Egon Bittner: Approaching Explications
Carlin, A.P.; Slack, R.S.

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Egon Bittner was a phenomenological sociologist who made extensive and fundamental contributions to ethnomethodology, the sociological study of mental illness, organisational sociology, the sociology of professions, and to the study of police and police work. His studies of the police are justly famous, and earned him the soubriquet ‘criminologist’. However, his work is not limited to what may be perceived as criminology and we suggest that the *prima facie* categorisation of his studies as ‘criminology’ hides the aspect of his police studies as *elaborative* of his work on organisations.

This paper provides an overview of Bittner’s *sociological* work. Reviews and critiques of his work on crime and policing are available elsewhere (Brodeur 1994 2001). This paper details themes, e.g., Bittner’s engagement with colleagues who were attempting to work out how sociology accounted for sociological phenomena, *inter alia*, Harold Garfinkel and Edward Rose; Rose’s ‘Larimer Street’ ethnographies on Denver’s skid row, which Bittner joined to conduct fieldwork with the police; and Bittner’s observations on the use of statistics and adequacy of methods for discipline-specific and organisational purposes. These threads consolidate an overview of Bittner as a phenomenological sociologist – and his seminal contributions to ethnomethodology and ethnography – *as well as* a researcher on policing; studies of police work may have been his bailiwick, but we suggest that policing was an adventitious and specialised expression of his sociological work.²

**PROFILE**

Born in Nový Bohumín, Czechoslovakia, in 1921, Egon Bittner migrated to the United States following the Second World War. He studied for a B.A. at Los Angeles State College, before his Masters and Doctorate in sociology at UCLA, under the supervision of Donald R. Cressey; he was awarded his Ph.D. in 1961.³ During his graduate studies he worked as a research social scientist at the Langley
Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute at the University of California, a position that provided insights not just into the psychiatric profession but various professions that had dealings with people with mental illnesses. Whilst still a graduate student, Bittner got a job as an instructor at University of California at Riverside, joining a staff alongside Aaron Cicourel; when he was awarded his Ph.D. he was appointed to a tenure-track position as an assistant professor. Hence, Bittner left UCLA just as Larry Wieder and Don Zimmerman were embarking upon their doctoral studies there (Wieder et al. 2010). Cicourel left UC Riverside to take up a position at University of California Santa Barbara (cf. Maynard et al. 2010: 316) before Bittner moved to the Department of Sociology, Brandeis University (1968–91). At Brandeis he held the Harry Coplan Professorial Chair of Social Sciences and was Chair of the Department of Sociology, was a member of the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement, which named a prestigious award after him, received the Police Executive Research Forum’s 1998 Leadership Award, was a co-founder and co-editor (with Sheldon L. Messinger) of the *Criminology Review Yearbook*, a long-standing member of the editorial board at *Human Studies* (Psathas 2010: 187), one of the original committee members of the International Institute for Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis (IIEMCA) (Psathas 2010: 189), and was President of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, 1981–82.4

His membership of high-level police associations, awards and writings lend themselves unproblematically to the disciplinary characterisation ‘criminologist’; however, within the ethnomethodological literature, Bittner has always been regarded as one of the most senior ethnomethodologists.5 As a student of Harold Garfinkel at UCLA, he collaborated on two of the papers that were included in *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, each of which are seminal innovations in the study of methods and methodology, coding and classifying, theory and theorising, and the agenda for and use of textual records in sociological inquiries.

Bittner in Context(s)

During his doctoral studies at UCLA, and with the encouragement of his supervisor Donald Cressey, Bittner took courses with Garfinkel, at that time a new and junior member of faculty. Garfinkel had become friends with Edward Rose, a professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder, following their meetings at conferences held in New Mexico. The work of Garfinkel and Rose shared certain elective affinities. As Rose was a more senior figure in sociology, he was able to support and apply for grants and funding for collaborative enterprises that would become known as ‘ethnomethodology’. Even though Garfinkel’s and Rose’s interests would eventually diverge, Bittner met them when they were both
preoccupied by people’s use of natural language. Both saw natural language and people’s natural-language practices as central but entirely missed in traditional sociology.

