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Understanding discursive persuasion in American and Iraqi call to arms discourse discursive strategies as instruments of persuasive politics

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**UNDERSTANDING DISCURSIVE PERSUASION IN AMERICAN AND
IRAQI CALL TO ARMS DISCOURSE: DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES AS
INSTRUMENTS OF PERSUASIVE POLITICS**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LINGUISTICS AND ENGLISH
LANGUAGE IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**AT
BANGOR UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES
SCHOOL OF LINGUISTICS AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE**

**By
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BANGOR, AUGUST 2018

Abstract:

‘Call to arms’ is the battlefield for the conflict for power and legitimacy between different ideologies, with language playing a vital role. Nowadays, the most recent examples are the speeches of various political figures on the War on Terror, due to the rising threat of terrorism worldwide. Analysing ‘call to arms’, the War on Terror, in different genres has received considerable academic interests in the last decade. However, most of these academic endeavours present themselves to understand the dynamics of such discursive constructs and strategies used either by western, American in particular or European discourse producers.

It is against this backdrop that this thesis investigates the American and Iraqi ‘call to arms’ discourse instantiated in highly formalised institutional genre. The study presents a critical analysis of how persuasion has been produced and discursively realised in two different socio-political discourses. The study examines four specific speeches: two by American Presidents, namely, George W Bush and Barack Obama, and the remaining two were delivered by two Iraqi Prime Ministers, Nouri Al-Maliki and Haider Al-Abadi.

The thesis incorporates some of the widely applied CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) analytical categories used in the DHA (Discourse-Historical Approach), including *referential*, *predicational*, *perspectivization*, *argumentative strategies (Topoi)* and *the strategies of intensification and mitigation* (Resigil & Wodak, 2001), and legitimation studies from Van Leeuwen (2007) and Reyes (2011), along with some elements from the socio-semantic approach of van Leeuwen on the representation of social actors (van Leeuwen, 1996).

The thesis emphasises specific linguistic ways in which language represents an instrument of control and a manifestation of symbolic power in discourse of war. It first develops an analytical approach that derives from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and legitimisation studies to account for how ‘call to arms’ can be produced and discursively realised in situ. This particular work expands, and further proposes, some key discursive constructs and strategies of persuasion political figures employ in the discourse of going to war.

The analysis of the data demonstrates that the American ‘call to arms’ rhetoric is not dissimilar to the Iraqi ‘call to arms’ rhetoric.

To the victims of terror all around the world

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

History has recorded innumerable occasions, for example, Alexander's speeches to his soldiers, the speeches of FD Roosevelt during the Second World War and later, the speeches of J F Kennedy, when leaders have convinced their people to sacrifice their lives or the lives of others in warfare for the greater good or some noble cause. Politicians and religious leaders are very adept at making use of discourse in this way to further their official positions. According to Beard (2000, p.35), "making speeches is a vital part of the politician's role in announcing policy and persuading people to agree with it." Additionally, they "have privileged access to mass media and the power to reach and influence enormous public audience." (Van Dijk, 1998) The more access to various discourse genres, contexts, participants and audiences, the more powerful are the social groups, institutions and elites (Mohan, 2013).

Politicians have benefited from using strategic language to convey ideologies. In this respect, the key to their success in doing so is their ability to practice soft power over their people (Oddo, 2011), which enables them to persuade others without the use of force to do what they do (not) want to do (Chouliaraki, 2005; Nye, 2004). Some of their soft power is derived from their status and rank (Oddo, 2011, p. 289), while some is a result of their oratory style and delivery technique (Mohan, 2013, p.34). Of course, this is by no means the only way leaders persuade their people to, for example, go to war. The most telling of these ways, the strategic use of language, is becoming the key means of generating support for a war.

The present study accounts for a crucial use of language in the discourse of war: the process in which specific linguistic ways represent an instrument of control and a manifestation of symbolic power, the power that makes the unpleasant realities of war necessary and deserves unification and support. It advances understanding of how persuasion has been produced, received and discursively realised in 'call to arms' speeches in two different socio-political discourses. The study explains the use of those discursive structures and strategies through four contemporary 'call to arms' speeches. These speeches are credible by their authoritative source and formal context. The study examines four specific speeches: two by American leaders,

namely, George W Bush and Barack Obama, and two by Iraqis, Nouri Al-Maliki and Haider Al-Abadi, to understand how they frame their argumentations by utilising the DHA's strategies as meaningful categories for convincing people of the moral virtue of war so they will support it. Therefrom, the thesis provides a new context of comparison, cross-ideologically contrasting the way the speakers build their persuasiveness from different ideological positionings.

In the course of this analysis, I employ a critical analysis to examine the rhetoric of 'call to arms' genre-the War on Terror, in two different political discourses. In most Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) studies, the critical effect of discursive structures and strategies used in political speeches regarding terrorism by Iraqi [Middle Eastern] politicians in highly formalised institutional genres have not paid sufficient attention to textual critical analysis. To this effect, this thesis contributes to CDA and the field of the War on Terror, as it investigates the words of two Iraqi (Middle Eastern) political leaders and extends the existing scholarship by examining the discourse of two American speakers: Bush and Obama.

The analysis anchored theoretically in CDA. It incorporates some of the widely applied CDA analytical categories used in the (DHA), including *referential*, *predicational*, *perspectivization*, *argumentative strategies (Topoi)* and *the strategies of intensification and mitigation* (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), and legitimation studies from van Leeuwen (2007) and Reyes (2011), along with some elements from the socio-semantic approach of van Leeuwen on the representation of social actors (van Leeuwen, 1996).

1.2. Terrorism and the War on Terror

Post the 11th of September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York City and Washington D.C., in the United States, when two fully seated airplanes were hijacked and intentionally crashed into the Twin Towers, this action resulted in the death of more than 3000 people of different nationalities. Since that, the term 'terrorism' or 'terrorist' has become an extremely common lexicon in the vocabulary of national and international politics and media. However, the term was not always this way until 1972 (Brulin, 2011). Historically, the meaning of 'terrorism' is related to the Munich fatal incident, and more specifically to the killing of Israeli athletes by Palestinian Black September Organisation during the Olympic Games held in Munich in 1972 (Brulin, 2011, p.12). This critical incident captured public attention, instilled fear and caused many to re-evaluate their plans that had otherwise been taken for granted for a

long time. Perhaps most telling of the future plans was that the term terrorism was considered by the UN as a measure to prevent international terrorism in December 1972. Then, the UN members agreed to be a resolution 3034¹ but with no clear-cut definition, the problem still persists, even in the American political discourse, where the term is contemporary resurrected (Hawks & Baruh, 2011).

In a historical–quantitative analysis, Brulin (2011) traces the frequencies of the word ‘terrorism’ in the American presidency discourse during the last four decades. In this study, Brulin hypothesises that the United States did not have, before the incident of Munich 1972, a discourse on terrorism. In order to pinpoint his hypothesis, Brulin examines only 6 speeches by President Roosevelt, 4 by Truman, 4 by Eisenhower, 1 by Kennedy, 44 by Johnson and 25 by Nixon. The analysis confirmed that the term ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ is used only once, occasionally twice, in the overwhelming majority of the selected data (Brulin, 2011). Another proof presented by Brulin to support his hypothesis, is the official message of the US President, Richard Nixon² to the Government of Israel, in which Nixon did not use the term ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ to describe the Munich incidents. He describes the events as “murderous” and “senseless and tragic” act perpetrated by “international outlaws.” The same holds for the US Congress’s statement of condemnation in which the act was described as “inimical to the interests and aspirations of the civilized world”, and that these were “acts of murder and barbarism” (Brulin, 2011).

Modern critical incidents include the 11th September attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., and relatively similar bombing incidents in different parts of the world, and most recently, in Iraq and Syria. Terrorism is defined as an “ideological and theological fanaticism coupled with rapid technological advancements in communications (e.g. the internet), transportation (e.g. modern international air travel), as well as conventional and unconventional weaponry, to create a truly lethal threat.” (Alexander³, quoted in Hawks & Baruh, 2011, p. x). This would mean that modern terrorism presents a multitude of threats, to the civil rights of ordinary people;

¹ For more about this resolution see <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/270/64/IMG/NR027064.pdf?OpenElement>

² The 37th President of the US from 1969 until 1974 when he resigned from the presidency. He is the only U.S. president to do so.

³ A professor Emeritus of International Studies, State University of New York and currently Director of the Inter-University Centre of Terrorism Studies.

safety, welfare, the stability of state systems, the health of national and international economic systems and the expansion of democracies, as in case of Iraq and Syria. Critical incidents, like these are remarkable events in the life of people that could act as “turning points” affecting people’s future behaviour (Hawks & Baruh, 2011). Perhaps most telling of this future is the declaration of the War on Terror as a pre-emptive war. In 2004, Bush stated that the deathly events of September taught us that threats must be anticipated before they materialise (Reese & Lewis, 2009, p. 34).

Consequently, the US President, George W Bush on 20th of September 2001, stood in the US Congress and declared an open war on terrorism. The war, as he stated, would continue until all terrorist groups are identified and defeated wherever they are. In this war “We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, and drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism” (Bush 2001). With its vague spatial and temporal scope, and unclear enmities and alliances, the War on Terror ranged geographically from Afghanistan to Iraq, and ideologically from the umbrella terms of the ‘War on Terror’ to ‘Iraqi freedom’ (Reyes, 2011).

The most telling of this pre-emptive war, the US began a series of military actions, started first on Afghanistan in October 2001, and then on Iraq in March 2003. The US Presidency justified the war against Afghanistan by claiming that the latter is a hotbed of terrorism within which the Taliban regime is supporting and harbouring terrorist groups, particularly al Qaeda. Less than three years later, the coalition forces, led by the US, invaded Iraq on the 19th of March 2003. In addition to the accusation that Iraq was developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), it was claimed that Iraq had links with the 11th September attacks (Piety & Foley, 2006; Rid, 2007). In more subtle ways for moral legitimization, the US Presidency headed its war on Iraq, the ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ (McGoldrick, 2004, p.16). Notwithstanding there being no proof to support the claims made regarding Iraq’s WMD programme and links to the attacks of September, at the time, millions of Americans believed them to be true and continued to do so for some time (Dadge, 2006, p.2).

1.3. Guiding research interests, aims and research questions

There are three different rationales for conducting this study from an academic and personal perspectives, and three issues attracted my attention and motivated me to research this area.

