in exactly the same way Waverley seems to elevate the private above the public. In this sense, we might situate her in the sphere

of the Platonic Republic which cannot be established except on the private unhappiness of all its citizens. Scott seems to suggest some thing of that sort, in a crude way, by sending her off to a nunnery at the end of the novel, as Alexander Welsh points out, which reflects a retreat from the world by an excessive idealism. Yet, even this idealism is not sterile and "petrifying" as Hart argues. The nobleness and disinterestedness that characterize her loyalty cannot be conceived of, in a world full of the turncoats, except through an idealist perspective. An evidence of her noble commitment to what she believes to be the right choice is her refusal to submit to her brother's Machiavellian tactics to push her to marry Waverley in order to advance the Jacobite cause. Yet, Scott, the rational, the pragmatic and moderate, cannot find her a place in society that had witnessed new historical changes and new facts, where extremists seem to be aliens even if they are noble. She needs to belong to a world that still recognizes her extreme devotion—a nunnery. Scott shows the reader the importance of loyalty as one of the sublime civic virtues that characterized older societies, but, in the meantime, he warns of excessiveness in a world where public concerns have retreated to the background. If Flora's public-spiritedness is excessive, Waverley's is deficient; if her Republic is founded on the unhappiness of its citizens, his, the republic of Men of Feeling, would not stand at all: the absence of civic virtue would destroy it. "The moral lesson" of this character contrast is thus identical to that of the anthropological contrast.

The contrast between Waverley and Bradwardine is, perhaps, the most suggestive. The Baron, as introduced by Scott is a combination of the "pedantry of a lawyer" and "the military pride of a soldier." Add to this, "his prejudice of ancient birth and Jacobite politics, greatly strengthened by habits of solitary and secluded authority"(41). The Baron is easily represented as the archetype of the long line of single-minded eccentrics that inhabit the Waverley novels. Moreover, as Daiches argues, his chief eccentricity lies in his strong adherence to feudalism which "outlived its purpose and no longer operates usefully in society."⁴² This, according to Daiches makes of the Baron an anachronism.

Francis Hart adds more to this line of argument. In his view, the Baron, like Fergus and Flora, is an "ideologue," but he is comic rather than a tragic one. He is, moreover, "attractive," and benevolent, two qualities that qualified him to survive after the collapse of his "ideology." As an "ideologue," instead of disappearing, we find that the emerging man, the uncommitted, "post-ideological" Waverley, who acts

as his protector after Culloden, rebuilds his ruined estate, and marries his daughter.⁴³ Following Karl Kroeber's argument, Hart reads *Waverley* as "an extended dramatization of the valuable diversities and complexities of mankind asserting themselves against laws too abstract, too rigid, too impersonal."⁴⁴ Despite the reservations which he expresses toward Daiches' anti-heroic reading of the novel, Hart seems to offer a subtler version of Daiches' thesis. For Daiches, modernity, which is "drab but necessary progress," triumphs over antiquity, which represents an "older heroic way of life"; while for Hart, modern flexibility, pragmatism, and "humanity" triumph over "ideology," or history.⁴⁵

However, I would argue that the "ideological"/"post-ideological" contrast is not what Scott intends to convey to the reader. Here, I would assume that the Baron fits a moral schema in which the contrast is between the magnanimous diehard, or "Old Trojan," as Scott sometimes called the type⁴⁶ and the self-promoting Machiavellian, for whom principles are a means to an end. In other words, Scott's interest is less in the conflict between pragmatism and "ideology" than in that between moral heroism, even in a bad or indifferent cause, and moral cowardice, even in a good one. In this sense, Baron Bradwardine does not contrast with *Waverley* but, as Hart suggests, stands as the antithesis of the "opportunists": *Waverley*'s "flexible" father, who recants his old loyalty to the Jacobite cause and turns Whig to get a place in the Hanoverian establishment, or the "pragmatic" Fergus Mac-Ivor, who finds Jacobitism a means to an earldom.⁴⁷ As far as ideology is concerned, Scott always expresses his sympathy and admiration for the sincere "ideologue." If Scott is willing to forgive mistakes in judgement and presents noble characters in all factions, he is not willing to forgive misconduct that reveals disloyalty. Individuals are judged in the view of the motive that underlies a given behaviour.

This schema resonates throughout Scott's life and works. He makes it clear that he did not wish his historical writings to show the probity of a particular faction, but rather the virtue of individual actions. Lockhart's anecdote about Murray of Broughton is suggestive in this respect. Murray, says Lockhart, who was "attending Prince Charles Stuart as his secretary throughout his expedition, condescended to redeem his own life and fortune by bearing evidence against the noblest of his late master's adherents." It happened that the disgraced Murray was a client of Scott's lawyer father, and eventually made occasional visits to the Scott home. Always travelling incognito, he aroused the curiosity of Scott's mother. Not satisfied by her

husband's vague replies to her questions, Mrs. Scott interrupted his meeting with the stranger one evening under the pretence of offering a refreshment of tea:

The stranger...accepted a cup; but her husband knit his brows, and refused very coldly to partake the refreshment. A moment afterwards, the visitor withdrew—and Mr. Scott, lifting up the window-sash, took the cup which he had left empty on the table, and tossed it out upon the pavement. The lady exclaimed for her china, but was put to silence by her husband's saying, "I can forgive your little curiosity, madam, but you must pay the penalty. I may admit into my house, on a piece of business, persons wholly unworthy to be treated as guests by my wife. Neither lip of me nor of mine comes after Mr. Murray of Broughton's."

The saucer belonging to Broughton's tea-cup chanced to be preserved; and Walter had made prize of it."⁴⁸

The significance of this anecdote is that in Scott's mind, as in his devoutly Whiggish father's, Broughton's treachery was much worse than his Jacobite "ideology." Among the other things, beside Broughton's Saucer, which Scott preserved "A claymore and Lochaber axe, given him by old Invernahyle, mounted guard on a little print of Prince Charlie."⁴⁹ Alexander Stewart of Invernahyle, is described in great detail in the 1829 Introduction to *Waverley* (386-388). Scott points out that Invernahyle's narrative of the '45' is embedded in the narratives of both *Waverley* and *Baron Bradwardine*. Invernahyle rescued an enemy officer, Colonel Whitefoord, at the battle of Prestonpans who was about to be struck down by a Highlander. Whitefoord later returned the favour by making Invernahyle's peace with the government after the defeat of the rebellion. The same episode is dramatized in *Waverley*. *Waverley* rescues Colonel Talbot and the latter returns the gratitude. At the same time, like Baron Bradwardine, Invernahyle survived the wave of persecution that followed the defeat at Culloden by hiding in a cave on his forfeited estate with the help of his loyal former tenants. The sympathetic "ideological" diehard deserves his good fortune in contrast to turncoat Broughton who deserves his disgrace.

From another perspective, Invernahyle serves another significant role in Scott's moral imagination, as well: he is the epitome of public-spiritedness. Years after the '45' when the American revolutionary John Paul Jones threatened Edinburgh with "three trifling sloops or brigs, scarce fit to have sacked a fishing village," Invernahyle "was the only man who seemed to propose a plan of resistance." Scott records the episode in his 1829 Introduction:

He offered to the magistrates, if broadswords and dirks could be obtained, to find as many Highlanders among the lower classes as would cut off any boat's crew who might be sent into a town full of narrow and winding passages, in which they were likely to disperse for plunder. I know not if his plan was attended to; I rather think it seemed too hazardous to the constituted authorities, who might not even at that time, desire to see arms in Highland hands. A steady and powerful west wind settled the matter, by sweeping Paul Jones and his vessels out of the Firth. (388)

This passage is reminiscent, both in its tone and sentiments, of Scott's account of the sack of Edinburgh by the Highlanders in *Tales of a Grand Father*. The following sentences in which Scott shifts forward in time to the threatened Napoleonic invasion of Britain, supports this connection:

If there is some thing degrading in this recollection, it is not unpleasant to compare it with those of the last war, when Edinburgh, besides regular forces and militia, furnished a volunteer brigade of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, to the amount of six thousand men and upwards, which was in readiness to meet and repel a force of a far more formidable description than was commanded by the adventurous American. Time and circumstances change the character of nations and the fate of cities; and it is some pride to a Scotchman to reflect, that the independent and manly character of a country willing to entrust its protection to the arms of its children, after having been obscured for half-a-century, has, during the course of his own lifetime, recovered its lustre. (388-389)

Critics who have taken note of the Invernahyle/ Broughton contrast have not usually seen all its implications. It is clear that Scott splits Invernahyle between Waverley and Baron Bradwardine, yet, Francis Hart, in particular, emphasizes the first connection and ignores the latter. Drawing a parallel between Invernahyle's rescue of Colonel Whiteford and that of Waverley's of Colonel Talbot, Hart explains the latter act in a way as to show that philanthropy prevails over "ideology":

[Waverley] follows his humane and courageous defense of Colonel Talbot against the Jacobites, and with this act begins his alienation from his new cause and the process leading to his survival. As a proof of a more humane fidelity, that transcends the historic accident of commitment to a cause⁵⁰

In fact, Hart's argument at one point asserts that Waverley's harsh experience elevates him from the narrow partisan commitment to a broader human one that qualifies him

to set an example for others who are still captives of their narrow prejudices. "Talbot is a bigot; Talbot learns humanity from Waverley [who] has achieved a fuller humanity as a result of the involvement. Waverley's experience is the broadest, his humanity the most attractive and fruitful, in the book."⁵¹

A question jumps to the foreground about Scott's implied aim of making Waverley in his fiction take the role of Invernahyle in history. But before we answer this question let see how Scott depicts Invernahyle in his 1829 Introduction to *Waverley*:

The author knew him well, and has often heard these circumstances from his own mouth. He was a noble specimen of the old Highlander, far descended, gallant, courteous, and brave, even to chivalry. He had been out, I believe, in 1715 and 1745, was an active partaker in all the stirring scenes which passed in the Highlands...was remarkable, among other exploits, for having fought a duel with the broadsword with the celebrated Rob Roy MacGregor. (388)

Why, then, does Scott derive Waverley's act which is not ideological but "human" from the act of a diehard Jacobite "ideologue" like Ivernahyle, that is, from an act suggestive more of old-fashioned chivalry than of a new-fashioned humanity? I think that Hart's term "humanity" which he uses to describe Waverley's act is vague. Thus, if we substitute more specific terms for "humanity" such as courage, charity or generosity, loyalty and disinterestedness, our understanding of Waverley's behaviour and its place in the novel changes radically. These virtues, true as they stand, may "transcend commitment to a cause," but they are best mediated not by the uncommitted, "post-ideological" Waverley, but by the committed, "ideological" Baron Bradwardine. In this view, Waverley is not a new type of human transcendence but merely an emulation of the old model epitomized by the Baron.

In this sense, the episode of a peasant woman, Janet Gellatley in the Baron's narrative is revealing. Janet was accused of witchcraft "on the infallible grounds that she was very old, very ugly, very poor, and had two sons, one of whom was a poet, and the other was a fool" (61). Rose Bradwardine tells us that the Baron was the only one to defend her, when, in a miserable condition, she was brought before a court of "Whiggish gentry and ministers" so as "to make open confessions of her sorceries":

My father went to see fair play between the witch and the clergy; for the witch had been born on his estate. And while the witch was confessing that the Enemy appeared, and made his address to her as a handsome black

man—which if you could have seen poor old blear-eyed Janet, reflected little honour on Apollyon's taste—and while the auditors listened with astonishment ears, and the clerk recorded with a trembling hand, she, all of a sudden, changed the low mumbling tone with which she spoke into a shrill yell, and exclaimed, 'look to yourselves! look to yourselves! I see the Evil One seated in the midst of ye.' The surprise was general, and terror and flight its immediate consequence. Happy were those who were next the door; and many were the disasters that befell hats, bands, cuffs, and wigs, before they could get out of the church, where they left the obstinate prelatist [the Baron] to settle matters with the witch and her admirer, at his own pleasure."

"Risus solvuntur," said the Baron: when they recovered their panic trepidation, they were too much ashamed to bring any wakening of the process against Janet Gellatley." (61)

One direct conclusion could be drawn from this episode: Scott as an Episcopalian is deriding and criticizing the fanaticism and superstition of the Scottish presbyterians. But once we finish reading the novel we tend to derive other implications. The episode reveals the significance of the civic virtues, especially, courage and loyalty in the old-fashioned society. First, the courage of the Baron is reflected in standing up to the clergy. Second, his loyalty to his tenants is rewarded later, when Janet and her son Davie, the fool, aided him by bringing him food and decoying the government troops when he was hiding after the defeat of the rebellion. The aid the Baron received from his tenants resembles the aid which Invernahyle received in return for his aiding an enemy officer. The Baron's virtues, Scott suggests, form strong bonds that bring people closer in the times of hardship.⁵²

On examining the acts of the Baron toward his tenants, Invernahyle toward Colonel Whiteford, and Waverley toward Colonel Talbot, we find that although the social consequences are the same, yet they differ in accordance with the difference of motives that brought on such acts. Waverley acts mainly on the impetus of his own spontaneous feelings of sympathy for victims, while the Baron, like Invernahyle, acts on principle. The difference is reflected even in the different styles of narration employed in the two episodes. Rose's version of the trial of Janet Gellatley is a sort of Augustan satire of religious fanaticism and superstition; the Baron himself, in fact, is a model satirist, interested in "fair play" because, while he is appalled by at least some of his society's defects, he also recognizes and upholds his own obligations (as a feudal land-lord) within that society. Waverley's adventures at Prestonpans, on the

other hand, are like a dream-sequence.⁵³ Scott describes Waverley's situation before the battle as if trapped in a dream:

Looking around him, he saw the wild dress and appearance of his Highland associates, heard their whispers in an uncouth and unknown language, looked upon his own dress, so unlike that which he had worn from his infancy, and wished to awake from what seemed at the moment a *dream, strange, horrible, and unnatural*. (221)

In the same scene a Highlander was preparing to kill Waverley's old superior, Captain Gardiner and "Edward felt as if he were about to see a parricide committed in his presence" (221). The next day, another incident occurs when Waverley amidst the "confusion and terror," of the Highlanders' charge sights an English officer in a critical condition. Waverley "struck with his tall, martial figure," was eager to save him from inevitable destruction." The officer, who turned out to be Colonel Talbot, in his turn, was "struck with Edward's generous anxiety for his safety" (225). Waverley acts generously and courageously, of course, but his generosity and courage seem to spring largely from subjective considerations—not, as in Baron Bradwardine's or Invernahyle's case, from an articulate view of life and its civic virtues.

Earlier in the novel, Scott comments on Waverley's courage as being limited, the courage of a Man of Feeling:

His passion for the wonderful, although it is the nature of such disposition to be excited by that degree of danger which merely gives dignity to the feelings of the individual exposed to it, had sunk under the extraordinary and apparently insurmountable evils by which he appeared environed at Cairnvreckan. In fact, this compound of intense curiosity and exalted imagination forms a peculiar species of courage, which somewhat resembles the light usually carried by a miner,—sufficiently competent, indeed, to afford him guidance and comfort during the ordinary perils of his labour, but certain to be extinguished should he encounter the more formidable hazard of earth-damps or pestiferous vapours. (181)

For Waverley, courage is not taken as a virtue to be exercised, but as a mere passing response to certain situations; whereas for the Baron it forms part and parcel of his "ideology," as a matter of principle. Consequently, if Waverley lacks the Baron's "ideology," he also lacks his principles.

It seems that this is not restricted to the virtue of courage, but it extends to the virtue of disinterestedness, which Scott's of "middle-of-the-road" heroes are usually said to exemplify, in order to bring on reconciliation between the conflicting parties, on the one hand, and to shun all sorts of fanaticism and extremism on the other. Thus, in certain instances, we find Baron Bradwardine, in spite of his ideological commitments, not less fair than Waverley to political opponents. In other words, disinterestedness could be one of the ingredients of an ideology, even we might say that Waverley himself was a beneficiary of this virtue early in the novel. On his first night at Tully-Veolan, when the drunken Jacobite Laird Balmawhapple offers a toast in which he implicitly means an offence to the established government of whom Waverley is an officer, the Baron took a tough stance on behalf of Waverley:

But, ere he [Waverley] could interfere, the Baron of Bradwardine had taken up the quarrel. "Sir," he said, "whatever my sentiments, *tanquam privatus*, may be in such matters, I shall not tamely endure your saying anything that may impinge upon the honourable feelings of a gentleman under my roof. Sir, if you have no respect for the laws of urbanity, do ye not respect the military oath, the *sacramentum militare*, by which every officer is bound to the standard under which he is enrolled? Look at Titus Livius, what he says of those Roman soldiers who were so unfortunate as *exuere sacramentum*,— to renounce their legionary oath; but you are ignorant, sir, alike of ancient history and modern courtesy. (49)

Although the Baron is a diehard Jacobite, he accepts Balmawhapple's challenge to a duel next day, and defeats him. For the Baron the whole act is a matter of principle. Waverley's role was to make peace between the two in such a way as to spare the feelings of both.

This comic episode is suggestive in many ways. If we compare Waverley's disinterestedness with that of the Baron we might put our finger on the difference. Waverley's role (as Scott wants it to be) or middle-of-the-road-hero, makes him almost always equidistant from the combatants because he has been involved or has personal attachments to both. Thus, when he returns to the Hanoverian camp he does not show any ill feelings to the Jacobite, in contrast with his friend, Colonel Talbot, whose bigotry makes him repeatedly berate Waverley's Scottish Jacobite friends. For instance, he

characterized the Baron as the most intolerable formal pedant he had ever had the misfortune to meet with, and the chief of Glennaquoich as a Frenchified Scotchman, possessing all the cunning and plausibility of the nation where he was educated, with the proud, vindictive, and turbulent humour of that of his birth. "If the devil," he said, "had sought out an agent expressly for the purpose of embroiling this miserable country, I do not think he could have found a better than such a fellow as this, whose temper seems equally active, supple, and mischievous, and who is followed, and implicitly obeyed, by a gang of such cut-throats as those whom you are pleased to admire so much. (246-247)

Even the Scottish ladies were not far from Talbot's mockery as Scott points out:

Now all this was mere spleen and prejudice in the excellent Colonel, with whom the white cockade on the breast, the white rose in the hair, and Mac at the beginning of a name, would have made a devil out of an angle; and indeed he himself jocularly allowed, that he could not have endured Venus herself, if she had been announced in a drawing-room by the name of Miss Mac-Jupiter. (247)

Apart from what Talbot's position embodies—political and cultural prejudice⁵⁴, what concerns us here is Waverley's response—in fact, nil—compared to that of the Baron's when Waverley was insulted. For Waverley, disinterestedness is a matter of experience, not of principle as it is for the Baron. There is therefore no rational argument to which he can appeal.

The episode could be seen from another perspective. When the Baron defends Waverley against Balmawhapple, he, in fact, invokes the patriarchal principle of unconditional hospitality to acknowledged guests: Waverley's opinion must be respected, says the Baron, while he is "under my roof." Put differently, while his disinterestedness does somehow transcend his ideology it is also rooted in it. For Waverley virtue is detached from ideology. It might be said that Waverley has extended the range of the virtue's application to a sort of universal benevolence or "general philanthropy," yet, in some respects, he reduced its efficacy, as a man of feeling he can feel disinterestedness, but he cannot practice it. This point here seems to be the same as that of the "dying sergeant" episode in chapter 45: the progress of civil society entails some potentially dangerous limitations on the human spirit. As Peter Garside points out: "a more modern 'general philanthropy' can seem hopelessly opaque, literary and ineffectually abstract."⁵⁵ Yet Garside observes a positive aspect of "sentiment" when he draws an analogy between the scene in which Waverley begs

Baron Bradwardine for the hand of his daughter Rose and a scene from Mackenzie's *The Man of Feeling*. It seems Scott employs this scene, according to Garside, to celebrate "the breaking down of feudal conventionality," and "the forging of a working Anglo-Scottish alliance." Here, "the man of feeling has suddenly acquired a new social significance."⁵⁶

Seen in this light, even Baron Bradwardine's notorious eccentricities are suggestive of something other than the obsolescence of the feudal doctrine. In this sense, Scott seems to play the Baron's card in two ways. Through the Baron's eccentric adherence to the feudal rituals he alerts the reader not to the anachronism in the Baron's behaviour, but to the significance of clinging to that behaviour. In one anecdote the Baron shows a strong will to disinherit his beloved daughter Rose in favour of a distant male relative, whom he knows to be his enemy, in order to uphold the charter's Salic stipulations. The Baron's argument recalls Burke's view concerning the notion of inheritance and its role in maintaining social and political stability. In another, he insists on removing Prince Charles' boots after the battle of Prestonpans because the charter suggests that, hundreds of years before, the barony was a reward to his family in return for this service. Apparently, these actions indicate a sort of antiquarian obsession, but in reality they mean an insistence to live the good life in the classical sense—that is to fulfill all of one's obligations as a citizen, and to allow public considerations to inform and shape the conduct of the individual's life. However, it should be owned that Scott alludes to his reservations regarding specific applications of the Baron's view of life, yet he emphasizes other positive aspects of this view. This is reflected in the protagonist's approval, in parts, of the Baron's practices. Thus, when Fergus criticizes the Baron mockingly for his being preoccupied with performing his duties of pulling the prince's boots, Waverley shows objection by commenting: "And how can you take pleasure in making a man of his worth so ridiculous?" (232).

In the end, Waverley returns to his normal life, that is, to his "real history," almost to be what Flora had predicted for him. Whether he learned any thing from his association with the Baron remains unclear as we know little of his life after the '45 and his experience does not mean that he had developed any ideology in his life. His private life necessarily would be consistent and derived from the nature of the life prevailing in a civilized society, that of English culture. In short, his life would consist largely of the private "emotional reactions" consistent to that of the Man of Feeling.

What he learns from the uprising is less a stock of "moral lessons" than a stock of aesthetic experiences for future reflection, best reflected:

In the painting, representing Fergus MacIvor and Waverley in their Highland dress, the scene a wild, rocky, and mountainous pass, down which the clan were descending in the background. (338)

The nightmare of the workings of the historical forces in a critical moment, instead of being a complication in Waverley's subconscious mind, is projected on the wall to be seen as something static and eventually peaceful. By doing so Scott makes his hero pursue his domestic life as a blank page. For Francis Hart, this operation may be subsumed under the rubric of a justifiable "escape from history."⁵⁷ Not only for Waverley, but for any one who had experienced the bitterness of a civil war such an escape is understandable; and, therefore, there is no need to argue, as some critics have, that Waverley's stance at the end of the novel is the object of open satire.⁵⁸ Yet the novel's denouement at least suggests that the post-civic Man of Feeling is, for Scott, something less than the ideal human type. By and large, the whole rhetorical structure of *Waverley*, with its large network of "contrasts," mediates the limitation of the protagonist's view of life no less than that of the Jacobite "ideologues" and the virtues of that ideology, mainly loyalty, remain predominant even after its defeat.

At any rate, the conventional "Hobbesian" or anti-heroic reading of *Waverley*, as I have suggested at the outset of this chapter, is closely linked to the historicist reading. The '45 in this view, appealed to Scott not as a source of moral exemplars but as an illustration of the historical process, through which, as David Daiches puts it, a "social code" viable in one era "outlive[s] its purpose" in the next, and "no longer operates usefully in society."⁵⁹ Thus the idealistic Flora and the high-minded Baron Bradwardine often appear to be anachronisms even among their fellow Jacobites:

Waverley had, indeed, as he looked closer into the state of the Chevalier's court, less reason to be satisfied with it. It contained, as they say an acorn includes all the ramifications of the future oak, as many seeds of tracasserie and intrigue as might have done honor to the court of a large Empire. Every person of importance had some separate object, which he pursued with a fury that Waverley considered as altogether disproportioned to its importance. Almost all had their causes for discontent, although the most legitimate was that of the worthy old Baron, who was only distressed on account of the common cause. (250)

Later in the chapter which this passage introduces, Fergus, outraged by Prince Charles' refusal to recognize his patent for an earldom or permit him to marry Rose Bradwardine, seems to renounce the most crucial articles of the Jacobite faith:

"Would you believe it, I made this very morning two suits to the Prince, and he has rejected them both: what do you think of it?"

"What can I think," answered Waverley, "till I know what your requests were?"

"Why, what signifies what they were, man? I tell you it was I that made them,—I, to whom he owes more than to any three who have joined the standard; for I have negotiated the whole business, and brought in all the Perthshire men when not one would have stirred. I am not likely, I think, to ask any thing very unreasonable, and if I did they might have stretched a point."

"After this, put your faith in princes!" (252-253).

The doctrine of royal absolutism and passive obedience of the subject no longer make sense, even to their fiercest proponents. "By manipulating the Prince," as Brown puts it, "his followers show they no longer really believe in the ideology of their own cause, and that the values of the bourgeois Lowlands and England have in fact become their values."⁶⁰ Or as Lukacs argues, Scott is demonstrating the historical necessity of the "downfall of gentile [that is, 'patriarchal' or 'heroic'] society."⁶¹

But as Scott's own words suggest, the "internal contradictions" of the Jacobite court are not peculiar to late patriarchal society: "the tracasserie and intrigue" of that court, made up mostly of petty aristocrats and clan chiefs, are only a sort of demotic version of the plots that plague the more sophisticated court of "a large empire," like that, perhaps, of modern Britain. The latter is certainly no less troubled by the "bourgeois" values of its self-seeking adherents. In fact, in his rage at the thwarting of his aristocratic ambitions, Fergus simply echoes the rationale of Waverley's father, who latches on to an attempted coup within the Hanoverian court in hopes of advancing his lagging bureaucratic career: "I'll tell you what I could have done at that moment--sold myself to the devil or the elector, whichever offered the dearest revenge." (254) As Buzard puts it: "Fergus exemplifies a modern selfhood corrosive of feudalism."⁶² Scott's interest seems to be less in the unique manifestations of the historical process than in uniformity of human passions such as selfish ambition, which produce similar effects in different stages of society or within different ideological frameworks; he presents a critique less of Jacobitism *per se* than of selfish

ambition as it affects Jacobites. Insofar as Scott deals with Jacobitism *per se*, his approach is not at all historicist. In a sense, his purpose is not to depict Jacobitism as a once coherent ideology in the act of becoming incoherent, but, as we have seen, to discriminate among the moral tendencies inherent in it, to separate the virtues from the vices and make the virtues available to modern society. This is nowhere more apparent than in the treason trial of Fergus Mac-Ivor in Chapter 21—one of the greatest scenes that Scott's nineteenth-century admirers no doubt had in mind when they compared him with Shakespeare.

The scene in which Evan Dhu, foster brother of Fergus, is sentenced is highly expressive. The judge, considering that Evan is "ignorant" and, therefore, the act of his loyalty is a mere blind tradition, engages in what amounts to sociological or anthropological analysis:

"For you, poor ignorant man," continued the Judge, "who, following the ideas in which you have been educated, have this day given us a striking example of how loyalty due to the king and state alone, is, from your unhappy ideas of clanship, transferred to some ambitious individual, who ends by making you the tool of his crimes--for you, I say, I feel so much compassion, that if you can make up your mind to petition for grace, I will endeavour to procure it for you—otherwise—"

"Grace me no grace," said Evan; "since you are to shed Vich Ian Vohr's blood, the only favour I would accept from you is—to bid them loose my hands and gie me my claymore, and bide you just a minute sitting where you are." (320-321)

Evan's loyalty to his chief is represented not as the expression of the unique moral system of an incommensurable culture but as a perverse variation on a moral norm, a product of human nature under eccentric social conditions.

Yet this sociological critique is closely tied to a powerful "moral lessons." If patriarchal society produces notions of loyalty that are excessively narrow, those loyalties are remarkably deep—so deep, in fact, that members of a modern commercial society find them troubling and embarrassing. Thus Evan's extraordinary offer to the judge when sentence has been passed on Fergus:

... that if your excellent honour, and the honourable court, would let Vich Ian Vohr go free just this once, and let him gae back to France, and no to trouble King George's government again, that ony six o' the very best of his clan will be willing to be justified in his stead; and if you'll just let me gae

down to Glennaquoich, I'll fetch them up ye mesell, to head or hang, and you may begin wi' me the very first man. (320)

The upshot amounts to what is probably Scott's most telling parable of civic virtue:

Notwithstanding the solemnity of the occasion, a sort of laugh was heard in the court at the extraordinary nature of the proposal. The Judge checked this indecency, and Evan, looking sternly around, when the murmur abated, "If the Saxon gentlemen are laughing," he said, "because a poor man, such as me, thinks my life, or the life of six of my degree, is worth that of Vich Ian Vohr, it's like enough they may be very right; but if they laugh because they think I would not keep my word, and come back to redeem him, I can tell them they ken neither the heart of Hieland man, nor the honour of a gentleman."

There was no further inclination to laugh among the audience, and a dead silence ensued. (320)

Jacobitism, for Scott, is in one sense simply the defunct philosophy of royal absolutism, the ideology of a "rude," patriarchal society; but it is also the simple courage and loyalty of Highland clansmen like Evan Dhu and the more sophisticated philosophy of civic virtue articulated by Flora Mac-Ivor and Baron Bradwardine. In the latter sense, Jacobitism will always remain "viable." How the essence of such virtues would be translated in the present is left for the following novels to answer.

Notes: Chapter Two

1. Sir Walter Scott, *Waverley; Or, 'Tis Sixty Years Since*, ed. Claire Lamont (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 5. All further quotations will be from this edition and will be noted in my text.
2. The first quotation is from "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist," 24; the second from "Sir Walter Scott and History," 471.
3. Devlin, 73.
4. Devlin, 114 - 16.
5. McMaster, 18.
6. Stewart Gordon, "Waverley and the 'Unified Design'," *English Literary History* 18 (1951), 119.
7. Stewart Gordon, 120.
8. Brown, 25.
9. John Wilson Croker, *Quarterly Review* 11 (1814), 377.
10. Croker, 361.
11. *British Critic* (August 1814), *Scott: The Critical Heritage*, 69.
12. Francis Jeffrey, *Edinburgh Review* 24 (1814), *Scott: The Critical Heritage*, 80 and 84.
13. According to Lockhart: "when the first volume of [*Waverley*] was completed, I still could not get my self to think much of the Waverley-Honour scenes: and in this I afterwards found that I sympathized with many." See *The Life*, 4:347.
14. *The Letters*, Grierson, 4: 478. Count Boralaski was a Polish dwarf who toured England in the late eighteenth century.
15. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), ed. Crawford Brough MacPherson (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1985), 125.
16. Brown, 12.
17. See Ferguson, *Essay*, xii.
18. Similar arguments have been conducted by J. H. Raleigh, "Waverley as History; or 'Tis one Hundred and Fifty-Six Years Since," *The Novel* 4 (1970), 24. See McMaster, 15-16. I am particularly indebted to McMaster's views in this and the following section.
19. *The Critical Heritage*, 80.
20. James Buzard "Translation and Tourism: Scott's *Waverley* and Rendering of Culture," *Yale Journal of Criticism* (1995), 8, II, 31.
21. Buzard, 40. Also see Richard Humphrey, *Walter Scott: Waverley* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Humphrey observes that Edward Waverley is an "intermediary" between Lowland and Highland, "change and stasis," and hence, through the protagonist, a sort of cultural study is presented as a translation of Ferguson's *Essay* and its treatment of the "barbarous state" of progress. (57)
22. See Saree Makdisi, "Colonial Space and the Colonization of Time in Scott's *Waverley*," *Studies in Romanticism*, 34 (1995), 155-187.
23. Stewart Gordon argues that there is a contradiction between Scott's two declared objects: to inculcate "moral lessons," as suggested in the "Introductory" chapter, and to give the rising generation "some idea of the manners of their forefathers," as suggested in the "Postscript, Which Should Have Been a Preface." 110.

24. Cockshut, 112.
25. William Robertson, *Works* (Edinburgh, 1822), IV: 234; VI: 300; VIII: 90. Quoted in McMaster, 56. See also E.E.Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Administration of a Nilotic People* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 151. Pritchard offers a description of an African tribe that applies very much to the Highlanders.
26. Alexander Welsh, *The Hero of the Waverley Novels* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 87.
27. Robin Mayhead, *Walter Scott* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 36-37.
28. Buzard, 47.
29. *Miscellaneous Works of Sir Walter Scott*, 20: 91.
30. McMaster, 13-14.
31. McMaster, 13.
32. Chris Jones, *Radical Sensibility: Literature and Ideas in the 1790s* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 1-12.
33. Ferguson, *Essay*, 256.
34. Davie, 36-37.
35. Brown, 22.
36. Stewart Gordon, 116.
37. Raleigh, 21.
38. Ferguson, *Essay*, 51.
39. Ferguson, *Essay*, 242-243.
40. For the debate in the Eighteenth Century about virtues connected with public spiritedness and those connected with self-interest imposed by the nature of progress in the light of new economical facts based on commerce and industry in the form of "the discourse of civic humanism," see John Barrell, *The Political Theory of Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt: The Body of The Public* (Yale University Press, 1986), 1-13 and 45-63.
41. Hart, 20.
42. Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," 470.
43. Hart, 26-31.
44. Hart, 30.
45. Hart, 30.
46. For more details of this type and Scott's attitude towards it, see Mary Lascelles, *The Story-Teller Retrieves the Past* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 6-11.
47. Hart, 26.
48. Lockhart, *The Life*, 1: 201-202.
49. Lockhart, *The Life*, 1: 199.
50. Hart, 29.
51. Hart, 29-30.
52. It is worth noting that Scott is not presenting an argument to legitimize feudalism. A few chapters before Rose's account of Janet's trial, Scott presents a sound analysis of the drawbacks of the feudal system in Scotland in his description of the squalor, poverty, and idleness of Tully-Veolan, the Hamlet attached to Baron Bradwardine's estate. The effect of feudalism here, Scott suggests is largely "to depress the natural genius" of the inhabitants. (33) As David Brown points out, Scott clarifies the connection, invisible to Waverley himself, between the depressing hamlet and the nearby baronial hall, which for Waverley is an autonomous world of romance. If the

feudal order is productive of some virtues worth preserving, it is also productive of injustice and economic waste. 9-11.

53. A number of critics, including Stewart Gordon, 116-17; Welsh, 151; and Hart, 27-8 point to this.
54. For a detailed treatment of this point see Humphrey, 62-66.
55. Peter Garside, "Scott and the New Man of Sentiment," *Anglia*, 103 (1985), 80.
56. Garside, 81.
57. Hart, 25.
58. See, for instance, Devlin, 53; and Brown, 23.
59. Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," 470.
60. Brown, 17.
61. Lukacs, 56-57.
62. Buzard, 47.

Chapter Three
Old Mortality (1816)

Like *Waverley*, *Old Mortality* dramatizes a historical crisis. Scott's treatment of the late seventeenth-century conflict between Scottish Royalists or Cavaliers and presbyterian Covenanters is liable to psycho-biographical interpretation. The novel, in this light, is a reflection of the author's mixed feelings about the past—of Enlightenment rationalism on the one hand and Romantic nostalgia on the other. Scott wrote jokingly of the dogmatic "cavalierism" of his youth.¹ Even as an adult, he wrote the imitation Royalist ballad "Bonnie Dundee," celebrating the exploits of John Grahame of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee, the arch-enemy of the Covenanters, and a portrait of Claverhouse adorned the library of Scott's Edinburgh home.² Equally, the young Scott was steeped in the tracts and martyrologies of the persecuted Covenanters, and even the adult Scott once proposed to install an aged Cameronian minister as chaplain at Abbotsford.³ In a letter to his friend Lady Louisa Stuart, Scott boasted that he had made himself "complete master of the whole history of these strange times both of persecutors & persecuted."⁴ Several critics have even pointed out that a perverse nostalgia for the period could be discerned surfacing occasionally in the novel, most remarkably in the denouement, where Scott's imagination is said to balk at the peaceful resolution of the Royalist-Covenanter conflict by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the constitutional settlement of 1689.⁵

On the other hand, this nostalgia is generally assumed to have been held in check by Scott's rationalist sense that, however emotionally attractive, the heroic way of life described in the novel is outmoded. In fact, of all Scott's novels, *Old Mortality* seems to be most open to what I have called a "Hobbesian" reading, which does not favour religious toleration but does believe that the choice of religious doctrines should belong to the Sovereign (king or legislature) alone, rather than to the individual citizen. Indeed, it deals with events that are little more than a late edition of the seventeenth-century wars to which Hobbes was responding. It pits the party of self-congratulatory aristocratic honour against that of religious fanaticism, and thus seems to discredit the heroic virtues of courage, devotion, and self sacrifice manifested by both parties involved in the conflict, the Royalists and the Covenanters.

Critics have interpreted the novel in these or similar terms. For David Daiches, the novel dramatizes "a moment when the heroic attitudes of self-sacrificing religious

enthusiasts cannot be successfully mediated into the modern world."⁶ Later critics have read the novel thematically as a portrayal of "opposing fanaticism" embodied by Burley and Claverhouse who are equally adverse to modern pluralism⁷, or as "opposite types of heroism; each is in contradiction to the levelling grayness of historical necessity."⁸ George Goodin offers a sound and systematic attempt to read *Old Mortality* along these lines. For him, many of the plot-motifs Scott uses, that is, the middle-of-the-road hero victimized by both parties involved in dispute, the cross-political romance thwarted by politics, and so on—are designed to denigrate political commitment and "favor the 'passive conservatism' that Trotsky found characteristic of all art."⁹ Despite the variety of their political stances and attitudes toward Scott, modern critics have almost all read the novel as being essentially concerned with the limitation of public-spiritedness.

Reading the novel from this perspective could have been derived from Scott's own comments. In his letter to John Richardson, an English friend, in which he explains the period of the novel. Scott writes:

As to the Covenanters and Malignants [that is, Royalists] they were both a set of cruel and bloody bigots and had notwithstanding those virtues with which bigotry is something allied. ...Neither had the least idea either of toleration or humanity so that it happens that so far as they can be distinguished from each other one is tempted to hate most the party which chances to be uppermost for the time.¹⁰

This passage does in fact suggest an attitude of cautious and studied neutrality between "opposing fanaticisms," and a preference for peaceable and pluralistic virtues like "toleration" and "humanity," as opposed to "those virtues with which bigotry is sometimes allied." This, of course, is attained as MacQueen remarks through "reconciliation symbolized by the wedding of old opponents," and hence, "the Killing Time is seen as a kind of baptism of fire for the emergence of the new society."¹¹ Scott's letter, however, was written almost a decade after the publication of *Old Mortality*, and its rhetoric is arguably an indirect response to negative criticism that the novel received. In fact, the passage in question seems to be a direct reaction to Richardson's unfavourable comparison of *Old Mortality* with the recently published second series of Scott's *Tales of a Grandfather*. With the *Tales*, Richardson tells Scott, "you have paid a debt which you owed to the manes of the Covenanters for the flattering picture you drew of Claverhouse in *Old Mortality*."¹²

By and large, *Old Mortality* remains a novel about Scott's view of history and the historical process, and the benefits the knowledge of history can contribute to society. In this respect, Scott's history is one of flesh and blood, not merely peopled with distant figures and battles. This conception of the notion of history, Lukacs argues, enabled Scott to explode myths such as the peaceful transition of the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 by showing the struggles endured by individuals. Scott's realism and objectivity, according to Lukacs, made him "keenly observant of the real facts of social development," and showed in his works "that this peaceful development was peaceful only as the ideal of an historical conception, only from the bird's-eye view of a philosophy of history."¹³ So instead of a "bird's-eye view," Scott endows the reader of *Old Mortality* with a series of filtering narrators, firmly on the ground, and therefore obviously open to the bias that their perspectives allow. First, as David Brown states, "by fictitiously citing *Old Mortality* as the inspiration for the novel, Scott establishes for the reader the essential, human link with the past."¹⁴ However, *Old Mortality's* dedication to the past is a form of what Ina Ferris refers to as "faithful and loyal memory,"¹⁵ the type of historicism practiced by Scott's contemporary novelists who wrote of the "Killing Time," including James Hogg and John Galt, rather than historical knowledge or experience. Nor does *Old Mortality* conform to the established historic version by Robert Wodrow who depicted heroic Covenanters battling against Anglicized, even "Popish Stuarts."¹⁶ With the "human link," Scott offers an invitation for his readers to profit from his historical fiction, in a manner in which he himself reads history. As a result of this strategy, his treatment of the late seventeenth-century conflict between Scottish Royalists or Cavaliers and Presbyterian Covenanters¹⁷ in *Old Mortality* demanded a sort of revision of the documented history. This daring attempt was at odds with comfortable reliance on traditional memories, which made Scott at best liable to the charge of distorting the historical facts and at worst as biased to the Royalists.

Although *Old Mortality* has supplanted *Waverley* in the estimation of many twentieth-century critics, its original reception was hostile, particularly in Scotland. As Francis Jeffrey points out in the *Edinburgh Review*, Scott's treatment of the Covenanters gave rise to an unprecedented public controversy:

It is a singular honour, no doubt, to a work of fiction and amusement, to be thus made the theme of serious attack and defense upon points of historical

and theological discussion, and to have grave dissertations written by learned contemporaries upon the accuracy of its representations of public events and characters.¹⁸

Detecting both Tory prejudices and a touch of religious latitudinarianism in the novel's treatment of the Covenanters, Jeffrey argues that Scott "scarcely disguises his preferences for a Cavalier over a puritan."¹⁹ While Jeffrey acquits Scott of the charge of distorting history, other critics were less generous.²⁰ An anonymous critic in the *British Review* argued, for instance, that Scott's portrait of the Covenanters is a mere caricature and "displays too little sensibility of the crimes and cruelties of the Royalists."²¹

But the most substantial attack on *Old Mortality* came from Dr. Thomas M'crie, a presbyterian clergyman. His critique of the novel in which he exposes Scott's "glaring partiality" toward Royalists and "injustice" to "Covenanters," in many ways, anticipates that of Alexander Welsh, especially in its attack on Henry Morton, Scott's middle-of-the-road presbyterian hero:

It is no apology...that the author, in a general statement, opposed the tyranny of the government, and military violence, to the turbulence and fanaticism of the Covenanters; for he has dwelt upon the latter, and only glanced at the former in a transient manner. ... had he only introduced the leading facts in a conversation between Henry Morton and a rational presbyterian, (if such a personage could have entered into the author's conception), he might have given a higher tone to his work, and invested the nominal hero with the real character of a patriot, instead of making him a mere everyday person of romance—a puppet, alternately agitated by love, and jealousy, and personal resentment, and a vague and feeble wish for fame.²²

Scott, according to M'crie, was incapable of making Morton a real, "committed" Covenanter—not because he wanted to preserve an anti-political neutrality, as Goodin suggests, but because he somehow sided with the Royalists. In short, many of Scott's contemporaries viewed *Old Mortality*, the novel modern critics have generally thought the clearest manifestation of his progressive or modernist trend, as the clearest manifestation of his Tory bias.

In fact, from the perspective of the twentieth century, the controversy surrounding *Old Mortality* resembles the sort of controversy that erupts when historical revisionism calls into question some group's cherished and longstanding notions of its

past—in this case, the Scottish presbyterian version of Scottish history. Actually, M'Crie's criticism suggests that he is reacting not simply to "bias" but to the discomforts of revisionism, which he regards as offensive to the Scottish national pride. Accordingly, he describes Scott not only as a Tory but also as "a Scotsman retailing English blunders, and dressing the most crude materials, with laborious trifling, to feed English prejudice at the expense of his country's honor."²³ Scott's friend James Hogg (the Ettrick Shepherd) had an even more striking response: the "picture of the times" presented in *Old Mortality* was untrue, he told Scott, because it conflicted with "the picture I have bred up in the belief o' sin ever I was born, and I had it frae them whom I was most bound to honour and believe [that is, his parents and clergyman]."²⁴ As the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper points out in his defense of the novel, Scott, in writing about the Covenanters, was forced to confront a dubious "official tradition":

In Scotland, ever since the Reformation, the Kirk had set itself up as the guardian of historical as well as of divine truth, and history had been written largely by the presbyterian clergy, who wrote...in the black-and-white terms of the old Testament books of Kings and Chronicles. The 17th century, in particular, was presented by them as a long epic in which the forces of light, represented by the theocratic Kirk and its 'Covenants', had waged a heroic struggle against the forces of darkness, represented mainly by [the] Anglicized, even popish Stuart kings.²⁵

In this context, few later historians dared to challenge this tradition. Except for the agnostic David Hume, who covers the 1679 uprising briefly in his *History of England*, the Scottish Enlightenment historians generally shied away from seventeenth-century history. William Robertson, for example, tactfully concluded his *History of Scotland* with the Union of Crowns in 1603. Most of the "philosophical" historians were at least nominal presbyterians, and many were actually clergymen themselves (Robertson) or sons of clergymen (Ferguson). The extreme creed of their forebears had fallen by the wayside, and the Covenanting period had probably become more an embarrassment than a source of pride. Yet the continued authority of the Kirk, even in the academic world, seems to have deterred them from attempting too close an examination of the Covenanters. Thus it was that Scott, a self-employed novelist and Episcopal convert, became the first revisionist of seventeenth-century Scottish history. By doing so, he abandoned the traditional memories. After all, to rely on

such traditions would be to accept the animosities and possibly to prolong the bloodshed of the Restoration in Scotland. Scott has his fictional narrator, Pattieson, close his introduction with a plea not to inflame the discord of the past that caused so much destruction.²⁶

As I have pointed out earlier in the introduction, Scott had emphasized the role of historical fiction in educating the reader and making him learn from the experiences of the past so that he can avoid the horrors which are likely to recur in the present: the constant elements in human nature make it possible that history repeats itself but in different versions. With historical experience it would be possible to treat problems in the present with more rationality rather than submit to the wild passions that would lead to destruction. *Old Mortality's* use of the "Killing Time," presents a diagnosis of the causes that helped in inflaming the divisions in Scotland, and a warning of what Scott felt might happen in his present time. In the year 1815, while Scott was writing *Old Mortality*, disunity was looming in the horizon of his country. Graham McMaster states that the time was "characterized by an outstanding degree of conflict and divisiveness."²⁷ The external threat posed by Napoleon was defeated, but internal threat, mostly owing to post-war economic issues began to surface. According to MacQueen, "*Old Mortality*, basically, is the story of a Whig uprising in the West of Scotland, and, as such, could not be without its painful relevance to the period which immediately followed the Napoleonic Wars."²⁸ The present threat seemed too difficult to be solved by either an army or governmental interference: "traditional divisions between Whig and Tory appeared quite minor compared to those between town and country, merchant and landlord, farmer and labourer, and industrial and rural haves and have-nots."²⁹ However, it should be owned that Scott did not mean to equate his time with the "Killing Time," but he was alarmed seeing in both situations the dangers posed to society when individual concerns and resentments led to zealotry and fanaticism, usurping feelings of patriotism and humanity. Therefore, it was necessary for Scott to reconstruct past events not chronologically, but with rational analysis.

In this chapter I will argue that *Old Mortality* is not presenting a mere Tory apologia for that period, but offers something like a "philosophical" history. Also, I will argue that this "history" manifests a cultural criticism of the period of religious conflict different in some respects from the anti-heroic and anti-political one offered

by Hobbes. Finally, I will argue that the virtue of loyalty remains a central issue for Scott that contributes to the stability of the nation.

It is usually assumed that, as historians, Scott and David Hume are at opposite poles: Hume is "judgmental," Scott "sympathetic"; Hume, as a child of the Enlightenment, sneers at the folly of past generations, while Scott, the proto-historicist, attempts to enter the consciousness of his subjects even when he reproves their conduct. Thus, for example, Cockshut:

Hume was one of those immensely persuasive men who employ brilliant intellectual powers in simplifying. Thus the simple antithesis of the "fanatic" or "enthusiast" (the covenanting type) and the "superstitious" (the Royalist Anglican) satisfies him. Those who are not covered by either term are simply selfish men without principle, like the hypocritical blacksmith, on one side, or violent, sensual men like Bothwell on the other. Scott is intent on showing how much more complex these psychological questions really are.³⁰

The "key point" here, according to Cockshut, "is Hume's use of the word 'fanatic,'" which in the *History* "invariably signals a fixed judgment and a closed question." In *Old Mortality*, he argues, Scott "was reopening the supposedly closed question, 'what is fanaticism?'"³¹

This view is the offspring of considering Hume as a representative Enlightenment historian. Here it should be recalled that Hume's notion of historiography is much akin to those of his "philosophical" Scottish contemporaries, who in many respects dissented from the British and Continental Enlightenment. On reading his *History of England*, it is not difficult to see that when he deals with the "fanatics" he shows little sympathy; but the word "fanaticism" does not invariably denote a "fixed judgment" in the sense of black and white. This fact could be sensed from his coverage of the British Civil War epoch. Here, Hume's painstaking work is to interpret the genesis, growth, and diversification of "fanaticism."

Cockshut emphasizes that Scott's superiority over Hume lies in the depth and subtlety of the former's insight into the past as well as in his presentation of the psychological mosaic among "fanatics": The all-enduring Bessie Maclare, the pedantic and cowardly Gabriel Kettledumple, the selfless and unworldly Ephraim Macbriar, the ambitious and energetic John Balfour of Burley, and the lunatic Habbakkuk Mucklewrath are each "fanatical" to a different degree and in a different

way.³² Yet, Hume's history affords similar distinctions. Consider, for instance, the passage on the Civil War distinguishing between the English presbyterians and the more radical Independents (or "puritan") faction of Oliver Cromwell, which emerged from under their wings:

The enthusiasm of the presbyterians led them to reject the authority of prelates, to throw off the restraint of liturgies, to retrench ceremonies, to limit the riches and authority of the priestly office: the fanaticism of the independents, exalted to a higher pitch, abolished ecclesiastical government, disdained creeds and systems, neglected every ceremony, and confounded all ranks and orders. The soldier, the merchant, the mechanic, indulging the fervours of zeal, and guided by the illapses of the spirit, resigned himself to an inward and superior direction, and was consecrated, in a manner, by immediate intercourse and communion with heaven.³³

In fact, the significance of this passage, nevertheless, is not limited to its distinction between types of "fanatics," but it extends to the relationship it establishes between these types and the historical process:

The presbyterians, imagining that such clear and certain tenets, as they themselves adopted, could be rejected only from a criminal and pertinacious obstinacy, had hitherto gratified, to the full, their bigoted zeal in [the persecution of other sects]: the independents, from the extremity of the same zeal, were led into the milder principles of toleration. Their mind, set afloat in the wide sea of inspiration, could confine itself within no certain limits; and the same variations, in which an enthusiast indulged himself, he was apt, by a natural train of thinking, to permit in others. Of all Christian sects this was the first, which, during its prosperity as well as its adversity, always adopted the principle of toleration; and it is remarkable that so reasonable a doctrine owed its origin, not to reasoning, but to the height of extravagance and fanaticism.³⁴

What we understand is that Hume's "principle of toleration" is an upshot of the "extravagance and fanaticism" of the Independents and not from "reasoning." This conclusion serves as an illustration of the law of heterogeneity of ends, one of the central tenets of "philosophical" historiography. In this light, the development of the modern British Constitution seems to be a consequence of the diversification of "fanatical" types.

Hume's analysis of the phenomena of extreme "fanaticism" as a sort of solipsism is important to his reading of the downfall of the puritan Commonwealth of 1649-60. In his account of the Civil War, Hume views the Stuart Monarchy as a source of order

and law, whereas the "fanatical" puritan opposition is a source of chaotic and socially disruptive individualism. This conservatism of Hume's *History* is a direct result of his "philosophical" understanding of human nature as essentially social, and of society as a prerequisite for human progress. Of course, this philosophical attitude stands at odds with the "inward" doctrine adopted by fanatics, which could reduce society to gatherings of totally autonomous but isolated individuals having no common purpose or interest. Even individuals in the same group might see purposes which are set before them as incompatible depending on the intensity of each individual's own "light." In this context, Hume looks to the creed that governs the fanatics as inimical to society. The "inward light" doctrine acknowledges no human laws and institutions, only the will of God. This opened the way for a sort of religious amoralism, as well as for religious toleration. Resigned to "inward and superior direction," the fanatic could justify exempting himself from the exterior and inferior laws of the state. In Hume's view, a society constituted like the puritan Commonwealth would necessarily prove ungovernable and lead to disintegration. The *History*, to a large extent, attempts to demonstrate this proposition.

