

Bangor University

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

George Herbert Mead and dualism

Roman, Judith

Award date:
1988

Awarding institution:
Bangor University

[Link to publication](#)

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD AND DUALISM

A doctoral dissertation by Judith Roman.



Contents.

Summary	2
Acknowledgements	3
<i>Preface.</i>	4
<i>Introduction.</i>	15
<i>Chapter I. The Schism in Society.</i>	53
Section 1. Seriousness, from the Inside. The Schism in Society.	53
Section 2. The Schism Grasped as the Discrepancy between the Social 'Ought' and the Social 'Is'.	66
<i>Chapter II. The Schism as a Macrosociologic Matter.</i>	86
Section 1. The Three Ascribed Paradigms of the Sacred-Profane Relationship. Blemish by Circumstance and by Virtue of Heretic Personality. Hubris.	86
Section 2. The Three Sociologically Relevant Functions of the Specialisation of the "Me" and the "I".	102
Section 3. Mastery and Slavery, Writ Small.	138
<i>Chapter III. The Schism as a Microsociologic Matter.</i>	157
Section 1. Being and Having. The Caretaker.	157
Section 2. The Turnstile. The Social Uncreativity of the Pukka.	198
Section 3. The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object.	230
Section 4. The Engineer and the Fixer.	276
Section 5. Our Big-letter and Small-letter Righteousness as Object.	291
Section 6. Part One: On Being Subject too. Which Came First; The Chicken or the Egg?	321
Section 6. Part Two: On Being Subject too; Rosebud or Bête Noire?	346
Section 6. Part Three: On Being Subject Too; The Coarse Caretaker.	379
<i>Chapter 4. The Self.</i>	
Section 1. The Romantic's Two-Stroke Categorical Imperative, and the Two Ways in which to Violate It.	404
Section 2. Adjustment and Maladjustment in the Act.	413
Section 3. The Necessity of the Self, and the Total Structure of Adjustment as Inclusive of It.	443
Section 4. Paradigms of Grace.	456
<i>Conclusion.</i>	483
References.	508
Bibliography.	515

Summary.

The thesis entertains dualism as a valuable conceptual frame of reference in the twentieth century. For the support of this contention, the Introduction calls on the writings of Piaget, Althusser, Chomsky and Lévi-Strauss. All these dualists share, in distinction from traditional past approaches to a dualistic conceptual framework, an insistence on the primacy of the empirical term (or at least on the parity of the empirical term) vis-a-vis the ~~deep~~-structural or covert term in their works, which two terms, on their accounts, indismissibly underlie the phenomena they tackle in their various disciplines.

The terms of the dualism of the main concern in this study, pertain to social psychology, or anthropology in the Continental sense. They are, on the one hand, (a) an updated Hegelian 'object' as contaminated with a Hegel-akin 'subject' (with the terms 'my world', 'perspective', 'lived reality', 'human reality', 'the self' as its usual expressions), and (b) the same 'object' as pure and uncontaminated with 'subject': the medium of society's 'carriership', indeed of the very being of society itself, whose positivity is overtly demonstrable in statistical charts, as Durkheim was the first to show. For that reason, not only the explicitly dualistic Continental students of the self upon whom the thesis focuses (the existentialist Sartre, Kierkegaard and Bultmann in the main), but also Durkheim figures centrally in the argument.

Another task which the thesis undertook was to show that the Hegelian, implicitly dualistic element in Mead's thought (picked up by him in Berlin: the scene of his undergraduate studies), amounts, not to a flaw spoiling the orthodoxy of his behaviourism (as usually grasped), but (when pursued and pushed to its limits), to a fruitful basis of comparison with and a valuable contribution to the works of his openly dualistic European anthropologist colleagues, just listed above.

Both goals are, on the whole, implicitly achieved in the thesis, as they are, in the main, phenomenologically approached, and the method of their treatment is to allow them to transpire through a structure dictated by an abandon to their implications in experience.

The dualism of Sartre's social psychology provides the major basis of comparison to Mead's implicit dualism. A by-product of this circumstance is the emergence, in the course of the argument, if not of a Sartrian ethics, at least of an ethics which is very Sartrian.

I wish to gratefully acknowledge the generous financial help of the following organisations:

The International Federation of University Women (particularly its branch: the Japanese Association of University Women), who generously awarded me the Winifred Cullis Scholarship for the first year of my Ph.D. studies. During the period of their sponsorship, I drafted the outlines of the thesis, and elaborated, in draft form, Section 3. of Chapter 3.

The Olga Ryan Trust, which paid my fees for the second year of my studies.

The Radley Trust, which paid my fees during the third year of my studies.

The Society of Friends, which paid my fees and generously covered my other expenses during the fourth year of my studies.

The University of Wales, which awarded me a month's stay at Gregynog Hall as a resident student, during which time I was able to extend my research in the library of that establishment, and write up a substantial part of my thesis.

Preface.

The title of this thesis is 'George Herbert Mead and Dualism'. At first I aimed, as the sole topic and aspect of this study, to tackle the implicit dualism in Mead's work, for which he is often chided by his American colleagues and interpreters; and treat that in a somewhat novel light. There is a tension in Mead's lifework, both as a social psychologist and as a thinker, resulting from a dissonance in his *oeuvre* in both his fields, produced by his European, or rather Continental training in both his capacities, (theoretically ambitious and somewhat flamboyant in its style), and the puritanistic, application-biased behaviouristic tradition in psychology and pragmatism in philosophy which reigned supreme in his country, in accordance with which he was to practice both his trades during his working lifetime in Chicago. The theoretical hue of his work, as a consequence, represents a marriage (a happy and totalistically appealing and fruitful one, to us, and an unhappy one for his critics), between the Continental grounding of his thought, imbibed by him during his student days at Berlin University, where Hegel's and Marx's dialectic method of philosophic thinking has not yet been forgotten, and upon which Wundt's contemporary, partially but importantly philosophy-informed socialpsychologic teachings in Leipzig had a powerful effect, on the one hand, and, on the other, the new, positive science-biased and 'speculation'-contemptuous intonation of the pursuance of social theory (Mead's speciality both as a thinker and as a social psychologist), with which he had to fall in in the later pursuance of his work in the United States. I endeavoured to treat Mead's lifework in a comparative light with that of his European contemporary colleagues, in whose handling of socialtheoretic thought a Hegelian-borne dualism between subject and object, latent in Mead, becomes explicitly further developed and full-blown as such, and to whose standards and lights the behaviourism as a psychologist and pragmatism as a philosopher, with which Mead's thought was willingly and importantly tinted after his return to the States, represents a limitation, - rather than in the more usual context of his American fellow-pragmatists and behaviourists, in whose eyes Mead's Hegelian leanings in socialscientific thought, are

seen as a blemish on his way of thinking which they wish to sweep under the carpet when his contribution to these fields is drawn on. In other words, in evaluating his work, particularly his most influential one: Mind, Self and Society, I wished to reverse the bias with which his somewhat schizophrenic thought, loyal to both contemporary European and American conventions, is usually viewed by his Anglo-Saxon tradition-abiding critics all over the world, to put right the theoretically very promising and fertile balance between Continental and Anglo-Saxon-inspired views and practices in the work of this exceptional thinker, and instead of bemoaning, as is fashionable in behaviourist and pragmatistic circles, that if only he had abandoned the dualistic transgressions of his theorising, he could have been a perfect champion of behaviourism and pragmatism, we say instead, with a Continental eye cast on his seminal contribution to social science and social philosophy, that but for his protestations of the metaphysical inconsequentiality of his dualism under behaviouristic pressures meaning to appropriate his *oeuvre* as a social psychologist, he would have been, and is, when teased out of him, a splendid dualist, his work valuably complementing the body of contributions, concurrent with his, to a dualistic social science as expounded by Sartre, Heidegger and Lacan, and the existentialist theologians, particularly Kierkegaard, Bultmann and Tillich. I undertook to give Mead as a social psychologist a Continental reading, and present his often commented-on 'weakness' as an implicit dualism, as a socialtheoretically pioneering virtue in the context of the work of these other thinkers just listed, and to show that his practical care for, as well as the soberness of, his environmentalistic bias to his topic as a behaviourist, enhances the dualistic thought of these others, underscoring in those the primacy of 'object' or the manifest, positive behavioural term of their dualism: a great step in thrusting their thought ahead when compared with the monistic philosophic idealism chosen, in the final analysis, by Hegel, which made his work of the latter in its uninterpreted state, useless in the practice of socialscientific thought in this century. Mead is also more constructive in the field of social psychology than was Marx during his short flirtation with that field, for the latter (who was the first to reverse the primacy of 'subject' and replace that with that of

'object' compared with Hegel's postulation of the dialectic relationship between 'subject' or 'spirit' and social body), grew to be so strongly fired by the interdisciplinary possibilities of positing 'object' as the primary term in such a dualism, that he abandoned the field of social psychology altogether in his activity as a fully-fledged thinker, after the first four years of that.

I would like to believe that this thesis, whose method is the phenomenological one in its greatest part, managed to accomplish this aim; however, in the course of its writing, the thesis became broader than this first aimed-at single dimension of it, and came to acquire an at first unintended secondary aspect. Marx and Sartre have an interesting and incidental feature in common: they both entertained, during the entire course of their lives, the writing of a theoretical treatise of the *rationale* underlying their output as social thinkers and practitioners - a pure dialectics in the case of Marx and an existentialist ethics in the case of Sartre - from the accomplishment of which their more urgent practical commitments both as authors and as the activists of their respective causes on the scene of the world, have kept them to the end of their days. As is well known, Althusser undertook to produce such a Dialectic as a philosopher on Marx's behalf, making that task the main aim of his work. I cannot boast that this thesis achieved an analogously valuable and complete supplementation of Sartre's work, in unearthing and offering a theory of ethics at the heart of his practical existential life-project which he promised to discern for us, but it can be said that what emerges on the pages of this thesis amounts to an ethics which is both very explicit and very Sartrian; it's not identical with that which is implicit in this respect in Sartre, but the overlap is very great. Sartre's militant dissociation of his thought system with the God at the centre of established European religions, does not amount in his work, as we see that, to a denial of the moral constructiveness, meaningfulness and effectiveness upon conduct of the entertaining of the radically person-anchored and informant, predominantly 'diachronic' God of the existentialist theologians; only he does not see that as corresponding to a positive, 'synchronic' structure which is 'out there' somewhere, in

tangible terms; a way of conceptualising the God of the socialtheoretically 'romantic' (for the meaning of this term see the Introduction), with which Tillich as a 'romantic' theologian, for instance, is quite happy. ^{'1'} Nor is our regard for the contribution of Sartre's socialpsychologic thought to a modern ethics, rendered useless, I feel, by such a mode of the entertaining of a positive God which equates that with the being and facticity of society *sui generis*, as some disciples of Durkheim claim their master's work brought forth, though never in explicit terms. Sartre does not exclude the possibility of such a conceptualisation of God; he simply devotes relatively very little attention to the question of the external being of society as such, or the philosophic and ontologic trimmings that may attach to a preoccupation with that, though in his work he very explicitly and consequentially, if sporadically, entertains the being, meaningfulness and importance of the positive facticity of society in external terms, which, to his conceptualisation, is always there over against human reality as an indissmissible and necessary background to that in all situations. For these reasons, the framework of ethics which comes to the fore in this thesis, has room in it for one or the other of these grasps of God, or rather, is not mutually exclusive with either of those, nor embarrassed by the postulation of God in either of these ways; this feature of it allowing for the provision of a greater common denominator between Sartre and the existentialist theologians, than Sartre himself was prepared to acknowledge; and the stress he gives to the functional and vital subsistence of the positive being of society in all human situations, allows, furthermore, for a fertile and instructive synthesis between Durkheim's work and Sartre's own, which we mean to systematically and consequentially demonstrate and draw on. Secondly, Sartre's socialpsychologic 'problematic' becomes a little bit tampered with in our treatment of that, in as much as in our treatment of the self and the make-up of its infrastructure as both 'object' and 'subject', or, in Mead's denotation, as both "me" and "I", the Meadean "me" or its Sartrian synonym: the 'existing' in its relation to 'subject' or Mead's "I", ^{'2'} receives greater limelight in this thesis than Sartre directs toward it, thanks mainly to Mead's much more fruitful preoccupation with and contribution to that

socialpsychologically positive term - the "me", that is - and its role in the microcosmic or intrapersonal makings of the self than Sartre has offered; the analysis of the make-up of the self with such a corrective bias to the treatment of the Meadean "me", hopefully proving itself as a valuable supplementation to Sartre's (more 'Being-for-Itself' preoccupied) outlook on the same phenomenon.

This thesis is an apology for dualism - an unapologetic one, in Sir Phillip Sidney's sense - endeavouring to present that as a consequential movement in the twentieth century, particularly in Europe, with many of the contributors to such a framework, entertaining and cultivating dualisms whose terms are not comparable or compatible with the terms of the dualisms of other workers. The dualism we are interested in is that Hegel-inherited one which affects and is operative in the infrastructure of the self, with the focus, however, not on the intrapersonal operation of those terms, ('object' and 'subject') in the first three chapters of this thesis, or merely incidentally and subordinately touching on such microcosmic spheres of that. Rather, we hope to present a dualism which is homed in, in the main, on the relationship between the subjectivity-shot self as a whole, vis-a-vis an entirely 'subject'-free external social reality *sui generis* confronting that, the collective consciousness for man in Durkheim's sense, yielding a dualism which is expounded in greater or smaller measures in the thematically kindred anthropological dualisms of the workers whose list has already been put forward here. (The term 'anthropological' is meant here in the Continental sense.) The postulation and delineation of the terms of interest to us has been greatly influenced by Roy Bhaskar's works on realism and particularly on naturalism ('3'), in which he identifies, among other things, consistently with Durkheim, the reality of a positive society as such in nature which, as an autonomous content to consciousness, is at the heart of sociology as an independent discipline. On reading Bhaskar's works, we became encouraged to entertain the special relationship between two or more tiers of being in nature, varying in their subject matters and sophistication as a function of their evolutionary ranking as orders of being, which may be made relative to and the subject of comparison vis-a-vis each other in

theoretic argument, in instances where such a comparison is fruitful and instructive. We felt free to comment on systematic effects and countereffects holding between two of those in the main: social reality and human reality, or the being of society and of the self, which seemed to us to clamour for attention in their relationship. Had we not narrowed down the study of the interplay between strata of nature, to just two of those - to the social world and 'my social world', the subject matter of sociology and social psychology respectively, - our position could easily have become a pluralistic one (not a dirty word by any means). Indeed, at some points of this thesis we bring the physiology (the study of a third tier in nature) to bear organically upon our argument; however, always with a care for the predominance of the two terms at the heart of the dualism of our concern, as just identified, making sure that those would be safeguarded as the centre of our field of vision, by our continuous concern for the cardinal status of those in our consideration, with a view to those pivotal terms of our primary interest, and their relationship, becoming served, enhanced and enriched in the light of our excursions into such evolutionarily neighbouring orders of their being.

One of the reasons for pointing out here that Bhaskar's 'naturalistic' philosophy was an important source of our inspiration in approaching the socialtheoretic dualism which serves as the centre of our study, and for stressing that it was from a wide array of possible strata of being in nature that we picked two of those to serve as the dyads, in their relationship, which is at the heart of the dualism that we shall concern ourselves with, was to dissociate as strongly as possible the dualism of our concern from the dusty and traditional, 'classic' dualism between body and soul, discredited and contaminated over the centuries by a philosophic idealism, which springs to mind most readily, with its awesome heaviness and solemnity, even to-day, when the term 'dualism' is mentioned. The dualism of our interest differs from that well-known and erstwhile postulation of 'dualism' on many accounts. First of all, it differs from that in the respect that the dualism of our study, unlike the 'classic' body-soul dualism, is the outcome of a fortuitous choice of a dyad, though with an important and

fruitful relationship inherent in that, from amongst many possible others, with no status of necessity attaching to the two terms chosen by us as privileged and solely suitable candidates to serve at the centre of a dualistic form of thought. It just so happens that the two terms of being which in their relationship feature at the heart of the dualism we entertain, are such that socialscientific thinkers of consequence in this century have preoccupied themselves with those and adopted those as the centre of their interest with a fruitfully interdependent view cast upon those, and that a comparative treatment of such workers has thereby become possible. Secondly, again as a product of the Bhaskarian naturalism-enabled choice of its central terms, our dualism differs from the traditional body-soul dualism in the obvious feature that it isn't primarily the terms 'body' (taken to mean 'flesh') and 'soul' which serve in a pivotal position in our dualism, (though this 'classic' dyad impinges occasionally and to some extent on the area of discourse of our dualism too), but the central dyad in our dualism is made up, in the bulk of our argument, by two evolutionarily higher-order terms; one of these being the Meadean "me", in the purporting of which the expression 'body' needn't be used at all, but when it is (as it sometimes happens in the kindred 'problematic' of Sartre), it refers to that term ('body', that is), in a special, symbolic sense, meaning the socialpsychologically overt aspect of the self as such - a sense in which we as selves are participants in the interpersonal social and socialpsychologic reality which we share with others, in the 'body' of society, so to speak; and the other term in a fateful relationship with this Meadean "me" or the 'body' of this special, symbolic order, is afforded by the Meadean "I"-inclusive area of being for the self, (Being-for-Itself for Sartre), with the "I" indissmissibly operative in that when grasped in an evolutionarily high enough sense to serve as the fitting dialectic partner in social or socialpsychologic reality, to that humanly sophisticated, symbolic and high-order "me": our first term. Finally, our grasp of dualism differs from the notorious classic body-sould dualism, in that the term 'dualism', for us, is a concept which concerns and consists in a form of thought rather than in the content which it supports, and which supports that; and any thought system or scientific method that relies on the relationship and

interplay between any two terms both of which are indissoluble for the adequate explanation or description of the total phenomenon or area of discourse to which they pertain, irrespective of whether those terms are evolutionary tiers of being or not, is deserving, on our view, of the title: dualism; as will be argued at length in the Introduction. However, this latter proviso is merely a conceptual nicety in the context of our dualism, which does concern itself with the relationship between two orders of being in nature, and which, on account of that feature of that as a thought system, amounts to a dualistic ontology. With the cropping up here of the term 'ontology', we are lumbered here again with another big word in addition to 'dualism', one with a stiltedness, starchedness and datedness comparable with that of 'dualism' at its unqualified, as a result of its traditional grasp of that in philosophy from medieval times onwards (in early preoccupations with it), in a manner which was contentually shot with and inclusive of the pleading of the being of God - a concept, therefore, with morally strongly committed connotations, arguments about which are marked by a history of bitter battles, verbal ones and such as brought even crusades and bloodshed in their wake; and which demands clarification, as was the case with dualism, to free itself from these connotations and misunderstandings attaching to its content in the course of its emotionally charged past history.

We are therefore spurred on to stress at this early stage, that the word 'ontology', for us, is merely a generic term which means the study of being, or, in our case, the study of two orders of being with special interconnections between those. Orders of being or reality are not confined to the solemn and venerable terms traditionally deputising as the content of the discipline of ontology, as just outlined. My mother-in-law, for instance, in her earlier days of mild senility, lived in a world of delicate ontological variegation around her, in which neither graded layer of being for her was such that has a place or history in philosophical literature or social thought. Always a discerning connoisseur and committed pursuer of human reality, particularly the interpersonal forms of that, (which to her afforded the highest order of being), in her declining years, during her ever-greater confinement to

the house, was condemned to ever-increasing recourse to television, yielding her, as a function of the ontologically qualitative hierarchy of orders in the viewing material (marked for her by its intensity as interpersonal human reality as discerned by her), a wide array of kinds and modes of being-with-people and a guide to surrendering her own commitment as a person to those. Highest ranking in her life, were the occasions of mingling with a friendly and relaxed crowd of real people in the streets and promenades, in the circle of her family and friends. These occasions afforded her the chance of a gluttony in savouring and participating in social life, chiefly in the colloquial sense, in the total richness and completeness of that with all the tiers of interpersonal human reality which she cared for: in the totally satisfactory proximity (in order of importance and qualitative ranking) of family, friends, and the jolly human tapestry in the background peopled by happy, holidaying strangers or just passers-by. (Even recourse to such memories afforded her some degree of a high-ranking order of being-with-others.) Second, third and fourth to such experiences were occasions in which such togetherness with greatly enjoyed company came to her not in such a total bundle of concurrence, but piecemeal or in less than total combinations of those. With her introduction to television, the reproduction of life on the screen came to graduate to her to a form and range of reality in which grades of higher-or lower-order modalities of being were discerned by her, no less than in real life, and on similar lines to the layers of that which were more or less treasured by her, though the reality of television ranked for her lower, on the whole, than the reality of real people in her surroundings, and the quality of the experience of her viewing became complicatedly influenced by the above-outlined qualitatively graded real-life company which happened to watch with her. But even with these riders, it was true for her that the variegated classification of broadcast material became the extension of her range of experience and scope for participation in types and orders of being-with-others, fulfilling to her as a reality and animatedly peopled environment to be with, to greater or lesser degrees, according to criteria consistent with her real-life reference to types of company, which caused her to judge and to experience the level of 'being' presented for her and

engaging her consciousness during viewing, as a more or less intense, satisfying and qualitatively graded social reality, for her indulgence. Highest of this canned and televised reality, which offered itself for experience along a descending qualitative continuum, were such morally high-tone dramatic pieces, involving people, in which good and bad agents were clearly recognisable (she was incapable of discriminating the identity of the people beyond such bold and grossly signalled attributes to them), in which the bad came to a sticky end and the good triumphed. Below such encounters followed such pieces which she didn't understand but the family liked and which passed for her as good, worthwhile and enjoyable on that account, and, in equal second place, films with a big cast, such as epics, which in their colourful crowdedness struck in her the chord of promenading people. In shared third place came the appearance of a man or a woman, *simpatico* or *simpatica* of course, such as that of a newscaster, and any scenario in which people could be seen as moving, such as plays beyond her understanding with small casts and documentaries with a human topic. Below this rock bottom in exposure to the presence of people in personal relation to her, were such strata and categories of TV-being which were devoid of the human element, such as travel documentaries, or were less than human, such as animal and nature films. At the very lowest extreme of her scale of classification of the forms of reality and being she was prepared to be exposed to, were cartoons, which appeared to her, in the sketchiness of their presentations of human life and reality, as the betrayal of those, dragging into a pastiche counterfeit her anthropologic ideals: people in any manner of their presence and representations; the surrogate being of whom as presented in film animations, offended her to such an extent that she was not prepared to watch such material even in congenial company. It seems to me that my mother-in-law's sharply delineated classification and view of the levels of being surrounding her, as a partly very valid one and resting, to quite some extent, on objective insight and sensitivity, and insofar as this is true, amounting to a perfectly meaningful system of an ontological hierarchy and variegation.

In a contrast of style with that of the argument of the thesis itself, which, as has been said, is in its greatest part a phenomenology, an Introduction of a drier and more scholarly tone will follow this Preface, which is to perform a dual function. First of all, in keeping with the modern convention, mainly in the English-speaking world, of approaching socialtheoretic and socialscientific topics in an appealingly disciplined and orderly manner, this Introduction will assume the task and function of a so-called sociologic or socialpsychologic write-up, affording a summary of related theoretic work as the basis of the study, allowing the proposal and identification of the hypothesis or hypotheses which underlie the whole undertaking in the light of such a background, which theoretically catapult the thesis into being, which afford a framework and serve as criteria in judging the plea for that in the main argument, and whose success or lack of success to stand up to detailed investigation there, is properly summarised and evaluated in the Conclusion. To anticipate this function of the Introduction here, this topic and set of hypotheses in our case will be now identified, firstly and most importantly, as the claim for a place in twentieth-century social psychology for a dualistic view of that, secondly to demonstrate the rightful place in such a modern dualistic socialscientific framework of the implicit contributions of George Herbert Mead, and finally and incidentally, to put forward a rather more elaborate existentialist ethics than Sartre presented us with, and which is nevertheless compatible with his thought, though not completely coincidental with that.

Apart from this main, socialscientifically orthodox aim and function, the Introduction will also serve as an excuse, partly in the guise of affording a theoretic background to this thesis, to introduce there some special concepts upon which the main argument of the thesis will heavily rely, so as to make subsequent reference to those easy in a concise and convenient way.

Introduction.

The threefold aim of this study has been identified at the very end of the Preface, but is usefully repeated and re-summarised here, as the explicit task of showing a certain brand and trend of modern, twentieth-century dualism to be an insightful and relevant mode of approach to the study of social thought, with particular reference to social psychology, on the one hand; and to interpret and demonstrate a decisive portion of George Herbert Mead's lifework within social science to be fruitfully, if implicitly, compatible with and contributory to that area of inquiry, rather than apologising for the dualism implicitly underlying his thought, for which he is often criticised by fellow-pragmatists and behaviourists. The third aim of the study (the unfolding of an ethics which is very Sartrean) is an incidental by-product of the argument which has been arrived at post-hoc and wouldn't be honestly represented in the Introduction as an aim which has been circumspectly set up with the purpose of the demonstration of it in the main bulk of the argument, so an exposition of it will form no part of the Introduction. For this reason, we shall concentrate here on the outlining and elaboration of the first two hypotheses, as set out above, which have inspired this thesis into being in the first instance.

In defining 'dualism', we invert Richard Schacht's approach to the study of alienation in a monograph bearing that title. We say of dualism, as he did of alienation, that it is a contrast concept, and therefore dependent in every context of its grasp on the two terms between which this contrast holds, if we want the notion to be meaningful. ^{'1'} But while that work proposes that unless both terms sustaining the concepts in their relationship can be specified and the pairs for its candidature narrowed down in numbers, the far too widely and vaguely used expression 'alienation' remains unworthy of academic usage, ^{'2'} we say that just because so many pairs of terms are being treated, in modern conceptual practice, as in a dualistic relationship to each other in consistent and revealing ways, the concept 'dualism' is beginning to deserve academic attention and respect.

Dualism, no less than 'alienation', is an area of study which has come to considerable disrepute through the history of its usage; principally, because before this century, the terms between which a dualistic relationship was postulated and discussed, were confined to 'mind' versus 'body' or 'matter', and considerations of this topic were conducted in the spirit of philosophic idealism, that is to say, with the primacy of 'mind' in the relationship taken for granted. However, in this century, the contents of dualisms, or the dyads between which dualistic relationships were postulated, became far more numerous and varied. The venerable 'mind' and 'body' or 'matter' pair, which interpretations of, say, Piaget or Althusser can be stretched to fit, still receive a place in the repertoire of dualisms, but are of course no longer idealistically approached, instead the primacy of the externally anchored component in these dualistic pairs, or, in the case of the structuralists, at least the causal concurrency and parity of that with 'mind', is strongly maintained and insisted on. As a result, the mind-matter dualism - that form in which dualistic thought is traditionally best known - is no longer equated with speculation directing attention away from reality as it really is and is experienced in the world, veiling that irrelevantly, and dualism is beginning to have a sympathetic hearing on the merit of works produced in the many fields of its updated forms.

Whether the dyads affording the twentieth-century dualisms of our interest, consist of modern restorations of the 'mind'-'body' (or 'matter') relationship, or in the postulation and analysis of dyads different from that, the concept 'dualism' is seen here as a generic notion which can profitably be (and is here) formally taken to refer to any two terms consistently tied to one another in a peculiar relationship. The twin terms affording, in their irreducible otherness, dualisms in the pregnant relationships to one another, can be related sets of phenomena, or uncongenial yet mutually necessary components operating, in their fateful and characteristic duality, within any process and area of study in any field whatsoever. It's enough for the two related terms sustaining a dualistic stance of their study, to be free from any contentual overlap in relation to one another (in other

worlds, for them to be mutually exclusive), and for the terms to work to each other's exclusion yet in a peculiar ensemble for the maintainance of the phenomenon of which they are fundamental components, to qualify their relationship to be deserving of the label 'dualism'. In other words, the tag is in place if the relationship which the two terms are supporting at the heart of the particular phenomenon they underlie, is a dialectic one. The relationship must be, moreover, one in which each of the two terms - indelibly bound as components in the ensemble in which they work - is indissmissible in and for a full understanding, a complete account of the phenomenon or area of study which the terms in question sustain.

Examples of dualistic thought systems in modern areas of study - among many others - are (most famous of all because of Althusser's reading of it) Marx's explanation of the phenomenon of surplus value, centrally supplemented by his hypothesised model of the relations of production; Chomsky's model of the semantic as distinct from the grammatic structure of language, one that lends itself to the expression of mathematic formulae denoting and decoding the deeper dimension underlying the obvious grammatic structure of language and affording the most complete account to date of the circumstance that young children are able to deal with far more numerous and creative word combinations than an account of that in terms of the input alone would justify. Thirdly, Lévi-Strauss has developed a symbolic way of expressing such patterns in the relationship within the extended family which are not fully represented in their descriptions in everyday usage, which, however, explain, in conjunction with the everyday language labels denoting kinship, some important additional patterns of culture within and outside the extended family, over and above slavish descriptions of the mere genealogic branchings of family trees.

Not only does such a formal approach to dualism afford a connection between phenomena in any field on methodological grounds and by virtue of their formally comparable internal workings, it doesn't draw, in principle, a sharp dividing line between the strengths and the depths in which dualisms are propounded, held, to encompass them as dualisms. Our

classification is flexible and unaxacting in respect of whether the relationship in a dualistic model holds between absolutes or relatives, whether a dualism is a thought system within epistemologic bounds such as that of Piaget, or involves and carries ontological claims touching on being in its totality, such as that of Sartre. This doesn't mean that we will be unattentive as to which of the latter identified pigeon-holes, epistemologic or ontologic, any particular dualism we argue does actually belong to; a differentiation of dualisms in the latter respect is extremely important in the particular context of the concrete examination of any one dualism, or in the comparative treatment of two or more dualisms approaching the same subject matter, and due heed will be taken in the identification of particular dualisms on the latter score whenever such will be in place and required.

The question also arises whether a work which sets out to argue, to probe a dualistic system, with the intent, and possibly effect, of reconciling and synthesising its two supporting terms in the final analysis, or suppressing one altogether, should be regarded as dualistic? We may argue with Schacht that two well-defined terms which are relevantly sustaining a relationship in their organic contrast, are a sufficient condition for the contrast concept in which they effectively serve to be valid, meaningful and justified... or with Kant that if it's possible for any one of the terms to maintain a universe of discourse in which it is indissmissible, the term attains an existence in a special sense at least. We may also usefully call, in this context, on Heidegger's notion *Fragestellung*, which literally translated means 'positing the question' or 'question-positing', and which refers to the delineation of the problematic of a work; with the argument in the work itself affording the answer to the problem-area posited. Works with a *Fragestellung* (all conceptual works) don't of course fall into two distinct part, first a *Fragestellung* and then subsequently the working out of the answer, but the *Fragestellung* underlies the whole work and is the base and organic part of that throughout, as is the resolution of the problematic. It seems that if the heterogeneity (in the author's interpretation) of the dualistic relationship between two central terms forms an essential core of the argument (amounts to a *Fragestellung*),

the work should be regarded as dualistic as a matter of its form and methodology at least; whether the author does or does not reconcile the terms in the final analysis appears to be rather a matter of content. Many works (certainly those of Mead) would seem then, on such a classification, as inadvertently and implicitly dualistic, (and are often identified by critics accordingly); this quality is either apprehended as a flaw - or, alternatively, such works lend themselves in the eyes of their students to interpretation as unashamedly dualistic, and to incorporation, in a valuable way, into the body of dualistic works, which in this century, in their explicit forms, are building up into a coherent school of thought as well as methodology, and to an intellectual movement with some following.

This thesis intends to explore a dualism which in this century governs some areas of social thought. It does not encompass all dualistic social theorising in this century, for instance the terms in Lacan's dualism between schemata of social categories in consciousness (s. a. that of the father) and the filling of that capacity with concrete human content in actuality, are too narrow to bring that dualism on a par with the terms which define the dualism examined here. The dualism we are considering is an ontological one. One of its terms is the social world as that exists in its positivity, as identified, posited and demonstrated by Emile Durkheim in his work Suicide. (3) He showed in that work that demographic statistics pertained to acts of individual conduct and consciousness in terms of sociologic laws as distinct from and independent of psychologic ones. He saw these statistical patterns as indices of the being of society as an autonomous positive stratum of reality in nature *sui generis*, located in and mediated by consciousness on its peculiarly collective level, in a way which was very definitely external in its experience and operation, to particular individual consciousnesses, and independent of those taken singly and psychologically, which peculiar being of society on its own merits he was the first to demonstrate. The other term of the dualism considered here is the compass of the being of consciousness as the self, Durkheim's own antonym to the former one in that work; 'anomie' or the morbidity of consciousness in relation to its collective aspect of

being (which is tantamount to the phenomenon and being of society), the two forms of consciousness, the collective and the psychology-governed individual one, consisting of and operating as uncongenial and damaging potentials to one another, as will be elaborated in later parts of this thesis, particularly in the Section in Chapter 3. entitled: On Being Subject too: Which Came First, the Chicken or the Egg? Some concepts in world literature related to this problem-area, affords some noteworthy synonyms or at least well-nigh identical conceptualisations of this second term in the dualism of our interest: individual consciousness or the self. Such are Heidegger's notion of 'my world' or man-in-the world, Sartre's human reality and the self in his elaborate sense, or Mead's discerning model of the self in Mind, Self and Society ^{'4'} or the 'perspective' in his later work The Philosophy of the Present ^{'5'} (the latter term serving in a comparable manner in the works of other contributors to this *Fragestellung*) - to name but a few. ^{'6'}

The identification of these two terms may be phenomenologically approached; tackling them from such an angle for a little while, might provide a more dynamic start to get them and their relationship off the page than the mere listing of synonyms for both these terms, though lists of related notions to both will be presented at the point when the train of thought dealing with those can support them with a minimally sufficient measure of familiarity and richness of meaning. But for the moment, a phenomenologic approach should get them off the ground.

It could be said that the object of this study accords with the fact that the social aspect of consciousness (Hegel's 'object' or Mead's "me", for instance), lends itself to two differential approaches. It may be approached from within the self in which context it's open, amenable to individual reflection, to psychological processes, to attraction to a subjectively centred frame of reference - a characteristic feature with which Durkheim would agree. But at the hands of those commentators on the subject matter who are predominantly the students of the self (the second term of our dualism, with all its synonyms offered so far) - such as Heidegger, Sartre, Mead and others yet to be listed - this

infectedness of the 'object' aspect of consciousness as the self with egocentric factors, receives far more elaborate and articulate expression in analytic models of the self than Durkheim's essentially hostile, grossly approached and dismissive presentation of it. On their various interpretations, the social aspect of the self is grasped as entering into, tied in a consistent and interactive union, with the corporate system of inner, subjective, individually anchored, psychology or social psychology-borne functions/capacities, which are not inclusive of the social or 'object'-aspect of the self itself (that ingredient of the self as such which is offered in résumé form in one's *curriculum vitae*). And this surplus aspect and ingredient of the self, over and above the "me", consists of and is indicated, generated and propagated by such inner functions as self-consciousness, psychologic or socialpsychologic reflection, the individual's endowments with the various talents of the particular self, the changing/permanent needs of the self of a psychologic, social and idiosyncratic kind, the dynamicity, inventiveness, spontaneity of the self, to name but a few. (A fuller list of these functions/capacities of the self making up its core of interiority, and their various synonyms and aspects, will be offered in later parts of this thesis, particularly in the three parts of Section 6. at the end of Chapter 3.) Some experts on the self drawn on here see the ensemble of these functions/capacities as a unitary but elaborate structure complexly made up by a number of subjectivity-shot and dependent factors, which in their organised togetherness make for a coherent dimension within the self opposite its 'object'-aspect, the Meadean "me" and its literary brothers and relatives, as does Sartre. Others, for instance Mead himself, conceive of it as a single strand of interiority: his "I". But all these models of this inner core of self-capacities in the works of the committed students and analysts of the self listed above, whether rudimentarily or sophisticatedly conceived, presented and entertained by them, have in common the feature that this innerly informed and operative dimension and component of the self is envisaged by them as in an ever-active interrelation with the overt sociologic or socialpsychologic 'object'-aspect or the "me" etc. vis-a-vis that within the self's infrastructure. Furthermore, all these conceptualisations, by the authors drawn on here, of the resulting

relationship and interplay between the overt social and socialpsychologic aspect of consciousness on the one hand and the more or less elaborately structured core of interior functions/capacities within the self on the other, share the pedigree of their origins in Hegel's epistemological 'object'-'subject' dualism, from which all of their models of the self directly or indirectly derive.

The Hegel-inherited 'object'-'subject' dualism, characterising, on the understanding of these authors (as well as by us) the integral make-up of the structure of the self - (just one of the terms in the grosser dualism of the Durkheimian 'social world' versus the 'my world of the self' which serves as the central theme of our thesis), may seem as a dualism within a dualism, seemingly yielding a complicated web of more than two terms to juggle with. However, with the relationship between the latter dyad (Durkheim's social world and the 'my world of the self'), approached with the bold ontological outlines, viewpoint and method adopted here, this will not be so. Thus apprehended, the epistemologically composite view of the 'my world of the self' in relation to Durkheim's 'the social world', yields but two strongly delineated areas, terms, in distinct counterdistinction with one another: the overt social and/or socialpsychologic 'object'-aspect of consciousness either engaged, affected by and exposed to, on the one hand, or unengaged, and unaffected by and unexposed to, on the other hand, the dimension of the Hegelian 'subject'-ingredient within the infrastructure of the self, or one of its updated descendants and varieties in the works of the social thinkers treated here. The shouldering on the part of consciousness to this interior dimension of the self, yields the world of the authentic self, properly synthetic with 'subject' or the "I" or whichever of its modern-day relatives and rivals we find ourselves on our hands with, for the stratum of socialpsychologic rather than social reality, the world of the self, one of our cardinal terms, to be what it is. In contrast, the shedding by consciousness of the "I", on the other hand, yields, amounts to and affords the external structures of Durkheimian social reality as such, in the scientific purity of the properly social aspect and sphere of its being, which amounts to society itself and to the peculiar being of it

sui generis; which is governed by, subsists in, and is experienced as, social laws (including the law in its colloquial sense), operating and fathomed as independent and outside of the world of the self, coolly and unaffectedly standing over against that and amounting to the other cardinal term of the dualism of our interest: society. The first of these realms of the being of consciousness refers us to, affords and consists in its infrastructure, the other amounts to its external structure as society; one affording and operating as its microcosm, the other as its macrocosm; one of these realities *innerweltlich*, the other *weltlich*; 'my world' and 'the social world' - the two terms at the back of the dualism to which we mean to direct our attention in the main.

There is no need to be evasive or shy about the scientific impurity which by definition attaches to - more than that: axiomatically defines - the very meaning and experience of one of the terms which will serve in a pivotal position in the dualism which we adopted as the central theme of our study: the 'my world' of the self or 'human reality'. Its opacity with emotional, usually unreflected-on, or 'impurely', psychologically reflected-on content, is the very qualification whereby it amounts to that which it simply is: the world of the psychologic or socialpsychologic self, and for which it is so characteristic and familiar to us in everyday life that we are, as a rule, reluctant to credit it with suitability as the object of academic analysis, as a job to be done to socialtheoretic benefit. Even Durkheim, one of the most volatile foes, on moral grounds, of such an ego-affected application of consciousness, recognises the resulting, experience-horizoned, innerly shot, murky, unscientific, mundane little world of human reality into which the social 'object'-aspect of consciousness is prone to be and is commonly, normally and actively drawn to afford the psychologic or even socialpsychologic content of itself, as an effective factor to be reckoned with in socialtheoretic thought, which is a reality well-delineated in its meaning and and sphere of efficacy no less than is the being of society in Durkheim's sense; amounting to a sphere of reality which subsists and operates as an appreciable force and potency for effectively opposing, bedeviling, thwarting the outer structure of consciousness as society, precisely by virtue of its hybridness with the

"I"; an attribute of it which is regrettable to Durkheim, and which is the decorous condition whereby the self becomes deserving of the morally valiant epithet of authenticity to Heidegger, Sartre and some of the other students and interpreters of the dualism of consciousness as *innerweltlich* and *weltlich*, socialpsychologic and social, (to be referred to later.) The resulting synthetic stratum of reality: that of the world of the self, in its proper capacity as such, is hardy, and resists attempts of its denial by monistic environmentalists who claim that the 'object' or "me"-component of the self is supreme compared with the 'subject'-component, to such an extent as to make the "me" of the self on all occasions indistinguishable from its operation in and as society, equating and reducing the being of the self in all contexts to that of society, without residue. Equally stubbornly, the peculiar hybrid ensemble of the world of the self or Sartre's 'Being-for-Itself' or human reality, resists attempts by philosophic idealists, such as Hegel, to abstract and distill the "I" or 'subject'-ingredient within the self so as to elevate that to, identify and equate that with the fibre and medium of society. Hegel was just as wrong to demand a throne for the "I" vis-a-vis the "me" as a candidate for a higher-order aspect and function of consciousness; that which amounts to society, discontent with the merely psychologic or socialpsychologic role of 'subject' or the Meadean "I" within the self as such, contaminated within that sphere, for Hegel's money, by its *mésalliance* to the murky socialpsychologic 'object' or "me", as are the pro-"me" promoters of the opposite psychologism, fretting to face and accept the role of the "me" in its socialpsychologic corruption and marriage to the "I" in human reality as an autonomous, legitimate and common sphere of the being of consciousness. Each of these positions is as guilty as the other of blurring the palpably meaningful and apt distinction between the role of the "me" within the self, on the one hand, where it serves as the limited, feather-brained, sozzled and gorged, yet indissmissible ingredient of the necessary phenomenon of the self, married to its psychologic roots, to its roots in the 'life' sciences as a condition of its being what it is, and, on the other hand, the being of the "me" as part of the collective consciousness, Durkheim's synonym for society, as the voluntary or involuntary 'carrier', representative and building-

brick of the latter: a role whose fulfilment is the inescapable lot and conscious or unconscious activity of everyone, as a matter quite apart from the psychologic and physiologic factors of the self; affording a second and concurrent aspect, role and sphere of being for the self's "me", which Durkheim was the first to identify and demonstrate. 'The ... body' Sartre writes, referring to the "me" in its socialpsychologic aspect and sphere of being, 'is meaningful... There could be no question of exhausting its meanings.' It is 'the totality of meaningful relations to the world. In this sense it is defined also by reference to the air it breathes, the water it drinks, the food which it eats... The result is that (it)... is for me a synthetic totality'; '?' amounting to a radius of being for the "me": that of human reality, which is sharply distinct and different from its sphere of efficacy and operation as a Durkheimian or Althusserian 'carrier', sustainer, agent and pillar of society, adequate or inadequate, and nothing else.

It is not difficult to see that Durkheim shares with Paul the apostle the problem of dealing with hybrid human reality in the given actuality in man's life and experience, which, to both of them, gets in the way of the traffic with and the dedicatedness of consciousness to its purer form, to its sublimation into the external being of the collective consciousness to Durkheim and of God to Paul, over against the corrupted little world of the self. The difference between Paul and Durkheim is that Paul was ashamed of the hybridness of man's everyday condition as mere human reality on account of the 'body'-component in that in the sight of his God, the "I" enthroned, whilst Durkheim was ashamed of man's soiled everyday condition as the self or human reality in the sight of the collective consciousness: the "me" enthroned, on account of man's soul, the *anima*, the "I"-component within the self, steaming up the window, obscuring the view of the truth of pure positive science; producing a 'glass opaque' in reverse, to Durkheim and his followers.

It is, then, the being of the "me" in the self within horizons both stretched and limited, precisely defined by the radius of its "I"-drawn, distracted, engaged and therefore heterogeneous structures innerly

anchored within consciousness, socialpsychologic rather than sociologic in its nature, whose locus is concrete individual consciousness, whose compass and medium is concrete individual experience, which is one of the terms of the dualism to which we mean to direct our attention in this thesis in the main: the world of the self; a unitary and autonomous order of reality and area of study, of which the twentieth-century students of socialtheoretic dualism whose works we wish to analyse, have usefully and relevantly offered up models of greater or lesser elaboration, and which even the sworn enemy of this mode of the being of consciousness: Durkheim, has recognised in his work The Rules of Sociological Method, as the proper object of psychology (the particular area of social psychology within that field of study was still in its embryonic stages then), emphatically indentifying that individually anchored, drawn and operative sphere and mode of consciousness (in sharp counterdistinction with the collective consciousness: the subject matter of pure sociology), as a subject matter of its own, one that corresponds to and is interpretative of that separate substratum of reality and being for man which consists in the world of the self, completely different and discrete from that of the collective consciousness, and acknowledging that individually circumscribed and engaged sphere of the being of consciousness, as legitimately at the centre of a discipline of its own, peculiar unto itself, fitting (in its distinctness from sociology's object: the collective consciousness), to inform its own scholars of its own peculiar operations, laws and rules. (8)

The grasp and appreciation of the fact that the social aspect of the self or the "me", 'object', etc., lends itself to another approach than the socialpsychologic one, is a very important cornerstone in our thesis. This alternative grasp, usage, role, frame of reference and capacity of the "me" or the social aspect of consciousness is outside of the self, as Durkheim showed, indicated by way of the demographic statistical patterns of society or the collective consciousness, which subsists independently of our awareness of that "me" as particular part of the psychologic or socialpsychologic structures within consciousness, which goes towards upholding society itself, and which amounts to the other term of the dualism of our paramount interest in this thesis,

opposite the first term of that as just discussed: socialpsychologic reality. This, the second of our terms, is the social aspect of consciousness (the 'object' of the Hegelians, old or new, and the "me" of Mead), intact, unperturbed by, outside the frame of reference of the interplay of the epistemological 'object' and 'subject' division and dialectic within the self, it is consciousness free and independent of, unengaged by any individual, self-saturated, subjective component. Defined less negatively, it is (to recapitulate), the order of the being of consciousness which is subject, exclusively and necessarily, in a systematic, coherent and characteristic fashion, to laws of a sociological nature peculiar unto themselves, the level and medium of its scientific projection in sociology, of which demographic charts afford the countenance and indication: the proper subject matter of sociology, as has been said, and the very being of society.

At this stage it may be useful to draw up a list of the concepts used so far to denote the terms of the dualism of our paramount interest, to afford a somewhat enlarged thesaurus for referring to them.

Durkheimian positive social reality in nature, society	the self human reality 'my world' perspective 'Being-for-Itself' the 'body' <9>
the collective consciousness	anomie of consciousness to Durkheim, 'angest' to Kierkegaard, consciousness to Sartre
sociologic	individual experience socialpsychologic

Other major synonyms and notions related in some vital respect to the terms of our main interest, which will emerge mainly in the course

of subsequent arguments in this Introduction, will be advanced here for inclusion in this list now.

social stimulus, the gesture	response
sociologic	anthropologic
the sacred	the profane

(The last synonym-pair for denoting our 'the social way of being'-'my social way of being' dyad from a certain, fertile point of view, will first crop up in its own merit only in Chapter 1.)

It is the problem of the "me"'s dual participation in the two orders, the sociologic and socialpsychologic tiers of reality, to both of which (on the conglomerate account of many reputable social scientists and in the single accounts of some) it simultaneously belongs in ways foreign, other, irreconcilable with one another, which is the object of this study. The Introduction aims to summarily touch on the thinkers who are preoccupied with this problem, and on the socialtheoretic positions they take with a view to dealing with this paradox.

Durkheim, in Suicide, showed that the terms of dualism postulated here - the prevalence of the collective consciousness on the one hand and that of the frame of reference of the self on the other, were organically and consistently related to each other as opposites in the statistical variations in the incidence of suicide. Nevertheless it seemed to him that in spite of its principal and integral role in the relationship, the frame of reference of the self could ideally be rendered out of play altogether, or more precisely that the frame of reference of consciousness as the ego was entirely accountable for and subject to the laws and factors of the collective consciousness and was, in his rendering and interpretation, engulfed as a sphere of being into the collective consciousness. Durkheim regarded himself as a monist and positivist; he identified the being of society as a positivity in nature, granting no room in his ontology to the self as such. He

referred with derision as 'anomie' to the patterns which human conduct in the self's frame of reference occasioned in his statistical tables, and the references he made to the self in its psychologically experienced context, are relatively few, and too grossly observed and emotively veiled to afford any appreciable scientific value in the field of study of that tier of reality; that of the self. In sharp contrast, he mapped out in thoroughgoing and fine detail the nature and attribute of the being of society as such, and the collective consciousness in which it subsists.

To redress this imbalance in Durkheim, a group of thinkers who provide a very colourful, full and vivid rendering of the self - all existentialists - will be called upon in this thesis. Their works are seen as in a special relationship to Durkheim. Out of these, the one whose social theory most readily offers itself for complementation (and perhaps unexpectedly, comparison) with his, is Sartre. Like Durkheim, he acknowledges the concurrent being of human reality or the order of being of the self and that of external positive reality in nature as mutually exclusive: the definition of one is what the other is not. Though he never states with great elaboration that he regards the external being of society as part of that natural order outside, '10' it's clear that he appreciates the external being of society which subsists over against the human reality of the self in a scientific, distant and different manner, and acknowledges it as a being in a strong, positive sense outside of human reality, apprehending it as a limit to the self as such; and while in terms of volume he makes no more than sporadic references in Being and Nothingness to the positive reality of society outside, he does not dismiss it from his cosmology the way Durkheim banishes the self, but, dualistically, maintains it alongside with the being of the self, even granting it primacy in relation to the latter.

Similar positions, from this point of view, are offered by the existentialist theologians Kiekegaard, Tillich and Bultmann, all of whom make elaborate, emphatic and weighty contributions to 'my world' in their writings, whilst their attempts to treat external social reality (like Durkheim's treatment of the self) remain gross, hazy inexact,

unscientific in their treatment; though they all valuably distinguish, in rough outlines, the being of that positive society from the socialpsychologic ladenness of consciousnesses within the selves of both its ascriptionally humble and prestigious 'carriers' as individuals, and the corruption of the relationships and institutions sustaining society, by the human element of their representations on the part both of the ascriptionally lowly and the mighty. These theologians equate, implicitly or explicitly, the positive being of society outside with God. Some interpreters of Durkheim give the collective consciousness a similar reading, though there is nothing in Durkheim's own writings which would seem to necessitate this.

The works of Mead will also be excessively drawn on in analyses of the self within this thesis. Mead is by no means a dualist in the above indicated ontological sense; his cosmology is contained entirely within epistemology and social psychology, rather than in sociology at its pure and classical. As already touched on, at the core of his model of the self (central to his socialpsychologic work) is the "me"- "I" dialectic. His treatment of the "me" in his most influential work, Mind, Self and Society, yields a richly postulated, described, wideranging and variegated concept. Its conceptualisation there scans a vast continuum encompassing the role of the "me" with its role ranging from that in the interior aspect of the consciousness of one individual, through its part in the formation of interpersonal relationships between two or more selves, or even in larger human groups, always considered in conjunction with the "I"-s in all its participants as concrete individuals, to its widest context, the construct of the generalized other: grasped as a homogenised body, afforded by everybody's "me", a coherent repertoire of the universally cognised totality of the stimuli of the world related to and defined as such by everybody's response capacity to that as an "I", symbolised in language in a commonly and therefore socially grasped manner, which is shared by all mankind and which, to him, amounts to the mind and informs the conduct of the whole species. The generalized other, however, is not the collective consciousness. Universal though it is, it's contained entirely within social psychology by virtue of the fact that its locus, medium,

justification and touchstone, is concrete human experience. It may be said that the generalized other is the experiential, socialpsychological 'inside' of the collective consciousness. The idea and act of producing a cosmology which is entirely contained within one order of being: the socialpsychologic one, is a very ingenious attempt on Mead's part to offer up a monistic thought system under pressure from the academic culture of which he was part, and where such a theoretical framework was prized, even demanded. By approaching the world outside in terms of stimuli, he transforms its immutable, external, ontologically absolutely facticity-constituted being, into the universe of shared socialpsychologic reality, into which even the humanly universal generalized other, the ultimate "me" on the scale of that of the species, belongs; the resulting totality of stimuli, no less than the individual stimuli for human experience taken piecemeal, subjectively encoded with and carrying with it a response-potential as the very definition, condition and nature of it as psychologic and/or socialpsychologic stimulus, or as the total and coherent cluster of humanly meaningful stimuli in the case of the generalized other. The generalized other may be paraphrased as the repertoire of the humanly recognisable and appreciable stimuli in the world, which is sometimes used interchangeably with the "me" in Mead, though the "me" also refers in his usage to the repertoire of this system of stimuli internalised by, contained within and concretely and personally operative in a single individual self; and the response to that cluster of external or internalised stimuli, or any one of those presented to the self, is the "I", in every case, irrespective whether the "me" is understood as the generalized other or as the social aspect of an individual self. Words, language signs, symbolise the world (the ultimate stimulus), and/or particular portions of it in bundles of smaller-scale stimuli, all of which are tied to the responses to those stimuli, in a very special, integral and organic way. Each particular symbolic stimulus-response pair forms and presents itself in the same package, as it were, with the stimulus and response components in them inextricably tied to one another as language and meaning. Stimulus sign and response don't follow each other in a relationship of contiguity - the stimulus simply and immediately encompasses the response and comes in terms of the response,

in the simultaneity of the occurrence and concurrence of both. The responses to the stimuli are their meaning, and it is that which is universally shared - it is through that that the system of stimuli which amounts to the world to man, becomes amenable to cohesion into a matter-of-course system of signs, language, which universally informs, and is the standard and medium of human rationality, in other words, of the generalized other.

The generalized other is the feat of the adult, socialised self. The accomplishment of sharing responses in that fluent, matter-of-course, automatic way in which the response becomes associated with the stimulus in such an integral union with it, immediately, without cerebration, is acquired gradually in the practice of the act of 'taking the role of the other'. It is through the practice - first piecemeal in childhood - taking stimuli one by one - of learning what the stimulus means to others, what response it invokes in them, in other words, in 'taking the role of the other', approximating with the "I" the way in which the stimulus (the other) displays his own "I" or understanding of what he is as his own self or his response to the "me" in him as such, that responses to a stimulus can be and are learned to be shared, and the stimulus is incorporated into the self with its symbolic, its public, rational identity, its shared meaning. This piecemeal, hesitant, experimental, particularistic mode of social learning at the beginning of the individual's life and socialisation process, is called by Mead the play, in distinction from the agent's playing the social game, in full possession of the rules of that, once he is completely socialised. The child at first handles, on Mead's account, just one or two roles; he sees the policeman, plays at being a policeman, at length, in depth, taking just that role, or two roles, say that of the policeman and that of the criminal; he arrests himself, experiencing both roles exhaustively. On Mead's account, the role of the physical object too, can be, and is, taken - consequently the symbolicity of stimuli of all kinds is gradually acquired in a skilled and fluent manner, and language, and a public standard of rationality - mind - is assimilated, gained.

The generalized other is attained later in life, when the many roles taken into the self cohere. A change in the quality and mode of learning occurs, comparable to that which the psychologists call the difference between learning and skill; a facility in identifying, handling stimuli - human ones and inanimate ones - is acquired, without having to delve into the self to consult the "I" for the meaning or the shareable, comprehensible response to them, one by one. This process yields and maintains the layer of being which Sartre labels 'human reality' (any of the above listed synonyms of the concept will do for denoting it), a layer of being and reality with both intellectual and ethical consequences, subject to varying and differential evaluation by and in the handling of the self. The generalized other emerges as a body, a stratum of reality with many facets - as fluent language amounting to the coherent universe of discourse of the comprehensible world, as an effortless frame of reference for practical rational behaviour in everyday reality, as a code of conduct, a set of etiquette, as a routine standard of law-abidance, which is at the back of people's mind and is referred to without explicit recourse in consciousness to those with whom language signals are being shared, in their concrete identity, or to concrete articles of the law, or to those subject to it in particular. Routine conduct arises in all these respects, in which the "I" is suppressed and attenuated; the most conventional responses settle into the groove of their most well-trodden meaning. The "me", Mead implies, is the citizen ⁽¹⁾; he 'is a conventional, habitual individual.' ⁽²⁾ Responses are not matched to stimuli with particular thought, taking time, idiosyncratically, personally inventively, surprisingly, as they are by the child, but are tied to the stimulus in a ready-made way via the quickest, ready-to-hand route to it, cognitional or moral. The "I", the response becomes stereotyped, the most obvious response becomes firmly bonded to the stimulus with a certain degree and air of inevitability. Mead also calls socially symbolised stimuli 'gestures'; these 'gestures' amount to a command, demanding, calling for the response specially built into them through the process of social conditioning in the course of their historic background in ontogeny and in long-standing social convention. As accounted for by Mead in Mind, Self and Society, the roles of the

stimuli of the social world, originally separately absorbed into the self, literally do become those roles in the self, engulfed within there, and equal the "me", the generalized other and society, which is gradually taken through this process within the self, by way of the repertoire of the social stimuli thus appropriated, this process maintaining society and simply amounting to it. Consciousness does not progress, as in play, with particular reference to the stimuli drawn on by it, but moves along the lines of the rules of society which have by now been acquired and absorbed as the primary mode of its conduct, and is underlain by, governed by and operates observing and keeping in the forefront, these rules, as in the game - any game - in baseball for instance; and this mode of conducting the self, is itself simply labelled 'the game' by Mead, distinguishing, as already said, the capacity of the adult for this fluent facility of conduct, from the 'play' of the child. Like the game in the ordinary, colloquial sense, the course of the Meadean social game as a mode of consciousness is a process - kept going, sustained by the action of the players intertied by the rules. The game then, attains, in Mead's usage, the meaning of the mode of the conduct of the socialised, mature generalized other, that of his manner of handling roles. Consequently society, by a Meadean implication, is not ontogenetically prior to self-centredness, though Mead always goes out of his way to stress that phylogenetically and ontologically it is.

This daily flux of the generalized other is not the society of Durkheim, the collective consciousness - as Mead himself shows he is aware in a single reference late in his work to the existence of society as a structure external to individual conduct 'really there in nature' which the generalized other merely approximates through its limited ability and compass for doing so in any given social act by a self in the process of assuming 'what is common (to all men)... in the continual passage from attitude to attitude.' ⁽¹³⁾ The generalized other, then, is not the external structure of the being of society itself, not Durkheim's psychologic or socialpsychologic reference-free collective consciousness - it's a human attitude, conduct, lining it, indicating it, affording it occasion in the process of living and conduct by

individuals, endowed with and exercising their capacity for choice in opting for conduct in this generalised modality, that of the 'game' (by no means the only available manner of action, as we shall see), however unconsciously the agent may exercise this choice of his. The generalized other merely affords medium, peculiarly human 'passage', concrete temporality to the collective consciousness; it's the socialpsychologically passive noise of the collective consciousness 'running idle' on the scene of the human world as it were, intellectual, moral musac in the background, the 'white noise' of nothing in particular happening in the commonsense world of the human everydays (the only world there is, on Mead's account) - the world which is disrupted on exceptional occasions only, in which belief is not often suspended. But while the Meadean 'citizen "me"' is reminscent of Adam Smith's 'spectator', Heidegger's *das Man*, Bultmann's 'legalistic agent' - the very embodiment of unauthenticity in the book of the latter two thinkers, regarding the agent's ethics - the generalized other as an intellectual construct is completely novel and unique to Mead, with no rivals in the systems of fellow-workers, and is very informative about a vast area of properly social situations, that, for instance, which prevails in the tax office, as a condition of making possible the business conducted there, as well as in other commonplace, hurried, routine or routinised spheres of activity, in which the generalized other as a frame of reference for conduct is by no means necessarily the vehicle and instrument of unauthenticity at all. Person-irrelevant conduct in the ordinary everydays is not at all necessarily unauthentic unless it operates as a feigned indifference camouflaging hate, for which Sartre depicts it in Being and Nothingness, '14' or unless it takes the place of conduct where an explicitly personal approach would be in place. Such conduct - the labour-saving and person-irrelevant modality of relating to people - can conventiently be called 'thirdness' as it is by some Mead-scholars. '15' Thirdness of conduct is perfectly normal and desirable, say, in a professional context; businesslike conduct is perfectly appropriate in business. Heightened personalness in medical or social work would be untenable for its practitioners, and quite conceivably unproductive of the long-term good of the client, who has to be returned to society as an efficient copper with its manifold

intricacies, demands, and made a participant, once more, in its smooth operation in the thirdness characteristic of it as such in everyday life, and who will have to be prepared by the various practitioners of his rehabilitation for functioning within such spheres. From the social or medical practitioner's point of view, it's also easy to see that a demand of deep personalness in his relationship to the client is both unrealistic and inappropriate. A Freudian psychiatrist, for instance, can't be expected to go through the rigours of ego-fieldwork in empathy with his client; it's enough, and preferable, if he knows the right remedy on the strength of his professional experience, and applies it in the most effective professional manner; given, of course, that he maintains a civilised, proper and polite demeanour towards the client the while prompted by his respect to him as a human being, in a routine behavioural idiom which is, in universalistic terms, constantly underlain in the practitioner in unobtrusive discretion, by a meant attitude of sympathy to all of his fellow-men and women in general, his client not excluded.

It is quite clear that, in its capacity as society in Mead's sense, the generalized other belongs to, is contained within, a completely different order than the collective consciousness, and is different from that. Wide as it takes, complete as it makes the universe of man as active and effective in the everyday world of practical rationality, Mead's account of society by way of the generalized other, has nothing substantive to say (though the subject matter is eminently meaningful) of consciousness outside the stratum, and discipline, of social psychology, outside the laws, or rather rules of the game as experienced, lived, flexed inside the bounds of that. He never specifies the rules themselves as such as they subsist outside the process of the game as it appears to the concrete grasp, knowledge and experience of it by the players; he devotes no attention to the law itself as such in its own peculiar modality of being, in the indifference of the latter to the individual consciousness of the players at any moment, the way Durkheim does. His individual "me" is indistinguishable from the generalized other; both are, in his treatment, regarding their functions, the platform, the temporal barometer and index of the individually anchored

process of 'the conversation' between the "me" and the "I" in the self or selves of the concrete players of the game; socialpsychologic in its genre. His generalized other is a socialpsychologically soiled collective consciousness, inseparable from and dependent on the study of the self, and belongs within social psychology. The laws of society which are the same whether the "I" is brought to bear on them, whether reflected on, or not, and the area of being of the external social positivity of consciousness: the collective consciousness, of which they are an aspect - perhaps to which they are tantamount, does not make an appearance in any extensiveness and depth in his account of society and rendering of the world. As a result, there is no room in his socialtheoretic thought system for the acknowledgement of the key difference between the law itself in such a Durkheimian sense, which notion his model of consciousness and of the universe lacks, and the human attitude of legalism (also absent in his *oeuvre*), which consists of an unquestioning allegiance, as a matter of individual consciousness and choice, to society's demands of the individual, no matter whether those appear as justified or unjustified by the measures and dictates of human reality, which blind society-abidance amounts to the unauthenticity of consciousness in the socialpsychologic idiom (by no means unavoidable as an important individual matter), and which is, for instance, one of Bultmann's consequential and informative preoccupations. Mead believed his account of society in terms of the generalized other to be complete without the notion of the being of the law as such over and above the individual's volitional and conscious rule-abidance in the socialpsychologic game, and his social psychology to be complete without a differentiation between the choice of the individual modality of consciousness to be personally loyal or disloyal to the self as such, in other words, his social psychology is devoid of the notion of the individual consciousness's freedom, opportunity and call to be personally authentic or unauthentic within the confines of social psychology, of 'my world', of the self.

Mead can, then, in no way be seen as a dualist in, say, Sartre's or Bultmann's sense (and in the sense which coincides with the dualism of the central theme of our thesis), all of which positions rest on the

appreciation of a rigid and decisive counterdistinction, and the ensuing necessary and uncongenial relationship, between the coldly human-reality-free and unaffected being of the body of the law as society *sui generis*, and the 'my world' of the self, which sharp division is absent in Mead. Nevertheless, Mead's work can certainly and easily be seen as dualistic in the weakest sense - as belonging to the inadvertant and implicit kind and effective merely within epistemological widths and depths, and he received much criticism even for his flirtations with a dualistic position of such an attenuated kind. In answer to such criticisms, he claimed that although his Hegel-reminiscent "me"- "I" dialectic was central to his model of the self, he was a monist because he never entertained the "I" in metaphysical terms but merely as a methodological device, and because his thought system was indeed entirely accomodated within one order of being - the socialpsychologic one - in other words, within experience. Yet Mead's "I" is not as methodologically subservient as he makes it out. The "I" in his system as a never out-of-commission component of the self, really operates, effectively touches on and shapes overt socialpsychologic reality, and even the positive reality of the world, its social tier included, by courting, at all times, the stimuli of the world, appropriate to its needs and suitable to 'answer to' those, to enter into an ensemble with those for their realisation in the self. The "I", in his rendition, actively scans the world for such stimuli, incorporating those, if its scanning is successful, into the repertoire of the self, passing by useless others - by this selection shaping not only the self but the world to a great extent, as has been said. In this respect his thought strikes a chord in the dualism of the structuralists who hold that systems of objects, or structures, in whatever order of nature, do not pre-exist the categories of the mind which apprehends them as such, according to the organisational capacity and sophistication of the 'mind' of the 'organism', the living specimen in question, (man, in the case of the structuralists), which 'mind' is encoded in terms of the categories to which it is receptive. Prior to being 'seen' as objects in the context and by the measures and criteria of capacities which define them so, the empirical world is just raw material. Mead writes in like vein, descending the evolutionary scale somewhat for his example to

describe the potency of even the pre-human rudiments of the 'mind' to shape both its own compass of operation and the world: 'If an animal that can digest grass, such as an ox, comes into the world,' he reasons, 'then grass becomes food. That object did not exist before, that is, grass as food. The advent of the ox brings in a new object. In that sense, organisms are responsible for the appearance of whole sets of objects that did not exist before.' And a page earlier: 'We pick out an organized environment in relationship to our response, so that these attitudes, as such, not only represent our organized responses, but also represent what exists for us in the world; the particular phase of reality that is there for us is picked out for us by our response. We can recognize that it is the sensitizing of the organisms to the stimuli which will set free its responses that is responsible for one's living in this sort of environment rather than in another... Our world is definitely mapped out for us by the responses which are going to take place.' (16) This Kantian element does, without a doubt, form part of Mead's sociology of knowledge, lifting his dualism out of those modest methodological confines within which he claimed his dialectic to move. 'Stimulus' as conceived of on the scale of the world, and 'response' conceived of at the scale of the totality of organised human attitudes in relation to that, emerge as a pair of concepts which deserve a place in the list of synonyms for the terms of the dualism which forms the core of this thesis, and which new pair of terms has already been advanced and included when we drew up our thesaurus of concepts kindred to the terms of the dualism of our main topic, earlier on in this Introduction.

However, even though Mead's philosophical position differs from the dualism of the existentialist students and exponents of the self referred to above, his work is embraced here in the body of contributors to the world of the self because of the richness and exceptional scientific worth of his social psychology - surpassing in this respect many of the existentialists, whether or not Mead's approach to the study of the self is valuably accommodative of a distinction between its socialpsychologic authenticity or unauthenticity, the way Heidegger's, Sartre's, and (implicitly) Bultmann's are. Mead's thought touching on

the self, irrespective of this important difference between his viewpoint upon that and that of his European colleagues, blends well with existentialism in many important respects, as discovered and pointed out by others before us - by Pfuetze, for instance, who wrote a work comparatively treating the *oeuvres* of Mead and Buber. ^{'17'} The existentialists mentioned here share with Mead a grasp of the self as the human organism reflective on its being and experience as such, by virtue of its being endowed with a human individual consciousness ^{'18'} - Sartre, Kierkegaard, for instance ^{'19'} - and all the exponents and specialists of socialpsychologic reality enlisted here lend themselves to being seen as inspired, at least indirectly, by Hegel's model of the self, and their thought systems as attempts to overcome the implausible idealism of the 'subject'-'object' opposition there ^{'20'} (a) by positing the 'object'-term as primary in accounting for both social and human reality - this is particularly stressed by Mead and Sartre - and (b) by their pragmatism - this is important in all - if by pragmatism we understand the maintenance of the overt act in conduct over the role of the covert act of thought by itself. (Pragmatism in this sense is to be distinguished from its meaning, much maligned by Althusser, as the limitation of the compass and reference of philosophical thought to the practical activity of men in the world - Mead alone can be accused, in this group, of pragmatism in this Althusserian sense, over and above his pragmatism in our sense.) Further, and most importantly, all these existentialists share with Mead (Sartre in the most elaborate detail), as already mentioned, the characteristic that the self is grasped and presented by them, as its most pertinent feature, as hybrid, internally made up (as the very condition of its being and operation) by the active union within it between the "me", and, indismissibly, the "I", the dynamic, diachronic aspect, the exigency of the self, other in its nature than the "me", whether in the individual or extra-individual (social) form, role and application of the latter. It is by virtue of this irreducible, second component of the self - the "I" - that the self is individualistic, inventive, spontaneous, never totally predictable. It is in this second aspect, the "I", that the source of the change and novelty both of the self and of the world lies, and in which consists the medium and link tying, leading, pointing the self to the future. On

the account of all the students of the self listed so far, it's by virtue of the very hybridness, in such a manner, of the self with both the "me" and the "I", that it differs from the area of the being of consciousness as pure society, as Durkheim's collective consciousness: the "me" pure and intact of the "I", and that the self, or the 'perspective', or the 'my world', is made the subject matter of opposition with the latter, purely and properly social modality and level of the being of consciousness, which concurrently subsists alongside with its socialpsychologic modality, that of the self.

To summarise and recapitulate, at this point, the main sphere of interest in this thesis, we may stress here again that what we mean to show as the central issue of our concern is that these two separate and non-overlapping orders of reality which consciousness dually supports, the socialpsychologic and the social one, are both the case, that consciousness occupies these spheres of its being and effectively operates within them both, ceaselessly and simultaneously, without either of these strata of and for its being reducing to the other.

In the face of this apparent paradox, there are, in those types of social science which are intolerant of and hostile to dualism, two logically possible and actually perpetrated strategies for the reduction of the sociologic-socialpsychologic dualism which we mean to present, plead and advocate. One of these is propounded by sociologists in the main, and the other predominantly by social psychologists (or just psychologists), both of whom typically encroach on each others' disciplines. The first of these reductions is psychologism (or social psychologism, to coin a phrase), which attacks, means to do away with or tactically (or genuinely) fails to grasp the Durkheim-postulated stratum of positive social reality in nature, approaching the study of the being or phenomena of society in terms of its simultaneous but society-irrelevant socialpsychologic workings, bringing human volition to bear, in an explanatory way, on the processes and structures peculiar to society. Oddly enough, this type of reductionism, common amongst psychologists and social psychologists of course, is also found amongst sociologists themselves. This Durkheim-postulated and demonstrated being

of society as a positive stratum in nature of its own peculiar kind, once grasped in the light of his argument, is a simple and axiomatic insight which one either has or hasn't got, and it escapes some people altogether, even if they work within sociology

The opposite case and strategy for the doing away with a dualistic postulation of the being and operation of consciousness similar to ours, is the denial and reduction of the self, rather than that of society. This latter case amounts to a more complex matter than the former reductional paradigm, that of psychologism or 'socialpsychologism'. Because of the hybrid make-up, to our understanding, of the self, as both "me" and "I" at all times, it can be subjected to both an upward and downward reductionism, so to speak, in other words, to a reduction to the "me" only, or to the "I" understood in a way to be completely exhausted by man's biological hungers. Its upward reductionism is that which identifies the self as the "me" only, it's the appropriation by sociology of human reality, the proper compass and medium of the self, by way of the explication of the world of the self in terms of its social role-performance alone, abolishing the autonomy of the study of the self as hybrid and as a reality unto itself, *sui generis*. The self's downward reduction, in contrast, threatens the world of the self as such from within experimental psychology. Because of the empirical non-demonstrability, by definition, of the "I" (except by the phenomenological method which to modern experimental psychology is suspect), it often, not to say typically, suffers at least indirect reduction within the latter discipline, to an empiricistically grasped psychologic level, holding out the impoverishment and therefore the sham semblance of the "I". The fact that the self's often displays an exigency and motivation leading that to its fulfilment as a better adjusted and more successful and satisfactory self with that end explicitly in mind, is explained by empiricistic psychologists in terms of 'secondary reinforcement' (as empirically remunerative in an indirect and delayed manner, that is), and the processes spurring on the self by the springs and desires of its socialpsychologically peculiar values and operations, are seen by workers in that discipline as, at the bottom of it, an exclusively empirical goal-directed rat-intelligence raised to a

human level at which it is credited with the capacity of the toleration of the postponement and symbolicity of empirical reinforcement by way of tokens implicitly instrumental to completely tangible rewards. A secondary type of reinforcement (such as a high social standing, for instance), is prized, according to psychologic empiricists, because it holds out the promise of eventual 'primary' or crudely empiricistic reinforcement, such as, ultimately, the saccharin pellet for the rat and the carrot for the proverbial donkey.

This thesis refutes and sees as erroneous the reduction either of society or of the self, in other words, either one or the other of our two major terms whose relationship we mean to present and analyse as the main topic of our argument. It refutes, as socialscientifically self-defeating, psychologistic attempts to absorb society into social psychology, as well as Durkheim's assumption that just because the the psychologic and socialpsychologic order of consciousness is the source of negativity to the collective consciousness, which erodes the latter and is the source of its changes, corruption and mutability, it can be banned from thought and from conduct. The phenomenological scepticism of the totally inward-looking and solipsistic scholar of the self is just as purile and socialscientifically inadequate in disallowing the being of anything outside experience, such as the social world and its externality, ⁽²¹⁾ as the scepticism of the doctrinaire Durkheimian positivist in dismissing any phenomenon which touches society unscientifically, wrongly, inarticulately put, sentimentally tied, emotively shot, hazy with the human element. The reality of the two orders, both of which human consciousness properly occupies: the social and the socialpsychologic, complement each other: and we hold that social science is neither complete nor realistic without knowing, acknowledging, reckoning with them both.

The irreducible simultaneity of the consciousness of man in both the sociologic and the socialpsychologic order, is worthy of assertion for its own sake, for the sake of these two discrete areas of reality, and is of interest here because the appreciation of this phenomenon is a necessary pre-requisite for providing the theoretical background to the

job undertaken here: the demonstration and pleading of the 'social world'-'my world' dualism, a direction of socialtheoretic thought in twentieth-century Europe, which, to our view, is worthy of note, and of attempts of its corroboration.

*

In this thesis, rather than treating the simultaneous relationship between the terms of the dualism of our main interest from the point of view of these two spheres of reality themselves, the stress will be on the way in which the concurrence of these two realities figures and operates in experience, using the phenomenological method which is particularly suited to exploring the relationship between these two cardinal terms as those that lends itself to study in individual consciousness.

There will be an imbalance in our argument between the presentation of these two terms, the purely social and the psychological reflection-soiled concrete individual area of the being of consciousness as those will emerge as the by-product of our method, the first of which terms, Durkheim's externally positive collective consciousness, is properly independent of, untouched by and uncongenial and unsusceptible to introspective psychologic and socialpsychologic processes to which the main bulk of our argument will be devoted, while the second one, human reality, naturally lends itself to, not to say consists in and is maintained, by the phenomenological awareness, observation and cultivation of itself in individual consciousness and experience, our method enriching, strengthening descriptions of this second, socialpsychologic layer of the reality of human consciousness, and which our phenomenological approach will, as a necessary by-product of its use as a method, explore in greater depth and expansiveness than it will be able to convey about the sphere of the being of society as such. For that reason, the job of stressing the indissmissible being of the Durkheimian collective consciousness, one essential part of our aim, will have to be restricted to emphatic statements, in a factual idiom, whenever appropriate, of its indissmissible role in any paradigm of human

consciousness, however psychologic or socialpsychologic the manner of its genre appears to be, as well as by proclaiming here, in a general, blanket manner, the tenet and conviction on our part that the collective consciousness is omnipresent in the context and the background of all individually conscious experience - indeed, is the precondition of that - and that all grasps of the self, its world and its phenomena, are complete and make sense in conjunction with the collective consciousness only, which ever operates in tandem (at least implicitly), with all socialpsychologic phenomena in all of their operations.

This feature of our forthcoming argument - that of its disproportionately greater informativeness about the 'my world' or the 'my social world' in comparison with 'the social world' as a modality of consciousness, is not an unqualified disadvantage from every point of view. It holds out one benefit at least: that of supplementing a characteristic weakness and shortcoming, due to an opposite bias, in the works of some of our well-known allies in acknowledging, upholding and treating the dualistic concurrence of the role of our selves as the egocentrism-irrelevant 'carriers' of society, (voluntary or involuntary building bricks in the collective consciousness) on the one hand, and, on the other hand, as perpetrators of what is often referred to in their works as 'lived reality' (a kin of our 'my world'). Such a converse bias to ours in the treatment of the dualism of our interest, is characteristic chiefly of the seminal works of Althusser, alongside with those of Durkheim, whose unworthily rudimentary treatment of and hostility to the 'anomie', the psychologic and socialpsychologic soiledness of consciousness as an indissmissible potential, and, if activated, actual destructiveness of the collective consciousness as its fateful dialectic partner, we have already critically pointed out. It would be gratifying, to our way of thinking, if this thesis would do the job of emancipating the 'my world' term of the dualism which we mean to treat here, from its relegation by these two great thinkers, and others loyal to them in this respect, to an irksome and regrettable aberration of and distraction from the elevated role of consciousness as the 'carrier' of the collective consciousness, which it is best not to talk about, or at any rate not to talk about with socialscientific

impartiality and respect as a tier of reality - that of human reality - *sui generis*, a firmly wedded, uncongenial partner in its being and operation to the collective consciousness and equal to the scientific status of that as such. For that reason, we adopt the task of the demonstration of the universal subsistence, not only of the collective consciousness but also of human reality in all situations where there are people, as a paramountly important aspect of our aim in this thesis - maintaining that the socialpsychologic modality for approaching all such situations really and universally persists, if no more than as a dormant possibility in grasping and living those in the idiom of human reality. To support this claim, we shall have to substantiate with good arguments (a) that the socialpsychologic, no less than the social stratum of reality, has a persistent identity and can always be, at least potentially, apprehended in its own characteristic idiom, which lies, as has been argued, in its hybridness, in the integral completeness and syntheticity of its mode of being with both "I" and "me"; and (b) the soundness of the contention that human reality is a universal ingredient in, and the condition of the possibility of, all situations involving people, no matter at what scale, will depend on the identification of ego-anchored mechanisms not only within the integral compass of one individual's consciousness, but also in the context of an interpersonal socialpsychologic reality, conceivably reaching to the dimensions of the entire species, to successfully rival the collective consciousness as a modality of being, and offer a socialpsychologic alternative to that in whatever volume, bundle and packages of anthropologic units the Durkheimian dimensions of society comes, operates, and faces us. Fortunately, we have already pinpointed and presented a socialpsychologic notion, dimension and mechanism of being which encompasses the whole of humanity at its widest, to offer a socialpsychologic counterpart to the collective consciousness at its universal; this notion was the generalized other of Mead. We have noted that the adoption of this general but still socialpsychologic dimension of consciousness, is indicated by and yields in concrete human behaviour the attitude and mode of conduct which we (and some students of this notion before us) have dubbed the 'thirdness' of conduct, overt or reflective; the vehicle and modality of consciousness, in any case, in

which the self functions in personal unauthenticity as a self, on account of the fact that the "I" has ~~been~~ made practically redundant in it, that there is hardly an "I" to it.

(It may be mentioned, in parentheses, that there is an additional socialpsychologic construct to the generalized other, in the form of which ~~the~~ human idiom of consciousness sometimes presents itself at a grand and conceivably anthropologically total scale. This is Sartre's 'spirit of seriousness': an attitude which is personally supportive of the external being of society, yet which is not that being itself, only the human medium of its upkeep. This construct may be defined here briefly as a sense of consciousness of being at one, by choice, with the collective consciousness, rather than with its personally and individually authentic and dedicated mode of its being as a self, as human reality.)

The 'thirdness' of the generalized other and the spirit of seriousness are not one and the same thing. The spirit of seriousness is not a routinised, shorthand mode of unreflectively and unnoticeably carrying on with, accepting and supporting, as a matter of course, the rational and moral operations of society in one's behaviour, in the modality of the self as very nearly a "me" only, the way the 'thirdness' of the generalized other is. If the 'thirdness' of the everyday of social routines is the humming which the collective consciousness makes when running idle, then the spirit of seriousness is the heavy echo it makes in its solemn, elevated, knowing, self-conscious capacity as society or the solemn representation of that, resounding in the human conduct of those perpetrating it; its sonorous moral tone. Like the generalized other, the spirit of seriousness too is an extra-individually coherent, continuous modality of consciousness, but, like the generalized other, it also consists of and is amenable to being grasped in the socialpsychologic makings of consciousness, and it can come and be recognised in parcels of the individual selves sustaining it. Such an ego-analytic approach to it reveals the spirit of seriousness as in fact being filled with an enhanced sense of an "I", bastardised and unauthentic though it is, the intensely personal feeling

of being 'one of us', one of the Sacred, at one with the licenced, ascribed righteous, and other than those who are not 'one of us' or 'Sacred' - a sanctioned, socialpsychologic ego-trip, albeit an unauthentic one, with hardly a "me" to it in consciousness.

Although, as has been observed, Mead does not entertain the differentiation in personal conduct between the socialpsychologic authenticity or unauthenticity of the self carrying that on, he contributes importantly, when looked at with an eye keen and sensitive to this distinction, paradigms and descriptions what Sartre and Bultmann would regard as *authentic* conduct in great richness, without himself using that epithet to denote and characterise those paradigms. Moreover, we have him to thank, in great part, for the term 'authenticity' (which he never used himself, as we said), attaining wider and more interdisciplinary dimensions than the confines of the self within which the term is usually understood (normally qualifying conduct in socialpsychologic dimensions.) However, many situations, as Mead recognised, are predominantly and properly social in their overriding intonation, and conduct in authenticity to *society* becomes, in such situation, a distinct possibility, endowing the term 'authenticity' with a special meaning, differing from its usual, narrower one. We have already referred to a general 'thirdness' in socialpsychologic conduct as appropriately matched, true to, expressive of society as it is in its uneventful 'passage' in the mundane everyday - Mead's contribution - which is authentic to and in properly social situations, and is unauthentic only if it falsely deputises for an attitude, mode of communication in a personal, socialpsychologic modality of consciousness and conduct when the latter would be appropriate, for instance, in the context of the family, within which the idiom of the self is natural in a manner which goes without saying. Focussing, once again, on the 'thirdness' of the generalized other (quite distinct from the spirit of seriousness, as has been said), we may identify, at this point, the socialpsychologic antonym of that 'thirdness' as a type and manner of conduct, which alternative style of attitude to people and mode of consciousness we label the 'saliency' of consciousness. 'Saliency' means 'with the "I" at play in, brought to bear upon the self in conduct,

personal or interpersonal; in a word, conduct in the idiom of human reality.' The term 'saliency' has been inspired, though not used, by Sartre; albeit his concept *ekstasis*, used in his description of the self's temporality to denote that highly particularised state of the self in which a close relevance of the future (or "I") and of the past (or "me") to the present state of the self, throws its current mode of existence and experience into strong relief, is highly akin with our notion of the *saliency* of the self. ⁽²²⁾ In other parts of Being and Nothingness too Sartre often refers to the self in its fully assumed capacity as such (influenced by Gestalt psychological usage) as 'figure', plastically standing out in consciousness against, and in counterdistinction with, the 'ground' of the attitude of impersonality: ⁽²³⁾ against the 'they', in other words, a kin of our 'thirdness': an "I"-less, 'flat', 'two-dimensional', routine mode of the being of the self. ⁽²⁴⁾

In the terminology of Mead, who also entertains what we call the 'saliency' of consciousness in its contrast with the 'thirdness' of conduct, 'saliency' is denoted by the term 'significance'. The 'salient' mode of conduct is the appropriate and typical one in psychologic and socialpsychologic situations in which we naturally relate to ourselves and to others in terms of persons rather than as objects of a physiologic kind (as in the doctor's surgery), or of a sociologic kind, where the 'thirdness' of conduct is appropriate, say, during a job interview or a driving lesson. Conduct and the definition of a situation between two or more people in intimate ensemble, such as in the circle of friends, or, again, in the family - just as much as in relation to ourselves as a solo consciousness - is 'salient'; the "I", in such cases, is brought to bear upon our relating to others, and is appropriately put into play by others in response. 'Salient' conduct is therefore authentic to those situations which are characteristically socialpsychologic, personal. It is conceivable that such appropriately socialpsychologic situations are approached and handled in the modality of 'thirdness'; but if the latter possibility is acted upon in spheres where the socialpsychologic modality of conduct is in place, our conduct vis-a-vis our properly intimate human environment will be unauthentic;

and such an occurrence would be personally unauthentic in relation to our own selves, too, as a necessary by-product of treating others as less than fully operative selves for their own part.

Authenticity to the collective consciousness is not assumed exclusively in the modality of 'thirdness'; it may be assumed in the 'salience' of consciousness too, in cases where a society is meaningfully and significantly approved of by an individual, and emphatically and personally supported by him as a self. Such a case presents an interesting paradigm of dual authenticity, social and socialpsychologic. It's a self's distinct possibility to assume authenticity to the positive social reality in the world, whether that social reality is established or emerging, in a concurrent, socialpsychologically also authentic 'salience', that is to say (in sharp counterdistinction with the spirit of seriousness) with the completeness and peculiar standards of the 'my world' not given up but retained as such and used to significantly endorse society in its fully assumed capacity as a self; this possibility, not to say power of the self is one which strongly preoccupies Kierkegaard and Bultmann out of the existentialists, and the fellow-existentialist Sartre's notion of 'elective assumption' is strongly akin with it. (25)

It may be added here, conversely, that the 'salient' mode of conduct, like its 'thirdness', can be, and often is, unauthentic, for example when its bearings on the true standards of human reality, and its imperative demanding a universalism in one's mode of relating to others with the same degree of respect as we regard ourselves, are shortchanged, dislodged. (Authenticity and unauthenticity will henceforth be used in their customary socialpsychological sense again.) The 'salient' mode of conducting ourselves interpersonally is almost always unauthentic in Sartre's descriptions of that in Being and Nothingness (in his rendition of love, for instance), but 'salient' interpersonal conduct can of course also be authentic, as it is, in the main, in Bultmann's and Mead's works relevant to the topic currently discussed. An unauthentic 'salient' consciousness is that in which the scope, the being or the values of persons, the agent's own or those of others in

relation to him, are slighted as selves in the course of conduct, and the authenticity of 'salient' conduct consists in the agent's respect, both in himself and in all others, of a person's capacity and need to be a self in its fully dignified and operative sense as such.

Finally, in our job of introducing and qualifying some notions here in advance to their analyses in later parts of our argument, we should throw some light on the notion of 'romantic' social thought which will consistently crop up in later parts of this thesis.

Because Mead's work will be integrally, and other non-existentialists passingly, drawn on in forthcoming treatments of the world of the self, a wider term than 'existentialism' is needed to encompass the exponents of the position opposite that of Durkheimian positivism and its jealously exhaustive possessiveness and reservation of consciousness for the unquestioning service of society as its only proper and appropriate repertoire and sphere of being. The phrase 'romantic social thought' has been chosen to encompass the resulting wider class of socialtheoretic thought opposite this Durkheimian position. The term 'romantic' is taken from literature. There is, in literature, a specific epoch labelled the 'Romantic era' during which all works produced in the decades of its reign can automatically be regarded as 'romantic' ones, but in our endeavour to find a summary label for works loyal to the self, the term 'romantic' is based on a looser understanding of that; one which attached to the term in the usage of those students of literature who see the history of literature as a process of alternating phases between 'classical' and 'romantic' eras within that, in a general sense. Classical phases, in the latter frame of reference, are typically governed and informed by the *structure* of thought and of the work to be produced, romantic phases and products of thought and art being those on which the individual, his spontaneity, upsurge of immediate inspiration characteristically leaves its stamp and less attention is paid to the rules and the structure of the writing. It seems, by analogy, that Durkheim's preoccupation with the form of society, his identification of that with its structure, and his anti-individualism made him comparable with the 'classicists', and that those

social thinkers who allowed the self complete with its spontaneous, fortuitous, unruly potentials integrally into their approach to their subject matter, resemble in this sense the 'romantics'. The term of course is, and must be, used advisedly - particularly as many of the supporters of the social notions in this thesis come from literature, - and must not be confused with the era in literature of Romanticism itself as many of the contributors drawn on later on in this argument as social romantics, do not belong to that era in literature at all.

'Romantic' in the sense used in the thesis is always to be taken in a socialtheoretic context, referring to the renditions of such social and socialpsychologic phenomena which involve, rely on the self, generate novelty, and are characterised or vitally affected by individualism.

The academic *genre* of this thesis is socialpsychologic, or anthropologic in the Continental sense. Anthropology, in any of its forms, differs from sociology in that its subject matter is not society itself, but human reality, albeit sometimes in dimensions writ large, as it is in its grasp in this country, where anthropology consists, by and large, of the study of large patterns of man's culture, externally approached in a more Durkheimian idiom, and empirically oriented. The subject matter of anthropology is, in any case, man's world, including the things, concepts and practices in the radius of human reality, whether projected, approached, presented and viewed on a wide epic screen, so to speak, as it is in this country, or 'in close-up', as on the Continent - and the expressions 'sociologic' and 'anthropologic' have, accordingly, been entered, in advance of the present train of thought, into the list of the opposite pairs of concepts which enrich, in their synonymity or relatedness, the pivotal terms of the dualism which will provide, in their relationship, the axis of this thesis: human reality and social reality. To distinguish the term 'anthropology' in our usual Continental sense in which it normally assumes socialpsychologic dimensions, from its grosser grasp as approached in this country, the term in its Continental, socialpsychologically grasped sense, will be provided with a suffix and referred to as 'micro-anthropology' in future use.

THE SCHISM IN SOCIETY.Section 1. Seriousness, from the Inside. The Schism in Society.

The terminology for the basic classification of our topic into the contrasting spheres of being treated here - those of society and of human reality - has been taken from Durkheim, but the terms adopted in future arguments are not, in the main, the 'collective consciousness' and 'anomie' which figure in Durkheim's Suicide, but 'sacred' and 'profane' which serve in a pivotal position in the work by the same author called The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. ' ' This is because the latter dyad allows for the classification of the topic not just in terms of concepts, but also in terms of humanity itself, and the thesis will concern itself with people a great deal, in whose sphere of being as people and conduct these two orders of consciousness operate. The 'sacred', as Durkheim argues in the latter work, is indistinguishable in essence from society, and is therefore analogous with the collective consciousness (which latter term will, of course, not be jettisoned from our future usage, just because its virtual synonym, the 'sacred', will elbow into the forefront of our argument.) The 'profane', on the other side, opposite the 'sacred', is pertinently representative, to our understanding, of human reality, in that, compared with the 'sacred', it is soiled in its ideality as a form of consciousness, is foreignly affected as such, thereby changing its sociologically pure and orthodox nature and made mutually exclusive with the 'sacred' or the collective consciousness.

'Sacred' and 'profane' are orders of being, a classificatory frame of reference, and labels for classes of humanity. Durkheim evocatively considers the sacred and the profane as those classes of mankind and things human whose opposition creates the greatest chasm that divides mankind and man's world into heterogeneous - opposite genres. Durkheim studied and presented the 'sacred' and the 'profane' as those terms as forms of consciousness operate in the world - as observable and discernable in Aboriginal cultural patterns in Australia - but the two notions may also be studied from within the individual's perspective, they are also experienced in human reality, in 'my world'.

When phenomenologically approached, the world seems to emerge in two characteristically different ways, which peculiar dual experience of the world will be utilised here as the first step in approaching the 'sacred' and 'profane' as experienced 'from within'. Such a view of the world yields a 'small-letter world' and a 'big-letter world'.

It may have been during my studies of German a long time ago that such a dual frame of reference for the world first occurred to me; in that language nouns are formed by altering the small-letter initials of verbs, adjectives and adverbs, to stand for those originally dynamic and vital notions in a solidified, arrested way as it were, conceived of as things; abstract things, but things none the less; the original notions taking their place, by virtue of their graduating to a big-letter status, and function from then onwards as noun-objects in an unchanging, positive reality, at one with institutions. In English, the concept-pair 'liberal' and 'Liberal', may serve as analogous examples. Many concepts, notions - possibly all - can be grasped in these two differing ways, typically dynamic and human reality-wise discriminative, such as verbs, adjectives, or typically thing-like and ossified, socialised, institutionalised, so to speak, in spite of the fact that their latter aspect is not necessarily denoted by big-letter initials in the English language to mark off and signal their being and capacity as inert noun-objects; as, for instance our way of referring, differentially, to the notion 'romantic' (ego-oriented) and 'Romantic' (meaning the practitioner of literature strictly within the movement and era of Romanticism) . Our way of spelling some common nouns with a capital letter in future parts of this thesis, at times when their use in our big-letter sense needs to be accentuated and distinguished from their small-letter use, serves as a means to denote the genus of the being and aspect of a concept - its noun-like, social one as opposed to its lively, human reality-expressive, enriching and congenial one. Our small-letter understanding of any of these terms yielded at times when the notion in question is approached and seen in a personal, concrete manner, intimate in its grasp and conceived of in the idiom of selves, and, contrastingly, the big-letter aspect of the same notions, words, (whether actually spelt by us with a big capital or not), is afforded by

one's approach to those in the Durkheimian, social idiom and sense, with the icon-like stiffness of an already established, Sunday-best positive social reality attaching to them. Some examples of concepts, notions which acquire different aspects and being as a function of whether one thinks of those in a small-letter way - as the process of its personal, immediate upsurge in experience in the intimate mode, or in the big-letter, already established, immutable, elevated, thing-like way, are 'family', 'generosity', 'home', 'life'. Some of these dually evocative and operative concepts were, it seems to me, originally small-letter words - the "I" (in spite of its usual English spelling), 'man', 'spontaneity', 'fun' - others may have been big-letter words to begin with and patriated later on into the small-letter world, such as 'God', 'Love' (I think), 'organisation', 'management'. Further, there are such words which seem to me to have differentially reflected, throughout the history of their usage, their separate meanings in the two worlds, big-letter and small-letter, to such an extent and with such consistency, that they have completely grown apart in their meanings in their present-day use. Such words are 'gift', meaning ability with which people are endowed, and 'gift' meaning things that are given to people. The same distinction obtains in the terms 'talent' and 'Talent', the first sense of that term referring to the personal talent with which one may be blessed through being able to be creative as a person, and 'Talent' referring to the money which the practice of this ability earns one. 'Committed' personally to an idea surrendering one's freedom to it, and 'committed' to prison, parting with one's freedom in a different way, externally imposed on one, seems to provide a further example, as does the distinction between the words 'trust' and 'Trust', the first, small-letter sense of the word generated by and consisting in one's safe, intimate anchorage in the interpersonal world of human traffic between people, and in the big-letter sense, 'Trust' (often spelt with small letter too), referring to an organisation in a business sense.

But the realisation of the possibility of such a simultaneous appreciation of objects and concepts in the world in both a big-letter and a small-letter sense came to me explicitly, not when first grappling

with German, but when thinking of a particular elderly person in whose life and personality many positive issues have played a very important part in a big-letter, institutional sense - a woman and a Friend, (2) both in a big-letter sense - but which many notions in the small-letter sense hardly touched her experiential repertoire and whom life, in the small-letter sense, seems to have passed by altogether.

The small-letter world is close in meaning to the profane - as experienced - as in the small-letter sense. It is also close in meaning to what is widely referred to in philosophy as 'lived reality'. Let's hope that being able to use the novel term 'small-letter world' and 'small-letter profane' in the place of 'lived reality', will help safeguard the notion in future considerations of it against some of the notoriety and ambiguity which attached to the latter expression through the history of its use, thanks in no small part to a scholastically respectable and fashionable appreciation of that term (or rather contempt towards it) in present-day, mainstream socialscientific dogma.

The concept 'society' itself can offer itself for experience in these two differing ways - referring us to two different strata in nature where it simultaneously prevails - to the socialpsychologic stratum, where its experience is personal, intimate, profane; and to society in the external positive reality in nature, as it publicly, immutably, factually subsists, in a way independent of our need for it, requests of it, thoughts about it, as persons. My dual appreciation of bus routes amounts for me to an example of how these differential properties of this public service, social institution, subsist in these two different ways at once, and are experienced, accordingly, in these two different ways, small-letter and big, at once, or perhaps alternately. In one sense, bus routes mean to me getting together with my friends, family, in spite of not having a car, in spite of my living in an isolated, rural spot; in this sense, the intimate one, bus routes and time-tables mean company, social intimacy, they are in this first sense a service. In another sense, and another, equally palpable stratum of reality, bus routes subsist for me in terms of their pre-planned logistics, order me absolutely in time and in space. I parcel up, in its

light, my freedom to do as I like all day long; I have to arrange my plans, my projects so as to be able to organise my activities and life around the bus time-table and in between the running times of the buses, if I want or have to participate in anything at a distance from my home. In this second way my personal freedom yields to its constraints, is altered by those. Durkheim was also aware of, and referred to, these two ways in which society figures in experience - of society as 'currents' and 'lived experience', apart from its mode and being as positive, external reality. (3)

Existentialists typically distinguish between their various contenders for the collective consciousness, which they appreciate as a universal, immutable whole, an absolute as a standard *sui generis*, in which lies its human reality-constraining capacity, its commanding status, its endowedness and efficacy as sacred, as man's experience of it as the norm and his inclination to obey it, as distinct from the concrete human content of that, provided by the inevitably ego-contaminated and therefore ethically fallible, actual agencies who do the job of its representation. The latter, actual mechanism of the representation of the collective consciousness, yields an aspect and understanding of society, whose standards as such are corrupted in this way relative to the ideality of the social norm at its pure, and which in its given state is far from morally fit to order man and his freedom, in Tillich's eyes, for instance. (4) When a shipment of Czech Jewish women sang in the gas chamber the Czech national anthem along with the 'Hatikva' (the national anthem of the then-day Palestine) with their last breath (as an eye-witness reported), it was the collective consciousness at its ideal which they envisaged in their hopes for Czechoslovakia, that they were addressing themselves to and demonstrated in the name of, as distinct from the actual Czechoslovakia under its current *régime* which allowed them to be innocently sacrificed and wiped out in this fashion. The two different modes of apprehending society (as ideal and actual) seem to correspond to the big-letter meaning and small-letter meaning of that, respectively. This discreteness of the being of society as its humanly mediated representation and network, from the collective consciousness at its ideal, figures in Kierkegaard's

and Sartre's thought too. But Durkheim doesn't make this distinction. To him, society as established is just that universal, immutable stratum of being, in the big-letter sense, which was there in nature as human society, as the external modality of man's conduct and consciousness, ever since the human species was there too, and which is going to indissolubly prevail in this capacity of itself as long as there will be humans in the world - as the universal form, category: society. He does not consistently contrast this concept of society with the particular content and lived human furnishing of that, with society as an ongoing process, as an historical content which is subject to the corruption of time and corruption in other senses to, in a moral sense certainly; I think that this is a shortcoming in Durkheim. The distinction between society as the absolute positive normative being for which Durkheim recognised it, and its given content which can be rotten to the core, is a useful one. Bultmann correctly interprets the death of Socrates, or rather his choice to waive the chance to have his death sentence commuted to exile, as a demonstration of allegiance on Socrates' part to society and to the state as such. (5) At the same time, Bultmann appreciates this and we would like to stress, the society and the state as such is not the same thing as the content of an actual society and an actual, given, concrete state. The death of Socrates, his acceptance, without quibbling, of the sentence passed on him by the legislative and normative authority of the state as such, did serve, uphold and strengthen society 'as such' in its universal, absolute capacity in which capacity it is a normative standard as an end in itself, and in which capacity it no doubt exists in a real way, as Durkheim maintains, irrespective of the corrupt state of its given content. But at the same time, the error by 'profane' or human reality-informed standards of the state in passing such an undeserved sentence on Socrates, the wrongness of the concretely given society of his day and of the fallible institutions in it, were shown up by the absoluteness of the standards and choice of Socrates which he exercised in his capacity as a self - a self informed by and consisting in his abidance by the moral code of human reality and judgement vis-a-vis the ways of actual society, and his death, the meant and personally authentic product of his own choice of that, was martyrdom, a

demonstration against the moral contingency of the actual, given network of society's representation, in relation to which he died in freedom. Under comparable circumstances, Galileo chose to recant his teachings and live; by his choice, in contrast with that of Socrates, he endorsed the authority of a corrupt and ignorant government and its irrelevant institutions which he saved the embarrassment of his martyrdom, and lived on with a modicum of freedom, professing allegiance to standards, both social and personal, which he knew to be untrue; therefore betraying both himself and society in the sense of, and as prevalent, in its normatively uncompromising absoluteness. As Durkheim rightly saw, the psychologic fallibility of human conduct which is at odds with the norm of society itself, harms the being of the collective consciousness in a real way; but his preoccupation with non-normatively coincidental conduct and its ill effects on the collective consciousness always figures in his work as occurring in isolated individuals and never as one which is prevalent and operative in the organisational behaviour of the people in power and which comes to expression in institutional behaviour too, causing that to be appreciably different, regarding its moral quality, from the collective consciousness at its ideal. This noncoincidence between the corrupt, self-interest-shot, self-presentation and perpetration-motivated actual conduct by society's great and well-placed, in institutional dimensions, and the ideal of an institutional conduct at the executive level of society's representation, pure and intact from such ego-affected considerations, (an imperative holding good in relation to the representatives of society, in no lesser measure than in relation to the relatively anonymous subjects under the rule of those), is, in a word, the schism in society itself. It's a pity that Durkheim is insensitive to the distinction, within the collective consciousness, between the ideal quality and function of its representation, and the conceivable, indeed frequent corruptedness of its actual institutions and networks by virtue of the imperfect quality of the conduct of its representatives. Because of his indifference, or blindness, to this eminently meaningful and valid distinction between these two capacities of society in any historic moment (its capacity as an ideal standard and ideal body of institutional morals on the one hand, and, on the other, its capacity as

the compromised actuality of these pure social standards in its reigning form - a great preoccupation of the existentialists), this important and consequential duality in the social norm itself, at its ideal and at its actual, and the social schism which this non-coincidence affords, forms no part of Durkheim's thought system, even though this schism in social being itself eats away, degrades and ruins the collective consciousness just as surely as do statistically summated incidents of suicides committed by desperate individuals in a socially 'morbid' and dysfunctional frame of mind, which Durkheim exclusively devoted his attention to, or rather against, with a zeal, evocatively representing this phenomenon in his statistical tables. Tillich's and his fellow-existentialists' distinction between the collective consciousness at its pure as an end in itself and society in its actual, given state, is a useful one.

Kierkegaard and Sartre are preoccupied with this separateness between the norm as such and as the actuality perpetuated in its representation in the society of the day, both from the point of view of society and as a matter of individual consciousness, and both these thinkers characteristically mistrust those ascribed as 'sacred' who wear the spirit of seriousness on their sleeves. Both these men are more prepared to trust the profane idiom of consciousness, consciousness as human reality. Kierkegaard writes:

Oh, it may be dreadful to see a man who is almost unrecognizable in his humbleness and wretchedness, to see such wretchedness that one can hardly distinguish a man; but to see meaningless highness and to perceive there is no man there, is horrible. (6)

To Kierkegaard, the only morally satisfactory way to a serious way of life in the big-letter sense is experiencing one's way through the thicket of profane being, through one's immediate, personal experiences of the notions which one eventually aims to match and tackle in one's conduct in the big-letter sense. No short-cuts, no direct bee-line to the big-letter world in the manner in which the 'Friend' and Woman, referred to in our earlier example, seems to have found her way.

Existentialist phenomenologists are typically preoccupied with the non-coincidence in experience of a sense of decency in the small-letter idiom (the moral code of human reality), and the notion of institutional righteousness in the socially explicit, big-letter sense, and all the anthropologists considered here give thought to the difference made to the self when there is a happy coincidence between a person's notions of the moral biddings of small-letter reality (or one's privately assimilated set of morals), and the knowledge (to which all men are susceptible) that in their activities they do the right things by standards they intuit as universally right too - not just that it would appear so if it were actually espied by an onlooker and thereby their reputation in the terms of and within the framework of actual society would be enhanced - but that by the absolute norms of the collective consciousness at its pure, they may recognise and experience their acts as a real contribution to, corroboration of the social world as it should be - that what they do matters in fact in that light, as judged by themselves. Consciousness has, to use Piaget-ian jargon for a moment, social 'schemata' - (Lacan, in different terminology, makes the same consequential claim), in other words, the consciousness of the individuals of our species is encoded to grasp positive social reality and its standards and structures as such - that individual consciousness is sensitive and responsive to the collective consciousness to which it has a primary capacity to respond directly, appropriately and relevantly, and also to knowing that it does so. One's normal code of responding to and cognising this properly social framework of consciousness is normally a fussless, small-letter feat and affair, desired by all as the effortless and natural moral framework of their ordinary, everyday conduct. Yet one knows in what way one's acts as a small-letter person hit the universal standards of social reality external to the personal horizons of those, and if they go amiss, if the standards of the positive social reality and justness are missed - either because the agent in question senses these standards as significantly absent, or because his own actions appear as wrong in their light, he feels a sense of loss and unreinforcement. Both Sartre and Kierkegaard were pessimists who suffered anguish through their sense of superfluousness, Sartre through his appreciation of the powerlessness

of the individual in the face and sight of the heavy, individual-indifferent being of external social reality in general, and Kierkegaard through his concrete experience of being relegated to a low human status in a crude and unthinking society to which his insights, so important to himself, seemed superfluous; and both these men hated, with a passion, people who appeared certain of their own importance to the community and who experienced no doubts about the justification of their own sense of seriousness as official moral authorities, without the corroborative weight and credentials of a sound and coherent set of values and a body of salt-of-the earth experiences behind them as selves - or indeed with such a set of personal standards which ran counter to the serious ones professed - not necessarily through dishonesty in a personal capacity, but because the institutional standards which informed them in their personal conduct were themselves out of joint, schismic, relative to the collective consciousness at its ideal. Sartre's pessimism was so great that he believed there could not be a match between a serious attitude and personally truthful insight, and to his way of thinking the spirit of seriousness is always insincere. Bultmann takes a more optimistic view; to his mind, a match between the standards of 'my world' and socially 'sacred' standards as such is common - and Kierkegaard believes that a personal authenticity (necessarily inherent in the profane idiom) is both the real possibility of the positionally high and often the case in their conduct in fact. (7)

The sacred or the collective consciousness is not the same thing as the spirit of seriousness. The spirit of seriousness is a state of inflated personal unauthenticity - a primitive socialpsychologic attitude which is unauthentic both in respect to the serious themselves, and also in respect to the people they deal with; a personally savoured and indulged-in fullness with the borrowed sacredness which attaches to their persons through their office - it's an arrogant identification with the expediency-infected, actuality-tied and guided, concrete institutional norm and ethics which inform their office in fact, related to by them as though those were the true standards of the collective consciousness. True, like the sacred (or society), the spirit of seriousness is a mode of consciousness in which there is a schism

between the ideal morals publicly propounded, and the serious agents' abidance by that norm and moral as selves; a schism in this sense which is externally observable, recognisable, discernible and appreciable from the outside. There is, in the spirit of seriousness, a flagrant noncoincidence in the conduct of the 'serious', between their publicly professed, ideal morals, and the actual and fallible way in which they, as persons, understand, interpret, judge and exercise their discretion and latitude in the social reality at their disposal to represent the collective consciousness vis-a-vis the individual, which is their job. However, 'seriousness' being a socialpsychologic frame of mind, (unlike sacredness which is a social quality of the highly ascribed, as a matter of social fact), it figures, both in its perpetration by the 'serious' and in their evaluation by their critics, as a matter which touches the 'serious' as an individual, rather than as a faceless representative and part of the social network, in his inert, external and socially axiomatic capacity as ascribed sacred. In principle, the spirit of seriousness (unlike the actual social norm, the sacred being of society itself in general), is amenable to being effectively related to in the socialpsychologic, personal idiom by the 'serious' agent himself, and therefore 'seriousness' is susceptible to the possibility of its jettisoning as a personal attitude by the act of the 'conversion' of the 'serious' agent by his own effort and decision, to a more authentic frame of mind; and the ensuing redemption, according to the criteria of the existentialist moraliser, can in such instances avail itself to the 'serious', as a personal matter. It's possible, on the occasions of his authentic moments, for the 'serious' agent to recognise and experience the guilt, by human standards, of the schism of his consciousness from the 'inside', as it were, and to relate to that, even to supersede that, in self-critique. However, this potential insight opening up, in moments of personal authenticity, the 'serious' person's original schism to himself, usually exists for the prototypical 'serious' in principle only - as his possibility - one that is usually dismissed by him as a redundant embellishment in conduct. As a normal state of affairs, the 'serious' agent will firmly deny the availability and meaningfulness of the ideality of a collective consciousness for everybody, including him, to abide by, as distinct from the corrupted public norm of which he is a

representative and a servant, and his recourse to such a more ideal collective consciousness than the one that he is part of, and with it his integrity and self *qua* a self, will be given up, surrendered completely to the public morality, represented in actuality as it is. The spirit of seriousness is seldom challenged, recognised and admitted by the ascriptionally high as a personal, socialpsychologic unauthenticity in him, but is allowed to cohere, in a functional way for the society of the day as actually perpetrated, into a homogeneous We-concept between the 'serious' egos who endorse society at its given with their chosen mode of consciousness, this phenomenon used by them to supply them the blinkers necessary for the problemfree upkeep of their office, so as to shield their vision against the truer values of and the possibility of a greater sensitivity to the collective consciousness as that morally purely, availably and meaningfully prevails. The spirit of seriousness, in this coherent capacity of itself as the We in its solidarity and socialpsychologically unquestioning, unauthentic oneness with the entire body of the 'serious', can define the tone of a situation even if some of the participants in it don't conceive of themselves as part of the We, and may amount to a coercive force over against the mode of consciousness and the conduct of the more authentic amongst the prestigiously ascribed; however, even in this extraindividually effective capacity of itself, the spirit of seriousness must be distinguished from the collective consciousness. Unlike the collective consciousness, this We, however extraindividually coherent and potent, is a socialpsychologic mechanism, a code of conduct experienced as operating as the collective Subject of the elevatedly ascribed - a kind of 'generalised "I"' - which endows the 'serious' with a fondness of endorsing and bringing, and has the capacity of sanctioning, in the name of the We, policies, whether of a sociologic or human kind; and gives the 'serious' a sense of qualification for, and instigates in them, self-indulgently, the constant exercise of judgement. It's important to recognise in the spirit of seriousness, in sharp counterdistinction with the collective consciousness (the sacred, or society), that it is socialpsychologic, is unauthentic as such, is inadequate as such because lacking an underpinning with individual judgement, and that it is contingent, both as a referent for human

standards, and in the sense that it is, as already remarked, susceptible to being given up and changed into authentic consciousness. The sacred, in contrast, is sacred without the hallmark of authenticity in individuals required to qualify it so; 'e' its being a positivity, it is not contingent on attributes of human reality.

The spirit of seriousness is not the exclusive privilege of politicians and religious dignitaries, but is available to anybody who belongs, in whatever humble a capacity, to a prestigious institution - a professional body, for instance - who adopts the dignified plural idiom of that as the mode of his consciousness, and exchanges for that the practice of speaking for himself as a self.

Section 2. The Schism Grasped as the Discrepancy Between the Social 'Ought' and the Social 'Is'.

The schism, noncoincidence between humanly corrupted standards affecting and degrading the collective consciousness, and those of the collective consciousness in its moral absoluteness and purity as its own ideal - the difference, in other words, between everybody's capacity to intuit society as the social 'ought' and their acting at a tangent with that perfect social ideal, does figure in Durkheim's work. He refers to this discrepancy in conduct by him by the term 'anomie'. 'Anomie', to him, is that which the incidence of suicide, recorded in the statistical tables of his work Suicide, is the index of. However, as pointed out in the later part of the preceding Section, he does not see and entertain the possibility that society itself is schismic, in other words, that a discrepancy between the ideal of exemplarily abiding by the standards of the social 'ought', the morally pure dicta of the collective consciousness at its unadulterated, on the one hand, and the corrupted standards of its institutional execution, by necessity, by morally frail human agencies and representatives of that, on the other hand, does occur within society itself, this noncoincidence between the social 'ought' and the social 'is', afforded by the non-identity of the ideal and actual representation of the collective consciousness itself, causing society, too, to be schismic, anomic, on the same account as the consciousness of one individual, sensitive to and aware, by definition, of the schemata of society in its purity, who nevertheless fails in his duty to abide by those completely, is schismic, in a more familiar sense.

Durkheim himself is sensible of the difference between the social 'ought' and the social 'is', in the context of society, but not to society's possibility of being schismic. This is because he considers these two functions of society, the normatively ideal and the socially actual positivity of it - its 'ought' function and its 'is' function, - as always perfectly coincidental, as a matter of social fact; and there is one important sense in which he is right to maintain this consequential insight: the scientifically and purely sociologic one.

Society, as he was the first to demonstrate with socialscientific authority, is a stratum of being and a positive category of human consciousness, in which social 'ought' and social 'is' coincide, in the sense that it is a normative stratum of positive reality which exists, whether we like the standards and qualities of its norm by the measures of human reality, or not. Society, approached in the sociologic idiom appropriate to itself, is simply the social norm as that is, not susceptible in such a grasp of it to the individual critic's recognising and commenting on the normative quality of that as right or wrong, as that appears to him in his capacity as a cultivated and discerning spokesman of the self, his own or that of another, or of many others. It is only when approached from the perspective of the individual, through the conventions and the deployment of the socialpsychologic modality of selves, that consciousness acquires the power to dislodge society's reign and capacity as the given norm at its sociologically absolute, that society can be deposed as the only moral source which holds good as the imperative properly informing everybody's conduct; this is why Durkheim locates the 'anomie', which has the potency to deconstruct society, exclusively in the individual, the self. In contrast, existentialism will not abide by the Durkheimian veto banning individual agents from applying their perspectives as selves in relating to society, not even in sociologic contexts. They feel justified in their practice to bring the standards of the self to bear on all social situations, even in a scholarly sociologic context, by the effectiveness of the deployment of their consciousness as society-wise critical individuals in showing society up as a mode of being and sphere of operation in which there is, in a very meaningful sense, a hypocritical divorce between its being as a normative perfection (as open to intuition for everyone), and, on the other hand, the moral actuality of the existing, given society, imperfect by the very dicta of the collective consciousness at its ideal, of which the individual agent is directly sensible as a condition of his authenticity; with these thinkers very definitely insisting on the individual agent's qualification, capacity and place to pinpoint this discrepancy, schism in society itself. Mead importantly contributes to the deposition of social actuality from its properly socialpsychologically untouchable

Durkheimian heights, by equating society with a psychologic, or rather socialpsychologic stimulus to man, which depends on, and is ever defined and justified (as are all stimuli) by the individual agent's response to it. If society can be grasped in individual consciousness and conduct (one's response as an individual to the social stimulus) as schismic, this is so - one can stretch this Meadean position to imply - because this capacity is inherent in the stimulus. It would be absurd and philosophically idealistic to suppose otherwise, that is, to isolate the origin of the schism or 'anomie' (a phenomenon characteristic, in a meaningful sense of society too), solely in the individual, and to put the blame for the frequent anomie of society itself, on the individual's doorstep. This argument will be further pursued in a little while.

To remind ourselves of Mead's position regarding the grasp of society as 'stimulus' (already enlarged on in the Introduction), we may remark once more on the fact that he uses the terms 'social stimulus' and 'gesture' interchangeably. Responses, he claims, become, in the course of socialisation, tied, through conditioning, to the stimulus or gesture, in a strong bond, with gestures coming to carry within them easily, immediately and appropriately, the obvious response conditioned to them. The socially stereotypic response to the socially symbolic gesture 'chair' is to sit down in it. The gesture is a command in socially conditioned terms, and the meaning it has come to acquire for man in terms of his correct act associated with it in this close bond, is the automatically prompted, routine, 'right' response to it, determined by custom. Mead thought of this model of his in socialpsychologic terms, in the main; in the present, larger context, we see society, the positive norm itself as stimulus, and the entirety of conduct as the response to that.