Personally, as an individual from a conflict zone, as I am from Iraq, I decided to contribute in giving a voice or a message to those who believe in democracy, human rights and freedom that terrorism is a common enemy and its elimination should be a common goal, with language playing a vital role. Secondly, after reviewing the literature, I found that in most Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) studies, the critical effect of discursive structures and strategies used in political speeches about terrorism by Iraqi [Middle Eastern] politicians in highly formalised institutional genres have not paid sufficient attention to textual critical analysis and left it almost unattended. Therefore, I believe that we still need to know more about the nature and quality of the Iraqi political discourse in term of the War on Terror, especially after the misrepresented of Iraq and Iraqis since 2001. The US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave rise to misrepresentation of Iraq and Iraqi, even so there was no proof of Iraq's links to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, or that Iraq possessed WMD⁴. In fact, Iraq is on the front line of the War on Terror, and Iraqis are honest partners of all who believe in democracy and human rights (Al-Maliki⁵, 2006). Hence, the main ideas of Iraqi political perspectives will be presented and explained here, have been clear for many years to the Iraqis, but it is the first time that they have been introduced to the English language readership, and I hope that this will contribute towards a more nuanced and critical assessment of Iraq and Iraqis.

Finally, the third motivation for conducting this research was the data itself, which stimulated my interest. In literature, no study has examined the works of the selected speakers in one work. The selected data represent four contemporary examples delivered by four different wartime leaders and reflecting three different political perspectives: Republican, i.e. Bush, Democratic, i.e. Obama and Islamic, i.e. Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi. Hence, the four speeches adequately represent three different types of 'call to arms' discourse. This may give rise to the following question: Can we see similar discursive strategies amongst the speeches, common to all of them? Political speeches are a highly-formalised genre and have the capability to persuade people. The promotion of ideologies via such speeches leads to the construction of political consensus (Carroll, 2009).

⁴ Weapons of Mass Destruction

⁵ The Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq 2006-2014 (see chapter 7, section 7.1 for more about him).

This is a descriptive and comparative study aims to decipher and show the operationalisation of discursive structures and strategies used in ‘call to arms’ discourse, and how they are instrumentalised by the four selected speakers as persuasive projects. It incorporates some of the widely applied CDA analytical categories used in the DHA, including *nomination/referential strategies*, to look at how social actors, objects, phenomena and events are named and referred to linguistically: *Predication strategies* to characterise social actors and practices in accordance with the evaluative characterisations of positive or negative traits through predicates; the *strategy of perspectization*, in which social actors (political figures) express either detachment or involvement of certain issue to position their points of view and opinions; *Argumentation, (Topoi)* the process of justifying and legitimising actors, objects and phenomena, in which the orator aims for acceptability by employing unlimited number of topoi (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4 for extensive definitions and examples), linguistic structures and rhetorical devices which study whether these speakers try to connect arguments to conclusion or central claim, and finally, the *strategies of intensification/mitigation* to certain actors or events. This group of strategies modifies and qualifies the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances. Intensification/mitigation is “a commonplace strategy to topicalize and de-topicalize a certain point of view” (Khosravi Nik, 2010, p. 57).

The thesis focuses on understanding how persuasion is produced and reflected in two different ‘call to arms’ discourses. Ultimately, at a broader level, this thesis aims to shed some light on how ‘call to arms’ have been produced and discursively realised in American and Iraqi political discourses. In order to investigate this aim systematically and in an empirically grounded fashion, an overarching research question was articulated to guide the analytical focus of this thesis. Drawing on Sunderland (2010), this primary question is operationalised by three sets of subordinate methodological, empirical and theoretical questions.

The methodological question targets the potential operationalisation of the empirical objectives of this research, to explore the possible method(s) that provides a meaningful understanding of persuasion in ‘call to arms’ discourse as instantiated in American and Iraqi political discourses. The empirical questions posited in this thesis are borrowed from Wodak (2009) and modified by the researcher to fit the aim(s) of this study. These empirical questions are, to some extent,

comparatively oriented. They emphasise the distinctive features and characteristics of the ‘call to arms’ discourses that produced by two different socio-political discourse producers. Hence, each of these empirical questions will be answered in a separate level of analysis.

Finally, the theoretical question attests the theoretical assumptions of each of the analytical categories and approaches applied in the thesis, i.e. the DHA’s methodological categories, persuasion and legitimation studies, against the yet relatively under-investigated American and Iraqi political discourses to provide persuasive ‘call to arms’ discourses. To that effect, new theoretical concepts will be advanced in this thesis to account for the nature and quality of discursive strategies used in ‘call to arms’ discourses on the War on Terror as represented in influential American and Iraqi political discourses. These new theoretical concepts will be of relevance to current advances in CDA studies and persuasiveness studies.

Primary question:

What are the nature and quality of discursive strategies used in ‘call to arms’ speeches on the War on Terror, as represented in an influential American and Iraqi political discourses?

Methodological question:

How can the production of persuasion in American and Iraqi political discourses be accounted for systematically?

Empirical question:

1. How have individuals, objects, events, processes and actions been named and referred to linguistically in the selected speeches?
2. What traits, qualities and features have been attributed to social actors, objects, events and processes involved in the discourse on the War on Terror in the selected speeches?
3. From what perspective have these nominations, attributes and arguments been expressed in the selected speeches?
4. What strategies are employed by the speakers in question to transfer an argument to a conclusion or central claim in the data?
5. What strategies have been used to intensify or mitigate illocutionary force by the speakers to topicalise and de-topicalise certain point of view in the selected speeches?

Theoretical question:

To what extent can the analysis of ‘call to arms’ discourses in terms of production attest the general assumptions of DHA, persuasion and legitimation studies, and theoretically contribute to these fields of scholarship based on empirical evidence from a relatively under-investigated data?

1.4. Outline of the thesis

In accordance with the aforementioned ideas and aims the study revolves around, the thesis is divided into eleven chapters. The present chapter, the Introduction, is designed to provide background information on the political, social, historical and analytical dimensions of the research project (sections 1.1 & 1.2). The chapter also sets out the rationale for conducting this research project and the researcher’s motivation for doing so, as well as its aims and questions (section 1.3). Finally, section (1.4) will, in turn, provide an overview of the chapters.

The second and third chapters introduce the different approaches employed in the analysis. The aim of these two chapters is to advance the theoretical framework that will inform the analysis in the later analytical chapters. Focusing on the theory of persuasion and political discourse, chapter two defines persuasion and its origin (section 2.2), explaining its inter-relationship with language and politics (section 2.3). It continues in section (2.4) to investigate the types and functions of public speeches, and the indispensable relationship between persuasion and the art of public speaking (section 2.5), focusing on Aristotelian Theory of Rhetoric (section 2.6). Finally, the chapter pinpoints the significance of persuasion in the development of democratic societies (section 2.6).

It continues in chapter three, the main literature on CDA and work which deals with ‘call to arms’ speeches is reviewed. The chapter begins by offering a historical introduction to critical analysis developments, describing the shift from what was known as Critical Linguistics to Critical Discourse Analysis (section 3.2), and shedding some light on its definitions, aims and principles (section 3.3). In order to produce a better understanding of the critical framework the study builds upon, section 3.4 investigates the three main methods and approaches within the school of CDA and their interplay when analysing political discourse (section 3.5), and ‘call to

arms' discourse (section 3.6). Finally, the chapter concludes by reviewing some discourse-oriented studies on the 'call to arms' genre (section 3.7).

The fourth chapter delineates the methodology and data collection. After the categorisation of the data according to content and function (section 4.2), the data selection criteria are clarified according to the indicated aims (section 4.3). The chapter then outlines the main premises of the DHA and how it is implemented to pursue the aims of the project (section 4.4). In the last part, the inter-disciplinary approach is defined and justified, whereby a closer inspection of how legitimisation strategies are defined and exemplified is made (section 4.5).

Chapters five, six, seven and eight represent the analytical part of the thesis. They introduce a detailed analysis and discussion of some of the widely applied CDA analytical categories used in the DHA, including *referential*, *predication*, *perspectivation*, *argumentation* and *intensification/mitigation*. In the fifth chapter, the congressional speech delivered by George W Bush on the 20th of September 2001, wherein he stood in the US Congress and declared an open war on terror, is analysed. The sixth chapter analyses President Obama's anniversary speech of the 10th of September 2014, which was given in Cross Hall of the White House, wherein he introduced the US counterterrorism strategy to combat ISIL. The seventh chapter focuses on the speech of Nouri Al-Maliki, made on the 26th July 2006 at the US Congress. This speech mainly exemplifies the praise-blame approach, concentrating on praising and blaming the American administration as it does. Chapter eight presents a conference speech delivered by Haider Al-Abadi on the 3rd of December 2014 at NATO. The purpose of this speech and the conference itself was to mobilise the international community to actively participate in countering ISIL in the world in general and in Iraq and the Middle East in particular.

The ninth chapter presents a comparative analysis based on the previous four analysed chapters. It will be more specific in the implementation of the strategies of ***nomination***, ***predication***, ***perspectivization*** and ***argumentation*** in the context of the War on Terror, and the four speakers studied.

The tenth chapter provides an overview of data findings, and then engages critically with the findings and discusses and evaluates them in relation to previous studies, and in the context of

existing literature on persuasion in political discourse and the discourse of ‘call to arms’ in particular.

Finally, chapter eleven, the conclusions, discusses and summarises the thesis results, explaining how these results address the research questions. In this section, the thesis’s methodological and theoretical implications are discussed. Besides, the originality of this work and its contributions to the fields of persuasion, CDA and DHA are delineated. In the last part, limitation and challenges (section 11.2) and ideas for the future research (section 11.3) are shared with the readers.

CHAPTER 2: LANGUAGE AND PERSUASION

2.1. Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to examine how an increased understanding of the process of persuasion contributes to a more informed perspective regarding public communication in general and the discourse of war in more particular. The chapter begins by defining the origin and meaning of persuasion (section 2.2). It expands to explain the intertwined relationship between persuasion, language and politics (section 2.3). Section 2.4 presents the definition, types and function of public speeches. Section 2.5 explores the indispensable interplay between rhetoric and persuasion. It focuses on the strategic functions of Aristotle's rhetoric that may serve the political actors' pursuit of persuasion in ways that naturalise their ideological perspectives and de-naturalises other's ideologies (section 2.6). Specifically, the section provides an understanding of the dynamics of such discursive structures and strategies that may employ to make the negative/unpleasant realities of war the good that deserves support. It foregrounds how rhetoric may exercise in 'call to arms' discourse in order to maintain the politicians' interactional goals and advance their political objectives. Finally, section 2.7 traces the application of persuasion and its impact on changing and modifying people behaviors or beliefs in democratic societies.

2.2. Persuasion: scope and definitions

In theory and origin, the word 'persuade' is borrowed from the Old French, and then developed by Latin to 'persuadere', as a blend of the prefix 'per' denoting 'completion' (throughout, or thoroughly), and the base 'suadere' meaning to 'advise' or 'urge' (Sandell, 1977, p.78). While, in Old English, the term 'persuade' did not mean to 'convince', but merely an attempt to convince (Brembeck & Howell, 1976, p. 24). In terms of definition, 'persuasion' refers to making the change in attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of individuals or groups of individuals (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; Dainton & Zelle, 2011).