Hume's treatment of the Covenanters, the radical sect of the presbyterians, follows the same line of thought discussed above. Hume's account of the Covenanter uprising of 1679 covers four pages in his *History*, yet despite its brevity it is suggestive. Hume underlines the theme of social disintegration through his account of the *Comprehension*, a compromise offered by the government to reorganize the national Church of Scotland according to the aspirations of the presbyterians:

As rigour and restraint had failed of success in Scotland, a scheme of *Comprehension* was tried; by which it was intended to diminish the authority of bishops, to abolish their negative voice in the ecclesiastical courts, and to leave them little more than the right of precedency among presbyters [that is, elected church officials]. But the presbyterian zealots entertained great jealousy against this scheme. ...Should the ears and eyes of men be once reconciled to the name and habits of bishops, the whole power of the function, they dreaded, would soon follow: The least communication with unlawful and antichristian institutions they esteemed dangerous and criminal: *Touch not, taste not, handle not*; this cry went out amongst them: And the king's ministers at last perceived that they should prostitute the dignity of government, by making advances, to which the malcontents were determined not to correspond.³⁵

Hume proceeds to show that the late Indulgence, although it allowed the Presbyterian ministers to settle in the vacant parishes "without requiring any terms of submission to the established religion," was not welcomed. The same reasons accounted for its failure: the Covenanters rejected all offers of mere toleration, for they believed that their acceptance meant a recognition of the supremacy of human institutions over the will of God.³⁶ For the Covenanters, human institutions could not be validated and recognized except under a theocracy. Though he was himself certainly no friend of the established church, Hume's attitude toward this obstinacy is clearly irreverent. Hume's view in this respect is that the Covenanters were calling not for freedom of religion so much as for the abolition of civil society.

On the other hand, Hume admits that the strict measures taken by the government after the failure of the accommodation only compounded the problem, aggravating the self-imposed social isolation of the "fanatics." One of the most rigorous measures applied was to "intercommune" Covenanters. As Hume puts it, "whoever afterwards, either on account of business, relation, nay charity, had the least intercourse with [an intercommuned person], was subjected to the same penalties as could by law be inflicted on the criminal himself."³⁷ Under such circumstances, all social relationships were undercut. Still worse, in an attempt to conceal from the king in England the cruelty of this measure, the Scottish Privy Council took a further step to augment the isolation of the dissidents; it "forbad, under severe penalty, all noblemen or gentlemen of landed property to leave the kingdom."³⁸ Thus, isolated from the rest of humanity and denied access to legitimate authority to complain, the Covenanters, already disposed to regard themselves as answerable only to the commands of God, came to think of themselves as exempt from human law and even from ordinary human moral sentiments. Hume's remarks in his account of the assassination of Archbishop Sharpe, the event that triggered the 1679 uprising suggests as much:

It is indeed certain, that the murder of Sharpe had excited an universal joy among the Covenanters, and that their blind zeal had often led them, in their books and sermons, to praise and recommend the assassination of their enemies, whom they considered as the enemies of all true piety and godliness. The stories of Jael and Sisera, or Ehud and Eglon, resounded from every pulpit.³⁹

The last sentence refers to the Covenanters' belief that, like the Israelites in the Old Testament, they enjoyed a special dispensation to kill their enemies indiscriminately,

contrary to the stipulations of the third commandment. Hume thus suggests that the amoral tendency latent in the English Independents had, partly as a result of oppression, become apparent in the Scottish Covenanters.

Before turning to *Old Mortality* itself, it would be of some advantage to note that Scott's non-fictional treatment of the Covenanters in the *Tales* is very much compatible with that of Hume. His account of them is, to a great extent, based on their exclusion from society. Like Hume, he lays much emphasis on the extraordinary practices to which the government resorted, such as the "intercommuning" of the religious dissidents:

The nearest relations were prohibited from assisting each other, the wife the husband, the brother the brother, and the parent the son, if the sufferers had been intercommuned. The government of this cruel time applied [this and other] ancient and barbarous statutes to the outlawed presbyterians of the period, and thus drove them altogether from human society. In danger, want, and necessity, the inhabitants of the wilderness, and expelled from civil intercourse, it is no wonder that we find many of these wanderers avowing principles and doctrines hostile to the government which oppressed them, and carrying their resistance beyond the bounds of mere self-defense.⁴⁰

Scott similarly attributes some of the Covenanters' peculiar religious views to their exclusion from society:

Superstitious notions also, the natural consequences of an uncertain, melancholy, and solitary life among the desolate glens and mountains, mingled with the intense enthusiasm of this persecuted sect. Their occasional successes over their oppressors, and their frequent escapes from the pursuit of the soldiery, when the marksmen missed their aim, or when a sudden mist concealed the fugitives, were imputed, not to those natural causes by means of which the Deity is pleased to govern the world, and which are the engines of his power, but to the direct interposition of a miraculous agency, over-ruling and suspending the laws of nature, as in the period of Scripture history.⁴¹

Scott, it seems, is wittingly making the connection between social isolation and "fanaticism" that underlies, but remains unstated, in Hume's treatment of the Covenanters. Scott may, as some thought, have painted a less flattering portrait of the Royalists in the *Tales* than in *Old Mortality*, but he certainly does not seem to have set

out to flatter the Covenanters instead by making them look more rational; he is simply trying, like Hume, to show their irrationality.

In his *Scott and Society*, Graham McMaster has observed that images of isolation or exclusion from society abound in *Old Mortality*. He attributes this emphasis on social disintegration to a general shift in Scott's perspective from a historical optimism, supposedly inherited from the "philosophical" historians and given full expression in *Waverley*, to a historical pessimism and disillusionment with modern, socially atomized Scotland. This shift, in McMaster's view, is accompanied by a corresponding shift from the basically discursive, analytical examination of "manners" that we find in *Waverley* to political allegory and symbolism:

The superiority of *Old Mortality* is to be found in the way in which Scott provides a convincing socio-psychological context for the exclusion theme. For this was the fundamental point about the Covenanters, not their "fanaticism". ...They are linked in Scott's work with gypsies, pirates, MacGregors and other outcasts, and ultimately with the victims of social and economic injustice in post-Waterloo Britain.

If the exclusion theme is primary, then social history, and the cultural changes of the novel, are of secondary importance; they are there because Scott's imagination and the taste of his readers insisted that in prose fiction at least a character or psychological condition could not interest without a context that guaranteed some degree of probability.⁴²

Yet the "theme of exclusion" is itself a "philosophical" one. Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith were both keenly aware of the dangers posed by unchecked economic individualism, which they saw as excluding not only certain classes of victims but even its apparent beneficiaries from society.⁴³ It is apparent that there is a sort of dialectic relation between the "theme of exclusion" and "fanaticism" whether in Hume's treatment of fanaticism or in Scott's treatment of the Covenanters in his "philosophical" *Tales*. Consequently, it might be argued that in *Old Mortality* the "theme of exclusion" is part and parcel of the "social history," and that the novel is in some ways as analytical and as "philosophical" as *Waverley*.

In the "preliminary" chapter of the novel itself, Peter Pattieson, the fictional narrator, suggests that his goal is to describe "the operation which their opposite principles produced upon the good and bad men of both [the Royalists and Covenanters] parties"(35)—very much as Scott, at the outset of *Waverley*, speaks of the "favourable opportunities of contrast" afforded him by the Highland and Lowland

cultures of 1745 Scotland. In his letter to Louisa Stuart, Scott makes it apparent that the novel could be conceived as a "philosophical" scheme that attempts to investigate the impact of different cultural "principles" on "manners" or behaviour:

It is a covenanting story. The time lies at the era of Bothwell Brigg, the scene is Lanarkshire: there are noble subjects for narrative during that period full of the strongest light and shadow, all human passions stirr'd up and stimulated by the most powerful motives, and the contending parties as distinctly contrasted in manners and modes of thinking as in political principles.⁴⁴

Emphasizing this argument, an anonymous writer in the *Critical Review*, who takes Scott's intention "to portray the manners of his countrymen" as primary, wishes that Scott had published *Old Mortality* before *The Black Dwarf* so that "not only the historical transactions, but the manners and habits of the people, might have been displayed chronologically."⁴⁵ Scott's seriousness about "portraying manners" is also demonstrated by his detailed reply to M'Crie's accusation of his inaccuracy in presenting the times. The reviewer writes of Scott "taking his seat on the bench of the historians of his time and country" and goes on to confirm that he is:

At once a master of the great events and minuter incidents of history, and of the manners of the times he celebrates, ... his judgement enables him to separate those traits which are characteristic from those that are generic; ...not less accurate, and discriminating than vigorous and vivid, presents to the mind of the reader the manners of the times, and introduces to his familiar acquaintance the individuals of his drama as they thought and spoke and acted.⁴⁶

In this respect, the opening episode, the wappenschaw, forms the most analytical part of the novel. David Brown and others conceived this episode as concrete social history. According to Brown it serves as context to demonstrate the breakdown of the Scottish feudal system, of which the wappen-schaw, a military muster accompanied by games and dancing, was part:

The wappenschaw is intended to manifest the feudal order of Scotland under the Stuarts; in theory, it is a gathering of the aristocratic hierarchy, supported by their retainers and vassals in the lower orders. Yet as the scene progresses it becomes clear that the assembly is actually a monumental façade, a ceremony reintroduced by the Stuart government long after any significance it has had as an actual expression of feudal

relationships has disappeared, and impressing on them that the traditional order and authority are still in existence.⁴⁷

At the beginning of the episode Scott does in fact describe the reinstatement of the *wappen-schaw* in 1679 as a part of a desperate effort by "the last Stewarts...to counteract...the strict or puritanical spirit which had been the chief characteristic of the republican government." (37) The individualism and social disengagement of the radical Protestants were to be held in check by "those feudal institutions which united the vassal to the liege lord, and both to the crown." (37) The episode, in this view, suggests that the effort was doomed to failure. Unable to levy the required number of retainers from among their recalcitrant Presbyterian tenantry, the Bellendens of Tillietudlem are compelled to enlist the services of their imbecillic fowl-keeper Guse Gibbie, whose martial incompetence threatens to turn the *wappen-schaw* into farce. The feudal order in effect collapses because the old feudal ties no longer bind vassal to liege lord.

Meanwhile, Scott does not present the breaking of these bonds as he would if he were merely a neutral observer of the passing of an outmoded social order. Although he admits the absurdity of forcing people "to dance and be merry by authority" (37), Scott speaks of the "rigour of the strict Calvinists" in tones reminiscent of Humean derision:

A judaical observance of the Sabbath—a supercilious condemnation of all manly pastimes and harmless recreations, as well as of the profane custom of promiscuous dancing, that is of men and women dancing together in the same party (for I believe they admitted that the exercise might be inoffensive if practised by the parties separately)—distinguishing those who professed more than ordinary share of sanctity, they discouraged as far as lay in their power, even the ancient *wappen-schaws*. (37)

Scott not only presents the extremism of the religious sect but, like Hume, he offers an explanation for this attitude:

The preachers and proselytes of the more rigid presbyterians laboured, therefore, by caution, remonstrance, and authority, to diminish the attendance upon these summonses, conscious that in doing so, they lessened not only the apparent, but the actual strength of the government, by impeding the extension of that *esprit de corps* which soon unites young men who are in the habit of meeting together for manly sport, or military exercise. (38)

Like Hume, Scott's analysis of seventeenth-century "fanaticism" sees it not simply as an attack on royal prerogatives or feudal institutions, but also, eventually, as an attack on public spirit, or as M'Crie understood it: Scott is charging the Covenanters with being "unsocial."⁴⁸

The wappen-schaw episode seems to deal with a narrower issue, as well. As I have pointed out earlier in this thesis, the "philosophical" historians did not believe that the "feudal militia"(44), as Scott calls it was outmoded in the same way that the feudal system as a whole was. Adam Ferguson, in fact, personally took part in the campaign to restore the Scottish militia, on the grounds that public military exercises might rebuild some of the public spirit or "esprit de corps" that had been lost in the transition from feudalism to early capitalism. Henry Home, Lord Kames, as Chris Jones points out, devotes a large proportion of his book, *Sketches of the History of Man*, which appeared in 1774, "to his scheme for establishing a national militia," which would reinforce public spiritedness and inculcate "manly virtues," in an attempt to immunize the individual against the potential effects of "luxury, selfishness and sensuality."⁴⁹ Moreover, such exercises help in creating the feeling of commitment to society and state. Ferguson asserts: "Institutions that fortify the mind, inspire courage, and promote a national felicity, can never tend to national ruin," since a "nation consisting of vigorous, public-spirited, and resolute men, is strong."⁵⁰ Scott not only has the same attitude as his mentors, but, like Ferguson, he even served in the restored Scottish militia during the Napoleonic Wars.⁵¹

It is true, as Brown argues, that the wappenschaw ends in farce; but the central event, the shooting match between the moderate presbyterian Henry Morton and the Royalist Lord Evandale, puts the whole episode in a different light. Some of the presbyterians present temporarily forget their objections to the wappen-schaw in rooting for Morton, and the good sportsmanship displayed by both contestants becomes the basis of their later transpolitical friendship. Thus, another contribution of the wappen-schaw seems to contain the rivalries, natural to man, threatening Scottish society and even to redirect them in a socially useful way, just as Ferguson suggests:

Man...is disposed to opposition, and to employ the forces of his nature against an equal antagonist; he loves to bring reason, his eloquence, his

courage, even his bodily strength, to the proof. His sports are frequently an image of war; sweat and blood are freely expended in play; and fractures or death are often made to terminate the past time of idleness and festivity.

Without the rivalship and the practice of war, civil society itself could scarcely have found an object, or form and he who has never struggled with his fellow-creature, is a stranger to half the sentiments of mankind.⁵²

The Covenanters' non-participation in the wappenschaw is once again made to appear as "unsocial" act.

Like Hume, Scott does not hold the Covenanters solely responsible for the disintegration of Scottish society. "Their minds," he concedes had been "fretted, soured and driven to desperation, by the various exactions and cruelties to which they have been subjected." (228) A desperate person, according to McMaster, is one whom society has in some way excluded with "nothing to bind him to the normal community."⁵³ The early chapters of *Old Mortality* provide ample instances of this type, most notably Mause Headrigg and her son Cuddie. Mause, despite her hardline Covenanting rhetoric, is attached by long habit to her haughty Royalist landlord, Lady Margaret Bellenden, who, also by long habit, returns her affection. Even when Lady Margaret comes to chastise Mause for absenting her son from the wappenschaw, traces of the old ties remain. Mause's first instinct is to point "to the chair, which on former occasions, Lady Margaret had deigned to occupy for half an hour at a time, hearing the news of the country." (85) When, at the height of their dispute, Lady Margaret calls Mause a "fause-hearted vassal," Mause, "bursting into tears," protests: "I am sure they belie baith Cuddie and me sair, if they said he wadna fight ower boots in blude for your leddyship and Miss Edith, and the auld Tower...and I would rather see him buried beneath it, than he suld gie way." (86) The upshot of this confrontation led to evicting the Headriggs from the Bellenden estate and Cuddie ultimately joins the Covenanting army that besieges "the auld Tower" his mother would have him die defending. The Headriggs are loyal to their masters and this loyalty helps them to live peacefully with the Bellendens without siding effectively with any one of the disputing parties. Lady Margaret's excessive political loyalty to the Royalists destroyed the noble loyalty that binds her tenants to her, consequently, driving her tenants to "desperation." Scott suggests here that the Royalists inadvertently undermine their own position, sundering the ties of social affection that held the Scottish feudal order together.

The case of Henry Morton, the novel's middle-of-the-road presbyterian hero, parallels that of the Headriggs. Although Morton from the very beginning is politically neutral, his relationship with the Royalist Bellenden family in general is intimate, in part due to his attachment to Lady Margaret's granddaughter Edith. However, when Morton mistakenly assumes that Edith has transferred her affections to Lord Evandale, "the depth of despair... seemed to destroy every feeling for which he had hitherto lived ...desperate himself, he determined to support the rights of his country, insulted in his person." (160) Despair, exclusion from "the normal community," and the breaking of the ties of affection that hold such a community together are all inherent in Scott's analysis of the phenomena of "fanaticism."

Like Hume, Scott considers the law of intercommunion as crucially responsible for nurturing and reinforcing "fanaticism." Morton's engagement with the rebellion is, in fact, the consequence of his violation of this law after sheltering the fugitive Burley. Sergeant Bothwell illustrates the purpose of the law as to isolate each dissident by prohibiting even his family "to correspond with him by word, writ, or message, or to supply him with meat, drink, house, harbour, or victual." (102) Such policy, in Scott's analysis is detrimental to society in the long run. Its effect, eventually, is to isolate every body, to engender tension or destroy all human relationships in an ever-widening circle. First, Morton is placed in a position in which he has to take a painful choice: either to obey the despotic law or to be consistent with his filial piety, which obliges him to shelter Burley because Burley once saved his father's life. Under the pressure of his loyalty to his father, Morton allows the intercommuned Burley to spend the night in the barn at Milnwood, thus exposing his old timid uncle to real danger by incriminating him and making his property liable to forfeiture. The effect of Morton's action extends negatively to the Headriggs. When Bothwell's troop of Life-Guards come to question Morton, Mause, unable to control her excitement, bursts into "testimony" against the Royalist soldiers. The scene ends in the arrest of Morton himself, while both Mause and her innocent son are evicted yet again, this time at the hands of a fellow presbyterian, Mrs. Alison Wilson, old Milnwood's housekeeper.

The parting dialogue between Mause and Alison, who blames Mause and Cuddie, rather than the government's policy for Morton's arrest, presents a striking example of the desperation produced by Royalist policies:

"Ill luck be in the graning corse o' thee! The prettiest lad in Clydesdale this day maun be a sufferer, and a' for you and your daft whiggery!

"Gae wa', replied Mause; "I trow ye are in the bonds of sin, and in the gall of iniquity, to grudge your bonniest and best in the cause of Him that gave ye a' ye hae—I promise I hae done as muckle for Mr. Harry as I wad do for my ain; for if Cuddie was found worthy to bear testimony in the Grassmarket [that is, be hanged in Edinburgh]—"

"And there's gude hope o't," said Alison, "unless you and he change your courses."

"And if," continued Mause, disregarding the interruption, "the bloody Doegs and the flattering Ziphites [that is, the Royalists] were to seek to ensnare me with a proffer of his remission upon sinful compliance, I wad persevere nathless, in lifting my testimony against popery, prelacy, antinomianism, erastianism, lapsarianism, sublapsarianism, and the sins and snares of the times." (109-110)

The above quotation gives us a clear idea of a society so radically disturbed that natural allies become enemies, even the tearing of the social fabric reaches the most sacred basic human relationships, like that of mother and child. (Maus's "testimony" against antinomianism is ironic: her readiness to sacrifice her son, Cuddy, suggests that she herself has turned out a victim of this heresy.) Scott wants his reader to grasp the negative social effects engendered by the tactics of oppression applied by the government against its subjects. This sort of disintegration sets every individual against every other, reducing all to a sort of Hobbesian state of nature.

Scott, like Hume, does not deny that the antisocial inclination is a part of the nature of "fanaticism," but he is always keen to show that oppression is only exacerbating such inclinations. Burley's attempt to persuade Morton to join the uprising indicates clearly how deep these inclinations are:

"Think ye," he continued, "to touch pitch and remain undefiled? To mix in the ranks of malignants, papists, papal-prelates, latitudinarians, and scoffers; to partake of their sports, which are like the meat offered unto idols; to hold intercourse, perchance, with their daughters, as the sons of God with the daughters of men in the world before the flood—Think you, I say, to do all these things, and yet remain free from pollution! I say unto you, that all communication with the enemies of the church is the accursed thing which God hateth! Touch not—taste not—handle not! And grieve not, young man, as if you alone were called upon to subdue your carnal affections, and renounce the pleasures which are a snare to your feet. (77)

Such a mentality foments further divisions. Scottish presbyterians, much like the English Independents, are sharply divided among themselves. Scott makes this point

early in the novel with an innovative use of the "catechism" device employed in *Waverley*. Having secured employment at Milnwood, Cuddie naively expresses his satisfaction with the religious principles of his new landlord:

"And now we're settled ance mair," said Cuddie to his mother, "and if we're no sae bien and comfortable as we were up yonder, yet life's life ony gate, and we're wi' decent kirk-ganging folk o' your ain persuasion, mither; there will be nae quarrelling about that."

"Of my persuasion, hinnie!" said the too-enlightened Mause; "wae's me for thy blindness and theirs. O' Cuddie, they are but in the court of the Gentiles, and will ne'er win farther ben [that is, will never get to the inner court], I doubt; they are but little better than prelatists [that is, Episcopalians] themsells. They wait on the ministry of that blinded man, Peter Poundtext, ance a precious teacher of the word, but now a backsliding pastor, that has, for the sake of stipend and family maintenance, forsaken the strict path and gane astray after the black Indulgence. O, my son, had ye but profited by the gospel doctrines ye hae heard in the Glen of Bengonnar, frae the dear Richard Rumbletree, that sweet youth, who suffered martyrdom in the Grassmarket, afore Candlemas! Didna ye hear him say, that Erastianism was as bad as Prelacy, and that the Indulgence was as bad as Erastianism?" (94)

Mause's speech reflects the opinion of one of the covenanting factions. This opinion is in its essence an overt call for rejecting any form of official toleration, including the so-called Indulgence. For Mause Headrigg, as for the rest in her religious sect, accepting the Indulgence means recognizing the primacy of merely human institutions, or falling into the heresy of "Erastianism." Accordingly, it is not surprising, that she views a moderate presbyterian like the Indulged minister Peter Poundtext as a criminal betrayer. It is true that the Covenanters lack the mutual toleration of the English Independents, as Hume demonstrated, yet the same engine of the "inward light" propels their doctrine to a socially disruptive end. The moderate Poundtext, in this context, is necessarily viewed as blinded to this light.

John Balfour of Burley most embodies Scott's depiction of the "inward light" doctrine. Some critics regarded Burley as a product of Scott the romancer rather than of Scott the historian.⁵⁴ Indeed, at first sight, Burley looks like a sort of Gothic villain, tracing his ancestry from Macbeth, motivated by "the vices of revenge and ambition" (232) and agonizes from repressed blood-guilt and hallucinations. Yet, in some respects, Burley's characterization appears to be consistent with Scott's "philosophical" scheme of demonstrating the "operation" of "principles." As

Cockshut has pointed out, Burley's exchange with Morton in the barn at Milnwood leads to a deliberate presentation of the doctrine of the "inward light."⁵⁵ Alluding to and justifying his murder of Archbishop Sharpe, Burley accosts Morton with a series of questions that explain his views and reveal a fully-fledged antinomianism. Burley admits "sympathy for carnal sufferings" in executing "judgments of Heaven," in the meantime he discharges this sympathy of its human meaning by sacrificing it in favour of what he describes as "strong impulse" to take action. (73) Conceiving that Burley's meditation stands in contradiction with normalcy and the very postulates of mind, Morton responds with a broad emphasis on natural law: "I own I should strongly doubt the origin of any inspiration which seemed to dictate a line of conduct contrary to those feelings of natural humanity, which Heaven has assigned us as the general law of our conduct." (73) While Morton's argument seems to call Burley's attention to the contradictions embodied in his doctrine, the latter evades this notice by accusing Morton of being "yet in the dungeon-house of the law." (73) Burley's doctrine makes it unacceptable to "keep the moral law as far as our carnal frailty will permit." The alternative for him is to take action and "smite the ungodly, though he be our neighbour, and the man of power and cruelty, though he were of our own kindred, and the friend of our own bosom." (74) Morton reminds Burley that these are the very sentiments that the Royalists impute to the Covenanters: "They affirm, that you pretend to derive your rule of action from what you call an inward light, rejecting the restraints of legal magistracy, of national law, and even of common humanity, when in opposition to what you call the spirit within you." (74) It is the doctrine of "Inward light" that summarizes Burley's and the Covenanters' ideology: the only valid law is the perceived will of God. This ideology, in fact, provides the rationale for Burley's acts of violence and ambition, which frightens Morton himself, who, after paying farewell to Burley soliloquizes with concern: "how dangerous would be the society of such a companion!" (78) Scott explains that the "inward light" doctrine, leads also to a sort of solipsism or radical isolation of the individual. By throwing away the feelings of common humanity or carnal affection, the Covenanters unwittingly, destroy the ties of their own community and, consequently, blow up their cause. Making of neighbourhood, kinship, and friendship only barriers to jump over, Burley appears as a Gothic solitary even companionless among the Covenanters, whom he deals with less as allies than as pawns to be manipulated. From the very first moment Burley found in Morton a pawn that enhances his scheme

to draw more moderate presbyterians into the insurgents' camp. Burley's own small sect, the Cameronians, apply a similar attitude even toward their comrades:

Burley and his confederates had drawn together a considerable body of these sectaries, amounting to a hundred horse and about fifteen hundred foot, clouded and severe in aspect, morose and jealous of communication, haughty of heart, and confident, as men who believed that the pale of salvation was open for them exclusively; while all other Christians, however slight were the shades of difference of doctrine from their own, were in fact little better than reprobates. These men entered the presbyterian camp, rather as dubious and suspicious allies, or possibly antagonists, than as men who were heartily embarked in the same cause, and exposed to the same dangers, with their more moderate brethren in arms. (316)

With their "inward light" doctrine which, ultimately, denigrates the feelings of common humanity, it is not surprising for such sectaries to view others only as a means to an end, or, in short, to be Machiavellians. However, it should be owned that there is an important difference here between Burley and Fergus Mac-Ivor of *Waverley*, with whom he is sometimes compared. Fergus's attempt to use Waverley as a political pawn does not finally preclude the possibility of real friendship between the two. This is not to say simply that Scott prefers Jacobites to Covenanters, but that he sees Jacobite "fanaticism" as qualitatively different from Covenanter "fanaticism," which not only permits but actually requires such behaviour on principle.

Returning to Burley, we see that after the triumph of the Presbyterian cause in 1688, he continued to fight as a solitary outlaw instead of joining his former comrades in the new church settlement, which he still regards as excessively "Erastian." When Burley isolates himself in a secret cave, "a place of almost unapproachable seclusion," (438) he, in fact, intercommunes himself. Alexander Welsh's argument that Scott "succumbs to the stock material of fairy tales," in the apparent "obliteration of Burley in a mist of Satanism and sublime nature,"⁵⁶ sounds permissible; yet Scott's "stock material," as Welsh himself asserts, "overflows with thematic significance."⁵⁷ Scott's detailed description of Burley's environment in chapter 43: a cave surrounded by impenetrable wilderness, opening on a waterfall whose roar overpowers all outside noise, and accessible only by way of a fallen oak tree is the perfect type of an introvert mind that focuses only on an "inward light" and totally cut off from the external world, including human contact. Bearing in mind that Scott's reading of

fanaticism as fundamentally an antisocial phenomenon makes of the "stock material," at least thematically, a natural doom for a fanatic.

If the Covenanters share with the English Independents the same doctrine of "inward light," they, on the other hand, lack the Independents' mutual tolerance; a circumstance that deprived them of any sort of consensus even on crucial matters that threatens their existence. David Brown attributes the chaos that followed the Covenanters' victory at Drumclog to their individualistic political and religious principles.⁵⁸ "The camp of the Covenanters, even in the very moment of their success, seemed about to dissolve like a rope of sand, from want of the original principles of combination and union." (206-207) For Scott, as for Hume, since man is social by his nature and since he can not carry on in an individualistic mentality, "fanaticism" undermines itself with its radical individualism, which makes community and communal life unbearable.

A similar analysis underlies many of the novel's later public events. The Covenanters' want of the original "principles of combination and union," contrary to the situation of the Jacobites in *Waverley*, is demonstrated a second time in the camp outside Glasgow. Morton struggles with little success to introduce some degree of discipline in an army of men who regard discipline a "yoke," and prefer "avowedly the more zealous leaders, in whose ranks enthusiasm in the cause supplied the want of good order and military subjection, to the restraints which Morton endeavoured to bring them under." (282) The Covenanters' deficiencies become more apparent in the outright schisms that weakened their forces before the final battle at Bothwell Bridge. Scott, here, draws a deliberate contrast between the "the spirit of insubordination" that was "communicated" to the insurgents by Habakkuk Mucklewrath's speech (331) with some of Morton's most public speech:

What signifies quarrelling on minute points of church-discipline, when the whole edifice is threatened with total destruction? O, remember, my brethren, that the last and worst evil which God brought upon the people he had once chosen—the last and worst punishment of their blindness of heart, was the bloody dissensions which rent asunder their city, even when the enemy were thundering at its gates. (332)

In the end, Scott relates the total defeat of the Covenanters, historically, to the same deficiencies, when "there remained none either to command or to obey." (336) Scott's analysis of "fanaticism" amounts to two significant conclusions: first, it

undermines the civic virtues, combination and union, necessary for any society to exist. Second, it undercuts the heroic virtues like military courage in which the Covenanters do not at first seem to be lacking.

The later passages recall the opening episode of the *wappen-schaw*: for the feudal militia exercises were not only designed to promote social harmony, but also to build up the military courage of the Lowlanders, whose lands were constantly raided by the more warlike Highland clans. For Scott and the "philosophical" historians, civic and heroic virtues cannot be separated: the heroic virtues are never simply personal; they always have a civic or social context. The contrast between the Covenanters and "Lennox-Highlanders," or MacFarlanes, at the battle of Bothwell Bridge highlights this point. The MacFarlanes' military courage seems to be a consequence of their possessing the spirit of "combination and union," best reflected in their collective response to the clan's war-cry. The courage of the Covenanters, meanwhile, comes from individual "enthusiasm," from a sense of "inward and superior direction," as Hume describes it, which they mistakenly take as an adequate substitute for externalities such as "discipline" and "good order." The Covenanters' courage manifests a limitation in certain respects. It is true that the covenanting ethic may produce men like Burley, willing to live for years in a cave, and die by drowning rather than to give up his principles, or Ephram Macbriar, willing to stand torture and even suffer individual martyrdom for his cause; but it cannot produce a Baron Bradwardine or an Evan Dhu, men equally willing to suffer privation or death, but also willing to command with discretion and obey disinterestedly. In short, as the novel progresses, the Covenanters' opposition to the *wappen-schaw*, where heroic virtues are built on a civic foundation, looks increasingly ironic.

Yet this ironic turn of events is anticipated even in the novel's "Preliminary" chapter, where Old Mortality, from whom the narrator claims to have received his story, laments the decline of the Covenanting spirit in eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Scotland:

"We," he said in a tone of exultation,— "we are the only true Whigs. Carnal men have assumed that the triumphant appellation, following him whose kingdom is of this world. Which of them would set six hours on a wet hillside to hear a godly sermon? I trow an hour o't wad staw them. ...nae wonder they dread the accomplishment of what was spoken by the mouth of the worthy Mr. Peden, (that precious servant of the Lord, none of whose words fell to the ground,) that the French monzies [that is, *monsieurs*] sall

rise as fast in the glens of Ayr, and the kenns of Galloway, as ever the Highlandmen did in 1677. And now they are gripping to the bow and spear, when they suld be mourning for a sinfu' land and a broken covenant. (32)

Old Mortality here compares the occupation of the Royalist Highland army of disaffected areas in the Scottish Lowland in 1677 with the prospected invasion of the Napoleonic armies to Britain two years before the action of the novel begins. Just as the original Covenanters objected to feudal militia training on narrowly religious grounds, so Old Mortality apparently objects to the drilling of the restored Scottish militia, believing that only a return to the old faith can save the country. If the Covenanters failed to resist the Highlanders in 1677 and 1679, will a new dose of "whiggery" be enough to resist the French now? Therefore, it is not "the modern world," as Daiches contends, but the Covenanters' own radically individualistic "principles" that undercut the heroic virtues.

Despite Scott's "Tory" bias, for reasons I will discuss later, the 1679 uprising was for him as for many others, Burke one of them, a historical necessity to achieve the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which maintained religious and other individual liberties. Such an achievement could have been next to impossible in the light of seventeenth-century Royalist principles.⁵⁹ Of course, the Covenanters, as the "revisionist" Scott represents them, are no more favourable to religious liberty than the Royalists, except where their own sect is concerned. Although Rev. Gabriel Kettledrumble, for instance, once proclaims "the right of every freeman to worship God according to his own conscience," his sermon issues in a call to sweep "the sanctuary" clean of all non-Covenanters—of "Papists, Prelatists, Erastians, and Quakers." (208) But by demanding liberty for themselves, the Covenanters open the possibility of liberty for others. Like Hume, Scott is invoking the law of the heterogeneity of ends to explain the development of the British Constitution. In a letter to Major Bellenden, Henry Morton himself seems to invoke this law to explain his engagement with the "fanatical" Covenanters: "Providence, through the violence of the oppressors themselves, seems now to have opened a way of deliverance from this intolerable tyranny...But God, who knows my heart, be my witness, that I do not share the angry or violent passions of the oppressed and harassed sufferers with whom I am now acting." (268) In accordance with the law of the heterogeneity of ends, Morton attempts to distinguish between the intentions of the Covenanters, of which he disapproves, and the possible long-term benefits of their actions. Like Adam Smith

explaining the workings of the free market, he invokes the "invisible hand" of "Providence," which brings order out of chaos and good out of bad. This passage is thus an important instance of what Lukacs calls a "necessary anachronism," which consists in the historical novelist's "allowing his characters to express feelings and thoughts about real, historical events in a much clearer way than actual men and women of the time could have done."⁶⁰ The "feelings," in this case, are those of Hume and the "philosophical" historians as they looked back on the seventeenth century.

It is not surprising, then, that Morton, in the same letter, should also echo Hume's conclusions about the state of affairs in late seventeenth-century Scotland. Here is Hume:

There was here, it is apparent, in the political body, a disease dangerous and inveterate; and the government had tried every remedy, but the true one, to allay and correct it. An unlimited toleration, after sects have diffused themselves, and are strongly rooted, is the only expedient which can allay their fervour, and make the civil union acquire a superiority above religious distinctions. But as the operations of this regimen are commonly gradual, and at first imperceptible, vulgar politicians are apt, for that reason, to have recourse to more hasty and more dangerous remedies. ... [T]he government, in stead of treating [the Covenanters] like common madmen, who should be soothed, and flattered, and deceived into tranquility, thought themselves entitled to rigid obedience, and were too apt, from a mistaken policy, to retaliate upon the dissenters, who had erred from the spirit of enthusiasm.⁶¹

And here is Morton:

My most earnest and anxious desire is, to see this unnatural war brought to a speedy end, by the union of the good, wise, and moderate of all parties, and peace restored, which, without injury to the king's constitutional rights, may substitute the authority of equal laws to that of military violence, and, permitting to all men to worship according to their own consciences, may subdue fanatical enthusiasm by reason and mildness, instead of driving it to frenzy by persecution and intolerance. (268)

Both Hume and Scott/Morton are good British Constitutionalists, but the emphasis of their constitutionalism appears to be less on individual rights than on the health of society as a whole: both conceive of "fanatical enthusiasm" as a "disease" or "unnatural" state of society, for which a religious toleration is the only cure.⁶²

Herein lies a significant difference between Hume/Scott/Morton's interpretation of the Civil War era and that of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes did not, of course, favour religious toleration.⁶³ But his intellectual heir, John Locke, did so, because, following Hobbes, he believed that society is artificial and founded only on a contract among individuals. Politics, according to this theory, should be understood not as a whole society's project for pursuing the common good, but as a framework allowing individuals to define and pursue their own private goods, including their own religious goods.⁶⁴ Hume and Scott/Morton, on the other hand, favour toleration because they believe precisely the opposite: that human beings are naturally social and that society is not founded on a contract. The individual cannot, in short, be abstracted from a social context. Given that religious views differ widely and that these differences often lead to disastrous social divisions, a toleration of private goods in the religious sphere is a useful expedient, guaranteeing that other goods may still be pursued in common.⁶⁵ Through religious toleration, the "civil union," as Hume puts it, "may acquire superiority above religious distinctions." Or, as Scott/Morton puts it, toleration will "subdue fanatical enthusiasm"—that is, lure isolated or excluded "fanatics" back into "the union of the good, wise, and moderate of all parties." Hobbes and Locke understood the calamities of the Civil War era as so many arguments against classical ideas of public-spiritedness or civic virtue; Scott and Hume understand the same calamities as powerful arguments in their favour.

It might still be argued that the Royalists of the novel are no less fanatical than their opponents, the Covenanters—that although they abjure the doctrine of the "inward light," their behaviour is virtually identical to those who hold it. This is the argument of Francis Hart, who deals with the novel under the rubric of "opposing fanaticism and the search for humanity." Hart argues that Burley and Claverhouse are "equals in the contempt of life" and for what Morton calls the "feelings of natural humanity." Here, Morton represents the modern liberal, whose heroism transcends "ideological commitment" and affirms "life and humanity."⁶⁶ Claverhouse himself provides ammunition for this argument, especially in the famous speech in Chapter 35 where he concedes that both he and Burley are "fanatics." When he attempts to distinguish between "the fanaticism of honour and that of dark and sullen superstition," between shedding the blood of "psalm-singing mechanics" and shedding that of "gallant soldiers and noble gentlemen," Morton answers him indignantly: "Your distinction is too nice for my comprehension... God gives every

spark of life--that of the peasant as well as of the prince; and those who destroy his work recklessly or causelessly must answer in either case." (355-356) This passage can obviously be taken as suggesting that Royalists and Covenanting "ideologues" are simply mirror images of each other.

There is more than one instance where Claverhouse's rhetoric is identical to that of Burley's. When Morton is held a prisoner at Tillietudlem, Lord Evandale mediates so that Claverhouse can spare Morton's life, the latter replied addressing Morton: "Be it then...but young man, should you wish in your future life to rise to eminence in the service of your king and country, let it be your first task to subject to the public interest, and to the discharge of your duty, your private passions, affections, and feelings. ...And if I yield this point, in compliance with your urgency, my present concession must exempt me from future solicitation of the same nature." (164) Claverhouse, in short, opposes "duty" to "private passions, affections and feelings" in much the same way that Burley and the adherents of the "inward light" oppose the perceived will of God to "carnal affection." The only difference is that, for Claverhouse, government has replaced God as the excuse for atrocities. This suggests that the terms of civic humanism embodied in Claverhouse's discourse suffer a makeshift breakdown in times of deep division of the "public" sphere.

In this light, unlike *Waverley*, where there is less doubt as to what is the "public" good and what state commands loyalty, *Old Mortality* is more problematical; consequently the identification of "private passions" or "carnal affection" that might support or threaten the public good becomes ambivalent. Yet Claverhouse's urging Morton to quit sensibility and commit himself to serving what the former considers to be the public good deserves serious attention; since Claverhouse reminds us of Flora's critique of *Waverley's* sensibility. Here it might be argued that Morton's virtue of sensibility, like *Waverley's*, is anachronistic in anticipating the late eighteenth century man of feeling, though in a less critical light; since, in the context of the seventeenth century, at least, Morton's sensibility is not yet contaminated with commercial values. Further, Morton's transactions show that the sort of sensibility he displays is not of the radical type that would call for excessive individualism that would weaken social relationships, but is rather presented as the rudimentary natural feeling, which is more alive to the emotions of public spirit and disinterested benevolence. In short, the narrative, following the "philosophical" historians, other than Hume, Adam Smith, Kames, William Robertson, for instance, seems to recognize "varieties of sensibility,"

emphasizing the role of noble natural feelings—benevolence, sympathy, friendship, gratitude and so forth—in maintaining social relationships without being contradictory with civic virtues, but rather a prerequisite for them.⁶⁷ With his eye on what is social, Scott confers such qualities, though with less intensity than Morton, on Claverhouse himself, who is supposed to represent the virtue of civic humanism (or classical republicanism).

Many of Scott's contemporaries, as I have pointed out, in particular Thomas M'Crie, had accused Scott of whitewashing the historical Claverhouse and Royalist or Tory in the novel⁶⁸. From a historical point of view, it is undeniable that Scott's treatment of Claverhouse differs significantly in many respects from his treatment of Burley. In his depiction of Claverhouse, Scott, like Hume, is keen to show that the Royalists in general, including Claverhouse, do not consider "duty" and "affection" as absolutely opposite; whereas, the antinomian Covenanters, including Burley, do. Thus, in Scott's view, although the Royalists perpetrated crimes equal to or worse than those of the Covenanters, yet, they did not in principle reject the "carnal affections" that hold society together, and ultimately did not threaten to uproot society altogether. To put it rather differently, "carnal affections" are necessary for creating a sort of social life at the minimum level, but not sufficient to create the solid social bonds that prevail in a tribal community, for instance, where civic virtues are of the first order in terms of moral hierarchy.

In more than one place, Scott endeavours to make this distinction clear to his readers without dogmatic assertion. Thus his characterization of Claverhouse as possessing social virtues and graces—a characterization whose import has often puzzled modern critics:

The severity of his character, as well as the higher attributes of undaunted and enterprising valour which even his enemies were compelled to admit, lay concealed under an exterior which seemed adapted to the court or the saloon rather than the field. The same gentleness and gaiety of expression which reigned in his features seemed to inspire his actions and gestures; and, on the whole, he was generally esteemed, at first sight, rather qualified to be the votary of pleasure than of ambition. (144)

Claverhouse's self-comparison with Burley is preceded by Morton mentally contrasting the two:

The gentleness and urbanity of that officer's manners, the high and chivalrous sentiments of military devotion which he occasionally expressed, his deep and accurate insight into the human bosom, demanded at once the approbation and the wonder of those who conversed with him: while, on the other hand, his cold indifference to military violence and cruelty seemed altogether inconsistent with the social, and even admirable qualities which he displayed. Morton could not help, in his heart, contrasting him with Balfour of Burley. (355)

Unlike Burley, Claverhouse seems to unite "social qualities" with "military devotion." Further, if his "military devotion" leads to cruelty, it is more a matter of circumstance than of conscious principle or ideology, as it is with Burley. As Scott puts it:

This leader was cool and collected in danger, fierce and ardent in pursuing success, careless of facing death himself, and ruthless in inflicting it upon others. Such are the characters formed in times of civil discord, when the highest qualities, perverted by party spirit, and inflamed by habitual opposition, are too often combined with vices and excesses which deprive them at once of their merit and their lustre. (144)

Associating Claverhouse with a sense of sociability makes Hart's argument that the "feelings of natural humanity," which he attributes to the "unideological" Morton, also exist, at least in principle, within the Royalist "ideology."

Scott points more emphatically to this conclusion by making Claverhouse act ultimately as Morton's benefactor. After the battle of Bothwell Bridge Morton falls into the hands of a band of vindictive Covenanters, who blame their defeat on his moderation and propose to execute him at midnight. Claverhouse arrives just before the appointed hour to rescue him (Ch. 33). Later, in chapter 36, he uses his influence to extricate Morton from his treason trial and finds him a military post on the continent, where Morton is sent in exile. Claverhouse's behaviour is interpreted as repaying a personal debt to his friend Lord Evandale, who is in turn repaying a debt of gratitude to Morton, who saved his life during the skirmish at Drumclog. In addition, Claverhouse has himself developed an admiration for Morton as a good soldier and worthy opponent and feels bound by professional honour to assist him. From Burley's point of view, Claverhouse has allowed his "carnal affections" to get the better of him.

It is true, as Welsh points out, that Claverhouse's change of heart toward Morton is also prompted by class prejudices.⁶⁹ When Claverhouse intended to execute Morton at Tillietudlem, he was under the false impression that Morton was a mere "psalm-

singing mechanic"; but now he knows better. As he explains to Morton before the battle of Bothwell Bridge: "I trust I shall always make some difference between a high-minded gentleman, who, though misguided, acts upon generous principles, and the crazy fanatical clowns yonder." (325) In the context of the 1679 rebellion, however, even Claverhouse's prejudice constitutes a moral advance. Claverhouse is willing to acknowledge that a political enemy can be related to him by class, as well as by profession, while, for Burley and the Covenanters, an enemy is an enemy even if he is one's own kindred.

For M'Crie, of course, Claverhouse's efforts on Morton's behalf amount only to a Tory *deus ex machina*.⁷⁰ Scott, however, seems to have intended it as an example of the way a web of "carnal affections" can, to some limit, hold a society together even in the worst of times. However great their crimes and cruelty, the Royalists do not, like the Covenanters, demand that this web be cut away. In this respect, Scott's treatment of the Royalist trooper, Sergeant Bothwell provides another example. Despite his cruelties and his humiliating of Covenanters in his jurisdiction, yet, like Claverhouse, Scott depicts Bothwell as capable of recognizing social ties and moral obligations to enemies. When, in a wrestle, Burley knocked Bothwell down, his comrade Tom Halliday tried to interfere against Burley, but Bothwell's conception of military honour compelled him to refuse, considering the fight as a fair play. He admits his defeat, shakes hands with Burley, and with a mixture of mockery of Burley's creed and respect for his skill in wrestling, attempts to do him a good turn: "Well, beloved... if thou be'st a Whig, thou art a stout and a brave one, and so good even to thee—Hadst best take thy nag before the Cornet makes the round; for, I promise thee, he has stay'd less suspicious-looking persons." (59) It might be argued that Bothwell's orthodoxy fades away when we recall that he accepted bribes from terrified civilians like Morton's uncle, but Scott soon deflates this argument by making Bothwell apply the "cutter's law," when he offers a share of old Milnwood's gold to Morton on the ground: "we must not see a pretty fellow want, if we have cash ourselves." (112) Once again, Scott shows that the Royalists are capable of "carnal affection" toward an enemy. M' Crie may have had Bothwell as well as Claverhouse in mind when he argued that Scott intended to "exalt the military character."⁷¹

Scott's attitude towards presenting the importance of "carnal affections," which the Covenanters despise, in cementing the social relationships, is almost always mediated through the Royalists characters. Scott makes an even stronger case for Major

Bellenden, a Royalist veteran of the civil war, and his sister-in-law Lady Margaret, the novel's archetypal "superstitious" Royalist, for whom preserving the memory of Charles II's single breakfast at Tillietudlem has become a sort of secular religion. Despite their strong commitment to the ruling government, the Bellendens exhibited deep feelings for Claverhouse's decision to execute Morton:

Old Lady Margaret, who, with all the prejudices of rank and party, had not laid aside the feelings of her sex, was loud in her intercession.

"O Colonel Grahame, " she exclaimed, "spare his young blood! Leave him to the law—do not repay my hospitality by shedding men's blood on the threshold of my doors!"

"Colonel Grahame," said Major Bellenden, "you must answer this violence. Don't think, though I am old and feckless, that my friend's son shall be murdered before my eyes with impunity. I can find friends that shall make you answer it."

"Be satisfied, Major Bellenden, I will answer it," replied Claverhouse, totally unmoved; "and you, madam, might spare me the pain of resisting this passionate intercession for a traitor, when you consider the noble blood your own house has lost by such as he is."

"Colonel Grahame, "answered the Lady, her aged frame trembling with anxiety, "I leave vengeance to God, who calls it his own. The shedding of this young man's blood will not call back the lives that were dear to me; and how can it comfort me to think that there has maybe been another widowed mother made childless, like mysell, by a deed done at my very door-stane!" (162)

This plea of the Bellendens to save Morton's life is an indication that, for the Royalists, "carnal affection" and "duty" can exist on the same plane without the necessity of the one to neutralize the other. The Major's obligation to Morton's father is translated into a unique human enthusiasm, which transcends any sort of political or even religious prejudice. For Lady Margaret, "duty" takes other dimensions. The first has to do with "the feelings of her sex," while the second has to do with the old Scottish code of hospitality, which makes it a shame, not less than a treachery, to shed the blood of others at one's own "door-stane." It seems that under the cloak of chivalry the Royalists adopt a tradition, which sometimes make them violate their "duty" to treat all their political opponents as enemies.

Bessie Maclare, the one Samaritan among the Covenanters, who hides Lord Evandale after the skirmish at Drumclog and eventually prevents his being captured and killed, is not less charitable than the Bellendens. Like Lady Margaret, Bessie is "as enthusiastically attached" to her cause "as to the duties of humanity," (432) and

her benevolence to Evandale in some respects goes on the same line of argument as that of Margaret's to Morton. In spite of the fact that the Royalists have murdered her two sons, and her sadness caused the damage of her sight, Bessie, in a rational tone says: "But, alas! Betraying Lord Evandale's young blood to his enemies' sword wad ne'er hae brought my Ninian and Johnie alive again." (428) Unlike the Bellendens, however, Bessie resorts to her religion to derive a formula for bridging the gap between "duty " and "carnal affection." While talking to Morton she says: "They said I should hae been to him [that is Evandale] what Jael was to Sisera--But weel I wot I nae divine command to shed blood, and to save it was baith like a woman and a Christian." (428) This broad conception of Christianity soon shrinks under Bessie's own narrow version, when, following the manner of Burley, she attacks the moderate presbyterian church established in Scotland after the Glorious Revolution, concluding that its ministers offer nothing but "a dry clatter of morality." (431) In contrast with the Bellendens, Bessie's benevolence, thus seems to be culturally anomalous. Scott's delineation of this character in the *Quarterly Review* is suggestive:

A patient, kind, gentle, and generous being, even in the lowest state of oppression, poverty and blindness; her religious enthusiasm, unlike that of her sect, is impressed with the pure stamp of the Gospel, combining meekness with piety, and love to her neighbour with obedience and love of the Deity.⁷²

Old Mortality, in exploring the operation of the contrasting principles of the Scottish Royalists and Covenanters, does not exhibit a neutral historicist examination of two equally outmoded ideologies. In fact, Scott offers a revisionist defense on behalf of the Royalists much as Hume does of the English Royalists in his treatment of the Civil War. Yet, it is worth mentioning here that the Royalists policies are seen from two different perspectives. The crucial issues for the Royalists were to defend the Divine Right of kings and the authority of the Established Church; whereas, for Scott, as for Hume, the real issue is the coherence and stability of society. The principles of the Covenanters, like those of the English Independents or Puritans, were such that they threatened not just king and church but every other social institution, as well. Consequently, "philosophical" historians like Scott and Hume found themselves compelled to write "Tory" histories. Scott, in particular, wants to remind his

contemporary readers of the dangers of the present for the whole British society entailed by political divisions and excessive individualism.

Finally, it remains to explore Morton's role in depth. John Plamenatz's statement is very much fitting to define Morton's dilemma and its ideological import both morally and nationally. According to Plamenatz,

Man is more than just the product of his past; he is the product of his memory. The past 'lives on' in him, and he would not be what he is unless it did so. Thus, for him, as for no other creature, to lose his past, to lose his memory, is to lose himself, to lose his identity. History is more than the record of how man became what he is; it is involved in man's present conception of what he is; it is the largest element in his self-knowledge.⁷³

We need to recall that Morton's dilemma, basically, begins when his memory is activated by Burley and his "self-knowledge" is brought under test. For Morton, as for Scott, the problem is not simply a matter of choosing between loyalty to a dead father or to a live uncle; rather it is to choose between two world-views. While Morton's father offers a model that embodies public spirit and civic virtue, his uncle presents a model of the withdrawn, inert and selfish man.