Socialpsychologically speaking, as already observed, Durkheim was right to assert that in society 'is' and 'ought' do coincide, by definition, always, as a matter of fact, in that society is the norm that is, looming large independently of our opinion of it or our will regarding it. But this peculiar stimulus-gesture of both 'ought' and 'is' - society - can be grasped, approached as, taken to have two

different meanings - one, that what society ought to be, it is; and two, what society is, that is what ought to be in society. The two statements are different in their meaning, and, sociologically speaking, Durkheim is right to imply that both are correct. The second implication: what society is, that is what ought to be, stands as maintained by Durkheim: if its laws, normative standards are faulty, bad, wrong, they are nevertheless binding, they are sacred and must be obeyed. But the existentialists are not unequivocal about this implication of Durkheim's dogma; in approaching the meaning of this being - society - as both 'is' and 'ought', they see a difference between whether it is the case that the actual condition of society comes up to the 'ought', the standards of the norm as absolute which man is both encoded and motivated to be responsive to, or, alternatively, whether the standards gestured to us as the norm to be maintained, the 'ought' demanded, is forced by the gesture to shed its ideality so that it may be brought down to the level of the 'is', possibly a rotten one, so as to coincide with that, to become equal with and indistinguishable from states of affairs in far from perfect societies, and made subordinate to a degraded practical institutional ethics which has ascriptive powers, too, with the difference between the two sets of social norms, ideal and actual, blurred, to suit the being of society as it is, making society's being and morality self-fulfilling in its own terms. The existentialist wouldn't consider normative standards under the latter circumstances as that forum, that absolute social level of the being of consciousness, which the individual would want to hit with his own personal standards and his conduct as coincidental with and corroborative to that, as a condition of finding thereby the measure of his goodness, and of feeling that his acts as an individual make a difference to the world in the light of those standards corrupted in and by social actuality, seeing through the pretensions of those standards to moral perfection; and he retains the motivation to entertain and refer to a social framework of standards more absolute than is the given society of his day, in informing his private conduct, which are signalled to one's consciousness and intuition by the recognition that 'they come from God, from nature, from "my nature", from society', as Sartre writes, adding defiantly: 'These ends ready-made and pre-human

will therefore define the meaning of my act.' ⁽⁸⁾ The same notion (society as a structure and category in nature), is also Durkheim's society - the collective consciousness, the being of the 'ought' which is - which subsists in its structures, in its standards in nature. But the existentialist, unlike Durkheim, will see the matter of the coincidence of the heavy being of the social 'ought' with the social 'is' also in the context and at the level of the actual social world he knows, with the 'ought' demanded by one's given, established society, recognised as compromised by its pragmatic synthetisation with the actual states of affairs of the society of the day there, and he will distinguish the outcome, the quality of the normative, ethical standards there ⁽⁹⁾ from the more absolute standards of the collective consciousness to which man's sensitivity lingers on and which are intuited as not met, shortchanged in the social reality as given. Durkheim doesn't make this distinction between these two levels of society - its absolute being as the collective consciousness, its structures and patterns in nature as demonstrable there on the one hand, and as it is in its given state in the humanly mediated ongoing processes and practices filling the structures of social relations and institutions with actual representational content on the other hand, though the probity by human measures of a government, its weight, quality, hue as human reality, if very far from the ideal dicta of the collective consciousness at its pure and ideal, certainly does contribute to the anomie or lack of anomie which obtains at society's statistically measureable, scientific level. The state of the collective consciousness at its actually represented and operative, if highly schismic and divergent relative to the normative promptings of the ideal of a society in its (perfectly fathomable) morally pure form, goes towards swelling up the prevalence of social anomie (as already observed), just as effectively as does the pooled conduct of society-averse and critical individuals, which latter factor and phenomenon Durkheim goes to so much trouble to capture and chart in his statistical tables. Yet Durkheim doesn't connect the possible morally questionable state of institutions and the rise in the incidence of anomie in society (the way he connects the individual's deviance from the collective consciousness and the incidence of anomie), and puts the

source of social anomie (the inverse notion and measure of society's stability), squarely and wholly on the doorstep of the conduct, and tendency to certain conduct, of individuals in their emphasised capacity as such. He never allows for the schism in society itself, afforded by the clashing values of the always-ready-to-hand and perfectly perceptible ideality of the collective consciousness, constantly niggling at everyone who is willing to pay attention to its promptings, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the bastardisation of these ideal social standards by a society in power, whether that morally unsatisfactory actual society subsists in small units (within a family, e.g), or in large ones (say, on the scale of an entire state.) Durkheim always considers these two levels of society, that of the collective consciousness as the standard of the norm in its absoluteness, and society as the given government of the day, as unitary, blurring the difference between those to such an extent as to appear non-existent, and his understanding of the collective consciousness is always inclusive of the given standards and practices of any social actuality. His work certainly carries the implication that society is what it ought to be and because of that its standards ought to be seen and accepted as right. He is right in the socialscientific, or rather sociologic sense that society in its actual representation (instrumentally human), however imperfect, remains (in its proper sociologic capacity) social, commanding, institutional, as opposed to individual in its grasp and idiom, in that it is other in its modality than profane or human reality, in that it retains its normative capacity, and in that the things and people who stand for it and represent it, draw from it the quality of the sacred, and are themselves sacred in this sociologic sense. An example of an object that is sacred by virtue of being social, is a ballot paper, distinct in its socially symbolic solemnity from another piece of paper, identical to that in all respects except that it does not carry the power for voting for or against the government, and does not represent the person filling that in as a citizen in the solemnly sacred, official sense. But an object need not have political weight and significance attached to it to be sacred in a social context and sense. A gift-wrapping can also be seen as a thing with such powers; it transforms small-letter objects such as chocolates or things of use

around the house, into 'potlatch' or other representations of the institutionally, socially symbolic occasion which is being celebrated, weddings, birthdays, christenings, coming of age, retirement after a lifetime of service, and the relationship between the people between whom the objects pass, into the stilted, fossilised, solemn formality of rites (rituals) and routines. Routines and rites are both social, formalised acts, but routines are everyday rites or rituals, which usually symbolise, express and perpetuate affairs and things social indirectly only, and do not directly stand for society itself on explicit occasions of the evocation and representation of that the way rites and rituals do, such as handing over a Bar Mitzvah present or (in a more modern and less usual understanding of such an occasion), as filling in a ballot paper. Another example of a social object, at the everyday social level, is a diary. Entries in that transform the flow of life, the vivid course of its events, into an organised system of external sociality, which once jotted down, gain a finality and permanence which should not be disturbed: creating from the spontaneous surprise of the future, a fixed structure of things to come, with the solidity of a historic fact which already has the authority of the past. Red letter days and activities in the diary are even more sacred, sacred at the level of rituals, sacred in the more conventional, symbolically social sense of the term. Finally, an example of the sacredness of persons by virtue of their institutionalised office, are postmen. Employees in the service of the Royal Mail - one hesitates to approach them for a favour in their private capacity, such as retrieving a letter which has already been posted. It may additionally^{be} observed here to complement former examples of things sacred because social, that a personal letter with small-letter news in it, acquires a solemn, official quality as the property of the postal services whilst in the custody of those, and will regain its profane idiom only once already delivered to the person to whom it is addressed in the intimate, personal modality and grasp of small-letter friendship, in which it has originally gained its being.

In Durkheim, the undeniable normative efficacy of the machinery, establishment, institutions of the society in power (any society), no

matter what use that is being put to, merges with the collective consciousness in its scientific ideality, whose being *sui generis* Durkheim was the first to demonstrate. The collective consciousness, on his account, equals society in any of its manifestations, and the resulting unity is to Durkheim that absolute normative positivity, that extraindividual, grand Gesture to which the right response of man, unquestionably inherent in that, is an unqualified 'Yes'. The equilibrium of society, any society in the givenness of the world, is to Durkheim the normative ideal, and man's individual, psychologic or socialpsychologic equilibrium, as he showed, indeed lies, to a great extent, in his compliance with that norm, as that actually operates in terms of the society of the day. So much greater the responsibility of any particular government, we might justifiably intercept in an existentialist vein, in making sure that the quality of the given norm does not deviate significantly from, does not betray too much, the ideal standards of the collective consciousness at its positively extant and morally pure, to which every citizen in his capacity as an individual is present through his direct intuitiveness to that as a self, which informs his critical standards to society's actuality, and which any given government represents, conveys, makes real as the collective consciousness for all individuals in social actuality. However, in a sociological context, Durkheim scores again in the respect of this vision of his, against the human reality-wise scrupulous existentialist and generally 'romantic' moral guard and champion of the collective consciousness in its purity, in correctly recognising that the society which happens to be the case, has really got 'sacred' properties, is an effective union of 'is' and 'ought' of sorts in the world, and is the most powerful occasion in actuality for the collective consciousness, in whatever compromised a sense it conveys its actual norms in comparison with the morally more satisfactory pure ideality of those as individually intuitable, and in correctly and socialscientifically informatively maintaining that presumably it is true that if a community lived in a spirit of a sense of security, compliant identification with a society that was cannibalistic or fascistic, the incidence of suicide would nevertheless be low; indeed, he showed that suicide rates are lowest in societies at war.

In contrast to Durkheim, the existentialist and other 'romantic' social theoriser, in approaching the matter of the coincidence or non-coincidence between the social 'ought' (the normative ideality of the collective consciousness) and the social 'is' of established societies, - while wholeheartedly agreeing that the social 'is', states of affairs in the world as they are, should meet the social 'ought', will not equate this recognition with, and will not additionally endorse, the Durkheimian implication that every society is what it ought to be, however weighty the positivistic scientific orthodoxy which supports such a position; and society, to his socialpsychologically committed experience of it, will come over with 'is' and 'ought' separate in that - as an 'ought' which *is* in a privately verifiable sense, experienced as significantly not being, and as an 'is' which *is*, experienced as antivalue.

To emphasise and elaborate a consideration which has already been hinted at, it must be stressed here clearly that existentialism as a brand of socialtheoretic thought, is a response to a schismic society - an adequate response - a schismic response to society which is apprehended as schismic. Durkheim claimed that society (stimulus in our sense here) is a unitary positivity in its being, and that the individual is the origin of and is causal in the patterns of anomie in society which the pooled schismic responses by individuals affect there. However, it must be recognised that society as the stimulus - in whatever capacity, in fact - is prior to the response to it by man; it's prior to the modes of being and relating to it by the consciousnesses, conduct and attitudes of individual men and women, and, as we have already pointed out, it seems absurd and philosophically idealistic to claim that individuals, the attitude of individuals, should be causal in attributes of, phenomena of social being. A stimulus could not be apprehended and responded to schismically if it did not itself have the capacity for being so. It must be the case that the stimulus itself is schismic. The schism in society is between the ideal, the standard of society - an end both for the individual and in itself - and the compromised actuality of its concrete representations, in which packages it in fact comes. It cannot be that existentialism - a schismic

perspective on society and consciousness based on such an understanding of society - is causal in the rise of the anomie there; it must be, as existentialist thought claims and analyses, that social actuality is schismic in characteristic and coherent ways, and existentialism is the response to it - schismic, anomic, but not causal; though responses to society, both in compliance with it and in the alternative mode of its critique, do act back on society, affecting it in an undramatic, but not irrelevant dialogue.

Drawing once more on the descriptive capacities of the Meadean gesture, existentialism is, from the sociological point of view, the wrong response to society as the stimulus which carries in it its command for man. The response gestured, as already remarked, is social compliance. The address which is inherent in society as symbolic stimulus - in society as command - is 'don't see me as schismic but apprehend me as unitary. Do not entertain your idea of the social 'ought' and do not dedicate yourself to it. See me as the being in which 'ought' and 'is' are at one and dedicate yourself to me. Do not match the schisms, the anomies in my body with your responses as adequate to those as an individual, and accept me as the being which is in charge and issues its commands, in terms of my standards as they are, and accept them as "the good" by definition. Mend the schism in your own response and you shall be contented.'

But the existentialist cannot conceive of the good in any set of norms, whether social or individual, in which the truth, the faculty of authentic vision, does not form a part. He sees 'the good' as a composite structure which is inclusive of the truth or authenticity, as prompted by the collective consciousness at its ideal and as that is endorsed and recognised in the intuition of that collective consciousness in its ideal form in the consciousness of the individual, searching for and insisting on this existentially verifiable criterion of truth; both in the context of society as stimulus and in the context of the consciousness of the individual perceiving it, in his response to it, this response occurring not as a result of careful cerebration, but as given at a stroke, as a matter of insight. This is well expressed in

Sartre's analysis in The Critique of Dialectic Reason of a situation in a Christian society where it was held that all Christians were humanly equal and it was justified to keep blacks, who were non-Christians, as slaves; and where this assertion served to circularly imply that blacks, who as slaves were manifestly not humanly the equals of Christians, should not be able to convert to Christianity, and to implement in practice measures for the prevention of their opportunity for doing so. This reasoning offends the rules of logic, compatibility with which is a measure of truth as a formal matter, as much as offending the intuitive, innerved, existentiell criterion of truth, the violation of which is reacted to in the guts, with prompt immediacy. Yet the above outlined, logically impermissible stringing together of tenets, furnish, in this Sartrean example, 'the good' of the social norm as implemented, in spite of the fact that its rationale, as just quoted, is a contradiction in principle as a formal matter, as well as being the absurd betrayal and inversion (offensive also to that forum of existentiell truth which is situated in the senses), of the universal ideality of an imperative ('be a Christian if you want to be morally deserving and good'), by bidding some 'do not be a Christian so as to be a good citizen in society, so as to deserve your niche in it.' More analytically approached, the untruth and unauthenticity underlying the norm which is based on such a logical and existential schism as was operative in the moral practice of the society just referred to, and which demanded the acceptance of this morally awry norm by all, goes deeply into the meaning of the authenticity or unauthenticity both of society and of human reality. Sartre's example shows, firstly, the discrepancy, the schism between the set of norms which serves as the form, occasion and the expression of the collective consciousness in the case in point (Christian ideology), in the comprehensible ideality of that on the one hand, and in the morally compromised actuality of that for the furtherance of the given institutions and relations in the actual society in question, on the other. In such a context, Sartre's example demonstrates that it is possible for society and its actual norms to be unauthentic to the collective consciousness as the true standard for itself, no less than for the behaviour of the individuals peopling it. The existentialist feels that if the standards of 'the good' do not coincide with the

standards of the truth - existential and, incidentally, logical, - both the truth and 'the good' are violated. Secondly, Sartre's example demonstrates the relationship between the schismic social stimulus (just identified) and the individual consciousness which perceives it; something that concerns both the slavekeeper and especially the black person who wishes to be converted for whatever reason (to save him from social slavery by means of Christianity or so as to be able to exercise the being of his self as everybody's equal, and to be present to and a member, in such a capacity, of a spiritually liberating ideal society of the anthropologic equality of all, just the same as the authentic white Christian). The existentialist will insist that the black person in his humanly and socially deprived situation in the social actuality of his day, is uniquely placed, as well as called, to respond to the reigning society's vetoing gesture to him as a potential Christian, to authentically respond to this gesture, at least in existential terms, but probably also, unavoidably, in intellectual and political ones as well. The black person wishing to be a Christian, the existentialist will say, has a choice in this situation. He may either choose the difficult course of responding to his situation as a would-be authentic Christian (his chosen potential), without being institutionally baptised, and shoulder the existentially considerably taxing burden of an explicit presence to and awareness of the ideality of Christianity (the ideology which represents in this case the collective consciousness itself at its normatively ideal), and an appreciation of the personal consequences for him, both in actual and spiritual or psychologic terms, of his excluded situation in the given society of the social 'is', in the light of that ideological and social ideality. Alternatively, he may give up Christianity in this authentically socially sacred sense, in the name of the 'christianity' dragged down to the personally interested level of the ascriptionally high, bastardised into the degradation of the expression of the collective consciousness in the world, to make it fit the conditions of their rule there, and accept his situation and himself as a slave and an anthropologically lesser being, in compliance with and in dedication to that debased pragmatic ethics. (Someone badly placed on grounds of class origin in a Communist country can be in an

analogous situation.) The existentialist (prompted by Sartre) calls the latter choice 'bad faith'.

In view of the fact that in the English translation the term 'faith' in this expression is ambiguous and implies religious faith as well as the trivial meaning of the term in the Sartrian expression 'bad faith', it could be pointed out here that in the French this Sartrian turn of phrase and the term 'faith' in it, merely refers to the act and project of responding to the call of any human or social situation with one's authentic faculties as a person given up, made redundant, responding not in one's capacity as a free, responsible, critically articulate individual, but hiding behind the facade of the set of expectations defined for one in society's stereotypes, as 'gestured' for one by society, and pretending to oneself that one has no choice to respond otherwise. Because in the above example it's Christianity of all possible sets of norms which is being usurped and used by the established norm as the matter-of-course done thing, rather than the term 'Christianity' figuring according to its original function and capacity as one's personal religious code of practice, providing one's possibility to respond freely and authentically to the ways of society as an individual, the coupling of the religious connotation of 'bad faith' with its less weighty Sartrian sense is particularly enhanced in the context of our example. But this is entirely coincidental and a peculiar yield of the English language, and those authors in foreign tongues (Bultmann, for instance), who wish to suggest that in a religious context, conduct in Sartrian bad faith makes for religious bad faith as well, have to labour the point.

Of course, it would be a pity if on account of this point of linguistic precision, one would lose the benefits of Durkheim's consequential and original insight that in primitive societies at least, the concept of 'social' and 'the sacred' completely overlap; the two terms kindred to the concepts of Sartrian 'bad faith' and, on the other hand, to the Bad Faith of the normative authority of the reigning Ideology, particularly if that sees itself as reliant in its morality as the norm on the mainstream religion in the culture, but even otherwise,

as society and its norms are, whether explicitly informed by a body of religious dogma or not, as we tried to show, simply tantamount to the 'Sacred'. One's inclination to brand with the label 'big-letter Bad Faith' the moral practices and quality of the reigning norm, which demands, by coercive as well as socialpsychologically persuasive means, the absolute attitudinal loyalty of the masses whose interests as individuals it systematically shortchanges, seems to me particularly apt at such times and in such cases when the own moral quality of the mainstream Ideology of the actual society, which informs and affords the reigning social norm, is itself manifestly very schismic, as it was in our last example, whether its schismicity transpires and is experienced as offensive in a religious framework and terms of reference, or in those of an explicitly secular ideology underpinning that norm, whose properties as society remain, again as we tried to show before, Sacred, simply as a matter of its operational definition and function as social.) We are justified, then, it seems to me, in retaining a strong awareness of the consequential coincidence between the concepts 'social' and 'the sacred', not only in the cases of the explicitly religion-informed norm of the primitive societies which Durkheim originally studied; the kinship, even interchangeability, to an important extent, of the 'social' and 'the Sacred', seems worth pursuing in modern cultures too. As already suggested, all social authorities and situations may be sacred in the sense that they are institutionally constituted and conceived, at times in an emphatic manner, as opposed to such authorities and situations being related to in irreverent doubt, in the individually searching, analytic, socialpsychologically authenticity-producing and demanding idiom, which attitude vis-a-vis the sacredness of society as such, amounts to and operates as heresy, in modern contexts too. The relationship between society's conceivable institutional Bad Faith and small-letter Sartrean 'bad faith', is that small-letter bad faith, unlike Bad Faith in the heavy and solemn social sense, is not a 'macrosociologic' or purely sociologic affair and state of consciousness. The strength and the enhancement of the big-letter sacredness and other big-letter qualities of the social stimulus (society), are the function of their intensity as social, of their generic purity, application and tonality as such. Small-letter

socialpsychologic bad faith comes into its own in routine, small-letter social situations, and in social contexts affected by, and related to in, the socialpsychologic idiom, the idiom of human reality, even if in the unauthentic form of that idiom. Small-letter, Sartrean bad faith is, first of all, the stuff of the being and operation of consciousness in what was identified as the socially low-key 'thirdness' in the Introduction, it is the 'stuff' of the 'social' in the colloquial sense, of routine social ways, not elevated to the enhanced and significant echelons of society in its solemn capacity as Sacred on special, particularly and self-consciously social occasions; it is the idiom of the unquestioning, socially routine operation and carriership of society by the agent, whose socialpsychologic unauthenticity is a small-letter one, whose 'rites' are merely 'routines', as distinguished and discerned a little while ago, whose sacredness in the purely sociologic sense is not poignant, is unobvious, even dormant. Secondly, in a way not unrelated to this first mentioned capacity of itself and sphere of its operation, small-letter bad faith is a socialpsychologic response capacity of consciousness to society's big-letter schism. In this latter of its capacities, it is the way of positively, corroboratively responding by the agent or agents to the reigning norm, in instances when it is discovered as guilty of big-letter Bad Faith. Small-letter bad faith is the alternative possibility to the 'heretic's' critical and personal authenticity in responding, in the socialpsychologic idiom, to the schism in society, if it psychologically inconveniently, and morally taxingly, stares one in the eye; it's the unauthentic modality, as the individual's response to it, of choosing to disregard that big-letter schism, that Bad Faith of the norm on a social scale, and giving society and its schismic norm the moral go-ahead as far as the individual agent is concerned, by being blind to it. In turn, the personal socialpsychologic unauthenticity, or the bad faith of the agent in responding, or rather significantly not responding in a personal capacity to the schism of society, comes to amount to a comfort and to offering socialpsychologic solace and shelter to the agent against the disturbing, explicit recognition of society's schism and its echo and personal implications in individual consciousness, small-letter bad faith thus working towards the equilibrium of the existing society

in macrosociologic dimensions, and, in socialpsychologic ones, affording equilibrium in the consciousness of the agent relating to any society, even if it be very schismic, in uncritical compliance with it.

The two best scientific demonstrations to date of bad faith and its relationship to the morally incongruous social authority in charge of it, with the Bad Faith of the latter scientifically devised in the laboratory, are Asch's and Milgram's classic experiments. ⁽¹⁰⁾ ⁽¹¹⁾ In these experiments, it was something sacred, though not in the obviously and literally religious sense - the professional respectability of the white overall-clad, bespectacled, bedside-mannered team of scientists who explicitly or implicitly presided over the experimental situation, which moved the participants to betray, in personal bad faith, the most elementary standards of human decency and probity, bowing to the sacred authority which 'gestured' them to do so, for the gain of a modicum of what these scientists dubbed as 'social desirability'. In both experiments, as already said, a schism was contrived, by experimental means, in the stimulus situation, between the 'social good' (whose semblance was guaranteed, to appearances, by the gesturers' social, institutional respectability), and the plain truth (in Asch's case) or the personally authentic the biddings of the standards of human reality in relation to oneself and to one's fellow-men (in Milgram's case); somewhat analogously, in the latter case especially, to the above described example of the slave-keeping Christian society. In Asch's experiment, the participants were 'gestured' as a condition of their social conformance, to contradict the evidence of their eyes and to misjudge from time to time the comparative lengths of lines plainly printed on large cards, in accord with the preceding incorrect judgements of the relative length of those lines by planted, false witnesses, confederates of the experimenters. In Milgram's experiment the participants were 'gestured' to do violence to the witness of their true nature as individuals, as simply human beings and their sense of authenticity as such, in a more figurative way. For a small payment, they were made party to an experiment by inflicting painful electric shocks (as far as they knew), often to the point of death, upon a fellow-experimental subject - who was, in fact, played by an actor not

really subjected to such pain, but feigning agony. Both experiments made dramatic discoveries - the most sensational no doubt being that almost all participants, recruited from the street, were in fact prepared to do the humanly dishonourable task demanded, gestured by the social situation, in the case of Milgram's experiment, to the point of 'killing' a fellow-'experimental subject'; but the other findings of these experiments are also worthy of note. To interpret the results somewhat unusually, both experiments showed what an untenable pressure an explicit awareness of the schism in the social stimulus between the socially expected standards of behaviour and the truth amounted to in the consciousness of the individuals called on to respond to it and to act in compliance with it. The inventiveness of the human organism in concealing from consciousness the trauma of the cognisance of the social schism - the armoury of bad faith in guarding consciousness against the need for the articulation of such a split between the command of the social 'ought', the good of the norm as institutionally demanded, and the truth as individually witnessed, were shown to go to such lengths as to lead to the actual perception of shorter lines as longer, longer lines as shorter, when so declared by a rigged consensus; and in cases where tricks of perception did not come to the rescue of individual consciousness to shield it from an awareness of the schism between the divergent values of the social 'good' and the truth in the social stimulus, it led to extreme distress in the tested individuals.

It is an existentialist insight, one underscored by Mead too, to insist that the acceptance of and compliance with the sacredness dictated by social situations, whether elevatedly religious or just socially strongly and enhancedly convention-governed and demanded, is not the only possible prompting and way for the individual to respond. Mead's words remind us that man may respond, instead, in an inventive, idiosyncratic way, in ways which may deviate from this immediate, conventional, commanding meaning of the gesture; or he needn't respond at all. 'There is a moral but no mechanical necessity to act', Mead writes; ⁽¹²⁾ in being able to delay, choose the ways of or altogether forego responding is what distinguishes man from animals, ⁽¹³⁾ and it is in this in which lies his freedom. Existentialism is a free response to

the command of society's gesture. Society gestures: 'Give up your sense of the social 'ought'.' Existentialism responds: 'Give up the state of the social 'is'.' The response to itself as gestured by society is bad faith, but the existentialist cannot accept a code of the 'good' which doesn't tally with his intuition of the truth, which does not ring true against the touchstone of his authenticity. Maintaining that the testability of the norm by the authentic individual's critique is the precondition of its 'goodness' in any sense, he responds with both social 'ought' and social 'is' maintained in his repertoire of demands and awareness vis-a-vis society, but with these two functions and qualities of society perceived by him as separate in the given norm of the day, if that lends itself to recognition as schismic. The existentialist's response to the bidding of blind society-compliance inherent in society's gesture to him, is a personal 'no'; it's an answer of its critique. Durkheim's work Suicide carries the implication that those who in the lights of their selves deviate from the standards of the good of society to a sufficient extent to cause them to commit suicide, deserve to die. Existentialism's answer to Durkheim's verdict passed on all deviants such as himself, is a 'sh'an't'.

Anomie in conduct - critique - does affect the collective consciousness; it's a source of change in it in two ways: one which could be called social 'constitution' ('social creativity' in Mead) and the other social 'disconstitution'. Both 'constitution' and 'disconstitution' are achieved by bringing the individual's unconventional lights, profane, schismic insights, to bear on a social situation which subsists in big-letter terms. Schismic response - retaining a personal vision of the social 'ought' in relation to the social 'is' or the actual society of the day - is the vehicle both of constructive innovation and of 'disconstitution' ('deconstruction' to the French), '14' the undefinition of the spirit of seriousness, representative of the being of the Sacred, of positive society as it both is and ought to be. Such 'disconstitution' is the reverse process of the social reifying of the small-letter concepts in the German, described in the previous Section; it's the reverse of the process of turning the vital activities and the lively qualities that verbs and

adjectives stand for, into more stilted, socially abstract things, by changing the small-letter initials of those verbs and adjectives into big-letter ones. In reverse, 'disconstitution' may be seen as the transforming of the originally sacred, big-letter social reality into the small-letter, human idiom of being. This reverse process to the social reifying of the vital qualities of adjective- and verb-concepts, may, and does, as Durkheim himself saw, truly effect, unmake the reality of society and social situations, occasionally bursting the whole content of that as social, metamorphosing its sacred nature, showing the make-up of the profane reverse to it, divesting it of the veneer of its outside and showing the joints, the filling of its cracks from within; it does the job of critique - constructive or otherwise - which unmasks the incongruous makings of the social show if it's founded on the base of standards untrue to, schismic with those of the collective consciousness in its ideality, to which, the existentialist insists, man's consciousness is directly present, and thus endowed and empowered with the faculty of its guardianship and promotion vis-a-vis the corrupted state of society, underneath its glossy surface.

An example of 'disconstitution' may be found in literature in an episode of The Good Soldier Šveik. (15) This episode describes how private Šveik, constantly picked on and pushed about by the officiousness of the officers with whom he is in daily contact, is one day standing guard while the officers in question are sitting in a row on the latrine. Suddenly, on seeing an officer approach, higher in rank than the ones constantly plaguing him, Šveik calls out: 'Attention!' Much more fell on that occasion than the officers' trousers. In socialpsychological, interpersonal terms, the tables were turned - he whom his selfimportant superiors have always gone to lengths to humiliate, has humiliated them. The schism, or anomie of the slice of society that reigned in the barracks, and with that the total Durkheimian one which the officers existed to uphold and maintain, has waxed, gained territory, and the schismicity of the social situation that obtained in the set-up in the Kaiser's army, was, among other things, made bare. In showing the ridiculousness of the actual régime within which humanly undeserving people, no cleverer than Šveik, are

being given superior roles, elevated ranks as a matter of their birthright, the author demonstrates the standards of the social 'ought' and the social 'is' as separate and divergent, their constellation absurd and self-contradictory. By literary means, and the introduction of 'poetic justice', the author could devise a situation in which both the interpersonal makings of that (a socialpsychologic affair) has been 'taken to pieces', 'blown sky-high', 'disconstituted', and society as such too has suffered, been eaten into, demoted - with a discontinuity, gap affected in it, made into nothing by way of its being turned into the unconventional, spontaneous, immediately experienced, personal, profane idiom; - redefined thus by the act of Šveik who seized the opportunity to get his own back for formerly being certified as a lunatic by that lot, and thereby having had his own order of being as a person dragged down accordingly. Through Šveik's act, the formerly prevailing social order and idiom has become, so to speak, atomised, deprived of its former quality of being as a whole - it is, at the moment of Šveik's revenge, no more. The gold, the halo on the icon-like image of its former being as sacred, faded away, disappeared - baring the little primitive stick-men, whom the artist, unconcerned with and unschooled in the secrets of living anatomy, had clad in lavish gold to hide their humanly lacking condition. 'The Emperor has no clothes!' cries the little boy in the story analogous in its message in many ways with the above considered example.

The direction in which Šveik took his aim in 'disconstituting' - knocking off the halo of the mighty - is not the only one in which 'disconstitution' can work. The social dignity of the people in the low ranks of the social spectrum is being disconstituted all the time by others high up above. The wholesale 'disconstitution' of persons, affected from up high, who have done nothing to deserve to be unmade as sacred, to be ranked with the ascriptionally profane of the world, begins, in many cases, at the moment of birth. 'As soon as you are born they make you feel small', John Lennon sings. There are more ways than one in which to qualify for a place among the demoted. Some of these possibilities will now be given consideration.

THE SCHISM AS A MACROSOCIOLOGIC MATTER.Section 1. The Three Ascribed Paradigms of the Sacred-Profane Relationship. Blemish by Circumstance and by Virtue of Heretic Personality. Hubris.

The division of the human world into Sacred and Profane in Durkheim's sense, is an original, archetypal separation of mankind into two, involving both the Profane and the Sacred in the solemn, elevated, big-letter sense. The Sacred are sacred in their weighty, self-conscious, self-important capacity as such, and the Profane are profane also in the big-letter sense, as judged and decreed thus in the spirit of seriousness, as a matter of ascription by the Sacred and on their terms. This relationship, when so grasped, is a macrosociologic primary structure of sociologic calibre, not a matter secondary to its experience and not a function of that; it prevails prior to its being made the structure and the object of critique for individual consciousness, and in independence of that for its definition in that capacity. Anomie, the modality and fountainhead of profane conduct - the prevalence of society-variant conduct and mode of consciousness, as Durkheim points out, 'is of whole cloth', in other words, to his understanding, is a sociologically basic and axiomatic entity first and foremost, un-atomised, un-parcelled up at its sociologically primordial, into particularly individual human consciousnesses; a sociologic phenomenon with socialscientifically predictive weight and properties, to which the individual's particular experience and psychologically sophisticated cultivation of it is subordinate. As 'whole cloth' so to speak, it may be envisaged as the dark areas in the statistical charts that yield forth, express the patterns of society. It's this anomie, as a mode of consciousness and conduct, which erodes the white areas that statistically evidence society as such as the uneventful and undisturbed state of its equilibrium; anomie is that society-alien medium which gets, gnaws at the sociologically wholesome coincidence of behaviour in man with society's norms as established, corroding that in its incidence, taking chunks out of society's very being in this sense, of its subsistence, its domain.

But in this gross, wholesale, sociologic grasp of this partnership between the two opposite sides of humanity, the sacred and profane, is not the only possible one. The relationship may be, and indeed is unavoidably, approached 'existentially' as well, in its more micro-

sociologic makings, in the mode of anomie particularised, as conscious human reality in the living. The collective consciousness as Durkheim's hard-and-fast phenomenon, as sociologic facticity, which comes over in experience as external to individual consciousness, is in a special relation with the generalized other, the microsociologic or social-psychologic package with experience as its medium, in which society comes, corruptly, in its living, familiarly in everyday life, as outlined in the Introduction, society as a process, pliable, fluid, society as it feels and is being mediated, sustained by human conduct. The two, the collective consciousness and the generalized other, afford in their relationship an aspect of the schism in society, as discerned in the first chapter. It is possible to bring a socialpsychologically slanted grasp on the solemn Sacred-Profane relationship as entertained by Durkheim, yielding a sociologically inappropriate, *dishabille*, fresh, disconstitutive, dynamic view to the workings of this primal tie between these two opposite genuses of mankind, deposing in its effect, unflattering, deconstructive to the Sacred and uncongenial to their properly sacred idiom, the spirit of seriousness, in which their chosen mode of being as sacred, thrives, on which it depends. A profane, scrutinising, critical 'look' at the Sacred when engaged in the solemn business of their upkeep as such, disconstitutes the Sacred and is uncongenial to their characteristic social idiom, their home ground, showing them as merely man-size, as transposed into human reality alongside with the Profane, and repatriating the latter category of man into its more homely, mundane, small-letter habitat of human reality, the mire, the microscopic culture of life where it flourishes, from within which confines it knows itself as profane and can define, or rather undefine, the Sacred as such, too; as illustrated on the last pages of the last chapter.

It may be protested, in the light of the current exposition, that because Durkheimian positive social reality, when 'playing at home' as it were, in instances when encountered as operative, as supreme in its own terrain, on its own terms, as in a court of law for instance, is postulated here as independent for its proper being on any profane definition of it by human reality, and, conversely, because the same Durkheimian positive social reality is seen as prone and amenable to being checked and even deposed in moments of its weakness and at its

anomalous by human reality (music to vulgarian psychologistic ears), our argument is either self-contradictory or half-right, properly pleasing either hard-nosed Durkheimian positivists or psychologistic solipsists, and the other half of our position, inconvenient to either one of these schools of thought, has to be thrown away. But far from it: what we claim here, dualistically, is that both are the case - that both positive society as such, is a complete stratum of nature, as Durkheim claimed, *sui generis*, and so is the coherent tier of the being of human reality, with these two orders in a special relationship to each other, as will transpire in the course or later arguments in greater detail, with one of these strata of reality ever potentially destructive of the other, each authentic and congenial to itself, but inappropriate, embarrassing, disconstitutive vis-a-vis its opponent as a possible modality of conduct and consciousness, and to their own perpetration, as already touched on in the Introduction. To be big-letter Profane, the grasp of the self of itself in this weighty sociologic idiom if one be so ascribed, is certainly the possibility of individual consciousness, but unauthentic to it in its capacity as human reality, and mutually exclusive with defining oneself in the latter idiom. Even if identified, decreed as 'carrier' of big-letter anomie, as less than sociologically wholesome, even then small-letter profane is the personally authentic way of being profane as an unavoidably always available mode of the being of consciousness.

A socialpsychologically conversant, inclusive grasp and view of the Durkheimian Sacred-Profane relationship, makes it susceptible and prone to the classification of it into eight particular comprehensive categories, to being analysed into the molecules of its dignified grasp and presentation as an unassailable macroanthropologic whole, yielding up even such aspects of the relationship which are other than those ascribed. These, however, will be treated in the next chapter.

This chapter, the first out of the two which will do the job of listing, analysing paradigms of the Sacred and Profane, will consider those three aspects of that bond between these two opposing halves of humanity which are determined and maintained primarily by ascription.

These will each be presented in diagrammatic form. However, before putting forward the first of these, the choice of one pair of terms which is taken here as often interchangeable with the Sacred and the Profane, and frequently used, calls for some explanation. The terms in question are the Pukka and the Rachmones; the two, when juxtaposed, yielding an odd, culturally heterogeneous dyad. 'Pukka', as is well known, refers to the East Indian élite in the heyday of the caste system there. 'Rachmones' is Yiddish for the little Jew (extendable in its meaning to the little man in any culture), down in his luck in the world, in the face of which he nevertheless stumbles along, there as best he can. 'Untouchable' offered itself first in the course of choosing this near-synonymous dyad to the Sacred and Profane, to evoke, to stand for the other half of humanity vis-a-vis the Pukka; and has been rejected. If chosen, it would have kept its ensemble with the Pukka within one culture, moreover, would have provided the correct description of the attitude of the Pukka towards the class of humanity apprehended by him as the opposite to itself - a sense of abhorrence of the kind which those abiding by *kosher* customs feel in the face of *treflach*. But Rachmones has been chosen because so consistent with the meaning of small-letter profane - with profaneness as experienced from within, from the point of view of the profane, warmly, innerly encountered, lived as such: the everyday experience of being a loser and having to fulfil the job of living all the same - an experience of oneself as at home in the profaneness which is the only life one has, assimilated through the virtues of wisdom, of realistic resignation, of spirit still privately cultivated, of the adequate management of being assigned low in the once-for-all manner in which this casting usually takes place; a somewhat endearing term: poor, pathetic fellow, the notion with a smile, with self-mockery and self-knowledge, chosen here because of its authenticity by profane standards: not Untouchable, but Pauline sinner, Rachmones, harajan, profane.

Table 1.

Type I Blemished; The Blemished by Virtue of Circumstance Only.

<u>The Sacred or Unblemished; the Pukka.</u>	<u>The Profane, Blemished, the Rachmones.</u>
--	---

Fit to be stewards (biblical sense), mediating, allocating my lot to me, your lot to you. A more modern term for steward is the caretaker in Pinter's sense; to be elaborated later.

government, social security _____ social worker _____ (i) the poor.

government, medical authorities, charities, social security, social worker _____ head of family, _____ (ii) the spouse, guardian handicapped

It is a vital insight on Mead's part that the "I" has the duties, the "me" has the rights. The "me" in this context is the capacity of the self as citizen; the self is a "me" in so far as it is continuous in its being with the generalized other, the concept which could be - has in the Introduction been - defined as the experiential or socialpsychologic inside of the collective consciousness or the Sacred, the moral *status quo* as established in society, of positive social reality. The concept of the Profane as a class of people may be defined as such selves in whom the duties of the "me" and the rights of the "I" have been deemed as separate, on account of the fact that they are blemished in some sense and are unfit, or are deemed to be unfit, to autonomously co-ordinate and to independently judge or handle, manage the relationship between their rights and their duties - in other words, to be responsible. The two classes of 'blemished' listed above are so, and cannot as a consequence manage independently, because of reasons to do with purely external facticity attaching to their selves as "me"-s. There is an Aristotelian sort of freedom and socialpsychologic autonomy as a self, as an internal matter, which is the possibility of these blemished, as indeed it is of all classes of Rachmones, but not as a matter, and on the plane of ascription, of external, social fact.

The above two classes of circumstantially incapables, are to be distinguished from certain other types of ascriptionally damaged. The

next category is provided by those who are ascriptionally blemished because of their society-variant, or heretic, personalities. This category is comprised, in the main, by the criminal and the mad, and their heresy consists in the fact that they are informed, and abide as the mainspring of their set of standards by other than the established, reigning one, other than the norm, the standard informing and maintaining society.

Table 2.

Type II. Blemished, or The Blemished by Ascription Only.

Caretakers, Sacred, Pukka.

The Undeserving
(in the sense as
expounded by Doolittle
in Shaw's Pygmalion)

Psychiatrists, health
service, the government,
the fuzz_____

social worker, head
of family, guardian,
spouse_____ (i) the mentally ill

The fuzz, the government_____

social worker,
probation service_____ (ii) the 'pure criminal'
or 'pure heretic'
or political offender
He shares with groups
(i), (iii), (iv) & (v)
that it's the body of
the social norm and
of the given doctrines or
the existing confines
of the law, in his case,
which he explicitly
means to affect, and
make inclusive with his
redefinition of that
according to his lights.
This is the explicit
aim of his deviance
which is clear in its mo-
tivation of other petty
or sordid content.

Same agencies as above _____ same agencies
as above _____

(iii) the common criminal
He, in addition to being
guilty on account of the
soiled, self-seeking con-
tent of his crime, is also
guilty of offending against
the collective conscious-
ness as represented in so-
ciety, though he doesn't
mean to change the latter
or take it to task; he means
that to remain unruffled
and himself to be undetect-
ed in the framework of it.

Same agencies as above.
The generalized other,
established academics _____

(iv) pure heretics as
scientific innovators
such as Giordano Bruno,
Kepler or Galilei - also,
for instance, a geneticist
in the Eastern (conceivably
also in the Western) world
who backs hypotheses dis-
continuous with the body
of science furnishing the
current scientific and
ideologic norm

Same agencies as in
group (iv) _____

(v) social innovators in
the arts;
an Orton, a Lennon, a
Marlowe, a Rousseau e.g.
- their possible separa-
tion, setting apart from
the Pukka, may not be per-
petrated in crude and
manifest ways - their
punishment, Profane status,
'excommunication', may be in
symbolic terms, possibly
secretly, unbeknown to them.

The mainspring of the mode of conduct of the political criminal -
that variety of the 'pure heretic'- may be likened to the hubris of the
hero of ancient Greek tragedy. The conflict between the ascribed norms
of society and the agencies, or agent, upholding those, versus the
hubris of the main hero, formed the central theme of that genre. The

hero of the tragedy, by Aristotle's definition and ruling, had to be an individual to whom the audience looked up in every respect, who was great and had no petty faults, the only flaw in his character - the reason why he had to fall and for which he was to pay with his life, was this only, big-letter crime: hubris, or putting his consciousness, his personal standards of human reality on a par with the order of the gods, the sacred as established in the order of society, bringing his "I", when at variance with that, to bear on that order, making a bid for his human standards to be assimilated in that reigning order: it was heresy in the sense of taking it upon himself to have his own standards as human reality, in an instance of its 'deviance' with the Sacred as defined in the word, embraced, absorbed in the Sacred, in society, so as to alter and affect society through a significant, critical, socially consequential, personal act, such as that of Antigone in the face of Creon - in an act that was moral according to her different, personal lights (those of human reality), one that was the product of her unique, inner, ethical insight and that alone, not yet endorsed by the mores as they were, as constantly propounded by the Chorus. Because of the hero's greatness, the conflict was great - sacred - in its nature; it was between the gods and their stewards, and the hero: himself a divine pretender. In the context of the Greek drama, the question of the virtue of the hero, his sin through the act of his hubris, was equivocal. It was seen by the audience as sin - because pointedly at variance with society - his or her consciousness big-letter Profane by definition; it was seen as profane, or sin, but one to be admired because consisting in and illuminated by consistent alternative standards, those of human reality. At the same time as the hero's act of hubris being, to the audience's mind, a blatant violation of the order of the Sacred, it had an underlying, socialpsychologically compelling rationale to it, amounting to a demand and obligation in terms of a personal set of morals, unavoidably moving the hero in his individual capacity to commit his act of hubris; and the audience could identify with the hero's personal set of motivation also. The view the Greek took regarding the hero's motivation as hubris was coloured by their dualism, an aspect of which linked them to the dualism of those thinkers who are considered in this thesis; they saw the problem of the proverbial coin which has two sides to it, consciousness in this case, one collective and the other the set and medium of standards anchored in human reality - two kinds of

reality upheld by contradictory structures, bodies of dicta, external and established versus individual and inner - an extreme, polarised situation; and that which makes an act right in the light of one of these angles, makes it wrong from the point of view of the other angle on it. Hubris is the vehicle of the project both of the subsequent saint who succeeds in having his insights stemming from human reality emancipated, and of the common or garden heretic whose lights as made public do not come to sprout roots in a following. It - hubris - is highly akin, if not synonymous, with Mead's notion of social creativity (to receive comment later.) Social creativity may be seen as hubris - pure crime, sin, pride '1', challenging, individual, socially consequential arrogance, made good.

The essential feature which the conduct of the mad, the heretic and the social pioneer have in common, may be labelled 'social surrealism'. It consists in the fact that the project of these would-be sacred pretenders (sacred on their own terms), is to create social reality *ex nihilo*. 'Ex nihilo', consistently with Sartre, is from the realm of possibilities for the "I" or in his choice of words, for Being-for-Itself. The pure heretic offers up, at the price of being branded big-letter Profane, the possibility which is the object of his heresy, his insight, his proposal for an amended generalized other inclusive of it, his self uncurtailed of his vision, to be patriated into the body of norms as universally upheld in established social reality. He means to graduate from the big-letter would-be Sacred or heretic, fighting solo for himself and others like him, to licensed acceptance complete with the claim of his "I" as small-letter sacred as it were, in the everyday, run-of-the-mill society as it is. Small-letter sacred is a term usefully introduced here; it is tantamount to small-letter profane, personally, normally becoming human demeanour in the ordinary way, profaneness realising itself in the world without a hitch as proper, as undisturbed, unruffled for what it is - the human condition, nothing better and nothing worse, allowed to make its way in the world without being stripped of its natural privilege and responsibilities as a person. It's the fussless bid, practice and management of the self, complete with the "I" in one's normal business in freedom as a self, as the self one is in one's unblemished, uncurtailed liberty to simply get on with one's life. The small-letter sacred are people who find room, neither

necessarily very obtrusively nor particularly apologetically, as salient human realities in the world (for the meaning of 'salience' see the Introduction), as the unselfconscious human realities they are as profane, as individuals on their platform in the world through their "me" somewhat consequentially anchored in the society of one's everyday, in the routine way of one's activities. Bultmann and Sartre reserve the label 'grace' for this unhassled, personally dignified, ordinary way of the individually adequate management of the self. 'Small-letter sacred' is definitely to be distinguished from the big-letter counterpart of the concept, from the ascribed, self-important Sacredness of the Pukka when officially asserting and promoting himself, that usage of the term for which we usually reserved the label 'Sacred' so far; and we shall for that reason fully spell out 'small-letter sacred' when that's what we mean, to avoid ambiguity.

The mad misjudge the extent to which this "I"-emancipation can be done in the world to accommodate the radius of their bid for the realisation and of their innovative selves as fully accepted human realities, as small-letter sacred. The social pioneer whose heresy will find response in social reality and thereby indeed will become emancipated, gets it just right. The completely uncreative person doesn't take on this project at all in the context of social reality, not even to a very slight extent. To the romantic existentialist moralist, he is the worst sinner of all, as he doesn't practice, doesn't act on his possibility of being small-letter sacred (though he may be imitative of the big-letter Sacred as his route to being with some personal excellence) - he doesn't act on his possibility of being in part god in the small-letter sense himself, or at least one who takes his degree of divinity as a man (or woman) through personally direct intuition, in his capacity as an individual, as a human reality, through giving leeway to himself as the divine spark which as a mode of being is the possibility of every self, is the possible fountainhead and informant of everyone's conduct, if this path, this project for the self's management be chosen.

The 'pure' political and social heretic, then, may be seen as one who aims to alter the generalized other as it is, by widening it to accommodate in the future, in 'kingdom come' as it were (here on earth

of course), the standards of his lights, personally intuited and upheld as human reality - a society more tolerant than the current one, one catering for his absolutely compelling personal standards. Of course, it's perfectly possible that the altered generalized other he is yearning to be part of, is more exclusive rather than more inclusive in its accommodation of universal humanity than the present one, that his lights as a person prompt the narrowing of the generalized other's condition of membership in the aimed-for established society of the future - our 'pure heretic' can easily be a reactionary, a fascist for instance.

A few classificatory and summary remarks are usefully made here.

Taking, once again, Type II Blemished as a comprehensive category, complete with the subclasses 'mad', 'criminal' (of both sorts), 'scientific innovator', 'social innovator in the Arts', as posited in Table 2, a point should be made regarding a consequential difference between the two main generic classes comprising this cluster of heretics: the criminal and the mad; - a difference which is lodged in Pukka attitude. While the Pukka admits that the setting apart of the criminal from the Sacred and constraining him, serves the interest of society, he usually would not admit that this holds for the mentally ill, too. He would say that the confinement of the mad, his caretaking-recipient, the curtailment of his freedom as responsible citizen serves the interest of the individual so blemished (the turn of phrase 'for his, or her, own good' a familiar verbal tag attached to implementing such measures as curtail the radius for his being as a self) - yes, the Pukka would typically deny that his constraining classification of varieties of the mad by psychiatric labels is an ideologic ploy, and that the assumption of the effected person's duties by the agencies identified in Table 2, safeguards the edifice, the Pukka's edifice of the norm at its manifold as it roots into, upholds and indeed comprises the generalized other by which the Pukka abides and which maintains his order, an insight which unfolds under the analytic prism of Thomas Szasz and of Foucault, in the different ways of these two workers.

In comparing Type II Blemished, so rendered because of their 'social surrealism', with Type I Blemished, those marred by circumstantial

factors in the main, certain differences and similarities should be noted. In the cases of Type II Blemished, the Heretical because of their personality and conduct, the separation between their rights and duties, "I"-s and "me"-s, and their subjugation as selves to caretaking, has been effected by definition rather than by physically tangible, external factors setting them apart from the Pukka. Their loss of autonomy as selves is 'constituted' by decree, as it were, by legal means. Nevertheless, their constraint, albeit by ascription only, obtains in a very real sense, on the level of social fact, of recorded positive reality, which will not go away in its hard-and-fast factual idiom, which stands outside them and between their project as selves to act upon their wishes and the realisation of those on their platform in the world in a free "me" as available to the sacred, big-letter or small. Even so, the curtailment of their "me", the privation of that from serving their will, however real, does not amount to the same order and extent of privation as that of the circumstantially damaged, particularly the physically handicapped. The handicapped person cannot, of course, be emancipated in the sense of mending his blemish without a trace at the end of his project aimed at transcending the dislodgement between the ideals of his self as an "I" and his "me" as given, he cannot have his project yield him the freedom of a dignified and autonomous self, except, as has been said, in an Aristotelian sort of sense, important as that is. No project of hubris, no degree of success in affecting the world to accommodate their lights, no project of martyrdom, crusading or unauthentic bid for transcendence (as that of the Jew in Sartre's Antisemite and Jew) can lift the confining facticity which is his lot, curbing his actio radius as an autonomous self; no bid for a comely balance between the will as an "I" and set of actual opportunities as a "me", will do away with his blemish, palpable to the eye.

Secondly, and conversely, as legislatively created ascription can, and does, curtail Type II agents as selves, rendering their "me" disabled in a real sense as such on the long term, so does the physiological or other circumstantial disability concomitantly introduce sociologically and socialpsychologically lesser, Profane status in the real terms of social reality, into the mode of being of Type I agents, with the Sartrian lack, constrained psychological sense of anomie, and

experience of big-letter Profaneness which goes with it - though Good Faith (and the Aristotelian freedom it can generate) and bad faith can both come to the rescue to some extent in attenuating the cognisance and sensation of the ensuing dislodgement of the self. The physically handicapped person, for example, may have urgent need for a new technical device which would make his life easier... or an economically disadvantaged family may undergo a spell of stress and want to shield a child from its effects; they may contemplate a brief period in public school for the child while the family trauma is being weathered. On application, there will be calls by the social worker... means tests... An intrapersonal schism, a split between what the person needs (the "I"'s function) and what he is assessed as worthy of having (his set of opportunities as defined for him as an actual "me"), is established, comes to transpire, and graduates to the being of a social fact (and as a consequence a psychological one too), facts which are now the case in a positive sense. Institutional agencies enter and become the judges of the "I"'s aspirations, staring at those and at the inner structure of the self to which those cohere, through the magnifying glass of a so-called objectivity. The schism is judged, measured up, audited, made a note of, entered onto files, debated, acquiring an existence on the big-letter continuum of society as a system of rigid, accomplished social facts, rising to the order of a Type II: Blemish as a matter of legislated social reality, and assumes its place alongside with the socially ascribed imperfects, sharing with those their order of officialdom-induced and maintained Profaneness. Needless to say, the institution, if approached for help in bringing nearer one's aspirations to the real opportunities for those in the world, may even have the power to sort out the applicants' private problems and emergencies in ways which are most easily at the disposal of the institution rather than in ways the recipients would need and envisage for themselves - an application for boarding school landing the child in care.

Socialpsychologically speaking, the blemish of the poor and the handicapped, is not just that which stares one in the eye when one sees the manifest signs of it. No; in addition to both the genres of the circumstantially blemished, the handicapped and the poor, marked off from the rest as a matter of crude, external facticity, their status among the physiologically and/or financially well-off Pukka as equally

dignified selves in an anthropologic sense, as people who as a matter of course are taken for granted as also pukka, small-letter sacred, their sense of being persons who know their own minds and are able, at least potentially, to normally and responsibly act on their own likes and choices, is also characteristically taken from them - as the radio series Does He Take Sugar? so perceptively shows in the context of the physically handicapped. In the context of the all too common mistreatment of the poor in the face of the insignia of their blemish, Mark Twain's Prince and Pauper affords a sensitive study.

Finally, the third macrosociologic form of the sacred-profane relationship should be identified here, albeit an intermediary type, in two senses. Firstly so because this type owes something to the socialpsychologic notion 'the stranger' (explored in greater depth in the chapter called "Rosebud or Bête Noire?") - and impinging on that to a certain extent. It's also intermediary in the context of the present chapter, as it is, in many ways, a mixture between Type I and Type II Rachmones, in some respects a circumstantially and in others an ascriptionally created type of handicapped, so created in equal parts.

Table 3.

Type III Blemished. Minority Subcultures.

Pukka, Sacred, Caretaker

Government, immigration
authorites (if applic-
able), patriotic indige-
nous citizen (generalized
other), the fuzz.

_____ race relations

officer _____ (i) racial minorities

Same agencies as above _____ (ii) national minorities

Government, established
Church (both of own deno-
mination and that of
religious majority_____ (iii) religious minorities

The generalized other,
government and other
security vetting
agencies_____ (iv) other minority sub-
cultures such as homo-
sexual ones.

These will not receive
comment in the same
detail as other Rach-
mones groups mentioned
here.

The above types of Rachmones share with Type II Blemished the feature that their relegation to Profane status subsists by virtue of being legislatively so created, by ascription only. Exceptions are group (i): racial minorities, and the homosexuals of group (iv), whose separation, setting apart from the generalized other of the majority, owes something to physiologic factors too - groups whose Rachmones status is constituted by the double burden of being 'constituted' Blemished in both Type I and Type II ways.

Type III Rachmones groups have in common with the mad that when dealt with individually by the ascribed Pukka, there is a pretence that caretaking is in the interest of the recipients, that those are better off due to caretaking in terms of the reigning indigenous norm than they would be otherwise; that they need the caretaking. With regard to some Type III Rachmones, there is some truth in this, particularly in the case of immigrant groups, especially white ones. When political refugees seek asylum, the freedom they are after is typically freedom to be middle-class, and not freedom to continue leading a life of probing, not freedom to be consciousnesses unfettered by, liberated, as Being-for-Itselfs, from anomalousness of the norm as society wherever and whenever this may be the case, and they settle in their niches offered for them by the receiving subculture as sanctified by the reigning main one. Immigrant subcultures are buffer zones, shielding the immigrants as individuals, from culture shock and tempering that for them, a crutch for postponing having to deal with it in the first person singular, spreading out that job in time and handing the need for it down to their

children - sidestepping, delaying the call for transcendence both of the unjustifiable norm which they fled, and of segregation in the chosen one - postponing that for generations, leaving to their descendants the unavoidable need to integrate. Again, coloured immigrants present a different case - being marked off as alien (and being regarded as Rachmones on account of that) on the long term across generations, due to the colour of their skins, the job of transcendence, of re-writing, redefining their future for themselves and thereby altering the reality which separates them from the Pukka and from the mainstream generalized other is not open to them, with emancipation for that reason harder - and because of the prolongedly differential attitude to them by the Pukka and by the generalized other, membership in their own subculture has a different, authentic meaning and validity for them.

The immigrant contingent of all groups within the Type III Blemished category share the feature with the criminals in Type II that the Pukka will admit that their separation from the Pukka as a matter of legislation and the dislodgement between their "me"-s and "I"-s as the by-product of their subjection to caretaking, serves the interest of the state. (As already touched on, the Pukka typically denies that this is so with the mad.) The way in which caretaking in the service of the state and of established society applies to the physically handicapped and the poor in their special ensemble, will receive comment later.

Finally, it should be noted in the context of Type III Rachmones, that within their own subculture, not all people who seem so classified on the surface, are in fact Rachmones. Some are Pukka or willing caretaker vis-a-vis those who are profane in other than their own subcultural aspect, conceivably even on account of subcultural factors which tie them to other subcultures. This situation is further complicated by the fact that these socially relatively elevated Pukkas in the context of their own in-groups may simultaneously be Rachmones in relation to more prestigious in-groups and of course to the host culture. But looking at this observation within the confines of the subculture, the effect which these individuals have, due to their somewhat prestigious ascription, upon the more lowly ascribed in their subculture, does not basically differ from the effect which the Pukka in the host culture have on every kind of Rachmones.

Section 2. The Three Sociologically Relevant Functions of the Specialisation of the "me" and the "I".

In this section we examine certain key ways in which the institutional separation of the "me" and the "I" through ascribed caretaking comes to be of systematic macrosociologic importance. There are three such ways.

In the classes of Rachmones so far identified, the 1:1 relation within the self of the "me" and the "I" is removed, not merely as a socialpsychologic matter concerning the individuals so affected (and irrespective of the re-uniting of these functions of the self within any Rachmones as a personal Aristotelian feat), but in a once-for-all manner, as a matter of legislation, and effectively so. An example is afforded by Sophocles' Oedipus Rex; he is uncovered as and therefore is a sinner, big-letter as such, and intolerable as such to society, even though he didn't mean to sin and was unaware, throughout his adult lifetime, that he was doing so. The two intraindividual aspects of the self, the components of its infrastructure, the "me" and the "I", will each be involved, in different and specialised ways in the overt phenomenon and process of society when thus uncovered as Profane, each going their separate way and playing a part predetermined for it in big-letter social reality. The "I" is assumed by the representatives of the Sacred, the caretakers of it, the choice of the "I"'s duties, its job of picking the causes to be served, of casting projects, venturing hypotheses, opinions, having ideas, disposing with resources, defining responsibilities, shaping its destiny, is institutionally requisitioned *in loco* the self and channelled towards the We, swelling up its prevalence. At the same time the "me", the self's overt arena of positively realisable or realised chances in the world as such, is sparingly apportioned and accessed to the self as though a gift from those anthropologically above, and not something already the recipients', not something already belonging to the Rachmones, by virtue of their being selves. The "me", the system of real opportunities to the self, of real occasions for realising the functions and calls of the "I", spans three categories in nature in which the "me" is simultaneously involved, as will be elaborated later - the physiologic, the socialpsychologic and the sociologic. It has the nerve endings and

the concrete, demonstrable outlines in the first person singular as an autonomous nervous system, a socialpsychologic personality and a social unit with a name, within which composite confines the pay-off of the projects, launched by socially more prestigious agencies than himself, (particularly when those have gone wrong) really does hurt, where the citizen's reputation, name, his dignity as a prestige-wise intact social 'carrier', is marred, where its life as a personality, socialpsychologic entity is curtailed, witnessed and experienced as other than small-letter sacred, as deprived, devoid of the evidence in his personal demeanour of a well-managed "I", of the evidenceable unity and completeness of his "me" with an "I" of his own - or 'grace' by Sartre's definition of that term. This process, the by-product of the 'specialisation' in this manner, of the "I" being seeped off by the Pukka and the "me" judiciously parcelled out by him to the Rachmones, takes place much of the time incidentally and automatically as the natural by-product of the everyday business of bureaucracy, but can at times be (and is, more often than meets the eye), strategically engineered. The systematic dislodgement of the 1:1 correspondence between the "me" and the "I" in people has the practical advantage to the Pukka that it's the mechanism whereby the individual or groups of individuals can be sacrificed in the name of the We when the causes and the projects of others misfire, or even otherwise, as a lasting arrangement of interpersonal intercourse or as an insurance for the prolongation of ascriptive states of affairs as they are, as a matter of long-standing policy. The expression and the concomitant underlying sentiment of 'this is going to hurt me more than it'll hurt you' is the sure-fire heralding of a project of the sacrificing of the addressee of this pronouncement for something unpleasant to him and useful to the Pukka.

The second macrosociologic or rather macroanthropologic purpose which such a dislodgement between the two basic functions of the self, the "me" and the "I" fulfils, is that the Pukka may be good. This point requires enlarging on to some extent.

It's a basic and axiomatic need in man that he wants to be good or 'excellent' as human reality. Mead's notion of the 'sentinel' traces back the origin of the notion of the display of personal excellence to

pre-human society, referring by this term to that animal in the herd which is best, most outstandingly endowed with the discriminatory powers of his senses, thereby becoming the leader of the other animals, followed by all. Such a sentinel is singled out by nature in the herd in this way by virtue of the refinement of its perceptual capacities. (2) In man, the sentinel capacity becomes an object for reflection, illuminated by the cognisance of this excellence in the context of the self, and is desired as an intrinsic quality of the self which is prized as an end in itself. Mead considers that, generally speaking, the avenues to excelling as an individual can be classified into the outcome of one out of two possible approaches to that project, one more primitive than the other. In simpler societies, and originally, excellence is understood and is being pursued in terms of and in compliance with the ruling norm, only more successfully and more intensely than the others, such as dressing according to the fashion and surpassing, in doing so, current taste itself, imitating and exercising that in its own superlative idiom and quality, the self revelling in its outstanding and enhanced 'sameness' in comparison with everyone else, aiming to display in what one is, seems and has, that which everyone else is and seems and has, only bigger and better. A more sophisticated and later strategy to excellence is that of being superior to the norm in terms of one's differences compared with it, excelling vis-a-vis the norm by nonconformity and originality of gifts, aspirations, accomplishments. (3) To want to be sentinel in whichever of these two possible veins, the wish to be paramount good to all and acknowledged as such, is probably universal in man. The explicit knowledge that one is not good is not easily tolerable and if shown in the socially prominently placed, is not popular, unless successfully masked by bad faith in the existentialist sense of the term, by the socially uncreative agent, or by big-letter Bad Faith in the heavy biblical sense: big-letter Hypocrisy. Bad Faith in this sense - the ploy of the Socially Uncreative high up in society parading as the paramount sources of goodness, in spite of their moral passivity or even counter-productivity in relation to the Social Good of all, is not confined to Old and New Testament times where the perpetrators of such hypocrisy were exposed by the contributors to the Bible in religious terms, but are recognisable, with their activities often secularised and updated, in twentieth-century times. In our day we can identify the morally

divisive practices of those high up by ascription, in the form of the cynical, programmatic and relentless stage management of the semblance of goodness in such highly ascribed people for the eyes and ears of the public, which semblance of goodness in the modern socially Pukka is achieved, quite commonly with the help of the media, by the stimulus pairing on the public arena of High Up personages with opportunities, indeed the monopoly, to ostentatiously do and be good. The Socially Elevated are systematically shown in conspicuous acts of the help of the Less Fortunate whose selves, "me"-s and "I"-s, more commonly than not, these Pukka are the ones to keep permanently dislodged and therefore inadequate, as a result of the arrangement of the assured and long-term distance in and for the 'profane' between the chances to become fulfilled "me"-s on the podium of the tangible, real social world, and the needs, deserts and rights of their "I"-s for such fulfilment, not less well developed in socially low-ranking people than they are in high-ranking ones. This kind of modern-day, big-letter Hipocracies functions, thrives, is gratified and fed through the systematic, shop-window display of the Pukka continually assisting and patronising those who aspire, hopelessly, to first-person-singular excellence themselves (with their opportunities to do so thwarted), so as to cause on the long term the values which are considered the touchstone of goodness to become and stay firmly fixed, attached to themselves in the high echelons of society. Goodness, contentment, self-realisation is, to appearances, issued from these high quarters as the ruling (often established religion-coincidental) ethics, instances of the fulfilment of ordinary people in the state of alienation from it are systematically attached to the Initiated Select by the diligent and relentless Pavlovian association between moving instances of dishing out 'help', and the sight of the Pukka as indissmissibly instrumental in any degree of adequacy attained in the socially lowly on such occasions. These knowingly engineered instances of charity are occasions for a Laingian complementary arrangement (writ large) between those (socially) low by whom fulfilment as human reality, not fully accomplished by them, is authentically pursued but to whom such fulfilment through one's own means and exertions is not available - (these agencies serve in this social symbiosis as object, strategically conditioned and kept so), and, on the other hand, the High Up to whom personal fulfilment as choice quality human reality is available but not usually personally pursued

and cultivated; these agencies figure in this two-stroke differential process as subject. The prizes to be won in this exercise are also differential; acknowledged goddness and all the moral privileges and hallmarks that go with that for the Pukka, and, in contrast, marks and certificates for effort awarded to the Rachmones whose bid for the transcendence of their unjustifiable lack in the world is deemed 'deserving' by judges informed by the ideals of ascription (as distinct from the ideals of human reality). The mechanism of this discriminatory separation of functions into the socially low and the socially high respectively, will receive more comment later in greater detail. For the moment, an example will be called upon to highlight how the jealous monopoly of access to the privilege of goodness as such by the Pukka, is maintained and kept operative in everyday life. Not long ago I had a conversation with a recently released prisoner: a criminal Blemished. He told me how his tainted image in the eye of the generalized other has barred him, since his release, from any occasion to perceive himself as a fully rehabilitated, freely breathing individual, from abandoning himself in participation as an equal among human beings in any walk of life, even in the religious community where he was known. I pointed out to him - he was a capable runner - that the annual London Marathon, is an elementally emotional event where people share, celebrate together in uplifting anonymity (or so I thought) the feeling of a challenge conquered together, and suggested that participating may provide for him the kind of unqualified experience of being one of the brave and sporting among many others, which he was missing so much. He thanked me, but when I met him later I learnt that he did not take part after all; on being told that permission to participate was subject to satisfying conditions in an application form, on finding that even this avenue of stretching himself, without compromise, as the person he still felt he was, as small-letter sacred, was closed to him by the establishment's all-encompassing red tape, he turned his back on the undertaking and started getting used to the Aristotelean confines within which alone his kind - an ascribed Rachmones - was free to continue to percieve himself as the human being he knew felt and believed himself to be, at least prospectively.

There is no source of goodness, excellence as human reality other than that deriving from the project of and success in 'mending the

lack', in Sartre's sense. The lack, of course, is not necessarily the dramatic affair exclusively touching the greatly disadvantaged, their absent desired "me" to match the "I" strikingly displaced from the greatly blemished "me" which is their lot in actuality. The undramatic business of getting by with dignity in the everyday complexities of life, managing satisfactorily with regard and in response to a discriminating "I" in the ordinary job of living, is excellence enough, is elating enough. Success at this project, the project of summoning a graceful "me" in response to an unsundered "I" in instances calling for that, may be called the 'closure' or completion of the self, the filling of the lack identified and proclaimed by the "I", with the object of its hunger, a realised "me" just fitting that, precisely 'answering to' that, the completed, satiated end, pay-off of its project, in however small a way. Everyone has lack, as Paul and Sartre point out, if temporarily no more than the potential for being with one; it's simply consciousness, the faculty of judgement of one's self, and that of another, as a person, as persons. The instance and occasion when the lack is met with positivity (the "me" rooted into its threefold system of tiers of reality), that positivity exactly which is appropriate to it, we can speak of closure. Closure is a paradigm of the self; it's the self at its fulfilled, in the process of social creativity. Closure of the self is no other than its grace, the fulfilled yield in the self of social creativity at its active and successful, or being small-letter sacred; it's the moment of affecting these almost synonymous conditions of the self. Social creativity is a fruitful aspect of the process directed towards this condition, to which a whole section will be given later in this chapter. In anticipation of that, the briefest of definitions will be given of it now, with just one or two examples as a guide to its applicability in practice.

Social creativity is the process of the tropism of the self towards closure in a human reality-wise fulfilled and fulfilling way, in oneself and in others, and the course and medium in which this is achieved in the overt act, in overt conduct. It's the dynamic project, inclusive with the occasion, of justice being done to the "I" of a deserving self, which "I" is that self's system of rights, needs, lights and clamouring capacities as such, in the accomplishment of these attributes to the self in the bid-at "me" at the end of the projects which aims at this

accomplishment explicitly. It is the desire for such a "me" which will be fulfilled, gratified and expressed by this project if successful. The act, in this sense, is the union in actuality of the coming true of the stated "I" in the accomplished "me", and, if realised, becomes the unit of the self at its active, with the act the molecule, the natural unit of the process of human reality, of the course of the life of the self as such. It's the undertaking, and phenomenon, of the "I" casting a project and its consolidating that in the "me", the platform for itself in the world, a brick in the repertoire of the "me" in the structure and radius of social positivity, though not with the "me" grasped in Althusserian impersonality, as 'carrier' of society only, but apprehended and experienced in personalness, with the "me" engaged in the project of its realisation ever expressive of the "I", an index of that, and of its particular project, in a concrete way for the individual as such. This 'fusion' of the "me" and the "I", its realisation in the accomplished act, can certainly be affected within the confines of a single self, though Mead usually refers to the interpersonal fusions of these constituent parts of the self when using the term 'social creativity' (something that will be explained anon). Examples of such a 'fusion' between a project-thirsty and generative "I" and the "me" poignantly 'answering to' it within the act of one individual, can be something as dramatic as writing a book to its completion, breaking a record in a sport, or something as undramatic as running a farm, a shop, pursuing a craft or any means of earning a living, making ends meet, enabling one for the project of quite simply conducting one's life, making good any undertaking in which the socially creative "I" of the self is gratified, made possible in actuality, in its marriage, fusion in an envisaged, and managing, "me".

But, man being a social animal, his need to be active in society an axiomatic hunger among all his other capacities as an "I", the object or "me" fitting, 'answering to' the "I"'s project, may be brought about, affected in cross-personality between two or more particular selves, with the "I" realising itself in terms of someone else's "me", and the "me" in one lent to another, realising, justifying someone else's "I". One's own "I" is also involved in such an instance, in the act of one's lending a "me" to another. 'The impulse of the "I" in this case is neighborliness', Mead writes, and he goes on to explain: 'It is that

social tendency which we all have in us that calls out a certain type of response: one wants to give", to lend a "me" to another's "I". '4' In this light, interpersonal paradigms of the fulfilment of "I"-s with "me"-s, "me"-s with "I"-s, must be enlisted in the repertoire of genres of 'closure'. Mead finely analyses processes and instances of multiple interpersonal engagements of "me"-s and "I"-s, such ensembles of "me"-s and "I"-s which are complete, gain particular, concrete 'closure' between two participants (possibly more) as well as within the self of the giver as an individual, in the course of simply using language, in simple conversation; and a story by Maupassant affords an instance of a very striking incident of the manifold engagements of "me"-s and "I"-s between two people, in very heightened interpersonality.

A wetnurse and a soldier, the short story goes, travel in the same train compartment. The nurse has been dismissed from service; her breasts, unsucked, bursting with milk to the point of crucifying her, and the soldier, having had nothing to eat for days, at the brink of starvation. After some initial words bringing these people closer to one another, the wetnurse comes to give suck to the soldier in the compartment. This is the entire story, but it lends itself to analysis in terms of intricate complexities of giving and taking, matching "me"-s with "I"-s both intra- and interpersonally. Both these characters bring their "I" to bear on one another, both by voicing their need and by offering their "me"-s in inventingly original and strikingly innovative social creativity, gaining their rewards as individuals both by way of the accomplishment of the hoped-for "me" in the other, in love in a certain sense, and in the form of the relief, satisfaction and successful gratification of their own "me"-s, these two distinct sets of rewards, personal and interpersonal, coincidental, synchronised and homogenised in time and in kind. That the nature and order of their mutual exchange of rewards is most obviously physiological, when narrowly viewed, should of course in no way detract from the elementally strong sense in which their gratification at the socialpsychologic plane also takes place, concomitantly. It has already been pointed out that we see the "me" as an individual human unit which spans, is rooted, in three orders of nature in concord, the physiologic, the socialpsychologic and the social; the soldier's and nurse's interpersonal encounter in the story as finally rewarded selves is, for

that reason, meaningfully construed as affecting the self as such in spite of the apparent predominance of the biologically 'material' nature of their respective hungers and the satiation of those. Moreover, in apparently taking only, the soldier also gives to the nurse, not only by relieving her physiologically and therefore being instrumental in her greater physical comfort, but also in the context of the socialpsychologic project they are simultaneously engaged in, by being party to the social unconventionality of their way of acting on their complementary personal needs, and the same can be said of the nurse - her giving in this dual sense perhaps even more obvious than in the case of the soldier, since she does the feeding in the most literal sense on the physiologic plane, too. The socialpsychologic "I" of both these characters is most definitely engaged, put actively into play in this situation at the properly symbolic, evolutionarily higher level of human reality as such. In the inventiveness and spontaneity of their act they transcend the 'death' inherent, according to Maupassant's message, in slavish, stereotypic confinement to social conventions and in the face of those; and their mutual and complementary giving and taking nourishment in terms of their "me"-s touches concomitantly both on the actual and the symbolic, social and socialpsychologic levels, too.

To Mead, any 'fusion', in authenticity, between the "I"'s projects and the "me"'s realisation of them, whether this occurs intra- or interpersonally, is classed as social creativity - the act of creatively bringing to bear one's capacity, talent, gift as an "I" on a "me" in the positive world of stimulation, in everyday, simple acts of complementary interpersonal exchanges, quite as much as in writing a poem in seclusion. This is so to Mead's way of thinking because he doesn't entertain the Being-for-Itself of an individual as a paradigm of consciousness separate from its Being-for-Others mode (to turn to a Sartrean nomenclature for a moment), but any mode of conduct of the self, in however private a context, is, to Mead, society internalised. And conversely, the 'fusion' of the "me" and the "I" is the sole purveyor of any excellence. Mead and Paul postulate the gift of social creativity as one of the repertoire of all and any talent in man, as well as a common dimension underlying, informing the application of any or all of these gifts - (a tall order in its message and implications for the scientist and his ethics.) (5)

The lack intuited in oneself and in others in empathy, is a strongly moving cognisance, and the experience of the 'closure' of the lack strongly cathartic. The lack derives, irrepressibly, from the "I" liaising, unavoidably, with the collective consciousness and its primarily, directly available schemata, as its norms are immediately fathomed at first hand, and from its measuring itself and others, the lot of those, against that, instead and in critique of the norm as it is and the "me" of oneself or another over against that current norm in actuality. Furthermore it derives from endeavouring to affect 'closure' for oneself or for others as a self, or selves, which are rightfully more worthy than their prevailing standing as such in the light of the collective consciousness thus grasped in its ideality, intuited, in first-hand authenticity. This is the responsibility of the "I" and there is no let-off; this capacity for responsibility is ceaselessly mobilised in response to detected small lacks or instances of great atrocity confronting human reality and its judgemental capacities, such as war, even if we are not directly involved in its perpetration, by Sartre's rigorous standards. No-one is exempt from coping with such responsibilities at first hand, and from doing one's damndest to repair affairs if such duties are implicated by present anomalous states in the world, morally belittling one (for we are all responsible for these and such affairs are everybody's guilt) - no-one is exempt from having to manage as a self in response to such anomalies, in other words, from authentically earning one's grace. The specialisation of the "me"-s and "I"-s into the two major anthropologic classes, the Pukka and the Rachmones, syphoning Subject status into those Pukka and affecting permanence of the lack between the possibility of such a status and the state of the "me" as given in others, leaving them to grapple, if they so choose (though they can't choose otherwise), with the job of the bridging the gap between that "me" and a more deservedly 'closed' or graceful self, has the effect of transposing 'grace', unearned, into those up high, and keeping those who carry the can for such social and socialpsychologic anomalies in the current constellation of "I"- "me" displacement in many, or in most people, from success, from first-hand experience or 'closure' by their own design, rearing by way of caretakership a portion of humanity to carry themselves with their heads hanging from early childhood, socially ungraced. Stewardship is assumed, moving conditions of 'closure' and with it excellence of a person, into

their exclusive radius, with selective access to it parsimoniously issued, as already observed. '*Wir wären gut, anstatt so roh, Doch die Verhältnisse, die sind nicht so*', Peachum sings in Brecht's Threepenny Opera. Presenting this process and phenomenon more positively, without recourse to the lack (though there is no reason why one should dispose of the concept), every "I", every project realised, is a dramatic instance of excellence (the only, 24-carat proof of that), whether to bring off such a feat is spectacular or quite a small, practical 'mission accomplished', in one's everyday. There is no source of goodness or excellence as human reality other than affecting a "me" of a certain order of oneself or another, a "me" of a certain stamp and condition, one which is proof and witness of an unsundered "I" vindicated, evidenced in it. The capacity of generating goodness, achieved excellence, is, the monopoly, in truth, of the socially creative, those who affect such "me"-s in the course of the Deed (in Goethe's sense), the act. Excellence and goodness, grace at its successful, is generated exclusively by a productive "I" of one's own or another's appreciated and responded to in personalness at first hand, fulfilling itself in agents in a "me", in a project of individual 'closure' or more than one concurrent individual 'closures'; though the point of fruition of the 'closures' of the self as human reality, its moment of the Nirvanah of that moment, and the conditions for such a 'closure', may be passed into care, and sparingly and meanly portioned out from above, from the ruling class which appears, by careful design, as the sole source of goodness.

It may be of benefit to distinguish here between the terms 'excellence' and 'goodness', which have been used interchangeably so far.

In doing so, it will be helpful to recall and stress again that Mead as well as Paul (as just quoted under Reference 4), both postulate social creativity as one of the repertoire of all and any talent in man with which he is endowed as an "I" - social creativity ranking as a capacity equal in status to, say, one's facility with figures, aptitude for writing novels, turning beautiful table-legs or having an ear for music; and at the same time, both Mead and Paul also regard social creativity as an entire common dimension underlying and informing the application of all or any particular gift.

We may recognise and define social creativity in our activities (whether that figures there in its own purity or as an underlying concomitant of the performance of any particular form of creativeness), as that kind of authentic, personal ceativity born of the peculiar and exclusive, first-hand productivity of human reality, which benefits, is meant to benefit, and causes the realisation of our other gifts to benefit, directly or indirectly, one or more Others.

It is, of course, easy to see that social creativity comes about and is served in a way to satisfy this criterion and definition in instances when "me"-s meet and realise "I"-s, "I"-s meet and realise, "me"-s interpersonally, as in the example of the wet-nurse and the soldier, just quoted above. But the performance, the carrying out of any project of 'closure' between "I" and "me" within a single self - in other words, the engineering of a meeting, within one and the same self, between the "I" with its claims for its realisation, and an actual "me" to fit, gratify, represent or vindicate this creatively keen "I" in the overt, positive terms of the world, can also be classed, carry the hallmark of and belong to the *genus* of social creativity, if one or both of the following justification for a 'closure' within one self are in effect: (a) the agent conceives of himself, if such a vision be in place, as rightfully the equal of an Other - any Other - in the respect of his own human rank and dignified right to be a fulfilled self, and therefore as deserving to be a realised self as the next man (in other words, when in our interpersonal and personal authenticity, we take the attitude to ourselves which we authentically take to another); and (b), we are socially creative in occasioning the act of self-realisation within the radius of our own selves (as has just been said), if we mean to, and succeed in doing justice to some outstanding peculiar talent that we happen to be endowed with, in a manner, and with the explicit or tacit, self-conscious or unselfconscious intention, of thereby gaining and sustaining our capacity for benefiting Others as selves too through the successful and effective 'closure' of our own selves in the act of the realisation, of the bringing to fruition our own peculiar gift, in the course of doing our particular thing, whatever concrete form that may take.

We may succeed in doing our thing, flaunt, prove our 'sentinelship' in any area of accomplishment in the performance of which we may be endowed with the capacity to distinguish ourselves, without reference to the question whether we are or are not socially creative the while. Any instance of the brilliant performance of any of our particular talents (whether or not this feat of ours is permeated with social creativity in the above outlined sense), will earn itself the epithet 'excellence'; but our success at bringing off a project of clear-cut, sheer social creativity or performing some other feat which is explicitly or implicitly underlain by and shot with a meant social creativity, will alone earn us the epithet 'goodness'. In other words, goodness is excellence at social creativity. In demonstrating our excellence through doing outstanding justice to any single gift of ours without reference to social ceativity, will earn itself the quality *virtuoso*; but only through drawing, at the same time, or solely, on our capacity to be creative on universalistic principles by meaning to benefit others as much as meaning to please ourselves, will our performance and conduct become *virtuous*.

The time has come to cast, summary fashion, a glance at the type of Rachmones who were considered so far, and on the issue of the multiple aspects of the specialisation of the functions of the "me" and the "I", differentially, into the Rachmones and the Pukka, respectively.

The poor are a special class in the Pauline umbrella of blemished considered so far. Poverty having been a very common condition of the afflicted by ascription from very early times, it provides a very ready dimension, with a history, underlying all types of Rachmones which have been discerned so far. In spite of this, it is important that our Pauline array of the Blemished are not confused with the working class in Lukács's analysis of class society and the specialisation of the famous Hegelian functions of the individual's consciousness and mode of being pertaining to the self, into ruling class (Subject) and working class (Object) as it is done by Lukács, - although the overlap between those alienated from their grace in the world in Sartre's (and Paul's) sense, and the proletarian population, is very great. The Pauline umbrella of the profane is both wider regarding its numbers and narrower in the sense that their situation is not analysed in economic depth and

inclusiveness as are Lukács's blemished, the working class. But in the Lukácsian context, the context involving the laws of socio-economics proper, the small and intimate, self-analytic canvas of the Pauline universe of discourse, that of human reality, becomes irrelevant and disappears (and properly so), and, conversely, in the more innerly analytic light of the autonomously Pauline spheres of our argument, Lukács's main concern, the gross sociologic patterns of class society likewise become irrelevant and disappear, and their introduction is no asset from the point of view of the different confines of the different discipline we concern ourselves with - social psychology. Lukács is jettisoned here (though he will be returned to later only to be jettisoned again when his widely known views inappropriately intrude on our properly and explicitly socialpsychologic horizons), as he is seen here as guilty of 'category error' and a source of some confusion as a result of that. His attempt to bring Hegelian variables to bear, with sociologically explanatory aspirations, on his model of sociologic class society, inappropriately reduces his study of the relations of production (his concern), to the socialpsychologic or micro-anthropologic theme we are now discussing, the dislodgement within agents between the "me" and the "I". What we are talking about here is not the system of alienation of the fruits of labour, its external products, but of the fact, the phenomenon, the incidence, creation, title to labour itself and Mastery itself in this sense, as will be elaborated in forthcoming parts of this argument. Labour, 'the Work', as it's analysed here, is both the product and the index of the self, the unit of the self defined in terms of its projects, engagement as such, its mode of being and fulfilment as such. The self, human reality - when chosen as the mode of one's being - is productive as its special hallmark, in contrast with the project of the secondary excellence of 'cooking with the recipe book in front of one' as it were, the borrowed, derived knowledge and excellence which is barren, ungenerative of further excellence, which is parasitic on the life and the first-hand mode of the self in the living, engulfs it to fill its lack, a 'stick-up' by the authority in the name and as the side-benefit of ascription, as *droit seigneur* used to be for the feudal landlord. Goodness - being good - can also be approached in this secondary, studied, extortionist manner by the exportation, stealing of very human reality, of social creativity itself from it, from the self at its fulfilled and

fulfilling, and the possessive hogging by the mighty of this function and human privilege itself. What we are talking about here is not the relation of production, but the relations of the production of the self, which is perfectly meaningful though some people might think it unimportant. It's the Pauline or Sartrean lack in the poor (in so far as we comment on those) and the alienation of that as necessary part of the potential to fulfil themselves - it's the alienation of first-hand title to creating goodness, causing excellence, one's own or excellence in this sense in others, which we are talking about, it's the poor or selves of any variety which lack, and their right to transcend that as equal children of god or Pauline profane which is our concern, and should not be conflated with the system of the alienation of the goods only which are produced as a function and question of the division of labour. The 'object' the alienation of which we are concerned with, is *innerweltlich*, though by no means unconnected with the alienation of any aspect of the yield of the product of and as the self, including the tangible and material varieties of it, though in the light of the dicta of 'my world', perceived and experienced through the rights and demands of the particularity of the self which produced them, the way Luther saw it, as will be expanded on later. The object alienated in the present context, that on which our attention is focussed, is the "me" itself, the socialpsychologic produce of the human reality-wise fertile ensemble of the "me" and the "I" within the infrastructure of the self, in the peculiar idiom of the "me" as the unified ensemble in which it simultaneously encompasses its threefold roots in physiologic, socialpsychologic and social reality, as suggested before, and as distinct from a narrowly sociologic grasp of that phenomenon. It's the alienation of the "me" as such, the divestment of its graciousness as experienced in the guts in psychologic reflection no less than in self-consciousness. An example of the alienation of the "me" as such is afforded in the film The Nun's Story, in the incident in which a novice of outstanding academic ability is ordered by a superior nun to deliberately fail an examination qualifying her for missionary work of a medical nature, as an exercise in humility, in shedding her over-average stature as an ego in one respect. Another example of this phenomenon is provided by Chekhov who describes the alienation of the ego in his play Uncle Vanya, in the character of the burnt-out Professor Serebryakov who sponges the life, scope, capabilities, material ones not excluded, of

everyone in the family so as to be able to sustain an ego hiself, making such a demand particularly on his daughter Sonya and on Uncle Vanya who do all the Professor's practical chores while Serebryakov himself maintains the pretence of an academic output, reducing the being of these people to the failure of their projects as equally ambitious human realities as such, though in the different ways they envisage that for themselves.

Poverty, then, as just touched on, affords an overriding spine to our Pauline gathering of Rachmones, as etymology also shows when synonyms in other languages for 'Rachmones' are sought. It's been identified above as someone down in his luck who is, by implication, steeped in constant poverty amongst his other troubles in the face of which he tries to muddle along in the world. The expression is more or less tantamount to the English 'poor thing', and, in a different culture again, with the 'poverino' or 'povero' of the Italian Catholic who dismisses man's universal condition of being profane, touching him too, with a wave of his hand as just part of life, whilst knowing and appreciating its weight as something which is everybody's lot, something one must come to terms with in himself and accept in all.

Poverty, then, even in the context of this microcosmic overview and classification of it, is singled out from other classes of Rachmones as that category of blemishedness which gives rise to the most piercing sense of guilt out of all other varieties of Rachmonesship, when the concept catches one unawares, in a passing state of unprotectedness from the comforts of everyday bad faith, as we had occasion to experience, for instance, in the face of the Ethiopian famine when the truth and extent of it suddenly burst into the sphere of the attention of Europe at the time of Live Aid - as indeed it always grabs one's conscience when the phenomenon emerges at its pure, in encounters of one's confrontation with the class of blemished who are so by virtue of their poverty only and nothing else, when there is no concomitant potentially blemishing factor at play to mix with and hide the disgrace of this condition. It's very helpful to the Pukka that blemishedness can come in clusters of factors rendering people so on multiple accounts, as the Pukka is then able to treat and experience the factors outside his exclusive causation in rendering the poor as blemished, as primarily

responsible for their concomitant poverty too, and treat the fact of their poverty as something which has nothing to do with his him. In contrast, when faced in a large part of humanity with being a havenot in the unalloyed starkness and wretchedness of that condition as not causally equivocatable-away, he cannot hide his guilt. To be able to cope with the embarrassment of their inferiors in wealth showing themselves as superior in their schooling in life and in the way of attainment as human reality as a yield of that process, instead of redistributing wealth in response to that anomaly, they rather redistribute goodness, merit, deservingness, so that that apparent anomaly can right itself as a consequence without having to change the world and shuffle around people's actual standing in that by virtue of their ascribed merits. There are, in the main, three avenues along which appearances of goodness can be caused to be tied, on a long-term basis, to those agencies who are already high in the world by virtue of accumulated wealth, and to make that arrangement appear as justified; each of these avenues being one ploy of Freudian displacement or another. First of all, if the poor Rachmones facing him is blemished on multiple accounts, the Pukka will scapegoat into one or more of his concomitant blemishes his own acknowledgement of and sensibility to the man's poverty, ostensibly latching on to and making a fuss about one or other of the accompanying factors of the man's wretchedness apart from his poverty, and crusading against discriminations vis-a-vis persons who are afflicted on account of this secondary blemish attaching to them (though often in the way of lipservice only, as in the case of the mad). Secondly, he hits hard at those groups of multiply blemished whose kicking on account of their accompanying blemish is popular, notably the criminal (with loud justification) and the blacks, particularly if immigrant, without bothering with the contrivance of an ideology to justify it. The third kind of tactics is different; positive and constructive in its nature rather than critical and negative. This ruse is that of 'help', the targets of 'help' being, with a longstanding tradition, the freak cases of nature's or chance's fortuity, the physiologically handicapped, first and foremost (though with the physically ill or dying often called upon to reinforce the numbers in this group), on whose private tragedies the Pukka homes in as the fit objects of his pity, and clearly not his fault... A trip to Disneyland for a little girl whose days are numbered, her lack dragged into the

open, the concomitant emotion it raises in the guts, burgled, bared on the scale of national publicity, on the news... The bigger, the more dramatic the lack helped, the better for the purposes of public relations. Children in their dependency, those bodily afflicted in a visible way, individually approached instances of bravery in the face of private adversity, are particularly valuable currency in the 'appearing good' industry, and provide an especially effective smoke-screen at a microsociologic scale for macrosociologic troubles on a public scale. Such Rachmones are sought out, their lack positively vetted so that it would be safe to entertain, without a bad conscience for the Pukka, then given a ticket, clearance for bringing it into contact with Pukka do-gooding, deemed suitable as the object of Pukka help on public show. An example illuminating the stringency of the positive vetting which such instances of misfortunes have to pass as suitably safe and kosher in their connotations to be associated with, remedied by the Pukka on the public stage, was provided for me when one morning I was watching a TV programme in which nominations for awards for particularly brave children and youngsters were invited. I wrote in recommending a one-time Vietnamese 'boat-boy', now a teenager, who's been living with his aged grandmother (his only surviving relative) in bed-and-breakfast places for the past seven years so as to save the grandmother from having to go to a home for the aged as she spoke no English and would not have been able to communicate there with anyone. While being tossed from pillar to post during the government's 'Costa del Dole' hysteria - a time during which some later hurriedly retracted legislation was passed forcing people on the dole to change their address all the time, the boy was a tower of strength to his grandmother, holding her hand and arranging, coping with every move of theirs. Needless to say, neither he nor I heard anything further on the matter.

This ploy, that of 'helping', may be called the Big Closure; a lack spectacularly provided, fixed up with a "me", though not one of the recipient's own self. On the contrary, the glory gracing the High who is helping, elbows itself into the place, keeps the fulfilment of that lack from being fusslessly, promptly and effectively accomplished in a way which is most satisfactory for the small-letter ego, the autonomous, first-hand privacy of the person who is being helped, the 'helping' agencies parasitic on the phenomenon of the fulfilment of the self in

question by itself, for their own glory. It's the Pukka who need the handicapped to be good, and the handicapped are their Saviours from the bleakness of their horizons as people, blinkered from human reality, the real conditions of that human reality, and from their responsibility as profane to face it, like anybody else, to own up to all the duties and homework involved in the job of being small-letter sacred. It's not equivalents which exchange in the trafficking of human reality between Sacred and Profane. The chance and conditions of the cathartic elevation of successfully mending the lack as a personal feat in all, which is snatched by the Pukka, the low-ranking are issued by the Pukka, instead of and in exchange for this chance to fulfil their selves at first hand and do themselves proud by doing so, the sham and second-rate social and personal glory of fleetingly occupying the consciousness of the Pukka, the caretakers on their behalf of the collective consciousness, with the Pukka posing as the deity which has privileged access to that collective consciousness and is therefore the proper agency empowered to define and issue beneficial portions of that, for the 'closure' of the Rachmones' self. The Pukka, in choosing and defining what dosage and kind of "me" from the repertoire of actual social reality to apportion to the Rachmones in need, characteristically issues a "me" which is ill-fitting to 'close' the "I", the lack which is clamouring for fulfilment, for help - the 'object', the "me" offered will be different in kind from that which is called for and desired by the gaping "I", and therefore inappropriate for its satiation. The "me" offered will be one that doesn't help that "I", that lack, which doesn't 'answer to' that "I" in terms of the particular hunger which happens to plague it. The import from the Pukka is a discretionary pittance, the export from the profane to them is human reality and the occasion for the attainment of goodness in the potent excellence-generating idiom and opportunities for that in the first person singular, which should be available to all. The handicapped who, of course need the money and depend on that for leading their lives under the circumstances which prevail, become the thrall of charities. In the course of my teaching I once learned 'contracted Braille', an advanced stage of Braille-writing which consists of sort-of shorthand signs and abbreviations to give quick access to the words and concepts which a blind person most frequently needs to communicate in the practical business of getting by, and was astonished to find that more than half of the signs were notions of Christianity.

The goodness-industry is big, and highly conversant with psychology, with Hidden Persuasion thrown in in its promotion in its full armour. This was particularly noticeable to the discerning TV-watcher at the time of the concert Live Aid on BBC 1. The establishment's usual, studied tamperings with the strategic stimulus-pairing of the Mighty with their normally monopolised occasions to perform good deeds, showed up in sharp contrast the genuine and elementally Pauline human emotional origins, intonation and appeal of the concert, committedly parading the participants, the donors of their souls and talent to their chosen cause, in the full rudeness of their not positively vetted gathering (queers, junkies, the angry, the decadent), in the full, avalanching rawness and spontaneity of the concert's sentiment, and the universality and unconditionality of the love it generated, a modality of charity which perceptibly threatened the way of our familiarly controlled idiom of our usual involvement by design in the orthodox presentations of such occasions for charity. It was noticeable how Live Aid was carefully embedded into, and surrounded by a blanket of conventional broadcastings by rival charities, which were presented in great numbers to compete with and crowd out the concert and all it amounted to and represented - unbridled love and uncritical, unqualified goodness as human reality at first hand, in the making, not taking account of what would have been expedient in terms of world politics or rational by 'normal', instrumentally goal-directed criteria. A week of high-intensity transmission of programmes featuring the kind of charitable occasions to which we are normally treated, both preceded and followed the Live Aid broadcasting, in a race between Pavlov and Paul, so to speak. A couple of days before Live Aid, for instance, a documentary called Jamie was shown on the BBC. It was advertised as a programme about a deaf and blind little boy, to be shown, it was explained, with a view to the scientific means which would help to overcome his handicaps. I thought it would feature the child-developmental techniques which were applied to the famous Helen Keller, retrospectively extended into infancy and benefiting Jamie from the outset in life, and I switched on with great interest. However, nothing scientifically very sound or informative was said during the entire programme, which was, in the main, about the visit of a High Personage to Jamie's home. Jamie's lack, or lacks, the rich quality of life as seen and heard which was not to be his, this loss sensible, as it were, in the background all the

time, was offered the 'balm', (completely irrelevant to the nature of the lack, ill-fitting and metastable to that), of the presence and grace emanating from the extremely fulfilled self of the Very Distinguished Guest who was present. "She knows about Jamie", the commentator said. But Jamie didn't know her and little prospect was offered in the programme of his ever having the capacity to do so. Her response to his lack as a "me" for Jamie, one of genuine compassion I do not doubt, could not be beneficially imported into his consciousness Hegelian fashion to come to recognise his "me", better his lot, bring solace, offer him a mirror of his self improved by his being known by an Other in love and sympathy; the lack was throbbing for us as the absence it was, behind his closed eyes, redundant, protruding little ears. On the other hand, she was getting a suntan in the borrowed light of his pieta - and in a sense she was washing his feet all the time, in the face of his real and moving deprivation, in her material irrelevance to that, though unbeknown to herself. Another programme, one following Live Aid by a few days, aiming, it seemed, to match and outdo Live Aid in the number of celebrities who gave it their seal of warranty by being involved, was the very ceremonious introduction by Esther Rantzen of a series on drug-addiction. It was the question "Is it the addicts' disillusionment in the world which causes them to take drugs, or have they been introduced to drugs by their friends?" (or words very much to this effect) which underlay and served to put into words a completely false and not at all mutually exclusive dichotomy as the ideologic kernel of the programme. Check-lists have been presented, in the way of preliminary research, to a number of drug-addicts, in which disillusionment with the world and introduction to drugs by friends were featured separately as alternative causes to drug-taking, and because more people chose the category "I was introduced to drugs by friends", the conclusion was drawn that disillusionment was not the reason for youngsters' taking drugs and that one should mistrust one's friends.

Of course, the Pukka taking part in such public relations exercises, are probably unaware of the fully calculating, clinically and articulately focussed and scientifically knowing attitude and sophistication which pursuing their monopoly of social creativity by design goes hand-in-hand with - of the displacement mechanism which such

a campaign feeds (in which they themselves are pawns, though they may not know it), although their continuous business in helping the handpicked needy, which masks even from them the sea of other troubles in the world, must be psychologically very welcome and gratifying to them. Through caretaking, to which the Highly Placed themselves are subject, as just suggested, goodness is divorced from the platform of human excellence in the well-circumscribed radius of an active self generating it at first hand - with the "me"-s of Rachmoneses as they are, permanently attached, apportioned to them, and the privilege of being informed of social need and the ticket enabling people to do something about it donated to the Pukka, and Subject status thereby imputed exclusively into the Prominent Personages in the long term.

It cannot be stressed enough that the alienation of the phenomenon (and of course the conditions) of goodness, excellence as human reality as just outlined, the process of the "me" and "I" being put asunder in the profane who generate this human reality in the living, with Object and Subject going their polarised, separate ways in the Profane and Pukka respectively by ascription and convention, is not the same thing as Lukács's phenomenon of the alienation of the material produce of the working classes, this process, in his presentation, yielding the ruling class and the working class as subject and object. Of course it must be said that there is a soft centre even in the mature Marx, which Lukács makes much of, implying that in communism there will be a metamorphosis in mankind producing a species psychologically liberated from vulnerability and sensibility to class interest and monetary advantage and disadvantage, with workers in the system (everybody) rising from their anthropologic status as object only and attaining not just materialistic but also anthropologic equality in their universal capacity as completely fulfilled selves. But the two frameworks of satisfaction, that of the hierarchy of human excellence and goodness (our topic) and, on the other hand, the stratification of society as a matter of social class, lower and upper, are appreciably different, and generically so, the two sets, dimensions of classification cutting across each other. The dichotomy 'first-hand capacity, mode and quality of productivity by way of the genre of and with recourse to human reality', versus sporting and sustaining a living by the pursuit and the boasting of a derivative and secondary type of excellence parasitic on

and borrowed in its substance from productivity-fertile human reality, is not necessarily confined to the context of the proletariat versus the idle rich on the arena of external affairs, (though certainly holding within and compatible with that relationship); the said dichotomy can just as clearly be detected and identified as typically holding in the confines of one social stratum only, the *intelligentsia* for instance, these two distinctive modalities and approaches to output and creative practice identifiable in the two contrasting types of scholarship, intellectual demeanour and fundamental choice in the Fausts as opposed to the Wagners of this world.

It is certainly the working class' possibility (Sartre would say its imperative duty) - though typecast as Object as Lukács saw it, to be pukka in the small-letter sense, to be unapologetically fully fledged small-letter sacred on the plane of human reality, irrespective of and concurrently with its placing as a matter of the class-stratification of the society as it prevails and is maintained by virtue of forces of a political economic nature and dimensions. Conversely, it is definitely the ruling class' possibility to be object only in the stage management campaign of the goodness-industry, as just discerned, and as just observed - in the stage management campaign and game which allocates excellence and opportunity for being (by seeming) excellent, good, to quarters where room for such goodness is judged as safe and useful in the equilibration and sustenance of the present structure of the norm as society which and as it is the case. An example to show the non-identity of elevation by ascription and elevation by virtue of authentic human excellence, is provided by the character of Jeeves in P.G. Wodehouse's series of books on the theme of the exploits of this character, the butler, and his bumbling, fumbling, hopeless, chronically non-managing 'master' Bertie Wooster, the author wittily reversing the stereotype 'Master or Subject=ruling class, Object or Slave=employee' formula, with Jeeves, the butler, in class below his employer, regularly coming to the rescue with his presence of mind and gentlemanly know-how, to pick up the pieces of the situations the humanly boorish Bertie allowed to fall apart. Already in the magpie works of Plautus, drawn in part from the Greeks and in another part from the streetperforming forerunners of the *Commedia dell'Arte*, there are seeds of the comic topic inherent in the anomaly which derives from the noncoincidence of

ascribed as opposed to conceivably superior native merit, showing the genius servant and his dull master by ascription in tricky situations where the servant excels as human reality at the master's expense.

It pays to acknowledge that the validity of the lesson in Jeeves' and Bertie Wooster's story - that the ascribed 'master' can be his ascribed 'slave's' inferior in human terms, is certainly not a one-off product of P.G. Wodehouse's imagination, but is broadly and commonly applicable to and general in quite ordinary walks of life, where its possibility constantly worries the Pukka, and this theme, which is plainly recognisable in real-life situations, is exploited in many other works (apart from Plautus'), particularly dramatic ones. The big-letter Pukka is characteristically not content with such excellence which is a person's due through ascription only, and would (indeed often does) find it embarrassing when someone lower-ranking and ascriptionally more junior than himself is personally more excellent in humanly authentic terms, on account of the exclusively personally deserved and deservable virtues of human reality, and tries to prevent or avoid occasions for being outshone in such a manner. Fear from cognisance (publicly or privately) of such incongruity between his ascribed as opposed to humanly deserved ranking vis-a-vis the personally deserved humanly decorous quality displayed by other people, and the often conspicuously unattained worldly status of the latter, causes a lack in him, is something that bothers his conscience, and greater human excellence than his own, in others conceivably more lowly ascribed than himself, is something that he jealously covets. This typical lack in the big-letter Pukka is something which preoccupied several authors throughout the centuries, and this familiar skeleton in the highly ascribed Pukka's socialpsychologic cupboard, has become the object of the artistic comment of many. Goethe, for one, warns the Pukka in his play Faust:

Was du vererbt von deinen Vätern hast,
Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen. (6)

Turning to a classic comedy again, where this predicament and worry of the Pukka is well expressed, we may usefully call upon the plot of Beaumarchais' play The Marriage of Figaro. In its storyline, the author portrays, truly to life, the character of Count Almaviva, a man highly

ascribed and not content to be Figaro's superior merely by virtue of ascription and law pertaining to property, securing him the prospect of the possession of Figaro's pretty and witty fiancée as a cold matter of *droit de seigneur*. He endeavours to be humanly Figaro's better too in winning her heart, he means to prove himself to be the smarter, the more excellent out of himself and his rival in wooing her, and sets Figaro up in a series of tricky situations to which the latter must be equal if he is to avoid allowing Almaviva to sleep with his bride on their wedding night. It is from this complexity in Almaviva's characterisation that stems the author's inexhaustible ingenuity and inventiveness in contriving ever-emerging new turns in the hilarious plot; and in the end, Figaro extricates himself from the traps which Almaviva set him, and emerges victorious on all scores, human and social; both in an allegorical sense, pertaining to the eventual historic victory of the class which Figaro represents, as anticipated by the author, as well as in terms of the plot of the play. But the establishing of Figaro's natural, socially acceptable parentage in the plot by accident, is an incidental feature in the play to Figaro's victory; Almaviva wasn't sincerely looking for legal excuses in trying to prevent Figaro's victory and, in the end, in concealing from himself his defeat in having had to give up Susanne, Figaro's bride, in the light of Figaro's newly found, moderately 'Pukka' parentage. Almaviva wanted Susanne - wanted to win her, not by the force of his and her circumstances, but as the better man. He and Figaro had had a relationship as human realities too - one of competition in man-to-man combat, not just for Susanne, but as one human being engaged in rivalry as a man vis-a-vis another, and it was in that, in the terms of human reality, that Almaviva truly, and most painfully lost. In the end, Almaviva remains proven as the lesser man, and Figaro's better as a matter of ascribed social rank only; his defeat doubly great because of that.

An example of ascriptionally thwarted human reality battling for outlet in the world of external realities for its attested excellence, on a scale wider than the arena of the escapades of Jeeves, Bertie and their literary relatives, - an example also of the noncoincidence between the Lukácsian embrace of the working class as humanly deprived and the broader category 'profane by deprivation' in the world - an example, finally, of subject behaviour in the profane of the world we

live in, is provided on the plane of actual politics by the South African blacks' quest for economic sanctions against their self-appointed 'masters' in their alienated mother land, and the failure of the British to respond to that quest, arguing, in bad faith, that as a result of sanctions the blacks would become even worse off, that they would suffer due to sanctions in material terms sooner and more strongly than the whites, trying to justify their refusal to impose sanctions in the light of this rationale. In doing so, they display their vulgarian understanding and interpretation of the objective of the oppressed class in question, and their presumption to speak for it, taking for granted that nothing could be of greater motivating power for the blacks than wanting to improve their lot materially. What the British fail to see, in their caretaking arrogance of knowing the minds of the oppressed ones better than they do themselves, is that the South African blacks, bishops and shoeshine boys alike, are prepared to, want to *have less* in order to be *more*, so to speak, a project well-nigh meaningless or at least certainly hard to grasp - indeed, conveniently impossible to entertain at all within the framework of a Utilitarian-bred or other vulgarian behaviouristic grasp of rationality. The reality which doesn't fit inside the framework of such a rationality is that at this moment it's not primarily money, not the Lukács-entertained yields of labour with which the blacks in question are asking for help to be reunited, (a different issue), but, already reunited, as a human feat in all as particular persons, with the vision of themselves as citizens in keeping with the ideals of the collective consciousness (and bidding for this unification to become a fact of law), for which they articulately and explicitly ask for moral support in the form of sanctions. The British are failing the South African blacks' movement as they opt not to appreciate that what the blacks demand is the realisation of every citizen's self as equal in respect of his colour and creed. The British are quite happy to continue to see the blacks as slave, a *be-not* as a person which he now officially very nearly is, though they would allow the blacks to be less of a have-not, and they pretend not to understand why this consideration on their part for the blacks' condition is not enough. It is the project of *being* a citizen in the full sense, to which plea by the blacks the British government is deaf, and instead of which they offer, in their sophistry, the prospect of a greater degree of economic comfort to the black man, if it is

meaningful to entertain the notion of 'comfort' in the context of the present condition of the blacks, which the British are not adamant to change. It is this plea by the black man which the British try to get away with ignoring by misunderstanding it, which they take it upon themselves to twist with their condescending stereotyping and philosophical pragmatism in the most shortsighted sense of that term, with the ultimate in human welfare seen by them as having access to material means and more material means.

The dichotomy master/subject and slave/object, then, does not equal, without residue, the dichotomy 'economically privileged upper class versus working class', but is a different dimension from that one, in spite of the great phenotypical overlap between the two, and cuts across it. To effect economic fulfilment, reunification of the yields of labour with the labouring class, is one of the dimensions we wish to identify here, an external, macrosociologic process in the world, which is the pledge and undertaking at the heart of Marx's revolution. To effect reunification of object and subject in everyone as an intraindividual feat, and secure room and, if deserved, recognition for the resulting personal grace and dignity in the world for the individual (the second competing dimension that which we are talking about) is Luther's revolution, envisaged in a special, generically different sense which extends to the whole of humanity. The distinction between these two projects, revolutions, is very clear, though the two kinds of revolutions are not really pure of one another in practice - Luther's revolution being properly inclusive with the material reunification of selves with the yields in this world of one's exertions and productivity as a virtuous self. (It may be usefully observed here that Jesus' revolution before Luther was more ascetic in its demands from and in terms of the world, so much so that it did not envisage, claim and make for itself any practical structural provisions there to secure its furtherance and assertion in practical external terms, and was followed by centuries of an all-time low for the faithful - the population of Europe.) Conversely and as the other side of the coin, in Marx's revolution the mixedness of its ideology with the criterion of mankind fulfilling itself in terms of selves as well as in terms of redistributed resources, is a little more blurred, due to the physical abolition of the bulk of the ruling class and the fact that the ensuing

ideological hegemony of the remaining working class majority, officially sees itself as object only, and also owing to the circumstance of the regular demise of the fainthearted Hegelians on the road to communism. As we know, this historic purification process did not lead to the abolition of the category 'class' in socialist society, where the class structure survives, though with the tables turned. The 'continued revolution' is not continued - or has not been continued in the Soviet Union until very recently; in the long foregoing decades, the downtrodden and the deprived there continued not to get the chances, and the chances continued to go to to the children of the proletariat and peasantry of the 'current moment' in 1917, which is the ruling class - though this is not the account Soviet society would give of its prevailing class structure, the existence of which it doesn't deny. However, though societies in both Eastern and Western hemispheres are established and static, the Luther-ean or romantic Christian project proves itself to be of hardy fibre, revisiting even societies which claim to be on the road to classlessness. This is shown, for instance, by to-day's form of Polish working-class Catholicism and its mission to support man's assertion of his ultimate say and discretion in the question of freedom to put towards or withdraw from society one's own labour. Examples for kindred, historically 'romantically' revivalistic trends can be pinpointed in to-day's Soviet society, too. Of course, it is not necessarily in the strict idiom of a recognisable religion in which such periods of questioning, 'nihilation', in response to and in the face of the ossification of the reigning dogma in the current norm assumes its guise and form at the point when that dogma becomes reactionary to the extent that it is intolerable and evident in its moral anomaly to the masses, by the irrepressible lights of human reality, whose revision of the historically even older norm once brought that now conservative norm into being. In the context of how, in the Soviet Union, the dicta of human reality are elbowing for new room in the face of the mummified norms sprung forth in a former revolution generations ago and now superseded, at least three strands of movements, processes known to the West can be identified as signalling such an individual-oriented, institution-nihilative thawing and the replenishment, reassertion of the spirit of human reality in the present on a social scale. One of these strands is the new, partly underground cult of pop among the young, especially in and around Leningrad; the

sentiment underlying this trend coming to expression, for instance, in the lyrics of the lead singer of the group 'Zoopark', belting out 'Everybody wants me to be somebody, but all I want to be is myself', to the screams of an army of fans. Secondly, religion in its overt and explicit form as such, also came to gather significantly greater momentum than it had in the Soviet Union in previous decades; phenotypically Greek Orthodox (or Catholic, in the instance of Poland), these expressions of feeling and critique of vision, from the point of view of the perspective of the self vis-a-vis the positivity of the norm as it is upheld in the reigning society, are assertions of 'existentiell' or romantic 'religion' in a broad, special sense, consistent with and akin to Luther's project centuries ago, - these outbursts of, bids for 'alternativism' to the socially reigning idiom of apprehending and expressing the self, are assertions of more individualism-tolerant and inclusive creeds, touching society in the mode of its critique. To be integrally brought to bear upon society is an essential part of the bid of these projects: the phenomenon may be seen as religion at work in its 'protestant' aspect and capacity, religion in the phase of its nihilative, revolutionary capacity, that capacity, face and phase of the process of religion which the existentialist theologian MacQuarrie, in his rather Hegelian train of thought, identifies and discerns as periodically typical, even unavoidable in the Introduction of his book where he puts forward and pleads existentialism among other reformational responses to an over-institutionalised morality, as a form, a phase of periodic Renaissances of religious ideologies, phases of the 'romanticism' of attitudes, creeds, thoughts and sentiments in the process of the history of established Christianity. '7' In this Introduction MacQuarrie implicitly but valuably postulates the historic process of religion as consisting of alternative phases of the established positivism of dogma and, when this becomes too restrictive for the individual's mode of being as such, periodically replaced by phases of its nihilation, romanticism, spontaneity as human reality, critique, reaction to established religion as encrusted into the ruling mores as the Sacred. In such romantic phases the human reality clamouring for room for its expression doesn't necessarily know itself and own itself up as religion. The third and final strand of the process of the now timely self-renewal of the established norm in the Soviet Union, is afforded by

the current twin- movements known as *perestroika* and *glasnost*, the two amounting to a programme of liberalisation from institutionalism in economic production and in the way of the thinking of the individual citizen, which pair of joint phenomena is not spontaneously revolutionary but which has originated from the government and which is only in part ideological regarding the compass of its effects, (in another part it is, of course, economical), but in so far as it is explicitly ideological in its sphere of aims, represents the shrewd and longsighted recognition 'from above' that the clamourings for the need for scope and the self-satisfaction of the standards of human reality as such, as socialpsychologically and in human particularity embodied in the individuals of a society, cannot be denied on the long term with political impunity, an insight issuing from political authority which aims, as an important side-benefit of the package of new policies in which it comes, to prevent this lesson eventually coming to self-expression in social reality in the form of spontaneous ideological dissent from that on a general scale, as a reaction to the scent of moth-balls of an old body of norms, which must follow in time if MacQuarrie and Hegel are to be believed, and which is already heralded on the plane of the factual reality of society by the two spontaneous movements in which human reality is claiming greater room and recognition in the Soviet Union, as just specified.

Descombes postulates that history is surpassing, or has surpassed, the stage of class societies, '3' with bureaucracy gradually claiming and assuming, in a sociologically and historically real sense, Subject or Master status, with its personnel network as the new élite which extends, in the superiority of its muscle, above the conventional ruling classes as well as above the sociologically oppressed ones, in a superordinate capacity over both, and he implies that in their progress towards this new order, class societies are becoming, or have become, gradually irrelevant in the wake of this trend. (This insight will receive further comment in the last but second paragraph of the Conclusion in this thesis.) Descombes' view as just expressed is consistent with the observations just made in the context of the West and indeed with those made with regard to the East. This new form of subjugation, in its idiom, is in a decisive part symbolic regarding its nature, and its radius of operation, rather than narrowly economical

in its base and conception, import and compass. Attempts to deal with it and try to account for it in terms of a conventional social class-anchored set of theoretical and crudely 'economistic' weaponry, will leave large gaps in explaining and appreciating the phenomenon completely and on its merits; the nature of stratification within it will not yield up its nature and content in terms of conventional classifications of or approaches to class, such as, for instance, that of the Registrar General's. The emergent Master status of the ruling crust has Hegelian ingredients to its superiority, and the notion 'epistemic subject' does pertain to it in apposite ways. The two opposing categories within the body of society are, on the one hand, bureaucracy with its institutions, the 'have'-ers of human reality rather than its 'do'-ers, the possessive storers of the main currency sustaining its order: 'intelligence' (in the political sense), in unsuspected depths and variegatedness of classificatory categories, based on principles (known only to them) of security-conscious data processing, and, on the other hand, we have the 'do'-ers, on the lower scale of society, the profane, big-letter or small, the actual perpetrators, producers of human reality, irrespective whether the ensuing, produced human reality is channelled in fact into the production in the practical plane of economic actuality - a category of people whose subjugation consists in the bureaucratic agencies with their self-perpetrating machineries 'having them taped'. We exist for this highly ascribed portion of humanity as object, object of knowledge and therefore of possession (the thoughts of Hegel illuminate the process how subjugation of selves as a function of such knowledge about them comes to being operative) - we come to acquire a mode of being vis-a-vis them which in its rank is subordinate in coercive ways to their mode of being as subject, which allocates a mode and quality of being to us in a certain qualified, dependent and passive sense in relation to them, with ourselves being known but us not knowing about them and even less actually knowing them as concrete agencies which concern themselves with us. Such an understanding of being object in relation to Others being subject, is consistent with Sartre's preoccupation too, though the historic way and dimension of the phenomenon we are putting forward here is writ large in relation to Sartre's postulation of it: in the sense in which we now identify the notion, we reveal ourselves in unknown thoroughness to the look of the new-style Masters operating from

behind silent windows, as Sartre described that phenomenon and experience in Being and Nothingness, but in our present context the phenomenon is blown up in reality to such proportions which justify our sense of paranoia in our capacity as human beings constantly checked and watched as object by the big-letter Look cast on us, silently, from behind edifices of information merchantry, state-maintained or commercially interested, the Sartrian confines of the experience now outdated, removed, extended into space itself, encompassing our awareness of spy-satellites, and their awareness of us, (let alone windows of buildings around us), the gadgetry of the agencies 'seeing us' without being 'seen' themselves, now extending to celestial dimensions.