In taking natural language practices as the cornerstone of sociology, each asked how social order was possible – for Durkheimian sociology (Rose) and Parsonian sociology (Garfinkel). Their admiration for these writers is well documented, and each attempted to clarify how the contributions of society-members established and elaborated their approaches. Garfinkel’s unpublished lectures and writings, including an unfinished book demonstrated his thorough-going engagement with Parsons’ theoretical structures, prior to and in his development of ethnomethodology, which was both a reaction to and stands as a fitting tribute to Parsons’ reasoning. Rose, on the other hand, attempted to specify Durkheim’s notion of ‘collective representations’. For Rose, Durkheimian social facts were not simply *ex cathedra* theorisations but were traceable and retrievable through historical records of members’ language practices, such as dictionaries, and the *Oxford English Dictionary* in particular.

Rose demonstrated how words act as ‘cultural units’ – they are units of meaning. Words have meanings and these meanings have histories, which can be transformed and, occasionally, lost from the record: ‘Words are intended to convey meaning, and, for any group of peers, the presumption is always held that some understandings are shared or can be shared through words’ (Rose 1962: 159–60). Ordinary meanings, as opposed to meanings of words appropriated and redefined by sociologists for their own special purposes (Rose 1960), are uniform features of a culture. Shared understandings are the results of ‘people putting culture to use’ (Rose 1962: 159). Rose demonstrated how ordinary words, in their many forms as found in the ‘English Record’ (Rose 1960), become increasingly distanced from their ‘natural sociological meanings’ (Rose 1962: 134). The reallocation of meanings, to words with natural meanings, is accomplished when sociologists apply ordinary words as technical concepts.

Rose’s arguments are expressed through Bittner’s (1965) ‘The Concept of Organization’ paper; though, arguably, there is a more Wittgensteinian emphasis in Bittner’s criterion of members’ terms and meanings in use not just in textual accounts of members’ uses of terms and meanings. Further, in realising the determinations of praxiological use of terms that are re-associated with core sociological concepts, such as ‘bureaucratic organisation’, we see an elision of pre-given theoretical structures. As a consideration of ‘The Concept of Organization’ shows (Coulter 1996: 340), looking at how members’ concepts are realised as ‘macro’ concepts provides for a respecification of ‘macro’ structures in sociology, problematising even further the dualistic character of some of the key organising principles of sociology.
It can be seen then that Garfinkel and Rose provided Bittner with crucial analytic contexts. The phenomenological concerns of Garfinkel combined with the sociologically linguistic orientation pushed by Rose, coalesce in Bittner’s ‘The Concept of Organization’. Bittner pushed a ‘strong’ version of Schütz, as shown by ‘The Concept of Organization’ and his ‘Radicalism’ paper (Bittner 1963).

The themes of the papers he co-authored with Garfinkel – who count as a member, and who decides who count as a member – share resemblances with Bittner’s discussion of producing an admissible cohort that was satisfactory-in-accordance-with canons of sociological rigour for the administration of a sociological study (Bittner 1961: 156–70). A later paper (Conklin and Bittner 1973) exhibits the ‘normal, natural troubles’ (Garfinkel and Bittner 1967a: 187ff.) that are encountered by sociologists gathering crime statistics. In the production and analysis of statistics, Conklin and Bittner worked with the entire data-set, not merely a ‘slice’ or ‘representative sample’. Claims made on the basis of statistics are deflated, via explication of conjectures, and ‘just how’ conjectures may be afforded by data. Rather than attempting to use data that have been gathered for non-sociological purposes to do the sociologist’s work, ‘where we found the records ambiguous or unclear, we sought and obtained the help of the officer in charge of the records or other officers who had the information we needed’ (Conklin and Bittner 1973: 210) and supplemented data analysis with fieldwork. That is, Conklin and Bittner produced a quasi ethnography of crime statistics. From this description, it should be obvious that not all Bittner’s publications could be glossed as ‘ethnomethodological’ or have prima facie relevance to ethnomethodology. However, we may discriminate a form of methodological adequacy in the assembly and use of statistics that is expressed by studies such as this as well as those by Bittner’s contemporaries (Cicourel 1968; 1974; Garfinkel 1948; Sudnow 1965).