Hart remarks that "from the beginning Morton is caught between two extreme alternatives: active commitment in his father's name, and cold prudence or miserly noncommitment after the manner of his uncle."⁷⁴ It is not without reason that Morton is introduced at the beginning as inert and hesitant. Morton's uncle is presented in a way as to be, by all standards, a bad example to be imitated. He is "an old miser...with whom a broad piece would at any time weigh down political opinions." (48) Elsewhere in the novel he is described as an "infirm, hypochondriac old man, who never meddles with politics, and loves his money-bags and bonds better than any thing else in the world." (71) However, nowhere is his character shown more clearly than when he hesitates offering the bribe that Alison has arranged in order to save his nephew from torture during his first arrest. (103) In short, Morton's cowardly uncle never operates outside the sphere of his own selfish interest in its most negative aspect. Scott makes it clear that the education of Morton's sympathies is stifled by his uncle's influence:

The base parsimony of his uncle had thrown many obstacles in the way of his education; ... Still, however, the current of his soul was frozen by a sense

of dependence, of poverty, above all, of an imperfect and limited education. These feelings impressed him with diffidence and reserve. (155)

Yet, Morton's temporary condition of passiveness is not final because his memory still stores the past bequeathed to him through his father. This is reflected, in the first place, in his decision made when he is forced to choose between obeying the law, in fact, his uncle's desire, and obeying his strong sense of filial piety, which obliges him to assist Burley because the latter once saved his father's life. Taking the risk, he resolves to shelter Burley. Henceforth, Morton's behaviour is guided by his father's to take an active role in the social and political life around him. This also awakens in him a sense of public spiritedness motivated by what he believes to be "public wrongs" committed by the prevailing "oppressive government," contrary to his uncle's selfish and isolationist tendency. (159)

Ian Dennis argues that in *Old Mortality* Scott "comes close to doubting entirely the beneficial effects of memory."⁷⁵ Yet should we apply this thesis to Morton, the outcome would be precisely the opposite. Following his father's example, Morton always argues from the past/memory to rectify errors in the present and to adjust stances in accordance with evolving public interest. Thus, when Morton expresses his doubts of the insurgents' conduct and divisions before he commits himself to them, Mucklewrath accuses Morton of betraying the cause his father has supported, and Burley compares the present insurgents to those of 1640. But Morton replies:

But their affairs...were wisely conducted, and the violence of their zeal expended itself in their exhortations and sermons, without bringing divisions into their counsels, or cruelty into their conduct. I have often heard my father say so, and protest, that he wondered at nothing so much as the contrast between the extravagance of their religious tenets and the wisdom and moderation with which they conducted their civil and military affairs. But our counsels seem all one wild chaos of confusion. (245)

What we hear here is the voice of memory, which directs his moderation and active faith in the present.

On the other hand, the "ambivalent legacy" of loyalty left by Silas to his son, Henry, is also suggestive. Silas finds he must change sides to act properly when the sides themselves are modified by events. His loyalty to a specific party is not dogmatic or fanatic but rather a sense of loyalty within the parameter of honour and public interest. While Scott advocates consensus, he seems to dismiss blind

affiliation and to allow some space for individual responsibility in judgment, including an evaluation of the factions. Embodying his father's morality, Morton does not prove to be single-minded in affiliating with the Royalists, Silas's last involvement, but rather allies with the Covenanters, whom he assumes to embody the nation's interest in liberty and justice. Therefore, Morton's loyalty, like his father's, transcends any ideology and is directed to the welfare of Scotland as a nation. Morton abides by this notion of loyalty until the end:

Silence your senseless clamours, yonder is the enemy! On maintaining the bridge against him depend our lives, as well as our hope to reclaim our laws and liberties. —There shall at least one Scottishman die in their defence. — Let any one who loves his country follow me! (332)

This patriotic cry epitomizes all civic and heroic virtue, which Scott calls for inculcating in the present as a bastion against excessive individualism and divisiveness. Morton's constant identity is his commitment to his nation. The modifications in his identity lie only in the means of perpetuating this constancy in a changing world.

According to Dennis, "Morton's national heroism, furthermore, his labours in the cause of a moderate and traditional Scotland, a Scotland of 'laws and liberties,'" lie outside the history of Morton himself. This "anachronism" Dennis argues is "both his virtue and his problem, and he endures all the social penalties of being 'ahead of his time.'"⁷⁶ This "anachronism," I would suggest, could be undercut when we consider it to be oriented toward the present. In the context of the divisions that threaten the British society in 1816, Morton's performance becomes a sort of artificial memory for the reader, much as Silas is the memory of Morton.

Scott's portrayal of the uncertain times in which Henry Morton strives parallels the changes taking place in his own time. Marilyn Gaull points out that "just as the traditional relationship between man and God, man and nature, had been shifting, so the traditional relationships among men had been open to question, specifically to discover what the best and necessary relationships were."⁷⁷ Amid such changes Morton's virtues and his centrist policy serve as an ideal model to be imitated in the present. Dennis remarks that *Old Mortality* reflects Scott's "anxiety over the new cycle of escalating desires—revolutions of rising expectation—and the accompanying paroxysm of national violence and death through which not just Scotland, but all of Europe was currently passing."⁷⁸ This remark, in fact, makes sure that memory, at

least in its positive aspects, remains important for guiding our foot steps in the present. Memory/history reminds generations now that the wars in Scotland were nurtured by divided loyalties. Second, the Glorious Revolution, which has brought settlement of the disputes, we assume is reached as a result of moderate solution, which anticipates the loyalty to the nation over the loyalty to faction or party. But the crucial question is: can we depend on these lessons from memory to solve contemporary problems? Dennis, like McMaster, finds in the ending of *Old Mortality* a sort of pessimism that manifests in Scott's doubts that the "individual life could even remain autonomous or provide centres of peace and accord independent of political and historical development." Dennis describes the union of Morton with Edith as "insubstantial,"⁷⁹ lacking the vitality and optimism which we discern in the case of Waverley and Rose. Does this mean that Scott has lost faith in the real value of progress? It could be, but his programme of progress and reconciliation proceeds till finally it gives a clear picture in *The Bride of Lammermoor* of how disastrous a society might look like in the absence of this programme.

Notes: Chapter Three.

1. Lockhart, *The Life*, 1: 32.
2. Some comments on this portrait by Scott's friend Joseph Train seem to have been the inspiration for *Old Mortality*. See Lockhart, *The Life*, 5:161.
3. For Scott's knowledge and use of Covenanting literature, see James Anderson, *Sir Walter Scott and History* (Edinburgh: Edina Press, 1981), 49-57. For the story of the Cameronian (or ultra-Covenanting) minister, see John Buchan, *Sir Walter Scott* (N.Y: Kennikat Press, 1967), 173.
4. *The Letters*, Grierson, 4:292.
5. See, for example, Gordon, *Under Which King?* 65-66; and Daiches, "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist," 109-110.
6. Daiches, "Sir Walter Scott and History," 471.
7. Hart, 67-86.
8. For this view see Thomas Crawford, *Walter Scott* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1965), 62.
9. George Goodin, "Walter Scott and the Tradition of the Political Novel," *The English Novel in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. George Goodin, *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, no.63 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 14.
10. *Letters*, Grierson, 11:59.
11. John MacQueen, *The Enlightenment and Scottish Literature Vol. 2, The Rise of the Historical Novel* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1989), 98.
12. *The Letters*, Grierson, 11:58. See Beth Dickson's essay, "Sir Walter Scott and the limits of toleration," *Scottish Literary Journal* 18, 2 (1991), 46-62. Dickson demonstrates that Scott's Toryism led him to discredit the Covenanters and glorify the Royalists, by analyzing the language describing both.
13. Lukacs, 32.
14. David Brown, 69.
15. Ina Ferris, *The Achievement of Literary Authority: Gender, History and the Waverley Novels* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 162.
16. Trevor-Roper, 228.
17. The Scottish part in the Civil Wars is so complex that readers unfamiliar with this corner of history may demand some background information to understand my argument. In 1634, the English Parliament, in an attempt to find allies in its struggle against the Crown, forged a Solemn League and Covenant with the Scots, who at that time shared a monarch with England but had a parliament of their own. Under the Covenant, the Scots agreed to support Parliament's demands for political liberalization in exchange for Parliament's promise to reform the Protestant state churches of both kingdoms along the lines favoured by Scottish Presbyterians. The proposed ecclesiastical reforms included the adoption of Calvinist religious doctrine and the abolition of the old Episcopal hierarchy inherited from Catholicism. For a time, this pact held, and its Scottish supporters, known as Covenanters, actually fought side by side with Parliamentary forces in England. Scottish enthusiasm waned, however, when the more radical English Independent, or "Puritan," faction achieved dominance among the parliamentary forces. The Independents sought to abolish the monarchy and centralized church authority altogether, preferring to establish a republic and to grant individual church congregations the power to decide doctrinal issues for themselves. (Their

views on church government led to their being called Congregationalists.) In 1647, after the defeat and capture of Charles I, the Covenanters broke ranks with the Independents and joined forces with the Royalists in an alliance known as the Engagement. This alliance was cemented in 1649 by the execution of Charles I, who was, after all, still King of Scotland, however the English Parliament might dispose of his claims to the English throne. With all of Scotland in open rebellion, Oliver Cromwell, who had emerged as the leader of the Independents, launched an invasion, defeating the Engagers at Dunbar in 1650 and quickly subjecting the country to military government. During the Cromwellian Commonwealth, the exiled Charles II dealt with both the Scottish Royalists and the Covenanters, promising the latter to fulfil the Covenant if he were restored to the throne. When he was called back from exile in 1660, however, Charles quickly broke his promise and re-established the old Episcopal Church in both Scotland and England. When the Covenanters objected and resisted all efforts to negotiate a compromise, Charles, collaborating with Scottish Royalists, resorted to force. The result was a series of uprisings like the one depicted in *Old Morality*. It was not until Charles' brother and heir, James II, was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 that the twice-broken Covenant was fulfilled and free Presbyterianism was established as the state church, at least in Scotland. For these and other details, see Rosalind Mitchison, *A History of Scotland*, 2d ed. (London & New York: Methuen, 1982), Chapters 12-14; also see John Burke, *History of England* (London: Collins, 1974), 135-168.

18. Francis Jeffrey, *Edinburgh Review* 28 (1817), 257.

19. Jeffrey, 258 and 195.

20. Jeffrey, 258. "[Despite] these [anti-puritan] propensities, we think he has dealt fairly with both sides."

21. *British Review*, 9 (1817), 195.

22. Thomas M'Crie, *A Vindication of the Scottish Covenanters, Consisting of a Review of the First Series of "Tales of My Landlord"; Extracted from the Christian Instructor, for 1817* (Philadelphia: James M. Campbell & Co., 1843), 21. Scott took M'Crie's attack seriously enough to respond to it in a lengthy and anonymous self-review in the *Quarterly Review*, 16 (1817), 430-480, defending both his conception of the middle-of-the-road hero and the accuracy of the picture he draws of the Covenanters. For Alexander Welsh's analogous treatment of Henry Morton, see *The Hero of the Waverley Novels* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 235-237 and 243-255.

23. M'Crie, 99.

24. Quoted by Trevor-Roper, 228.

25. Trevor-Roper, 228.

26. Sir Walter Scott, *Old Mortality* (1816), ed. Jane Stevenson and Peter Davidson (Oxford University Press, 1993), 36. All further quotations will be from this edition and will be noted in my text.

27. McMaster, 78.

28. MacQueen, 99.

29. McMaster, 78.

30. Cockshut, 134.

31. Cockshut, 132.

32. Cockshut, 146.

33. Hume, *The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688* (Edinburgh: J. Ballantyne & Co., 1808-1810), 7: 558.

34. Hume, *The History*, 7: 558 -559.
35. Hume, *The History* 9: 154 -155.
36. Hume, *The History*, 9: 155.
37. Hume, *The History* 9: 163.
38. Hume, *The History*, 9: 164.
39. Hume, *The History*, 9: 242. Scott's Covenanters also refer to Old Testament stories as examples for their violent behaviour. In fact, the story of Jael and Sisera is itself mentioned in the novel. See *Old Mortality* (1816), 211 and 428.
40. *Miscellaneous Works of Sir Walter Scott*, 24: 212. (Emphasis mine.)
41. *Miscellaneous Works*, 24: 212- 213.
42. McMaster, 169.
43. McMaster, 221.
44. Letters, 4: 293.
45. *The Critical Heritage*, 107.
46. *The Critical Heritage*, 128 -129.
47. Brown, 70.
48. McCrie, 15.
49. Chris Jones, 45.
50. Ferguson, *Essay* 212 -213.
51. For the details of this episode, see Edgar Johnson, 1: 131-134.
52. Ferguson, *Essay*, 28.
53. McMaster, 171.
54. See, for instance, Welsh, 60. &232. He treats Burley as a type of "dark hero."
55. Cockshut, 141-142. It should be noted here that Cockshut fails to note the similarity between this exposition of the "inward light" and that of Hume's *History*. See also Brown, 81 - 82.
56. Welsh, 256.
57. Welsh, 256.
58. Brown, 80. David Hewitt, in his article, "Scott's Art and Politics" draws a connection between the dissension among the revolutionaries and their "democratic tendencies," which are disapproved of by the narrator. The narrative, Hewitt argues, is an "argument for the existing constitution at a time when Whigs and radicals were attempting to give effect to the democratic idea of liberty by reforming Parliament." By associating democracy with chaos and social dissolution, *Old Mortality* becomes a comment on contemporary happenings. *Sir Walter Scott: The Long-Forgotten Melody*, ed. Alan Bold (U.S.A: Vision Press, 1983), 62-63.
59. Scott's admiration for the Glorious Revolution is well known. In fact, a number of critics have accused him of distorting history by painting too rosy a picture of the state of Scotland after the Revolution in the post-1688 chapters of *Old Mortality*. See for example, Brown, 87-88. Scott's view of the Glorious Revolution seems to echo Burke's. According to Burke, "Accepting King William was not properly a choice; but to all those who did not wish, in effect, to recall King James, or to deluge their country in blood, and again to bring their religion, laws, and liberties into the peril they had just escaped, it was an act of *necessity*, in the strictest moral sense in which necessity can be taken." See Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution & Other Essays*, ed. Ernest Rhys (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1910), 16.
60. Lukacs, 63. For a similarly "anachronistic" use of the heterogeneity of ends, see Morton's debate with Burley about the historical value of violence at the end of

Chapter 21 in *Old Mortality*. Burley argues that good may come of an apparently evil action such as his own assassination of Archbishop Sharpe or Robert the Bruce's assassination of the Red Cumming (a crime that preserved Scotland's independence from England in the late middle ages). Morton concedes the point, but insists that the perpetrators of such actions are no less guilty, much as in his letter to Major Bellenden, he distinguishes between the "violent passions" of the Covenanters and their providential consequences.

61. Hume, *The History* 9: 156.
62. See Welsh, 240, 256-257. Welsh strains to reduce Scott's Constitutionalism to a defense of individual property rights.
63. Hobbes was what the Covenanters would call an "Erastian"; he believed that the choice of religious doctrines belonged to the sovereign (king or legislature) alone, rather than to the individual citizen. Imposed unanimity in the religious sphere was supposed to result in civil peace, which would allow each individual to pursue his private good in the secular sphere more effectively. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651), ed. Crawford Brough Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985) III. Chapter 40.
64. I am here referring mainly to Locke's *Second Treatise* (1698), Chapters 2, 7, 9 and *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1690).
65. "Goods" here should not be taken in an Aristotelian sense, since Hume and the "philosophical" historians generally rejected the Aristotelian view that "the good for man" is discoverable by human reason. For Hume, the good is defined in hedonistic and/or utilitarian terms. At the same time, Hume's belief in the uniformity of human nature commits him as much as Aristotle to the view that at least some kinds of goods are common to all human beings.
66. Hart, 70-71, 81. Hart, of course, treats Edward Waverley in similar terms as I have demonstrated in my analysis of *Waverley* in chapter two.
67. For a detailed study about various sensibilities, see Chris Jones.
68. See M'Crie, 40. Scott himself was aware that he was engaged in historical revisionism in his depiction of Claverhouse. In his conversation with Joseph Train that inspired the novel, Scott said of Claverhouse that "no man had been more traduced by the Historians." See Edgar Johnson, 1:552. Also see a more colourful version in Lockhart, *The Life*, 5: 161.
69. Welsh, 236.
70. M' Crie, 40.
71. M' Crie, 44.
72. Sir Walter Scott, *Quarterly Review* 16 (1817), 469.
73. John Plamenatz, *Man and Society: Political and Critical Theories from Machiavelli to Marx*, Vol. 2 (London:Longman, 1992), XXX.
74. Hart, 76.
75. Ian Dennis, *Nationalism and Desire in Early Historical Fiction* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 94.
76. Dennis, 91.
77. Marilyn Gaull, *English Romanticism: The Human Context* (New York: Norton Press, 1988), 112.
78. Dennis, 93.
79. Dennis, 94.

Chapter Four

Rob Roy (1817)

Like *Waverley* and *Old Mortality*, *Rob Roy* takes place against a background of rebellion, the Jacobite uprising of 1715. It is to be expected that the novel shares some features with its predecessors, despite the shift in Scott's narrative technique—in *Rob Roy* the story is told as the first-person autobiographical narrative of Osbaldistone's son Frank, addressed in old age to his reader and business partner of many years, Will Tresham. Thus for contemporary criticism the value of the book, along with the rest of the *Waverley* novels, lies in its realistic representation of "national manners."¹ Yet later criticism, observing that these ideals were almost dead by the time Scott wrote his novel, is reluctant to take this thesis at its face value.² Critics, as a result, endeavour to explore any underlying moral lessons in *Rob Roy*, in the light of Scott's vision of history and progress.

For David Daiches, the novel juxtaposes two worlds of different manners or cultures; one feeds on "heroic violence," the other hinges on "enlightened prudence."³ Thus the main concern of the book is in dramatizing "the effect of historical process on older surviving social forms, codes of behaviour and personal ideals."⁴ For Daiches and in line with his well known schema, the underlying theme of the novel is "the necessity of sacrificing heroism to prudence, even though heroism is so much more attractive."⁵ In the same vein, Donald Davie argues that *Rob Roy* displays a sort of apology for the emerging commercial world so that "the old gets less than justice."⁶ The old is present in the novel, in his view, just to demonstrate changes in moral standards, for instance, an ancient virtue like "honour" mutates and takes the form of "credit" in the present.⁷

It is clear that both readings of *Rob Roy* tend to attribute to Scott unqualified commitment to progress and commercial ideals, in contrast to his position in *Waverley*. Perhaps the role of the protagonist and the unglamorous presentation of the Jacobites in the novel have led to such readings. Frank Osbaldistone, unlike Edward Waverley, shows no attraction to the Jacobite cause and its heroic world (manners) from the beginning till the end.⁸ Also the state of the clans in particular and the Jacobites in general is presented in *Rob Roy* as divided; each works for his own interest following bloodshed and intrigues. This dim picture, besides the

economic misery in the Highlands, stands in sharp contrast with the brilliant picture Scott draws of the performance of the Jacobites in *Waverley*.

Other critics, making use of the author's psychobiography, seem to read the novel in terms of Scott's ambivalence toward progress and civilization. In his article, "The Commercial Motif of the Waverley Novels," Lawrence Poston views Scott's position in *Rob Roy* toward the past and the present as divided: "Many of his sympathies lay with the money-making class to which he belonged; another side of him, reflecting his innate Tory paternalism, was appalled at the human waste that an unrestrained competitiveness could produce."⁹ Almost in similar terms, Bruce Beiderwell, in a more recent work, argues that Scott's contrast between the heroic world of the Highlands and the commercial world of the lowlands in *Rob Roy* is only an embodiment of the philosophical historians' view of the stages of progress. In his view, the narrative, through this contrast, "reveals the liabilities of the advanced, commercial state; it is a state, of course, that so greatly rewarded and eventually bankrupted him [Scott]."¹⁰

Robert C. Gordon, on the other hand, focuses in his reading of the novel on the issue of filial connection, which, in his view, occupies a considerable area in the novel. He views the novel not only as "Scott's variation on the parable of the Prodigal Son" but also asserts: "it is the issue of filial responsibility that unites *Rob Roy*."¹¹ Gordon treats the issue of "filial responsibility" according to the *Bildungsroman* tradition—the protagonist's obedient return to his father after being educated by more than one agent: Bailie Jarvie, Die Vernon and Rob Roy. However, this reading, true as it stands, remains incomplete; for the complications that govern family connections in the novel cannot be understood in isolation from historical progress and contemporary politics. We know that views about family are politicized in the writings of radicals such as Thomas Paine and conservatives like Edmund Burke. Both writers, in fact, elaborate on the aristocratic law of primogeniture and its effect on the stability of familial, social and political life, though, of course, in opposite directions.¹²

My argument shows that *Rob Roy*, like *Waverley*, uses socio-historic analysis, in the tradition of the "philosophical" historians, employing the notion of contrast of cultures for ideological effects that are complex rather than simply attributable to one contemporary ideology. Firstly, I would suggest, it serves to undercut the specific political conflict of the '15 by making it a model of a clash of cultures that

encompasses all aspects of human life. Secondly, contrary to Daiches's thesis, it serves to assert the social-moral import of civic and heroic virtues and the possibility of transferring them into the present in new forms that match the new context. Within the framework of Pocock's seminal work *Virtue, Commerce, and History* (1985), I show how the virtue of "honour" could mutate, in terms of commercial humanist rhetoric, into the virtue of "credit." Thirdly, I expand Gordon's argument to show that Scott attempts to reach a synthesis of the otherwise antagonistic principles of Burke and Paine concerning family affairs. That is, he recognizes the significance of cohesion and hierarchy in family structure provided that traditional paternal authority, as a form of dictatorship, is redefined to take the form of mutual understanding and respect, at least in the private sphere. Likewise, Scott recognizes the law of inheritance but submits it to civil law. Finally, I demonstrate that Scott's attitude towards the commercial world is based on social-moral considerations.

Earlier and recent critics, who might have taken their cue from Scott himself, confirm that *Rob Roy*, in one way, is concerned with contrasting two cultures, semi-barbaric in the Highland versus commercial in the Lowland.¹³ In the long 1829 Introduction to *Rob Roy* Scott writes:

It is this strong contrast betwixt the civilized and cultivated mode of life on the one side of the Highland line, and the wild and lawless adventures which were habitually undertaken and achieved by one who dwelt on the opposite side of that ideal boundary, which creates the interest attached to his [Rob Roy's] name.¹⁴

This passage is reminiscent of the stages of progress as postulated by the "philosophical" historians, particularly Adam Ferguson. Unsurprisingly, any one who reads Ferguson's *Essay* will come across similar passages that contrast the manners of primitive societies with commercial ones. Therefore we expect that Scott will employ this contrast much as Ferguson does to reveal codes that govern people's relationships in relatively primitive societies with particular emphasis on civic and heroic virtues and show how civilization and refinement could weaken them by excessive gravitation towards individual autonomy and selfishness. Scott, however, seems to pose the problem of apparent incommensurable cultural norms and then attempts to solve that problem by tracing divergent norms back to an original element—human

nature. This attempt in itself legitimizes accommodating ancient virtues to new contexts.

The first cultural contrast takes place in the episode of Glasgow's town prison when the protagonist, Frank Osbaldistone, and Rob Roy meet the turnkey, Dougal. The picture Frank draws of the turnkey and the warm welcome the latter shows to his chief, Rob Roy is suggestive:

He was a wild shock-headed looking animal...In my experience I have met nothing so absolutely resembling my idea of a very uncouth, wild, and ugly savage adoring the idol of his tribe. He grinned, he shivered, he laughed, he was near crying, if he did not actually cry. He had a "Where shall I go? What can I do for you?" expression of face, the complete surrender, and anxious subservience and devotion of which it is difficult to describe, otherwise than by the awkward combination which I have attempted. (193)

Although Frank seems to comment patronizingly on the scene yet, in the wake of Frank's strained relationship with his father that has ended with alienation, Scott renders the whole scene as a comment on Frank himself, and in some sense a critique of his culture. Dougal is a typical ordinary member of Rob Roy's clan reminiscent of Evan Dhu. He is attached to Rob by ties of natural and genuine affections, the rudimentary cement for social cohesion. Also, he belongs to a patriarchal world wherein allegiance to the chief, tribe and parents, is irrational and absolute. Therefore, it is no surprise for Frank to describe what he sees as his first experience. After all, he belongs to a relatively liberal and enlightened world; wherein the son can say his word and even rebel against his father's will. For Frank, as for the reader, who ignores clan culture and the strong bonds that attach members of a clan to each other and to their chief, the scene might present a sort of exaggerated compliment associated with a sense of servitude. However, to reveal the underlying social-moral import of this episode from a philosophical perspective, Scott designs another episode in which he transfers Dougal's feelings and real commitment from theory into practice allowing a moral lesson to emerge. Captain Thornton, in his campaign in the Highland to capture Rob Roy, takes Dougal as a captive and negotiates with him to capture Rob.

"And now, my friend," said the Captain, "let us understand each other. You have confessed yourself a spy, and should string up to the next tree—but come, if you will do me one good turn, I will do you another. You.

Donald—you shall in the way of kindness carry me and a small party to the place where you left your master [Rob Roy] as I wish to speak a few words with him on serious affairs; and I'll let you go about your business, and give you five guineas to boot."

"Oigh! Oigh!" exclaimed Dougal, in the extremity of distress and perplexity, "she canna do tat—she canna do tat—she'll rather be hanged."

Hanged, then, you shall be, my friend," said the officer; "and your blood be upon your own head. —Corporal Cramp, do you play Provost-Marshal—away with him!"(276)

For the Captain, who, like Frank, ignores the clan culture, it is normal to think that his offer could induce Dougal to betray his master (Morris is a counter example of Dougal). For Dougal, it is a stunning offer, more horrible than death itself. Before the first picture, which associates Dougal with savagery and servility, crystallizes to take a heroic and civic dimension, we momentarily doubt his courage not to betray his master when he exclaims: "Shentlemans, stops—stops!—She'll do his honour's bidding— stops!"(276) Even Bailie Jarvie, an expert in clan culture, finds in Dougal's concession to betray his master an anomalous act that belies the notion of honour that governs the Highland culture. Such shameful act, in Jarvie's view, deserves death: "Away wi' the creature" said the Bailie, "he deserves hanging mair now than ever—awa wi' him, corporal—why dinna ye tak him away?" (276) Later, in chapter 31, we come to realize that Dougal is not showing weakness, but a canny tactic to lead the Captain and his soldiers into an ambush.

Anthropologically, the suggestiveness of Dougal's episode could be explained in two ways, historical and moral. Historically, it shows that in the Highlands at this stage of historical progress it is difficult to break the tribal social bonds, regardless of hierarchy. For all objective reasons the interest of the clan member is part and parcel of the interest of the whole tribe. This dictates the absolute loyalty of all members to their clan in the figure of its chief. The chief "embodies the clan identity, rather than the essentially economic relationship of servant to master within the historical context of emerging capitalism."¹⁵ This contrasts, for instance, with the relationship between Frank and Andrew Fairservice in which the latter acts autonomously without being morally obliged. In the case of Dougal, if the chief were lost, the clan would be nothing more "than a wasp without its head, which may sting once, perhaps, but is instantly crushed into annihilation." (306) It is historical necessity that has cultured Dougal and Evan Dhu in this manner. Their honesty is a cultural heritage not a willed

individual choice. Feudal society demands the fulfilment of roles in which loyalties are determined by birth; hence deviation from a given role results in disgrace.

Morally, it shows no contradiction between what is public and what is individual; reciprocity that defines social relationships in the tribe is adhesive rather than repulsive. Here, the moral and the historical are one and the same. The morality behind this episode, then, is that loyalty, in general, is an integrative force that implies some sort of disinterestedness. Commenting on the episode, Brown states that "both the officer and the Bailie apply the typical standards of their own society, quite mistakenly, to Dougal: in fact the clansman is utterly incapable of being bribed to such an end."¹⁶

Nevertheless, it is not uncommon in Scott's fiction to present a traitor, at all times and by all standards, as dangerous for his family, society and nation—Rashleigh adduces a notorious example. But although in Dougal's critical case betrayal might be justified; yet by adhering to loyalty at the expense of his own life he ascends to the level of heroism. Here the civic and heroic are confounded; occasionally, to achieve a civic virtue some sort of heroism is needed. For instance, though Jarvie detests "a worldly and a perfidious creature," and "filthy lucre of gain that men gie themselfs up to" (276) we are not sure that he can match Dougal's heroism under the same circumstance. We are told earlier in the novel that in Jarvie's commercial lexicon honour is suicide and so we do not expect him to carry out such an enterprise. Such expectation is further reinforced when the corporal alludes to Jarvie's potential cowardice: "it's my belief and opinion, honest gentleman ... that if you were going to be hanged yourself, you would be in no such d—d hurry." (276)

Although, apparently, the general atmosphere of the narrative tends to endorse Jarvie's attitude, which pits the virtue of rationality and personal safety against that of heroism, as most critics argue, yet in depth the case is not like that. The philosophical argument that supports the viability of civic and heroic virtues emerges when Captain Thornton himself becomes another civilized Dougal. Captain Thornton, unlike Dougal, belongs to an advanced stage of progress or to the world of commerce, yet he displays no less heroism than Dougal in his promptness to sacrifice his life for the sake of what he perceives as duty toward public interest. For him, fighting the "gang of ruffians, whose licence has disturbed the country so long," (280) is a public interest that deserves sacrifice. When it comes to public interest, which, I think, constitutes one of Scott's concerns, heroism in response to honour or heroism in response to duty

becomes compatible in essence. This we might understand from Thornton's message to his commanding officer urging him to do his duty keeping Rob in captivity despite the fact that such a measure might lead to Thornton's death at the hands of Helen MacGregor:

present my compliments...to the commanding officer, and tell him to do his duty and secure his prisoner, and not waste a thought upon me. If I have been fool enough to have been led into an ambushade by these artful savages, I am wise enough to know how to die for it without disgracing the service. I am only sorry for my poor fellows,' he said, 'that have fallen into such butcherly hands. (302)

Although the uniqueness of each stage of progress suggests that chivalric heroism is almost alien to commercial culture in which priority is given to private interest, yet the narrative, in the context of the uniformity of human nature, also suggests that its social-moral meaning can be retained by education in various institutions that have replaced the patriarchal system. Defending public interest at all times is a moral duty, without being necessarily associated with violence and bloodshed. Jeanie in *The Heart of Midlothian* is also no less heroic in her exploits in defending the interest of her family, community and nation than those who resort to violence to achieve the same ends.

Almost every episode in *Rob Roy* underlines the contrast between the Highland culture and the commercial one with sociological analysis and a moral lesson to be derived from it. The historical moment of the tribes, Scott points out in his Introduction, is the antithesis of a civilised society. The codes and way of life that govern their culture are alien to a civilised man like Captain Thornton, who, it seems, has forgotten that in the end he is an English stranger among the Highlanders. For instance, he thinks that the alliance of some tribes with him in their fight against Rob Roy would be absolute and extends beyond that mission to fight the Jacobites, but this opinion proves to be false. When the Captain points out that he has to arrest Frank and Jarvie on being Jacobite suspects, the alliance proves to be fragile:

"We'll wash our hands o' that," said Inverashallock. "I came here wi' my men to fight against the red MacGregor that killed my cousin...but I will hae nothing to do touching honest gentlemen that may be gaun through the country on their ain business."

"Nor I neither," said Inverach. (270)

An agreement or contract, according to Captain Thornton, needs to be respected as the basis of a civilised society, while for the Highlanders it means only a circumstantial event. The Highlanders' loyalty to a government that embodies commercial ideals is tactical and ends with the death of Rob, but strategically they cannot but be loyal to the Jacobites by virtue of analogy between the clannish patriarchal tradition—absolute allegiance to the chief—in particular and the Jacobite/Stuart ideology in general. The latter is founded on the idea of Divine Right doctrine or absolute monarchy. This congeniality perhaps provides another explanation as to why the Highlanders are always the first to support and fight for the Stewarts in their claim to restore the throne.¹⁷ Paradoxically, Major Galbraith, a Highlander participating in the mission to capture Rob Roy punctures this congeniality when he puts it succinctly for the English Captain: "There's the king that is—and there's the king that suld of right be—I say, an honest man may and suld be loyal to them both, Captain." (271)

Yet Scott solves this paradox, dualism of loyalty, in terms of economy, as Jarvie demonstrates in chapter 26. After the death of Queen Anne, King George ceased to provide the chiefs of the clans with "neither like to be siller nor pensions," hence the alternative is "an outbreak for the Stewarts." (238-39). This explanation evacuates politics from ideology and asserts economy within a cultural context as the basis of all ideologies. In the context of contemporary happenings, the message is quite clear; Scott seems to remind the authorities of the relationship between economic distress and rebellion, as he does in *The Antiquary* through the conversation between Oldbuck and Saunder Mucklebackit in chapter 34. Also by focusing on the economic factor, Scott seems to undercut the value of any political ideology that governs the Highlanders' allegiance. By adding a cultural twist to the factor of economy in determining the Highlanders' loyalty, Scott reduces the whole political affair of the '15 to a sort of breakdown in communication between two distinct cultures.

Some Highlanders befriend the government forces only to help them in the act of revenge, one of the main features of clan culture in the Highlands. As Beiderwell points out, in a clan culture members of a clan "will not surrender their right to punish private affronts in exchange for public safety."¹⁸ The notion of revenge, as another component of honour, is another reason for the loosening of bonds among the clans so that they become vulnerable against the government forces. However, when it comes to fighting the Jacobites it becomes an encroachment on the whole culture rooted in

the patriarchal ideology that preserves their own way of life. This fact, not apparent to Captain Thornton, is very clear to the Bailie Jarvie whose roots extend to the Highlands and knows about their mentality very well. When the Captain talks about his reliance on the Highlanders in his plan to finish Rob Roy, Bailie Jarvie admonishes him:

"I dinna ken," said the Bailie; "there's mair brandy than brains in Garschattachin's head this morning— And I wadna, an I were you, Captain, rest my main dependence on the Hielandmen—hawks winna pike hawks' een. They may quarrel amang themsells, and gie ilk ither ill names, and maybe a slash wi' a claymore; but they are sure to join in the lang run against a' civilized folk, that wear breeks on their hinder ends, and hae purses in their pouches." (280-281)

Through this passage, the author shifts our attention from a political conflict about legitimacy to a cultural conflict based on a sharp economical discrepancy between those who have and those who do not have.

Jarvie's analysis of the socio-psychological state of the clan society is that of a "philosophical" historian. For instance, Adam Ferguson describes the state of affairs of the tribes in a similar way:

they [clans] require the exercise of foreign wars to maintain domestic peace: when no enemy appears from abroad, they have leisure for private feuds, and employ that courage in their dissensions at home, which, in time of war, is employed in defence of their country.¹⁹

In other words, if the law of concentric circles of loyalties justifies various disputes among the clans, the very same law unites them to fight a foreign enemy (or a foreign culture). It is worth noting here that while Ferguson describes the clan's external war as a "defence of their country," Bailie Jarvie calls it a war against "a' civilized folk, that wear breeks on their hinder ends, and hae purses in their pouches." The purport of the two descriptions is highly significant. In the first case the Highlander's courage and military skill is associated with lack of luxury and a sort of politics and nationalism, while in the second it is associated with cultural-economical distinction—savage against civilized and poor against rich.

Unarguably, Ferguson, as well as Scott, views the Highlanders' "private feuds" as moral failing yet both for sure would exalt their spirit of military courage, at least it is

useful in defending the country against external enemies. Jarvie, however, has his own reasons to mask the relationship between luxury and the spirit of military courage. After all, he is financially prosperous as a result of accepting Hanoverian rule and the growing commercial economy of Scotland. Jarvie's repeated justification of the Union is the opening of Scottish trade to America and the West Indies. This, to a contemporary reader, would not only involve the "free-trade" ideology of the USA but also the issue of slavery. Jarvie tells us in chapter 26 that he "had learned the art of composing...excellent liquor," by using "the limes" which "were from his own little farm yonder-awa," without locating it geographically. Significantly, Scott debunks Jarvie's ambiguous move when he comments between two brackets: "indicating the West Indies with a knowing shrug of his [Jarvie's] shoulders." (229) Scott seems to allude to the issue of slavery and the exploitation of slaves in plantations of the British colonies. As Jarvie appears to know its moral implication, he shrewdly keeps the location of his farm obscure. The recipe of luxury, free market economy, profit, slavery and colonization undercuts the concept of Jarvie's decency, credibility and honesty in the absolute ethical sense and confines it only to business and profit. Jarvie expresses his full satisfaction with luxury though he admits that the "good ware has aften come from a wicked market." (229)

On the other hand, Scott, the anthropologist, through Jarvie, shows that economy is a crucial element in determining manners and social-moral values. Economy in the Highlands at this stage of progress for all objective reasons is based on a conflict for survival. The one who does not have in order to survive needs "to live by stealing, reiving, lifting cows and the like depredations!" It follows that "depredation", as a profession, needs physical strength and sometimes violence. In this context, as Jarvie explains, the Highlanders "take pride in it, and reckon driving a spreagh (stealing a herd) a gallant, manly action, and mair befitting of pretty men...than to win a day's wage by ony honest thrift." (235) "Depredation," as Jarvie explains, may take the form of "blackmail." (237) Rob used to levy blackmail from farmers in return for protecting their cattle from looters. Interestingly, he performed his job honestly: "—let them [farmers] send to him if they lost sae muckle as a single cloot by thieving, and Rob engaged to get them again, or pay the value—and he ay keepit his word." (237)

The fight for survival renders a blackmail system a sort of business recognized by both parties, the one who offers protection and the other who pays money protection,

much like a gentleman's agreement that commits both parties to its terms. Rob views this commitment in terms of his own culture as an obligation dictated on him not by law but by a sense of chivalric honour; "he's easy wi' a' body that will be easy wi' him; but if ye thraw him, ye had better thraw the deevil." (237) This, ironically, looks like an inversion of legal business contract in the Lowland. While in the Lowlands a contract is based on credit and supported by the power of law, in the Highlands it is founded on honour and guaranteed by the power of the sword, or some sort of vengeance, to set the record straight. In *Waverley*, we recall what happened to Bradwardine's milk cow when he discontinued payments to Fergus.

Economy in the Lowland is based on commerce and manufacture, which demands an authority to maintain stability and peace; one's survival rests on one's self-independence, credibility and respect for law rather than on physical strength, heroism or symbiosis. Adam Smith describes the situation in a commercial stage as:

Commerce and manufacture gradually introduced order and good government, and within them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had lived before almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors.²⁰

As the economic factor shapes manners in a given society at a given historical moment, and ultimately brings cultures into distinction, it is no accident that Jarvie would be loathe to apply the term "honour" to his own character, as he tells Frank:

But I maun hear naething about honour—we ken naething here but about credit. Honour is a homicide and a bloodspiller, that gangs about making frays in the street; but Credit is a decent honest man, that sits at hame and makes the pat play. (231)

Judith Wilt points out that Bailie Jarvie's "conceit indicates an awareness that a change not merely material but psychic also is in the process, from an economy of honor to an economy of credit."²¹ In his seminal study *Virtue, Commerce, And History* (1985), Pocock highlights the relationship between economy based on commerce and exchange and the change in man's psyche. The very nature of economy, in his view, demanded the emergence of new types of virtues—"manners." According to Pocock, as economy shifted to commerce, man

entered an increasingly transactional universe...in which his relationships and interactions with other social beings, and with products, became increasingly complex and various, modifying and developing more and more aspects of personality. ...Since these new relationships were social and not political in character, the capacities which they led the individual to develop were called not 'virtues' but 'manners,' a term in which the ethical *mores* and the juristic *consuetudines* were combined, with the former predominating. The social psychology of the age declared that encounters with things and persons evoked passions and refined them into manners; it was preeminently the function of commerce to refine the passions and polish the manners; and the social ethos of the age of enlightenment was built upon the concept of close encounters of the third kind.²²

In the wake of Pocock's analysis, Jarvie's notion of credit becomes a sort of new social code or norm that determines individuals' conduct (manners) in commercial society with a presupposition of commitment to contracts, probity, punctuality and other virtues that contribute to the promotion of commerce and business. Still it is difficult, however, to treat credit and honour as two distinct virtues since common sense says that the former cannot hold without including the latter in some way.

What Jarvie seems to be referring to as "honour" is, in part, the sense of honour, which is defined as a public esteem, or reputation, or fame.²³ But it may also be the "honor" with which Jarvie would be familiar that brings about clan feuds and the type of revenge practiced by Helen MacGregor, for instance. "Credit" is standing by one's word for Jarvie. Credit becomes the modern world's partial, but essential manifestation of honour, and Jarvie is its incarnation. However, credit adds a dimension of commerce to the virtue of honour, and though Jarvie may deny it, Scott has merged the two terms. Scott's biography provides good evidence that credit and "honour" constitute two faces for the same coin, as John Sutherland illustrates in his *The Life of Walter Scott*.²⁴ But when Frank asks Jarvie how he can help his father and maintain his own honour, the Bailie is appalled because to him honour is an empty concept, unless backed by credit. Unless Frank's father proves his credibility to his clients by restoring the lost papers, his career will be ruined even though he might be honest in earnest. Here Jarvie is emphasizing the spirit of "honour" which needs to be translated by practice, or as Ian Dennis puts it: "the world of Nicole Jarvie" is one "where honour and credit can combine, and decency can determine behaviour without sacrifice of profit."²⁵ Such a formula, in Jarvie's view, can hold through prudence as a warrant for integrity and against loss of profit and, secondly, by abiding, literally, by the terms of any transaction even it proved to be unfair to the

other party. Frank's father's violation of the first rule has almost brought him destruction, while Rob's violation of the two rules did utterly destroy him. Yet, paradoxically, Jarvie does blame Rob for imprudence describing him as "venturesome" but, on the other hand, he praises him when violating the second rule by describing him as "baith civil and just in his dealings."

Through Jarvie's defence of Rob's magnanimous behaviour, Scott seems to humanize commerce in a way that undercuts credit in its mathematical commercial sense. This he does by giving credit an injection of public responsibility, which proposes an amalgamation that concert the operation of reason (Credit) with that of heart (magnanimity or benevolence):

"Robi was anes a weel-doing, pains-taking drover, as ye wad see amang ten thousand...And he was baith civil and just in his dealings, and if he thought his chapman had made a hard bargain, he wad gie him a lucky-penny to the mends. I hae kend him gie back five shillings out o' the pund sterling."

"Twenty-five per cent" said Owen "a heavy discount."

"He wad gae it though, sir, as I tell ye; mair especially if he thought the buyer was a puir man, and couldna stand by a loss." (236)

When Owen considers a "Twenty-five per cent" a "heavy discount," (236) he implicitly testifies for Rob's extraordinary humane behaviour. Rob could have confined his transactions to the ethical rule of commerce, which Owen simplifies in mathematical terms: "Let A do to B, as he would have B do to him" (12) without even impairing his credit, but his patriarchal tinged culture makes him feel morally, at least in his own eye, that he is dishonest and villain. Rob's sympathy with the poor man is a moral duty that supersedes credit without undermining it. It is derived from a simple hierarchical culture that determines the moral responsibility of each rank toward the lower in a sort of symbiotic relationship, which is, of course, beyond Owen's and Frank's recognition. Rob's action seems to be symbolic of the constructive role of the traditional aristocracy that began to stagger after the weight of economy began to anchor in commerce instead of land, and it may be a critique of the emerging callous capitalism. At any rate, this episode also reveals that though credit seems to be just and puts two parties on equal terms yet it remains a hard justice that needs to be mitigated with human sympathy.

At this point, Rob Roy's chivalric performance seems to elevate honour above credit as the former is imbued with a sense of sympathy, humanity and benevolence.

In this context, Rob's honour emerges as more practical than the credit of William Osbaldistone—based on speculation—yet closer to that of the Bailie Jarvie—based on prudence. Dramatizing Rob's benevolence in this heroic way—benevolence is also a heroic act after a sort—is stark evidence that refutes Daiches's claim above; it proves that heroism, in its positive aspect, as a virtue, is still viable and necessary in the present as long as there is a public interest. Scott, out of sociability and sensibility, much like Wordsworth and Coleridge, seems to exhibit a Romantic antipathy toward rational systems and abstract propositions; in a sense, he would embrace the attitude of "thought-in-feeling, rather than of pure ratiocination."²⁶ Credit as reflected by Frank's father tends to be purely rationalistic while Rob's reason tends to be mingled with a charge of feeling. Scott's credit, therefore, is a synthesis of both in a way that allows honour in the civic humanist tradition to survive. As Homer Obed Brown points out: Scott transfers "the language of chivalry to modern commerce."²⁷

On the other hand, the narrative shows that if a later stage of progress can assimilate and adapt a given old value, it remains very difficult for an earlier stage of progress to assimilate this adaptation. This, of course, explains the impossibility of reversing the course of history, and poses the question of how to avoid cultural collision. None in the Highlands is pleased with the notion of Credit, because it embodies a complex structure of values. The Highlanders are unable to decode its symbols, for instance, probity, especially in keeping promises, punctuality, contracts, institutions, etc. This complex culture is heterogeneous to their simpler state of society. For them the culture of credit bears only profit connotation; and magistrates, the hand of law, are created to secure this profit. Take for instance, Garschattachin's furious comment when Jarvie, as a magistrate and merchant, reminds him of his "duty to his creditors":

"D—n my creditors and you, if ye be ane o'them. I say there will be a new world sune. And we shall hae nae Cawmils cocking their bonnet sae hie, and hounding their dogs where they dunrna came themsells, nor protecting thieves, nor murders and oppressors, to harry and spoil better men and mair loyal clans than themsells." (268)

As Brown points out, credit for the Highlander represents "economic thralldom."²⁸ The only way to break this bondage is by destroying the culture of credit and establishing a "new world." (268) It is clear that each time the Highlanders express

their distress at the present order and their craving to restore the old one in the figure of the Jacobite uprising, Scott is keen to shift the reader's attention to issues connected with culture rather than politics. For example, Rob, though a Jacobite, does not use explicit political terms when he expresses his resentment against the present regime. The focus is on the old way of life and the new way of life, the old culture and the new one. Like Garschattachin, Rob is tormented by the "tharldom" of the institution of law:

"I gie God's malison and mine to a' sort of magistrates, justice, bailies, sheriffs-officers, constables, and sic-like black cattle, that hae been the plagues o' pur auld Scotland this hunder year. It was a merry warld when every man held his ain gear wi' his ain grip, and when the country-side wasna fashed wi' warrants and poidings and apprizings, and a' that cheatry craft." (226)

This and similar passages should not be understood as reflecting Scott's nostalgia for "auld Scotland," nor as an attempt to debunk the mentality of uncivilized society; however, if taken alongside Rob's attitude to commercial professions, the meaning would emerge in a different light. Rob, in fact, loses no chance to this effect. Addressing his cousin Bailie Jarvie, he says: "to my own proper shame be it spoken! That has a cousin wi' accounts, and yarn winnles, and looms, and shuttles, like a mere mechanical person." (205) In the same chapter he admires, and even honours Frank, just because the latter shows contempt to "weavers and spinners, and sic-like mechanical persons and their pursuits." (207) Towards the end of the narrative, when Jarvie offers to help him get his son apprenticed as a weaver, he looks at the offer as an insult: "My sons weavers!...but I wald see every loom in Glasgow, beam, traddles, and shuttles, burn in hell-fire sooner!" (331) It could be an anachronism alluding to Adam Smith's notion of the division of labour and its impact on social-moral and political life.²⁹ Yet here Scott seems to be more concerned in dramatizing the historical process to show how large the gap has become between a civilized society and a society which is quasi-primitive. In this context, Rob's complaints become only a psychological symptom in a transitional period when society finds itself alienated and standing in no man's land and the individual becomes the victim of historical forces. This is best reflected in Rob's impressive speech to Frank: "My cousin Nicol Jarvie means well...but he presses ower hard on the temper and situation of a man

like me, considering what I have been—what I have been forced to become—and, above all, that which has forced me to become what I am." (335)

Rob tried to progress and conform to the modern world and be what Jarvie is, but he failed. And when he moved to live in a world where he could hold "his ain gear wi' his ain grip" he became the victim of injustice in the form of the law. Scott is showing that it is to be expected that Rob resorts to the criminal exploits for which he gained renown. He had been left with nothing else, robbed of his honest means to earn his livelihood and thus stuck between two different worlds. By engaging in his exploits, he became a representative of his family's struggles to maintain identity and values, which were also the fundamental Highland struggles with the modern world. Hart may have well missed this point when he asserts: "The Highland grievances that led to the '15 are not those that turned Rob Roy into outlaw."³⁰ They are indeed the same grievances, the continuous acts of repression sanctioned by laws, which represent the fears and shortsightedness of the Hanoverian government. It is not just that "Jacobitism relates strongly to their yearning for an older, simpler state of society in which the power of the clans was still unchallenged,"³¹ it is also the desire to maintain the values by which those clans have lived. It is no surprise, then, for Rob and the rest in the Highlands to refuse a culture whose laws fall short of implementing justice, on the one hand, and ignore their own way of life on the other.

Scott himself was a lawyer and when he treats the issue of law in his novels, he considers it as a part of the whole cultural heritage of any community. Legal systems and moral judgment, according to Scott and his "philosophical" professors, were to be correlated with stages in the progress of civilization; they were not to be understood as arbitrary products of individual cultures.³² Scott's understanding of law in this way reflects Montesquieu's contribution to the Enlightenment analysis of the nature of law:

Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth; the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which this human reason is applied. They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are made, as to render it very unlikely for those of one nation to be proper for another. ... They should be relative to the climate...to the quality of the soil, to its situation and bigness, to the manner of the living of the natives...to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, number, commerce, manners, and customs.³³

The problem with the law imposed after the Union, was that it was English law, which did not accommodate traditional Scottish values, and it was therefore viewed as a violation of Scottish national character. In this feeling the Lowlanders joined, although not aggressively, with the Highlanders. The lowlanders had accepted, even welcomed earlier Scottish laws, which secured their peace from the Highlanders as Scott writes in the *Tales*.³⁴ Such innovations Scott viewed as evolutionary in social development. The Lowland and Highland differences were settled by men who were products of their communities but who tried to resolve clashes on behalf of a greater good, a unified Scotland. The law imposed by the English had different intent and different consequences. English law was imposed by a society in a different stage of development, and therefore with considerably different values. The imposition of values is viewed as repressive, and repression, Scott is suggesting in his three Jacobite novels, may produce insurrection. As far as law and national identity are concerned, Scott's distress at the legal reforms pressed by a victorious Whig administration in 1807, which, in his view, worked towards defacing the Scottish identity is highly revealing.³⁵

Notwithstanding that the smoke of cultural conflict curtains the political dimension of the Jacobite uprising, yet restoration of the Stewart line means to the Jacobites a restoration of national honour. If we compare Helen MacGregor's exchange with Captain Thornton, the representative of the English law, and what Scott writes about the Clan Act of 1714, we, perhaps, get an additional latent clue as to why the uprising essentially broke out. Consider what Helen says:

"What seek ye here?" she asked... Captain Thornton.

"We seek the outlaw, Rob Roy MacGregor Campbell," answered the officer."