In contrast with the ruling classes of historic (as opposed to our 'post-historic') society, the new, anonymous bureaucratic aristocracy is not idle in comparison with human reality (the mode of active being and sphere of operation of the oppressed), though, by definition it does not create that human reality in the course of its exertions; on the contrary, *its efforts are* directed at constraining it, and at preventing the reproduction and propagation of it in practice - at thwarting the only possible source of output of a certain stamp and calibre by and as human reality. It's this very project - crusading against human reality and its set of ideals and scope for development - which the new upper crust considers as the elevated target of its labours; redefining the criterion of supremely worthwhile human activity in the process, as one which is, paradoxically, hostile, uncongenial to the self-generating productivity of all human reality, to creativity in the ordinary sense which it considers as undesirable in comparison with the pukka array of excellence. The novel, faceless peerage (unlike the old-fashioned one in the days of class societies proper) is not uncreative because rich, but rich because uncreative. It's ideal of merit and proper range of learning is typically applied rather than pure and research-perpetrative, with the disciplines prized and preferred for pursuance, law and accountancy before all others, is such as is not generated by human reality, but, in contrast, is functional and generative of ways to serve and perpetrate its own power. It may be generally observed of the new ideal of excellence in its relation to knowledge and intellectuality (we already argued the validity of this

observation in the context of morality), that it is a meritocratic one whose ideal mode of and subscription to knowledge is secondary as a matter of explicit preference and chosen creed, and functionally so - it's a kind of affiliation to knowledge which is originality-alien, inbreeding, analytic and interpretative of the kind of knowledge which has been pioneered at first hand, feeding on the latter and itself not feeding it; it's a type of excellence which is so through the appropriation of sentinel quality from creative selves and thrived upon; sustaining a system where other people perform the function of excellence with the new Pukka sense of values borrowing and monopolising its glory. The difference between the two clashing ideals of excellence in knowledge is not a question of IQ and something quite independent of that; it's a matter of fundamental choice.

Descombes' theory of the rise of the new invisible élite in supersession of earlier, still 'historic' societies and their 'Sacred' and elevated representatives so determined by virtue of social class, is certainly borne out by the observation that civil servants know more and have greater power than political party-affiliated ministers (even if they are Tory), with elected representatives of social classes of whatever hue, as it's widely known, 'carried' and informed by these bureaucrats. Selling, privatising institutions, concerns which are properly bureaucratic and facelessly institutional in the form of the powers they have and wield, and converting the mode of belonging of those into private and capitalistic ownership, is certainly a retrograde step in the light of such Descombian considerations and theory of the chronologic stratification over time of the orders of society as they emerge. Descombes' vision of the new society and its impersonal genre in this peculiar, modern sense, is certainly born out by the way Pinter presents the almighty and fearsome 'caretaker' as ordinary people's overlord, an insight which will receive greater elaboration and attention anon. Further observations and examples compatible with Descombes' fertile notion about the new élite and its rise and transcendence over, or at least co-presence in our Western culture with our a more conventionally understood upper class, offer themselves in the advent in the popular media of the new glamour female, the policewoman as a rival contender in escapist entertainment to and alongside with the jewel-bedecked heroines of the industrialist scene of

'Dallas' or 'Dynasty' (an historically older type of heroine), and even the new élite's exclusive preparation measures for 'life after death' may be seen as comparable, in the distribution exclusively to the bureaucracy of fall-out shelters, to the availability of funerals to Pharaohs only (comprehended as gods and the relatives of gods) as was the custom in ancient Egypt, the deities kitting themselves out with provisions in exclusiveness and separation from the common underlings, for their passage to the afterworld.

In summary, the job of identifying the second sociologically functional way in which the specialisation, in a manner writ large, of subject or "I"-function into the Pukka and object or "'me" only' function into the Rachmones or profane, is now completed. This second ploy and avenue to feed, allocate, keep and channel these two functions of the self differentially into the ruling upper crust and to those typecast low respectively, is to make the definition and the stronghold of goodness, excellence, the exclusive privilege of the Pukka by fully intended and socialpsychologically sophisticatedly knowing ways. Moreover, it has been postulated above that the direct, first-hand consultation of the standards of the collective consciousness at its ideal (in strong counterdistinction with how that is actually realised and embodied in the given, reigning society and in critique of that), is individually available for direct intuition by all, which act of direct, first-hand grasp and recourse to the schemata of an ideal society (inclusive of the Lacanian categories of it) may be paraphrased as the Sartrean imperative project of the reunification of the "me" and the "I" and thereby the assumption in the individual of the full, properly hybrid self as both object and subject in all, which project has periodically been, is, and predictably will be at historically overdetermined times, the project on a mass scale of multiform reformational agencies, bursting into being in an upsurge of an emergent ideology, committedly represented and formulated by protagonists of the self. Such responses are expressions of the intolerance of the species to the total starvation and deprivation of the ordinary profane (most of us), of normal room for stretching oneself, exercising the natural scope and small-latter sacred glory for everyone in one's capacity as a self, and historic movements reclaiming such rights for the mode of being of all as individuals, are reactions to inflexibility

in and by the established norm in its check and control over the profane in experiencing, practicing and knowing its own scope for goodness and excellence as a socially creative self and the equal of all as such.

The third and final way in which the separation and specialisation in the above grand sociologic way of the "me" and the "I" will serve in promoting the maintainance of the status quo as the norm which amounts to the established society as it is, may be identified as the purpose and the mechanism of riddance of the unpleasant, unseemly and sociologically dysfunctional schism in the selves of both the Pukka and the Rachmones, though on different terms - on terms which allocate, as just said, subject role to Pukka and object role to Rachmones, on terms, moreover, which will dump the stigma of the sinfulness of living with recourse to the schism by not surrendering subject status, firmly into the court of the profane only. The identification of this third sociologic area of effects of the differential specialisation of the "me" and the "I" into Pukka and Rachmones respectively, may sound rather psychologistic, and because of the involvement in its discussion and analysis of socialpsychologic factors touching on the infrastrucure of the self, it foreshadows our next chapter, (which will deal with microsociologic paradigms of the Pukka-Rachmones relationship), and will receive detailed analysis there. For the moment just two observations - the phenomenon just referred to (the divestment of the Rachmones of freedom to schismically respond to anomalies irking the self in society), is relevant in the context of our present macrosociologic consideration too, not only because the process of schism-riddance on different terms for the Rachmones and the Pukka is engineered with a view to sustaining and does tally in a complementary way with outside sociologic interests, but also because (as we argued in Chapter I.), the socialpsychologic schism in the individual in the face of moral anomalies in society is not a primary phenomenon; it is (and, materialists know, it has to be) a response to and therefore secondary to and dependent on the grand schism in society as a stimulus which is capable of anomalousness as such. This schism in the stimulus (positive society) is the discrepancy between the content of the body of the norm of society as it is (the collective consciousness compromised at times, or much of the time, in its actuality and realisation) as opposed the collective consciousness in its ideality which is the possible object of

the intuition of any individual if he chooses to be present to that; in other words, between the collective consciousness at its fathomable pure and the generalized other.

In contrast, the recognised (rather than denied, suppressed, equivocated-away) response to, acknowledgement and reflection of the schism in society within the individual agent, the owned-up-to witness of the noncoincidence between the conditions desired for the gratification of the "me" by the self with the "I" brought to bear upon the recognition of it, as distinct from the actual degree of gratification of the self's "me" or the lack of it in the world's actuality, is the schism, the self in a certain, complete sense. To own up to this self, as the schism, is a matter of fundamental choice. This cognised difference, noncoincidence between the ingredients of the self, the "me" as defined for one in actuality, versus the authentic response to it and desire for an alternative, more fulfilled "me" in a future and more ideal social actuality, with the faculty of the "I" brought to bear on intuiting it, may indeed be equivocated away in living and conducting the self, as it is in bad faith.

Section 3.Mastery and Slavery, Writ Small.

The self is a structure, a phenomenon which simultaneously takes place in two orders of reality all at once, like Z.S. Harris' phonemes, disjointed individual utterances of the larynx never the same in the actual pronunciation of two single individuals, and, on the other hand, concurrently participating as bricks (each of the same value of importance) in the syntactic structure in which those also serve, defined and uniformised regarding their weight in that capacity by the rules of grammar governing them, by the authority of the different overall structure of it and its set of rules sufficient unto itself as such, and independent in that capacity of the actual idiosyncratic vocal articulation of these bigamous units: one aspect of their being.

The separate pieces of rock making up Stonehenge, likewise, are a collection of rough slabs with aesthetic attributes to their arrangement if comprehended in one way, but with a certain star pertinent to the worship of a group of religious followers, which annually appears in the focal point of this arrangement of slabs on a significant holiday, this collection of stones is a temple, its meaning, weight of importance and nature altered, transformed, this latter meaning, aspect of its being rubbing off on it even when that star is absent in this symbolic visual context during other days of the year. The Caryatids are another example of building bricks of structures deputising in two orders of being and functions all at once; objects actually holding up, structural bearers of the building they support when globally viewed, but, when the statues are appreciated separately or some considered as in particular relationships to single others, they can be apprehended as sustaining and pertaining at the same time to an aesthetic order as well as the first, physical one, contributing to that aesthetic order and affording examples of that; as indeed can be claimed about oil drums too, washed ashore by the sea, litter on the beaches in one of their capacities, and if suitably worked and played in an orchestra, objects for appreciation, instruments of considerable beauty in an aesthetic order. It's possible, (unavoidable to Sartre) for man to grasp, to live the self too as simultaneously occupying both of the different symbolic orders concurrently making demands on it, involving it: the socialpsychologic and the sociologic orders. In one of these contexts, in its aspect as routine rationality, it's continuous with the generalized other, to

which it contributes, of which each self is constitutive as part, so many Caryatids in the positive social edifice they sustain, with the "me" serving as Althusserian 'carrier'. In another context, in another capacity of the "me", it's illuminated, shot and effected with the particularity and subjectivity of the "I" to which it is married in its socialpsychologic capacity, forming with it its privately enmeshed, *innerweltlich* little ensemble which peculiarly mediates its own self-supporting standards as human reality, a mode of its being which ever affords an angle of critique on the generalized other as such and, self-consciously, of one's own "me" as constitutive part of that, allowing for a distanced reflection upon that. The self as this schism of vision in which it dually serves and comprehends itself, is this distance between the "me" as rooted in the coherent *milieu* of the generalized other on the one hand and its own critical perspective on that as an individual on the other.

This dual manner of the comprehension of the "me" of itself is important in analysing the relationship between the differing social and socialpsychologic spheres of operation of the self. The "me" of the self, serving in both a sociologic and a socialpsychologic context, both *does* and *does not* make perfect contact with the social world around it. A simile may be helpful in appreciating this. There is a fish which feeds on insects on the riverbank. It has to shoot up above water level to catch them. As it claps its sight on the insect from under the water, its eye and the water surface form a little optic system, like a telescope, its own perspective, with a meaning only to itself and its kind, through which it views the insect, distorted from the 'objective' point of view of its food on land by the refraction of the water surface in relation to it. This relatively distorted aperture is the only visual information it has, and yet in the act of catching it, it efficiently compensates for that deceptive refraction, or rather uses it, and gets the insect every time. Similarly, the self is never comprehended as indistinguishably continuous with the outer, empirically 'objective' crust of the generalized other; it's an eddy in it, as Mead observes; its "me" not quite flush with it, and protruding a bit as well, like the top end of a telescope only just cutting a peculiar little curvature compared with the surface, like a water drop or a small lense, a pupil, a window on the world and not the world itself in a completely

straightforward manner; it's not the regular slice of the generalized other, not of the same mould as the other "me"-s generalised into one continuous, predictable mode, body of conduct and way of thought which holds good for all, but a "me" with a certain sheen, one suggestive of an "I" in its hinterland on the other, hidden end of the telescope, a small-letter sacred "me" with a reputation as a self, of one kind or another. It's the self as a whole as such, the individual as sacred, infrastructurally organised, outstanding, individually excellent or notorious in the context of society - not in the sense of the big-letter or big-letter-imitative sacredness of a self, the externally borrowed elevation of the powerful by ascription or the mimicking of it by the unoriginal and socially uncreative, but a sort of first-person singular-generated, peculiarly socialpsychologic, personally authentic sacredness in the sense of human reality intact on its own terms. Everybody would like to be - can potentially be - sacred in this sense, gracefully autonomous as an unshortchanged amalgam of both object and subject, as an accomplished individual. It's the small-letter, socialpsychologic sacredness, the distinction of the ego, it's the hybridness, the synthesis, equilibration, adjustment within the person's self afforded by an unsundered "I" and a "me" personally matched, defined, managed, maintained according to its own lights as such, as a self: endowed with 'grace' according to Sartre's criterion of that quality as already mentioned and as will be elaborated later. The 'specialisation' into separate channels of the "me" and the "I" as described in the previous section, is intolerable to the self if authentic in its aspirations as a self in the sense which we now argue. The fable of Bluebeard's Castle tells the story of how the will of one self for the petty possession of another, greater one, gradually strips that at first more outstanding, originally "I"-inclusive personality of its veil of remoteness in relation to the generalized other, it describes how such possessiveness robs the self of its singularity, of its privacy, of its implicitness for the other with a personal "I" so as to draw out and conquer this secrecy, complete with the "I", making its secrets as a self outward and explicit, baring that of its status as a self with its own, self-delineated stature, transforming it bit by bit into openly named desires, sordid in their tangibility, into the string of rendered-up instincts, lowly thoughts, meant or committed crimes of an expressed, factual past, and only that. The castle is symbolic of Bluebeard's being

as a definite, imposing self, as its own overlord within it, in the self-possessed, upstanding wholeness as that; its hidden, private possibilities, its "I" gradually uncovered, yielded up to the daylight as a delicate negative of a film, as his newly wedded wife Judith insists that all its doors be opened up, one by one, for her. With the last door opened, both Judith and Bluebeard die symbolically, their personalities, the primary structures of their selves as such, broken down, and with that the possibilities of being partners for one another in a certain socialpsychologically as opposed to sociologically constituted and constitutive sense, which Bluebeard had sought. The castle, his own self completely yielded up, its distance taken hold of, made public, reduced to object only, and Judith, his executor in this sense, herself demoted as a dignified self in the way of one with a human demeanour of a certain quality, unthroned as such by her own deed, falling from her original pedestal offered her by Bluebeard, joins Bluebeard's women, failed past partners in marriage, behind the last door. Bluebeard murdered her, the symbolism of the story prompts, and she murdered Bluebeard. The myth, for Bluebeard's part, depicts a process similar in its meaning and mechanism to Heidegger's *Neugier*; like the moral of this story, that notion refers to the will and the process of razing the self from its state of wholeness to the ground, rendering that up to the public inspectability of *das Man* (Heidegger's contender for the notion which to Mead is the generalized other) by way of subjecting it to, invading it with a pervidious curiosity designed to secure the other as a *mere object* at one's disposal (as distinct from interest: an authentic interpersonal attitude) and gradually appropriating it, taking it into the custody of a public grasp of that, or of any one person beholding it, claiming it from such an angle, in such a capacity.

Such draining of the self of its dignified completeness with an "I", the reduction of that to 'object only' status, is a familiar encounter commonly ran across in everyday life; the artistic and symbolic account of it in Bluebeard's legend wrongly suggests a rarity and selectness of the occurrence of this process, which isn't really the case. I shall provide a more mundane and example of the same ploy which will have the ring of familiarity. At an early stage of my sojourn in this country, I was removed from the subculture of my fellow-national emigrants who

typically reside in London; my move to the provinces looked down upon at the time in the light of the cosmopolitanism-valuing norms of that subculture. I accepted the cold shoulder from my former peers in my former *milieu* (un-answered Christmas cards and other such indeces of that), and have gradually grown to pay no attention to it. After a while my family has turned into one of 'achievers', something which was, in contrast, valued by the standards of the subculture from which I was earlier separated, and this second fact, having seeped back into the circles of my exiled compatriots in London, came to be part of a conflicting, ambivalent body of opinions about us there, beginning to counteract to some extent the attitude, *pukka* there, to shun the provincial, and it raised interest. Twenty ^{five} years have gone by, and on one occasion I telephoned, on my husband's behalf, a colleague of his about some important professional news concerning them both. It was the colleague's wife, associated with the said subculture and herself a former friend, who answered the telephone and who gave me what could be called a spiritual *lumbar puncture*. In shrill tones, she asked me 'blow by blow' about our family and fortunes, turning me inside-out as it were, in suddenly assumed caretakership, quizzing me of our situation, until the point when in the course of my 'news chronicle' she stumbled on an item which conveyed to her a temporary set-back in one of our sons' education, I believe. Her voice immediately changed to one of satisfaction, and she closed the conversation. 'I have no more time' she said 'I have to go out'. When I reminded her that the purpose of the call was to talk to her husband, she told me that he'd gone out in the course of the conversation, totally unaware, I assume, that the 'phone call was for him; but she achieved what she, for her part, set out to do: make me as an object ready for gossip: 'They are not doing so well, after all...' - processing us for the consciousness and verbal consumption of the generalized other (of which she was the champion in her interrogation) as an object not so contradictory in terms of the mode of their entertaining us, yielding a more comfortable attitudinal position in their relating to us; doing well, but provincial folk, after all, you can tell. They didn't quite have the background...

A few words may be usefully said here about gossip, or rather a Heideggerian term related to that: *Gerede*. It's closely connected with *Neugier*; *Neugier* being the instinct, the project to cut down the

uncomfortably free-floating, not-yet 'taped' individual to the size of the generalized other (*das Man* in Heidegger) as we just mentioned in the context of the relationship of Judith and Bluebeard in the legend, with *Gerede* one of the instruments whereby this can be achieved, affected. *Gerede* is one of the Heideggerean weaponry whereby a 'closure' of the self (a concept put forward in Section 2. of this chapter) can be affected in an Other in a way that does not encourage in him, indeed allow for him the degree of salience of a somewhat outstanding, personal "me" in 'closing' his self into an autonomous socialpsychologic ensemble where he could provide, accomplish a "me" on his own terms to match the genuine, authentic needs of an "I" whose calls the agent doesn't wish to compromise. *Gerede* is a tactics and tool for 'socking' a kind of ready-made closure in the idiom of the generalized other to the self as a sort of stereotype gag for it in the place of the medium of satiation it happens to genuinely desire, preventing the 'closure' of the self in the idiom of the unique self in its emphatic significance as such, protruding, in the involuntary distinction of its individuality as we have just suggested in our simile of the self's perspective, its 'telescopic lense' directed at, focussed in on the generalized other, breaking up the undifferentiated surface of the calm sea of the latter, so to speak. *Gerede*, in a word, is a means of inappropriate 'closure' to the authentic self as such. This claim calls for some elaboration.

Man's "me", his indissmissible capacity as object, as already pointed out, spans three categories in nature: the physiologic, the sociologic, and the socialpsychologic, the latter mediating, encompassing and complementing his being as a self. These levels of being in all of which the "me" properly and simultaneously has its roots, amount, of course, to three levels of its possible fulfilment which clamour for the kind of 'closure' or 'feeding' appropriate to its specific in the three-fold diversity and medium of the self, physiologic, social and socialpsychologic respectively. Sartre would add a fourth level of the possible 'closure' of the self, higher-order even in its sophistication than any of the levels of the self we previously postulated. The Sartrian addition to the above array of the spheres of the fulfilment of the self, comes into play in the activity of 'pure reflection'; in this the hunger of the "I", or rather of its Sartrian relative: 'Being-for-Itself', is the exploration by consciousness, its thirst for the

knowledge of itself *per se*, and its gratification, its 'food' for reflection is quite simply itself, in its isolated purity, which candidate and peculiar medium for its 'closure' can be regarded as 'object' in a very special sense only, as it is empty of all other content except itself, and which is properly called 'the reflected-on'. Opposite these four levels on which the "me" touches and which together comprise it, we see and distinguish between as many strands of the "I" corresponding to those positive media and means for the 'closure' of the self, as the hunger and capacity for these variegated and multi-tiered fodders to the self, each of these corresponding capacities clamouring to be filled in their own idiom, calling out for gratification by the varying, appropriate layers of the "me" specially complementing them, as just identified. This view of the complex of gradations of the "I" - physiologic hunger and thirst, sexual needs, social capacities, the socialpsychologic cravings of the self as such, and its undeniable capacity for 'pure reflection' (which perhaps is a less basic need), though organised into the unified notion of the "I" of the self or into the four-tiered possibility of 'Being-for-Itself, can be fruitfully analysed into its four, evolutionarily variegated gradations of lesser or greater sophistication, and grasped as a sort of conatus, or the organisation of those into the unified "I" of each self, each of these needs clamouring singly, as a capacity different in kind from the other three, for levels of 'closure' by the appropriate tiers of the "me" 'answering to' those, and failure to offer to those, gratify those with a "me" homogeneous with and appropriate to those hungers, will result in the uncatered-for aspects of the self 'starving', being laid waste (notwithstanding the fact that it is only the failure of the gratification of physical or sexual hunger or thirst which results in death or extinction in the physical and literal sense.) By 'closures' which are 'homogeneous' with the particular hunger or capacity capable of being gratified by 'fodder' complementary to its own kind, I mean the meeting of each of these capacities with the actual reward appropriate to it: sexual drive being 'answered to' with the sexual act, physiologic hunger satisfied with food, social needs and capacities satisfied by their own kind of reinforcement, praise, companionship, social intercourse, leisure activities and the means to be able to gratify, realise these particular capacities for reward. Finally, socialpsychologic 'closure' is peculiarly, congenially, properly,

fittingly and 'homogeneously' effected by the internally experienced and reflected-on process in 'impure' or 'psychologic reflection' upon the external opportunities available (or unavailable) to the "me", from the point of view of the capacity of these opportunities for the satisfaction within the self of the "I"'s peculiar hungers in operation (Sartre's classification), with the role of the resulting socialpsychologic "me" different from the sociologic one in being cognised, experientially savoured, (palatably or unpalatably) by the self in the first person singular, and, if authentic, critically assessed by the "I". The socialpsychologic "me" which is referred to here, also differs from a simpler and more schematic sociologic one in being relevantly brought into contact with the self's hubris-potential for the small-letter sacredness of each self, the "I" constantly probing, questioning the socialpsychologic content of the "me" as to its authenticity, asking whether it is a fitting, effective, complementary platform in the world to match its authentic lights as such, putting forward, projecting new "me"-s and catching up with those in critical transcendence over the older, past ones. This process is called by Mead 'the conversation of the "I" and the "me"' and, as just observed, 'impure' or 'psychologic' reflection by Sartre. If gratified, acted upon, it may also be recognised as the project of 'doing one's thing', (relative to everybody's given circumstances, of course, doing what one must as defined by the "I"-s response to real affairs, and not in some abstract context.) The reward of this process, apart from its yield of status and real possibilities in the world, which such conduct affects for better or worse (depending both on its quality and success), is the concurrent, reflected-upon, intrinsic reward or disappointment, as the case may be, the knowledge of bringing one's projects to fruition or failing to do so, something whose success is valued and desired as an end in itself, as an accomplishment per se, in terms of the self: everybody's dream. The project of exercising 'pure reflection' and the possible interpretability compatibly with Mead's notion of the process of the 'conversation of the "me" and the "I" won't be discussed here at length, as it would divert the argument too far.

It is important to appreciate that 'closures' may be effected at the 'wrong' level as it were, hungers as the "I" met with levels of action by the "me" which are not homogeneous with that, in instances where the

various gradings, orders of the "I" are gratified by tiers of stimulation, with ranks of object-fulfilment within the self which are not appropriately complementary regarding their level and kind to the hungers of the "I" at play. A well-known 'upward mismatch' between orders of "I"-s and a more elevated level of the "me", is Freudian sublimation in which sexual drives are 'closed', 'fed', made to 'answer to' by social activities, performing good deeds, intellectual projects, by chasing accomplishments, symbolically rather than physiologically positive rewards. (Among the evolutionarily variegated tiers of the "I", Freud gave pride of place to the 'id', a low-level, physiologically anchored drive, as the principle form and capacity of the "I", to the detriment of more sophisticated and evolutionarily more refined aspects of the "I" which, once they appeared on the evolutionary scene with the advent of man, have been operating distinguishably from, and alongside with more primitive drives of a physiologically rooted order, as Mead's writings suggest. For neglecting higher-order aspects of the "I" as often autonomously and originally operative among motivations, and for a tendency to derive, sometimes inappropriately, such higher-order motivations from the 'id', Mead is critical of Freud). (3)

But 'downward mismatches' in the course of the fulfilment of the hungers of the ego are also common in everyday life - wrong, jarring, faulty 'closures' by virtue of satisfying with a more lowly "me" the higher-order clamourings of the "I"; this case is perhaps more common even than are 'upward mismatches'. An example is reasoning emotively in an academic argument, 'magical behaviour' in bad faith in the case of interpersonal conduct when reasonable wishes could be communicated in explicit language but are instead realised by emotional blackmail which impresses on others that contrary responses to one's wishes would be emotionally intolerable to a self; or instances when arduous exertions in pure reflection in the process of intellectual or artistic creation are replaced, either voluntarily because of their difficulty or under the pressure of outside expectations by socialising, by totally time-consuming participation in the socialpsychologic business of ^{our} everyday life informed by 'impurely' reflective activities, forced upon one (particularly on agents against whose high-intellectual practices there is a prejudice) in the name of the 'greater normalcy' of a day-to-day sphere of rationality, and the duties which that implies or demands;

often coupled with the active creation and contrivance of circumstances which apparently justify the inappropriateness of pure reflection for some. Another example of wrong or inappropriate downward 'closure' is overeating, through intellectual frustration, neurotic munching, satiating hungers as a self with food in the literal and tangible sense. Many more and more refined levels of 'closure', and therefore mismatches in the course of effecting them, may be identified; for the moment we just mean to show how *Gerede* out of the many ploys drawing the self into the lazy and routine levels of the being of the self, may be instrumental in strategically, and coercively effecting the wrong 'closure' of the socialpsychologic authenticity-thirsty self if that be the colour of one's project. Especially in *Gerede* (and in the application of some other items of the Heidegger-postulated armoury for cutting down the outstanding self to size so as to comply with the standards of the generalized other, to be elaborated later), *das Man* (or generalized other to us) and agents subscribing to the promotion of the self in its idiom, try to 'close' the socialpsychologic authenticity-aspiring individual self as other than an active consciousness informed by and sporting an "I", as other than a being of free spirit and individuality; agents enforcing the generalized other in other people's quest for a complete self, apportion to such would-be authentic selves a ready-made "me" defined by the generalized other for all, indiscriminately and routinely meting out to everyone a self which is lacking in the sheen and quality of an insisted-on 'perspective', one which is incomplete with, devoid of the evidence of a 'telescopic lense' on the undifferentiated surface of the generalized other so to speak, forcibly offering instead, in the idiom of the generalized other, a "me" without such a sheen, a stereotype, a socially rather than socialpsychologically conceived and conducted cut-out of a personality. Graham Greene's book Travels with My Aunt tells the story how a bank manager, retired after a regular sort of a way of life in shelteredness from passionate personal commitments of any kind, a life ordered throughout by total predictability, under the sudden prevalence in his life of his newly discovered, intensely living 'aunt', embarks with her on a course of adventurous encounters which he then comes to adopt as his new way of life. 'It was as though I had escaped from an open prison' Graham Greene writes in the character of his main hero, 'had been snatched away, provided with a rope ladder and a waiting car,

into my aunt's world, the world of the unexpected character and the unforeseen event... I can remember very little of the vision preceding the prison house: it must have faded away very early 'into the light of the common day'... and (I) thought of my aunt, that she, for one never allowed the vision to fade. Perhaps a sense of morality is the sad compensation we learn to enjoy like a remission for good conduct.' (10)

The way in which *Gerede* (meaning small-talk or gossip in German) 'processes' a self to become the object of a 'closure' in oneself or in others on such terms - the terms of 'the light of the common day', the terms of the generalized other - is throwing the self, one's own or that of another, the bait of idle chat critical and intolerant of the object on the receiving end of small-talk if not found corroborative with the standards of the generalized other. The way in which the generalized other gets to work on the offensively obtrusive self in this process, consists both of robbing the small-talkers, and possibly authentic others who may be roped into such conversations, of precious time in which a true human project could be effectively and productively exercised the while, and also, as the by-product of the typical topics of such conversations which characteristically concern themselves with food (exchanging recipes e.g.), people's sexual affairs, past and present failures and most particularly death, or at least illness which deputises for death as a topic in a minimalised or partial way, such talk has the effect of constantly dragging both the talkers and the person who is the object of such talk, down to the 'earth' of the generalized other as the maximum horizon for any self, and also to the earth in which we are all to become 'ashes' and 'dust', pretending that it is that which we must be during our lifetimes too, and finally to the symbolic earthly levels of our exercising our bodily functions, such talk keeping us all within these minimalised spheres of the modes of being supporting our consciousness. *Gerede* is this capacity, performs and possessively maintains, hugs and claims room and territory for and perpetrates what may be conveniently called 'bullshit', a relative of the Sartrean 'viscous' as the vehicle and 'substance' of antivalue. The way how talk of illness and death fulfils this function is evocatively described by Sartre. (11) The preoccupation with food is also a contribution in an important way to the 'death' of the person who is the object of such conversation, in two senses: firstly, it

enforces an inappropriate level of the 'closure' of the self who may aspire to exercise a more spiritually taxing, demanding and engaged "me", by taking its place and elbowing that out of existence; and secondly, this topic is also complementary and contributive to the 'eating', consumption, devouring in a symbolic sense (as is illness) of the individual who is the target of *Gerede*, to gratify the violent hunger of the talkers as sociologic beings, and more often than not, also as thwarted, socialpsychologic beings who are vacuous as such, ever and irrepressibly, for having and being selves themselves, which arduous project, however, they themselves will undertake to embark on in authentic ways. There is a tradition in twentieth-century European drama which depicts food and the household routines of eating, as the vehicle of the function of this process of personal or interpersonal devouring. Strindberg was the first, to my knowledge, to introduce the figure of the Cook as the coercive forcer of the human spirit and the possibility of the higher-order projects of the characters he portrayed in his plays, to be satiated, replaced by food and ousted by rigorously adhered-to eating routines. Prokofiev's opera The Love of Three Oranges affords a second example of a fearsome cook, a towering giant monster, sang by a bass in drag, who constantly interjects 'herself' and puts 'herself' in the way of the characters' fairy-tale pilgrimage to realising themselves and their dreams. Simon Grey's much newer comedy, Close of Play can also be enlisted in the dramatic tradition which utilises the same vision and makes this very point by similar means; in this play the pursuit of the characters depicted of the job of ironing out their lives, is constantly interrupted and made impossible by reminders and enforcement of mealtimes.

The victim of such *Gerede*, willing or otherwise, becomes 'closed' in his capacity as a socialpsychologic consciousness at the level of the generalized other, his self levelled out in continuity with that, decapitated of its excellence or his aspirations for it, his being desirous of 'doing his thing', stuffed instead with the fodder of the generalized other's forcibly gesturing him to be, as a self, the same as, homogeneous with the generalized other, and will be, as a consequence, defined, outlined, judged in fact as being the banal "me" only which is apportioned to all in the name of and by the power of the consensus of others - unauthentic others - as "me"-s only by choice,

and in corroboration with that social and socialpsychologically unauthentic continuum which this consensus (the generalized other) affords. Once the free project of life in authenticity in openness and sensitivity to and inclusiveness of an "I", is 'closed' by this outward definition and medium by the convention of reigning expectations by the champions of the latter, that is what one is, a "me" only of the sort which is most convenient, and cast accordingly, by one's *milieu* (unless re-converted to be open and receptive to the vision again, like Graham Greene's hero) ('12') which will inform one, Hegelian fashion, of one's "me" in the world of facts by way of the mirror for one in other people's eyes, by way of public consciousness, the frame of reference carved out for one, limiting the proper sphere of one's acts. That's it; the self is 'closed' in the real terms of the generalized other. One's lack is saturated with the retrograde object, the matt finish of a "me" of one's past, already uncovered, forcibly socked to one as one's lot as a self, to identify with - and also 'closed' as a consumer who must eat as well as be eaten, as somebody who is eventually condemned to death anyway and is already living partial gradations of his death during his lifetime, and in the shadow of that death; and any future "me"-s in the light of one's continued loyalty to the "I" are possible as one's freedom in open nihilation of that limited "me" typecast for one - ('I have begun in immoral freedom', Graham Greene's 'hero' writes rejoicing in his newly discovered way of life), or if such an overt conversion is not available to one owing to circumstances, one may elect to live in one's newly found freedom in an inner, Aristotelean sense merely: it must not be forgotten that one's course of conduct within such confines at least, the choice of such a future "me" as far as one's own self is concerned, is possible, important and eminently meaningful.

The fibre of bullshit, the medium of Sartre's viscous, antivalue, the coherent continuum of the generalized other at its unauthentic (for it is possible for it to be authentic too, as will be subsequently argued) is the poor man's "We", spirit of seriousness. It's the subscription to the values of the Serious by those who would be but have no ascribed title to perpetrate that in first-hand authorship; it's the spirit of worship of the generalized other in the form in which it usurps, takes the place of society's norms (ideally tantamount to the collective consciousness), degrading those into the norm of the given

society, soiled by and transcribed into a morally compromised social actuality, affording a sham collective consciousness which is elevated by the existing ideology which serves the bureaucrat (the *nouveaux* aristocrat) and which the bureaucrat serves, to the status of sacredness, with religious weight, and handed down to the rachmones, profane, to worship. It's the approved mode of the Rachmones' assumption of himself in the solemn object status as typecast, by the force of the given, coercive norm, contaminated by a morally anomalous actuality, but declared and operative as Sacred. Its tone, accordingly, is mundane, banal and, importantly, judgemental, as is the 'We' proper which it imitates, in strict counterdistinction to the simple and spontaneous authentic interpersonal which is inherent in human reality, as Mead and Bultmann discern; with the unauthentic interpersonal values preoccupying Heidegger the degradation of those. MacQuarrie ('3), interpreter both of Heidegger and of Bultmann, discerns how the values of human reality at its interpersonal, informing both individuals and the community at its Pauline authentic, turn and gel in the alternative, humanly depersonalised, sham medium of *das Man* (tantamount to our generalized other when unauthentically chosen), into devices serving personal laziness and interpersonal possession as symbolised, for instance, by Bluebeard's and Judith's story. The discreet virtues of ordinary human decency between intending small-letter sacred, come to acquire in this process of their degradation a second meaning and sphere of efficacy in the medium proper to their unauthentic bastardisation: *das Man*, at variance with their original soil and their thriving in that as human reality in the process of the continuous and spontaneous upsurge of that mode of being, affording of that system of virtues a mirage, a magician's trick projection, an upside-down, shadow body of those properly *un-self*counscious attributes, medium of giving in interpersonal traffic, which is downlifting in its experience and actual operation and effects, onto the level of this phoney, sham, judgementally trigger-happy "I" of power over one another, a toolkit for mastery. Heidegger's analysis and description identifies, lists and treats some key notions in this degraded level of interpersonal double-talk, though in his treatment it is only the unauthentic projection of these attributes of interpersonal conduct which receive all the limelight. His gallery of these ruses for interpersonal domination is useful in illuminating familiar patterns of those in our everyday, and

more can be added to his collection of exhibits. To list just a few of these notions of interpersonal being and conduct - the cement of sympathy in their authentic employment between people and, in sharp contrast, the instruments of coercive domination over others in the *das Man* manufacturing process as the meant effect of their unauthentic application, we can start with mentioning *Gerede* again, the false reflection of its unspoilt alternative in the armoury of human reality: 'conversation', a basic tool and vehicle for the sustainance of authentic 'Being-for-Others', to use Sartrian jargon for a moment to denote a process most profoundly and extensively treated by Mead and Bultmann. As Mead expounds it, 'conversation' or its near-synonym: symbolic interaction, emerges as the natural arena of the self for its own being as such as well as for its being for others, the "me"-s which are being exchanged in the course of it, directly and aptly filling man's constant, axiomatic social, interpersonal need (a primary capacity in all), the communicating self's "me" which is being put forward in the course of the 'conversation' reflecting back upon itself in the process of the constant feedback in the response to and appreciation of that "me" in the other's eye, further both formulating that "me" in the communicating ego and fulfilling and maintaining at the same time the Other as a self whose hunger as a social being is also being filled by the voluntary and free gift of his partner's "me" in this 'conversation'. The speech of which Mead's 'conversation' consists is personal and authentically borne of the self exercising, knowing and meaning itself as such, subjectively conductive and conducive, rather than preventative of that, as is *Gerede*. Among other originally authentic notions of interpersonal traffic which the mode of *das Man* turns into their unauthentic, watered-down or rather methylated-down facsimilies for interpersonal use of a lowlier kind, we may list 'interest' (unmistakably sincere and interpersonally concerned when experienced at its genuine), whose ill-meaning and sham likeness and substitute is the already familiar *Neugier*'. Love, in this process of the unauthentic transformation of tools of interpersonality, becomes fussing in this process of unauthenticisation - it turns into sentimentality, the offer of a brotherhood which is intolerant of individual differences, rejecting, thrusting, as if pus, any assertion and show of such out of its body. Care, in Heidegger's presentation, emerges as transformed from the plentiful, ungrudging and voluntary

giving from the psychological time of the duration of one's own life, to another who depends on this personal help; the Heidegger-identified unauthentic counterpart of the notion of care shows itself, in contrast, as a tool for interpersonal possession again, and will operate in its effect as a contrivance for the domination of the Other, made possible by the recipient's temporary weakness, diminished powers and the varying degrees of his exposure (through his need) to his 'caretaker'. The entire collection of all these ruses for the domination of the one exposed to unauthentic interpersonal on the receiving end, originates from and consists in the *instrumentality* of human traffic and practice of relating, in the terminology of Heidegger. This instrumentality, as opposed to the possibility of interpersonal authenticity, means the construing of the Other opposite us (and of ourselves too, as will be seen in a minute) as object only, as someone without 'grace' in Sartre's sense, lacking the dignity of being with an "I"; it consists of tactically affecting a position and actively conceiving of and exploiting it as one of permanent weakness and dependency for the Other relative to us as an ego regarding its power - it means the setting up and the prolonged presentation, perpetration and justification of such an interpersonal situation as something morally desirable and approved, as sanctified by the dicta and maintained under the guise of the bastardised body of genuine interpersonal virtues as just identified, altruistic on the face of it, but a device, in fact, for the use of the Other as instrument in our own project of psychologic advancement and perhaps advancement in the world. The fact that in this process the Other who is meant to be subjugated is envisaged by the 'dominant' partner as someone without a dignified, "I"-inclusive, autonomous self, relative to him, on the long term, as Slave, doesn't mean that the subjugator will necessarily want to live a life in which the "I", his possibility of being 'Master' will be actively and imaginatively utilised just because he secured that chance for himself; his interpersonal 'victory' doesn't automatically entail that the potential for having the upper hand as gained in this unauthentic relationship, will in most cases be exercised by the winner with recourse to a truly outstanding "I", as Subject, even within the self-centred confines of his own ego. More often than not the chance for 'mastery' emerging from the practices of unauthentic interpersonal, is grasped as the privilege of being outsize and supremely obscene

Object among lowlier and more modest ones, it will result in the apprehension of the self, not as 'master' by way of conspicuous active reliance on the mature "I" in conduct, but in keeping with the more primitive understanding of sentinel-capacity out of the two possible ways in which outstanding human stature relative to that of others, can, according to Mead, (as already commented on in Section 2) be approached, achieved and purported; these two alternative routes to conspicuous excellence being an enhanced 'sameness' or else 'difference' compared with others. In such projects of Heideggerean unauthentic interpersonal 'mastery', instrumentality, the excellence of the 'conqueror' is typically envisaged and grasped as supreme 'sameness', purely social object-status in all, with oneself seen as a more prominently mighty and zealous social object in a narrow and vulgarian sense than others whom we mean to so define, with mediocrity (one's own included) raised to a pedestal: the project of outshining the mediocrity of all and glittering as the most supreme champion of that, a process insightfully and richly rendered in Sartre's Antisemite and Jew in his description of the antisemite's psyche. Subject-potential is seen by the winner in this Heidegger-identified interpersonal ploy as a chance for being object *extraordinaire*, a sociologically higher-ranking object than others with power for the subjugation of them, rather than as a chance for the liberation in anthropologic equality of composite selves, each sovereign and hybrid 'object' illuminated as such, in part at least, by an "I", one's own self included among others as one with duties as well as rights - as a self apprehended, as are others, as properly complete with both a "me" and an "I": the resulting authentic quality of brotherhood being Bultmann's strong preoccupation. Of course the generalized other at its unauthentic, as just described at length, is the same crowd (or indeed the same individual) as Paul's authentic redefinition and grasp of that crowd, or any member of it, as known and intuited by him on authentic interpersonal occasions - it is the same population as that living and knowing itself interpersonally as small-letter profane at its authentic, or small-letter sacred, which is the same thing - authenticity as human reality, or alternatively, unauthenticity, being every person's, and every crowd's, genuine competing possibilities, and the chosen framework of values, whichever of these two contrasting styles of conduct is opted for, will cause a homogeneity and gelling within each of these alternative sets of ethical

notions, these concepts touching on interpersonal conduct, as just listed, cohering as whole systems of behaviour and consciousness in either the case of the overriding authenticity or unauthenticity of their use. The unauthentic out of these two alternatively resulting frameworks of interpersonal conduct, Sartre's antivalue, if plunged for, will be as strongly held as can be the authentic one, and solemnly adhered to, albeit in bad faith, but purported no less committedly for that, than would be an authentic code of interpersonality. My former friend who quizzed me over the telephone about my family and our standing, meant me no harm (in terms of the ideology informing her conduct at least) by exposing me, preparing me for the Look of the generalized other which latently had designs on us for several years. Through her processing me ready for *Gerede*, she held out, offered me the possibility of my, our, acceptance into the society in which I belonged by the force of cultural expectations, by virtue of my background - on certain qualified terms of course, because of our still being provincial as well as on account of my having shown, over the years, my spiritual independence from that community and its judgement - so as to plausibly and 'deservedly' fit us into a niche within its body ready and waiting for us to be melted into, shedding in the process our veil of secrecy that attached to us during our years of seclusion from that environment. She lifted out, removed the stop in and for myself of my own, my personally and independently defined and developed "me" for 'closing' myself as an adequate and autonomous Sartrean Being-for-Itself, an individual managing without the spiritual crutch of my 'natural' subcultural generalized other which is properly and naturally available to me in the world, deflating in her act my being and that of my family, of any "I" in us over and above that 'proper' communal culture defining us in readymade terms, and filling, satiating her own self as self-appointed 'master' over that stature which was newly allotted, offered by her for us, taking us into her self the while and making us hers through the nourishment of information, the stuff and means of interpersonal power in the process of the abuse of generously offered human reality in the act of donating one's "me" in authentic interpersonality, normally benignly surrendered as well as received in the course of authentic conversation - that which, however, can be falsely and tactically appropriated in *Neugier* and further and totally

consumed in *Gerede*, with a view to gaining overlordship over the person who is the object of the 'conversation'.

On a sociologic scale, this process finds an echo in the insatiable data hoarding by the new, bureaucratic élite and its polarization, suction of subject status into itself and ejecting, releasing object status into the profane subordinate to it. Both these processes, Heideggerean socialpsychologic unauthentic interpersonality and the systematic 'specialisation' of subject status on a grand scale into the bureaucratic élite and object status into the profane of the world, have the power, in comparable ways, of subjugating the self of the other in the way of instrumentally having, possessing him instead of co-being with him in interpersonal 'transparency' (to mingle Sartrean jargon with a Heideggerean one for a moment), as Bluebeard's story conjures forth on the micro-anthropologic scale, or, in the case of sociologic 'specialisation' in the practice of the anthropologic abuse of the larger part of humanity, in sharp contrast with a democracy which would not be hypocritical, which would not render the greatest part of humanity, ourselves, as data-fodder, Slave in a very strong, real and meaningful Hegelian sense. The activity of the new élite in this context, may be seen as *Gerede* writ large. Its calling is to reduce, make null, the schism in society which, if it is allowed to remain articulated, explicit, will disturb; and, by implication, reduce the schism in the individual too, albeit the schism in his consciousness is the individual's key tool enabling him to appreciate the schism in society and to respond to it as an individual. In the main, its aim is to reduce that schism in its big-letter aspect in the world, though on different terms for ascribed Sacred and Profane, channelling Subject status into the Sacred and object status into the Profane, as already described.

This section, which comparatively considered the systematically differing schism-reduction for Master and Slave on two planes: as writ large in society as such, and as writ small within socialpsychologic confines, touches on the borders of both macrosociology and microsociology, and would therefore have been equally legitimately, conveniently and naturally discussed as the first section in the following chapter.

THE SCHISM AS A MICROSOCIOLOGIC MATTER.Section 1. Being and Having. The Caretaker.

The structure of the "me" and the "I" drawn into, engaged in relation to each other, this inner architecture of the perspective of the self, not foresworn, maintained by the person on its own terms as a self, at an angle with the generalized other, critical of, noncoincidental with that, a vantage point upon itself from the generalized other without surrendering one's private perspective on that, is the schism as a microsociologic and socialpsychologic matter; a close relative of hubris. Hubris is articulated anomie, or schism, one's being, or ever-ready potential for being at variance as a self with the generalized other if one's individual conscience informs one of the need for that, it's the project of the maintainance of the familiarity with this condition of consciousness and choosing it as a call to transcend, better it, if necessary, act upon it, as a function of an intrinsic bidding for its own sake and as an end in itself. The schism as a microsociologic or socialpsychologic matter in this sense, is sin. As already said, it is the socialpsychologic, individually experienced inside of Durkheim's notion of the pooled anomie of statistics, the mechanism in consciousness experientially underlying that blanket, that 'whole cloth' of anomie grasped as a sociologic phenomenon as is by Durkheim (and for which it is at times appreciated by Sartre), it's the small-letter projection of anomie, a process, the hobbly course within the self of the "me" always falling short in its actual realisation in the world of the demands of the "I" on it, and of the self creating newer and newer "me"-s to match those demands, to ground them in positive reality outside, with the "me" therefore always in a cognised and slippery disjointment with the generalized other if authentic. Sartre claims this is always the case but we may choose to be blind to it in bad faith. In authenticity, the course of the small-letter schism as consciousness, is always tied up with the ever-imperfect but ceaseless project of the self always catching up in the world with its condition of socialpsychologic equilibration, with satisfaction as a consciousness always ahead of it, always deluding it; the schism provides and animates the course of the ego always thrusting itself ahead of its given condition in its constant adjustment-tropism; the process ever titillating the agent's consciousness so that it never quite knows, experiences the notion of 'enough' as a completely satisfactory and satisfied self. It's akin with Freud's Angst,

Kierkegaard's *angest*, the more modern psychologist's 'anxiety'. And yet this schism, this rupture, this relation of transcendence between the "I"'s hungers, projects, terms, and its given platform of realisation in the Sartrean *existing*, the "me"'s foothold in the self, quite simply equals the self, as Sartre points out, and is nothing other than the condition and process - this process - of being one. Already Freud implied, and a string of psychological studies since him made his thesis better explored and more explicit, that it is only in extreme conditions of schism, distancedness between the needs of the "I" and the self's sense of the attainment and adequate satiation with those needs in the world, that anxiety is burdensome, untenable, amounts to unbearable and unequivocal anguish, gets out of the reins of normalcy. Such degrees of anxiety which were discovered in psychologic study as conducive and the prerequisite of any achievement, are on the same continuum: that of anxiety. Even normal levels of achievement are possible only with considerable - better still, with high levels of anxiety, and constant lack of achievement, with all other things equal, usually and characteristically goes hand in hand with insufficient levels of drive, anxiety. You can only attain to be a person of a certain quality on your own merit at the price of some anguish, mixed with a sensation of the risk and thrill of the engagement, the pushing of the self nearer its creative limits, with the delighted-in experience and more important: anticipation of the occasional bringing together of a "me" on the "I"'s terms with the pay-off of its project in the world, of actually winning in the mode, currency and medium, of human reality. The schism, *anomie*, *angest* is a pregnant, fertile process, the only one generative of itself in the terms of this currency: human reality, of labour, of pain, of labour pain through which mode of approach alone the self is productive, creative, an achieving one by the criterion of being fulfilled, salient, fully fledged as a self; not quite a run-of-the mill one, perhaps somewhat problematic, with a "me" of participation, a "me" of the constant renewal of itself and its condition, one with the lustre of a self-realised, self-acknowledged "I" leaving its stamp on the self of its engager, one with an "I" which is integral to and suggestive of a self of a certain sort and not equal to the "I" of the outward ostentation of an outsize "me" with greater than average power, on which we commented on the last pages of the last section. The attestable distinction, gloss finish of the self in its condition of the frank

acknowledgement of and active recourse to its schism which gives it any dynamic powers it may have as a self, is indeed other in kind as well as to appearances than the distinction as supreme object lent by subscription to the second-hand, Pukka-imitative ideals of the generalized other as just observed on the tail end of the last section. Neither is it interchangeable with the equally phoney "I" of the really powerful Pukka so ascribed in the actual terms of the world, the quality of their serious and typically bombastic "I" congealing among them in a "We" as a total phenomenon - the distinctive quality of the authentic self which is ready to own up to its schism, sharply differing from that of the coercive ascribed Masters who hold and can withhold, blow as part of their sphere of duty, one's dignity-constitutive secrecy and socialpsychologic autonomy of the self in the profane, us, in a manner writ large in sociologic dimensions.

It is this, such selves, selves with such a creatively potent and authentic, first-hand socialpsychologically distinguished, endowed and articulate, personal "me", which those high by ascription covet and mean to have. In reality, they are engaged in the self-defeating undertaking of acquiring such selves, the selves of 'doers' and not of 'have-ers' which they themselves are, but without recourse to and being stigmatised with the label of sin, a reputation as sinners; they would themselves like to have the mark and quality of first-hand selves which come from engaging one's very being as sounding boards to sonatas of doubt and daring which they would themselves like to be able to play rather than buy tickets to as paying audience, but without themselves screechingly probing into this possibility as a step towards attempting to be bold virtuosos, staking themselves the while in the exertion and risks that go with such a prize. They would like to secure such an outstanding self and its genuine glory for themselves, but by the power of legislation, by the allocation of such selves to them by legislative, ascriptive ways. It is the "I" of the achiever on account of creative attributes generated in the first person singular which they would like to be with, and not the polite, baptised, seedless substitute for that which they can manage to lay claim to and enforce and proclaim as the mark of social (not socialpsychologic) distinction and standards; the kind of excellence which alone they can have. Nobody wants to be an outstanding "me" merely by virtue of having bought or fixed his way to it. In the

Hungary of my childhood, only a few children were able to own a football, and an interpersonal notion and syndrome called 'he owns the ball' developed among bunches of children amongst whom there was only one person who had a football to go around among the rest of the players. (I believe this notion has found a place in the language use of this culture too.) The expression 'he owns the ball' is expressive of the interpersonal conspiracy in which out of a sense of diplomacy 'master' status in the sense of personally deserved excellence is tactfully feigned, politely allowed to attach, to someone 'master' in the inferior and personally unauthentic sense of superordination by virtue of mere privileged 'having' (in the case of these groups of children, through owning a football), so as to secure for the real champs a slice of the conditions for playing the game. In practice, this meant that when children got together to play football, it was accepted that the owner of the ball had a say in doubtful decisions, which inevitably went in his favour; he was, moreover, never to be made feel a complete washout as a player even if he was one; to do so was somehow felt unethical and most certainly unexpedient, in view of the fact that the possibility of the next match depended on the owner of the ball wanting to play, and the continued psychological incentive for participation for him had to be taken care of.

Everybody has 'schism' as his original possibility as a human being; this is simply consciousness and the structure of consciousness, as Sartre discerned and demonstrated, though in most of us this condition of consciousness is not as cultivated as it is in him. The tolerance of the schism (particularly when the distance between the claims and capacities of the "I" in their Sartrean absoluteness and the chances for a "me" for the gratification of those in the world is very great), is psychologically or socialpsychologically difficult for all, though authentic, and for selves which are Sacred because so ascribed, the schism (a threat to these conditions of sacredness in the world) is seen as intolerable both in the Sacred and the Profane, as a question touching on the entire style of conduct, and also as a matter of the concrete socialpsychologic consequences which result, follow from it. Decrying, as the average and typical Sacred does, recourse to the anomic mechanism of the furtherance of the self in ever-ready fundamental questioning (without which a mind of a certain stamp, artistic or

scientific, simply isn't possible), with the universal need and call for a socialpsychologically authentic, "I"-affected, self-supporting and self-propagative "me" waved aside, forgone, they are in the desperate straits of having a schism, permanently locked, in everlasting stagnation, between an "I" fully operative with all its hungers and claims, and the 'ceiling' of their selves in a realised "me" relative to that, inflexibly and immutably fixed in that "me" in the world which money can buy, which a free pass in the established network of opportunities there can fix, and which is the only type of "me" they all will have, by choice. Contrasting with the psychologically or rather socialpsychologically authentic "me" of the innerly propelled, spontaneous kind, the plastic, perpetual mechanism of the ceaseless transcendence of the self of itself to ever-newer, self-identified horizons by its own standards in the process of anomie, stands the mechanism of the maintenance of the superior standing of the ascriptionally high, furthered by the kinetics of schism-intolerance, by a Heideggerean system of socialpsychologically unauthentic ruses (as elaborated in the last section) operating to interpersonally offload that schism and its demands and psychological consequences to another on the terms of mastery, subject, winner status for one's own self, and slavery, instrumentality for the other. The workings of this process which produces, maintains and feeds, to the convenience of the Pukka, "I"-appropriative or Master status to those originally and incidentally so ascribed, and 'object', Slave, instrument status for those incidentally and originally ascribed as Profane, are seldom explicitly articulated by the Pukka in the mode of frankness and openness either vis-a-vis the Rachmones, or even vis-a-vis himself, but this process and its socialpsychologically and socially favourable outcome for the Pukka is commonly justified by the latter as the proper reward of the Pukka's long-standing and typical ascription-abidance, by virtue of his fundamental choice, according to which he laid aside the project, the generic modality, pursuit, title and route to excellence which can be gained only by reliance on the authentic, pulsating medium of human reality in the living; this elected unquestioning ascription-abidance by the Pukka presented and understood by him as the quintessence of virtue. The Masters by ascription typically pretend that excellence is properly earned, not by a participatory exertion of overcoming the schism, not by riding that schism on the crest of the act in the process of actively

being the self, but by virtue of possessing another's self, by virtue of sustaining a self by way of *having* selves and the glory of their excellence, proffering instead of the twentyfour-carat virtue of the productive self by the hallmark of that very productivity, an alternative and fake code of excellence of the ascriptionally privileged which ostentatiously boasts 'I am what I have'. Selves as a whole, the privilege of their realisation, crowning culmination in, alive with, effused into accomplished and accomplishing "me"-s, are imbibed by such colonising, unauthentic selves, taken into them whilst extinguished in, sucked out of others, scrambled, the "I" and the "me" thereby put asunder in those who were originally productive of the self to be appropriated, the attainment of a dignified "me" which is complete with and indicative of an underlying "I", made the condition, in the case of the less privileged, of qualified access to such a "me" in those socially not destined to be endowed with a self of the first order. The ensemble of "me" and "I" is unmade, responsibilities, discretion, immediate perceptibility of, presence to the collective consciousness as directly intuited, interpreted, sensed at first hand, is disallowed, ungranted to the lowly ascribed, and the system of rights tallying with those in the world (the "me" which is there for them) assumed, defined for them and access to it apportioned to them by the Pukka in mean measure. Pinter's notion 'the caretaker' can now be introduced: in his play bearing that title, set in contemporary times, its action renders the pilgrimage, never to be accomplished, of a tramp to 'Sidcup' which, in spite of its apparently specific name, is a mysterious terminus where certificates, information, the facts relating to all persons, including his person, such as his name, his place of birth, his place of residence: a home, the job he is to do, in short: his identity as a whole person, as a small-letter sacred self, to be issued to him on arrival, is kept by nondescript, unspecific, unnamed administrative agencies in unbridgeable, unapproachable separateness, alienation from him, where his person, defined by all these attributes to it, is made by these barely fathomable agencies, the object of care, in the Heideggerean, instrumental sense, but writ large in relation to that rendition.

(Another allegory of the 'caretaker's' undertaking, practice in its operation: the process of his creaming off the most sublime and personal

aspects of selves for their own use of them by standing in their way as selves on their journey, in prayer, in the act of commending themselves to the gods, the representatives of the collective consciousness at its purely and ideally Sacred, in their hope of the fulfilment and maintainance of those selves as a result of this project, is parodied in Aristophanes' play The Clouds, in which Socrates is depicted as suspended in a basket between heaven and earth, intercepting the sacrifices of mortals directed to the gods, and collecting tax, customs duty for letting through the 'incense', the medium of their worship, their prayers, offerings.)

Pinter's 'mortal', profane hero, marks, bides his time, stagnantly, indefinitely, in a half-way house to 'Sidcup', with lodgers of longer standing as such than himself, fellow-pilgrims, fellow-tramps, fellow traveller folk in a variegated system of accession to degrees of title to room, rights as egos on the road of progression towards a name, an *Eigentlichkeit*, to increasing grades of strength through being *in situ*, which is indicated by the varying title to and exercise of aggression. His quest for an identity is oriented to uncovering, finding, meeting, re-acquiring his self from the authorities with the power of issuing that to him at the point of his destination, but they are invisible, unfathomable, faceless. So is the landlord of the half-way house of his stay; absent and anonymous. The highest authority that is visible to him is the caretaker *in loco* the landlord, his identity also unstable, his name in the course of the plot constantly changing, his role handed on from person to person, the only knower, mediator, purveyor of the inscrutable rules pertaining to staying or moving on: the arbiter of duties to be rendered in exchange for shares in rights. (This is the currency the caretaker earns and the tenant pays: the rent is not tendered in money.) The 'caretaker' of Pinter's plot, both the changing chain of characters assuming that office and the concept, is an allegory of a schedule, a régime of strength as derived from, as drawn into ownership, requisition and tenure of the conditions of the realisation of the self, of selves. It renders the code of reference of the project of being individually somewhat outstanding, of attaining status as a self, not by virtue of the productivity of it, not through any generating and giving, though this is the appearance, but by holding, withholding, and grudgingly letting those of lower ascription have

morsels of that personal identity, properly unique to all, which already is rightfully theirs and has been theirs from their births as human reality, as selves with possibilities, selves with the ghost, hope, conception, cognisance of the self which is the very own of each as ideally fulfilled, as a self with a future which is in part of one's own making.

It has already been observed in Section 2. of the previous chapter that in the constantly staged charade on the media of the association of high personages with spectacular moments of the realisation of the selves of the 'less fortunate', creating the impression that such moments of bliss for the rachmones could exclusively and properly emanate only from those Up High, the Pukka's practice of the prevention and interception of the private and autonomous ways, means and methods of the fulfilment of ordinary people's lacking selves, is a meant and tactical policy which is functional for reinforcing the stability of the reigning system in macrosociologic ways and dimensions over and above the socialpsychologic gratification inherent in it for those who systematically, nay, professionally, fulfil this duty of apparent giving. Another, distant but related echo of the same phenomenon, that of the institutionally functional interception of the autonomous fulfilment of the self for the sake of the furtherance of an established social structure will also be identified here, though scaled down in this second context to the dimensions of the family. This second, related use of the socially tactical frustration of the fulfilment of the sphere of duties and operation of individual selves, can be observed in the extended family, with censorious, measured access granted in a partial and socially circumscribed and qualified manner to the junior woman to her children and other areas of responsibilities in the family by the senior woman, now aged, who would otherwise be unable to support herself in any sense of the word, particularly not in the socialpsychologic sense of being an autonomous self herself, which she wasn't brought up to be when she was a junior woman, with her parasitic being on the junior woman as the number one matriarch, the 'caretaker' of the sanctity and functioning of the extended family, protected by the appeal and aura of the ascribed sacredness of the grandmother stereotype attaching to her, and the resulting pattern of a lifetime's cycle of socially functional insufficiency for women as selves and the eventual

pay-off of this condition in the coercive grandmother-role, handed down as the legacy of the junior woman as something to which she will graduate when she is a grandmother, when life has beaten her too and all the go and quality as an individual have gone out of her, so that the arrangement may serve to support her as a person, lend, secure for her fulfilment and the semblance of dignity as a self.

What the caretaker-ethics, norm, style for conducting the self fuels, maintains, and which Pinter's play symbolises, is a scale of merit in which the provenness, order of one's elevation as a person is asserted by the overwhelming extent of the hold over and the meanness of the measure in granting room to another person's self, in which the height of and the title to office is indicated by the heaviness of manner to subordinates, harshness of being, greatness of the push of oversight, in which, respect to those more menially ascribed is missing as a necessary feature of the relationship (though there may be a love of a Sartre-depicted, unauthentic sort), and in which that which is good for one who is in the 'caretaker's' 'care' is indicated by the firmness with which that 'good' is sat upon and judiciously given out by the 'caretaker'. The caretakers provide protection to the selves in their care in the same way as that is proverbially apportioned and granted by the mafia 'godfather'. This approach to high personal ranking, to caretaking, has appeal to the naive, the immature. The other day I came across records of the notorious training ship 'Clio', moored off the shores of Bangor in the last century: a part educational, part corrective community for the young (though some boys were committed there by virtue of poverty alone, because their parents couldn't care for them), where eleven to sixteen-year-olds were kept under such repressive rule by an autocratic headmaster that the pity felt for them by the public was remembered even in this century; the people of Bangor were giving sixpences to the elegant naval cadets when they went ashore during a visit there between the two wars, in remembrance of the training ship boys who used to occasionally go ashore there, several decades before. Many of the original boys on the Clio, on completing their service there, have subsequently sent letters of gratitude to this man. Selves who are superordinate by ascription, who are in the position of the privileged syphoning off of the "I" or Subject function for themselves in the process of the 'specialisation', distribution,

allocation of "I"-s for the Pukka, "me"-s for the Rachmones (as described in Section 2. of the last chapter), the ascriptionally privileged, are engaged in a kind of reverse anomie of accession above other selves by exclusion, the exclusion of some (or rather, of most) from dignified, creative human reality status, rather than by constantly creating such a status for themselves in the process of ceaselessly exercising socialpsychologically earned and expressed, first-hand human excellence. Those "I"-appropriating and hogging Pukka who cultivate (instead of authentic means of self-betterment in taxing and self-referential anomie) this exercise of the anthropologic keeping up with the Joneses, their sense of excellence deriving from the external index of who can show greater say and power in having other selves at their disposal, in their caretaking jurisdiction, as expressed in the hierarchy of the various 'honours lists' of ascribed merit in the world as already allocated, have the sadness of the absence of a pliant, flexible, creation-responsive and sensitive, productive and generative "me" of a dynamic self of their own, of having to be content, in *their* kind of socialpsychologic process and method of overcoming the schism, with always being, instead of 'better than' so and so (or even their own former selves), forever merely 'better off than'. They can never have the mark of that self which comes from the daring of a disciple of Descartes or from being thrown willy-nilly to insights of the profundity of the doubt of the generalized other so that he can manage on the scraps of what the generalized other throws him as a self after he has been judged by that at the end of each of his projects in which he will forever engage, or cope with the burdensome individual privilege of standing up to newly discovered peaks of their selves which such projects may bring them in the race for one's self; they must forever forego the lot, truly distinguishing but psychologically considerably consuming, of one who solves the task of schism-management which we all have to do, as a self that feeds on licking its wounds, on his own resin as a self. Their schisms never resolved into the momentary glorious synthesis between "me" and "I" as an ever exigent self, but frozen into the unbridgeable and painful gap (which is in us all as anomic sinners) between all they would be and all they can have; what these selves hunger for, what they mean to get out of the caretaking project, is the "me" of a shining, salient, unique ego, so as to be this kind of a self with a certain stamp, a first-hand, personal one, the product carrying

the trade mark of a schism owned up to and managed, offered up, constantly mined, delved into, drawn on. They legislate the schism away as the mark of deviance in the face of the established norm in that generalized other which is the case in the world, but lay claim to importing into themselves the natural privilege of one successfully resolved, kept up, open, constantly reaped. What they want, what they have their eyes ambivalently clapped on, a thorn in the flesh as ascribed Sacred but their anal attitude to selves vacuous, eager for it, is a jewel of a self; not their own, terminating directly, without a seam, in the generalized other, flush with that, a barren desert of a synthesis with an "I" served up on a plate and tailor made to fit its field of gratification in the world, and, conversely, a world tailor made to fit the demands of their "I", but a self with knobs on as such, at a noticeable tangent to, distinction in relation to, the sea of the generalized other as the reigning norm, with the brand name of a socialpsychologically outstanding "me" suggestive of an authentic "I", with a depth, a will of its own, stating itself as a humanity, as human reality of its own making and limits. The Queen's "me" often states itself, emerges as such a "me": employing, as she has done, for instance, a homosexual in the highest rank in her personal security team and reluctant to dismiss him after years of impeccable service in spite of pressure from public opinion, until the generalized other showed its superior muscle and got them both, forcefully removing the man from his job and checking the Queen's freedom to exercise her judgement as a person as prompted to her by a personal "I" in her capacity as a human reality. Such an authentic self is that of an artist, an actor, its "me" a spectacular assumption of its convention-deviant inner resources, a flagrant individual perspective on the generalized other, a prism on its surface, showing that up, a schism of which he is not only unashamed but able to make a living of; or a Diogenes, in his barrel for a home and with his spirit occupying an elaborate structure, edifice of thought, and claiming a universe for its accommodation - together with the army of the nameless followers and amateur successors of his kind as a self; or unruly children who are heard as well as seen, or hitch-hikers on holiday abroad who know better how to have a good time than the tycoon, a Citizen Kane lost for ways of enlivening his spirit and way of life wherever he goes. It's the sheen of a self, fresh, unlooked at, private like Bluebeard's, king of the

castle of an autonomous soul, it is selves with such sheen which the voracious Pukka means to absorb, draw into his collection, gallery of hijacked and hogged selves, 'take internally' so as to be with it; but, regardless of the numbers of the selves he engulfed he can only have these selves, he cannot fuel, maintain a qualitatively improved more authentic one of his own by virtue of his administrative overlordship, gluttonous caretakership vis-a-vis those, because he rejects the avenue along which that can be gained, as a matter of his fundamental choice. His plan to obtain, incorporate into himself the target self chosen for his absorption, like that of the sadist in Sartre's description, is doomed to failure. Either the self of the other as object only, that which his caretaking produces, is one not worth having any more after its conquest, or it is not successfully owned - the Hegelian mirror image as his feedback regarding himself in the Other's eyes which he hungers for as the prop and basis for his own self, will show up his self, his being as a sham, secondary one 'made in Hong-Kong' as it were, and the project of taking into himself the selves of his fixation will continue to elude him. He will quote figures in the way of conversation during social get-togethers, when others exchange, air their genuine common interests, their observations about the world and its ways, their learning; he will display his knowledge of a great number of facts about places, buildings, things of tourist interest, items suited for or taken from books of records, percentages of production. This type, if he happens to be a teacher, will relish telling his fellow-spirits how he got the better of a little blighter at school. These manifestations of this type of degraded but gregarious "I"-s are all hymns of having, sung in their own praise - delivered with the chilling lustre of a self lent by the attitude 'See all the things I have?' - the stiff, starched, forbidding uprightness of a bastardised Protestant ethics advertising, asserting the self of its subscribers by the dictum 'I am what I have'. But they are not content with the resulting graceless, hapless, smileless lustre of the self - they covet the warm, unmanufactured and spontaneous, first-hand sheen of a cottage-craft, home-produced one, boasting unselfconsciously: 'See all the things I am, and all that I did?' - and it's such a self that they mean to have for themselves by appropriation, in the name, by the dicta and according to the yardstick of ascribed merit in the world; a self-defeating, hopeless undertaking in this, the battle, the competition of these two conflicting tactics,

authentic and unauthentic, producing first-rate and second-rate excellence, the competing possibilities for the being of consciousness, producing a distinction between those, basically (to rely on a Shavian classification for a moment), who 'can', and those who, tragically, 'can't'. It is this division within mankind reflecting and telling of the differing alternative modes of one's fundamental choice as one's mode of conduct, to which Kenneth Tynan referred when he classified the population of the world into *gypsies* and *accountants*; a fundamental rift, perhaps the greatest there is, the rift between those who go about in the world by 'doing' because they can (*wanting to be able to 'do'* being a necessary prerequisite to their constant and characteristic display of in fact *being able*), and those, on the other hand, who don't attempt a lifestyle of 'doing', of conducting themselves as such selves which can, will and must carry themselves in their everydays as such first-hand and ever-productive egos with a trademark as such, but purchase instead or freeze the personal assets in others capable of producing and carrying a 24 carat proof self. The 'accountant', as a classificatory category, decries the project of excelling in the gift of continuous and authentic social creativity, producible exclusively in the idiom and medium of the self only; he crusades against the 'gypsy's' fundamental choice of constantly engaging, putting into play the dynamism within the self's infrastructure, actively consulting the personal "I" in critique of the status and quality of the "me" and the extent to which that is achieved or allowed leeway to exercise in the world its authentic lights, and creating and if need be fight for newer "me"-s to fit in reality one's ideal of a "me" called out by the "I". This process amounts to, affords that privileged process which alone the self can secure for itself, and for other selves, licence to carry out one's project of self-production and self-betterment, each according to their talent, and the produced and productive self is absolute in every case, whether spectacularly limelighted or quite unobtrusive in its scope and nature. A new classification of Pukka and Rachmones has now become possible to add to the ascribed types, paradigms and manifestations of the relationship identified in the last chapter; this time the fundamental division between these two halves of mankind is made on the basis of the psychologic, or rather socialpsychologic attributes which are differentially at work within the selves of these two opposing camps in mankind respectively, as a matter of the

fundamental choice which fuels and maintains their different status as sacred and profane, rather than the distinction obtaining by virtue of macrosociologic features attaching to the reasons for the chasm between them, as was the case in the last chapter.

Table 4.

Accountants

The 'have-ers'. Caretakers by way of interception of fulfilment of other selves, hold-up of those, like the gods, caretakers in Clouds; cultivation of second-rate, derivative virtues.

Gypsies

Resolvers of schism, angst, personal anomie, by getting it by the horn, coping with it authentically, perpetrating, thriving on it as though on a bacterial culture; their element, as the method whereby to handle their schism, anomie: every self's lot.

Table 5.

Gentlemen.

Players.

In illuminating the distinction between the Gypsy's approach and the Accountant/Gentleman's different approach to the project of attaining what to each of these anthropologic classes, differentially and respectively, amounts to excellence, I am reminded of Ramuz's 'book' to Stravinsky's The Soldier's Tale, a piece 'to be read, played and danced'; 'a legend illuminating in rich symbolism the progress through life and the alternative quality of that as gained in the shadow of our choice in adopting one or the other of the above identified, competing modes of the overriding style of our consciousness - that through which we may acquire a sense of morality by virtue of *being* selves - ourselves - and that kind of elevation, on the other side, which we may try to attach to ourselves by way of *having*, owning other selves.

The soldier is on his way home on leave, carefree, penniless, stretching his legs on the wayside, full of the prospect of seeing his girl and his mother again, idly rummaging through his things in his knapsack, fingering the fiddle he has bought for a few pence. The Devil

passes by, disguised as an old man (to look more and more like the Devil in his conventional guise as the action progresses). He asks for the violin; the soldier refuses, but is finally persuaded to swap his fiddle, so cheap to have bought, for a book which will make him rich, with 'bank notes, bearer bonds, gold... collateral... market quotations' (readable in the Devil's book a few days before they are actually published), and on top of that, his promise to go with the Devil to his place for three days. With the three days gone, the Devil takes back the soldier to his village. It transpires that the 'three days' spent with the Devil were three years; he has lost during that time that which he has been for his girl, for his mother, for folks: himself as he was for them, their knowledge of him: the basis for his self, his identity, if Hegel is to be believed. No-one recognises him, not even his mother, and his girl is now married with children. 'They all take me for a ghost, I am dead among the living.' It's ambiguous whether his death was real, 'ontic', or symbolic of a new existence without a soul, lacking the aura and foundation for one, in the sense of his having attained a new style of existence, one without exigency, spirit, without 'life' in a certain sense. He sets off on the road again with his book, the gift of the Devil. First he is a trader, a 'peddler of wares' and then he finds himself on to greater things; it turns out that, in possession of the book, he can't go wrong in business and grows unbelievably rich, but equally unhappy, and wishes to be able to shed everything he has, longs to exchange the book for his old way of life, for the things that made him happy. The Devil appears to him again, still disguised as an old man, a 'poor peddler' himself, begging the soldier to buy one of his bric-a-bracs. The soldier reaches for money to give him as a goodwill gesture, but the Devil forces him to accept the items he had brought for him in exchange for the alms: the things he brought the soldier for sale turn out to be the contents of the soldier's old knapsack: a mirror, a picture of his girl, all meaningless now; and finally, the fiddle. The soldier's eyes light up at the sight of the fiddle, but the fiddle won't play for him; the proof of the rightful ownership of the fiddle is that one can play it. The soldier throws the violin back to the Devil and tears up the book: he has neither now, he has nothing in both senses of the term, neither the burden of the Devil's gift and with that an unflinching winning streak yielding him meaningless plenty, nor his own authentic gift to be able to tease out a tune from his violin; but the

double negative of being without both, does not in itself bring him what he yearns for: the recovery of that life which he surrendered to the Devil in the first place. To attain his freedom of old in the sense of the Sartrean potent double negative of disowning the dearth of life with 'having' as its keynote which the Devil bestowed on him, he must unmake his original deal with the Devil, reverse that in an inverse contract, in a ceremony of comparable symbolic meaning and totality, in deed, in depth, absolutely. There is a kindred notion in Sartre's play The Vicious Circle: even 'after death', when damned, the rebuilding of the structure of trust (authentic love) between people is forever open, there remains an avenue to salvation. The soldier sets out on the road again with the aim of purging himself of the Devil's gift with the ensuing kind of life and regaining his own. He hears tell of the princess of the land ailing; he who restores her to health gains her hand. 'Doctoring?' the soldier muses, 'Just think... a girl to call your own, after so many years alone.' The Devil appears again, reminding the soldier that his original gift is not yet his own. The Devil performs virtuoso, empty flourishes on the violin. 'I have my methods! I, not you.' he calls. The soldier sees this as his moment to recover all that the Devil had taken from him. His plan is to challenge the Devil in a game of cards. The Devil is sure to win, and the soldier means to 'lose back' to him the zero being of what he has become as a man, everything - lose back to the Devil his present which still clings to the soldier's being in the idiom of 'having', and gain all that which he'd rather be: himself. As they play, the bad faith which was the Devil's gift seeps back into the Devil's personage; the soldier's trick will be done when everything he possessed is gained back by the Devil to the last penny. It's a case of 'loser wins'. Once the Devil starts playing, he is 'turned on', he is on the 'automatic pilot' of the exclusively empirically homed-in, goal-directed bad faith of his kind, he cannot help but win back all the soldier stakes, and win again. Raking off all that can be had is the Devil's element, he is condemned to it: this is the only meaning which 'winning' has for him. The course of the game is a crescendo of winning in the differing senses which the term has for the two players: the Devil is more and more 'sent' as his 'victory' of ripping off the soldier is more and more total, not noticing that life is increasingly going out of him the while; he starts tottering, losing his breath, whilst the soldier raises the stakes more and more wildly,

and as the pile of coins and notes in front of him diminishes, he lives more and more. In the end the Devil dies and the soldier takes the violin off him. The Devil's death, again, is ambiguous; he dies in both senses, actual and symbolic, but soldier and narrator are both aware that the limits of the Devil's kind of life reach beyond one death and that therefore his demise will not be lasting. The narrator warns: the Devil will be back.

The soldier plays the violin to the princess and she is cured. He wins her; they 'tango', 'waltz' and 'ragtime', but the Devil is also there. He threatens: '...this realm of yours is not so great. If once its frontiers be passed Then you'll be in my power at last:', and both he and his princess would be lost; the princess back in bed again. The Devil foretells that the soldier won't know what's enough. It's not, of course, his rightful happiness with the princess that he must not have enough of; 'one happy thing is every happy thing'; human reality is of 'whole cloth' too, like Durkheim's anomie. There is therefore no end to the happiness of a life conducted according to the rules of human reality; but the soldier is to fall nevertheless because he will finally want something of the Devil's kind; have something that he has undeserved. He allows the princess to persuade him to take her back, introduce her to his folks, to add his past, lost happiness to his present one, to own that too, after all, to own that which he has deservedly lost, from which it was his due to be thrust; he can't leave the fruits of his old failure alone and wants to turn them into a positive thing for himself, a feather in his cap. They start off on their way to his village. On its frontiers they are to part. The Devil suddenly strikes up a tune on the violin leading the way as the soldier follows him, and the princess 'a little way behind', is never to arrive into the sight of the audience.

In contemporary, twentieth-century literature, as in New Testament times, the preoccupation with, the positing of two gods is clearly discernible. One could be called the Absentee Landlord, the other perhaps 'Godot', with Becket. The former is conceived of and worshipped, characteristically, in terms of having, the second entertained, in strong counterdistinction with the first, chiefly by existentialists - all, it may be said, but most notably perhaps in this context by Tillich

and by Bultmann: God as hypothesised, cultivated, pursued, conduced in and through the mode of one's being, conducted by one's life in the living. Both are absent, rather than palpable to the senses, concepts, frames of reference to, keynotes of conduct; but while the Absentee Landlord is followed with a view to securing him and is conceptualised as, corroborated by and reinforced in terms of things in that which is here, permanent objects, massive, solid, substantive, whether literally tangible or the lattice, *corpus* of established practices, relations, the positive architecture of institutions in which society positively consists - the God as conceived of according to the latter, Becket-ian, existentialist, transilient modality, tradition, is never there to hand, is always fathomable as ahead in time, an informant, *point'd'appui* untransformably and constantly in the future; to be 'waited for', ⁽³⁾ contact with whom is in the medium and mode of exigency, orientation towards it, transmitted, served, witnessed in the idiom of direct, particular personalness, experienced, sought *per se*, for itself, for the self, and in terms of it. Bultmann traces back the latter, empathic, internalised, life-perpetrated, first-hand grasp of God to the 'spark' of the Gnostics whose influence he identifies and asserts as one component in the upsurge of Christianity as protest, anti-established order or 'romantic', individual-assertive, revolutionary mass-movement as it was at its advent; the 'spark', the soul in each conceived of at this time as so many spin-offs of God as light which are 'inclosed in man and represent his innermost self' as a bit of god-likeness, creator, emanating capacity in one, towards which man as spark is drawn and with which he finally unites. ⁽⁴⁾ This *innerweltlich* or microcosmic or innerly contained and dynamic grasp of God - diachronic, so to speak, non-substantial, energial in its conception - is characteristic of Christianity's subsequent structure-nihilative and reactive phases and Renaissances, (Christianity, like all life-processes, however general and wide-spanning in their prevalence, periodically renewing itself in its phases of Romanticism at times of the decadence of its structured form of established positivity in the world, as already argued in Section 2 of the previous chapter and as Hegel would agree. Examples of such structure-nihilative phases of Christianity offer themselves in the instances of the Reformation, then, in more modern times, in the assertion of the spirit rather than of the established form of any religion by the flower-power movement, then again in the civil rights

movement of Martin Luther King in the United States, or the existentialist religious upsurge earlier this century predominantly in Europe, and finally as such a nihilative spiritual phase shows itself in the present day in the way in which the *status quo*-critical, officially oppressed (or at least discouraged) authentic spirit asserts itself in the face of the reigning, powerful bureaucracy, during the current phase of the decline of class-societies. This modern-day spiritual dissent takes various forms as a dissenting response to the emerging, new bureaucratic order both in the East and in the West, which range from Rastafarianism from below to a wave of speaking out against the inhuman ethical anomalies of the established régime from the highest quarters of the Churches in the West, through a religious renewal in Poland and the Soviet Union, and in other forms of the advocating of the personal, militant authenticity of the self, of particular selves and their human rights as such vis-a-vis the restraining, ossified norm of the establishment wherever that is the case. The intellectual movements which may be classified among present-day manifestations of spirit engaged in the nihilation of its institutional oppression in many places of the communist and also of the capitalist world, don't necessarily see themselves as Christian, but their aims amount to projects which are consistent and compatible with Paul and with the promotion of his outlook regarding man and man's call, of which the medium and aim of Live Aid was just one example.) In contrast, the Absentee Landlord as a frame of unauthentic reference in approaching God is intuited and cued in outwardly referential, spatial rather than *existentiell* terms and analogy - in terms of substantial, established facticity in a now to which we are anchored in terms of ownership, such as that of Pinter's 'house', conceptualised, grasped in terms of belonging to the Absentee Landlord, (though he is not manifestly there), through which he can be posited, interpreted, 'read', fathomed in terms of property; a God of stagnation, of structural positivity, grasped and operative as a permanent erection of the literally or symbolically solid kind in the established world; a world which one minds on his behalf. This God of established positivity, tangible or socially symbolic, is sustained, transacted through a morality of possession. According to the code of this God, virtue, distinction consists in the caretaking of his world within a system of various gradations of status, with one's rank defined by way of seniority in a framework of selves who are charged with

preserving the things in it, and engaged in the ongoing process of practicing and enforcing loyalty that is owing to one who has shares in this world, justified by the worship of this God of things and rightful belongings. Virtue by the dicta of this God consists in looking after the furniture and the fixtures in this God's world, Pinter's 'house', making sure they are not damaged, that they are kept in good order, ideally even beyond 'reasonable wear', in Parmenidean perpetuity. The 'enjoyment' which is the yield of the two differing approaches to the worship of God, is again an ambiguous word which has a Big-letter and a small-letter meaning; a process in the small-letter sense, fluid, immediate, subjective, born and conveyed in personalness - its other, Big-letter meaning legally connotative, spatially referential, experienced as the just deserts of a meritorious tenant who earns his right to the enjoyment of the premises, a territorially assertive attitude, the pride of the cock of the portion of the walk allotted to one, paid for; its yield, reward expressed, brought forth, indicated by the things one rightfully has as held by and purported, say, in the established Puritanic morals of the present. Our family recently went through a very stressful period of dispute concerning our right to live in a house we built ourselves, and in the course of it we learnt to know a whole new vocabulary, frame of human reference and code of virtue. 'A good man with plenty of clout' was someone whose favours it was a good idea to seek, whereas someone who has already been 'got at' by agencies rival to us, was to be avoided like poison. Moments of weakness, suggestions in one party of temporary openness to liability in one sense or another, are the cue to making a move in relation to such a relatively unprotected person, to do him down in the course of the race with the other party, in the process of wriggling up the rungs of privilegedness, either of the kind which meet the eye or which are secondarily useful in the sense of being the actual means to attaining those. Such conduct is thought as both right and rational. Constructive liaisons between people within this frame of reference take the form of tacit blackmail, with favours needed from one party withheld until and unless a return favour or equivalent remuneration of some kind is agreed on (often tacitly, by implication only), understood, clearly implied, secured. 'I employ this person because I like his work' is seen as something suspect because of the lack of the clarity of ulterior, tangibly goal-directed motivation underneath it all to make that

comprehensible, with a more transparent, nepotistic or otherwise society-wise instrumental *rationale* secretly underlying the act of giving someone a break naturally suspected, probed for. Giving effective help to someone when it is needed just because 'they are friends' is seen as dishonourable, inexplicable and unplaceable within the framework of the exchange of finely calculated, directly or indirectly tangible 'equivalents' - indicative of unfairness, morally not up to scratch, disrespectful of those whose assistance in their ego-assertion is possessively and exclusively earmarked by the Jacob's ladder of ascribed succession and rankings of meritoriousness, such as their being family or being advancedly placed in the queue of ascension by the powerful dicta of some other set of established social hierarchy. .

The spontaneous 'romantic' virtues of being a 'gypsy' who can and will cast projects in the style of selves such as manually building one's own house helped by friends, can and indeed was in our case, met with such an expression and elaborate counterproject of violent legalism launched by a community of already established property-owners, offended by the affrontery of such settling behaviour, and reverently informed by the code of selling and buying as opposed to making and creating, that the success either of our project or their counterproject came to mean and entail the total destruction of the other, together with the selves which the two clashing campaigns promoted, stood for. It was either to end literally in the razing to the ground of our house which was all we had, or alternatively the humiliation, symbolic destruction of our objectors as local people with clout, and the saga of our building the house turned into a display of the strength of a mafia called on to sort us out whose breadth and depth of *actio radius* we never suspected. There is a Hungarian poem by János Arany called The Nightingale which tells the allegoric story of this songbird settling on the fence between the properties of two farmers, its beautiful song plunging the two men into ever more bitter hatred, demoralisation and financial ruin in the legal battle and indulgence in the bribery of the sheriff in the competition to decide which out of the two men the nightingale was singing for. In the end the two farmers openly approach the sheriff asking outright 'Which of us is the bird singing for?' The sheriff slaps his own pocket with money jingling in it and declares: 'It's singing for me.' The poem symbolically juxtaposes the bird, vagrant little musician, akin in its

conception to the music-making gypsy being of the hero of The Soldier's Tale, realiser of his talent as a splinter, spin-off, spark of a Gnostic diachronic understanding of a God at its creative, as creator, in the sense in which we are a bit of god as it were in the exertion of our creative talents ('mere' social creativity included) as we are bid to do in the biblical parable, over against and in counterdistinction with the caretakers of the established order, tin gods as owners, hogging not only their bought piece of nature, made sacred and sanctioned, to their understanding, by fence-pegging but standing for all who hog and all that is being hogged by like-spirited agents in the service of an ethics of immutable ownership, bits of god by way of 'having', securing, buying for themselves God (the Absentee Landlord, in truth) and owning shares in him, reducing everything to property, longing to hog and thereby destroy everything that does not yet figure in their property deeds, such as a bird and its song, careful that no uncharted spark should intrude in the world which they intuit as the pegged-out space it occupies, including the life furnishing that, with a preservation order on it all as far as they are concerned. The term 'deed' which just cropped up, offers itself for inclusion in our collection of words with a dual, opposite pair of meanings as a function of being grasped as big-letter or small-letter. 'Deed' in the more usual sense means the act, stands for human reality whose unit the act is, as accomplished in exertion in and by the self, a spark of the energial 'godhead', according to the Gnostics-originated understanding: a slice of life. In the context 'property deed', however, the term has sprouted legalistic roots, standing for the proof of a share in the world which is officially so sanctioned, so rubberstamped to make it an accomplished fact of ascribed ownership, a unit, circumference of a self as defined by its acquired possession, one's 'godliness', mode of divine being, consisting of, experienced, amounting, rather than a slice of life, to a slice of inertia.

The question of the relationship between the self who is spark, social creator, and what he should and/or does own in terms of the security as a self anchored in the world in the way of property and other worldly privilege, is a longstanding preoccupation of ethics. The early Christians saw an absolute chasm between the two; they were by definition poor, absolutely so, having to give up their property, often

their lives, to follow the spirit and the choice of life of Paul, as self-confessed profane aspiring to a truer future as a self, and did not see god as a kind of positivity which could be in part theirs in terms of the various forms of the external being of society, of this world, contained within nature in the here-and-now. They did indeed entertain the positivity of God who was to see them right in terms of the positive rewards, in the end, of their efforts and exertions in life, but removed outside from this world in space and time, His kingdom a facticity outside nature and beyond life. In their lifetime they encountered earthly riches in their absolute alienation from a life authentic in Paul's sense, and maintained a strong, mutually exclusive dualism between the God in heaven propagated by true, authentic conduct in life, and the god of gold in this world worshipped in bad faith, Mammon, the false god whose reverence went hand-in-hand with the persecution of the socially blemished at their colourful Pauline. It was Luther who first coherently brought together in an ideology of authenticity, God who is personally promoted in and with the being of all in everyday conduct (without compromising the call of a life of personal authenticity as a divine duty in Paul's revolutionary sense), and the God to be had, to be earned in terms of riches in this world, as the consolidation in tangible ways of God as spark, conducted, 'been', created and creative in our own selves, with the world of the here-and-now conceived as the proper arena of its rewards, the positivity of that seen as the scene of the just deserts of authenticity as human reality propagated by the deed in the context of the external actuality of the world; the pearl secreted by one's project as a self seen as rightfully the self's own. The 'house' with its symbolism in keeping with Pinter's cosmology (as rendered in his play which we are currently entertaining) could be likened, consistently with Luther, to that, say, of a snail, the by-product of the occupant's very life, therefore itself sacred, because earned, produced, in inseparability from the self. There are two ways to occupy the 'house' symbolic for the world and its idiom of having; one is to match one's being to it in subservience as a self to the terms and rules of tenancy as given in remoteness from the self and its comprehension, the other is to match the house to one's self, to emanate the self's tenure in and of the house, from one's being as such. The first of these grasps, of these attitudes to the relationship of what we are as human reality and the room and instrumentality for it in the

world on which our being as selves impinges, what we have the right to have, is that which Pinter describes, one's place in the 'tangible' universe derived, according to his rendition, from the removed, personally incomprehensible, unchallengable, immutable property laws of the Absentee Landlord, in one's pilgrimage towards the allocation to one of his self. Contrastingly, in the second type of approach to the 'house', the 'house' can be had, or rather: creatively 'been' as an extension of the lived and living, authentically deserving, productive "me", creatively affording one psychological space, much is the same way as Sartre regards a walking stick which is being used as an extension of the body, of Being-for-Itself. Of course, this is not to simplistically imply in Luther, or in the young Marx who is greatly preoccupied with a highly kindred 'problematic', that one has to manually build the house he lives in to be deserving of it; with the division of labour in operation, it suffices if one has earned with one's creativity exerted in any manner, one's right to his share in nature's riches. Nor does such an approach to having, the Lutheran one, imply to Luther's disciples that by building a house manually, the need for property deeds and other legal prerequisites to erecting a home can be waived, dispensed with, in establishing the right to its ownership. The contrast of the two attitudes to occupying a house as just outlined, is, to 'romantic' Protestantism, not so much a question of its ownership as rather one of fundamental choice colouring one's attitude to living in it; one or the other attitude to occupying the house can be assumed quite irrespective of whether one owns the house, rents it or squats in it, like Pinter's tramp. As in the young Marx, what you have and what you are, your metal as productive human reality which brought forth your share in the world, come together in Luther; to him too, you have first-hand title to what you have earned, the wealth you produced. He brought what we call here earned excellence as human reality, to bear by virtue of one's earning it through his work, upon man's rightful share in the world, in a one-to-one relationship of what he is as god, spark, and what he has to show for it in terms of his share in nature, also of God, the domain of God, also God. The god within man, whose existence he maintains, is in a special, organic relationship with man's standing and endowment in the world, making his being as the inner god of creativity, 'slice of life', rightfully and sacredly inclusive of what he is in the world in terms of having, as a 'slice', section of 'inertia' there, the

riches of the world coming alive through an undercarriage of human reality in the process through which man deserves his share in that, by virtue of his work. This God of Luther, this in-itself-for-itself in this world, is meaningful and coherent, notwithstanding the common and widespread alienation between the god one is 'inside' and the reward one has for his exertions as that here on earth: the god which one righteously has, in actuality. The concept of god as an alloy of these two aspects of it, as entertained by Luther, this in-itself-for-itself in this world, remains coherent and meaningful regardless, as an ideal, here on earth, which should be effected. The new cosmology of Luther, materialistically somewhat more inclusive than that of Paul, comes from bringing the two gods of the New Testament, the true one of *being* and the false one of *having*, integrally together as ideally unified in the lot of each in the world (as well as in the world after), the ideal norm conceived in the context of the here-and-now. This ideal in-itself-for-itself god is meaningfully the social 'ought', a standard which persists, which strikes a chord in consciousness and as a norm in a special, ideal way, and if it is dislodged in the world, if what people have is unsupported by the undercarriage of self-produced human reality to justify it as such, it is offensive in the light of this ideal standard. The unity of this in-itself-for-itself god of one's everyday is intuited as the God which should be, even when the external yields of a 'true' man's exertions in the way of having are alienated and grace someone other rather than him who deserved the tangible fruits of the Work, by virtue of the self engaged, employed at its active, in the ideal alloy of the "I", one's capacity, talent, endowment, need as such, and a decent "me" to fit it in the world. The God of gold is sacred by virtue of man as the spark having applied himself to bring it forth, illuminating it by his creativity in the first person singular; an original relationship, properly at one and not separate, not different from Paul's god of the authenticity of being, except when one's having is alienated from this unity. Gold, when this unity prevails, is sacred and money is sacred because secreted, produced, sustained as human reality by man's constructively applied talent. Gold has to be honestly 'made'; the alchemist, fixing his way to getting rich by producing gold through his ingenious substitute mode of bringing it forth, alternative to nature's, would not have morally earned the gold gained through this shortcut to it, nor the title and elevation of being among the

distinguished in the world as measured by outward means, even if he had succeeded in his cynically materialism-motivated experiments to produce gold from lead, from 'tin'; the resulting gold crowning their endeavour would have remained sham in a strong ethical sense; and the project of those who acquired, who own 'gold', riches and the ensuing elevation in society without having exerted themselves along the proper avenues to that by Luther's and the young Marx's criteria to give it the shine of the yield of a productive self, would have produced merely tin gods, as does an adherence in the modern bureaucrat, to his code, solemnly chosen, of a moral standing rooted in ascription, in which the creative productivity of the self as such does not, characteristically and as a fundamental feature of the kind of meritoriousness it upholds, play any part. 'Gold', if earned in Luther's sense, stands for, its worth is definitive of our very life; a conception of money which came to be identified in our own experience through an example in recent times of its emanation at its most direct, dramatic and enhanced, when we were invited to pledge money by telephone whilst watching Live Aid, in a very special and unique rite. It was from us, from and of our lives to the lives of the starving that we have given a 'blood-transfusion' or rather 'life-transfusion', a symbolic as well as actual transference of the fruits of our selves, of our work as such, expressed and crystallised in money. It was simply the gift of ourselves (in unison with the selves of the artists who donated their own, spectacular gifts *gratis*), which was at the heart of the total experience of participating in the broadcast in the spirit of the artists' invitation of us to do so; it was our response, in a unification of our selves both with those of the artists and those of the starving, to the plea of both these communities of human reality, each making their claim in different senses on our authentic compassion, one community lacking and the other abundant in their ability to produce life in every sense of the word, that the symbolic "me", expressed in pledged money, of one and a half billion viewers, was pooled, pooled into the act of giving both symbolic and tangible tokens and 'shares' of that communal "me" in the project of saving, creating lives in a mammoth instance of social creativity. The implication that the misappropriation of money as the currency of authenticity, representative of the donor's "me" is sinful in a profound sense, was also effectively highlighted in our experience during Live Aid, when it transpired that forged tickets and imitation

Live Aid T-shirts were being sold before and at the concert, not for the sake of swelling the profits meant for the starving, but for obtaining private gain; with the small-letter sacred money, representative of our very being, rechannelled, diverted, stolen from the human destination where we meant that to go. It's only such money, alienated, divorced from the self who earned it and at whose disposal it rightfully is, as well as from the selves for whom it is explicitly meant by its producer, that it is Mammon-money, sinful in the most individually concrete, personal and socialpsychologically meaningful way.

It's time that the big-letter and small-letter duality of the synonyms 'talent', 'gift', 'ability' were explored, emphasised and identified, both in the first sense, as rooted in human reality in the small-letter understanding as a capacity and the process of its exercise, and in the second way, in their big-letter meaning and sense, as expressed in the self's anchorage in money as made (or not made) by its user, and in what it buys, or fails to buy, for the self of its maker (or appropriator) to gratify the calls of the "I", the system of the conditions of the realisation of that in the inert universe of facticity connecting with the world as and for the "me". All these terms, - talent, gift and ability - are ambiguous. This is perhaps not readily seen in the case of 'ability' as it is used in the expression 'each according to his ability', leaving unclear whether the contribution from the self is demanded in terms of what it has the inner capacity or outer means to produce. 'Talent' (as well as its other two synonyms), in our small-letter sense, is capacity for excellence as expressed in worldly ways, with the compelling implication that it should be realised on the arena of external actuality in a "me" in the world, with a longstanding tradition of being grasped thus, as will be further argued. The "me", it must be borne in mind, is the occasion, tool and medium to consolidate the self in the world as one must. The "I", as already suggested in Section 3 of the previous chapter, is seen here as a variegated system of capacities, vacuums, appetites for its manifold 'being'; the "me" may be said, in its equally many gradations, to be the platform and the instrument in the mode of *having* in the world to correspond to the calls of the "I". Some of the shades and tiers of the "I" have been identified in the relevant paragraphs in Section 3 of the foregoing chapter. A similarly graded inventory of the

"me" can also be afforded by the pooled interpretation of the works on that subject matter of the many students of that concept. What is the "me"? It is the repertoire of man's big-letter Ability, man's capacity as object in three strata in nature, as already hinted. To Mead, the "me" is the citizen. This is the sociologic radius, tier of its being; it's the public platform of the self which goes to vote, which has a name to carry on in society, which has, or fails to have, a standing, a reputation in the community. Sartre pays hardly any attention to this layer of the being of the "me". However, he has a great deal to say of the other two strata of nature in which our "me" figures as object. To his understanding, the "me", his 'existing' as the overt facet of the self, is richly illuminated from the point of view of the 'self itself in a socialpsychologic light, particularly in the context of Being-for-Others, in which light our "me" and Sartre's synonymous notions for it emerge as the basis for our overt personality, as that (and with it the socialpsychologic being of our self) is immediately indicated for us in the Other's cognisance, definition, 'constitution' of us as a person, for which we recognise ourselves as reflected in the Other, providing the basis for the socialpsychologic tier of the positive being of the self as we learn to know that. This product, the personality, the socialpsychologic aspect and radius of the "me", Mead and Sartre agree, is both the prerequisite and the index of the success of the process of our producing and conducting a graceful self (or our significant failure to do so), a managing self, one telling of its active conjunction with an operative socialpsychologic "I", evidencing, or significantly failing to do so, the presence of an "I" constantly and typically drawn on as the hallmark of the fully engaged active socialpsychologic quality of the self. The other tier of the "me" (the third in our inventory) on which Sartre's thought system is very informative, is the physiologic one. From Sartre's work (not so much from Mead's), the description of the lodgement of the "me" in the biologic startum of nature emerges richly and systematically rendered as one locus of the being of the "me", or rather, to be true to Sartre's usage, of the 'body' rather than the "me", in its engagement with the "I", which in his thesaurus is interchangeable in its meaning with 'Being-for-Itself', the self, with a multiplicity of extra aspects afforded by him within these confines of the concept, with significant bearing on the socialpsychologic aspect of the self's reality, too. As purely physiologic, biologic object, the

"me" or 'body' and its functioning is the proper concern, first and foremost, of the doctor; the being of the self in this, its evolutionarily most lowly radius of its operation, is of course the necessary precondition of its participation, being in the higher-order areas of realities on which it impinges, simply by virtue of the fact that without the physiologic foundation of its being it would simply lack ontic life. But the body at its physiological is the precondition for the realisation of one's small-letter talents at a higher-order level of the operation of the self in many other respects and senses too; a good singing voice, an athletic physique or dexterous hands being obvious examples of modalities of the 'having' of the self included in the "me", as contained in the human body itself and as the prerequisite of the project of 'being' one's gift, or, in less fanciful language, all these above mentioned forms of physiological endowment may be prerequisites, in crudely bodily ways, to the morally consequential project and determination of one to cultivate, maintain, keep going, conduct a creative self if one's aspiration for putting one's talents to use happens to be in the area of music, sport, or the pursuit of some type of manual craftsmanship. One's looks are also part of the repertoire of one's original gifts in the repertoire of one's "me", which can be enhanced or worsened by the quality of the attitudes of the "I" to the possibility and practice of keeping that up or neglecting it. But the 'body', as Sartre discerns it, is rarely experienced and rarely serves as physiologic object only in the context of the self. The complete array of its needs (always in operation) for satisfying its hungers in the many ways in which they make their presence known to consciousness, constantly brings sociologic and socialpsychologic factors and modalities to bear on its modes of existence, prevalence. In the course of the gratification of its sexual drives and in its occupation of psychological as opposed to merely physically taken up space⁽⁵⁾, the "I" is organically involved, and so is the composite, "I"-inclusive self of the Other who is touched in one's relation to him, the ensuing interpersonal paradigms of the self involving complex inter-and intraindividual patterns of "me"-s and "I"-s, an example of which was already analysed in the context of Maupassant's short story in Section 2 of the last chapter. The 'body' in Sartre which, in its usual sense is hybrid with the "I" and is of a socialpsychologic order, is the "me" at its living over and above the merely ontic sense of that word. Whether

we examine the process of its intake of food, the physiologic as well as the psychologic ways of its occupation of space, or its spreading itself in the symbolic 'house' as part of its universe on earth which we described a few pages ago, this last grasp of the life-project of a self is unavoidably touched by economic factors and conditions, involving and affecting the self as such in terms of its *having* in the worldly idiom; the young Marx's concern. He as well as Luther, and some followers of Marx who didn't jettison Hegel from their works, such as Lukács, Erich Fromm or Karen Horney, definitely saw the terrain of economics as the question of the rightful, personally either deserved or undeserved distribution of the tangible wealth of the world in conjunction with the self and its moral deserts, and the way in which that affects the life of individual as well as groups of people as the proper object of the analysis both of economics and of the self, as an area which is certainly and properly inclusive in their understanding of people's "me"-s, so to speak: with economic factors in one's fulfilment as a self made part and condition by these authors of the self's grace (Sartre), 'health' (Fromm and Horney), the self's fulfilment in terms of material factors to be rightfully apprehended, according to them, as part of the "me" which it is our high duty to bring forth in reality for ourselves as an expression and yield of our talents put to use, and our decent fulfilment in respect of the economic factors determining our "me"-s in exchange for our exertions in those is subject to the command (as are our other small-letter capacities for the indulgence of the self properly waiting for gratification): 'Do justice to your talents'. These workers, as well as Mead, brought the raw material of the world within the umbrella of man's socialpsychologic "me" as a necessary object for the latter in the idiom of the self, and through their interpretation, the material universe of this earth became 'humanised', softened, adapted for and by its use for the purposes of human reality, changing its *genre* to become a socialpsychologically consequential part of, area for the "me"; not claiming, of course, that this approach to the world's material content affords the sole mode of its being, but merely, and in implicitly (or in Sartre's case explicitly) dualistic fashion that such an aspect of its apprehension, side by side with its being in its crude 'In-Itself' physical modality, independent as such of human reality in the first instance and in every sense prior to that, can at the same time be realistically seen as a necessary and meaningful part and the

natural arena for the self, organic to that and endemic to its being and fulfilment, and that in this context it's properly part of the socialpsychologically grasped "me" too.

Mead humanises nature itself, most notably in his rendition of the so-called 'conversation' between the civil engineer who is about to erect a construction, and the landscape which is to be thereby transformed, directly addressing the rock formation opposite him to which he proposes to cast a bridge, 'taking the role' of that in the idiom of human reality; the landscape thus addressed, becoming party to his relationship with that humanly conceived, and an extension, addition to his "me", as did Sartre's walking-stick, as already mentioned.

Heidegger's contribution of the use of others in instrumentality to the self-realisation of the aggressor self, with other selves considered and treated as less than human compared to his own, demoted to a thing, is a useful addition to the repertoire of external facticity (though not of a physical type in this context but of a socially and socialpsychologically positive order) which can be subordinated by the self as a given, external resource, one that can be made, possessively, a prop, an aid, a means in satisfying the clamouring needs of the "I" and thereby making other "me"-s 'fair game' to the extension of one's own "me", in the course of colonising and converting the environment to a subjectively effected mode of that for the purposes of the self's own realisation, much in the same way as the raw material of nature can be conceived and treated thus. It's a pity, however, and a limitation in Heidegger, that he postulated the availability of other "me"-s for the extension of the "me" of one's own in furthering one's realisation as a self in the world, merely in the context of such interpersonal and mastery-desirous personal unauthenticity of the self's intensions and deeds. Mead's theory of symbolic interaction is a valuable supplementation of the pessimistic exclusiveness of Heidegger's conception of embracing other "me"-s in one's own and drawing on those in the realisation of the ego, as a function, in Mead's rendering (in counterdistinction with Heidegger), of the explicit will on the other's part to donate, lend his "me" for the benefit of the fulfilment of another's lacking "I" in interpersonal projects, fitting a personal "me" to someone else's "I" with the consent of, nay, as a matter of the

authorship of this project by the agent whose "me" will be interpersonally used. An example of such an interpersonally and personally authentic engagement of two cross-personally supportive "me"-s in response to the complementary needs of the "I"-s in two participants, has already received detailed comment in our former analysis of the plot of a Maupassant short story. .

In conclusion, in the course of the preceding train of thought, the "me" as that aspect of the self which makes contact with the world in the mode of its unavoidable *having* it and aspects of it for the use of the self, emerges in appreciable depths and breadths of dimensions, displaying a *many* factored array of the areas of empirical benefits and access to them which make up that "me". This array is comprised by the human body, the psychologic, or socialpsychologic personality (there is no difference between the two in Mead), the generalized other and interpersonality in good faith or bad, the citizen in the self with its rights, its access to the worldly network of its rightful opportunities and equipment for the realisation of its small-letter talents and capacities and its ensuing needs as a self in terms of those, complete with the space it occupies in the Newtonian universe as psychologically conceived by it, and also with the natural as well as manufactured resources and economic factors in the world which are owing to the self in fitting measure to its positive exertions in the modality of human reality; all these areas at the disposal of the self in the "me" figuring as tiers of the latter in the modality, in their ensemble, of its dynamic, enlivened, personalised *having*.

The "me" and the "I" are redefined by such a classification of the "me" in particular as a finely graded, organised collection of the modes of its *having* in so many ways, to fit, to fuse with, to fittingly meet in the realised self with the equally discriminately variegated kinds of talents, needs and capacities of the "I" complementary, in every instance, to the specific tiers of the "me" (the "I"'s analytically discerned layers specified in Section 3 of the last chapter). Both these clusters of components, those making up the "me" and those making up the "I", are necessary conditions for the active being of the self as such, with only the two together with a view to their complementary realisation sufficient for truly representing and comprising it. Man as

a self, as socialpsychologic actuality, as a personality, as a "me" hybrid with the "I", as 'body' in Sartre's sense, is defined by its realised mileage in relation and its appropriateness to its gasoline it was filled up with from the outset as given in the "I" as its potential talent, its cluster of capacities and needs he could act upon truly to its gifts in freedom, this array of specific talents being, to romantic Christianity, something with precise extents as well as limits, bookkept faithfully in heaven. The 'parable of the talents' is already an example of the grasp of human life, human reality, as the total (or rather as the ratio, at the end of the day), of the gifts one comes into the world with and the extent to which one realises those in the actuality of his life as lived - a grasp and evaluation of a life according to which of its many gifts one has realised or, in contrast, which one has made nothing of, and to what extent one has cashed in or, alternatively, wasted one's talents, with any deficit in the utilisation of one's original package of gifts as shown in the final reckoning, seen as something to be called to answer for as part of oneself laid waste, something that will be put towards in its evaluation as a self as that on account of which one will be found wanting; the unrealised original gifts of one conceived as that part of one which is conspicuous in its absence and so in a certain inverted Sartrean sense, which also is, which figures as that which one has nothing to return to one's maker for the loan of, the realisation of which one has been fully entrusted with, put in charge of as one's own caretaker. One is answerable for having shortchanged oneself in the realisation of any of these two clusters of the components of the self, the mesh of the original talents as the "I" and that of the "me" of our cashing those in in actuality, and being made responsible for not having done justice to either the expressed "me" or to the expressible "I" if one or the other be the case - either for the sin of bad faith in living as a mere citizen only who enjoys his rights shouldering none of his responsibilities which are cut out for one by the "I", or conversely, for living with insufficient care for one's external platform in reality for doing one's bit as the "I" - the neglected aspects of the self coming back, in the final analysis, in any of these two events, into the total picture and experience in life as something one fell down on. Crime and Punishment can be read as the rendition of the case when a life is lived with the "me" waved aside, the project of drawing on and gratifying the "I" only in one's mode of

conducting the self, ending, by necessity, in failure. The Soldier's Tale and Chamisso's somewhat similar Peter Schlemiel can be read as renditions of the opposite lopsided project; lacking in an opposite way to that of Raskolnikov's undertaking in Crime and Punishment, is the project of living a life in which the "I" is jettisoned. The *résumé* of The Soldier's Tale has already been put forward, but Chamisso's story with a kindred moral to that may be usefully commented on here.

Schlemiel, the 'hero' of Chamisso's story, has sold his shadow to the Devil in return for a magic purse which never runs empty of gold coins; but he becomes so unhappy without his shadow that he wants to go back on his deal with the Devil. This cannot be done at this stage without trading in his soul in exchange for his shadow, which Schlemiel is prepared to do, does, and is relieved. The shadow, in this nineteenth-century parable, stands, I think, for the substanceless, darker side of the self in its Sartrean freedom, akin to Bachelard's realm of the night for man, its possibility for questioning in Cartesian depths, its 'being' as capacity for critique, as one's ability and vehicle for pursuing the God of the romantics in hubris, angst, recognising that God by criteria discovered at first hand as a self, through its hallmark as the god of human reality judged by standards intuited in the first person singular. The shadow which Schlemiel gained back, to my understanding, symbolises that avenue along which he can yet authentically gain back, earn his soul; I see the shadow as that lively nothingness to which his not yet realised portion of his possibilities in life amount, and its loss as the deprivation of his self of the ability to dispose over that, to yet alter his life with the use of that in a positive manner in creative acts, to still improve, reduce that sense of the insufficiency of the self regarding itself which the presence of that 'shadow' creates in the course of one's living, as critique, feedback by a personal morality; I understand that shadow as that live-wire nothingness, as the privilege and duty of the self to conduct itself consequentially in the first-hand conduct in the possession of its talents is understood in the biblical parable of the talents on my reading of that as just outlined; it amounts to the lack in his life derived from knowing that one still hasn't fulfilled the promise for which one yet sees himself as a self, complete with one's projects as such, as the remainder of one's course of life in which one feels one can still make good; Schlemiel's self and his life, like

everybody else's, is complete only with his shadow, in terms of which he can still attain the kind of excellence that is not ascribed, which his tangible Talents without the support of his surrendered active "I" behind it couldn't buy. Without that, he finds, his life cannot be sustained, and he trades in his soul, with a view to still earning it.

Chamisso's story shows how *having* is meaningless and untrue to being without the undercarriage of an exigent human reality sustaining it. But man must also *have* so as to be true to himself, he has to *have* in the varied idiom and complex configurations and stratification of his personal *having* as the "me" in the world, so as to simply be in the first place, in the physiologic sense, and to *have* the instrumentality of his *milieu*, human or inert, to mediate, to carry to their expression, externalisation his small-letter, personal gifts. Stock is taken by the critique of the "I", sizing, reckoning up what there is in the world as a not-yet realised "me" for itself, not in the detached, calculating way of the miser, but as an inner process in an ever unified creative ensemble with the "me" which is the case for it in actuality, relating its being and operation to that in the authentic adjustment or maladjustment of the self (in case the claims of the critical "I" cannot be authentically done justice to in the world as expressed in the present through the position and the place of the "me" there.)

The individual's freedom to create, and, in contrast, the extent of his proneness to the frustration and the alienation of his talent, is of course decisively determined by the measure and the modality of the crude facticity of its dependence on external instrumentality needed and available for expressing his talent, by the circumstance, for instance, whether he needs a Stradivarius, or a cast to direct, to realise his talent or, alternaltively, whether all he needs is a voice, his bare hands or a pen and paper for making his small-letter gift happen as bid. To some thinkers the desirability of a perfect match between one's 'lack' in its readiness to be expressed, and the attainment in a "me" of its fitting, justified concomitant area corresponding and belongig to that 'lack' in the world by rights, for attaining a self of an outstanding quality as such, is equivocal, and they entertain the notion of the 'coefficient of adversity' as conceivably beneficial to the creative process and the quality of its output in the creation, as do

Sartre and Mead, with the phenomenon of deprivation in the world recognised as often enticing, inspiring the inventiveness of the self and serving, stimulating a capacity to enhance creative output in depth. The example of the child first littering the beaches and then turned into the mediator of, instrument for the expression of musical talent, can be called upon again in this context. So can be the case of Beethoven, of whom many say that on having gone deaf, his work acquired even greater, almost unique profundity and complexity, evidently benefiting by the circumstance of its limits of expression and sensitivity no longer being constrained by the confines of feedback in actual terms. Gorky certainly feared, in an important sense, the prospect of the consolidation and satiation, in positivistic ways, of his project of championing a system of greater social justice, in the historic moment when the society he fought for came to pass in political actuality, fretful that the rich psychological and financial remuneration which would await him in the new society would put an end to, dry up his creative motivation fuelled by his sense of injustice in his early work. It was true of him what Philip Larkin said about himself: 'deprivation is to me as daffodils were to Wordsworth', and in anticipation of the loss of his elemental ability to create masterpieces, no longer propelled by his strongly felt dedication to putting class injustice in society right, he changed his name from Peshkov to Gorky, meaning 'bitter', as a psychologic measure to prevent the possible death of his 'spark' and a reminder to himself as an "I" of the need to further apply himself as a writer, as an artist, as one drawing as the hallmark of his profession on the subjective "I". Unfortunately for him, with the progressive successes in the establishment of the new régime and of his own standing in that, his writing deteriorated in spite of his precautionary pen-name and his fears became justified; only to inspire in one an even greater admiration for a Tolstoy, a Shaw or an Albinoni whose abundant positive endowment in worldly terms did not get in the way of the sustenance of their artistic and human projects, the quality of their creativity.