Bittner concretised his work on organisations, and at the same time provided a coruscating critique of Weberian verstehen sociology, in arguably one of his most famous papers (Bittner 1965), albeit one that is both ‘undervalued’ and rarely explicated in its own terms (Anderson, Hughes and Sharrock 1990: 237; Orr 2006: 1807). To use Garfinkel’s phrase, its ‘corpus status’ as an ethnomethodological study was confirmed when it was reprinted in an early collection of papers on ethnomethodology (Turner 1974); and its inclusion in a multi-volume celebration of ethnomethodological work (Lynch and Sharrock 2003) attests to its longevity and its pre-eminence within the field. This highlighting of Bittner’s (1965) paper is more than an acknowledgement of an early study but a pointer towards the continuing presence of his work: for example, contributors to a new volume of ethnomethodological studies of work (Rouncefield and Tolmie 2011) locate their inquiries in reference to Bittner’s (1965) paper.
‘The Concept of Organization’ influenced subsequent organisational studies (inter alia, Anderson et al. 1990; Orr 1996; Watson 1986; Watson and Sharrock 1990; Zimmerman 1966), which have a high profile in sociology of organisations, ethnomethodological and ‘studies of work’ literatures, and have, in turn, been influential texts in their own right. Its high-profile presence and importance within ethnomethodological subfields derives, perhaps, from its generative qualities, such is the variety of uses which ‘The Concept of Organization’ affords. The paper is suffused with luminous explications of members’ accounting practices that have been critical in the pursuance of ethnomethodological inquiries. For example, ‘theoretical short circuit’, ‘terms and determinations’, authorisation through members’ ‘bona fides’, ‘corroborative reference’, ‘gambit of compliance’, ‘stylistic unity’; all these feature in Bittner’s concision and are available for subsequent ethnomethodological analyses (Button et al. 2012). Bittner’s articulation of bona fides – how people are recognised by others to possess the knowledge and authority to define situations – consolidated his notions of ‘competence’ and ‘membership’, which are signature concepts of the Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) paper, as Bittner had explored earlier in his Ph.D. (Bittner 1961; 1980) and his considerations of psychiatry (e.g., Bittner 1968)11 and police work.

We can see also that Bittner (1965: 239, n. 1) provides an initial iteration of the ‘haecceity’ (then, quiddity) argument that would feature strongly in the ‘pulsar paper’ (Garfinkel et al. 1981) as one of the auspices of ethnomethodological studies, in contrast to studies which ‘lose the phenomenon’.

For those sociologists who read it, Egon Bittner’s (1965) challenge to organisation theory, and organisational sociology, required of them irrevocable change in how they approached their inquiries. Bittner provided not just a critique but a programmatic research agenda for work not just on ‘organisations’ but upon socially organised phenomena:

Plucked from its native ground, i.e., the world of common sense, the concept of rational organization, and the schematic determinations that are subsumed under it, are devoid of information on how its terms relate to facts. Without knowing the structure of this relationship of reference, the meaning of the concept and its terms cannot be determined.

In this situation an investigator may use one of three research procedures. He can, for one thing, proceed to investigate formal organization while assuming that the unexplicated common-sense meanings of the terms are adequate definitions for the purposes of his investigation. In this case, he must use that which he proposes to study as a resource for studying it.

He can, in the second instance, attach to the terms a more or less arbitrary meaning by defining them operationally. In this case, the relationship of reference
between the term and the facts to which it refers will be defined by the operations of inquiry. Interest in the actor’s perspective is either deliberately abandoned, or some fictitious version of it is adopted.

The investigator can, in the last instance, decide that the meaning of the concept, and of all the terms and determinations that are subsumed under it, must be discovered by studying their use in real scenes of action by persons whose competence to use them is socially sanctioned.