"Ay," retorted the Amazon, "I am no stranger to your tender mercies. Ye have left me neither name nor fame—my mother's bones will shrink aside in their grave when mine are laid beside them—Ye have left me and mine neither house nor hold, blanket nor bedding, cattle to feed us, or flocks to clothe us—Ye have taken from us all—all! —The very name of our ancestors have ye taken away, and now ye come for our lives." (283)

And consider what Scott says about the Clan Act:

This statute...enacted 1. That if a feudal superior went into rebellion, and became liable to the pains of high treason, all such vassals holding lands

under him, as should continue in their allegiance, should in future hold these lands of the Crown. 2. If a tenant should have remained at the King's peace while his landlord had been engaged in rebellion, and convicted of treason, the space of two years gratuitous possession should be added to that tenant's lease. 3. If the superior should remain loyal and peaceful while the vassal should engage in rebellion, and incur conviction of high treason, then the fief, or lands held by such vassal, shall revert to the superior as if they had never been separated from his estate. 4. Another clause declared void such settlements of estates and deeds of entail as might be made on the 1st day of August or at any time thereafter, declaring that they should be no bar to the forfeiture of the estates for high treason, seeing that such settlements had been frequently resorted to for the sole purpose of evading the punishment of the law.³⁶

This is a systematic attempt by England to break the patriarchal system that holds the tenant to his master as a step to erase all the traditional Scottish values, especially in the Highland clans. In fact, it is there that the Union was followed by national discontent. Clearly, unlike Helen MacGregor, Rob, Garschattachin, and the Lowlanders embraced the disbanding of the clans as a measure of their own security. In the same way, they were much quicker to abandon loyalty to Scottish nationalism in favour of a British Empire that would privilege them with economical prosperity. Bailie Jarvie is here possibly preternaturally gifted with insight. When Andrew Fairservice criticized the Union he rebuked him severely:

Whisht, sir! –whisht! it's ill-scaped tongues like yours, that make mischief atween neighbourhoods and nations. There's naething sae gude on this side o' time but might hae been better, and that may be said o' the Union. Nane were keener against it than the Glasgow folk, wi' their rabblings and their risings, and their mobs, as they ca' them now-a-days. But it's an ill wind blaws naebody gude—Let ilka ane roose the ford as they find it—I say, Let Glasgow flourish! (246)

In short, although the uprising has historical political roots connected with Scottish national pride yet Scott wants to say that the Stuart-Hanoverian conflict is in the first place a cultural conflict or, as Daiches would like to say, a clash between two worlds. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that toward the end of the narrative, Scott leaves this issue open by disclosing the gap between Rob and Jarvie. They make offers for each other that neither will ever accept. Yet Scott makes it clear that if Rob and Jarvie diverge culturally, they converge in mutual loyalty as kinsmen in the first place and as friends, in the second:

Our host [Rob] took leave of us with great cordiality, and even affection. Betwixt him and Mr. Jarvie, indeed, there seemed to exist a degree of mutual regard, which formed a strong contrast to their different occupations and habits. After kissing each other very lovingly, and when they were just in the act of parting, the Bailie, in the fulness of his heart, and with a faltering voice, assured his kinsman, 'that if ever an hundred pund or even twa hundred, would put him or his family in a settled way, he need but just send a line to the Saut-market;' and Rob, grasping his basket-hild with one hand, and shaking Mr. Jarvie's heartily with the other, protested, 'that if ever any body should affront his kinsman, an he would but let him ken, he would stow his lugs out of his head, were he the best man in Glasgow. (347)

They are separated by diversity of cultural values, but the values of loyalty and honour they share are strong enough, Scott is showing, to unite them in sympathy and friendship. The law of reciprocity that featured in the relationship between Waverley and Talbot, and Morton and Evandale is parallel to the relationship of Rob and the Bailie. Gordon observes that "the principle of honour and reciprocity not only links London with the Highlands, it also resolves the antithesis between the world of calculation and the world of heroism—the figures of arithmetic and the figures of heraldry."³⁷ From another perspective, if it is problematic for one culture to cancel another, at least in *Rob Roy* the tension is there and it would be wise if both cultures stand as complementary to each other. The power in the Highlands capitalizes on courage and valour and Rob is ready to put it under the service of Jarvie; whereas, the power in the commercial world relies on money and Jarvie is ready to employ it in the service of Rob when he needs it. Scott supports the Union between Scotland and England calling for respect of the specificity of each culture. Such compromise, Scott extends to the issue of family as I show below.

It might be argued that the political conflict between the Stuarts and the Hanoverians is merely a conflict about who has the right to be in power yet the case is not simply so. As we have seen, the conflict is between two different ideologies or cultures in which the political leaves its impact on all aspects of society or in which almost everything becomes politicized. Accordingly, the pattern of family life, as a social institution, cannot but draw on these ideologies. In a recent study of *Rob Roy*, Homer Brown has pointed out that the two plots, the historical which involves the Stuarts and their Hanoverian cousins, and the private, which involves the individual

hero, are "mirror images of each other, and that image is refracted in all the paternal, avuncular, fraternal relationships that are multiplied" throughout the novel.³⁸

This leads us to expect that Scott's projection of the historical into his fiction is in some way a projection of contemporary political debate between radicals and conservatives, who made the institution of family a crucial element in validating their political doctrines. In the wake of the French Revolution, English Jacobins, such as Thomas Paine, William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft adopted revolutionary ideology based on rationalizing all aspects of human life. Building on ideas of philosophers like Rousseau, they depicted society as enslaving the individual and confiscating his will. In the name of natural right in all spheres, these writers called for the emancipation of the individual, asserting his selfhood outside social conventions and family traditions. Appalled by this rhetoric and its potential impact on familial and social relationships, anti-Jacobin novelists and writers, most remarkably Burke, reacted to "emphasize sociability and the individual's duty to social convention."³⁹ Burke, for instance, arguing from past experience, called for adhering to traditions with emphasis on hierarchy in family structure and paternal piety.

Scott's focus on "national manners," like Burke's interest in traditions, is an attempt to invoke historical or past happenings to adduce a corrected version that fits the context of the present. My argument in this section shows that Scott's treatment of family affairs adopts a conservative-liberal strategy; in that Scott emphasizes filial changes within traditions embraced on emotional, imaginative, and rational grounds. Nevertheless, for a better understanding of how Scott employs history in his ideological fictional treatment of the issue of the family, a brief account of the Royal family disputes that preceded the Glorious Revolution might be helpful to our argument.

Historically, the Stuarts ruled according to the Divine Right doctrine, which gave the King absolute authority in handling the country's affairs. Also, according to the law of inheritance, inherent in this doctrine, the King's elder son/daughter was naturally the legitimate heir to the throne. This pattern of political doctrine also extended to family construction, as far as hierarchy, inheritance and authority are concerned. Just before the Glorious Revolution (1688) the Catholic King James II, for religious reasons, violated the law of inheritance when he decided to disinherit his Protestant daughters, the older Mary and the younger Anne. The daughters

disapproved of their father's arbitrary act, and with the help of William of Orange, Mary's husband, and the support of both Tories and Whigs, Mary led a coup against her father, and he abdicated. Finally, the Parliament, through the Bill of Rights dealt the notion of absolute authority a death-blow.⁴⁰ Necessarily, then, the fall of the "Divine right," by limiting the authority of the king in the political sphere, would entail corresponding changes in the social sphere and would, in particular, call into question the limits of future family relationships in terms of authority, piety, inheritance and liberty. Indeed, *Rob Roy*, in one of its aspects, attempts to adduce a solution for this question.

The disagreement between William Osbaldistone and his son, Frank, in its simplest form appears to be a conflict of desires or as a breakdown in communication. The father wants his son to apprentice in commerce, on the assumption that his interest lies there, while the son, following his romantic inclinations, wants to be a poet. Yet in a more complex form, and in terms of real history and historical change, the tension between the father and the son could be viewed as analogous to the tension between king James II and his daughter Mary. In both cases, we assume a dictator father whose authority is absolute, and a rebellious son/daughter who fights for some sort of natural right to choose her religious creed or freedom at all cost. On the other hand, in the context of contemporary debate, Scott depicts the tension as embodying two trends neither of which seem to please him. The first trend presents a petrified conservative view that absolutely resists recognizing the facts of historical progress and hence denies any margin for private freedom, while the other presents a radically liberal view that calls for absolute freedom for the individual. King James II and Frank's father exemplify the first view, while Frank embodies the second.

As early as the first chapters we come to understand that there is something wrong in the relationship between Frank and his father, which, basically, could be attributed to defining their relationship within a frame of materialism. Frank, defending his choice of future career, addresses his father impersonally: "I will never sell my liberty for gold." (19) The father, in his turn, comments: "that is to say, you wish to lean on my arm, and yet to walk your own way," (21) a proposition, which he strongly rejects. Symbolically, William Osbaldistone embodies the deformed creed practiced by absolute monarchs, which has become part of the past in the wake of a liberal environment. Thus, while he displays a liberal and progressive attitude in his business and social relationships, paradoxically, he insists not to apply this spirit to

his family. Scott seems to show that nothing is static, and that familial values like other social values, heroic and civic, are also liable to change and redefinition.

The relationship between Frank and his father polarizes respectively into extreme liberality in the tradition of Paine and extreme conservatism in the tradition of Burke. As a result, Frank's claim for liberty transgresses any duty of respecting paternal will; the father, in his turn accepts the challenge and washes his hands of any responsibility towards his son. In this form, the paternal relationship deviates from the natural track, which keeps the family united. Scott seems to show that the son erred and the father compounded the error by alienating his son. Frank describes this situation as:

There had been such unexpected ease in the manner in which my father slipt a knot, usually esteemed the strongest which binds society together, and suffered me to depart as a sort of outcast from his family, that it strangely lessened the confidence in my own personal accomplishments, which had hitherto sustained me. (23)

The correction of the situation, then, needs more consciousness of the social and moral dangers of jumping over the duties and obligations that govern paternal relationship. Here, duties and obligations are founded not on paternal absolutism but rather on natural feelings and mutual respect in line with progress.

Frank is left doubting whether his father ever had real affection for him: "I was not aware, that there are men who indulge their children at an early age, because to do so interests and amuses them, and who can yet be sufficiently severe when the same children cross their expectations at a more advanced period." (20) His father, however, seems to have erred in adopting "rational" criteria about rational partiality. Thomas Reid argues that there are two types of affection, one of which needs earned regard to exist:

There are some affections which we may call rational, because they are grounded upon an opinion of merit in the object. The parental affection is not of this kind. For, though a man's affection to his child may be increased by merit, and diminished by demerit, I think no man will say, that it took its rise from an opinion of merit. It is not opinion that creates the affection, but affection often creates opinion. It is apt to pervert the judgement, and create an opinion of merit where there is none.⁴¹

William Osbaldistone seems to have been giving his son the second type of affection. Therefore, when he shifted his affections adopting the first type, the relationship

between the two became strained. William is actually following the rationalist code of “Jacobins” like Godwin who denied the claims of mutual affection and insisted on real merit as the only standard of judgment. Extreme Jacobite and Jacobin doctrines are implicated in this breakdown, as they are in William’s original rebellion against his father, when William’s rationalism had been part of revolutionary self-definition. It is the son Frank’s surviving emotional and “family” feeling that eventually redeems the rebel son William. Frank feels a loss of identity, only realized when he became aware of the damage he could have caused to his father as a result of his disobedience, and that his worth is only asserted by correcting his error. The reunion of Frank with his father takes place when the former realizes that obedience to the father is a social and moral duty motivated by natural feelings rather than a sense of servitude, and the latter understands that taking care of the son and respecting his aspirations is a responsibility defined by the same motivation. To achieve this end Scott first designs a psychological shock that triggers Frank's feelings toward his father, then he introduces him to a variety of paternal paradigms that contribute to his education. Here enters another thin thread in the web of the narrative. Once again, Scott resorts to comparison and contrast to highlight the importance of keeping the paternal relationship warm as a necessary prerequisite for maintaining a healthy community, both socially and morally. Such qualification of this relationship, the narrative suggests, becomes more liberal, more a matter of mutual respect, but still invested with a special emotional charge.

In contrast to Queen Mary and Frank, the heroine, Die Vernon, as her name suggests, is a self-sacrificing daughter who devotes all her life to the protection of her father. While her commitment to the Jacobite cause makes of her a version of Flora McIvor, her interest in the domestic reminds us of Rose Bradwardine. Furthermore, we are told by the end of chapter 37 that she is willing to abandon the world for a convent in order to honour a commitment her father has made. In short, she is acquiescing to an old ideology that equates politics with family in terms of absolute authority. However, through Vernon, given her paternal piety that erupts with feelings of devotion that bears social-moral and humane implications, Scott seems to show that not all aspects of traditions are deficient. These noble feelings, in his view, are the rudimentary cement that binds the family together in a stage where materialistic progress tends to render people callous. In this sense, it could be argued that Vernon is the antithesis of the heroine of sensibility, Julie, in Rousseau's

masterpiece, *La Nouvelle Heloise* (1761). But in another way, Vernon's narrative seems to offer a critique of some aspects of old worn-out traditions connected with family affairs in terms of absolutism, which render Vernon's condition almost tragic since the reins of her private life are not in her hands. Scott, metaphorically, likens her social capacities to "singing-birds... which would have adorned society, had they been left at large." (43) Here irrational social norms, imposed upon her, show the other dark side of the picture associated with paternal obedience. We are told that "her father's commands, and a certain family contract, destined her to marry one of Sir Hildebrand's sons. A dispensation has been obtained from Rome for Diana Vernon to marry *Blank* Osbaldistone...and it only remains to pitch upon the happy man, whose name shall fill the gap in the manuscript." (107) In this context, her loyalty to her father is not unquestionable and her complaints become quite understandable when she says: "I should be rather like a wild hawk, who, barred the free exercise of his soar through heaven, will dash himself to pieces against the bars of his cage." (43) In her case, we might have excused her protest, had she refused to bow to tyrannical social convention but for sure we might not have admired her so much had she failed to perform her duty towards her father, as Queen Mary did. In fact, her merit is correspondent to the dear tribute she is willing to pay in this direction. Vernon is an ideal, charming, virtuous, pure, committed, confident of herself, rational, as well as emotional; she has a "mingled character of shrewdness, audacity, and frankness." (52) Such qualities qualify her to win Frank's confidence for "guidance and protection." (58) After all, she plays a crucial role in helping and directing Frank in the process of correcting his error of disobeying his father's will. Of course, her efforts would not have been fruitful had Frank remained a victim of his romantic sensibility about the meaning of liberty and paternal piety.

Therefore Frank's waking up to his romantic delusions under the pressure of the disaster that could affect his father's health and honour, and his feeling of a sort of parricide is a prerequisite for taking the advice of others: "Good Heaven! How shall I redeem the consequences of my error!" (158) Frank is now not only conscious of the guilt of his rebellion against his father which has opened the path for Rashleigh and his intrigues but, more significantly, he becomes aware of the nature of the relationship that binds him with his father. For Scott, as for Burke and the "philosophical" historians, the nature of this binding force is innate affections that cannot be rationalized or ignored. Even when they appear to be absent, they are, in

fact, latent and soon surface when agitated as a sign of inescapable commitment. Vernon, significantly, reminds him of his fatal mistake: "Remember, had you been on the post designed for you, this disaster could not have happened," and she urges him to act quickly so that the whole affair "may be possibly retrieved." (158) Frank learns the first lesson of paternal piety at the hands of Vernon so that he is now prepared to quit the "foolish pride and indolence" (158) and follow his instinctive natural feeling in the process of uniting with his father. Yet he is still in need of further education to solidify this new attitude toward his father.

Frank's father "as a man of business, looked upon the labour of poets with contempt; and as a religious man, and of the dissenting persuasion, he considered all such pursuits as equally trivial and profane." (15) In Glasgow, Scott provides Frank with another character, much similar to his father, to reinforce his consciousness of the value of taking his father's advice. Bailie Jarvie instructs Frank in this direction in various ways. He, in general, shows respect to his deceased father by constantly referring to him "the deacon my father" as a source of the values he lives by. For instance, when Frank asks Jarvie for help and advice that could assist his father in his critical situation the latter comments: "I am no the man that will refuse it to the son of an auld correspondent, and my father the deacon was nane sic afore me." (233) He also still remembers one of his father's recommendations: "never put out your arm farther than ye can draw it easily back again." (201) This advice is, in fact, a comment on the present situation of both, Frank and his father. Jarvie has sold this wisdom to William Osbaldistone, but "he dinna seem to take it a'thegither sae kind as I wished..." (201) In contrast, William Osbaldistone remembers his father with a sort of reproach for disinheriting him of his legal right in the estate of the family. Secondly, as a businessman, he defends commerce as an honest profession, and not without having a fling at the unavailing way of following literature. Finally, he gives Frank guidance when the latter asked him how he could help his father. (230-33)

Scott's manipulation of the "filial issue" shows that in all societies and in all stages of progress, the paternal relationship proves to be the origin of all loyalties that could extend to encompass human relationships in a wider sense. Rob, for instance, though he belongs to a world different from that of Frank's, serves as another example in adding a twist to what Jarvie and Vernon have accomplished. Learning the cause of the fight between Frank and Rashleigh, Rob is impressed with Frank's motive. Within Frank's hearing, he comments: "The ne'er a bit will I yield my consent to his being ill-

guided, for standing up for the father that got him." (226) Perhaps this adds another reason for Rob to proceed in offering his help to Frank. It is worth noting that Scott extends the familial issue beyond the sphere of paternal relationship, within the law of concentric circles, so that it encompasses other relationships: husband and wife, brothers, cousins, and even distant kinship. For instance, Rob chastises both Rashleigh and Frank for dueling because for him it is a real crime to shed a relative's blood: "What! The sons of those fathers who sucked the same breast shedding each other's bluid as it were strangers! By the hand of my father, I will cleave to the brisket the first man that mints another stroke!" (224) On another occasion, Rob, though one word from his cousin the Bailie Jarvie is enough to put him in prison, feels assured that the Bailie will not take any legal measure against him "for the sake of the auld wife ayont the fire at Stuckavrallachan, that made some mixture of our bluids." Jarvie, in his turn, recognizes that "bluid's thicker than water." (205)

Rob is presented through his clan culture as the embodiment of all types of familial ties. Rob's feeling toward his wife is the same feeling toward himself. Also he shows no less concern about his sons' future than about his wife. It is true that he refuses to apprentice them in any mechanical profession, for instance, "weavers" (331), yet he can not conceal his distress for his sons' situation: "—I'm vexed for the bairns—I'm vexed when I think o' Hamish and Robert living their father's life." (336) He admits his responsibility for retarding his sons from improvement, although it is out of his hands due to his critical circumstances.

Vernon's interest in helping Frank's father, though Hanoverian, and against her interest as a Jacobite, as well as Rob's effort in the same direction is an indication that family bonds could be extended to a wider sphere as a sort of social bond. Scott seems to present the idea of the family, though relatively a private affair, as more profound than the idea of the rebellion, which is a public one. We discern that the major part of the action concerns Jacobite figures interesting themselves in serving Frank's mission for his father, something foreign if not contrary to their interests in the rebellion. This also serves as another way of presenting the Jacobite uprising as no serious movement on the public level. Historically, we know that the rebellion "was the result of a private decision taken by one man because of his personal circumstances. The man was John Erskine Earl of Mar, and the circumstances were simply the complete collapse of his political career."⁴² Scott in his Appendix A tells us that Rob himself was hesitant and even refused Mar's orders to participate in the

attack on the Government's positions. Rob's reply was: "No, no! if they cannot do it without me, they cannot do it with me." (413) Another suggestion still is that Scott wants to show that loyalty to family lies at the heart of Jacobitism as a patriarchal ideology regardless of any political considerations.

At any rate, the renewal of the familial bond is marked when Frank performed his "duty to honour and obey" his father by retrieving the lost papers that threaten his career. Scott's depiction of the scene in which they were united is suggestive:

Owen was not alone,—there was another in the apartment, — it was my father.

The first impulse was to preserve the dignity of his usual equanimity, — 'Francis, I am glad to see you.'— The next was to embrace me tenderly, — 'My dear—dear son.'—these scenes which address themselves to the eye and to the heart, rather than to the ear.—My old eye-lids still moisten at the recollection of our meeting; but your kind and affectionate feelings can well imagine what I should find it impossible to describe. (350)

The instinctive affection that enkindles in the father's breast redefines the relationship that binds him with his son. The callous, serious and absolute authority is absent here. We see a new attitude in which the father listens to his son and respects his choice. At the outset of the narrative, when Frank asked his father to allow him join the army, his father protested indignantly: "Choose the d—l...I profess you make me as great a fool as you are yourself." (17) Consider how this stance on behalf of the father has undergone toward the end of the novel:

I acquainted my father with my wish to offer my personal service to the government in any volunteer corps... He readily acquiesced in my proposal; for, though he disliked war as a profession, yet upon principle, no man would have exposed his life more willingly in defence of civil and religious liberty. (355-356)

However, William's acquiescence in Frank joining the militia reveals William's utilitarian and, perhaps, selfish nature when it is recalled that this concurs with his strategic vision in defending the existing government. William himself "agreed to support the credit of the government" (365) through his financial services. As a merchant, his power is part and parcel of the power of the existing regime; and therefore it is hard to believe that William's attitude toward the military is ideological, that is, to defend "civil and religious liberty" in the patriotic sense but rather a pretext

that masks his real attitude which aims at protecting his own private interests. In the feudal era, traditional aristocracy, that is the owners of land, used to defend their interests by being always loyal to the then political system in the person of the king. The same story recurs in a different guise but with different social-moral import. Now wealth is no more defined mainly in terms of real property, land, but also in terms of fluid and imaginary property, cash money and stocks. Although, theoretically, in either case the power of the sovereign authority, more or less, still rests on property owners regardless of the type of property yet in the commercial stage the situation is more complicated and, perhaps, more drastic in terms of social and moral values. *Rob Roy* and the *Waverley* novels in general deal with this issue always from a moral and social perspective, as I show below.

Yet the real change in paternal relationship in the narrative focuses on the limits of parents' authority on their sons and daughters, as a historical necessity that parallels the change of the notion of honour. Filial relationship, based on patriarchal tradition, has become problematic in the new world and refining it of its connotation of absolute authority requires reinterpreting it. The solution, the narrative suggests, lies not in the Jacobin ideology that elevates the individual's freedom above the social, which could lead to possible rebellion or atomization on the domestic level. Scott is close to the strong Romantic current that runs through the later Coleridge, Wordsworth and Southey who regard society and continuity in social tradition as a psychological need that evolves from the self and its feelings. Frank's return to family loyalty through "feeling" and his reinstatement of traditional relationships go in this direction and perhaps mask the moves away from paternal absolutism represented by Vernon and by *Rob Roy* himself. While Frank's father, "was sensible that, in joining him with heart and hand in his commercial labours, [Frank] had sacrificed [his] own inclinations," (384) Sir Frederick, Diana's father, whose wish was that she take the veil, "was understood to refer the matter entirely to her own inclinations." (384) *Rob*, aware of social progress and wishing to join it with his sons is forced back into his role by injustice and kept virtually a prisoner within it through loyalty to his wife and clan. All come to understand that progress is inevitable and therefore adhering to old attitudes is no less alienating than quitting them radically. The final settlement, in this direction, becomes a redefinition of the paternal relationship that recognizes both tradition and progress. Vernon and Frank are allowed to choose but with parental

blessing, thus patriarchal absolutism is attenuated in a way that extricates the family from the danger of disintegration.

Religion in *Old Mortality* is depicted as a main cause in social, political, national and even family disruption and bloodshed. By contrast, in *Rob Roy* and *The Heart of Midlothian*, progress renders religion, through toleration, an integrative and social-moral value. The protestant William Osbaldistone has no objection that Frank is wedded to the Catholic Diana; for him "so dutiful a daughter cannot prove but a good wife." (384) Once again, Scott's rationality endorses the "defence of civil and religious liberty" as means for maintaining social and political stability brought about by the Glorious Revolution, as he, Burke and the "philosophical" historians would argue.

On the other hand, whether the Glorious Revolution was a public reaction to depose a "recalcitrant monarch who betrayed the terms of his trusteeship,"⁴³ or an attempt by the British aristocracy to preserve their interests, still, in either case the event represents change in continuity. The issue of succession and inheritance, violated by King James II, is reaffirmed after purging it from absolutism by the effect of secular law. Similarly, in *Rob Roy*, within the context of familial relationship, the legitimacy of the law of inheritance or primogeniture is asserted but with a progressive vision. Like the notion of honour it has to cope with the spirit of change in a commercial world.

In fact, Scott raises this problem as early as the second chapter. Consider the paragraph in which William Osbaldistone recites to his son, Frank:

I will cut all this matter very short—I was at your age when my father turned me out of doors, and settled my legal inheritance on my younger brother, with ten guineas in my purse, I have never crossed the threshold again, and I never will. I know not, and I care not, if my fox-hunting brother is alive, or has broken his neck; but he has children, Frank, and one of them shall be my son if you cross me farther in this matter." (17)

Using Paine's words, William is "thrown to cannibal for prey," and his ties with his brother, Sir Hildebrand, cut. Now, he is repeating his father's mistake when he threatens to disinherit his son in favour of his treacherous nephew, Rashleigh. Later in the narrative, that action recurs when Sir Hildebrand disinherits his remaining living son, Rashleigh, as a traitor to the Jacobite cause, in favour of Frank, who is actually the legitimate heir by his father's primogeniture. Rashleigh himself, for

political reasons, turned against his uncle and cousin and tried to destroy both. Apparently, William's speech above might give the impression that Scott, like Paine and Godwin, scoffs at the law of inheritance as potentially unjust and could cause disturbances in the family ties and by extension in the state.⁴⁴ But this impression soon melts away when we realize that Scott, in fact, is only establishing a case to defend the inheritance law within tradition legitimized by law rather than tradition based on arbitrariness. In short, the problem is not with the legitimacy of the law of primogeniture itself (though common sense says it is unjust) but in the way of its illegitimate application. This suggests that disturbances in the Osbaldistone family, as in the Royal family, have emerged as a result of the absence of legitimacy in operating the law and not in the law *per se*, as Paine and others would like to argue. And this absence of legitimacy is once again associated with the notion of absolutism and extremism that govern the paternal relationship in the narrative. Scott gives no reason as to why William's father has disinherited him. It could be a deliberate contrivance by Scott to assert the arbitrariness of the act, for in the absence of any convincing reason, the act itself becomes capricious. The narratives of both William and his brother present the former as more qualified than the latter to preserve the estate of the family from wreckage as Frank tells us: "My poor uncle, Sir Hildebrand, whose estate was reduced to almost nothing by his own carelessness and the expense and debauchery of his sons and household." (356) When, toward the end of the novel, Scott engineers the death of all Sir Hildebrand's heir sons, to restore Frank's father's right in the court, he, in fact, carries out another Glorious Revolution to protect traditions by adapting it to civil law and not through Burke's notion of prescription as an absolute right; otherwise absolutism would have triumphed. Frank makes this point clear when he tells us: "I was directed to apply to Squire Inglewood for the copy of my uncle's will deposited with him, and take all necessary measures to secure that possession, which sages say make nine points of the law." (360) Now the absoluteness of primogeniture is shifted to the absoluteness of civil law that covers and protects the former.

However, by bringing the narrative to this end, Scott does not aim only to support the idea of primogeniture; it seems that he "preaches a merging of the old and the new interests," that is, the "fluid wealth of the 'man of credit'" and the "wealth of the 'man of honour'" so that Scott's "doctrine" becomes "one of consolidation rather than expansion, the turning of new money into old, of fluid into fixed wealth."⁴⁵ Yet the

question that poses itself here is in what way could this ending be relevant to his ideological address other than updating the law of inheritance under the banner of civil law? The answer to this question could be approached on two levels. The first has to do with the negative aspects of progress/commerce on manners and morals and the second, a derivation from the first, has to do with the loss of sense of community based on traditional social relationships and social values.

Like all the philosophical historians, Scott believes in the historical stages of progress. He also believes in the benefit of trade and commerce in contributing to the "general commonwealth" and refining manners. Yet, like his mentors, he also believes in the potential evils engendered by the transfer from land economy (agrarian) to the market economy (commercial and industrial) on social and political values. In fact, *Rob Roy* through symbolic characters reflects both the hopes and fears of this transfer. When William Osbaldistone celebrates commerce:

It connects nation with nation, relieves the wants, and contributes to the wealth of all; and is to the general commonwealth of the civilized world what the daily intercourse of the ordinary life is to the private society, or rather, what air and food are to our bodies. (13)

he, in some way, echoes the "philosophical" historians' view of its advantage. This aspect of commerce connected with exchangeable commodities in the form of trade is desirable and is as old as man himself when in earlier stages it took the form of barter. Many Scottish theorists welcomed the commercial age for its sociability, the 'douce commerce' as opposed to the 'hard' commerce of Osbaldistone, and it is the spirit that directs commerce and that determines its effects.⁴⁶ Therefore, what Scott seems to warn against is the other aspect of commerce which, as Pocock points out, was the target of "the polemic of Anne's reign and was directed against monied interest: against a speculative society typified less by merchants...than by the stockjobbers, political adventures, and investors in the public funds."⁴⁷

Rob's narrative highlights both sides of commerce, "douce" and "hard." As Bailie Jarvie tells Frank: "Robin was anes a weel-doing, pains-taking drover, as you wad see among ten thousand...But the times cam hard, and Rob was venturesome." (236) As a result, he and his family were destroyed. Jarvie does not explain the type of venture Rob has been engaged in, but Scott in his Appendix A makes it clear that speculation was behind Rob's destruction:

"Sudden fluctuations; and Rob Roy was—by a sudden depression of markets, and, as a friendly tradition adds, by the bad faith of a partner named Macdonald, whom he had imprudently received into his confidence, and intrusted with a considerable sum of money—rendered totally insolvent." (400)

Scott himself has had the same fate as Rob. For him, the world of speculation is dangerous due to "sudden fluctuations," usually created deliberately by speculators for making profits at the expense of simple victims like Rob. In this light, "uncontrolled commercial and speculative instincts could bring disastrous crash to hapless people"⁴⁸ hence, speculators are potentially morally corrupt and are not concerned with the public interest, but rather with their own interest, exhibited in a strong passion for acquisitiveness.

On the issue of commerce, the narrative introduces a new and significant motif which shows that it is still more dangerous when speculation takes the form of "political adventures," wherein, politics and business become a concerted effort that serves not only selfish purposes for promotion, but also serves as a decisive weapon in destroying and supporting governments, ultimately plaguing the nation with social and political instability. Burke points to the relationship between money and political adventures: "the monied interest is in its nature more ready for any adventure; and its possessors more disposed to new enterprises of any kind. Being of a recent acquisition, it falls in more naturally with any novelties. It is, therefore, "fluid wealth" which will be resorted to by all who wish for change."⁴⁹ Rashleigh and William Osbaldistone provide a case in point in this respect. The first works on destroying the "firm's credit" of his uncle in a plan to force the lairds in the Highlands to join the Jacobite uprising as Jarvie explains to Frank: "the stopping of your father's house will hasten the outbreak that's been sae lang biding us." (240) The second launches a financial counter attack when he and Frank hurry off to London, where they "immediately associated with those bankers and eminent merchants who agreed to support the credit of the government, and to meet that run upon the funds, on which the conspirators had greatly founded their hopes of furthering their undertaking, by rendering the government, as it were, bankrupt." (356) It is the empire of money that defends the State, which is, in fact, the State of the few who own the money and not the State of nation in the social, moral and patriotic sense. In short, money and

business through commercial institutions in close "communication" with the administrative structure of the state has replaced heroic acts and sacrifice as sinews of power.⁵⁰

Rashleigh with his "two faces under one hood" (101) and excessive selfishness, perhaps, embodies all the defects of the commercial stage predicted by the "philosophical" historians on all levels. At first he worked on destroying his uncle in favour of the Jacobites and later "he added treachery and apostasy to his catalogue of crimes" (370) by betraying the rebels to the government. Scott, in the person of Rashleigh, as Beiderwell points out, seems to dramatize "the worst aspects of a sophisticated civil society—the self-centered, dangerous individualism, the lack of community, the sense of alienation."⁵¹ Scott would suggest that characters like Rashleigh are to be found in every stage of progress, but in the commercial stage, due to the nature of mobility in wealth and rank, the multiplication of the like of Rashleigh becomes a sort of fashion to be emulated even by ordinary people, though on a limited level, such as Andrew Fairservice and Morris.

Scott presents Andrew Fairservice as a pragmatic comic character, "being almost exclusively concerned with how much money he can extract from the guileless Englishman into whose service he has wheedled himself."⁵² After reaching a good bargain to accompany Frank to Glasgow, Andrew makes it clear that his "employment" has nothing to do with loyalty or courage. His motto is that of his mother: "Be it better, be it worse, Be ruled by him that has the purse." (250) Ironically, such policy extends even to Jarvie, although under a different pretext—the justification of the Union and the loss of Scotland's independence for the sake of economic benefit. Here lies the danger to society and State. Perhaps, through Rashleigh's opportunism and ability to combine the power of commerce with politics, Scott wants to convey Ferguson's message:

When mere riches, or court-favour, are supposed to constitute rank; the mind is misled from the consideration of qualities on which it ought to rely. Magnanimity, courage, and the love of mankind, are sacrificed to avarice and vanity.... The individual considers the community so far only as it can be rendered subservient to his personal advancement or profit: he states himself in competition with his fellow creatures; and, urged by the passions of emulation, of fear and jealousy, of envy and malice, he follows the maxims of an animal destined to preserve his separate existence, and to indulge his caprice appetite, at the expense of his species.⁵³

On the other hand, while Scott denounces "stockjobbers" and "political adventures", he seems to advocate the type of commerce in the form of investment based on profit but, in the mean time, dedicated for improvement and public benefit. Here, Scott, like Adam Smith, takes into account the human psyche, which makes the overriding motive of man the "desire of bettering our condition." As Smith argues, "An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better their conditions. It is the means the most vulgar and the most obvious."⁵⁴ Bailie Jarvie wants to "augment his fortune," but in a way that seems to enhance public benefit, by "draining the lake and 'giving to plough and harrow many hundred, ay, many a thousand acres, from whilk no man could get earthly gude e'enow, unless it were a gedd, or a dish of perch now and then." (348) Jarvie's interest is no less in the industrial improvement than in the agricultural. When he talks about preserving "a portion of the lake just deep enough and broad enough for purposes of water-carriage, so that coal-barges and gabbards should pass as easily between Dumbarton and Glenfalloch as between Glasgow and Greenock," (348) he also shows an insight of the importance of the transport sector for real improvements. It seems that Scott, anachronistically, points to "the canal age in Greater Britain...dated between 1732-40,"⁵⁵ when the country's economy was booming.

However, the overall tone of the narrative still reflects Scott's misgivings of the impact of this progress/commerce specifically in the manufacturing sector rather than commercial society as a whole. If Scott approves Jarvie's liberal and optimistic attitude towards the advantages that could be reaped from progress by improving agriculture, in the meantime, he shows a sort of reluctance towards Jarvie's ambitious industrial project. Scott, in *Rob Roy*, besides the products of the slave islands, introduces another cautionary note expressed in his contempt of commercial professions and "mechanical persons." Nevertheless, Scott's fears of industrial progress, which surface in Rob's criticism of commercial professions, are mainly social and moral in nature, and perhaps anticipate Dickens.

In one way the division of labour has a tendency to alienate members of the same family as well as the same community, while man's happiness depended largely on leading a communal life, as argued by Ferguson. In another way, man's interest in pursuing lucre makes social relationships more impersonal and less intimate. Of the commercial state, Ferguson writes:

It is here indeed, if ever, that man is sometimes found a detached and a solitary being: he has found an object which sets him in competition with his fellow creatures, and he deals with them as he does with his cattle and his soil, for the sake of the profits they bring. The mighty engine which we suppose to have formed society, only tends to set its members at variance, or to continue their intercourse after the bands of affection are broken.⁵⁶

Scott was to argue along similar lines in a letter of 1820 criticizing the shift of factories from small-scale country operations, where the manufacturer knew his workmen and felt concern for their needs and morals, to larger urban sites where the alienation of the individual is complete: "a master calls together 100 workmen this week and pays them off the next with far less interest in their future fate than in that of as many worn-out shuttles."⁵⁷

Therefore, appalled by the social and moral effects brought by the nature of progress, Scott sought to create a microcosm at Abottsford with his concern for the well-being of his tenants and dependants. Recalling that his microcosm is established by the money he amassed (fluid wealth) from his business and speculation explains the significance of merging new wealth obtained from commerce and old wealth inherited from land. The implication of Scott's shift from investment in business to land is to sustain the web of relationships between the land-owner and his tenants and workers, in an attempt to contain the social effect, which had been foreseen by Ferguson and other writers of the Enlightenment. With this point, Scott's ideological address in *Rob Roy* becomes complete and Frank's return to his legal estate becomes justified. Scott seems, apparently, to embody Burke's thesis concerning manners, commerce, land and aristocracy. Burke, as Pocock points out, believed that order, on the one hand, and moral and social responsibility, on the other, can be attained by a "union of land and commerce," provided that "the management of...commerce must be in the aristocratic hands."⁵⁸ But when we recall that Scott himself is not an aristocrat and belongs to the emerging middle class, we immediately realize the difference between both.

With this ending it becomes clear that Scott is neither nostalgic nor apologist for the present in absolute terms, but rather an advocate of a paternal order in commercialism, much like the feudal structure, but based on voluntary loyalty between employer and worker, as Poston argues:

Commerce, for him, was potentially creative force, providing employment (which Scott repeatedly regarded as the most important of necessities for assuaging working-class discontent in an industrial era); and at its best commerce recreates something like the old bond of loyalty between master and servant. To some extent, this was doubly necessary in an era in which the inheritors of wealth themselves seemed less sensitive to their traditional obligation.⁵⁹

Notes: Chapter Four

1. See the *British Review*, 11(1818), 225. I will use the word "manners" in a broader sense that conveys the meaning of culture in its entirety.
2. See *Waverley*. Scott announces clearly that his purpose in writing *Waverley* is "preserving some idea of the ancient manners...and to the rising generation the tale may present some idea of the manners of their forefathers." (338-339).
3. Daiches, *Sir Walter Scott and his World* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 101.
4. Daiches, "Scott and Scotland," *Scott Bicentenary Essays: Selected Papers read at the Sir Walter Scott Bicentenary Conference*, ed. Alan Bell (Scottish Academic Press, 1973), 52-53.
5. Daiches, "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist," 45.
6. Davie asserts that, in *Waverley*, Scott had succeeded in his attempt to "strike the balance between his nostalgia for the old and his complacency in the new." In *Rob Roy*, "the nostalgia disappears and there is nothing left to counterbalance the complacency." (59-60) See also Robin Myhead who argues that "the idea of the prudential clearly exercised a highly non-Romantic fascination over Scott." (98).
7. Davie, 57.
8. Mayhead points out that Frank is "akin to *Waverley* in that he travels from England to Scotland and finds himself involved in the kind of perilous adventures for which he has not bargained, but with that, significant resemblance stops." (99).
9. Lawrence Poston, "The Commercial Motif of the *Waverley* Novels, III," *English Literary History*, 42 (1975), 63. For Mayhead, likewise, "the book has money at its very centre and at times positively smells of the counting-house." (98)
10. Beiderwell, 47.
11. Gordon, *Under Which King*, 67-68.
12. For more details about this subject, See Nicola J. Watson's *Revolution and the Form of the British Novel 1790-1825: Intercepted Letters, Interrupted Seductions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Watson points out that during the years of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, and their aftermath of social unrest, Sentimental fiction was understood to foment revolution in the state as well as indiscipline in the family. Jacobin writers like William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft employed the sentimental plot in their writings to achieve political ends. In a sense, the individual reader, by identifying him/her self with the hero or the heroine, develops a rebellious inclination against prevailing social and political tradition. In contrast, anti-Jacobin novelists, for instance Maria Edgeworth and Scott, attempted to redirect the plot of sensibility through "strategies which highlighted the disciplining of individual desire by social consensus to promote... 'national virtue'." (1-6). In short, within this context, *Rob Roy* becomes an allegorized counter ideology that parodies contemporary socio-political issues. And the socio-historic analysis employed in the notion of cultural clash as well as the notion of "national manners" would be a vehicle fit to support this ideology. See also Kelly's, "Romantic Fiction," ed. Stuart Curran, *The Cambridge Companion to British Romanticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 197-215. Kelly, like Watson, situates Scott's novels in general within the above context.
13. See Cockshut, 155; also see Briederwell, 47; Brown, 95; Ian Dennis, *Nationalism and Desire in Early Historical Fiction* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 95; Kathryn

- Sutherland, "Fictional Economies: Adam Smith, Walter Scott and the Nineteenth-Century Novel," *English Literary History*, 54 (1987), 98.
14. Scott, *Rob Roy*, ed. John Sutherland (Everyman: J. M Dent. London, Charles E. Tuttle Vermont, 1996), 386. Further quotations will be from this edition and will be noted in my text.
 15. Chris Ferns, "Look Who's Talking: Walter Scott, Thomas Reddall, and the Voices of the Colonized," *A Review of International English Literature*, 26:4 (October 1995), 59.
 16. Brown, 96.
 17. For more detailed study on this point see Bruce Lenman, *The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746* (Eyre Methuen, 1980). Lenman points out that "the Stewarts saw themselves as the authoritarian fathers of their peoples and in the Highlands men still lived in clans which were a sort of authoritarian extended family." (128-29).
 18. Beiderwell, 49.
 19. Ferguson's *Essay*, 102.
 20. Smith, *An Inquiry... Wealth of Nations*, 412.
 21. Wilt, 55.
 22. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, And History*, 48-49.
 23. Welsh, 207.
 24. Sutherland, *The Life of Walter Scott*. Sutherland points to a sort of mixture of "prudence" and "chivalry" in Scott's personality. The great crash that Scott's fortune suffered in 1826 confirms that chivalric virtues are not a fashion that has gone for good, but rather form part and parcel of one's self esteem. Therefore, "honour" does not stand in contradiction with "prudence." Scott refused to resort to any commercial expedient to evade or reduce his debts. Scott could have, for instance, "declare[d] bankruptcy and compound[ed] with his creditors at a few shillings in the pound," yet Scott appeared in "his darkest hour not prudent but chivalric. His debts he declared, should be debts of honour, he would pay them in full--every last penny and unaided. Scott reacted to his predicament with the vaunt of a border chieftain." (4). This episode goes parallel with Rob's debts to Jarvie.
 25. Dennis, 105.
 26. David Simpson, *Romanticism, Nationalism, And The Revolt Against Theory* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 153.
 27. Homer Obed Brown, *Institutions of the English Novel: From Defoe to Scott* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 1997), 149. Brown uses his argument to show that William Osbaldistone's career in speculation requires a sort of heroism based on adventure, risk, bravery and hazards; and therefore, he is the counterpart of Rob Roy in incarnating the notion of heroic honour in the world of commerce. For this point, see *Rob Roy* (8-9).
 28. Brown, 97.
 29. Kathryn Sutherland points out that "if technological innovation and economic growth hang upon the division of labour, so, too, do the inspirational and moral poverty of the individual." (113-114).
 30. Hart, 32.
 31. Brown, 97.
 32. Laws and moral judgment evolve and vary from one stage of progress to another and to apply laws on certain people who belong to a given stage of progress, a magistrate, a legislator or an authority should know about the culture of the people

- magistrate, a legislator or an authority should know about the culture of the people so that justice is not distorted. For this view, see Dugald Stewart, *The Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers of Man* (1828), ed. James Walker (Philadelphia: E. H. Butler, 1870), 144-146.
33. Baron de la Bre'de et de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*, ed. David Wallace Carrithers (London: University of California Press, 1977), 104-105.
 34. *Miscellaneous Prose Works of Sir Walter Scott*, I: 27-29.
 35. See Edgar Johnson, "Scott and the Corners of the Time," *Scott Bicentenary Essays: Selected Papers read at the Sir Walter Scott Bicentenary Conference*, ed. Alan Bell (Edinburgh and London: Scottish Academic press, 1987). Johnson cites Lockhart's painting of Scott's picture when teased by Francis Jeffrey about the violence of his emotion during the meeting of the Faculty of Advocates to show Scott's concern about the national identity of Scotland. Scott's reaction was "... 'tis no laughing matter; little by little, whatever your feelings may be, you will destroy and undermine, until nothing of what makes Scotland Scotland shall remain." And then Scott "turned away to conceal his agitation, leaning his head against the wall of the Mound, but Jeffrey saw tears falling down his cheeks." (22).
 36. *Miscellaneous Works of Sir Walter Scott*, IV: 262-63.
 37. Gordon, 76.
 38. Homer Brown, 153.
 39. Kelly, "Romantic Fiction," 205.
 40. See John Burke, *History of England* (London: Collins, 1974), 163-164.
 41. Thomas Reid, *The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D.* (Edinburgh: Maclauchlan, 1846), 561.
 42. See Bruce Lenman, 126.
 43. See Kathleen Wilson, "Inventing Revolution: 1688: and Eighteenth-Century Popular Politics," *Journal of British Studies* 28 (1989), 358.
 44. See *The Life and Major Writings of Thomas Paine*, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: the Cidetal Press, 1974). Paine, for political reasons, criticizes severely the aristocratical law of primogenitureship. In his view, "aristocracy is kept up by family tyranny and injustice" and "their ideas of distributive justice are corrupted at the very source." (288-289). Similarly, for Godwin, this idea is "gross imposition." For more details of Godwin's position, see William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness*, ed. F. E. L. Priestley, 3 vol. (Toronto, 1946), Bk. VIII, ch. 2.
 45. Kathryn Sutherland, 98-9.
 46. See William Robertson, *History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V*, (London: Edinburgh, 1796), I: 76. Robertson speaks of commerce in similar terms.
 47. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 235.
 48. Poston, 63.
 49. Burke, 107.
 50. After the Glorious Revolution the tendency to support the power of the state became less dependant on feudal military class and more on professional standing armies financed by trade and commercial prosperity. For a more detailed study on this subject, see John Brewer who describes the state under the Hanoverians as "the fiscal-military state." *The Sinews of Power* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), xv-xxii.
 51. Beiderwell, 58.
 52. Chris Ferns, 58.
 53. Ferguson, *Essay*, 226.

54. "Bettering our condition" occurs frequently in Smith's *Inquiry...The Wealth of Nations*. See 1: 341-342, 405 and 2:674.
55. Markman Ellis, *The Politics of Sensibility: Race, Gender and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 141. Ellis maintains that "The canal building period was a significant financial and commercial event in itself, combining private capital and commercial speculation of the highest order (and profitability) with the promotion of works improving the public good (lowering the price of coal or wheat, for example)."
56. Ferguson, *Essay*, 24.
57. Grierson, *Letters*, 6:103-104.
58. Pocock, 281.
59. Poston, 63.

Chapter Five
The Heart of Midlothian (1818)

In the last paragraph of *Midlothian*, Scott illustrates the moral lesson implied in the novel:

Reader—This tale will not be told in vain, if it shall be found to illustrate the great truth, that guilt, though it may attain temporal splendour, can never confer real happiness; that the evil consequences of our crimes long survive their commission, and, like the ghosts of the murderer, for ever haunt the steps of the malefactor; and that the paths of virtue, though seldom those of worldly greatness, are always those of pleasantness and peace.¹

The reader does not need much effort to realize that this conclusion in general concerns the sisters' history, Jeanie and Effie. Jeanie and her family enjoyed a pleasant and peaceful life "in a utopian microcosm of rural Scotland."² Effie, who rose to a high social rank, in the end "betrayed the inward wound by retiring to the Continent" and "lived and died in severe seclusion." (507) Further, both her husband and son suffered a tragic end. So why did Scott bother to close his narrative with a notice we assume to be taken for granted? Maybe it is an anticipated defense of the thematic and structural unity of the book, particularly the fourth volume, which many critics treat as mere appendage at worst designed to solve Scott's financial problems and at best a peg for Scott to hang his cultural and historical material on.³

Cockshut remarks that *Midlothian* is "the work of an author who has many different aims" and "so often tries to achieve them all at once."⁴ In the light of this objection, Scott's note could be seen as a reminder that the ultimate moral lesson of the narrative is virtue versus malice, reward versus punishment, and that the providential court which he establishes in the fourth volume, which determines the fate of his key characters is an extension and completion to his earlier historical task that determines the fate of Porteous. The last sections of the narrative are quite relevant to the main theme, rather a necessity to round off the narrative than a "frivolous and melodramatic contrivance,"⁵ as some critics argue. On the other hand, not dismissing this assumption and approaching the novel from various perspectives, more recent readings, it seems, have succeeded in presenting *Midlothian* as a unified work both thematically and structurally.⁶

I shall deal with the novel as a whole in an attempt to investigate a framework that might accommodate the key issues raised in the novel in a coherent ideology. These issues arise from the Porteous riot and its multi-faceted implications politically and legally both in terms of authority in its absolute and fragmented forms, and the historically tense relationship between England and Scotland within the context of colonization; Robertson's/Staunton's educational background, which extends to overseas colonies and calls into question the notions of luxury and trade in slavery and their negative impact on morality; Duncan Knockdunder's irregularities, which symbolically set an example of the limitation of justice in a totalitarian community. Finally, and most importantly, Scott's position on religion as embodied by the heroine, Jeanie Deans and her husband, Reuben Butler and its implications. All these issues, I would suggest, could integrate when we situate them within the framework of Scott's vision of progress and his concern in maintaining civic virtues. These virtues, I show, derive their legitimacy from religious education and are defined in terms of religious piety. The narrator's introduction serves as a guide in this direction.

Pattieson's introductory frame-story in *Midlothian* opens with a discussion of the significant recent changes "in the rapid conveyance of intelligence and communication betwixt one part of Scotland and another."(13) The narrator suggests that the increase in the speed and extent of the transportation of news, goods and people pose a vague threat in both England and Scotland. He attempts to visualize this dramatic change and its potential danger by comparing ancient modes of transportation with modern ones. Ancient coaches are "slow, and sure modes of conveyance," while modern coaches are speedy: "mail-coach races against mail-coach, and high-flyer against high-flyer."(13) In case of an accident, "the ancient vehicle used to settle quietly down, like a ship scuttled and left to sink by the gradual influx of the waters, while the modern is smashed to pieces with the velocity of the same vessel hurled against breakers, or rather with the fury of a bomb bursting at the conclusion of its career through the air."(14)

Metaphorically, the contrast between ancient and modern modes of transportation serves to describe a condition of a society, in its entirety, progressing in two different ways; one that progresses gradually and remains organically integrated, even in the case of a disaster and another that progresses rapidly and is fragmented, or "smashed to pieces." The narrator develops this metaphor soon after the coach "Somerset had

made a summerset in good earnest."(15) He immediately shifts our attention to describing the condition of the minor society in the coach, which has disintegrated, and the focus is on three passengers, two young lawyers, Hardie and Halkit, and an older, nearly destitute man, Mr. Dunover. This society, the narrator hints, could have undergone further disintegration had not the young lawyers shown all generosity to the stranded poor Dunover: "you must not remain on the pave here; you must go and have some dinner with us." (17) Also we realize that Hardie has, on a former occasion, released the unfortunate Dunover, whom we discover to be Hardie's (only) client, from prison. Treating Dunover benevolently, the two lawyers are rewarded through success and fortune after being "engaged in the great political cause of Bubbleburgh and Bitem." (26) Even after that, they benevolently intervene to "do-over" Mr. Dunover, for whom they "obtain a small office for the decent maintenance of his family." (26) The disasters and evils of the world that could accompany rapid progress—summersetted coaches and fated poverty—are shown to be remediable through the benevolent intervention of those fellow-creatures responsible for exercising authority. In the voice of his persona, Cleishbotham, Scott finds the silver lining in Dunover's clouded career:

After a train of constant and uninterrupted misfortune, [Dunover] could trace a dawn of prosperity to his having the good fortune to be flung from the top of a mail-coach into the river Gander, in company with an advocate and a writer to the signet. (26)

The opening episode emphasizes two key points. It reveals that Progress/speed is inevitable, as a natural law of human history, and that social disintegration is possible, but through benevolence the three passengers are reunited and the social bonds among them remain strong and all are promised prosperity. The second point shows that providence, through human agents, works towards recognizing civic virtues such as generosity and benevolence, as constructive elements in human affairs both socially and morally. Conversely, this recognition manifests itself in the punishment inflicted upon those who abstain from such virtues, as the narrative of Porteous in particular shows. The Scottish Enlightenment also recognizes the importance of civic virtue as a social bond and moral value. Hume and Smith assert that even in a market economy benevolence or pity and compassion toward the unfortunate would remain natural and unprompted motives of action. As Istvan Hont points out, "it was to this discretionary

sentiment that they looked for the relief of the necessities of the poor in any emergency."⁷ In his account of economic progress and its effect on social relationships and morality, Smith talks of an external force, the "invisible hand," of course without identifying it with God or religion, which brings balance to economic and social life. Similarly, Hume, as John Dunn points out, "had little hesitation in subtracting God in thought." For both, "the bonds of human society, human moral sentiments, neither depended nor needed to depend for either their prevalence or their rationally binding force upon an authority external to human society or to the human race as a whole."⁸ But through the novel's animation of the secular-tinged "invisible hand," by identifying it with the notion of "providence" as an absolute conscious disposing power Scott apparently adds a religious dimension to civic virtue, or, in other the words, suggests a redefinition of virtue in terms of religious morality. Within this context, the "paths of virtue" indicated in his note above, are not taken on their own terms as concerned with crime and punishment, and benevolence and reward can in spirit be expanded to serve as code for honest and humane conduct, based on moral autonomy and valid in whatever capacity: familial, political, legal, national, economical and so forth.