It cannot be emphasised enough that for the active being of the self with justice done to it as such, both man's anchorage in the web of its *having* in the world as a self as the condition and occasion for its positive, In-Itself 'being' as such, and his *being* in another idiom, as

a consciousness, as a 'lack' in the way of the equally intricate web defining its small-letter capacities as its "I", are vitally necessary. This point is particularly important to make in the Hegel-embracing context of this argument. Whilst utilising Hegel's insight of the meaningfulness, coherence and indissmissibility of the "I", the faculty of inspiration as one half of the phenomenon of the self as discerned here, we turn from the reductionism of his phenomenology. He reduced matter to spirit, and in turn, did not see that at its 'concretised', as the society of his understanding, the spirit dynamically operative for or against that must be different in kind and medium from that society itself, by necessity; relegating his work to the puristic confines of a monism - the philosophically idealistic one - (the other possibility of a monism is afforded, of course, by vulgar behaviourism in this context and other narrowly empiricistic psychologies and social psychologies which nominate the "me" alone as the sole constituent of the self and dismiss the "I" from the infrastructure of the self as illusory). Either of these reductionisms leads as surely as the other to the separation of its proponents from the dualism of twentieth-century anthropologists who integrate, realistically, as we see it, both Hegel's 'subject' (the close relative of our "I" in this context) and the "me" or 'object' of the psychologic empiricists; causing the self to emerge as integrally and necessarily complete with both "me" and "I" in the constant interrelation of the two, avoiding both the possibilities of 'the twin confusion of "mechanistic materialism" and the idealism of consciousness', to borrow an Althusserian turn of phrase in support of our current train of thought. (5)

The union of the "me" and the "I" emerges after the above argument as paraphrased to mean the union of the 'being' and the *having* of the self, to refer to that of the totality of its small-letter and big-letter talents, the thesaurus of its gifts, abilities as capacity, and the big-letter sphere of its ability as expressed in the world and through the world. The particular gifts we came into the world with, be that visual originality, facility with words, aptitude for spacial construction, or just a capacity to conduct our way in life in active personal and interpersonal authenticity as selves, all come together with the "me" acting upon these original abilities, bringing its equipment in the universe of facts, actively to bear on that, the "me"

and the "I" meeting in the realisation, the justification of both in one another in the act. It's this mutual actualisation, 'fusion' between the statement of the "I", whosever, and the appropriate range of actuality of the "me" in the hierarchy of its repertoire in the world, complete with the 'generalized' and particular 'other', which Mead means by social creativity. '*Als ich kann*', Jan van Eyck painted in small letters on his fine portrait of the 'Man in a Turban'. '*Johannes Eyck fuit hic*', he spelt out on his painting in the Arnolfini marriage. These were statements of the "I", a little display of voiced hubris, with the accomplished work the fitting, evidenced "me" to do justice to it, a mirror of and witness to its being executed by that in a final, definitive way as a self. It is important to bear in mind, to refer, once again, in some detail, to Mead's and Paul's insight that social creativity is not necessarily confined to putting very outstanding talents into play. Being with other people in the arena for personal, inventive and authentic interpersonality of one's everyday, with the possibility of intricate configurations of "me"-s and "I"-s uniting within ourselves and between people, also ranks, to the minds of both these moralists, as one aspect of social creativity, as an item, a particular gift in the repertoire of gifts, in its own right; more than that (again, as already touched on), Mead and Paul both postulate this particular gift - that of social creativity - as a necessary general undercurrent, a broader, universal dimension underlying all instances of excellence in any medium of talent as a potentially morally creative one between people, one's 'parametric' audience (to draw on statistical jargon for a moment), or better still, one's audience as humanity envisaged in the particularity of each to whom the socially creative act extends, one's "I" creative of its "me", and reciprocally, one's "me" to fit the aspirations and responses of the "I" of that audience, extendable to the whole of mankind, for which we are responsible, a position, to be stressed again, with consequential implications for the scientist's ethics.

'The gift' emerges through Marcel Mauss's work, as argued and discerned in his famous anthropologic study of that title, as an autonomous 'universe of discourse', 'problematic' of its own, one with which Mead's Mind, Self and Society strikes a kindred chord, possibly in independence of Mauss. What is the gift to the minds of these authors?

It's simply the self. (7) (8) Mauss studied and analysed 'in the field' the underlying meaning to the custom of making gifts at the socialpsychologically significant elevation of that phenomenon, interpreting that as symbolic for the entire self of the one who gives. The gift, the portion of our *having* we part with to give to another, is representative of us, stands for the totality of what we are as selves, the object of our gift illuminated by the fact that we brought it forth, either directly and literally as in the case of potlatch which we actually prepare and whose consumption is the symbolic offering for the taking of ourselves into the other in the sense perhaps in which this act is the distant echo of the host in the Holy Communion, or it is our produce in the non-literal sense, as something we acquired in the special and particular idiom of our and then the other owning it in personalness, through our ability which enabled us to muster it by our own effort, our own gift, and expressive as that of us, to and for the other. It's the union of the duality of our *being* and *having* as selves, the "me" brought to life, to meaning, made hybrid by being underscored, validated by the "I", by its will as such as the basis for our endowment to give, the totality of our small-letter gifts, capacities as the "I" endorsed, made overt in the "me", yielding an expressed statement of ourselves complete with both "me" and "I", these two components of our selves gelled together in the act of giving that; amounting to a sample of our life as the active, hybrid "me" standing for our life itself, be that in the enhanced, big-letter idiom with which Mauss concerned himself or as life emanated and conducted in quite small ways, the silent talent for instance of applying ourselves interpersonally, for others and for ourselves in social creativity, as a continuous process. The gift is simply what we are, one's standing, expressed talent, beauty or lack of it, youth or old age, freshness or wisdom; it's whatever he who gives makes himself for the other. There is, then, an ideal unity in the gift between the totality of the talents of the self, its capacity to be socially creative in any particular medium of his endowment with talent as an "I" on the one hand, and the realisation of those talents in the "me" of whose produce the fibre of the gift is in a significantly meaningful sense, put into play as one's life, a produce as one's life enlivened by the "I" which wants to make the gift. If there is an essential non-coincidence, misproportion, mismatch, lack of correspondence between the "me" in whose idiom the

gift is expressed to overt appearances and the "I" authentically endorsing the gift, either through a flaw in the the spirit in which it is given or a flaw in the entitlement of the giver to make the gift as something personally deserved by himself, in the respect that the gift and what it represents hasn't been brought forth by the giver himself in the first place, in whatever indirect a sense, then the gift is in bad faith. In the absence of this ideal accord between the being (apparent and representative "me") and the meaning of the gift (the "I" in the spirit of giving), the "me" presenting that to appearances and the "I" tacitly underscoring that, may be irrevocably alienated, effecting the occasion of making the gift and its entitlement both to rightfully mediate the self of the giver and its proper efficacy to benefit the recipient. A striking example of such an anomaly at the heart of a gift is afforded in Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. After Juliet's choice to risk death rather than be forced into a marriage by her parents in which she must forego her true love, her parents, in their remorse, vow to erect a golden statue of her. This gift of Juliet's likeness, a body, so to speak, in separation, alienation from, without the substratum, of human reality, living, pulsating life to support it, produce it, in spite of its being made of gold (or perhaps because of that), is offensive to Juliet, to what she could and should have been: herself, and which she blatantly and evidently isn't: living human reality. The statue is a phoney fascimile of her, devoid of her spirit. With her death into which she was in a real sense thrust by her parents' ways, her small-letter gift as life became channelled astray into this false, substitute gift, into the solidity of a body of gold alien to and other than her gift as life, lacking in that life and in the animation, *anima* that she should have been with. The statue is, inappropriately, a *body-only* in this sense, and therefore obscene by Sartre's criterion '3', the opposite of its grace at its lived, at its animated. The small-letter, unostentatious gift that Juliet simply was, was her life first and foremost, her grace, freshness, *being*, love for Romeo, it was her social creativity for him, capacity, in real terms, at its personally fulfilled and fulfilled in their interpersonality, to be human reality. It was this which the statue was meant, erected, hopelessly, to replace, a pathetic gesture, an impotent sacrifice, with the false god of *having* only, the Absentee Landlord, to address itself to, its gold fibre refracting with gaping nothingness in its most barren sense instead of

the true, full being of its recipient, a memento of everlasting death instead of temporal life as the gift, this presentation cruelly shortchanging not only Juliet as the gift herself, but also the parents, with no-one to give it to in a real sense in their repentance. Had she lived, there would have been no need for the statue; she would have then had the gift in the authentic sense, that of *being* it, as the hybrid of the spark as the hallmark of the life of a person which lives in actuality here on earth.

Section 2. The Turnstile. The Social Uncreativity of the Pukka.

The tactical sidetracking of social creativity in ways which are dysfunctional to the socially creative process and to the self mediating that, but functional, corroborative to and supportive of the upkeep of the reigning norm: society itself, has been given ample room in foregoing parts of this thesis, particularly in Section 2. of the previous chapter. In this process, our overlords (who are mainly the bureaucrats, according Descombes, in our already partially post-historic times), systematically syphon away, cream off the real excellence generated at first hand by others whose production the Pukka intercept as the ascribed caretakers of that, for their own use, to maintain the seeming superiority of the *We*, the subject-status of the Pukka in the ideological network through which this practice operates, so that through their membership in that *We* they can shine with the aura of creativeness whose privilege is monopolised by them in this alienative way. In previous accounts of this topic here the example of Aristophanes' comedy The Clouds was cited, in which Socrates is featured as floating in a basket between heaven and earth, the plot depicting how the smoke of the sacrifices to the gods by mortals, (symbolic for the surrender by the mortals of their being as human reality to the divine realm of the collective consciousness at its ideal), is intercepted by a 'caretaker' of those godly agencies, so perceived by the worshippers, with toll collected, in a serious and consequential sense underneath the comic facade of the play, for the further passage of human reality thus volunteered and exerted, meant for their sacred destination, the object of their worship, at Olympian heights.

The preceding trains of thought in this thesis entertaining this phenomenon were dedicated to the macrosociologic aspects of this process; they described how the so-called 'specialisation' of 'subject'-function into society's ascribed Sacred and 'object'-function into the profane served the *status quo*, the existing norm in which society at its actual consists. Now a new example illuminating this process will be called on, one which allows to show this process with a socialpsychologic bias, throwing light on the microsociologic ramifications of this phenomenon and its socialpsychologic consequentiality for the individual. This example is provided by a fable by Kafka, quoted by Sartre. '10' According to this story, a merchant who needs to plead his

case at some unspecified higher agency where he arrived at the end of his pilgrimage, is barred entry to that destination by a guard at the gate, and he dies in the process of waiting for being admitted. He learns just before his death, the story goes, that the gate was made just for him, and Sartre goes on in interpreting the story to suggest that we all make our own 'gates' on the road to realising ourselves in our life project. This observation is not to mean, of course, that the obstacles as social reality against which man runs up on his journey in this sense are illusory, but that it is in our power and making as human realities and that it is our duty to ourselves as such, to pass by its vetoes to our being as such if those vetoes consisting in hostile caretaking forces pitted against our self-realisation are malign and unjustified, and that with our passivity in the face of the guards of the agencies with whom our identity as selves rests, we endorse the reality of those often unjustified bars to our true possibilities simply as ourselves. The point that the 'gate' was specially made for us also conveys in a metaphoric way that such gates stand there in personalness for us, in a socialpsychologically significant idiom (in addition to the reality of those 'gates' as a matter of social facticity), that what is often denied us by those 'gates', concerns something that we are in our capacities as particular selves, that it is human reality itself which is in such instances claimed, taken from us by this interception, and that it is by way of our insistence on that, on ourselves as human reality, that we may overcome, supersede this hold-up; finally, the fable certainly implies that we are responsible for those 'gates' once we perceive them. The toll required is our life, ontic in the case of Kafka's story as well as ontologic, the expiration of that in Kafka's symbolicity standing also for the end of our life as socialpsychologic reality as well as the physiologic one which this story ostensibly describes, it also refers to the end of our lives as a fully fledged socialpsychologic "me", active, exigent, sovereign as such. Its message, bidding us to disregard, when appropriate, the 'gate' barring us from ourselves in the world, to push the guard aside, is the message of Luther's revolution too, one that does not cease to be of topical significance to us in this day and age - the modern little parable of Kafka's also akin with Pinter's notion of the 'caretaker' on which we dwelt in some detail in the previous Section; and we find that our notion of 'the caretaker' introduced by us there, can be expressively

extended by the introduction of a synonym of it in the light of Kafka's and Aristophanes' stories; this synonym to the 'caretaker' being the tollcollector, the customs and excise personnel, taking our excellence in its originally produced, first-hand form, in exchange for our dues as such a self whose distinguishing attributes as such we are made to shed when not ascriptionally qualifying for its retention, with a ticket of clearance as a compliant, troublefree social object. Kafka's and Sartre's 'gate', Aristophanes' suspended 'basket', Pinter's half-way house to 'Sidcup', may all be understood as that turnstyle at which our pilgrimage to our identity kept from us by society, our very selves are being claimed, forcibly metamorphosed, taken and paid off by a chip entitling us to participation as dependable social 'bearer's' and only that in the overt arena of the external, actual social scene of our gratification as selves. This turnstyle may be possible to envisage, in a mechanistic vein, as a turning point on the conveyor belt, or rather conveyor chain, ongoing process and mechanism which is operative in the differential processing of our selves as *object only* if profane and *subject only* if highly ascribed as Sacred, (this process of the social 'specialisation' of selves already commented on at length in Section 2 in the previous chapter). In that part of the thesis, the notion that it's not equivalents which are being exchanged in this transaction, has been touched on, a notion which may beneficially be extended here to allow for enlarging on the socialpsychologic aspect of this extortion of our selves by the Pukka, in exchange for the authenticity-destructive currency of a pat on the shoulder for being obedient and satisfactorily vetted mere social 'carriers', "me"-s without an "I", as approved for the profane, these incidents seriously shortchanging us as the dignified and autonomous people who we could otherwise be, complete with an "I"; though the label we earn concurrently as 'good' citizens, is made to seem as worthwhile and fair payment in exchange for the gem that we part with as human reality at this stage. Because of this nature of the exchange, seemingly fair but in fact depriving us of our very human status in the full sense, that process of sham give-and-take which is now being analysed here, reminds me of the phenomenon in Althusser's treatment of the apparently mysterious production of surplus value at the Pukka's disposal (comparable, in our context, with the inexhaustible production of subject-status to the Pukka with all its privileged

benefits), in relation to which the phenomenon under our microscope now, may be seen as this Althusserian phenomenon, writ small.

Althusser, like ourselves here, reveals labour as limitless and energial rather than thing-like in its kind, and generically different, like our human reality which is given up at the 'turnstile', from anything - any thing, including the money that is being paid out in wages - that can be in principle satisfactorily exchanged, by measures of fairness, for that meanly and sparingly issued share in the things which the Pukka unjustifiably has, and which is given us, the lowly ascribed, in exchange for our labour: the supreme currency of human reality, which is the contribution of the socially low-ranking. The prize we, the socially undignified, gain in this exchange, is a qualified place and subservient role and opportunities in the economic system institutionalising the exploitation of the workforce in Althusser's case, and moral approval by humanly false measures from highly ascribed but humanly unauthentic quarters and designs on us as human reality, in our case. Althusser ridicules the scientifically and morally deceptive and (to borrow Sartre's word), 'metastable' logic, rationale, ideology at the heart of us being thus cheated out of our rights duly earned by our labour for the pittance we get for that in unfair exchange (wages in Althusser's case and the label of good citizenship in ours), and he likens the ideology which is the outcome and the justification of this dishonest economic practice, to a *yellow logarithm*, the semantic absurdity of this expression demonstrative of the generic incompatibility, in both the spheres of interest we examine here, Althusser's and ours, between that medium which we give (ourselves, nothing less, in our case) and the vulgar and life-alienated, cold and external medium, the tool of masking the unfairness of the exchange, the vehicle therefore of false value, which we are given in the way of a pay-off for our labour, based on the utilisation of the difficulty of analysing apart the surface structure of productivity and rewards (the only frame of reference for those to appearances), and the deep structure of productiveness and its own kind of reward as human reality, imperatively ours too, which underlies the workings of the surface structure in its externality, and is, in an important part, a condition of that. This conflation between the two kinds of currencies for our remuneration, tangible or surface and

socialpsychologic or deep, both properly ours, as encountered on the threshold of this transaction, on the borders of two categories (that of human reality and social reality in our case). In Althusser's case it is the *economic system* and the *relations of production* which he identifies, on a macrosociologic scale, as the two terms whose proneness to 'metastability' and to therefore being conflated with each other so as to give the appearance of the monistic homogeneity in economic terms of both these two generically different ingredients which participate in the creation of profit, with those in the driving seat utilising the ensuing apparent but false reducibility to appearances of labour to the worth of the amenities produced, enabling those to hijack the labour of the lowly ascribed in exchange for paying them wages, gaining, in the process, a surplus profit from the draining of that empirically undemonstrable source: labour (which, however, in truth, is the inexhaustible fountainhead of more and more production and which is in its characteristic endlessness at the disposal of those ascriptionally high up in the class society.) The two currencies that exchange at the predominantly socialpsychologic 'turnstile' which we now consider, are just as incomparable, differ in kind and weight, jar to quite the same extent, as do the terms which are of interest to Althusser. Within our present, scaled-down, socialpsychologic confines of presenting a kindred occurrence, the terms which are unjustifiably and forcibly exchanged in such a transaction, are a person's produce as life, as human reality itself on the one hand taken in this 'hold-up' from us by the Pukka, either in blindness to (through bad faith) or in explicit and cynical awareness of the 'metastability' of the deal, and, on the other hand, the token chip we gain in exchange entitling us to participation in society as mere sociologic "me"-s, the resulting sham mark of distinction to a self falsely appearing as the crowning achievement of our creativeness and excellence as human realities, which latter endowment, in reality, we lose, and which chip cannot ordinarily be cashed in ever again for fully fledged human reality status as a person, for a mode of individual being as first-hand human excellence, Huxleyan Alpha-status as an individual. The chip can only buy the citizenly virtue of swallowing one's loss of oneself as such a being, and the sense of impotence in the wake of such an unconsoling reward for the loss of our fully fledged selves, in trying to do something to right this great wrong befalling us. The only legitimately available avenue to

coming to terms with such injustice may be, and often is, the project of resorting to bad faith encouraged for our adoption, by assuming a way of life based on the denial of the fact that we, the rank-and-file Rachmones have the possibility of being fully fledged selves ourselves.

Many of Chekhov's and Ibsen's plays provide an example of how people ascriptionally lower ranking than those solemnly appointed by the dicta of tradition, are being shortchanged, exploited in their very being as productive human realities at this 'turnstile' as writ small, how they are on the receiving end of a philosophical practice and *rationale* similar in its moral and logical incoherence by authentic standards to Althusser's 'yellow logarithm' and stripped of their socialpsychologic elevation as fully small-letter sacred as a result, in the context and internal confines which are scaled down to the bounds of 'my world' and the family in comparison to the Althusserian broad social canvas where this 'yellow logarithm' operates, to his mind. Ibsen's play The Wild Duck, for instance, may be read as a rendition of the process in which the authoritarian family and its upholders sap and in the end altogether take away the ontic as well as ontologic life of the most exposed in the family so as to shine with it themselves; the heavy father, for instance, allowing little Hedvig, whose failing sight must be caringly spared, help with his paperwork in the face of medical warning, and the ungenerosity and hypocrisy of her 'elders and betters' weighing on her in other respects too, eventually causing her to commit suicide. Ibsen wrote to a friend, with reference to this play: It 'doesn't touch on political or social problems... It takes place entirely within family life; (but) I daresay it will arouse some discussion.'

The simile of the conveyor belt employed above to illuminate the process of the differential production of 'Subject'-status in the Pukka and 'object'-status in the Rachmones, may be further exploited here to illustrate the fact that the process in question is a two-phase one, in which the two phases involved are simultaneous. One phase consists of the 'conveyor belt' taking the being of the 'gypsy', the active, creative self past the tollgate, the 'turnstile' where this creative self is gestured to shed itself as such, in the way of tax, as it were, whilst, as a twin occurrence, the 'underside' of that 'belt' rolls back to us, or with us, at the same stroke, on its way back from the

processor, harvester, on the borders of socialpsychologic and social realities, making the Pukka on the far side from us over the chasm, as Subject, and depositing us on this side, on its way back, as Rachmones in the world and bidding our self to be *object only*. The fact that the twin phases constituting this process are simultaneous is an important one, for it helps to avoid, in envisaging this process, a philosophical idealism - (absurdly purporting the primacy of the engagement of selves in this process, as the fountainheads of the "I", which "I", assumed by the Pukka, fuels, produces and maintains society, Hegelian fashion, through some kind of 'positivisation' of itself), and it also helps us to avoid a crude philosophical materialism (purporting the primacy of society, grasped as supreme, higher-than-human 'object' in its external, positive form, Durkheimian fashion, as causative of that merely social "me" in us which we, the profane, the members of the brotherhood of the socially oppressed, are bid to be as the exhaustive radius of our being as selves): each of these monistic philosophic positions denying either the role of society as 'object' (as in idealism) or denying us, the profane, as partly subject as selves (as in a crude materialism). The truth, as we see it, is in the recognition that the process currently discussed is socialpsychologic in its making which doesn't touch or effect the positive collective consciousness in its pure form (objective and fact-like, the way Durkheim sees it); it involves society in its existing (as distinct from ideal) state, as corrupted by the human element of its representation, but which process, for all its socialpsychological constitution, is not seen in a philosophically idealistic way, but with the two currently discussed phases operative in it (object-production in the Rachmones or 'gypsy' and subject-production in the ascribed Pukka), seen as concurrent and on a par with each other, both as a matter of temporality and as a question of causality. The twin phases constituting the process currently discussed (those of human reality producing the Pukka as Subject and, on the other hand, state bureaucracy producing us as Object), are seen as coincidental in time and as causes, with both these phases the condition of one another, and with neither phase primary or secondary in any respect. The two parts of the process, incomplete by themselves, gel together as complementary, as one symbiotic Laingian operation writ large, the specialised creation by us of the Pukka as Subject (in our unauthenticity of assuming ourselves as *object only* as typecast); our endorsing, in other words, of

the bureaucratic Masters in our order, with their ascribed monopoly as excellent selves, makes us Object at the same instance in the concurrent and complementary specialisation of ourselves this side of the chasm, ranking us among 'players' rather than 'Gentlemen', so to speak. While refuting Hegel's idealism which consists of his purporting that the Subject-component appropriated by the Pukka ossifies in and affords the fibre of society (the Durkheimian collective consciousness in the terminology of this thesis), we welcome and mean to utilise his insight which we claim, with Hegel, to hold in *socialpsychologic* confines of any kind (our own present one included), that each self creates the Other in a potent Pygmalionic way, by way of defining the "me"-component of the Other's self, though in our present sphere of interest this Hegelian insight applies in mass (but even so still *socialpsychologic*) dimensions. We say that, in our present context, the Pukka create the Profane, and the Profane create the Pukka to a decisive extent. There are important lessons to be learnt from the contention, first of all, that the Rachmones creates the Pukka. There are two ways in which we, the lowly ascribed in society, are free to 'create' him. Firstly, we may authentically and correctly 'create', define the Pukka in the militantly non-conformist way of unique individual selves, showing the Pukka up as half-a-self in his interpersonal attitudes touching us, as *Subject-only* in comparison with our own partly profane self, which is complete with the productive "me" and the critical "I", unlike that of the uncreative Pukka. The other, alternative attitude for us profane to the Pukka's attempt to create us as *object only*, is playing the game on the Pukka's terms, that is unauthentically as individuals. In this latter case we, the Rachmones, will 'constitute', create the Pukka for the 'good person', and the exclusive custodian of the 'good' of society, for which the Pukka sees himself, accepting his sham understanding of his kind of 'good', twisting affairs in the world so as to corroborate his higher than profane human deservingness for which he puts in an exclusive claim, by accepting and performing our *object only* role which the Pukka has issued ourselves with. Our Object status, in turn, is created by the comprehension of us by Pukka standards as devoid, and functionally so, of the gleam of a constructive, and imaginative "I", as people who are not fellow-"I"-s to the Pukka, without the recognition of ourselves as agents and perpetrators of social creativity, of ourselves, at first hand; though when utilising this Hegelian insight, the *socialpsychologic*

limits within which it holds, must always be remembered. This original Hegelian notion, and its working, are well described in Shakespeare's Winter's Tale, for instance, in a speech by Polixenes, when he first meets Camillo when Camillo has just been made privy to Polixenes' falling from favour with Leontes, king of the land.

Polixenes: Good Camillo,
Your changed complexions are to me a mirror
Which shows me mine changed too; for I must be
A party to this alteration, finding
Myself thus alter'd with it. '11'

In our present context, we consider this Hegelian mechanism in mass (though still socialpsychologic) dimensions. The Pukka, to our contention, typically 'creates' the Rachmones as Object by regularly conditioning him through relating to and informing the Rachmones regarding himself, in terms of the Rachmones' stereotype. The Rachmones is approached in the two dimensionality of the body of prejudices defining him to the crude perceiver as a person. The Pukka are Pygmalions of social uncreativity; uncreativity as human reality, that is, human reality being the only original source of creation, as said before; as spark. They create us as *object only* in their unimaginative, pedestrian image of the profane as such. Plato observed that doctors, who have the power to create health, have, by the same token, the power to create unhealth, illness, and this can be seen as applicable, or analogous to the present socialpsychologic context, to the creation of the self of the Other which is to be constituted as fulfilled or unfulfilled; particularly when utilising Karen Horney's medically analogous definition of the 'healthy' self which equals, to her, the wholeness of the self in the autonomy of its full *Gestalt*, defined and experienced as such; its ill health consisting in its incoherence in experience, in its being apprehended by itself as scrambled up, the sum of its parts, no more, robbed of small-letter sacred status as the 'king of the castle' of one's own universe: 'my world'. The division made by the differential typecasting for the big-letter Pukka and the profane respectively, as just outlined, and the 'shackles' (Horney's term), the Kafka-ian bars, the interception of the furtherance of our being as human reality by 'guards' in society's positive medium as a matter of ascription, forbidding the Blemished any transgression into its monopoly of privilegedness, sacredness in the big-letter sense of the word, is by

no means illusory. 'Guards' in such a context are found in abundance in many fields and ranks of the social spectrum - not just among industrial bosses, as Lukács would have it, but among quite low-ranking bureaucrats, social workers, teachers, the medical caretakers of the mentally ill and of other kinds of disadvantaged, and even among just plain citizens who unquestioningly abide by the divisive morality of the Pukka, reserving big-letter Rachmones status for the rachmones, and privileged, *Subject-only* status for the Pukka, on the long term.

Of course, it is the possibility of the Pukka - whether of the very high-ranking or the rank-and-file type, to construe the Rachmones in his charge or simply in his experience, in authenticity to both the Rachmones he encounters and to himself. The road to such authenticity in cross-personal situations between a Kierkegaardian authentic caretaker ('steward', in his language), is, as it is for all of us, the avenue of social creativity. A description of social creativity has already been advanced in Section 2. of the last chapter, together with an example to illustrate such an interpersonal, socially creative act: that of the wetnurse and the soldier in Maupassant's short story, and it has been established there that social creativity in its cross-personal form shows itself and is characterised by occasioning acts that are conducive to the realisation of one's own self in the full sense and that of another, or of several others, in instance when the "me"-s to complement "I"-s are located in different selves, and when these cross-personally subsisting "me"-s and "I"-s are made to connect in the act of one agent's lending his "me" or his "I" to other selves who have an insufficiency of one or the other of these components of the self, so that another self can come to fruition as such, do justice to itself in its project, in the act of its expression, engagement. I feel that in this context, further examples of cross-personal social creativity would usefully complement the previously advanced example, that depicted in Maupassant's short story.

A second such example is provided by the project of the famous Joey Deacon, the spastic author unable to speak intelligibly or write, who produced a stunning autobiography at the twilight of his life. It was the "I" as well as the "me" of his human environment which was plunged into operation in setting up the project of two people apart from Deacon

applying themselves as the tools, by their own choice, of Joey expressing himself, making intelligible his extraordinarily developed, expressive and sensitive "I" which inhabited his handicapped body, without anybody realising it, for years; and both his "I" and his "me" attained spectacular horizons in the realisation of this project of his self through the resulting team-act of multi-personal social creativity in producing his splendid book, endowing Joey's, the 'Rachmones', whole self with the aura of dignity of small-letter sacredness in which mode this man was capable of sustaining his self, unbeknown to anyone, over decades. His closest friend, a spastic himself, imaginatively developed ears to understand Joey's impaired speech, which made sense to no-one else, and the nursing staff engaged both their "I"-s and "me"-s in comparable creativeness in giving Joey and his friend credence and endless time in setting into motion a three-fold interpersonal chain in the act of writing Joey's book, one human 'link' in this 'chain' (his friend) translating his speech, and another, able-bodied person (a nurse, figuring here as an authentic caretaker, to which status his spastic friend also graduated in this situation), committing Joey's thoughts, mediated by his friend's speech, to the typewriter. This intricate configuration of complementary "me"-s and "I"-s between three selves, this threefold instance of social creativity, elevated Joey to the authorship of his fine book, Tongue Tied; his friend and the nurse bringing Joey to full life as a "me" in one stratum and idiom of the operation and existence of a "me", that of human reality of a first-hand quality, as surely and meaningfully as the legendary Pygmalion has endowed the raw material which he sculpted in human shape, with physiologic life, by illuminating it with the vision of the "I", a meaning and reading of the Greek myth which Shaw also utilised in his play Pygmalion, drawing on the metaphoric power of the Greek legend to express, stand for the bringing of someone to full life, so to speak, as human reality, building up the "me" of a person to its due and meant potential in whom this hallmark of the self at its highest and most deserved, was kept down, concealed by circumstances of her birth, in a project of interpersonal social creativity, launched with the aim of the realisation of this talent explicitly in mind.

Another example of social creativity which enabled someone to do justice to his self by virtue of the loan of the "me"-s of others, is

provided by the underground train driver Chris Hughes who became International Mastermind in 1983. He and his colleagues (authentic Others who unwittingly and unselfconsciously employed themselves as his socially creative caretakers), informally reorganised shiftwork between themselves to cover for Hughes during the preliminary heats of that competition if the time of those didn't tally with Hughes' free periods from work, so that he could attend them. When Hughes eventually won the title, he received a warning from his place of work, with threats of he sack 'next time'. 'This is the work of petty pen-pushers' he said to the press with admirable clarity of insight. The wording of the warning betrayed to him that his fortunes both in the heats and within London Transport were monitored and unorthodox shift arrangements noted in the course of the previous six months. ⁽¹²⁾ The warning was a response by his ascribed superiors - unauthentic caretakers in their conception of themselves vis-a-vis Hughes as Pukka in a stereotype sense - to the success of his project, it was sent to him at the point when that came to a head and called for comment, when a word of congratulations would have been in order and was in the place of that. It was expressive of the rejection, by his unauthentic caretakers by ascription, of Hughes' display and accomplishment as a "me" of genuine personal excellence, knocking a hole in the monopoly of the more outstanding excellence ever and properly reserved for his superiors, as far as they were concerned, by virtue of their high place in the ascribed pecking-order which held at his place of work along the pyramid of job-seniorities established by long-standing tradition between blue-collar staff and white. Hughes' sacrilegious behaviour in showing such human excellence which would have done any of his superiors proud, went in the face of the traditional reservation of greater superiority at all times for the established meritocracy, the bureaucratic élite over the 'rude mechanicals' at his place of work, serving as the root cause and the stimulus for his severe punishment. The success of his project seemed an outrageous challenge in the face of human value-differentiation properly and traditionally obtaining in that ascriptive order, and the reply-gesture by the company was one of his symbolic excommunication from London Transport, taking the form of his threatened deprivation of his work and livelihood there.

The above train of thought leads to the introduction here of the notion of the Referee.

The Referee is a Hegelian concept. He is the author of references of children who leave or change schools, of students going into the world or passing on to fields of higher education, of employees who have or want to go into other jobs. The Referee quite simply 'states' these people on such occasions. The contents of the reference is the summary of a person, a personality, a self, as the Pukka, or some Pukka, have judged him, sized him up, composed, 'constituted' him. Hegel described the small-letter aspect and dimension only of this concept; but to our understanding, the notion stands for the authorship by the Other, the Sacred or some particular Sacred, of our "me", the "me" of the profane, the "me" of the charge of the Pukka's caretakership, in one significant milestone in our lives in relation to which the reference is issued and also, eventually, on the long term in our subsequent lifecourse which the reference affects, effectively defining the factual, socialpsychologically overt being of the self, both in the context of the social world as that is ascribed (a new dimension to the notion), and in relation to oneself, (Hegel's sole concern). In this process the Other (in our case the Pukka), dishing out to the recipient, the Profane, the externally objective mirror image of the agent who is being defined by the Pukka as a "me", in the mean manner and measure in which that "me" is construed in relation to us by the Pukka; the resulting "me" thus constructed, bouncing back upon the Rachmones, yielding quite simply what he is as a socialpsychologic (in our case also social) object, contents as a self. To our understanding, the Referee, as he yields us in his definition of us from his ascribed Pukka heights, affords the force fuelling the phenomenon of the constitution of the self at society's Kafka-ian turnstyle of one's debut on the public scene; the Reference-issuing Pukka, or string of Pukkas, are the source of the making, production, definition of us at our socially elevated or unelevated, depending both on their manner of constituting us as well as on our chosen attitude towards these 'guards' at the turnstyles of our lives, as an inner matter for ourselves. The Pukka, in such instances, is the Appointed, Highly Ascribed Other with whom lies the discretion of creating our being as people in the world in one way or another, either as *object only* or alternatively, as a budding or fully fledged self grasped and presented by the Referee as a fellow-small letter sacred, small-letter Pukka, complete with an "I" same as the Referee; he defines us, in one manner or another, as that ego in the

shape of which we will quite simply exist in society. The Reference, construed in such a big-letter way, is the socially, not just socialpsychologically, consequential statement of the self being judged on the podium of the world, it's the dowry of one as an effective "me" in society, either of a blemished hue or as a one-of-us Pukka, in terms of which one enters the social world, the effect of the Reference extending to the whole course of one's lifetime.

It's a very consequential issue how the Referee goes about, approaches the job of giving his Reference in this big-letter manner and context. In giving it, in defining the being of his 'charge', both to himself and quite as importantly to others, to future Pukkas in the life of the 'charge' to whom the Reference refers, the issuing Pukka as our Referee (for that's what he is when he gives us a passport, entitling us in one way or another to opportunities of one sort or another, lowly or prestigious, in the world), exercises his own fundamental choice in the respect of establishing the Other, (us, in his charge), whether this is explicitly known to him or not. At the time of the introduction of the '11+' just before the 1944 Education Act, when secondary school selection was still based on the teacher's Reference, a useful and revealing term came to the fore in referring to the two ways in which the Referee (in this case the schoolteacher) can approach the job of giving his reference. The term which became fashionable then was the 'halo effect', operative or unoperative, as the case may be, in his writing the reference. It was at the advent of the 1944 Education Act that the Referee's power to saturate the reference with a 'halo', so to speak, in relation to the child about whom the Reference was issued, or, alternatively, his power to withhold that from a reference, became recognised as an important issue. It was then that the limelight was directed at the consequentiality of his giving a reference implicative of a licence, as far as the he was concerned, for his 'charge' to be a potential "I" as well as a "me" in the make-up in his self as his future possibility, or, alternatively, his key placement to thwart and withhold such a humanly decorous classification from children not approved of by him. At this time the problem of these two modes of giving a reference, with the 'halo' usually reserved for the middle-class child and the type lacking in such a 'halo' to the working-class one, was recognised as the cornerstone issue and force in differentially channelling children into

the secondary school system, with one type of secondary educational institution, the Grammar School, reserved for the ones judged by the teacher to be blessed with a higher degree of excellence, and the second type of school, the Secondary Modern School, reserved for those judged to be endowed with a lesser degree of excellence; resulting, prior to the Act, in a sieving process which is of special interest in the context of our current argument too, as we see one of these types of references or the other, as reflecting the teacher's ability as well as human stature in being either perceptive and responsive, or deaf and blind, to the young working-class 'charge's' authenticity and potential for authenticity as a human being, and consequently his success or failure to grant potential and room for authenticity in the self of all children as the proper due of all; an act of choice on the Referee's part which defines, at the same stroke, the Referee himself too, not just his reference, as authentic or unauthentic. A reference affected by, conceived with the halo effect at work in it - why not be academically inelegant - is one composed with love. It's the definition of the self which is grasped and advanced as a complete Gestalt, in the spirit of respect to the academic's or employer's 'charge' as human reality: more than the sum of its parts, more than a bundle of individual attributes haphazardly and not coherently conceived in grasping and describing the self of the ego to whom the Reference refers, irrespective of whether the factual truthfulness of the data on which the Reference is based (to which factual correctness the unauthentic Referee often adheres, in seeming honesty, no less than the authentic Referee), are factually overwhelmingly favourable or not. It should be realised that a mere faithfulness to recorded data does not in itself make a Reference authentic; indeed, the ideal of the factual sparseness of a Reference usually yields an unauthentic one, particularly in the case of children. To the Sartrian (though not to the engineers of the 1944 Education Act), it is the Reference with the 'halo effect' which qualifies the Reference for authenticity, it is the Reference complete with the 'halo effect' which gives the Referee's charge his due as a human reality, present and future, and it is furthermore this type of Reference which produces the 'objective' mode of giving a reference for Sartre's money, compared with the slavish and meagre empiricism-prompted objectivity of drafting a Reference which has regard for the factual achievements only in describing the human quality

(always, ideally, inclusive of the 'charge's' potential) of the person about whom the Reference is written. It is the more authentic Reference by our definition of that, the type putting into play the 'halo effect', which alone has the potential and power to recognise in a Chris Hughes, underground train-driver and International Mastermind in 1983, as the schoolchild and eventually the employee who potentially has it in him to achieve such a feat, if the performance of that be realistically inherent in his personality, the identification of which talent is the Referee's duty.

The Reference will not graduate to one conceived in the 'love', in the appropriate sense, of him to whom it refers, (the love, in other words, which is seen, experienced and meant by the Referee as the due of a deserving fellow human being who is apprehended as a potential equal in the present or future to the Referee), and will not therefore become an authentic one, by the Referee composing it in the tone of unauthentic love, by way of slipping into the reference solemnly emotive words in a kindly tone, which make the Referee himself appear as a Good Man, but which projects his 'charge' about whom the Reference is written as his inferior, or potential inferior in the case of school-references, as one who has his anthropologic classification as *Rachmones*, cut out for him with reference to both the present and the future, due to some less than optimal ascriptional feature attaching to his person or background, causing the Referee to comprehend him as *object only* in relation to him on the long term, whilst apprehending himself as big-letter Sacred in sanctimonious personal superiority over his 'charge'. An authentic reference is not necessarily very different in its merely empirical content, as already remarked, from an unauthentic one; it's based on, contains the same information regarding the 'charge's' past achievements, qualities, examination or test results etc., as does the unauthentic reference. It is merely made authentic by its optimism and long-sightedness in stating the fullness of its content with the 'charge's' potential, not yet fully assumed "I", not yet fully developed talent, as well as his "me" conceived of at its merely inert. It deploys the Referee's imaginative objectivity in identifying the potential in his 'charge', particularly when young but also in cases where the 'charge' is fully matured in years, to make good at the optimum level as the whole person he is; it's made authentic by the Referee's well-

founded faith in children, all children in the ordinary way, to have it in them to forge ahead when motivated, by virtue of the motivation-generative power of the knowledge of being backed up by the good opinion of a respected senior authority, and a supporting fellow human being at that, fuelled by the power which a good reference can give to a self as his potentials are gradually solidified in the practice of everyday into successes, big ones or small, in one's biography, *curriculum vitae*, as the fruits of the potentials of the Referee's 'charge' are gradually entered into the frame of reference of the effective outside world in significant moments as well as in the mundane contexts of the history of one's continuous lifetime. The quality which shines through such an authentic reference as warmth is not the product of a stylistic artifice, and its meant and sympathetic authenticity extending to the child certainly need not be made explicit in emotional terms at all for it to remain committedly authentic; it's interpersonally constructive qualities and eventually effects are merely the natural reflection of the 'charge' conceived in the Referee's own spontaneous authenticity in his capacity as an unofficious, small-letter pukka, testifying, in a Pygmalionic manner, to the being, quality of the Other about whom the reference is written, as a like small-letter pukka,

particularly when his Reference is issued with regard to schoolchildren. The overall, positive hue of a Reference, whether it refers to children or fully grown adults, is not, of course, effected by the projection of unrealistically favourable qualities regarding the Referee's 'charge', but comes about effortlessly as a function and because of the human totality in which the Referee grasps the Other in a holistic, humanly authentic fundamental choice, both of himself and of his 'charge' as he does so.

The alternative mode of the Referee's discharging his duty as such, is that of the unauthentic Reference, issued by the Referee in his chosen capacity as Subject only, as the rightful creator, constitutor, definer of the Other, his 'charge', as *object only*, across the Chasm, the upkeep of which chasm between Sacred and Profane he sees as his solemn duty as an ardent Sacred himself, vis-a-vis a poor schoolchild or, say, a released prisoner - conceiving of his own job as Referee in the heartfelt unlove, or, worse still, the more powerfully subjugating unauthentic love in his exercise of tolerance, of an ever-qualified

nature, of the Different-from-himself: his 'charge'. The manner whereby the Reference projects the Other, the Referee's 'charge', unauthentically, is through the conception and presentation of the self of the latter by the Referee as merely an itinerary, a receptacle of facts, missing him as a person altogether, through a basic and sincere inability on the part of the Reference-issuing Pukka to see him as such. The unauthenticity of such an empirically sterile or self-indulgently and sentimentally condescending presentation of a person prevails, operates, consists in a stronger way than merely in putting the Pukka's 'charge' over incompletely, insufficiently, in conveying him as a person: the effect of a reference illuminated by such an unauthentic choice both of the giver of the Reference and of him to whom his Reference refers, is that it constitutes the person referred to as completely, inertly and effectively *object only*. Any favourable feature, merit in the person commented on - for instance, that he is talented - will be stated as one of the many fragments defining him as a self of the *object only* breed, as something inorganically, inexplicably, alienly attached to the bundle of facts he is otherwise seen as - not as an axis uniting, organising him into what he really and wholly is as human reality, as a self, by Sartre's and Karen Horney's criterion. This approach on the Referee's part will yield a reference which is realistic and objective, or rather objectivistic, in the degraded sense, as detached from the possibility of an ego potentially of a certain stamp, and a unique one as such.

The way the 1944 Education act resolved the problem of the injustice of the monopoly, on the teacher's part, of laying down the course and quality of the further passage in education of the children in his charge as their Referee, and of his typical practice in exercising that by extending the 'halo effect' to middle class children only and withholding that from working-class ones, was to opt for the narrow empiricistic *rationale* underlying the '11+', plumping for the method in the making or breaking children at the age of eleven, of judging them on the evidence of a battery of tests and that alone, with their qualities as pupils to be marked and in the process fatefully classified by examiners who had personally no knowledge of the children, the pupils' results on these tests establishing, defining the children for the future, on the basis of a sham equality of a democracy of atoms. As is

well known, the '11+' didn't work; working class children still tended to perform less well on this crucial test than did middle-class ones. The reason for this, it seems to me, is the inappropriateness and inapplicability of this degraded understanding of the objectivity of the tests to decide the academic classification and fate of the children, and together with these factors their human fate in general which is manifoldly affected in adulthood in ways which importantly follow from their type of secondary schooling. The '11+' was introduced as a result of the teachers not having had it in them, in the first place, to love the working-class child sufficiently, either at the age of eleven or before or after, to see the working-class child, to grasp him, to create him as a quality of consciousness which is complete with a 'halo', so to speak, the way they had it in them to create the middle-class child. They didn't manage to view, relate and address themselves, as a longstanding state of affairs, to the working-class child's present and particularly his future, to his not yet realised potential as a first-class human reality, which is universal in all and which the teacher is particularly well placed to bring out all children from the outset. The need for the '11+' reflected the effects of the average teacher excusing himself, on the long term, from having to be a good teacher to all, his art of teaching being the strongest seductive power in luring any child into liking a subject and doing well in it through self-motivation, developed and reinforced by the teacher in rewarding and encouraging his educational successes, in small ways or big throughout the entire course of his schooling, which is the most potent precondition of the child's clinching, conquering an academic area. At the heart of the problem which the '11+' was called into being to remedy, was the teacher's consistently applied relative parsimony in extending the 'halo effect', in the course of practicing his art, to the less well-spoken, less well-clad, less polite working-class child, blemished in these ways from the moment of his birth, as a longstanding matter of his attitude, lack of love it may be said, towards such a 'charge' of his. It is this truth - that of the systemating evading by the teacher, in his dealing with the working-class child, of his first duty of the empathic and imaginative teaching of all children - that the continued poorer results of working-class children, '11+' or no '11+', was the objective index of, rather than of the untenable and wrong dogma and foolish hope, entertained by the authors of the '11+', that by the removal of the 'halo effect' from

all children's academic assessment, objectivity will be served and attained; that the banning of the 'halo effect' from a single, though fateful moment in his assessments, will set right the injustices following from the 'halo effect's' differential availability to children with different backgrounds, which accompanies them throughout educational lifetimes.

It might be fruitful to consider here the dual meaning of the notion of expectations. In their small-letter capacity, expectations act as the major instrument and condition of our socially creative imagination in bringing out the best in people in Pygmalionic constructivity, apart from the time, of course, which we must be prepared to put into the project of realising the Other, with our "I" left open for him to verify himself as a self against a fellow-fulfilled self in and for us, so as to remain alert to his real potential as such. Expectations are usually credited with acting as the instruments of summoning the forces of inertia in the mode of and by the generalized other to keep down individual excellence in unlikely candidates for such by conventional standards, or indeed even in likely ones, which is the way in which Sartre entertained them, and they do indeed perform this constraining role in reality to a great degree, in cases where expectations are interpersonally unauthentic. But at their humanly and interpersonally sensitive, constructive and authentic, expectations have the power to create the other to his own authentic limits as a "me", ever and properly hybrid and complete with his own "I", and are, indeed, a necessary condition for that. Expectations, then, emerge with a dual meaning, as a question of their being interpersonally authentic or unauthentic in the light of the potentials of the "I" (the "I" in such a context importantly at play in both the socially creative and the socially created selves) - the expression 'expectations' emerging in this context, the way the terms 'life', 'trust', 'deed' etc. have done in our formerly discussed trains of thought. In one sense, expectations are the levelling shackles to the individual as such, the way Sartre sees them, and in the other sense, when originating from the trusting and personal Other, stimulating and necessary for the bringing about of the fullness of the self of the one on the receiving end of the expectations - absolutely indispensable if a child is ever to do justice to himself. It goes without saying that expectations, even in the

latter sense, at their constructively interpersonal, must be congenial and complementary to the self of the Other to which they are extended, tailor-made to it, the qualities of its capacities imaginatively watched for; in helping to realise them, constant nudging in insensitivity to the limits and kinds of the small-letter capacities of the one to be reared, is just as harmful as the denial of leeway to those potentials. This process, that of listening for, keeping open one's consciousness for the other's specific needs as a "me", is not a strenuous and unnatural effort but a normal and relaxed one, the fussless by-product of one's fundamental choice vis-a-vis the Other and the implications of the authentic outcome of that choice for oneself, bidding the self of the helper, of the authentic 'caretaker', to apply himself to developing the self of the Other in the spirit of the recognition and respect of the needs and gifts of the self precisely as they are found in the Other, and not ours. It's significant that the product in the above example of a three-fold cross-personal project to bring out Joey Deacon's self-expression, was his autobiography and not something which was imposed on him by the egos of those who made themselves available to him in the project of realising his self. Of course, it is impractical for the teacher to devote as much ego-constructive 'love', care and individual attention to the materially and spiritually disadvantaged in his or her class as Joey Deacon's 'caretakers' were able to lavish on Joe, in classrooms with forty or fifty children (as was the case in the 'forties and 'fifties when the 1944 Education Act was expected to remedy the chronically different attainment of middle-class and working-class children respectively, and which classroom conditions are still to be found to-day); but this fact does not do away with the imperative that such an authentically empathic, individually creative and imaginative approach by the teacher to the education of every child in his or her care should constantly inform him or her as an *ideal* - an ideal which does not hold in some airy-fairy Utopia, but which is constantly operative in his or her work and realised in the most practical ways available, in the everyday of his or her professional activities.

The concept of the Referee, in the context both of the child to be brought up and in that of fully developed adults, emerges and ties in with the classification of the forms, paradigms of the Pukka-Rachmones relationship in the world advanced before, and allows us to draw up two

further diagrams expressing new aspects of this relationship. In the first of these the position of the child versus the agencies responsible for and involved in his upbringing: parents, teachers, foster parents, employees of one kind or another of the social services who may be effectively involved in the child's early history, figure as the 'Sacred' term opposite the child, who is grasped as profane, not yet socialised, with the rift consequentially separating these two opposite anthropologic groups consisting, basically, in the generation gap with all the ascriptive trappings going hand-in-hand with it. The second diagram, prompted here by the introduction of the Referee, depicts the dividing chasm as the concomitant of the separation in external, but also in innerly effective ways, between the employer and employee. Again, employers, as the ascriptively senior party, have real and effective Pygmalionic powers, as Referees, the References issued by them potentially deciding the tenor of how the next employer or perhaps all future employers of the person referred to in the Reference, (if he has the bad luck of hitting on unauthentic employers or the representatives of them all through his working lifetime), will relate to, effectively and lastingly classify the employee in question as either a Rachmones or a pukka himself. It must be stressed here that the focus employed here for viewing the employer-employee relationship is not identical with and carries no connotations of a class-ideology based on affairs in the state of the relations of production, which is an important facet in Lukács's treatment of the lasting and fateful chasm between capitalists as Subject and the typical ascription of members of the proletariat as Object, importantly operative in capitalism. One reason why a confusion between Lukács's political-economically in-depth approach to the division between the diametrically opposite classes of humanity which we now treat (the employer-employee dyad, that is) should be avoided, is that the classes of the humanly oppressed with which we concern ourselves here are wider and more inclusive than Lukács's working class; and a second reason for stressing the difference between the two approaches to the employer-employee relationship, Lukács's and ours, is that this thesis, unlike Lukács, concentrates primarily on the socialpsychologic workings and effects implied by the 'problematic' currently treated here. This thesis concerns itself with the presence and socialpsychologic consequentiality of the schism at work in the consciousness of the ascriptionally subordinate party in this

relationship, the employee, and with his option to choose himself, so to speak, in the face of his greater human exposure and vulnerability than that of the Pukka in this relationship; with his ensuing choice resulting in the socialpsychologically dual possibility of his personal authenticity or unauthenticity, in the face of his humanly lower-ranking typecasting in the situation, both of which possibilities are open to him. This thesis views the employee in his capacity as profane, and concerns itself with the possible schism in his consciousness, if that justifiably obtains in view of his situation; this schismic vision caused in him by the cognised discrepancy, discontinuity in his consciousness between his private, critical, authentic 'perspective' on his lowly notch marked out for him by the area of work which he is to perform, this critical view of his situation illuminated by a more ideal self which he may harbour, and by the more ambitious area of activity that his ideal self would be justified in sustaining, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the hard-and-fast nature of the ascribed quality of his placement and the classification of his self in the world in actuality, from which he cannot escape, which must remain his lot, together with all the prejudices pertaining to his lowly ascription in his job, as the underground train-driver Chris Hughes, in our earlier example, experienced to his expense. It is, consequentially, up to him whether to authentically sustain a sense of his 'ideal self' in the definition of himself either when a one-off Reference is issued to him on a special occasion, when wanting to change his job, for instance, or as a continued state of affairs touching his human status at work on the long term - and relate to his predicament in critique of his own situation, as well as implicitly or explicitly assuming a sense of responsibility for the schism on a similar account in all who are subjected to a comparably frustrating definition and scope for their selves at their place of work. He may, of course, alternatively choose to sweep under the carpet, in bad faith, the dictates and his sense of a more self-fulfillingly deployed 'ideal self' than his reference and classification as a quality of work-force, conceived without a 'halo', will allow. Grasping this phenomenon in socialpsychologic terms rather than social ones, as did Lukács, entails that we direct our spotlight in concerning ourselves with this phenomenon, on the concrete interpersonality that obtains and operates in human terms between the one issuing the Reference and the one to whom it refers, or at least

grant consequential room to such a socialpsychologic aspect in the operation of the phenomenon we now describe, and put down the commonness, if not universality, of such a Reference systematically doing injustice and disallowing a more favourable tenor to creep into it as the Rachmones employee progresses in his life, to the typicality of a humanly unauthentic consciousness in those who are in the driving seat in such situations. (The qualification may be usefully made here that in cases when a work-reference is being penned, the author of the Reference is often not the employer himself, but, particularly if the employer is a large firm or institution, the job of issuing the Reference is often done, with glee, by a bureaucrat representing the employer). We put down the predictability of a poor, qualified, humanly enslaving Reference that is typically issued with regard to one who has once been apprehended as Profane and not Pukka, to the popular and seductive appeal to those who are in a position of relative ascriptional heights compared to the Rachmones implicated, of the opportunity to exercise and assert their socialpsychologic power and relatively greater degree of ascribed goodness and excellence, and with that to the wish on the part of the Referee to perpetrate the already existing ascriptional structure, in which the Referee and his kind have a superior place relative to the reference-seeking Rachmones and his kind, as a long-term arrangement.

To summarise these two new groups in our typology of forms of the Pukka-Rachmones paradigm, we will now present these in diagrammatic form.

Table 6.

Sacred. Pukka

Parent, guardian, teacher,
fostering agencies, social
services

Profane

child

Table 7.

Pukka.

Employer, work-referee

employee

The concept of the employer-employee relationship, and the differing socialpsychologic as opposed to sociologic grasp of that, brings the argument to the notion of the Work, particularly the socialpsychologic aspect of that, different from the better-known concept of labour in the Marxist, or Althusserian sense, and differing also from the sociologic dimensions of positing that notion in the Marxist way. The Work is a notion connected by indelible ties to social creativity or creativity as human reality (all instances of which are social as their precondition and regarding their potential significance, to Mead's understanding). The Work (a long-standing preoccupation of French philosophy), is the end product, the overt output of creativity as human reality, of the activation of the "me" and the "I" to bear on each other in the act, whether in the personal or interpersonal compass of the *actio radius* of selves. It's the dialogue between the "me" and the "I" committed to paper or to the spoken word or expressed in terms of any artistic or scientific medium or in a craft or simply in realised effective overt conduct. It's the application and expression of the "I" in the "me", the evidence of life in the socialpsychologic sense. The Work as seen here is the natural product by and in the idiom of the self, the touchstone of that as productive as such. Van Eyck's Work is 'Man in a Turban', for instance, Joey Deacon's Work is the enjoyable quality of his life which he attained and his autobiography giving an account of that, Hughes' Work is driving the train, engaging in intellectual games, sharing his high spirit and spirit of inventiveness with his human work environment, as the character Hawkeye does in the television serial MASH. The nature and reward of the Work is of its own kind, the quality of that serving as the feedback to and for the process of socialpsychologic creativity; its prevalence and reward may be thought of apart from the economic system. The focus in describing the Work as we understand it here is not on the material product of it in abstraction from the total human context of its production, of which the tangible produce, fruits, are a part, in the sense in which this was the case for Luther, as commented on in the latter half of the preceding Section where the external yield of our productivity were seen as one organic factor in the repertoire which comprises the many possible forms and facets of the self's socialpsychologically rightful and personally relevant modes of *having*, earn in the course of its being as a self and the application of that in the Work, in work. This

subjectively inclusive angle on the possible socialpsychologic modes of *having* is not to deny meaningfulness and relevance to the study of the systematically differential modes of *having* for the reigning and the oppressed classes respectively as a function of gross sociological patterns and the forces of the relations of production which Marx and the discipline of political economics concern themselves with; we merely wish to observe that our socialpsychologic angle on the modes and ethical justification, or otherwise, of *having* as defined by subjectively inclusive criteria, which we entertain alongside with Luther and which we would now like to examine in the context of the Work within our range of interest, is also meaningful and important, though in a socialpsychologic context in the main. Moreover, we would like to make the point that without a socialpsychological angle on the process of production as a goal, self-rewarding *per se* to a great extent, the job of the study of the phenomenon of work would be left predominantly to empiricistic economists and behaviourist psychologists homed in on outwardly anchored, empirical goal-directedness as the sole psychologic motivator of the phenomenon of the Work, leaving this phenomenon only partially rendered and the scope of its study unrealistically impoverished, from a socialpsychologic point of view at least.

The Work to us in this context (whatever the lessons of the Marxists' analyses of the phenomenon kindred to this, writ large), is both the yield and the reward of human reality as an end in itself as such: it is the privilege of work as such, of being productive as human reality. To be productive is an anthropologic feature and hallmark; it's a reward in itself, remunerative in terms of its own currency. Saussure was the first to postulate the *semiotic function* with which we identify the intrinsic and self-pollenating reward mechanism which underlies, teleologically, it could be said, as a function whose aim is justified and exhausted in its own process and in the service of its own end, the axiomatic human exploit of productivity, work as such, continuously in operation at the root of human reality, an irreducible motivation firing the process of the self, of human reality as such. This faculty causes children to play (including games of social creativity such as 'house', doctors and nurses), without any reinforcement other than that of its own kind inherent in the game, the process of the play a function which clamours to be gratified *per se*, a by-product of simply being *homo*

sapiens, the intelligent animal; a faculty which the behaviourists deny (because it contradicts an orthodox learning theory which is entertained by crude social psychologists as exhaustively encompassing all human behaviour, with external reinforcement, in a primary or secondary sense, envisaged by them as the sole motivator of all human activity) and which Piaget, in contrast with crude behaviourists, recognised as an important universal human faculty from early childhood, a prerequisite of and concomitant to cognitive behaviour at all ages, making that notion a cornerstone in his *oeuvre*. Perhaps the great area of embarrassment to behaviourist psychology, the rats in Hymovich's experiments which delight in performing tasks irrespective of being or not being externally rewarded, once they got the hang of them, may be seen as pointing in prehuman life to the rudiments of this function. 'Work ennobles', the Hungarian proverb holds, compatibly with Protestant standards. This little axiom is usually treated with derision, partly because in turn-of-the-century times it was usually uttered by those who did no work, and due in another part to the stronghold of behaviourism and pragmatism informing in predominant ways psychologic thinking in both hemispheres, East and West, resulting in trends in both reigning socialscientific systems of thought which disallow its meaningfulness. But, with the mass unemployment of our day and the first revolutionary impact of the silicon chip still not exhausted in its social consequences but heralding more unemployment to come, its meaningfulness is vindicated in several ways. The psychological and social scourge which the systematically induced redundancy of the creative spirit is proving to be in our society, shows itself in its displacement into deviant activities and functions, with the crime rate and the incidence of depression in individuals rising in suggestive correlation with the rate of the loss of work opportunities. Moreover, both experience 'in the field' and a growth in relevant socialscientific research have gradually uncovered the fact that in spite of the recipience of dole, social security and various allowances by the unemployed, yielding in an overwhelming incidence of cases a regular source of subsistence which is not significantly lower than the wages of the lowest paid workers, it is nevertheless *work* which the unemployed would typically opt for rather than redundancy with all its 'unearned benefits'. Sociologically speaking, the unavailability of the privilege of work in a society ideologically governed, by the definition of a dutiful citizen as

productive in and of society, it's the norm itself, Protestant work ethics, that very ideology in terms of which the world makes sense to the culture, which is being pulled from under people's feet, society's very content as the norm, its being, stability consisting in the self-definitive powers of the coherence of that, as Durkheim showed, which is fundamentally threatened by unemployment striking people *en masse* unpredictably, regardless of skill and other aspects of individual worth making someone viable as willing labour force, and the phenomenon of financial remuneration often unlinked to performance in the experience of those who rank lowest in the way of class, both these practices feeding the core of a blatant contradiction, not to say crisis, by the very standards of the reigning ideology, at the heart of the norm governing our day. This circumstance makes nonsense of the attempts by the authorities to wash their hands of the rising incidence of the various aspects and indices of the social anomie which Durkheim studied a century ago, particularly the rise in the crime rate which has already been passingly referred to, hiding behind the rationale that some of the offenders are not unemployed; sophistry based on category error, disallowing the 'being' and self-contained efficacy of the norm, the collective consciousness, an *actio radius* of its own at which it operates as 'whole cloth', whether satisfactorily or anomically, but independently, in either case, of the need for a one-to-one justification of its own prevalence and ways in terms of the individual psychological motivation of people whose behaviour goes to make up demographic statistics in obedience to sociologic laws. What we witness, in our time, on a sociologic scale, is the mass prevalence of human reality frustrated in its own, special, self-rewarding terms, on a massive scale; an anthropologic matter. It's the gift itself, capacity for social creativity as the Work of those affected by unemployment, which goes a-begging. After years of moral conditioning in the education system as a result of which people learnt to define their worth as selves in the coincidence of the application of oneself as an individual with the contribution through one's work to a society calling for that, to see the terminus of one's life-project as causative of, contributive to the flourishing of the country, society's prosperity going hand-in-hand with one's own, now all of a sudden, with the practice of drawing unemployment benefit and other allowances by which one can somehow make ends meet, this traditional stimulus-pairing

between one's own welfare and society's welfare falls apart for the individual. There is suddenly a surprise in store for the sceptic who thought the little proverb 'work ennobles' as emotional nonsense. With the severance of outlets for social creativity by way of the redundancy of many, in the absence for them of opportunities to contribute with their work towards the progress and flourishing of society, an appetite for work is nevertheless retained by the unemployed - showing that the *raison d'être* for the need for industriousness as human reality is not exhausted as far as the individual is concerned with the cessation of its validation in and usefulness for society; there remains a residue of a motivation for wanting to work as an end *per se* after being declared useless and superfluous for and in the course of promoting the social aspects of production. Rationalisations, manipulations informed by the narrow single-disciplinary, empiricistic economics on which the government relies, contemptuous of interdisciplinary links and any connectedness with the relations of production, does not manage to make the factor of workforce vanish without a trace after cutting it back, and does not explain the problems stemming from its lingering on in a sociologically important and demanding way after its official pronouncement and branding as redundant. The human factor, human reality, utilised, engaged, channelled in the production process so far, shows itself, proves its continued, now problematic prevalence, in a Sartrean sort of double negative, as an invisible need that has not been noticed so far but which hangs about now like Banquo's ghost when it fails to be extinguished after its being waved aside to appearances, which clamours for recognition, calls for being channelled again, as something which has been hurt, abused, something which did not go away just because shown the door, something still prevalent as dissatisfied, unfulfilled now, gone awry in relation to what it properly is: human reality, axiomatically, properly productive as such, and as something to be now reckoned with, a problem. Where did it come from? What is it? There is a general failure to grasp the act of the Work as a natural right to satisfy the hunger for it in the "I" as something not completely validated by its usefulness to society and something more and other than what has been paid for, or paid off, in the way of the wages or even a substantial golden handshake that is being offered in exchange for it, this financial remuneration for it wrongly seen as the sole be-all and end-all for the ultimate objective at the terminus of man's

hunger or rather thirst for work, and there is a general puzzlement in the face of the phenomenon now that this thirst, this force, is not extinguished when finally paid for, or even in cases in which it is continued to be paid for. The will to work continues to show itself as an inexhaustible hunger for its accomplishment on its own terms, as a socialpsychologic and not economics-restricted issue, a statement of itself as human reality which will not reduce because dismissed by economists, which is indissmissible because an indelible capacity and medium for realising and perpetuating itself as human reality, concurrently and tautologically with the Work, informed and validated by standards of human reality by definition and in terms of its own autonomy as such. The point that the being of the self as its contribution, its Work, is something meaningful as such which it is at the self's, its producer's discretion, which the self is free to put towards, or alternatively withhold from society and which choice on the individual's part is of consequence to society, is strongly made and illustrated in the film The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner, in the main character in it. The film treats the topic of an outstanding talent (excellence in athletics in the instance of the hero of the film), in someone who is firmly ascribed as Blemished, a boy committed to borstal, whose ego is being dressed down in every moment of his life there, through the fact quite simply of his being there. An opportunity, a chance to participate in a race, is arranged for him, which will allow him to do justice to his unique gift in a big way for all to see. In the course of the race, he has a massive lead all the way; but he stops just before the goal post, allowing others to reach it before him. It was his own gift over which he assumed discretion, disposal, power of decision as to whether to surrender it, allow it to flow into the delta of society, so to speak, or keep it from that; and he chooses not to let society shine with a phoney, half-hearted liberalism in which light he felt it would appear had he allowed it to give him an award, had he won according to the rules of its game. It could be said that he committed suicide, an act of martyrdom, not in an ontic but certainly an ontologic sense, caused the unfulfilment of his self, as the creator of his own Work as such, brought off a bloody revolution in the confines of 'my world', refused the possibility of accomplishing himself as human reality in the qualified potential confines of his self in the world which would have awaited there for him, on established society's terms;

decrying his reward as Talent, announced in a big-letter way, refusing a medal, choosing not to assimilate the offered extent and degree of the acknowledgement of his excellence as an ego, in protest against and in remembrance of his deprivation of that through a lifetime, since childhood, and to militantly assimilate instead his standing for the rest of his life as a self which will continue to be defined, marked even after this event with ifs and buts in the world, his "me" still stripped there for good of small-letter sacred status there, declassified as a fully fledged unit of social creativity.

It's the Work, socialpsychologic life itself as the self's produce, which is alienated in our society, not just its tangible yields about which the mature Marx was concerned; an occurrence, a subject matter which is apart, distinguishable from and outside the science treating the alienation of the economic fruits of labour only. What is happening on an increasing scale, is the alienation of the privilege of productiveness as human reality itself, in the sense in which

Salieri tried to alienate the Work and life (both on the ontic and ontologic level) of Mozart, as Pushkin depicted in his play Mozart and Salieri, with the story re-told by Peter Shaffer; as the architect Solness alienated the work of his son throughout a lifetime, putting his own signature to his son's designs, as portrayed in Ibsen's play The Master Builder. In spite of the Hegelian makings of this process of alienation, relevant first and foremost to the individual in his capacity as such, this phenomenon is attaining dimensions which touch on our progress towards a post-historic society itself, due to the systematic growth of its prevalence as a concomitant and by-product of the silicon-chip revolution. The process which is referred to here is the tendency of present society for only the ascriptionally high-ranking bureaucrats to have work, 'productivity', going with the pretence that they shine with the privilege, the apparent endowment with the ability and deservingness which only work can lend, sporting a self whose condition and hallmark is work and leaving the unemployed and the unsatisfactorily employed out in the cold to appear as humanly second-rate because of their forced unproductivity compared with them, a process which is now beginning to claim the attention and

recognition even of those who were at first inclined to view the phrase 'work ennobles' with some derision. What is happening in our society is the systematic alienation from people of the exercise of, and seemingly also the potential for, creativity (a) through the removal of opportunities for realising the selves of those whose work is not in demand, their gift pouring into nothing like Onan's seed, the way Joey Deacon's "me" would have gone had he not been able to express it, an energy, human capacity gushing down the overflow; and (b) through the Pukkas' channelling away out of commission the frustrated capacity for work of those who haven't got the opportunity to bring that to fruition, in the devisive sidetracking of social creativity in ways which are dysfunctional to the socially creative process, but functional to the *status quo* as it is, by way of the ruse of the Pukka elevating their secondrateness and uncreativity of spirit, to the status of the ideal of human quality, and feeding the resulting, phoney core of morals informed by this twisted shift in desirable gifts (and with it the sense of worth of their own selves cheated into being), by robbing the self of the Rachmones of his very self as the mediator and source of human excellence, already extensively described in former parts of this thesis.

Section 3. The Horizons and Limits of Our Authenticity as Object.

The concept of the Fall may be usefully introduced here. In our sense, the Fall is the event in which one is either relegated Profane through an accident in his life, or processed from birth as object in the above described ongoing mechanism and process of the 'specialisation' of the ascribed Pukka as subject and the effective attribution of profane status, by the same stroke, to the rest of us, either as a matter of ascription or by virtue of our professed fundamental choice as Gypsies rather than Accountants, and our concomittant graduation, by society's dicta and terms of reference, to Players as opposed to Gentlemen. All the above identified classes or rather genres of Rachmones, in juxtaposition to the Pukka: Type I, the poor and the maimed, Type II, the criminal and the mad, Type III, Type IV and so on, right down to the paradigm of us as so many walking collections of processed and processable data rather than small-letter sacred persons within the private *actio radius* of our selves, as fodder, in other words, into the electronic hardware, mastered and handled by the pundits of the bureaucratic order in our subjugation to it, are fallen, in the sense that we, the profane are the ones gestured to be objects only as our proper lot in the world as a matter, in the final analysis, of our ascription there, coupled, importantly, with the socialpsychologic assumption and bid to our consciousnesses to be Slave, so to speak. Mark Medoff, the playwright, in the plot of his successful play rendering the world of the main character Sarah, a deaf young woman and her friends, fellow-passengers as deaf in a hearing world, puts the socialpsychologic condition of those on the receiving end of being the profane in such a sense, very well indeed in his choice of title for the play: Children of a Lesser God; the action of the play depicting how Sarah and the sharers of her 'blemish', fight their object status in their socialpsychologic authenticity, by privately not denouncing their title to and the conception of themselves as children as the fully dignified god of everyone as potential selves, by refusing to be persons with diminished scopes as selves whose affairs have to be managed on their behalf, by insisting on a place under the sun equal to anybody else's. Being Fallen is being thrust from the comforting, Parmenidean paradise of the collective consciousness and from all the ascribed gleam of being ostensibly part of that as a person of standing in the world (a remunerative experience regardless whether such a standing in the world

as small-letter sacred is in every case authentically deserved or otherwise), on account of offending the reigning standards of the collective consciousness with one's blemish of whatever *genus* out of the large repertoire of ways of being profane, identified earlier - and being condemned either to meekly surrendering oneself to society's compulsory stereotype casting of one as one type of Rachmones or another, object only in any case, existing as and accepting this lean and socialpsychologically lifeless social role as the exhaustive definition of one's self in and for the sake of the smooth running of society, in the mode of one's unauthenticity as an individual; or, alternatively, if authentic, one is being forced to conduct oneself in the face of one's own Fall by carrying the cross of an awareness of and constant recourse to the schism which consists in the cognition and acknowledgement of the rift between one's position as a consciousness which continues to insist on the free being of itself as exactly that in one's capacity as an ego which is partially an "I", on the one hand, and, on the other, the blemishedness of one's actual "me" in society as now stereotyped, its experience differing from the sensation of the fuller "me" of the self as privately entertained, both as an inner, socialpsychologic matter and regarding its altered, diminished radius of outward chances in the world as those now are.

There are, in the light of this train of thought, basically two ways of handling one's fall, of being fallen - the common condition of everyone except the select minority of the humanly unauthentic Ascribed Sacred. One can respond to the bid to be object only in one's area of functioning, either as a 'doormat' or alternatively, as a 'fallen angel'. In opting for being 'doormat' out of one's above defined two-way choice of responding to society's forceful invitation to us to be object only within its body and nothing more as a self, one volunteers for and leads a life as exactly that consenting object and nothing else which is 'gestured' for us to be. In partial contrast, being 'fallen angel' in personal authenticity in the face of one's Fall involves, likewise, the acceptance of the social and socialpsychologic fact of the Fall (and doesn't go with an unrealistic denial of that either as far as our affairs in the world or as far as our psychologic attitude to ourselves is concerned). This latter mode of choice of oneself in the face of being fallen is not insensible of or oblivious to one's own

public image as a "me" cutting a figure in the world which singles one out by virtue of the insignia of one's blemish - such as worn clothes, a bent demeanour, physical imperfection perhaps, but it is an awareness of all these aspects of the consequences of the Fall in the world, without, however, surrendering one's responsiveness to the lights of the standards and promptings of human reality as a fountainhead further informing one's conduct and seen as relevant to one's future attitudes. The project of being 'fallen angel' goes with the continued insistence on conceiving one's own self as a unique accident and not something indistinguishably absorbed into the body of the generalized other as forcibly gestured to the fallen, and it entails being still engaged in the project of sticking to the practice of the relating of one's consciousness to the generalized other and our own position within that, in the critique of both, from the authentic perspective retained by the self for the purpose of its continued awareness of both these proper objects for one's consciousness, namely the generalized other and one's somewhat differentiated and personalised, socialpsychologic "me" within that context. However, both the chances for and the quality of one's continued uniqueness and distinction as a self *sui generis* over against the otherwise inert and undifferentiated texture of the generalized other, (inviting the self at all times into its individually, personally unauthentic surrender and union with that), are considerably altered after the Fall, even when the fallen self opts to resist the generalized other's enticement of it into such a personally authentic union with itself. The little protruberance, the bubble of the self always hybrid (if authentic) with the "I", which distinguished the self's being from the generalized other, is now burst. The self, once discontinuous with the generalized other in a manner in which one's relative elevation as a somewhat outstanding self in relation to it, conceiving of itself and cutting a figure to outward onlookers as a distinctive little protrusion over and above the generalized other, has now been burst open, is a pockmark on it, its formerly outstanding little "I"-inclusive hybridness, small-letter sacredness, hubris, private little eddy, sussed out, unveiled, exposed, rubberstamped as illegitimate; the socialpsychologically complete "me", the telling index of an active "I" in its personal hinterland, for which it once perceived itself, and the grace that went with that, are pushed out of its reach. It's a disconstituted self, yet it must make good in the world, though it now

hasn't quite got the means to do so. The social world, proclaimed by the social norm as the equivalent, by definition, of the 'good', is, of course, the arena of its acts, but this arena is distanced from it now, in practical terms. The self is informed that there is a shift in his experience of himself in authenticity as the familiar and hopefully loved Number One, which it used to be, on the one hand, and on the other, the continued incoming signals of that 'good', which does not now include him. He himself still chooses to carry on consulting and drawing from the standards of the ideality of the collective consciousness in his maintainance of a first-hand liaison with it, the voice of the social ideals still calling to him in keeping with the standards of the ideal, (though not actual) collective consciousness directly gained by him in his intuition of it, which are not rendered out of commission as a private matter, just because he passed the point of the 'turnstile' on our metaphoric conveyor belt where the "me"-s and "I"-s are differentially sorted, bringing the "I"-s in the way of the Pukka, and processing him, as Profane, as object only, as described at the end of the last Section. But it is forcefully gestured to him that it is no longer his place to practice such social critique which, if constructive, originates in this active process of consultation with the ideal schemata of the collective consciousness. He must also learn that what have seemed as his dearest and most appreciated virtues before the Fall, or, if he was born as already fallen, (into poverty or with a physical handicap, for instance), those virtues which would have been appropriate to him in the eye of public opinion without his fall, do not appropriately grace him any longer and, more than that, are often perceived as faults in him. Charm in him, all right in those certified as Pukka, is seen in him, particularly if a criminal fallen or the recipient of charities due to his poverty, as something to be suspected; being clever is said about him with overtones of disapproval; unexpected liveliness, unaffected spontaneity, conduct in continued confidence, is easily labelled 'hyperactivity' in the mentally ill, and continued insistence on oneself as the authentic, fully fledged self which one doesn't wish to surrender and refuses to have defined in terms of society's typecasting of it, is readily judged, in all classes and sorts of Rachmones, as a chip on his shoulder. The possibility of the rehabilitation of the Fallen following his Fall will be contemplated by the Pukka who is now ascribing him as blemished, and by the generalized

other which usually mimicks, in unauthenticity, the Pukka and his morality and makes itself in the wake of that; moreover, not only will the Pukka and the generalized other allow for the rehabilitation of the Fallen, but they will positively insist on that after a seemly lapse of time following his punishment, hospitalisation or whatever form the aftermath of the event of the Fall of the agent takes; but the rehabilitation in the aforementioned, personally unauthentic terms, as 'doormat', which is expected of the fallen, and often enforced with moral heaviness, is envisaged for the fallen by the Pukka on the terms which he, the Pukka upholds in the form of the established norm on the terms and on behalf of which he practices his role as caretaker. The Profane, whether so ascribed from the beginning of his life or as a function of the more recently encountered event of his Fall, is compulsorily gestured to make his self continuous with and indistinguishable from his role as Rachmones and nothing more, as typecast for him by the Pukka and the generalized other, exactly by the dicta of public morals which hold for him, in mending the attitudinal discontinuity on the surface of the generalized other which the event of the Fall of his self caused and will continue to cause there without the public apology on the part of the fallen agent on account of his former fall and in his attitude to that; he is gestured, in other words, to make himself continuous in his ego as object only, in keeping precisely with the dictates of the generalized other's official attitude to him, on account of whichever from of blemishedness this humanly lowly ascription may hold for him. Should such a Profane assume himself as a rehabilitated self in keeping with the way which we described as 'fallen angel' rather than 'doormat, he will not be considered as suitably rehabilitated and will be openly hated or at best, his continued charming, graceful behaviour (by Sartre's standards), construed as arrogance. If, on the other hand, the fallen agent gives in to the grand gesture of society for him to be object only after his fall, obeying established society's call summoning him to learn his new, redefined area of the being of his self, he will be at best the object of an ostentatious pity of an unauthentic kind (to be distinguished from authentic pity which we advance to a self in difficulty with whom we identify as potentially our equal) - a kind of pity which is the tool of the Pukka's further and long-standing superiority vis-a-vis the Fallen, serving as the instrument of the Pukka's self-indulgent sympathy feeding his own ego, a sublimation and

substitution of his hate towards the Fallen which resembles love, but is not truly and authentically that, for it is an unauthentic love reserved for those who have once been construed by the Pukka as Untouchable, an attitude which the Pukka hasn't got the imagination and personally generous authenticity to give up on the Fallen's actual or possibly successful and therefore, by definition, desirable human rehabilitation on humanly authentic terms, not as object only, will therefore fail to be able to accept the Fallen and truly accept the Fallen as a result of delivering both himself as someone humanly authentic and the Fallen opposite him on the same terms, as both small-letter sacred. This ostentatious pity is the Pukka's attitude to someone whom he ought to, but hasn't got it in him to love, strongly contrasts with the authentic pity born by genuine love which, unlike the Pukka's attitude to the 'rehabilitated' Fallen, is always discreet, personal and empathic, that is to say, goes with putting ourselves in the place of the other who is pitied, 'taking the role' of the other in his plight, and not merely sizing him up from the outside, so as to emotionally pigeon-hole him.

Examples for these two, alternatively operative modalities of assuming one's self after one's Fall, (doormat or fallen angel, that is), abound in literature. One such example in which these alternative possibilities are explicitly opened up to an agent and offered for his choice, in the character of the Little Monk in Brecht's The Life of Galileo. (13) A meek, consenting cog in the service of the Inquisition, the Little Monk is confronted by Galilei (standing, to Brecht's interpretation, for the new-type, commonsense, practical, politically conscious scientist - albeit in the end he compromised himself in the latter capacity - who was rightly identified by the political machinery of the feudalistic, mediocrity-upholding and enforcing Inquisition as a heretic in its face). Galilei unfolds for the Little Monk his opportunity to make the fundamental choice as a consciousness, between the part he may continue to play as 'doormat', such a project resulting in his laying waste the light of his personal authenticity, as well as his moral probity as a scientist, in the course of carrying out his spiritual practice as a priest, and, on the other hand, of choosing his spirit as a force and opportunity to enlighten, awake others to the truth about the suppression of scientific truth and also the oppression of the little individual such as himself by the régime, and claiming in

the light of that truth the rightful place under the sun both for himself as a unique and authentic consciousness and for the consciousnesses of all who are socially his kind, as well as insisting on a better quality of life for himself and for the human environment which he may influence as a human reality in the course of carrying out his calling. By his choice to assume himself as the object only which is bid by the established religion which he serves, for his assimilation in regarding himself, in the manner he in fact chooses to conduct himself, he becomes the instrument of injustice which is reigning in the world as it is. By this manner of the choice of himself, he comes to shortchange both himself and his longsuffering plebeian forebears and contemporaries of their happiness as people and their fulfilment on the actual arena of given society. The dialogue between Galilei and the Little Monk implicitly uncovers the guilt which the Little Monk perpetrates in his everyday life by preaching a creed which is satisfied with displacing into life after death the rewards and the gratification of the clamouring need of his kind to accomplish themselves as human beings both in overt and covert terms, in exchange for their sufferings and exertions in everyday life, forswearing thereby the benefits of people's status as graceful and gracious beings rightfully earned by them here on earth.

Another example of the consequences and the workings of the unauthentic choice of one's self as object only, showing graphically how the socially 'Sacred' prevailing order 'successfully' conditions the ascribed profane to adopt that role and classification as the modality of his, or rather her self, in keeping with the bidding to the Fallen to lead a life as doormat, object only, is provided (not from the repertoire of literature this time but from the realm of real-life experience) by my friend Sybil. A young widow with a history of personal inadequacy from childhood, mother of a small daughter, on behalf of whom some money is being handled by some charitable trustees (making instalments of that available to her at times of crises), her life has become a string of incidents of disaster. Moving in circles of drug addicts, her home and scanty belongings were regularly exposed to being burgled. She reported these events to the trustees among whom there was a great upheaval at such times. They visited her to comfort her, and invited her to tea at their homes, something she thoroughly enjoyed; and

she was given on such occasions sums from her money, too. She identified as the way of the betterment of her lot (for in the ordinary way she was extremely bored and unhappy), the course of becoming an ostensibly more and more compliant object true to expectations of her: she came to be the part of the Rachmones more and more totally, treating herself to the financial and social reinforcement available to her from the trustees at the times of dramatic misfortunes which befell her with increasing regularity. The Pukka involved were also psychologically greatly reinforced at such instances in their capacities as the 'good', shining in the part of caring caretakers which was their personal stake in being involved in the whole undertaking, and Sybil always treated them grandly to the experience of being the rescuers of injured innocence, or rather a powerless, subordinated psyche slighted, by wholeheartedly being the part of helpless object deserving to be given an occasional break, performing the part cast for her as doormat to a l. She considered it worth her while to shed all her belongings from time to time in return for the treat that was occasionally to be hers in the course of the string of disasters to which her life amounted, carrying her being as Rachmones to professional heights. She simply adopted being object only as the meaning of her life, her meant 'sincerity' in playing the part shining through with the convincing powers of the truth and pleasing, satisfying the Pukka. However, her money was waning and her progress in the world, which the trustees undertook on the face of it to promote, made no progress at all. They approached me for advice about how this state of affairs could be remedied. I suggested that the pattern of the 'reinforcement schedule' to which they subjected her (rewarding her for her failures, that is), was reversed, that is to say, that they should start making instalments of her money available to her and fuss over her after certain periods of incident free and good management as a reward for those, rather than regularly rewarding her in multiple ways for her occasions of crises. My suggestion was treated as heartless and cynical because of the hardnosed psychologically scientific principle at the back of it, and her conditioning in the former manner to her eternal Rachmones status carried on, completing for her the course of behaviouristic training as social object only which has been started for her from early childhood, making her, by virtue of the force of that, destined to be obedient Fallen Rachmones to the end of her life.

The authentic way, in contrast, of relating to one's object status, fallenness in terms of the collective consciousness as it is in the world - in other words, the attitude of shouldering one's brandedness there as Profane without the denunciation of the "I" as organic part and continued informant of one's future conduct as a self in the face of society's gesturing to one to make do without that, certainly does not mean that one can, unrealistically, deny that one's self as the fallen object which society has decreed that one should be, is the case in the real sense of society's positive facticity - it does not mean, in other words, that even in authenticity (that is to say, with the "I" insisted on in leading one's life) one wants to or indeed can pretend, with any hope of success and effectiveness, that one can dissociate oneself from, wash one's hands of the external definition of one in one's future conduct as the fallen object for which one has been ascribed if that be the case. One important message of Paul's anthropology as reinterpreted by Bultmann for the twentieth-century use and edification for existentialist moralistic thought, is that it is precisely in our state of our inevitable fallenness as object, and in the attitude of facing of that, that our authenticity as human reality lies. True, in Paul's sense of this message, it is our fallenness, sinfulness in the eye of God, in other words in our relation to the ideality rather than to the actuality of the collective consciousness (if we want to extend, stretch our understanding of God into Durkheimian directions) that we must reckon with our fallenness as 'object', 'body' in the world as a condition of our authenticity as human beings, but even so, Bultmann's and later MacQuarrie's attempts to bring to a common denominator a narrow individualistic understanding of our selves and condition as 'body' in Paul's sense with our profane state as members in the 'body of society' (*soma Christou*), an additional, social dimension of our axiomatic profaneness emerges compatibly with Paul's teachings, on top of Paul's declaration of our universal fallenness as a necessary by-product of the carnal, physiologic aspect of our selves. It is certainly in keeping both with Paul's ethics and with that of twentieth-century existentialists, that we must own up to, shoulder our responsibility as profane, as object in a social context too, however authentically and full of divine pretensions we may circumscribe the *actio radius* of our selves in the context of and over against society and its norms as they are; indeed, the more authentic we want to be, the more we must

acknowledge and assume the 'object' ingredient, the "me", which is part of our selves. The important issue in assuming our object status in society, inevitable for all, deciding our authenticity or unauthenticity, is the quality and modality of our assuming ourselves as object, which is up to our free choice: it's the question whether we see ourselves as *quite* object, that is to say as a self to whom being object as well as an un-denounced "I", (which we must be at all times as a condition of our personal authenticity), is a welcome completion of the authenticity, scope, dignity and power of our selves, not so much a stigma but a privilege and an opportunity to actually do something about the lot and quality of our own selves and that of others in internally and externally positively consequential ways, or, alternatively, whether we choose to see ourselves as *object only*, as *mere object*, as established society gestures us to be, opting of our own will to tackle the inevitable aspect of the being of our selves as object, on account of which we feel guilty and ashamed in our nakedness as such if so ascribed, by penitently and meekly jettisoning our individual sovereignty as a self and spiritual armoury as such which lies in the retention of the "I" in addition to being a "me", and as a result of our so doing, our latter-style, unauthentic choice of ourselves consists in regarding ourselves and acting as unquestioning, uncritical and willing matter-of-course conscripts in the prevailing social norm's ceaseless crusade in suppressing in us, the profane, the "I", in severing us profane from that "I" in ourselves, as the safest and most effective ruse by society for perpetrating its own self-preservation and continued being in the norm as it happens to be in its present states of affairs.

In the previous sentence we hinted that our attempt, project and bid to be authentic as opposed to unauthentic object out of the two possible ways of assuming ourselves as such (in our choice to be, in other words, *quite object* as opposed to being *object only*), we must own up, as a condition of our own authenticity, to our responsibility in being party, not only to our successes and failures in grappling with and resisting society's automatic and axiomatic attempts to relegate us, the profane by ascription, as *object only*, which we must resist as a condition of our own 'grace' (in Sartre's sense at least, already multiply defined in former parts of our argument), but we must also see ourselves as responsible, if we aspire to authenticity as selves, for

our participation in, through the endorsing with our attitudes, the relegation, demotion, utilisation, branding of the Other, (any other) as *object only*, whether that goes on in small ways or big ones; we become, through our passivity in the face of that occurrence, wittingly or unwittingly, party to society's practice of curbing other people's horizons and the processing of them as not whole selves, as slighted small-letter sacred, as hurt, diminished, lessened human realities, are forcibly and humiliatingly gestured to be *object only*. We all have it in us to respond to the phenomenon of mass "I"-deprivation as did Jesus, the paragon of authenticity in this sense, the critic of the social world at its individual ego-curbing coerciveness to millions, the crucified champion of the spiritually complete wholeness of the selves of all: we can share with him both the attitude and potency to be the champion of complete children-of-god status for all, even in relation to those who are ascribed profane (or rather, particularly to those) in the way we conduct ourselves towards those, and we are able to respond, like Jesus, in egalitarian empathy, to the woundedness of those authentics who are exposed to the crucifying experience of being deprived in real social terms of a full human status complete with an autonomous, "I"-inclusive ego and treated, handled accordingly; we are all equipped with the capacity of putting ourselves in the place of the spiritually and human dignity-wise maimed, severed and punished as though they were us and feel in accord with them their *pietà* in this deprivation. Our Jesus-potential in both these senses is 'continuously distributed in the population', to use the statistician's terminology. Mead claims we are able to share concepts, language signs and cope with and perpetrate the being of our social consciousness in language, by virtue of the shareability of people's responses to them: they mean the same to everyone in a sense near enough to allow them to be universally illuminated with function, being, the entire repertoire of language signs amounting to the content of the "me". But we are also able to respond, in comparable ways but in a negative sense, to respond to the shortchangedness in some as selves consisting in denial of the acknowledgement and lee-way to the "I", their deprivation in this sense of a potential and status as small-letter sacred in socially and, importantly, socialpsychologically positive terms, as socialpsychologic "me"-s, as human realities. We have the capacity to share the response to each other as divine, and consequently also as selves rendered less

than divine, as originally endowed and later cheated out of one's encodedness to respond at first hand to the paramountly ideal social and anthropologic values for all in the collective consciousness at its unadulterated by the reigning norm at its given, and in the face of the states of affairs of the corruption of that in that given norm. We are all sensitive and responsive, regarding our potentials, to our state, and of the state and fate of people like us, in having been once or twice cut down to size as object only in the course of our occasional projects aimed at drawing from the fountain of those ideal values to which the self complete with an "I" and such a self alone has recourse, we have all experienced being clamped down on for voicing our lights, acting in the name of such greater than officially ordered assumptions of our selves. We all have the potential (to paraphrase that which has just been said) to 'take the role' in the Meadean sense of the term of this frustrated Jesus-potential in us all, of the authentic hurt, cut down in the world; but this awareness and capacity needs to be tempered in everyday experience (for it is commonly to be called on and easily activated in the quite undramatic business of our ordinary social intercourse), for the protection of the sanity of the self and in courtesy to the Other to whom we could constantly or very often relate in such intense terms as a fellow-"I", otherwise the perception of ourselves and others in this manner would be psychologically untenable in the long term. Still, our potential for summoning our authenticity in this manner in principle, in socialpsychologically attenuated ways at least, is an important one in this context.

We have distinguished above between the authentic and the unauthentic ways available to us in shouldering, acknowledging, relating to our socialpsychologic object status as profane when we are so regarded as a matter of the accepted view of us. We can respond to the outside definition of us as object in the above sense (to recapitulate) either unauthentically, by accepting ourselves as that *mere object* which we are gestured to be, or alternatively, we may respond, in socialpsychologic authenticity, by summoning ourselves as inevitably but unapologetically object as selves with our additional light as an "I" as also part of our selves brought to bear protestingly on the forceful calling on us by society to make our socialpsychologic "me"-s continuous with the fibre of the generalized other with no other

socialpsychologic function retained in sustaining the mode of our being as individuals. A finer classification of our modes of being as consciousnesses in response to society's gesturing to us to be *mere objects* when profanely ascribed in some sense, may be yielded when we look at the two possible ways that obtain for us within the *authentic* modality of conduct if that is what we deviantly plunge for in the face of the bidding by convention that we should regard ourselves as object only in view of our blemish in society on one of the formerly identified scores of our being *Rachmones* or another.

There are two ways of living up to the dictates of authenticity in critique of our humanly unworthy relegation to mere object status, in instances when we consequentially retain a worthier vision of our place in the collective consciousness, (if not in the actuality of that for us), to which social ideality we remain perceptive and open. One way of tackling the ways of society and particularly its restrictions to our authenticity because of our status as fallen in terms of its norms as those prevail, is the course of overtly and directly pleading our case to the world as the personal witness in relation to as critics of the existing world which we see ourselves as when slighted in the above manner as a full ego. In this case we are openly and explicitly crusading for the emancipation of the blemished of our kind and of our own selves in particular; the only course for our authenticity in the project of the emancipation of our selves which Mead allows for. This is the course which the protagonist heroes of *Greek* tragedies have chosen (or the deaf activist colleagues of Sarah in Medoff's play, to draw on the example of a hero not from the ranks of royalty and the nobility surrounding it, but enlisting the project, in unsundered authenticity, of someone who has to constantly summon that militant project of authenticity in everyday life.) But the bleakness of this project, that of the explicit plea, fight for the vindication of one's somewhat deviant stance as an individual for inclusion in a better, future generalized other (here on earth, of course), arguing publicly for our acceptance of what we uncompromisingly are as selves, blemished in the eyes of the public or not, makes great demands and only a few follow that course. The second road to personal authenticity in relating to our object status (an inevitable reality for all of us in society in the sense just described above) - is doing the job of quietly and

privately getting by in the world, shouldering our *object only* status as ascribed, though illuminated, as a private affair, with the lights of a retained "I", without bidding for the alterations of affairs in the world, with our self as the sole audience to this feat, owning up to the schism to which this socialpsychologic undertaking amounts in relation to our lot as object only in the world as typecast, and making one's way as human reality as gracefully as one can, but within the confines of that which can realistically be done with the appreciation of our placement, positioning as selves in the world as ascribed, and ever appreciative of the fact that we must sanely earn our supper there, which is not easily granted to schismic consciousnesses. This second, secretly authentic strategy to responding to one's relegation to be *object only* with one's greater dignity as a self retained as a matter of private freedom and opinion in the face of such ascription, can merely yield socialpsychologic authenticity and not a concurrent social one as well, as can the big-letter project of the socially irate heretic openly taking on the world for its unjust cruelty to those lowly ascribed in a manner unjustifiable by the lights of human reality, as just commented on. The small-letter authenticity of the second course of action is of a different order than the big-letter Authenticity of the outspoken activists of the cause of the acceptance of the slighted egos of the various sorts of 'fallen' in the world. In counterdistinction with our earlier preoccupation with the big-letter Authenticity of Aristotelean dramatic heroes and their latter-day heirs in publicly championing the cause of the emancipation of themselves and their kind, our spotlight is now on the mundane and smooth managers of the schism as a day-to-day matter, rather than on the public arena of the martyr's or dramatic hero's transcendence of that as a socially overt act of constructive and bold 'social surrealism'. The kind of schism-managers we want to consider now are the quiet getter-byers with the schism in ordinary life, those who don't want to relinquish their being as somewhat dignified selves in ordinary ways just because a bit blemished here and there - not beautiful, not successful, not indigenous, not one of the religious mainstream, one's reputation a bit tarnished, a bit sinful too, caught once or twice *dishabille* or smiling foolishly into the candid camera which captured him in real life, having done the wrong thing; the abjectly poor who don't want to give up their minimum claim to the semblance of gracious living and don't have it in them to be wise

ascetics when removed from the means of leading such a somewhat better than ascribed life in realistic terms, such as Jingle in The Pickwick Papers, or those who have been branded blemished with a little bit of *hutspeh* still left in them, trying to go the way, advance to themselves the 'kingdom come' in which they anticipate themselves as with a bit of grace, so that they can have a little bit of that already here on earth. Our 'follow-spot' falls now on those who go down, or perhaps up (depending on the way we look at it), fighting in a small way, as persons, no less, no more, who make a bid in the secret of their privacy to be autonomous masters of their destiny in the freedom of which consists every man's divinity; on those who want to claim the fruits of their being divine sparks and try their hands at ways of being so, those who would like to shout '*als ich kann*' as did, figuratively speaking, van Eyck when he added this phrase to one of his masterpieces, but have no paintbrush enabling them to show it, who want to say 'I am sacred' though this is not strictly true regarding their manner of ascription in actuality; and who therefore 'advance the truth' a bit; on those who would like to be the crickets in Aesop's fable as a manner of their fundamental choice, as did the librettist Ramuz's hero of The Soldier's Tale which Stravinsky set to music, but their violins have been taken away. The small-letter fallen, socialpsychologically authentic pursuers of the project of being a somebody illicitly, in spite of carrying society's stamp 'damaged goods', 'seconds' as regards their real states of affairs in the world with such a label on account of some Blemish or another subliminally but effectively stuck to them, those who have not been caught at and therefore keep trying to swing a two-star motel accomodation for themselves on the road to their identity instead of the Bleak House hostelling the profane under the regime of the Caretaker, to stick to the symbolism of Pinter's play of that title. Those possibly not yet 'nailed', not yet solemnly identified as Fallen by ascription, but clandestinely able to retain some measure of personal authenticity and the dues of such a person in the world, though this is beyond their legitimate means, are, and have been by long standing, a favourite topic of folklore, mostly of an urban variety. The topic and character of Billy Liar is of this ilk, the little crook immortalised in early Soviet literature in Ilf-Petrov's Ostap Bender, the legendary Columbo, champion of a socially silent, greater excellence than that of the arrogant, ascribed Pukka villain whom his business brings him face

to face with, parading his dirty raincoat and always getting the posh crook who talks down to him to begin with, before outwitted and got by Columbo, according to the recipe to which the scenarios of the episodes are written, or Šveik, getting the better of his superior officers, set apart from them as second class by ascription and at the same time protected as a free spirit by his certificate of lunacy; those, in a word, who are authentic enough in themselves to take the hate and/or the ostentatious pity of the highly ascribed without openly protesting against those attitudes, managing, at the same time to be that secretly small-letter sacred person, as far as they are concerned, who they are to themselves.

The above examples, all taken from literature, illustrate the paradigm of schism-management in which the part of 'object' has irretrievably been ascribed to one by society's cold, externally positive standards, but the agent so ascribed (while playing his part as problemfree *object only* to outward appearances so as not to ruffle external affairs as those exist writ large), wholeheartedly rejects, in individual authenticity, his typecasting as a personal matter regarding the state of his consciousness in the socialpsychologic order of its being, (unlike Sybil who totally accepted that stereotyping in the way she led her life as *object only* as ascribed in the sincerest of bad faith). But the literary nature of the examples we just put forward for the illumination of this paradigm, would wrongly imply that this socialpsychologically authentic manner of the choice of oneself as *Rachmones* is an esoteric contrivance on the part of these symbolistic commentators on the anomaly and futility of society's oppression of human reality in the dynamism which makes that what it is, upheld, in every case, by these high-spirited pirates in society. (Columbo's reading differs in this sense from the other literary examples just given in that it is not the collective consciousness at its ideal, but society at its actual, which his personally more glittering performance as a human reality than would normally be expected of someone so poor and unassuming, goes to serve). This particular paradigm of the socialpsychologically authentic being of the self in the face of the veto to it by officialdom and stereotype convention, is a familiar occurrence in everyday life too, and I will now summon further examples to support this view. My auntie Googey emerged from the Second World War

as a widow, her husband, editor of the *Jewish Review*, having been a casualty in the holocaust. After a period of mourning, Auntie Googey started wondering how to pull herself up by her shoestrings and make a go of her life again. She came upon the idea of going around collecting subscriptions from her husband's former clientelle, notwithstanding the fact that there was no paper now to sell - because none produced. 'Let's put on our *Rachmones toilette*', she said to her daughter, formerly a journalist on the paper, and they went to 'work', calling on the houses of and collecting subscription from former readers, dressed suitably and heartrendingly for the purpose. This dramatic charade as *Rachmones* for the sake of appearances, however, prevailed strictly in hours of business only. In private and after 'work' they appeared well-dressed and were their usual selves. At first their customers were a little surprised by their approach, but later got used to it and the money was ready for the two ladies every time the subscriptions were due. Each year they went to a holiday resort where they had a good time and gave others a good time too, out of the kindness of their hearts. There they met their clientelle who were pleased to see them in good circumstances and felt they had helped their respected friend the late editor to provide for his loved ones in a style they have grown accustomed to and which he would have wanted them to have. Another example of the project of committed, small-letter personal authenticity in the face of the ways of the norm which interfered with and violated it by forcing it into the straightjacket of its conventional ways and forms, is provided by my friends Eva and Paul S., brother and sister. Following their flight to the West after the collapse of the Hungarian Uprising, they lived for a while, as we have done, as refugees in Vienna. They registered there as members of every religion, and every day collected a great number of luncheon vouchers solely available from the headquarters of such denominational institutions, not only as a means to feed themselves, but also to distribute among their fellow-refugees who had scruples about pretending to belong to a denomination in order to fill their stomachs: Robin Hoods of the principles of conscience.

Many paradigms of ordinary-life ways of schism-management may be identified, some personally authentic, some not. The most common of these is ordinary bad faith in Sartre's sense, personally unauthentic, of course, an attitude of consciousness which rids itself of the schism

yielded by a dislodgement between its intuition of its ideally rightful place in society in the light of the establishment-critical "I", and, on the other hand, its contradictory experience of itself, unduly disadvantaged in the actuality of the social world, not by manipulating affairs in the world a little to fit the greater-than-ordered claims of the authentic "I", but by jettisoning that "I" and with it its intuition of the self at its more socially deserving than actually happens to be its lot. We have already provided examples of this paradigm in our reference to Brecht's Little Monk and my friend Sybil. We have also given a few examples of the mundane variety of the paradigm of consciousness which will soon emerge below defined as the 'ideal lie', in the instances of Sveik, Ostap Bender, my auntie Googey and Paul and Eva S. (Though Auntie Googey's case doesn't fit exactly the socialpsychologic model of the 'ideal lie', not even as that pertains in its writ-small, small-letter confines, because she eventually made herself believe that her strategy in getting round the prospect of her abject poverty which would have been her lot without her rather singular ploy, was morally right. Her case is one which 'represents intermediaries between falsehood and bad faith', in Sartre's words.) (14)

The project of perpetrating the 'ideal lie' at its pure and classical, does not need to enlist a *rationale* for pretending on the 'ideal liar's' part that he is morally right and good by conventional standards whilst carrying out his projects in personal, but not social, authenticity. 'The liar intends to deceive' Sartre writes, 'and he does not seek to hide this intention from himself, nor to disguise the translucency of his consciousness; on the contrary, he has recourse to it when there is a question of deciding secondary behaviour. It explicitly exercises a regulatory control over all attitudes.' (15) The ideal liar's consciousness, Sartre explains, is one of critique, 'cynically... affirming truth within himself'; translucent, freed from the opacity of beliefs in, from the engagement, givenness of himself to the positive, factitious being of society; unobscured by any regard to an identification with that; a consciousness uncluttered by any degree of adoption, acceptance of positive states of affairs in the world - his disregard for the facticity of the world inclusive of his clearly intended dismissal of the norm which is there to punitively respond to

his kind of negative consciousness; a consciousness at the same time which coolly intends to reap the benefits of the world through his pretence of being someone with a respectable social standing there whilst knowing that he has no title to that by the dicta of the norm, with this project of double dealing quite explicit in front of himself. We have already considered forms of the project of the 'ideal lie' as that is pursued within a strictly socialpsychologic compass, as that project pertains writ small, not touching explicitly on existing sociologic dimensions, with an intentionally consequential negative, critical attitude towards that, as an important part of the project. The small-letter ways of perpetrating the 'ideal lie' was illuminated above through the examples of Bender, Šveik, Paul and Eva Š., and so on. Now we will mention Don Giovanni and his project, who, as a consciousness, in contrast with the small-time adherers to conduct in the mode of this ideal lying, is one of an explicitly and actively motivating contempt towards the world, and whose project in the spirit of the ideal lie is consequential in a meant way to society as such; whose project as the ideal lie takes on dimensions in the way both of its underlying attitude and in the way of its effect on society which are writ large in comparison with the projects of the abovementioned mere amateur muddlers, illicit swingers for themselves of the opportunities in life. Don Giovanni's project is a heretical denial of the life - even of the elevated death, equated, in the symbolism of the dramatic plot, to the immutable norm as signified in the stone statue on the grave, of the Commander who epitomizes, even through his memory, the being of society itself. Don Giovanni's project has a great deal in common with what's known as Derrida's game, as reviewed by Descombes in his book Modern French Philosophy. Oblivious, by choice, as is Don Giovanni, to the collective consciousness at its ideal, which informs the personal standards of the social innovator (in contrast with Don Giovanni and Derrida's player) in his project of taking to task society as it is at its corrupt given in the name of personal authenticity, Derrida's game-playing agent, as Descombes lucidly summarises his type of consciousness, fights 'a very close contest against a formidable Master' (we may view this Master as the omniscient and ever-relentless enforcer of the social norm, the ideality and actuality of which is all rolled into one for Derrida, as it is for Sartre - the Master an artificial construct in Derrida who has no place for a God as society's

positivity with which some of Durkheim's followers equate the unbridled human reality-alien collective consciousness at its pure and uncorrupted - hence the need for postulating such a Master), which Master, Descombes goes on to explain, 'we might think certain to win the game with rules he himself has fixed. Derrida opts to play a double game (in the sense as a 'double agent' serves two sides), feigning obedience to the tyrannical system of rules while simultaneously laying traps for it in the forms of problems which it is at a loss to settle.' (16) These problems, to our reading, are projects of fixing and contriving lee-way for and opportunity to shine as an individual consciousness unfettered by the Master's rules, for the sake of doing so; without, however, violating to overt appearances the Master's rules for keeping the maverick individual consciousness taking him on in the way of sport in this manner. For the sake of the seeming perfection of the agent's outward conduct, he makes himself an expert of the rules of the Master, assimilating and playing flawlessly the game of outward society's perpetration according to the dictates of the Master's rules, 'committing knowingly the fault' of professing, the way empiricists do, the hegemony of social facticity as the proper and sole informant and referent for our conduct, (careful not to commit himself to 'positivist naiveté' the while). 'But this will have to be', Descombes writes, 'irreproachably done, or else the Master will win the game against a bad player, whereas Derrida means to be a double player - his intentions bad, but his moves impeccable'; (17) in the same way as the intention to lusciously partake in the tangible fruits of the positivity of the world available to the adherer to the mundane norm, forms part of Don Giovanni's project as a consciousness which, in truth, challenges, in limitless self-seeking, society's rules as such as an end in itself.

We can look at Don Giovanni's project, analytically as a paradigm of schism-riddance and management, of which we wish to outline here a socialpsychologic typology. Looked at through such an aperture, we may pinpoint Don Giovanni's project as the opposite of that of bad faith. He deals with the schism - that yielded by man's simultaneous and indissmissible presence in his consciousness of both modes of being - social and socialpsychological, collective and private - not by jettisoning the private aspect, claims and spheres of his consciousness without a trace, as do those who are in bad faith, but by ridding his

spheres of loyalty of, serving his marching orders without any scruples to, his allegiance to the social aspect of his consciousness; firing from that everything towards which he may have interpersonal duties in his capacity as an individual, riding on, being carried by his set of interests, lights as a self and that alone, with complete and self-deception-free identification with it, scoring in the meantime on the empirical level of the world. The project of reaping all available empirical gains in life is also the aim of the man in bad faith, but in going about this aim he pretends that he is morally deserving of those by dedicating his being one hundred per cent and uncritically to the norm, with his characteristic abstention from ever bringing his lights as a person to bear on the way in which he goes through life giving his conduct the air of selflessness and the justification in front of himself of his right to the spoils that he can secure for himself in the world. The man in bad faith cultivates a lifelong marriage between his own self-interest and things, ideologies, states of affairs in the reigning *regime* as they are, with the distinction between the discrete nature of the two participants in this marriage within his consciousness, self-seeking (rather than self-realisation in his case) on the one hand and social good on the other hand fudged, obscured, made 'metastable' even in front of himself, until he manages to put an 'equals' sign as far as he is concerned in his own conscience between these two. The project of bad faith thus never results in social creativity, does not yield the worldly transcendence of the norm by itself nudged to do so by the actively deployed, less anomalous lights prompted by axiomatic insights of individual, and (in stronger cases of reform, small ones or big), by universally pertaining socialpsychologic standards of human good, good by the first principles of human reality meaningful and pertinent to all, even in case the ruling norm in the world is blatantly corrupt and unjustifiable by truly obtaining and not fictitious human as well as ideally collective standards.

But Don Giovanni's project, which is on our dissecting table at the moment, differs not only from the totally unauthentic project of bad faith, which is based on dishonest conduct both regarding the socialpsychologically private and the social makings of consciousness (in relation to which the Don Giovanni project it is partially authentic, in the respect of its boldly meant and undisguised

socialpsychologic deployment at least, whose aim is always explicit and clear), but it also differs from the project of the social pioneer who aims, as does Don Giovanni, to affect affairs in the world to suit his own lights as an individual who is, authentically, both an "I" and an effective object in the world as a self, but in whose case, unlike in that of Don Giovanni, conduct as an individual and the championing of his own lights as human reality in the first person singular takes its source from, is informed by, and is organically and fatefully tied up with the lights of the collective consciousness and our other primary social schemata at their ideal, to which all of us are axiomatically and naturally sensible as consciousnesses, as shown both by Durkheim's work in a the context of society and by Lacan, for instance, in the context of the family, to name but two social scientists whose *oeuvres* are relevant to our current train of thought. Don Giovanni's project, then, is not authentic in a both socialpsychologically and socially expansive and total way, as are the horizons of the the consciousness of the social pioneer, who has recourse to the lights of the ideality of the social schemata with the presence to which in effortless ways we are born, and who takes on the current norm at significant times as the enemy to both individual and social authenticity, with a view to righting and transcending it in both individually and, in the final analysis, socially positive ways, in the terms of external actuality, as do the Aristotelean ^{dramaturgical} heroes, for instance. Sartre does not entertain at any point the difference, though it is quite meaningful, between the project of the 'ideal liar', our Don Giovanni, and that of the real-life Aristotelean-type heroes of past and present days, for which latter-type paradigm of consciousness there is no room in his thought-system, neglecting thereby in his typology of socialpsychological schism-management and transcendence, the all-round authentic innovator whose humanly authentic hubris (well-placed arrogance, hailed by Sartre as the indissmissible accessory to authenticity) is publicly voiced against the norm of established society in the name (importantly) of the dicta of the collective consciousness as his operative presence to the social *ought* as distinct from the social *is*, which illuminates his own sensibility to the authentic individual and social truth, in the coincidence of the two, and with an indelible tie between the two in his consciousness. Sartre leaves unexplored the mode of the consciousness of the agent's possible presence to the ideal of society as susceptible to

his intuition, in negative response to the given norm in the world of our Socrates, Prometheus, Jesus, of Sarah and her fellow-freedom-fighters on behalf of the deaf, whose project is, in big ways or small, the transcendence of society by itself at the same stroke as it is that of the transcendence of the individual over given society clamouring to the authentic for alteration in totally authentic ways, both socially and individually speaking. The social pioneer wants to found a better society by way of the emancipation of his deviant, because humanly more complete and inclusive, lights, with an amended generalized other tolerant of those lights optimistically enlisted and envisaged, whilst Don Giovanni's project, similarly authentic, as far as its, individuality-assumption is concerned, is entirely self-seeking and negative in its attitude to the social world, present or future, actual or ideal. Sartre's failure to distinguish between these two qualities of the individual's transcendence towards individually freer and truer horizons in opposition to society at its given, one informed and the other uninformed by the ideality of the collective consciousness, is the result of the circumstance that he doesn't systematically discriminate between the collective consciousness - God as society to him '1e' on the one hand, and the corrupted form of that, its actuality as the established norm which in its practices may be unacceptable both to one's personal sense of authenticity and to a superior ideal of social reality in one fell swoop, on the other hand; and this is seen as a shortcoming in Sartre, an insufficiency which prevents him from identifying, as we do, the make-up of the consciousness of the social pioneer whose self-assertive lights take their source from his committed intuition of the collective consciousness at its ideal, as a separate paradigm from that of the Don Giovannis, as a separate paradigm in the thesaurus of the schism-managing and schism-transcending tactics of consciousness.

Finally, in listing ways and types of schism-management, two further paradigms of that may be still recognised. One of these is big-letter Bad Faith - bad faith in the heavy Christian sense as that was known in New Testament times and later as a target to Luther's Reformation, which can be extended so as to be identifiable in more modern and other than religious contexts, as a phenomenon and tactics for psychologically resolving 'the schism' between our appreciation of our self in our own

experience, as that ideally could be on the one hand and as it is in its present psychologically appreciable givenness, that schism with which we are all lumbered in our moments, or prolonged spans of authenticity. This paradigm of Bad Faith, in contrast with its small-letter variety and counterpart, has macrosociologically strongly effective consequences, as it refers to the resolution of the schism, that is to say, the sense of personal dislodgement between the 'goodness' or otherwise of the "me" as it has been ascribed in the actuality of the world, and, on the other side, as introspectively experienced as a personal matter, not in the Rachmones, to whom we so far turned our attention in examining ways of schism-management, but in the Pukka who is in a position to manipulate the outward social world as one locus for the fulfilment of the "I" in his self in a "me", when that doesn't tally with his deserts judged by himself as socialpsychologic object, which he is, whether he likes it or not, at the innerly informed plane of the being of the self. The ploy of the Big-letter Pukka who finds himself in the predicament of his prestigiously ascribed "me" in the world not being supported and endorsed by a personally worthy self as expressed in his sense of the socialpsychologic "me", which is not to his personal satisfaction in his moments of authenticity, resembles the small-letter bad faith of the little man, in that it is not his personal moral standards of his conduct and consciousness which he will summon, engage and constantly better in socialpsychologically real ways for greater authenticity and deservingness as a person, but he will pretend that his personal moral lights are up to scratch because they sustain, coincide with, endorse the social norm as it is which to him equals 'the good', which goes with denying that the world and the social standards in that as those prevail, need, call for reform and alterations in small ways or big, by the individual's authentic lights, and accepts and adopts the outward norm as it is, as the touchstone and justification of his place as a deserving individual under its sun. But there is greater room and opportunity for the Pukka in bad faith than there is for the small man in small-letter bad faith to falsify the world and justify his deservingness in the outward evidence of that as the outsize, socially arrogant "I" of his self (one which he gained by ascription rather than on account of his outstanding psychologic endowment and engagement and which is therefore personally unauthentic), which "I" he needn't denounce by external necessity, as must the powerless little man, to be

able to say that the world and his place in it as a deserving and worthy ego effectively match, in a morally seemly manner. The man in small-letter bad faith gets rid of the "I" because it gets in the way of his successfully transcending his schism in the world which he hasn't the power to alter. The "I" of the man in big-letter Bad Faith is morally wanting in the face of anomalous affairs in the world on account of his pledge, as a matter of his fundamental choice, not to concern himself with righting those affairs in a morally really satisfactory way, which is the pledge of the little man in bad faith too. But the "I" of the man in big-letter Bad Faith, even though unauthentic in socialpsychologic terms, is not wanting in dignity and elevation in outward, socially ascribed ways, as does the self of the little man in bad faith, and our Pukka will therefore insist on retaining and justifying his highly ascribed "I"-status by influencing the facticity of the world, not in a socially progressive way of course as does the social innovator, but in a reactionary one, one that causes the corroboration of his "I" by the standards of the world as it is, so that his conduct may continually appear as socialpsychologically, morally seemly as justified in the outward signs of his adherence to the reigning norm, suitably stage-managed by him, which will underscore to appearances that his oversize self sporting an "I" which is a mammoth one in its unauthenticity, is morally good, better than the "I"-inclusive self of those who really are excellent as human realities but who are more lowly ascribed. We have extensively reviewed the tactics to which this project has recourse, chiefly in Section 2 of Chapter 2 and in the previous section, and we provided several examples throughout Chapters 2 and 3 to illuminate the nature of this project, some of which we will now recall. This ploy is the sapping, monopolising, by design and as a systematic state of affairs, the very being of selves as such, the process manifesting itself in the waning of the ontologic life, sometimes coupled with that on the ontic one, of the gifted, the productive: it's the robbing the life of the Gypsy by the Accountant; what we are talking about now is the appropriation of the goodness, excellence of the original in the face of the already established and therefore highly ascribed, in any area of the establishment, as happened in the well-known example of Mozart and Salieri, as was the case with the novice whom a senior nun bade to fail an examination, as was depicted in the plot of Ibsen's Wild Duck where lives are claimed so that the meaning of the life of the

parasitic head of the family who is past it in terms of output, may be sustained; the project and practice also of Solness in Ibsen's play The Master Builder who put his name to his son-in-law's architectural designs throughout a great part of his working lifetime, or, at a macrosociologic level, the publicity campaign conducted in Bad Faith, cynically employing the tools of social science, chiefly behaviouristic psychology, in an endeavour to attach goodness and the conditions of goodness, the sheen of human excellence, by systematic associative pairing of the much publicised, outward display of such excellence by the suitably ascribed, and away from those afflicted in some sense, whose exertions produced the conditions of the show of such excellence, goodness by the Pukka. The project of big-letter Bad Faith differs from the formerly listed paradigms of schism-management, including small-letter bad faith, not only in the depth of badness in which the individual's commitment to exert itself, in whatever cause, public or private, is meaningfully twisted, extorted, misused and channelled away from the human reality-wise and social ideality-wise fertile, in the Pukka ploy of schism-reduction in the world inside and outside the consciousnesses of agents, but also supremely bad in that the project currently under our microscope is conceivably, indeed often, over and above being a project serving individuals, greedy for an excellent self, is also perpetrated as an active function of and on the scale of organised society.