It is only the last case which yields entirely to the rule specifying the relevance of the perspective of the actor in sociological inquiry. This is so because in order to understand the meaning of the actor’s thought and action, which Weber sought, one must study how the terms of his discourse are assigned to real objects and events by normally competent persons in ordinary situations.

(Bittner 1965: 247)

This extended quote has been reprinted here because it exhibits a family resemblance with the ‘analytic mentality’ – to use Jim Schenkein’s (1978) term – of ethnomethodology. Bittner’s summary encapsulates the differences between and the radically alternate nature of formal-sociological and ethnomethodological inquiries. Embedded within a discursus on organisations and organisation theory, Bittner clarified not only the methodological inadequacies of traditional sociological, formal-analytic approaches, including Weberian approaches, to the study of organisations; Bittner’s programmatic statement provided a radical, alternate research agenda to the emergent field of ethnomethodology.

This agenda is followed through in his book, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society, as Bittner elaborated: ‘instead of attempting to divine the role of the police from programmatic idealizations, we should seek to discern this role by looking to those reality conditions and practical circumstances to which the formulas presumably apply’ (Bittner 1970: 4–5). By ‘constructing theoretical puppets that do nothing other than what a specific theorist proposes’ (Wieder 1971: 108), formal-analytic sociology is limited to working with decontextualised, reified idealisations of members and organisations. Idealisations nullify competent membership in theoretical accounts of social organisation: members’ competence is ‘theorised out’ by formal analysis through formal-analytic practices of theorising. Members become bit players in their own lives as sociologically retold. The skills with which they ‘do the organization’s work’ (Watson 1986) disappear in a theory-driven cloud.
A feature of sociology has been the ‘problem’ of ‘objectivity’ in sociology, at least what ‘objectivity’ could possibly be, regardless of whether ‘objectivity’ is detached from the canonical standards of scientific inquiry in the social sciences (Bittner 1973: 117). In various formulations Bittner would refer to the nature of attempting to satisfy the canons of scientific method, which was an avowedly phenomenological approach towards the ‘scientific’ or ‘analytic attitude’ and ‘the normal, ordinary, traditionally sanctioned world-view’ (Bittner 1963: 929). Such formulations implicate science, sociology’s scientific pretensions, and sociology itself.

Bittner’s contributions to ethnomethodology can be seen in a context where ‘objectivity’ is a formal-analytic idealisation produced by theorising social orders, which may be achieved or, at least, approximated towards, through the use of formal-analytic methods. ‘Methodology’ is a gloss for the epistemological bases for doing research – the nature of knowledge, the nature of phenomena to be studied by a discipline, rather than how access to those phenomena can be realised (methods). This distinction is instructably observable in books entitled *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Kaufmann 1944; Weber 1949) and is elaborated by texts that discuss aspects and logical implications of doing research and doing writing in sociology and the social sciences (Winch 1958; Znaniecki 1968). Such that, for example, phenomena that are the proper topics of sociology are only available from particular approaches, e.g., that take account of ‘subjective meanings’ (Weber 1947), or of the ‘humanistic coefficient’ (Znaniecki 1927).

Bittner challenges the formal-analytic conception of sociology as a programme that adheres to a set or canon of criteria for judging scientific adequacy. Methodology neither describes nor dictates methods; rather, the methodology-discipline nexus revolves around the ‘clarification of meanings’ (Kaufmann 1944: 46). Unfortunately, in formal-analytic inquiries the practices of theorising and search for ‘objectivity’ do prescribe methodic options, formulated as ‘methodogenic ontology’ (Wieder 1980). The methodogenic ontology of formal analysis imposes limitations upon the range of phenomena that are available to FA inquiries. Formal-analytic inquirers may combine methods – at the risk of conflating different language games and producing category-mistakes (Watson 1992) – but do not take the radical ethnomethodological turn of developing methods to suit the phenomenon of inquiry (Livingston 1995). Harold Garfinkel would work through the ‘problem of objectivity’ through the phenomenological bracketing of researchable phenomena, which he formulated as ‘ethnomethodological indifference’ (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970). Bittner was also concerned with this issue, the
realisation of how the ‘canons of scientific method’ (Bittner 1963: 931) were inappropriate to studying phenomena of social organisation.¹⁴