Seen in this light, the heroine Jeanie Deans could be viewed as an embodiment of civic virtue in its broader sense. When Scott frames Jeanie's narrative within her religious education that prevents her from telling a lie, he suggests that commitment to telling the truth is, by implication, an absolute commitment to all sorts of civic virtues. If not, what qualification can we give to the various qualities that shape her character such as loyalty, courage, fidelity, chastity, paternal piety, self-disinterestedness, independence, benevolence, mercy, integrity and so forth? These virtues demand self-consistency, but significantly, in consistence with God's commandments. Self-consistency, as imposed by God, in other words, becomes a translation of humanized chivalric honour in its broader sense and can operate as the foundation of morality in a civil society. Therefore, Scott, within the framework of religion, seems to employ Jeanie's virtues in a project that compounds pedagogy and ideology. Pedagogically, the narrative suggests that traditional civic virtues could be reproduced through progressive spiritual education, which, by stressing religious piety, could create the morally autonomous individual, whose supreme determiner of action, on whatever level and under whatever circumstance, is his moral conscience or the voice of God. Ideologically, the moral autonomy is employed not as a

substitute for secular and economic values but rather to guarantee their reliability, humanity and durability at all levels and in whatever station.

Jeanie's virtues do operate on these levels, indeed. Her loyalty to her family, though not tinged with clannish or tribal association, fulfils the traditional idea of keeping family ties strong and of saving "an honest house from dishonour." (369) This, inversely, bears analogy to other disintegrated families in the novel whose members lack this virtue, for instance, the families of Robertson/Staunton and Madge Wildfire. Also, in the fictional world of the novel there is an allusion to the loose attachment among members of the ruling family in real history.⁹ Chastity, in compliance with Gods' commandments, not romantic love or vanity, defines Jeanie's love relationship with Butler. By invoking religious tradition in the theme of love the novel suggests that when the institution of marriage is founded on religious morality it is likely to be immune against dissolution and vice and is more qualified to produce the ideal family. Scott points to this issue when he traces the history of each member of the Butler family in the last pages of the novel. This contrasts with the romantic relationship between Effie or Madge and Robertson that transgresses tradition and morality; further, at the highest level, it touches upon the moral corruption and debauchery of the court in the figure of the King's mistress, lady Suffolk.

On the other hand, Jeanie's commitment to her nationality without any malicious prejudice towards the Other emphasizes her distinct Scottish identity, in all its cultural dimensions, within the union of the British nation and presents her as a model for the public heroine. Her civil and moral courage, which she displays in facing dangers while seeking for justice, sets the record straight and debunks the failings of the judicial system, due to a lack of moral autonomy. Had this system been morally independent in pursuing justice, fragmented authority and political manoeuvre would not have subverted it. Above all, Jeanie's moral autonomy, notwithstanding that she is a humble peasant, endows her with independence and integrity that make her resist any concessions that might stain her dignity or spoil her pure love relationship with Butler. Last but not least, her benevolent and merciful attitude towards her community reflects her public spirit and sympathy in her social transactions.

Scott's revival of such civic virtues, within the framework of religious teachings, particularly the one connected with moral independence is revealing in terms of ideology. Parodying political power, he seems to make moral independence and not economic independence the foundation of civic virtue in the present. We know that

civic virtues include that of independence. One of the reasons that political power was restricted to the wealthy was because they were thought less likely to be dependent, but this point was under attack in the period because of the perceived corruption of the rich and the radical emphasis on moral and intellectual independence as the qualification for political agency.¹⁰ When we contrast Jeanie's education with those whose education has fostered a "bad" independence, for instance Robertson/Saunton, it becomes clear that Scott is re-affirming the providential influence of the familial, religious, and moral framework of traditional civic virtue to produce a different kind of independence. Through this ideology, the author offers an educational programme in social, economical, moral and political theory in an attempt to reconcile old values with progress and, at the same time, to propose possible solutions to contemporary challenges. Within this context, the authority of the institution of religion, as a source of moral values and as a constructive force, is emphasized in the last sections of the novel. But why and on what basis does Scott give religion an inherent role in creating what he thinks to be an ideal community after he has almost treated it, in *Old Mortality* and even in *Waverley*, as an element responsible for social disintegration and political dissension? Investigating the nature and details of reward bestowed on Jeanie and her family might help us in finding an answer to this question.

Providence, through the agency of Argyle, transfers Jeanie and her family to a semi-paradise in the island of Roseneath, but the authority of the novelist seems to have contrived this reward for ideological reasons. The general framework of reward, that is, choosing a location "beyond the bounds of ordinary law and civilization," (410) on the verge of the Highlands bears two assumptions. Either Scott's temper is beginning to lose faith in progress and he resolves to withdraw into an imaginary world of his own creation, or, through his fictional world, he attempts to take part in the debate of his own time in which he offers a model of a "future community." The elements of progress employed in the construction of his proposed community such as modern farming and a progressive vision of religion make it difficult for us to accept the first assumption. Although, like the "philosophical" historians, Scott has reservations concerning the negative impact of progress on social and moral values, in *Midlothian*, he is not at all pessimistic of progress provided that it evolves from and improves on tradition without undermining it. Accordingly, the second assumption becomes more likely, if we interpret Scott's community in Knocktarlitie as a rival to

radical communistic Spencean ideas, and particularly to those of Robert Owen, who was proposing his Villages of Co-operation to a Parliamentary Committee in 1816. V.A.C. Gatrell, in the introduction to his edition of *A New View of Society* and the *Report to the County of Lanark* (1969) quotes Owen's plan:

Any plan for the amelioration of the poor should combine means to prevent their children from acquiring bad habits, and to give them good ones—to provide useful training and instruction for them—to provide proper labour for the adults—to direct their labour and expenditure so as to produce the greatest benefit to themselves and to society; and to place them under such circumstances as shall remove them from unnecessary temptations, and closely unite their interest and duty.¹¹

Owen publicized his plan extensively in 1817 and it was looked on favourably by Southey (who shared some of Scott's views). By 1817 Scott could hardly be unaware of the famed model of community of New Lanark and its voluble owner. Owen proposed his plan as a means of calming the agitation of the poor—the Blanketeers, Derbyshire "insurrection", the Spa Field "riots"—and Scott might have been aiming to produce a less radical version of a utopian community. Above all Owen was noted for his secularism and, after a famous meeting in the Crown and Anchor in 1817, for being an enemy to religion. Scott might have reacted against this in putting religion at the heart of his community and reaffirming its value in his central character. Once again, if Owen and other radicals are likely to take a hostile position against religion and dismiss it from their computation in any thesis that seeks for an adequate ideology in social, economical, political and moral theory, why does Scott, in contrast, include religion in his ideological address?

Throughout history, religion proved to be a rich source of civic virtues as far as moral and social values are concerned; in the meantime, politicized religion and fanaticism proved to be a main cause in putting these virtues at stake, as we have seen in *Old Mortality*. While Owen is convinced that there is "something wrong in religions because of the contradictions between them,"¹² Scott observes that the problem has always been not in religion itself but rather in the irrationality of men in understanding the moral import of religion and its role in establishing civil society. Scott, like Owen, observes that unenlightened religion is socially disruptive, but he regards excessive rationality that excludes religion in considering social and political theory as no less destructive. Scott's view of religion in this direction arises from a

deep insight into history and nature of man and his relationship with metaphysical matters as historical precedent. Making an advantage of the virtues inculcated through religious teachings and avoiding "contradictions", Scott seems to suggest, can be attained through an established church, which tolerates different varieties of creed. Burke and Montesquieu, are also advocates of complete toleration of different religions. For them, social peace and order requires the establishment of a national religion and that the priests of that established religion, whatever their private opinions might be, must conform to the official doctrine.¹³ Burke's thesis has in mind Protestantism and the British nation as a homogeneous cultural and national identity, while Scott has in mind the specificity of nations—Scottish, Irish and English—that constitute the British nation. For Scott, religion has always been part and parcel of the Scottish nationality and conforming to Protestantism means conforming to the English church and ultimately beginning to lose one of the crucial components of the Scottish identity. It follows that when Scott speaks of tolerance and conformity he, in fact, has in mind the idiosyncrasy of the Scottish nation and its Kirk.

Butler embodies the idea of conforming to the official doctrine, that is, the Scottish established church. On this basis he rejects an offer of preferment by Robertson/Staunton who provides that Butler "should take orders according to the English church." Butler replies: "I hope I have done, and I am in the course of doing my master's work in this Highland parish; and it would ill become me, for the sake of lucre, to leave my sheep in the wilderness." Butler's commitment, which anticipates public good over private interest and profit, is also an indication of the importance of the institution of religion in preserving communal life in a commercial world that tends to foster individualism and social alienation. Butler's loyalty to his religion is far from prejudice and presents a culture, based on toleration, which prevents him from entering "into various debates between the churches" but confirms his commitment to his own church: "I was brought up in mine own, have received her ordination, am satisfied of the truth of her doctrines." (492-493)

In *Midlothian* Scott's rational and liberal attitudes towards religion are different from those of Owenism and later Marxism. While both seem to find in progress and enlightenment a potential to jump over history, to undercut human passions and to have greater faith in reason and ultimately to ignore God and religion, Scott seems to take the other way round. Religion, as Peter Singer puts it, like "Freedom" and

"Justice" yields "eternal truths." "Communism," according to Singer, "abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience."¹⁴ It is true that Scott's ideological address in *Old Mortality* does treat Burley's religious fanaticism as an obstacle in the way of human progress, but such criticism does not deny the moral import of religion. In *Midlothian* Scott seems, as Singer suggests, to constitute religion on a "new basis" and to emphasize its role as a "past historical experience" in a sense which makes it even different from Burke's static and archaic view.

The way Scott rewards Butler serves the ideology of reconciling the progressive with the traditional. By appointing Butler minister of the kirk of Knocktarlittie, Scott seems to achieve two things. On the one hand, he deals with the Kirk as a "past historical experience," that mirrors the Scottish nation's morality, as well as its political and social identity. On the other hand, he tries to redeem a "national" religion from accusations that have been made, not least by himself. In *Waverley*, for instance, one of the followers of the Cameronian Gilfillan is said to be lineally connected with modern Jacobinism.¹⁵ Also, Scottish Calvinism and its antinomian tendency had been satirized by Robert Burns and was to provide that classic of Gothic Romanticism, Hogg's *Confessions of a Justified Sinner*.¹⁶ In *Midlothian*, unlike *Old Mortality*, Scott seems to be trying to show its sectarianism being gradually dissolved and brought under the enlightened leadership of Butler and the "learning of St Andrews" (85) and is stressing it as a source of social, moral, and familial solidarity.

While Davie Deans prevails on Butler not to compromise "his former professions, either in practice or principle," Butler "was frequently of opinion that it were better to drop out of memory points of division and separation, and to act in the manner most likely to attract and unite all parties who were serious in religion." (449) In spite of "their general agreement in strictness, and even severity, of presbyterian principle," Butler finds it difficult to stick to irrational formalities associated with the Covenanting doctrine which proved to be socially harmful and led to division. He is not for "persecuting old women for witches, or ferreting out matter of scandal among the young ones, which might otherwise have remained concealed." (449) Therefore, he is not in need of Duncan's warning for him later to refrain from punishing Ailie MacClure of Deepheugh as a witch. Taking into account "the risk of ill usage which the poor woman might undergo at the hands of the rabble," Butler suggests a more

civilized way of mending her character—"that he would give her the necessary admonition in private, instead of bringing her before the assembled session." (457) Throughout the narrative Butler proves to be rational not only in handling religious matters, but also in his interpretation of natural phenomena (405).

Further, emphasizing reconciliation in religious matters, the narrator tells us that Jeanie having "the merit of those peace-makers" (451) asserts her ability to bridge the discrepancy "related to certain polemical skirmishes betwixt her father and her husband." (449) Jeanie's efforts help to some degree in acclimating her father with the facts around him by contending that "many devout ministers and professors in times past," whom her father always recalls, are not in essence different from those in the present, most notably her husband, Reuben Butler. Jeanie simplifies the difference in a way: "it wad happen that twa precious saints might pu' sundry wise, like twa cows riving at the same hay-band." (450)

In the course of the narrative, the author makes Davie Deans himself aware of the futility of insisting on the old practices, making him recognize that it is in vain to set the clock back. In one instance, Davie begins to "feel from experience, that the glen of Knocktarlitie, like the rest of the world, was haunted by its own special subjects of regret and discontent," but this discontent never exceeds a personal opinion as in the case with Issac Meilehose, who shares Davie's criticism of Duncan Knockdunder's smoking the pipe in the kirk. (437-478) The gradual dissolving of Davie's Covenanting spirit under the established church culminates when Scott deftly obscures Davie's adherence to one of the main tenets in the covenanting doctrine, that is, "to enquire, whether Butler was called upon to subscribe the oaths to government." The narrator leaves this matter vague and unresolved: "Some have insinuated, that his neglect on this head was, in some degree, intentional; but I think this explanation inconsistent with the simplicity of...David's character."(438). To distort the whole affair, the author suggests that the "books of the kirk-session [that] might have thrown some light on this matter...were destroyed in the year 1746." (438)

At the beginning of the novel the author is downright in showing Davie's deep concern in such matters; particularly in his refusal "to authorize his daughter's giving testimony in a court of justice" on the ground that this act is considered by Cameronians as "a step of lamentable and direct defection." (196) Even when Davie has proposed to leave the matter to Jeanie's conscience to decide for her self, Davie is still not convinced: "God forbid that she should go into defection at bidding mine! I

wunna fret the tender conscience of one bairn--no, not to save the life of the other." (196) The vagueness with which Davie's attitude toward the issue of the oath is surrounded allows Scott to drop a curtain on one of the major issues that could split the church and lead to social and political disruption.

Davie's providential reward also falls within Scott's programme of progress and reconciliation. Davie is not at all archaic; he, unlike Burley of *Old Mortality*, proves, to some extent, to be malleable in admitting progress, which ameliorates tradition and does not cut with it. Davie's concessions in religious matters are remarkably attributed to his contention that Butler is an ideal compromise; that is, he holds to the principles required from a minister and the Kirk. Similarly, Davie proves to be capable of progress through his scientific farming methods under the patronage of Argyle. Argyle, in some respects, like Butler, is an amalgamation of the progressive and the traditional. Recalling Dumbiedikes's decaying estate in the first chapters of the narrative, we can discern the underlying significance of Argyle's role, as a representative of enlightened aristocracy, in leading the community and in enhancing tenants' economical and social status.

For Scott, as for the "philosophical" historians, the economical, the moral, the political and the social are interdependent when civic virtue is in question. While the nature of economy in a feudal system, apart from injustice and lack of individuality, entails patriarchal relationships that define moral, familial and communal life with stability and unity, in a commercial world economy depends on division of labour, which, potentially, threatens this structure. The Deans's plight and the disturbance in this structure, in fact, starts after Effie's movement, for economical reasons, to work in Edinburgh where the effect of open market economy is more apparent. In this context, we can understand why Scott rewards Jeanie in Argyle's estate as a first step, then enlarges this reward by enabling her to buy her own estate. By doing so, Scott seems to suggest that the ideal place that preserves moral, familial and communal life is that where there is a balance between market and traditional economies under the patronage of enlightened aristocracy.

Scott seems to find in traditional aristocracy, in the figure of Argyle, a moral, social and economical utility, as well as a political and national power, but this view is not absolute, in the tradition of Burke. Burke believes that "great families with a tradition of many generations of service to the state...were especially valuable to the country, for they would be the least liable to corruption from the court or to the

pressure of popular agitations."¹⁷ Scott, as we shall see in the final chapter of this thesis, gives a considerable weight to the emerging middle class as no less important than traditional aristocracy, as nationalists and agents of unity and morality. At any rate, Argyle, in this vein, provides a source of political power intermediate between the Crown and the people, which works on creating harmony between the court and the public in cases of crisis. After the Union and in the course of progress, authority has become centralized in London; traditional aristocracy also moved to the capital in pursuit of their own private interests. The patriarchal system, which allows for a sort of direct relationship between people and authority, is now giving way to fragmented authority allowing for more disintegration, political corruption and injustice. Perhaps the comments of Mr Plumdamas and Mrs Howden on Porteous's reprieve in chapter four serve as an explanation for this idea. When the heads of authority, "king, and a chancellor, and parliament" are close to Mrs Howden she "could aye pebble them wi' stanes when they werena gude bairns--but naeboddy's nails can reach the lengths o' Lunnon." (44) When Argyle's effective role is restored, through activating his communication with the court and the public in Edinburgh, the gap between the highest authority and the base is bridged and Scottish national pride is preserved. This is translated through Jeanie's interview with Queen Caroline through Argyle's agency. Nationally, Argyle proves to be a national hero who is ready to work for Scotland's interest (also for his own interest) when threatened by a corrupt court. Authority, which appears to be fragmented in the first parts of the novel, as I attempt to show below, becomes unified in the figure of Argyle and, indirectly, in his representative, Duncan Knockdunder in the Knocktarlitie section.

Apart from the fact that Duncan's sole principle seems to be his loyalty to the Laird, he is full of irregularities. These irregularities are, doubtless, cultural, but what seems to be cultural contrast in the last sections of the novel and is remarked by some critics as irrelevant is not at all thematically dissociated from the issues presented earlier when looked at from a sociological and moral point of view. In fact, the cultural contrast has a pedagogical intent in which the author reveals the virtues and the vices of traditional and progressive systems and encourages his audience to reach a real compromise that sifts vices and retains virtues. In a sense, Knocktarlitie ceases to be a "utopia" but, much like the world of Edinburgh, has its own defects in terms of justice, social relationship and individual freedom. The latter shows that Progress/rationality without the essence of heroic and civic virtue is perhaps worse

than the former in its application of these virtues in their vulgar form. In short, this cultural contrast is an attempt to reach a compromise that binds the morality of Knocktarlitie with the rationality of Edinburgh or the traditional with the progressive.

Nevertheless, the cultural contrast that serves Scott's purpose in the novel is, perhaps, nowhere more expressive than in Duncan Knockdunder's irregularities, best reflected, though comically, in his dress:

[Duncan's] pleasure it was to unite in his own person the dress of the Highlands and Lowland, wearing on his head a black tie-wig, surmounted by a fierce cocked-hat, deeply guarded with gold lace, while the rest of his dress consisted of the plaid and philabeg. Duncan superintended a district which was partly Highland, partly Lowland, and therefore might be supposed to combine their national habits, in order to show his impartiality to Trojan or Tyrian. The incongruity, however, had a whimsical and ludicrous effect, as it made his head and body look as if belonging to different individuals; or as some one said who had seen the executions of the insurgent prisoners in 1715, it seemed as if some Jacobite enchanter, having recalled the sufferers to life, had clapped in his haste, an Englishman's head on a Highlander's body. (427)

Duncan's dress might, apparently, be viewed as a symbolic indication of Scott's own dilemma in reaching a compromise between the old and the new, in sticking to his Scottish roots and in accepting the demands of progress. It might also suggest that Scott wavers between presenting the "modern" Scotsman as the proud descendant of the ancient clans and as a half-civilised clown. Finally, it might be an indication that the issue of Union has become problematic and Scott himself emerges more doubtful of a real union between Scotland and England. Whatever symbol Duncan's portrait does represent, it certainly remains a reflection of the author's well known feelings toward antiquity and progress. Yet, in another way, it points to the superficiality of any compromise not based on a real evolution in mentality and moral education. The costume, after all, refers to a national identity and heritage and has never been a sign of progress and civilization or the converse. The real compromise of progress and reconciliation, the narrative suggests, lies elsewhere in a real combination of rationality and morality, which neither Duncan's world, nor that of Porteous seems to satisfy. Through Duncan, as through Porteous, authority, law, punishment, justice, social relationships, are once again called into question.

Duncan's authority derives its legitimacy from an archaic tradition; his belief in "heritable jurisdictions," (504) renders him representative of both legislative and

executive powers. The eccentricity with which he proposes to handle law in punishing the "banditti" who killed Robertson/Staunton needs to be examined in terms of virtue and vice, morality and irrationality. At first, Duncan leaves the matter to Butler to "hack off Donacha's head" on the spot. Knowing that Butler's culture does not allow him to do so, he proposes to punish Donacha in his own way: "[Donacha] will be a greater object of satisfaction to Leddy to see him entire; and I hope she will do me the credit to believe that I can afenge a shentleman's plood fery speedily and well." (500) Duncan's operation of law, when dealing with a criminal act, reflects a sort of moral strictness, and is tinged with a feeling of heroism as a result of capability and practicality. When we remember the intricacies in legal process in Peter Peeble's case in *Redgauntlet* and the disrespect for law as reflected in Porteous's reprieve, we might look at Duncan's authority, in executing law, as a contribution to order, peace and morality; and, apparently, to some extent, this is true. Yet such impression soon fades away when we realize that Duncan is irrational and, perhaps, ridiculous. Consider how, in his speech to Butler, he justifies his hanging of the members of the "banditti": "I will... hang these idle people up to-morrow morning, to teach them more consideration in their doings in future." (503-504) Scott is not jesting here; he and the reader know that the dead cannot learn, but he seems, through Duncan, to raise a thorny issue connected with the rationale behind punishment and justice. Punishment is a dual operation; while in the short term, it sets the record straight by making the criminal pay for his wrong doing; in the long run, it serves to teach the living some lesson in morality. Ironically, Duncan's view of punishment, more or less, only serves its moral end and fails to achieve its educative purpose. While Duncan's culture echoes Francis Hutcheson's view which asserts that "the end of punishment is the general safety", Scott, I think, seems to support Adam Ferguson's view in which he sees that "the object of punishment is to correct the guilty, and to deter others."¹⁸ In other words, Scott's point is to show that justice needs to be done honestly, but not on an irrational basis as an act of mere revenge; after all, Duncan is not a magistrate proper and he has nothing to do with the technicalities of law. When Butler reminds him of the "act abolishing the heritable jurisdiction, and that he ought to send them to Glasgow or Inverary, to be tried by the Circuit. Duncan scorned the proposal." (504) Scott, the sociologist and moralist, makes it clear that what concerns Duncan is not a fair punishment in a court, but rather to show that Effie's "husband, had been suitably afenged." (504) While

asserting morality (tooth for tooth and eye for eye), Duncan's world seems to deal with justice as a heroic virtue associated with chivalric honour that spoils morality with revenge and violence. Duncan cannot imagine "that a shentleman, friend to the Duke, was killed in his country, and his people didna take at least twa for ane." (504) This equation in its own right is irrational and undermines the concept of the virtue of justice as dictated by God and as it should be understood in a progressive world. Such episodes reflect the "philosophical" historians' view: less progressive societies are strict in dealing with morality but are little acquainted with justice.

On the other hand, the world of Porteous is more progressive and is supposed to be rational. It recognizes separation of authorities, but unfortunately, in practice it proves to be worse than Duncan's world. It is true that the judicial body is independent and this, compared to "heritable jurisdictions," is a sign of progress and a contribution to law and justice, yet this independence is revealed to be only nominal and impotent in implementing law and maintaining justice. When the upper authority of the court intervenes to annul a judgement passed by the magistrates, it behaves in a way similar to that of "heritable Jurisdiction" with a slight difference in that it operates under disguise. Here, the danger manifest in the fact that separation of authorities turns out to be an expedient that distorts responsibility and masks political corruption. While the narrative seems to argue that rationality and morality need to be linked together and that the absence of one of them undercuts the other and puts justice at stake, it also points out of the difficulty of reaching this end in practical life.

In the chapter, "Frustration of Justice in *Midlothian*," Beiderwell argues that Scott's answer to the question of human justice and law is "hesitant and infinite; for Scott, human justice remains imperfect [and] never free from the self-interest, passion, and uncertainty of the individuals involved."¹⁹ It is not surprising then when confidence is lost in human justice one seeks justice from a perfect authority that has nothing to do with such considerations—providential justice. Scott's note in the last paragraph of *Midlothian* goes in this direction. Kerr, grasping the content of the message, points out: "the fate of this unhappy pair is intended to show that those who violate the laws of the state and the laws of God must pay dearly for their sins. While Effie and Staunton succeed in evading the force of the law, they cannot escape the pattern of fatality"²⁰ Once again, religious morality, a new version of civic virtue, is given the priority in support of justice.

Duncan's irregularities are manipulated by Scott to give answers as to why he is not fit to represent Argyle as well as Scott's imagined community not only on the level of authority and justice but also on the level of individual freedom and humane feelings. Scott, like the "philosophical" historians, believes in a society of hierarchy and social ranks not as separate entities but as integrated body in which each individual, within his/her capacity, is morally obliged towards the other in a sort of progressive paternal relationship. Both worlds represented by Duncan and Porteous do not meet this qualification. In his relationship with his community, Duncan seems, like Redgauntlet, to adhere to old feudal tradition in its worst form that reflects suppression and tyranny. For him, "parishioners" are almost like slaves; they are not allowed even to have "any scruples, which sometimes happen in the mind of sincere professors." (482) Butler, as a rational minister, proposes to remove "any scruples" through interpreting them and educating "parishioners," while Duncan, as an irrational superintendent, has a different view. For him, even "sincere professors" are not "bred up to scruple ony thing that they're bidden to do." Any one who disobeys this tradition is tortured by towing him from a boat "for a few furlongs"; water, in his view, "washes off Scruples as weel as fleas." (428) Duncan manifests cruelty and ill treatment towards lesser people to the point of slavery. The narrator tells us that if the workers were delayed and "were to neglect his pleasure and the Duke's, 'he would be tamn'd if he paid them the t'other half either, and they might seek law for it where they could get it.'" (433) This impersonal and inhumane relationship between Duncan and the tenants of Roseneath is parallel to that between Porteous and the public of Edinburgh. Of course, Scott is not an apologist for democracy, but for an adherence to intimate and cooperative relationships based on sympathy, benevolence and humanity regardless of social ranks. Ironically, Porteous and Duncan are respectively representatives of monarchy and aristocracy but Scott's strong belief in them prevents him from a direct criticism of both and he saves this criticism for their representatives. Although the narrative suggests that a virtuous king or aristocracy might exercise a paternal authority over lesser men, yet his hope in a real compromise seems to shift to an emerging middle class, guided by moral autonomy and embodied by Jeanie and Butler.

However, the novel touches on other issues which surface in almost all of Scott's Scottish novels but with various degrees of emphasis. The Union between Scotland and England and the notion of colonization and its implications, political, moral and

cultural; smuggling and trade in slavery and the notion of luxury, all are historically there and Scott's imagination cannot escape them. In spite of the fact that a century has passed on the union between England and Scotland, the tensions remain looming in terms of authority and culture. The chain of events that lead to the Porteous riot is initially triggered by the act of smuggling prohibited by law. Yet in the last section Argyle, though a member of the British political administration, has not "given orders concerning the putting of it [smuggling] down." (430) This does not only reflect a Scottish dissatisfaction with the English excise but also may reflect a Scottish national feeling of being under an alien authority—English colonization, and that Argyle is potentially capable of challenging the political authority in London when the Scottish interest, or even his own interest, is ignored. His resistance to retaliatory measures against Edinburgh after the Porteous riot is a case in point. His reply to Queen Caroline, "I will take leave of your Majesty, and go down to my own country to get my hounds ready," is not left ambiguous. Scott clears its import by making the Queen understand it as threat in defence of his nation's dignity. (73) Yet in another way it shows that Argyle seeks his own interest in the first place. There is an allusion of this sort at the feast of Reuben Butler's ordination:

the Duke's extensive rights of admiralty gave him a title to all the wine in cask which is drifted ashore on the western coast and isles of Scotland, when shipping have suffered by severe weather. In short, as Duncan boasted, the entertainment did not cost MacCallummore a plack out of his sporran, and was nevertheless not only liberal, but overflowing. (439)

This picture added to an earlier one in which the Duke appears as a connoisseur of cheese and of snuff and tobacco shows that, like Jarvie, Argyle does not seem to be put off his luxuries by the iniquities in the trade that brings them to him. If Argyle's picture emerges as a national figure as well as reconciling agent, his virtue is sometimes questioned. Various episodes in the last section of the novel are also thematically meaningful in another direction. For instance, the Whistler's engagement in a famous trade with America, kidnapping British citizens to serve on the plantations, alludes to minor issues connected with the colonial origin of evil in the novel, best understood in terms of the hint of Robertson/Staunton, revealed earlier in the narrative. On the assumption that colonial vices are imported to the mother country, then by analogy English vices connected with luxury would infect Scottish

morality, thus distorting its cultural identity. The remedy concerning all these issues, Scott suggests, can be sought in qualifying the individual with a new version of civic virtue that combines morality with rationality and is fostered by religious education.

In the following section of this chapter, I want to examine the relation Scott constructs between the public event of the Porteous riot and the theme of providential justice, considered politically and morally. My purpose is to show that *The Heart of Midlothian*, in one of its aspects, can be viewed as part of the settlement Scott was negotiating with his own historical circumstances, involving the question of political authority. I suggest that Scott, despite his adherence to his Scottishness, quite deliberately transfers the vexing problem of authority from the spheres of politics and history to the transcendent and transhistorical realm of universal values and providential authority with emphasis on the moral aspect. In the second section, I want to show that Scott's position in *The Heart of Midlothian* is unlike that in *Old Mortality* regarding the issue of religion. Religious fanaticism, in *Old Mortality*, is depicted as a destructive force, socially and politically. In *The Heart of Midlothian*, Scott, for various reasons, seems to modify his position; religion mutates to be a vital and constructive force that shapes the individual's character and behaviour in a way that contributes to creating the morally, socially, and nationally committed citizen. Finally, I will consider the key points I hypothesized concerning the last section of the narrative in more detail to explore their bearings on contemporary happenings.

As a depiction of one of the most serious crowd actions of the eighteenth century, Scott's representation of the Porteous riot is interesting in itself. The interest lies in its validity, whether it is approached from the context of the historical period itself, or in the context of Scott's own time. In his interpretation of the early chapters that cover the historical event of the Porteous riot, James Kerr seems to take the first choice. For him Scott gives "a convincing picture of a morally and politically decadent Britain, emphasizing this decadence through the sinister pattern of pardons which link the plight of Effie Deans with the killing of Porteous."²¹ However, in the Porteous chapters and those ensuing, Scott gives a didactic reading of a public event, one which raises questions about crowd action to obtain justice, and about authority and rebellion. Implicit in any account of the Porteous riot, but specially in a historical novel conceived as a didactic instrument, we should expect to find traces of the author's attitude toward political authority. Brown notes, "we see Scott hedging round the incident with enormous individual, political, and moral complexities."²² I believe

these complexities are more decipherable if we consider the novel from the perspective of the time of Scott's writing rather than the political environment of 1736.

These first chapters make readers spectators at various public ceremonies—the smugglers Wilson's and Robertson's attendance at the Tolbooth Church, Robertson's escape, Wilson's hanging, Porteous firing on the crowd, Porteous's trial, his aborted execution, and the crowd action which followed his pardon and ended in his hanging. All these events refer to the administration of justice, and, taken together, insistently raise the issue of political authority. Some of the ironic hedging Brown notes is attributable simply to the dramatic irony implicit in an account including several perspectives. Scott's own perspective emerges rather more clearly, I believe, if we see the story of Jeanie's walk and Effie's pardon, not merely as a parallel to Porteous and his pardon, but as an interpretation of the story of the Porteous riot written in the context of the beginning of Reform agitation.

At all social levels and within all social contexts, authority is seen to be very problematic. Saddletree, the amateur legal pedant, "had a supreme deference for all constituted authorities." (122) "Recollecting the necessity of keeping up his character for domestic rule," Saddletree invokes the grandeur of terms drawn from law and monarchy to prop himself in his domestic life: "I allow neither perduellion nor lese-majesty against my sovereign authority" (130) The irony here is that he is but a figurehead in his family, executive power resting with his wife. In this single strand, Scott shows both the claims and the limits of legal formalism, suggesting operations of power beneath the social surface. The conjunction of authority and formalism appears even in small but revealing incidents:

Mr. Butler [church usher], who happened to have some particular occasion for the rein of an old bridle (the truants of that busy day could have anticipated its application), walked down the Lawmarket with Mr. Saddletree, each talking as he could get a word thrust in, the one on the laws of Scotland, the other on those of Syntax, and neither listening to a word which his companion uttered." (48)

We are parenthetically informed that the gentle Butler has plans for enforcing his authority in fulfilling his office by beating his charges. Further, law, education, and the church are comically seen to be in conversation with each other about authority, though the conversational structure ironically testifies to actual independence of goals

and procedures—a fragmentation of authority produced by the multiplication of authorities and institutions in a complex society.

Butler's and Saddletree's conversation demonstrating the fragmentation of Law into laws occurs at the end of Chapter Four, in which we hear of Saddletree's "open rebellion"(45). The phrase is telling, for the chapter depicts the planned execution of Porteous and his reprieve by Queen Caroline. This reprieve will soon result in "open rebellion" of more public consequence. And finally, also in this chapter, we discover that Queen Caroline herself finds difficulty in exercising her civil authority over the crowd in Edinburgh and likewise her domestic authority over her son. (48) In this single chapter, then, Scott manages to represent challenges to authority in familial, social, institutional, and even national or constitutional contexts. Moreover, authority is not unitary and self-consistent; rather it is supplementary. Rival authorities are seen to be in sometimes quarrelsome conversation with each other. And as Jeanie's struggle with her conscience will show, the setting for this cacophony of institutional voices is not only social but also painfully individual.

In presenting the Porteous affair to readers, Scott very deftly manipulates perspective, thus selecting what and how much we see of public events. The rhetorical effect of his control is to shape our responses to the questions about authority which he raises. In Chapter Two we are immediately ushered into an Edinburgh which is primarily presented as the theatre for the display and maintenance of public authority. The first scene is at the Grassmarket, "the scene of public executions."(27) But in this chapter the authorities remain remote and anonymous; the government, the magistrates, the Collector of Customs—all unnamed. The occasion for the enactment of public justice is the punishment of the smugglers. But Scott makes it clear that smuggling was almost universal in Scotland at the time. In a sense, it is tolerated in public opinion:

Contraband trade, though it strikes at the root of legitimate government, by encroaching on its revenues,—though it injures the fair trader, and debauches the minds of those engaged in it,—is not usually looked upon, either by the vulgar or by their betters, in a very heinous point of view. (28)

That smuggling, is tolerated by not only the "vulgar" but also by "their betters," implies Scottish dissatisfaction with the English excise and a feeling that rejects submitting to an alien will. Such interpretation presents Scott's voice as a Scottish

citizen. Yet Scott's voice, the lawyer and advocate of a British nation, shows that smuggling doubly offends authority. Not only does it directly reduce revenues, it also debauches public morality by encouraging scorn and resistance to authority in general. As a particularly thorny problem for the law and for the authority's public image, smuggling resembles the statute, which, without evidence, convicts Effie Deans of "presumptive child-murder." As in Effie's case, the victims of the unpopular statute are specified in a way that the authorities who punish them are not. Wilson and Robertson begin with some of the status of folk-heroes—and Wilson becomes more popular when he helps his confederate escape. The effect is to link readers with the public's admiration of colourful scamps and against the anonymous authorities. Wilson benefits from public sympathy so much that it was rumored he would be rescued from the place of execution. Chapter Three opposes the folk-hero Wilson to the folk-villain Porteous. The public's dislike of the Captain of the City Guard is to a degree impersonal, in a sense institutional. Yet Scott provides more information about Porteous than about any other character in the first seven chapters. While some such personal specification made smugglers sympathetic in the second chapter, Scott's short biographical sketch of Porteous shows this agent of institutional force as disagreeable. His history reveals that he lacks human sympathy usually shaped in the first social cell, the family:

a wild and irreclaimable propensity to dissipation...it was only by his military skill, and an alert and resolute character as an officer of the police, that he merited this proportion, for he is said to have been a man of profligate habits, an unnatural son, and a brutal husband. He was, however, useful in his station, and his fierce habits rendered him formidable to rioters and disturbers of the public peace. (33)

Scott's emphasis in this censure falls on Porteous's moral failings, even outside of his official capacity. The Captain gives evidence of his cruelty in his refusal to loosen Wilson's handcuffs. He also shows himself formidable to crowds in ordering his troops to fire when someone tries to carry off Wilson's corpse. Later, soldiers fired on pursuing crowds: "it is not accurately known whether Porteous commanded this second act of violence; but of course the odium of the whole transactions of the fatal day attached to him, and to him alone." (38) The culmination of Scott's moral censure occurs when the Captain's celebration of his reprieve is interrupted by rioters planning to carry out his execution:

It was, therefore, in the hour of unalloyed mirth, when this unfortunate wretch was 'full of bread,' hot with wine, and high in mistimed and ill-grounded confidence, and alas! With all his sins full blown, when the first distant shouts of the rioters mingled with the song and merriment and intemperance. (65)

Scott's language here is religious, even Biblical; this is not the customary enlightened tone of the narrative voice in the Waverley novels. At Wilson's hanging, many in the crowd had remarked that Porteous "seemed to be fey, a Scottish expression, meaning the state of those who are driven on to their impending fate by the strong impulse of some irresistible necessity." (36) Porteous's fatedness and the Biblical language used to delineate and censure his character combine to support the rioters' claim of acting in the cause of a higher justice: the Captain's death is thus transformed into a call to judgement.

Scott's presentation of Porteous invokes Biblical language, an absolute standard of justice, and providential chastisement. Thus, the narrative voice echoes the public judgement of the Captain: "of course the odium of the whole transactions of the fatal day attached to him, and to him alone." But in his police actions he had proved himself useful. To whom? At his trial, "he had been described by his counsel as the person on whom the magistrates chiefly relied in all emergencies of uncommon difficulty." (41) He had been instructed by them to keep order at Wilson's hanging, because they expected trouble. But "his patrons the magistrates" (36) remain anonymous; only one—Middleburgh—is named, and not until Chapter Eighteen, long after the crucial events. Even as anonymous figures, the magistrates remain behind a narrative screen; we never see their councils or hear their deliberations summarized either at the time of Wilson's hanging or of the conspirators' riot. To be sure, the magistrates are censured themselves by the public, as when the voice of the community wonders "Would they venture to defraud public justice?" (41) Even the English authorities are indirectly criticized for usurping ancient Scottish independence by Miss Damahoy, Mr. Plumdamas, and Mrs. Howden. But Scott does not present the operations of the magistracy as part of his evidence about the Porteous affair. Nor does he investigate the difficult situation of the magistrates, forced to contend with the effects of the London reprieve in the streets of Edinburgh. Nor does Scott draw readers' attention to authority higher up; Queen Caroline and the Council of Regency

are mentioned in the Porteous chapters rather perfunctorily, but their relations with each other and their operations in Scotland are not explained until Chapter Eighteen, the same chapter in which Middleburgh finally gives a name to the authority of the magistrates. Why are the higher reaches of authority systematically shielded from view in the Porteous chapters?

I do not want to argue that Scott endorses the unlimited exercise of authority or an inequality in the relationship between the English and the Scots even in defence of civil society, though this seems to have been his emotional reaction at the time of the Peterloo massacre.²³ To the contrary, Scott appears to condemn the Civil Guard's firing on the Wilson crowd and carefully documents the relative orderliness and sense of justice, which animates the "rioters (if they should not rather be described as conspirators)" who execute Porteous. (70) Authorial condemnation is reserved for Porteous alone, while higher authorities, though perhaps tactless or impolitic, escape serious blame. Like the Edinburgh populace, readers are allowed to enjoy letting off the steam of their discontent about the abuses of power without materially challenging the continued operations of that power. Political authority is at issue but the issue is never directly or systematically scrutinized by Scott.

When the actual specific agents of authority are at last named (chapter 18) and reviewed, their small company includes a diverse lot: Ratcliffe, criminal turned turn-key and informer; Sharpitlaw, a professional ferret for the law; and Bailie Middleburgh, as his name suggests, one of Scott's typical moderates, a generally good man forced to act in unpleasant circumstances. The agents of authority, though sometimes venal (especially Ratcliff), register some sentiment in the exercise of their duty. Both Ratcliffe and Sharpitlaw are touched by Effie's plight and offer sympathy, after their fashion. Middleburgh extends his sympathy to Effie and her father, encouraging them to bring forth saving evidence. But the Bailie's sympathy is compromised by his motives: he strongly suspects that Effie's lover is Robertson, now also believed to be the leader of the Porteous conspiracy. His sympathy functions at least in part to further the operations of authority in the investigation of Robertson. But Middleburgh's very interesting mixed motivation is never directly scrutinized or commented on by Scott.

Once Porteous has fulfilled his rhetorical purpose by demonstrating his sinfulness and thus serving as a scapegoat for authority in general, Scott radically undercuts his early apparent sympathy with the Porteous conspirators. Their leader turns out to

have been Robertson/ Staunton, the libertine, smuggler, and seducer of Effie Deans. On his first extended appearance, a meeting with churchman Butler, Robertson announces himself:

I am the devil!...call me Apollyon, Abaddon, whatever name you shall choose, as a clergyman acquainted with the upper and lower circles of spiritual denomination, to call me by, you shall not find an appellation more odious to him that bears it, than is my own. (111)

Butler's own combination of gentle religion and vestigial folk superstition prompts him to second Robertson's Byronic negative self-assertion:

Was it the passion of a mere mortal [his] eyes expressed, or the emotions of a fiend who seeks, and seeks in vain, to conceal his fiendish designs under the borrowed mask of manly beauty? The whole partook of the mien, language, and port of the ruined archangel...it was in such places, according to the belief of that period (when the laws against witchcraft were still in fresh observance, and have even lately been acted upon), that evil spirits had power to make themselves visible to human eyes and to practice upon the feelings and senses of mankind. Suspicions, founded upon such circumstances, rushed on Butler's mind. (113)

Though tempted to believe Robertson, Butler soon rationally puts aside any such deviations from "the general rules by which the universe is governed." (113-114)

But here, as in *The Antiquary*, Scott invokes the supernatural to resonate metaphorically. The renegade Robertson's usurpation or rebellion is in a sense a heresy, a controversion of his father's authority as religious interpreter. And Scott uses the contemporary mentality in which both Robertson/ Staunton and Butler have been inculcated to produce a demonology of rebellion (just as he had in *The Antiquary* produced but defused a demonology of social mobility). Given the providential "general rules by which the universe is governed," Porteous, as a man of sin, was fey or fated to be brought to judgement through the agency of the Edinburgh mob. Likewise, the leader of that mob, the instrument of Porteous's providential judgement, Robertson/Staunton, as another and even more complete man of sin, is similarly fey or fated, condemned after long years to die at the hands of his unknown, unacknowledged son, the Whistler. What initially appeared to be an investigation of the tangled skein of fragmented political and social authorities is rephrased (or re-inscribed) and resolved at a higher level of absolute moral authority. In all this, Scott

claims to show Providence operating in what seems to be the actual historical world. His answer to questions of political authority is to invoke the ultimate authority of Providence. In this recourse, he appears to follow the program of a divine-rightist, though he manages to do so without the Stuart dynasty. Still, Scott cannot manage without some specified, personalized representation of authority in positive and providential guise.

Queen Caroline is the highest representative authority in the novel. In fact, at the time of the narrative events she presides over all Britain while the king is in Germany. The council of Regency advises the Queen in the king's absence. Indignant at the slight put upon their authority by the murder of Porteous, they dictate stern measures to punish the city of Edinburgh. As we soon discover, factions within the court jockey for advantage. Even at the highest levels of state we see authority divided. The multiplicity of authoritative voices had earlier contributed to Effie's and Jeanie's dilemma and, in the form of the reprieve, sparked the Porteous riot. But as any Machiavel would know, the fragmentation of authority also creates opportunity for manoeuvre for one skilled at the game. The Duke of Argyle, first lord of Scotland, is just such a canny courtier. He is won over to Jeanie's cause by his obligations to Butler's family, Jeanie's own simplicity, and her nationality. Like Bailie Middleburgh, however, Argyle has motives beyond the exercise of sentiment in magnanimity. He hopes that a Queen's pardon for Effie will undo some of the damage done by the Porteous reprieve, reconciling subjects to Queen, Scotland to England. Having slipped from the highest favour himself, he might also reasonably expect that such a rapprochement might re-establish him in the Queen's good graces (though Scott parries such a possibility). So also, as Scott and critics make clear, Queen Caroline grants the pardon more for political than for humanitarian reasons. The King had

Entrusted to her the delicate office of determining the varying degrees of favour necessary to attach the wavering or to confirm such as were already friendly, or to regain those goodwill had been lost. ...It was, therefore, of the highest importance to retain some hold over so important a personage as the Duke of Argyle. (360)

To keep a channel to Argyle open, the Queen even makes an ally of sorts of her husband's mistress. When Caroline, a little moved, grants Jeanie's request for a pardon, "the prerogative of mercy here becomes a tainted political weapon," as

Cockshut observes, and "it is as if Effie's great appeal to the court had been granted in the letter and denied in the spirit."²⁴ Scott's shrewdness as a moral observer of history and politics keeps him from sentimentalizing Jeanie's interview with the Queen. He has no interest in becoming an apologist for the Queen or for any other specific authority. His interest in the novel is instead to demonstrate that, even working with the very imperfect instruments of a fallen world, providence accomplishes its design and emphasizes benevolence as virtue.

Many critics of *Midlothian*, as I have pointed out earlier in this chapter, have remarked the providential rewards which accrue to Jeanie in the final third of the novel and some have found the Roseneath section of minimal interest. Once again, the Roseneath material proves to be necessary to round off Scott's providential design, to reward Jeanie, Butler, and Davie Deans and to bring about the egregiously histrionic chastisement of that man of sin, Robertson/Staunton and his accomplice Effie. But another element in this final section frequently goes unmentioned. As Fisher cogently observes, Scott's

Conservative deity finds its prophet in the Duke of Argyle, whose greatness is his ability to supersede faction and control rebellion in the approved fashion of chieftain and clan... [he is] the vehicle of the miracle which the persistent faith of Jeanie Deans has effected.²⁵

Whether or not he supersedes faction and controls rebellion, Argyle stands for traditional paternalistic authority. But Fisher tends to emphasize Argyle's actions in obtaining the pardon. The truly providential basis of his authority emerges as he becomes Jeanie's fairy godfather, establishing her lover in a career and providing her and her father with a model farm. These actions are untainted by any conceivable political motive; they are purely benevolent. Argyle thus functions as the novel's best exemplar of "the cult of the moral father." Fisher uses the phrase in explaining Davie Dean's fidelity even to restrictive principles. But Argyle, much more involved in the fallen world and therefore much more sorely tempted, supersedes the paternal authority of the ineffectual Davie in making the workings of providence manifest in the world. Through Argyle, authority is redeemed, but redeemed in its traditional, paternalistic form. In short, Argyle embodies Scott's political, national and social views that are in the interest of Scotland, as well as Britain.²⁶

Writing just after Waterloo, Scott attempted in *The Antiquary* to rally the troops of civil society in a comic reintegration of social classes, which simultaneously celebrated triumphant British nationalism. Writing just before Peterloo, Scott's reading of current events, inferred from *Midlothian*, seems much less sanguine. The political questions facing Britain, decipherable in the public and private remonstrances of the novel, can be resolved artistically only by invoking traditional paternalistic authority and providential rewards and chastisement. The odd disjunction between the issues raised early and the facile concluding section may stand as testimony to Scott's apparent crisis of confidence not in economic progress but rather in moral regress. After Peterloo, he was to write the romantically tragic *The Bride of Lammermoor*, a novel of disintegration and dissolution.

Writing of Scott, Fisher claims "liberalism was closely connected in his mind with the confident insolence and reckless abandon of those who turned from the ordered historical process of providence to the revolutionary historical progress of 'Fate'."²⁷ At times when no settlement in current events seemed manageable, it is not surprising for Scott, though a great historical novelist, to turn from philosophical faith in enlightenment to the more traditional consolation authorized by Christian faith, from historical progress to the Pilgrim's progress. Such a suggestion leads us to explore another central issue in *The Heart of Midlothian*: religion and religious education and its relationship with civic virtues.

In *Old Mortality* Scott, the social scientist and "philosophical" historian, views religious fanaticism as an anti-social phenomena that impedes social and political progress. This rational tendency justifies the defeat of a politicised religion that does not recognize the Other, but not of religion itself. In *The Heart of Midlothian* Scott seems to embody Burke's view of religion in terms of universality, particularity, and function. Burke, following Montesquieu, believes that religion is universal and that throughout history it proved to be crucial in maintaining a nation's character and morals, though he also thought it should be truly believed in.²⁸ This seems to imply an enlightenment view of religions as of similar validity but he, also like Montesquieu, seems to support indigenous national religions on the ground that particular religions were naturally adapted to different societies, and especially different social structures. He was, therefore, a defender of the Christian establishments in Europe, for instance, but saw no reason to interfere with Hinduism in India. He disapproved of attempts to reduce particular religious faiths to a so-called

"natural religion."²⁹ Knowledge that can be gained by religion, particularly in *The Heart of Midlothian*, is fundamental to the welfare of society because it allows for moral choices. Also, while it calls for toleration it emphasizes national religion. Take for instance, Butler's remark on Effie's retiring to a convent to practice the Roman Catholic religion:

Jeanie had so much of her father's spirit as to sorrow bitterly for this apostasy, and Butler joined in her regret. 'Yet any religion, however imperfect,' he said, 'was better than cold scepticism, or the hurrying din of dissipation, which fills the ears of worldlings, until they care for none of these things.' (507)

The misleading expression "any religion, however imperfect," can only be understood in terms of the universality of religion as the "mainspring"³⁰ of virtue and in terms of Christianity as a suitable religion for Europe.³¹ As far as Scotland is concerned, Catholicism, though tolerated, remains imperfect.