Finally, in enlisting, identifying paradigms of schism-management, we should account for a special case of the possible matches and mismatches between the capacity and deployment of the "me" as social 'carrier' by choice in Althusser's sense, and the "me"'s alternative capacity to be a personally becoming psychologic index of an authentic 'my world', of the socialpsychologically active self as such - the constellation of these two simultaneous capacities of the socially and/or socialpsychologically engaged "me" affording to consciousness, at all times, implicitly at least, the schism: the concurrence and non-identity, in other words, between these two autonomous radia and operations of consciousness (the socially and socialpsychologically summoned aspects of the "me", that is), in cases where that consciousness authentically assumes itself as both socialpsychologically and socially active. This 'schizophrenic' awareness of one's "me" as

potentially social as well as potentially socialpsychologic, is occasionally acute and explicit and directly, readily recognisable in experience, in moments of significant choice, without philosophic artificiality or sophistication, though at other times this concurrence in consciousness of the social and socialpsychologic capacities of the "me" may be unactivated in their simultaneity and dormant, but even so yielding to discrimination between these two aspects of and calls on the "me" in and by consciousness, prone to recognition as distinguishable in introspection. This final paradigm of the relative positions between these two terms, between these two modalities of the "me" it could be said, is their *coincidence* in significant moments as well as in the tacit concurrency of the two in the course of leading one's ordinary life; it is the experience of these two modalities of the "me" in consciousness propping up each other. It is important to see that in this position, that of their coincidence, these two modes of being for the "me" in consciousness do not collapse into one another with one or the other disappearing without a trace, but these two states of the being of the "me" in consciousness remain intact in their sovereignty and operate as specially, markedly, mutually supportive, enhancing, reinforcing of each other, whether in one dramatic moment of the paramount significance of both in a situation calling for the consequential witness of these or in the quiet perpetuity of the sustained existence in consciousness of the two. The case in which society in the world is underscored by the socialpsychologically experienced and constituted, personally authentic lights of the individual, when the summoning of the lights of the self engaged in the service of and as the gift of the individual self to the system and cause of an existing norm or a norm in the making, recognised and chosen as worthy in its own authenticity for the support of the self as such. The gift of the self as such to the society thus chosen, shines on such occasions with a social as well as socialpsychologic significance, as does a signature on a petition. This paradigm, that of the *coincidence* between the shouldered socially as well as socialpsychologically chosen and summoned "me" is called 'elective assumption' by Sartre. (The notion received detailed treatment in the Introduction here). Sartrean elective assumption, this paradigm of the weighty coincidence by personally and socially consequential choice of a psychologically authentic "me" and a socially authentic one too, the resolution in their coincidence of the

distinctness between the agent's significantly summoned up self in the name of its personally held authentic standards on the one hand and the choice of a society which is recognised as meeting the ideals of human authenticity for all on the other hand, must not be confused with the coincidence in consciousness between the personal "me" and the existing norm, which is effected, in bad faith, by the jettisoning of one's discriminatory faculties both as a self and as a socially uncritical 'carrier' of, citizen in, the reigning society regardless of its anomalous moral quality and attributes. It would be preposterous to equate Lord Byron's project of joining one of the Greek wars of independence in an outstanding act of elective assumption, with the bad faith of the mercenary for whom neither the horizons of an authentic self nor the need for a society worth fighting for by the standards of the collective consciousness in its ideality which authentically informs the social situation supported, figures as relevant when he undertakes to become a soldier. There is a consequential difference between the exalted coincidence of the two levels at which the "me" figures in consciousness - the index of human reality and the significant choice of a good society, that is, which is the case in elective assumption - the coincidence, in other words, of the personal "me" as a potential socialpsychologic commentator, positively or negatively, on affairs in the world and the "me" which is socially deployed as 'carrier' in external social actuality, and, in sharp counterdistinction, the project of collapsing both these two frames of reference for the being of the "me" into a nought, as it is in bad faith; and these two paradigms of the coincidence between the socialpsychologic aspect of the "me" and its society-supporting role and deployment, are usefully distinguished from one another, and postulated as separate, nay, in certain key ways opposite methods of schism-management.

In summarising our understanding of the Fall, we must pay more attention than we have done so far to the big-letter variety of that concept, focussing in on the type of Falleness which, as distinct from small-letter falleness, has been publicly caught, identified, and introduced onto public records (though in our present, post-historic days which Descombes claims we are living, the personalities and biographies even of the publicly passive, everyday profane are the objects of data-storing and therefore amenable to vetting, judgement and

classification by officials without their ever knowing of it). Even so, for us to be big-letter Profane, big-letter Fallen, it is necessary that (unlike the small-letter, publicly inconspicuous fallen), our trespasses and spiritual insubordinations in the face of the Pukka norm, our acts of retaining, in small ways or big, the schism in our consciousness as individuals in our way of relating to what is preordained for us as profane and therefore properly *mere objects*, be made public in the eyes of the other profane too, unfurled to the generalized other, publicly brought to daylight, either by our schisms detected (thought-crimes or actual crimes), or by our publicly volunteering the private schism of our consciousness, at a variance with the norm of the generalized other (in 'coming out' as the type of profane we are on account of one or the other of the above identified multiplicity of possible grounds - politics, religion, etc, and the norm craved by us at a variance with the generalized other as that is in the present). When the Fall is public in this way, it graduates in a once-for-all manner to a social fact; a hard-and fast one as such in the Durkheimian sense, from the point of view both of society and as the the socialpsychologic reality defining the personality, the "me" of a self, which in the Fallen is constituted as a *mere object* only, one deprived of an "I" and all that being with an "I" entails in a self, in the eye of the ultimate Other: the generalized other. At this moment we are gestured, as already touched on, to be *object only*, as a social imperative, in the face of which definition of our selves, our protestation of our small-letter sacred personal self as we used to see it and maybe still do, doesn't wash in the least. There is no return to and no room in the ascribed compass of excellence, big-letter sacredness and the proper spheres in society for the Fallen, something which applies in such absoluteness particularly to the Type II Blemished, and it graces the self, the sanity and sense of realism in one who is thus afflicted, to accept this fact; it is on condition that he acknowledges and accepts himself as Profane as a matter of fact that he is socialpsychologically authentic, and he must come to terms with that in the duty to further manage himself in the world, even if he does so in active personal authenticity (which possibility, although not approved by society, does not altogether drop out of his repertoire of conduct as an individual matter, but which project as a person now incorporates the realistic recognition of his fallenness to both the public and private definitions

of the "me".) As far as the public definition of his self, demoted to *object only* is concerned, (and he must make a note of this classification of himself if he is to apply his conduct relevantly to the future in the context of which he may remain personally authentic in an Aristotelean sort of freedom), he and the issue on account of which his Fall occurred, cut a stereotype to public consciousness as *object only*, experiencible to himself and to others as a passport, or better still, prison-photograph-like fascimile of the human reality for which he knew, or knows himself, condemned by the norm and by the generalized other to be typecast for good as Profane, as was the character of Jean Valjean in Les Misérables who could only lead a life as an intensely good public figure at the cost of successfully hiding his past. When discovered as Blemished, one's Fall is total and not piecemeal; we tend to be either Sacred or Profane in society, with no real middle-course in-between. Our being in society as either Fallen or the One of Us of the Pukka, rests on a sensitive and delicate balance, a razor's edge. Two literary works exploiting the theme of what a fickle thing small-letter, or even big-letter Sacredness really is in the face of the generalized other, and how one's blemish publicly espied thrusts a person from among the Good and, conversely, how the disappearance of the Blemish establishes him in the bosom of the public as Sacred, are O'Neill's play The Iceman Cometh and Britten's opera Albert Herring, whose hero metamorphoses at a stroke from a saint into quite a lad.

It is important to see, then, that the Fall of the agent, if not a successful fugitive from his past, remains the case in this big-letter manner in society; as a social fact it becomes very real in an externally objective way, as well as an internally objective one (subjective to anyone else apart from Sartre). Even in case the big-letter Fallen will be emancipated with his lot changed in an altered, adjusted world, the Blemish which is the object and the form of the Fall, even if eventually transcended in response to crusading in public for its acceptance, will continue to figure exactly as that deviance in the face of the former generalized other which was made good in the new one; it is precisely that on account of which the once publicly fallen agent superseded himself in society.

However, it should be appreciated that the wound both in the generalized other, offended by the Fallen self's deviant consciousness, and particularly as that wound obtains, socialpsychologically, within the discovered deviant's acutely schismic self, its "me" ascribed as a Pariah but still experienced as totally humanly aspiring self, in the name of oneself and of all one's kind as similarly Fallen (the Jesus-potential in a small way of the particular Fallen 'in hand' and of all those whose selves are similarly dislodged as a stereotypically, less than fully humanly ascribed Profane but a privately surviving, fully fledged self), is, in a sense, his strength, as well as his Achilles' heel, his vulnerability; his standing as a person, if authentic, amounts now to a statement, a rude presence of his Blemish in the community. Hurt by society, demoted from small-letter sacred status, he, and that on account of which he is Fallen, amounts to an issue, his issue, in the world - and as an ambassador there of his kind, he has a certain power. The possibility of the existentialism of his consciousness (implicit in most cases), his Aristotelean feat (if authentic, of course), of being free in an inner sense in the face of his Blemish, locked out on account of it from social paradise, but still an aspiring total consciousness outside that, becomes a calling in life; he is, at the point of his Fall, (as we already observed), free to choose whether his insistence on himself as a continued human reality rather than his stereotype, is or is not surrendered as gestured; whether to donate himself as the mere object which he has now been made, to mend with his demoted, purely object being the gap which his deviant, critical magnifying glass of his perspective directed at and focussing on the generalized other, burnt in the fibre of actual society, in the fibre of the generalized other, or, alternatively, to Look Back in Anger and see, call on and address himself to the anthropologically universal and personally compulsory object standing of those who have so relegated him, to identify those as objects too in their capacity as selves, a mode of their being which they can try to hide, but cannot successfully wave aside in a very real, socialpsychologically obtaining sense.

The concept of Looking Back in Anger - having been Looked at first by society at the moment of one's being rendered, decreed, ascribed Object coincidentally with one's big-letter Fall, may be grasped, apprehended as the event of the Sartrian Look, writ large. Being

arrested, maybe in actual terms too but certainly in the sense in which the Sartrean Look arrests the self in a socialpsychologically debilitating and real way, the moving, animated realisation of the screenplay, so to speak, of the process of conducting one's life, stopped, frozen at the 'cinematographic frame' of one's big-letter Fall in society, which defines one's self from that moment onwards as big-letter Profane, forever, by public deed, being caught, identified red-handed, either as a result of being detected or by way of one's volunteering oneself as one of the Fallen, constitutes one as big-letter Object, not merely to the Other, as it is the case with the Sartrean Look, but Object, Slave, in the eyes of the generalized other; human reality photographed, captured, showed up to eternity as illicit, less-than-sacred in external ways, by the standards of that. The individual has the power to Look Back in a sense, to 'arrest' by his own 'look' the ascribed Pukka, and show him up in the light of human reality, as the executioner of that in an ontologic though not in most cases in an ontic sense. An example, in ordinary life, of my having Looked Back on the High and Mighty, in response to their having cast the snare of their arresting Look as invisible subject upon me, comes readily to my mind. Whilst an undergraduate, I was once in crucial need of a relatively small private grant. The address of a grant-giving organisation was given to me, to which I applied in an understated letter, being at pains whilst writing it to make my request as brief and dignified as possible. Unbeknown to me, the Trustees of the charity to which I turned, were people known to me personally, who, I knew, were of the opinion that wanting a degree involved an arrogant bid on my part in relation to the lowly niche in which they saw me on the scale of the ranking of the Rachmones and the Pukka in this world. I received a reply to my letter: it requested a second, long and detailed letter from me, explaining the grounds on which I needed the grant in great detail, supporting my request with as many aspects and justifications of my qualifying for a private grant as I could muster up; in a word, they asked me for a begging letter, one that made me an Object in their eyes on account of as many aspects of the hardness of my situation, as many personal reasons qualifying me for help, as I could think of. I wrote such a letter and was made a grant. Years later the volume called Directory of Grant-Making Trusts appeared: a list of charities in which all such organisations, trusts, were obliged to publicise their existence,

assets, policies, directorial personnel. On leafing it through, I stumbled on the charity to which I have formerly turned, and was able to put a face to the people who led me such a dance, who humiliated me, watched me 'through the keyhole' (to turn to the Sartrean description of how the 'Look' operates), unseen by me, as I was undressing, so to speak, baring myself to the limits of what was humanly decent, and even beyond that point, to their Look, as Rachmones, as Object. But the moment that I was able to 'see' them too, their anonymity blown by the inclusion of their Trust in the publication in question, their own, undignified pose of being bent over in front of the 'door', peeping, burgling me 'through the keyhole' of my being to some extent a subject, also became revealed. They stripped me naked of my dignity as a self of a certain human standing, but I, too, Looked: - Looked Back in Anger. I judged them for the colour of their sport, and was retrospectively glad of the money they gave me, detaching them, and my gratitude, from it as an emotional issue, and freed myself as a human reality of a certain, rather than a zero, gradation as such, as they would have made me, and would have succeeded in making me, had I not exercised (once I knew who they were and what they had been about) the function of my own "I", passing its own judgement, as far as I was concerned, of the situation and the definition of myself as a self. The project of the anorexic child (according to one medical reading of the internal, psychologic makings at the back of that), is another example of the effectiveness of the socialisation-wise, ascriptionally lower and humanly slighted party's power to make his or her statement, attitude as a fundamental choice in the face of the institutionally stronger and tradition-wise more highly sanctioned human surroundings, his or her elders and 'betters' in the family who are in a position of strength there by the dicta of the external, reigning norm, though his or her choice of attitude vis-a-vis those differs somewhat from the case of my choice of myself and my stance vis-a-vis the donors of my small grant, in the respect that my ensuing moral freedom and personal independence of the agents abusing their position as Pukka in relation to me as Object was consequential within the confines of 'my world' only, whereas the anorexic child's protest against his or her lack of happiness as a self in the family is outwardly, interpersonally effective too. Through aiming to denounce his or her life, the anorexic child's project is a weapon affecting those who fail to make him or her happy and adjusted in

that it deprives his or her parents too of her life, and at the same stroke of *their* life as well in a sense, in so far that the child and his or her love are a significant part of their being, in the sense that his or her life, the representation, product and biologic as well as social continuity in the child which his or her being brings to them, will be foiled as a function of the child's withdrawal of his or her being from them. All individual cases of martyrdom, similarly, are endowed with social as well as socialpsychologic meaning and effectiveness in this way. Cases of martyrdom are innerly and outwardly effective and socially constructive on the long term in that the dissenting being, and the withdrawal or threat of withdrawal of the agent's being in a total way, amount to a witness to the insult by and failure of society to grant dignity and leeway to the full human reality to the ambassador of one or another group of humanity clamouring for the realisation of the dignity of their kind by the ideal lights of a better collective consciousness of which the martyr is a member and representative (maybe the sole member and herald at the time of his martyrdom), and a potent and socially as well as socialpsychologically consequential protest against the not sufficiently tolerant actual norm in the world; with the wound which the protesting, schismic self is in the body of society as well as his own individual consciousness, and his insistence of that both in the social and in his socialpsychologic spheres is a condition of society's transcendence of itself in the respect of the martyr's cause.

The modern-day heretic may occasionally find himself on a crossroads presented to him by his need to respond in an overtly and publicly weighty way, (whether he wants his project to figure in such a publicly big-letter way or not), to society's lowly ascription of him and of his retrospectively justified cause and motivation which moved him to act in the first place as the critic and deconstructor, enemy of the established norm as that subsists, in his pursuit of his project which originally resulted in his Fall in a prologued way. Nowadays the heretic and the issue which his project vitally touches upon, is no longer punishable, even in extreme cases of the socially temporarily destructiveness of his conduct, by ontic death; he bodily survives his ontologic 'execution' to which his Fall amounts, affecting him as a person on the social and socialpsychologic levels of his being in the

public eye, and therefore it may conceivably be the case that his vindication as the martyrdom, comes to him in his lifetime, rather than after his death, as was often the case with the current norm-nihilative pioneers and champions of human reality in the face of the quality of the reigning order coercive to the authenticity of the consciousness of individuals and the dictates of the standards of their being and witness as such. This moment in the martyr's life may come in a small, merely socialpsychologically consequential ways, though it may of course come in a big way as well, in case the pioneer's original issue has touched upon the mode of the being of society itself. Such instances may come when the 'heretic's' schism is made good as a valid, indeed forwardlooking way to see the world, or when he simply shows and proves himself as a worthy, autonomous, dignified self in the face of his former, institutional ascription as blemished, when the Pukka's feeling of pity (the vehicle of disguised hate and sham love in reality, his coping mechanism while retaining his image of 'goodness' vis-a-vis the ascribed Rachmones), clearly transpires as inappropriate as a response to him, as something which obviously is no longer in place. It is in such moments of choice in which the vindicated heretic is called upon to respond in his capacity as an enhancedly socialpsychologically or even socially elevated person in relation to a society or merely a community which is embarrassed by its former symbolic but nevertheless effective excommunication of him, in a small way or big, from the generalized other, following the recognition on a general scale that this body of opinion has shed from its *corpus* a person as outstanding as he is shown to be in the moment of the rehabilitation of his cause and his conduct, and that this is the person who has been branded, decreed, made as less than small-letter sacred, humiliated as a self. The former 'heretic', in such moments, finds, however discreetly and anonymously he wishes to apply and figure as a self, that he has the power, which will come into operation whether he likes it or not, to 'arrest' the Pukka who so treated him, and that as the by-product, however unintended, of his rehabilitation as a self and as the kind of the Blemished for whom his project spoke too, it is his former executioners' turn to be Looked At, to be made as less than small-letter sacred in the public eye, and that it is to a great extent at the vindicated heretic's discretion, whether he likes it or not, to allow the psychologically cap-in-hand Pukka (which he now is as a result of his espied failure in human terms),

continued future as big-letter Sacred, or alternatively dish out to him a dollop of ontologic oblivion in return for his former humanly unbecoming, primitive, outwardly arrogant but inwardly slavish trigger happiness in Arresting, branding him in the first place, in an act of the Pukka's effective deconstruction, consequential disconstitution both in his human and official capacity. The weighty choice whether or not to put his repaired self (a renewed authority as human reality) at the Pukka's disposal so as to even out with it the discontinuity caused by his withholding his self and his blessing from the Pukka now discovered as the offending agency, from this ascribed representative of the reigning norm (and consequently from the reigning norm itself), is really his. Having performed the duty, by the dictates of human reality, of having brought off his project, and having victoriously survived his Fall in an ontologic sense too in addition to his ontic survival of that, a double-edged situation arises, in which his forgiveness will be sought by society, though appearances will be typically manipulated so that it should seem that the act of the forgiveness for which the Pukka clamours as a human being aspiring to greater authenticity as such than that of which he himself has shown himself to be when he branded the fallen Rachmones, as well as in social terms (for he needs to be delivered of his hate, a sentiment psychologically taxing, which he feels in the face of the former Blemished, as well as being delivered of his shame as a loser). The rehabilitation of the victorious authentic will be typically stage-managed so that it should seem that he needs forgiveness for formerly ruffled things in the fibre of society. Such a pretence may attach to the simplest and most everyday instances of the morally victorious and rehabilitated agent formerly ousted from the paradise of the blameless champions of the generalized other; I once knew a young man in Hungary whose parents have disinherited him and driven him out of his home when he decided to go on, after the successful completion of his secondary schooling, into higher education, rather than find a job or a paid apprenticeship so as to be able to contribute to the family income straightaway. Having eventually obtained a decent degree, the family sent him word: as long as he was able to fit into the family pattern (i.e. was willing to make financial contributions to the household on the father's terms), he was welcome back to the family and 'all was to be forgiven'. In such and similar instances, the vindicated Blemished must

make up his mind whether the Pukka's reciprocal rehabilitation by him is really in his own interest bearing in mind his revised situation, presenting him with the world as his oyster if he conducts himself wisely and jealously of his newly regained freedom, and he must also weigh up the effects of any forgiveness extended to the Pukka upon society as that is and, importantly, as it could be or ought to be, not losing sight of the fact that in reality it is really the Pukka whose being is in moral jeopardy as a result of the rehabilitation of the formerly Blemished, as the proclaimed paragon, by the rules of ascription, of human excellence and also as the effective caretaker of the society in the idiom of the external being and power of that, whose project and existence as the promoter of both these functions, society's actual as well as moral superiority, which needs to be saved by being underscored by the once Fallen individual's O.K. as a man as well as the champion of his cause. To illuminate an instance of such an occurrence, in a more macrosocialologically constituted and effective context than the example of the young self-made graduate just given above, a moment of Charles Chaplin's life will be called upon here. Banned, on account of his political stance, from the States, his adopted home, he went on, in exile, in isolation and lonely defiance, to engage his consciousness, through his work, with its convictions, human lights unaltered, irrespective of his Fall. Deprived, in the MacCarthian purge, publicly, of his small-letter sacredness, officially endorsed elevation as a person as well as the representative of his views, and demoted to Offending Object as a public matter, he chose the modality of his consciousness in response to his new social typecasting as 'Angel', (albeit a Fallen one), rather than 'Doormat', the latter human status being the punishment gestured for him - which, had he accepted that choice of himself as was 'gestured', would have strengthened the established norm which had so 'blemished' him. Exiled in externally objective terms, he postulated, indeed successfully formed a better society by his own lights of Sartrean internal objectivity, of which he was the fully sacred, although sole member. When he has proven himself, through his continued work and the quality of that, and as a human reality (survived intact), when he was seen to continue his original project successfully, on his own terms, and the target of his attitude of critique, MacCarthy's régime, was eventually shown up as morally wanting by his intellectual and artistic project as well as by the

projects of spirits kindred to his in their own personal witness in authenticity, he was suddenly faced by the choice of whether or not to return to the States where an ostentatious state invitation and reception awaited him. His decision was consequential both from the point of view of the integrity of his own perspective, individual self, and from the point of view of the public effect of his choice, of the possibility to exercise his forgiveness, carrying with itself the condoning of the society which banned him and his fellow-spirits from the possibility of carrying on in freedom the exercise of their lights as human realities. He decided to accept the hand which once tried to crush him, and not to bite it back in return. It was the Sacred (as his example accentuates), which needed the endorsement of its own being, by Chaplin's 'profane' one; it was the 'gods' who needed man. Of course, he was perfectly free not to accept the V.I.P. invitation by his former judges, and thus perpetrate, effect in their being, the continued wound which *their* moral Fall (on account of Chaplin's own, unjustified, former one) caused in the image and social fibre which the erring Pukka upheld, concurrently with insisting on and using as a weapon his own wound as the state of the dislodged self which his former ontologic 'executioners' effected. First blemished and then rehabilitated as a self with a small-letter pukka outward image and public standing as such in his society, he would have been free to prevent the use of his self for being fitted back into the gap of this fibre which his protest against that created, free not to lend his being for patching that up.

We have come to a point where a distinction between the project of the political socialist and that of the Pauline, personally authentic 'romantic' Christian are usefully distinguished from one another once again. The first difference consists, of course, in the fact that the classical Marxist revolutionary envisages and recognises as imperative the emancipation in the overt affairs in the world (of which aim the romantic Christian's crusade for the rights and righteousness of the big-letter Profane is inclusive), for the poor only, out of the entire repertoire of the classes of Rachmones which have been identified so far in the thesis; whereas the 'romantic' Christian extends his claim for full human status in this world as well as in the world after, to all classes of Blemished which have been listed so far, certainly to the personally authentic in all these various types of Rachmones. The second

very profound difference between the Marxist revolutionary and the Pauline champion of human as well as, ideally, social-actuality-wise implicative egalitarianism regarding all those who are big-letter and small-letter profane in the world (including, in the absoluteness of the Pauline doctrine, all of humanity), is that romantic, even revolutionary Christianity concerns itself in a very serious way, with the human emancipation as a moral matter (salvation, in Paul's language), of all the personally authentic, even if they are highly ascribed in the context of the reigning superstructure of society (the bureaucrat in the instance of the post-historic society of our present day and certainly of the future, to whose paramount superiority of power in the external world of our present society Descombes has drawn our attention); and the 'romantic' Christian sees it as a necessity that everyone in the world, whether ascribed highly or lowly, should graduate to such socialpsychologic elevation as a person in this manner. In cases where the 'caretaker' by ascription, in high office, does recognise the need, as a matter of and as the indissoluble ingredient in his personally authentic choice of himself as human reality, and conducts himself in the course of carrying out of his office truly to the lights and individually authentic standards of human reality which he considers as binding for himself too, there isn't a problem for the 'romantic' Christian; he passes the Pukka as a saved and morally, humanly deserving individual and one entitled to his office if he, as a self, follows and adheres to a conduct of such personal authenticity. (Naturally, those Pukka who pay lipservice only to the moral ideal, binding for them too, of being a righteous Christian in this personally authentic sense, and hope to qualify for personally righteous status by formally, routinely sticking, in appearances, to the upkeep of the external dictates of any organised religion without appreciating the Pauline message bidding for all the adoption of the meant lights of personal authenticity which the highly ascribed must pursue too, doesn't impress the 'romantic' Christian; indeed, he sees such Pukka as the paramount targets of his moral fight to affect authenticity in this world as well as in the next for all, and, if he is in his right mind, doesn't entertain the need of saving those. The same contempt applies, as far as the champion of human reality is concerned, to those highly ascribed who profess that regard and claim for human reality and the observance of its standards are not a necessary ingredient in the manner in which he carries out his

office.) Kierkegaard certainly entertains the paradigm of consciousness of 'the good steward' in whom personal authenticity and elevation of office coincide, and he acknowledges the need for such a steward, as well as the desirability that such a person, and such a person alone, should be in a position of government, in both big-letter and small-letter ways in the world. (19)

Thus, the 'romantic' Christian, unlike the Marxist revolutionary, must face and cater for the eventuality that the unauthentic Pukka, once abusive of his socialpsychologic, as well as social power to subjugate the Profane, may grasp the moral error of his former conduct at the moment when he is vanquished and uncovered as one erring and desirous of forgiveness by the one formerly relegated as *object only*, in moments of the emancipation and successful human rehabilitation of the latter agent; a situation which is trickier to handle for the established moral order-nihilative Pauline authentic. It is the mendicant brother's difficult call and duty to help the Pukka formerly erring in this manner through the eyes of the proverbial needle, if the latter voices this wish on his part, on his way to the ideality of heaven, though not necessarily, but possibly (as far as the 'romantic' Christian is concerned), also to the continuity of his high place in the actuality of the prevailing social hierarchy of the world, the underpinning of which external hierarachy by matching personal moral standards of authenticity in the 'caretaker', the 'romantic' Christian sees as necessary, at least as an ideal. The Christian, unlike the Marxist revolutionary, is called on to give a thought to the Pukka who, as a result of his retrospective insight discovering him to himself too as the author of a great injustice by the tenets of human reality (and also by the tenets of collective consciousness in its ideality), desires, after committing the crime of effectively doing down a socially, or at least socialpsychologically outstandingly authentic person, to be redeemed as a human reality in the doubly emancipatory event of forgiveness by the undeservedly slighted agent - emancipatory to the forgiving party, the formerly Fallen, in the terms of the actuality of the social world and also in his capacity as a proven authority as human reality, and socialpsychologically emancipatory to the Pukka who was once the executioner of the unjustly slighted man's life at the symbolic, social and socialpsychologic level of that. Of course, the once wrongly

Blemished must be judicious and scrupulously discriminatory in the granting of such forgiveness; he must not fall victim to any naïveté regarding the Pukka's voiced determination to be converted to more personally authentic lights in his future conduct, and he must judge whether this momentary determination on the Pukka's part to revise his standing vis-a-vis the former Blemished and his kind, is merely a ruse for overcoming the temporary embarrassment of his being defeated in the public eye by the victorious formerly Blemished, or whether his remorse runs deep in a way which will consequentially alter his attitude towards the profane with whom the Pukka now discovered the need for and the glory of being *on a par* as a human being, in his privately authentic capacity. The Christian champion of personal authenticity must give even the bad caretaker a chance to be a person, (quite that in the fullness of his self as object too, as one of the socialpsychologically profane, for which we must all recognise ourselves as a condition of our personal authenticity as a fellow-harajan), if that's what he really wants; when he is asked for forgiveness, implicitly or explicitly, by his former executioner, from the echelons of the High Ascription of the latter, so that even the Pukka may pass in the future as a human reality at which test he failed beforehand, the already emancipated agent must make sure, as a condition of his own further double authenticity, as both a socially and socialpsychologically discriminating "me", that his forgiveness is given, exchanged, with both parties conceived and involved as whole selves, fully-fledged 'children of god', himself certainly no less than that and granting the Pukka full status as such if the former Rachmones judges that as deserved on the Pukka's part, in other words, he should see that his forgiveness is not granted in the spirit of his creeping as obedient *object only*, nor should he forgive the Pukka half-heartedly and continue to see him in continued enmity on the forgiver's part, as the two-dimensional Subject-template only for which the Pukka has made, defined himself in the past of his own volition, and which type of self the authentic Rachmones, so ascribed in the world, must despise and fight against on account of that unauthentically operating as only half a self; the Subject-half. But, it should be stressed that the agent whose forgiveness is sought in such a moment, must also judge, as has already been touched upon, on the basis of his knowledge and moral sizing up, estimation of the Other who has unjustly branded him in the

first place, whether the Pukka in question *has it in him* to be an equal human being, whether he is to be trusted as a human reality and entrusted with a person's ensuing quality and potential as that, or whether he is likely to use the vindicated formerly Fallen person's re-giving himself to him, in the full dignity which the moral victor has now regained, and his advancement to the Pukka the cathartic union between two human beings, for reoffending against the Blemished and his kind, and for the further sustenance and promotion thereby of the symbiotic and establishment-assertive practice and machinery of the rigid and specialised ascription of *object only* status to the Profane and exclusively allowing the members of the caretaker stratum in our bureaucratic society, to have and have room to be Subject-inclusive selves, a mechanism in society which has been extensively reviewed in Section 2 in Chapter 2 and in the last Section, for instance. It cannot be stressed enough that the touching and humanly authentic event (for which the authentic Christian must cater) in which the formerly and erroneously demeaned and now rehabilitated 'offender' makes the formerly erring Pukka privy to the spirit, tone and privilege of a small-letter, human, personally 'salient' social intercourse in his endeavour to grant him a chance to be with the grace of an authentic fellow-harajan as a condition of the remorseful Pukka's 'radical conversion', must never make room for or become confused in practice with the foolish mistake of giving the Pukka a chance to get out of his embarrassing situation as 'loser' for all to see, in terms of his continued human unauthenticity which is deadly to the free spirit and authentic project whereby the formerly blemished Rachmones could, and can, successfully exonerate himself, and which may develop, due to the lack of the sufficiently shrewd judiciousness of the Rachmones, into an instrument in the Pukka's hand for adding to the Rachmones' already damning file as profane, as a matter of his own fundamental choice, and therefore undesirable in the eyes and terms of the already established society. Such a use, on the Pukka's part, of the insights advanced by the Rachmones in the spirit of personal intimacy, with a view to adding, through this source, to the doing down of the person whose attributes as an individual are of interest to a paranoiac establishment (potentially all of us), belongs to the lowest type of treachery that exists in the universe of human reality, but is nevertheless a favoured ruse by the police in their

security-data-collecting work in more countries in the world than one cares to imagine.

To summarise the foregoing point, the rehabilitated Blemished must be strongly aware of the real socialpsychologic power he has at the moment of his own emancipation in the public eye, to grant or withhold his forgiveness as an unauthentic agency from the Pukka and all that he stood or stands for, in the context of the cause of which the rehabilitated former Fallen showed himself as the champion; he must know the consequentiality of his further attitude to the Pukka, and his real possibility, which is in the power of all of us, to 'create', Pygmalionic fashion, (this universal human faculty having received detailed comment in the previous Section and will be further entertained at length in the forthcoming one), to 'constitute' the self of the 'Other' as either a socialpsychologically curtailed stereotype whom it is the authentic's duty to hate and fight, or, alternatively, whether he construes and therefore makes and handles him, and in so doing sets the standards for others (even the generalized other) to handle him, as a socialpsychologically dignified self which assumes, and is rightly entitled to assume, the mode of the being of his individual consciousness as both object and subject, a "me" as well as an "I", thus endowed with the honour of being a fully fledged self, small-letter sacred as a person by the authentic standards of the profane dictates of human reality, too; and if he is 'found wanting' as a potentially viable and fully fledged authentic human reality in the estimation of the formerly Blemished, if the latter judges the Pukka's remorse for formerly offending human reality, as tactical or skin-deep, forgiveness must be withheld from him. It is at the discretion of and the effective possibility of the once condemned person at the instance of his public emancipation to exercise this Pygmalionic faculty towards the agency which once slighted, blemished his person on account of the cause which he identified, and to exercise this faculty, the 'creation', definition of the self of the formerly erring Pukka, in either a positive way or a punitively negative one, as Charles Chaplin was once in a position to do, as just observed. Jesus, in his passive resistance, 'created' Pontius Pilate irretrievably for what we now know him for, just as surely and effectively as he 'created' himself for whom

we now know him through his project as Absolute Authenticity, the touchstone of human reality at its ultimate.

However, such moments of the public emancipation of the profanely ascribed, big-letter or small, is rare in actuality, and the big or small-letter 'fallen angel', a Fallen authentic human reality is seldom in a position to choose or refuse to claim his place again among the socially Sacred as a public matter, though to hypothetically exercise such a choice on his part as a private consciousness, attitude, is certainly of interest both to himself, and his private choice in this respect a matter of consequence in the eye of the Establishment, and the basis of its attitude towards him. The Fall of the profane separates him, on a long-term basis, whether discarded Angel or newly created Doormat, from the Sacred, he is as a matter or hard-and-fast social fact, fundamentally set apart from, is firmly on the other side of the great chasm in society, opposite to the Sacred; and, as already observed, it commends his sense of realism and even his human stature, as viewed from both the angle of the public and of his self, to continue to identify himself with those of his kind who have not (yet) been emancipated. For those decreed as publicly Blemished, it is inappropriate, either by the authentic dictates of the standards of his self or of those of society, to attempt to rise again into the ranks of big-letter Pukka; it must be recognised that both the individual and society now must accept after the formerly free agent's fall, to be Fallen to one another. This is what Jeremy Thorpe did not see, which he learnt too late. Formerly the Liberal leader, he was exposed (some say by manipulation on the part of his political opponents), to a trial, reviewed and broadcast all over the world, on the charge of having conspired to kill a former homosexual lover. He naively thought that on his name being cleared by the court which acquitted him on the charge of conspiring to murder, it was still a continued possibility for him to make a comeback into public life at a level of some social responsibility and elevation. He did not see that 'in view' of his other, private deviance, also publicly aired during his trial, he had to assume and keep to his mould as fallen, no longer unblemished, as cast for him by the generalized other. He applied, subsequently to his trial, for the leadership of Amnesty International, a morally very worthwhile as well as prestigious organisation, and was forced to withdraw from

taking up his new appointment at the helm of this institution, due to public pressure; showing him up, for a second time, as a loser in the public eye, notwithstanding the fact that in view of his own political victimisation, it may be said that he was singularly qualified for heading an organisation which was formed for the saving of the political victims of societies morally reprehensible in their treatment of its martyrs, from unjustified punishment and torture.

Another example, from the world of drama, of a Fallen victim of society and its norms, making inappropriately, indeed unauthentically (which was not the case with Jeremy Thorpe), a bold bid to continue her life among the big-letter, ascribed Sacred, who would have readily put her to death had they grown wise to her trespass for which she was only partly to blame, is provided by the character of Abigail Williams in Arthur Miller's play The Crucible. In the puritanic social surrounds of the Founding Fathers of the New England of her day, she was a victim (clearly enough for us to see but not so in the eyes of her community), of an adulterous relationship between herself and a married man. She was authentic in seeing that the public attitude to the unspoken blemish of her conduct, potentially marking, blemishing her, if it came out, a wicked adulteress, was hypocritical and unjustly threatening and hurtful, and she was also right in appreciating the danger in which her secret had placed her in real social and individual terms. But she was wrong and unauthentic in choosing, as the ploy for the overcoming, the resolving of the schism, the deviance of her conduct in relation to the public norm, by opting in the mode of her future conduct for the methods and the spirit of the self-same religious hypocrisy which threatened her, for propping up, by her own chosen subsequent behaviour, the big-letter Bad Faith of the world which she rightly condemned as matter private to her, by joining 'Them' when she realised she couldn't beat 'Them'. She was wrong and unauthentic in attempting to transcend her undiscovered blemish in society, and the possibility of her punishment on account of that, by contriving to be appointed as the first among the Ascribed Judges, and was just as unspeakably evil as those who would have been her judges for her social trespass, or even more so, for claiming in her newly assumed position among those, the death of the small-letter profane in her community whom she exposed to her harsh and unjust society for nothing more than being human, small-letter profane

in their choice of themselves as a way of life and conduct, in the eye of a paranoiac establishment suspicious towards those who led a quiet and private life in partial seclusion from the political machinery of it, and critical of that machinery when its representatives demanded that society's simple profane accept its sickly twisted truth about themselves and their way of life, and interfered with their rights and witness to being authentic; each and every one of Abigail's victims formally less blameworthy as qualities of human reality as profane than she has been herself. She would have done much better, and been more authentic, had she packed her things and left the community which threatened her, as she eventually did.

Section 4.The Engineer and the Fixer.

The exposition which the notion of the Fall received in the previous Section, enables the argument to further develop its former preoccupation with social creativity, which in past considerations of it culminated in the notion of the Referee. Two further concepts may be added now to that former notion to beneficially complement it. These new concepts are the Engineer and the Fixer.

The Engineer is a Meadean notion. (20) It refers to a self explicitly engaged in social creativity, to the activity of one who affects, by virtue of his inner fundamental choice (a matter of his attitude) and consequently in the typical mode of his overt conduct, the raising of the level of being, the production of other selves; it refers to one who helps other selves to being fulfilled in terms of the "I"-s of their own selves, (the "I" referring here to the other's needs, insights, potentials to be such a completely fulfilled self), and at the same time engages his own "I", his vision, thought, will, in the project of the betterment of another's "me", overt self, by lending the Other the relevant aspect of his own "me"), in complex interpersonal and cross-personal 'fusions' of "me"-s and "I"-s, as this possibility was described before, early in Chapter 2 Section 2, for instance, or towards the end of Section 1 in Chapter 3. In postulating the notion of the Engineer, Mead outlines a type of person and the attitude into which his praxis coheres, as a practical, intelligent and concrete application-biased one, as opposed to an airy-fairily benevolent, self-indulgently generally muddling and unauthentically or at least thoughtlessly, routinely do-gooding one. He enlists the phenomenon of team-work among the most outstanding of all examples in which the multiple realisation of "me"-s and "I"-s across one's own self as well as between persons takes place, including in pride of place those cases where the agent's single "I" may effect a better, fuller socialpsychologic "me" in a multitude of other persons, not necessarily known to him, such as in the practice, say, of a professional social worker or a gifted social innovator with great and universal insight into the future. In such instances, he writes, the (social) Engineer carries around a blue-print with him, as it were, analogously with the mechanical engineer who designs a machine, at the designing stage of it, when the machine, the tool for the envisaged job, Work, does not yet

exist - it has merely been conceived and formulated into a plan at the drawing board. The Engineer in the social context, has taken the attitude of the Other or of Others, that of just one or many, his "I" in empathy with the "I", of all, cognising, taking into himself, assimilating as a self their needs and hopes, and shares in the "I" of all in this sense, his own capacity as a self. The genre, the medium of the Work that lies ahead when the (social) Engineer plans his blueprint, is the socialpsychologic 'fusion' between his "me" (which he will make available to the Other as his response to the need for that of the Others as "I"-s), carefully listening to those "I"-s, putting into practice this interpersonal 'fusion' desired by Others in the form of his output as human reality, in specific accord with the demand calling for that gift of himself as a self. Actively effecting this 'fusion' by way of his socialpsychologic creativity in which his own self is organically instrumental, by choice, in the realisation of the Other selves involved, is highly cathartic, as already remarked, for the Engineer as an "I" as well as a "me", and if the Engineer's blueprint is authentic in the sense that his gift and skill as social creativity fits the need of other selves as identified by him, its moment of the effective 'fusion' of his "me" and the "I"-s of the others calling for that, will also be cathartic for the others touched by the coming to fruition of the Engineer's plan. Again, as also outlined before, this Work of bringing about, in practice, such 'fusions' between formerly lacking "I"-s, truncated possibilities as selves, with concrete "me"-s which satisfy, 'answer to' them, is the only source of goodness (whose definition is 'excellence at social creativity'), which is generated in the course of the irrepressible process and upsurging medium of human reality, that raw stratum of the being of the self and of the generalized other in the world, which quite simply amounts to (or asserts its presence and operation in consciousness as perceptibly and significantly failing to satisfactorily amount to) human reality, either in one's heightened awareness of one's frustrated realistic potential for one's fulfilment as such, or in the sensation of actually being fulfilled, in terms of such goodness. It should be appreciated that this human reality may also be maintained and consist in the cognised frustrated desire for this goodness, for the product and peculiar medium of human reality at its fulfilled, that is, in instances when one's hopes for this kind of fulfilment, for the prospect of such a 'fusion'

between one's lacking "I" and a "me", one's own or that of another, to 'answer to' that lacking "I", are unrealistic, the external conditions for it absent. When an interpersonal event of this manner comes about (through the happy and effective meeting in social and/or socialpsychologic actuality, between the Engineer's entire self, as both an empathic, interpersonally sensitive and imaginative "I" and an interpersonally available and effective "me", on the one hand, and the "I" of the candidate for a similarly complete and fulfilled self whom the Engineer helps to become just that by way of the loan of his "me", on the other hand, the participants are party, as already observed, to a privileged, heightened reward of a socialpsychologic nature, which holds for the Engineer himself, as well as for the self of the Other successfully fulfilled, and which, on top of being personally reinforcing to both the helper and the helped, is also reinforcing to the medium of human reality itself, which obtains in and consist of the process of social creativity. This process, human reality in its emergence, is experienced, when fulfilled, as bulging, being in the making, bursting into being as such, as 'salient' in the sense outlined in the *Introduction*, in relation to and over and above the socialpsychologically routine, everyday being and experience and engagement of one's consciousness in relation to others in the generalized other, affecting and productive of personally authentic human reality in the particular concreteness of that medium. As already touched on at some length, early in Chapter 2, Section 2, and again towards the end of Section 1, Chapter 3, for instance, aptitude in social creativity in the Engineer's sense, (excellence at which equals goodness, to our understanding), is one branch, one form, one manifestation of the entire array of 'gifts', is one kind of talent among the full thesaurus and armoury of talents which someone can conceivably be endowed with - but at the same time, it's that gift which underlies all other particular talents, as a unifying dimension at the back of all of them, at least potentially and ideally, both in the sense that social creativity often informs great works of art and other forms of creativity, and through the possibility and effect which productivity in all other forms of creative medium may and usually does have on social reality in the constant creation of the latter, by virtue of the change and development in outlooks, artistic or scientific, which the cultivation, the deployment of any form of first-hand creativity

produces in society; a phenomenon with which Mead vitally concerns himself. In this sense, Mead says with Lenin (though Lenin only suggested this in the context of the artistically creative), that the practitioners, realisers, deployers of their creative talents, are 'engineers of the soul'; their own souls, obviously, but at the same time, and consequentially, also of the souls of others.

The concept and involvement of the Engineer doesn't exclusively apply to major instances of cross-personal acts of social creativity affecting a multiplicity of people; it includes, at its minimum, the complementary gift of "me"-s and "I"-s between two people, the Engineer and another, indeed, possibly, two Engineers, as we showed, discerned in the example of the wetnurse and the soldier in Maupassant's story in Chapter 2, Section 2. To recapitulate, once more, some other previous examples illuminating some of the various paradigms of social creativity, 'Engineering' which can take place between and involve various numbers of people in the 'Engineering' act, (also figuring chiefly in Chapter 2, Section 2), we may once again call on examples of somewhat different, bigger than a merely dual cluster of people between whom social creativity, 'Engineering' can be, and has been exercised. One was the example of how a three-person team became operative in the writing of the book Tongue Tied by its highly physically disabled author Joey Deacon. In another of our past examples we analysed how Bob Geldof's vision of people in richer countries saved people in Third World from famine, his novel idea for financially helping the latter having been put to realisation first in Band Aid, then in Live Aid and then in Sport Aid, so many instances of a mammoth-scale social creativity, touching billions. In fact, any good idea, prompted to the Engineer's "I", to his responsiveness to other selves in need of 'bodies' (Sartre's synonym for the operative self), realised "me"-s, in the physiologic or social, as well as a conceivably socialpsychological sense, (depending on the nature of the demand impinging on the Engineer's empathic and responsive "I" and calling for the compassionate donation of his "me"), can be suitably enlisted here as an example of 'Engineering'. Such examples abound; one such is afforded by the launching of an appeal, in the course of the last decade, for the donation of one's organs after his death, for transplant into patients in need of these organs. The "I" of the one who first thought of this,

reflects one of an Engineer in its inspiration to creatively put forward, put into being such a 'blueprint', so to speak, but the donors who decide to positively respond to this call, are also 'Engineers, in the sense that they activate their "I"-s to make their "me"-s, in the idiom of the physiologic aspect of that, available to others who are in need of their 'bodies' in this literal sense - in the act of giving their very ontic "me"-s to someone else so that the Other may be created and maintained as a living self in spite of a terminal illness; with the pledge of oneself for this purpose (expressed by carrying a donor card) being made in one's lifetime, and the reception of this gift of one's "me" for its use by another, coming into effect, fruition, maturation, after the death of the 'Engineer', the creator by means of the lending of his self, or some aspect of that, to another. Another example of 'Engineering' in quite a mundane context, is the simple initiative and undertaking involved in organising a baby-sitting circle so that the opportunity for the enjoyment of the full compass of the activities of the parents as adults outside the family context, may be from time to time extended to every adult in the circle, with the chance of breaking the strictly house and family-oriented routine of the participating parents, taken in turn; this imaginative idea and practical arrangement also amounting to an interpersonally constructive project and therefore to one of 'social Engineering'. Teaching, imparting one's knowledge to schoolchildren, or parenthood, the project of rearing, socialising children within the family, afford yet newer examples of 'social Engineering' at its most common, in the context of our simple everydays.

The Fixer, in sharp contrast, may be said to be the Engineer of the unauthenticity of human reality. An ascriptionally high-ranking unauthentic Pukka may be found, in many instances, by the 'drawing board', engaged in the 'Engineering' of the 'blueprint' of a large-scale project touching and effecting the egos of many, often millions, just as can the authentic expert of social creativity, Mead's professional social worker, the Engineer in the sense in which his understanding of the latter concept most strongly and most typically applies in his usage. In other words, the Fixer, like the authentic Engineer, may be found to be engaged in the orchestrating of the dramatic, or quiet and discreet meeting of the "me" and the "I", as the case may be, both interpersonally and cross-personally, knowingly, meaningly and

tactically effecting patterns of the 'fusion' between the ideal aspiration of selves as "I"-s with the actual opportunities as "me"-s in those whom he is in a position to either realise or frustrate as full selves, towards whom he feels he has a calling to oversee, dispose. The Pukka casting himself in the role of *Subject only*, his own "me" is uninvolved in the process in which he and his kind (toward which he is morally loyal), ever emerge as pure "I", while, in contrast, the Rachmones finds himself systematically and lastingly cast as *Object only* at the end of the Pukka's baton, this so-called 'specialisation' of the Pukka as Subject and the Rachmones as Object, having received ample comment and analysis towards the end of Section 2 of this chapter, for instance. The Fixer's 'blueprint' will be conceived in keeping with the promptings of the preservation of the normative *status quo* as it is, which ideal morally informs the Pukka in question, reserving for him and for his kind the privilege of excellence, not just by virtue of ascription but also in seemingly human terms, with the aim of continuing to arrange differentially the opportunities for being so (humanly excellent, that is), for those for whom it is proper, by his lights, to be excellent and, conversely, keeping excellence and chances for excellence from those for whom it isn't proper to be so. His benefit drawn from his manner of 'Engineering' in this way, is dual. One aspect of his gain is social - it consists in his success in keeping the superior moral hue that goes with being apparently excellent, (the kind of morality to which he himself committedly subscribes), in the Pukka camp in the world, this continued and strategic allocation of 'goodness' to the Pukka ideologically justifying, to appearances, by seemingly human standards too, the keeping of high offices for himself and for others like him. The second area of the benefit in store for him as the result of his performance of the job of his 'engineering', or rather 'fixing', is socialpsychological; as the 'caretaker', in which capacity he functions whilst fixing, in this manner, suspended between heaven and earth, as it were, as was Socrates in Aristophanes's comedy, he is in a position to cream off, collect in the way of toll, the socialpsychologically elemental and spiritually reinforcing reward that goes with the successful effecting of instances of the 'fusion' between "me"-s and "I"-s in others, though in his case this potential for and experience of the elation inherent in affecting such 'fusions', is bastardised into the personal satisfaction which is inherent in the

enjoyment of socialpsychologic power over the selves of the Others who are being 'created' of the Other according to the 'creator's moral lights, authentic in the case of the Engineer and unauthentic for the Fixer; monopolising and appropriating for himself the act, and its socialpsychologic benefit of being actively involved, as a function of one's choice and will, in social creativity (which in the Fixer's case is of a sham kind), reserving for himself the glory that lies in inventing, engineering the fulfilment of selves, this privileged activity shrouding him in a cloud and experience of goodness, a heightened one at that, which lies in the exclusiveness of the loaning to him the monopoly of the exercise of such 'engineering', without himself having to make the effort of being excellent, outstanding as a self, by the measure of personally authentic merit justified, maintained and earned at first hand, in contrast with the Engineer's seemingly similar activity in which the latter is prepared to personally stake and engage his creative beliefs and himself in the process.

Nevertheless, it must be said that the Fixer is often quite as morally motivated as is the Engineer in 'drawing up his blueprint' for such social engineering, and putting it into practice. However, the Fixer's moral motivation and the efforts he exerts in carrying it out in practice, have opposite roots and effects to the authentic engagement of the 'Engineer', in that the Engineer's project is morally informed by the lights of human reality in its purity as such, whilst the Fixer draws the strength of his moral position, if he claims to have recourse to such, from the Absentee Landlord. Consequently, the Engineer carries out his project in the exclusive framework and medium of the ever-emerging novel, creative upsurge of human reality and realities as such which is caused by his practice, the merit of the case in which he is involved judged by him without justificatory recourse to the worldly classification as Sacred or Profane of the agent who is being 'created' by him as humanly excellent. The morality of the Fixer, in contrast, is directed towards the ideal of, and has its effects, accordingly, in the keeping of all those who are already differentially ascribed in the world as ascriptionally Sacred or Profane, in their allotted places on either side of the chasm separating mankind in these ascriptional ways, both the ascribed Sacred and the ascribed Profane firmly fixed in their appropriate niches as those obtain in the existing normative order as

that is, which morally maintains the Fixer in his elevated position and which the Fixer morally maintains.

This general and overriding moral givenness, dedication to the immutability of society on the part of the Fixer, on principle, does not, of course, mean that he is not active, in the the mode of his carrying out his office, in very concrete and practical ways. One range of his activities is positive: he is busily engaged in fixing opportunities for his own kind, right from the beginning of the educational process, with the allocation of chances to a Pukka fledgeling often cynically divorced from the real talents required in the job and from the real ability or qualification of the Pukka's *protegé* to be equal to them, and in other cases, if the Pukka has to play the game according to the rules, with apparent respect for the ethical propriety in the allocation of jobs on a basis of personal merit in the applicant justifying the appointment, the Pukka gives the opportunities, in the spirit of the semblance of fairness, to his kind again, whose typically and constantly favourable achievement pedigrees have been systematically shaped throughout their education by the benefit of the 'halo effect' privilegedly attaching to them throughout and at every milestone of their educational assessments and other stages of their progression in life. The old boy network, connections, are enlisted, mobilised on such occasions, with the Good Reference for 'One of Us' launched into operation.

The other area of the Pukka's practical engagement in fixing opportunities differentially for his kind and for others, is entirely negative (for it is that aspect of the phenomenon which touches the *Rachmones* whose ego is being socially and socialpsychologically manufactured in this 'specialisation' process so that he typically and strategically shouldn't be equal to the chances that obtain and are available in the world), and comes to the fore when the distribution of excellence as established in the world, in which system of ranking the Fixer and like Pukkas get the lion's share in the morally as well as materially remunerative laurels available there, becomes threatened, when the stability of the order so fixed may conceivably be upset. There are, basically, three ways in which this can come about: one is if a *Rachmones* is about to rise above his station as ascribed by virtue of

his outstanding human excellence, the second when a formerly Sacred has Fallen and the circumstances now threaten that he will become Blemished and as a consequence a compensatory rearrangement of that part of the norm and the little structure in the world in which his former Sacredness was effective, becomes necessary. The third case arises when the Pukka in his ascribed heavens, makes a mistake, a consequential error of judgement regarding a small-letter profane (who is also a small-letter sacred, as we have observed before), making him into big-letter Profane, one to be properly discriminated against, and this error on the ascribed Pukka's part becomes manifest in the public eye, when, in other words, the Pukka has been proved wrong in his unjustly slighting a profane in human and/or factual terms, for all to see, with the Pukka himself 'Looked at': (for the meaning of this last turn of phrase see the end of the last Section). This third case is conveniently referred to as the Cock-up.

It is dangerous to allow a show of goodness, excellence in just anyone run its natural course, for that may suggest the appropriateness of the rearrangement of grades of deservingness as those exist in the pyramid or the reigning ascriptional system of ascendancy, social and by implication moral, particularly if the reigning norm is informed by Protestant Ethics, as is ours, according to which everyone's standing in the world is seen as the index of their just deserts in the light of their personal worth and talent. Any of the above three types of upsets carries the implication that a redistribution and reclassification in the social standing of a Sacred who is implicated by a publicly espied anomaly, witnessed discord between his socially ascribed and personal worth, has become necessary, so as to bring the offending Sacred's placement in the system of the moral and ascriptional pigeon-holing of people in society, into line with his evidenced fallability, and to embarrassingly having to introduce the undeservedly slighted, unjustly branded big-letter Profane, into the heavens of the morally intact and the humanly excellent.

In discussing the three abovementioned ways of an effective upset in the socially functional equilibrium between ascriptional and human excellence or those in the Sacred crust of society, on the seeming accord between which two indices of merit, our reigning ideology (on

the face of it) insists, we shall take the case of the recent Fall of the former Pukka first. The recently Fallen Pukka and the already Blemished profane will be treated here in one package, for their recent positions in society are similar from the moment of their official Fall. There is a small discrepancy in their cases, which consists in the fact that there will be a high degree of feverish fixing by the fellow-Pukkas of the once Sacred Pukka who is threatened by the prospect of the Fall, to manipulate appearances so as to avoid the social branding of their colleague, up to the last minute of his Fall. But once the former Pukka has been unavoidably Fallen by the disclosure to the public of his moral error or misdeed, his former fellow-Pukkas will come to learn to relate to their formerly Sacred colleague in dependable bad faith. An adjustment in the CV of their former equal will be effected, the formerly warm tone of the Reference relating to him will metamorphose into an inert fact-sheet, in the mode of which the born Rachmones's CV is normally grasped from the moment 'go', causing the Fallen Pukka to be reduced, as is the born Rachmones, to a bundle of attributes, a thing, a strange being to whom some praiseworthy features, due to which he so far qualified to a Sacred status, inexplicably attach, and he will be viewed, as a consequence, as is the born Rachmones with a disturbingly high show of personal endowment, as something oddly astounding, like a cactus which can, say, write essays. His past will come to be reinterpreted and fundamentally reorganised, so that doubt, suspicions and dishonourable qualities will be cast on aspects of his past which were formerly grasped as fully favourable. Telephone calls will precede him before interviews, warning fellow-Pukkas approached by the newly Fallen for a job, of the dodginess now of his classification, a practice which will also be normally put into play in relation to a former Rachmones who is about to rise. He is now on the wrong side of the chasm separating the Sacred and the Profane, not 'only just', not piecemeal, but in an all-or-nothing way, as a function of his simply and social-factually being, by necessity, either Fallen or not, his susceptibility to being rigidly and totally classified from one moment to the other as wholly Blemished, (or in the event of his clearing as wholly Sacred), in the make-or-break manner in which such firm moral pigeon-holing occurs in the eye of the generalized other, as already illuminated through our former examples of the hero of O'Neill's play The Iceman Cometh and

that of Britten's opera Albert Herring, commented on towards the end of our last Section.

But in time, no actual telephoning needs to be involved on the Pukka's part to let his own kind in social and socialpsychologic power know how the Rachmones in need of a job or a higher educational opportunity is to be 'properly' treated, by Pukka lights. After a while in the course of the progression of the life of the Already Blemished in the world, the Rachmones in question will come to telegraph simply by the overriding external socialpsychologic modality of his "me", telling of a long period of his anthropologically lower typecasting, the way in which it is appropriate for the Pukka to relate to him. The visible ensemble of the socialpsychologic insignia of the blemished status attaching to him: a broken deportment, lack of grace, the signalled likelihood of his being of a certain political affiliation, a tangible record of poor mental health in the past, a CV marred by a criminal act; or merely a foreign accent, or the colour of the Rachmones's skin, will prompt to the Pukka the underlying tone in which to properly apprehend the Rachmones facing him, in his capacity as a Referee, as an employer, as a teacher, or simply as a person vis-a-vis the Fallen. The stubbornly obtaining tendency for the Rachmones to be systematically kept down, opportunity after opportunity, does not necessarily indicate a hysterical string of telephone-calls, external activities to affect a curbing of the Rachmones's chances, the way in which such frantic 'fixing' typically occurs shortly after the instance of the Blemished's recent fall. When his Blemish has become both socially and socialpsychologically established, no single telephone receiver needs to be lifted to follow the Rachmones's path for the fixing, the conspiracy to keep him apart from chances of a certain calibre in the world, to remain operational. When the Rachmones turns up on an interview, he elicits the response of the Pukka as a socialpsychologic stimulus, a "me" plain to see as that of a Rachmones, the hot-lines between the Pukkas are activated in a merely covert and symbolic way, the push-buttons of their telephones breaking into an implicit little *dance macabre* for the Rachmones' chances, in the mind only, without such hotlines being actually handled; the buttons become animated in an imaginary, but for that not illusory way in the Pukka's mind, like the keys of a pianola, as it were, touching on the nerves telepathically of

all the Pukkas whom the Rachmones encounters, spelling out to the salient Pukka in the Rachmones's current experience the warning of the former's past colleagues of the Pukka in his life: 'This guy is not one of us'. The continuance of the conspiracy to keep the Rachmones separate from real chances, is assured by the way the Pukkas' minds work, precoded and ever informed by the Absentee Landlord. The stimulus which the "me" of the Rachmones eventually grows to present to the Pukka as oftentime doormat, and automatically activates in the Pukka the stereotype response: 'Wipe your feet on me'. Man is a judging animal, by definition; if he is morally stimulated, he will morally respond. As has already been observed in Chapter I., man's freedom, according to Mead's insightful etiologic criterion, consists, in contrast with the psychologically determined behaviour of animals, in his ability to suspend, delay, or altogether forego responding in such a mechanistic fashion on coming face-to-face with a stimulus. A morality that professes and practices the lack of choice, one which claims the unavailability of responding in the face of a stimulus, particularly a moral one, as stereotypically gestured, is a very primitive one, by Meadian measures. It is man's real possibility, and the hallmark of his higher refinement and greater sophistication as a human being and as a judge as such, to respond to everyone, including the Rachmones, by taking into account, in relating to him, the totality and complexity of both his personality and his situation, the need for and appropriateness of which discrimination applies, by definition, to the case of everyone to whom one responds and vis-a-vis whom he acts, whether in big and consequential ways or small and inconsequential ones. This careful and sensitive discrimination in forming one's opinion and acting in relation to a person - any person, is a precondition of one's conducting themselves interpersonally in the constructiveness of human reality, in which type of conduct lies any person's Pygmalionic power to grace his fellow-man with his freedom in apprehending him, and indeed, to exercise and gain his own, at the same stroke.

Finally, the situation of the Cock-up, when the unfair slighting of the Rachmones by the Pukka doesn't go publicly undetected, is both a little more complex and a little more serious than the simple and matter-of-course case in which this exercise (the doing down of the Rachmones in the service of maintaining bad faith and the allocation,

'specialisation' of the dignity of an "I"-inclusive self to the Pukka and a more lowly, "I"-deprived self to the Rachmonesø, goes without a hitch. Normally the practice of the prevention of the Rachmones's chances in the 'specialisation' process is smoothly and successfully camouflaged by the current norm, it can be effectively hidden behind the reigning ideology which is equipped to justify that. But the situation of the Cock-up or threatened Cock-up is more serious and dramatic than the normal process of the tacit running down of the Rachmones in the service of the established social norm and its guardians, because when the Pukka is seen to err (and when this occurrence becomes difficult for him to cover up with his usual bad faith both as an external issue and as an internal moral matter for himself), he is the representative of the Sacred norm, and as a consequence he is in greater trouble in every sense, inner and outer, than the Rachmones when the latter, already rubber-stamped as second class goods, falls short as an agency of outstanding excellence. Indeed, the show and standing of personal excellence on the Rachmones's part is properly expected to be a diminished one, and when he nevertheless demonstrates such in its full glory, this causes a disturbance in the prevailing moral pecking order which differentially obtains for the Rachmones and the Pukka respectively, it interferes with the prevailing ranking of goodness in the world as sustained by traditional values. The phenomenon of the Cock-up is also more complex than the smoothly running course of normal bad faith rendering the Rachmones as *object only* and therefore second-class citizen, in that a multitude of remedial measures have to be deployed to cover up the Cock-up, precisely on account of its greater seriousness. The first and most usual of these ploys is to shift the responsibility for the upheaval onto the Rachmones whom the Cock-up adversely affects, and his Reference which has so far agreeably established him as either a harmless and well-meaning *object only* or, even more favourably, as a small-letter sacred, gifted, worthwhile and altogether pukka self, gets quickly re-written, yielding a CV or a Reference doctored in such a way as to suggest that the Rachmones's recent fall or misfortune as a result of his unjustifiable and unreasonable treatment as big-letter Profane at the hand of the Pukka, was always on the cards.

Secondly (not unrelated to the first ploy as just outlined), an ideology is invented according to which the disadvantage with which the Rachmones has been unfairly lumbered as a result of the current issue unjustifiably pinning him down as Profane, was what he deserved, for reasons that obtain concurrently with the present issue in hand. If the Rachmones can be construed as problematic on any other account than the present query attaching to him and blemishing him as Rachmones on dodgy and questionable grounds, these side-issues will be summoned and with them a pretence that the misfortune which is about to befall him, is due to, or at least is justifiable in the light of these secondary issues. If this doesn't work or is not enough to put right appearances which point to the Pukka as unjust, and it is not too late for the opportunity to be salvaged for the Rachmones, he will get it, usually on qualified terms to retrospectively justify the to-do initially surrounding and calling into question his right to be granted the opportunity in question, unless the Rachmones is able enough to stand up for himself and fend off the damning qualifications in his 'Reference', whether that already exists on his file or its official filing is still in limbo. Furthermore, there will be attempts to whitewash the erring Pukka - minutes and such like, records regarding the newly Fallen which mark, on an official level, his progress leading up to the Cock-up wrongfully branding him, will be retrospectively fixed, and any unpleasantness that arose due to the Pukka mishandling the situation will be put down to a 'misunderstanding', an 'honest mistake' as the Americans are fond of calling it. If, however, the Pukka's error cannot be backpaddled on and the Rachmones's aimed-for opportunity is irretrievably lost, other forms of frenzied fixing will come into operation to put the Pukka's ensuing moral unseemliness right. Ideologic justifications of why the Cock-up occurred will be persistently resorted to again. The quasi-"I" of the 'caring' Pukka: the We-concept (described in Chapter I) whose calling is to support, from its heavens, the profane, will be summoned in the form of ostensive fussing; forms of compensations will be offered, in acts of tokenism, for the demonstration of the Pukka as an untiring conscience for and on behalf of the Less Fortunate, the volunteering of such tokens and concessions operative till the problem is out of the Pukka's hair. Inferior conscience-moneys to keep the Rachmones quiet, either in the literal sense of a small sum or in the metaphoric sense of something of practical value in the pursuit of benefits of tangible worth, will be

'benignly' held out with the pretence that this is more than a fit reward to grace the Rachmones in his unjustifiably disappointing situation. The Rachmones will then be in a position of forgiving or not, accepting or not such positive goblets of the Pukka's conscience to help him along on the road to his betterment, now somewhat set back: he is free to Look Back in Anger or not to do so, a situation already reviewed in the last Section; he can indeed choose to permanently 'Look Back' at him and be a hundred per cent winner as a moral feat, particularly if he eventually becomes a 'winner' in positive terms too on an alternative route to his acknowledged excellence. Alternatively, he may opt, or be in a position to have to accept the conscience-smarties or rather saccharin-pellets at the end of the maze which he successfully ran, like an experimental albino-rat, so to speak, only to find that the real reinforcement at the goal was displaced, and accept the inferior reward, selling out the strength of his moral standing vis-a-vis the Pukka, and either obediently comply with its typecasting as doormat in the future or retain, cultivate the while the notion of his self in its whole deservingness and freedom as such in which the truth of his own intact stature as a self in his situation remains well-defined within him as a private matter, as in a Sveik or a Columbo or my auntie Googey, and carry on, in the secrecy, perhaps exclusiveness of his own consciousness, his pilgrimage towards a tenable place under the sun in the world in which proper justice is done to him in keeping with his own expectations of himself, fumbling, on the brink of successfulness as a self, along the road in his 'dirty raincoat', 'Rachmones toilette', or with his certificate of lunacy as the cue to his classification as profane in the world in terms of his outward circumstances, for a little longer, or indefinitely; his human stature in its fullness remaining a private accomplishment, amounting to a personal freedom, though merely within Aristotelean confines of it.

Section 5. Our Big-letter and Small-letter Righteousness as Object.

In foregoing arguments regarding the agent's capacity for and exercise of 'fundamental choice' - his opting, in other words, to either be socialpsychologically authentic through perpetrating his conduct and sustaining his consciousness in keeping with the dicta of human reality or, alternatively, to be socialpsychologically unauthentic and consequently conduct his consciousness in unquestioning, axiomatic moral loyalty to the established norm as that subsists in the world as society, attention has been given to both the socialpsychologic and, (predominantly in Chapter 2.), to the sociologic consequences of this fundamental choice of one's self and its overriding modality of conduct. What still needs to be brought out with greater weight than it has been before, is that, as an important ramification of this area of the thesis, both the socialpsychologically authentic and unauthentic modes of conduct, are *moral* regarding their *genus*, both in their *extra-individual* operation as the outward norm, and in their *intra-individual* operation, in their capacity, in other words, as the 'private' conviction, strength and feeling of the agent, with which these two contrasting and conflicting frameworks of morality, alternatively propelling and keeping up the self, are adhered to as a personal matter once one or the other is adopted (for one or the other is inevitably subscribed to whether this is explicit in the mind of the agent or not.)

The socialpsychologically *unauthentic* manner of the choice of one's consciousness which is dedicated to the upkeep and stability of society, rain or shine, amounts to and operates as a coherent frame of moral reference, no less than (though different from) what we may call small-letter or socialpsychologically authentic righteousness made up by an also coherent set of beliefs informing personal conduct. Viewing the morality of unquestioning norm-abidance from a sociological angle, it will show itself as, society-wise, positive and corroborative in its effects, going hand-in-hand with a socialpsychologic sense of goodness and righteousness (although diametrically opposite to its rival set of

values: that of human reality, and in a relationship of personal bad faith to the latter). The unquestioningly society-supporting, personally unauthentic mode of choosing ourselves and our morality, draws its moral justification and applicability as a framework of individual conduct, with a fluency, from that autonomous set of values which is in any situation and at any time intuitable and recognisable as functional for the upkeep of the moral *status quo*, and which are just as easily, readily and immediately ascertainable and derivable from a socially given and dedicated source of moral framework as is a socialpsychologically authentic conduct from the equally coherent set of dicta of human reality. Descriptions of the process and consequences of a socialpsychologically authentic fountainhead and choice of conduct have already been advanced in previous parts of the thesis; at this point an evocative rendition of the moral whose virtues are drawn from an unquestioning ascription-abidance and acceptance, will be offered here, taken from Shakespeare's play The Winter's Tale. In this play, the author highlights the nature of a socialpsychologically unauthentic sense of goodness which emanates from an exclusively ascription-abiding morality in its extreme form, by giving these words to Leontes, the despotic ruler of the fictitious realm of 'Sicilia', in reply to a courtier's desperate appeal to him to abandon the senseless destruction of his own queen and son in an attack of paranoiac jealousy, unfoundedly implicating his wife as an adulteress.

Leontes:

.....Why, what need we
Commune with you of this, but rather follow
Our forceful instigation? Our prerogative
Calls not your counsels, but our natural goodness
Imparts this; which, if you - or stupefied
Or seeming so in skill - cannot or will not
Relish a truth like us, inform yourselves
We need no more of your advice. The matter,
The loss, the gain, the ord'ring on't, is all
Properly ours. (21)

The competing terms alternatively informing an individual's characteristic moral tone of conduct as the function and outcome of his fundamental choice - these terms being the socialpsychologically

authentic and the socialpsychologically unauthentic frameworks for individual consciousness - are mutually exclusive in relation to one another, and work at each others' peril. It is conceivable that in a society which happens to be tolerant of the individual's inner authentic liberty, the socialpsychologically unauthentic agent will profess views which are, in keeping with the reigning norm, phenotypically congenial to some values which coincide with those of human reality; but in the event that the reigning, institutionally held ideology changes its tune about its individually acceptable tenets and/or policies, the socialpsychologically unauthentic agent will uncritically side with these altered policies, unacceptable by human measures as they may be, and the sham fibre of his personal goodness (by human reality's measures), will show through for what it is: socialpsychologically unauthentic. Conversely, it may be the case (as it is in what Sartre's calls 'elective assumption', reviewed in the Introduction), that a socialpsychologically authentic agent underscores, of his own free will, society's norms when those happen to be overwhelmingly congenial to the dicta of human reality, and in this event his attitude to the social norm will phenotypically coincide with that of the socialpsychologically unauthentic agent, supportive of the social norm whatever the contents of its morality. However, the allegiance of the personally authentically committed agent to the given norm is a fickle one; as soon as he perceives the norm as turned from its human reality-tolerant and corroborative hue and content, his own moral colour and modality of personally authentic conduct will not turn with the wind of such outside normative changes, and he will continue to keep up his individually authentic sets of standards prompting him the imperatives of human decency and the critique of a society which is oppressive to personally tolerable and authentic standards.

In Section 3. in this chapter, some human qualities have been listed - vivaciousness, charm, intelligence, principled insistence on one's personally authentic lights in conceiving of and conducting one's self, even when that has been unjustly slighted - which qualities appear decorous in the light of human reality even in the socially profaned or 'fallen' individual, but which qualities are necessarily grasped as

faults in the book of the principled socialpsychologically unauthentic agent, particularly if those qualities pertain to one or another class of profane. Vivaciousness in the mentally ill, as a result, is easily labelled as out-of-place hyperactivity by the socialpsychologically unauthentic 'caretaker' and by one unquestioningly bowing to his authority; charm in the 'gypsy' in any sense of the term metamorphoses in the eye of the unauthentic Pukka into something to be mistrusted, intelligence and adequacy on the terms of the ego in the non-pukka came to figure as an unfitting and morally suspect 'cleverness', and the continued reference to an 'ideal self' in the way in which a 'profane' agent conceives of himself, is grasped as a 'chip on his shoulder'. This list of human attributes may be extended in our present context, to support the contention that many, or most, adjectives that are essential to human nature and an authentic conduct, systematically appear as virtues to the socialpsychologically authentic, and as faults to the socialpsychologically unauthentic, and *vice versa*. Spontaneousness, inventiveness, originality-preference in one's pursuance of his ordinary, everyday conduct or in carrying out one's work, for instance, will appear as a precious personal characteristic to the socialpsychologically authentic, and as suspect and undesirable features to his unauthentic counterpart; and conversely, the epithet (prized by the socialpsychologically unauthentic) of a predominant and typical reliance on already respectable 'secondary sources' in academic work or in everyday moral or intellectual style, will come over as contemptible to the socialpsychologically authentic. It may be said that the two noncoincidental moral frameworks, socialpsychologically authentic and socialpsychologically unauthentic, systematically and necessarily support and sport differing and conflicting sets of basic virtues, and that the resulting non-complementary arrays of human attributes are, potentially and also actually (when called on for the agent's assumption, in choice situations, in their competing extremes), in a dialectically opposite relation to each other, firstly in the respect of their capacities as socialpsychologically organised, coherent and informed springs of people's personal motivation as individuals, to which modality of morality the uncompromising socialpsychologically authentic approach of righteousness is naturally congenial, and an

unquestioning assumption of consciousness in socialpsychologic unauthenticity is uncongenial. This fact reflects our already extensively argued contention that 'goodness', 'righteousness' in a socialpsychologically authentic frame of reference, in sharp contrast with a socialpsychologically unauthentic conduct, draws its justification and mode of its furtherance from an active social creativity, be that interpersonal or completely intrapersonal in its radius, resulting in a choice of the agent's consciousness which is (whether he is articulate about and conscious of that in his own conduct or not), operative as a fertile, inspirational talent, experienced and exercised at first hand, with the individual's will called upon and actively engaged as a key ingredient in crusading, wittingly (or unwittingly, as an unselfconscious by-product of such a project following from human reality as one's chosen conduct) for a society in which leeway for the lights and needs of an "I" (if that be truly authentic and inclusive of universally implicative humanitarian principles) is universally assumed in the name of all who subscribe to the necessity of such humanly authentic lights and needs; this project acting as, amounting to the hallmark of goodness according to one of these sets of moral standards: the personally authentic one, out of the two with which we now concern ourselves in the light of a comparison between the two.

The framework for the goodness of the unauthentic, in contrast, is (ideally from its own point of view) relative to the form of society that happens to exist, derivative from that regarding its content (though as a source of reference as a morality and in its everyday application perfected, with practice, into an unhaltingly flowing fountainhead of information and colourant of external conduct) and, unlike the righteousness of the subscriber to the dicta of the dignity and fulfilment of one's own self and, by implication, the self of others, is not original, in the sense that it is based exclusively on the acquisition, learning and assimilation of the given norm in the world as sacrosanct (with one's primary sensitivity to the universalistic promptings of the collective consciousness at its ideal, into which a presence to the needs of the self may blossom out in

adulthood, after a lifetime of the observance of authentic human values in a dialectic counterrelation with one's socialisation). The blindly norm-abiding choice of one's morality is, furthermore, also relative regarding its operation, as it works by way of a comparison, consists in the measuring of one's own personally unauthentic moral standing as indicated in one's social respectability in the world as the index of one's 'goodness', by the yardstick of the similarly unauthentic 'worth' of others, as that is read and judged through the external signs of tangible rewards, more easily attached to and attained through a socialpsychologically unauthentic choice of oneself than through the risky pursuit of an authentic excellence.

A further, and connected, key difference between the personally authentic and unauthentic ways of grasping and propagating goodness is that the excellence, virtue, righteousness of the authentic, as has already been said, stems from, 'makes itself', consists of and is carried, thrust forward by the taxing process of 'angest' or anxiety-engagement, supersession and vanquishment, which project alone is vested with the capacity to produce and maintain a self with a certain distinctive sheen, grace, a sense of first-rateness. In counterdistinction, the fountainhead of the goodness of the unauthentic, is faithfulness to the morality of the normative *status quo*, with the tactics for and product of it as 'goodness' 'matt' in its quality, so to speak, and continuous with the generalized other, its 'metal' as a self (as it's often referred to in everyday parlance) indistinguishable from that, in the light of the secondary, imitative assimilation of its ready-made recipe for goodness, one already proven as positively reinforcing in the world as it is. The unauthentic consciousness differs from the authentic one in that it waives, by necessity (as it would be destructive of itself), the first-hand, spontaneous mode of its conduct and betterment as prompted by human reality, in that it decries the very medium of the goodness of the authentic, borne in the difficult course of 'angest', and seeks and exercises in the place of that and as its substitute. The source and operative frame of reference which fires it is different from the authentic's 'angest', it's one which is based on and generated by a judgemental sense of comparison between its own

routine morality and the mode of the consciousness and conduct of the odd, disdainful towards the odd and the dissenters of any kind from the generalized other. This, socialpsychologically unauthentic source of goodness, virtue, will receive the label Righteous Indignation, as the attitude, the gauge and expression between fellow-generalized others in the project of a successful adherence to individual undistinction as the standard of goodness, with the resulting socialpsychologically degraded brotherhood between selves of a counterfeit excellence, serving as the basis of the sentiment which acts as an emotive reinforcement existentially sustaining the norm as it is in its established state, as it is operative, and is which is sustained by such a sham human socialpsychologic level. Righteous Indignation sustains and propagates a false sense of excellence between selves who assert themselves in unauthentic pride as *objects only*, breeding a sense of distinction which consists in a proudly sported state of proven spotlessness of any maverick conduct in the social world, expressed in one's social reputation and (very often) in the typical trappings of that reputation in the way of possessions, useful connections and a favourable ascription. This process of a sort of moral keeping up with the Joneses, (its proof being the public recognition that one is as faithful and morally undeviating an adherer to the totally predictable, because totally established, normative values, as the next man, and doing as well in the world as a consequence) - this project of ostentatious moral elbowing forth, serves as the somewhat circular justification of our having what we have, and excusing ourselves from the pursuance of human excellence the hard, socialpsychologically positive and authentic way. It may be helpful at this point to turn to Graham Greene's vividly described distinction between these two competing approaches to and grasps of 'good' - that stemming from a personal authenticity and that stemming from a personal unauthenticity - which is very expressive of the contents of both these competing frames of moral reference, as well as of the special, mutually exclusive, alternative relationship between the two, and for that reason we now recall a passage from his novel Travels with my Aunt, though we have already quoted these words of his in the last Section of Chapter 2. Assuming the character of his main hero who embarks on an expedition of wholeheartedly savouring the

remainder of his life in the company of his remarkable 'aunt' after an entire career spent as an 'Accountant', so to speak, rather than a 'Gypsy', (to draw, once more, on Kenneth Tynan's nomenclature), Graham Greene puts forward the following description of his hero's state of mind:

It was as though I had escaped from an open prison, had been snatched away, provided with a rope ladder and a waiting car, into my aunt's world, the world of the unexpected character and the unforeseen event...I can remember very little of the vision preceding the prison house: it must have faded away very early 'into the light of the common day'... and (I) thought of my aunt, that she, for one never allowed the vision to fade. Perhaps a sense of morality is the sad compensation we learn to enjoy like a remission for good conduct. (22)

In enlarging on the difference, and the relationship, between these two distinct frames of reference of 'goodness' - that obtainable through a personal deservingness and righteousness by the dicta of and as emanated by human reality through the method of an active social creativity, on the one hand, and the sense of 'goodness' inherent in and fed by what we call here Righteous Indignation, on the other, a return to Mead's notion of the 'sentinel' may be useful. Mead (it may be recapitulated here) denotes with the label 'sentinel capacity' the phylogenetic legacy in humans of the phenomenon of the special endowment of one animal excelling in a herd, and this individual acting as the outstanding scout to all the others, and followed by those. In man, Mead reasons, such natural endowment with extra sharpness and edge to one's senses qualifying and distinguishing one in comparison with everyone else, becomes self-consciously reflected upon, graduates to a feature which is appreciated as morally decorous, with this sentinel-capacity operating as an ideal for each by definition as a natural by-product of being human, acknowledged as everyone's possibility, and universally desired. Mead distinguishes between two differing approaches by man to the project of reaching such acknowledged excellence in comparison with the gathering of the unendowed in similar respects, one of these approaches historically more primitive than the other, in a way which allows for the comparison of one of these ruses for the achievement of

such sentinel-capacity with the ploy of our socialpsychologically unauthentic, and the other out of these two ruses with the project of our socialpsychologically authentic. Firstly, as a survival from early times in man's history, Mead considers, man may go about stressing his sentinelship by showing that he is the same as the generalized other, but with a vengeance. He complies with the norm as a self who is just as dedicated to the standards by which everyone abides as is anyone else, but with knobs on, so to speak; by dressing according to the fashion, for instance, but in a way which makes him stand out through the superiority of the price he paid for his outfit, on account of that being of a better material, by sporting the most extensive wardrobe within the confines of that fashion. Alternatively, (this tactic being historically newer and telling of greater sophistication as an approach), he may go about his excelling by being different from everybody else and unique in relation to those, rising above the generalized other by virtue of his originality, through the enhancement of his individuality; not as a meaningless and *l'art pour l'art* exercise, but with personally authentic 'value' recognised and adopted as the spring and progenitor of human reality in one's conduct, and favoured because of that reason alone. (23) Putting Mead's observation into an ethical context, our big-letter Righteous Indignation as discerned here, is the choice of the first approach to 'sentinel quality', that obtainable through the cultivation and sensation of an 'enhanced sameness' in a more than average dedication to being *object only* in the idiom of consciousness which is available to subscription, as a matter of one's keynote to personal morality, to the generalized other at its unauthentic (the personally safe approach to a sense of elevation on account of one's 'goodness'), in sharp counter-distinction with the pursuit of 'sentinel'-capacity as grasped and propagated in and by one on the basis and strength of the uniqueness of one's first-hand talent (available to all if so chosen, in some form or another), as a matter of one's fundamental choice. The unauthentic ruse for achieving a semblance of 'sentinelship' is the assumption of the more primitive approach to exemplariness than the burdensome, active, authentic approximation of that borne of and propelled by 'angest', the self's ideal expectation of itself as such, complete with the moral implication

of the imperative to ever further the realisation of such an ideal set of expectations of one's self, and demand the same of others. Big-letter Righteous Indignation, as identified here, is a state of mind, that which is meant to afford, and, accordingly, does afford and consists of the power (which comes to man without effort if his mind is suitably prepared by virtue of his chosen loyalty to the norm of the Absentee Landlord and his reign in the world as it is) to stereotypically judge others in a raw readiness and with a speed unhalsted by any empathic consideration of one's fellow-men as fellow-individuals in the spirit expressed in the phrase 'there, but for the grace of God, go I', in a constant act of judgement devoid of any critical reflection upon the human object of one's judgement in the true merit and complexity of his situation eliciting his conduct, waving aside the possibility of specially endorsing or, if that be in place, specially resisting, as a person, the easy and unreflective facility of the most socially immediate, stereotypic judgement of his fellow-man in his own capacity as a complex and discriminating self himself. Big-letter Social Indignation is the vehicle of the indiscriminate judgement of any apparent deviance, as an exercise yielding a sense of unauthentic excellence and for the sake of that. The glee with which the unauthentic exercises his capacity for Righteous Indignation for the sake of doing so as a measure of his own human excellence, consists in and is characterised by the attitude of the socially primitive agent's triggerhappiness as a man and therefore a judging animal, with this faculty of his used and seen by him as a mark and medium of his sense of goodness; - as a shortcut to a state of mind as big-letter Righteousness, by way of one's dedicated affiliation to the routine being of the generalized other, as an alternative to the authentic project of achieving, constantly earning the not easily available socialpsychologic laurels of a person as human reality (should he choose the latter framework as the informant of his sense of excellence as a self). We may enrich our definition of the big-letter Righteously Indignant as presently put forward, by introducing the label 'amateur judge' as a synonym of the unauthentically Righteously Indignant. This additional tag in naming him underlines his characteristic practice of revelling, as a mark of his own elevation as a self, in his orthodox

judgemental faculty for the sake of it, so as to provide him with a sense of *élitism* in his mediocrity through the elemental and unreflecting condemnation of the 'different' in a moral comparison with himself as an unconditional mercenary of the norm, putting into operation his unrefelctive faculty of judgement as a vehicle and tool for the asserting, for the zealous identification with any measure of his own ascribed sacredness, in whatever tier in the corridors, or rather staircase, of the established system of the social rank-and file that happens to exist in the world, by way of the resulting sensation of a goodness 'holier than thou'. The nature of such 'amateur judgement' as a socialpsychologically operative mechanism in 'the mob' (in Mead's sense), in counterdistinction with the operation of the faculty of judgement in the hands of the initiated, trained and consequently more discriminating and sophisticated professionals, may be highlighted by the overwhelming popularity of the death sentence as tapped in an opinion poll in recent years, at a time when this extreme punitive measure was voted down in the House of Commons by the large majority of the specialists in the representation of the people: Members of Parliament, the elected and expert arbiters of the law on people's behalf. 'The tracking down of a murderer takes one back to the vengeance attitude of the primitive community', Mead writes. (24) This attitude, that of the exercise of Righteous Indignation as the tool and hallmark of unauthentic personal goodness, underscored by the standards of a primitive generalized other (whether operative in the crowd degraded through this project: the mob, or in a single individual in bad faith), may conveniently be called 'mediocracy'; as already observed, it is the worship of and indulgence in a sense of excellence that is verified, OK-d, reinforced by a pride in our range of belongings (our public respectability, at the symbolic level of positive society, certainly included among these), by the grace of the Absentee Landlord who saw it fit to give us these benefits for our unconditional worship of him and of his order of ascription in the world, at all times and at all costs.

The distinction, in Mead's work, between two capacities of the generalized other: a primitive, morally crude one, called by him 'the mob', (25) and his finely discerned postulation of a historically more

developed generalized other which underlies, sophisticatedly, the entirety of his most consequential socialpsychologic work Mind, Self and Society, is strongly akin with Kierkegaard's and particularly Bultmann's differentiation between the authentic and unauthentic possibilities of the community, and brings us to the important observation that 'romantic' (particularly existentialistic) strands of social thought are wrongly and unnecessarily accused, in popular conceptualisations of such schools of thought, of equating an authentic mode of conduct with the *individual's* mode of consciousness, and of branding the mode of consciousness of the crowd as axiomatically unauthentic. Out of the existentialist socialpsychologic theories, it is solely the concept of 'das Man' - Heidegger's rival notion to the generalized other - which emerges as the epitome of a contemptible and sham morality, by personally authentic measures, without any qualifications, while other socialpsychologic frameworks of a 'romantic' hue often, and importantly, allow for the insight that authenticity or unauthenticity is not a question of numbers, that the justification of the application of one or the other of these two moral qualities does not lie in the circumstance whether it is adopted by one or by many. The choice between conducting the self in that phoney and predigested idiom which is labelled here Righteous Indignation, or, contrarywise, in first-hand and personally staked authenticity, is open to crowds no less than to individuals. An authentic body, community of selves, and Mead's 'mob', is the same crowd, consists of the same people and number of people, all cohering as the generalized other, whose ensuing differential moral quality depends on that crowd's choice of itself as authentic or unauthentic. A crowd may be, and often is (in revolutions, for instance) fired, in the face of morally inhumanly outrageous and unjustifiable affairs in the world and in response to those, in human authenticity, with each and every member of it summoned in a genuine capacity as an ego, in a communal act of 24-carat 'social creativity' by so many 'Engineers' (for the meaning of the latter concept see the last Section.) Two important points follow from the appreciation of the freedom of the crowd to summon itself, in such a 'fundamental choice', as authentic or unauthentic.

One is the recognition that a socialpsychologically unauthentic, big-letter Righteous Indignation, if opted for, may serve in the crowd, no less than in the individual, as the vehicle of the displacement, in a way writ large, of the calls of an outraged and humanly authentic *angest*, bastardising that authentic sentiment as a framework of goodness into a pale semblance of it in the conduct of the unauthentic and lazy. The Righteous Indignation of a crowd, (no less than that of a socialpsychologically unauthentic individual), conceivably embracing a whole nation, is identified here as the frequent deposer of 'angest' as a motivational source feeding the craving for excellence in man (never extinguished even if he chooses to be socialpsychologically unauthentic), and lends itself to a comparison with the mechanism and function of *angest* as a source of motivation. An important property of Righteous Indignation, whether it operates in the crowd or in the individual, lies in the characteristic of its being free-floating, as is *angest* or anxiety, whose difficult and demanding authentic prevalence and creative role it bastardises and usurps. It attaches itself, as does anxiety, following the changing fashions for its institutionalised, legitimised outlet), to objects of it (various kind of *rachmones*, that is, which happen to be appropriate targets to the current moral tastes of an historically ever-changing norm, which differing, fashionably despised groups of *rachmones* as the potential object of the ever-demanding capacity of people for a sense of excellence in unauthentic ways, vary in the course of history from culture to culture, sticking at any time, to the group of *Rachmones* whom it is currently pukka to hate. The ideology of fascist Germany, which took the ideal of 'mediocracy' as a measure of human excellence to its extreme (as so evocatively analysed by Sartre in his work Antisemite and Jew), '26' invented and operated a highly sophisticated, variegated and elaborate official system of norms, bringing under the umbrella of its sanctified moral disdain of that all groups of Different who were identified and judged in comparison with the ideologically mollycoddled majority's own ideal of mediocre populism both on racial and ideological grounds, which they put on a moral pedestal as the fountainhead of citizenly virtue, compulsory for all; (such populism to be distinguished from democracy, of course). This all-embracing and hostile classification on the 'national socialists'' part

of the Different in all conceivable senses, yielded a system of fine discrimination embracing an amazing number of classes of the Blemished, for the explicit purpose of scapegoating any discontent that previously loomed in German society, and for the successful hogging by the new ascribed *élite* any semblance of goodness and excellence that was possible to have in the world, the emerging ideological smokescreen of Nazism designed to hide and displace the sense of ill in the nation which was threatening to undermine the social order in response to decades of bad government. The play Bent ⁽²⁷⁾ unfolds the operation in a Second-World-War concentration camp of the resulting finely discerned hierarchy of these many classes of persecuted Blemished, indicated by various colour badges worn by the inmates, qualifying those for differing kinds of treatment at the hands of the camp commanding personnel. The physically or mentally odd had no badges but were immediately exterminated without further ado. The worst off were the homosexuals who were set apart from the rest by having to wear pink badges. Next up in awaiting their turn for extermination in this inverted row of ascendancy, were the Jews, who wore yellow badges, their extermination the most staggering out of all groups destined to be murdered, by virtue of the greatness of their numbers as murder-victims, but, regarding their treatment in the period of their waiting for the gas-chamber, somewhat better treated than the homosexuals and fed on a slightly better diet in this queue for death. The *élite* among the condemned were the common criminals, who wore green badges. These were entrusted with little chores by the Nazis and, unlike the other groups who were the targets of the Nazis' hate, given food with some degree of nourishment in it.

Our current form of government and practical ideology which reigns in this country in our day, cannot, of course, be brought on a *par* with Nazi Germany in any sense, particularly not in the sense of the overt inhumanity that it shows towards its unfavoured. Nevertheless, this government is not at all macrosociologically naive in the promoting of the monopoly of 'goodness' which is jealously reserved for those who are 'pukka' by ascription, and kept tooth and nail from those who are not (albeit in very subtle ways compared with the Nazis), as we have shown,

mostly in Chapter 2 Section 2, in our analysis of the differential apportioning of chances for being 'good' to the ascribed Pukka and to the ascribed Rachmones, respectively, by means, largely, of its campaign of Hidden Persuasion knowingly promoting the Pukka's monopoly for goodness, in the service of its very practical ideology. What is being further maintained here, moreover, is the conviction that the unashamed scapegoating of the deviant (one class of those only, in the case of our government), for the purpose of channelling and attaching to that group the currently prevalent freefloating national discontent, looming unsympathically towards this government on account, largely, of the mass-unemployment for whose implementation it is predominantly responsible, is going on in our society by a socialpsychologically articulate and meaning design. It is usefully remarked at this point that the populism (a courting of the tastes of a generalized other not noted for its demands and wish for the pursuance of an excellence born in taxing personal authenticity), for which this government is well known regarding its politics in respect of the arts, has concomitant moral overtones (not incidental ones) in actuality, which extend to social reality in that this populism orchestrates, directs the unauthentic range of moral tastes (a natural companion to the artistic 'mediocracy' cultivated and encouraged in the generalized other of our day), against the one group of Blemished vis-a-vis whom the present government levels itself in abandoned Righteous Indignation. Of course, this group is not - cannot be - any of those groups of Different for whose persecution the Nazis have become historically discredited; it's not, on the face of it, the blacks, the Jews, the homosexuals into whom the government explicitly displaces the freefloating Righteous Indignation which the generalized other is in readiness to deploy, if successfully unauthenticised. It is, in our day and culture, the criminal only who fills the bill of the sanctioned object of the selfrighteous hate of a sizeable part of the masses, educated to be populist in moral ways as well as artistic ones; it is the criminal, consequently, who serves as the occasion for the exercise of the 'mediocratic' trigger happiness of the morally sweetly courted generalized other, in a consciously manoeuvred way, so as to afford an anchorage for the safe landing and termination, in actuality, of this nationwide manipulated

macro-psychologic function: anomie - a function reshaped and rebaptised as the anti-criminal wrath of the population, to serve for the equilibration of the established norm, the government thereby taking the heat out of the large-scale small-letter righteous indignation of the people on account of the staggering scale of unemployment, in the form of which it originally lingered, and which, if not tackled, would have further found its expression in the form of its engagement as authentic righteous indignation over the employment-situation in our society, which gave rise to the socially untoward discontent in search for a scapegoat, on this account, in the first place.

This argument doesn't wish to comment on the real merit and justification of the condemnation of the criminal element as a desirable or undesirable end in itself, on which level the government tackles the matter, to appearances. This argument merely means to clinically observe that in the context of the freefloating, or perhaps already deconstructively engaged discontent of the nation on account of the government's systematic and cynical creation of mass-unemployment as an articulately envisaged part and by-product of their economic policies from the moment of their being first elected, is effectively, and by design, sidetracked into the government's 'war against crime', this campaign agitatedly promoted by officialdom through all available media and means so as to side-track and metamorphose the attention, the moral quality and the colour of allegiance of a voting public which that would otherwise have directed in uncongenial ways to the government in power. As a result of this government's socialpsychologically sophisticated response to this danger as just described, the 'war against crime' has graduated to a central issue at the heart of the Tory Party's election campaign, at the same time, ironically, as the crime-rate was in fact soaring in social actuality as a direct product of the government's uncaring attitude to the public whom they would have liked to, and eventually have, persuaded to vote them into power again, with this socialpsychologic ploy such a hit with the public that it had to be adopted, as a necessary precondition to winning, as a central issue in the Labour Party's election manifesto too.

So far one side-benefit of recognising the crowd as the possible vehicle of authenticity, as well as of a possible unauthenticity, depending on its fundamental choice of itself, has been pursued at some length. To summarise this already argued point, this first side-benefit of the recognition of the community's moral freedom and power to be authentic or unauthentic, just as much as such a moral freedom is the property of the consciousness of the individual, consists of the uncovering of 'Righteous Indignation' and the morality that goes with it, as the mechanisms, in dimensions writ large, of the common displacement of a first-hand social creativity, born in an authentic angst and concern about one's lot and that of one's fellow-men, and of the frequent evading by governments or other 'caretakers' of their ensuing humanly authentic duties to the community, of which duties towards the community and its members, we are all the custodians, in whatever menial a capacity.

The second side-benefit inherent in entertaining the generalized other as alternatively authentic or unauthentic, is that such a grasp of the generalized other allows to underscore the contention, put forward in the Introduction, that the collective consciousness at its pure (as embodied in the body of the law in its absoluteness and impersonality), is not the same thing as the generalized other. The generalized other (unlike the body of the law or the collective consciousness whose constitution is purely factual in a sociologically scientific idiom) is a socialpsychologic concept, albeit one writ large, which is prone to, mediated and shaped by emotion, particularly by the emotion of an authentic and small-letter, or alternatively an unauthentic and big-letter Righteous Indignation in the face of its moral sentiments elicited by affairs touching the lot of people in the world, depending on whether the generalized other takes an authentic or unauthentic stance in its corporate capacity in response to such affairs. However, the body of the law and the norm at its 'lived' in the modality of the generalized other, are in a special relationship to one another, the two running parallel in the course and process of legislation. The standards of the generalized other - the norm at its 'lived' - has the capacity of constituting a pressure on the body of the law, a retrograde one in

comparison with the content of the law, if choosing itself in human unauthenticity, and a progressive one in its authentic forms and phases. On the avenue towards social progress (along which, one hopes, we are reaching towards constantly greater and greater degrees of perfection of social tolerance), the generalized other is thus at times ahead of, and at other times behind the law in its demands of a more civilised humanitarianism. For the illumination of the occasional humanly authentic, progressive function of the generalized other, impatient of human anomalies in legislation, or in an intended legislation, we may cite the wide-spread pressure, in our day, for a return to the once outstanding standards of the National Health Service, or in the demand for the future continuity of the subsidised higher education for the academically deserving members of the democratic majority at a certain stage of their education, the widespread and volatile voicing of which demand caused the Conservative Government, in comparatively recent times, to abandon its preparations for the cessation of student grants. Conversely, the generalized other, in its unauthentic choice of itself, may trail behind legislation in the respect of the liberal tolerance of not-yet culturally emancipated social groups, with the law declaring homosexuals, working women, blacks and other members of traditionally disadvantaged groups as the equals of anybody else, and the generalized other slow to release its hold on these 'deviants', as sections of the community from whom opportunities, equal in comparison with those who are Unblemished, continue to be withheld in practical ways.

Several ramifications follow from a comparison between an authentic or small-letter, and an unauthentic or big-letter understanding of goodness, righteousness, or righteous indignation, which are important in both theoretical and practical ways. The theoretic foundations of the relationship between these two competing moral frameworks have now been laid, and may now be usefully recapitulated, with a view to paving the way to the practical consideration of the topic, by way of the peppering of its further discussion with concrete examples.

In previous Sections we have commented amply on the project of the 'Gypsy', identifying that as the authentic way and attempt to draw from

and ever insist, in the course of one's creative project (whether that is spectacular or modestly everyday in its nature) upon the 24-carat proof quality of the self as human reality in pursuing its attainment as such, and which immediate, spontaneous and direct well of inspiration as human reality alone has the capacity to generate the sort of self which is marked off by a first-hand originality. The Accountant's understanding of goodness, excellence, in contrast, as already said, takes its source and frame of reference from the heights of already existing ascription, moral and aesthetic, and hopes to approximate that by mimicking the rules and recipes according to which that works in its established actuality. The latter, unauthentic champion of Academy-determined orthodoxy in the arts (or indeed in the creative sciences) avoids the 'gypsy's' kind of first-hand approach to output for his part and views that practice with suspicion in others; (because of the arduousness of that process, the fact that this course and phase of creation is not manifest to the eye of a humdrum interpreter of first-hand work and because in such an authentic, first-hand approach there is an element of the risk of failure). The humanly unauthentic pursuer or interpreter of the project of creation sees excellence as the product of industry alone, as the fruit of an untiring dedicatedness to 'mediocratic' confines, which he adopts as the ultimate source and horizon of any excellence. To the 'mediocratic' 'idealist' goodness lies in, is nurtured by, identification with the brotherhood of the not odd, the so-called normal. As an example to illuminate the moral and aesthetic philistine's tone-deafness, 'Accountant'-fashion, to the difference between these two contrasting approaches to excellence - the authentic and the unauthentic, and his ensuing denial of the authentic way, - we could recall a film made a few years ago about the beginnings of the Beatles, depicting the early life-story of the group as a chronicle of each of its young members as that of the typical 'boy next door'. The lives of each of the four young men in the group are uniformly presented as a constant process of working very hard together in the spirit of neighbourliness and behavioural harmony, never at loggerheads with each other or in any major way with the authorities, the resulting message of the film suggesting that any four nice lads could achieve the same success and degree of excellence if only they

tried hard enough. Richard Wagner's opera The Master Singers ridicules the character of a civic dignitary, Beckmesser, who enters the annual Mastersinger competition of medieval Nuremberg, having prepared for it with extra diligence, composing his entry song, as all competitors had to, with the strict observance of the aesthetic rules as already laid down, and falling flat on his face on account of the mediocrity of his entry in front of the adjudicators. The well-known story of Mozart and Salieri provides another example of the fight to the death between these two artists, one (Salieri) second rate and dedicated to a life of industry without a spark of human reality in him, and the other, Mozart, a genius who rose to exceptional creative heights through the constant, inspired, vital engagement of his elemental gift as human reality, superseding, overtaking every established rule. Another figure in real life, Florence Foster Jenkins, and a character of fiction, the second wife of 'Citizen Kane' in Orson Welles' classic film of that title, (both the characters 'singers'), offer themselves as two further examples in our current endeavour to demonstrate the fact that being well rewarded, indeed outstandingly endowed in external terms - notably in the way of wealth, connections - is, in itself, a totally incidental and barren condition for the generation of one's well-deserved success as an artist; the staggering sums of money that both Jenkins and Citizen Kane poured into establishing palaces of the arts so as to buy the status of stardom in those for oneself or one's 'loved one' (in the case of Kane), is an approach which is totally inappropriate and wrong for creating, fuelling or maintaining outstanding gift where there is none - both these characters becoming pathetic objects of derision when they tried to assert their claim to artistic fame, to try their wings as first-rate creative artists, (whose quality as people they coveted), by actually performing in the palaces of art which they built.

In describing the relationship between the two conceptions of 'goodness' which we argue, a special connection seems to emerge between these alternative avenues to and grasps of morality, on the one hand, and the notions of 'fixing' and 'engineering', on the other, in the sense in which the latter two notions figured in the last Section. The authentic approach to the creative process takes its source from and

thrives through the pursuit of what we called 'Engineering' - the project of bringing creative inventiveness to practical fruition in gratifying, expressing the visions, needs, demands and bids of an unsundered "I" in a personally outstanding "me", summoned in a first-hand endeavour for the realisation of this "I" in the *existentiell* idiom of the first person singular, for better or for worse. The other, the unauthentic approach, typically makes and advances itself by 'fixing' rather than creating - its notion of 'goodness', 'excellence' searching and finding itself in the servile manipulation of already existing aesthetic and moral formulae, without resort to new elements offering themselves in the process of inspiration, and, in another sense of the term, the 'fixing' of, the effecting a lack of actual opportunities for those whose genuine talent threatens both them and their understanding of 'goodness', by its novelty and dynamism; the second understanding of 'fixing' conceivably entailing the active exercise of conspiracy and trickery to which both Salieri in real life and Beckmesser in the world of fiction, actually resorted in the pursuit of their claims to fame as artists. Poor Salieri and Beckmesser haven't got a chance to strike the right chord, so to speak, in their endeavour to take on the authentic artist regarding the quality of his excellence (in cases when the project of the latter happens to succeed), in spite of all the industry and/or 'fixing', trickery of the unauthentic artist. Our Beckmessers and Salieris simply go about their pursuit of *first* rateness as artists the wrong way, having slavishly pledged themselves to the aesthetic and moral *status quo*, above all, as the fountainhead in their pursuit of art or simply lifestyle, in the original act of their fundamental choice; in their having opted, in the first place, for that frame of reference as their touchstone and guide of creativity, which decries, hates, fears, separates itself from human reality as the framework to challenging, probing the limits of its ultimate potentials, siding with the 'Accountants' in choosing their morals and aesthetic values, and recognising themselves in their opposition to those of the 'gypsy'. What is meat to one of these frames of reference in the exercise of creativity, is poison to the other one, and, (both of these alternative frameworks understanding themselves as the key to and quintessence of excellence and goodness), in our rummaging among the repertoire of

methods and toolkit which peculiarly and appropriately come with buying into one or the other of these frames of references, authentic or unauthentic, the application of items in these different sets of instruments which are inclusive in the price which we pay for our chosen mode of conduct and allegiance, will really prove itself as congenial, reinforcing, corroborative to our chosen framework in approaching the job of collecting and enjoying the extraordinarily glorious laurels which are available to the self when successful by virtue of its output (whether we are engaged in the pursuance of the arts in the conventional sense or in the art of everyday social creativity, pure and simple), and items in the weaponry peculiarly apt to the pursuance of this goal in the mode and idiom of one of these two frames of references, will prove inappropriate and disruptive to the other. As Macbeth observes when his Lady and himself realise that in order for them to have reason to be 'jocund' in the secure knowledge of the success of their project to become king and queen of the land, further murders are necessary in addition to the past chain of their acts of vicious 'fixing', including murder: 'Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill.' (2.2.8) It may be said that playing the game of the pursuit of excellence, may in some respects be likened to adopting one set of conventions or another in our way of playing bridge. Each coherent set of conventions applied singly is potentially suitable as a strategy for winning the game - the game, in our metaphoric sense, of pursuing excellence, whether in humanly first-rate or second-rate ways, depending on which of these ways we pledged ourselves to follow; but mixing sets of conventions can only lead to confusion and defeat, it can only lead to losing the game, whether we envisaged winning it authentically or unauthentically.

Two of our earlier examples may be usefully recalled here to throw further light on the practical ways in which the two competing moral and socialpsychologic frameworks - the 'mediocratically' unauthentic and the personally authentic - show themselves and operate as inimical to and intolerant of each other, as repellent to one another. In Chapter 2. Section 2., we quoted the case of a released prisoner (an ascriptionally greatly Blemished), who wished to take part in the highly elating event

of the London Marathon which he hoped would afford him an occasion to feel as one of the anonymous crowd of the intending excellent by human measures, but found this avenue barred from him on his own dignified human terms as an anonymous 'harajan', so to speak, and everybody's equal in this sense. In another of our earlier examples, the underground traindriver Chris Hughes, whose project to become International Mastermind succeeded in 1983, also met with the wrath and the retribution of his unauthentic Pukka superiors by ascription, lesser than Hughes in human terms. These examples illustrate the typical denial of the sense of excellence fuelled by the needs and dicta of human reality, by the ascription-abiding and informed arbiters of a 'mediocratic', second-rate excellence. The following two examples illustrate the opposite paradigm of the intolerance and repugnance of one of these two approaches to excellence to the other. This second and alternative paradigm springs into being and operation in situations where human reality is confronted with a coercion bidding the agent to abide by a set of second-best dicta of excellence born in the framework or 'mediocracy' idealised, which is untenable to the agent who pledged and cultivated himself as authentic human reality throughout his entire past, which latter mode of creativity by means of the unreserved engagement of himself as an inspired, original self, he once opted for as the mode of his fundamental choice.

The first of these examples is provided, by the plot of the play entitled Whose Life is it Anyway. ⁽²⁹⁾ It treats the predicament of a sculptor and connoisseur of life who becomes a tetraplegic in a road accident. Tempted in his hospital bed by an overpowering selection of high-tech gadgetry to afford him a measure of scope for his continued activity within a very diminished radius of further creativity to function as an individual, he decides to commit suicide rather than settle for what he sees as a degraded range of activities in comparison with his originally chosen life-project. But because of his great physical disability he needs to be aided by the hospital staff to carry out this new project of authenticity, solely available to him now, as he sees it: suicide. He gets into a collision course with the chief physician who throughout the better part of the play imposes on him his

own morality according to which life, however diminished in its quality for the one who must lead it, must be preserved. The conflict consists in the hero's affirmation of his own freedom to decide on the worth and quality of his own life, of his right to choose between the complete and uncompromised being or the complete absence of it in absolute terms, and, on the other hand, the moral stance of the chief physician who questions and denies him this right as an individual, superimposing over that his own code of practice prompted by the imperative of preserving life, however painful and disagreeable the experience of that life for the agent on whose behalf the matter of life or death is being decided. Finally, the people he encounters in his new situation, first swayed by the chief physician's moral grasp of the sculptor's dilemma causing them to resist in their attitude the sculptor's project of suicide, come to respect the authenticity of the sculptor's choice and the power of judgement which that choice rightfully wields within the confines of a self, and, thanks to their compassion and help, his life-support system is finally turned off. Another play, similar in important features of its synopsis, which makes a point akin to the former one, is Tom Kempinsky's Duet for One.³⁰ In its plot it is multiple sclerosis which causes the debility of a violinist's hands; and it is this circumstance which forces the heroine to consider the adoption of an alternative, diminished range of activities as her new calling in life. There is pressure on her from the outside world to assimilate the sensible values of its mundane dicta, bidding her, according to the promptings of the common-sense morality of the socialpsychologic 'norm' in the world, to simply maintain her life with its new compromised horizons. She learnt to play the violin as a little girl to overcome her grief over her mother's death, this loss fuelling, inspiring, launching her to be an exceptional artist throughout her entire life. We witness her sessions in the psychiatrist's office, which she attends because of the intolerable frustration of not being able to carry on with her authentically chosen vocation, and her inability to accept the redundancy in her way of future activity of the underlying meaning of her work which has always fuelled her output as a human being. She too contemplates suicide, and the series of her sessions at the psychiatrist (of which the plot of the play consists), shows her psychological fortunes

in coping with her weighty predicament, and the process in which the second-rateness of her altered, alienly experienced, make-do range of little occupations which fill her days, permeates her entire life, affecting the quality of her relationship with her equally famous husband, whose artistic equal (or even superior) and partner in music she has once been, and her own new tone of perceiving herself as a result of her redundancy now in that relationship. What makes both the artists in these two examples contemplate death, is the enforced watering down, indeed replacement, of the peak of authenticity in their creative lives, by a lifestyle relying on values prompted by the practical rationality, the humiliating force of external circumstances which, due to their altered situation, creep into their lives, usurping there the role of their originally chosen authentic project: offering them both a life with diminished horizons, unacceptable to both.

The fact that in the above two examples it was artists whose fortunes as selves illustrated the case in which one's original pledge to cultivate human reality proved intolerant and resistant to being dislodged by standards of mere expediency disallowing the carrying out of that pledge, should not be taken to imply that authenticity can only thrive through activity in the echelons of the fine arts. The next example chosen to illuminate the same paradigm (that of the uncongeniality of the compromise of one's authentic choice of oneself to the future functioning of consciousness in loyalty to human reality, as a question of fundamental choice) is called on here to show that an authentic genius in the way of everyday forms and areas of social creativity is not only a conceivable but a general and frequent, indeed constant possibility for the selves of all, and that such an everyday sort of genius is just as vitally corrupted by the introduction of a degraded morality into the pursuit of its own kind of excellence as is the genius of the artist when the authentic mode and idiom of its conducting itself is fatally and effectively challenged. It is Grusha, the main character in Brecht's The Caucasian Chalk Circle, '31' whose example will be invoked here to illustrate this point. Grusha meets her betrothed, Simon, in a revolution in which they both fight for the overthrow of the tyrannical rule of the monarch, who is eventually

killed in the revolution. In the course of the revolutionary events, Grusha and Simon are thrown apart and lose each other. Grusha rescues the monarch's infant son: a choice on her part dictated by the spirit in which the revolution was fought (and which she shared with Simon), that of a new understanding and the democratic appropriation of a good and human nobility for all, the innocent child included, as human reality whose upkeep was undertaken and pledged by and for all. This ideological by-product of the aim of the revolution is clearly implied by Brecht, along with the concurrent and more manifest aim of the revolution, that of the redistribution of wealth. The plot follows Grusha throughout her pilgrimage to search for Simon together with the infant grown to a boy, now her son, caring for him, working to support him, in poverty, and shouldering the stigma which attaches to the unmarried mother: her authentic project, in love and authenticity both to Simon, herself and the child. This project of hers is the medium and form of her excellence as human reality. But she falters on the way to carrying this project to its authentic conclusion; at one stage of this project and journey, she betrays, shortchanges this aim for the apparent values of married respectability, marrying an old and rich man on what seemed to be his deathbed, trading in her original project together with her faith in Simon's return, for a wedding ring so that her child should have a name. She got intimidated by Righteous Indignation, and gave up her small-letter human integrity and authenticity: her small-letter righteousness. According to the legend which was the basis of Brecht's story, poetic justice is dealt to Grusha for opting for a life at this point which was supported by a mere semblance of values, without love, untrue to her first undertaking. Her husband is nursed back to health and ties her down to his side. Grusha abides by her marriage vows and fulfils her role as his wife, in a reverse sort of ethical paradigm, whose immorality attains meaning through its comparison with the nature of her first choice of herself, her first authentically envisaged way of life, as her original project. She finally meets Simon, but is now pledged to someone else, and loses Simon's love and all that stood for, having made a fatal concession, in a moment of unauthentic choice incongruous with her original one, giving in to the sham values of a degraded sense of 'good' as upheld by the generalized other at its unauthentic.

As a conclusion of the above train of thought, that concerning one's loyalty in exclusive ways either to the Accountant's or to the Gypsy's understanding of goodness (to conveniently take advantage here of Kenneth Tynan's shorthand terminology in expressing the complex notion of our necessary choice of ourselves either in the humanly unauthentic or, alternatively, the authentic mode of our consciousness as the typical and overriding colour differentially informing our way of life), two more diagrams classifying man's belonging to either the Sacred ('Accountant') or the profane (gypsy'), may be drawn up here; one depicting the authenticity, the other the unauthenticity of such a choice. However, the ensuing little tables representing the polarization of mankind into one of these classes or the other, will be different here from the classification of people in such opposite ways which were advanced before, in the important respect that the ascribed Sacred will not figure in either polarity of our first diagramme (that mapping out authenticity), and therefore only one category out of our usual former two, will be populated, filled with people: that of the profane. In our present context, we grasp our fundamental classification of the sacred and the profane, in inner, *innerweltlich* terms, with everybody, by the dicta of Paul, ideally and at least potentially belonging to one and the same side when authentically choosing himself: the side of people quite simply, of the profane, of the sinners, to which anthropologic class we all belong, or ought to belong, if we opt, (as we should), to authentically shoulder and cultivate our being as people, taking our inevitable angst, schismicity, by the horn and trying to transcend, supersede it. Of course, we may choose ourselves unauthentically and opt to assume our consciousness in the bad faith of Paul's, Sartre's and the existentialist theologians understanding of that term, rejecting our only kind of, inevitably schismic, being as humans, and choose instead to sleep our lives through in the denunciation of our lot as people, and authentic at that.

In the case of our authentic choice, our Gurus are on the same side as ourselves, they are included among the only class of humans as depicted in the first diagramme: the profane. Unlike our previous diagrams, they are not even represented as intermediaries in a half-

way position between the Sacred and the profane; no anthropologic agencies are; so all of us, our Gurus included, handle and relate together, as profane, to our own tropism towards what the Sacred stands here for: an ideal. That polarity in our diagram - which is usually occupied by the Sacred or Pukka, is in this context devoid of people and not directly represented by men: any man. What occupies the polarity opposite the people, the profane, is the ideal of grace, which is there for us to direct our consciousness towards, (here on earth, of course.) The notion of grace, in the context of our following diagram, is meaningfully and workably filled by many senses of that term. However, we shall concern ourselves with only one meaning of the concept: that given to it by Sartre ('32), to be enlarged on in the next chapter in the Section entitled 'Paradigms of Grace'. This Sartrian notion serves as a synonym of another Sartrian notion, 'adjustment', which is the index of man's natural socialpsychologic decorum as small-letter sacred, it serves as a standard of an innerly balanced equilibrium of an operative self-fulfilling self, with neither of the two ingredients of the self's infrastructure (the "me" and the "I" that is) waived. Grace (bodily grace, in Sartre's treatment), is the index of inner gracefulness as an ego, of the successful feat of the self conducting itself as the hybrid it properly is, somewhat divine as a function of the "I", and also *object* as profane, (not *object only* but *object as well*), by necessity, by virtue its being body in the physiologic and also in the socialpsychologic sense; an organisation of its 'members' (meaning physiologic organs: as the *soma*), and a 'member' itself in his capacity as filling a *niche* as a man in the larger, symbolic body to which he belongs: the community, *soma Christou* (to borrow from Bultmann's vocabulary in making a connection between the two strata of nature - the physiologic and the socialpsychologic - which the "me" simultaneously occupies). Utilising this connection between the concurrent capacities in which the term 'body' pertains to the life of man, it may be said that the Pauline notion of being schismic - having 'sin in one's members' - needn't be exclusively entertained in the narrow, physiologic sense only, but its significance may be extended to be implicative also of the schism in one's consciousness as a member of one's community. In this latter context, man is sinful or schismic

because of his constant potential to view the community that he lives in through the perspective and aperture of a self complete with an unsundered personal "I", with his resulting, schismic vision of the community (if assumed) compromising, soiling an Althusserian or Durkheimian socialpsychologically sterile conceptualisation of the selves of all of us as social 'carriers'. Secondly, when assuming ourselves as sinful (because critical) social 'carriers', we also discover ourselves as schismic on account of our cognising and appreciating the corruption which may obtain in a given society (the hard outside of the community, in the inevitable positivity in which that subsists in and dovetails - 'glieders' - with the given social world), and the concomitant bad faith operative there, of which social world we are also part as a matter of hard sociologic fact and therefore also sinful in sharing the corruption of that; and because of the inevitable schism in our consciousness (whether we own up to it or not) as imperfect, because 'ever human social 'carriers', we also share in the sin of our critique vis-a-vis society's actual condition and our own human condition as responsible 'members' of that.