In order to elaborate the scope of this definition, it is desirable to review some technical definitions that have been developed by scholars who have studied persuasion in public and interpersonal communications. Miller & Roloff (1980, p.15) for instance, argue that '*being persuaded*' refers to situations, whereby an audience's behaviour has been attracted by symbolic

transactions (messages), which are sometimes, but not always, associated with coercive force (indirectly coercive). Accordingly, this definition stipulates that a certain modification in behaviour has to be affected so that one can assume that persuasion has taken place. In other words, persuasion seeks change, not mere information gain.

Likewise, Reardon (1982, p.25) believes that persuasion is, in all cases, “the activity of demonstrating and attempting to change the behaviour of at least one person through symbolic interaction.” Persuasion, then is that transmitted symbolic action intentionally intended to form or change the beliefs, opinions, values, attitudes, and/or behaviours of oneself or others. Persuasion, hence, is a transactional process among two or more persons whereby the management of symbolic meaning reconstructs reality, resulting in a voluntary change in beliefs, attitudes, and /or behaviours (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1992; Johnstone 1994; O’Keefe, 2002). This means persuasion is a speaker-audience interaction activity, which can be produced and understood as a speech action. In performing a speech action, the speaker may perform several acts and produce different effects (Hornsby, 1994). In the introductory part of a public speech, speakers perform various speech acts like thanking, sharing goal, showing association for performing the action with connecting to the audience.

Other scholars do not require such change in behaviour for persuasive ends. They believe that change in beliefs and attitudes (minds) of individuals or a group of individuals is enough to recognise persuasion. For instance, Bettinghaus & Cody define Persuasion as “a conscious attempt by one individual to change the attitudes, beliefs of another individual or group of individuals through the transmission of some message” (Bettinghaus & Cody 1987, p.3). In this sense, Bettinghaus & Cody’s definition categorises persuasion as a verbal activity geared to bring about some change in belief or attitude of targeted people. Thus, the term persuasion refers to any instance in which an active attempt (language and symbolic actions) is made to change some person’s mind or influence choice –making (Petty & Cacioppo, 1987; Nothstine 1992).

In accordance with the aforementioned definitions and discussions, there is agreed on definition that persuasion is a communication transaction activity aims to change attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours of individuals or groups of individuals. This may give rise to the following question: How individuals’ attitudes, beliefs and behaviours are changed or attracted? In this connection, Mulholland (1994, p.47) states these changes of individuals’ beliefs, attitudes or behaviours can

be attended by the “misuse of power”, same could be said of the “manufacturing of consent”, or of the “artificial activity.” In terms of politics and politicians, these changes can be accomplished via ‘empty words’ and ‘misleading arguments’ (Charteris -Black, 2014), while, in discourse of ‘call to arms’ persuasion can be seen as a ‘manipulation of other’s minds (Oddo, 2011) or politics of lying (Kellner, 2007).

However, it is worth pointing out that manipulation⁶ and persuasion are two different concepts. Harré (1985, p. 126) views these two processes, i.e., manipulation and persuasion, as “processes of interpersonal action, [which] imply an asymmetrical direction of influence” (p. 126). Yet, the latter may “entail the existence of a psychological state or condition, that of being persuaded.” On the other hand, manipulation has negative psychological implications, i.e., that the audience, who is the victim of manipulation, are not aware of the power exercised on them (Harré, p. 126). In the same vein, van Dijk (2006b, p. 13) distinguishes between persuasion and manipulation. According to him, persuasion is legitimate as “the interlocutors are free to believe and act as they please, depending on whether or not they accept the arguments of the persuader.” On the other hand, in manipulation recipients are more or less passive, making them victims of the manipulation (van Dijk, 2006b, p. 361). Therefore, manipulation is considered an illegitimate form of social interaction. (For more about manipulative discourse see De Saussure, 2005; Hart, 2013a; Maillat & Oswald 2009; 2011 and 2013).

It seems the first conceptualisation of persuasion (i.e. ‘manipulation of other’s minds’, ‘empty words and ‘misleading arguments’) does not approach the purpose of the current study. Therefore, and in order to place my thesis in this context, I looked for a second conceptualisation to be more suited to understanding the discourse of the ‘call to arms’ and evaluate the agenda of the given speakers (i.e. the declaration/continuous war), which in turn fills the gap left by studies which do not show evidence of reasons, argument and legitimation for persuasive attempts. The second definition can be perceived as the antithesis of the first one. This second definition claims that in context of the ‘call to arms’ discourse persuasion is *an interactive process of communication that depends on reason, argument and legitimation*. This means

⁶An attempt to affect the target in such a way that his/her behavior/action is an instrument to achieve the goal of the manipulator-although these goals are presented in such a way that the target does not recognize them (Puzynina, 1992, cited in Blass, 2005, p.170).

persuasion is a cooperative action in which the yet relatively under-investigated American and Iraqi political leaders try to give sufficient, relevant and reasonable information so that the audience can deduce the meaning before framing any opinion or decision (i.e., support or not support) about the speakers' proposal(s), the War on Terror. This is because 1) war is a social practice that is a dangerous and often-deadly activity, and it must be assigned reason, argument and legitimation before undertaking it (Oddo, 2011). 2) The live audience of all the speakers were experts in politics (i.e. Statesmen, politicians, military and social leaders) and had knowledge of the negative realities of war and were not ordinary people that one could persuade (deceive/manipulate) them via empty words or misleading arguments.

Besides, defining persuasion in terms of reason, argument and legitimation does not only help in understanding the meaning of it and the evolution of political discourse, but also allows for observing the discursive attempts of politicians as persuasive projects, to maintain and extend their political and social 'in' and 'out' group, as they define themselves in terms of social groupings. This way of extending the notion of in-group involvement and out-group detachment helps in understanding political discourse as strategies for persuasion, rather than information or entertainment. Therefore, the study views persuasion as the not accidental social activity. It views persuasion as inherently a pre-planning communication activity like any political activity that aims to persuade the public rather than inform them.

2.3. Persuasion, language and politics

Persuasion is an essential element of political discourse; wherein political orators use various rhetorical and discursive strategies in order to persuade their audiences to modify their opinions and decisions. They create political ideologies and exercise power over their people through the persuasive use of language. In politics, language is not always an innocent and objective medium of sharing meaning and information. Indeed, it is the main tool to perform political actions and advance political agenda. Chilton and Schaffner (2003, p.3) maintain, "the doing of politics is predominantly constituted in language." Language can be used for constructing ideologies, exercising power and persuading people. Those who know and use these powers of language become powerful. For various socio-political purposes, politicians use language for persuasive ends rather than information, as every political action is prepared, accompanied, controlled and influenced by language (Schaffner, 1997, p.1).

Of course, language is not the only means of persuasion, but it is one major tool in the achievement of it. People may be persuaded for example, by bribery, by the influence of family or social relations, even though they may not correctly take place unless they are delivered within persuasive language (Mohan, 2013, p.34). This is because the language has many influential powers. It can be employed to achieve social as well as personal effects. Language can be utilised to affect, to suit, to construct, to attack or defend, to maintain or damage, and so on, of people's ideas, beliefs, ideologies, values, relations, and assumptions; any of which could be persuasively applied for some intended purposes. Mulholland (1994, p. xviii) conceptualises the persuasive function of language by defining language itself. He defines language "a means of interpreting the world, and a set of methods by which to influence their own and other's perceptions of the world, [...], and to manage the interactions they have with other." For instance, our ideas are constructed into texts, which represent our attitudes and emotions to the world through words, grammar, and, to such extra –language factors like voice qualities and body language.

In politics, language is not an innocent and objective medium of transferring information but, it is a tool of power, dominance, control, and persuasion. Some practitioners of language like politicians, advocates and the orators achieve great power with the help of language as a tool of power. These practitioners of language know what to say, when to say it, whom to say it to, and most importantly, how to say it. They use language strategically to catch the attention of and convince an audience. This strategic use of language is provided by the art of rhetoric, the art of public speeches in which rhetors look for what is possibly persuasive in every given case.

2.4. Public speech: types and functions

Martin Reisigl (2008, p.243) defines a speech as a series of coherent speech acts delivered by a single person for a specific purpose on a particular occasion oriented to a more or less specific audience. It can be seen as a purposeful interaction between the speaker and the audience in which the communicative intention of the speaker is to persuade the audience to accept the speaker's views and support his/her suggestions. Public speech is an important genre in the area of political discourse, and it takes a different form according to its purpose, social function and subject. According to Fairclough, (1995, p.14), genre is a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity. Crystal states that depending on the type

of genre, there are “several impositions on language use in relation to subject-matter, purpose, [...], textual structure, form of argumentation and level of formality” (Crystal, 2003, p.201).

There are three forms of oratory: the judicial, the deliberative and the epideictic (Schild, 1992; Plett, 2001). Setting the judicial oratory aside, political speeches can then take two forms: first, ‘*deliberative*’ speeches, which are related to issuing political decision(s) and making policy (Charteris – Back, 2014, p. xiii-xiv); and second, ‘*epideictic*’ speeches, through which politicians share political values and builds a consensus (Klein, 2000, p.748). However, it is often not easy to identify a speech as being one form or another (Engels, 1996, p.70 cited in Reisigl, 2008, p.244). Integration is often possible, for example, sometimes consensus-building paves the way for making crucial decisions or future policy known and vice versa, as in case of Obama’s speech (see chapter 6). Obama exploited the eve of the 13th anniversary of the 11 Sept. 2001 attacks to declare a new strategy\ stage of the War on Terror.

Within the rhetorical view of oratory, it is helpful to identify whether political speeches belong to the deliberative or epideictic genre. Thus, the function of a political speech can be determined. However, this distinction, as Martin Reisigl (2008) states, is insufficient to understand the current complexity and dynamics of political texts as the rhetorical theory does not follow these political developments closely. Hence, the rhetorical theory cannot do a comprehensive analysis of such political changes. To use Reisigl’s words:

Since the first rhetorical genre theory was outlined by Aristotle, political situations, systems, conditions and circumstances have changed and become increasingly complex, and, with these transformations, the forms, types and functions of political speeches have also altered remarkably. Rhetorical theory has not always followed these developments closely. Thus, the ancient rhetorical view of speeches alone cannot do analytical justice to the many complex political changes (Reisigl, 2008, p.244).