The way *Midlothian* treats the issue of religion embodies Scott's vision of history as an evolutionary process which, he suggests, filters the vices of the past but accommodates its virtues in the present. Thus, if Scott makes of Davie Deans's adherence to the letter in practising his religion (religious fanaticism) an anachronism, he makes of Jeanie's application of the spirit of her father's doctrine more than contemporary. Here lies one of the focal points in the novel. Without Davie Deans's School, though it belongs to the past, it would be difficult for Jeanie to be what she is in the present. With this emphasis on the spirit of religion rather than on the letter, Scott invokes a traditional element in the history of the Scottish nation, which, in his view, would contribute to social and spiritual life under the impact of excessive materialism in the course of historical progress. *Midlothian*, then, could be perceived as a parable in moral pedagogy in which religion is at the centre. Scott sets as an example Jeanie Deans and her father to highlight the role of education, most significantly religious teachings, in shaping the individual's moral conduct, a necessary step for acting responsibly in family and being committed nationally. Davie Deans, an old Cameronian, belongs to a historical generation, the Covenanters, renowned for their religious fundamentalism. History had already determined his character and he always remembers his days of challenge and suffering:

How muckle better I hae thought mysell than them that lay saft, fed sweet, and drank deep, when I was in the moss-haggs and moors, wi' precious Donald Cameron, and worthy Mr. Blackadder, called Guessagain; and how proud I was o' being made a spectacle to men and angels, having stood on their pillory at the Canongates afore I was fifteen years old, for the cause of a National Covenant! (116)

Although all evidence around Davie attests to the changes that have occurred since his prime yet he cannot escape the web of his own history. All that remains for him is a sort of nostalgia that cannot set the clock back. However, despite his zeal for the Covenanters' cause, Davie's prejudice becomes overshadowed by his personal pride when his daughter, Effie, brings shame upon the family name. Davie compromises his life-long standards by commenting: "If she [Jeanie] hath freedom to gang before this judiciary, and hold up her hand for this poor cast-away [Effie], surely I will not say she steppeth over her bounds." (196) Davie Deans is abandoning—through the passage of time and the mutation of circumstances—his ardent belief against Oath-taking before the court. To survive, he needs to comply with the new facts imposed by history in the present.

Yet the stern, old Cameronian father, Davie Deans, who has stood by the most unyielding Covenanters, had already carried the zeal of the Covenanting cause to its utmost limit, that of instilling uncompromising principles in the first-born daughter, Jeanie, to adhere to the Covenanting standards with unbending rectitude and to permit her conscience to bow only to God. The narrator, significantly, informs us that Davie's way of preparing Jeanie for life was not only religious, though religious "instructions and lectures" were the foundation elements in his schooling. He taught her how to shoulder responsibility and to be productive within the frame of her social class (peasants) as of her early life:

But Douce Davie Deans knew better things, and so schooled and trained the young minion, as he called her, that from the time she could walk, upwards, she was daily employed in some task or other suitable to her age and capacity; a circumstance which, added to her father's daily instructions and lectures, tended to give her mind, even when a child, a grave, serious, firm, and reflecting cast. An uncommon strong and healthy temperament, free from all nervous affection and every other irregularity, so often influences the mind, tended greatly to establish the fortitude, simplicity, and decision of character. (83)

Jeanie, then, is brought up in a peasant milieu associated with hard work and religious piety which, potentially, enhances virtue and brings about self-satisfaction, in contrast with the upper class or the luxurious life in the city. With such characteristics inculcated in Jeanie, she becomes qualified to exhibit all sorts of heroism and to meet challenges on all levels, beginning with her meeting with the "devil," Robertson, at Muschat's Cairn and ending with her interview with Queen Caroline, in contrast to her sister Effie and even her future husband, Reuben Butler.³² Here, it is relevant to raise the question: if, as I have hypothesized, Scott's objective is to show that early education pays off in producing the committed and virtuous citizen, then why does Deans's school succeed with Jeanie and fail with Effie? Effie violated the religious traditions of her family as well as the conventions of her social class through her clandestine love relationship with Robertson/Staunton and attaching herself to the aristocratic class. Daiches attributes this failure to Scott's belief that history alone can never determine character: "Each [Jeanie and Effie] is influenced by the aspect of history to which she is temperamentally most sympathetic."³³ Scott recognizes individual differences; that is, the nature of each individual allows for some degree of idiosyncrasy, but more importantly, he asserts the role of parents not only in setting good example for their children but also in an on-going process of controlling their children's conduct:

And to the good old man, his younger daughter, the child of his old age, seemed a child for some years after she attained the years of womanhood, was still called the 'bit lassie' and 'little Effie,' and was permitted to run up and down uncontrolled, unless upon the Sabbath, or at the times of family worship... [Effie] possessed a little fund of self-conceit and obstinacy, and some warmth and irritability of temper, partly natural perhaps, but certainly much increased by the unrestrained freedom of her childhood. (97-98)

Scott, here, lays more emphasis on "unrestrained freedom" in making the individual vulnerable to external temptations and excessive individualism than on natural inclinations. Natural inclinations of the individual are tamed or set wild in relation to the social environment the individual is most exposed to.³⁴ Scott's warning of the dangers of uncontrolled social liberty to some degree echoes Burke's argument concerning uncontrolled political liberty.³⁵ In the absence of a real control Effie becomes a free agent; spending more time with evil associates than with her family, she is rendered an easy prey for any temptation that raises her desires. It is natural,

then, for her to commit sin and to convert into a rebellious character against the "puritanic rigor of her home"³⁶ and to act on her own without even consulting her elder sister. Now shaped by the habit of being "uncontrolled," in response to the call of her passions, she becomes a threat to the very existence of the family socially, emotionally and morally. Scott highlights the effects of free agency on the social order embodied in the family. Consider the exchange between Jeanie and her father, Davie, after she knew that Effie left them to live with Robertson/Staunton:

'The Lord protect us!' said Jeanie.—'Can the unhappy bairn hae left you for that villan?

'It is ower truly spoken,' said Deans--'she has left her auld father, that has wept and prayed for her—she has left her sister, that travailed and toiled for her like a mother—she has left the bones of her mother, and the land of her people' (408)

As Kerr points out:

In returning to her seducer [Robertson], Effie places herself outside the emotional and social valence of the Deanses and the Butlers, rejecting the moral authority of her sister and father to follow the dictates of her own passion. In Effie's career, the individual will and the related force of sexual desire take predominance over the bonds of family.³⁷

Some critics give little attention to the fact that Effie's plight is the result of excessive freedom. Instead, they focus on her nature. Francis Hart, following Fisher argues that: "The crime for which Effie suffers is a continuing one: it is her nature, as that nature is defined and judged in the context of the book. Fisher sums it up best when he refers to Effie as an improvident, fatal character with a 'capricious lack of integrity'."³⁸ Hart supports his analysis by quoting Effie's confession towards the end of the novel: "for you, my dear Jeanie, have been truth itself from your cradle upwards; but you must remember that I am a liar of fifteen years' standing, and therefore must by this time be used to my character." (477) Yet, still we can argue that the novel tells us nothing about any deterrent measure taken against Effie's first lie, which if it were to happen, it could, potentially, have changed the stream of her life. But we are told that she was a free agent at the time her conduct ought to have been under control; meanwhile, we are told that Jeanie was under almost complete control. In short, the narrative tends to support the thesis that Providence works with

social means; and that neither Jeanie nor Effie is "fated" by innate character, but character and passion need social control. In a more recent study of *Midlothian*, John MacQueen points out that Scott's concern in the novel is "a study of human understanding, passions and morals as these had been shaped and directed into action by circumstances, particular beliefs, family, companions or surroundings...in the historical period under consideration, without losing its relevance for contemporary characters and happenings."³⁹ This argument highlights Scott's attempt to describe an educational programme that inculcates moral principles.

Scott extends the treatment of education to other characters in the narrative to show that excessive freedom and over-indulgence can only spoil the manners and foster irresponsible free agency, as George Staunton's history demonstrates. Unlike Jeanie and relatively similar to Effie, "he passed the first part of his early youth under the charge of a doting mother, and in the society of negro slaves, whose study it was to gratify his every caprice...So that George Staunton acquired, even in childhood, the habit of regarding his father as a rigid censor, from whose severity he was desirous of emancipating himself as soon and absolutely as possible." (341-342) Such education only fosters excessive self-interest and kills all civic virtues that would define his relationship with his family, society and nation. To make things worse, his mother "contrived to place a considerable part of her fortune at her son's exclusive control or disposal." Scott, here, alludes to the relation between money, luxury and even colonisation in spoiling of character, as I attempt to show below. The narrator, moreover, makes it clear that the good qualities George enjoyed "might pass well in society," if he "was under restraint," (342) but the underworld he attached himself to had left its impact on him to produce a morally corrupt character.⁴⁰ By the same token, it is not surprising, then, for Madge Wildfire to be what she is when the novel reveals her mother, Old Meg, to be the ultimate source of crime. Meg's motherly nature is presented as violently uncivilized; she acts on maternal instincts like that of the "she-wolf and lioness." (486) While apparently she shows an attention to Madge's welfare, she kills Madge's child and Madge's sanity with it. She also, we remember, nursed Robertson/Staunton "at this withered breast" (293) and he later comments that "the source from which I derived food, when an infant, must have communicated to me the wretched—the fated—propensity to vices that were strangers in my own family." (323) In short, early education and the social milieu are crucial elements in moulding the character of individuals. Scott shows that when

religious teachings are included in educating the individual, the individual develops a new sort of civic virtue based on moral autonomy rather than economical independence.

Jeanie's history suggests a sort of independence and free agency, yet for Jeanie, unlike Effie and other morally dissolute characters in the novel, any step she carries out remains calculated as framed within God's commandments, paternal sanction, and human dignity. It is true that she is free to love Reuben, but her love relationship is pure and virtuous. Given her journal, she learns to channel her emotions or desires to comply with God's legislation and social conventions. Her loyalty to her love is a matter of principle even in the most critical moments when she is in a bad need for money to fund her trip to London. To win her heart, Laird Dumbiedikes, cunningly, shows her his "leathern-bags, full of gold and silver coin." (256) She refuses to be a commodity in a "market economy."⁴¹ Her answer echoes the loyalty of Evan Dhu, Dougal and others in Scott's novels: "It canna be, Laird—I have said it—and I canna break my word till him [Reuben Butler], if ye wad gie me the hail barony of Dalkeith, and Lungton into the bargain." (257) Jeanie here is the same as in the court. There, she cannot break a promise with God, similarly, here, she cannot break a promise with man. Scott shows here that the individual's consistency with his creator necessarily leads to consistency with his fellow creatures. In this sense, there is no contradiction between civil society and religion as far as the former restrains moral violations.

The reference for Jeanie's actions, as a heroine, has already been shaped and firmly grounded in principle; a fact that rules out any expectation of changing her character. Unlike Waverley and Frank Osbaldistone, Jeanie, as we are repeatedly told, "was no heroine of romance." (251) That is, her vision is not tinged with romantic imagination. Therefore, she needs not undergo any romantic experience, which is usually associated with a sort of aberration, or falsehood. As Jane Millgate puts it: "Jeanie Deans is the heroine of truth. She has no need to search for a father or identity—her paternity and her selfhood are never in doubt."⁴² At home, she is very much concerned about her family's comfort and honour. She treats her sister, Effie "with all the love and care of a mother." (97) When Jeanie observed her sister returning home late and with a man, something against the tradition of a religious family, she rebuked her. When Effie felt that her response has hurt Jeanie's feelings, she regretted: "—and I wish my tongue had been blistered or I had vexed ye." "Never

mind that, Effie," replied the affectionate sister; "I canna be muckle vexed wi' ony thing ye say to me—but O dinna vex our father!" What counts for her is her father. This reminds us of Liliass's plea to her brother Darsie not to "vex" her uncle, Redgauntlet. Paternal piety is central theme that recurs almost in all of Scott's Scottish novels in different guises. Edward Waverley joins the Jacobites in retaliation for his father's humiliation at the hands of the Hanoverian government. Henry Morton falls into the web of combating fanatics as a result of his loyalty to the memory of his father. Frank Osbaldistone risks his life more than once to save his father's reputation. Darsie Latimer's deep concern with parentage concerns his real identity. Each of these heroes has his own reason that justifies his loyalty to his father. Perhaps the closest to Jeanie is Die Vernon who devoted all her life to the safety and welfare of her father. However, in the case of Jeanie her loyalty to her father is not merely an instinctive drive, but a moral duty. This duty is one of the fruits of religious teachings that emphasize the strong bonds among the members of the family in a hierarchical order. To emphasize the effect of such hierarchy, Scott makes Jeanie's agency at every point in her pilgrimage sanctioned by paternal proxies: she moves with the aid of "Daddie Rat's" underworld passport, Dumbiedikes's "siller", Mr. Staunton's coach, the Butler's hereditary credit with the Campbells. Even Madge Wildfire, despite her insanity, had contributed to her safety in return of a previous charity. Jeanie returns the paternal blessing with complete devotion and obedience to her father, but always within the strict religious principles he nurtured.

In chapter 19, the night before Effie's trial, Scott brings the effect of religious principles on the individual to the highest point. It seems, here, that Scott is not only concerned in showing that the passage of time is qualified to mitigate the sternest principles, but, more significantly, to show the eternal strength of paternal passion as a natural instinct more powerful than any abstract commitment. This notion prevails throughout the novel in Madge's insanity as a result of her lost child, Effie's burning passion to know about her child and Robertson/Staunton tragic end while searching for his lost child. Even Meg Murdockson, the emblem of all evil, is overcome by her maternal passion. When Levit, one of the robbers, addresses her: "still I say, that if revenge is your wish, you should take it on the young fellow himself [Robertson/Staunton]." Meg forcefully refuses the idea because she has "nursed him at this withered breast." (293)

I do not want to argue that Jeanie's compassion for her sister is less intense than that of her father's for any personal reason (selfishness, jealousy, hypocrisy) because her interest is in her family rather than her self. Nor does she refrain from committing perjury because she is doing a social crime. After all, her witness in favour of her sister will not do ill for any body. Jeanie's first concern is to tell the truth as she "should answer to God at the great day of Judgement." (229-231) Then comes next her concern with the moral health of her family as a whole, and her sister forms a part of this family. Therefore, her sympathy with her sister is beyond any doubt. Not only the ardent pilgrim's progress she carries out attests to that, but also her second question, soon after she returned to the Highlands: "And Effie?—and Effie, dear father!" was an eager interjectional question which Jeanie repeatedly threw in among her expressions of joyful thankfulness." (407) The grace she seeks is for her father's house, since it is to this that she has always referred her identity. Her self-interest is only the image of her family's interest and not the other way round: "You seem to me to think of everyone before yourself," remarks the embodiment of that grace, the Duke of Argyle. (350) In her plea, Jeanie addresses Queen Caroline: "Save an honest house from dishonour." (369) Here, Jeanie echoes her father's voice, Davie: "Thou hast redeemed our captivity—brought back the honour of our house." (407)

Jeanie's relationship with the society around her also proves to be constant. This constancy negates, in some sense, the tradition of the middle-of-road-hero in Scott's novels. Scott saves this role for Jeanie's husband. Although Welsh strives to fit her into the pattern of the proper social hero⁴³ there are many indications that attest to the contrary. She refuses to submit to social pressures on all levels. Her trip to London suggests that she is dissatisfied with the human law that dooms her sister. Her action manifests a sort of protest, though not rebellious, in contrast to the Porteous riot. The society around her, implicitly or explicitly, including her father and the magistrates, encourages her to witness in favour of her sister. Robertson/ Staunton confessed his deed and assured her of Effie's innocence and urged her by all means to save her sister from an unfair law. Her answer is very simple: "I can promise nothing...which is unlawful for a Christian." (153) Ratcliffe upbraided Jeanie over her refusal to say three words that would give life to her sister and affirmed that if he were in her place he would not hesitate to take the oath on the Bible. Yet her religious and moral ideals and not the social consensus determine her refusal or agreement. As David Hewitt argues:

Jeanie regards God's law as the supreme determinant of human conduct, consistently acknowledges that truth and justice abide with God, and strives to reconcile herself and her conscience with God through self-examination and through prayer. That she might do some thing for her sister comes to her as a revelation 'like a sun-blink on a stormy sea.'⁴⁴

Further, Scott shows here that the Machiavellian attitude of people like Ratcliffe or Robertson/Staunton is only governed by their culture and the way of life they were brought up with, robbery and lawlessness. But Jeanie looks at the matter from a different standpoint since her culture is different from theirs. Their temptation count less for her compared to her father's, who implanted in her what she is convinced is her duty to perform. That is why she interprets her father's pointing out to her how to save her sister as a "fearful' temptation." (199) For her, it means, simply, to violate the ninth commandment which prohibits telling a lie, which if it were to happen would "bring the honesty of her entire life into question, to deny one of the foundations of her personality—her integrity."⁴⁵

Finally, not accepting her father's argument, Jeanie emerges as more fanatic than her father in abiding by the spirit of the commandment.⁴⁶ Basically, she doomed her sister when she answered the judge that Effie had told her "nothing" about her pregnancy. (231) Following her conscience, Jeanie has disappointed all in the court, including the magistrates, and above all her father. Although Brown emphasizes "the confluence of cultural and personal influences of Jeanie's character," yet he points out that "these influences are not to be understood as merely 'external' to Jeanie." He argues that, through Jeanie, Scott exhibits a deep understanding of the "'internalising' influence of education, culture, and religious belief on human beings: through her own life and her moral struggle, Jeanie gives these influences an independent status of her own."⁴⁷ To substantiate his argument, Brown cites Lukacs:

The story of these inner battles and of this struggle to save her sister show the rich humanity and simple heroism of a really great human being. Yet Scott's picture of his heroine never for a moment obscures her narrow Puritan and Scottish peasant traits, indeed it is they which again and again form the specific character of the naïve and grand heroism of this popular figure.⁴⁸

Even a Marxist critic like Lukacs cannot deny that Jeanie's heroism and her sublimity in "rich humanity" is, primarily, triggered by her religious doctrine. It is true as James Reed argues that "Scott has shown the heroine and her father to be products of a particular locality at a particular time; the finger of history has moulded them."⁴⁹ Yet it seems that Scott, through both, aims to show that fortifying the individual with religious teachings serves not only to preserve the individual from moral defection and the family from dissolution but also to reinforce the national feelings. In this sense, the matter transcends locality to be more universal.

Throughout history, at least Scottish history, religion and nationality are almost always interconnected. Scott makes this point clear when he links religion with the notion of nationalism in chapter 34: "With the fanaticism of the Scotch presbyterians, there was always mingled a glow of national feeling." (341) Through a written letter and in an attempt to repair Effie's misfortune, Robertson/ Staunton proposes to Jeanie that she deliver him to "the hands of the executioner," in return for saving Effie's life. (340). "But Jeanie, in the strict and severe tone of morality in which she was educated" has more than one reason not "to make barter between the lives of Staunton and of Effie." (340) Most important is that Robertson / Staunton is the leader of the Porteous riot which is understood by the government in London as a challenge to its authority, whereas "in the eyes of those of Jeanie's rank in life...the action, though violent and irregular [is connected] with the idea of ancient national independence." (341) Once again Jeanie is subjected to a bitter test. Now she has to choose between a narrow familial allegiance that guarantees her sister's life and a wider national allegiance, which if ignored becomes "an act of treason." (341) Her resolution not to betray her nation is an indication of her public spiritedness. It is the same spirit, which Redgauntlet attempts to implant in his nephew Darsi Latimer.

If the loyalty of Dougal and Evan Dhu is the product of tribal tradition and embodies civic virtue in its crudest form, Jeanie's loyalty to her nation is a conscious mixture of religious and social duty. Failure to do this duty is not less shameful for her than Effie's career. As a simple peasant girl bred on weighing matters not in terms of utility but in terms of morality, her performance often seems embarrassing, yet on the whole it is spontaneous and effective and above all reflects moral courage. The episode when Jeanie meets the Queen and talks to her is a case in point. The Queen, patronizingly, asks Jeanie: "and tell me what a sort of a barbarous people your country folk are, where child-murder is become so common as to require the restraint

of laws like yours?" Jeanie replies: "if your leddyship pleases...there are many places beside Scotland where mothers are unkind to their ain flesh and blood." (367) Although, apparently, Jeanie's answer represents a natural argument that reinforces her position to get a pardon for her sister, yet for Scott, in the context of the royal family's history, the purport of the answer becomes purposive. In the meantime, in the context of Jeanie's history it is difficult for the reader to believe that Jeanie knows about the Queen's quarrel with her son, and Lady Suffolk's position. This suggests that Scott has designed the episode in this way for other reasons. As critics argue, Scott seems to present a criticism of a corrupt court, both morally and politically and that the English, especially the court, could learn something from Scottish morality, which is not yet contaminated by the effect of luxury that characterizes a country like England in an over-mature commercial state. Yet in another way the Queen's language in addressing Jeanie serves to highlight the tense relationship that governs the two countries. The language employed by the Queen sounds unnatural (if not arrogant) between subjects of the same country in spite of difference in rank—a good counterexample of this is Argyle's sympathetic conversation with Jeanie—but rather more natural between two subjects of separate countries only connected by a colonial tie (or rather a sense of superiority). Jeanie's argument seems to confirm Scotland's superiority over England in terms of virtue.

Following the elite of Scotland's politicians, merchants and philosophers, Scott's support of the Union settlement, when seen from a political and economical perspective, is indisputable. But his complacency under the authority of the British Empire has never suppressed his fears of the abolition of Scottish culture. More important, Scott's concern seems, as Kerr points out, to be Scottish moral values and how to preserve them from being dissolved under the impact of English commercial culture, based on a pure market economy.⁵⁰ We have seen this ambivalence in the writings of the "philosophical" historians and their call to accommodate some civic virtues as a guarantee against moral corruption. *The Heart of Midlothian* suggests that to maintain this equation in reality is problematic since the Union "constituted an absorption of Scotland into the body politic of England."⁵¹ Thus, the national feeling which seems to be a call for political independence on the surface is in depth a sort of autopsy of the repercussions entailed by this "absorption" on the cultural and moral levels. Economical progress accrued to England from its trade with colonies had opened the way for wealth, luxury and corruption, which in turn is imported to the

mother-country, England. Through this channel colonial vices, also, are transmitted to Scotland. In one of its aspects, the narrative asserts the notion of a colonial origin of evil, the remedy of which, in Scott's view, can only be achieved through a compromise that could be traced in Knocktarlitie. Knocktarlitie becomes a kind of model for responsible colonial rule.

Any reading of *The Heart of Midlothian* cannot exclude the theme of nationalism. Yet Scott's national feelings need not be interpreted in terms of Scotland and England as rival neighbours, but in terms of cultures and moral valence. In *Rob Roy* Scott's treatment of the Union is explicit and direct. Jarvie's defence of the Union against Fairservice's complaints is motivated by the benefit of economic progress. Generally, the narrative stifles Fairservice's criticism of the Union and emphasizes the economical progress rendered to Scotland. In *Midlothian* Scott's treatment of the issue of Union takes a different bent, not so much political as moral. Lack of morality in English society makes the politicians there "na gude bairns" and they do not account for their corruption, but if the corrupt court were in Scotland it could be mended on the ground that the Scots are still not morally contaminated. Porteous's fate, as an image of the corrupt authority in "Lunnon," provides a good example. It is fit here to argue that when the Edinburgh mob executed Porteous they were expressing their vengeance not only against Porteous but also against the entire corrupt system of London-based, quasi-colonial rule which Porteous represents. In the context of civic humanism, the corruption manifested by the authority in London and its representative Porteous becomes an allusion to the commercial culture that legalizes "warlike expansion" from which "it was argued, arose the corruption which destroyed the commercial empires of Athens and Rome."⁵² What makes Porteous's crime intolerable is that he "shed the blood of twenty of his fellow-citizens." (43) One of the spectators comments: "Is this to be borne? Would our fathers have borne it? Are not we, like them, Scotsmen and burghers of Edinburgh?" (43) The tone does suggest a sort of irony because normally the citizen soldier is supposed to be the defender of his "fellow-citizens" not their executioner. The latter case, at best, does reflect a sort of alienation between authority and public and at worst a sort of "quasi-colonial" relationship that governs two countries with disparate positions on the axis of progress.

Scott seems to approach the "quasi-colonial" relationship between Scotland and England from a moral perspective by drawing a connection between the practices in

the American and West-Indies colonies and that in Scotland. In both cases, luxury and free market economy govern the morality of the colonizer and entail moral corruption. Robertson/Staunton's history, for instance, highlights the impact of imperial expansion morally on both the colonized and the colonizer. Robertson is the product of a marriage with a "wilful," "indulgent," and extravagant West-Indian planter's daughter and he grows up flattered by the ministration of slaves. The colonizer's policy motivated by exploiting slaves' effort for making wealth and enjoying luxury is seen to be socially and morally detrimental. Those who acquire the mentality of living only to make profit and live luxuriously, can in no way desert this way of life even when they are back in their home country. Here, the colonial origin of evil in the novel is stressed. In the figure of Robertson the colonial vices come home to the mother-country not only through his practices that lead to a tragic end for both Madge and Effie but even through his lineage. These vices, however, cannot be seen as "foreign" incursions into a pristine metropolitan culture (the Orientalist gambit). The last section of the novel presents the Whistler, Robertson's son engaged with Donacha dhu na Dunaigh. Through the agency of Donacha dhu na Dunaigh "a horrible trade then carried on betwixt Scotland and America, for supplying the plantations with servants, by means of *kidnapping*, as it was termed, both men and women, but specially children under age." (502) The Whistler himself becomes a commodity for sale and resale. He is sold by Madge to a female stroller who "sold him in her turn to Donacha dhu na Dunaigh" (501) who intends, initially, to sell him into servitude in America and he does indeed sell him as a slave. (506) The episodes of Robertson/son, both hint at the corruption of a pure market economy and English misrule in other subject countries. Pure market economy justifies the slave trade as a means for securing more wealth and more luxury, even if those to be sold as slaves are British subjects. If the "philosophical" historians on the whole praise commerce and trade as contributive to human progress and economical and social improvement, they, on the other hand, call attention to the negative effects of unchecked market economy on morals. Adam Ferguson points out the relationship between luxury and "political corruption," and how this corruption could extend to infect "all orders of men, with equal venality, servility, and cowardice."⁵³

If Scott shares Mrs Howden's view concerning the corrupt authority in London, he certainly has in mind Ferguson's critique of luxury that menaces the morals of an over-mature commercial state. Yet, unlike Mrs Howden, he envisages the remedy not

in dissolving the Union, but rather by setting examples of Scottish morality that guide the British nation as a whole towards the means that help in containing the evils of progress. Such examples represent a sort of compromise best described as founded on Burke's notion of "change-in-continuity." Burke, as Pocock points out, is a "defender of an aristocratic and commercial order which could be represented as at once natural and progressive and defended by reference to a system of civilized manners."⁵⁴ Such configurations apply very much to the order Scott attempts to create in Knocktarlitie under the authority of Argyle. Argyle represents the lost patriarchal authority. He is enlightened, moderate and finds in the Union a mutual interest for both Scotland and England. Allegorically, when Scott presents Argyle's characteristics, he seems to suggest how the ruler of the British nation may safeguard the Union, and act responsibly, guided by old moral values as a reference:

He was alike free from the ordinary vices of statesmen, falsehood, namely, and dissimulation; and from those of warriors, inordinate and violent thirst after self-aggrandisement... Soaring above the petty distinctions of faction, his voice was raised, whether in office or opposition, for those measures which were at once just and lenient. (344)

Despite the generally idealized portrait of Argyle as an embodiment of compromise, his picture is not free from some discord, as I have pointed out in the first section. However, Scott's emphasis on Argyle serves him in redefining the relationship between the base and the top in a hierarchical system whose economy is based mainly on modern agriculture. In this context, the colony of Knocktarlitie "becomes the stronghold of both traditional patronage relationships and modern civilization"⁵⁵ For the reader this project remains ideal, but for Scott it seems to be achievable. Henderson observes that "the very architecture of Abbotsford expresses this dual relation" in which Scott puts his earnings from trade (selling novels) "in the service of rural economy."⁵⁶

Notes: Chapter Five

1. Scott, *The Heart of Midlothian*, ed. Claire Lamont, (Oxford University Press, 1982), 507. All further quotations will be from this edition and will be noted in my text.
2. Kelly, *English Fiction of the Romantic Period 1789 - 1830* (London: Longman Group UK Limited, 1989), 155.
3. In this respect, one of the earliest reviews of the novel came from the *British Review*, *Scott: The Critical Heritage*, 169. "It is a poor device for so great an author, and if he had not been compelled by his mercantile engagement to spin out the thread of his story, with or without materials, so as to make out a fourth volume, and by that means secure the fourth thousand pounds, he would have scorned to introduce any part of the trash, of which he has composed for the latter part of his work." (169). Later criticism of the novel was not far from this view. Perhaps, the severest criticism came from Dorothy Van Ghent, "On *The Heart of Midlothian*," *The English Novel* (1953 rpt.1961). According to Ghent, "we must judge the book at its full length without commiseration for Scott's financial needs in building Abottsford." (114). Ghent even dismisses the whole work as of no literary merit. For more recent readings, in the same vein, see Gordon, *Under Which King?*, 94; Robin Mayhead, *Walter Scott* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 44; Harry E. Shaw, *The Forms of Historical Fiction* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), 242.
4. Cockshut, 173.
5. See Ian Duncan, *Modern Romance and Transformations of the Novel: The Gothic, Scott, Dickens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 149.
6. Fleishman treats the novel as a "parable of modern history as the speculative historians conceived it." Unlike Ghent and others, he defends the thematic and structural unity of the narrative particularly the last volume (79 & 93); Kerr argues that "the protruding pastoral in the last eight chapters of the novel is a result not merely of the author's greed or lack of taste, but of Scott's effort to compose in *Midlothian* a romance of national regeneration." (64). See also Kelly. What Kerr sees as the overall theme of the narrative, "national regeneration," is seen by Kelly, but in a different terminology, as the "modernization" of Scotland; wherein "the Deanses and the Butlers become a part of Argyle's project for the modernization of Scottish, culture, religion and economics." (155). Andrea K. Henderson, *Romantic Identities: Varieties of Subjectivity, 1774-1830* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), approaches the novel within the context of "market economy." Henderson explores the relationship between progress and the free market economy and their impact on social and political life ultimately asserting the relevancy of the fourth volume. For Henderson the image of Roseneath offers "an idealized vision of an economic self-sufficiency that would render exchange relations simply unnecessary." (130-131).
7. See Istvan Hont and Michel Ignatieff, "Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: An Introductory Essay," *Wealth and Virtue*, ed. Istvan Hont and Micheal Ignatieff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 24.
8. John Dunn, "From Applied Theology to Social Analysis: The Break between John Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment," *Wealth and Virtue*, 120.
9. See John Burke. 206. Burke writes: "the Hanoverian monarchs had all so far had antagonistic sons who set up 'shadow courts' while waiting their time to inherit--and then, having inherited, viewed their own offspring with similar mistrust."

Metaphorically, this also has bearings on the tense relationship between political and judicial authorities, on the one hand, and the public on the other, as reflected in the Porteous riot.

10. For more details about the conception of the relationship between economic independence and virtue, particularly, political virtue in the classical sense, in which the citizen possesses the public spirit to participate actively in the community's government and defence, see John Robertson, "The Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic Tradition," *Wealth and Virtue*, 138.
11. V.A.C. Gatrell, *A New View of Society and the Report to the County of Lanark* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 53-54.
12. Gatrell, 23.
13. See F. P. Lock, 16-17.
14. *Ethics*, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 43.
15. *Waverley*, 171.
16. See David Craig, *Scottish Literature and the Scottish People: 1680-1830* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), 167-197.
17. Lock, 19-20.
18. Both quotations are in Breiderwell's *Power and Punishment in Scott's Novels*, 21. Breiderwell quotes the first from Francis Hutcheson, *System of Moral Philosophy*, "as quoted" in James Heath, *Eighteenth-Century Penal Theory* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84 and the second from Adam Ferguson, *Institutes of Moral Philosophy* (Mentz: Kupferberg, 1815), 184.
19. Breiderwell, 65.
20. Kerr, 84.
21. Kerr, 64.
22. David Brown, 114.
23. See McMaster, 100.
24. Cockshut, 186.
25. P.F. Fisher, "Providence, Fate, and the Historical Imagination in Scott's *The Heart of Midlothian*," *Nineteenth Century Fiction*, X (1955-65), 105.
26. Kelly argues that Argyle is the "British statesman [that] Scott felt that the new United Kingdom (Britain united with Ireland in 1800) needed in the deepening of crisis of the late 1810s." (156). For Ian Duncan, "Argyle himself stands for the return of that sovereign authority that no scion of the house of Stuart, soiled with ambition and resentment, could ever incarnate." (166). For more details about this point see Hart, 145.
27. Fisher, 105.
28. See Burke, *Reflections*. Burke wrote that, "We know, and what is better we feel inwardly, that religion is the basis of civil society, and the source of all good and of all comfort." After all, "man is by his constitution a religious animal." (87-88).
29. Lock, 15-17.
30. *The Miscellaneous Prose Works of Sir Walter Scott*, 18: 222.
31. *Journal of Sir Walter Scott*, 2 vol. (New York: Harper, 1890), December 18, 1827. Scott praises the Christian religion for "its divine origin proved by its beneficial effects on the state of society." See also Fleishman, 85-86.
32. See R. S. Edgecombe, "Two Female Saviours in Nineteenth-Century Fiction: Jeanie Deans and Mary Barton," *English Studies*, vol. 77 (1996). Edgecombe describes Jeanie as "trained to a life of practicality, a life of action rather than the decorative passivity imposed on women of the upper class. As a result, she assumes the role of

- protectress toward Reuben, both temperamentally and physically less able than she." (49).
33. Daiches, Introduction to an edition of *The Heart of Midlothian*, ix.
 34. See William Acton, *Prostitution* (London, 1857), 118. Quoted in Miriam L. Wallace, "Nationalism and the Scottish Subject: The Uneasy Marriage of London and Edinburgh in Sir Walter Scott's *The Heart of Midlothian*," *History of European Ideas*, 16 (1993), 42. Acton describes the vice of women as consisting of "Natural desire. Natural sinfulness. The preferment of indolent ease to labour. Vicious inclinations strengthened and ingrained by early neglect, or evil training, bad associates, and an indecent mode of life." Wallace cites Acton's analysis to apply to Madge Wildfire and her mother Meg, but in another sense it supports our argument that "early neglect" is a major factor in character's deviation as far as Jeanie's and Effie's histories are concerned.
 35. See Burke, *Reflections*, 57.
 36. See Edgar Johnson, *Sir Walter Scott: The Great Unknown*, (New York: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), I: 658.
 37. Kerr, 78. For Gordon, "except for Jeanie's intense loyalty, the family situations in *The Heart of Midlothian* are emblems of a widespread social breakdown...for it involves both the fragmentation of the contemporary social order and the loss of continuity between one generation and another." (97). Scott, therefore, as social scientist, is bringing to the foreground the causes that underlie the disintegration of society (moral laxity) embodied in the family and offers religious teachings as a cure through Jeanie's performance.
 38. Hart, 133.
 39. MacQueen, 34.
 40. See *The Heart of Midlothian*, xvii. Scott is accused of contradiction in presenting the character of Robertson Staunton as being a "mixture of courage and cowardice, brutality and tenderness." I think we cannot judge Staunton's contradiction except in the context: man is potentially liable to be good or bad. But Scott wants to show that each individual has the two genes of goodness and badness. What makes one predominate over the other is determined by various factors the most important of which is the individual's early orientation.
 41. Henderson, 130.
 42. Jane Millgate, *Walter Scott: The Making of the Novelist* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), 153.
 43. See Welsh, 129, 134.
 44. David Hewitt, "Walter Scott," *The History of Scottish Literature, vol. III, Nineteenth Century*, ed. Douglas Gifford (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1988), 81. See Hart, 138. Hart, unlike Welsh, argues that Jeanie's conduct is not derived from social considerations. According to Hart, it is Effie who anticipates the opinion of society over God's fear. Her shame and fraud prove it. As her faith is not deeply rooted in her, compared to Jeanie, she heeds less what is metaphysical compared to the society surrounding her. However, Kelly remarks that Jeanie "does these things not by defying the public, the legal, and the historical, but by modifying them in terms of her feminine and domestic virtues and values." (154).
 45. Brown, 120.
 46. See Hewitt, 81. Also see Edgar Johnson, I: 655.
 47. Brown, 121.
 48. Lukacs, 52. Also see MacQueen, 37.

49. James Reed, *Sir Walter Scott: Landscape and Locality* (London: The Athlone Press, 1980), 114.
50. See Kerr, 62.
51. Millgate, 157.
52. Pocock, 195.
53. Ferguson, *Essay*, 241.
54. Pocock, 209.
55. Henderson, 160.
56. Henderson, 158-59.

Chapter Six
Redgauntlet (1824)

In *Redgauntlet*, the last of his major Scottish novels, Scott wrote his third and final study in fiction of Scotland's Jacobite past. If the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745 employed respectively in *Rob Roy* and *Waverley* are derived from the annals of real history, the Jacobite event (1765) in *Redgauntlet* is not, which makes the whole narrative fictional in every sense. In the previous novels Scott dealt with times when the Scottish nation was in the process of transformation politically, economically and socially, or when challenging the English political and cultural hegemony over Scotland was a possibility, while in *Redgauntlet* the process of transformation had already been completed and intercepting history to reverse its course was impossible. The novel, however, was susceptible to severe contemporary criticism as it was viewed to be a repetition of *Waverley* and *Rob Roy*.¹

The resemblance in the plot structure is accompanied by variations in the narrative techniques employed and of the themes it embodies, as later studies show. In the view of some critics and biographers, one of the inferences that could be drawn from Scott's return to Jacobitism is his desire to produce a work that, symbolically, recreates certain aspects of his earlier self.² For Daiches, the novel embodies Scott's divided personality between Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic nostalgia, which finally pits the party of self-congratulatory progress and "prudence" exemplified by Alan Fairford and Darsie Latimer against that of feudalism and "heroic violence" manifested by Redgauntlet.³ The narrative, in other words, like its predecessors, attempts to discredit heroic and civic virtues, for instance, loyalty, military courage, devotion and self-sacrifice in the present.

For Graham McMaster, it is "highly dubious" to look to *Redgauntlet* for "continuity of subject and technique" to *Waverley* and the similarity between the two novels is only "superficial."⁴ *Waverley*, in his view, dramatizes a "contrast of cultures," while *Redgauntlet* "is a difficult and obscure novel, and one that has been ill served by being forced into the mould of *Waverley*, with which it has only very accidental connections."⁵ McMaster's argument is directed against interpretations that see Scott yet again making a choice between old and new with Darsie as his mouthpiece.⁶ In his search for thematic clues in *Redgauntlet* McMaster focuses on the narrative techniques employed in enhancing the plot. In *Redgauntlet* Scott uses a

mixture of narrative devices: epistolary, personal journal and omniscient narrator. As Scott opens the novel with "character," and the exchange of letters between Darsie and Alan, this, according to McMaster, situates the two characters "within an economic and social context."⁷ For McMaster, "the important concepts outlined in the opening pair of letters" are about "freedom and restraint, money and the law, isolation and community. Much of the rest of the novel is a development of them. There is no suggestion of any contrast between the old and the new."⁸ In other words, *Redgauntlet*, deals with social analysis in Scott's present time. It depicts the dialectical relationship between the individual and his society in terms of family, class, friendship, economy and politics within the framework of the prevailing commercial world.

Ian Dennis, in a more recent study, seems to read the novel in similar terms. For him, "the issue of free will and fatality is a major theme in *Redgauntlet*." But, in his view, Scott treats this issue not as a "purely abstract question," but in terms of "rivalrous envy," connected with social class, economy, nationality and familial identity as reflected in the letters exchanged between Alan Fairford and Darsie Latimer. Dennis, like McMaster, seems to situate the theme of the novel mainly within two coordinates—social and economical.⁹ But *Redgauntlet* is not only the narrative of Darsie and Alan. As Rohan Maitzen points out: "one of the novel's most striking features is its abundance of nested narratives," the narrators of which "recognize that conditions have changed, and they endeavor, through narrative, to elucidate the alterations."¹⁰ Support for such reading can be found almost in every narrative in the novel and is presented either directly or symbolically. Joshua Geddes's narrative, Wandering Willie's tale and even some of the Jacobites' memoirs serve as examples to this effect. This and similar arguments, however, tend to view the novel as mainly dramatizing historical change with little indication of any ideology or moral lesson that might underlie this dramatization. Nevertheless, Scott's own comments on the novel might provide a clue to his real intention behind his return to write about Jacobitism and its relevance to his own times.

In his Introduction to *Redgauntlet* written in 1832, Scott describes the Jacobites as "looked upon in society as men who had proved their sincerity by sacrificing their interest to their principles."¹¹ Scott cites an anecdote that shows the admiration of even George III for the Jacobites' loyalty to their principles. Hearing of a gentleman of Perthshire who still does not recognize the legitimacy of the usurping family of

Hanover, the King "commissioned the member for Perthshire to carry his compliments to the steady Jacobite—'that is,' said the excellent King, 'not the compliments of the King of England, but those of the Elector of Hanover, and tell him how much I respect him for the steadiness of his principles.'" (10) It seems that the King's admiration of his opponent's integrity and his adherence to his political creed inspired Scott to dramatize a "peculiar and striking feature of ancient manners," (10) the notion of loyalty.

Cockshut, in an earlier study of the novel makes the theme of loyalty central to the narrative but, unfortunately, he confines it to "loyalty at a psychological rather than at social level," which renders the book "a study of memory and nostalgia."¹² But Scott immediately reminds his reader that, while his narrative aims at showing through an array of characters how progress could affect people's adherence to their principles, "various circumstances in the composition induced the author to alter its purport considerably." (11) Scott declines to give any reason for this alteration or specify its nature leaving it open to speculation or inference. My discussion attempts to investigate this issue to find possible answers for this alteration and the possible ends it serves.

Perhaps Scott's awareness of the difficulty of applying the Jacobites' version of loyalty in the classical sense, as a civic virtue, has dictated the task of devising a definition that makes it acceptable in the present. While the Introduction seems to imply that in many cases a surviving Jacobitism is a warrant for integrity, and is recognized as a private virtue by the King himself in a 'private' capacity, in the novel the link does not seem to be so clear and the survival of the kind of integrity associated with "chivalric" honour is problematic in the modern commercial age. Alan's choice between a client's case and his own commitment to friendship provides an example that reflects this problem. Although through other examples and counterexamples we can discern a decidedly problematic air about accepted definitions of loyalty, we also feel a strong willingness to reintegrate them in more individualistic ways to take the form of integrity. In a sense, loyalty becomes a universal term, as a social value, that combines integrity and honour and is redefined as doing honourably to and by others as a bond, in whatever station or transaction, regardless of any particular sect, rank or period. What Scott has done in his treatment of the notion of "honour" and "credit" in *Rob Roy* seems to recur in *Redgauntlet* in his treatment of honour and integrity. Scott's own biography, once again, can provide

evidence of the possibility of merging honour and integrity in social transactions; we recall that Scott's "honourable" dealings with his creditors is not enacting "loyalty" but a similarly "chivalric" rather than legalistically commercial attitude. Support for this assumption could be sought in Scott's strategy which seems, through various examples, to extricate loyalty from the sphere of dogmatic allegiance—political, religious or familial—and to civilize it as a human and social virtue valid in all times and under all systems.

The novel demonstrates that although integrity is best shown by those who have known what "loyalty" was in the past, it also shows that it is not necessarily confined to the older order and to the Jacobites in particular. Significantly, the narrative shows that those with the most picturesque nick-names for their Jacobite activities are sometimes the least honourable in their treatment of Alan, for instance, Maxwell Summertrees, alias Pate-in-Peril. The content of the letter addressed to Redgauntlet which Maxwell gives to Alan to help the latter find the whereabouts of his friend, Darsie, does, in fact, reveal Maxwell's dishonesty as we come to know later from the Chevalier himself. We suspect Pate's flaw of integrity earlier when Provost Crosbie advises Alan to "take a keek into Pate's letter before ye deliver it" (251) While Pate's sense of honour seems to operate within the narrow sphere of his commitment to Jacobitism, it proves to be vulnerable as a wider bond.

By contrast we are introduced to characters, who are, though not ideologically committed, astonishingly honest in their dealings. For example, Nanty Ewart refuses to betray the Jacobites though he does not believe in them, in contrast to Cristal Nixon who is supposed to be a genuine Jacobite. Despite Nanty's occupation and status as a smuggler and outlaw, the author asserts that: "his wild ideas of honour and fidelity could [not] be shaken even by resentment, or by his Protestant partialities." (383) Nanty's integrity transcends any ideology and therefore it is always present in any situation that demands self-consistency. This is manifest in his feelings of loyalty to the woman whom he loves (in opposition to his father). In this perspective, the Chevalier's loyalty—or honourable dealing—to his lady, as well as to Alan might seem more integrated with the theme of the book.

In spite of the Chevalier's knowledge that Alan's political and religious creed is that of the Hanoverians', and that he is of a "plebeian descent," the Chevalier deals with him honourably on the basis that Alan is "by sentiments and education, a man of honour and a gentleman." (297) Redgauntlet also lays emphasis on the role of

education and company in creating the honourable and committed individual, though he limits it to civic virtue in terms of political allegiance. He views Darsie's "deficiency of spirit," as a result of "grovelling habits of a confined education, among the poor-spirited class you were condemned to herd with, that keeps you silent...your impulse has not yet learned the genuine throb that answers to the summons of honour and of patriotism." (339) Integrity/honour, then, as a moral and social virtue, though presented as an individual capacity, could be enhanced and developed by education according to the needs of society so that it becomes a code or a habit operative on all levels of human life regardless of hierarchy, occupation, wealth or political creed.

Scott seems to approach integrity, in the same way Hume does in his treatment of justice in his *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1777), in terms of "public interest and utility."¹³ For once integrity is defined as a manifestation of honourable dealing to and by others, then, by implication, a dimension of justice is added to it. Justice of any sort involves integrity in performance and the converse necessarily holds true. Scott attempts to redeem loyalty from any dogmatism under which its agent might behave unjustly to the Other, as it becomes an internalized social ethics. In this sense, all issues raised in the novel become thematically integrated under the umbrella of integrity. Thus we may correlate integrity with nationalism or patriotism, law and justice, commitment to family and profession, religion, social transactions, or romantic love. It is relevant here to recall Jeanie Deans and how all these loyalties surface in her conduct as a result of her integrity, though such integrity is owed to religious teachings rather than to any social creed.

Once again, Scott, as a social and moral scientist, unearths the past, even fictionally, to comment on the social-moral failings of the present and to show that a real progressive and civilized community is the one that improves on its ancient virtues. If, as we have seen in *Rob Roy*, it is hard to maintain credit as a social value without associating it with some sort of ancient honour, it is equally hard, without the spirit of loyalty, even in its narrower sense, to imagine integrity as a social merit. Pedagogically, *Redgauntlet* teaches this morality by setting examples of contrast and comparison. This fact appears even more clearly when we investigate the "nesting narratives" in terms of temporality, present and past. Through this relationship the present and the past are made to exchange comments as viewed by philosophical history, leaving a space for possible moral lessons to emerge and perhaps intended by the "alteration" the author speaks of in his Introduction.

Here it becomes pertinent to ask the question: what about Redgauntlet, who represents and fights for restoring the Stewarts' dynasty to the throne, thus denying the legitimacy of the present authority and the way of life it embodies? Can we reduce "a man of violence determined to command the tides of history or die in the effort"¹⁴ to a competitor who looks out for his own interests as Dennis and others claim? Or, can we say that he is an opportunist, like Rashleigh in *Rob Roy* and Fergus in *Waverley*, using politics as a vehicle to improve his social and financial status as could be suggested by a commercial mentality and the notion of class mobility? Still more, can we say that he is there only to emphasize his obsolescence? Redgauntlet's role, I think, is deeper than that and his attempt to change the course of history to ratify the feudal values of the past embodied in his political creed, which he still believes to be viable, is not the major issue. The major issue lies in the social-moral-political implications that underlie his ideology, an ideology founded on the abstract notion of "honour," as Redgauntlet defines it: "Men of honour...set life, property, family and all at stake, when that honour commands it!" (340) Redgauntlet's rhetoric about honour is absolute and undefined but clearly it denotes disinterestedness, a whole devotion to an idea or to what might be called public or national interest that denies the individual any civil right outside this sphere.

Such idealism and absolute commitment to one's doctrine reminds us, in various degrees and various contexts, of the Jacobite Flora, the Royalist Claverhouse and in some way the Covenanter Burley and how they are doomed; likewise, Redgauntlet is doomed to failure and alienation. As far as patriotism is concerned, we may agree with Redgauntlet's thesis, and perhaps Scott, as his biography tells, supports the noble motive that underlies it provided that it is not misguided and serves the collective opinion as to where the interest of a nation lies. Basically, Redgauntlet's view of integrity and honour in defending one's own country is not and will not be obsolete; it is an eternal truth much like freedom and justice. Given that Redgauntlet stands for civic virtue in a wrong historical moment according to the Divine Right doctrine, Scott seems to assert and redirect the application of the same principle in the present as urgency to defend the nation's interests, politically, socially and morally. Politically, therefore, it serves in preserving national solidity against external threats and internal dissension. Socially, it provides a code that embodies just dealings among individuals. Morally, it helps in curbing selfish and individualistic tendencies that shape the commercial age. This attitude towards Redgauntlet's role cannot be

revealed in isolation from other characters' narratives particularly those of Darsie, Joshua Geddes and Justice Foxley.

Darsie's narrative in one of its aspects seems to be engineered to polarize with his uncle's; as such it endows Redgauntlet's anachronism with some degree of acceptability. Darsie's rhetoric, in contrast to that of Redgauntlet's, presents him not in the *Bildungsroman* tradition, nor as a middle-of-the-road hero (in fact, this role is given to Alan) but rather as a type that represents modern thought in terms of excessive selfishness, passiveness and individuality. His condition is best described in his own words: "Misfortune--early deprivation--has given me the privilege of acting for myself." (212) Redgauntlet's call for absolute commitment versus Darsie's claim for extreme free agency is one of the crucial problems raised in the novel, as far as public spiritedness and patriotism are concerned. The first incarnates civic virtue and political involvement, though against the spirit of the age, while the second embodies excessive individualism as a symptom of political and social detachment. Both are shown to be detrimental socially and morally and the significance of Alan lies here as an agent of compromise.

Redgauntlet's role, therefore, cuts both ways; while it recognizes the death of heroism as some critics might argue, it also serves to debunk some moral failings in the present. Without Redgauntlet's role it is difficult to understand the political and social transformations, in fact, complications, that have already taken place in Scottish society in particular and the British nation in general and their impact on morals and social relationships. Harry E. Shaw is quite right when he maintains that *Redgauntlet* "depicts with brilliant economy the historical significance of the transition from Stuart to Hanoverian rule, so that the process of ideological accommodation will be concretely intelligible."¹⁵ My first point attempts to show that if cultural contrast is not there as a major theme of the narrative, as McMaster and others claim, its presence at least as an explanation of English cultural hegemony and the conduct of the government towards the rebels cannot be ignored. The picture Darsie draws of the Highlanders to his friend, Alan, anticipates Redgauntlet's pathetic conclusion towards the end of the novel which has to do with the notion of the death of heroism in its chivalric sense. But in the meantime it highlights the meaning of loyalty associated with it in terms of identity, nationality and personal integrity. Secondly, guided by contemporary intellectual ideas about progress and morality, Scott, I show, employs each episode and confrontation as a parable to demonstrate the

value of integrity in various contexts: family, law and justice, economy, love and public interest.