In the light of the above train of thought, then, the definition of fundamental choice can be paraphrased to boil down to our freedom, and our way of engaging that in relation to our own selves and to the social world, to either side with the profane (the condition of us all), wishing to own up to the ensuing biddings of the lights of this authentic frame of reference of consciousness, or, alternatively, wash our hands of this sense of belonging with the blemished - ourselves and everyone else in authenticity - and try to be unauthentic *god only* instead, the fledgeling or imitator of the Absentee Landlord. The following pair of diagrams is meant to represent this choice.

Table 8.

(a) profane, sinner, harajan, blemished,
(the unauthentic if he wishes to
convert)

grace (socialpsychologic
adjustment as human
reality, the authenticity
of the individual).

Alternatively, the opposite paradigm, that of waiving recourse to grace in personal unauthenticity, may also be presented in diagrammatic form. 'Grace', in this case, does not lose its meaning as the unauthentic will have it, - it will amount to, and operate, instead, as a morally consequential ideal conspicuously disregarded. The continued meaning of grace if ignored by an agent as a standard, and the outwardly indicable effects of such an authentic choice of the self in conduct, will be analysed at length in the next chapter.

Table 8. (continued)

(b) The Pukka (high-ranking or low), with his sociologically big- letter Sacred regalia as a self unsupported with a personal "me" (human object-status), without which no self is complete and authentic.	lack of grace
---	---------------

Some of the historic heroes who made an outstanding pledge to side with the profane as a matter of fundamental choice as the colour, the very mode of their selves, life-project, and their rejection, at the same stroke, of the reflected, sham, second-hand elevatedness as institutionally oriented and guided big-letter Pukka, who immediately spring to mind, are Diogenes, Socrates, Jesus, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Emile Zola (who removed in his writing the formerly demanded social class-distinction as a precondition of a character's literary elevatedness to the status of a main hero, and sported in such a pride of artistic place in his plots 'common' people instead), Victor Hugo, Gerhard Hauptmann and Gorky, on the same account (these three extended sympathetic and psychologically well-discerned main hero-status to thieves and other criminals), Chaplin, Shaw, Sartre, who consequentially expanded this practice even further in their works, and the Rev. David Jenkins, Bishop of Durham, who, in our day, voices the affinity of his consciousness with the lights of the dicta of human reality, underlain by the principle of the anthropologic equality of all men, and his disgust in the face of the fact that the government of our day contradicts and disregards these dicta in their treatment of the poor, in sham Christianity.

Section 6. Part One: On Being Subject too. Which Came First: the Chicken or the Egg?

The two terms of the dualism we are dealing with in this thesis are 'human reality' - 'social reality'. There are, of course, many synonyms to these two terms - we may paraphrase the terms in that dyad as 'my world' - 'the social world', and indeed in many other ways, as listed and presented in diagram form in the Introduction, with the two diagrams summarising these various expressions for these terms, affording a fairly extensive thesaurus of words referring to these concepts.

In dealing with the relationship between the two terms which serve at the heart of the dualism of our interest, we showed a bias to the 'human reality' component in that dyad, in the respect of the volume dedicated to it in our descriptions of it. We have shown, established that term, I think, as meaningful and autonomous in its meaning, as one which has a permanent and consistent identity, as one which subsists, takes its reference from and is mediated by the self as its basic unit, and as one which has typical, indeed inevitable effects, both overt and covert, in the context of the self, effects which touch the social world too, over and above the way in which that term is constitutive of and determines the self. At this stage we are to some extent equipped to tackle the notorious question whether this term, satisfying so many of the criteria of the autonomy of a concept (an autonomy which is assertable at least by virtue of that term's firmly exclusive relationship vis-a-vis another autonomous notion: that of the positive being of society in Durkheim's sense), can therefore be seen as itself a positivity in some sense? If the answer is 'no' and the term is regarded as a negativity, as it is by Sartre, we must further ask whether we can legitimately attach the tag 'being' to it, alongside with characterising the outside world (including the stratum of society in that), as also endowed with 'being', as does Sartre, this practice on his part resulting in an ambiguity in his *oeuvre* of the term 'being'. We can, I feel, also hope to elucidate, maybe even remove, this ambiguity, as an incidental by-product of our discussion of the conceivable

positivity of the term 'human reality', 'my world', etc., - which is the main task in hand at the moment.

Our answer to the erstwhile question: 'is human reality positive?' - is a simple one. The two terms of the dualism we are commenting on, that of Durkheimian positive society and that of human reality, 'my world' etc., are in a special, inseparable, direct and necessary dialectic and mutually exclusive relation to each other, tied to each other in a partnership of opposition: they are the two sides of the coin of human consciousness, amounting to a kinship of negation relative to each other, and in this sense even 'human reality' is experienced as a positivity, at least from a subjective point of view (which is not good enough and therefore we must further argue to show 'human reality' as in a sense positive from an objective point of view too), in moments when 'human reality' is necessarily and successfully pitted against the society as a matter of one's fundamental choice. Not only 'social reality' but also 'human reality' can momentarily assume such a status of 'being', externalised in behaviour for all to see, in overt terms in this sense, in instances when the agent sees it fit to negate in its special idiom - that of the self - the external norm, by means of its insights. (The 'being' of human reality is, in such instances, indicated in terms of what empiricists mean by 'objectivity'; we sha'n't complicate the issue here with that which Sartre means, in counterdistinction with the empiricists, by 'objectivity', though to that Sartrian understanding of the notion, the 'being' of 'human reality' is ^{an} essential and a necessary precondition.) What we merely wish to establish here - or rather, stress again, for the contention was already put forward in the last Section - is that whatever is positivity to one of these pivotal terms of the dualism of our concern, is negativity to the other, and the definition of either of these terms may be taken as tantamount to that which the other is not, as Sartre argues and discerns. Whether one or the other operates as a positivity in consciousness, is a question of focus, as are ambiguous 'figure and ground' pictures in the repertoire of Gestalt psychology, with 'figure' coming to the fore at one time, and 'ground' at another, either one at the other's expense and exclusion. The 'human reality' term, as just

observed, can be grasped as a positivity relative to society when the latter is experienced as an intolerable barrier to the rights and axiomatically assertive standards of the self as such, to its radius of the 'being' of the self *sui generis*, ('being' understood here as contained within socialpsychologic confines, and of a socialpsychologic kind) a 'being' in this peculiar sense, which is irrepressible as we shall try to show, while the 'Being' of society in a different sense co-subsisting within consciousness in its opposite *genre*, uncongenial to the 'being' of the self as such. (it may be useful to denote the 'being' of society in its own peculiar idiom, by spelling its first letter with a 'capital'.) Whilst asserting that consciousness is ever potentially present to the standards of human reality as such, not ousted from there by our sensibility of the schemata of the collective consciousness, we must also stress that, conversely, any attempt on the part of human reality to deny or dislodge society's own kind of Durkheimian, positive Being within as well as outside consciousness, is, of course, an equally hopeless task. Even within consciousness, the Being of society, in Durkheim's ~~sense~~, is permanently present as a potential at least, even in moments of our nihilating it; the two kinds of structures within consciousness, those of society as it subsists in its norm on the one hand, and those of the self on the other, lie dormantly side-by-side even at times when the opposite out of these two alternative modalities of consciousness is being asserted, whether dramatically in extreme choice situations, or in undramatic and everyday ways, in which case either of these terms may prevail latently as a potential only, one ignored and never militantly assumed, one or the other of these modes of consciousness as one's possibility as a self quietly hibernating throughout a lifetime even. However, at times of crises, the two sets of standards, sociologic and socialpsychologic, Sacred and profane, may clash and then the socialpsychologic ones act as destructive to the collective consciousness in its actuality and, conversely, publicly enforced norms are destructive to the inward standards, conditions and dictates of human reality. Relative to one another, in situations of clashes, the sociologic and socialpsychologic planes of 'being' are negative, atomising to, disconstitutive of one another.

We endeavour to show here the meaningfulness of the 'being' of human reality as a positivity in the special sense of the prevalence in consciousness of the agent's possibility as a self, by no means coincidental with what the agent's self is at its established, as a personality in the present, as a mere overt "me"; the 'being' of the self in this sense is the ever prevalent necessary possibility of a self at its completely dualistic, comprised both by the present "me" and the future "I", to which the agent is in a definitive sense privy, if he so chooses himself in socialpsychologic authenticity. The positivity of the self in this sense, (a universal standard to all), is inclusive of the "I" and the functions of the "I": the needs, the duties of the self which rest on, and in turn, comprise the "I" - it is inclusive of the "I"'s experienceable and interpersonally verifiable co-presence with the "me" of our own and the Other's self in our consciousness, indicated by the directly observable physical and the indirectly observable attitudinal grace of the self - that of ourselves and that of the Other, as we defined that towards the very end of the last Section. The self's 'objectivity' in this sense, is meaningful even to the empiricist; and its ensuing 'being' (ideally at least if not yet actually), amounts to our and the Other's being or at least capacity as a one hundred per cent harajan, small-letter sacred self, it amounts to each and every one of us being a hundred per cent whole as such, - to all of us being fulfilled human realities as a matter of our possibilities over and above our actualities as selves (if we don't denounce that); it amounts to the insight and circumstance that one of us, in this full capacity of ourselves, is not worth more than the Other but is worth exactly as much, to the insight and circumstance that each one of us is more than the sums of our parts. In this latter sense, we have a definition of an 'objectivity' whereby to judge the self, which is broader, deeper and more pertinent and complete than the empiricists' grasp of that.

The positive Being of society, as has already been observed at several points of our previous argument, is, if pitted against such a grasp of the 'being' of the self, disconstitutive, 'atomising' to our 'being' as selves in this special sense - and, in extreme cases, fundamentally threatening to it. We enlisted several examples to show

how the 'disconstitution' of the self may take place when attacked by the heavy authority of the established norm's understanding and classification - or rather declassification - of us as selves; the stories of Bluebeard and Judith, that of the awarders of a small grant to me who asked of me, in their anonymity, a begging letter, though they already knew me very well, the instance of a former, long-lost 'friend' quizzing me over the telephone about my family's, and my own, current status in the world so as to prepare me for 'Gerede' in the circles of the subculture which I left, were all variations on this theme. Now I would like to add another example to these in order to illuminate from yet another angle how the small-letter sacred status of selves may be fatally disturbed and caused to go off in a puff of smoke when our own understanding of ourselves, and our right to be fellow-harajans in an anthropologic equality with everybody who posits himself in a similar capacity, is coercively challenged by shoving the official definition of ourselves down our throats on account of our being lowly ascribed in social terms, as a function of our ascriptionally belonging to one kind of rachmones or the other, which forms were enlisted, in an accumulative way, throughout our former argument.

I once taught, briefly, during the first few weeks of a schoolyear, in a school where the headmaster, I remember, called out on one occasion after Assembly: 'Those qualifying for free uniform, please take ten steps forward.' On another occasion he called out: 'Will those who qualify for free school meals, step to one side.' Two formations of people resulted on both occasions whose noticeable level of 'being', in both senses of this term, socially ascribed and socialpsychologically maintained, palpably registered as different from the more dignified selves of the children who were not asked to move. Those singled out by the headmaster's command, became manifest as selves - reduced, atomised, unfulfilled ones - declarative to the eye of their non-management, inadequacy in the socialpsychologic job of gracefully co-ordinating, as autonomous persons, the needs of the "I" with the "me" as the occasion to meet and satisfy those needs and lights. They stood there as "me"-s only, but not as successfully stated "I"-s as well, they did not feature as their privileges to be complete, small-letter sacred selves in the

sense of the roundedness of their egos with the legitimacy of their being self-fulfilled selves inclusive with the statement or indication of their own "I" underlying their "me", just like all the others who were not asked to step out of the formation of the first, seemingly homogeneous group of individuals, of whom we assumed, to begin with, that they were satisfactorily coping with their everydays as such. The headmaster, their 'Referee' for the moment so to speak (for the meaning of this term see Section 2. in this chapter), displayed them as second-rate selves in the above described sense. They lacked grace; and so, Paul and Sartre would say, did the headmaster who has rendered them thus in manifest actuality. The non-managers stood out as 'not whole' in socialpsychologic terms, they stood out as people with 'no halo' in the sense formerly described in the context of the Referee. They were shown as big-letter, ascribed Rachmones, owing to both social and socialpsychologic features inherent in them as displayed, as underlined by the two formations resulting from the headmaster's command, the locus of the children as occupants of one of the two groups or the other, indicative of their social, and, just as importantly in the context which we endeavour to argue here, also anthropologic class (as either Sacred or Profane, that is), though they may have been 'master', small-letter sacred, as an intrapersonal matter private to them. The 'romantic' social thinker, particularly the existentialist, will tell us that whether or not the agent complies as his private affair with his externally typecast role prompted by his sociologically, structurally constituted situation, whether or not he adjusts as a self to his ascribed anthropologic classification as gestured from without, - his "me" will not collapse into the collective consciousness without residue, - his "me", fulfilled or unfulfilled, will persist as the experience of the self, *sui generis*. There is a peculiar autonomy of a socialpsychologic nature, albeit sometimes present as a potential only, in people being self-possessed, in an episode, an encounter which is properly of a socialpsychologic nature being self-contained, self-sufficient as such, and very great reward in the quiet adequacy of the successful co-ordination of "me"-s and "I"-s in terms of selves, within a socialpsychologic compass; in simply coping, in other words, in people conducting, producing, managing the husbandry of the self in

satisfactory socialpsychologic relations to other selves, which interpersonal socialpsychologic traffic takes place in terms of "me"-s and "I"-s between people in the idiom of social creativity, inventiveness, as a matter of the participants' own discretion, with relationships and dependencies adequately managed by all, in the spirit of respect for the self in oneself as well as in others as equal harajans. Such adequate management is an undramatic catharsis, adjustment, synthesis, coincidence between man's two sets of possibilities, needed and actual, "me"-s and "I"-s, enjoyed in a quietly conscious, rather than self-unaware manner; the everyday, experientially soiled, lived, small-letter *nirvana* of life quite simply coped with, one which doesn't normally include crises - it is the successfully managed socialpsychologic mastery of the reality of significant selves (defined and described as 'salient' in the Introduction) - one's own included - it's the self-reflective intrinsic reward of such adequacy, and of effecting such adequacy in others in a project of 'engineering' (the concept described in Section 4. in this chapter), the joy in the act of bringing together "me"- and "I"-s that fit, as a matter of course, with the resulting socialpsychologic reality seen and enjoyed as an end in itself. It was this tier and sense of the 'being' of the self - the properly and peculiarly socialpsychologic one, which the headmaster chose to burst, using the potent socialpsychologic weapon of defining, classifying the children as small-letter and big-letter Profane which was at his disposal as the 'caretaker' of the individuals in his care, by bringing to bear on their situation the ascribed, socially external classification of the children in question, an idiom alien and repellent to the 'being' of their selves in and as their socialpsychologic fullness and therefore adequacy as whole selves.

We have tried to show the sanctity of the self or human reality as a proper and self-contained sphere of the being of the self, - self-contained because systematically different from the slavish ascription-abundance of consciousness as a function of the agent's fundamental choice - showing human reality as a well delineated radius for 'being' and acting as a consciousness which consists, in a real, meaningful and peculiar way, in the grasp and mode of one's conduct as

socialpsychologically whole, which is susceptible to 'disconstitution' if the whole in which it peculiarly subsists, is torpedoed, threatened in its own peculiar idiom, its organisation into an autonomous self caused to burst into pieces, dislodged and replaced by a socially ascriptional or empiricistically atomistic definition of that. Now we will turn our attention to the opposite paradigm of 'disconstitution', that of the atomisation, this time by human reality, of the autonomous whole in which society peculiarly consists (as Durkheim showed), with the content of the 'wholeness' of the externally positive Being of society, different from that of the self, but a wholeness none the less which is essential for society to subsist sacredly and with its own kind of dignity, as it must, particularly in situations where it is essential and proper that it be spared individual critique as a precondition of the assertion and upkeep of its very Being. Such is the case in courtrooms, in games where the role, standing and ruling of the umpire or referee must not be challenged, in the various kinds of Forces, or in the various government offices where the administrative function of society is being enforced and conducted, to pinpoint just a few of all those occasions and settings where the idiom of the Being of society emphatically and properly prevails in a superordinate capacity over the 'being' of human reality. In such situations the introduction and voicing of the socialpsychologic idiom registers as other, alien, as inappropriate. Subjective side-tracks, personal witticisms, acts of individual self-assertion, are redundant, and have the effect of being disruptive, disconstitutive, 'deconstructive' of the socially whole, sacred, solemn representation and prevalence of the collective consciousness at its pure and formal: the condition of its very Being as specially asserted and sustained in such situations; and if challenged and threatened to be replaced and disrupted by human reality, the introduction of the idiom of the self is liable to 'atomise', shortchange, betray its Being for what it is, by blowing that to shreds, fragmenting, parcelling it up so as to serve the ego's lights and purposes. We have already put forward an example of how this may happen, when we analysed, from this point of view, Šveik's escapades in the army of the Kaiser, in Chapter I. Some new examples will now be offered to

illustrate the phenomenon of the 'atomisation' of the proper whole of society by human reality, in disrespect and uncongeniality to it.

Someone told me that, the other day, when his business took him to court, he saw a man come up before the judge, charged with a small crime. 'Have you anything to say?' the judge asked before sentencing him. 'Beam me up, Scottie', the man remarked, hopefully. Everyone present fell about, laughing; the court disintegrated and the judge imposed on the man a fine for contempt of court, in accord with the demands of the situation. He 'had no choice' as the judge; he was less free to deviate from the standard practices of the court than was the man up in front of him. The judge had to be his own judge too, enforcing the judiciality of everyone's consciousness, appropriately defined in the given situation as the collective consciousness - whereas the man, in exchange for a mere fine, had taken back his blemished ego from the care of the judge, and asserted it as whole on the situation-alien plane of human reality.

From the world of literature, a fine example of the symbolic rendering of the rival concurrence in consciousness of these two frameworks available for its choice, the socially sacred and the socialpsychologically profane, is afforded by Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard. (33) The cherry orchard in this play quite simply stands for the collective consciousness or the Sacred; and Lopakhin, in having taken it over merely by virtue of having earned his right to it by way of individual business enterprise, is in this sense guilty of heresy. The heresy of his act does not consist in his having crossed, by the same fell swoop, the crucial social class barrier between the money-ed and the havenots, or not in that alone as an oversimplistic critic might make out, but in having transformed the Being of the 'cherry orchard' as that social whole in which it was formerly represented by the landed family in the *ancient régime*, so to speak, (a feudal one), which was in a relationship of an ideologically formerly and traditionally justified, not to say Sacred ownership and caretakership to that land. Chekhov characterises this ascriptionally highly elevated family richly and in terms of the noblest personality traits - not for Chekhov to present

that now historically redundant upper class by means of a cheap, *pastiche* schematisation. Lopakhin succeeded in buying the cherry orchard by taking out a mortgage payable back only after the land's division into rentable allotments. With the "me" of Lopakhin (in the broad sense as described in the Section called 'Being and Having'), as the telos of the act, the individual project of his act as the new 'master' of the 'cherry orchard', fulfilled, had atomised the 'orchard', made it into dust, and with it everything for which that stood: the intact whole of the by-gone society, complete with its own values. Lopakhin, brought up as the offspring of a serf, is sensible to his heresy and cringes, stumbles awkwardly this way and that, bows under the guilt of it; as a fulfilled self he is jubilant - these two conflicting modes of the awareness of his self, the socialpsychologic one realised and the society-compliant and abiding one failed in the duty to which he was conditioned, alternating in the character during the last act, without a middle course.

Another example which symbolically depicts a wild individualism and self-seeking, causing the disintegration of the whole of the state, without, however, a reciprocal social insight within consciousness inwardly resulting in remorse at this sacrilege, is provided by Marlowe in the character of Edward the Second, as reflected in this excerpt:

King Edward: (aside) It boots me not to threat; I must speak fair:
 The legate of the Pope will be obey'd.
 (Aloud) My lord, you shall be Chancellor of the realm;
 Thou, Lancaster, High Admiral of our fleet;
 Young Mortimer and his uncle shall be earls;
 And you, Lord Warwick, President of the North;
 And thou of Wales. If this content you not,
 Make several kingdoms of this monarchy,
 And share it equally amongst you all,
 So I may have some nook or corner left
 To frolic with my dearest Gaveston. (34)

When positing social reality and human reality, the two terms in the dualism we are dealing with, as two layers of reality, each one with a well-delineated radius of 'being', organically tied together as consumers, by necessity, of one another as a function of and as the

possibility of their own assertion, subsistence, and both interdependent in their mutual opposition as the 'no' to the other as the condition of the saying 'yes' to itself, the question of the primacy of one or the other of these terms in their actuality on this earth, inevitably arises. Which came first, the Being of social reality in consciousness in Durkheim's positive sense, or human reality as the absolute negativity to that, for which both Durkheim and Sartre recognise that in its relationship to the indissoluble Being of society? Our answer to this famous dilemma is inspired by, takes its position from, French structuralism which sees any two of such interdependent, dualistic categories, as absolutely simultaneous in the question of their advent, as well as in their import; with neither of the terms deserving title to primacy, but both simultaneous, depending for their own definition on each other, each gaining meaningfulness and identity as that which the other is not as consciousness. We may observe with Bertrand Russell that language (one important index and overt medium of consciousness), bears witness to the circumstance that man learnt to say 'no' as soon as he learnt to say 'yes', from the outset: with things and affairs human, Russell proposes, being marked and expressed, and functioning exclusively, in concepts which are capable of being negated. We might say that society is the phylogenetic precondition of the reality of human consciousness as the self, endowed with the power of reflection to know itself as such, because in evolution, rudiments of society preceded the emergence of humanity. On the other hand, rudiments of intelligence (experimental psychology shows), also preceded the presence of *homo sapiens* on earth.

Ontogenetically approached, our position is also even-handedly dualistic with regard to the question of the primacy of one of our terms or the other, either the social "me", the vehicle of the generalized other (developed in the course of socialisation) or, alternatively, the "I", the spontaneous tool and medium for the promotion of man's individual needs and responses to society as such, which Mead sees as also an indissoluble precondition in the mechanism whereby the self is ever mediated, though he modestly qualifies the "I" as merely a 'methodical device' in his model of human conduct and

consciousness. The natural concurrence of the "I" and the "me" in conducting any verbal, reflective or interpersonal traffic, and the unnaturalness and 'obscenity' (Sartre's term) of jettisoning an "I"-saturated modality of the self - or, in Sartre's terminology: human reality, in the business of conducting ourselves in personal and interpersonal intercourse in any here-and now as adult consciousnesses, is an important point in making a case for the natural concurrence (the precondition of adjustment, to Sartre) ⁽³⁵⁾ of the 'body', the social body included, for us, by implication, as expanded on before, and, on the other side, the subjectivity-shot 'my world' or simply the self as such. An exhaustive thesaurus of morally and socialpsychologically unbecoming paradigms and modalities of the self in which either 'object' or 'subject', "me" or "I", is made redundant in conduct, will be put forward and analysed in some depth and volume throughout the next chapter. However, in the question of the temporal primacy in ontogeny of one of these two terms in the self (the "me" and the "I", that is), we also assume a stance egalitarian to both these terms, from the point of view of their advent in a person's life-history, a point which may conveniently be discussed here.

The French Enlightenment was fundamentally preoccupied with what we now call the infrastructure of the self at its complete as both "me" and "I", highly critical of the way of life which living as a "me" only amounted to, no less than was Sartre. Rousseau in particular concerned himself with the ideal of what we now call a fully shouldered human reality informed by its authentic, spontaneous lights at its true, entertaining that as a morally desirable frame of reference, superior to a merely conventionally socialised "me" as the fountainhead of one's private morality. He saw, as we do, human reality in its true form hallmarked by laudable attributes peculiar to it, with the self's excellence being of a certain first-hand quality available only with regard to and by the assimilation of those attributes. But we cannot agree (and modern social science also showed it as erroneous), with the tenet on which Rousseau based his educationalistically consequential novel Emile, that keeping, safeguarding the developing child from socialisation in the world as it was in his day, which he critically

identified as rotten to the core, would produce a breed of man innocent of the artfulness of that society and its morally unattractive norms - that by simply banning, stifling, eliminating from the child's education any exposure to the generalized other with all the ethical imperfections of it, would produce a 'Noble Savage', a valiant Tarzan, uncorrupted by the self-contradictory standards of the reigning society. The fortunes of Amala and Kamala, two twin sisters, lost from infancy from their little Indian village and reared by animals (as was the fictional Mowgli, also inspired by a similar socialpsychologically 'romantic' view), only to be recovered, at the age of ten, by the human community into which they were born, unable to learn to speak, to relate socially to other humans, to walk upright or even to survive for very long after their rediscovery, shows the *naïveté* of the socialscientifically romantic myth that in ontogeny the noble standards of human reality at its highly developed can conceivably be spoon-fed as some tangible positivity in a pure form as such, in independence and seclusion from the "me". The two girls of our example whose developing selves were kept altogether from socialisation, failed to attain such horizons of rationality which were human at all, let alone superior to the compromised limits of selves socialised to an unattractive model of a given generalized other, however disagreeable the reigning form of that established system of norms may have been to the authentic.

Nor can we agree, as the other side of the coin, with those social theoreticians who reserve any meaningfulness, validity and endowment with 'being' to the "me" only (out of the socialpsychologic "me"- "I" ensemble), waiving aside the role and existence of the "I" as speculative and absurdly (and certainly unfashionably) metaphysical. The *tabula rasa* theory ingeniously and insightfully postulates that man's consciousness at birth is like a wax writing board which awaits psychologically overt experiences being carved onto it in the course of social learning so as to attain any acquisition as an intelligence which is of a human order; but however apt, useful and fruitful this theory, we cannot agree with those empiricistic apostles of it who equate the emptiness of that 'board' at the outset in life, and its scope, programmability, with nothing at all - we can't agree with theories of

the *tabula rasa*, in other words, which, because of the virginity of that 'board' at birth, deny or miss the *tabula rasa* of their postulation as a significant and meaningful frame of capacities for peculiarly human possibilities, we can't side with such interpretations of it which deny the simile of the *tabula rasa* its role as the ground of the eventual negation by the socialised adult of the social contents with which it has been filled as the "me" in imperceptible continuity with the social norm as expressed in the generalized other (of which kind of negation man alone is capable). We decry such approaches to the *tabula rasa* which miss its character as a well-delineated and absolute Sartrean 'lack' ready and endowed with the capacity to receive input for a 'rationality' gathered in the process of consciousness being furnished with external social stimuli, and beyond that empirical input, as a critical response to those stimuli, ever pushing itself as such a response capacity to hitherto unplumbed, untried heights of a rationality and intelligence which supersedes in its repertoire and quality its overt input, and is no longer justified and completely analysable in terms of that input alone. We cannot accept such interpretations of the *tabula rasa* theory of consciousness which treat that concept, just because of its intactness from any stimulation at birth, and just because of its susceptibility to being thwarted by insufficiently intensive stimulation, is something that might as well not be there, not reckoned with as the potential mammoth horizon for human consciousness as such. This *tabula rasa*, in the usual human sense, is something that man emphatically does have and lower animals don't, however intensively they may be stimulated. Foucault pointed out that every culture at its given and actual is that set of choices which the species did not reject, which it cared, chose to engrave onto the *tabula rasa* in the dimensions of an entire culture. Ontogenetically speaking, Simone de Beauvoir observed that every choice involves, marks, represents a loss: the loss of another potential, another scope for human consciousness than the one opted for, the rejected one also potentially amenable to entering onto the *tabula rasa*, that which the *tabula rasa* might have been ready and capable of accomodating, assimilating, tolerating, catering for, but didn't happen to. The fact (returning to Foucault's cultural dimensions of entertaining this notion) that the species,

genetically hardly varied, supports so many cultures, suggests that to the metaphoric *tabula rasa*, to this firmament of possibilities for the modes and degrees of accomplishments of human consciousness, actual cultures are fortuitous limits; and (back in the realms of ontogeny again), monozygotic twin studies in psychology show that two specimens of the species identically encoded with potentials for sustaining a "me", are capable of developing completely different personalities, choosing completely different courses of life. This implies the reality and import of the *tabula rasa* as emphatically not nothing, but a framework of possibilities inclusive of all that which consciousness is not, not yet, not quite and not for everyone, and it also shows the absurdity of a puristic learning theory in which the notion of the *tabula rasa* is used to negate this concept as the capacity of consciousness as a meaningful and perhaps infinite repertoire and store of possibilities for human choices, - in a grasp of that notion which is pitifully inadequate when compared with a postulation of the *tabula rasa* as a necessary precondition of the cross-fertilising process in ontogenetic history between a peculiarly human frame of capacities on the one hand, and its stimulation, endorsement, by way of learning, through the systematic exposure of that to the environment on the other hand, as does Piaget. Piaget has a name for the dimension of consciousness whose existence we currently argue - that of man's potential encodedness to be responsive to, effected and complemented by learning, borrowed from Saussure, his fellow-structuralist. The name of this dimension is the semiotic function, which, according to Saussure's and Piaget's postulation, causes the child (and the adult if this faculty is not eventually conditioned out of him by his being systematically punished for engaging in other than tangibly positive goal-directed learning), to play for hours on end without being reinforced in an extrinsic sense, in that sense, in other words, in which classical learning theorists exclusively understand 'reinforcement'.

Towards the end of Section 1. in this chapter, we treated and analysed the notion of 'the gift' at considerable length. Summarily put, 'the gift' is the entire and all-inclusive array of one's talents,

capacities of consciousness for being realised in overt conduct as the degree and form of excellence for the cultivation, activation, fulfilment, cashing in of it in the actuality of one's socialpsychologic lifecourse, with which we were specially encoded when we came into the world. The view we afforded of this concept at that point of our thesis had a lot in common with the moral of the 'parable of the talents' in the New Testament. We distinguished at that point between the small-letter meaning of 'the gift' - that of the duty, by the lights of socialpsychologic authenticity, to realise the scores of capacities with which we were blessed as individuals when we were born, as just referred to - and the big-letter meaning of the term, denoting those objects, tangible or socially symbolic 'valuables', which we present to others as tokens representing us as 'gifted', figuring as a representative sample of our very selves and of our output as somewhat excellent, as signified by a section of our self-made (including earned) rewards of that with which we chose to part so as to share that with the Other in and through the gift. Returning to the first, small-letter meaning of the term, how could we underscore, supplement by way of our use of it, our current endeavour to demonstrate the 'being' of the self in a special, socialpsychologic sense? How could we better pinpoint, using that concept, the meaningful reality of the store of our original potentials as cognisant humans, uniquely 'gifted', unlike other animals, as 'species-beings', as well as uniquely and variably 'gifted', as individuals, at a stage when our 'gift' or rather store of 'gifts', is still unrealised, as in the case of the newborn infant, or in the more mature individual in whom the realisation of the 'gift' of the self failed to come to full fruition? In elucidating the difference between our maximum potentials as *homo sapiens* and as individual specimens as such from the outset in terms of our possibilities, and the extent to which we turned out to be gifted in some particular sense or another, as 'objectively' measurable by the psychologist and also indicated in its observable actuality in other ways by ourselves and by others (the two, the ceiling of our potential 'gift' and what we can actually show for it conceivably, indeed often, not coincidental), we can profitably borrow from McGill University's famous psychologist, Hebb, for the analogy-value of his thesis regarding the two facets of intelligence in any one

of us, potential and actual. 'Intelligence', Hebb's sole object of interest in this context, is not, of course, the same concept as human reality for whose demonstration as a dual capacity (ideal and actual), we shall borrow from Hebb; his 'intelligence' comprises merely one item in the possibly obtainable armoury of the latter; and it is certainly not a necessary determinant or precondition for one's excellence as and endowment with our capacity for human reality. However, human reality as a concept and phenomenon is nevertheless profitably amenable, as a question of form and method, to a like treatment to Hebb's approach to intelligence, with the role of the pre-encoded qualities tacitly inherent in the *tabula rasa*, virgin consciousness as such the way I see it, capable of being fathomed analogously, in many ways, to Hebb's 'potential intelligence', and the agent's - any agent's - quality as a human reality in its factually attained form, lending itself to a fertile formal comparison with Hebb's 'actual intelligence'.

Hebb postulates two aspects of intelligence, pertaining to everyone, Intelligence A and Intelligence B. Intelligence A is the ideal, 'pure' ceiling to one's intelligence as genetically encoded for one, that limit to which intelligence is capable of being developed, of being expressed in the measurable actuality of that after an educational lifetime of its optimum stimulation: a capacity. Hebb's work implies that this maximal potential ceiling is concrete in each individual, varying from person to person. Intelligence B, in contrast, is that level of intelligence, demonstrable and testable in a narrow sense, which the individual has actually attained, that level of accomplishment which has actually been carved upon the *tabula rasa*, in intellectual terms. If - or rather when - less than optimally stimulated, coaxed, teased into its actual being, intelligence B is inferior in its scope and quality to Intelligence A, and, conversely and sadly, in cases where Intelligence A is of a very limited standard, no extent of coaxing and coaching will significantly and generically push that to any barrier higher than Intelligence A, as completely realised in an Intelligence B; (though there are some who don't accept the second half of this proposition). Human reality, capacity for social creativity (as distinct from the capacity for one's merely being intelligent), can, I feel, also be postulated, fathomed,

grasped at its ideal, as an 'A-capacity', so to speak, available for one's fulfillment or, alternatively, to the starvation, to the laying oneself waste as such in one's conduct, if not cultivated. This A-capacity, I believe, is individual-invariant in its general presence for all persons, (not in the respect of its given forms which obtain, out of the store of all possible talents, in any one of us, of course), a constant for the species, haunting each individual as a universal potential quality which is there for all, though not universal for all regarding its content, and certainly not dependent, in all of its forms, on I.Q. I once attended a lecture by MacQuarrie, in which he spoke of the concept of this maximal endowment, A-capacity for excellence by general human measures in the species and the particular ways in which this meaningfully exists for the individual, particularly as this notion is entertained in Japanese philosophy as the Ideal Face. The Ideal Face, to expand on this notion, is the self as optimally fulfilled to the maximum potential of its original capacity for merit as that which we call human reality, which is there as an ideal, even if we sadly fail to completely realise, or even significantly approximate to it, hitting, in its ideality if not in its actuality, the upper limit which man, endowed with the *tabula rasa* (tantamount to the Ideal Face when not conceived as a void, empiricist fashion, just because not yet 'written' on it at birth), has it in him to attain - the store of talents, in other words, which Christian personal ethics bid man, in a kindred way to ancient Japanese philosophy, to bring to as full a fruition as possible in the way one conducts oneself with this ideal of one's excellence as human reality always in sight. Our actual self as manifest, amenable both to psychologic testability and, even more poignantly and importantly, to the constant appraisal of it both by ourselves and by others in the business of our normal everydays, could be conceived as our 'Actual Face', as a sort of Human Reality B, the totality of us, in our actual personalities, as the mere extent to which we managed, as a matter of empiricistically 'objective' fact, to cash in on the talents which we came into the world with, and whose incompleteness with the rest of our potentials, both to the ancient Japanese philosopher and to the authentic Christian, we are accountable to ourselves and to others. The Ideal Face of our selves is both

experienceable (its presence as our pure possibilities ever 'haunting us', as Sartre will have it), and meaningful, both to the individual whose Ideal Face is implicated (everyone), and as a notion for philosophy or even social science to usefully (and, I think, necessarily) entertain. The difference between our Ideal Face and our Actual Face is that in the notion of the Ideal Face the "I" assumes a predominant role, whereas our 'Actual Face' consists, in cases of absolute bad faith, of a "me" only. The "I" of which the Ideal Face almost exclusively consists, is not, of course, a pure and disembodied notion. It is an "I" which differentially obtains for everyone, and makes sense only in conjunction with the limited and experientially soiled "me", whose concrete limitations when compared with our presence to our 'haunting' Ideal Face, we wish to supersede in the very particularity in which it consists and irks us with its imperfection, as a precondition of our attaining, or at least approximating, our Ideal Face. The Ideal Face is the mode of our emphatic not being as selves what we ought to be, illuminated in the meaningful light of that ideal of us, to which we are ever present if we so choose, as ancient Japanese thinkers and Sartre are telling us, and it (the 'ideal Face', that is), is therefore useful and makes sense in terms of its ever-continuous conjunction with the "me" which we in fact are as that imperfect state and standard of us as personalities which we wish to transcend. The Ideal Face is of import as an available party, saturated as it is with an "I", which we may crave to marry, if we are authentic, to our actual "me" in our consciousness and conduct, so that those may be fulfilled by the peculiar measures and dicta of human reality; - the Ideal Face, then, serves as the scope for our ideal realisation as selves, attainable for our knowledge, and acts as the standard of our self as that ought to be, peculiarly for each and every one of us. It would not be out of joint with a Sartrian conceptualisation of this "I"-saturated residue in our selves over and above what we are in actuality as "me"-s only, to call that 'the soul'; though in its Sartre-prompted understanding, this soul is (at a hundred and eighty degree variance with its usual conceptualisation) something that is plentiful (at its completely unrealised), absolute as the total bundle of the individual's human possibilities at birth, and completely, absolutely lost at death

after a lifetime of its waning, at which moment it's only the body which remains intact and survives as the plenitude of the "me". Our stress in viewing the "me" which we leave behind at our death, is not, at this moment, on the physiologic tier of its being 'body', flesh, but (as accentuated in the last Section), the symbolic tier of the being of the "me" as a question of its occupation of, membership in the body of the community, *soma Christou*, in which context Sartre so compellingly treats this phenomenon in his chapter called 'My Death', and the other chapters surrounding that in Being and Nothingness. In such a context, it is true to say, with Sartre, that the being of the self, having shed the soul (the "I", the firmament of the self's further possibilities as such, its Sartrian 'movement', its dynamism), will graduate to, or be demoted to (depending on the point of view which we adopt towards it), a purely sociologic sphere of its existence, as the name for which it survives, as *object only* in this sociologic and socialpsychologic sense, available for comment and judgement by the Other and the generalized other, without being able to retort to that by way of its ever-altered 'being' as a live and vital human reality which it carries on shaping, in response to its recognised limitations in the light of the criticism of the generalized other, and its own personal response to that as the living soul, informed by the Ideal Face: a private and inexhaustible frame of reference for an ever more authentic being as a self.

Sartre also devotes his attention to the relation of this 'soul' to the carnal human body, the evolutionarily lowest tier of the 'being' of the "me" for us, out of the three tiers of 'being' it is anchored in: the physiologic, the socialpsychologic and the social, to which three-fold stratum of its necessary sphere of functioning we have already dedicated considerable volume in our foregoing argument, and Sartre's observation that it is the 'soul' which ceases at death and the physiological body in its absurd and perishable form which remains, also holds good in this latter, ontic context. As has been the case with the 'being' of the socialpsychologic "me" whose perishing at death and transformation into a purely sociologic "me" we just commented on, the 'soul' (and all its synonyms just enlisted: 'movement', dynamism etc), which at this point leaves the body, is but an abstraction when

postulated as something distinct from the "me" as a component of the self: it doesn't occur in nature in any form or sense other than in conjunction with the "me", the occasion for that in the living body: it's simply the 'life' of it, whether on the actual level of physiology, or on the symbolic one as the socialpsychologic "me", as already commented on above. Conversely, restricting our argument for the moment to the physiologic confines of the being of the Sartrian 'body' or self, whilst the "I" is never directly encountered in nature in a way disembodied from it (though indicated in people's lifetime by way of indices of it in the overt behaviour of the 'body' and its socialpsychologic qualities), the body without life is eminently conceivable and observable in its tangible actuality, though, of course, not as alive. Is this circumstance reason to grant the physiologic body (the "me" only at the biologic level, that is) primacy over the "I", which during life inhabits it? Such a conception upholding on this ground the primacy of the body crude and raw in its relationship to the "I", would absurdly 'tend to put the corpse at the origin of the living body', as Sartre observed. (35) The phenomenon we are interested in is the 'body' in the full Sartrian, animated sense, as activated and operative hybridly with the "I" in and as its peculiar reality, that of the self in other words, a "me" ever-married, in one's lifetime, to the "I", its life-function as full human reality. The manifest corpse - the body without life - is in no way more relevant, to this reality in the making and operation of the self in its full and proper sense than is the abstract "I" alone. It is true of the "I", what is true of the 'flesh', the physiologic "me" only, that it can only attain occasion to function to its full potential in the living self as understood by us, in and through its ensemble with the other out of these components of the self, and either the raw physiologic "me" or the disembodied "I" is inconceivable in any sense in the context of the self's living and therefore full and proper reality as such, apart from the other component of the self; the "me" attains meaning in the "I", the "I" attains Being in the "me", and the two together yield human reality, which is properly hybrid with these two components of itself, in the active 'marriage' of which components it attains and sustains 'being' in the sense peculiar to itself.

What other attributes, apart from its life, does Sartre identify as defining and characterising the "I", or rather one's pure possibilities in the Being-for-Itself, as dualistically married in such inseparable conjunction to the 'flesh' in the biologic tier of the "me", and the psychologic, or socialpsychologic personality at the symbolic tier of the 'being' of the "me", as a member of the body society?

In the same train of thought by him regarding the corpse to which we just referred, Sartre puts forward two further essential aspects of his concept of pure possibilities (our 'soul', the "I", etc.). These two further aspects or attributes of the notion in hand, are 'action' and 'meaning'. 'There is no difference in nature between action and life', he writes, also observing that '...the body... is meaningful... The body is the totality of meaningful relations to the world.' The 'body' is used by him in these contexts in his own, special sense, understood as hybrid and alive, as synonymous with human reality, as the dualistic conglomerate of body and soul, "me" and "I" if we want to use a Meadean terminology; in a sense therefore which is to be sharply distinguished from the corpse. At another point of Being and Nothingness, when Sartre elucidates the problem of 'grace', he adds the attribute of 'movement' to those features, already listed, whose presence in consciousness and overt behavioural actuality distinguishes the full self from a mere "me" (57), and we propose to contribute the concept of the 'future' to round off this inventory of attributes characteristically attaching to our so far somewhat motley notion of the "I", pure possibilities, etc., which is postulated here as in a special and fateful relation opposite the biologic and/or socialpsychologic "me" in making up the self in its proper and full sense, in the several tiers of its reality.

'Life' as used by Sartre, biologic life in its crudest and most essential form, is a strong and fruitful term to see at the core of the Sartrian dualistic notion of the 'body', the body as living, as endowed with an "I", as being complete with *anima* breath, movement. *Anima* seems a happy term to denote this composite notion, our "I", as it unites, in its connotations, the concepts of the soul and of its index, according to Sartre, in movement, animation. The interchangeable use of 'life' and

'soul' by the early Christians, bestowed on 'life' a symbolic meaning too (as we do), expanding the mere physiologic meaning of that term to encompass the function, area of operation and the meaning of the *anima* as operative in its socialpsychologic compass in relation to the sphere of being of the "me" at the symbolic level, as a function of one's membership in the community, the generalized other, *soma Christou*. By their understanding of 'life' at this level, they extended, projected their grasp of 'life' in this latter, socialpsychologic sense, into heaven after the individual's ontic death, as a displacement mechanism, source of comfort, in the face of the suffering by many (or rather most) an unjustly starved, thwarted condition of the "I" and its worldly socialpsychologic grace and dignity here on earth during their lifetime; affording, by virtue of this displacement, a dimension of the notion of the "I" (and its synonyms), which is not necessary for its meaningful postulation in its mundane spheres in the here-and-now, or in the immediate future vitally connected with the here-and-now (our concern), though not embarrassing to that either; merely incidental to that. As for the kinship, or even synonymity, in this context, of the "I", man's possibilities as individuals etc., with the notion of the 'future', we can again say both with Sartre and with Bultmann (and other 'romantic' Christians), that it exists, pertains, operates, if not denied natural and spontaneous expansion in the course of a kind of socialization repressive to it, as the *tabula rasa* of our understanding as initially not yet realised, but imperatively to-be-realised talent as social creativity and any or all forms of it (expanded on in Section 1. in this chapter), for which our potential and particular endowment makes us fit. The *tabula rasa* subsists significantly as a set of potentials for the future at birth: there is plenty of "I", plenty of its 'future' then; not first and foremost in the sense of the projection of that future, displaced into heaven after life as it was to the early Christians, for instance, but as understood by us, here on earth, within the compass of a lifetime. To enlist here Sartre's famous moon-metaphor for elucidating the meaning of this 'future', "I", virgin 'Being-for-Itself' etc., and its ontogenetic history, we may liken the firmament of these as yet almost totally unrealised possibilities at birth to the large invisible area at the heart of the waxing moon, and the "me", (or the 'existing',

to Sartre) as the thin slice of the visible portion of the disc of the moon which at this early stage of its waxing is perceptible to us. At first the self, by analogy, is almost all future, secret, darkness to us, fathomable as the non-manifest conglomerate of our as yet latent potentials, with very little 'existing' as an already lived "me". But the moon waxes: there is less and less of the future and more and more of the 'existing', more and more of the "me" of the self as learned, already socialised, that overt component of the self which has already come to pass, as it both is and knows itself to be in external and observable as well as self-analytic ways, as therefore possessed in this way, by oneself and by others, through its ever-more-completely realised being and knowledge pertaining to itself in and as the self, and to others in relation to that. To the existentialist moralist, and even more pronouncedly to the existentialist theologian, such as Tillich, it is therefore not nothing at all in which the dark area of the moon, signifying the individual's realm of potentials, consists, but big-letter, significant Nothing, a genetic encodedness and duty to realise as human reality, which the developing and fully developed individual may retain as a live-wire potential to be an original self and authentic at that during adulthood even, underlying his ever-growing overt personality in the form of the Sartrian 'existing' and the Meadean "me", a splinter of god or the spark as the Gnostics saw it, if you like, who isn't, always, forever, a share in us of the almighty who is omnipresently not, who is for an eternity dependably, functionally, usefully absent as a standard to the self which that is called to realise, and which is irreducibly other in kind than the "me" from the outset (though in a vital and particular dialectic relation to that as a condition of the concrete 'being' of that as a self), which is in an organic and fateful relation to the "me" or the 'existing', the overt personality as that demonstrably exists at any time, not vulgarly absent, meaningless and devoid of a referent as the materialistic monist would have it, but present as potential energy at birth when the 'soul', if you like, is absolute, looms large in the innocence of childhood, in the child's (and if not conditioned out of him in the course of socialisation, also the adult's) play, as the Saussurian 'semiotic function'. As life goes on, this precious dark area as integral part,

referent and precondition of the authentic self wanes, together with the waxing of the visible portion of the moon, and is, at death, completely lost, ceasing totally at the moment when the soul of the individual in the way as we see that, dies, and one's life at the level of the symbolic positivity of society, in which the realised biography of the self was and remains included, continues as part of society only and in no other sense, without its being socialpsychologically enlivened by the vivid and active individual "I", the once alive self, surviving, after the death of the "I", in one's name, in a solid, social "me" only, occupying the here-and-now apart now from one's particularly experienced, living self, without human reality; it exists, survives at this stage in the form of its already accomplished 'existing', "me", as public property, with the outside events in which the individual agent was engaged having completely caught up with him as a self, without any further remaining possibilities for him as a self in the 'disc of the moon', without any future in earthly confines, without any chance for the further transcendence, betterment of the self. At this point one is sociologic body only, the index of the now completely judged individual after his exertions as human reality in the race to catch up with the socialpsychologically enticing 'kingdom come' awaiting, teasing the individual here on earth, as the ideality of one's fathomed Human Reality A, the Ideal Face. At death Human Reality B becomes the official version of one's *curriculum vitae*, graduating at this point to an obituary, the definitive version of his story about himself, which is from that point in time onwards no longer subject to argument, pleading, room for manoeuvre, further choices or qualitative alterations of that on the part of the individual to whom this life-story attaches.

At this point of the argument, the "I", with all its synonyms enlisted so far, postulated as an indissmissible component dimension of the self, emerges as illuminated through many angles, enriched with several kindred notions put forward in the hope of enhancing the meaningfulness and importance of it as we postulate it. A summary of the above enlisted synonyms and kins of this notion, the "I", will follow directly below, in Part 2. of this Section, where it will be further highlighted by a couple of new notions vitally pertaining to it.

Section 6. Part Two: On Being Subject too; Rosebud or Bête Noire?

The train of thought of Part 1. of this Section treated the question of the primacy, or more precisely, the co-presence, in consciousness, of the two pivotal terms of our dualism, one of its terms, the externally positive one, somewhat extended, in this context, to embrace not only the sociological, but also the physiological realm of its Being and operation: involving, in a dialectic relation to each other, the external reality in which we are anchored, in two tiers of nature, through our "me" which occupies these two strata of crudely positive Being in the world (the social and the physiological, that is), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, human reality in the full sense, importantly, innerly, indismissably and properly constituted partially by the "I", as well as by the "me" in both of the tiers in nature in which the "me" is externally lodged, so that this marriage between the active "I" and the two-tiered "me" as human reality may afford the self as such in the socialpsychologic sphere of its 'being'. We treated the relationship between the "I", our response potential as humans to the positivity of the world which the "me" manifoldly, variegatedly and complexly occupies, and, on the other hand, the crude 'body' or "me"-only, at two of those levels at which that 'body' figures, in two ambiguous senses (as the physiologic and the social 'body', that is), consequentially, from the point of view of the self; with our bias in interpreting the role of these two 'bodies' into which the "me" is lodged in its relation to the "I", so far tilting the proportions of our argument in favour of the physiologic aspect of the "me", concerning ourselves, in the main, with the indelibly linked interdependence of the 'flesh' and its life (the function of the "I"); with the physiologic 'body' emerging, as a result of its merger with the "I", Sartrean fashion, as something composite and live, as properly hybrid as a "me" with an "I", forever shot, socialpsychologically soiled with that "I", and the resulting active alloy of "me" and "I" simply amounting, as a phenomenon, to the self or human reality or Being-for-Itself. But our argument also touched, though in lesser proportions, on the higher-order category, at the symbolic level, of the organic bond between the self's "me" as a constituent of the socialpsychologic and social 'body' too, in

the sense of that as *soma Christou* on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the "I" or the soul or 'life' at the socialpsychologic level, in the Christian as well as the Sartrean sense. In the course of Part 1. of this Section, immediately preceding the train of thought currently pursued, the "I"'s sphere of activity, as operative vis-a-vis the "me" at the physiologic as well as the socialpsychologic levels, emerged as related or indeed tantamount to a variety of concepts, which may be summarily recalled here, to possible benefit. These kindred or synonymous concepts to the "I", were the soul or anima, the 'future', the semiotic function, playfulness, movement, the dynamism of the self, 'Human Reality A', the small-letter gift or one's store of talents, the firmament of one's possibilities as a self, the dark centre of the waxing Sartrean moon, which simile is adopted here to represent the self in its ontogenic development, and, finally, action, movement and meaning; and, of course, 'subject' too, though this term didn't as yet figure in our thesaurus of the relatives of our "I" put forward so far. We now mean to devote greater attention to the operation of the dualistic make-up of the self (as both "me" and "I", that is) at the higher, socialpsychologically and socially symbolic level, as expressed in and as the choice of one's conduct in authenticity as human reality, complete with one's explicitly and willingly shouldered profaneness in whatever course of life one is engaged, complete with one's acceptance and staking, cultivating one's total array of human capacities as a way of life. In the course of tilting our argument of the relationship between the "me" and the "I" in the socialpsychologic rather than the physiologic direction this time, three more terms denoting or at least further illuminating the "I", will emerge, which may usefully be included in our description of the "I".

One is Marcel Mauss' notion of the Stranger; a concept greatly overlapping the "I" in this context. Mauss' work The Gift ⁽³³⁾ may be read to demonstrate the poor tolerance, by a given social body, of a self not yet coded and therefore not yet possessed in terms of that society, and the pressure upon the self to lend itself to a safe and decodable pigeon-holing in terms of the society in the surrounds of which that self appears, so as to make that as yet free-floating, not

yet properly possessed and therefore free self, in this sense, amenable to being 'appropriated' and consequently accepted by a culture as prevalent in its givenness; this phenomenon condensed, in Mauss' treatment, into the instance of making a gift, (which embodies and symbolises the self making the gift), in a symbolic gesture, in this sense, by an ambassador of a foreign, not yet known community and culture, one not yet classified in terms of the visited culture's generalized other, to the representative, usually the chief, of the visited society to which the gift is brought. In Mauss' handling, this phenomenon is treated in the macro-, or at least microsociologic (not socialpsychologic) dimensions, embracing tribes and entire cultures, but the experience is well enough known and easily transferable into smaller-scale socialpsychologic interpersonal confines. This pressure for the socialisation of a newly arrived self is, of course, recognisable, in a more gradual process, in the course of the growing up of a child, and moments of the psychologically traumatic and significant encounters between representatives of alien categories of people, may be identified in ways to which Mauss' description of such symbolic meetings is useful and analogous, in instances, say, where sympathies between people across any sort of cardinal anthropologic, political or social barriers are suddenly developed, such as when an individual on either side of the Profane-Sacred chasm, or a member of the enemy forces perhaps, comes to command the respect of the representatives, or one representative, of the 'other half'. The dramatic value of the bridging of anthropologic, political, evolutionary or other kinds of profound chasms between participants, in sudden and convention-alien friendliness to one another, is exploited and extended in fiction to the meeting between humans and extra-terrestrial beings, with supernatural stories taking the presentation of such experiences between mundane mortals and the representatives of the extraordinary who are not bound by the limits of our established socially rational area of activities even further, contriving occasions in which ghosts, the dead in heaven, witches or whatever, meet and befriend the ordinary living. All these fictional and real instances of the meeting between Aliens, Strangers, the Different, on the one hand, and the representatives of the established norm of our civilisation, on

the other, share the feature that there is an ambivalent interpersonal fascination, preoccupation with the visitor or sojourner at the bottom of these encounters, with attention directed at the newcomer in a poignant mixture of love and hate, of trust advanced and fearful suspicion. This phenomenon, that of suddenly learning to know the Stranger, as has been said, is the most acutely intense socialpsychologic relationship there is between groups and kinds of people in the face of each other; hence the compelling viewing of films exploiting such occurrences. The Stranger is not well tolerated whilst an uncategorised, untapped, uncomfortable freedom as human reality for which it first appears in foreign surrounds, and Mauss' work implies that his free "I", not yet conquered by the host culture at the moment of its appearance, axiomatically clamours, in and by the culture receiving the Stranger, for being defined, 'arrested', patriated, had, in and by the generalized other there, so as to be sorted out, given its meaning and *niche* in the social web of the receiving culture. The Stranger is under great pressure to offer himself as a self decodable, managable there, to allow his foreignness to be made safe by its signalled appropriability in the familiar idiom of the norm there, and, for as long as he stays, the measure of his success in his being considered and treated as safe, as pukka, as not disturbingly alien and no longer subject to further pressures for surrendering himself as the unattached freedom for which he is first apprehended, is the degree to which he manages to reassure the host culture that as an ego he is compatible and 'the same' as the generalized other receiving him. Mauss claims that in the custom of bringing a gift, the newcomer reflects himself in the gift as of great value, an absolute value in a first person singular human reality which he dedicates to the receiving community or any of its representatives, the gift expressing, at the same time, the great value, in his estimation, of the people to whom the gift is offered; the essence of the gift thus standing for the union between two sets of valuable, small-letter sacred people, oneself and the Other and/or all similar others in the host culture to whom the gift is made. The gift expresses the wish on the presenter's part that he be possessed by the recipient, that he be counted on. It stands symbolically for his giving himself in the spirit of socialised safety,

for the subordination of his self to the generalized other of his hosts. The expression 'the little stranger' in referring to the newborn child, extends into ontogeny the echo of Mauss' insight and observation regarding the meaning of the gift, as already observed - the child as the gift himself representing the as yet unacquired self as the object of future social adoption, patriation, clamouring for his introduction into the culture he was born into, in a process which is to continue throughout his entire life.

The second notion usefully identified here as a relative of the "I" is Foucault's concept of irrationality, that capacity of consciousness which is uncharted by socialisation, which is as yet, or forever, not quite expressed in that framework of conditioned learning which is governed by a goal-directed, pragmatic rationality, and other in kind than that which realised overt behaviour is to the behaviourists, in other words, something which is axiomatically and entirely accountable for in terms of empirically functional and successful goaldirectedness. Foucault's term refers to an ever-available, fortuitous, extra realm over-and-above that overt personality for which aspect of the self as a "me" only the behaviourists will exclusively allow; with Foucault entertaining the notion of the irrational as meaningfully and actively figuring in conduct as the not yet or not entirely realised self, which is an inexhaustible fountain and condition for personal originality and which need not be, and isn't, if one is authentic, surrendered in adulthood even. Continued resort in conduct to Foucault's irrationality must of course not be conceived of as divorced in its effect and mode of being from the pragmatically rational output of the self as the "me", which the behaviourists acknowledge as exhaustively making up the subject matter of psychology, both in the social and personal contexts of it; the presence of Foucault's 'irrational' as an informant of conduct is indicated merely by the original quality of overt behaviour and output, which quality is missing when recourse to the 'irrational' is decried and denied by the agent in the way he conducts himself. The actuality of the self as the "me" will emerge as the richer for always being partly born of a spontaneous, not merely pragmatically rational "I" underlying that "me", that's all; this personally fresher and more

first-hand conduct than the totally predictable, purely empirically goal-directed behaviour of the unauthentic, is the only index of the active working of this irrationality at the back of the authentic self. Other, mostly French, students of and commentators on the 'irrational', correctly identify recourse to this element in our consciousness as the indissmissible precondition of what they call 'the Work': some monument in the agent's output of a first-hand, original intellectual or artistic creation. But they also insist (incorrectly, for Foucault's money), on the actual carrying out such a 'Work' as the necessary justification of having such a first-rate mind, or rather consciousness. Foucault claims, in counterdistinction to his colleagues who insist on 'the Work' as indissmissible proof of such an original self, that conduct with its keynote in irrationality is completely vindicated as the mode of the 'being' of one's consciousness, and nothing more, even if the project of maintaining such conduct is not crowned in actuality by such a 'Work', but cultivated and pursued as an end in itself in everyday conduct merely, as the style of the way of leading one's ordinary life.

The third new notion to illuminate what we mean by the "I" even more extensively, is taken from Orson Welles' classic film Citizen Kane. The synopsis of the film can be permissibly (though too schematically, to do its psychologically rich presentation justice), summarised as the story of best part of a life spent in unrelenting goal-directedness as an uncompromisingly ambitious "me" only, giving an account of the life of a citizen fulfilled in such a capacity, as a mere "me" in bad faith, that is, in constant and vain search for that element in his life which would make it happy. Plucked from his family as a small child, after the best education money could buy, his approach to the content of his life (including his career as a journalist: the chosen profession to which he pledged himself in his youth, and in his patronage of the arts), came to be pursued with an unscrupulous dedicatedness to the glory of such a singularly and outwardly distinguished "me"-only, accumulating badges of honour in public life, and greater and greater wealth. As a consequence, the hero achieved, as the by-product of this pursuit on his part, a stark, lonely, isolated lifestyle, spent in an entombedness in a luxurious but lifeless palace, and his condemnation to two marriages

both of which were lacking in love, each, but particularly the second one, conducted in the loneliness of two people at each others' side. The course of this kind of life came to be the passing of his time, till the very end of it, as a 'body'-only in the context of society, a "me" at this higher, symbolic level which lacked a spontaneous and authentic "I" and any recourse to that as a self, 'dead' in no less true a sense than the physiologic 'body' that is without life, a 'corpse' of a "me" as a socialpsychologic human reality or a self in the full and authentic sense, in the context of the world into which he was so optimally anchored in the form of great wealth and high connections. On his deathbed, after such a lifecourse, clutching and then dropping a cheap toy winter scene, with falling snow, encased in a little glass container, Kane's last word was 'rosebud', of which his fellow-journalists, eager to report the manner of his life and death, were at great pains to learn the meaning. Nothing among his belongings, conscientiously rummaged through, offered a clue; until, as the last item to be thrown into the fire where worthless items of the content of his house were burnt, a little child's sledge turned up, with the word 'Rosebud' painted on its back. The audience, but not the journalist searching for the meaning of the word, realised that it was after he was playing on this sledge outside his home on a winter's day, that he learnt that he was to be sent away to school by his mother, never to be intimately part of his family again. The film ends with the image of this little sledge being thrown onto the fire and burnt in the furnace among his other meaningless everyday possessions. To my way of thinking, and to that of a host of commentators and students of this classic film, 'Rosebud' stands for the "I" as previously discerned here. It stands for that intact, virgin medium of the self of a child from whose pursuance Kane was banished, and which element in conduct he consequently banished, in turn, from his own life, in self-defence and as a safeguard against the memory of the pain which the loss of the 'rosebud' in his life caused in him; it stands for a spontaneity, an openness, a vulnerability to an "I" sensitive to the raw experience of human reality as such, life pure and simple, a youth, a playfulness, an innocence, which Kane decried, went without, as a consequence of his fundamental choice to shun that in his consciousness as a grown person. The term and

concept 'rosebud' emerges here, in the light of such a consideration of it, as an apt term to enrich, indeed denote, stand for, be interchangeable with the "I" in the sense in which it is argued here.

We have just used the term 'innocence' as a characteristic feature, an attribute at the heart of the notion of 'the rosebud', the unspoilt, childlike, playful "I". On reflecting for a moment on this term - innocence - we discover that it can be used in an ambiguous way, with a big-letter and small-letter meaning, and we can identify these two senses of the term as in a dialectic relationship to each other; the small-letter variety of it grasped as a positivity operative in the radius of human reality, denoting the quality of the "I" as something strongly meaningful, personally and interpersonally constructive, decisive and characteristic in the framework of the authentic agent's properly subjectivity-shot and enriched 'my world', and the big-letter version of that term identified as supporting and generative of the upkeep of the given society as such, contributory to the special kind of positivity, Being of society, these two meanings of the term contrary, destructive, mutually exclusive of each other in their operation, as will be argued. The two differential life-projects which have at their hearts, respectively, one of these two understandings of 'innocence' or the other, both acknowledge and sport this ambiguous attribute - innocence - as the hallmark of moral goodness in the differential grasp both of 'innocence' and of the two frameworks, understandings of goodness at the heart of which 'innocence' in one of its meanings or the other, is a key attribute; between which two senses of goodness we have distinguished in Section 5. of this chapter; discerning two meanings of 'goodness', one that informs the socialpsychologically authentic, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the sense in which 'goodness' serves at the centre of the moral conduct of the blindly and unquestioningly authority-abiding agent. 'Innocence', it may be validly observed, in its small-letter and big-letter senses respectively, figures as the supreme virtue in one or the other of these two differential frameworks of goodness, elbowing the lifestyle centrally informed by the other understanding of 'goodness' and its most morally decorous attribute: 'innocence' in the matching authentic or unauthentic sense, out of

operation and room in consciousness. In the first of these senses of 'innocence' - the small-letter one - , this attribute to conduct figures as the most positive virtue of human reality, whilst not regarded as relevant or pertinent in the social sciences as conceived in positivist ways; indeed, it is viewed as disruptive to morality in the latter framework, and treated in that latter context with suspicion. When conceived in this first sense, in the spirit in which human reality is posited as the paramount area of 'being' to be upheld, 'innocence' is seen as the operative virtue of being and having resort to the 'rosebud' in one's life, in the sense in which this latter notion figures in Citizen Kane; it meaningfully amounts to the key attribute in the conduct of the self choosing itself in loyalty to, awareness of, gracefulness as human reality, in the act of the agent's pledge of himself to the basis of preserving and perpetuating that lifestyle; it's a condition of one's freshness of vision as a human being, complete with intuition, a spontaneity, playfulness and generosity as a self, an un-selfconscious nakedness of one as profane, it's the individual's lack of either artfulness or apologeticness as a self; it stands for an unashamedness of this nakedness as a self which one has no reason or call to hide, and is therefore freely given vent in conduct, serving as the inimitable trademark of a first-order human reality there. In the second, big-letter sense, 'innocence', or rather 'Innocence', congenial and nourishing to the stability of Durkheimian positive social reality, the term's connotations are akin to 'innocence in the eyes of the law', and the term stands for a negativity of conduct when grasped from the viewpoint of the standards of human reality, the notion in the big-letter sense referring to the absence of one having blotted one's copybook, of having littered one's *curriculum vitae* with marks of experientially, contentually soiled, rude, naked living, and a lack of evidencing in the course of one's life that one was present and alert as a consciousness to the duty, by the dicta of authentic human reality, of remaining loyal to the self's schismic, critical vision of and presence to the quality of social reality when that is less than morally decorously perpetuated in its actuality, with which potentially schismic view of the self in relation to outward actuality, the meaning of individual consciousness is simply tantamount (as we have argued,

inspired by Sartre). It seems strange that it is a score of Russian literary works which should spring to mind abundantly to aid us in our wish to illuminate, through examples, firstly the power and the moral superiority of the individual's schismic view, as a function of the simple and spontaneous authenticity of that, to the moral and human fallibility of an ethically crude government, and secondly the conclusion - in the light of that fallibility of society's representatives in high places - the romantic tenet that the absence of error on the part of the individual as the ideal of his conduct, which such morally frail governments demand of the ordinary man, holds, in reality, little virtue both as a matter of the intrinsic worth of such conduct for the edification of the individual, and also in its effects upon the quality of society which demands such conduct of us; nevertheless, for some reason, it seems to be Russian literary works which offer these two related insights in a tumultuous prevalence, and we shall gratefully take advantage of some of these.

Two famous Russian comedies are based on and exploit the Pauline message that one's profane, schismic status as merely human is universal in places socially high and low, and that everyone, even the lowest of us by ascriptive standards, is endowed with reponse potential to human frailty, shortcoming in high places as a consciousness, apt to judge that frailty in officialdom by the measure and echo in ourselves of the same capacity for frailty, in the light of everyone's potential presence to the ideal of a more authentic conduct by the ideal standards of human reality; our Human Reality A as defined in Part 1. of this Section. These two comedies are Gogol's The Government Inspector and Chekhov's one-act play The Jubilee; both these works cashing in on the satirical value of engaging a critical, humanly authentic vision vis-a-vis the corrupt practices of agencies in highly ascribed quarters, as the source of ridicule of the 'sacred' in established society, 'deconstructed' and identified as fallible humans by these two authors. The plots of both of these plays amount to a strong statement of the fact that the human agencies populating the ascribed 'sacred' Pukka circles and the bureaucratic echelons of the established societies of their day, were themselves schismic on account of the non-coincidence

between their actual conduct and practices in the mode in which they carried out their office in reality, on the one hand, and the ideal appearances they wished to project about themselves on the other; both these plays revealing that underneath the Pukkas' appearance of elevatedness and moral loftiness, they were inadequate, corrupt, hysterical and maladjusted (in the sense of lacking grace as human realities). This message transpires, in the case of The Government Inspector, by the contrivance on Gogol's part of a mistaken identity: in its plot, a high-spirited confidence-trickster successfully poses during his sojourn in a Russian province, as the government inspector whose visit is due at the local government offices. After the trickster's timely disappearance (having taken advantage of the appealing front which the officials were keen to present about themselves as officials, this air of them specially assumed for the occasion, and having exhausted the bribes lavished on him), the real inspector appears, catching the local government personnel with their trousers down, undisguisedly ineffective and detestable. In the plot of The Jubilee, Chekhov conveys a similar message. In the case of the latter play, it is the disintegration of a bank's celebratory anniversary party, which shows up the fragility, underneath the surface of the initial seriousness of the occasion carried and perpetrated by the self-important bank manager, which veneer of solemnity gradually peels off in the course of the occasion, through the cumulative drunkenness of the manager's silly wife, by the rudeness and bitterness of the long-suffering and maltreated office clerk, and by the gatecrashing of a widow unstylishly demanding money.

Our third example from Russian literature highlights, by even stronger satirical means, the message which we currently mean to discern, that 'innocence' in the big-letter sense, is not only an ever-sham, because impossible, intactness of human frailty in the conduct and consciousness of 'the serious', but also an anaemic substitute for, and a pale virtue in everyone's everyday conduct in comparison with, 'innocence' in the small-letter sense, the socialpsychologically positive attribute and endowment of an active, authentic self. We wish to call on the story forming the basis of Prokofiev's Lieutenant Kijé to

demonstrate this point. The author of the narrative which inspired Prokofiev in the composition of this piece, holds up a mirror to the unreality of a way of life of which the so-called virtue of innocence in the big-letter sense forms the basis, to the absurdity, by human measures, of a successful career in life whose excellence consists in a blamelessness of any untowardly naked, rudely fresh and un-selfconscious human reality, in refraining from utilising the capacities and functions of one's life as a self, with all its risks and hazards to the individual inherent in the active engagement of one's consciousness as such. Lieutenant Kijé, according to the plot, came into being as a spelling error in the official files, and the allegoric story tells of 'his' rise to the rank of General, and the crown princess' fiancé, as his reward for the supreme virtue in the eyes of those swearing by the standards of sacredness by ascription as their ideal, of considerably not existing at all in the impolite, experientially soiled, offending, ordinary sense of live human reality, of not accumulating any blemishes on his file by way of instances of the unruliness of man's profane being, by not operating as a self threatening, as such, with a degree of unpredictability, error of judgement in the face of established rules as laid down and therefore as a self which is politely and exemplarily contained, by virtue of his humanly unnoticeable conduct, for these reasons, within the confines of a totally predictable, pure "me", in which aspect of his self 'Kijé's' personality was totally exhausted and with which it was completely coincidental, with none of that inconvenient residue that is rooted in and carried by a conceivably establishment-discordant, active "I" looming as the possibility of his self; never idiosyncratically affirming himself in one way or another, never uttering surprising comments or displaying any other such singularity, his self representing no risk of any deviation from the norm which is determined by ascriptive ways alone, through the danger of actually and concretely putting them into play in the dodgy and fallible context of human actuality, without being exposed to that profane idiom which is inherent in people actually living in terms of the norm, in their concretely acting it out. I am reminded of a term in modern police jargon in rendering this ideal of conduct of the individual, that of his big-letter Innocence, as demanded by authority. In their work of

detection, the police strive to contrive a so-called 'sterile' condition in which to tackle and eventually apprehend the suspect: a situation devoid of psychologic and other complications caused by so-called extraneous variables in relation to the perfectly distilled context of the crime, devoid of the 'microbes' of any human actuality in which 'bacterial' culture', if you like, of actual individual conduct, man's axiomatic fallibility thrives, to which human reality is simply tantamount when given vent in the full sense.

There are two points of possible social scientific usefulness which the modern parable of Kijé affords when viewed in the light of a 'romantic', human reality-tolerant and oriented approach to it, and which a positivist stance in relation to its message (the absurdity of a morality which demands the banishing of the not totally predictable "I" from conduct) typically and necessarily misses, has nothing to say for, denies, and waves aside as meaningless. One is that the all too common lack in a lifecourse of the exercising, engaging of an active "I", a life-history spent as a "me" only, without 'life' in the symbolic sense as we understand that notion, (this attribute, its lack of 'life' in our sense, pushed to the extreme, by satirical means, in the story of Kijé), need not entail, as the only possible explanation of the popularity of a life-project without recourse to the "I", that there is no such thing as the "I", as the positivist will have it. Not a bit of it; it may be the case that the renunciation of an "I", and human reality in the full sense which is inclusive with the "I", by the agent conducting himself in bad faith, is deliberately chosen with the ulterior motive of dipping in more profitably into the unauthentic's readily attained tangibly empirical and socially positive rewards in the world; in an act of choice on the part of the "I"-denying agent, which is unnatural, and shortchanges him considerably, in terms of human reality. It is at the cost of the violation of the nature and capacity of consciousness - everyone's consciousness - for truth, intelligence and natural common sense, Kijé's story pregnantly implies, that one is capable of being good and virtuous by officially 'sacred' and 'serious' standards as the condition of one's blamelessness - big-letter Innocence: the ultimate ideal and the only kind of goodness which the solemnly Sacred Pukka

demand of the profane. The project of perfect "me"-identification, as officially demanded of the profane, particularly if authentic, is an uphill struggle whose course differs considerably from the spontaneous dictates of human nature, a struggle, moreover, which goes hand-in-hand, as part of the bargain on offer to the Rachmoneses by society, as a condition of being declared deserving of the epithet 'good' and all that implies, with the denunciation of the pursuit of an outstanding quality as an individual - in other words, 'good' as understood by the agent who adopts human reality and its peculiar lights as the prime informer of his consciousness and conduct, as a matter of his fundamental choice. In the production by the agent (in keeping with society's command), of a truncated self, a "me"-only, which meaningfully dismisses the "I" from its frame of reference as a self at the cost of such effort, is commonly systematically, purposefully and functionally underlain by the explicit and not easily suppressed ruse, at the heart of such a socialpsychologically unauthentic life-project, to send begging the perfectly meaningful and commonly available vision of one's subjectivity-shot, critical individual 'perspective' upon the world and its state, so as to clear the way for the more easily reinforcing and satisfactory life, (in worldly terms, of course), as socialpsychologic *object only*. If the agent wants an exemplary *curriculum vitae* such as that of Kijé, then a very explicit awareness either as regards the actual ways of the world, or recourse to the fantasy or vision, if you like, and sense of calling of oneself as a citizen of a better society in the light of the collective consciousness readily fathomed by all in its more perfect ideality than those states of affairs which happen to prevail in the reigning society, will not be of very great help to one. If a man with a very keen ability to see the firm's jubilee party, as did Chekhov, with his tongue in his cheek, and the shoddy human fibre of those with greater title to taking care of his affairs than he is allowed to, on account of their greater ascribed sacredness, if the moral foundations of the social world surrounding him appears to him very explicitly as rather weak and shaky as they do in Gogol's play The Government Inspector, then he doesn't stand much chance for being able to keep under his hat his capacity for the sin of being with the schism, of social blasphemy and heresy as something that had better remain a

matter just between him and his conscience, as was the case with the authentic schism-managers we considered before (Šveik, Auntie Googey, etc.), who put down that schism inwardly and philosophically as simply man's inheritance through just being a man, irrespective of whether he opens his mouth or lifts a finger in the light of his capacity for such a schismic consciousness, or not. The blemishes, heresies, to which the 'thought-crimes' of a highly aware critic of his actual society amount, will be prone to become actual *faux pas*'s, witnessed as a public affair, slowing down his progress to Generalship considerably. Such a man - one with his eyes very fondly on a Generalship, will not be very keen to own an "I", and if he recognises that he has one, to cultivate it as such. He will not try to be an amateur Socrates when making his fundamental choice, but opt for the horizons of his self as that of an aspiring pig, wallowing in the radius of a self without a demanding spirit (to fall back for a moment on John Stuart Mill's terminology in classifying humanity as a function of which level of the being of consciousness one adopts as one's qualitative target as human reality), not because man, every man and woman, doesn't have it in themselves to be a bit of a Socrates, capable of entertaining heights of consciousness and capacity for judgement regarding the ways of the world in one area of human endeavour or another, as the positivist would have it (the 'romantic', particularly the existentialist social scientist will insist that everyone is cursed with the burden of some degree of Socrates-capacity and the moral, intellectual and practical responsibilities following from that endowment), but because of one's awareness, acquired in the course of socialisation, of learning, both in one's own experience and through studying history), that the price which the body of a Socrates (including his standing in the world in his blemished citizenly capacity as a "me" brought to justice), has to pay for his exercising the great beauty and perfectionism, the admirable daring and honesty of his spirit, involves the risk of, and more often than not, brings about the 'fall' of his self, if no longer, in our day, in the form of the physiological annihilation of that "me", at least, still very commonly, in the form of the loss of the small-letter sacred status of that "me" as a self in society. The man in bad faith, who makes his "I" redundant, does so because he has learnt in his personal lifetime and in his

reflections on the course of man's history, that daring to be a Socrates, speaking one's mind as an individual, particularly if that individual is a very keenly schooled and critically discerning one by the standards of human reality, sticking one's neck out as such a human reality first and foremost, which activity one can choose to adopt as his characteristic mode of conducting oneself, risking, as a consequence, the possibility of erring to everyone's knowledge, offering up his possibility as a schismic, dutifully profane consciousness, so as to make a difference in one aspect of the world as it is or another, is not more but very much less likely to attain the goal of being regarded as a virtuous, good, deserving person, than the man to whom the meaning of good comes to equal the kind of choice of himself which is free from such a self-dedicating endeavour, which lacks, foregoes the eminently possible project of one's engaging one's "I" in an outstanding capacity as a self for the good both of oneself and of society.

The second insight available to the 'romantic' and (Sartre would say: deliberately) unavailable to the positivist, or more precisely, empiricistic, narrowly behaviouristic student of the self, on which the story of Kijé also throws a dramatic light, is partly contained or implied in our comments on the first point. It is the insight that for the gain of a reputation that is blameless, for a place under the social sun alongside with the Sacred, the price of not living at all - or at least, not living fully as a self, living with the greater part and capacity and the potentially truly available reality of human consciousness given up, foregone, is too great. As a further extension of this implication, the 'romantic' social scientist and thinker sees, just as the socialscientific empiricist doesn't, that by man choosing his lifeproject in bad faith in this manner, by the lights of a self from which the "I" is jettisoned, as just described, does not yield him adjustment by the 'romantic's', and particularly the Sartrian's yardstick '³³', and, by such Sartrian implications at least, man doesn't attain 'adjustment', 'normalcy', natural fullness as a self; and what is traded to him under these labels, is of sham socialpsychologic and individual psychologic value. Part of what he foregoes as a consequence of his choice of opting to be a "me" only, is the presence of his

consciousness to adjustment in the full sense, a grasp of, a capacity of his adjustment in a sense which equals man's desire for his adjustment to a better society, articulated or at least meaningfully fathomed in his consciousness as an individual, of which he would be a happy member, and in which he would be happy to participate in the depth of experience and consquentiality of someone whose self - ever complete with both "me" and "I" - is thereby, in turn, fulfilled. This understanding of one's adjustment in and to a society, (actual if the reigning norm in it is easily assimilable by the agent's humanly authentic lights, in the authentic agent's positive attitude to that which Sartre calls 'elective assumption', and otherwise prompted by the agent's presence to the ideal of a better, more self-tolerant society), is importantly and fundamentally different from that which 'adjustment' means to those social scientifically empiricists who demand of man, as a condition of his adjustment in their sense, that he aim for the complete coincidence and identification of his self and of his whole being as that which is possible in the given social world, whatever the quality of that norm sustaining it. Kijé's story ridicules, in the implication of its satiric stance with respect to the ideal of a mere social blamelessness as the condition of access to rich pickings in the way of both social and empirically tangible rewards, a way of life adopted through an "I"-abstinence, in which the mere absence of social erring amounts to the touchstone of virtuousness: a life led in perfect inconspicuousness as a self, with the non-existence of human reality in that adopted lifestyle, parading as and mistaken for virtuousness. Of course, many people live in Kijé's lifestyle: that of an effectively curtailed range of displaying human excellence by virtue of feats of the self, through the force of circumstances, and with no room for choice, in actual terms, regarding their situation, which does not allow them the alternative of living in such a way as to authentically cultivate a socialpsychologically decorous and outstanding self, as an end in itself, for the sake of venting and sustaining human reality as such. Their radius for a sense of goodness is often confined, through no choice of their own, to the sham social virtue that's demanded of them and which consists of the delaying and foregoing the gratification of their selves and of the 'being' of that in socialpsychologically real terms, in a way

in which striving for the good things available for the selves in the positivity of the social world in the here-and-now, and personal worth in the first person singular, which is a man's due for a lifetime of hard effort in obeying the arduous dictates of striving to be moral through the denial of the self, are systematically kept apart in the sense of virtuousness that is deemed, by the dicta of the reigning norm, as proper to man. The choice whether or not to nod assent to the veto which the reigning moral code dictating the current official definition of a man's propriety, becomes available to many people only when their situation, and the displacement between their "I" (taken into 'care' or denied them by other ways), and the "me" (demanded in surrender to the reigning norm), is made explicit and intelligible to them; as was the case in the instance of the character of 'The Little Monk' in Brecht's play The Life of Galileo (already referred to once), in which Galileo awakens 'The Little Monk' to his duty: the fruit of his education, to adjust, during the years ahead of him as a priest, his horizons to the need of making other descendants of plebeian forebears, such as himself, aware of the moral dishonesty and ideological as well as human destructiveness of the dictum, shoved down the throats of his kind, that the just deserts of a hard-working lifetime properly await those who are uncomplaining, self-denying and therefore 'virtuous' by the yardstick of the prevailing norm, in the world after and not on this earth. But, the existentialist points out, many people live a life blind to the ceilings of their human possibilities which could be theirs by rights, without being forced to do so on account of circumstances depriving them of the liberty to choose any other code of personal worth and virtuousness than that of Kijé, and existentialists also point out the fact that, whatever people's reasons for opting for a Kijé-type lifestyle and understanding of a sense of virtuousness, they typically compensate themselves with the displacement, as a consolation for their loss of the ideal of a good and humanly fully deserving life, striving for which is an aim which, as everyone who is suitably enlightened knows, man is capable of truly and articulately wanting, and incapable of not wanting, except at the cost of effort to consciousness; (the most common forms of displacement being the conceptualisation of the rewards of a hardworking lifetime as otherworldly only, the exaltation of those things that one can or does

in fact have, or the cultivation of such an ideology, kindred to that of the Nazis, on Sartre's account, which morally elevates mediocrity to the ideal of goodness, as the measure of man's real personal worth in the world and the key of his just deserts there; so many ideologies of bad faith.) The agent, then, in the ordinary way, wages the worth of the 'good' in the 'romantic' sense of that, against the 'good' in the sense of the blindly authority-abiding socialpsychologically unauthentic: the security which living as a citizen Kane or a Kijé can typically bring, and elects, as the keynote of his conduct, 'goodness' in the second sense as the fountainhead of his morality; and the 'romantic' will say, with a degree of justification meaningfully deriving from his own point of view, that for the 'good' objectively and subjectively available to man through a reputation of blamelessness (as has already been observed) too much is given up out of the possible scope of human life as offering itself in a really available and necessary sense for and in the idiom of perpetrating and being sensible to authentic socialpsychologic virtue and excellence, as a matter of first-hand experience. From the outside, the way of life of the pursuit of authentic human excellence, even if somewhat fallen (the term 'fallen', in our sense, defined in Section 3. of this chapter), in the course of the fumbings of a would-be Socrates, may seem as a lesser project of virtue than that of an unblotted copybook; the blankness of the pages of one's diary if an aspiring Kijé, may not seem something regrettable compared with the *curriculum vitae* of a little bit fallen excellence; it will seem as virtue. But by the private, profane, small-letter standards of human reality, to those who are present to the possibility of their grace as a self ⁽⁴⁰⁾, in the authentic adjustment of that self by Paul's and Sartre's standards - all men, in fact - , a diary filled with small-talk or non-existent because of the lack of a sort of life to report, will not seem a satisfactory biography, nor a desirable one. In comparison with those who have the shining social reputation of a Kijé, the somewhat fallen aspiring authentic excellent can boast to have gained a freedom as profane and to have attained the prize and luxury of an unselfconscious, not puritanically self-tortured, guilt-ridden consciousness, on account of being unresigned to the necessary sin of being human - both merely human and fully human, and properly so to some extent in order to be

human at all. Man is profane at all times as his actual condition as a self, his consciousness as such complete with the possibility of reponding schismically, unconventionally, irreverently, critically, capable of recognising a quality of society's norms as the stimulus to his conduct, as schismic, if it be so. Even if fallen - and fallen well and good - , this freedom as a self's remaining possibilities need and will not be rendered out of commission in the conduct and consciousness of the authentic. Marx observed, in the context of macro-sociology, that the ruling class exposes itself to a great degree of insecurity and risk if it leaves the working class with nothing to lose but its chains, by virtue of the fact that the resulting absolute deprivation of the oppressed class, both in the way of the tangibly positive and the socially symbolic sets of its belongings as consciousnesses and citizens with a degree of vested interest in the ruling *régime*, endows them with a great degree of freedom in the face of the world, in a real and meaningful sense. This observation, I feel, finds an echo and analogy in the context of a self fallen as such in the world in a once-for-all manner, with the implications of Marx's observation writ small. Kierkegaard, the migrant, vagrant have-not as a function of his fundamental choice in his elected authenticity as small-letter profane, certainly seems to have thought that in the course of his increasing reputation of anti-sociality and enmity as a consciousness towards the reigning hypocritical moral standards and practices of the world surrounding him, gradually causing him to lose, as a result, his wealth as well as his privileged standing by virtue of his being born into highly ascribed circles in the first place, has brought him something that was of value (even if the process of gaining that was painful and the price was high): the booty of a clear conscience, an authenticity and a freedom, waxing in direct proportion with the waning of the positive benefits of his initially privileged anchorage of the world. Kijé's story implicitly suggests the absurdity and concomitant loss involved in the project of sustaining a vulgarian sense of normalcy and adjustment, which is attained not by living up to the 'romantic's' and the authentic's internal standards in judging and claiming room for the agent's inherent possibilities as a self, but by ever living down to the standards of a mere "me" as publicly defined and actually available

to the self in the world as both that and the niche of the self in that is, as one's chosen creed, in order to be deserving of the titles 'adjusted', 'normal', 'reliable' in a puristically empiricistic socialscientific sense, nodding assent, through the overriding choice of one's personal conduct in bad faith, to the decrying of a more authentic way of life as meaningful and possible, in keeping with the degraded and human reality-wise minimalistic or even completely intolerant ideology tacitly underlying the social sciences at their morally and experientially most impoverished. Kijé's story advocates the normalcy and legitimacy of our profanness in the everyday business of living our lives in an abandon to the human reality in which that life actually consists,, in an inverted sort of way, by showing the absurdity of a life devoid of an anthropologically fuller than a so-called 'sterile' ideal and understanding of a consciousness's socialpsychologically authentic scope and standard of adjustment, by satirically showing the socialpsychological ungrace and anomalousness, and the moral and experiential barrenness of the ideal of big-letter Innocence at the heart of conduct: of the ideal of the mere absence of social erring in its operation. It's the Rosebud and all which this concept implies and brings with it as the informant of one's socialpsychologically positive and active quality of conduct in a very real and rich sense, as expanded on a little while ago, that a Kijé or a citizen Kane forego and opt to go without. In Kane's case, it was his faithfulness to his core of youthful ideals, in the spirit of which he first undertook his career as a journalist and newspaper proprietor, solemnly pledging to tell the truth to his readers irrespective of the cost of this project to himself as the publisher of an uncompromising authenticity-spirited paper, or better still, in the hope of and with a view to bettering affairs in the world and people's lot there, which he came to cynically denounce at the point of his allowing his limitless, unscrupulous and unjustified self-aggrandisement to creep into his work, for instance, by fabricating good reviews about his wife who was an atrocious singer; this lack of authenticity informing this newly adopted humanly unprincipled practice on his part, and the moral stance underlying that, ultimately poisoning the happiness both ^{of} his wife and ultimately of himself.

I think we have established to some degree of satisfaction the contention that our notion of the soul, *anima*, the "I", 'life', the 'rosebud' (for a more complete list of synonyms see Part 1. of this Section), and the acknowledgement, cultivation and gratification of that dimension, encodedness of consciousness in practical conduct, is a necessary condition for attaining excellence, goodness shining with the distinctive and special quality of human reality: that this dimension and aspect of, room for the 'being' of consciousness as a meaningful and available potential of that underlying conduct, is an indissoluble factor and attribute of childhood, youth, retainable also in adulthood (in a constant conjunction with a normally developed and shouldered "me", of course), and that a reliance on that as the source of inventiveness, of an originally questioning attitude in the light of that capacity and encodedness, is a basic necessity and condition of creativity, of conducting oneself in the rich and full three-dimensionality of a socialpsychologically 'salient' self (in the sense in which 'salience' was defined in the Introduction), rather than a mockery of the two-dimensional cartoon character of a self which chooses to have recourse to the "me" only, in a citizenship of laziness, responsibility-shyness, blindness and indifference to the true complexity of the human condition and state of affairs in the world. But we have not yet established that a way of life which is characteristically led with an active recourse to the "I", is a sufficient condition for such an outstanding excellence as human reality. For this to be so, it is necessary that the "I" (*anima*, 'meaning', 'dynamism' of the self etc.), be constructively channelled. One's decorousness and articulateness as a self actively and organically complete with an "I" as the keynote of one's conduct, may be made into the mechanism of and the precondition to the evil in one's individual conduct, too; and in the remainder of this part of the current Section we shall argue that, formally speaking, 'good' and 'evil' as alternative functions of human reality as such, are not generical opposites when seen in their similarly repugnant and contemptuous relationship to bad faith or the socialpsychologic unauthenticity as the possibility of one's conduct, but both the 'good' and the 'evil' modalities and varieties of human reality in the conduct of the self actively engaged

as such, stand in opposition to the lowly and simpleminded dishonesty and betrayal of human reality in the bad faith of the socialpsychologically unauthentic, with socialpsychologically cultivated and carried goodness and evil sharing the same dimension and capacity in consciousness, (that of the "I"), with evil definable as the goodness of the authentic self warped, as authentic goodness gone wrong and usurping the room and capacity in consciousness of authentic human reality as informed, ideally, by its own authentic standards. Evil is the fruit of the debasing transposition of the socialpsychologically positive attribute and modality of consciousness as authentic innocence, not in the direction of the unauthentic, human quality-free big-letter 'Innocence' of bad faith, deaf-and-blind to the meaning and ideal standards of authenticity universally available to all, but into the bastardisation, misuse and usury of the peculiar equippedness, arsenal of attributes and tactics for consciousness of the authentic, unselfconsciously inherent in his human reality-wise positive innocence which yields, in its true form, an extensive repertoire of individualistic means for doing and promoting the good of selves who will have that good (including oneself). Evil is the abusing of that good, for the purpose of the promotion of the ends of an unscrupulous and mischievous *egotism* of nurturing and cultivating an ego without regard for the good of others - the term to be sharply distinguished from *egoism*, the latter notion 'healthy', because essential for the socialpsychologically positive quality of the 'graceful' and fertile, human reality-generative adjustment of one's self along universalistic lines (that is to say, along lines on which the ego presupposes and keeps in sight the adjustment of others, in ways analogous to its own adjustment, or, conversely put, in the act and attitude of the ego insisting on its own adjustment as a self in ways analogous to that of others who display an adjusted and fulfilled self). Kierkegaard offers a distinction between 'egoism' in the 'bad' sense (referred to here as 'egotism'), and 'egoism' in the latter, 'good' sense, which is a necessary precondition of our very authenticity, of the ideal of the unselfconscious sustenance and enjoyment of the 'my world' of everyone and anyone, with all its peculiar and proper benefits and endowments for

the self, using the simile of the bird rejoicing in its own radius of happy being, which he can't help living, exercising to the full. (41)

Two consequences arise from such a way of viewing the individual good and evil of conduct, as the alternative occupants of the dimension of human reality in consciousness. One is the stubbornness and the strong survival potential of this human reality, which may, and does, at least as a potential but often as a socialpsychologic actuality, continue to be meaningful and operative when assumed as a matter of one's fundamental choice, even when society's coercive pressure to the 'fallen', publicly profaned self demands that it assume itself in bad faith, as merely *object only* for the rest of its life; its innocence debased, bastardised, but not effectively waived. The socially problematic conduct of a great proportion of the young in our society affords a case in point for supporting such a contention - the contention of the oftentime futility of attempts for the suppression of the ebullient spirit as an axiomatic phenomenon in people, particularly young ones, a spirit which does not become disembodied and evaporated when separated, by society's command, from the "me", the typecast dished out to us profane in the scenario of society, but which continues to operate in conjunction with the norm as that is in the world, and which will know itself as critique, socially and socialpsychologically functional or dysfunctional, as the case may be, when affairs in the world are intuited as unjustifiable in the light of the self's authentic, spontaneous judgement and experience of those affairs. When society's aims and measures are not congenial to the lights of such a spirit, the spirit of the 'rosebud', of the "I" as an original attribute in ontogeny, (our dowry as consciousnesses when we come into the world), will be alternatively channelled in our attitude to the world, not towards the spirit of a constructivity in relation to it, but into that of unconstructivity, 'deconstructiveness' vis-a-vis the world. The phenomenon of vandalism and football hooliganism of our day are cults in which the spirit of youth is (often explicitly) engaged in the affirmation of itself in the face of a society which chronically fails to harness that energy, the energy of the 'rosebud' productively, and is blind to the need for that, and to its duty, by definition, to

satisfactorily nurture that, as an unwritten law firmly and axiomatically landed on the doorstep of every society. Its blindness to this duty is crystal clear in the light of the not just socialpsychologically, but also socially disastrous history, manifested in the continued failure, from every point of view, personal and social, of the so-called 'short, sharp shock' method of the punishment of young criminals. These 'short sharp shock' centres have their usual routine revised from time to time, to remove those aspects of the régime imposed on the youths which prove to be enjoyable to them, to which their misdirected spirits may attach themselves in a socialpsychologically, maybe even socially constructive positivity, such as vigorous physical exercise which proved itself popular with the youngsters in the early days; this practice telling of the attitude of irrational hate towards the young offenders by them, and a lack of concern by the Pukka with the consequence of this stance towards the unruly young as that manifests itself in the ever-growing rate of reoffending. The phenomenon of the increasing rate of reoffending amongst the youngsters who went through this form of punishment, also demonstrates the futility of the attempts of this government - any government - to legislate, coercively bid out of existence the presence, in any society, of a youthful readiness and preparedness to engage itself as active human reality in the mode of an unwillingness to surrender the spirit of the "I" to society, in ways which may be engineered to be beneficial for the improvement of the present state of society, by humanly purer lights than that reigning within that, even, or particularly, when this surplus spirit over and above plain citizenship, in a potential subjective discontinuity with the latter, was ignored, laid waste in a great proportion among a nation's young, was made redundant, ignored and caused to go frustrated and eventually fatally warped, by virtue of the shortcomings, shortsightedness and duty-evasion by the Pukka to society's young. Socialpsychologically approached, as we see it and as we suggested earlier, a way of life with active resort to the "I" is the vehicle both of constructive and destructive 'deviance', of goodness and of evil, for social creativity or social highwaymanship; and we may reaffirm our contention that criminality, as a frame of mind, is the 'rosebud' gone wrong.

A second consequence which the insight that active personal goodness and evil share the same dimension of consciousness (that of the "I)", and that the variety of outstanding personal evil of an agent as a quality of human reality, with which we concern ourselves now, actively deputises for and usurps consciousness's scope for authentic human reality and excellence in the idiom of that human reality, may be appreciated when looking at the relationship of bad faith to both of these varieties of dynamic human reality: outstandingly personal good or evil in one's conduct as a self in the socialpsychologically autonomous sense of that. Both these "I"-informed and fed modes of personal conduct, one constructively and the other dysfunctionally applied (personal good or evil, that is), are repellent of and inimical to bad faith, with bad faith, when adopted, causing one to disguise and mask an authenticity of conduct, whether well or mischievously used. Bad faith may conceal both good and evil. It usually conceals evil, 'egotism' rather than 'egoism'; it most commonly covers up that reprehensible sense of the promotion of the ego which is motivated by material selfishness, in contrast with egoism in the 'good' sense, as already defined: - the sense of conducting ourselves with as much regard for and expectations of our own selves as we are prepared to advance to others, in authenticity both to them and to ourselves. The first kind of, morally unbecoming, egoism - denoted hereas 'egotism' - typically makes use of bad faith to hide, behind the agent's bland and stereotypic, unspontaneous armoury of second-hand virtues, a project of unscrupulously subjugating and twisting all our values as a human reality, which are alternatively and normally available to be decorously used, to serve his own selfish ends at the cost of others. But bad faith, lying about our real potentials as human reality, may come to be used to conceal an outstandingly decorous endowment as human reality as well, in instances when the agent, blessed with over-average, remarkable gifts, does not insist, with an 'egoism' of the right and healthy kind, on his right and duty to put to use the exceptional virtues which he is singularly endowed with, in instances when he bows to the laying waste, to the surrendering of his special endowment when such endowment is judged, signalled, 'gestured' as out of place by the standards of a generalized other, by the outside norm which is more average and lesser in some

respect or another than that of the authentic who comes into contact with that. Parain's lies consist in the falsification, in public interpersonal accounts of the self and its history, of one's idiosyncratic contents as an authentic self, which gets into the way of the accepted and simpler norm governing the "me" of selves, which latter aspect of the self alone is sharable by and meaningful to all. Parain's lies are aimed to simplify, admissibly and conveniently (according to Parain's lights, at least), by getting the idiosyncratic contents of one's self out of the way, the job of presenting and involving the self in everyday human traffic. Lying by an overqualified candidate at a prospective place of work where a prestigious Ph.D. would be contrary to the normal level of qualifications of future colleagues, in settings where such a badge of human excellence would be resented, affords another example of bad faith being employed to conceal laurels of an outstandingly positive personal capacity, in one aspect at least, as a self. One may ponder on the question whether the unfashionableness of saints in our present day and age, is a true index of the absence of any such people in our contemporaneous societies, when compared with the much higher incidence of saints in by-gone times. The hypothesis may perhaps be ventured that there may, in our days, be people who are guided and informed by intense moral promptings and visions, comparable to those of the saints in a historic past, who wisely attenuate and transpose, with a degree of bad faith, this special sensitivity and presence of themselves to higher spiritual truths than the current norm defining and dictating the rational limits of consciousnesses and selves, so as to bring those visions and intuitions within the confines of our ordinary standards of language and conduct, to save themselves from being locked in a mental hospital. To pursue even further the implications of the contention that personal good and evil are close bedfellows, and the fickleness therefore of the moral classification of our consciousness as one or the other, good or evil, we may perhaps usefully observe that postulating good and evil as generic opposites, seated in two separate faculties within, or, even more calculatingly, exclusively outside our consciousness, would be psychologically very convenient to us in instances when we chose to do evil. Such a divorce between our capacities to do good and the endowedness of our

consciousness, by the same token, to do evil as a human reality, as a responsible self, would agreeably allow us to put down our inclinations for misdeeds, even our acting upon such inclinations for such misdeeds in our actual conduct, to the promptings of the Devil, seen as an external and self-alien force, as something outside us and nothing to do with our will: a single dimension.

Another interesting possible classification of the quality and degree of the personal goodness of our conduct, lies in the analysis of the extent of its drawing on the social ideality of the collective consciousness, and its universality in considering the good of others in its projects of authenticity in the face of a society, intolerant of us as profane, somewhat 'fallen' or lowly ascribed, or as very authentic consciousnesses. The conduct of Don Giovanni and his fellow-evil usurpers of the armoury at the disposal of the constructively authentic, for his own egotistic ends and to the detriment of the human dignity and fulfilment of other selves, completely lacks in a universalism, in the consideration and wish to extend the benefits of one's authentic lights to other selves as such. But even within the context of humanly decorous and interpersonally not destructive projects of the pursuance and furthering of a human reality in one's own conduct, we may identify and discern degrees and varieties of goodness or an effective universalistic sharing with one's fellow-authentic the socialpsychologically beneficial fruits of one's project of authenticity. In foregoing analyses of ways and methods of the maintenance and management of the schism by the authentic, (this schism yielded by the difference between the scope of one's bare "me" which alone is allowed the profane in the world, and one's insistence on a more complete self as personally retained and entertained), we have distinguished between the quality and the radicality of the method of openly stating this schism in the fight to make one's more ideal self than presently allowed acceptable to and rehabilitated by the generalized other, on the one hand, and, on the other, the more quiet and and socially ineffective and inconsequential but also authentic project of privately stomaching and resolving our schism, our deviance, our irrepressible endowment with the qualities of an exuberant youthfulness and innocence in the face of the inert norm in

the world hostile to such affirmations of the self in the profane, without us making a public witness of this quality as human reality in militance, without our trying to use that critically constructive schism for altering the world so that its norm should be more receptive of us and the likes of us, without actively asserting the need that our own variety of the Different may unapologetically parade among the small-letter sacred in the world as uncurtailed, rather than stereotypically conceived and reduced human realities, with our human status there equal to everyone else's. A hierarchy of human worth, excellence as human reality, more finely graded than either saintliness or pathologic criminality, extreme good or extreme evil as the two morally qualitative polarities of the dimension of the "I", will emerge from an analysis of the degrees and quality of the use to which one's witness to that "I" is put. Antigone's kind of responding to the bidding of the oppressive society-critical schism in her consciousness, yielded by her own keen awareness of the absolute standards of human decency as an active and morally discerning self in the face of a society which is totally insensitive and oppressive of that, is the most admirable because of a most constructive order, totally universalistic in the sense of her envisaging the humane promptings of her own lights as human reality, as imperatively extendable to everyone in her situation and aimed at altering the law itself so as to accommodate her personal moral insight through the precedence which she created. She makes a public stand of her schism as human reality in the face of Creon's rule, which means (and bids her too) to thwart her possibilities of acting on her own moral lights as a self-respecting human being, which forbids her to bury her dead in the name of her respect for the life of those dead and for everybody's life, her project complete with the authority of a better society which is more tolerant than the present one, of human reality and its biddings, a future society of which she is a herald, a pioneer.

To delve into the store of literature again, we can find a fine example in Restoration comedies for a paradigm of schism-management and transcendence in which, unlike in the project of Antigone, the choice of sticking to one's guns as 'rosebud', youthful vitality and bid for freedom, is conducted with a lesser degree of ambitiousness for the

universalistic consequences of such an undertaking. The topics of comedies of that era usually treat the fortunes of youngsters in love, who have our support and sympathies as audience because they are more sensitive than the older and more established perpetrators of the artful and false norm of the reigning society, because they are more innocent, vulnerable and natural as human realities in comparison with the hardness and calculatedness, with regard to human relationships, of the reigning norm, because they suffer under its corrupt yoke which threatens the course of their genuine, small-letter, spontaneous love and which bars their innocent happiness; but they don't plead their case in the name of a better society, tolerant of the ways of romantic lovers and free young spirits. Their target, *telos* and actual fulfilment is envisaged as coming into their own in terms of the same pretentious high society which opposes them; they mean to graduate to that society in a married respectability according to its conventions; they mean to be subsequently accepted, when their affairs of the heart become victorious, in the privileged notch for them in the social hierarchy which awaits them there. It is merely their greater than demanded, approved, allowed, 'normal' moral sensibility, and lack of cynicism, expressed in their romantic love, which makes us keep our fingers crossed for them. The authors' (particularly Congreve's) prism in depicting the rotten society of their day is penetrating and profound, and this is the extent to which their critical vision is deployed. They entertain no alternatives but to live in and with such a society, corrupt as it is, a society which they do not reject but shoulder as their own, which elicits a sadness, but not a hate in them. The result is a variety of authenticity, heartfelt but not universally aspirative or consequential in its implications in actual social ways; hence the quality of a tart and pessimistic authenticity and delectable decadence characterising these plays; every one of them a masterpiece. (The same evaluation and criticism may be made with regard to Scott Fitzgerald's lifework, as well as of Oscar Wilde's plays, such as An Ideal Husband.) But whatever quality, form, strength, the "I" will come to assume in its assertion of itself in the self as human reality, political militance, heresy, an introverted, socially passive, prolonged state of sensibility, or even its criminally channelled avenues, it will (because

it is real as one's gift or burden, depending on the point of view adopted towards it), resist, in a meaningful and emphatic sense, attempts to stifle it, render it out of existence by officialdom, in the context of the family or of society; it will haunt one necessarily in childhood and in youth, and also in adulthood if we choose to resort to it, if we don't denounce it in bad faith, if it continues in conduct and consciousness as something to be reckoned with as one's necessary possibility as a self. As Mead so plausibly suggests, '42' even the most zealous observers of the seemly confines of a socially proper existence, as a matter of their fundamental choice, can and must find channels for engaging the residue of their selves produced by a never quite repressible "I", somewhat deviant in its relation to the mere "me" as the entirely evidencible radius of our selves in which we are exhausted as selves in the knowledge of us by others, and even by ourselves, if in bad faith; however much we may wish to effectively suppress that. Not even the most respectable of citizens is excused from the need and job of managing, channelling or letting off steam as an "I", at least in a pretend way, at least in a way in which he can hide it even from himself that he does so. Mead writes with a sense of disgust about the popularity of murder stories in which the otherwise seemingly perfectly socialised pukka, the totally compliant individual, gives vent to a degraded, latent "I"; hence the thrilling qualities of such works. 'It is astonishing what part of the "I" of the sick is constituted' in such forms of art, he observes.

I would suggest that in addition to Mead's observation that this (the clandestine motivation to sport an "I" which is disallowed room in the conduct of the polite in society), is at the bottom of people's fascination, not only for crime movies, but for missionary films too or films about the pioneers of other good and daring human or artistic causes: films depicting social creativity in the most constructive sense. By identifying with the main heroes/heroines of such films as the champions of the spirit of pure goodness or excellence as human reality, the social etiquette-wise normally very conventional and cautious viewer takes his "I" on a little trip on which in real life he would never embark. On the face of it, he pretends to himself that, like the good

guys in the film, he would have helped the social or artistic innovator portrayed in the movie, the character he now knows to be supremely good or excellent in social or artistic ways, because the hero/heroine had since won, thereby emancipating his/her arrogance in appointing himself/herself divine ambassador with a calling to change some society or established Academy somewhere in a respect which seemed intolerably unjustifiable to him/her, for having found a way to do so, and for pushing their innovative vision and project through. However, nothing could be further from the truth than such a picture regarding the very conventional and socially proper viewer, the paragon of goodness by the standards of ascription. In real life, the average Pukka would have been offended by or been jealous of the freedom and visionary endowment of the hero/heroine which moved him/her to tamper with affairs in the world as they are. He would have shelved indefinitely the artist's submissions and the missionary's letters, refused the hero/heroine appointments had he/she tried to call, or have had left him/her unattended in the waiting room in case he/she tried to call nevertheless; or, more likely still, had him/her politely dismissed by his secretary; and, had he nevertheless acquired some notion of the worth of the artist's or the missionary's project or idea, he would have stolen it as soon as he felt reassured that he/she had been shaken off well and good, taken that as 'toll' by virtue of his privileged ascription, as the dues payable to his officiality, and put that project or those ideas into operation as his own, so as to appear to have earned some degree of excellence for himself.

I think the folk tradition of the Whitsun King on the Continent - appointing someone from the village to be king for a day, real king, one living in the palace, with everyone following his orders, bowing to his regalia - a folk custom to which the tradition of the Child Bishop in this country is somewhat comparable - conceivably also satisfies the need for man to act on his hubris, let his "I" hang out every now and then, in a way which is legitimised, made safe through its being brought within the context of the Christian calendar, somewhat ritualised and transposed into the idiom of festive jollity, fun, a jest, made a mere and temporary flirtation with the real thing. This folk custom gives the

Child Bishop or the Whitsun King the opportunity to give his "I" a field-day - to remember for a life-time that he had once been a god of a sort for a day, even if only in pretence; and to some extent provides the by-standers - his subjects for the day - with the opportunity to have the same trip to divinity by identifying with their mate in the ordinary way - the Child Bishop or the Whitsun King - , feeling that they might just as well had been the lucky ones, been in his shoes.

Section 6. Part 3. On Being Subject too: The Coarse Caretaker.

I once heard sociology defined as 'the celebration of the ordinary man'. This definition may be approached and understood in two ways; one authentic and the other one unauthentic. Out of the first grasp of this statement emerges a view of man - every man, including the Rachmones - which throws into relief man's capacity and potential for adjustment in the full sense as just described in Part 2. of this Section - in the sense of recognising and emphasising the fact that man has the ability, if not always the opportunity, to actively live his own, personal self in the context of a shared, public social reality as both a participant in and as the conscience of that - either endorsing it with the power of his personal vote for that norm, prompted by his "I" as well as carried out with his "me", in instances when that norm tallies with and is judged by him as univeralistically accomodative of himself as an authentic human reality and of other selves in society such as himself, or, if society fails this test by his authentic lights as a self, he exercises the "I" of his self in applying himself as an authentic citizen of his society, as the critic of society in all its phases and varieties, good or bad. In either case, he experiences and uses the "me" as both the right and the fitting platform for the "I" of his self, and the anchorage of his whole self in society - the actual one or a more ideal one fathomed by him and informing him - participating in one or the other (the actual society as it is or the actual society as it should be, for his money, in the light of a more ideal collective consciousness to which he is present), as a "me" which he is happy, or would be happy, to experience his self as continuous with the prevailing norm, because in terms of the prevailing norm the need of the "I" to be sovereign in society as a self, is, or could be, satisfied. In other words, that man has the need and capacity to experience and engage himself as a 'Whitsun King' (see the last paragraph in the foregoing Part in this Section), in the real 'kingdom' in which he lives, positing himself as one who has a say in it as an authentic and somewhat personally powerful citizen at all times, not just during 'Whitsun'. Sociology, serving and studying the participation of the individual in society in this first sense, is the celebration of the insight that this

need and possibility is ordinary to man and universal to man, and true of people who grasp and summon their selves as such; and it's a particularly strong point of existentialist social thought that it is equipped to distinguish strongly between this first possible interpretation of the definition of sociology as just quoted, and a second, more pedestrian understanding of it, according to which the definition just quoted becomes a little twisted to assert that 'sociology is the celebration of the ordinary in man.' It is Sartre whose writings show, to my mind, the greatest appreciation of the distinction between these two possible interpretations of social experience and participation by the individual, the full and authentic one as first given here, and the degraded one as latterly quoted; a distinction of which Mead too is cognisant and to which Mead too is sensible. ⁽⁴³⁾ In Antisemite and Jew ⁽⁴⁴⁾ Sartre gives an insightful rendering of the antisemite's debased form of man's socialpsychologic sense of reinforcement for his unconditionally society-corroborative participation in politics in bad faith, available through the worship of one's averageness as a self as an ideal, coupled with a dedicated rejection and suspicion of any flexibility, spontaneity, originality, display of individual differences. The antisemite, as shown by Sartre, gains a sense of elevation as a person through the cultivated experience of mediocrity, which affords him a substitute for an authentically earned sense of excellence, and provides an external, macro-socialpsychologic mechanism too which acts as the lazy and otherwise unendowed man's surrogate hubris, made interested in abandoning his authentic one, - deploying and cashing in on the citizen's surrogate, unauthentic "I" (this process described in the Section called 'Our Big-letter and Small-leter Righteousness as Object'). This practice in fascism proved to be an instrument to link the fascist to those more highly ranking than himself in the ascribed hierarchy in society, the mechanism uniting several, otherwise distinctly circumscribed and separated social types through their shared hate of the Jew, the newly arrived competitor for participation in the older, wider, already established national heritage, and the scapegoat for society's ills. In addition to this very extreme, obvious and undisguisedly bizarre and humanly twisted form of ideology in which the antisemite substitutes a

mediocrity for the deserts of real excellence as an authentic self (of which he would also be capable but which would cost him greater effort), Sartre affords, in the course of his various socialtheoretic writings, many other shades and forms of established thought, historical, social and political, according to which man's 'normalcy' and qualification for 'adjusted' status, are equated to his living strictly and committedly within the confines of a "me"-only, (for the resulting humanly anomalous and limited sense of 'normalcy and 'adjustment' see the last Part and the beginning of the current Part of this Section), and according to which the implicit command of the reigning norm that man forego the insights and critique of the "I", surrendering the choices and responsibilities that go with an active resort to that "I" to the caretakers; and Sartre is consistent in showing how such a limited demand on man, or rather such a demand for this limitation as the condition of the granting of his 'adjustment', shortchanges him in terms of his full capacity for adjustment in the authentic sense. Romantics are, generally speaking, agreed and aware that while it is true, as socialscientific positivists, empiricists and behaviourists claim, that the subjectivity of the judgement of the "I", the deviance of the 'perspective' of the individual in relation to the shared content of consciousness as society or the collective consciousness as it exists, is indeed the source of error, ⁽⁴⁵⁾ and of all the ill that may follow from the exercise of deviant judgement in the light of that 'perspective' or self, both outside in society and inside of the self in question, as authentic hubris gone sad and sour; but they also see and concern themselves with the experiential loss, socialpsychologic anomalousness and less than optimal and authentic scope and quality of the self as both a citizen and a private person, through the denunciation of man's capacity for fresh insights and novel and authentic responses to society, an attitude prompted by a fear of erring, resulting in a way of life which adopts a cautious inconspicuousness of the individual's consciousness as its ideal, which is also the source of the barring of the self from attaining virtue in the authentic sense, as argued in the foregoing Part of this Section.