Hence, Reisigl (2008, p.244) suggests a transdisciplinary politico-linguistic approach in order to present a comprehensive analysis of political speeches. This approach triangulates rhetoric, political science and discourse analysis for understanding the function of political texts (see Reisigl, 2003; 2006). It conceptualises the concept of ‘political’ in terms of three dimensions: *polity*, *policy* and *politics*. This division better facilitates an understanding of the function of political texts. Moreover, it helps analysts to understand the wide realm of political speeches in question. ‘*Polity*’ relates to the normative, legal and institutional manifestations of political

actors, which frame the basic principles of political actors(s). The aim of these speeches is to establish political order and establish the values of the political in-group. They concern the overall political system, political norms and values. Some examples are funeral orations, vituperative or laudatory speeches given by chancellors, presidents and mayors. Such speeches make a significant contribution to the speakers-politicians. Traditionally, this type of speech displays the character traits of the epideictic genre, which is based on praise and blame rhetoric (Reisigl, 2008).

Reisigl allocates the dimensions of *policy* and *politics* into the same category of political actions but recognises their different functions. *Policy* is the content-related dimension of political action(s). It determines and formulates the function of political tasks, aims and programmes in different fields of policymaking (Reisigl, 2008, p.246). In other words, it represents governments by speaking (Peters, 2005, p. 754). In our case, the policy of anti-terrorism can be evaluated as necessary to promote the concept of the War on Terror and encourage the public to support it. Speeches on this issue commonly occur in parliamentary debates as speakers attempt to justify and legitimise their policy for political reasons. Such speeches aim to form the social by political means. Indirectly, this type of speech represents the successful policies of governments. The last dimension of ‘political’ is *politics*. It tackles the question of how and with whose help politics is performed (Reisigl, 2008, p. 246). In the case of going to war, political actors aim to mobilise potential public support. This type of speech belongs to the consent-oriented subgenre. One of the central methods used to gain consent is positive-self and negative-other representation. However, election speeches are still the prototypical example of this political dimension (Reisigl, 2008, p. 246).

In spite of the differentiation between political dimensions, political speech is a form of language which sits itself between written and oral expression, since it is written down yet transmitted orally. However, public speech is different from other oral political discourse in terms of manner and strategies. A public speech is not a typical form of face-to-face interaction, as in the case of an interview. (Dedaic, 2006, p.700). It is mostly one-way communication influenced by the audience’s reactions of applauding or slogan shouting (Atkinson, 1984, p. 13). Another important difference is that with public speeches, the time of the speech, place of the speech and the microphone are in the control of the speaker himself, wherein rhetoric plays a

vital role, whereas in interviews on television these are all controlled by the interviewer. Furthermore, the speaker's responses are often guided, interrupted and modified by professional interviewers.

2.5. Rhetoric: the art of persuasion

In view of classical rhetoric, public speeches have been used for persuading the masses. The art of public speech was so highly valued that the Greeks and Romans cultivated it through formal training. In Ancient Greece, the art of public speeches was studied as rhetoric (Nash, 1989), and no Greek could be a leader without devoting some attention to the art of oratory⁷ (Downing 2006; Gagarin 2007). Subsequently, rhetoric therefore, is the art of persuasion (Wilkin, 2003 cited in Alo, 2012, p. 90), and oration is the art of its application in society. Kenneth Burke (1969, p.72) summarises the relationship between rhetoric and persuasion as inseparable factors for producing meaning, he puts forward: "Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is meaning, there is persuasion" (Kenneth Burke 1969, p.72, quoted in Higgins & Walker 2012, p.195). This section, however, is not to carry too much weight concerning historical distance. Full historical accounts of rhetoric may be found in Kennedy (1980, 1994, and 2007) and Richards (2008). The section focuses on the rhetoric of persuasion. In this regard, Aristotelian rhetoric still seems unavoidable.

In theory and origin, the word 'rhetoric' has been derived from the Greek word '*rhētōr*', which means a public speaker, which is probably equivalent to a politician (Kennedy, 2007). Greece is thought to be the birthplace of rhetoric (Kennedy 2007, p.9) as this country has a very old and long tradition of learning and teaching the art of public speaking. The earliest use of the word '*rhētorikē*', meaning the art of public speaking, is found in Plato's Dialogue *Gorgias*⁸, which was probably written around 380 BC (Kennedy, 1994, 2007; Richards, 2008).

2.6. Aristotle's rhetoric theory

Since the first rhetorical genre theory, Aristotle was the first great scholar studied the persuasive use of language systematically. His rhetoric mainly stands on logical arguments, as well as on

⁷ a word of Latin origin that denotes skill in public speaking, which is equivalent to the classical meaning of rhetoric that means "the art of using language to persuade or influence" (Richards, 2008, p.3)

⁸ This version of dialogue has been described by Richards (2008:23) as the "foundational example of anti-rhetorical thinking"

debating the opposite opinions of opponents (Charteris-Black, 20014, p.5). This, in addition to the importance of the logical validity that which extend to understanding ethos and pathos as rational components of persuasion as an audience will consciously evaluate the reliability of the speaker (Wisse, 1989, p.29). In term of persuasion, Aristotle identified various techniques of persuasive speaking or writing in the form of his theory of Dialectic and Rhetoric.

Dialectic, an art of philosophical disputation, was in the form of intellectual debate, in which one speaker used to state the thesis and the other contestant used to refute it mostly by using 'yes/no' questions answered by the proposer of the thesis (Kennedy, 2007, p.28). The respondent could lead the interlocutor into an indefensible position by showing contradictions and by drawing analogies (Kennedy, 2007, p.28). The Dialectic and Rhetoric share certain similarities. They try to defend their argument and attack the arguments of others. They function on the basis of what is probable in the given situation and take into consideration commonly held public opinions (Aristotle: 1354a in Kennedy, 2007, p.28). They use arguments to support their position, yet there are certain dissimilarities between them. While Dialectic proceeds from questions and answers, Rhetoric uses a continuous exposition. Unlike Rhetoric, Dialectic has no such divisions as introduction, narration and epilogue. Dialectic has only proof and refutations, whereas, rhetoric uses proof (*Logos*) further to two additional means of persuasion, namely, trustworthiness, the character of the speaker (*Ethos*) and an appeal to the emotions of the audience (*Pathos*) (Kennedy 2007, p.29).

On this, Aristotle recognises rhetoric to be the counterpart of dialectic theory. However, dialectic is not persuasive enough like rhetoric. Rhetoric regards logos, pathos and ethos together as factors in persuading others, while dialectic depends mainly on logos. What makes Aristotle's rhetoric a privileged model of the practical art of persuasion, is its focus on the stages of speech composition. He attributes that rhetoric is a tool for true persuasion. He relates persuasive speech to the orator's activities: invention or discovery, disposition or arrangement and style (Richards, 2008, p.32). These stages are detailed in depth with relevant examples in turn.

2.6.1. Means of persuasion: types of appeals

Aristotle identifies two types of persuasion, speakers or writers could apply to persuade their audiences or readers. The first one is the non-artistic, '*atechnic*'. The sources, which are not,

provided by the potentiality of speakers' rhetoric; they are the already pre-existing sources like witnesses, laws, testimonies, evidence and contracts (Kennedy, 2007, p.52). The second type is the artistic, '*entechnic*' proof, those, which are prepared or invented by the potential speaker that must be discovered before they are arranged in speech (Wise, 1989, p.84). Under this category, Aristotle generates three species or structural principles. These three categories are unique, not only in public speeches, but in any field of life. They are unique in business management (Higgin & Walker, 2012), health improvement (Perloff, 2000) and politics (Cockroft & Cockroft, 2005; Chrteris-Black, 2014), however, the methodology of applying each of them is diversified in relation to the diversity of the topics and the context it is applied for.

1. Logic (Logos)

Appeal to logic is a powerful tool of persuasion, as man is a rational creature and wants some proof before believing in something (Mohan, 2013, p.31). A speech without logical data and proof looks insincere and this diminishes the trustworthiness of the speaker as well. To introduce persuasive arguments, a logical, accurate, and factual proof are necessary to persuade an audience, such as definitions, statistics, testimonies, examples, etc. For instance, in his part of speech to the House of Commons, in March 2003, Tony Blair uses some official documents and testimonies, like the WMD⁹ inspectors' report and some statistics (*in italic*) as logical reasons to convince his audiences that Iraq is a potential threat to Britain:

It became clear after the Gulf War that the WMD, [...], when the inspectors left in 1998, they left unaccounted for: *10,000 liters of anthrax*, a far-reaching *VX nerve agent* [never gas] programme, *up to 6,500 chemical munitions*, at least *80 tonnes of sarin*.

Aristotle as cited in Roberts, (2004, p. 18), defines logos as "what makes the argument of an orator's speech demonstrative and worthy to believe." In this regard, Axelrod (2007) argues that the three appeals of persuasion are together essential to create a persuasive speech; however, logic is almost always reliably persuasive. Logos can directly support the speaker's arguments with accurate evidence and reasons. It represents objective facts and not bias to the speaker/listener's subjectivity. There are two basic tools for logical persuasion, namely,

⁹ Weapons of Mass Destruction

Paradigm and Enthymeme; they constitute the core of logical persuasion (Van Dijk, 1985, p.120).

- **Paradigm**

Paradigm is the use of examples, fables and parables that lead an audience to some conclusion. The speaker can give either factual examples from history and common natural phenomena or fictional examples from fables and parables. Aristotle prefers the use of paradigms in the end as in this case, the paradigm functions like a witness and hence, they are more effective. The use of paradigm in “a number of similar cases” (Aristotle, 1356b, p.14) has proven important to the choice of whether to tackle Saddam now not later. In his endeavours to induce the potion of war, Tony Blair reminds the nation how the policy of appeasement that the British government pursued in the 1930 was futile (in italics):

It is true Saddam is not the only threat. But *it is true also- as we British know- that the best way to deal with future threats peacefully, is to deal with present threats with resolve* (Blair, speech to the nation on the Iraq invasion 20 of March 2003).

- **Enthymeme**

Literally, enthymeme¹⁰ means something “held in the mind” (Kennedy, 1994, p. 59). Aristotle defines enthymemes in relation to and with the help of a maxim. A maxim is a pithy assertion “about things that involve actions and are to be chosen or avoided in regard to action” (Kennedy, 2007, p. 165). If these maxims are true, the reasons and arguments in their support must also be true in consequence, in this case they become enthymemes (Aristotle, 1984, p.15-16, cited in Richards, 2008, p.35) For example:

For 12 years, the world tried to disarm Saddam, after his wars in which hundreds of thousands died. UN weapons inspectors say vast amounts of chemical and biological poisons, such as anthrax, VX nerve agent, and mustard gas remain unaccounted for in Iraq. So our choice is clear: back down and leaves Saddam hugely strengthened; or proceed to disarm him by force. (Blair, 20 March 2003).