‘Science’ – its relation to sociology – has always been constitutive of the sociological firmament (Mills 1959) but the implications of its relevance for sociology (or what was assumed to be relevant for sociology) remained unexplained (Kaufmann 1944). The terms of the science/common sense debate reappear under various guises and under various auspices of the ‘canons of scientific objectivity’ (Bittner 1973: 114).¹⁵ A diverse corpus of writing (inter alia, Dennis 2003; Elliot 1974; Garfinkel 1960b; Husserl 1970; Pollner 1987; Schütz 1943; 1953; Sharrock and Anderson 1991; Winch 1958) deflates the apparent dichotomy between scientific and common-sense forms of knowledge, or the dichotomy between the common-sense attitude and the theoretic attitude.

Part of a wider tendency to dichotomise sociological approaches, reducing debate to series of dualisms (such as structure/agency, macro/micro) that are ‘derivations’ from philosophical foundations (Sharrock and Watson 1988), the objectivity/subjectivity opposition is based upon misapprehensions regarding the determinations of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ (Sharrock and Anderson 1991). These misapprehensions create needless positions and in so doing afford erroneous attributions of positions, a form of misplaced perspectivism, e.g., that if approaches are not ‘objective’ then they have to be ‘subjective’ (Sharrock and Watson 1988). When it is clarified that ethnomethodology is not objective it is mischaracterised as its ‘opposite’, subjective, even when clarification insists that ethnomethodology is indifferent to and resists the language game of such theorising.

Bittner elaborated upon the traditional frameworks of structure/agency, objective/subjective via a phenomenological approach. For Bittner, it was the determinations of sociological analysis, not just the (at times partisan) terms of any particular form of sociological analysis, which was at issue. Bittner argued that formal-analytic inquiries will always remain inchoate and parasitical on members’ common-sense reasoning because ‘sociologists always attempt to render accounts of matters about which accounts already exist. For example, to be analysed, kinship structure is always already known to those who constitute it. Furthermore, the sociologist is required to draw the terms of his analysis from what is known from the perspective of the actor. Consequently, to gratify the hope for a scientifically objective sociological account the sociologist would have to substitute objective for indexical expressions. … [N]o-one has ever succeeded in the objective study of society without relaxing canons of objectivity, and therefore it is not unreasonable to argue that this relaxation is indispensable’ (Bittner 1973: 116). Here we are witnessing the themes of competence and membership, regarding what can be studied, and by whom.¹⁶
However, Bittner does not here provide an entry point with formal-analytic inquiries that are seen to be ‘subjective’ rather than ‘objective’. In his paper ‘Objectivity and Realism in Sociology’, Bittner (1973) distances ethnomethodological inquiry from the then dominant ‘qualitative’ sociological approach – Symbolic Interactionism (SI) – which he argues is characterised by the development of theoretical ‘structures’ and layers of conceptualisation that cannot approach the phenomena of social interactional orders that SI purportedly describes. Bittner anticipates the demarcations of ethnomethodology and ‘qualitative’ formal-analytic approaches, such as ‘construction’ (Pollner 1987: 161), which were formulated later (Garfinkel and Wiley 1980); and he anticipates the development and limitations of (what would later be called) ‘postmodern ethnography’ (Travers 2001: 161). Bittner elaborates on the methodological aspects of theoretical options in ‘qualitative’ sociology, particularly SI and its relative position to ethnomethodology, a ‘perspicuous’ juncture that, at the time, had been subjected to considerable consideration (Wieder 1971; Zimmerman and Wieder 1971).