As the novel unfolds it becomes clear that one of Scott's aims is to show, approvingly or otherwise, that: "the cause [Jacobitism] is lost forever" (396) and this constitutes the loss of a whole culture associated with it in all spheres of social and political life. The narrative shows that the anachronism of Redgauntlet lies not in the absurdity of his ideology that once embodied Scottish culture, but in the fact that it is no more advocated by the Scots themselves. As Ernest Breisach puts it: "There were two forces of innovation that erupted into history from time to time, the people and the great men (heroes)."¹⁶ On the assumption that Redgauntlet embodies the hero, where are the people who share his doctrine of reversing the course of history? They are no more in the cultural sense. The absence of the Highlanders, who used to symbolize primitive civic virtue; who formed the military backbone in the Stuarts' cause and who stood and fought for the Scottish identity and traditions (culture) in the previous novels, is highly significant in this respect. Darsie, in his argument with his uncle, relates the inevitability of the failure of the rebellion to the disappearance of the Highlanders as a unique identity: "how can you, with a body of unarmed and disorderly insurgents, propose to encounter a regular army? The Highlanders are now totally disarmed." (340) This description of the insurgents applies very much to the condition of the Covenanters in *Old Mortality* whom Scott praises for their courage and public spirit.¹⁷ Despite their condition, the Covenanters, as we have seen, were able to confront and defeat the regular Royal forces at the battle of Drumclog. Their power was derived from their religious doctrine and culture, which they thought was a representation of national and public interest, besides their "detestation of the oppression of their rulers." Darsie's contrast of the balance of power between the Jacobites and the government focuses primarily on number and armour in determining victory and neglects any idea connected with public spirit or civic virtue. In fact, such an idea may have never entered his consciousness; after all, his education has deprived him of any experience of this sort. The narrative would rather argue that the balance of cultures and public spiritedness, which ultimately determine social and political consensus on a certain issue is the crucial element in determining the outcome of any conflict. This fact becomes clear toward the end of the novel when we discover that all social fractions are on one side and Redgauntlet alone is on the opposite side regarding allegiance to legitimacy and authority; more importantly, the

“usurping” authority shows no sign of “oppression,” a fundamental element that could arouse people’s spirit and instigate them to rebel.

The Highlanders themselves are now tamed by hegemony of a superior English culture to the point of dissolution and loss of national identity and its patriarchal system; now they are totally British subjects in the cultural sense. Consider how Darsie describes the state of the Highlanders twenty years after the Forty-Five:

The Pretender is no more remembered in the Highlands than if the poor gentleman were gathered to his hundred and eight fathers, whose portraits adorn the ancient walls of Holyrood; the broadswords have passed into other hands; the targets are used to cover the butter churns; and the race has sunk, or is fast sinking, from ruffling bullies into tame cheaters. (28)

This picture tells half the truth about the real change that the Highlanders had undergone and about the relationship between them and the Pretender. The other half is left for the Pretender himself to complete towards the end of the narrative when he refuses the theatrical concern of the Jacobites, in the figure of Sir Richard, about his safety. Addressing Sir Richard, he says: “Care not for me, young man...when I was in the society of Highland robbers and cattle-drovers, I was safer than I now hold myself among the representatives of the best blood in England.” (380) The change from “robbers” to “tame cheaters” does not count very much; both activities are socially and morally offensive in the view of a civilized community. Yet, as we have seen in *Waverley*, from an anthropological point of view, robbery, as a profession, does not necessarily imply dishonesty and lack of integrity, while cheating does. The real change, therefore, which is not clear to Darsie and is implied in the Pretender’s speech, is that the Highlanders in the process of transformation of their culture have lost a crucial element that characterises this culture, loyalty as chivalric honour. The contrast here is not between “cheaters” or “robbers” and “the best blood of England” but rather between a culture that translates commitment as a civic virtue into action at whatever cost and a culture that allows bargaining and disengaging when it is costly.

In *Rob Roy* we have seen how the English government’s main concern was to destroy the Highlanders not only militarily by using direct force or by encouraging clan conflicts but also culturally by introducing the conceptions of trade and commerce into their society. Scott himself notes the impact of “the gradual influx of wealth, and extension of commerce” in destroying the clan culture in his preface to

Waverley (340). Force alone, Scott's insight seems to suggest, is not a sufficient means for controlling, or quasi-colonizing the Other, so long as the Other adheres to his culture. The rebellion of the 45 confirms this fact. Accordingly, the process of cultural destruction proceeded even after the Forty-Five in an attempt to dissolve Scottish identity, in the cultural sense so that it becomes part of the British Empire rather than an independent Scottish nation.¹⁸

It is possible here to draw analogies between the policy applied by the English in ruling India and in subjugating Scotland culturally. India as Benedict Anderson points out was ruled by a "commercial enterprise—not by a state, and certainly not by a nation-state." This project is carried out by introducing into the Indian society "a thoroughly English educational system," which, according to Anderson, created "a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect." This "mental miscegenation" premises cultural quasi-colonization. The difference in this analogy lies in the fact that in India the agents who carried out this sort of cultural implantation were British politicians, whereas in Scotland the agents were the Lowland Scots themselves, particularly the elite and merchants who thought that Scotland's interest and progress depended on following the English example. As Anderson puts it: "Anglicization naturally also offered rosy opportunities to armies of middle-class metropolitans (not least Scotsmen!)—functionaries, schoolmasters, merchants, and planters."¹⁹ To borrow Anderson's view of nationalism, the "imagined community" now is not the world of romantic Scotland of the Highlanders but rather the world of rational commercial Britain in terms of culture.

Redgauntlet's Burkean comment: "the cause is lost for ever," is not only a conscious conclusion on behalf of Redgauntlet's romantic vision of nationality, identity, independence, traditions and all associated with culture, but also of Scott's pragmatism that calls for accepting the present as *de facto*, though not without a sense of bitterness. This bitterness is not nostalgia for a static world that hinders progress; Scott is a believer in progress. It is a reflection of Scott's feeling that the sense of honour and integrity that characterized the old world is now withering under the impact of excessive selfishness. In the last scene Redgauntlet himself, finally, allows this pragmatism, though ironically conditioned, for his nephew, Darsie, but denies it for himself.

Unlike McMaster and others, David Brown observes that *Redgauntlet* touches upon the issue of culture not in the form of conflict, the case in *Waverley* and *Rob Roy*, but rather in the form of an end of conflict in the form of containment if not hegemony in earnest.²⁰ The last scene is instructive in this direction. Redgauntlet's belief in fatality and the necessary accomplishment of his family curse "that the cause which they espoused should never prosper" (211) prepares him for the worst, a fate similar to that of Dr. Cameron in the Introduction of the novel. But Scott's authority, which always tends to reach a compromise, ends the novel differently. Therefore, the final failure of the revolt comes as no surprise to Redgauntlet, but the pacific manner of General Campbell and the leniency of the King's offer astonish him: "'Is this real?' said Redgauntlet. 'Can you mean this? —Am I—are all, are any of these gentlemen at liberty, without interruption, to embark in yonder brig, which, I see, is now approaching the shore?'" (395) If we are willing to share Redgauntlet's experience of the aftermath of the Forty-Five and the harsh measures taken by the Hanoverian government against the Jacobites and those who supported them, then we might be no less willing to share his astonishment. It is if Scott aims to rectify a historical error through suggesting that if the Forty-Five ended in the same way of leniency, then the cause would have died of itself as a political movement leaving only sentimentalized memories.

Dr. Cameron's case, in the context of the cost of historical progress, highlights the harshness of the terms of this cost, which could have been more humane if Cameron's case were handled in the same way as that of Redgauntlet's. Instead of executing him on ground of "treason," Scott suggests "limiting his punishment to perpetual exile." (5-6) *Redgauntlet's* denouement seems to support this view although the circumstances of the 45 are different from 1765. Scott is able to "attempt to recast history, to recreate the past as he wished it had happened,"²¹ for the imagination of the novelist allows for containing conflict peacefully, but realities on the ground make it difficult for politicians to contain any conflict unless they are assured that they have the upper hand. Walpole's general leniency can only be exercised from a position of strength and with the conviction that opposition will wither away unless given fresh provocation. Most significantly, the narrative suggests that the leniency of the government can only be interpreted in terms of cultural containment.²² Now not only the Highlanders are tamed and forced to comply but even the higher representatives of the Jacobite movement are not serious in the matter of rebellion. Charles's supporters,

save Redgauntlet, are more inclined to be pragmatic Jacobites if not Hanoverians in deed. Cockshut observes that Charles's reaction to Glendale is meant to cast suspicion on Glendale's Jacobitism. The king wants "to prove to Sir Richard that he was not really a Jacobite at all."²³ This supposition is seconded by the representative of King George, General Campbell, who summarizes the situation to Redgauntlet: "and Jacobite will be henceforward no longer a party name." (398)

At this point Scott deftly makes wild loyalty in its romantic and fanatic political allegiance give way to social integrity that ties persons with mutual honour. It is significant that though Glendale is not ready to fight in defense of the Divine Right doctrine, he is presented as ready to die for the safety of the King as a person through "honourable resistance," (393) as he announces: "let the King be first cared for." (393) The Wanderer is not ready to fight for his own unattainable right but he is ready, perhaps, to die honourably to save the souls of his partisans: "I surrender myself willingly, to save these gentlemen's danger—let this at least avail in their favour." (394) General Campbell's dealing with the conspirators, unlike Claverhouse, is not based on political fanaticism. Authority in its arbitrary sense gives way to a sort of friendly negotiation that preserves the individual's dignity as well as public safety. All display integrity/honour that supersedes partiality and maintains confidence but within a social context. Civic virtue, in its new social paradigm proves to fulfil its purpose without bloodshed or violence. Scott's final scene seems to present a realization of Adam Ferguson's prophesy in which he sketches a picture of civilization's potential that makes of integrity almost the second authority that obliges people in every capacity to behave honourably:

So long as the majority of a people is supposed to act on the maxims of probity, the example of the good, and even the caution of the bad, give a general appearance of integrity, and of innocence. Where men are to one another objects of affection and confidence, where they are generally disposed not to offend, government may be remiss; and every person may be treated as innocent, till he is found to be guilty.²⁴

Authority works not on mere suspicion but on concrete evidence. In theory, the conspirators plan to launch a rebellion but in practice none acted against public safety. Therefore any harsh measure taken by the government against the conspirators (citizens) becomes arbitrary and shakes the confidence between the authority and people.

The last scene leaves two alternatives for Redgauntlet; either he has to submit to the modern ideology imposed by the Hanoverians like the rest of his hesitant comrades, or choose to live in alienation. Consistent with his ideals and integrity, Redgauntlet prefers the latter choice. His compromise, even when given the chance to choose, is honourable and does not admit alternatives. At this point he becomes the gentleman of Pershire whom King George III respects for "the steadiness of his principles." If he cannot fight for his cause he "shall never fight for the house of Hanover," and therefore he "shall sink it [his sword] forty fathoms deep in the wide ocean." (398) Scott depicts the last scene pathetically and arouses our sympathy towards Redgauntlet simply because he is a captive of fatality, history and above all his ideology; we admire his stoicism in accepting his role as representative of civic virtue.

While the last scene seems to pit realism and resilience against idealism and rigidity in ideology yet it asserts the essence of loyalty, as self-consistency and personal integrity. Consider Redgauntlet's advice to his nephew:

You pass under the service of the reigning Monarch without the necessity of changing your allegiance—a change, however,' he added, looking around him, 'which sits more easy on honourable men than I could have anticipated; but some wear the badge of their loyalty on the sleeve, and others in the heart. (398)

Redgauntlet is no more concerned that his nephew is in the opposite camp; he is only concerned about his personal integrity and his steadiness in committing himself in his choice under all circumstances. The last sentence he communicates to his nephew reflects this concern: he "will, I trust, now depart from the house of Redgauntlet, since its present representative has adhered to the winning side. I am convinced he will not change it, should it in turn become the losing one." (399) If Redgauntlet, the archaic, has been defeated, as a historical necessity, his integrity has triumphed as a timeless virtue. On the other hand, Darsie, the modern, has won but his integrity is still questionable. This highlights how each one of the two characters understands his relationship to the world around him according to his cultural background, and how Scott understands this relationship in the light of progress.

Redgauntlet's integrity is part of an older culture, one that sees men fulfilling predetermined roles, and not free, in contrast to Darsie who is brought up in a liberal

environment that prioritizes individual freedom and guarantees it by civil laws. The former rejects the notion of romantic freedom and describes it as "the true cant of the day" simply because he believes that "the privilege of free action belongs to no mortal—we are tied down by the fetters of duty—our mortal path is limited by the regulations of honour—our most indifferent actions are but meshes of the web of destiny by which we are all surrounded." (212) It is no surprise for Redgauntlet, within the context of Divine Right doctrine, to view duty as a "web of destiny" determined by tradition and God. Scott views the "web" as social connections, in which the opinion of the whole society determines the limits of the freedom of the individual. This attitude finds support in the novel and outside it. In the novel, for instance, General Campbell demonstrates that Redgauntlet is not concerned about the results his actions will have on society:

His majesty will not even believe that the most zealous Jacobites who yet remain can nourish a thought of exciting a civil war, which must be fatal to their families and themselves, besides spreading bloodshed through a peaceful land. He cannot even believe of his kinsman, that he would engage brave and generous, though mistaken men, in an attempt which must ruin all who have escaped former calamities. (395)

It is immaterial to Redgauntlet whether the return of the Stewarts would even be in the interest of Britain. Scott, unlike Redgauntlet, tends to think that it would not be:

Neither is it probable that Charles Edward, educated as he had been in foreign courts, and in the antiquated principles of passive obedience and arbitrary power, would have endeavoured to conciliate the affections of the great mass of his subjects, by disavowing those sentiments of despotic government which had cost his grandfather so dear.²⁵

The narrative indicates that more civil strife would have resulted both from the opposition and from the Jacobites themselves as they vied for power. Both ideas are given support in *Redgauntlet*, a novel that highlights what forms integrity, liberty, and duty may take in a commercial world.

If in the old order "duty" is an obligation, in the new world freedom is a claim. But for freedom to be socially valid it must be a freedom to choose ways beneficial to a social order which has developed from the habits and values of its people. Redgauntlet is not aware of the fact that people "cannot at this time of day, think of

subjecting their necks again to the feudal yoke, which was effectually broken by the act of 1748, abolishing vassalage and hereditary jurisdictions." (330) It could be argued here that Scott interpolates Wandering Willie's tale just to depict in anticipation the breakdown of the feudal system that forms the foundation of the Jacobite movement, with civic virtue at its heart. Wandering Willie is the modern manifestation of his ancestor Steenie Steenson. In his tale, Willie tells of the feudal relationship between the earlier Redgauntlets and Steenie, which culminates in Steenie's journey into hell and his declaration of not serving. Many critics have suggested that this foreshadows Darsie's declaration to the present Redgauntlet.²⁶ More likely it helps define the present Steenson's relationship with Redgauntlet, and it is for this reason that Willie tells it. Willie serves Henry Redgauntlet out of choice and not feudal duty:

It was a runaway match betwixt Sir Henry and his lady. Poor thing, they would not allow her to see him when in confinement—they have even the meanness to leave him without pecuniary assistance; and as all his own property was seized upon and plundered, he would have wanted common necessaries, but for the attachment of a fellow who was a famous fiddler—a blind man—I have seen him with Sir Henry myself, both before the affair broke out and while it was going on. I have heard that he fiddled in the streets of Carlisle, and carried what money he got to his master, while he was confined in the castle. (244)

Willie's blindness could be seen as a symbol of the impotence of his role compared with the feudal role of his ancestors. Steenie broke the chain and Willie now serves voluntarily, for humane reasons. But the amount he can serve and the difference he can make is slight. This becomes even more obvious in the aid that Willie renders Darsie. He plays his fiddle to let him know he is not alone, but he cannot help him escape. Darsie hopes for more assistance:

I must now be on the alert to make my escape, if possible, before I am forced on shipboard—Blind Willie will not, I think, desert me without an effort on my behalf, especially if he has learned that I am the son of his late unhappy patron. (336)

However, "the warning that the 'Campbells are coming' is too late, is irrelevant to the outcome of the narrative"²⁷ His attachment to Redgauntlet himself is even more vague, and perhaps purposely so in order to underscore the end of feudal relationships

and with it the fierce inner loyalties of clannish and feudal society. Hugh Redgauntlet leads no one any longer, and he alone remains unquestioningly and anachronistically loyal to the authority of the prince.

The anachronism of Redgauntlet, then, lies in the fact that he works against consensus and against evolving tradition. If as Hume argues "the good of mankind is the only object of all laws and regulations" and "the safety of the people is the Supreme Law,"²⁸ then integrity outside this formula, according to Scott, would be unjustified and detrimental to public good. Darsie's critique of his uncle's myopic vision, that he fails to observe the circumstances around him objectively, underlines this point:

I look around me, and I see a settled government--an established authority—a born Briton on the throne—the very Highland mountaineers, upon whom alone the trust of the exiled family reposed, assembled into regiments, which act under the orders of the existing dynasty. France has been utterly dismayed by the tremendous lessons of the last war, and will hardly provoke another. All without and within the Kingdom is adverse to encouraging a hopeless struggle, and you alone, sir, seem willing to undertake a desperate enterprise. (339)

Mindful of the French Revolution, Scott always felt that the history of a people was often rejected or ignored in a revolution. The narrative alludes to the Glorious Revolution that brought about change and freedom but within the framework of inherited tradition, unlike the French Revolution, or what contemporary radicals call for. If radicals fight for undermining all that is traditional, calling for democracy, equality and freedom in the absolute sense, Redgauntlet fights to undermine all that is progressive and liberal, calling for absolute passive submission, heredity, rank and vassalage. It seems that Darsie's character forms a third type that rejects the past and lacks commitment, in the positive sense, to the present.

Darsie's objections in the above quotation are significant, and Scott would not disagree with his argument.²⁹ History, tradition, peace are important to society according to Scott, and here he acknowledges that the Jacobite ideology has been altered by time and circumstance, and would now be viewed as a disruption of peace rather than a restoration of traditional order. But these are not Darsie's thoughts. The emphasis of his objections focuses on the futility of the Jacobite cause and balance of powers and not on whether it is philosophically or socially just. He tells Redgauntlet

that he "will take no step of importance but upon conviction." (367) But it does not seem that, politically, he has any convictions except passively to accept established authority. Scott, through putting Darsie's credibility under test, attempts to show that his integrity is flawed and that, as a type already formed, he would rather endure the pains of a "solitary" than take the risk of being committed responsibly, or when commitment is hazardous. As Fiona Robertson puts out,

At first, Darsie wants to repossess his past only on his own terms, and is not prepared to accept the demands which it might make of him in return. He finds, however, that his past threatens to assimilate, not to complete, him, and that he has to struggle against a doctrine of historical determinism rigidly adhered to by his authoritarian uncle.³⁰

Darsie, unlike Waverley and Morton, represents a modernity that rejects good brave causes. His passiveness purchases his personal safety, freedom, leisure and selfishness at the expense of family, nation, and even his manliness. But Darsie's passiveness and his romantic freedom which has become threatening for himself is not isolated from the objective circumstance he is bred in.³¹ These have left him with no real education to commit him to any ideology in earnest. Here Scott carries Darsie's narrative a further step to highlight the role of family and education in preparing the committed individual.

Scott recognizes the role of parents in educating their children but he seems to emphasize the effect of the father as a representative of masculine education associated with manly virtues. Here splitting Lilies's and Darsie's education between uncle and mother respectively becomes suggestive. Darsie's early memories are of "unbounded indulgence on my mother's part, and the most tyrannical exertion of caprice on my own." (16) Indulgence, coupled with money, entails a failure to utilize his natural abilities; in some respect he is similar to Robert Staunton in *The Heart of Midlothian*. Both cases demonstrate that indulgence might weaken and damage character. In the case of Staunton the result is moral corruption; he finally drifts into the world of smuggling and criminality while in the case of Darsie it leads to selfishness and carelessness to the world around him.

Lilies, much like Jeanie Deans or Diana Vernon, has been brought up under her uncle's custody who implanted in her a spirit of accepting challenge, and facing danger with "intrepidity" and fortitude. (325)

However, Liliash's courage and familial commitment, does not impede her development of a rational attitude towards politics and religion that tempers the fanaticism her uncle could have nurtured. As she grows up she becomes aware that "freedom of religious opinion brings on freedom of political creed," and even she is prepared "to question the doctrine of hereditary and indefeasible right." (324) Her liberal opinions bring her closer to Darsie's view of the futility of her uncle's enterprise, but, unlike Darsie, she sympathetically justifies his dogmatic conduct:

'My dearest Arthur,' answered Liliash—'for that name, as well as Darsie, properly belongs to you—it is the leading feature in my uncle's character, that he has applied every energy of his powerful mind to the service of the exiled family of Stewart. The death of his brother, the dilapidation of his own fortunes, have only added to his hatred against the present reigning family. He is, in short, a political enthusiast of the most dangerous character, and proceeds in his agency with as much confidence, as if he felt himself the very Atlas, who is alone capable of supporting a sinking cause. (323)

On another occasion she "entreats" her brother to avoid any announcement against the family of Stewart, which "would either break the heart" of her uncle, "or drive him to some act of desperation." (331) While her position reveals that the world of politics is changeable according to times and circumstances, in the meantime she proposes constancy in carrying on with family ties throughout time. This explains her strong adherence to her uncle even when his real authority over her is gone. Through the affectionate farewell between Redgauntlet and his niece Scott pumps warmth into the veins of familial relationship: "No, sir," said Liliash, seizing his hand eagerly. "You have been hitherto my protector,—you are now in sorrow, let me be your attendant and your comfort in exile!" (398)

Redgauntlet has become the surrogate father for Liliash. This paternal piety echoes Vernon's and Jeanie's. It is the education of men that inculcates in women what makes them worthy of respect. If Liliash shows prudence in rejecting silently a scheme all evidence attests a failure, she cannot but preserve her integrity to the one who protected her. Liliash's passion that erupts with commitment in the last scene is counterbalanced by an absence of genuine passion on Darsie's part. Commenting on the incident of the "King's Coronation," Darsie "considered it as an idle tale." (329)

Surprisingly, he addresses his sister: "I little thought how nearly I was interested in the actors of a scene so daring—How could you have courage to go through with it?" (329) It is clear that the notion of courage is strange to him to the extent that he cannot imagine an act that would expose him to any risk regardless of the motive behind it. But ironically, this is not his view of the notion of courage when he raises it with his friend Alan earlier in the novel. Scott here seems to dramatize what Adam Ferguson has warned of in his *Essay*: the commercial stage of self interest and luxury with no education that inculcates civic virtue might produce men of weakness and effeminacy.³³ Symbolically, forcing Darsie to put on female clothing as a travelling disguise aims at emasculating him. Though Redgauntlet might expect Darsie to react by "growing" into manly reaction against this treatment, it seems to underline both Redgauntlet's high-handed domination of him and his own incapacity to grow into such a head of the family as Redgauntlet wishes. Urging Darsie to throw away the dress and restore his manhood, Redgauntlet says:

I restore you to yourself, and trust you will lay aside all effeminate thoughts with this feminine dress. Do not blush at having worn a disguise to which kings and heroes have been reduced. It is when female craft or female cowardice find their way into a manly bosom, that he who entertains these sentiments should take eternal shame to himself for thus having resembled womanhood. (367)

Unfortunately, he remains diminished and feminized. Harts suggests: "his sense of a mysterious and fateful alienation, his wonder as to his true lineage and his real fidelities, make him poignantly equal to Waverley as an exiled wanderer between conflicting worlds."³⁴ But whereas Waverley is able to grow from his experiences, and at least come to admire the noble sacrifices of the Jacobite martyrs, "Darsie experiences no dawn of Prestopans. He has become nothing significant; he has performed no act of moral self-assertion."³⁵ There is profound irony, therefore, in his letter to Alan in which he writes longingly of "merry England! Of which I boast myself a native, and on which I gaze, even while raging floods and unstable quicksands divide us, with the filial affection of a dutiful son." (28) Alan understands the filial affection of a dutiful son, but Darsie exhibits little understanding of such commitment. And if he cannot show that devotion, then by his own analogy, neither does he understand the loyal duty required of the patriotism which he claims to feel.

Alan, on the other hand, is for Scott the more acceptable compromise between traditional and modern. In his filial devotion, his loyalty to his friend, and his diligence and knowledge of law, he fulfils the Bailie Jarvie role in this novel. Hart argues that after Darsie becomes the passive prisoner of Redgauntlet, Alan "becomes the heroic agent."³⁶ James Kerr reinforces this view by saying that Alan's role supplies a critical counterbalance to Darsie:

Alan is the voice of things as they are inveighing against the romantic imagination, exhorting his friend to keep his fancy under control. He is an eminently practical young man, trying to keep his friend's feet on the ground. In the generic terms established by Scott in his 'Essay on Romance' (1824), Alan is at this moment the voice of the novel, endorsing the 'ordinary train of events' against the fanciful productions of romance.³⁷

Although both Darsie and Alan claim integrity in their friendship, Alan's fidelity is the more active of the two. Darsie hesitates to reveal his identity when, in disguise, he is assisted in dismounting by Alan. Like a child he insists upon seeing that Alan is safe when held by Redgauntlet, and "longed to speak, but dared not." (367) Alan is more often active. Darsie would have Alan follow him in his romantic excursion, but Alan will not. Alan characterizes the difference between the two young men in the type of courage each exhibits. Darsie's is, according to Alan:

What may be called intellectual courage; highness of spirit, and desire of distinction; impulses which render thee alive to the love of fame, and deaf to the apprehension of danger, until it forces itself suddenly upon thee. (25)

Alan describes his own courage quite differently:

We have long since agreed, that, quiet as I am, I have the advantage in this important particular. My courage consists, I think, in strength of nerves and constitutional indifference to danger; which, though it never pushes me on adventure, secures me in full use of my recollection, and tolerably complete self-possession, when danger actually arrives. (25)

The desire for fame makes Darsie liable to charges of selfishness, a characteristic to which he already has a propensity. That he is not aware of danger means that he does not knowingly risk anything. The romantic aspect of Darsie presents him 'empty' in his lack of commitment, but he feels this emptiness and worthlessness. He

shows this in seeking for his identity and seeking for love, but each quest is only a 'romantic' foray that does not lead to real involvement. He is easily reconciled to the loss of his romantic hopes. Alan's "self-possession" is more in keeping with the honour that asserts a moral code from within. Such rationality allows Alan to place himself in danger to help Darsie. For Alan, the voice of duty to help in saving Darsie's life in commitment to friendship sounds even louder than the voice of commitment to his father and the law. Accordingly Alan unhesitatingly chooses the path of sacrifice, remote from any self-interest. In contrast, Darsie is never placed in such a situation because his commitments are not strong enough to govern his actions. Alan's courage, unlike Redgauntlet's, is a courage that Scott saw as not only still possible in modern Britain, but necessary. It is the same courage with which Alan credits his father.

The circumstances under which Darsie comes to live with the Fairfords shows the senior Fairford's strong attachment to his son. Alan's friendship with Darsie is allowed to flourish because Alexander Fairford perceives his son's growing attachment for Darsie, and Alan's need for such a bond. He encourages the friendship despite his reservations about Darsie's whimsical nature. This example serves to educate Alan's own integrity, even, ironically, when going against his father's wishes. When he learns of Darsie's critical situation he is quick to act:

Alan doted on his friend Darsie, even more than he loved his profession, and, as we have seen, threw every thing aside when he thought Latimer in danger; forgetting fame and fortune, and hazarding even the serious displeasure of his father, to rescue him whom he loved with an elder brother's affection. (226)

In his parting letter to his father, Alan explains that his delay in leaving had been a "sacrifice to filial duty" but that now he must "obey the calls of friendship." (156) Recalling that Alan also sacrificed a case and a client for his romantic commitment to friendship, suggests that Scott wants to show that the survival of the kind of integrity associated with "chivalric" notion of honour is problematic in the modern commercial stage. Although we may admire Alan's loyalty to his friend, yet we might not agree with him wholeheartedly that a lawyer should not be kept to a contract like any other tradesman. However, the integrity Alan exhibits even earns him Charles Edward's respect despite the fact that Alan is of "plebeian descent." In calling attention to class

mobility, Scott accomplishes two things, one in terms of its narrative, one political. First, he reflects the historical period, a period in which there was greater individual freedom for those of the growing middle class, but that meant there was a greater responsibility to make choices. Scott acknowledges this as an appeal to his readership, especially since its bulk was, like Alan, newly mobile, to recognize the responsibility and possibility that accompany such freedom.³⁸

As always in Scott's novels, personal integrity is analogous to political integrity. The Fairfords are no less patriotic than Redgauntlet. Yet changes in time, in political and economic circumstances, have demanded different forms of patriotism. Their patriotism, like the courage with which they defend it, manifests itself differently. When Darsie questions Alexander Fairford's actions during the revolution of 1745, suggesting they were cowardly, Alan is quick to defend his father:

Imagine this train at your heels, Darsie, and ask yourself whether you would not exert your legs as fast as you did in flying from Solway tide. And yet you impeach my father's courage! I tell you he has enough courage to do what is right, and to spurn what is wrong—courage enough to defend a righteous cause with hand and purse, and to take the part of the poor man against his oppressor, without fear of the consequence to himself. This is civil courage, Darsie; and it is of little consequence to most men in this age and country, whether they ever possess military courage or no. (47)

Alan's assertion that the practice of law involves "civil courage" is associated with Scott's own belief that Scottish Law at its best embodied nationalistic sentiments. In a discussion of the court system that tended to rely more on "evasion by legal fictions and the like" than Scott liked, he wrote:

The consequence will in time be, that the Scottish Supreme Court will be in effect situated in London. Then down fall—as national objects of respect and veneration—the Scottish Bench, the Scottish Bar, the Scottish Law herself, and—and—'there is an end of an auld sang.'³⁹

Alan believes in practices and cherishes the law as an important Scottish institution. He is brought to the law by his father's encouragement and despite the fact that he was from the middle-class:

Deprived of the personal patronage enjoyed by most of his contemporaries, who assumed the gown under the protection of their aristocratic alliances

and descents, he early saw that he should have that to achieve for himself which fell to them as a right of birth. (226)

"Civil courage" may not match the heroic courage of Redgauntlet in drama, but it is what Scott felt was needed as a virtue of the day and as a foundation to maintain justice in various aspects of human life. Bruce Beiderwell views Alan's "civil courage" as a virtue that "primarily concerns fair dealings in financial matters: that is, the courage not to cheat for profit."⁴⁰ But decency alone, the narrative suggests, is insufficient. "Civil courage" needs another crucial component, bravery, to support a just decision, which if a man of law lacks the result would be putting justice at stake. In Alan's words, a man of law should have the courage to accept any challenge "without fear of the consequence to himself."

The episode that connects Matthew Foxley, the Cumberland magistrate, his Clerk, Nicholas Faggot, Peter Peebles, Redgauntlet and Darsie provides comment on the above issue. Foxley and his clerk represent respectively cowardice and corruption. Both contribute to suspending justice and fail to perform their legal duty, which is supposed to secure Darsie's right in freedom. Peter and Redgauntlet both are involved in legal cases of different types and each one of them follows his own path in defending what he thinks to be his own right. The whole scene is a court, in which the only absentees are law and justice. Foxley and his clerk are quite sure that Redgauntlet is an outlaw and that "there are warrants out against" him (200); furthermore, the clerk himself has a warrant in his custody that legalizes arresting Redgauntlet. Yet fearing the latter's revenge, and to extricate himself and Mr Justice from this dilemma, the Clerk contrives to assassinate the law itself by handing the warrant paper to Redgauntlet. Redgauntlet "flung the warrant into the fire with one hand and, and fixed the other, with a stern and irresistible gripe, on the breast of the attorney" threatening to throw him in the chimney. The author, significantly, alludes to Nicholas's (and perhaps Foxley's) anticipation that Redgauntlet would act that way, at least, in burning the warrant: "Nicholas placed in [Redgauntlet's] hand a paper, and seemed anxiously to expect the consequences which were to ensue." (201) As the warrant is turned into ashes Justice Foxley is now relieved of any responsibility towards law and in his view "it would not be advisable" to proceed with the arrest. (203) The scene ends peacefully but not without Redgauntlet's slipping some money into the hand of the attorney as "a little atonement for the rashness with which he had

burnt the warrant, and imposed no gentle hand on the respectable minion of the law by whom it was exhibited." (204) In other words, cowardice and lack of integrity go hand in hand.

However, for Redgauntlet, the shortest and quickest way to defend a right and settle a legal case is through heroic courage, in contrast to Peter Peebles. Peebles believes in law but scores of years passed on his case in the Court of Session "have never been able to ding the bottom out of it yet." (198) Alan, through his "civil courage" has given him some hope to have the job done. Certainly, Scott would not approve the way adopted by Redgauntlet and Foxley yet, from a philosophical view of the rules that govern the process of justice, the compromise could be considered as ideal. According to Hume "the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that utility."⁴¹ If we have to apply this relativity and "utility" of justice to the state in the Solway where the effect of law is almost suspended, then both Foxley and Redgauntlet emerge as doing justice to each other by preserving peace. Each one recognizes the needs of the other without precipitating further violence. Here Redgauntlet's comment: "Judiciously resolved" does not point to the English or even the Scottish law but rather to the law that governs the state of the Solway. (203) From this perspective, Foxley's conduct towards Redgauntlet, much similar to that of Bailie Jarvie towards Rob Roy, tends to be prudent.

Scott, as Mark A. Weinstein points out, intends to dramatize "the impossibility of justice in human affairs, but such suggestion is too much to claim." Yet one cannot deny, according to Weinstein, that Scott "is certainly questioning the efficacy of law whether on the Border or in a civilized community like Edinburgh."⁴² This "questioning" seems to argue that the judicial system, in whatever stage of progress, is only a human artificiality to achieve equity. Any system in its own right, like traffic signals, does not afford safety to people, if people lack the integrity and the will to support this system in the absence of any external authority. Within this context, the moral passion that the Fairfords bring to the practice of law is perhaps the major justification of that institution in the novel. In *Waverley* the attraction of the "new" civilization is to a great extent based on the prospect of "equal" laws instead of the gracious or brutal arbitrary procedures of monarch and clan chief. In *Redgauntlet* the security of law is as precarious as the sands of the Solway. Divided systems, partial interpretation, a politic blindness to treasonable activities compound the obliquities of

corruption and sheer domination of force. On the other hand, the formal intricacies of law processes can become an obsession to such as Peter Peebles and a theatre for practice to the young apprentices, but the Fairfords can chart a pathway through the quick sands of the Peebles' case by their clarity of moral concern. The problem is not in the system whatever the system is, but in the way the system is applied. It is character and integrity that sustain system and secures it reliability. Law, like any other institution, could be used to fulfil the objective of its own creation, as the Fairfords practice it; and it may be used as a cloak for personal or private utility, as Geddes does, to protect exploitation, violence again ingrained in this "parable" Quaker's genealogy.⁴³

As a "philosophical" historian, Scott's interest in the history of the Geddes family provides a sort of social study that invokes the idea of the constant elements in human nature, and Geddes's performance is only a variation of this constancy. When Darsie proposes to Rachel that her brother, Joshua "ought to avert the danger by compromise or submission," she agrees with him, but immediately comments: "even in the best trained temper there may remain some leaven of the old Adam." (74) This remark convinces Darsie that "the spirit of the old sharers of the spoil was not utterly departed even from the bosom of the peaceful Quaker." (74) Joshua's ancestors were "famed for successful freebooting, robbery, and bloodshed," as a means for making profit. (66) While he retains the principle of confrontation in defending his project for making profit, he changes the means of achieving his objective. For the modern Quaker, the new version of heroism hinges on "courage in enduring," which he regards as effective as Redgauntlet's courage of "acting." (56) Darsie confesses that Joshua "had the right, when he averred that there was as much courage in sufferance as in exertion" (74) but he ignores the real motive behind Joshua's conduct when he couples him with Redgauntlet to form "no bad emblem of Peace and War." Darsie means to accredit Joshua as a man of peace and to see the other as a man of violence.

It is true that several qualities are common between Redgauntlet and Joshua Geddes—myopic vision, courage, contempt for the law and believe in directness of language; yet, given the real moral motives in all this, the narrative tends to depict Redgauntlet's violence with more sympathy than it does Geddes's peace. The position of Redgauntlet, though obsolete, seems to be more acceptable than that of the Quaker, as far as integrity and public interest are concerned. Nowhere is Redgauntlet's authority so readily accepted as when protecting the traditional right of the Solway

spear-fishers against the new capitalist system of netting adopted by the Quaker. Joshua, we may say, is a machiavellian proper, and if he promotes peace, unlike his ancestors, it is only because, like all capitalists, his trade will not prosper except in a peaceful environment.

His kindness to the horses and other animals of Mount Sharon is extraordinary, but he does not extend the same thought to the men whose livelihood he interferes with by his fishing methods. Winning the loyalty of an animal needs minimum care, perhaps only feeding. Binding men with the cords of affection and obligation, however, demands a sort of schooling and kindness. His argument with Redgauntlet about the legality of his nets is purely materialistic. The nets, he reminds Redgauntlet, are constructed with "our own purses." (56) For all of his justification, economics control at least some of his actions. It would not be bad for Joshua to consider prosperity if he were less hypocritical about his stand and could extend the same financial consideration to other fishermen. Willie describes the Quaker-trade as "Canting and lying," (120) while Redgauntlet interprets Joshua's justifications for not resorting to violence to defend his right in the tide-nets as a "cloak to your hypocritical avarice." (56) In fact, there is evidence that supports such claims. Joshua's religious doctrine admits that "laws and lawyers are evils," yet he is ready, as a tactical move to protect his nets, to ally with them as "they are necessary evils in this probationary state of society." (59) Apart from Joshua's commercial mentality and his flaw of religious integrity, he is not presented as totally bad; at least he is shown to respect bonds of friendship. He does all he can to find Darsie and help him. He travels "in the sorrow of the soul, and mourning for the fate of Darsie Latimer as he would for his first-born child." (348)

Scott presents another version of men of religion who, in some aspect like Geddes, make of religion a veil to cover their immorality. Tom Trumbull, also called Turnpenny, as his name suggests, exhibits a religious hypocrisy that hardly masks a profitable smuggling business. Recalling how fanatic religious sects, particularly the Covenanters, reject mundane pleasures and choose to lead a mystic life that, in their view, secures virtue and guarantees the hereafter, we understand how progress has shifted a Covenanter's concern from Heaven to Earth. Alan's first impression of Turnpenny is a "rigid old Covenanter, who said only what he thought right, acted on no other principle but that of duty, and, if he committed errors, did so under the full impression that he was serving God rather than man." (256) The picture becomes not

only ironical but even shameful when later he finds "himself thus completely in the power of a canting hypocrite." (260) Religious culture, in the moral sense, which plays a significant role in the previous novels, at least in sustaining a sense of national and public spirit, is now giving way to new concerns that foster lucre and reinforce individualism. Turnpenny is committed to an economical world that employs utility in its ugliest form. As a smuggler, he violates the laws, threatens economy and above all lacks any patriotic feelings; his trade with the rebels would lead to civil war, bloodshed, and national disintegration. He is precisely the sort of man the "philosophical" historians have warned against who lack all civic virtue that would guide his moral choices. Geddes, unlike Turnpenny, though interested in economy, is frank in his trade. He invests his money and relies, though reluctantly, on law to protect his investment. Although the new techniques he introduces jeopardize the fishermen's interest yet they could be also looked at as improvement.

The old order of Redgauntlet embodied in a patriarchal system is different from a commercial world, as the old system has become deconstructed into various institutions. Now loyalty in the feudal sense is something of the past but loyalty as a form of integrity/honour should form the basis of conduct in every institution as a warrant against corruption. Here Alan's role is to show that it is possible, through his integrity, to improve on the customs of the ancestors. If Alan alone represents new Scotland, or even prospective Britain, it would not be difficult to make a claim for Scott's sympathy. Alan is himself sympathetic and essentially shares many qualities with Redgauntlet. He even displays integrity towards the Prince though he does not wish his return:

Fairford himself remembered Father Buonaventure, and made little question but that he was one of the sons of the old Chevalier de Saint George; and with feelings which, although contradictory of his public duty, can hardly be much censured, his heart recoiled from being the agent by whom the last scion of such a long line of Scottish Princes should be rooted up. (390)

Alan feels conflicted by the division between the traditional, that which is ingrained in his heart, and that which he sees as more practically beneficial to society. Alan, however, represents one side of modern Scotland particularly that connected with law, but law which observes the public good and not manipulated law that supports individual interests. It is important to note here that while Geddes is disappointed that

the law will not protect him, Alan tells Darsie that the nets are not generally considered legal:

The legality of the mode of fishing practised by your friend Joshua, is greatly doubted by our best lawyers; and that, if the stake-nets be considered as actually an unlawful obstruction raised in the channel of the estuary, an assembly of persons who shall proceed, *via facti*, to pull them down and destroy them, would not in the eye of the law be esteemed guilty of a riot. (84)

Once again Scott capitalizes on the integrity of lawyers such as Alan and by extension every one in whatever system who protects progress and civilization by setting the record straight to secure morality as the foundation of political and social stability.

Even when the narrative deals with integrity among individuals on the private level, for instance, friendship and romantic love, it places it within the coordinates of moral and social justice. The private is not isolated from the public. Alan's romantic integrity, reflected in his response to aid his friend, Darsie, is, perhaps, justified in terms of his noble feelings yet socially it is unjust; his conduct breaches a contract, leads to a loss of a client's case, disrupts justice, and above all disappoints his father. Nanty Ewart's episode touches upon many issues; all are concerned with romantic integrity and its impact on justice and morality. Nanty's father, "a true chip of the old Presbyterian block," similar to Alan's father, wants him to train in divinity. The difference is that while Alan is always kept under his father's supervision, Nanty, who is only nineteen and an "innocent lad," (275) is sent to Edinburgh to fall into sin through female temptation by a girl, Jess Cantrips. This situation, inversely, reminds us of Effie. However, Nanty could have mended his mistake, as he puts it: "I would have married the girl, and taken my chance—I would, by Heaven! For she was a pretty girl, and a good girl, till she and I met; but you know the old song, "Kirk would not let us be." (275) To save his lover's reputation Nanty has to please the "Kirk-treasurer for a small sum of money" and the next step is to "proclaim" Jess's "frailty to the whole parish, by mounting the throne of Presbyterian penance, and proving, as Othello says, 'his love a whore,' in face of the whole congregation." (275) All Nanty has, "as a penniless dominie," is his integrity; instead of scandalizing his lover, he decides to go home. But he comes to understand that his father "did nothing for six days but cry out, 'the glory is departed from my house!' and on the seventh he preached a sermon, in which he enlarged on this incident as illustrative of one of the

great occasions for humiliation, and causes of national defection." (275) Thus shamed by his father, Nanty exiles himself.

Even in exile Nanty's integrity towards his father and his lover is still alive. Returning from exile with "little prize-money" his thought is to marry Jess and reconcile himself to his father. Once again he becomes the victim of remorse as he discovers that his father has passed away affected by what he considers the "falling away" of his son. (276) Jess and her mother, Lady Kittlebasket become, indirectly, the victims of Nanty's sin. Nanty's sudden departure and his father's death have prevented the Lady from the payment of the arrears for lodging. The landlord, who lacks any sense of benevolence, and whom we come to know later to be Peter Peebles, ejects the lady from her "airy habitation" to be "driven to the workhouse" and finally die in distress. (276) Jess's destiny is no less disastrous; she "had the honour to be transported to the plantations, for street-walking and pocket-picking." Nanty's integrity to his lover makes him expect "to meet Jess at every turning." (277) His only way to express his integrity toward those whom he loves is by gradual self-destruction. "The remedy" to "qualms" he has is the bottle. (276) Scott, through this episode, seems to highlight more than one point. Firstly, he presents a sort of criticism of irrational adherence to religious belief which, instead of taking the form of enlightened religious integrity that offers practical solutions for moral problems, as Butler could have done in a similar case, complicates matters and leads to further social and moral damage. In a sense, what is supposed to be religious justice does not do justice to any one of those involved in this episode. Secondly, it shows that personal integrity is part of one's character in all capacities. Nanty suffered for his integrity towards his romantic love and also died for his integrity that prevents him from doing a villainous act of treachery. In either case, he proves to combine chivalric honour with integrity.

Perhaps nowhere are integrity and honour best displayed than in Charles's stance in defence of his mistress, Mrs. Wallkenschaw. As far as personal relationship is concerned, we might admire and appreciate Prince Charles's gallantry and integrity in as much as we do of Alan's, Nanty's or even Redgauntlet's integrity. But Charles's integrity towards his mistress concerns not the fate of a single person but a whole public cause and this fact in its own right undermines romantic integrity and makes it invalid. However, such romantic integrity, though it appears to be ridiculous, if taken from Charles's view, who, like Redgauntlet, ignores historical changes around him

and still adheres to the "spirit of hereditary obstinacy," (8) it arouses our sympathy towards him. I think Scott's point lies here. Integrity as a civic virtue is always needed but what determines its value, validity and justice is the state of society in the course of historical progress. Education needs to foster it in terms of public utility rather than individual utility. Hume makes it clear that "we are naturally partial to ourselves, and to our friends; but are capable of learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable conduct."⁴⁴

Notes: Chapter Six

1. A summary of contemporary criticism is provided by Gordon's *Under Which King*. Gordon himself describes *Redgauntlet* as showing "arbitrariness, eccentricity, and a strong impression of having been composed to please the author rather than the public or critics." (149).
2. See James Reed, 151. See also Edgar Johnson, II, 920-921; Daiches, "Scott's *Redgauntlet*," *Critical Essays on Sir Walter Scott*, 139; Gordon, 150-151; John Sutherland, 268-269. All observe that some characters in the novel are images that parody Scott's real life. Thus, Alan Fairford becomes Scott himself, Saunter Fairford, Alan's father becomes Scott's father, Darsie becomes partly an image of Scott's friend, William Clerk, and partly the other romantic side of Scott's personality, the portrait of Green Mantle is a reminiscence of Scott's early, unsuccessful love affair with Williamina Belsches.
3. Daiches, "Scott's *Redgauntlet*," *Critical Essays on Sir Walter Scott*, 138.
4. McMaster, 9.
5. McMaster, 17.
6. See Devlin, 115-116.
7. McMaster, 19.
8. McMaster, 22.
9. Ian Dennis, 155.
10. Rohan Maitzen, "By no Means an Improbable Fiction: *Redgauntlet's* Novel Historicism," *Critical Essays on Sir Walter Scott*, 122-123.
11. Scott, *Redgauntlet*, ed. Kathryn Sutherland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 10. All further quotations will be from this edition and will be noted in my text.
12. Cockshut, 194 -195.
13. Hume, *Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1777), second edition, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 183-204.
14. Gordon, *Under Which King?* 155.
15. Shaw, 207.
16. Ernst Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, & Modern* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 253.
17. See *Old Mortality*, 212.
18. See, Miriam L. Wallace "National and Scottish Subject: The Uneasy Marriage of London and Edinburgh in Sir Walter Scott's *The Heart of Midlothian*," *History of European Ideas*, vol. 16 (1993), 41-74. Wallace, in the last two pages of her article, quotes the Act of Proscription, 1746 to elaborate on the harsh measures taken by the government against the Highlanders in the aftermath of the 45 rebellion as a part of erasing their culture. Also see Saree Makdisi, "Colonial Space and the Colonization of Time in Scott's *Waverley*," *Studies in Romanticism* 34 (1995), 180. Makdisi argues that the several acts of legislation passed by the British Parliament immediately after Cullodon facilitated the colonization of the Highlands. Of course, this colonization would not have been substantial had not the acts of legislation been directed at destroying the cultural and social structure of the Highlands.
19. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 86-87.
20. See, David Brown, 166. See also Homer Obed Brown. Homer Brown suggests that "in terms of Scotland's future, this entails a cultural loss of a certain past and the nation's ambiguous profit by that loss as the result of the '45." Further, Brown

observes that the journey of two young Scotsmen, Alan and Darsie, south to England is to "witness the death of the English Jacobite dream, casting this problem as that of both nations, rather than the issue that divides them." (145-146).

21. James Kerr, 122.
22. David Brown points out that the government's "magnanimity" is "founded securely on the underlying social reality of the period," as a result of "the British government's attempts to dismantle the social basis of Jacobitism in the Highlands after the 1745" (166). On the other hand, Bruce Beiderwell observes that Scott's treatment of leniency anticipates Foucault's historical conjecture of the meaning of punishment as such "it becomes a new 'technique of power'" (106).
23. Cockshut, 210.
24. Ferguson, *Essay*, 227.
25. *The Miscellaneous Prose Works of Sir Walter Scott*, V: 403-404.
26. Critics note that "Wandering Willie's Tale," in many ways, presents a problematic digression in the novel. Edgar Johnson sees the Tale, symbolically, as the "center of the entire novel, an anticipation of the confrontation and defiance that is ultimately to be demanded...of Darsie...in resisting the tyrannous claims of a moribund past." (II: 924). Daiches in "Scott's *Redgauntlet*," reads the Tale as part and parcel of the theme of the novel. It portrays the broken "paternal relationship between master and vassal which Scott could not help sighing after and which in some degree he tried to re-create between himself and his servants at Abbotsford." It also presents "a critical piece about master-servant relations in old Scotland." (146). Fleishman, sees the Tale as a depiction of "the stages by which a typical aristocratic family is seen moving, after the Glorious Revolution, from feudal indolence to economically-pinched harshness, and finally to temperate adherence to the new order of modern life." (73). At any rate, the Tale remains a sort of analysis of how the social structure was and how it evolved to be what it is now.
27. George Levine, "Sir Walter Scott: The End of Romance," *Wordsworth Circle* X (1979), 157.
28. Hume, *Inquiries*, 192 and 196.
29. Scott's position is against any movement connected with dissension, as Lockhart in *The Life* indicates: "had any anti-English faction, civil or religious, sprung up in his own time in Scotland, he would have done more than other living man could have hoped to do, for putting it down." (653).
30. Fiona Robertson, *Legitimate Histories: Scott, Gothic, and the Authorities of Fiction* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), 258.
31. See McMaster, 21-22. McMaster establishes a link between the notion of freedom and the interest of the individual and the family and community on the one hand, and the individual's own interest on the other. Thus, whereas the family and the community impose certain restraints on the individual's choices that direct and order his conduct, unlimited freedom would be detrimental for both the individual himself and the community around him. According to McMaster, Alan's freedom is of the first type, while Darsie's freedom is of the second type.
32. Hume, *Inquiries*, 190.
33. See Ferguson, *Essay*, Section III, on the "relaxation in the national spirit incident to polished nations."
34. Hart, 58.
35. Hart, 63.
36. Hart, 63.
37. Kerr, 106.

38. See Kelly, "Romantic Fiction." For Kelly, Scott argues "for a coalition of gentry and professionals to lead Britain through immediate domestic and international crises while leaving the paternalist social structure in place." Not to forget that Scott himself "rose from urban professional to landed gentleman." (197 and 212). For this reason, many critics find in Alan Fairford a projection of Scott.
39. *Journal of Sir Walter Scott*, June 9, 1826.
40. Hume, *Inquiries*, 188.
41. Beiderwell, 107.
42. Mark A. Weinstein "Law, History, and Romance in 'Redgauntlet,'" *Scott and his Influence: The Papers of the Aberdeen Scott Conference*, ed. J. H. Alexander and David Hewitt (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, 1982), 144.
43. See Daniel Cottom, *The Civilized Imagination: A Study of Ann Radcliffe, Jane Austen, and Sir Walter Scott* (London: Cambridge University Press), 171-177. Cottom's section on "law and violence" argues that the problem of law in the Waverley novels is the problem of distinguishing "civilization from decadence." Progress of civilization presupposes that law should replace violence in implementing justice and hence law entails "serenity and peace," yet Scott's novels, according to Cottom, question the issue of law on the basis that law becomes a means of further violence. In the past there were "no social forms that men could wear as masks to their individuality," the result is that "laws give birth to lies." In Cottom's view, "violence has the virtue of openness and law the demerit of obscurity, and the problems of interpretation caused by this obscurity may finally lead to more violence." Given this understanding one can see the merit and the sort of chivalric courage of the Fairfords embodied in their clarity, directness and integrity in handling the case of Peter Peebles, about to be lost in the labyrinth of legal technicalities. Scott's novels, according to Cottom, would argue that civil law in the absence of character and integrity becomes worse as reflected in legal proceedings which show them "to be irrational or unjust in their origins and capricious in their resolution."
44. Hume, *Inquiries*, 188.