Two nights after the order to send the British troops to Iraq by Prime Minister Tony Blair, he addressed the Nation that the war on Iraq was the safeguard of their peace. The arguments and

¹⁰ In English language enthymemes are often recognized, when two sentences are often connected by a conjunction ‘therefore’ or by conjunctive adverb ‘consequently’ (Richards, 2008:35).

the primases he used, which were essentially based on the probability that the peace of the Nation was under threat. His silent assumptions prepare two narrow options, no third, either to disarm Saddam and remove him from power or back down at your peril (underlined).

2. Emotions (Pathos)

As defined by Foss (1996, p.29), pathos is “an appeal designed to generate emotions in the audience.” These emotions range from pleasure and pain. They could be evoked by fear, as Tony Blair did in his endeavour to affirm the rightness of the choice of the war against Iraq.

WMD being ready for use in 45 minutes, [...], Iraq was an imminent threat to Britain and was preparing to attack us, [...], my fear is that we wake up one day and we find either that one of these dictatorial states has used weapons of mass destruction - and Iraq has done so in the past and we get sucked into a conflict, with all the devastation that would cause (Blair, 2004).

While on the other hand, emotion could also be aroused through humour. In this regard, Charteris-Black (2014, p.14) presents a good example, when Reagan¹¹ asked by Bob Hope “what it felt like to be President.” His reply was “It’s not a lot different than being an actor, except I get to write the script.” According to this view, emotion is an appeal of cognitive nature. It needs reasons such as fear or anger to stir, which in turn influence people’s opinions and judgements (Fortenbaugh, 2007, p.17). Therefore, in contrast to Plato, Aristotle argued that emotions are a rational appeal, because their responses could be evoked by reason(s). A model orator needs to present reasonable arguments that excite the appropriate emotional responses to the situation he talked about it.

3. Trustworthiness (Ethos)

Ethos has been defined as the trustworthiness and the character of speakers that effects audiences’ reactions (Foss, 1996, p.29). Aristotle (2010, p.8) recognises ethos as persuasion, which depends on the speaker’s ability to run the speech not on the speech itself. In this, ethos is a speaker-audience interactive process. Practically, how the speaker presents his actions, and how the audience’s reactions to these actions were (Hauser, 2002). Aristotle’s theory of *ēthos* is striking however, he limits its effect to the effect of character as conveyed by the words of

¹¹ An American politician, commentator, and actor, who served as the 40th President of the United States from 1981 to 1989.

mouth. However, Aristotle did not recognise the significance of authority, influence, charisma and setting and the importance of the context, where the speech is embedded on the speaker's ethos. These factors play a very important role in persuading the audience. Usually, people come to listen to the orator because they believe that the orator is important, knowledgeable and trustworthy. The clear-cut definition of ethos is therefore, still a little controversial. No agreed definition of ethos among theorists. Some of them associate it with the speaker's character (Foss, 1996; Beard, 2000; Kennedy, 2007; Charteris-Black, 2014). Others like (Corbett, 1990; Gross & Walzer, 2000; Aristotle, 2010) relate it to how well the speech is spoken. In political discourses, ethos has three characteristics: moral character or integrity, intelligence and good will (Hauser, 2002).

In either case, an orator (politician) needs to convince audiences that he and his proposed policies can be trusted. In this case, an orator tries to speak in such a way that he should establish his trustworthiness, as people believe fair-minded and trustworthy orators readily and quickly. In his election rally speeches, the US president, Barack Obama, the 44th and the ex-president of the United States, made an appeal of ethos (in italics):

When it comes to the war in Iraq, the time for promises and assurances, for waiting and patience, is over. Too many lives have been lost and too many billions have been spent for us to trust the president on another tried and failed policy opposed by generals and experts, Democrats and Republicans, Americans and many of the Iraqis themselves. *It is time for us to fundamentally change our policy. It is time to give Iraqis their country back. And it is time to re-focus America's efforts on the challenges we face at home and the wider struggle against terror yet to be won* (Obama, 25 January 2007).

In this extract, Obama shows his appeal to ethos by criticising the performance of the previous presidency (the Bush presidency), specifically, the war with Iraq. This war, as he described depletes too many lives and billions of dollars and resources, which should be invested to face the challenges American people face at home. Regaining the American's trust that they have lost with their elected leaders was the major theme of Obama's election rally campaign speeches.

2.6.2. Parts of persuasive speech

A persuasion is a form of speaking or written action which aims to induce the audience to take action(s). Classical rhetoricians have discussed the act of making a successful speech in two

parts – the issues of the structure of speech and the issues of the delivery of speech (Kennedy, 2007). In classical works, public speech was recognised into four parts, while it was increased to six parts in the Renaissance period, and to seven parts by the Quintilian (Richards, 2008; Charteris-Black, 2014). These discrepancies show that there is no generally agreed canonical order of parts of speech, nor the probability of using them as a school uniform for all types of speeches. For example, a conclusion or ‘*epilogue*’ is not a necessary requirement of each forensic ‘judicial’ speech (Kennedy, 2007, p.231). However, Aristotle dispelled this dispute, by focusing on the orator needing to structure his speech into four parts: two of them are necessary for every speech: proposition ‘*prothesis*’ and proof ‘*pistis*’. Whereas the other two are almost necessary: introduction ‘*prooemion*’ and ‘conclusion ‘*epilogue*’ (Kennedy, 2007, p.230-31).

1. Introduction (prooemion)

The introduction is the first part of the speech. It is the opening part of the speech, whereby a speaker tries to connect with the audience and state the theme of the speech. The remedial functions of the introduction are to make the audience well disposed, attentive and receptive (Kennedy, 2007, p. 233-34). The introduction can be in the form of a statement of the context or an appeal to the audience. Some statements put the audience in a certain mood, or simply give an introduction of the speech to follow. In furtherance, in this part, an orator seeks to establish his character in the best light ‘ethos appeal’, which later on establishes empathy. In doing so, an orator applies multi-techniques, such as using the first person plural pronoun ‘we’ rather than the first person singular pronoun ‘I’ or displays his modesty towards his audience. Consider the opening to Barack Obama’s keynote address to the Democratic National Convention 2004 (*utilized*):

On behalf of the great state of Illinois, crossroads of a nation, land of Lincoln, let me express my deep gratitude for the privilege of addressing this convention. Tonight, is a particular honor for me because, let’s face it, my presence on this stage is pretty unlikely. My father was a foreign student, born and raised in a small village in Kenya. He grew up herding goats, went to school in a tin-roof shack. His father, my grandfather, was a cook, a domestic servant (Obama, 27, July 2004).

For the greatness of the state of ‘Illinois’ Obama represents it, talks on behalf of it, and regarding the importance of the conference and the ‘Democratic National Convention’ he invited, Obama opens his speech with modesty and ‘deep gratitude’. He emphasises his humility in relation to

his background, 'his ancestry'. That he is descended from a simple African family (underlined). By offering his ancestry, Obama simultaneously evokes positive emotions and primarily ethical appeal. Sometimes, political orators prefer to discuss their family members for persuasive ends (Adams, 2008, p.10). This is likely to make the audience well disposed, attentive and receptive to the next part, the proposition '*prothesis*'.

2. Proposition (Prothesis)

The proposition is about establishing a certain thesis or stating clearly what the case is the 'main argument'. In this part of speech, an orator tries to provide "a springboard for his main argument" (Charteris-Black, 2014, p.18). It can be in the form of a simple statement or in the form of narration according to the nature of the speech. Unlike the introduction, which is usually directed towards the speaker, the proposition is oriented towards the event or the topic that is claimed. Moreover, the proposition needs to be supported by proof in the next part. So, after finishing his autobiographical account, Obama continued (utilised):

I stand here knowing that my story is part of the larger American story, that I owe a debt to all of those who came before me, and that, in no other country on earth, is my story possible. Tonight, we gather to affirm the greatness of our nation, not because of the height of our skyscrapers, or the power of our military, or the size, [...]. Our pride is based on a very simple premise, summed up in a declaration made over 200 years ago, '*we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal. That they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights. That among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness*' (Obama, 27, July 2004).

In the form of a narrative, Obama presents his speech argument in support of the democratic policies and human equality. He formulates his argument in stories transaction. The story of his personal life story "my story" to the larger story the "American story", to frame the social story, the story of independence, the "American Declaration of Independence" (in italics), which is assumed to be recognised and respected by all the American people.

3. Proof (Pistis)

Whatever the speaker has spoken in the proposition has to be supported by proof. The proof can be non-artistic as witnesses and artistic like paradigms and enthymemes. Paradigms, i.e., proof from examples, is more suited to deliberative speech while enthymemes are more suited to judicial speech (Mohan, 2013, p.22). Continuing with Obama's speech, in 2004, he said:

A belief that we are connected as one people. If there's a child on the south side of Chicago who can't read, that matters to me, even if it's not my child. If there's a senior citizen somewhere who can't pay for her prescription and has to choose between medicine and the rent that makes my life poorer, even if it's not my grandmother. If there's an Arab American family being rounded up without the benefit of an attorney or due process that threatens my civil liberties. It's that fundamental belief – *I am my brother's keeper, I am my sister's keeper – that makes this country work.* **It's what allows us to pursue our individual dreams, yet still come together as a single American family.**

Obama continued to support his argument that priority should be oriented towards social needs rather than that of an individual's. Obama therefore, cites a number of cases (underlined), which illustrate how human relations should be interdependent, in which the individual is the kernel of any society. People in general, and Americans in particular should work within the frame of a single family (in bold).

4. Conclusion (Epilogue)

The epilogue makes the concluding part of a speech. Kennedy (2007, p. 249), identifies four functional purposes of conclusion: 1) disposing the hearer favorably towards the speaker and unfavorably towards the opponent; 2) amplifying and minimising; 3) moving the hearer into an emotional reaction; and 4) giving a reminder of the chief points in the argument". This is especially important where the audience is expected to make a decision after listening to the speech, so the last impression is important. Consider how Obama ends his campaign speech in Pennsylvania, 22 April 2008 speech:

But don't ever forget that you have the power to change this country. [...]. *You can make this election about how we're going to make health care affordable for that family in North Carolina; how we're going to help those families sitting around the kitchen table tonight pay their bills and stay in their homes.* You can make this election about how we plan to leave our children and all children a planet that's safer and a world that still sees America the same way my father saw it from across the ocean – as a beacon of all that is good and all that is possible for all mankind. [...]. Thank you, and may God Bless the United States of America.

Obama ended his speech by summarising two crucial issues of his arguments (italicized & underlined), which he has outlined earlier in his speech. These two keys are most probable to trigger an empathetic reaction. So, in (italics) he is referring back to the domestic financial problems, which he saw, that is partially solved by active participation in the coming election.

This is particularly motivated since the election campaign was in its final stages. This is strengthened (underlined) when he personalised his arguments, an appeal to ethos, “the same way my father saw” and using the metaphor “a beacon of all that is good.”