Indeed, Bittner here deflates (what Howard Schwartz would call) the ‘news from nowhere’ aspect of ‘qualitative’ forms of sociology. One of Schwartz’ arguments is how ‘qualitative’ sociologists must attempt to make their studies stand apart from ‘what “everybody” knows’ – when the sociologist shares the natural language with both the group being studied and the group to whom the study is presented. The novelty of any ‘findings’ is further compromised because sociologists, who will be the audience for the study, share the same natural language as the group being studied. To circumvent this problem, the qualitative sociologist can select groups ‘so that their daily lives are substantially disjointed’ (Schwartz 2002: 104) whereby the study exhibits ‘insiders’ accounts which are no news to the insiders themselves, but which have the status of findings for the group to which they are presented’ (Schwartz 2002: 105).

Bittner’s (1973) appeal for a more explicative sociology, what we can refer to as avoiding ‘methodological irony’, locates asymmetries between the observer and the observed not as a theorised, artificial-but-real for-all-practical-purposes encounter, e.g., characterised by an ‘unequal power relationship’, but a practical real-world occasion between members who share a command of natural-language competencies, what Schütz termed the ‘natural attitude’, but that this encounter is subject to the post hoc analytic relevances of the observer. Bittner’s call for explication takes the form, ‘if the field worker’s claim to realism and to respect for the perspective of the actor are to be given serous credence, then it will have to be made clear what from they assume when they are a function not of a natural attitude of the actor but of a deliberately appropriated “natural attitude” of the observer’ (Bittner 1973: 118).
As such, the observer-observed encounter is open to the practical work of theorising in an analytic attitude (Smith 1974) and, to use Pollner’s term, the ‘ ironicizing of experience’. Bittner’s set of phenomenological arguments in ‘Objectivity and Realism’ thus contain resonances with Peter Winch’s Wittgensteinian counter to Alisdair MacIntyre (1962): ‘When MacIntyre goes on to say that the observer “cannot omit reference to the rationality or otherwise of those rules and conventions” followed by the alien agent, whose concept of rationality is now in question: ours or the agent’s? Since the observer must be understood now as addressing himself to members of his own society, it seems that the reference must here be to the concept of rationality current in the observer’s society’ (Winch 1974: 97).

CONCLUSION

Recognising Bittner’s phenomenological rather than Wittgensteinian emphasis does not accord with an attribution of his being solely of historical interest within the development of ethnomethodology. It is possible that locating Bittner’s work as expressing a commitment to phenomenology within ethnomethodology, or considering Bittner’s sociological writings in a historical or chronological context, obscure the continued relevance of his work to the programme of respecification.18 As we argued earlier, his paper ‘The Concept of Organization’ set an agenda for ethnomethodological inquiries. However, this is an agenda that continues to provide a rationale for ethnomethodological studies, shown by its use in recent contributions to the ‘ethnomethodological studies of work’ programme (Rouncefield and Tolmie 2011). Orr (2006) describes how ‘The Concept of Organization’ afforded an analytic approach that was more appropriate than traditional organisational models to studying organisational work, and members’ work as employees of organisations. Coulter (1996) also shows that ‘The Concept of Organization’ affords a respecification of traditional sociological topics. In a chapter dedicated to the respecification of epistemology as a sociological concept, Sharrock and Anderson (1991) demonstrate the perspicuous and crucial intervention of Bittner’s ‘Objectivity and Realism in Sociology’, in which Bittner identifies epistemological and methodological troubles that should be topics of explication for sociologists if they hope to satisfy the expectations or pretensions of scientific status (Sharrock and Anderson 1991). Indeed, they highlight its continued relevance for the debate, endogenous to ethnomethodology, problematising the use of the term ‘construction’. Given its uncritical appropriation by formal-analytic sociologies to be pressed into service regardless of topic – a theme explored in ‘The Structure of Psychiatric Influence’ (Bittner 1968) – ‘Objectivity
and Realism in Sociology’ is a salutary source on the reification of both topics and concepts for doing sociology.