Michael Green wrote an amusing series of books attaching the adjective 'coarse' in the title to every one of the areas of activities described by him in each of the books, such as The Art of Coarse Acting, The Art of Coarse Golfing, etc. (46) Analogously to the dichotomy in dividing projects, occupations, activities, into two ways of approaching them, coarse and other, as suggested by Green's usage, the possibility seems to offer itself that the job of 'caretaking', which in former descriptions of it in this thesis emerged so far as always coarse, stereotypic and humanly insensitive in its approach to the profane, may be entertained and presented as other than coarse. Coarse and other caretaking will be distinguished from each other here by the index of their effect in interpersonal affairs, and by the different keynote which underlies the 'caretaker's' job of governing other people's chances and affairs, and of exercising a say in the ascriptional classification of other people's human status in the world. Coarse caretaking is the style of government (and this means here not just political and state government, but the government of any interpersonal relationship in which the duties belonging to the "me" and the rights belonging to an "I" of one or more other selves whose affairs are being managed, 'taken care of') - in which the benefits of the caretaking are envisaged and imparted to the recipients of caretaking in a direct manner, without recourse to (or opportunity for) the exercise of the recipient's own freedom, choice, individual judgement or autonomy as a self. A one-party electoral system, in which voting for the only party that figures on the ballot paper is compulsory, even if the party in question is popular, historically right and convincingly vindicated - would be an example of coarse caretaking, in which people are made to do the right thing, but not as a function of their individual choice, and without drawing on, giving scope for their autonomy, without putting into play, engaging their capacity, as individuals, to coordinate the rights of their own "I"-s and the duties of their own "me"-s according to their own chosen lights as individuals, as a matter of their own personal judgement. But a coarse style of political caretaking on such a grand, national scale can operate in subtler and less obvious ways too, such as in instances where there is a two- or multiparty electoral system, but the voting population is courted and bombarded by the ruling

party for the returning of that party, by below-the-belt, psychologically deep and sophisticated, subliminal ways of suggesting the favourability of that party on the media, including the skillful, direct and systematic advertising of recommended forms of activities congenial to that party's policies, by methods of Hidden Persuasion. Generally speaking, coarse caretaking is based on the view, and on the promotion of that view by measures available to the caretakers with ascriptive powers, that the responsible business of the coordination of the rights and duties, "I"-s and "me"-s of citizens, properly belongs to the initiated - politicians, local government officials, social services personnel, psychiatric personnel, who have been trained to do this job, and the voters or other recipients of caretaking of various forms - in a word: the ascribed Profane, are amateurs, "me"-s only, who need to be told how to put to good use the "me" which the country, the 'normal' population and other manifestations of the established crust of the norm and any human corpus unauthentically sustaining that *status quo*, needs; with all varieties of Profane identified by us so far apprehended by the ascribed Sacred and its representatives, as in need of acting on their behalf when it comes to choices concerning them; and the kind of political bad faith which consists in the citizens', or some citizens', preferring to benefit from government decisions taken on their behalf without drawing on the exercise of their personal and authentic choices, and in the denial that ordinary citizens need to match, or are potentially capable of matching, the initiated in aptitude for judgements exercised on their behalf, may be termed 'coarse citizenship.' A coarse form of government is that to which it is undesirable that the collective consciousness for which it sees itself should consist of citizens with politically autonomous and active selves, whose consciousness is free in and through the exercise and voicing of their own judgement, idiosyncratic and politically creative insights as selves complete with an "I", as consciousnesses which are not completely indistinguishable from or identical with the generalized other, and such a coarse government is punitive, in more or less overt or, alternatively, more or less subtle and hidden ways, of such a politically authentic attitude of individuals as citizens. It's a style of caretaking which means to benefit its citizens (if it's not cynical

enough to lack this motivation), by making individual freedom redundant in the way in which its citizens draw advantages from it. Coarse caretaking is the type of government which does not see or does not want to see that a form of state that consists of individually independent citizens supportive of it (as its ultimate aim) who have the faculty to make political judgements for themselves, is a better form of state, better form of political system and a better quality collective consciousness than the coarse one, not just for the sake of the individuals that inhabit it, but for the sake of the government and for the sake of the quality of the collective consciousness that happens to reign. Coarse teaching styles will be easily identified on analogous lines - those approaches to education in which the values of the culture, and the content of those academic subjects that are being taught - are imparted directly by spoonfeeding them to the children and which are blind to the value to the children (eventually adults), and to the culture which they will eventually populate as adults, of social being of a quality in which individuals are self-sufficient, autonomous, do the right things because they see the need, have it in them, can be trusted to, and want to do those; and who can be listened to if they don't, because they may be right and the system may be in need of repairing in certain respects if they judge it right for it to be so. Finally, the notion of coarse sociology and social psychology, making the safeguarding and ensuring of the adjustment ('equilibrium', to Durkheim) of society and people's consciousness and attitudes to it, exclusively their business, thrust themselves to attention in this context again, on analogous lines. Coarse sociology is that which conceptualises adjustment as something which equals causing people's selves to be absolutely coincidental with the "me"-only, in other words, with the generalized other without residue as an "I" in the self, as opposed to the anthropologically full understanding of a self's adjustment, as referred to in the last Part of this Section - an adjustment or good match within selves, between the social ideals of the self, partly the business of the "I", and the actuality of society, as available to and coincidental with the "me", as that "me" which is in fact available to meet people's needs and desires for those social ideals. Coarse sociology will deny that people's selves may have more

authentic than 'gestured', they are capable of entertaining and being profitably consulted about the meaningful and legitimate social ideals which they hold over and above their actual possibilities as the "me"-s in the world which they actually are as overt, citizenly personalities and which they are bid to be as the exhaustive radius for their selves;, and the coarse sociologist will deny that the actual prevailing norm that's available as the sole and exclusive informant of the "me" of the selves in a complete identification with that norm, may be judged and experienced as less than ideally satisfying in moral and *existentiell* ways in the personally authentic lights of any individual as such, that the "me" typecast for people may at any time come over and feel in their experience as less than fair, fitting and satisfactory by their socially and personally authentic judgement, however ordinary a social *niche* he may occupy. Even that type of coarse sociology which sees itself as progressive, will deal with the concept of a better and more just future society than the present one, in a way in which the enriched possibilities of selves in that coming society are envisaged entirely in terms of, and as coincidental with, a future "me" *only* for all, with a future generalized other which, again, won't cater for diversity and deviation, which will be compulsory for all in the only available way in which that will serve as the actual possibility for individual selves. If an enlarged scope for the "I"-s of selves is envisaged, romantic socialtheoretic fashion, as a possible universalistic moral and socialpsychologically rewarding side-benefit to selves in that socially more just future society, the coarse progressive sociologist or politician will dismiss the notion as meaningless or a frivolity for which the busy and practical man has no time. (47) The coarse sociologist, whether socially progressive or reactionary, will arrogantly regard himself as the highest authority and expert on society's as well as people's individual 'adjustment' (not admitting the axiomatic, legitimate and generic difference between these two standards for adjustment any time), and the 'ordinary man' who is regarded as either unentitled to or uninitiated in the project of the pursuit of his own adjustment as a grown fledgeling venturing out of the nest of the generalized other which socialized and shaped him as a "me" in the image of the reigning norm whilst a budding self, regards every self,

ordinarily profane, as an amateur in the ways of society and his lot within that as a citizen, on whose behalf it is his uplifting task to act so as to promote social adjustment within and outside him as a self. Sociology to him will be the celebration of the 'ordinary man' in a condescending way, in the way in which he very kindly does the celebrating, and the 'ordinary man' whom he credits with a "me" only, is fodder in the process oriented to social adjustment both in the inner and the outer sense, who is someone whose consciousness is not sacred in a tutored and explicit way in the feat of the adjustment between society and selves, not capable of or properly, meaningfully and legitimately desirous of the thrill which is inherent in the appreciation, socially constructive personal exercise and existential savouring of the coincidence between the collective consciousness he agrees with and the individual consciousness which solemnly chooses that society out of his own free will, in the act and experience which Sartre calls 'elective assumption' - the highest form of social consciousness - and which receives attention in the Introduction at some length.

There are two kinds of coarse sociologists; one is the type that will entertain, allow for, own up to the meaningfulness and/or possible experience of an "I" as attaching to, involved in the phenomenon of coincidence (the coincidence between the ideals of the self and the collective consciousness, actual or ideal, which the self will choose for its personal endorsement), for his own part, but not for the part of the 'ordinary man', and who will claim privileged access to the mystery of such practice as one of the initiated - as the sole authority on engineering (in the ordinary sense) and knowing this phenomenon of the collective consciousness, which in reality is open to the 'ordinary man' in the act of solemnly exercising the project of 'elective assumption' as a morally sovereign, decorous and significant ego. This type of coarse sociologist, siding with or appointing himself as the equal to and the mouthpiece of the highly ascribed 'caretaker' Pukka involved in charitable work or in an executive position in the social services, will be one who conceives of himself as someone apart from the consciousnesses of those who, as far as he and the social process he appoints himself as the promoter of are concerned, are properly endowed,

to his view, with a "me" only; this first type of coarse Pukka caretaker will see himself, in a word, as someone apart from those consciousnesses which are the object and medium in which the collective consciousness in its actuality factually consists as collective. The being of the consciousness of the 'ordinary man' as "me", as *object only*, to the mind of this first kind of coarse sociologist or executive 'caretaker', is in fact the condition of his own possibilities as a complete self, inclusive of an "I" as such, which he will grant to himself or herself, rather than the possibilities of a complete and full exercise and realisation of the self, on similarly dignified terms, of the 'ordinary man' whose 'caretaker' he is. The Pukka engaged in such a style of 'caretaking' doesn't have to be in a very highly ascribed position in charitable networks or the social services to sustain and promote such an attitude in the mode of his relating to his client, the 'ordinary man'. One can encounter such an attitude in relation to clients in quite rank-and-file workers in the social services too. One can identify socially not highly elevated coarse social workers who see their job as worthwhile as a condition of their own happiness and fulfilment, forgetting the demand for and the right to a comparable human dignity in the conception of the selves who are his or her 'cases'.

The second type of coarse sociologist or social worker, highly ascribed or low, is the socialtheoretic positivist. This latter type will not see the "I" as at work in any form of sociologic or caseworking practice, in the self of anyone involved in it, client or 'caretaker'. He will approach the task and the practices of the study of sociology or the application of it 'in the field', in actual encounters with the 'ordinary man', in a perfectly matter-of-fact manner, in a way to which the celebratory mood is inappropriate, and will regard both himself and the 'ordinary man' - the object of his study or professional assistance - in the cool light of day only, to fall back for a moment on a Bachelardian nomenclature. There is an aphorism in G. B. Shaw's play Pygmalion, in the form of a line given to one of the main characters, Elisa Doolittle, according to which there are two distinct and differing styles in which to be pukka ('gentleman') - one is treating even a princess as though she is a flowergirl, and the other treating even a

flowergirl as if she is a princess. Of course, these two differing stations in the world - 'princess' and 'flowergirl' - must not be taken here in a socially narrow and facile way to falsely imply that Elisa's observation refers to the flowergirl's poorer and the princess' better actual chances in the world for being less or more elevated in the hierarchy of class society, thereby reducing the complexity and anthropologic subtlety of the message at the heart of Shaw's play, misinterpreting the story of Elisa's pilgrimage from flowergirl to 'princess', to a question of social mobility. The two terms in which Elisa sees her alternative possibilities as either doormat to Henry and his likes or a lady on her own human terms, whether flowergirl in social actuality or not, are to be understood in a socialpsychologic, human context in Shaw's updated story of Pygmalion: the creator of a 'body' complete with life and therefore soul, out of the raw material of an apparent, humanly unambitious and undynamic, consenting "me"-only. By wishing to be 'princess', she fights her way to being the 'princess', the socialpsychologically 'graceful' being (for this Sartrian meaning of 'graceful' see the concluding Section of this thesis), which every girl has a right to be as a person if she so chooses, in an anthropologic ambitiousness and discerningness generally expandable to all, a quality with which an actual princess need not be endowed in the least, as this possibility (the lack of 'gentleman', 'prince' or 'princess' status, so to speak, by human measures, in the highly ascribed), was described in Chapter 2. Section 2., showing up the meagre extent of human class in Bertie Wooster and Almaviva, compared with their manservants', Jeeves' and Figaro's abundant endowedness with human excellence. 'Princess' in the sense Elisa refers to it, is synonymous with the terms 'Whitsun King' or 'Socrates' (rather than a 'pig'), in the sense in which these terms were featured in the last Part of this Section. It refers to one's classification as a self, and therefore socialpsychologic status in life as a matter of one's private ideal possibilities as a self, with these possibilities drawn on, thrown into one's way of conducting one's intra- or interpersonal business at all times, with these possibilities unavoidably, either enticingly or unwantedly and menacingly (according to one's fundamental choice), available to consciousness as a decisive part of the mode of its being; its

incorporation into one's everyday style of conduct yielding a 'grace' in the Sartrian sense which the individual either is with, or, equally conspicuously, is without. In illuminating this contention, I would like to call on the example of a woman I know who, moving to a town where her new job took her, advertised for accommodation there. She had one response to her advertisement, and on taking the room offered, she became aware that it was let to her on the tacit condition, and with the anticipation (underneath the legally orthodox terms) that as a condition of her tenancy, she would make the order of her being, her anthropologic standing, continuous with the culturally, or rather subculturally established hierarchy which pretty well completely determined her self-image as a single and independent-minded woman, in terms of the prejudices towards such a person in relation to the propertied male who offered her the accommodation as well as to the minds of his friends and family, whether they lived on the premises or not. The subculture suddenly surrounding her was unanimous in assigning, ascribing to her a self so subservient to the letting party that escaping the landlord's insulting attitude to her which consisted of the way in which he apprehended her as a self, cost her constant effort during a sustained period, whilst being obliged to accept the tenancy for the lack of the availability of any other. Under her circumstances, it made a great difference whether the woman in question chose her possibilities as a 'princess' or, less outlandishly put, as a 'lady' in a socialpsychologically perfectly meaningful sense, (even though, as a matter of social ascription, she belonged to the working class) - or whether she chose her self in terms of that mere "me" which was 'gestured' as proper to her by the human quality and set of expectations of his human surrounds, in terms of the stereotype to which her "me" amounted in terms of the convention of the subculture with which she made contact. Romantic social theoreticians will tell us that the woman in our example was free to define her self and to lead her life inclusively of her possibilities as a 'princess', 'Socrates', 'Whitsun King' (or rather, 'Whitsun Queen'), or whatever metaphor we may choose out of those offered here so far to denote the humanly more authentic mode of her self than the pedestrian one typecast for her as someone lowly ascribed according to the conventions of the culture surrounding

her. A romantic way of socialtheoretical thinking throws light on the fact that she was free to see and conduct herself as the emancipated citizen of an as yet future society, 'Whitsun' kingdom, illuminated by the 'halo', the "I" to which she remained faithful and 'present', for her part, and the romantic social or socialpsychologic theoretician will also tell us that while it is truly the case that positive social reality or the "me" available to her as a matter of course in the world as it was, really did define her personality according to overt, external socialpsychologic and social measures in the present, her 'presence' to a more fully human self, complete with an anthropologically more aspirative "I", was indeed capable of causally eliciting her response to her situation, and as a consequence of her authentic response to the inert classification of her self as typecast, as a "me"-only, she successfully because freely chose herself as inclusive of her private ideal possibilities, anthropologically more complete than her present ones, which in an active and dissenting response to her typecast, reacted back upon and actually shaped the actual reality both of her self and and of her cultural and social environs, and bettered the quality of her self there in real terms. Mead calls this process of action and reaction between social stimulus and a critical response to it, 'the conversation of the "me" and the "I"'. Romantic socialscientific theory - including that of Mead - is definitely inclusive of the rationalistic element making up the subject matter of their study, which consists of the power of the "I" as a response consequential to the quality of the social world as stimulus, as just shown by our example. It maintains (in Meadean language) not only that the "I" comes into being in response to the "me" or generalized other or social stimulus, but that the "I" must really be reckoned with as a capacity, as a stimulus-hunger, as the need of the self for human reality in which to thrive, a kind of reality other than the bare and stark Durkheimian social one which stands immutably over against that peculiar human reality which partly consists in the response capacity of the "I", in terms of which response the socially, physiologically and materially positive depositories of the world become humanly meaningful stimuli, peculiarly defined by and 'answering to' the needs and dicta for the fulfilment of that peculiar, humanly populated,

constituted and demanding stratum of reality - human reality - which operates in terms of its special, socialpsychologic idiom rather than a rigidly social one as does the collective consciousness. Through this mode of personal being as a self, by way of which these stimuli in the world, social and other, come to attain a 'meaning' both in general and particular human terms in a way exactly appropriate to the needs of the "I" as a capacity to apprehend, define and enliven, bring alive, illuminate stimuli in such a sense, in the process of the self incorporating, colonising for its own particular mode of being, those stimuli out of the mere haphazard array of raw material in the world which potentially avails itself to being incorporated into 'man's world, into man's 'my world', into human reality in a significant way, which human reality will then, in turn, define, shape, make sense of, indeed, make the world to a great extent. There is no question, no doubt as to the fact that this Kantian element forms one part of Mead's theory of the process of social reality, and this circumstance makes, to my mind, Mead's theory of the constant emergence of society in this way in its effect, one of the dualistic sociologies of knowledge, similarly to Althusser's or to Sartre's account of the constant upsurge of the external social world, in terms of man's need and ability for the realisation of the "I", or rather the creation and maintainance of Being-for-Itself, 'lived reality', 'my world', the 'perspective' etc., a tier of reality axiomatically inclusive of the "I": human reality. Romantic social theory (as already argued at length early in a former Section which bears in its title the words 'The Social Uncreativity of the Pukka'), is most definitely and importantly inclusive of crediting people with Pygmalionic powers in relation to each other, by virtue of their capacity to conceive the Other ('external social reality' according to its very fertile Sartrian conceptualisation), either passively as an immutable part of that external social reality, as a mere stereotypic "me"-only, or, alternatively, in a humanly dynamic way as a fellow-Being-for-Itself, complete with the full human dignity of such a self, which comes through its 'grace', a self which is authentic, regarding its potentials, no less than one's own; making it, through one's interpersonally creative or uncreative classification of other people as selves, either difficult or easy for them to be 'princesses'

rather than 'flowergirls', or 'flowergirls' rather than 'princesses'. It's a Hegelian thought, as remarked in the Section called 'The Social Uncreativity of the Pukka', that seeing ourselves defined, constituted in the mirror of the eye of the Other in terms which are different, often humanly lesser, than those terms in which we have chosen, constituted our individual selves in a maximalistic authenticity, the mirror image of our 'real self' bouncing back on us our mere "me" in the Other's gaze, the noncoincidence of our self as grasped by us and as defined by the other, affording us the experience of the duality of our selves as ideal and actual, an experience which jars in our consciousness on such an account. Romantic social science in this century (including that of Mead), is typically preoccupied with this dualism of the self, yielded by its private conceptualisation and entertainment of a possible, more ideal, personally fathomable and cognisable "me" (prompted by the "I") than that "me" for which we are commonly known in a pedestrian social and interpersonal actuality. Our sticking to our guns of the conceptualisation of our so-called 'ideal selves' as meaningful, and our insistence on the relevance of that aspect of our selves which we may effectively and actively create and cultivate, if we so choose, in the name of that one-member society in which we are ace and fully recognised citizens by the dicta of the peculiar lights and imperative of the humanly perfectionist standards of our own individual consciousness as such, yields a strongly operative vision of the social placement and quality of our selves in the ideal society tolerant of our selves as fathomed by us, to which there may not be any other "me"-s to correspond as yet, of which the only citizen at the present moment is the "me" of our self already living according to the not-yet existing norm and standards of that society in which people of our own kind as Whitsun pukka, so to speak - pukka in advance in the present, in spite of the fact that our pukka status, our 'prince' or 'princess' status, our emancipated citizen, small-letter sacred status is not yet endorsed by the "me" of anyone else, and, sadly, needn't necessarily come to be endorsed at any time by any kind of posterity. The 'romantic' social thinker and the romantic moralist is egalitarian in the anthropologically full sense - in the sense that he restores the 'halo' to everyone and advances a 'halo' to everyone. (For the meaning of

'halo', see the former Section featuring in its title the phrase 'The Social Uncreativity of the Pukka.') The 'romantic' social theorist makes every agent responsible for his part in how far others who are in an interpersonal liaison with him have realised their selves, helped by him and by the power of his 'gaze' or, more Sartrian still, of their 'look', inclusive of their original human possibilities, those potentials which their selves once had, and still have in the "I" - as the promise they once saw themselves as, and which they still are as the "I" - and the 'romantic' social thinker also makes every agent responsible for the extent to which he had performed or alternatively failed to have performed the same duty to himself as the equal of the Other - of every authentic other; consistently with the New Testament's message expressed in the parable of talents, as considered in Section 1. in this chapter. The 'romantic' social thinker makes all of us responsible for the extent to which we have done our best to humanly emancipate ourselves, for how far we created ourselves as full persons and not the stereotype interpretations of our selves, to which fully human interpretation of themselves our selves avail themselves. The 'romantic' will judge us by the measure of how far we have done our best to be a consciousness, each and every one of us, one that is the witness to those ideal possibilities of ourselves of which we are aware of now, which we are living now, by the more inclusive norms of a more ideal collective consciousness than the currently prevailing body of prejudices by which our 'real selves', our "me"-s are invited to abide. By insisting that every self live, apprehend and conduct himself or herself complete with the sense of duty, the freedom and the socially not yet predigested idiom of thought which is the prize of those who choose to identify with their possibilities not as the blemish they are now but as the sovereign person they are capable of thinking of themselves as being - in other words, by restoring people's halos to them, the 'romantic' sociologist and moralist does everyone a debatably welcome favour, in so far as his halo is not an unequivocally kind gift to the 'ordinary man', for it makes him, if he chooses to live with recourse to it, one of the universally extraordinary, and takes away the pretence that there is no choice for him but to be less. It goes with the bidding that the 'flowergirl' be the 'princess' she sees herself as, and whom she feels

if she so chooses, and makes her mindful of and responsible for the choice of being so or declining to be so. 'Romantic' egalitarianism is the apprehension of all selves as complete with the "I"; with the resulting understanding both of egalitarianism and of adjustment completely different from a positivistic understanding of both these notions, and, generally speaking, different from all those understandings of 'egalitarianism' and 'adjustment' which do not allow for the "I" as the possibility - the necessary possibility - of the 'ordinary man' - which do not make use of the dignified possibility for all of the inclusion in their selves of the "I" as the condition of everyone's equality. The coarse sociologist or coarse social worker who is coarse in the first manner of coarseness identified here a little while ago - by virtue of separating from the 'ordinary man' the elation which is inherent in a man's or woman's capacity and experience as adjusted to universal standards as a self fulfilled, sovereign, - reserving familiarity with this sense of elation to himself or herself as the 'expert' on this phenomenon, and our second type of coarse social practitioner whose coarseness of social thought consists of universally disallowing everyone (including himself or herself) the possible role of the "I" in the conducting of the self, in other words, who denies for everyone the potential of being a 'Socrates', 'Whitsun King' etc., and who works with his or her clients in the spirit of universal indifference and subservience to a stereotype anthropologic ideal of man as all "me" - both these types promote a sham equality and sham adjustment, barring the possibility of a more true-to-life, more spontaneous, a completely effortless, more real and anthropologically more fully inclusive equality and adjustment, one that's anchored in and encompasses both the individual's inner perspective and his interpersonal relations. Through not crediting his clients with an "I", the coarse social practitioners will be slumming in face-to-face situations with their clients, either not bothering with promoting a semblance of human equality between the 'caretaker' and the 'caretaken' at all, or forcing a sense of equality between the two agencies in question, which doesn't ring true and doesn't come naturally.

The 'slumming' referred to here is an anthropologic attitude, one that's not at all parallel to or interchangeable with the problem on the part of the socially arrogant of mixing with the culturally alien lower-class agent, and it would amount to a misleading oversimplification to see it thus; as a matter of social class, that is. The demeanour of the coarse social practitioners who themselves come from quite poor backgrounds is just as prone to being shot with the kind of human reality-wise offensive patronising when face-to-face with a 'case', in an anthropologic sense, as is the demeanour of coarse social workers coming from across the social chasm, from a more affluent socio-economic background than that of their clients. The attitude referred to here - anthropologic slumming - takes its source from the need on the coarse empiricistically informed social practitioner's part to cover up his or her embarrassment over engaging in personal dealings with someone he or she apprehends as one divested of a soul, as one without an "I", as one ascribed as blemished, as one socially humiliated, and psychologically 'ungraceful', even depressed; exhibitionistically flaunting an overjolly "me", as the 'gesture' whose meaning is this: 'All nice people have such a jolly "me" in common, at least as their glorious possibility; look how hard I work on mine; so you jolly well respond accordingly, take your jolly "me" into both hands and put it to work; then you will do as well out of playing my game as you possibly can with the chances left to you according to the game in the social world.' There are entire subcultures where the untiring cultivation of a jolly, humanly egalitarian "me" in an unceasing demonstration of a personally adjusted comradeship is a socially highly prized attitude, not to say one that's constantly demanded of people as the signification of their one hundred per cent social 'normality'; and as the condition of their being able to reap the tangible droplets of a reward due to those who try hard to be such a "me". The type keenly complying with and promoting such conduct, is widespread in such cultures, and is not necessarily confined there to the professional practitioners in such liaisons between the enthusiastic "me"-promoters and other rank-and-file profane; and can be conveniently called 'the organisational type'. In Hungary, where this attitude happens to be most typically perpetrated by females, the expression 'organisational woman' ('mozgalmi nő'), is part of everyday usage,

strikes a chord and affords a meaning which everyone understands, one that people from different cultures may also readily recognise as familiar. The 'organisational woman' will eat out or go to a holiday resort mostly and typically when public functions so demand; even then she will not enjoy herself and relax for a moment but talk to the kitchen staff, unnecessarily from everyone's point of view except her own, boring them with small-talk which the staff is too intelligent to draw any spiritual benefit or sense of interest from and which holds them up usually at a time when there is the most urgent need for them to do their work. Whilst talking, the 'organisational woman' will show signs of strain, fatigue, lack of concentration and other side-effects of working too hard, often repeating herself as a consequence and offending her partners in the conversation who are initially naive to her self-indulgent motivation in starting the conversation, by showing at certain stages of the encounter that she paid no attention to their earlier replies. In her rare moments of solitude (rather than privacy, which latter state of mind is alien to her), all life goes out of her after such intensive working stints; she is fatigued, her mind nervously clinging to, moving on to, the next mundane social chore which she'd better do. There is nothing to occupy her consciousness independently of others and she cannot enjoy herself, cannot draw advantage of, cannot savour or cultivate her moments of loneliness for the intra-individual benefits that making good use of those may yield, reading such books even at such times, which arm her to perform the duty of constructive socialisation even more perfectly and zealously during the next interpersonal occasion. She would be ashamed to admit to inner resources and makes sure she never encounters any. Suggestions that the possibilities of a Socrates could be hers for a moment or that she could think of herself as a 'princess' in Elisa Doolittle's sense, would seem mad and decadent to her, and she would do her best to thrust them from her memory as quickly as she could if these possibilities were put to her; they would represent antisociality, immorality to her, and entertaining them would give her a bad conscience. So, as we see, anthropologic slumming need not go hand-in-hand with social slumming, and its interpersonal performance may even be based on the fathoming of a need to respect the human status of other human beings, albeit in a

sense that degrades the capacity of other profane to be dignified selves by their own socialpsychologically more discriminating and sophisticated scope, needs and standards according to which to be human, and narrows the meaning of that anthropologic dignity down in the human object approached in the slumming experience, to an area of the recommended being of the approached person, to spheres which are unrealistically, uncomfortably and inappropriately restrictive to him as a person, as a quality as a person, as a self. Conversely, it would be equally mistaken and misleading to equate a person's choice of his higher than merely social stereotype-prompted possibilities, his project of rejecting his way of life as typecast as a mere "me", and his exchanging that for a way of life that is based on values that he holds higher, more socialpsychologically authentic and fulfilling as a self, with a ruse to yield him socially higher, ascriptively more advantageous horizons. An example of the conceivable class-irrelevance of a project of anthropologic mobility towards a greater human nobleness than that which would stereotypically emanate from an unimaginative, society-wise mud-bound and fatalistic understanding of one's fitting human ranking in the world as a function of class, and a type of behaviour that would slavishly follow from that, is afforded by the course of action of the father of Turner, the painter. At a point in his life, when his son was still a young, struggling artist, Turner the older sold his own flourishing barber-shop, and apprenticed himself to the young man, learning techniques of how to mix paint and other skills that would have ordinarily seemed menial in comparison with the secure career he had given up, to give a much-needed helping hand to his son who embarked, before him, on a dicy career, that of an artist. The Registrar General's classification of occupations would be quite an irrelevant guide to interpreting the greater human dignity than that which the father would have been able to display had he stuck to the career predetermined and justified for him, according to an ordinary and conventional rationale, by the glory and his success as his own boss. Anthropologically speaking, the two Turners were equal as regards their ranks as selves. In rejecting a socially inert, readymade course by virtue of their class-origins, for the rest of their lives - rejecting a future entirely given by and in unbroken continuity with the past, by jettisoning the

option which would have led both of them to a safe middle course in the predictable social orbit for both their selves, by rejecting acting upon the kind of consideration which, to a conventional kind of approach to their proper careers, might have appeared as the most 'normal' one, by not adopting a way of thinking according to which 'maybe letting the boy do what he wants will lead to greater heights, maybe not - but by not changing the way of life which has been working for us quite nicely so far, we can't go far wrong' - Turner senior has most certainly realised his ideal possibilities as a self as fully as he could, and chosen for himself a kind of being as a self which was exactly as creative and original as that of the young Turner; the older Turner's originality and authenticity as a self taking the form of the special talent which Mead dubs 'social creativity'. Perhaps the worth of the older Turner's act as humanly higher-order than the entirely predigested stereotypic alternative course of action he could have chosen, was even greater than that of his son in following the dictates of his genius, always self-evidently clamouring to him for its realisation. There was certainly no anthropologic servitude in the father choosing to serve his young son expertly, professionally - because in opting for that new career for himself, he also chose, at the same stroke, the dignified job of being Pygmalion to his son, and became his progenitor over again, this time not in the physiologic sense but as the creator and promoter of his son's possibilities, as a fulfilled mature self himself; he 'made him' to some extent, in the sense the Americans use this turn of phrase, in the Pygmalionic sense. The young Turner had made an equally important and authentic choice in accepting his father's gift of his own self, so to speak; accepting this gift 'made him' as a human being in addition to 'making him' as an artist, in the spirit of a socially unusually creative freedom and originality. By coyly hesitating, by letting petty scruples as to whether he was worthy of his father's gift or not get in the way, or by imposing his own opinion as to whether his father's choice was the wisest one from his own point of view, stopping his father in realising his own act of social creativity, the young Turner's conduct would have been unauthentic in the light of the confidence and his presence to the imperative that he must paint: the proper dues and consequence of his own recognised genius. Hesitation, rejection in the

face of his father's gift of himself to his son, would have ruined the chance for, and eventually the realised fact of, both father's and son's concurrent and mutual fulfilment as selves. However, as it happened, the young man had the generosity and authenticity to accept the father's new, risky choice of a career, his sacrifice, which in truth was his father's ascent in a sense, and the ascent of his own, in a more obvious sense. Fortunately, the young Turner was mature enough not to choose the path of false modesty, and instead got on with the job, authentically, for the purpose of which his father 'risked his being', to borrow a turn of phrase from Hegel. In contrast, the coarse social practitioner unmakes potentially full and complete 'ordinary people' by what he has in mind for the 'ordinary man' as the proper lot of the latter, by disconstituting people, persons, 'cases' who are, as their original possibilities, both "I"-s and "me"-s, by decreeing them, defining them 'in the mirror of their eyes', as just "me"-s, as selves whose true potential is, as far as the coarse social practitioner is concerned, running the full course of their social inertia as persons. A Tolstoy, a Shaw - their socioeconomically upper-class origins notwithstanding - had never mirrored, either in their writing or in their everyday interpersonal conduct - the person of, say, a serf or a down-and-out such as Elisa or her father, in such a humanly condescending way, in which the coarse social practitioner's professional fieldwork manner on the job (comparable to the doctor's patting-on-the-shoulder bedside manner) shows up, arrogantly, his 'cases', his clients, as less than themselves, or in which our 'organisational woman' grabs the female proletarian employee by the button, so to speak, drowning her with a larger-than-life, "I"-exclusive, over-jovial "me", in an affected, laboured exhibition of sameness between all people, particularly and privilegedly her own and the one to whom she is just talking, in a strained demonstration of the two of them as two identical slabs of the salt of the earth inside their selves - an overloud performance which in truth covers a lack of sense on the part of the coarse social practitioner that her partner in the conversation, and indeed she herself, have a soul. All kinds of coarse social practitioners, the solemnly Pukka who insists that he alone has an "I" but not the client, or the empiricist who swears that neither he (she) nor the client has

got one, are motivated by the desire, whilst performing their caretaking job, to avoid having to identify with their clients in a socialpsychologic attitudinal depth of authenticity; with our 'organisational woman', or, conceivably, 'man', out of our gallery of positivists, exalting his or her chosen way of being a self as *object only*, to emotional heights, imperatively extending the socialpsychologic project of the choice of oneself as *object only*, one devoid of an "I", to all members of his or her social environs with missionary zeal, making it morally compulsory, for his or her money, for everyone to be 'ordinary' in the socialpsychologically limited and limiting sense, and shying away from the possibility of himself or herself, as well as his or her clients being extraordinary, each and every one of them, as selves complete with the faculty of social originality, human immediacy and social critique if that be in place, in quite simple walks of life, for which there is plenty of room for anyone who cares to choose the latter option in conceiving of and conducting his self. Both the solemnly 'serious' coarse Pukka caretaker, who sees himself or herself as Sacred and with a mission as one endowed with an "I" towards the less fortunate than himself or herself in this respect, and the coarse empiricist caretaker, including our 'organisational woman' or 'man', who too loudly exhibits his or her own "me" in relation to the client's fellow-"me" in a hypocritical demonstration of an attitudinal generosity to the client, does so as a ploy to be able to engage his own practical "me" in the interpersonal encounter as a mere token of giving himself or herself to the client in need of his or her caretaking or help, advancing to the client a "me" which, underneath the larger-than-life assertion of that, lacks a meant illumination by an "I" in conceiving the client, and therefore is devoid of a significant personal and interpersonal human content, which in his or her practice is distanced, which amounts to the quality of a self in himself or herself that is not risked, not staked, not exposed to contamination, to the possibility of catching germs, of being dirtied in real identification with the conceivably angry because self-deprived client, desirous of a complete self, small-letter sacred status in society, just as much as that of his 'caretaker', and this project on the 'caretaker's' part, whether anthropologically pompously or

empiricistically coarse (because humanly mean in the way of grasping other selves), amounts to a tactics to avoid such a fully interpersonally authentic conception of the client in a respectful empathy towards him as another small-letter sacred self-aspirative human being. The authentic caretaker, in contrast, is one who appreciates the need of all people to be fully-fledged selves as an ideally natural part and bonus of their re-emancipation by the 'caretaker' whose vocation it is to help the client in ways which are inclusive of producing their ideal self-image - a self-image on the client's part which is typically not a fanciful notion but one that often lends itself to a natural understanding by the 'caretaker', and takes little effort on the 'caretaker's' part to appreciate, with a modicum of empathy imagination. Such an authentic approach to the client on the 'caretaker's' part needn't go with an ostentatious exhibition or even an explicit articulation of this minimally imaginative demand, expectation, appreciation and allowance for a capacity for a human decency on both his or her own, and on the client's part, but may operate as a quiet or even tacit human universalism and goodwill in conceiving all people, whatever their ascriptional status, as potential anthropologic equals; this human authenticity on the 'caretaker's' part quite conceivably operating as nothing more than a latent assumption and premise underneath an efficient, competent, undramatic and discreet or even smooth professionalism in which he or she carries out his or her job; with the possibility of an emotionally heightened exhibition of his or her natural anthropologic generosity as an authentic human being in his or her style of dealing with his cases, usually laughed off by him or her as both needlessly taxing for all concerned and repellent to good taste. Nor is such an authentic stance and attitudinal undercarriage in initially conceiving cases, tantamount to a hopeless naiveté on the 'caretaker's' part; should the client signal to the 'caretaker' by way of his own behaviour or attitude, that he is undeserving of, unauthentically deaf-and-blind or too calloused for his part to humanly utilise such an attitude and advancement of authenticity towards him in the spirit in which this possibility is offered to him, the 'caretaker' will routinely, wisely and fusslessly register the redundancy of his or her own kind of personally authentic attitude in the interpersonal

encounter, and nevertheless carry out his or her job in relation to his or her 'case', as best he or she can, for this is what he or she is paid for. He or she will recognise with Mead, that sympathy alone - because of its interpersonal particularity, as well as fickleness, in spite of the social practitioner's best intentions - is a poor basis for social work. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ It follows, by implication, that if adhered to in the purity of the social worker's humanly authentic motivation, sympathy as the exclusive motivation fuelling the *raison d'être* of the social worker in his professional capacity, will shortchange some clients as a result of the social worker not helping whole-heartedly those he or she doesn't like; moreover, if interpersonal sympathy is cultivated and exercised by the 'caretaker' with its full emotional chargedness in every case, this will leave the social practitioner emotionally unprotected, prove an intolerable imposition to him or her in getting through his or her workload, and leave him or her emotionally drained. But in spite of all these qualifications, it may be validly asserted that the quality of the authenticity of the 'caretaker' is one that will shine through as an ideal appreciable to the intellect, meaningful as a worthwhile personal feat in the authentic as opposed to the coarse 'caretaker', and often and vitally, in the effective concomitant quality, totality, worth and perfection of the client's rehabilitation in the respect in which the social practitioner gets into contact with him in the first place. To extend the results and effects of such authenticity to literary examples, we may say that the human richness, fullness of characterisation of literary figures created by Tolstoy or by Shaw, irrespective of the conceivably low social class of the character and the high social class by original ascription of the authors, is so because these two great writers apprehended and engaged their own selves in the fullness in which they grasped all human realities, with the social "me"-s they depicted in everyone, concretely, understandingly put on a par with their own fully experienced and cultivated one, illuminated by the thorough knowledge of such "me"-s by their own analogous familiarity with their own, and also because they apprehended other people - every character, irrespective of their social backgrounds - with their endowment with a soul included, no less than they were aware of having souls themselves (or rather: being souls themselves),

and therefore 'equality' meant to both these great minds, that they themselves were complete with both a "me" and an "I", and so were other people - other selves - all other selves, potentially at least. In interpersonal relations it is important both that the agent sees himself thus and live accordingly, and that he sees others thus: as autonomous - or, regrettably, non-autonomous managers of their inner relationship between an active and engaged "me", and an active, engaged, truthful, responsible, receptive, imaginative "I", and as a consequence, either fulfilled and adjusted (if good managers of the relationship between their "me"-s and "I"-s, rights and duties), or regrettably, unfulfilled and non-adjusted, in case either a "me" or an "I" is denied them, or is voluntarily denied by them, and the adjustment of their relationship between the "me" and the "I" therefore askew, awkward, forced, false, unnatural.

THE SELFSection 1. The Romantic's Two-Stroke Categorical Imperative,
and the Two Ways in Which to Violate It.

In the last four Sections of Chapter 3. we argued the 'romantic' notion that the reality of the self is properly hybrid with "me" and "I" in a manner of which the self need not be ashamed on either account, but which duality of the infrastructure of the self he must uphold in its true and proper complexity if it aspires to attain the label 'authentic, as this dual infrastructural make-up in the constitution of the self amounts to the medium of human reality, which underlies consciousness and determinately colours one's style of conduct as authentic, and of which level of the self's 'being', no-one should, or indeed can successfully wash his hands. As a consequence of this 'romantic' insight into and determination of the self, a dual moral imperative arises from 'romantic' socialtheoretic thought, addressed to the self, which could be phrased something like this: 'Be fully human and exactly human. Do not attempt to be more than human (as "I" only), or less than human (as a "me"-only)'.

There are, then, as follows from this dual 'categorical imperative' (the precondition of socialpsychologic authenticity), and as already anticipated in former parts of this thesis, two ways in which one may be unauthentic, or betray, dismiss, the self's proper hybridness with both "me" and "I", as a condition of its amounting to and operating as an 'adjusted' human reality, and a 'graceful' one at that, in Sartre's sense of these terms. ' ' One of these ways is the dismissal, jettisoning of the "me" in the self, the other way is to send begging the "I" in the manner in which we choose ourselves as selves, as consciousnesses, and in the way we conduct ourselves. A grasp of these two types of socialpsychologic 'gracelessness' or 'obscenity' (Sartre's term), may be facilitated by illuminating them through examples.

A modern parable bringing to expression the sin of unauthenticity in this first sense, which consists in dabbling with one's possibilities as spirit only, of turning a blind eye to one half of the 'romantic's' above quoted imperative: 'do not try to be more than a man; know and be

your limits, duties and needs as a "me", is afforded in The Sorcerer's Apprentice; and a less allegorically gross, indeed psychologically very finely discerned presentation of the same kind of undertaking - that of trying to be and "I"-only by dismissing the dicta of a "me" in conduct, is offered in Dostoyevsky's rendering of the project of Raskolnikov, the main hero in his novel Crime and Punishment, in which Raskolnikov embarks on murder, the ultimate crime in the eyes of the law as the social body (as well as by the dicta of human reality), with the experimental purpose of seeing whether this crime would go officially undetected as well as indifferent and inconsequential to Raskolnikov's initially strongly summoned consciousness as a mere "I". As we know, Raskolnikov will fail on the latter score. Another manifestation in human conduct of the same kind of unauthenticity - that of trying to secure access to unlimited powers man imagines can belong to him on account of the capacities of consciousness as more than *mere object*, pretending the while that his social object status demands no decent limits to the realisation of his possibilities as subject - is the trend and practice in state bureaucracies, particularly technologically very advanced ones, of having a wholesale, microchip-stored data-collection about 'ordinary people', thereby reducing them to as explicit *object only* status as imaginable and, of course, as practical, divesting them of privacy, of having the privileges of subject to some extent - to an extent necessary for them to be and operate as autonomous selves, to conduct their selves in the medium of human reality, 'shining torches' on their lives reduced, owned, captured, 'taped' as mere facticity. For their own part, the agencies doing this, remain in anonymity. As human realities, even as representatives of the society of the 'ordinary man' which poses as democratically comprehensible and accountable, in its generally moral and concretely executive capacities, to the average individual, this technologically updated, bureaucratic upper crust, remains nameless and faceless to the 'ordinary man', actively occasioning and nurturing, in its unseen ways, a constant and large-scale confrontation between subject (the state and its representatives and servants) and object (the 'ordinary man'); in a manner and by methods whose ways of operation we identified and argued at length in Parts 1 and 2 in the previous Chapter. The extreme ideology based on an

indecent "me"-contempt and "I"-cultivation in such an unbalanced pursuit of the limits of the possibilities of the human spirit, is fascism.

The other way in which a person may be unauthentic, through betraying, to a decisive extent, the 'romantic's' two-stroke categorical imperative as advanced above, happens, on Sartre's account, through the denying the "I" as a reality which partly constitutes the self, denying the capacity of people for subjectivity-shot, spontaneous, personal judgement of human situations, a judgement by each individual for himself as the expert, at first hand, of such situations which effects him as a self or the likes of him as selves, and the sense of individual duty which arises out of this critical capacity of each self as a consciousness, that capacity, that endowment of consciousness which is clamouring, in the ordinary way, to be given room in conduct so as to be satisfied in and through acts which every man needs to, and, unavoidably, does perform, necessarily causing a personality to emerge: if not an authentic one, then an unauthentic one. A man is unauthentic in this second sense through unnaturally, untruthfully suppressing the "I", through deliberately underestimating the freedom and the need of human consciousness to exercise its critical insight and capacity for individual judgement in response to anomalous or schismic social stimulation, when such is encountered. This second type of unauthenticity - that of "I"-suppression in the self - may take the form of deliberately curbing one's own horizons, or of denying and suppressing recourse to the "I" in conduct for the benefit and in the face of oneself, as well as to others, and with that the chance to realise oneself and to be instrumental and helpful in others realising themselves and their individual possibilities over-and-above their "me"-s, (and of course in one's own), as the stereotypes conventionally available for one's own and for other people's socialpsychologic 'being', in terms which are type-cast for one in the real-life soap opera of the social game according to the humanly impoverished and *cliche* 'script' of it if interpreted and furthered in the direction of the least resistance for that in society.

Examples for this second type of maladjustment through the unauthenticity which follows from an "I"-denial, have already been put forward when citing, for instance, 'The Little Monk' in Brecht's play Galileo who, in his choice to grasp his sphere of activity and consciousness as *object only*: a mere soldier of the Inquisition, betrayed his duty to summon his fellow-plebeian faithful as full selves with rights to match such a complete human status here on earth, and when commenting on Willy Loman, the main character in Arthur Miller's play Death of a Salesman, who in his supreme endeavour to be a 'well-liked' man, adopting in a spiritual servility this imperative demanded and enforced by the ideology in his society, was driven into depressions and eventually to suicide, by his lack of success in this project and the loss of the love (or so it seemed to him) of his nearest and dearest in the course of his committedly pursuing this bidding of the social norm. (A detailed analysis of the plot and message of this play is offered in Section 4 in this chapter, entitled 'Paradigms of Grace').

On pondering on the romantic's demanding two-stroke definition of adjustment, inviting people to be authentic 'object' as well as authentic 'subject' to a certain extent, in a comely balance between these two capacities of themselves within their selves, we should perhaps say that such a definition of adjustment as is maintained by them, is not mutually exclusive with a positivistic sociologic thought, only it is more inclusive. It does not contradict the socialtheoretically positivistic dictum, or rather imperative, that the individual, as a condition of his 'grace' and fulfilment and for the sake of the fulfilment of society, should and must be adjusted, and adjusted in the terms of the actuality of the positive being of the external, existing society, that the self, the individual's perspective with its capacity for deviant or critical thoughts, should become adjusted to society, that the "I" should be brought into alignment with the "me" in order to secure the norm both for the benefit of society and as the aid for the clinical normalcy of the individual, so that the norm, in which the individual's "me" is anchored, should be experienced by the individual as that platform, source and touchstone of his stimulation, by which he is happy and contented to abide, upon which the

self is happy to appear and perform. Only, the 'romantic' social thinker would add two provisos to maintaining this part of his double-stroke imperative: 'be the "me" you are in society as your unavoidable social facticity and real personality as one condition of your authenticity'. The first is that if the actual norm doesn't live up, in the individual agent's authentic estimation, to standards of universalistic fairness to all its authentically adjustment-desirous members, he should be free, and justifiably so, to entertain a morally improved and more ideal society (conceived in practical terms, of course) than the one he is a member of in actuality; '2' that he should be free to define and practice his sphere of 'being' as a citizen, in the name of the collective consciousness as improved and more ideal, to which he is and remains sensible and loyal, in spite and in the face of the existing society, anomalous on a universalistic moral account, in the mode of the criticism of that existing society on the score on which that society is judged by him as morally wanting. The other difference between the behaviourist's ideal of adjustment and that of the 'romantic', consists in the circumstance that the 'romantic' social theorist will insist that the need for the self to adjust to the affairs in the world and his self's position in them as the condition of its sanity is only half the story, and only one part of the definition of adjustment. The ideal of adjustment is indeed both a socialpsychologically and socially practical and a moral imperative, but the maintainance of 'normalcy' and 'adjustment' is a two-stroke process; hence the two parts of his categorical imperative bidding man to be adjusted. The first part of the imperative as maintained by the 'romantic' school of socialtheoretic thought in this century - as given above in its full form - is, as we have just said: 'be no more than human'; don't try to be just 'subject'; adjust to the "me" as a condition of your mental balance as a condition of your viable, practical personal adjustment the way the positivists agree you should, demand you should. But, at the same time, the second part of the 'romantic's' long categorical imperative, given above, insists, bids the agent: 'be no less than human' - do not try to be just a "me", for then you will again not be what you are as a man, as man. As Ibsen sums up this part of the existentialist imperative to the being of the self in Peer Gynt - 'be thyself'; be a self, that of your own,

fully. Not just thy self and none of the social world, as Peer Gynt vainly attempted to be, but 'thy self' as well as being a social fixture in the world, as part of your adjustment. Freud has a technical term for the manner in which the socialscientific positivist demands adjustment of the individual. The positivist's demand of the individual's adjustment is 'autoplastic'; it involves changing the self, together with its insights and standards peculiar to it as such, so as to fit demands of it, the mould for it, in society. The 'romantic' socialtheoretic idea of adjustment, in contrast, is importantly inclusive of that phase in the process of adjustment which the individual must regard as his ideal as the concrete, experienceable form of itself as human reality and which it must take it on himself to perpetrate and effect, which Freud calls 'alloplastic' and which means changing the world, making the world give too, in the process of accomplishing adjustment - an adjustment conceptualised, grasped, inclusively with the personal adjustment in people of a "me" to an "I", insisting on a "me" which a self individually judges and experiences as right for itself in its true lights - or to push this statement to more dramatic limits, choosing a "me" which an "I" can tolerate if it is authentically activated and brought to bear on the self's condition in the world - and the 'romantic's' criterion for adjustment is also inclusive of the adjustment of an "I" to a "me", in an observance of the actually possible to the limit of the self which the "me" can tolerate it fully engaged in its authenticity, so as to achieve a comely balance between "me" and "I" with neither of these two factors within the self either suppressed out of existence or untenably overtaxed, but both authentically retained and wisely used to its optimum. Romantic socialtheoretic and moralistic thought in this century, particularly the existentialist and Gestalt psychological brands within it, fulfils the function of pointing out by means of analytic reflection both of a phenomenological and of a scientific kind, (I am thinking here of Mead, Asch and Milgram), '3' '4' that any route taken towards the securing of the adjustment of an individually judged set of norms to a publicly judged and maintained set of norms so as to secure what Sartre would call the 'being of the individual's consciousness' in the continuity of that with the collective consciousness as actualised and given in the

social norm - , in other words, any route taken towards the securing of the achievement of securing the adjustment of the consciousness of the self to society, which has no recourse to the individually judged, personal authentic witness of the truth by human measures in that situation, and which takes a shortcut in achieving such adjustment through by-passing the need for people's intrapersonal adjustment between "me" and "I" in achieving this outward adjustment, is wrong, and is also traumatic or downright intolerable to the individual as such, as well as generative of personal maladjustment, or, in Sartrian vocabulary, the socialpsychologically 'obscene'. The existentialists go furthest in exploring the manifold ways in which it is possible and instructive to discern this discovery in individual psychologic, socialpsychologic and sociologic contexts, with Mead going along with them a very long way.

What can be easily and legitimately identified as a kindred conceptualisation of adjustment as a two-stroke, two-fold process and phenomenon in the emergence of social consciousness within and outside the self in Mead's Mind, Self and Society ⁽⁵⁾ - with one aspect of the adjustment process consisting in the judicial fitting of the "I" (though without denouncing that) as response to the simulation of the self by social objects, including other people's, and one's own, existing personality or "me", and the other aspect of the adjustment process consisting in the rationalistic, Pygmalionic one, that is the creation and shaping, within reason, of course, of the social stimulus, the state of the world and the Other as part of that, to accommodate one's "I" if the unique lights and demands of that happen to be justified, as already outlined towards the very end of the last Chapter - could be summarily put in the following way, using Meadean idiom: Not only is it the case that the adjusted self is responsive to stimulation that has the capacity to satisfy it, but it's also the case that the quality of stimulation chosen ('selected', in Mead's words) by the self and incorporated into conduct, 'answers to' the need and the capacity of the "I" - the need of the self as such - in a way which precisely fits this need as a self, or at least satisfies that need the most optimally out of the range of the stimuli available to such a 'selection' by the "I"

available in the world, so as to make the 'selected' stimuli integral part of conduct and of the self. It is through this process that the "me" or one's personality (with a view to that "me" serving as the platform and the occasion of the rights of the "I"), and the interpersonal social world comes about, to a great extent. However, Mead's dialectic model postulating in this fashion the two phases of social emergence, is but implicitly put and carries no further implications; restricting his above described theory to socialpsychologic confines; though within those confines, this postulation of his has much in common with the existentialist model of the emergence (upsurge) of consciousness - creative of itself and of its social object, its own personality included as such; and the central role assigned to this process by the 'romantic', is the proper part of the complex process of adjustment, by the 'romantic's' measure.

In contrast, existentialist socialtheoretic thought in this century, does carry its two-fold criterion of adjustment to such limits as to lead in its implications into other disciplines too. To comment first on an existentialist social theory's contribution to socialpsychology/micro-anthropology, it has already been shown that this school of thought is critical of both those sources of unauthenticity which have been considered so far - of the displacement of either of the two complementary components of the self (the "me" and the "I"), into the functioning, into the active cultivation of the other component, exclusively governing consciousness, as a result, as the overriding modality of that as either a "me"-only or as an "I"-only; such a school of thought is critical of the wasting, the starving of the self of one aspect of its being or the other, of its swelling itself as all "me" in bad faith pretending it doesn't have consequential choices to make as an "I", and that it needn't and can't be a responsible and effective caretaker to its own self and to those around it to whose being and possibilities it is instrumental, and that it's nonsensical that the freedom to apprentice oneself as paintmixer and dogsbody to a not yet established artist, as a project with a possibly dicy outcome in actual terms, as did Turner's father in our example quoted near the end of the last chapter, can be sanely, legitimately and unapologetically made part

of it to certain personal and interpersonal benefit, as an end in itself. Conversely, existentialist thought is also critical of the unauthenticity of the self swelling itself up as all "I", contemptuous and unable to suffer those mundane day-to-day routine tasks which it owes others and also itself for the sake of the sane management of its anchorage in the various aspects of the concrete, given world 's', as a mere, practical "me", with no direct and immediate relevance to the self's own advancement and glorification in an obvious way.

At the socialpsychologic level, 'romantic' thought, then, importantly, states, as one of the criteria of the total phenomenon of adjustment, the need for a balanced and complementary relationship within the infrastructure of the self, between an "I" which is given the full scope spontaneously inherent in it - as fully put into play in response to the recognised demands of the actual social "me", and a "me" just as frankly admitted and fully put into play so as to avail itself as a concrete, active social object, a platform and occasion for itself or for the need of another self by its own decision, as in the case of the older Turner, in contrast to abstaining, to withdrawing, to being unavailable.

Section 2. Adjustment and Maladjustment in the Act.

The 'romantic' conceptualisation of the total phenomenon of adjustment has just been outlined in the previous Section. It is emphatically underlain by the maintainance of the need, not only for the self to accommodate the standards, calls and demands of society, in what Freud calls 'autoplastic' adjustment to the world, if the self be deficient in the light of the more applicable, appropriate and adequate social norm there, but also the need, possibility and demand for the occasioning of the adjustment of the world by and to the self, in a so-called 'alloplastic' socialpsychologic process, in cases when the lights of the self are more justified than the moral ways of the existing social norm, or some particular aspect of it which concern the self. It may be useful to analyse the 'romantics'' resulting complex notion of adjustment - (whose postulation receives detailed comment in the previous Section, and which to the 'romantics' is the only adequate way of conceptualising that) - into two dimensions: its lateral structure, and its deep structure.

The lateral structure of adjustment is its socialpsychologically authentic dimension. It comes about in the tacit act of reflection and the overt act in conduct, by the cultivation of an active and practical socialpsychologic ideal of a balance between the visions, duties, needs of the "I" and the realisation of those in the "me" both within and outside the self, peculiarly and properly within a personal and/or interpersonal socialpsychologic compass, and from a point of view inclusive of it. The bonus for successfully effecting and maintaining such a balance between the "me" and the "I" in one's tacit or explicit area of activities, is the self's socialpsychologic 'grace' - a synonym, in Sartre, for the feat of 'adjustment' (?), an attribute in which both Raskolnikov (the "me"-denouncer) and Brecht's 'Little Monk' and Willy Loman (the "I"-denouncers) in our examples put forth in the previous Section), were lacking. (A detailed account of Willy Loman's case will follow in an analysis of Arthur Miller's play Death of a Salesman, in Section 4. of this chapter.) The sphere of the lateral structure of the active consciousness and overt conduct, consists of and is exhausted in

the activity of the synthesising of the "me" and the "I" in the act, covert, and particularly and more importantly, overt, or, contrarywise, in the significant and poignant failure to synthesise the "I", as fully recognised and owned up to as the self's response capacity, with the "me", or the capacity of the self to choose to be a concrete object and to serve as the concrete occasion for the recognised response capacity of the self as partly an "I" - in one's own concrete self and/or in that of another which we may occasion. All the 'romantics' considered here are pragmatists in the sense in which MacQuarrie and elsewhere Sartre entertain that notion, (9) (10) in that they see human reality, the reality of consciousness, in the act. They share Goethe's proposition (Sartre explicitly quoting it): 'In the beginning was the act.' The act to them - the unit of human reality - is the synthesis, as that human reality happens, takes place in its upsurge, between man's dual possibilities as it were - those not yet but perhaps eventually realised, possibilities of which man explicitly knows he is capable, has the capacity for, and, in Sartre's 'book', has the *right* to (in a particularly conspicuous way when those possibilities are unfulfilled); (11) - his ideal possibilities, which consist in his encodedness for certain response capacities as a species being and whose frustration he feels unnatural and untenable if he is true to himself as a self - his authenticity as an "I"; and, on the other hand, those possibilities which he has as a "me", as an overt personality with certain credibility, standing, means, which has or alternatively, significantly and regrettably has not got the capacity, in actual terms, to be the occasion to his sense of duty, for the rights, for the need of the "I", as a "me", in other words, which can do something about those needs. The first mentioned set of man's possibilities (its repository in the "I"), is the rationalistic precondition to, component of the act, the second, that of the "me", the actual; each are necessary conditions to the act, and their actualised synthesis is the sufficient condition for it. Mead and Derrida (11) (12) label the first set of possibilities, that which a man can toy with, judge whether it's a possibility proper and/or worthy of 'marrying' with the actual possibilities in external reality of the overt "me" in and through the act, with the term 'rehearsal'. The rehearsal is done privately; in Mead's description, the

rehearsal precedes an occasion in which the agent at first encounters, as a novelty even to himself, the response of the "I" to a problematic or unexpected situation affecting his self called on to act, whether in a social or the personally creative context, and practices, as it were, the way in which that will be put over publicly to the scientific, artistic or just social community, (the generalized other in all these ways), weighing up how he will come over as a "me"-cum-"I", or a self, in the actuality of that self, how his personality with his newly discovered "I" brought to bear upon that, will actually come about, come to 'be' in outward reality, matching that "I" to more than one possible "me"-s (by a Meadean implication) that one can put into contact with, incorporate into the actual reality of the overt personality and make part of the reality of the world, 'actualise' or (in Sartrean language) 'possibilise'; to which he decides, in other words, to give the verdict (to draw on filming jargon): 'print that'. The well-rehearsed new ensemble of the "me" and the "I", his chosen self, that is, will become the object which the self overtly, actually, concretely, publicly, verifiably, in fact, is, the real thing after the rehearsals, the previously private content of the reflective consciousness in the subjectivity of its perspective, surrendered, concretised - made part of the social act - of external socialpsychologic reality. The rehearsal goes on after the real thing, real 'performance' too - it precedes that both in Derrida, Mead and also Sartre, and, according to all these 'romantics', it follows that too: the "I" rises again in a new upsurge in response to, in critique of the 'real thing', to the Meadean "me", to the Sartrean 'existing', whose impact is unsatisfactory, or will soon be unsatisfactory when that becomes inadequate in the light of a new insight by the "I", or with the 'performance' gone a bit wrong, somewhat misfired, misunderstood, not well enough credited publicly to result in the adjustment of the self or of society in the new light of the "I", which, as the judgement of and response capacity to the imperfections of the "me" as it is to oneself and to the Other, or to many others: the community, is never given up.

Which came first: the real thing or the rehearsal - the "me" or the "I"? The response capacity perhaps in the spirit of critique or

unconventional inventiveness in response to a problematic social stimulus situation affecting the "me", or does the self's capacity to be a "me" come first? Mead says the "me" does, and so do most modern theorists of the self - Lacan most pronouncedly - but the question of the primacy of the "me" over the "I", the "I" over the me, makes sense outside the context of the act only, in which context Derrida, in fact, considers it. In the act, the complementary realisation of the "I" in terms of the "me", and, conversely, the "me" in the "I", are the condition of one another, the condition of the act, the condition of the self and the definition of adjustment at the socialpsychologic level, all at the same stroke, and what students of the act as the unit of conduct and of human reality are concerned with, is whether the act and with it the authentic possibilities of the self, dually made up regarding the analytic structure and conditions of its production in the above suggested way, and, as a consequence of that, the creation and advancement of human reality, do in fact come to pass in and through the synthesis between the "me" and the "I" in the given, particular, concrete act time after time, or do not come to pass although they might do, and are thereby significantly missed?

The unit of human reality, as just observed, is the act; this unit may be of the duration of a lifetime, or of the duration of a prompt, single act in which the self acts upon a newly discovered potential for itself or for other selves effected by its act. The idiom of consciousness and conduct as human reality is its realised and realiseable action potential, or simply its action: its creativity, with special emphasis on its social creativity - a necessary by-product of all human reality-wise positive activity; and the way in which it shows itself as fulfilled, as being what it is, is in that it is productive. It is an important part of this postulation of the act as the product and index of the 'marriage' between the "me" and the "I", that "me"-s (the concrete, actual, overt possibilities of selves) can be joined to the need and the ideal potential of an "I" clamouring for fulfilment, outside the bounds of a single self; the self can offer its own "me" as the platform and occasion of the realisation of other selves' "I"-s, or, conversely, the insights of one's "I" may be offered for the

enhancement of the realisation of the "me" of another self, or several selves. Human reality is created in such instances just the same, as was shown in our earlier example offered on the last pages of the last chapter, of Turner's father having changed his "me", the range of the actual potentials, to suit that to his son's ideal potentials as an artist, or "I"; and conversely, the younger Turner offered his "I" for the betterment and greater discrimination and pleasure of the qualities of the "me" of his father as well as the "me"-s of countless others who, as a consequence, can now view and appreciate his vision, realised in his work.

It has been observed in the last Section that there are two possible 'lateral' sources of bad faith, that is, fulfilled and active self-avoidance. To recapitulate, one is "I"-denial, pretending one is personally too inconsequential, powerless, inert, too absolutely bound by social conventions, too object-like as a self to socially or socialpsychologically make a difference, and for that reason it's not proper or worth it for him to act in a novel and personally conspicuously endorsed way - with the weight of his person behind the act. The other source of bad faith is "me"-denial, pretending to be too precious, too well-bred, too much a cut above a mere social object-status to sink to the practical level of conduct. This variety of bad faith is carried to its conclusion in the extreme and uncommon case of Raskolnikov, asserting the "I", in the spectacular act of calculated murder, at the exclusion, in his consciousness, of the dicta of the "me", both as a social 'carrier' bound by the law (the external standards of the social norm) and, in an intrapersonal context, at the exclusion of the peculiar standards governing the self, and particularly its executor: the "me". These socialpsychologic standards informing the ego, bid and demand, as an imperative, that the self have regard for life - for one's own life and that of another, - and it was with these intra - personally powerful standards informing the self and prompting the personal "me" to abide by this human dictum, that Raskolnikov failed to reckon, and whose prevalence and potency he at first underestimated and fatally overlooked as a consequence; and, as a result, human reality of a positive nature from its own point of view, failed to be created,

or, even more retrogradely and negatively, was destroyed, by his act. (13)

The first out of these two possible sources of bad faith is more common and is the one which enjoys the more respectability, justification and protection out of the two in other than 'romantic' schools of socialtheoretic thought and codes of conduct. Outside the 'romantic' frame of reference, the characteristically passive way of life in which personal responsibility and discretion, credit or blame in complying with acts issued from up high is waived, is rarely equated with a source of and for maladjustment, although the perpetrators of maladjustment on this first account, Willy Loman fashion, swells the numbers of patients in mental hospitals; and romantic social thought is to be credited with identifying, showing this more common approach to and method of sidestepping chances for social creativity, for the bad faith and maladjustment it is. The other systematic and complementary source of bad faith, that of "me"-denial, particularly when of a pathological nature, is more universally and readily identified as such, and as the index of maladjustment. Systematic avoidance of acting on actual opportunities to fulfill a self's needs (or more selves' need), may come about through a clinically deficient grasp of reality as that is given - as in cases of delusions of *grandeur* (deficient interpersonal conduct) - schizoid uncoupling - (reality-irrelevant personal conduct) - or indeed such social reality-deficiency may come about by way of the specialised conditioning of one anthropologic class to concern itself with thinking and issuing orders, leaving it to another anthropologic class to conduct itself practically and/or carry out orders. Latter-type bad faith - that of the "me"-denial of the self - is, of course, universally available to members of all social classes and is not restricted to members of the upper class - as the comedy Little Malcolm and his Fight with the Eunuchs shows - its plot depicting the response of Malcolm, the rebel youngster, in the face of his sudden success in securing for himself a real chance in life after years of crusading for one. When actually available, the hero of the play refuses to take the far greater risk and trouble than diligent political outspokenness, which is involved in the project of really wanting to make something of

one's break, and opts for the pose and affectation for merely debating for such chances as a habitual mode of being a nonconforming consciousness.

'Little Malcolm's' shunning the pursuance of the real opportunities available to his "me" in the world, amounts to an example of the way in which "me"-denunciation results in a typical lack of productivity and action of a personal order and quality of which only the authentically fulfilled self is capable of contributing. As a contrast, another example will be summoned here to show how the "I"-denunciation of the agent (the opposite paradigm of the self's authenticity-distorting and betraying conduct to Malcolm's and Raskolnikov's "me"-denunciation), also frustrates the authentic act, to demonstrate how this second type of socialpsychologic unauthenticity (the mirror maladjustment to that of Malcolm's and Raskolnikov's), operates and comes to be deserving of the attribute of bad faith, both in the individual perpetrating, and in people around him demanding and encouraging such conduct, and how this second, opposite type of bad faith, foils, equally effectively, the full possibility for the creation, in and through the act, of the agent's decorous, productive and authentic self in particular and the creation of human reality in its proper capacity, in general. We have already offered earlier on the examples of Brecht's 'Little Monk' and Arthur Miller's Willy Loman (referred to, among other places, in the last Section of this chapter) to demonstrate this case, but now we hope to reinforce the argumant of this paradigm of maladjustment in the context of the act, through the additional example of Beatrix Potter. A talent as an artist on many scores, for which she has eventually proved herself, Beatrix Potter spent the first decades of her adult life tending the whims of her bad-tempered, invalid and totally possessive father, which full-time occupation for her prevented her both from getting married and from cultivating a career much earlier on than she actually did, as the writer and illustator of genius, for which she eventually declared herself relatively late in life, after her father's death. Throughout the best part of her adult life, her self was kept, no less than the practical output-shunning 'Little Malcolm' who avoided employing his "me" when the opportunity to do so had come to him, from

the productivity-generating 'marriage' within her self between her outstanding endowment with an ideal creative potential as an "I" which dormantly amounted during many years to her sense of calling in life and which had to be kept quiet and frustrated during this great span of time, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 'actualising' of that ideal potential in and through the real potentials available to the "me" in the world to do justice to those 'ideal' possibilities and talents of her as an artist, the way in which this 'marriage' between "I" and "me" within her self, eventually came to be effected and expressed in her remarkable *oeuvre*; suppressing and exchanging throughout the decades of her earlier adulthood, her authentic potential for output as a self and an artist in the personal light of her "I", which she always longed to be, and which eventually came to pass and became vindicated as her real self, for the creatively passive life (by her standards) of a domestically efficient spinster of means, managing her affairs as such on her father's side, in bitterness about her lot.

(Although we referred to the existence, in a real and meaningful sense, of Beatrix Potter's self as an authoress even during her years of domestic confinement - in which period her eventually vindicated self as an artist of great ability already loomed as her 'ideal self', it may be mentioned here in parentheses that there are 'romantic' social psychologists to whom Beatrix Potter as writer and illustrator of excellence, and not as her father's housekeeper, was her 'real self', even during the early years of the frustration of her talent, although this 'real self' of hers was only belatedly endorsed by her in the act, and it was consequently later that this 'real self' of hers graduated to an actual reality. The status of the self that she was cheated out of by her father over many years, they would say, was not of the feeble order of a merely imagined ideal self, but was a necessary one; 'objective', if not by the empiricist's measure, perhaps by a Sartrean one ; and some would go so far as to say that her self as an authoress would have been her 'real self' even without her ever having been in a position to provide tangible proof of that 'real self' later on in life. One can sympathise with such a conceptualisation of the notion which is the 'ideal self' to us, and see the point in grasping it as also real, in a

very meaningful sense; but deviating from the way in which we used the term 'real self' so far - that inclusive of the aspect of the self for which the Other knows us and of which he informs us in the here-and-now - would introduce confusion into our argument, and for that reason this interesting nomenclature in the usage of some 'romantics' in referring to our 'ideal self' as also 'real', is only mentioned here as a point of interest.)

The examples of 'Little Malcolm' and Beatrix Potter, both of whose frustrated selves borrowed from, and in turn, produced a consequentially negative effect upon the external world which became impoverished through their prolonged lack of output in actual terms, show that there is always an element of arbitrariness in commenting on the lateral structure of a person's adjustment, or of any act, in a divorce from its deep structure, which is afforded by the relationship between the sphere of activity of a person as a self, and the framework and background to that within society, as will be enlarged on in a little while. Malcolm's choice to denounce the opportunities for his "me" in the world, had the side-effect of the withdrawal of his self, when the chips were down, from the practical consolidation at the collective level and platform for his life-long verbal crusade for an equal chance for all in social actuality, - an externally very consequential negative result of his conduct, - and Beatrix Potter, in silencing the unique endowment of her "I" for many years, and making that "I" redundant, failed to make a stand against Victorian society's values which called for the sacrifice of her self with its potentials for achievement and output as a sovereign individual, demanding that she surrender the talents with which she was singularly blessed, to the oppressive and socially authoritative expectations and biddings of that society, ordering her as a mere daughter to submit herself, as a matter of course, to her social and ascriptional elders and betters in the small society of the family, and therefore to her father and his bad-tempered caprices whilst he was alive.

To summarise the conclusions drawn from the examples of Malcolm and Beatrix Potter through the spectacles of the 'romantic' social and

socialpsychological theorist, we may observe that the view of the 'romantic' student of society and of human reality characterised by a strong concern, in grasping and entertaining the notion of adjustment, with the relationship between the self as human reality, and every stratum of nature on which the self and its activities impinge - the biologic and the social in particular, in addition to the socialpsychologic one - and a concern also with the way in which the self makes an impact on all three of these levels of its being and conduct part of the 'romantic's' notion and judgement of the self's adjustment. These cross-categoric makings of adjustment and maladjustment - taking their source from the simultaneous involvement of the self in its adjustment in the physiologic and social (in addition to the socialpsychologic) levels of nature all at the same time - are identified here as the deep structure of adjustment. Out of this cross-categoric ensemble of the total adjustment-structure as just specified, the sociologic or social, and the socialpsychologic strata, are in a special relationship to each other, which may be seen as dialectic and deepstructural. It is, of course, the socialpsychologic or micro-anthropologic layer which is most properly and realistically seen as the deep structure of positive sociologic reality in this relationship and not the other way round; the Durkheim-postulated stratum of reality in this relationship (or the collective consciousness), adherence to which as a behavioural and normative ideal and typical practice historically reigned supreme before society grew increasingly tolerant to the society-critical, individualistically more sophisticated and somewhat deviant fashions of citizenship, must be recognised as the primary term in this special relationship between society and human reality or the 'my world' of the self. Nevertheless, the 'romantic' and particularly existentialist tradition and tendency in this century, to insist on the separateness and the relative autonomy of the socialpsychologic level of reality, that which subsists, characteristically, in terms of selves, which is transient, which consists in the dual and complementary possibilities of "me"-s and "I"-s being seen and realised, acted on, 'possibilised', 'married' (I think Mead's synonym: 'consummated' is the best), in concrete acts by concrete people, as a reality other than the permanently manifest and crudely and already given, predigested and

ready-made social norm, is seen as meaningful and reality-relevant. Albeit merely the source of change in relation to the stereotype prevailing social norm, the transient, inventive, concrete activation of "me"-s and "I"-s in terms of each other, offering themselves for 'marriage' from situation to situation, is a reality precisely as a source of change which must be paid attention to (for social reality does change and does so according to regularities that analysably and discernably obtain in socialpsychologic reality) - and also because the self's inventiveness in terms of activating laterally complementary opportunities for the 'marriage' or consummation in each other of "me"-s and "I"-s when they are found to potentially tally, is an axiomatic feature of human consciousness - its engagement in this activity, which holds its own kind of fulfilment, is the index of its being what it is, and the denial of this level of the being of consciousness, results in the unauthenticity of selves in particular and in the unauthenticity, the betrayal of nature itself in which the activation of socialpsychologic reality through the human act, is a universal possibility and, if realised, then also a reality, in all situations where there are people. On the 'romantic' socialtheoretical view, particularly as propounded by the existentialists in this century, a marked non-coincidence (amounting to a matter of fundamental choice) can be identified as obtaining (at least as a potential) in all human situations at all times, particularly critical ones, between the conditions of adjustment to society by the self in keeping with socialpsychologically authentic standards (alloplastic, to an appreciable measure), and another route to the adjustment by the self to society, entirely in terms of the the ready-made idiom of the already prevailing norm (unconditionally autoplatic), which is glib as the mode of the expression of the self, aiming at the realisation of the stereotypically grasped self in society in a way which is alternative to the personally authentic one, by-passing all recourse to human reality and its own standards of judgement, sense of responsibility, presence and weight as a self or as an opportunity for social inventiveness, drawing entirely on clichés of the self as a matter of the chosen preference of that. (We have previously asserted that, even in cases where the authentic self chooses to prop up, endorse the norm of an

existing society, there is nevertheless a difference between this authentic way on its part to give itself to the society in question in the significant personally meant act of 'elective assumption', in which act the intrapersonal adjustment of the self as an active and operative ensemble of the "me" and "I" does not become redundant, and the unconditional surrender of the self to society at all times by the unauthentic agent, so as to avoid having to engage and maintain the socialpsychologically arduous way of the authenticity of the self. A description of 'elective assumption' is given in the Introduction.) There is, then, always a choice for the individual, the 'romantic' will say, as to which out of these two routes, the personally authentic and the personally unauthentic one, to take in the capacity of the self as the occasion for society, which the 'romantic' will characteristically see as part of the whole adjustment phenomenon. The 'romantic', particularly the existentialist, is as concerned with the way a person's own idea of his adjustment as a self dovetails (*gliedert*) with that of society as Durkheim is with the same issue, and on top of this aspect of the cross-categoric connection between the self's and society's equilibrium or adjustment, he also concerns himself with how personal adjustment dovetails with the physiologic level of fulfilment, something that doesn't occur in Durkheim's problematic at all.

Perhaps Durkheim's system and modern European socialtheoretic thought are unique in entertaining, and in making integral part and cornerstone in their socialtheoretic thinking, the shared insight that external social reality as a source of information to consciousness is irreducibly other than the intimate, particularistic mode of consciousness apprehending its reality - the insight, in other words, that sociologic reality in its pure, scientifically entertained form as a mode of human consciousness, and socialpsychologic (or in Sartre's language: human) reality, are irreducibly other, and properly studied and appreciated as separate subject matters, whether these kinds of realities and modes of consciousness are approached interdisciplinarily, or treated in different disciplines. Consequently, Durkheim and the existentialists are probably unique among socialtheoretic thinkers in considering the question: 'how is society

the intended/unintended outcome of individual wills?' - as meaningless and as one with which they do not concern themselves in the least, each of these two schools maintaining (though Durkheim not caring) that the interplay of wills and their actual interpersonal realisation does appropriately form part of the study of the infrastructure of the self and properly belong to the area and study of socialpsychologic reality; furthermore, Durkheim and the existentialists also share the appreciation that the being of society is properly studied within positive social science. Durkheim and the modern existentialists also agree that neither of these two strata of consciousness - the sociologic or the socialpsychologic - will reduce to the other, but they will both figure and be effective over against one another in nature, in a dialectic, mutually exclusive and uncomplementary otherness, a state of affairs we devoted considerable attention to in the Section in Chapter 3. entitled 'Which Came First: the Chicken or the Egg?' Durkheim and the existentialists both see that socialpsychologic reality will effect social reality inappropriately only so to speak, as anomie, as uncongenial to that social reality, if brought to bear on the being of society with its socialpsychologic standards posited as alternatives to society's own, other, but equally autonomous standards of 'adjustment' or rather, in Durkheim's terminology, 'equilibrium'. The pure phenomenon 'society' is, for that reason, in no way the outcome of individual wills, intended or unintended, as Durkheim and modern existentialists will agree, but it stands indifferently over against selves and their wills as external, other, alien to them and experienced by selves accordingly. But, existentialists will add (and Durkheim and they will part company here), that these two modes of consciousness - sociologic proper and socialpsychologic proper - will both persist as the different and specially non-complementary autonomous realities they respectively are in their own right, both of them; congenial to one another or not, each the condition and the possibility of the other. Socialpsychologic reality is not easily and naturally attenuated, as Durkheim would have it, so as to become irrelevant to the continuous and inert being of equilibrated positive society, to which it incessantly relates. While maintaining the reality of the Durkheim-postulated positive Being of society outside the self, 'romantics' assert the concurrent reality of

the socialpsychologic being of consciousness, that of human reality as one's, everyone's, potential to be a self - its reality as the perpetual readiness to incorporate into itself concrete stimulation in and by the world, according to the needs of the "I", in the continual emergence of the latter in response and critique of the "me", the actual condition of the self as continuous with the social world (imperceptibly, if the agent is unauthentic, and as a protuberance on the body of the norm if the self asserts itself authentically there, for what it is *qua* the self). This continual emergence of the self, on account of the ceaseless birth of new "me"-s in response to the irrepressible "I"-s need and critique, and of the "I" in response to and in critique of the quality of the "me" in actuality, amounts to an ongoing socialpsychologic process informed by the self's presence to its own standards demanding that it be a fulfilled self - one comprised by the satisfactorily composite and complementary relation between the "me" and the "I" within its infrastructure. This is the socialpsychologic level of the being of consciousness, a reality which, though other, is just as axiomatically meaningful and present in the here-and-now, and as autonomous within its proper compass: the area of the being of the self (the 'romantic' theorist will say), as that of the Durkheim-postulated and demonstrated external being of the collective consciousness, irrespective of Durkheim's hostile and normatively disapproving attitude to it. It is by virtue and through this process that human reality 'is what it is'. In Being and Nothingness the being of consciousness as the potential which it always sees itself as being as a fulfilled and adjusted self, is equated with its right - a Sartrean proposition already touched on in this Section, under Reference 10.

Of course, the same area of study, in the treatment of modern existentialist thought, that with which Durkheim's work is being juxtaposed here, suffers from the opposite bias of these radically 'romantic' social theorists, who often conflate sociologically professional conduct and purely scientific thought - for which there most definitely is a time and place - with false affectations of those in human attitudes, underlain and amenable to being analytically shown as a socialpsychologically decodable motivation to avoid the arduous

prospect and course of authentically entertaining and maintaining an authentic conduct as a self, and a legitimate concern for that. For that reason the existentialist Bultmann is hostile to such attitudes, which he labels 'legalism', and, to Sartre's way of thinking, the values of the norm seem, in a blanket way, due to the common socialpsychological adulteration of that norm by the above described motivation of the unauthentic, to be 'antivalues' from the point of view of human reality. But this attitude does not move these existentialists to deny the being of external society which exists in that norm; on the contrary, it causes in them a heightened and correct awareness in their models of conduct and thought, of the external, positivistically objective mode of the being of consciousness, that which Durkheim propounds, as other than the socialpsychologic level of its functioning (which they claim, is also objective, or even more objective, includes the additional light of more microcosmic and discriminatingly socialpsychologic standards), and they characteristically grasp adjustment as complete with the objective reality of society outside; they treat adjustment as a phenomenon in which reckoning, coping with, even assuming individual responsibility for the external Being of society forms ^{an} integral part. It is for that reason (the above argument leads us back to the point), that it is at the cost of considerable arbitrariness that the lateral makings of adjustment are further traced here as relatively autonomous - not independent of the issue of the equilibrium of society *sui generis*, but other in kind than it, and its autonomy is salvaged from a Durkheimian absorption into an unattainable ideal of a human-adjustment-irrelevant, puristic socialscientific reality which, by Durkheimian normative implications, properly permeates all modes of consciousness, desirably yielding an all-encompassing and exclusive reality in every area of conduct from which human authenticity is jettisoned as cluttering up the tidiness of the positive monism there. A 'romantic' preoccupation with society and study of the lateral makings of adjustment, particularly in the context of society, are of avail; they supplement sociology, supplying it with the rules of its adulteration in high places or low, as well as with the structures of social novelty, creativity, emergence; lateral structures of adjustment are usefully analysed apart from a purely social level of fulfilment or a purely physiologic one, for the

choice on the part of a person as to how many of these levels of adjustment he cares to make his business, and regards as the object of his duty - whether he includes lateral or socialpsychologic standards in his conduct or not - affords different structures in consciousness and in outward reality.

We have already offered two examples in this Section: those of 'Little Malcolm' and of Beatrix Potter, to demonstrate the two possible constellations of bad faith within consciousness: "me"-denunciation with the overemphasising of the role of the "I" in conduct, and "I"-denunciation with the overemphasising and overdeploying the orphaned "me", which comes to the fore in conduct as a consequence of such a choice, as the sole and impoverished informant of the self in its participation within the spheres of its socialpsychologic as well as its social reality. We shall now turn to two further examples to demonstrate the same two paradigms of bad faith, picking instances this time in which the outward, sociologic as well as socialpsychologic consequentiality of these two projects of bad faith is greater and more paramount than was in the case of our examples of Potter and 'Little Malcolm'.

To depict first the case of object-deficiency in such a context, we shall turn to Sartre's very critical, acid and sharp attack on the Jew in his work Antisemite and Jew, on account of the Jew's unauthentic project of withdrawing into the ivory tower of intellectualism, (a typical option on his part in the project of bettering his lot), whilst his race is persecuted in society. Through the example of the Jew, Sartre attacks, by implication, all people who belie, betray that which a person is in his unapologetic profaneness and social as well as socialpsychologic actuality in his somewhat powerful position in the social world as the 'carrier' of it - as part of that social body himself in such a capacity, in his capacity as an authentically, socialpsychologically, as well as socially, concrete "me".

In depicting the opposite paradigm, that of "I"-denunciation on such a social and wide cultural scale, we turn to Sartre's writings again. In

his work Philosophic and Literary Essays, '14' Sartre writes about a Frenchman who had emigrated to the United States some time before Sartre and he met there, and who, during his years in the States, had identified with the vaudeville, most ready and crude stereotype image of the Frenchman known to and upheld by the humanly most lazy members in his new culture who didn't wish to be bothered with personally, singly, authentically relating to other citizens as humanly somewhat dignified or small-letter 'sacred' people and individual selves. The Frenchman, to oblige this stereotype, had learned to loudly thrust himself on everyone's attention as a one-tracked-minded, constantly sex-preoccupied character, as the permanent index and advertisement of his 'overriding project of eager compliance with the host culture's expectations of the Frenchman, quite unlike anyone Sartre had met in France. The man's exaggerated, larger-than-life familiarities embarrassed and saddened Sartre; the price this man chose to pay for his assimilation into the society chosen by him, was giving up his self; and he was also, though Sartre didn't make this point specially, a poor ambassador for the French. The reason the man was blameworthy in Sartre's book, was not that he chose to endorse with his being his adopted culture - society outside - existentialism allows for this part of a man's authenticity provided he makes himself available to society as a matter of his personally and honestly considered choice - but because he has given up his self as such the while - made himself *object only*, a stereotype lecher so as to maximally accommodate as problem free social object; a ready object in every stratum of the self except for that of the hybrid, synthetic, socialpsychologically realisable and imperative one - imperative at least to the 'romantic' social theoretician's way of thinking. He deliberately addressed his being, gave himself to, chose his self and his project to refract upon 'not reality', to quote the poet, but 'a heavenly copy of that', though in an inverted sense to that which was meant by the poet in question. '15' Whilst the Frenchman's consciousness, conduct, was made redundant within the compass of the 24-carat authenticity of real persons, through betraying that level of peculiarly *human* reality in which all socialpsychologically authentic feel at home, his being aimed at and involved the different, stereotype, socially schematised reality of an individual's 'ideal type' in public

opinion, that reality in which that of real persons is transposed into judged expectations of those as institutions. (Weber). I have recently heard of two competitions - one where prizes were offered to the best imitators of Graham Greene, and the other where prizes were offered to the best imitators of the GPO's 'whistling' telephone, the 'trimphone'. With the prizes given, Graham Greene wrote in to complain that his entry didn't get a placing in the Graham Greene competition; as for the 'trimphone' contest, the 'trimphone' itself came a joint third. The Frenchman of the example (to utilise these analogies) aims to win popular competitions where his self is judged by a consensus, like a boppy number written for the Eurovision song contest for judges who don't know the indigeneous language of the countries entering, and to whom subtleties of expression, idiosyncratic turns, moods, particularly ^{conceived} authentic content, get in the way of judgement and enjoyment; and in order to come first, the Frenchman simply gives up who he really is.

Sartre's example of the Frenchman in America provides here a convenient opportunity to clear up a misunderstanding that sometimes attaches to interpretations of the existentialist's demand for personal authenticity as against and as complete with the social background of adjustment; one to which our choice of the example of Turner's father at the very end of the last chapter, might have added some fuel. It's sometimes wrongly thought that the advocacy of the authenticity of acts - of the need to give one's attitude to the environment one's personal weight, the need to 'choose oneself' as the person who is there and available - is advocacy of some spectacularly flamboyant act that goes with the creation of a past-irrelevant new self or the turning of one's back on the old set-up. Far from it. The Frenchman in Sartre's example would have been more authentic if more discreet and less outlandish, had he overacted less. Had it been Turner's mother (to go back to our old example again) and not his father who had willingly made herself a special person-about-the-house, cook, apprentice, handy-person in the execution of the creative work of the young artist - even though coming from the mother, such a course of action would have coincided exactly with the cultural stereotype - her act and choice would have been just

as authentic as was Turner's father's under the circumstances. There are plenty of mothers who are authentic, give their all as persons to being a mother without kicking against social conventions in any way, and in Ibsen's portrayal of Mrs. Solness in The Masterbuilder, we have an example of an existentialism-prompted criticism of the personal unauthenticity of a mother-figure in the family, to whom all the chores involved in fulfilling her role in the house are merely solemn duties. Mrs. Solness has chosen, from the moment of her marriage to the masterbuilder, to accept the role of wife and mother in the household; but the death of her twin children has made her bitter, and warped her attitude and commitment to the role-set originally chosen by her; resulting in the type of "me"-denouncing maladjustment for which Ibsen represented her, with a critical edge on account of her subsequent, lifelong choice of herself as a pathetic, hurt figure, too precious to be part of the concrete world around her which clamoured in practical ways for her authentic and effective help within it, and was worse off through her emotional withdrawal of that. Mrs. Solness' way of carrying out her duties in the house, underlain by the affectation of an attitude of distaste for those chores nobly and virtuously conquered, serves as an example for an inconspicuous, everyday sort of unauthenticity, just as the converse attitude, the authenticity of many persons doing their bit as socially ascribed with the weight of their persons behind it, is not conspicuous. In the absence of a mother in the Turner-household, the father's authentic project stands out at a tangent with accepted stereotype behaviour, and in such cases there is positive proof, as it were, in the person's manifest conduct of his social creativity and inventiveness, of the personal authenticity of his conduct as an alternative, or extra, to his regard (or disregard) for social conventions - his authenticity thrown into dramatic relief over against that merely conventional background. I suppose it is for this reason that very conspicuous and anticonventional instances of authenticity tend to be quoted more; those are the ones that meet the eye. The existentialist's bidding: 'be authentic', however, is very clearly addressed to everyday people in everyday walks of life, as the two Sartrean examples, that of the Jew and that of the Frenchman imply. Both these people, Sartre suggests, should be less pretentious, assume

themselves as they find themselves and do the job that they can do through such means only, through their personal authenticity. They should be the selves they are, by their own choice, endorsed by their willingness, through assuming their own selves, complete with the facticity in which they find themselves as such; and if they supersede that, that facticity will remain part of their selves as the past, absorbed into their selves, as part of precisely that "me" which they superseded; they must choose to be the effective object they factually are in socialpsychologic reality. If a pun be permitted, the self as chosen object, is also the found object. First it is found as it is, and then creatively chosen, like Braque's and Picasso's bits of newspaper and string. On whichever account the self is lacking - whether on the account of a denied "I" or on account of a denied "me" - whichever types of these two synthesis-deficiencies prevent the self from being effective, should be supplemented by the self so that its authenticity may be resumed. The Frenchman is now *object only*; he should resume the old *esprit*, and climb off the footlights of vaudeville. The Jew should ~~become the social object he is and climb down as would-be subject only.~~ He should not try to shed his blemished objective social being as such, but do the job of the simple martyrdom of his everydays in the ghetto, of serving as the sandwich-man, as the witness of the surrounding society's guilty conscience, by simply being there for who he is. Sartre's immigrant Frenchman is a relatively oversize "me" because of the outward society's promptings that he should be so - his greater completeness with an "I" than convenient for a stereotype way of thinking, which is always in a hurry, would complicate coping with, make difficult the dovetailing of a more particularistically attention-demanding authentic self into, the smooth running of the routine of social everydays. The Jew in Sartre's description is, contrariwise, a relatively oversize "I", on account of his own perception of himself as a not less than average personal excellence and repository of human capacities in general, in relation to the actual status ascribed by society to his "me", degraded and inadequate as a platform to his normal "I". The most plausible way out for the Jew from such a predicament, to save him from the discomforts of the incongruity of his self as experienced by himself as small-letter sacred, over against the social

background which casts him differently, is overreaching with his cultivated intellectual excellence, through hard work and achievement in such an intellectual way, the niche assigned to him in the world as it is, transporting himself into circles where intellectual excellence is O.K., fleeing into a project of intellectualism out of the context of a socially ordinary life where his relative excellence as a self socially disturbs, into circles, furthermore, where the self of the Jew himself will have an easier passage through adopting this project of flight, than he is having if staying put and having to pocket looks of hate from those who are not decent and of pity from those who are, as Sartre is aware he is casting towards the Jew whom he recognises as wearing the insignia of his social blemish - a David's star or the sad look of those set apart. The point has already been made that authentically choosing oneself as the "me" one already is, is often an undramatic project and act, in instances where the job of being who we are, involves assuming more willingly than we may wish, the unglamorous object the self finds itself as being - as in the case of Mrs. Solness who doesn't find it in her to do the chores of the mother and wife figure in the family cheerfully, or the Frenchman whose overt "me" in the new culture is tarnished with a foreign accent and with other cultural differences that show in his personality as that naturally is, or in the case of anyone who hesitates to identify with the "me" which he finds is lacking in prestige in the world for some reason or another. Now perhaps the additional point may be beneficially made, to supplement this former observation, that in instances when in order to be who we are calls for assuming, not the "me", but the "I" which, as selves, we also are, in response to the situation which our "me" is already in, even then the "I" we assume in 'choosing ourselves' is not some fanciful possibility of ours of our own outlandish and imaginative making, but a 'found' "I", so to speak, one that's discovered as part of our already existing talents, sometimes not very prestigious ones at all; it's something that gets, because it must be, by the 'romantic's' dicta, authentically coped with (just as is our "me"), in the business of getting on with what we must do in its light, and our authenticity as an "I" to a properly appreciable extent, simply consists in our giving it the scope it already has in our lives, if we make the effort to look for it. It's not

our authentic gratifying of the "I", but the denial of that in our lives, pretending it's not part of us, which is the course of action that involves fuss, falsehood, airs. In the case of the Jew in Sartre's study, who is aware of a greater "I" in himself than is cast for him in his antisemitic social surrounds, it's easy to see that he simply inherited the sensation and condition of an oversize "I" relative to the diminished prestige allowed for him by society outside, and that his greater personal standing than befits his station in the world is something he doesn't seek and would much rather be without, but he cannot easily shed it or transcend it, except at the cost of lying about who he is as object and betraying his own cultural past; and Sartre tells him that as he finds the "I", so he must choose and deploy it, in order to be authentic. But the existentialist claims that the job of assuming the "I" that we naturally are in part as selves, is something everyone must do all the time, not just those on the receiving end of discriminative social attitudes. For instance, in the context of the same example of the Jew's position in antisemitic France, the response of the non-Jew to the persecution of the Jew matters, even though he is part only of the social background to the Jew's problem; Sartre is just as angry with the non-Jew as he is with the unauthentically intellectualism-seeking Jew, for failing to assume his "I" where and when he finds it as a response to the given situation in question, and to respond as an authentic self in the face of this ready-found state of affairs touching the Jew in France. A restatement of the need to actively respond as an "I", as the condition of the authenticity of the self, to situations already there completely in the world that oneself was quite simply born into, which don't immediately attach to the narrow individual problem-area of the self who personally suffers through humanly anomalous and offensive affairs in the world, and which circumstances surrounding a person he has done nothing by his own effort to bring about, is afforded, in the context of war, in the chapter called 'Ethical Implications' in Being and Nothingness. Thomas Nagel also interestingly contemplates the issue of that guilt which consists simply in assenting unquestioningly, without bringing the individual judgement and the sense of responsibility of the "I" to bear on conduct, to institutional avenues of action, and posits the need for an alternative,

personally authentic approach to public issues. '16' The need for the self to utilise its judgement *qua* the self for the preservation of its own equilibrium, adjustment - a prerogative easily endangered in the most mundane contexts and walks of life, is a favourite preoccupation of Gestalt social psychology.

What conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing train of thought regarding the two logically, or perhaps ontologically, possible sources of maladjustment of the authentic and therefore properly hybrid self - a "me" deficiency and "I" deficiency, respectively? Several, and their implications touch on many disciplines: sociology, social psychology, aesthetics, ethics. The juxtaposition of these two Sartian examples - that of the unauthenticity of the immigrant Frenchman because of his under-eagerness as "I" and that of the unauthentic Jew because of his under-eagerness as "me", allow for the illumination of the synthetic nature of the 'romantic', particularly existentialist view, for it to be authentic, what it is, a self. I am not uncritical of Sartre's portrayal of the Jew and of the Jew's situation; I think it suffers from Sartre's naiveté to bad faith in that subculture which is no more attractive there than than it is in any other society, and through his blindness to this factor, Sartre's case and argument for the authenticity or unauthenticity of the individual Jew who 'transcends' his surroundings as his society, as a matter private to him, is incomplete, and because of the rosy-coloured spectacles through which he views the subculture commented on, he is more grudging to the individual Jew in granting him the same conceivably valid chance to be a nihilating individual consciousness in For-Itself authenticity than he is to other people. But his criticism of the unauthenticity of many Jews in turning their backs on their culture through cold feet at the prospect of sticking at the difficult business of being a Jew in a hostile world, even though they, as selves, have no quarrel with the values of their own circle of society, very often fits the bill, and the resulting "me"-deficiency serves as a paradigm of unauthenticity to complement the the "I"-deficiency of the immigrant Frenchman's consciousness. The two contrasting unauthenticities that ensue from the Sartrian socialpsychological analyses of the intellectualism-seeking Jew and the

immigrant Frenchmen, afford poignant illustrations of the two possible sources of bad faith that have been posited earlier, those which, respectively, may prevent the lateral fulfilment, the pragmatic authenticity of the reality of the self. ('Pragmatism' here is understood in the sense in which it was defined at the very beginning of this Section.) What is important from a pragmatistic point of view in the special sense which holds here in which the term is equated with a bias to overt action rather than narcissistic and passive preoccupations in the face of one's discovered duties and talents, a sense of the notion 'pragmatism' which is strongly affiliated with 'romantic' socialtheoretical views - and Mead's position is compatible here again with that of other 'romantics' - is the question whether the reality of the self does or does not come about in that synthesis between "me" and "I" for which the fulfilment in the act of the self is the occasion? The cardinal point of concern is whether the "me" is or is not assumed, whether the type of bad faith in which the "I" is too ponderous and finicky to strike reality as an effective self at the pragmatic socialpsychologic level of everyday is avoided, and whether or not action is frustrated by virtue of the converse source of bad faith, that of failure of the assumption of the action-generative "I" in its attachment in the act, or in overt conduct on the long term, to the too lazy or fretting mere "me" which, without the engagement of the "I", entirely saturates the self with an accentuated object self-image and *actio radius* so as to enable the agent to evade, by means of the convenience and appeal of the resulting, voluntarily endorsed or even chosen inferiority complex, the need to act with the responsibility of people fully in possession of their individual power of judgement and that appreciable degree of discretion which is the property and possibility of autonomous persons. (17) (18)

The points that emerge from 'romantic' socialtheoretic preoccupation with this area of enquiry into the kind of reality peculiar unto itself which emerges when selves are fulfilled and doesn't emerge otherwise - socialpsychologic reality - is, first of all, that this area of reality is, the reality, that is to say, that consists in terms of and in the idiom of selves is a reality of its own kind, with its own kind of

identity and when it's frustrated, when it doesn't come about though potentially it might, it's something meaningful and potentially realisable that's missed. It's the selves themselves that are missed when not done justice to as both the dual sets of potentials that they authentically are as human reality, as selves, as both "me" and "I" in synthetic unity.

Of course, while it's useful to analyse the differential sources of unauthenticity ("me"-shyness and "I"-shyness) on account of which the self as authentic may be frustrated, missed, forfeited - nevertheless, when one of these types of bad faith or another is the case, it's not just part of the self which is unfulfilled, but the entire structure of the adjustment of the self is ruined, foregone. Whichever type of maladjustment of the self out of the two just described obtains, it's the whole self which is maladjusted in the 'romantic' sense of the term all at once, and not piecemeal. In fact, one type of maladjustment is seldom found in any given self without the other: both the Jew and the Frenchman abroad in the above examples have unauthentic "me"-s as well as unauthentic "I"-s. A headmaster who, regarding his personal and professional ethics, is very "me"-compliant, and apportions corporal punishment with great readiness because it's legal to do so and because he hesitates to superimpose alternative standards of personal discretion in punishing the child, thinking it unduly individualistic and airy-fairy liberalism and fashion-courting to do so, is both servile in this attitude, in other words is both a mere social object as regards his own chosen, perfectly norm-complying conduct, and at the same time he is also behaving sadistically, as mere subject in relation to the child he beats, whom he regards as less than him, as mere object in relation to him. The same may be the case with the commissioned officers, or ordinary privates even, in a war situation - it's through regarding themselves as mere objects without any title to draw on personally informed, alternative standards to those bidding them to kill the enemy in war, that they come to apprehend themselves as agencies who have moral title to take the life of others, title as absolute subject. When the law regarding corporal punishment is changed, or when the war is over, the very cornerstone of that which had informed the agents in the

examples just quoted as safely dependable on, and as the fountainhead of morality itself, is removed, then they may suddenly see the entire past history of their overt conduct by authentic human standards which is in such situations all that remains for them to inform them normatively, ethically, aesthetically; suddenly exposed to the insight of the past course of action of their selves by the standards of human reality, such people in such situations sometimes suffer nervous breakdowns, possibly even incurable ones, as did the American pilot who dropped the atom bomb on Japan at the end of World War II. Conversely it may seem, on the face of it, that, say Torvald, Nora's authoritarian and overprotective husband in Ibsen's play A Doll's House, is subject only regarding his brand of bad faith in that interpersonal relationship in which their marriage consists, or likewise the schoolteachers who lay down the law firmly regarding the need to stick to the curriculum and tolerate no distraction from that by such inquisitive children whose intellectual needs and capacities seem problematic in relation to the strict letter of the curriculum, appear, judging by the disciplinarian style of their conduct, as 'subjects only', by virtue of their 'fundamental choice' in relation to the children; but, at the same time, the effect of their chosen mode of conduct as 'subject only' by their own appointment, also involves that kind of bad faith on their part in which the agent's conduct is saturated with being effectively mere object. The self of Torvald as husband and partner is lesser in its scope in a concrete and personal way than that of the Nora who had, perhaps unconsciously, liberated herself in the positive act towards the latter part of the play (though she herself was at first unauthentic as *object only* throughout the better part of the play under her husband's pressure for her to be so), and the person of the authoritarian, curriculum-upholding teacher is probably often lesser when viewed as a total self including his potential capacities, than that of the inquisitive child in the class, and by Torvald and the teacher being (by virtue of their own choice as a self), fairly oppressive and authoritarian interpersonal mere objects too, laying down the law from a position of power regarding what's the proper ceiling for selves up to which those are free and virtuous to foster potentials, and acting as wet blankets to those more potentially capable than themselves, more spirited, more complete with an

"I" as a condition of their fulfilment and authenticity. This is true of the relationship between Torvald and Nora as depicted by Ibsen, in which rendition Nora's self is shown as stifled by and according to justifications that ascribe lesser personal scope to selves who enjoy lesser ascribed anthropological ranking and standing in the reigning culture, i. e. wives in turn-of-the-century Norway, and it's also true in the context of the educational system that which is the instrument not only of the broadening of the horizons of the self of the developing child, but also of handing down those confines to educational potentials beyond which the teacher's own quality and degree of education did not stretch - standards which have often not hit very high summits.

Because selves are authentic/unauthentic, as the case may be, not on account of adequate/inadequate "I"-assumption only, or on account of adequate/inadequate "me"-assumption only when their situation calls for their support as significant persons, but tend to be either unitarily and entirely authentic with "me" and "I" both fulfilled in terms of each other in complementary socialpsychologic equilibrium and adjustment, or, alternatively, entirely and unitarily unauthentic, with one kind of the above postulated unauthenticities ("I"-overdose or "me"-overdose) effecting the whole self and upsetting and frustrating the authenticity or both of its components and the entire make-up of the self, in the complementary disequilibrium and maladjustment of the "me" and the "I", the above discerned two types/sources of conduct in bad faith are seldom differentiated from each other in literature treating the topic of the authenticity or unauthenticity of the self. The terms 'authenticity' and 'unauthenticity' usually refer, as ordinarily used, to the self in a blanket sort of way, qualifying that as authentic or unauthentic *in toto*, in its entire effect. This usual, *en bloc* usage of these terms - authenticity and its antonym - accentuates the pragmatistic side of 'romantic' preoccupation with the self and with its reality. A differentiation between the two opposite styles and sources of bad faith illustrated above through the example of the Jew in Sartre's study and through the example of his immigrant Frenchman respectively, - the choice of someone as predominantly mere subject or as predominantly mere object - is analytically informative regarding the make-up and the

typology of the adjustment of the self, and as such a very important and characteristic aspect of the 'romantic' and particularly existentialist schools of thought. In practical contexts, however, particularly as observed in its setting over against its external social environment, the self is 'found' and 'chosen' - or fails to be 'found' and 'chosen', as an entire self and not usually in separate contemplation of the 'found "I"' or the 'found "me"'. It is the question whether the self, in the final analysis, is assumed or not, which is of importance to socialtheoretically 'romantic' students of the self; it's the self in its entirety which is either there or not there as the reality of its own kind behind external conduct, as available when there is a need for it, or not so. The usual blanket sense in which 'unauthenticity' is ordinarily used, referring to the entire hue and quality of the self as a unity, affords a grosser and stronger contrast to authenticity than our previous distinction between the two possible origins of unauthenticity. This stronger contrast resulting from the more general use of the term 'unauthenticity' without specifying which of its two possible varieties is meant, is that between the all-over unauthenticity which characterises the entire style of the conduct of the self as a whole against its concrete external setting, as opposed to the possibility of the authentic being of the self - its possibility of drawing on the special idiom, that of human reality, for the being of the self, one's own included. The more usual, unitary grasp of the self as authentic or unauthentic in its entirety, underscores the romantic insight, most strongly posited in Sartre's thought, that whether it's because an oversaturation with an "I", or oversaturation with a "me", that the self fails to be what it could be and what is called for - in either of these cases of unauthenticity it's because instead of drawing on, dealing with the situation in the socialpsychologic idiom which would be appropriate, the self attempts to cope with personal and interpersonal reality in terms of externally ascribed servitude or mastery - attitudes of consciousness appropriate to its sociologic mode of being, as argued in Chapter 3., but both externally ascribed servitude and mastery unauthentic to the socialpsychologic, personal intimate mode of the being of consciousness, to the reality of significant selves. It's because both kinds of the above discerned

chosen unauthenticities of the self, its voluntary servitude in trying to be just "me" or its would-be mastery by conducting itself as though just "I", inappropriately, irrelevantly by-pass the idiom of the prevailing socialpsychologic mode of reality, that which should be responded to, coped with, that unauthentic consciousness fails to answer the needs, calls, opportunities of human reality, that it's wrong, not authentic or appropriate in relation to that human reality and the selves involved in it. I think it should be observed here that the socialpsychologic idiom of conduct - conduct in terms of human reality, of the reality of the selves involved - is not necessarily the appropriate one, not necessarily that which is correctly chosen in preference to the alternative kind and tonality of conduct, the sociologically conceived one, in each and every interpersonal situation, as already argued in the Introduction; but in situations to which the socialpsychologic level of the being of conduct is obviously the properly applicable idiom, it matters that it's missed, not gratified, justice not done to the selves whose need as "I" and availability as "me" potentially makes for the reality of the selves involved. Many are those who, in positions of charge in relationships of personal dependency - parents, guardians, husbands, teachers - are so strongly, heatedly and so positively motivated in the idiom and terminology of consciousness of the institutional apprehension of their ascribed role as senior partners in their particular relationship, that they feel excused from having to observe the most minimal standards of ordinary human decency in the small-letter sense of the term, and fail those most or all for whom they would do the most. Ibsen's play A Doll's House tells the tragedy of two people - that of Torvald and that of Nora. Nora would be in the position neither of dominance nor of servitude of spirit to her husband - in the course of the play she actually frees herself from unauthentic type-casting on the latter score, into which typecasting her husband relegated her through his expectations of his wife, and to which typecasting as *object only* she herself nodded consent for a long time through her own personal unauthenticity as such, agreeing to conduct herself as *object only*. After her self-liberation through the act from anthropologic servant-status at the side of her husband, she would just be herself and love and be loved for who she

totally is. But this is not the way in which Torvald knows how to love; and although he too would love his wife well and be loved by her, he is too stilted in the way he thinks both of himself and of her to be able to be that partner to Nora they both wish he were. Both unfulfilled as selves, to begin with - one *subject only* and the other *object only* - and uncongenial later on regarding the respective idioms in which they know how to give themselves - one profoundly and immutably *unauthenticity-abiding* and the other *authenticity-thirsty* - their one intention misses the target it aims at: their successful and loving relationship directed towards each other, and it aborts in different directions, with Nora and Torvald both starving as selves.

Section 3. The Necessity of the Self, and the Total Structure of Adjustment as Inclusive of It.

Romantic thought, preoccupying itself with the self hybridly grasped (as the organic alloy of the "me" and the "I" within its infrastructure), stresses very strongly the contention that the socialpsychologic radius of man's - every man's - being, is an irreducible, indissoluble and proper compass of the consciousness, experience and existence of all as human beings, throughout a lifetime and in every concrete encounter in particular, and that the quality of every person's being as the resulting human reality, is decisively and consequentially coloured, tainted, characterised by, open to judgement as the good or bad, successful or unsuccessful, smoothly efficient and matter-of-course or, contrarywise, jerkily coping or ridiculously unbalanced, too pompous or unbecomingly subservient management within the self of some kind of balance, some kind of working enmeshment between the "me" and the "I", between object and subject, mastery and slavery, dependence and being on top; the resulting balance or imbalance between these two constituent components of the self - object-subject, master-slave, "me"- "I", caretaker-dependent, yielding the adjustment of the self as its product, making for the quality and being of the self as human reality. This is so even in situations whose differentially ascriptional features are very strong, that is to say, in which persons of positional (or in the case of the family, also maturational) seniority take part and exercise, engage their consciousness and conduct in their heavy, ascriptionally 'sacred' capacity, vis-a-vis their ascriptional juniors, the Rachmones in their 'care'. All these participants in such situations, both the ones positionally on top and the ones in a position of outwardly given dependency on the former, the romantic social theorist will insist, do also and concurrently with their socially ascribed roles in the situation, strike a figure as human reality too. This fact may of course not have, and very often doesn't have, the slightest bearing on the sociologic make-up of the situation which happens to simultaneously reign, in a conceivably overbearing and primary manner compared with the socialpsychologic makings of that situation, persisting immutably and concurrently over against and outside the 'my world' of the participants, and in a Durkheimian

indifference to them. Nevertheless, it can't be helped, according to the 'romantic' student of the social sciences, that the reality of the selves also comes about side-by-side with the purely social makings of the situation in which they are functionally involved as 'carriers', as representatives and perpetrators of that outside social reality, by virtue of the roles they fulfil therein; the Rachmones promoting it in his capacity as *object-only*, and the Pukka functionally assuming his role within that framework as *subject-only*, as commented on at length in the previous two chapters. However, socialpsychologically speaking, the 'romantic' will tell us, attempts, as a personal matter, for the suppression of the situation-redundant component of the self (the rachmones' "I" and the Pukka's "me"), will not effectively result in the effective dismissal and diffusion of the selves involved, or of their reality as such. The "me"-less Pukkas and the "I"-less Rachmoneses, functionally produced in the social process, will, when socialpsychologically approached, become thrust into personal significance as selves; maladjusted ones if they don't manage to personally transcend their typecasting, but selves, nevertheless. These two types of selves (the "I"-only Pukka and the "me"-only Rachmones), will cut figures which are corroborative to the role-sets cast for them by society, but which are untrue, unauthentic and misrepresentative of the full and authentic selves which are their possibilities but which they neglect to assume. Consciousnesses open to and drawing on their ascribed avenues only and characteristically, misrepresent the nature of human reality, trade it in for a two-dimensional signification of that which touches on the sociologic makings of the situation only, affording a sort of shorthand for human reality in terms of roles, with the selves in either of these two conditions of relative internal disequilibrium, that of putting over and living the self as though pure "me", and the other: conducting the self as though pure "I", deputising for just templates of those selves whose potentials as selves necessarily subsist the while. *Cliché* is French for sewing pattern - a kind of template. The reality of human reality, on a romantic social-theoretic account, if authentic, will escape heterogeneously and unscathed, cliché representations of it; attempts to account for its phenomena in terms of role-theories of personality and nothing more, will fail.

Socialpsychologically speaking, human reality, inevitably experienced wherever there are people in situations, will sit uncomfortably in clichés ready-made for selves on account of the mere sociologic role-sets attaching to them, and the self of the person taking part in any situation as a self which may potentially fully assume itself in its own kind of authenticity, will want to get out of ready-made niches and clichés of that situation of whatever kind, bulging out of those uncomfortably like a too fast growing younger cousin from the hand-me-down clothes that come to him in the rota of the age-hierarchy governing in the family. The attribute of a person as socialpsychologically authentic or unauthentic, has an appeal or lack of appeal as the case may be, at a socialpsychologic level, making an impact as human reality as distinct from any other mode of the being of consciousness, which cuts across political sympathies, or which may offend in spite of shared political views; conversely, the adjustment of the quality of the self amounts to its own peculiar kind of reality which speaks for itself in its own terms through a life lived, an act done, as a peculiar sort of being and quality which cannot be retrospectively imported back into a lifetime if it has not been there in the first place, however desirable this might be from the point of view of public relations. This is not to suggest that the romantic social thinker doesn't care about the stance a person takes as a self in relation to sociological and interpersonal affairs outside of his own self in the world, that the appeal of his quality of adjustment is independent of and a matter apart from his relationship to and choice of consciousness vis-a-vis the greater historic issues of his day as an additional condition of his adjustment, as long as the autonomous management between the "me" and the "I" in his own self is harmoniously enmeshed; and the romantic will certainly not be impressed with the conduct of Richard III in Shakespeare's rendering, just because of the remarkable lack of self-deception of that character and his achievement of a perfect accord between the ruthlessly ambitious "I" and the ever-successful creation of a "me" to suit, in terms of actual outward, worldly opportunities and standing as a self, the gargantuanly power-hungry appetites of the "I", as his individual project. On the contrary, the romantic social thinker is characteristically preoccupied with configurations of match or mismatch

between the individual's private and public sets of standards of righteousness, Aristotelean dramaturgical fashion. The romantic social thinker is a dualist. Mead himself draws attention to the elemental originality of ancient Greek thought and art on account of its radical individualism underneath its classical formal facade, or rather, in significant conjunction with that. '⇒' Socialtheoretically romantic thought and art has, at the heart of its 'problematic', the tragic or tragicomic predicament of the agent who is inevitably responsible as an individual for the choice of his "me" (whether that is merely, though actively 'found' and assumed by him as 'found', or spectacularly and newly created by him to suit the biddings of his "I" in the factual transcendence of the situation into which he was born) - as a job which cannot be avoided by him, whether he cares to take on that responsibility or not, as his "me" will be continuous, whatever he does, with positive social reality outside, corroboratively with it or otherwise, morally becomingly or unbecomingly, rightly or wrongly; and the romantic social theoriser concerns himself with an endless number of paradigms and permutations of how inward and outward sets of virtue and conditions of equilibrium of consciousness may or may not, will or will not, complement one another. It's probably the only strand of social moralising tradition in art or in science which has time and sympathy for the individually authentic who is historically wrong, say, for Danton in Büchner's treatment who finds his social ideals, to the promotion of which he devoted his life, corrupted in the realisation, but nevertheless endowed with the sacredness of a victorious ideology which comes to be established as the norm in power or in the historically destined making, and himself and his finicky scruples and sensitivity to the imperative of the universal betterment of the conditions of all oppressed selves, which made him a revolutionary leader in the first place, as outdated and in the way of the promotion of the new society as it is gradually more established (partly his own brainchild), in the light of whose emerging norm he, as the persistent critic of any established society which is found by him to be humanly anomalous (the emergent one included) has to be disposed of. A similar paradigm may be found in the film The Bridge on the River Kwai whose hero, the English colonel in Japanese captivity, finds his dogged and

unimaginative adherence to his scrupulously and idealistically honest, romantic set of boyish, public-school standards which he upholds in his capacity as a self, as historically hopelessly stupid and very nearly politically and socially greatly destructive in its inflexible application in the greater, historic context, where its inappropriateness stares everyone else in the eye, and which beautiful, personally authentic but historically counterproductive, individual mode of consciousness informing his conduct, together with its tangible fruits, have to be and are rightly destroyed in the service of the greater historic cause for the upkeep of which he is there to serve.

As a converse paradigm to that discerned in the above two examples, Jean Renoir's strongly pacifist and socially very romantically committed film Le grand illusion affords an elaborate statement of the righteousness and pathos (on the artist's view) inherent in the justifiable, indeed necessary dismissal by the microsociologically authentic and macrocosmically articulate and critical individual of morally anomalous public standards stretching to a global historic situation, in the name of the uncompromised human standards, movingly shared by every personally authentic character across geographic and political frontiers.

Renoir (by implicit, artistic means) depicts the outside cruel norm in war which all the characters he cares to present, all authentic in the small-letter sense, universally defy as if by an unvoiced conspiracy, by keeping up their committed, ordinary with small-letter profaneness in the everyday of the war, in preference to the paranoiac and murderous big-letter norm which gets out of control. According to Renoir's rendering - as a matter of his artistic testimony - both the men and their officers persist in their conduct as authentic individuals, neither set of characters suspending, in the face of the war and its dehumanised moral dictates, their dedication to their private standards as people: though in maintaining their small-letter authenticity as humans, no contentual common denominator between the peculiar and non-coincidental profaneness of the rank-and-file men and that of the upper-class officers will arise either on the German or on

the French side, in keeping with the Sartrean insight that attempts to forge humanly authentic links of fraternity between people across social barriers, meets the strongest resistance among all attempts to establish such between unlikely partners, firstly because of the perishable or rather exhaustible nature of the sentiment of generosity which fuels such an attempt on the Pukka's side, and secondly (though Sartre doesn't mention this), because of the (authentic or unauthentic) pride and the well-placed suspicion on the part of the proletarian candidate for such a partnership in the face of the Pukka, from whom the proletarian's source and mode of profaneness (different in its content, partly informed by a philosophic materialism, from that of the Pukka) is personally removed, is difficult to assimilate by the Pukka in effortless and first-hand ways and, even if the Pukka appreciates the need and function of the working class and peasant subcultures as the substance of the profaneness of these social classes, the concrete ways and forms of the proletarian's peculiar profaneness are merely a matter for a distant and aloof contemplation for the Pukka. (20) However, in the separateness of the repertoire of interpersonal authenticity that exists as a possibility for the lowly-born of the world, and for the highly-born of the world, respectively, Renoir provides many examples to demonstrate, in accord with his belief, that the bulk of people, whether ascriptionally high or low, is authentically profane in his own, ascriptionally separate way if given a chance, as is propounded in the film, for instance, in the episode when two rank-and-file German frontier guards let two escaping French fellow-proletarian prisoners of war, at the brink of success in their escape and worn out in the effort, slip over into neutral Switzerland. For the part of the well-born participants in the war, one of the main plots of the film explores how the two commanding officers on the two sides of the war, the French in captivity and the German as the captor, grow to develop a humanly very deep friendship in their capacities as individuals. Both the French prisoner-of-war commander and the German commander in charge of him and of his men as well, withhold from the performance of their big-letter Office the unquestioning subordination to that of their private sets of standards, so dear to them both respectively, and consequently they find that, owing both to the social and the human nobility of both, they have

much in common. They are fond of speaking English, of food that tastes good to the discriminating palate, and share a taste for good wines. In the meantime and concurrently with performing their individual project of conducting themselves in accord with what their authentic capacities as human beings demands of them - this project furthering and deepening their personal friendship - they also fulfil their roles as commanding officers in terms of their typecast in the external world on account of the war - their dual situation as officers in one sense and human beings in another, affording a real Racinean intrapersonal dramatic double-bind between the conflicting sets of private and public duties in the consciousnesses of both these men. The French officer heads the escape-attempt of his men; and when, within that plan, his moment to make his move arrives, he acts on it and the German commanding officer shoots at him, as his duty commands. He tries to miss the Frenchman, but his aim is too good. The Frenchman is mortally wounded; the best care (which he is given) can't save him; and as the German sees him die whilst sitting at his bedside, it is his best friend he is losing. Neither of these two commanders choose to be the mere clichés of their office which they could have been had they opted for the spirit of seriousness as the keynote of their conduct, had they related to their role typecast for them in the war, in the mode of personal unauthenticity. They chose instead to retain, even in a war situation, their selves as the continued frame of reference and informant of their consciousness, and to remain, (underneath the badge of their office to which they could have reduced their being had they so chosen to), small-letter profane, or small-letter pukka, which is the same thing, as Paul tells us; this great Pauline message consisting in the recognition that small-letter sacredness is solely inherent in and available through shouldering at all times one's small-letter profaneness, as the touchstone of one's personal authenticity with all the human implications of that, a view shared by Sartre too. Both these anthropologists (Paul and Sartre) can be read in such a way as to yield up the insight that only through retaining who we are as profane, can we really be a pukka human being. Sartre once referred to a speaker on a public occasion he attended, who opened his speech with the words: "We

psychologists", and Sartre instantly concluded in response to these words that 'the man was a villain.'