2.6.3. Style of persuasive public speech

The choice of proper words and their proper arrangement make the diction ‘*lexis*’ of the speech. Diction is, therefore “closely related to ‘identity’, being a manner of self-expression that makes an individual as distinct” (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 30). Aristotle is not in favour of using complex expressions, new coinages, and rare words in public speech. Perhaps, because the audiences of public speeches are a mixed crowd of people with various levels of knowledge and education, public speeches should be such as it could be easily understood by the audience. The speech will lose its clarity and effect if the speaker uses ponderous compounds, unfamiliar words, and inappropriate compounds (Kennedy, 2007).

Therefore, Aristotle recommended the use of the words and metaphors in “prevailing and native meaning” (Kennedy, 2007, p. 199). Metaphors should be used to show analogy and they should be chosen for sound, meaning, and visualisation. Metaphors mediate between the conscious and the subconscious and convey meaning through positive and negative associations (Charteris-Black 2005). In furtherance, Aristotle also recommended the use of antithesis for creating the effect of contrast (Charteris-Black, 2014, p.30), the use of kinetic metaphors for actualisation and visualisation and the use of proverbs and well-liked hyperboles to make language urbane (Kennedy, 2007, p.225). Aristotle emphasises the use of proper grammar for bringing clarity and effect in speech. The speaker can gain clarity in style by using proper connectives, calling by proper names, using correct pronoun reference, correct naming of plural and singular, and by avoiding equivocation (Kennedy, 2007, p. 206-8).

For a persuasive style, Aristotle emphasised the essentiality of both fitness and timing to the occasion of all types of speech. He recommended the use of expansiveness and conciseness according to the needs of the situation. Expansiveness can also be used as a technique of amplification of some situation or case. Expansiveness can be achieved by using the definition in place of words, and conciseness results when the speaker uses one word in place of a phrase or definition. If the word is shameful and inappropriate, the speaker should use definition, and

if the definition is shameful and inappropriate, he should use a word in its place (Kennedy, 2007: 209). The style should be appropriate according to the subject matter. It should clearly express the emotion and character of the speaker. If a serious matter is spoken about in casual style and a casual matter in a serious style, it will result in comic effect (Kennedy, 2007, p. 212).

2.6.4. Delivery of public speech

The classical and contemporary rhetoricians related to style, modes of communication and delivery, the voice quality, of making persuasive speeches. Charteris-Black, (2007), for instance, argues that in practice “style and delivery go hand-in-hand.” In the case of Martin Luther King, his style was described as “African American liturgical” that shares his historical and cultural background ‘slavery’. This, in turn, affects his features of delivery “African-American tradition”, the ethnicity of African origin, which politically shares social purposes (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 30-31). The style of delivery of speech, therefore is an interaction between the speaker’s choice- words and phrases, and social meaning. Consequently, a style is persuasive when it combines the personal and public meaning (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 32). The delivery of speech ranges from whispering, like (Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani¹²), to a ranting style (black pulpit preachers), and from humour (Eminem¹³) to seriousness (Martin Luther King) to share social purpose (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 32).

Voice, body movement, gesture, eye contact, and energy play a crucial role in the performance of a public speaker (Nowak 2004). In chapter three of *Rhetoric* Aristotle attaches very high importance to the delivery style of a speech. He recognised the importance of volume, pitch change, and rhythm in the delivery of a speech. He says:

It is a matter of how the voice should be used in expressing each emotion, sometimes loud and sometimes soft or intermediate, and how the pitch accents [*tonoi*] should be intoned, whether as acute, grave, or circumflex, and what rhythms should be expressed in each case; for [those who study delivery] consider three things, and these are volume, change of pitch [*harmonia*] and rhythm. (Aristotle translated by Kennedy, 2007, p.195).

¹² Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is an Islamic thinker, and the spiritual leader of the Shiite, who was born in 1930 in Mashhad, Iran.

¹³ The white rapper whose style was described as a blend of humour and multisyllabic rhythm, and clear diction and complex rhythm. He combined these features to share his audience’s experiences i.e., drug addiction, family breakdown (see Edwards, 2009, cited in Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 32).

Aristotle feels that these things are necessary for the delivery, as these delivery techniques are capable of changing the opinion of the audience because the audiences are mostly attracted and become biased towards the orator whose style they like (Kennedy, 2007). In voice, the speaker needs to have an audible volume with proper pitch variation, clarity of speech with a complete pronunciation of words, moderate pace with variation and pauses, and emphasis with pitch change, volume variation and lengthening of vowels in the words he emphasises (Nowak, 2004). A speaker should use proper periods and pauses in the speech otherwise his speech will become tiresome and boring. The periods should be placed in such a way that meaning is not distorted and the audience grasps the utterance easily (Kennedy 2007, p. 215). Pauses are essential components of a speech, as they are helpful for both speaker and audience. A pause helps the speaker to obtain a moment to guess the response of the audience. Meanwhile, a pause gives the listener time to connect to the words and grasp their meaning. In the happy moments of pauses, the meaning happens, and a common ground emerges (Nowak 2004).

2.7. Persuasion and Democratic Societies

The persuasive use of language becomes more important in democratic societies, as in the democratic world of today the skill of public speaking is highly valued. People elect those persons who persuade them best as their rulers and leaders, as persuasion is the most natural and civilised way of changing the world since all people are consumers of persuasive attempts to change their attitudes (Hart, 1999). While doing that, political actors (de)legitimise ideologies and myths with their political rhetoric in order to influence public decisions. These ideologies involve “beliefs or mental representations” and function for “the coordination of the social practices of group members for the effective realisation of goals of a social group and the protection of its interests” (van Dijk, quoted in Bell 1998, p. 24).

Political speeches are not necessarily success because of their truth-value; rather they may be a matter of presenting valid arguments convincingly (Beard 2000), as persuasion and bargaining are indispensable features of any political process (Miller, 1991, cited in Chilton, 2004). For instance, in the last Iraqi Parliamentary election campaigns, in 2006, where caste and religion influenced elections, political rhetoric played an important role. The rhetoric of caste politics creates the myth that a leader from a particular caste or religion is preferable as such; a leader

will promote the welfare of a particular community or caste. Charteris-Black (2006) attests to this opinion, to use his own words:

Within all types of political system, from autocratic, through oligarchic to democratic; leaders have relied on the spoken word to convince others of the benefits that arise from their leadership (Charteris-Black, 2006, p. 1).

Political discourse operates on the notion that people's perception of certain issues can be influenced by language, where language is a vehical of ideologies and through which speakers (i.e., politicians) produce and exercise power relations (Oswald et al., 2016). Hence, politicians rely on language to gain more power, there is no political activity that could exist without language, (Chilton, 2004; Fetzer, 2013). Politicians enforce their own political beliefs by persuading the masses to accept them as the truth. For this, they create ideologies, and strengthen or weaken others, so that the people may accept the political beliefs as 'common sense' and act accordingly out of their free will, considering these dominant ideologies as 'norms'. These ideologies do not represent the politicians themselves, rather the governments or the parties they belong to (Schäffner, 1996).

Public speeches are the site, where ideologies are created, nurtured, and practiced in the most effective way, wherein, political orators use various rhetorical devices and discursive strategies to influence the audience's perception of a certain issue in order to win their support or to motivate them to take some action. In the discourse of going to war, Charteris-Black (2014) provides a striking example. He extensively investigates the impact of modality (epistemic & deontic) on persuasive and logical discourse. Charteris-Black analysed one crucial political speech delivered by Tony Blair,¹⁴ "*We face a tough and stark choice*" at the House of Commons on 18 March 2003. In this speech, Blair was looking for some political backing for upholding his claim of supporting and participating with George W Bush's¹⁵ presidency in an invasion of Iraq. Despite the national¹⁶ and international opposition to this war, Blair won the vote convincingly. Although, Blair's rhetoric is not purely a matter of language, rather bodily performance (Fairclough, 2000; Dahlberg, 2011), part of his persuasiveness was his shifting

¹⁴ The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007

¹⁵ The 43rd President of the United States from 2001 to 2009. (See chapter 5).

¹⁶ London, the UK capital witnessed the largest-ever demonstration against Blair recommended strategy (Charteris-Black, 2014, p.114).

between the epistemic and deontic modality basis integrated in his claims to constitute his conviction rhetoric about the ‘good’ and ‘evil’; ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’, as illustrated in the following extracts.

We **must** face the consequences of the actions we advocate. For me, that means all the dangers of war. But for others, opposed to this course, it means-let us be clear- that the Iraqi people, whose only true hope of liberation lies in the removal of Saddam, for them, the darkness will close back over them again; and he will be free to take his revenge upon those he **must** know wish him gone (Tony Blair, 2003).

Blair expresses in relation to the truth he mentioned (statistics and quotations), the necessity of taking some military action against Saddam’s regime. Here, Blair employs the epistemic modality (in bold), where he not only expresses his assumptions or assessment of the situation in relation to the truth he presented. Rather he also indicates his confidence in the arguments he expressed. Otherwise, this regime will enhance his position and embolden other terrorist states, which he considered as morally wrong. Therefore, Saddam’s regime must go. Within this conclusion, Blair expresses how he is obliged to have permission to do this. Deontic modality is an expression of the necessity or possibility of acts a speaker believes are morally preformed (Lyons, 1977; See Charteris-Black, 2014 for more examples and discussions).

Some other persuasive strategies politicians apply in democratic societies go beyond the use of language itself. Political oratory involves many persuasive strategies of connecting, emoting and motivating the audience. Some of these strategies are practiced not only in speech but also in clothes, selection of language and accent and socio-drama. They indulge in political socio-drama, which has some symbolic meaning. It ranges from Clinton’s bus tours in the 1992 general elections in America (McLeod 1999, p. 363-5) to Obama’s visiting the house of the poor (Mohan, 2013). This socio-drama helps politicians in showing association with the concerned public in order to win their support. These strategies are in line with some social research, which argues that social and personal identity matches create a positive persuasive effect (Nelson & Garst, 2005). The affiliation to the race, political party, class, profession and even age group of the audience heightens the orator’s reliability, grasps their attention and promotes central processing of the message (Fleming & Petty 2000; Petty et al., 2000).

Another such strategy is the intentional use of the family members to create ethos by the politicians, as in case of the US President Barack Obama in his election rally speech:

And I wouldn't be the man I am today without the woman who agreed to marry me 20 years ago, let me say this publicly. Michelle, I have never loved you more. I have never been prouder to watch the rest of America fall in love with you too as our nation's first lady. Sasha and Malia before our very eyes, you're growing up to become two strong, smart, beautiful young women, just like your mom. And I am so proud of you guys (part of Obama's victory speech on 7 November 2012¹⁷).