Bittner’s work was vital in the emergence and development of ethnomethodology, and, as shown by the use of his work in recent publications by others, his work is of continued importance for the prosecution of sociological projects today. To our minds, much of what is regarded as organisational sociology would benefit from an engagement with the analytic mentality and observational sensibilities of Bittner: then we might see something of the worldly practices constitutive of organisations’ work and move toward a peopled social science.

NOTES

1. Acknowledgements: We could not have written this without the help of Deborah Seys Bittner and Thomas Bittner. We also thank Aaron Cicourel, Peter Manning, Howie Schwartz, Rod Watson, and Maria Wowk for their patient advice.
2. Bittner (1990: 2–3) admitted that there was a perceived difference between the work he was known for in different research communities.
4. For his presidential address to the SSSP, see Bittner (1983).
5. E.g., Garfinkel (1967); Garfinkel and Sacks (1970). See Garfinkel (2007), wherein Bittner is described not only as one of ‘ethnomethodology’s authors’ (passim) but as the author of ‘exemplary studies’ (p.19). See Psathas (2006: 253).
7. Parsons’ Primer (Garfinkel 1960a). His Ph.D. thesis (Garfinkel 1952) and proximate writings (e.g., Garfinkel nd), as well as manuscripts edited by Anne W. Rawls (Garfinkel 2002; 2008) make available the depth of Garfinkel’s appreciation for Parsons.
9. The analytic contexts to which Bittner contributed are detailed in various sources (e.g., Heritage 1984; Lynch 1993). It was a serious, high-level engagement. Given the resemblances between Larimer Tours and Harvey Sacks’ (1972) ‘police paper’, in terms of ‘normal appearances’, one of these contexts was the emergence of ethnomethodology (Schegloff 1999).
10. In explicating professional sociological interest in ‘organisation’ for non-sociologists, Garfinkel (1956: 181–84) detailed continuities and discontinuities between laic and analytic conceptions of the term, one of which being the form of bureaucratic organisation treated in Bittner’s paper.
11. This was acknowledged by Garfinkel (1967: 57).
12. This book is also included in *Aspects of Police Work* (Bittner 1990), a collection of essays written for different audiences over time. It makes available a variety of Bittner’s papers of interest to criminologists and research on the operations of the police, but there is no claim to a ‘thematic unity’ under the auspices of ethnomethodology.

13. Both Livingston and Wieder here provide ethnomethodological elaborations of Bittner’s summative statement in his Ph.D. dissertation: ‘the conclusions drawn from the data will vary with theoretical interest, where conclusions refer primarily to programs of future inquiry indicated by the findings’ (Bittner 1961: 244).

14. Of course what ‘scientific method’ consists in and how it is constituted in social science is a worldly achievement. Taking one example, the survey interview, Maynard and Schaeffer show the ‘interactional substrate’ (2006: 10) or the ‘talk-in-interaction’ that achieves the standardised interview.

15. Or, as Garfinkel noted, ‘seen as a procedure of successively transforming, or better successively reconstituting a world, any world, in accordance with the particular rules of the scientific attitude and the procedures of the scientific method’ (Garfinkel nd: 4).

16. Competence regarding topics of inquiry is formulated elsewhere as the ‘[s]ocially-sanctioned-facts-of-life-in-society-that-any-bona-fide-member-of-society-knows’ (Garfinkel 1959: 51). Limits of analytic privilege according to membership are summarised in the same source: ‘Just as sociological inquiries are not confined to professional sociologists, neither is the attitude of daily life confined to the ‘man in the street’” (Garfinkel 1959: 55).

17. Using Pollner as an example, Sharrock and Anderson (1991: 76) note how approaches to ‘construction’ differ within ethnomethodology as a corpus, and within corpora of individual ethnomethodologists.

18. It is of note that while some of Alfred Schütz’ work had not fully expunged a cognitive cast, which was problematic for the programme of respecification, that some of Aron Gurwitsch’s work (e.g., Gurwitsch 1964), subject to ‘ethnomethodological misreadings’, featured directly in Garfinkel’s formulation of respecification (e.g., Garfinkel 1996).

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