Conclusion

Guy Mannering (1815), *The Antiquary* (1816), *The Bride of Lammermoor* (1819)

In the previous chapters we examined Scott's vision of history and progress and how it manifests itself in some of his Scottish novels. This vision, in its epistemological and ideological implications, we argued, derives from fundamental assumptions in the Scottish Enlightenment philosophy about the uniformity, progressive and social-political-moral nature of man and the evolution of his social, political and economical institutions. Most importantly, we showed that Scott's treatment of civic and heroic virtues in contexts of religion, family, social relationships, nationalism, law and justice, politics, and economy is based on this vision. According to this vision, Scott's programme of progress and reconciliation, founded on gradual improvement, shows the possibility of and need for accommodating ancient virtues in the present. Ideologically, Scott's programme fights against selfish philosophy, and the potentially negative impact of unbridled materialism on integrative social-political-moral values, which Ferguson robustly warns against in his *Essay*. It offers a basis for unity in the evolution of tradition. To conclude this study, I consider three more of Scott's novels, *Guy Mannering*, *The Antiquary*, and *The Bride of Lammermoor* in an attempt to show that Scott's vision of progress and reconciliation extends ideologically to the rest of the Waverley novels. Within the same context, I give special attention to Scott's treatment of social class conflict and social mobility.

It is obvious that in these novels Scott narrows his scope as he shifts from dealing with historical conflicts, political or religious at the level of the nation to minor conflicts based on the themes of "usurpation of property" in *The Bride* and the "lost heir" in *Mannering* and *The Antiquary* at the level of families and small communities. In his treatment of *Mannering* and *The Antiquary*, Gordon points out that this shift has no effect on Scott's concern in dramatizing the relationship between the past and the present. In his view, if anything, it releases Scott from "history's decision on the Jacobites" so that he can now freely express his conservative sentiments by making "ancient virtue" triumph over "modern rascality."¹ In *The Bride*, according to Gordon, where economic virtues triumph over ancient virtues, Scott expresses himself as a Tory pessimist, sceptical of progress and commercial values.²

As far as the romance plot is concerned, in *Mannering* and *The Antiquary*, Gordon and most recent critics seem to underestimate any thematic role of the protagonist simply because they assume that Scott was writing a *Bildungsroman*. For Ian Duncan, the private plot in *Mannering* “weaves itself around no central subjectivity or even a single protagonist, but a miscellany of characters and voices and discourses [which are] brought together not by a single human experience but by the allegorizing order of the plot.” The hero’s progress in his view receives “minimal psychological attention” and Harry Bertram, unlike Edward Waverley, “undergoes no spiritual conversion, disenchantment self-reconstruction, but a realization of his original identity.”³ Duncan’s argument is extended to Lovel in *The Antiquary*, whom Harry E. Shaw qualifies as “the weakest and least interesting protagonist in the Waverley series.”⁴

Unarguably, the focus in these novels is on the relationship between ancient and modern virtues, but Scott’s interest in highlighting this relationship, I would suggest, can be understood not in terms of Scott’s sentiments, conservative versus liberal or optimistic versus pessimistic but rather in terms of Scott’s historicism, and his attempt to work out an aesthetic solution for the paradox of the impact of progress/improvement on civic and heroic virtues, registered in the writings of the “philosophical” historians. This solution suggests that the contradiction or tension that might arise in the course of progress can be resolved and must be resolved, for the sake of establishing a genuine progressive community, by adopting a culture whose very foundation is active humanism. Along the same line I suggest that while Scott was not writing a *Bildungsroman* here, his heroes are not devoid of ideological significance. In *Mannering* and more apparently in *The Antiquary*, the hero’s significance lies in his role as a type that represents a new adaptive ideal for the present in many ways. The hero, unlike Edward Waverley, ignorant of his roots, earns his social status not by virtue of heredity or birthright but, as a middle class representative, through his own struggle and exploits (talent, skill, moral autonomy, manly virtues and so forth) before he is re-established in his real social position as an aristocrat. In *Mannering* the hero, Harry Bertram, makes this point clear when he writes to his friend in the military: “we have fought our preferment, and gained that by the sword which we had not money to compass otherwise.”⁵ Similarly, the hero, Lovel/Neville, in *The Antiquary* is no less self-reliant, as he indicates to Oldbuck: “I

owe no man anything—I have the means of maintaining myself with complete independence.”⁶

Thus, as a type, the hero seems to be employed to achieve two purposes. The first is to bridge the gap between the upper and lower social classes caused by the nature of economic progress, while the second is to redefine the conception of hierarchy by prioritizing personal merit over heredity in assuming social and political responsibilities. In a sense, unlike Burke, and much like the “philosophical” historians, Scott confidently legitimizes crossing social boundaries within a recognized but almost seamless hierarchy, providing that social mobility is propelled by honourable means improving on heroic and civic virtues. As for Edgar Ravenswood, the hero in *The Bride*, I attempt to show that his role does not indicate his obsolescence but his validity. Echoing Ferguson’s views, he serves to comment on and debunk the defects of both the ancient and modern worlds, paving the way for a future ideal community.

To begin with I want to examine some of the activities, sayings and doings of symbolic characters that would support my argument regarding Scott’s position towards Progress/improvement and his vision of reconciling ancient and modern values. Scott, as we have argued in chapter one, believes in progress as something inherent in human nature and its institutions but the way he envisages progress deserves some attention. Progress might improve many defects of an old order but it takes in its way many good things too, as Oldbuck expresses it bluntly in his justification of the French Revolution: “It might be likened to a storm or hurricane, which, passing over a region, does great damage in its passage, yet sweeps away stagnant and unwholesome vapours, and repays, in further health and fertility, its immediate desolation and ravage.” (277-278) Yet, guided by the turbulent and violent history of Scotland and the peaceful settlement of 1688, Scott has always displayed reluctance to any change that comes by effect of the “hurricane” of rebellion or revolution. Therefore Scott might agree with Oldbuck in principle but the first few chapters in *Mannerings* demonstrate disagreement with the means.

In these chapters Scott presents us with a sort of rebellion, when Godfrey Bertram chases the smugglers and evicts the gypsies from his estate in the name of improvement. Although Bertram exercises his personal and legal rights in his enterprise yet he is exposed to severe criticism. The general impression of this criticism makes us, as many critics do, believe that Scott’s conservatism aligns him

with Burke, who fights for continuity and rejects change. But the case is not simple. The measure taken by Godfrey is legal and in real life Scott did not oppose improvements that would lead to economic progress. His support for the act of Clearances, which parallels in some sense the eviction of the gypsies, attests to that even though, as quoted by John Sutherland, this support goes “in contradiction” to his “better judgment.”⁷ This suggests that Scott’s social-moral-legal-economical analysis, taken in context of the consequences of Godfrey Bertram’s overnight improvements and the damage he did for himself, his family and his community, serves only as a method for highlighting the contingent risk of change on the organic links that hold individuals together.

In chapter six, we seem to hear Burke when Scott comments with characteristic humanity on the impact of Bertram’s reforms on the local relationships as they disrupt irremediably the long-standing pattern of life in the Ellangowan community: “We are not made of wood or stone, and the things which connect themselves with our hearts and habits cannot, like bark or lichen, be rent away without our missing them.” (54) On evicting the gypsies, Scott asks: “Ought the mere circumstances of Bertram’s becoming a magistrate to have made at once such a change in his conduct towards them?” But lest we think that he is reactionary and against improvement, in the tradition of Burke, Scott proposes that “some means of reformation ought at least to have been tried, before sending seven families at once upon the wide world, and depriving them of a degree of countenance which withheld them at least from atrocious guilt.” (64)

It is obvious that Scott is not against Bertram’s individual right in progress and improvement but his eye is on the community’s interest; the damage to which Scott refers is significantly to Bertram’s lack of human sensibility. It is true that “certain qualms of feeling had deterred Ellangowan from attending in person to see his tenants expelled” (63) but this is not the type of sensibility that concerns Scott. Passive humanity incarnated by the “Man of Feeling,” as we have seen in *Waverley*, has been a target for Scott’s critique. It follows that Scott’s proposition that Godfrey should have behaved humanely instead of exercising his authority with “more severity than mercy” (52) refers to active human sensibility, which in some sense improves on heroic and civic virtues, as the antithesis of selfishness and villainy. This humanized civic virtue, as a compromising and defining frame for progress in various social and political institutions that fits for a wider allegiance, can be seen at work in all

activities in the novel, suggesting that reform may be necessary but it should be humane reform that recognizes traditional and popular values.

The loss of the Bertrams' right, the anarchy, the conflict and violence that have shaped the Ellangowan community are but a direct result of applying laws mercilessly, on the one hand, and manipulating laws on the other. In this case, human affections are suspended in social transactions. We recall how Scott makes this idea central in *Old Mortality* when he links the destruction of social ties to the suspension of human affections in context of political and religious fanaticism. Thus, to restore lost right and justice means first and foremost to restore the spirit of the community by reactivating human affections among its members, each in his own capacity, and to translate them into action. Here Scott seems to envisage a community or even a nation as a sort of civilized tribe on a large scale in terms of social relationships; strong primitive kinship relationships are transferred to communal relationships and sponsored by humanized law under a new and broader nomenclature, active duty-right commitment, as Ferguson would suggest.

As far as the institution of law is concerned, Scott, as a lawyer, is aware that modern law in the hands of a lawyer is like the sword in the hand of a soldier; in either case decency and humanity are needed if justice and military spirit are to be dissociated from amorality, crime and savagery. Junius Pleydell, the Edinburgh attorney in *Mannerings*, seems to speak for Scott when he defines civic virtue in terms of human affections at large: "we lawyers are not of iron, sir, or of brass, anymore than you soldiers are of steel...But the devil take a soldier whose heart can be as hard as his sword, and his dam catch the lawyer who bronzes his bosom instead of his forehead!" (256) Pleydell, as a compromising agent, much like a "philosophical" historian, studies the past only to shun its irrationalities and improve on its virtues. For instance, he adheres to his ancestors' religious doctrine but he implicitly rejects their fanaticism: "I love to pray where my fathers prayed before me, without thinking worse of the Presbyterian forms, because they do not affect me with the same associations." (259) Similarly, in his career as a lawyer, Pleydell argues that the past is important in directing the present, which explains his interest in the history books of law. "These," says Pleydell, "are my tools of trade. A lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic, a mere working mason; if he possesses some knowledge of these, he may venture to call himself an architect." The implication is that laws may evolve over time, fitting themselves to new social circumstances but the principles of

justice from which they derive remain the same. The challenge for a lawyer, then, is to abide by the spirit of law and to find the possible means that approximate justice with humanity, accuracy and practicality.

In this respect, Pleydell is no mere mason but an “architect,” indeed. On one occasion, he applies Rob Roy’s law of limited justice, which is based on family and tribal allegiance, guided by instinctive human affections, and defended by chivalric honour. On another, he applies the Fairfords’ modern law of universal justice, based on rationalized human affections and supported by probity, skill and civil courage. In which case, he seeks to set the record straight in a pragmatic and humane way. Dandie, a simple peasant, who disputes with Jock o’ Dawston over a trivial piece of land, like Peter Peebles, in *Redgauntlet*, insists on pursuing a lawsuit against his neighbour but Pleydell, who knows about the emotionally frustrating proceedings of law and, in most cases, the dishonesty of lawyers who seek lucre, proposes that he either settles the matter by following old ways or quit the whole idea. For Pleydell this could have been a good opportunity to make money yet he reminds Dandie that: “justice, like charity, should begin at home. Do you justice to your wife and family, and think no more about the matter.” (253) Pleydell’s altruistic and chivalric response towards Dandie is reminiscent of Rob Roy’s similar compassionate attitude toward poor people in his business transactions. By contrast, Pleydell, as a progressive and professional lawyer, resorts to modern sophisticated law, exerting all his skill to uncover the complications surrounding Bertram’s case and to gather strong evidence that confirms Glossin’s involvement in the criminal acts connected with this case. Only after establishing a strong case against Glossin does he order a warrant against him, though not without expressing his sympathy. “I am sorry for Glossin,” he tells Mannering. But Scott, the moralist, amplifies this human feeling by adding a twist of moral philosophy to it. Given the fact that the authority of law like any authority could be doubly employed, Pleydell deplores Glossin’s lack of professional integrity, which presupposes also a lack of human sensibility. According to Pleydell, “Glossin would have been a pretty lawyer, had he not had such a turn for the roguish part of the profession.” (411)

In a commercial world where laws and the written word are crucial in organizing transactions among people and because, unlike inherited norms, they can be manipulated or misinterpreted, the virtue of “honour” remains a necessary component

of a lawyer's character. Commenting on writers and partnerships in the world of business, Oldbuck pronounces:

In a profession where unbounded trust is necessarily reposed...it is the more to the honour of those...who unite integrity with skill and attention, and walk honourably upright in that profession where there are so many falls and stumbling-blocks for those of a different character. To such men their fellow-citizens may safely entrust the care of protecting their patrimonial rights, and their country the more sacred charge of her laws and privileges. (338)

In short, Scott shares Ferguson's view that "the influence of laws...is not any magic power descending from shelves that are loaded with books, but is, in reality, the influence of men resolved to be free; of men, who...are determined, by their vigilance and spirit, to make these [laws] be observed."⁸ If active humanity in applying the spirit of law is the way for maintaining justice, it is no surprise to find in it a way for maintaining social solidity and protection in a given community.

Mannering who remembers his first visit to Ellangowan Estate and Godfrey's generosity toward him "could not restrain his tears" (10) for the wretched condition of the homeless Bertrams but this sentimental act alone is not sufficient to elevate their distress. Thus he substantiates this passion into activity, as he becomes a surrogate father for Lucy Bertam and offers her and her loyal satellite, Dominie Sampson, permanent shelter. So does the Sherrif-substitute of the county, Mac-Morlan, whose defense of the right of the Bertrams is "chivalric" by all standards. Taking the challenge, he shows civil courage and moral responsibility to adjourn selling Bertram's estate in an attempt to thwart Glossin's selfish scheme for purchasing the estate at the lowest price. His conduct, much like that of Mannering, presents him as an embodiment of integrative humanitarian ideals of altruism.

Ideologically we feel it hard to separate Mannering's magnanimity and his readiness to enact benevolence and charity from his career. Scott seems to suggest a relationship between military education and heroic and civic virtue in general. Normally, military life besides inculcating patriotic feeling that exacts self-sacrifice in defense of national security, also inculcates manly virtues that surface as heroic acts. This military altruistic spirit, Scott seems to suggest, becomes a second nature and manifests itself as moral and social responsibility in the protection of public interest and safety even in times of peace. Within this context, Scott once again asserts that

the spirit of civic and heroic virtues of the past can be transferred into the present and operate within a new code best described as social and national duty. Given this suggestion, Mannering's role, as an upper-class leader and agent of unity is further highlighted by setting an example in military courage and self-sacrifice in the protection of the community from external depredations, and in confounding all social distinctions.

In chapter 30, writing to her friend, Matilda, about the circumstances of the confrontation between her father and the smugglers, Julia points out that her "father had served the king, he would not refuse to protect the servants of the government, when threatened to be murdered in the discharge of their duty." (201) Such patriotic sentiment could be seen as a sort of advanced tribal commitment that operates not as an instinctive reaction on a narrow level but rather as a conscious institutionalized one in response to public interest under the banner of law and duty. The "military loyalty" and courage, which Mannering displays in challenging thirty smugglers is enough to spark public spiritedness. Charles Hazlewood, son of the passive aristocrat, Sir Robert, seconds "with great spirit" Mannering's readiness to fight, and even the simple Sampson "seized upon a fowling-piece" to take part in resisting the smugglers (201-202).

The analogy between Mannering and the hero, Harry Bertram/Brown, begins here. Harry is also in the military, and he reacts in a similar way as he interferes to support the peasant Dinmont when attacked by the robbers on a deserted road. Although the robbers beg him to "follow his nose over the heath...for they had nothing to say to him," (156) yet the captain finds it his duty to engage heroically with them in a deadly fight to save the life of the peasant. The episode tests the hero's legitimacy as a middle-class member in terms of social and moral commitment before he earns his real rank. In the meantime, it shows, in the light of Dinmont's assistance for Harry later, the significance of social unity in facing dangers.

As agents of compromise, Mannering and Pleydell, each in his own station, interact positively and responsibly in unison with all social ranks, including the gypsy Meg Merrilies in an effort to restore justice, unity and order to the Ellangowan community. Baron Robert Hazlewood is shown to be of little help to the Ellangowan estate precisely because he takes his inherited position too seriously. He hates all the Bertrams of Ellangowan "because a certain baron of that house was traditionally reported to have caused the founder of Hazlewood family hold his stirrup until he

mounted into his saddle.” (296) His adherence to past formalities, worse still, makes him resent the present because progress has rendered justice distributive and not selective. For him, crime should be judged differently “according to the just gradations of society, the guilt of an injury is enhanced by the rank of the person to whom it is offered, done, or perpetrated.” (300) Finally, his social discrimination makes him complain that “now...the clouted shoe of the peasant galls the kibe of the courtier.” (302) As a degenerate Baron, Sir Robert’s representation of the old order stands in sharp contrast with Baron Bradwardine. We recall, when Baron Bradwardine’s feudal sensibility is put on trial in the case of poor Janet Gellatley, on accusation of witchcraft by the Whig gentry, he attends to ensure “fair play between the witch and the clergy.” In fact, it is this spirit of moral and social responsibility among social classes, which Scott wants to transfer into the present. Mannering, in this context, serves as a critique of Sir Robert’s unenlightened and irresponsible attitude towards his community.

Mannering is also wealthy and no less enthusiastic than Sir Robert about prejudices “in favour of birth and rank” (120) but, unlike him, and much like Bradwardine, he breaks social boundaries when he descends from his ivory tower and venerates the peasant Dandie for his manhood, generosity, honesty, and altruistic support for Harry Bertram. Mannering not only receives Dandie with “heartily welcome,” but also adds that “he was sure his rough coat and thick soled boots would honour a royal drawing room.” (361-362) This spirit of social harmony takes additional dimensions in the cooperation between the protagonist and Meg Merrilies. Meg, as a gypsy and thief, has no place in Scott’s progressive community and therefore she has to pass away, but not before she accomplishes her job in helping Harry restore his right. Yet her performance and rhetoric are significant in terms of moral implications. As a symbol of “the savage virtue of fidelity,” (12) she spares no means for helping and protecting Harry against possible dangers until finally she pays with her own life at the hands of Hatteraick in the course of clearing Harry’s identity and right. Throughout her short relationship with Harry, she acts as a guide for him, enriching his experience by setting one example after another in disinterestedness so that he will not repeat his father’s mistakes. Meg’s influence upon Harry materializes as he tells himself: “she has been upon honour with me if she were the devil, and I will be equally upon honour with her.” (192) Meg anticipates that Harry shall be “the best laird that Ellangowan has seen for three hundred years.”

(332) The implication is that Harry represents an updated version of his father. He has experienced the meaning of loyalty in the person of Meg, manhood in the person of Dinmont, integrity in the person of Pleydell, and generosity in the person of Mannering. Above all, unlike his father, he understands that one cannot survive without the help of the community. This understanding qualifies him in the future to establish a relationship with his tenants based on mutual loyalty, humanity and respect.

Scott's emphasis on inculcating such a culture appears to be more urgent in *The Antiquary*. This is no surprise, for *The Antiquary*, according to Scott, "refers to the last ten years of the eighteenth century." (4) By that time, portents of class conflict potentially threaten the social and political structure of the British nation. Also class mobility has opened the way for the emergence of the middle class as an influential power in social and political life. This perhaps could explain Scott's focus on the middle class in *The Antiquary* and his attempt to define its role, in terms of virtue, as a leading and unifying force.

The Antiquary is similar to *Mannering* in terms of the private plot. The protagonist, Lovel-Neville, like Harry Bertram, is originally displaced in the social context. The protagonist's problem in either case is primarily connected with loss of identity. This impedes his union with the heroine, but Scott undercuts the theme of romantic love by laying emphasis on the hero's relationship with symbolic characters in the public plot, as most critics note. Through this relationship we come to know about the hero's ideological position in terms of the various issues raised in the public plot. These symbolic characters take much of Scott's attention at the expense of the hero. For instance, Oldbuck, the Antiquary himself, as an upper class representative, and agent of both virtue and communal values takes a central position in the novel, much as Edie, the beggar, does. Both provide a new definition of social-moral-economical values that cope with the spirit of the age. These values favour personal merit over lineage and are conferred on Lovel, as an aristocrat.

Before we discover the social and moral implications of Oldbuck's role, Scott interpolates the gothic tale about Oldbuck's German predecessor, "Aldobrand," in an attempt to define Oldbuck's social status and to draw an analogy between Aldobrand and Lovel. The tale reveals that Oldbuck is a descendent of one whose mobility in the social hierarchy is the result of personal attainment rather than lineage or privilege. Aldobrand's motto, which is in fact, Oldbuck's, is: "KUNST MACHT GUNST—that

is, skill, or prudence, in availing ourselves of our natural talents and advantages will compel favor and patronage, even where it is withheld from prejudice or ignorance.” (85) Lovel has seen these words in his dream and Oldbuck translates their meaning to him and points to how Aldobrand wins the hand of his master’s daughter through his skill in printing, which ultimately, brings him close to his master in terms of family station, rank and wealth. In the context of the private plot, Lovel, like Aldobrand, looks forward to winning Isabella, whose father, Sir Arthur, capitalizes on “purity of birth” (99) and heredity as criteria for social rank rather than skill and prudence. In the context of the public plot, the implication of the story encourages us to see social mobility as rational, progressive and legitimate, even though the gothic tale about “The Fortunes of Martin Waldeck” seems to argue to the contrary. What seems to be a contradiction, however, could be solved when we realize that Scott’s objective in both tales is to show that social mobility is one of the fruits of progress, but the means employed to prop it, and the end to which it is employed, in terms of virtue remains the arbiter in legitimizing it.

Oldbuck’s narrative supports the assumption about the legitimacy of social mobility and asserts the positive role of the middle class, as a buffer zone that would prevent friction between the upper and lower classes. His sympathetic interaction with and the services he offers to his community attest to that. His conduct at the funeral of Steenie, son of the poor fisherman, Saunder Meiklebackit, presents him as an enlightened antiquarian who is able to employ virtues of the past to remedy potential ills in the present. Caxon informs Oldbuck on his proper role in Steenie’s funeral according to local customs: “ye ken in this country ilka gentleman is wussed to be sae civil as to see the corpse aff his grounds...it’s no expected your honor suld leave the land...[just] a step and half ower the doorsane.” (237-238) Oldbuck approves the custom by incorporating it into philosophical history: “It comes from ancient times, and was founded deep in the notions of mutual aid and dependence between the lord and cultivator of the soil...the feudal usages mitigated and softened the sternness of classical times. No man, Caxon, ever heard of a Spartan attending the funeral of a Helot.” (238) Not limiting himself to the form of custom, as is the case with the aristocrat, Sir Arthur Wardour or Sir Robert, who takes from the past only family prejudice, Oldbuck attends the funeral. Steenie’s father is so overcome with grief that he is unable to enact his part in the funeral according to custom, that of supporting the head of the coffin. Oldbuck, undertaking an extra step beyond that

required of him, informs the mourners “that he himself, as a landlord and master to the deceased, “would carry his head to the grave.” (252)

This gesture shows that the middle-class Oldbuck endorses feudal practice not simply as a person bound to tradition (like Bradwardine who insists on removing the boots of the prince after the battle) or as guarantor of privilege but as a man rationally committed to mitigating the strains of social hierarchy. Further, though he announces his position in the familiar language of feudal law, he undertakes this partly because his sentiments are moved. The community asserted by his act, then, is not simply one of law—feudal custom or enlightened—but of human sentiment translated into action. The result for British social cohesion could not have been better if calculated: “by this instance of compliance with their customs, and respect for their persons, Mr. Oldbuck gained more popularity than by all the sums which he had yearly distributed in the parish for the purpose of private and general charity.” (252)

Many critics interested in asserting that Scott offers a serious criticism of life and exhibits an acceptable social conscience adduce as evidence the outburst against “gentles” by Saunders Mucklebackit in chapter 34. The scene and language are indeed powerful, among Scott’s best work. Oldbuck happens on Mucklebackit patching his boat and moralizes: “I am glad...that you feel yourself able to make this exertion.” (267) Mucklebackit’s response, partly to Oldbuck and partly to himself, reveals his sense of class grievance and antagonism:

And what would ye have me to do...unless I wanted to see four children starve, because ane is drowned? It’s weel wi’ you gentles, that can sit in the house wi’ handkerchers at your een when ye lose a friend; but the like o’ us maun to our wark again, if our hearts were beating as hard as my hammer...There is a curse either upon me or on this auld black bitch of a boat, that I have hauled up high and dry, and patched and clouted sae many years, that she might drown my poor Steenie at the end of them, and be d—d to her...She maun be mended though again’ the morning tide—that’s a thing o’ necessity. (267-268)

This may well be Scott’s most effective portrayal of lower class resentment, wonderfully expressed in folk-rhetoric. But Mucklebackit’s remarks are virtually without direct political or economic reference; his grievance against “gentles” is expressed in very general social terms. In fact, his motive for speaking, like the excuse for not carrying his son’s coffin, is an excess of human sentiment. Thus, Scott raises the specter of class antagonism only to dispel it by invoking humanized civic

virtue as the remedy for what might become a reality. Oldbuck, who embodies such virtue, recognizes the fisherman's grief and necessity by offering to pay for the local carpenter to do two day's work. Mucklebackit responds with warmth:

I thank ye. Ye were aye kind and neighborly, whatever folks says of your being near and close; and I hae often said in thae tiems when they were ganging to raise up the puir folk against the gentles—I hae often said, ne'er a man should steer a hair touching to Monkbarns while Steenie and I could wag finger—and so said Steenie too. (268)

Ironically, this speech of reconciliation and fellow-feeling gives far stronger evidence of class hostility than the earlier and much more frequently cited passage; since it points clearly to dissatisfied peasants or labourers and their attempt to revolt against their landlord. But Scott seems to allude to social discrimination as one of the dangerous illnesses that potentially foment rebellion and suggests that benevolent paternalism displayed by Oldbuck towards lower classes is the cure. The reconciliation of classes enacted socially at the funeral and individually between Mucklebackit and Oldbuck is further highlighted in the shape of a wider allegiance when the Earl of Glenallan, who has ceased to be a social agent after retreating to quietism, resumes his social responsibilities. The Earl willingly joins Oldbuck's team in the effort of rescuing poor Edie, the beggar, from jail. Oldbuck is now a link between lower and upper classes.

By annulling differences and discontents among the social classes, Scott not only rescues communal values but also establishes a model for a progressive community in which middle class values become unifying elements, and could be adopted by the nation at large. The design of an imagined French invasion at the end of the novel serves as a test for this social solidity. Here Scott makes of proportional economic interest for all classes a premise for enhancing political and national consensus in the face of external threats. As Oldbuck points out, in his address to Edie, "the country's in little ultimate danger, when the beggar's as ready to fight for his dish as the laird for his land" (346). Oldbuck, who is opposed to the "democraws" of Fairport reacts to political tension by transferring it into a sort of "social democracy," but is essentially integrative. This communal spirit is reemphasized in Baillie's Littlejohn speech: "take the horses into our warehouses, and the men into our parlours,—share our supper with the one, and our forage with the other. We have made ourselves

wealthy under a free and paternal government, and now is the time to shew we know its value.” (350) Scott’s expedient not only dissolves class differences but also mutes political authority by using “government” as a general term to identify it. Under the word government Scottishness and Englishness, Stuart and Hanoverian, protestant and catholic all disappear and the authority of “government” becomes synonymous to that of community/nation. Besides, by combining “freedom” with “paternity,” Scott stresses unity in tradition; paternity is a traditional Tory thesis and freedom is a progressive Whig term. In *The Antiquary*, written just after Waterloo and set at the time of the French Revolution, this assertion of emotional and symbolic connection between the lowest and highest orders of hierarchy (not conceived as opposed poles) is meant to rescue British social arrangement from the rising tide of radical republicanism.

More importantly with relevance to our study, this test proves Scott’s assumption of the possibility of updating a virtue lamented by the agent of antiquity, Elspeth Cheyne, in her nostalgic speech about the race of Glenallans. She recalls the times when they “stood shoulder to shoulder—nae man parted frae his chief for love of gold or of gain, or of right or of wrong—the times are changed, I hear, now.” (262) For Scott, the times are changed, indeed. Yet the spirit of the times could be restored and employed in a civilized manner. All ranks are now standing “shoulder to shoulder” but not in the old tradition, in which allegiance is motivated by all sorts of fanaticism and directed towards internal conflict. Nor is it dictated by virtue of economical dependence, reflected in the relationship that links vassal to master, but as a quasi-militia that represents a unified community, whose individuals move willingly according to a progressive vision of patriotism.

However, if Scott finds some sense in feudal loyalty, as a unifying social bond, he exposes and rejects the irrationalities associated with it. Such irrationalities, Scott shows, undermine the social-moral import of loyalty at the level of humanity and justice. In compliance with feudal loyalty, Elspeth “hated what [her] mistress hated.” Accordingly, she treats Eveline Neville, “a being so innocent and gentle,” with utmost cruelty. As Elspeth “wad not hae spared the blood of [her] body, or the guilt of [her] soul, to serve the house of Glenallan,” (261) she remorselessly commits perjury and swears “upon the gospels” (264) in a plot the result of which is disastrous to Lord Glenallan and his family. Applying present moral standards, we most probably reject this paradigm of loyalty for its flagrant vulnerability in terms of humanity and justice.

as it is almost akin to tyranny. Yet Elspeth's position, Scott seems to suggest, is understandable when taken in historical context; after all, she is a vassal whose economic dependence on her mistress could be seen as a sufficient reason for her blind obedience and lack of free conscience. Elspeth alludes to this point in her confessions to Lord Glenallan: "when she [her mistress] lived, wha dared to speak what it would hae displeased her to hae noised abroad?—But she's gone—and I will confess all." (256)

Elspeth's case suggests that Scott breaks company with Burke half way. Burke's thesis espouses a system based on patronage as a warrant for social cohesion and stability. According to Burke, making lower classes economically dependent on their superiors, a tenant or a slave would not think of rebelling against his master. Scott, although no less concerned about social cohesion than Burke, seems unlikely to endorse this thesis literally, at least for its moral consequences. If a master is fanatic, unjust, indecent or cruel, then his dependants, given their limited economic options, become perforce morally vulnerable. Thus Scott's vision for solving this problem could be sought in Edie Ochiltree's philosophy. Edie offers a possibility for creating a community whose citizens are economically independent and in the meantime socially and morally committed.

Edie rejects all offers that could put restraints on his economy because he is aware that such step would undercut his virtue, as it "would be a public loss." (93) Moralizing on this issue he tells Miss Isabella: "na, na, Miss—it's because I am mair independent as I am—I beg nae mair at ae house than a meal o' meat, or maybe but a mouthfou o't—if it's refused ae palce, I get it at anither—sae I can be said to depend on naebody in particular, but just on the country at large." (92) Depending on his community at large for his living, Edie becomes, to a great extent, economically independent. His loyalty, in return, becomes community oriented, and this grants him a free margin to exercise his moral courage consistently, justly and humanely to defend what he sees in the interest of the whole regardless of class or rank, and most importantly without having to be a "rebel." (90) In other words, through Edie Scott seems to suggest a new social-economical consciousness based on viewing a given community as an integrated union in which the well-being and survival of each individual in his own capacity depends on all rather than on a particular person or class.

The episode of rescuing Sir Wardour and his daughter Isabella from the rising tide seems to be designed to this effect. Wardour appeals to Edie “Good man...can you think of nothing?—of no help”—I’ll make you rich—I’ll give you a farm.” Edie replies “Our riches will be soon equal...they are sae already; for I have nae land, and you would give your fair bounds and barony for a square yard of rock that would be dry for twal hours.” (58) Edie’s message is clear. If riches and rank are helpful in some cases, they are ineffective in other cases, so is individual effort. Real help always comes from a joint effort defined by the interdependence of all social segments in the community, each in his/her own station not from lineage. As Oldbuck cynically makes it clear to Sir Arthur, “a pedigree of a hundred links is hanging on a twalpenny tow.” (64) Miss Isabella, who seems freer than her father from the complex of rank and family pride is quick to understand Edie’s hint when she confidently asserts in a communal voice: “they must be aware of our situation, and will raise the country to relieve us.” (58) Significantly, among the rescuers is Lovel and Edie attests to his gallantry: “he’s behaved this blessed night, as if he had three lives to rely on, and was willing to waste them a’ rather than endanger ither folks.” (64-65) Lovel’s effort in this episode plus Edie’s comment above pit the spirit of community against individualism. But most importantly they contribute to the value of the hero.

The meaning and importance of Lovel’s character emerges only inferentially, through the thematic resonance between Aldobrand’s tale and Lovel’s present situation. Like Aldobrand, Lovel is a suitor rendered hopeless by questions about his family station, even his identity. Yet he has already exhibited his skill in the rescue of Isabella and her rank-obsessed father; thus the motto adopted by Aldobrand seems to predict a happy ending for Lovel. This association with the skillful middle-class Aldobrand, makes clear that, if Lovel is himself a lost treasure, the treasure revealed will be not merely, nor principally, Lovel’s true rank and fortune, but his already evinced merit. Towards the end of the novel Lovel is revealed as qualified citizen, able to lead his community in a fight against the French. More importantly, he turns out to be the agent who extricates Sir Arthur from his economical dilemma. The point of the Aldobrand-Lovel conjunction then is to confer middle-class virtues and values on the upper-class hero, thus implicitly showing that this aristocrat, at least, deserves his privileges. Favor and patronage are not scorned in the novel but, as in the case of the hopelessly incompetent Sir Arthur, they are shown to be insufficient without

merit, a virtue oriented to the present, not the past. If Scott breaks company with Burke's absolutism, by legitimizing crossing social boundaries, he also seems to be aware of the dark aspect associated with mobility when it is not founded on virtue, as could be inferred from the tale about "The fortunes of Martin Waldeck." The tale, according to the author, is fundamentally didactic, in that it highlights "the miseries attendant upon wealth, hastily attained and ill-employed." (146) Symbolically, however, it could be seen as a parable on the consequences attendant upon failure to accommodate civic virtue, in context of social mobility, rather than reflecting skepticism about mobility itself.

By linking Martin's economical and social progress to the world of demonology, which generally symbolizes evil and alienation, Scott's focus becomes more on Martin's merit in terms of talent, skill, prudence, and virtue, as pre-requisites for normal mobility in a free market economy. Martin's character and conduct show that he possesses none of these virtues. For instance, apart from his courage, the author describes him as submitting to "the fiend of avarice," "pride," "cruelty," and "oppression." (144) Contrasting Martin's view of life and his inhumane conduct with that of Oldbuck's in terms of virtue, we realize that Martin serves as a critique for agents of mobility who focus in their progress exclusively on the economic aspect and neglect the moral one. Martin not only alienates himself from his community, but also emerges as an agent who aggravates social class antagonism and threatens social cohesion in his milieu. As the author points out, Martin's "prosperity soon made him odious, not to the nobles only, but likewise to the lower rank, who saw, with double dislike, the oppressive rights of the feudal nobility of the empire so remorselessly exercised by one who had risen from the very dregs of the people." (144) Had Martin taken the preaching of the priest seriously, or had his conduct been guided by religious virtues he might not have been an easy prey for the demon of materialism that divested him of his humanity. Further, by presenting the priest as a rational preacher who denounces superstition, Scott emphasizes the authority of progressive religion as a crucial element for inculcating and enhancing morality, as he does later in *The Heart of Midlothian* through Reuben Butler and Jeanie Deans. Butler, we recall, is presented as a rational minister and Jeanie, unlike Martin, is shown to be able to improve economically and socially by opening herself to divine guidance rather than yielding to the demon of materialism.

The demon of materialism and ambition in *The Bride*⁹ is presented not as an individual pestilence but rather as the thriving culture of an emerging commercial society, guided by excessive selfishness whose doctrine is perfectly Machiavellian. Scott seems to employ the state of affairs that surrounds the usurpation of the Ravenswood's castle and its extensions, as well as the tragic end of the love romance in all its ramifications to give a comprehensive portrayal of all the issues he already raised in the rest of his Waverley novels in terms of virtue. In a sense, the world of the novel reveals that it suffers a crisis of virtue on all levels. Whether this crisis expresses the author's pessimism and nostalgia, it still adduces a sort of empirical study in social-moral and political history, in which Scott seems to link genuine progress with progress in morality. This study suggests that although progress leaves no chance for the older order to survive literally, the modern world still has much to learn from past experience to remodel social-moral and political theory on a new basis that rests on accommodating ancient virtues, as Ferguson would suggest.

The background in chapter two of the novel against which the events of the novel unfold seems employed to argue from the past to support this suggestion. Here Scott invites us to read a chapter from Scottish history which depicts a makeshift radical change in politics after the departure of James VI. To fill the political vacuum, as the narrator notes, power was delegated to political parties as if in a state of quasi-democracy. But as each leader of these "contending parties" set himself in competition with the others, his main power was "employed in rewarding his partisans, in extending his influence, in oppressing and crushing his adversaries." Further, as the political and social are morally interrelated, "the administration of justice, in particular, was infected by the most gross partiality," to the extent to which the judges adopted the adage: "show me the man, and I will show you the law." Worse still, Scott points out, credibility and decency in handling justice gave way to lucre in its most demeaning form; the "purse of the wealthy was too often believed to be thrown into the scale to weigh down the cause of the poor litigant," and "the subordinate officers of the law affected little scruple concerning bribery." (28-29)

Nevertheless, Scott's critical exposition of the state of affairs in Scotland presents him as conservative-liberal; for, despite his compassionate attitude toward the Stuart family, he is sufficiently rational to reject the rule of the Divine Right doctrine. It follows that his contrast between a state of absolute monarchy and no monarchy serves only as a method to alert his readers to the potential risk connected with

republicanism or democracy (without naming it, of course). The substitute for the authority of the king under whatever pretext, he asserts, presupposes fragmentation of political authority and hence social disunity and moral deterioration. As a result, political activity would deflect from its presumed original task that rests on serving public/national interest and becomes only a medium for achieving personal ambition, power and self-aggrandizement.

But absolute monarchs, Scott reminds us, are also liable to corruption. An “indolent” and “selfish” king is “disposed to arbitrary power” and at some point he might violate people’s interest. But “in a free country” where the king’s “own interests are clearly connected with the community at large” (28) reformation becomes a necessity or a mutual interest. This could be done, in his view, by limiting the authority of the king not by replacing a whole system by a new one based on speculation. The dangers of speculation in political theory, that is, total discontinuity with the past, Scott would say, are conspicuous in the atrocities committed in France during the Revolution and perhaps in more recent events, for instance, the Peterloo Massacre. Thus when Scott invokes history his objective is to diagnose the sources of divisiveness in the present and to assert unity in tradition.

Equally, Scott transfers the idea of political unity in tradition to social and family institutions. Tradition, for Scott, most often refers to ancient virtues that are natural to man, which define him as a social-political-moral creature and make his social and familial life better protected. These virtues are in general humanitarian, altruistic and communal in nature. In this context, the picture of the villagers at Wolfs’ Hope could be seen as diagnostic and didactic at the same time. Before progress has taken its way there, the social ties that used to connect them with each other and with their lord were strong and based on reciprocal obligations that define a patriarchal or feudal system. Yet the sense of individuality in the context of economic thralldom was almost absent. Now they are “emancipated from the chains of feudal dependence, and free from the various exactions with which, under every possible pretext, or without any pretext at all, the Scottish landlords of the period, themselves in great poverty, were wont to harass their still poorer tenants at will.” (136) But instead of adapting their progress in economy in a way that preserves their social solidity, their community becomes a mere gathering whose individuals are disconnected, as each one pursues his own selfish interest inhumanely and, worse still, with predatory zeal. For instance, just as the attorney David Dingwall, eagerly looks forward to the death

of the county's sheriff-clerk to replace him, (273) so Gibbie Girder seeks an easy job as cooper to the queen's stores and happily profits from the death of the incumbent. (151 and 153) Even the clergyman Bide-the-Bent is said to have his eye upon "a neighbouring preferment, where the incumbent was sickly." (74) This new culture demonstrates the social and moral failings of purely economic values that feed on extreme utility.

This, however, does not imply that Scott is against improvement in the economic conditions of the villagers. In fact, he devotes a whole page to describing the plenty of food, cleanliness, warmth, furniture, luxury and comfortable life in the cooper's house in an attempt to highlight the change in economic independence, in contrast with the miserable condition at the Castle of Wolf's Crag, the lodging of Edgar and Caleb, where the food is scarce and life is hard. But, didactically, he alerts his readers to the risk that underlies this commercial spirit in terms of social unity and humanity. Any thought of returning to patriarchy in its old version is totally rejected. This is apparent in chapter 12 through David Ding Wall's and the cooper's strong denial of Caleb's argument in which the latter appeals to "antique custom and hereditary respect" in his attempt to obtain food for Edgar's depleted pantry. David reminds Caleb that "new times are not as old times," pointing to the authority of both civil law and government (139), while the cooper expresses the same idea in terms of economical change: "that their hens had caickled mony a day for the Lords of Ravenswood, and it was time they suld caickle for those that gave them roosts and barley." (173) Times have changed in terms of feudal obligations, but, what difference would it make had Caleb been given the food as form of charity or benevolence? Had they done so, David and the cooper would have done a social and moral service and they can still feel comfortable that they are economically free. Their act in this case could be seen as a humanitarian response rather than imposed upon them as a feudal exaction. The issue, then, is not in rejecting the feudal order, for it is no more there in effect but the real problem is in abstaining from accommodating its virtues in the present. Scott seems to show that the crisis in the modern world is a crisis of virtue.

The private plot deals with this crisis on family level in terms of economic values and absolute authority. In a patriarchal system the authority in a family, much similar to that of an absolute monarchy, is traditionally ascribed to father, and the child-parent bond, like that of the wife-husband bond, all too often make of submission an

unquestionable religious and social duty. An extreme conservative like Burke would find in this pattern a way that reinforces the unity of family. Yet Scott's liberal attitude seems to view absolutism in directing family affairs by either parent not only despotic but also does no help in maintaining genuine unity, as it might appear from delegating to Lady Ashton the absolute authority over her family. For instance, we are told that Sir William Ashton and Lady Ashton "work in concert" in the public but "without cordiality," and "the lady looked with some contempt on her husband, and that he regarded her with jealousy and fear, rather than with love or admiration." (30) This suggests that the real bond that should bind husband and wife should be based on mutual love and respect not on hegemony or "domestic thralldom," (30) as is the case with Sir William who becomes the present-absent father/ husband, as Lady Ashton usurps his role and employs it to enhance her selfish schemes. Similarly, Scott suggests that the child-parent bond should not be defined in terms of enforced obedience but rather on natural feelings, which allows a margin for individuality, particularly in matters that concern private life, for instance, marriages. This arrangement finds support in the denouement of the love romance in which Lucy is pushed into a marriage designed by her mother.

Lucy Ashton falls in love with Edgar Ravenswood who represents all values connected with chivalry. When William catches the opportunity and encourages this step he uses Lucy for his own advantage, but the author seems to show that whatever interest William might reap from their union it remains morally and socially acceptable as long as it fulfils a common interest for the father and the daughter. Regarding Lucy, William shows respect for her feelings and recognizes her right to choose her future husband. Regarding himself, this marriage is a key for reconciliation with Edgar that puts an end for feudal enmity with him. Besides, Ravenswood is a blood relative to the Marquis of A—who occupies a key position in politics, and this would be promising for William's political career. But no less important, for William and perhaps for Scott, is Edgar's manhood, which reveals the author's attitude toward manly virtues as a binding force that legitimizes the authority of husband/father over family affairs (but of course not absolute authority). Consider Scott's comment on this point: "then his daughter—his favourite child—his constant playmate—seemed formed to live happy in a union with such a commanding spirit as Ravenswood; and even the fine, delicate, fragile form of Lucy Ashton seemed to require the support of the Master's muscular strength and masculine character." (181)

Out of context, this romantic and chivalric picture seems to argue against Scott's realism but within context it acquires different meanings. It acts as a critique of William's lack of masculinity, which proves to be humiliating and destructive in more than one occasion. The first, when his wife acts with "incivility" as she insults Edgar by bidding him to leave her house while he is in her husband's hospitality. (239) The second is, when he bows unwillingly to his wife's authority and leaves his daughter all alone to meet her tragic end. Within this context masculinity, as a manly virtue, becomes a warrant for defending human, social and familial justice.

Lady Ashton's denial of her daughter's right to individuality leads to the tragic conclusion, in which Lucy, having stabbed Bucklaw, the man who has been chosen for her, dies in complete insanity, taking with her Edgar's will to live. Lucy is shown to be the victim of her mother's dictatorship. Yet besides rejecting the logic of absolutism in the parent-child relationship, Scott touches on other relevant points through Lady Ashton's character. Lady Ashton views the entire world around her in terms of economic values that are extremely utilitarian and devoid of all natural affection. As the narrator points out, she "was seldom mentioned in the terms of love or affection. Interest,—the interest of her family, if not her own interest,—seemed too obviously the motive of her actions." (30) Unfortunately, her interests are economically oriented and fanatic. She views her "alliance" with Bucklaw as an opportunity to promote her eldest son, Sholto, politically. (228) On the other hand, her enmity to Edgar arises from an aggregation of political, religious, and economic prejudices that foment division and impede reconciliation. She, for instance, denounces him because historically his family fought against "the immunities of God's kirk" (288). She also hates him because he is poor, as she characterizes him as a "beggarly Jacobite bankrupt" (238) When discussing Edgar, Peter Bide-the-Bent, Lady Ashton's own minister and spiritual guide, remarks: "the seed of the righteous are not seen begging their bread..." (150) This reminds us that the heroic indignation and zeal exhibited by the Presbyterian warriors of *Old Mortality*—men who fought and suffered for the doctrines that lady Ashton now espouses vehemently—have been corrupted by an ignoble materialism.

Against all this it is a mistake to see the protagonist, Edgar Ravenswood, and his loyal servant, Caleb Balderstone, as mere representatives of the feudal and heroic past whose values are outmoded and that he retains "nothing of value from the past except an unjustified pride."¹⁰ It is true that Caleb resorts to all tricks in an attempt to save a

lost pride and honour of his master's house. But his conduct, which might seem eccentric, could be seen as noble when viewed from a perspective of instinctive loyalty, which he has internalized over the years and has become immutable. The author's, as well as our sympathy towards him arises from our realization that he clings to ancient virtues in a world that abandoned those virtues. Caleb reminds us of Meg Merrilies, Evan Dhu, Dougal, and many others, as symbols of fidelity. The last scene in the novel dramatizes Caleb's loyalty in its most passionate and humanistic way. Edgar in his last moments asks Caleb not "to cling to a falling tower" but the latter gives a pithy reply: "I was born for the family—I have lived for them—I would die for them." (346-47) Caleb's "fidelity" to Edgar is felt even after the latter had passed away in the quick sand. Caleb "ate without refreshment, and slumbered without repose." (348) Caleb, unlike the villagers at Wolfs' Hope, cannot change simply because he knows no other track to follow except the one he has committed himself to. In the light of changes around him, this track leads him to nowhere and he is completely stuck in the web of history that gives no attention to his virtue of loyalty.

But Edgar's role, unlike Caleb's, is more complex than it might appear. Although chivalric in his transactions, he is not archaic. When discussing Edgar most critics seem to forget his rationality and his awareness of the changes taking place around him, which render him ahead of his time, much like Henry Morton in *Old Mortality*. Most often he seems to speak for Scott himself, as a philosophical historian, whose consciousness of human nature and the workings of historical process motivate him to adopt a frank, pragmatic, moderate, and reconciliatory position in all his dealings. For instance, unlike Caleb, he is never ashamed of his poverty. Also there is strong evidence to believe that he breaks away from the tradition of his ancestors concerning the notion of revenge, as a means for maintaining justice. He makes it clear to Bucklaw that his confrontation with William will not go beyond upbraiding him "with his tyranny and its consequences" to shake "his soul within him," (81) while, on the other hand, he asserts to William that he will seek justice at the "British House of Peers, a court of equity." (162) This rational and progressive attitude towards implementing justice is further emphasized in his speech with a former tenant to the Ravenswoods, Alice, who misinterpreted his rapprochement with the Ashtons as a means for revenge: "You drive me to madness, Alice...are you such a wretched

Christian as to suppose I would in the present day levy war against the Ashton family, as was the sanguinary custom in elder times?" (201)

Edgar's toleration of Mr. William seems to be linked with his love affair but had he not had this aptitude of rationality his love to Lucy would not have been a sufficient reason for him to make a reconciliation with his enemy. Consider Edgar's reasoning in justifying himself to take a moderate step towards William: "those from whom we won our ancient possessions fell under the sword of my ancestors, and left lands and livings to the conquerors; we sink under the force of the law, now too powerful for the Scottish chivalry, let us parley with the victors of the day, as if we had been besieged in our fortress, and without hope of relief. This man may be other than I have thought him; and his daughter—but I have resolved not to think of her." (160) What we hear here is Scott's voice in his Introduction to *Waverley* about "passions common to men in all stages of society" and the "great book of Nature, the same through thousand editions." (5) This means that either Edgar has to give up and admit historical defeat or fight William using the weapons of the age, the law. Yet Edgar, as a pragmatic, prefers to reach a compromise based on toleration and moderation, two terms too dear to Scott's heart.

Scott views political activities not as a career for securing private profit or personal influence, or even for gratifying personal pride, but rather as a social-moral virtue. For Scott, the crucial issue is not who is in power, Tory or Whig, as long as the concerned party shows integrity and commitment in handling the nation's interest. As David Hewitt points out, Scott's praises Pitt in his poem *Marmion* because of the latter's defence of Britain's interest in the face of the French threat. Hewitt reports Scott's view that Pitt "was interested only in serving his country, not in private rewards."¹¹ Similarly, Edgar tells Bucklaw that a day will come when Tory and Whig become "nick-names as at a trumpet sound. As social life is better protected, its comforts will become too dear to be hazarded without some better reason than speculative politics." (101) Edgar's voice is the voice of a "patriot" (100) who elevates common interest or "social comfort" above personal advantage, national or party prejudice. Edgar's tragedy, in short, cannot be viewed as the result of his blind adherence to obsolete ideals but rather as result of his rationality which makes him look beyond his time. If I am correct, Scott emerges not as an apologist for the old order as much as an ideologist, considering Edgar's virtues as the antidote for what he diagnoses as the ills of modern life.

Notes: Conclusion

1. See Gordon, *Under Which King*, 26.
2. Gordon, *Under Which King*, 98-109.
3. Duncan, 119-120.
4. Shaw, 74.
5. Scott, *Guy Mannering* (London: Adline Press, 1964), 142. All further quotations from *Mannering* will be from this edition and will be noted in my text.
6. Scott, *The Antiquary* (1816), ed. David Hewitt (Penguin, 1998), 105. Further quotations will be from this edition and will be noted in the text.
7. John Sutherland, 182.
8. Ferguson, *Essay*, 249.
9. Scott, *The Bride of Lammermoor*, ed. Fiona Robertson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). All quotations will be from this edition and will be noted in the text.
10. Daiches, "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist," 45-46.
11. David Hewitt, "Scott's Art and Politics," ed. Alan Bold, *Sir Walter Scott: The Long-Forgotten Melody* (Version press, 1983), 49.

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