In this sense, Obama shows love for his wife and daughters as a strategy to enhance his social character in addition to the political ones. By mentioning his family names (wife and daughters) Obama portrays himself not just as a leader or President, but as a trustworthy spouse and father. This is enforced by the way he starts and concludes his statement. In this connection, Adams (2008, p.10) states that sometimes, political actors prefer to discuss their family members for persuasive ends.

¹⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/07/barack-obama-speech-full-text>

CHAPTER 3: CRITICAL FRAMEWORK OF DATA ANALYSIS

3.1. Introduction

The overall aim of this chapter is to acquaint the reader(s) with the fundamentals of CDA, which is central to the present study. In accordance with the purposes of this study, this chapter illustrates the relevance of the analytical tools of CDA in general and the DHA in particular for analysing the political speeches under investigation. In addition, it also illustrates the relevance of the research by claiming that the analytical tools of CDA can be adapted to Iraqi politics, the discourse which left almost unattended. To that ends, section 3.2 opens by reviewing the historical development of critical analysis. It explains how and why critical analysis evolved from a single approach, i.e. Critical Linguistics (CL), into a school of critical approaches, i.e. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It continues for section (3.3) to define CDA and explain its main aims, principles and focuses. In turn, section 3.4 presents a brief review of some CDA methods, with a special emphasis on the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). Section 3.5 interrogates the functions of political discourse, as a strategic way to define it. It continues in section 3.6 to interrogate the interplay between politics and political discourse. The last section, 3.7 reviews significant recent literatures and its relationship to critical analysis. It closely looks at studies that consider the relationship between macro-politics and language, based on issues like persuasion and legitimisation in the discourse of war.

3.2. CDA: historical development

The credit for making the earliest systematic attempts to critically analyse discourse goes to a group of linguists and literary theorists at the University of East Anglia in the 1970s (Fowler et al., 1979; Fairclough, 1995b). Perhaps, the most telling of these attempts was the emergence of the 'Critical linguistics' (CL). It is a largely linguistic approach to text analysis. It was developed in the United Kingdom by Gunther Kress, Roger Fowler, Bob Hodge and Tony Trew, and first applied in the monograph *Language and Control* (1979). According to Lopez-Master & Lottgen (2003, p.209), the monograph 'language and Control' has been cited as the starting point of CL and the earliest linguistically oriented critical approach to discourse analysis. The practitioners of CL consider language to be a social act through which different functions are performed (Fowler et al., 1979). In their attempts, they aimed to isolate "ideology in discourse" and show

"how ideology and ideological processes are manifested as systems of linguistic characteristics and processes" (Trew, 1979a, p.155, cited in Sheyholislami, 2001, p.1).

Over many years of research by different linguists and theorists on various topics and in numerous situational contexts, the limitations of Critical Linguistic (CL) were identified and the need to develop a new model for critical linguistic analysis was argued for. One major aim to develop a new research model for critical linguistic analysis is the struggles and contradictions that characterise the modern world and its multifaceted political phenomena that cannot be explained by using such uni-directional methods and doing analytical justice to the many complex political changes. One of the prominent linguists who exposed the limitations of CL was Norman Fairclough. However, Fairclough (1995b, p.28) acknowledges the significant role of CL in the development of critical discourse studies. He criticises the earliest works of CL as they did not adequately focus on the interpretive practices of audiences. Fairclough (1995b, p. 27-28), claims that CL practitioners have assumed that audiences interpret a text in the same way as analysts do and that, thus, texts tend to be interpreted by CL analysts without considering the interpretive practices of audiences. Furthermore, Fairclough (1995b, p.28) adds that the earlier contributions in CL were very thorough in terms of grammatical and lexical analysis but were lacking in intertextual analysis. It has been argued that analysis of texts should be concerned with both linguistic representation and language as a social semiotic practice, which is complicated and multifaceted and, thus, requires the use of intertextual and interdisciplinary research methods (see Wodak, 2001).

As an attempt to overcome these limitations and more, a fruitful symposium was held in January 1991 at the University of Amsterdam to which many prominent linguists, such as van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, contributed. However, the theory of CDA got real momentum in the late 1980s and early 90s with van Dijk launching the journal *Discourse and Society* in 1990 besides the publication of several important books in the area, as in case of, *Discourse Approaches to Politics, Culture and Society* (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p.4; Wodak, 2013, p. xxiv). Very soon, CDA established itself a distinguished school of critical analysis. Its wide popularity and applicability in different disciplines has led to it being used by many social scientists in the fields of psychology, sociology, management, politics and linguistics. In due course, CDA developed and broadened into more than just a

method of analysis as it started using a range of approaches (Bell & Garret, 1998). It was no longer a homogenous model or “a school or a paradigm, but at most a shared perspective on doing linguistics, semiotic or discourse analysis” (van Dijk, 1993, p.131).

Since its inception, different scholars, with a diverse set of concerns, have labelled the critical analysis of discourse differently. In the linguistics domain, Fowler et al. preferred to call it Critical Linguistics (CL), while the same theory with certain developments became van Dijk’s Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), and finally, linguists such as Fairclough, Wodak and Meyer preferred Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). In view of the above, it can be claimed that CDA is a modified version of CL as they share certain theoretical principles. However, CDA expands the linguistic analysis of discourse. It considers the significance of the socio-political and social-cultural context wherein the discourse is embedded.

3.3. CDA: definitions, aims and principles

After presenting a historical glimpse of the CDA developments, the present section pursues its definitions, aims and principles. CDA has been defined differently by scholars with a diverse set of concerns. By integrating these, a definition of CDA as a branch of qualitative social science that examines discursive phenomena and structures, employing various methods and approaches to examine language, can be concluded. As such CDA is neither a toolkit for analysing discourse (written, spoken or visual) nor a discrete academic discipline for answering certain research questions. It is a problem-oriented interdisciplinary research movement that uses a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agendas (Fairclough et al., 2011, p. 357).

Analytically, the CDA is a research enterprise that critically analyses the relationship between language and society (Wrbouschek, 2009; Wodak, 2013) and studies the way ideologies and inequalities are created and (re)enacted through texts produced in social and political contexts (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). To that end, CDA essentially has an agenda to promote enlightenment and emancipation by making the implicit explicit. It is concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships to expose social inequalities, such as dominance, discrimination, power and control, which are expressed, signalled, constituted and legitimised in language (Meert et al. 2006, p. 4). In so doing, the CDA sheds light on the linguistic

dimension of social and cultural phenomena and the processes of change in late modernity (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2006, p.61).

Moreover, CDA distinguishes itself due to its way of viewing (a) the relationship that exists between society and language and (b) the relationship that exists between the practices being analysed and the analysis itself. Hence, the overall aim of CDA is to link linguistic analysis to social analysis (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Woods & Kroger, 2000). Based on these principles, Horvath (2009) examines the persuasive strategies in Obama's public speeches in an attempt to link social practices with linguistic practices. Horvath grounds his analysis in Norman Fairclough's (1995a, p. 45) assumption that "ideologies reside in text [...], it is not possible to 'read off' ideologies from text, [...], texts are open to diverse interpretations." Based on these hypotheses, Horvath attempts to link Obama's inaugural speech with its social processes. This, in turn, provides a new context of comparison, cross-ideologically contrasting between Obama and his predecessor (Bush) to deconstruct the covert ideology of his inaugural address. For example, "My fellow citizens", the statement that Obama started his speech with, implies a citizen-centred attitude. It includes all nationalities and ethnicities, unlike Bush's exclusive and elitist opening statement, "My fellow Americans" (Horvath, 2009, for an alternative example, see also Circgeda & Ruiz, 2013 and Mohan, 2014).

Examining the general principles of CDA, it can be said that CDA focuses on the critical investigation of different social problems, such as discrimination, sectarianism, domination, extremism and the like. These different socio-political phenomena are implicitly created, reinforced, propagated and practiced with the help of certain ideologies that create and are created by discourse. CDA understands language as a social practice that is used to create power and dominate. Therefore, CDA investigates language not in isolation but in its social context to understand and expose power relations, domination and subjugation. The context might be social, psychological, political or ideological because discourse shapes and is shaped by society. Hence, it can be said that different social problems are (re)produced by discourse, as discourse cannot exist without social meaning and there is a strong relationship between language and social structure (Kress, 1979).

CDA highlights these relationships between language, discourse and society to develop a better understanding of the problem(s) under investigation. As one major aim of CDA is also to investigate the sites of power difference, domination, and subjugation in discourse, the CDA aims to expose and resist these dominating ideologies. In doing so, CDA analysts consider various linguistic, social and political factors and intertextual references alongside with the fieldwork and anthropology wherein a discourse is manifested. This is to keep the problem under investigation open-ended for further investigations. The main principle in CDA is not to impose one reading of a piece of discourse. Indeed, other interpretation or reading is considered possible, and any other way of looking at the discourse is also possible. Hence, CDA is not a "biased interpretation" of discourse or "prejudiced on the basis of some ideological commitment" or it "selects for analysis such texts as will support the preferred interpretation" as Widdowson claim that (see Widdowson, 1996, p. 169).

3.4. Theories of CDA

This section presents a short commentary on the three main approaches of CDA. The aim of which is to facilitate comprehension of the analytical framework of this work as its concepts are referred to quite frequently here. The first one is 'Socio-dialectic Theory', which was developed by Fairclough (1989, 1992, and 1995). The second is 'Socio-cognitive Theory', which was proposed and developed by van Dijk (1998, 2002), and the third is the 'Discourse-Historical Approach', which was advocated by the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis headed by Wodak (1996, 2001, 2009). This section looks briefly at both Fairclough's Social-dialectic and van Dijk's Socio-cognitive Theories. Then it reviews Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach in some detail. However, keeping these analytical models separate and independent from each other in doing a critical analysis is hardly feasible as these levels always have 'dialogic' relations to one another (KhosraviNik, 2010).

3.4.1. Socio-dialectic Theory

Fairclough (1995a, 1995b) made the most elaborate and ambitious attempts to theorise the CDA program. He posits a useful framework for the analysis of political discourse and social practices. He mediates between discourse and society through social action. For him, the main goal of CDA should be to highlight the belief that "language is both socially constitutive and

socially determined” (Meyer et al., 2000, p. 148). In other words, discourse is in a dialectical relationship with other social practices. With this understanding, Fairclough diverges from poststructuralist discourse theory, which understands discourse as being only socially constitutive. Fairclough understands discourse as an important form of social practice. He believes that discourse constitutes social identities, social relationships and system of knowledge and belief. With this understanding of discourse functions, Fairclough draws upon Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), specifically the multifunctional approach to language.