At this juncture in the argument, the opportunity offers itself to stress again, and to pay tribute to Renoir's presenting in the characters of the French and German commanding officers (unexpectedly but compellingly displaying small-letter pukka qualities in relation to each other and to the war situation) the difference between the small-letter and the big-letter meanings of the term 'pukka', already commented on in Chapter 2 Section 2 and in the Section called 'The Coarse Caretaker', citing there the lack of gentlemanly, though not social elevation of the 'masters' Bertie Wooster and Almviva, both of them losers in human terms in relation to their manservants. In these two foregoing Sections it has been argued (to recapitulate) that being small-letter Pukka is being the gentleman we all would like to be, in a human sense, which may have nothing to do with the degree of the social elevation which happens to be our lot in the world. Big-letter Pukka, in contrast, is someone who may not necessarily be dependable at all in small-letter, human terms the way the two commanding officers in Renoir's film are, but who is Pukka merely by virtue of the elevation of his social role-ascription, and conceivably a villain as regards his personal qualities. There is no guarantee that someone socially ascribed to big-letter Pukka status is a qualitatively outstanding person as a matter of his personal standards too; for him to be fully deserving of pukka-status in both senses of the word, he must also sport an internal 'adjustment' between his "me" and "I" as a person, as a human being; and in Renoir's handling of both of the two commanding officers as pukka in both senses of the term, social and anthropological, these two socially highly ascribed characters come to supersede in human terms, and to put to shame, the figures of Almviva and Bertie Wooster.

Turning now to the portrayal of the personally authentic morality of the proletarians depicted in Renoir's film (gentlemanly in anthropologic terms only), it is true to say that just as the director avoids (as just shown) the pitfall of characterising the socially ascribed, high-ranking Pukka - the two commanding officers - in terms of

socially elevated two-dimensional clichés, to which their interpretation might avail itself to a socially and humanly coarse, simplistic and schematic artist, but represents them as people who by choice fully assume their private world, that which to them is their being as people in the ordinary way irrespective of the norm crudely and grossly 'gesturing' their consciousness to shed that and to conduct themselves completely in terms of the office they represent, so, conversely, he doesn't shortchange his conception of the people he chooses to portray from the other end of the social spectrum, the men, avoiding a clumsiness in supporting his conception of the working and peasant classes by representing their individual members cliché-fashion, as *objects only*. The rank-and-file characters in the film are represented, in the main, by those two of the men who manage to escape, particularly through the delicately observed and rendered portrait of one of them and the gentle unfolding of his love affair with a German war-widow, a person delicate in her manner and at the same time strong, managing and caring with quietly fussless pathos, for herself and her little daughter on her lonely farm, where she hides the escaped prisoners from the patrolling German search-parties. In Renoir's interpretation of the branch of the plot which follows the two escaping men's and the German widow's fortunes, together with the episode of the two German frontier-patrols who allow these two men to escape into Switzerland, as already referred to, the characters who make up in this film the core of the socially un-elevated, amount to no lesser heroes than the two commanding officers, in the dramatic sense in which the rank-and-file participants of the war are each portrayed with exemplarily full dualistic complexity, no less than their two military superiors, as masters of their own destiny as human beings on the one hand, and the thralls of the humanly unauthentic norm of the war on the other, in the face of which, too, they assume themselves as responsible.

With the fullness of the selves both with "me" and "I" so strongly stated in the film in the socially high as well as in the socially low - the officers refusing their type-cast possibility to be just "I", to be the solemn protagonists of their office and nothing else, and the rank-and-file participants in the war assuming their selves complete with the

social situation-irrelevant "I", thereby amounting to so many human beings of stature, as more than mere "me"-s, as more than mere fodder to the cause fought (illusory, on Renoir's testimony, with no hint on his part to the effect that the French fight in a just cause) - Renoir's film is a very strong statement on behalf of a united humanity, irrespective of national frontiers, in the name of human reality, for the propagation of which the artist himself strongly sticks his neck out as such, and which human reality he conjures up for us as the proper and necessary sphere of the being of man in order to be a man, or rather a person in any walk of life, in order to live; this human reality providing a set of personal moral standards that necessitates the total and absolute rejection of the impersonal forces of war and its inhuman norm outside, a choice which is available to all persons, on Renoir's interpretation, whether socially high or low.

This is the anthropologic aspect of Renoir's message in this film; he puts it forward committedly, using his artistic licence as he must as an artist; for instance, by selection. As already pointed out, there are only authentic people in the film, the two high-class Pukka are both such people who turn their backs on what they socially stand for, and on the implications and connections of that in the outside world, dissociating their consciousness with the impersonal forces there which cause the war. They have subordinated their possibility to identify in their being with the dictates of their social role, and refuse to adopt those as their personal norm - they carry out the motions that go with their jobs, but as individual consciousnesses they have nothing to do with them. They choose to be people and not their roles, and suffer the consequences of their acts necessitated in the context of and by the war; greatly. Renoir doesn't bother to show the humanly unauthentic on either side of the social spectrum, leaves those alone as an artistic device to maximally underscore his anthropologic message as just set out, his personal and artistic creed, his belief that it is the universal potential of man - any man - to divorce himself from the impersonal forces at work in war. The film, at the same time, doesn't explicitly carry the implication that there are no such people in high places - indeed, in low places - who are responsible for the war and who

are humanly unauthentic in the face of it, although such people are only tacitly there in the plot, are there by implication, for there is a war in which people have to suppress their nature, aspirations and lives as people. The clear statement of this anthropological message, without sacrificing the psychologically true-to-life complexity of the characters who bring to life and mediate this message, is a strong virtue of the film.

There is, concurrently, another great artistic virtue in the message and method of *Le grand illusion* which singles out Renoir's film from among many sociologically romantic artistic comments on and statement of the same theme. This is Renoir's lack of naiveté to social reality, to the overriding primacy of its dictates in the world, over and above the anthropologic ideals, dreams of any man, not excluding Renoir's own wishful thinking about the universally nobler nature of man than his actual one which allows for war. Renoir manages to show his own vision: a world more true to human reality, as 'present' in terms of the way in which that not yet established world as a possibility of everybody's self already 'is' in their consciousness, in an anticipatory, Sartrean sense, even though no room and legitimacy for this more ideal world or the contemplation of it is granted in the here-and-now as it officially is; but in the wishing of which people are united as people, through the shared hate of the actual reality of the war, of things as they are, and on the envisaging and perception of which humanly more authentic world they already act. The film shows the two non-overlapping spheres of the being of man, that of the anthropologic aspect of his consciousness (human reality writ large) and that of the social actuality which is there for him, in counterdistinction with one another, both these different realms thoroughly and well observed. Anthropologically speaking, the film shows movingly how people's being as persons, highly ascribed or low, bulge desparately and wishfully (to draw once more on an earlier metaphore) out of the positively rigid 'honeycomb' of its placing in the actual structure of society as it is; but, for all that, Renoir is not blind to the indissmissible being of that 'honeycomb', but acknowledges that and shows that in its overriding absoluteness, as it commandingly prevails side-by-side and simultaneously with the

anthropologically conceived, unfolded and depicted sphere of human reality, as analysed above. While the anthropologic universe, on Renoir's account, envelopes the whole of humanity, as the really available potential of all, the social chasm dividing the two basic classes in society: the ascribed Pukka and the ordinary folk within that meaningfulness of human reality for all, is absolute, in Renoir's realistic presentation of it. True, both the Pukka-kind and the socially 'ordinary' type, as people, are shown in the film as fully authentic in the Pauline sense, both as regards their basic need to be so and in the respect of the actual conduct they practice, but clearly (as already hinted) they can only be so within the bounds and idiom of the separate compass of each of the social classes which the ascriptionally high-ranking and low-ranking respectively occupy, as a matter of social fact. There is indeed a small-letter profane sphere of consciousness available even to the highly ascribed Pukka to choose and exercise his self authentically, rather than socially stereotypically and unauthentically as a person, but his range of the experience as authentically and personally profane is not the same as the experiential content of small-letter profaneness of the socially ordinary man; except formally - in the sense that small-letter profaneness, if unattained, is accentuatedly experienced by every man in whatever walk of life as a lack which he must fill with private, small-letter standards of human excellence of an authentic, first-hand, experiential nature, as a condition of his moral salvation as human reality as it were, (though Sartre doubts that this is available to the socially high in any workable way.) As has already been pointed out, at no point in the film is there an exchange at the level of friendship or in any personal depth between the socially well-born and 'the other half', as they say; the officers don't endeavour to endear themselves to the men, and the men don't give the question whether or not they are liked by the officers, a single thought. The consciousnesses of the lowly born and the highly born simply don't connect, though each half lives fully, richly in experience and in range of personal being, on the evidence of the film. The socially Pukka and the socially low-ranking quite simply don't exist for one another as human realities. While there is a strong sense of fraternity between the French and the German in each of the separate areas of social being -

the highly ascribed ones and the lowly ascribed ones, that is - demonstrated by the warm relationship between the two commanding officers, and, in the other main strand of the plot, between the two defecting men and their plebeian fellow-beings whom they encounter during their escape - yet, the film shows that, as the very condition of the authenticity of people belonging to one or the other socially ascribed half of humanity, they can't be authentic in each other's idiom. The configurations of the relationships serving to illuminate Renoir's social as distinct from anthropologic messages as those come to the fore in the film, spell out his position as the inverse of Durkheim's dictum (who, in his entire activity as a sociologist, never touched on social class) - with Renoir's vision emerging as the antithesis of Durkheim's claim that the greatest chasm between man and man is of an anthropologic kind: sacred versus profane, in an elemental religious sense, and never the twain will be mixed up in consciousness. Renoir maintains, at a tangent with this Durkheimian view, that all men are, if they so choose, anthropologically equal, with the common denominator between them as such provided by their all being in part small-letter sacred and in part small-letter profane as hybrid selves, in a humanly becoming personally equilibrated, autonomous ensemble between "me" and "I" in each and all, while the chasm between the two main social classes reigns as absolute on grounds for which there is no anthropologic justification; a truly socially romantic message. Renoir's work is anthropologically optimistic, socially pessimistic; proof that he appreciates the sociological and the anthropological (human reality-constituted) strands of being as distinct from each other.

Section 4.Paradigms of Grace.

Renoir's film Le grand illusion (analysed in the previous Section) as an example to illustrate the distinguishability, in a meaningful way, of the anthropologic as distinct from the sociologic mode of the consciousness and morality of man, is very informative on another score too. With the elaborate and richly and inventively varied paradigms which its treatment affords between every one of its characters' accentuated personal authenticity on the one hand, and, on the other, the configuration which that humanly significant attribute - an appealing balance between "I" and "me" in the inward structure of the characters' personality - forms with their situation as "me"-s outside, firmly set, placed through these "me"-s in the 'social 'honeycomb': the cast-list and structure of the historic pageantry going on around these selves, in which outward network the selves thus cast, form a part, play a role. Renoir's classic amounts to one of the very rare statements, in terms of positivity, of romantic social thought's ideal of the intrapersonally adjusted man, of personal authenticity; a notion which - important, not to say central to a romantic framework of social theorising as it is, is more usually stated within that tradition of thought in terms of negativity - through examples in which adjustment of personal demeanour as a human being, and thus the assumption of the self as authentic in its relationship with its outside historic setting, is deficient, unappealing, lacking.

The socialpsychologically positive ideal of intrapersonal, humanly authentic adjustment, on the rare occasions when it receives an exposition in the socialtheoretically romantic tradition, is at times evocatively referred to as 'grace'. In Sartre's work - and, of course, in that of Paul, as has already been touched on once or twice before, the expression 'grace' consistently props up in this sense, in a manner which is to some extent comparable in Paul's and in Sartre's handling. The connection between Sartre's and Paul's somewhat overlapping understanding of this term emerges particularly poignantly through the work of Bultmann, the deliberate interpreter of Paul's and inadvertant ambassador of Sartre's anthropology, and the discernor of the

transferability (inherent in both Paul and Sartre) of some key notions concerning man as both physiological and social 'body'. In the brief section where Sartre explicitly puts forward the notion 'grace' (21) - he uses the term interchangeably with 'adjustment'. The Sartrian concept at this point in Being and Nothingness is the yield of an analysis of the situation in which the 'body' (Being-for-Itself) is engaged in a physiologic context, but of course it's meant, in Sartre's usage there too, with symbolic, sociologic significance as well. The Pauline connotations of the term 'grace' normally apply in a symbolic rather than physiologic context, with the term 'body' figuring at the socially ontologic level: the *soma Christou*, so to speak, 'graceful', 'membership' in which is usually to be taken as the affair of one's personally righteous sociologic or socialpsychologic participation in the worldly copy of the kingdom of Jesus, the ultimate in the ideality of the collective consciousness, rather than in one's capacity as a being with physiologic 'members', another preoccupation of Paul's; but these two understandings of the properties of the 'body' in Paul, socially symbolic and actual, as Bultmann discerned, are not unconnected, and echoes of one grasp of the 'body's 'grace' (the sociologic one) in the other grasp of this notion (the physiologic one), usefully reinforce one another, on Bultmann's account, in the Pauline context too. The possibility of the conflation of the most evident, sociologic meaning of 'grace' in the Pauline sense with the most evident physiologic meaning of this decorous attribute in Sartre, is certainly one that didn't bother Sartre in his choosing the name of the concept; indeed, in his choice of the label for the notion 'grace' in his own peculiar, predominantly physiologic sense, without qualifications to distinguish its meaning from its usually sociologically symbolic Pauline one, was deliberate on Sartre's part, or at least it mirrors, it seems to me, an unselfconscious welcoming on Sartre's part of the ensuing dual, social and physiologic applicability and amenability of the term.

'Grace' or 'adjustment' in Sartre's usage, as has already been pointed out, refers to physical demeanour. It's the index, the sign, the reward of the adjustment between the object-aspect of the 'body' (meaning the 'self') on the one hand, and, on the other, the agent's

capacity to retain and to exercise his autonomy as a self, his spontaneity, his self-mastery, his freedom as a self; reminiscent of the "I". 'Grace' as used at this point in Being and Nothingness by Sartre, is the index - and the reward - of the fullness of the self with both these aspects of itself - with the "I" on the one hand and, on the other, with the "me", both in the physiologic sense and in the socialpsychologic or sociologic one; it's an accomplishment in this sense, one that is gained in spontaneity, rather than through studiousness; it's a socialpsychologically natural endowment. Lack of grace, to Sartre, equals conduct as though Master or "I" or 'subject' or individual freedom only (sadism), or, in the case of the opposite maladjustment, as though doormat only (masochism). Conduct in either of these two assumptions of the self in bad faith (one entailing the other in an interpersonal context), is, on Sartre's account, obscene; masochism is no less deserving of this label than sadism. The transferability of the Sartrian notions of 'sadism' and 'masochism' onto the socialpsychologic or social planes of conduct, doesn't, I think, call for overmuch elaboration; both the terms in question are commonly used in the socialpsychologically or socially symbolic sense in ordinary parlance. The kinship between these two maladjustments of the self (sadism and masochism) in Sartre's overtly physiologic sense, and the applicability of those Sartrian maladjustments to an 'obscene' *socialpsychologic* attitude of arrogant 'mastery' vis-a-vis another, and the complementary 'obscenity' of a passive *socialpsychologic* attitude of the acceptance of such interpersonal dominance over oneself by another self, seems to me eminently meaningful and evident. Examples for both these types of socialpsychologic 'obscenities' - "me"-renunciation and "I"-renunciation, respectively - have already been offered in abundance so far, and will be highlighted again in our present context for classificatory purposes in considering the logical possibilities of authenticity and unauthenticity in the self, afforded by different constellations within the self between the "me" and the "I".

In approaching, first of all, the first out of the self's two possible *obscenities* or unauthenticities at the socialpsychologically symbolic level, we shall refresh our memories regarding that paradigm

of socialpsychologic obscenity which consists of assuming the "I" only and dismissing the concrete, practical "me", which "me" potentially and properly anchors, if properly assumed, each self into even a predominantly social situation, and is effective as the proper compass of what's within a person's sanity and call as a human being to do, in the light of the dictates of his "I". This, the first out of a person's two possible unauthenticities, is the 'obscenity' of a self who 'believes his image' when that is publicly elevated and inflated into an idealised "I"-role, and missing on account of this pure subject-pretence the standards of adjustment as human reality, naturally defining the spontaneous self as properly both object and subject (as argued above). We already offered, to support a similar point, the examples of 'Little Malcolm' and Sartre's unauthentic Jew, but further examples here may strengthen the argument. One such example offers itself in the conduct of Jean-Jaques Rousseau, founder of and prolific contributor to modern educational theory. His work argued, for the first time in educational history, the recognised need in a child's natural and optimally fulfilling development, to ensure scope in that process for his individual potentials, as those are naturally there in his personality from the moment go as a specimen of the human race; while, at the same time, he put for adoption each and every one of his numerous children as they were born, one after the other. A second further example for this kind of unauthenticity, more specific than Sartre's general objection to the unauthenticity of a Jew who escapes from his concrete problem in the world as a Jew by fleeing into an intellectualism, as outlined in his work Antisemite and Jew, ⁽²²⁾ is offered by the person of Emile Durkheim, a Rabbi's son, who, with the public attitude which claimed Dreyfus as its scapegoat and victim politically very much in the air, dedicated his life to elaborating the sociologically invaluable theory that, at least in primitive cultures, the notions of 'sacred' and 'society' and (as a connected issue) the subject matter of society and religion, completely overlap. The example of the actor Raymond Burr can further be quoted here, who fell victim to the myth of the invincibility in court of Perry Mason, the famous television lawyer, the hero of a serial, played by him, and who decided to defend himself in court when charged on an issue which affected him

personally, spectacularly losing his case. Tsar Alexander of Russia and his family provide a further example in this context. Alexander accepted his worship by the Russian peasant, poor beyond description, who related to Alexander as a deity in utmost sincerity, never referring to him publicly or privately in any other way than 'our little father the Tsar'; penny-pinching throughout his life so as to be able to afford to give his few remaining kopeks to the Church as a way of expressing in prayer his thanks to the Tsar for his hand-to-mouth existence and asking his help in his deliverance from his pitiful condition. In accepting this, the conduct of the Tsar and his family take on a dimension which in its extent of personal unauthenticity and human offensiveness transcends confines which are themselves rational or which can be responded to rationally, a dimension and quality which is not entirely accounted for in terms of merely economic exploitation in which vulgarian historians sum up the anomalies which called the Russian Revolution into being, but it touches on, involves that stratum of human reality which makes sense in terms of selves and their condition as such as well, and draws, calls on an appreciation of both inter- and intrapersonal ideals and standards of adjustment; the total meaning and repugnant quality of the Tsar's conduct, and that of his family, is greater in this respect than that which the social positivists identify and acknowledge as its exclusively economically constituted and rationally appreciable make-up. In turn, the revolutionaries themselves responded irrationally, when their turn came, in a way which was perhaps not an unexpected response to this anomaly in the Tsar's treatment of them; in executing the Tsar and his family without further ado, they responded to the Tsar not only as the source of their economic exploitation, not only as the abuser and usurper of their labour, the appropriator of the economic fruits of their exertions so that he and the likes of him could pursue a lavish lifestyle at the expense of theirs, but also as the cynical betrayer and misappropriator of their kind's and their forefathers' spiritual offering to him and his forbears of their very selves.

The 'organisational woman' (described earlier in the Section called 'The Coarse Caretaker'), may be seen as illustrating this paradigm of

conduct (sheer "I"-assumption), showing how people in not exceptionally socially elevated positions - say, as rulers, executives or highly acknowledged artists or intellectuals in society, but in a rank-and-file capacity in the social world, can fail - the way many well-meaning social workers do - to hit the horizons of human reality altogether in their own consciousness and conduct, and therefore in conceiving, in their own image as complete selves (which they are not), the persons and the human terms of the rehabilitation of the people in their 'care'. In other words, the 'organisational woman' and her relatively lowly-born likes as social workers and workers in related fields, through conceiving of themselves in terms of a kind of 'sublimation', in the name of the collective consciousness of which they see themselves as the representatives as the totally exhaustive sphere of their consciousness and conduct, miss in the course of their work the content of human reality in their interpersonal dealings, both as far as their own selves and as far as the persons of their clients are concerned, forgetting and betraying that content of human reality which forms part of the human environment of which they themselves were once part, and in which framework they are now to apply their interpersonal skills, so as to rehabilitate their clients as selves in addition to rehabilitating their clients to some extent, in more tangible terms too. This shortcoming in the 'organisational woman' and her kindred-spirited colleagues (the denunciation of the "me" in them), causes the annullment for themselves and for their clients, of the dignity inherent in the assumption of their own small-letter sacred human and cultural roots, which lie in their fully granted, matter-of-course small-letter profaneness, and they deprive their clients, as they deprive themselves, of the freedom and good which such an assumption of their selves in the idiom of their own culture, would hold for them in socialpsychological, personal terms. Furthermore, the conduct of the 'organisational woman' and her likes, breeds not only an obscenely oversize "I" in them - they would never admit that they harbour such a self-image - but comes to typical expression in their conduct in a concurrent, obscenely affected, overstated, unnatural, too gross, not personally meant, often overjolly "me", and such individuals typically engage in a condescending anthropologic slumming in relation to their human status-deprived

clients, in an act of a humanly most offensive and hurtful arrogance. In their act of compensating for their being an "I"-template at the bottom of their own personal problem, they need to push an image as "me"-templates as well, so as to have a "me" of any sort at all, unauthenticity thus spreading to the whole make-up of their selves, affecting both of their selves' two components, the "me" as well as the "I". But they don't really mean this "me"-charade at all; it's an effort, play-acting for them, hard work, after which they take this "me" off as a pair of shoes that is too tight, doesn't fit, and abandon themselves as the "I"-only consciousnesses they truly are, just like their well-born colleagues, upper-class charitable ladies, relics of the Victorian era; (though this paradigm is more common in upper-class charitable ladies, who are still around in abundance.)

Examples of the other type of socialpsychologic 'obscenity' or personal unauthenticity: that of being "me"-templates only, surrendering the "I" as a self, 'believing one's image' as the "me"-only as is typecast for one (as already illustrated through the example of Sartre's Frenchman abroad), offer themselves in equally great numbers. The first to be enlisted is the life-project of Willy Loman, the main character in the play Death of a Salesman, though in the tragedy of this person Arthur Miller, the author, blames not this tragic anti-hero who falls because of choosing the pursuit of the sham ideals of a life which lacks a personally authentic "I" to serve him right as a person, but Miller blames for this phenomenon this man's typecast in the culture of which he is part, whose strait-jacket of the less than fully human and dignified horizons of a consciousness is forced on this well-meaning and loving person by the so-called 'American Dream' in which he is a helpless cog, whose demands of him to perform his part in this so-called 'dream' in the human unauthenticity 'gestured' to him, this intellectually not especially endowed character is unable to question, transcend and reject.

In Miller's presentation, Willy Loman, the play's hero, or rather anti-hero, arrives at a crossroads in his life. After a lifetime spent in the virtuous avoidance of offending the norm reigning in his culture

- exemplified in the terms of reference of his neighbourhood, particularly in the way of life of his relatively well-to-do next-door neighbour, - adopting, as Willy Loman does, the ultimate ideal as demanded by his culture of being 'well-liked' as the main endeavour in his conduct, and teaching his sons to live by this ideal too, Loman discovers that he has lost the respect of his sons, spent his hard-earned money senselessly in his attempts to maintain an unrealistic living standard, has not managed to meet his family's financial and even less its human needs, and became, hurtfully, a laughing stock in the wider world. In order to set the score right in all these respects, he makes the ill-judged decision to head for a fatal car accident for the benefit of the insurance (for which, unbeknown to him, he has forfeited his family's right by his former, unsuccessful suicide attempts), and for the benefit, as he saw it, of ridding the family of the presence of his self which he perceives as failed and irksome, whereas in reality, by the end of the play, he emerges as the object of love to his family, whose presence they all need and crave as a partner, as a friend, as a slighted fellow-traveller through the anomalies of the world: as a person.

This second type of 'obscenity' in Sartre's book (that of exclusive "me"-prevalence and "I"-suppression, in interpersonal subservience), is a familiar paradigm of conduct in many ordinary walks of life; we discover it in Sartrian 'waiters' who exhaustively identify themselves with their subservient "me"-s or *objects only* to which their selves have become tantamount in the performance of their jobs. ⁽²³⁾ Sometimes recognise this type in a certain breed of academic woman - stooped in her demeanour in the presence of Great Academic Men, or more usually, Great Academic Man, looking askance at him, speaking *sotto voce* in his presence; Goethe's Wagner too is a junior scholar to Faust in such slavishness of spirit. We can identify this type of humanly, socialpsychologically maladjusted modality of consciousness in an interpersonal context, in those hypochondriacs whom we sometimes see in a doctor's waiting room, 'dressed for the occasion' as it were, in spirit at least, behaving as though in a temple, awaiting their turn to be in the presence of the ~~Great~~ Doctor, in whose spiritual radius such

people shine, come alive with a sacred glow, as though during a holy service.

The socially theoretically 'romantic' ideal of the authentic, 'graceful', well-adjusted self, characterised by an internal and also external harmony in a self between its "me" and its "I", may be directly demonstrated by such examples in which such a mode of consciousness and conduct is successfully accomplished and perpetrated. Fortunately, such examples abound too, and the illustration of the ideal of the 'grace' of the self need not be exclusively and roundaboutly approached through such instances in which one or the other component of the self is forfeited, resulting in one sort of maladjustment, socialpsychologic 'obscenity' in the Sartre-implied sense, or the other.

A list of examples of the authenticity of a person - as an equilibrated self, with the "I" actively engaged in the assumption of its social anchorage, and a "me" to match that within the self, ready for its realisation in the first person singular, by getting one's own hands dirty in the process, so to speak, is perhaps fittingly headed by the style and quality of the conduct of J. S. Bach who, while already publicly revered in his lifetime for the artist he was, found time to write two volumes of progressively difficult piano exercises for his wife who was interested in learning to play, and tutored several of his many sons to become musicians of note in their own right. Another such example may be provided by St. Joan who, moved by the ideals prompting her to free France from under the English yoke, fought in all battles alongside with the men who were inspired by her ideals. Of course the men fighting in her free army in a rank-and-file capacity - in so far as they fought on account of the same kind of motivation - because of the assumption of their selves in the service of ideals not first recognised, but endorsed and upheld by them as a matter of personal conviction, were no less authentic than Joan herself. A third example of true and socialpsychologically well-adjusted authenticity is provided by the manner of conduct of Rosa Luxemburg who insisted on serving all her prison sentences (save one), rather than be bailed out as was the privilege of the revolutionary leaders, though of course the criticism

charging her that while she wasted time in prison in the display of true and great personal decorum, the revolution went short of leadership, are perfectly sound and in place, from another point of view. It's not argued here that a person's choice of himself or herself as human reality as opposed to the predominant surrender of his or her self to the purely public function of it, is the correct choice of a person in every situation. It's not suggested, for instance, that Durkheim should have neglected his calling as a uniquely insightful and original *social theoretical* writer, or that he should have contributed to social theory less than he did to make room in his life for serving ideals that are more attractive to a Sartrean; all that is suggested here is that the romantic social theorist's claim that a person will cut some kind of figure as human reality whether he means to or not, is fruitful, meaningful and suggestive.

The above list of paradigms, postulating the possibility for the self to constitute itself (a) as "I"-template or *subject only*, (b) as "me"-template and *object only* and (c) in its full authenticity as a well-matched and optimally realised ensemble of "me" and "I" which defines the potential of the self in the complementary exercise and match between these two internal components of it, does not yet amount to a full typology, for the above treatment was confined to the socially sacred, as it were. All the people referred to in our above examples were players of the game, either not fallen in Durkheimian terms, or fallen (Joan, Rosa) only to be later emancipated by some society or subculture which succeeded as actual social reality, in keeping with those lights which they, through the engagement of the "I" in anticipation of a new society, upheld with their selves before that new society's time, and these people have been adopted by the new social norm when that emerged, as that new society's own Pukka. All the people referred to above - whether authentic in their personal capacity or not so - belong to those who are socially on the map among the Durkheimian unblemished, sacred, according to some already operative or newly established norm or another, they are all consciousnesses in the idiom of the social positivity which is now the case somewhere, and which they meant to be the case. But the human authenticity of a person, in so far

as that is a 'good' in its own terms, was an extra endowment available to these characters (as indeed it is to everybody) on top of being socially Pukka, an endowment which has been the choice of some (J.S. Bach, e.g.), but not of others. (Raymond Burr, e.g., suffering from delusions of mastery of legal expertise without concrete grounding of such through training or real experience to justify it, displaying on this score a *subject-only* unauthenticity - and, as the other side of the coin, Goethe's Wagner, clinging throughout a lifetime to second-hand research by choice, displaying on this score an *object-only* unauthenticity.)

The aesthetic appeal of a person humanly adjusted in the above described sense, strikes home as *social* psychologically 'good', without much further qualification. The normative appeal of the equilibrium inherent in a decorously chosen compass of a self as an authentic human reality, not too much of a self-inflated and self-professed demigod, not someone with humble pie as his sole diet, in a comely balance between the "me" and the "I" on which the romantic student of the self in society insists, is also something few will argue with. Grace or adjustment of personality as such, in Paul's and Sartre's sense and in the sense of quite a common modern understanding of the adjustment of the personality in this context, figures as a standard and has its payoff in the range and the medium of human reality itself, *sui generis*. This reward is coping as a person, quite simply normalcy, managing adequately, in a self-sufficient manner, the husbandry of the self and its private affairs; it's the success and the privilege of matching, on the long term, the business, as a person, of the co-ordination between one's sanely assessed potentials as an "I" in the light of one's own discretion, and the practice of the selection of adequate actual opportunities in society to do justice to those potentials in a graceful "me". It's this discretion (the "I"'s concern), and this range of actual opportunities (the "me"'s concern), which are displaced in relation to one another, which are removed by ascription in the socially blemished, taken into care. The self's right and its propriety of the management of its own autonomy as a self, its self-sufficient caretakership of its own chances for its *social* psychologically adequate and fulfilling conduct as

the criterion of its normalcy and dignity in a small-letter sense, is propounded by much of social psychological thinking to-day, particularly by the Gestalt social psychological school; so we can add here that 'grace' on our Sartre-prompted understanding is a 'good' in a sort of clinical sense, too.

There is, within the 'romantic' strain of approaching adjustment, a long-standing preoccupation with the study of the 'authoritarian personality', which is the type of consciousness that equates the self with the role which selves must perform, whether ascribed as Master or Servant, in the reigning ascriptional system as it is, coupled with a strong normative identification with that system as a matter of personal conviction. (Studies discerning this personality-type, may or may not approach it in the context of its contrast with its alternative: the self-adequacy and autonomy-valuing personality types and frames of intrapersonal reference, with an ideal of Master and Slave all rolled into one in the individual's consciousness and conduct, as it were). In one famous study in this line of research, that by Else Frenkel-Brunswick et al., (24) the 'authoritarian personality' as a mode of consciousness, does not come over as either very reassuring in the big-letter Caretaker, or as very conducive of happiness in his dependants if so ascribed by circumstance. The study shows the authoritarian type (using controls for comparison), as politically very aggressive, lacking in critical insight regarding their selves, as having difficulty in supporting loneliness, as having diminished perception regarding their own selves and those of others, and compensating in the face of any threat to their self-image, with excessive scape-goating or Freudian displacement. Controls, in contrast, were shown as more inventive, as having more varied pastimes, more interesting range of activities, and greater honesty and tolerance towards their own selves and towards those of others. Besides the socially oriented branch of psychology, there are other branches of psychology, notably clinical, developmental, and educational, which afford bodies of study showing that adjustment, a sense of accomplishment as a person, the chances even for a personal as distinct from social excellence in adulthood, correlate with lack of conditioning in a person's early history in terms of such a mentality

which prizes more highly a person's knowing his place, high or low, than the active participation in family situations of the junior and dependent.

To pick up once more the main drift of the argument, there were two paradigms of maladjustment among the above listed examples, one afforded e.g. by Rousseau (not personally graceful but the initiator of good in educational thought, to be incorporated into educational dogma in later times) and the other one afforded by the example in the last Section of the commanding officer in the Bridge on the River Kwai (personally very gallant but historically wrong), which show, in their respective ways, that the phenomenon of adjustment as human reality, or socialpsychologic grace, is not necessarily tied to the good of the public cause upheld by the agent; and the two - social good and socialpsychologic virtue or 'good' - within the context of one person's conduct, are neither proof nor the necessary condition for one another. The socially ascribed Pukka can be without socialpsychologic grace (as shown through the examples of Almaviva and Bertie Woster in Chapter 2. Section 2.), and in so far as they possess excellence in the idiom of human reality, they do so as an extra feature in addition to their social elevation in the world (as illustrated in the persons of the two commanding officers in Renoir's film, analysed in the last Section), and the Pukka must - can only - attain their personal grace, if they have it, through and in terms of the idiom of human reality, just like anybody else.

At the same time, socialpsychological adjustment, grace, is available to the Rachmones, the socially blemished by ascription, to those who neither can nor necessarily would support the morally anomalous existing norm even if they could. (A very Pauline thought.) Out of the three paradigms postulated above, that which consists of the unauthenticity of participating as social subject-template only in the actual social world, identifying with one's socially very sacred and elevated role and with that only in the definition of one's self, is of course unavailable to the socially blemished, but he is fully free to assume himself, giving the full weight of his person as a full-blown and successfully equilibrated ensemble of a "me" and an "I" as such, to the

authentic choice of himself as socially blemished, as that "me" which he in fact truly is as a matter of his ascription in positive social reality, in the mode of his self-acceptance as such a curtailed and blemished "me". Of course, the "I" which he assumes now (no authenticity is complete without that) is no longer anchored in a big-letter Pukka "me" to which alone actual external freedom can be granted as a matter of course; the freedom of his "me" survives only in the socialpsychologic sense as his personal, not always actual possibility; it lives on and continues to operate in an inward, Aristotelean sense in the main. However, in the light of the Rachmones' continued freedom, albeit within such internal, Aristotelean confines only, two genuine possibilities continue to avail themselves to him, as a socialpsychologic matter, for choosing himself in the face of the 'Fallen' condition of his "me"; his authenticity and his unauthenticity as such a 'Fallen' self, as already argued. He can choose himself as ascribed Rachmones in the humanly unauthentic way as *object only*, nodding assent to himself as a blemished "me"-only as ascribed socially a thing, a dependant with no recourse to sacred status in a small-letter sense, let alone a big-letter one - null as someone with social and personal weight, flaunting himself as a curtailed *object-only* self in a spirit of docility, of lifetime apology, thrusting himself underfoot all over the place to the Pukka as doormat, in subservience to them. Alternatively, he can be the social Blemished, the Sinner, the ascribed Servant he is in the personally authentic way that Paul and Sartre (Cicero, Seneca) recommend, by utilising the fully retained, inward, Aristotelean "I" vis-a-vis his realistically accepted diminished external definition of a "me" and of his situation, in the personal transcendence of that "me" and of his entire self in that as the mere social object typecast for him, for which he could see himself if he so chose; the latter, authentic choice of himself yielding him real grace, if not in terms of the social world, in socialpsychologic ones by all means.

Examples of those ascribed Rachmones, Blemished in the Durkheimian sense - of those statistical embarrassments who spoil and dissolve the graphs in which the positivity of society comes to expression, contributing towards the pools of charted anomie in there - those, in a

word, who choose to assume their 'Fallen' "me" in the spirit of authenticity, may be conveniently begun, from the ranks of criminals, with the story of the character Fletcher in the television serial and film Porridge. Fletcher is the sage of his condition in the nick. He looks on quietly while a new inmate throws a fit, panicking at finding himself in prison. Fletcher stands by calmly and helpfully, and administers to the man words of consolation, expressed in the proverbs of experience, such as 'If you can't do the time, don't do the crime.' A kindly, do-gooding visitor comes, and asks him condescendingly what crime it was that got him into prison. 'Got caught', Fletcher replies, obligingly. He is calm, helpful, decent, patient, always on his toes, while the screw in charge of him is tortured by the problems of a bad marriage, the caprices of his bad-tempered superiors, of being constantly short of money, and the other slings and arrows that those who are free in the outside world, have the privilege to be heir to. His gaoler practically never manages to keep his cool, and the rock-solid, unshakable decorum of Fletcher - the end of whose sentence never seems in sight - is not the least of the reasons for his always being in a state. Earlier on (at the beginning of Chapter 2) - we drew a distinction between 'pure' crime - hubris in the face of the 'Sacred', the 'stewards of gods', such as the crime of Antigone who took on Creon and his rigid, inhuman order - we were concerned with the guilt of explicit heresy against society, unadulterated in its make-up, in the name of alternative standards, ideals, which are seen by the socialpsychologically outspoken authentic individual as preferable to the reigning social norm. We drew a line between so-called 'pure' crime in the above sense and, on the other hand, petty crime soiled in its motivation with other content, and undertook then to restrict the argument to consideration of just acts of 'pure' heresy, and not get sidetracked by crime of the soiled type. The crime for which Fletcher got convicted in the first place, obviously belongs to the 'soiled' variety, though what it was is never said. But whatever it was, is incidental from the point of view of the treatment of Fletcher's story now. Whatever the particular crime that got him convicted to begin with, he is now, as the central issue of the story, guilty of a gently understated but incessant, consistent, chronic Aristotelean hubris too

as the normal way of his life, which gnaws away permanently at the bars of the expectations confining him within the limits of his stereotype a criminal, and unflinchingly resists being contained in the metaphoric prison of the constraint dished out to him as a self in the existing social order. The never-ending plot is a string of variations on this theme, it's the story of how this is the case episode after episode; and in this sense, it is the petty criminal Fletcher's 'pure' heresy, dramatic hubris in addition to his almost incidental, original crime of the 'soiled' variety, that affords, in quite a classic dramatic understanding of the notion 'hubris', the portrayal of a social psychologically authentic self engaged vis-a-vis the constraining norm bent on subjugating his spirit, his "I". Through an irreverent borrowing by the writer of Aristotle's dramaturgical devices which are aimed at securing the viewers' sympathies for the main hero in his endeavour of willing out, on account of his greater than 'gestured' personal authenticity, from the 'honeycomb' of society to which he is forcibly committed as a self, Fletcher emerges as a dramatic hero who, paradoxically (in true Aristotelean dramaturgical vein), successfully takes on his 'caretakers' from situation to situation as the function and product of his greater inner freedom and greater human endowment and quality, succeeding, within socialpsychologic confines, in challenging, in the terms of human reality, the conventions of the ascribed hierarchy in a humanly shoddy and imperfect social actuality, by doggedly and successfully (though, to appearances, unassumingly) maintaining private standards more outstanding in human terms than is the norm in the established order and particularly in the personality of its representatives. In a word, it's the central character's quiet, Aristotelean, everyday hubris pitted against the humanly unimpressive and imperfect existing social norm, which really serves, truly to classical traditions, as the centre of the plot, which provides artistic, dramatic and socialtheoretic fuel and comment in it.

In representing the case of the certified mad who may be, just like the criminal Fletcher, embarrassingly and paradoxically adorned with the inward grace of personal authenticity superseding his typecast by the norm, we turn to the example of Šveik. The mad, in an important

sense, from the Durkheimian point of view of being a threat to the social norm as that is in actuality, are also heretics, on the same account as are the sane heretics of the criminal variety (particularly the politically criminal variety) on account of actively drawing on social 'surrealism' in their conduct in disobedient reference to the established norm in and as society, bringing their insights as human realities *ex nihilo*, so to speak, to bear on that society - on account of entertaining and practising, in reality, the enactment, the cultivation of systems, structures of possibilities, which are alternative to the normative order as it is in fact given in the positive being of society, but which personal structures in seeing the world, cause that to appear as divorced, dislodged in relation to the human standards applied to that in the mode of the carefree suspending and questioning of any content of consciousness, including external, positive society, in Cartesian profundity. At least Šveik's variety of madness is of this type. The certificate is nothing that Šveik can do anything about - it's the badge of his "me" which the official classification of his personality in the world now equals, it's what ✓Šveik has been ascribed as, which he, in a word, is, as far as society is concerned. He assumes this outward definition of his "me", the public aspect of his self, without quibbling, without quarrel, and makes of his authentic being as human reality what he can in view of and with regard to that "me". He plays the part of the certified lunatic (as Fletcher played his part as a criminal) unassumingly, without a word of complaint, and makes this badge publicly signifying his "me" to be of benefit to him in terms of human reality. It is on purpose that he exploits the advantages of his certificate of lunacy to bring him freedom from the wearisome responsibilities and constraints of conduct that apply to the Normal and Respected, thereby achieving for himself a life of remarkable fulfilment, with constant opportunities to score points over his superiors as a person. It may of course be (Hásek, the author never lets on which of these alternatives is the case) that it is the natural side-effect of the abandon of the simplicity of the feeble-minded that yields ✓Šveik great contentment in sailing through life, while his fellow-men, particularly his superiors, are condemned to muddling along through the obstacle-course of the complications of a

socially responsible way of life which causes them to be in a constant state of desperation. Whichever of these two possible readings of Hašek's novel is the correct one, it remains the case that the certified lunatic Šveik seems to systematically cream off for himself the satisfactions of an ego in life in the course of his service as batman to his officer Lukaš, leaving nothing but headache for his superiors in his trail. In one typical episode, Lukaš lines up a rendezvous with a high-class lady acquaintance and a champagne dinner to help with the entertainment, but is unavoidably called away before the event. 'My God', Lukaš exclaims to Šveik, 'what is there to do? Look after her, will you, and do everything you can to satisfy her every little whim.' And Šveik does so, carrying out the order to a 't', in an act of seemingly complete and unquestioning subordination to the letter of the command of his superior officer, which apparent attitude on his part is not quite paralleled by a meant servility towards that sacred set of orders and the spirit of the ascribed norm pertaining to the relationship between a private and his superior.

Such examples as afford a contrast to authenticity as a self in a position of Rachmones as a matter of ascribed position - as illustrated above - showing paradigms of unauthenticity in response to the command 'gesturing' the Rachmones to be a devoted and obedient *object-only* in relation to the Pukka, may be introduced, first of all, by the well-known story and the character of the black servant Uncle Tom, who is yearning his soul away in subordinate love towards the children of the white Master and their heartrendingly model parents, from his pitiful cabin, bridging in an irrationally generous gift of himself, the gap (as far as he subjectively is concerned at least) which in terms of rigid and hard factual social reality separates, by the force of the coercive outside norm ascribed and maintained by the white Master, black from white, rich from poor, as a matter of hard-and-fast social fact. Uncle Tom's attitude strongly contrasts, in this respect, with the greater personal reserve which the socially unelevated privates displayed towards their commanding officers in Renoir's film reviewed in the previous Section - in an attitude which rather became the privates portrayed in the film in comparison with Uncle Tom's servile choice of

himself in the face of the humanly anomalous world of a rigid class society. Such political implications are, of course, not a necessary concomitant of the paradigm of consciousness we are considering now: that of the committed determination of a self to suck up, as a systematic socialpsychologic and interpersonal attitude, to one representative or the corporate body of the ascriptionally higher-ranking Pukka in the established terms of the world. Creeping in school, for instance, is a common example of such a servile choice of somebody's self in a context which is not political.

These acts of anthropologically upward creeping by the 'lowly ascribed (as just elaborated), are the complementary opposite to the Pukka's acts of anthropological slumming. The two acts are of the same genus: heresies, not in the idiom of society's norm (which is complemented by such acts) but according to the standards and in terms of the dicta of authentic human reality. Both these acts, anthropologically upward sliming by the ascribed Rachmones and downward sliming by the ascribed Pukka, are illicit gatecrashings, according to the moral code of human reality, into the human hearts of those who are differentially ascribed than the individual in point who is unauthentically giving himself in such a way to a socially differently ascribed agency as a person, in the sentimental, emotive idiom of the currently operative ideology; and such acts, whilst effectively perpetrating the established order, do not serve and are uncongenial to such gatecrashers as people, as selves, as authentic human realities. These acts and the interpersonal phenomenon they afford, are to be distinguished from the phenomenon of coolly calculating upward social mobility, whose underlying motivation and psychological spring is not primarily emotive. Socially upward mobility of the clear-headed kind, may be seen as a heresy from the point of view of established society and its conventional norm, but it is not the same thing as the heresy in the face of the dicta of human reality of Uncle Tom's sentimental kind, which does not offend the social norm, but is complementary to its upkeep, and which is offensive in terms of the moral code of the self. It is well to keep in mind that the heresy (by human measures) of an Uncle Tom-type upward anthropologic creeping, is distinguishable from

the heresy (from society's point of view) of the upstart, the *parvenu* with tangible social advantage as the gain of this project exclusively in mind, such as Becky Sharp's in Thackeray's Vanity Fair, whose personality as human reality isn't really socialpsychologically ungraceful at all. Upward crossings of the ascribed borders in acts of anthropological (as distinct from social) creeping upwards, don't bring the crawler tangible social advantage by themselves, Uncle Tom's attitude to his Master as human reality doesn't really improve poor Uncle Tom's lot in the actual terms of his society and its structural makings, and creeping at school doesn't make the creep member of the staff or bring him better GCSE results, though of course there are school situations in which the pupil's progress is judged and determined on a basis other than objective tests, in which instances personal acts of sliming up the trouserlegs of those in authority do tend to get reinforced in tangibly advantageous ways, these situations and this type of conduct breeding, by virtue of the usual linkage between hard results and upward social amenability of attitude in its wake, the authoritarian rather than the liberal and liberated personality from an early age. But acts of anthropological, emotive reaching over social borders in a personally meant spirit, the act of the gift of the Rachmones's very self to someone or many across the social chasm as a question of human attitude, are distinguishable from the acts of the self involved in upward social mobility explicitly and predominantly with that project as one's aim, irrespective whether that project will succeed or fail. The anthropologic as opposed to social crossings are heresies not to society but to human reality, and it's in terms of human reality and not of instrumentally tangible gains, that anthropologic heresy yields its results, it's in terms of the moral attitudes in keeping with the established ideology that it necessarily takes place. Its yield is within human consciousnesses, it's the concretion of selves into an ideology, it consists in the gift of the very selves of the social underdog to the ascribed Pukka, conceived as though this gift were in keeping with and in the service of moral value, whereas it contributes not to value, which is always conducive of, meaningful and measured in terms of personal authenticity, but it goes towards reinforcing and serving the Sartrian gue,^{or 'viscous' as Mary Warnock prefers to call it,} identified by Sartre as antivalue from the

point of view of the dictates, demands and the ideal of the dignified, graceful selves of all.

I think the Pauline notion of 'children of God' could be brought in here to benefit, and the process just described illuminated as the betrayal of that. 'Children of God' or a 'child of God' is a name for the agent which may be seen as the hybrid social psychological self when adjusted or 'graceful' in Sartre's sense, but anthropologically writ, writ in phylogenetic dimensions. 'God' to which the agent is linked, tied in the notion for which the Pauline label stands, corresponds to the "I" within the self in which lies the agent's necessity as a person rather than, say, an eel, his future, his possibility as a person, his creativeness, responsibility, will, capacity for what Mead calls 'hypothesis-formation', and a say in the order of things and of course his own affairs in the first person singular, speaking for himself, as well as his capacity for choice. 'Child' in the expression stands for dependant, for profane or sinner, that is to say man as object, a "me" as well as an "I", laden with concrete and actual content both as physiologic and social body, the practical instrument and occasion to realise the possibility of selves, of any self to whom this "me" is made an instrument, one's own included. Universal love reaching across ascribed, man-made borders in the Pauline sense (and every person other than one's self is a border, an Other, somewhat different regarding the social contingencies attaching to his personality - amounting to that other person as he is in fact), differs from the above described process of a socially ascribed Pukka person penetrating the consciousness of the ascribed Rachmones in his capacity as a 'warm, loving caretaker', as a self assuming for the Rachmones his "I" or spirit only as an act of gift of himself from above with an intonation of affect and personalness, and in the converse and complementary act of the ascribed Rachmones compliantly penetrating the consciousness of the ascribed Pukka, making himself a gift of merely object for him in the idiom of meant personalness. The difference between the two processes, universal love in Paul's sense and this complementary upward and downward slinging as emotive object and subject template-selves respectively between the ascribed Pukka and the ascribed Rachmones, is that in the Pauline

process both "me" and "I" are engaged in each person in a homogenised ensemble, while in the other process, the socialpsychologically unauthentic, emotively complementary act of the gift of the ascribed Pukka and ascribed Rachmones of their selves in their capacities as their respective social roles to one another, the "me" of the Pukka and the "I" of the Rachmones are rendered out of commission, and functionally so, from a social point of view, as analysed in Chapters 2. and 3. The latter mentioned process is that of public charity, as well as that of social work when pursued in the modality of personal unauthenticity on the social practitioner's part, while the contrasting process is that of love between people in the Pauline sense, usually not at all in a self-indulgent way, but in an unselfconscious one at its most typical and authentic, which is not at all incompatible as a motivation with a professionalism in social work. This latter-type authentic love in the Pauline sense is certainly within experience and is people's real possibility. This kind of universal love in Paul's sense, authentically advanced to all others conceived in one's own image, on principle, at the outset of any human encounter, is distinct, both regarding its socialpsychologic infrastructural make-up and in experience from the ascribed type of emotive established class-promotion process up and down the social ladder, as a condition of the Pukka's evident and publicly paraded 'goodness', fed by his unquestioned self-love and by his condescension from such a socialpsychologic position to the Rachmones, as well as of the Rachmones' supper, for which he must, under 'normal' circumstances, sing in the self-depreciating tones socially expected of him, as a typecast *object only*. The two kinds of processes, interpersonal traffic in the idiom of universal love and, in contrast, complementary upward and downward sliming across social borders between the subservients and the rulers, are not congenial to one another in experience, but work there to each others' exclusion. I am sure Tolstoy, the hugely wealthy landed gentleman, was capable as an artist and a human being of love to his fellow-men in the universal Pauline sense, but as he came to engage more and more fully and unsparingly all that he was as an artist and a human being in the practice of that, he became more and more self-conscious of and hindered in this project of his by all he had as a land-owner, and he had to

reconcile these two matters for his consciousness, informing him, in clashing terms, of the socially lowly state of the serfs in his overlordship (conceived of by him, as were all of his fellow-men, as his anthropologic equals), and his own ideals regarding authentic interpersonal attitudes, by eventually surrendering his estate. As already mentioned at the end of Chapter 3., Mead interestingly considers 'sympathy' from those up high in a charitable set-up, in a chapter of Mind, Self and Society devoted to that notion. Sympathy in such a context, he implies, is, because of the individual person-dependency of its generation, an inadequate basis for social work; and Sartre's view expressed in his work Literary and Philosophical Essays (already referred to in the context of our analysis of Renoir's classic film in the previous Section), which considers that generosity in the personally meant sense from the socially high up, must fail them as selves in the endeavour of entering into a personal union, on humanly compatible and authentically brotherly terms, with those who are socially down, (through a lack, in no small part, of a shared background with the socially low in the repertoire of personal experience in consciousness), also comes into its own in our present train of thought (25).

The notion of 'children of God' is an aspect of the self. Like the self to the Gestalt psychologists (who influenced Sartre explicitly and Mead implicitly) - 'children of God' is a holistic concept. It's an ensemble of "me" and "I" as lived and managed, as co-ordinated in the unit of the self. There are differences between every concrete "me" and every concrete "I", so the actual degree and concrete content of personal excellence will be different in each person; and it's extremely arrogant to meaningfully manipulate, cause a levelling in the content, and particularly in the degree of excellence in another self, in the name of a sham egalitarianism often rooted in jealousy. We already cited, earlier on in this thesis, an example of this false egalitarianism, when we referred to the film entitled The Nun's Story. In an episode in this film, an academically brilliant young nun is commanded by a superior in her order to deliberately fail an examination, as an exercise in humility in the spirit of the love of God. The warpedness in human terms

of this command serves to emphasise the correct anthropologic understanding of the equality of all children of God as selves, irrespective of individual differences regarding the depth and content of their endowedness as concrete consciousnesses, as propounded here. It's important to see that the need for everyone's generosity in accepting our fellow-children of God as humanly our equals, for which Paul compels us, definitely includes the act of our entertaining and acceptance in such a capacity of those who are naturally better endowed as selves than we are, alongside with our coping with the easier case of accepting those as our human equals who are naturally less well endowed as selves than ourselves. Even though everyone is different regarding his or her particular mixture of "me" and "I", his or her singular constellation of facticity and spiritual endowment in the self, his or her ratio of social dependency and caretaking, guardian function, each child of God as organised into the unit of the self is an absolute human reality and in this respect equal. The sham egalitarianism produced by the levelling of outstanding individual excellence is to be distinguished from a true egalitarianism (for which it often parades), from a humanly as well as socially authentic egalitarianism in other words, which is realistically tolerant of individual socialpsychologic diversity, which is not incompatible, but goes hand-in-hand with and informs an egalitarianism and impartiality in the sight of the law at its ideally perfect, with this feature of it coupled, by the dicta of the collective consciousness at its ideal and universal for all, with the extension to all of equal opportunities in the outside world for the realisation of any talent they may have, as the equal due of each person as an absolute human being, as an equal unit of human reality, as a self grasped in a socialpsychologically holistic way, in the light of which each self, each 'child of God', is worth one hundred per cent as such.

The humanly reduced, reciprocally functional emotional process between Rachmones and Pukka of complementary upward compliance and downward condescension as just described, is not confined as regards its workings and structures, to the interpersonal makings of public charity, but many of its features characteristically apply to the processes of unauthentic love in more everyday walks of life, in education, in the

family or even just between lovers, as discerned by Sartre in Part III of Being and Nothingness, in so far as the idiom of the selves of the participants is conceived of in terms of senior person and dependant, as up and down, respectively, in the way of human status, in relation to one another. However, special stress is in this thesis on that level, on those anthropologically embracing dimensions of the process of the unauthentic, socialpsychologic complementation of the ascribed Pukka's self by the ascribed Rachmones in terms of the Pukka's *subject-only* stereotype, and conversely, by the ascribed Pukka of the ascribed Rachmones in terms of the Rachmones' *object only* stereotype, at which the phenomenon of public charity takes place (as enlarged on throughout chapters 2. and 3.).

The need is stressed here again to see that this emotively shot exchange between the dominant and servile social types as this is 'gestured', demanded by and goes to feed the conventions of society at its established, in compliance with these opposite-type roles as cast for the Pukka and the Rachmones respectively, is not at all identical with, not informative or descriptive of the level of the being of society itself which is served, propped up and complemented by these normatively enforced roles, which subsists independently of the socialpsychologic process just described, and which appears as outside of that process in individual consciousnesses too, as the Durkheim-identified positive social reality. The *status quo*-compliant, socialpsychologically operative upward and downward sliming process as complementarily performed by the Pukka and the Rachmones, is not at all the same thing as the *social* processes themselves that obtain in peculiarly social terms and actuality between these parties, and which are predominantly socio-economic in their make-up. To fall into the error of conflating the two, the socialpsychologic inter-class sliming and the processes, structures and institutions of society *sui generis*, would lead to the naive swallowing of the myth and illusion, which escapist aberrations of the creative arts mean to perpetrate, that, for instance, the amorous pranks of the gentry, of the well-heeled *beaux* and of romantic Hussars, as well as their women-folk in 'classic' Viennese and Hungarian operettas, provide some indication of, and indeed mirror

and characterise, the actual historic and sociologic order of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its anomalous forces as a matter of sociologic fact, which these fictional representatives of that present to us as harmless and charming, or, to draw on a more modern-day form of escapist mythology depicting 'society', it would lull us into the false reassurance that there is nothing for us to concern ourselves about in the state of industries and the world of the stockmarket over and above the escapades of J. R., Sue Ellen and other characters in 'Dallas' and 'Dynasty' who represent, in the imagination of the socialscientifically soporific viewer, the industrial society of which these characters of fiction are the pillars and mouthpieces, at the highest level of its success. The process and maintainance of what to Sartre is antivalue (constituted, in an important part, by the transposition of both authentic human and honestly approached sociological standards and realities, into the actual practice or literary representations of schmaltzy emotional familiarities between the rich - or worse still: between the rich and the poor, or rather between social clichés of these two types), is not at all the same thing as the social classes themselves, it will not yield the latter, one stratum in question or the other (the social and its socialpsychologic twin-layer of reality) will not reduce to, melt into the other, the unauthentic human process will not melt into society itself, nor will society unfold its true nature and processes through a humanly sentimentalised grasp and representation of that. If the distinction between these two strata of realities, the social and the socialpsychologic, is not seen, and the meaningful, though different actuality of these two differing media of consciousness is not appreciated both as realities in their own rights and in the mutually indissmissible autonomy and independence of both vis-a-vis each other, the consideration of the sovereign concurrence of each will slide into the philosophic idealism of Hegel and later Lukács, students of the relationship between human classes in terms of *en masse* socialpsychologic mastery and servitude, both of whom, as thinkers, credited the socialpsychologic, human workings underlying society in the idiom of the self (albeit at a universalistic scale), as being, in the final analysis, definitive of society itself. Alternatively, a lack of

appreciation of the legitimate, not to say necessary place in appropriate situations of both these strata of reality which consciousness dually occupies: that of society and that of human or 'lived' reality, may lead to the sociologic arrogance, intellectual *élitism* and socialpsychologic naiveté of Althusser who, while giving room in his dualistic system to the being of human reality as a phenomenon in its own right as such, always features the being of human reality as false, and writes as though socially scientific thinking were obtainable by all, or sustainable in the way of life of any one individual all the time.

Conclusion.

The unique contribution of a romantic view in our sense to socialtheoretic thought is to bring to bear on all human situations, including properly social phenomena, appropriately or inappropriately, a microscopic, pettily, socialpsychologically conceived grasp of them, unavailable to a positivistic approach to the study of society and even of social psychology of a vulgarian, schematic, crudely empiricist sort: its usual way of presentation in the social sciences of our day. It may be said generally that romantic social thought serves the sometimes debatedly advantageous function of drawing attention relentlessly to the micro-anthropological prism which is potentially available for looking through in every situation that involves people, including such situations in which such a view is as distracting, inappropriate, distorting of the characteristically social genre of that as it is to take a photograph of the family solemnly posing for posterity, with the use of X-ray equipment. The romantic, humanly analytic method can 'disconstitute' (deconstruct) properly social situations for what those are as such, as has been shown in our earlier examples, say, of Šveik issuing the command 'Attention!' to the officers perched on the latrine when a superior of theirs was passing by, or the humorising small criminal up in court who called out 'Beam me up, Scottie' when he was invited by the judge to say a final word in his defence before his passing judgement.

There is value in looking at socially sacred situations through such a micro-anthropologic prism, even when the insights gained through such an unduly discerning and socialpsychologic detail-oriented vantage point shows the social slice of life thus approached as just as startling and absurd by its own dicta as the group of skeletons shown up in the portrait of the family posing in their Sunday best, when the film used to immortalise them is focussed in through an X-ray apparatus. The viewing gained through the prism of micro-anthropology is true and aptly revealing from the individual's profane point of view at least, and sometimes the bizarre insights yielded from the micro-anthropologic vantage-point afford relevant information regarding a sociologic

overview of the situation too, particularly when that is anomalous in its own terms from the point of view of the critical dicta of human reality which is brought to bear on it, and therefore deconstruction is called for and criticism is in place to prevent further anomalies in subsequent social construction along humanly intolerable lines, which in its excesses is ultimately and indirectly threatening to society too. One of the most fruitful aspects of the romantic practice of applying such unusual, cross-categoric standards to phenomena that are at least partly social, is in the context of the notion of adjustment which, in the book of the romantic, indismissably includes the good integration of the "me" and the "I" within the 'graceful' self, not only in its relation to the world, but also in terms of the self's own socialpsychologic, infrastructural dicta. Therefore, to the mind of the romantic, any maladjustment between the aspiring 'graceful' or socialpsychologically adjusted self and its jarring or constraining situation in the world preventing him from maintaining such an accomplished and fulfilled self, is just as plausibly, naturally and readily overcome by 'alloplastic' ways (by manipulating the world to suit everybody's right to be such a fulfilled and socialpsychologically balanced self as both a fully cultivated "me" and a fully cultivated "I"), as does the social positivism-advocated, alternative, 'autoplastic' tactics for achieving adjustment both within the infrastructure and in terms of the outward, worldly situation of the self, in other words, the tactics of conveniently degrading, 'flattening', two-dimensionally simplifying, and socially schematising the individual's self by bending the dicta of the "I" within that (in extreme cases surrendering those altogether), so as to present a socialpsychologically uncomplicated, indiscriminating and socially unproblematic individual consciousness in the service and complementation of the humanly anomalous and insensitive social norm, in instances where the normative ideals and conditions of society's own adjustment clash with the conditions of the adjustment of its individual citizens as persons, as particular individuals, as socialpsychologically active ensembles of "me"-s and "I"-s. (It should be intercepted here that 'autoplastic' or "I"-corrective measures towards adjustment are in place according to romantic socialpsychologic practitioners too in

certain instances, such as those cases in which the "I" operates socialpsychologically dysfunctionally, reality-irrelevantly, by clinical standards, which threaten or affect the intra-individual grace of the self. However, the romantic, unlike the positivist or empiricistic social scientist, will not advocate 'autoplastic' adjustment in instances where the root cause of a self's maladjustment in relation to the world is not in the dysfunctionality of the self as such, but in the dysfunctionality of society and its norms as a public attitude in relation to the properly and justifiably fulfilled self or selves.)

In contrast with the socialtheoretic positivist, to whom the "I" is a redundant and fictitious finery in the idea of the adjustment of any self, the romantic always judges the individual's conduct and mode of consciousness as more than the stereotypic promptings of its sociologically most convenient typecast in its merely socially intuited situation. His notion of the socialpsychologically animated and illuminated personal "me", is ever 'salient', socialpsychologically three-dimensional with the needs and dictates of the "I", to which an ever-personal and individually concrete "me" is a unique platform, of which it is the peculiar index, and which as a socialpsychologic reality is necessary, the romantic will claim; no man, be he a judge or the least conspicuously cast participant in the situation, is justified in having recourse to a "me" which is reduced to a mere social template solely defined by its social roles; no man may be excused from being a personally owned-up-to, practical, individual "me" in the socialpsychologically concrete and significant idiom. He who doesn't care to assume a practical "me" high up in office and parades as an "I"-only as type-cast for him, will nevertheless cut a figure as human reality, a human reality which is deficient, one that the romantic worries about as an unauthentic socialpsychologic phenomenon, just as he worries about the display of a sheer "me" in the ordinary, equally personally unauthentic citizen who doesn't care to assume the "I" which also belongs to every person by necessity, on the romantic's account. The person who tries to be social *object only* as humbly cast for him or *subject only* as prestigiously cast for him, is just as obscene, awry, out of balance, lopsidedly developed, unauthentically specialised a

phenomenon as human reality to the Sartrean, as is the consciousness of the masochistic lover divested of his spiritual as well as physiological grace in the sexual act, or the Other who sadistically tries to assume mastery over the masochist presenting himself to him as *object only*. The romantic commands every agent in all situations: 'be exactly human, quite human, and no more than human'; bringing home and making quite as burdensome a present of the "me" to the caretakers as he makes of the "I" to the ordinary citizen, by ramming home the personal responsibilities and the duties both of the former, the ascribed caretaker in the light of the "me" of which he is shy, and in the ascribed profane in the light of the "I", in the use of which he may be, and often is, unschooled.

The romantic's complexly grasped, microcosmically and macrocosmically inclusive view of adjustment, with its paradigms of ego-fulfilled and fulfilling grace on the one hand, and the opposite socialpsychologic obscenities of an "I"-deficiency in the would-be human doormat and the "me"-deficiency in the would-be Master in all interpersonal contexts (social ones included) on the other, yield a rich and more adequate definition of adjustment than a positivistic or empiricistic one, as well as a varied and informative typology of maladjustments, which have been given an airing in some detail in the last two Sections of this thesis.

In understanding the relationship between the profane and their caretakers, the question of deciding who is sacred and who profane may be seen as a battle of definitions, depending on whether these two opposing categories are seen in the small-letter or the big-letter sense - because the dignified human qualities and conditions which make for sacredness and amount to master-status, so to speak, on the one hand, and the ego-afforded, perpetrated and mediated human contamination of consciousness which makes for profane status on the other, are considered by conflicting criteria in the two competing traditions of social thought, the positivistic one concerned with the big-letter aspect of these two human categories in their relationship, and the romantic which is concerned with the small-letter aspect of those human

categories. Profane and sacred status are both attained and defined by ascription according to the positivist tradition, and both are maintained by abidance by the ascribed norm differentially existing for the ascribed sacred and the ascribed profane, '1' the ensuing two levels of the norm as established, serving to keep ascribed Sacred and ascribed Profane apart on the long term. The romantics threaten this positivistic definition and effective classification of sacred and profane (a) by advocating alternative criteria for excellence as a definition of human worth and qualification for master-status; they propose constantly earned rather than permanently and rigidly ascribed excellence as human reality as a measure of one's entitlement to one's rights; and (b) by serving as a practical ideology for those profane by virtue of ascription who are willing and able to emancipate themselves by way of a dynamic, alternative, small-letter grasp of their situation, which they insist ensures for them the possibility of yet earning an excellence and sacred status according to their own definition and criteria of that, in the course of their future, as is so evocatively propounded by Kierkegaard. '2'

Through being able to posit, in a coherent system of thought, socially and socialpsychologically relevant norms in terms of earned worth, romantic sociology, or social thought, forges ahead and furthers both itself and the socialpsychologic, human reality which it comprises, defines and advocates. The ensuing attitude of consciousness and project of being is effective in restoring freedom, certainly as a socialpsychologic and maybe also as a successfully and usefully innovative social matter, to those who are able and individually adequate enough to restore that for themselves, even in a society which is characteristically intolerant towards and suspicious of the odd, the unafraid, and those who are unwilling to curb any outstanding gift they may have so as to fall in with a morality of uncritical and personally unearned virtuousness informed by an effortless mediocrity, by the dicta of a normative ideal which affords a sense of excellence solely but surely to those who want to shine through keeping to the well-trodden paths of ascribed value rather than to be shown as conceivably less excellent than those who may be more lowly ascribed, in the individual

competition of everyone vis-a-vis everyone, defending themselves and their elevated position in the world against a morality of personally earned worth, by sticking to a morality of convention by virtue of which once ascribed high one will always remain high, regardless of personal aptitude to justify one's prestigious office and placement in the world.

Starting, in our job of contrasting the two clashing and competing frames of reference for individual excellence (personally and authentically earned as opposed to ascribed), we may conveniently start with the humanly authentic one. In understanding it, the showbusiness truism 'you are as good as your last show' may be helpfully called upon, as the saying succinctly expresses a system and criterion of measuring human worth (one which has a great deal in common with that of Kierkegaard's, just quoted), as the acid test of this first of the two kinds of contrasting moralities we are concerned with: that which consists in and is maintained through the dicta and observance of the standards of first-hand, never-stale and never-static human reality. An abidance by this kind of standards - those of human reality pure and simple without regard to any other consideration - presents a tall order for those aspiring to the ensuing, ever-authentic human status and dignity, compelling everyone to constantly earn his or her worth. In contrast, the moral inherent in the sanctity of ascription gains and maintains its inert strength both on account of the socialpsychologic and its functionality for society and for its caretakers who are appointed in keeping with the dicta of ascribed moral convention. From a socialpsychologic point of view, it's understandable that no-one highly ascribed would want to change his prestigious niche and sacred status even of a moderately high degree which he already has and is able to maintain by virtue of ascription and through merely observing the self-perpetuating dictates of that, for the hard life of constantly having to earn one's worth. From a sociologic point of view, it's equally clear that by constantly earning and unearning one's worth as a condition of one's place under the sun of recognised merit, society would become very unstable and disequibrated. A romantic ethics and style of conduct underlain by such ethics, are a threat to society which exists in the positivistically approached and constituted norm and in the subservience

of the individual to the ascribed value of that. It may be said that a romantic and a positivistic moral ideology are in a special, dialectic relationship to one another as each other's opposites, one unmaking the very being of the other whilst maintaining itself. The romantic frame of reference in respect to value, as we have seen from the above train of thought, makes itself and unmakes society, as a condition of its being, elbowroom (or prevalence) and operation.

From the point of view, not of society's already existing states of affairs, but of human reality both in the individual and in society dynamically viewed as a process, the feature of the romantic socialtheoretic tradition that it insists on the "I" as a necessary part of every self in all situations, offers very real value. It carries the moral assertion that nobody deserves to be treated as less than human, and shows the inhumanity, by profane standards, of that ascribed norm and those ascription-abiding individuals, who render a great class of humans so, just for being blemished in ways they cannot renounce. It also shows the oppressiveness and the sham nature of a morality of ascribed virtue as the ideal of individual conduct - the sense of the exemplariness of the complete adoption of the social norm undiluted by concrete personal standards, as it was satirically presented in the story of *Lieutenant Kijé*. The Kijé-fable emphasises both the general scale and the absurdity of the predictable triumph in society of a humanly completely passive conduct. Through never erring - because never trying or doing anything (the story implies), through politely not existing at all in the ordinary sense of being alive, one never accumulates blemishes, never offends from society's and the generalized other's sometimes questionably decorous moral point of view; this is how an 'ideal' *curriculum vitae* is produced in keeping with the dicta of the ascribed norm. Romantic social thought shows this frame of reference - that of socially never offending through always being totally passive - as an unadmirable method of rising to high ranks, of achieving excellence, of attaining Generalship as it were, of earning one's seat among the sacred.

However, whilst full of insight in granting the halo to the blemished, there are great shortcomings in modern romantic sociology. One such consists in its typical feature (and romantic, early Marxism, and even later Marxism is included here) that it doesn't, characteristically, grant any such 'halo' as human reality to the conceivably humanly deserving ascribed sacred as his personal possibility, and is in this sense non-egalitarian. The romantic, furthermore, 'disconstitutes' too indiscriminately. In rightly drawing attention to the anomalousness by absolute measures of a low ascribed status often suffered in our contemporary cultures by the project and course of the cultivation of real human excellence as an ideal in itself, romantic social thought critically highlights the popularity and the unduly easy reinforcement-attachment in the world to the type of maladjustment or obsecenity which consists in the Pukka's total identification with his highly ascribed social image as an empty windbag, which thereby becomes, in actual practice, a common substitute for real, authentic personal excellence, and which is the Pukka's or caretaker's preferred and characteristic avenue to maintaining his superiority as Master, without any substantive beef (by the measures of human reality) of a truly excellent individual self underpropping the ascribed Pukka's readily granted sacred status in the world. But the romantics too often fail to see and to credit, as already observed, the occasional exceptions to this rule in the Pukka, moreover, they characteristically tend to fail to see (and here they part company with the followers of Marx) that the loyalty of the ascribed Pukka to society in the name of which he typically conducts himself in the mode of the socialpsychologic gracelessness and maladjustment of opting to be an "I"-template only vis-a-vis the ordinary profane, is not a loyalty to nothing at all. Romantic social theorists and practitioners are characteristically blind to the positive being of society which is being effectively served even by personally repugnantly unauthentic representatives of it, and in being critical of the human-reality-wise unauthentic and morally unbecoming Pukka who often, even typically, subserves society in the modality of a socialpsychologically offensive personal unauthenticity, the romantic often throws out, disconstitutes, deconstructs the baby (society itself) in his act of throwing out the

socialpsychologically dirty bathwater of the humanly objectionable attitude of the personally unauthentic sham 'Masters' of society (who in reality are very often the spineless servants of that at the same stroke, as the romantic is ready to see.) In meaning to socialpsychologically 'disconstitute' the personal pompousness (typically coupled with personal spinelessness by authentic human measures) of the Pukka, in social situations, they also 'deconstruct' society itself, often inadvertently and in an unduly anarchistic and blanket way. Aiming the X-ray equipment of their critique at the 'icon' depicting the sacred scene to show up the pathetic individual sketchiness and inadequate accomplishment by particularistic measures of the little stick-men, anatomically poorly drawn, who hide their human insignificance 'in the picture' under the regalia of their officialdom, the romantics often destroy the icon itself, which may conceivably be worth having. They criticise power, but if they were to attain it, they wouldn't be able to institutionally consolidate it - they often don't understand the need. In viewing the phenomenon of socialpsychologic 'construction' or 'constitution', they are valuably preoccupied with the rationalistic element in that - in other words, with the Pygmalionic power of the Other to define our own selves, by way of our learning to know our own externally positive "me" through the Other mirroring, reflecting, projecting that back to our self more correctly than our self would be able to achieve by its own effort, informed by its own narcissistic, solipsistic frame of reference alone. But the intellectual toll which this recognition and preoccupation of the romantics (particularly existentialists) take, is their notoriously insufficient understanding of the decisive extent to which one's being as a socially and socialpsychologically positive personal "me" is determined in a shorthand, routine and directly available manner by way of and with reference to the network of the self's roles and the set of social facticity within which every self is situated, without constant recourse to such a particularistic, concretely Other-prompted and created Pygmalionic feedback regarding one's 'real self' or publicly verifiable personality all the time. In freeing man from the constraints of the ordered and limited imagination of ascribed norm-abidance as one's moral horizon, in emancipating that which prior to twentieth-century

socialtheoretic romanticism has been regarded as heresy in social thought, by resuscitating the exercise of the nihilation in Cartesian depths of established society and its artistic and scientific institutionally monolithic superstructures, modern social romanticism, particularly existentialism, has launched into being and administered a fantastically revitalising vitamin-injection to twentieth-century art, revolutionalising that by virtue of the ensuing new, disconstitutive vision of what has previously been accepted as sacredly and immutably social in its idiom and purpose, by introducing the surreal and a variety of 'isms' to replace in art the representations of the literally and palpably real in that in other ways too, thereby raising our contemporary art to the heights of a new renaissance. However, in giving birth to the surreal and to the other refreshing alternatives to the slavishly representative idiom of a foregone artistic and intellectual conventions, the ideology of society-irreverent romantic thought was in some instances destructive to the positively real in both theoretically and practically detrimental ways, for instance in underestimating, in the context of social science, the primary and elemental reality of the collective consciousness and its actual powers as sacred on its own terms. In challenging sacredness through ascription as the ideal criterion of a man's deserts in the world, in attacking ascription, with partial justification, as a suitable ideal in assigning sacred and profane status, the romantic social theoreticians and practitioners in this century typically paid insufficient attention - in fact, overlooked - the power and adequacy of ascriptive standards and methods of sustaining the Sacred-Profane division and hierarchy in actual society.

What romantics typically don't care to see and which they are weak at appreciating is that society quite simply is - *sui generis*, as Durkheim would say. If one deconstructs it too much, withdraws identification with it as a matter of personal commitment, if profound heresies of it are not contained, it will nevertheless go on existing as a whole, as society, but a very unfulfilled one, with a great lack, substantial Durkheimian anomie in its very being, analogously with an individual's life grasped as a whole, in which a man's potentials, fulfilled or unfulfilled, are taken account of, are weighed and found

either good enough as such, or alternatively found wanting on account of its not having become what it 'had to be': its own potential to be what it is. Society, a being fundamentally different from and mutually exclusive with the 'my world' of human reality, also must be what it is: its own positive being, just as the reality of 'my world' is one that 'has to be' what it is: human reality, in its irreconcilably different idiom from that of society. No matter how useful, from the point of view of the individual or of a particular social issue, the application of 'deconstruction' may be, the social consequences of such an act do not, and cannot extend to the doing away with the Durkheimian category 'society' in the actuality of nature, nor of those values and norms in which any given society (whether nascent or established) in fact subsists, and according to which sacred and profane status is defined and assigned, in whatever novel a given and positively social way, in a manner to which individual, norm-deviant definitions of moral worth are uncongenial and threatening. In terms of society's own positive order of reality, a person who has been ascribed his humanly qualitative status as either sacred or profane, has been qualified and really 'constituted' in that capacity in terms of the external positive reality of society in a socially factual, hard-and-fast sense, just by virtue of that circumstance alone - the circumstance that such-and-such a status has been ascribed to him. The criminal, or other *Rachmones* so relegated by ascription, becomes Profane by definition when identified and declared so through and by virtue of prevailing public standards - as a matter of the law, of the solemn and formal judgement in which the very being of society in fact consists, in its capacity as the Sacred. 'A criminal is he who has been punished', Durkheim laconically observes in a statement which, however brief and however simple the point it makes, is a statement worth making as in defining criminality, this claim is stated in a way which excludes any alternative moral frame of reference in defining it - particularly the competing romantic one (as just described) according to which a man's status and merit, the measure of his dignity as an individual, is the extent to which he has earned that through an ever-varying flux of human excellence, incessantly exuded in the course of one's life in one's capacity as a person. Such a competing set of reference would be threatening to and mutually exclusive with the

prevailing social one according to which one's righteousness in the big-letter, public sense or, in contrast, one's blemished status, consists in its being so decreed - moreover, according to which the big-letter righteousness of the man who has taken charge of the blemished criminal's autonomy as a self (expressed in the exercise of the co-ordination of the blemished person's rights and his duties, his "me" and his "I", *in lieu* of him), rightfully consists in the sacred society's agent carrying out the job of such caretaking to the letter, for the purpose of relegating the criminal (or other kind of Rachmones) to Profane status and himself and the authority-perpetrating likes of him to a permanent Sacred status, on the long term. The Pukka, from the point of view of society and the norm in which that consists, is really right in doing this job; the truth of this, the caretaker's righteousness in the big-letter sense, is not a figment of the imagination as the orthodox or rather too narrow romantic makes out. Just as the romantic fears for the individual's consciousness if the lack in that, the potentials he 'has to be' but is prevented from becoming, remains unfulfilled, so the committed positivist moralist fears for the being of society if the incidence of heresies, maladjustment in relation to the positive being of society, deviance from it - madness, crime, suicide - show the dark side of social life, its lack, to be very great, causing society to be found wanting in relation to its own potentials as society, which consist in its being what it is, what it 'has to be' as society, sustained by and through its self-ascribed norm in which it prevails, upheld by people morally supportive of this end as individuals whose chosen project is simply to supremely identify with it. The Pukka says with Tillich: 'God needs man'. He sets an example, and offers his being to society in a religious spirit. He is often a zealous caretaker. To a certain and fateful, decisive extent, he keeps in his hands the business of co-ordinating the correspondence between the natural aptitude ("I") and the actual chances ("me") of someone not Pukka, not Us, Profane; he is positively motivated in enforcing that the Profane person's possibilities, potential and actual ("I" and "me") are kept apart well and good. As far as he is concerned, the man who has shown himself as not Pukka, is not a complete man, is not the kind of complete self for which he warmly apprehends himself and his fellow-Pukka. In the

hypothetical instance that a Pukka became convinced that the thick police file of a black youth is the record of nothing more than the inability of one particular policeman on the beat to conceive of the mere presence of this youngster in the street in any other terms than 'loitering with intent', the Pukka would neither be free nor right in throwing the lad's file on the fire and eradicating all other references indicative of the boy's blemished status elsewhere too, even if this were possible. The Pukka owes it to the collective consciousness which he serves not to entertain this possibility, and excludes this from his conduct through the most positive of considerations. A person once identified as socially incongruous, deviant even regarding his intentions in relation to the stability of society and is defined thus on public record, has acquired an existence as such in positive social reality and has been profaned accordingly as a matter of social fact. If the hypothetical Pukka of our example brought the issue of how far the young offender earned his blemish in being so classified in society to bear upon his attitude to this youngster's case, he would not play the game in Durkheimian terms any more, in terms of the positive social reality to which he has dedicated the being of his consciousness; he would, by this individualistically oriented approach, bring society as such and his consciousness as continuous with it, his own *raison d'être* into question, pick a hole in society. He excludes the possibility of reassessing the youth's case in his own personal lights, not as a socialpsychological, interpersonal matter between the youth and himself (which dimension and possibility of attitude is functionally jettisoned from his consciousness), but as a matter of solemn, socially sacred moral conviction, guided by a moral passion: big-letter righteousness or Righteous Indignation. The *Rachmones* amounts to a holistic image in his eyes: one less than Us, less than the Pukka's fellow-Pukka towards whom he feels love, but to a whole none the less; a whole of a different, other than fully human genre - to the stereotypes 'Mad', 'Criminal', 'Not Us', 'They'. The *Rachmones* in his care, is grasped by the Pukka as social deviance 'as such' - as that phenomenon which threatens the being of society, eating into it, unbalancing its equilibrium, causing discontinuity in it, actualising a not-yet known, heterogeneous, alternative, deviant, uncongenial, negative being in its fibre. The

Rachmones he faces is intuited by him as the sinner, as the deviant or criminal in the absolute sense, in a sense upon which the concrete content of his deviance or crime doesn't necessarily have any bearing. The Pukka hates these stereotypes with a positive, moral passion; the mere words 'crime', 'sin', 'madness' shock him. He feels horror in encountering them, in a manner in which there is 'nothing personal' in his attitude to the blemished in front of him; he would feel the same towards every other blemished in the Rachmones' shoes. The Pukka doesn't allow his own sentiments to be profaned by thinking of the man facing him in other terms, in the human terms reserved by him for the Pukka. His consciousness is entirely taken up by the big-letter righteousness of his duty to society in doing what he can for his part in enforcing the Ascription. From the point of view of the category of Being which he supports and for which he deputises - the positively social one as distinct from the socialpsychologic one with which the romantic is primarily preoccupied, and the romantic typically doesn't see that the Pukka who appears to him as an empty windbag is in fact filled with positive society itself in a real sense, and he pours his society-congenial and corroborative spirit back into society with devoutness. He and society are at one, are one, in this process, attitude and act. He is the caretaker of society; his consciousness is the collective consciousness, and he is thinking in the plural. As far as he is concerned, it is, in a meaningful sense, the Norm, the Ascription of society itself which this representative of Deviance has offended, called into question through his conduct. It is both the Being of society and his own solemnly chosen being as the caretaker of it which the Pukka in this situation is defending - for if the sacredness of Ascription is called into question, what is there left to assure him that he is normal, that he is sacred, that he is worthy of his elevated Caretakership, of the fact that society, which he protects and which is protective to him, quite simply is; with no clothes on, what would make him Emperor in a small way at least, or at any rate someone at one with the Emperor, a trusty consciousness in the service of the Empire as the very minimum, as a question of the definition of his life-project and of the sense of his very being as a person, as a man? The romantic social thinker pays undue disrespect (through lack of seeing that his

positivist opposite number does a job) and pays the same discourtesy to the Pukka which he suffers from the Pukka, in ignoring that both he and the society-loyal social positivists are characteristically unwilling to entertain that the other may be purely motivated, that the springs both in his and in his ideologic opponent's conduct, while humanly unattractive when viewed from their own respective points of view, may be unsoiled by petty motivation, and neither of these two varieties of social thinkers, the romantic and the positivist, see that the other may be positively principled in their motivation, through the dedication of their selves to the cause of safeguarding human value and moral standards in the context of society, their differing understandings of the criteria for this aim notwithstanding. This blind spot in the horizons of both the romantic and the positivist social scientist is the result of their mutual intolerance. Both these types of thinkers typically fail to see that their colleagues in the other socialscientific tradition want to achieve the good of man in society; the romantic thinker doesn't acknowledge that this is the Pukka's aim (any more than the Pukka acknowledges that this is the romantic's aim), and the romantic characteristically challenges the place and the meaningfulness of the seriousness of the Pukka's project (Kierkegaard being an exception). ⁽³⁾.

Finally, in enumerating the socialtheoretically consequential aspects of early and mid-twentieth-century romantic social thought, we may mention, still on the negative side of the romantic social tradition, its characteristic *élitism*, which often causes romantic social thinking to fall down in practical terms on its own ideals of an anthropologic egalitarianism applicable to all. In respecting the project of self-perfection and self-emancipation - by providing an alternative moral to that prevailing by virtue of ascription alone, for the restoration of the self's autonomy in those whose "I" could be trusted to manage it and who are unduly humiliated through not being allowed to do so in terms of real opportunities, it forgets about those who are not naturally endowed to be able to utilise a chance to do so, and of whom the romantic social theoretician and/or practitioner, expects such an effort as a duty. Romantics do society good in

discouraging an attitude of dependence on society; a society of independent and socialpsychologically autonomous and self-relying people is, by ideal standards, a better one than that in which the greatest bulk of citizens in socially undistinguished ranks are dependent, either through their personal inability to do otherwise or because they are effectively forced to rely on caretaking to an overwhelming extent by society's dicta demanding such dependence of them as a normative matter. However, in spite of the laudability, in general terms and as an ideal standard, of the maintenance by the romantic of the universalistic ideal reserving, in principle, the responsibility and right for all to present themselves as dignified and sovereign selves at all times, (insisted on at least as a need in all), he more often than not forgets about those who are potentially and in fact unable to live with such a high degree of independence, and he is unaccomodative of the reality of those whose dislodgement between "me" and "I" cannot be disregarded and therefore made null as a partly personal and partly empirically objective feat on the part of the agent supporting such a dislodgement. He leaves out in the cold those who need 'taking care of' in our sense, and who are better off with caretakers who do their job of representing and promoting their welfare, even if in a somewhat insensitive manner, than they would be under the reign of the kind of high-minded romantic theoriser who would tell them to go and survive in the fair competition which goes on in the world among the naturally gifted.

But even these faults of the 'romantics', as just described and listed, are able to contribute to society's good, if drawn on in the right dosage. Their nihilative and critical power, when brought to bear upon the social sciences and on the practical ways of an actual society, can operate as an ultimately constructive double negative which affords positive results in society, insofar as the 'romantic's' nihilation of society's anomalies (negativities themselves), is able to annul malfunctions in public standards, offensive to private ones, too. This process, which liberates individual consciousness as such, is also generative of outward, positive, concrete consequences. 'I am exercising my freedom fully', Sartre writes, 'when I, who am myself a nothingness and a void, make of everything that exists a nothingness. Doubt is a

breaking of contact with being. Through doubt, man has a permanent possibility of disentangling himself from the existing universe and of suddenly contemplating it from above... In this sense, it is the most magnificent affirmation of the reign of the human... There is an order of the true because man is free, and even if this order does not exist, it would be enough for man to be free for there never to be a reign of error because man... can... withdraw at any moment from a false and faked nature.' ⁽⁴⁾ It is, moreover, important to see that a romantic society-critical stance and practice, whose principles of morally reprehensible norm-supersession by the standards and dicta of human reality, are valuably able and well placed to effect, prompt, inform and play a role in all timely social change and in progress, in ways great and small. An important class of anomalies in society is constituted by the frustration of and insensitivity on the part of the existing norm to the simple, basic and socialpsychologically necessary and matter-of-fact needs in and for the selves sustaining society in their capacity as individuals, this partly subjective aspect and capacity of their consciousness demanding its satisfaction in terms of human reality at all times, concurrently with the normal selves' role-performance as society's 'carriers' and their awareness of the need for their participation in society by positively exercising their capacity as such, in the positivists' sense; and a society which is chronically deaf to the human needs of humans, is dysfunctional, not only from the point of view of the individual humans peopling that whom such a rule deprives of the chance and necessary actuality of sustaining a dignified self to a normal and necessary extent in the terms of human reality, but is dysfunctional, in an important and practically consequential sense, as a society too. Human reality is necessary in a world of humans, not only in the context of the normally profane, everyday business of personal and interpersonal conduct of each of its members at the unavoidable and universal socialpsychologic level of their humanly concrete possibilities and conduct, but it's also necessary in its relation to social life, in which context the role of human reality figures writ large, and in which context the established norm is the barometer and gauge of society's capacity, as well as axiomatic and proper duty, to accomodate the indissmissably concrete human needs of its members as

individual people and as, to an appreciable extent, sovereign and personally autonomous citizens, each and every one of them; and the standards of human reality are both the fountainhead and instruments of society's changes in instances when the intolerance by society of its members as human beings, or selves, assumes humanly insupportable dimensions. Our chapter on 'coarse caretaking' meant to demonstrate the anomalousness, absurdity and inadequacy of a 'government' both on a national and on a microsociologic scale, which expects people to subsist as society-carrying "me"-s only, at all times, and which demands the forswearing their sphere of being as salient, socialpsychologically significant selves as well, even in situations and contexts of which the tone is properly personal. Our coarse caretaker is someone who bids people to shed their capacity as authentic selves even at times when it would be appropriate for them to be so, who bids them to give up their selves in the ordinary, personal sense in which selves are properly complete with "I"-s too. The resulting shortchangedness of the humans who are made the 'mere objects' of such caretaking, contaminates and qualitatively degrades the daily business of ongoing life under such a government, in social ways as well as individual ones, and necessitates periods of minor or even fundamental revisions of the norm, which must, from time to time, give way to the re-assertion of human reality of itself to such a natural extent which is normal and necessary to it as human reality. Such a re-assertion of human reality of itself, will sometimes occur on a mass scale, in instances where the longstanding and systematic oppression of the individuals' 'my world', sphere of operation as selves, cannot and will not be supported by society's humanly deprived selves any longer. Examples of phenomena on the scene of our actual and contemporary world history which bear witness to such revisions of the social norm at the instigation of untenably discontent and frustrated human reality, clamouring for room in society for its re-assertion, are provided by the turbulent aftermath, in our day, of the human reality-suppressive Cultural Revolution in China, as well as by the current upsurge of religion in its romantic, society-critical and nihilative forms, in the face of the individual-alien established ideology in present-day Poland and Russia (congenial, regarding its central nature, to the current phase of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in

Soviet society for which - the idea may perhaps be legitimately hazarded - this religious frame of reference for norm-deviation importantly, and certainly to some extent, paved the way). The clandestine or even publicly eruptive popular religious practice in these two countries, served, and still does serve, as the instrument and medium of the protest of an appreciable section of the masses, against the oppression of the self and its fundamental rights as such, by the socially orthodox and coercive, individual-contemptuous reigning ideology. This movement as just described, may be apprehended as a latter-day echo in history, in some important respects, of the first Christian revolution, documented in the New Testament, and of the post-medieval revolt by the suppressed individual spirit on a mass scale at the time of the Reformation. It is perhaps Hegel who was the first to systematically and most influentially offer a view of history as an ongoing process of alternation between predominantly social-structural phases of government, typically enforcing their norm with a view to the self-perpetration of that, allowing little lee-way for the individual spirit, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, such phases in which this spirit re-affirms itself, in a renewal both of itself and of society at its ossified given, but, as the above quoted examples show, this proposition on his part is proving itself as one with continued meaning and topicality to-day. As for earlier times in our century, Hegel's model of the history of society also proved itself as generative of a following, as in the works, for instance, of Durkheim, who, for his part, also makes a reference to this process as something that is predictable and regular, likening the structure of society over time to an inert building, edifice, which persists and lasts sometimes outdatedly throughout history, and which is from time to time illuminated, enlivened and refurbished by periods which he calls Renaissances, by periods, in other words, of its being re-furnished with life at times when human reality repossesses that, bestowing on that a new, topical, 'lived reality'-relevant meaning, filling that with novel, vital, new content as society. '5' MacQuarrie, in his Introduction to his work An Existentialist Theology, '6' puts forward a historical view of religion, which suggests (albeit in part implicitly) that the history of religion is a process in which periods of the

organisation of that into established normative dogma, are followed by phases of the reassertion of the romantic, individual-relevant and concerned content and function of religion in the face of its outgrown structure in the world, which has usually become unaccommodative of the authentic individual's spiritual satisfaction and the interests in more than one sense - as egos and as economic units - of the worshippers who sustain that religion, and that a view of religion in Europe is incomplete without an appreciation of both these phases, which together and in their contiguity amount to the history of Christianity. Such a dynamic view of society - one that is grasped as a process which is complete with its own changes and with an appreciation of one important source and systematically recurrent cause of those (the periodic re-affirmation of the rights of the masses as selves when that is insupportably taken away from them) - a view which is clearly and vitally informed, in part at least, by the romantic grasp of social science - is realistic and informative regarding society. Such a view automatically carries the implication that a narrow positivistic view regarding society and its history, which sees social change as unpredictably, randomly and inorganically attaching to the history and external processes of society, is, in contrast with the above outlined romanticism-informed view regarding the social process, incomplete and inappropriately torn out of the context of the dialectic interplay and alternation between the characteristically synchronic and the characteristically diachronic phases, functions and forces of society as such, with the two types of phases indelibly tied together in their unavoidable contiguity, and whose theoretically acknowledged union, romantic fashion, affords a much more adequate account of society's dynamicity, development and progression than a narrowly positivistic one. Of course, when paying such a handsome tribute to Hegel's insight regarding the history of societies, we must stress that his idealistically reductionist rendering of that process, which credits the claims, needs and rights of the human spirit first and foremost with responsibility for the shaping and definition of society at any time, amounts to a half-truth only; but this half-truth, it pays to acknowledge, is a valuable half of the whole truth regarding the course of society as a process. Naturally, we must not forget, as Hegel did,

the concurrent and even primary being of society as a positive reality independent and outside of the human spirit, with this human spirit normally and typically confined as an issue, when not noticeably and consequentially challenged by established social authority, to the individual consciousnesses of the people populating society as selves. This external being of society, ignored by Hegel, as Durkheim has shown us, is the solid norm in and as society *sui generis*, which, in synchronically secure phases of society, subsists and operates essentially uneffected and untouched by Hegel's 'subject' or its citizens' individual spiritual endeavours, and which even at times of the mass-response to it by human reality-assertive, society-nihilating selves in the diachronic phases of society, (even when such nihilations of it occur on a mass scale), doesn't cease to exist, even if it exists at such times dysfunctionally, and is seen to do so. The supreme reign of society in this external, Durkheimian sense, is the other, more evident half of the truth regarding the workings of society, one that indismissably complements, at all times, Hegel's spirit-assertive half of the truth regarding the course of society and its processes. The aspect of consciousness identified by Durkheim: that of society itself in its proper and autonomous sphere of being as such *sui generis*, will at no time dissolve into a human spirit or a 'subject'-dominated, social positivity-irrelevant, subduing or dismissive historic flux; it was short-sighted and erroneous of Hegel to suggest that it does, and that this process, as seen by him, amounts to the whole story regarding the process and phenomenon of society. All we mean to say here in paying tribute, albeit a qualified one, to Hegel, is that the half-truth which he brought to bear on the history and interpretation of society, valuably and usefully limelights half the mechanism propelling forth society (which palpably does develop, propel on, and wouldn't do so had Hegel not been partially right), in pinpointing and asserting that the subject-inclusive self or selves *en mass*, which ceaselessly and legitimately claim acknowledgement, licence and room for expression and maintenance within psychologic and socialpsychologic confines, will, when squeezed out of their legitimate area of operation by the reigning established norm, pick holes, through their re-affirmation as selves, in the social fibre of the positive reality of society in Durkheim's sense,

and offer their own standards and medium for the mending of that damaged social fibre for and in the future of both mankind and society. It follows, and we mean to stress this Hegel-enabled point of view here, that the romantic, individual-appreciative and acknowledging approach to society is incompatible with - but even so more realistic in interpreting social change which is endemic in every society than - a purely positivistic one, and the greater adequacy of a 'romantically' aware view of social history lies in its capacity to acknowledge that the relationship between the being of society in phases of its solid and equilibrated zenith, and the phases of the eruption and bursting of human reality onto the forefront on the social scene at times of society's *nadir*, is an unavoidable, fateful and characteristic one, in which the Hegelian half-truth regarding the potency of the spirit (subject, "I" etc.), to shape the history of society, is recognised, grasped and presented as a necessity; a half-necessity maybe, but one without the limited validity of which the being of society as predictably changing, is incompletely understood. This, the Hegelian half of the story, is needlessly and wantonly dismissed by the positivists, and dismissed at the peril of the truth as presentable by and available through a holistic social science. Even to-day when, in keeping with Descombes' revelation already quoted (reinforced and anteceded by a prophetic passage in Sartre) '>' 'e)', our times have passed into post-historic ones, already showing tendencies of superseding class-societies as Marx knew, presented and treated those, and a bureaucracy, rather than any class in a classical Marxist sense, has come to reign in our Northern hemisphere, slowly superimposing itself over the different ideologies of particular types of governments there (as treated in a former sections, such as Chapter 2 Section 2), the call for a witness and claim for elbowroom of a new form of human reality (sophisticatedly incarcerated into the shackles of the body of computer-stored information regarding selves and transforming those into the inert idiom of their possession by society), has grown to be of a new, significant relevance. The expression of human reality in our day amounts to, takes the shape of and is operative through the exercise and assertion of that freedom and spontaneity in the conduct of people, whether in units of groups or of individual selves, which comes from

conceiving of themselves as living humans, in the face of and as the very opposition to the bureaucratic governments which envelop the being of the actual societies of the Northern hemisphere, and coercively carve out, in singular bleakness, the mode and radius for the profane being of the ordinary man, the ordinary citizen, as a "me" only, defining him and making him into a mere pile of data, determined, tapped and 'taped' in the terms of a cold and narrowly society-functional software superimposing the grasp of the ordinary citizen as a computer-datum upon his own ideals regarding himself as a sovereign person, a living, dynamic perpetrator of himself as human reality. This practice by the *nouveaux*, bureaucratic Sacred produces, breeds and brings forth a new type of social underdog: the *nouveaux* profane, the helpless victim of data-hoarding and processing by the force of coercion, in the business of the securing and enforcing, demanding, cashing in from the individual, aided by the development of a new technologic advancement, perfection and efficiency, his socialpsychologically bleak 'carriership' in the upkeep of society.

Finally, on the gain side of a romantic socialscientific modality and method of thought, we may repeat in this evaluation of that theoretical viewpoint, that, in its light, human reality emerges, realistically, as a persistent stratum of reality which will unavoidably take place, attain being, either in a dominant or in a dormant, but even so always ready-to-hand way, in every situation involving people: in a way and idiom, in any case, which is unique and peculiar to itself, and stands up on its own autonomous terms, in sharp counterdistinction with the being and activity of the different but equally peculiar and autonomous modality of consciousness as the collective consciousness or society as such. No propaganda, historic account or public relations exercise can retrospectively import the attributes of a life spent in a personally comely and human reality-wise authentic pursuance and observance of the peculiar standards of human reality, into the life of a public figure, whether a prominent or an anonymous soldier-ant in society, if it has not been there in the first place, if it failed to grace the ostensive or unostensive champion of any cause, on the terms of its own authentic rules and standards (those of human reality) which

always concurrently and distinctly present themselves in consciousness for actualisation, alongside with the biddings of the equally persistent laws and structures of society outside and inside of consciousness, in spite of the fact that people's social 'carriership' is the only mode of consciousness to be usually acknowledged and accredited in the mainstream social science of our day as providing a legitimate role for man in society and in his capacity as an individual citizen, even as a self; and a romantic view of society and social psychology is equipped to beneficially and realistically redress this bias and balance in modern socialtheoretic thought.

I think there is virtue in entertaining both these approaches to social reality which have just been contrasted - the positivistic one focussing on that from the point of view of ascribed status and its maintenance, and the other, the romantic frame of reference which concerns itself with and throws light upon social reality as the occasion and platform for personal human worth and fitness of the self, particularly in the potentially critical relation of the latter to ascribed status when that is unjustified by socialpsychologic measures in the great and in the small, which status the romantic social theoretician reserves the right to judge as justified or unjustified by individual quality of output and conduct. Furthermore, a romantic social theory also relevantly recognises human/reality as the only source of change in society and therefore important in a social context too. The resulting amalgam of the method of thought in approaching social reality, gained from the imaginative and appropriate interlacing of the positivistic tradition of thought with the romantic one, affords, in its totality, a holistic and realistic insight into the mechanism of sustaining as well as animating society, conceiving of society as the interrelated package of the collective consciousness outside and the occasion for that in and through concrete human reality in terms of the self or selves *en masse*, appreciating and showing these two sets of values, social and individual, as related to each other and as irreducibly interactive with one another, both in the context and idiom of the self and in those of society. I think that such a model of society, sensitive to the interaction between a social scientific

positivism and socialscientific romanticism, is valuable, as the insights afforded by just one of these frames of reference in social thinking or the other, are incomplete and unduly simplistic - the romantics chronically lacking a sober enough appreciation of how real ascribed social reality really is, and social positivists often blind to the error and danger in not seeking the need for the substantiation of ascribed sacred and profane status by individual worth, and to the anomalousness of a code of practice which sustains a hierarchy in institutions where a fluid and periodically re-assessed correlation between social standing and human capacities both in the Pukka and in the rachmones is not sought, as an end in itself, particularly at times when the witness and need for the gratification of people's individual perspective is institutionally ignored and decried, and when, in response, those elbow into being in the social field for legitimate recognition there; in instances, in other words, when human reality comes to the public forefront to demonstrate and state that it will not go entirely frustrated, but claims being and recognition by the standards, dicta and values whereby it is peculiarly governed and informed, no less than this is periodically the case, in reverse, with the different norm of the collective consciousness of Durkheim's understanding, which will needs assert itself at times when its norm is appreciably threatened by excesses of the peculiar norms, or rather standards, of human reality, on an historic scale. We may say, in consequence, that the science of the study of society, as well as that of the self, according to the principles of a puristic socialscientific positivism, affords quite as unrealistic and incomplete an account of the self and of society as does a solipsistically narrow, purely 'romantic' view of the self.

REFERENCES.

- Abbreviations: **MSS** Mind, Self and Society by George Herbert Mead.
University of Chicago Press, 1934.
- PP** The Philosophy of the Present by George Herbert
Mead Open Court, 1959.
- BN** Being and Nothingness by Jean-Paul Sartre
(Translated by Hazel Barnes) Methuen, 1969.

Preface.

1. Tillich, P. The Shaking of the Foundations. Pelican 1949 pp. 151-154
2. **BN** pp. 86, 88.
3. Bhaskar, R. The Possibility of Naturalism Harvester Press 1979.

Introduction.

1. Schacht, R. Alienation Allen and Unwin 1971 p. 242.
2. Schacht, R. op. cit. "Introduction" (by Walter Kaufmann)
pp. xlii-lvi.
3. Durkheim, E. Suicide (Translated by John A. Spaulding and George
Simpson) Routledge & Kegan Paul 1952.
4. **MSS** (See 'Abbreviations' above)
5. **PP** (See 'Abbreviations' above)
6. Some synonyms, such as 'man-in-the-world' will not be used in future
contexts, as it is felt that so many synonyms may make the argument
too diffuse; other related concepts, such as the 'ego' in Freud's
sense, have not received a review on their scientific merit, but
will still be used.
7. **BN** pp. 344-345.
8. Durkheim, E. The Rules of Sociological Method (Translated by
Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller) The Free Press New York 1966
pp. xlix, li.
9. The 'body' is included here in a special sense, one tantamount to
the self, which will come into its own in Chapter 3. Section 5.
10. Though that he apprehends society in such a context is hinted at in
BN p. 440.
11. **MSS** p. 196.

12. MSS p. 197.
13. PP p. 87.
14. BN pp. 381-382 and the context of the entire chapter.
15. e. g. Miller, D.L. George Herbert Mead: Self, Language and the World University of Texas Press 1973 p. 15.
16. MSS pp. 128-129.
17. Pfuetze, P. Self, Society, Existence Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1961.
18. MSS pp. 136-137.
19. Kierkegaard, S. Christian Discourses (Translated by Walter Laurie) Oxford University Press 1961 pp. 40-41.
20. Tillich, P. op. cit. p. 127.
21. Althusser, L. For Marx (Translated by Ben Brewster) Allen Lane, Penguin Press 1969, p. 209. (Hegel's 'pure interiority whose exteriority is no more than a phenomenon.')
22. BN, p. 159.
23. e.g. BN, p. 345.
24. BN p. 416.
25. BN p. 416.

Chapter 1.

1. Durkheim, E. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. (Translated by Joseph Ward Swain) London, Allen and Unwin, 1915 (Reprinted 1968)
2. 'Friend', spelt with a capital letter, means 'Quaker'.
3. Durkheim, E. Suicide (See Reference 3. in "Introduction" above) pp. 30, 44, 45, 314. e.g.
4. Tillich, P. op. cit., p. 95.
5. Bultmann, R. Primitive Christianity (Translated by R.H. Fuller) Fontana 1960, p. 143.
6. Kierkegaard, S. op. cit., p. 61.
7. Kierkegaard, S. op. cit. p. 55.
8. BN, p. 440.

9. Nagel, T. Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press 1979, pp. 82, 83, 84, 90.
10. Asch, S.E. Social Psychology New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1952.
11. Milgram, S. Obedience to Authority New York Harper, 1974.
12. MSS, p. 178.
13. PP, pp. 84, 126.
14. Descombes, V. Modern French Philosophy. (Translated by L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding) Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 109, 155.
15. Jaroslav Hašek: The Good Soldier Šveik. (Translated by Cecil Parrott) Heinemann 1973.

Chapter 2.

1. In the biblical sense.
2. MSS, p. 190.
3. MSS, pp. 221-222.
4. MSS, p. 274.
5. New Testament, I. Corinthians, 12:I-II, the latter part of the passage. (Quoted in Tillich, P., op. cit., p. 122.)

Goethe, J.W. Faust Part I Scene 2. Christian Wegner Verlag, Hamburg 1949, p. 29.

(Translation of quotation:

'That which you inherited from your fathers,
Deserve it, so as to possess it.'

7. MacQuarrie, J. An Existentialist Theology SCM Cheap Edition, 1955. "Introduction."
8. Descombes, V., op. cit., e. g. pp. 112-113, 178.
9. MSS p. 211.
10. Greene, G. Travels with my Aunt. Penguin 1969. pp. 202-203.
11. BN, p. 356.
12. Greene, G., op. cit., pp. 202-203.
13. MacQuarrie, J., op. cit., pp. 91-92, 99.

Chapter 3.

1. Roberts, E.W. The 'Clio' Unpublished M.Ed. thesis, University of Bangor, 1979.
2. Ramuz, C.F. (Translated by Michael Flanders and Kitty Black) The Soldier's Tale Chester Music 1955.
3. Tillich, P., op. cit., pp. 151-154.
4. Bultmann, R. op. cit., p. 194.
5. MSS pp. 278-279.
6. Althusser, L. op. cit., p. 202.
7. Mauss, M. The Gift. (Translated by Ian Cunnison) Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954, e.g. p. 10.
8. MSS pp. 274-275.
9. BN p. 401.
10. BN p. 550.
11. Shakespeare, W. The Winter's Tale Act I Scene 2., The New Penguin 1969 p. 68.
12. Daily Express, Wednesday August 31 1983, p. 15.
13. Brecht, B. The Life of Galileo (Translated by Desmond I. Vesey) Methuen 1963. pp. 75-79.
14. BN p. 48.
15. BN p. 48.
16. Descombes, V., op. cit., pp. 138, 141.
17. Descombes, V., op. cit., p. 14.
18. BN p. 440.
19. Kierkegaard, S., op. cit. e.g. p. 61.
20. MSS pp. 276-277.
21. Shakespeare, W. op. cit. Act II., Scene 1., p, 78.
22. Greene, G. op. cit., pp. 202-203.
23. MSS p. 190, also pp. 221-222.
24. MSS p. 213.

25. MSS p. 213.
26. Sartre, J.-P. Antisemite and Jew (Translated by George J. Baker) Shocken Books New York 1946.
27. Sherman, M. Bent Amber Lane Press, 1979.
28. Shakespeare, W. Macbeth New Penguin 1967, Act III. Scene 2. p. 93.
29. Clark, B. Whose Life is it Anyway? Amber Lane Press, 1978.
30. Kempinsky, T. Duet for One; a play. French, 1981.
31. Brecht, B. The Caucasian Chalk Circle (Translated by James and Tanya Stern with W.H. Auden) Methuen 1963.
32. BN p. 400-401.
33. Chekhov, A.P. The Cherry Orchard (Translated and introduced by Michael Frayn) Eyre Methuen 1978
34. Marlowe, C. Edward the Second Act I. Scene 4. in The Complete Plays Penguin English Library 1969 p. 448.
35. BN p. 401.
36. BN p. 344.
37. BN p. 401.
38. Mauss, M. The Gift See Ref. 7. in this Chapter.
39. BN p. 401.
40. BN p. 400.
41. Kierkegaard, S., op. cit., p. 82.
42. MSS p. 213.
43. MSS p. 213.
44. Sartre, J.-P. Antisemite and Jew See Ref. 26. in this Chapter.
45. e.g. PP pp. 171-172.
46. Green, M. The Art of Coarse Acting Hutchinson of London 1964. (Other titles in the same series: The Art of Coarse Rugby, The Art of Coarse Golf, The Art of Coarse Sailing., The Art of Coarse Drinking)
47. Kierkegaard, S., op. cit., p. 59.
48. MSS p. 299.

Chapter 4

1. BN pp. 400-401.
2. MSS p. 389.
3. Asch, S.E. Social Psychology (See Reference 10. in Chapter 1.)
4. Milgram, S. Obedience to Authority (See Reference 11. in Chapter 1.)
5. MSS pp.214-215.
6. MSS p. 212.
7. BN pp. 400-401.
8. MacQuarrie, J., op. cit., pp. 49, 61.
9. Sartre, J.-P. 'Departure and Return' in Literary and Philosophical Essays (Translated by Annette Michelson) Hutchinson 1968. p. 166.
10. BN p. 99.
11. MSS pp. 197. 179.
12. Descombes, V. Modern French Philosophy (See Reference 14. in Chapter 1.) p. 145.
13. The validity of regarding human reality and its furtherance as a positivity in the special sense and within the context of its own autonomous circle - a positive reality which operates and subsists in opposition to the positivity of Durkheimian society and works to the exclusion of the latter, suffering, in turn, the same fate of its extinction by society's assertion of its own kind of positivity when pitted against that, has been argued in the last Chapter in the Section called 'Which Came First? The Chicken or the Egg?'
14. Sartre, J.-P. 'Individualism and Conformism in the United States' in Philosophic and Literary Essays, see Ref. 10. above, pp. 97-98.
15. Arany J. 'Vojtina ars poetikája' in Selected Works (Válogatott művei), Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, Magyar Remekírók Sorozat, 1971, Volume I. (I. kötet), p. 408.
16. Nagel, T. Mortal Questions Cambridge University Press 1979 e.g. pp. 89-90.
17. BN e.g. pp. 472-475.
18. MSS p. 201.
19. MSS pp. 209-210.

20. Sartre, J.-P. 'Materialism and Revolution' in Literary and Philosophical Essays (See Refs. 10. and 15. above) p. 238
21. BN pp. 400-401.
22. Sartre, J.-P. Antisemite and Jew (See Ref. 26 in previous Chapter)
23. BN pp. 59-60.
24. Frenkel-Brunswick, E. Levinson, D.J. and Sanford, R.N. 'The Authoritarian Personality' in Prohansky, H. and Seidenberg, B. Basic Studies in Social Psychology Holt, New York, 1965.
25. As in Reference 20. above.

Conclusion

1. Sartre, J.-P. 'Materialism and Revolution' in Literary and Philosophical Essays (See Ref. 10. in Chapter 4 above) pp. 214-215.
2. Kierkegaard, S., op. cit., p. 29.

(Authentically and) 'Christianly the question is never raised what a man was, but what he became, not what sort of a man he was, but what sort he became, not about the beginning, but about the end.'
3. Kierkegaard, S., op. cit., pp. 32-33.
4. Sartre, J.-P. 'Cartesian Freedom' in Literary and Philosophical Essays (See Ref. 10. in Chapter 4. above) p. 178.
5. Durkheim, E. Suicide (See Ref. 3. in 'Introduction' above) p. 314.
6. MacQuarrie, J., op. cit. (See Ref 6. in Chapter 2. above)
7. Descombes, V. op. cit. (See ref 7. in Chapter 2. above) pp. 112-113, 170.
8. Sartre, J.-P., 'Materialism and Revolution' in Literary and Philosophical Essays (See Ref. 10. in Chapter 4. above) pp. 204-205.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Althusser, L., *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1969).
- Asch, S.E., *Social Psychology* (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1952).
- Bhaskar, R., *The Possibility of Naturalism* (Harvester Press, 1979)
- Brecht, B., *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, trans. James and Tanya Stern with W.H. Auden (Methuen 1963).
- Brecht, B., *The Life of Galileo*, trans. Desmond I. Vesey (Methuen, 1963).
- Bultmann, R., *Primitive Christianity*, trans. R.H. Fuller (Fontana, 1960).
- Chekhov, A.P., *The Cherry Orchard*, trans. and introd. Michael Frayn (Eyre Methuen, 1978).
- Chekhov, A.P., *Uncle Vanya*, trans. R. Hingley (Oxford University Press, 1964). 1
- Clark, B., *Whose Life is it, Anyway?* (Amber Lane Press, 1978)
- Descombes, V., *Modern French Philosophy*, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (Cambridge University Press, 1980).
- Dostoyevsky, F.M., *Crime and Punishment*, trans. D. Magarshak (Penguin, 1970).
- Durkheim, E., *Suicide*, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952).
- Durkheim, E., *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (London, Allen and Unwin, 1915).
- Durkheim, E., *The Rules of Sociological Method*, trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller (The Free Press, New York, 1966).
- Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson D.J. and Sanford, R.N. "The Authoritarian Personality" in Prohansky, H. and Seidenberg, B. *Basic Studies in Social Psychology* (Holt, New York, 1965).
- Goethe, J.W., *Faust, Part I.*, (Christian Wagner Verlag, Hamburg, 1949).
- Greene, G., *Travels with my Aunt* (Penguin, 1969).
- Hasek, J., *The Good Soldier Sveik*, trans. Cecil Parrott (Heinemann, 1973).
- Ibsen, H., *A Doll's House in Plays 2.*, trans. and introd. Michael Meyer Eyre Methuen, 1980).
- Ibsen, H., *The Master Builder in Plays 1.*, trans. and introd. Michael Meyer (Eyre Methuen, 1980).
- Ibsen, H., *The Wild Duck in Plays 1.*, trans. and introd. Michael Meyer (Eyre Methuen, 1980).
- Kempinsky, T., *Duet for One* (French, 1981).
- Kierkegaard, S., *Christian Discourses*, trans. Walter Laurie (Oxford University Press 1961).
- MacQuarrie, J., *An Existentialist Theology* (SCM Cheap Edition, 1955).
- Marlowe, C., *Edward the Second in The Complete Plays* (Penguin English Library, 1969).
- Mauss, M., *The Gift*, trans. Ian Cunnison (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954).
- Mead, G.H., *Mind, Self and Society* (University of Chicago Press, 1934).
- Mead, G.H., *The Philosophy of the Present* (Open Court, 1959).
- Milgram, S. *Obedience to Authority* (New York Harper, 1974).
- Miller, A. *Death of a Salesman* (London Heinemann, 1968; first published 1949).

- Miller, A. *The Crucible* (London Secker and Warburg, 1966; first published 1953).
- Miller, D.L. *George Herbert Mead: Self, Language and the World* (Univeristy of Texas Press, 1973).
- Nagel, T., *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge University Press, 1979).
- Ramuz, C.F., *The Soldier's Tale*, trans. Michael Flanders and Kitty Black (Chester Music, 1955).
- Roberts, E.W., *The Clío* (unpublished M.Ed. thesis, University of Bangor, 1979).
- Sartre, J.-P., *Antisemite and Jew*, trans. George J. Baker (Shocken Books, New York, 1946).
- Sartre, J.-P., *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel Barnes (Methuen, 1958).
- Sartre, J.-P., *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, trans. Annette Michelson (Hutchinson 1968).
- Schacht, R., *Alienation* (Allen and Unwin, 1971).
- Shakespeare, W., *Macbeth* (New Penguin, 1967).
- Shakespeare, W., *The Winter's Tale* (New Penguin, 1969).
- Sherman, M., *Bent* (Amber Lane Press, 1979).
- Tillich, P., *The Shaking of the Foundations* (Pelican, 1949).