Fairclough’s approach sheds light on the links between texts and societal and cultural processes and structures. Thereof, Fairclough suggests an interdisciplinary perspective, in which textual and social analysis are combined. His sociocultural analytical framework concentrates on three indispensable levels of discourse analysis. They are the textual, discursive and social levels of analysis (see below). It shows the essential relationship between text, discourse and sociocultural practices, as such, it deconstructs the text and gives insight into the direct and indirect influence of ideology and power on discourse construction.

1. **The textual level**, where analysts look at the formal linguistic features of texts, the linguistic realisation of discourses and genres. This involves looking at grammar, phonology, syntax, semantics and sentence coherence. It is traditionally called detailed textual analysis,
2. **The discursive level**, which involves looking at the process of text production and interpretation. It looks at the process of text production and its socio-cognitive effects. This level of analysis is traditionally known as ‘macro-sociological’.
3. **The social level**, traditionally known as ‘micro-sociological’ or ‘interpretivist’, focuses on the social situations or the social organisation to which the social practice belongs, where people produce and consume a social practice.

In congruence with the above analytical framework levels, Fairclough (1989, 2001) identifies three stages or dimensions of CDA. The first stage is *description*, which is concerned with the formal properties of the text. The *interpretation*, which is concerned with the relationship between the text and interpretation based on the cognitive processes of the participants. It

concerns the relationship between text and interaction, seeing the text as the outcome of the process of production. Finally, the stage of *Explanation*. It considers the relationship between interaction and social context, with the social determination of the processes of production and interpretation and their social effects.

3.4.2. Socio-Cognitive Theory

Van Dijk's Socio-cognitive Theory is one of the most often referenced and quoted in critical political studies (Wodak, 2013, p. 8). Van Dijk is the leading figure in cognitive approaches to critical discourse studies (Sheyholislami, 2001; Fairclough et al., 2013,). In the 1980s, van Dijk started to apply his Socio-Cognitive framework of discourse analysis in the fields of media and news discourses. He highlights the importance of ideologies and contexts in formulating (production and understanding) discourse. He does not believe that texts are used merely to covertly express some reality but that they are based on certain ideological standpoints representative of persons, organisations, etc. Therefore, evoking Thompson's understanding that ideology is "the ways in which meaning is constructed and conveyed by symbolic forms of various kinds" (Thompson, 1990).

The Socio-cognitive theory emphasises the fundamental importance of 'cognition' in mediation between discourse and society to reach a comprehensive understanding of discourse. It believes that discourse is not just socially or linguistically constructed but is also based on cognition (see van Dijk, 1984, 1978, 1991, 1993a; also, see Renkema, 2004, chapter 13 'discourse and cognition'). For instance, the combination of cognition and social dimensions, as van Dijk (2002) defines the global and local context of discourse meaning. This integration presents a critical, descriptive and explanatory analysis in the study of a social problem (van Dijk, 2002). In other words, cognition depicts the relationship between discourse and society through an investigation of the ideological aspects of language.

In his Socio-Cognitive Theory, discourse analysis is an ideology-oriented analysis. Ideologies are the basis of both sharing the mental representations of social groups on the one hand and controlling their social practices on the other. Ideologies affect social cognition as they instill beliefs in group members' minds. Thus, ideology is both a social system as well as a mental representation (van Dijk, 1995, 2002, 2011; Juez, 2009). For his ideology-oriented analysis,

van Dijk formulates a triangulated framework for doing critical discourse analysis. It consists of three indispensable dimensions:

1. **Social analysis**, in which the overall societal structures are investigated. This focuses on the social context in which the discourse takes place. Hence, it can be called ‘context-based analyses’.
2. **Cognitive analysis**, in which van Dijk looks at the social and personal cognition that mediates between discourse and society. Social cognition is the “system of mental representation¹⁸ and processes of group members” (van Dijk, 1995, p. 22). These mental representations are implicitly organised within certain ideologies that indirectly influence the personal cognition of group members. In practice, it affects people’s ‘model’ of acting, writing, reading and understanding other people’s social practices (van Dijk, 1995).
3. **Text-based analysis**. In the same way, as he made a distinction between global and social meanings, van Dijk studies discourse in terms of global and local forms or formats.¹⁹ In this vein, van Dijk studies those structures of discourse (text or talk) that are controlled or controllable by speakers, such as intonation, rhetorical figure, syntactic structures and so on (see van Dijk, 2002). Generally, those various forms indirectly express understanding or the speaker’s current mood or emotions. The relevance of studying discourse in this format is to present a systematic account of how ideological discourse represents ‘US’ versus ‘THEM’.

Other scholars have also put forward certain models based on Cognitive Theory, for example, Chilton’s Spatial Proximity Model (2004) and Cap’s STA (spatial-temporal-axiological) Model of Proximity (2008), which also contribute to a prospective cognitive theory of language and politics or political discourse. In its most general and practical sense,

¹⁸ According to Van Dijk, mental representations “are often articulated along Us versus Them dimensions, in which speakers of one group will generally tend to present themselves of their own group in positive terms, and other in negative terms” (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 22).

¹⁹ Global forms or superstructures are “over all canonical and schemata that consist of typical genre categories, as is the case for arguments, stories or news articles. While those forms of the syntax of sentences and formal relations between clauses or sentences in sequences: ordering, primacy, pronominal relation, active-passive voice, nominalizations, and a host of other formal properties of sentences and sequences” are the local forms of discourse (Van Dijk, 2002, p.107).

“proximization is a discursive strategy of presenting physically and temporally distant events and states of affairs (including “distant” adversarial ideologies) as increasingly and negatively consequential to the speaker and her addressee.” (Cap, 2013, p. 293). Proximization is a relatively new concept in linguistics. It is originally proposed by Cap (2006), who also first used it to mark an *organised, strategic deployment of cognitive-pragmatic construals in discourse*. Ever since, proximization has developed into a cognitive-linguistic, pragmatic, as well as a critical discourse analytic concept accounting for the symbolic construal of relations between entities within the Discourse Space by Paul Chilton (see Chilton, 2005).

3.4.3. The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)

The third important critical approach to analysing (political) discourse is the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). This approach was developed by Wodak and other scholars, such as Martin Reisigl, Peter Muntigl and Gilbert Weiss, in Vienna in 1986. It was first used to analyse the constitution of the discourse of Kurt Waldheim that created anti-semitic stereotyped imagery in the Austrian presidential campaign. It was soon used for critical analysis, and it has been used extensively to investigate various socio-political issues (see Benke & Wodak, 1999; Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Pelinka, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Kryzanowski & Wodak, 2008a, 2008b; Wodak, 2008; Forchtner, 2011; Wodak & Matouschek, 2013).

The DHA is based on the importance of historical socio-political contextual factors to discourse analysis. The term ‘historical’, refers to all the available background knowledge related to the issue under investigation. The most significant of the historical dimension of discursive actions is to explore the way the discourse genres under investigation change through time. The DHA is then, a systematic way of integrating and investigating a large quantity of available knowledge on the historical, social and political background of discursive events embedded in discourse. At this point, the DHA incorporates social theories in order to explain the so-called context wherein discourse is embedded (Wodak, 2001).

In theory and origin, the DHA is sociolinguistic in nature, however, it believes that the social-linguistic analysis alone cannot do analytical justice to the many complex political changes that characterise the modern world (Titscher, 2000; Wodak, 2000; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). As a result, the DHA considers the importance of not only the socio-psychological and historical

context but also extra-linguistics factors to discourse production and interpretation and highlighting the significance of the historical and cognitive factors that affect discourse construction. This would confirm that the DHA is a multi-method approach that uses different methods, approaches and factors in the analysis of a particular issue (Wodak, 2000, cited in Balfaqueeh, 2007, p.31).

Apropos its perspective on language, the DHA evaluates language on its own a powerless factor in terms of constructing and imposing power relations. It recognises the power of language in establishing and maintaining power relations through the power of its user. This would mean that the illocutionary force of utterances depends on the speaker or writer's social position, for example, President or Commander in Chief, and not on the utterances themselves as Austin stated that (see Renkema, 2004, p.283). Less powerful people are less quoted and less spoken about (van Dijk, 1993, p. 260). Hence, language manifests, constitutes and interacts these power relations variously in society in relation to the various social position and social group to which the user belongs.

Another remarkable characteristic of the DHA is the importance of 'Text Planning' where the intentions of speakers and the extra-linguistic factors in text production are recognised (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 154). Wodak deploys the theory of 'Text Planning', or what she formally calls 'Socio-Psycholinguistics to study the extra linguistic factors that affect text production, by which an attention should be paid to speech situation, the participants' status, time and place, sociological variables (group membership, age, profession, socialisation), and psychological deterrents (experience, routine, etc.). These components are all incorporated within socio-psycholinguistics analysis of discourse that support the investigation of the social and psychological factors that impact upon text production and consumption. (Titscher et al., 2000)

Another salient feature that characterises the DHA is its objectivity. For an objective analysis and unbiased evaluation, the DHA calls to investigate discourse interdisciplinarily, multimethodically and empirically. In simple terms, the DHA analyses a text considering its social context, linguistic content and choices (Wodak, 2000). Linguistically, it looks at the choice of lexicon and grammatical structures. Socially, it considers not only the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships constituting the discourse but also the social context in which the

discourse is located (See Wodak, 2000, 2009b, 2009d; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Interdiscursivity means that different discourses are conventionally interrelated with each other in a communicative event. A discourse is primarily topic-focused, for example, discourse on war, and it frequently refers to discourse topics or sub-topics, such as national security, finance or health.

On the other hand, intertextuality means that one text is explicitly and sometimes implicitly related to various other texts. Such connections show the influence of history on the construction of that text and the influence of the text on history. Hence, a text draws on earlier texts, and through the de-contextualisation and recontextualisation of certain elements, transferring these elements from one context and then inserting them into a new context, it contributes to historical development and change (see Kristeva, 1986; Fairclough, 1992b; Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002; Wodak, 2009). One of the best fields to apply the intertextuality is political speeches. In public speeches, political orators refer to various past and present texts and incidents as a strategic way to legitimise current or future action(s) for persuasive end. For instance, in his speech in 2001, George W Bush, the then President of the United States, referred to diverse topics, actors and events from other past and present texts, such as the events of Black Sunday, 1949, and the dramatic events of 9th September 2001 in order to convince his audience of the necessity of military action (i.e., the War on Terror). However, it is still commonly supposed that media discourse most commonly makes use of ‘intertextuality’, whereby news reporters use various texts (oral, written and visual) from different disciplines to manufacturing newsworthiness of the events that attract audience and then influence their mind.

Method-wise, the DHA is distinguished by its analytical apparatus. It works within three analytical dimensions: a. social-psychological, b. cognitive and c. linguistic. Through these dimensions, the DHA’s proponents examine the *content of the themes and discourses*; the *discursive strategies* - the systematic way of using language (argumentation strategies²⁰) deployed in the construction of text; and finally, the *linguistics applications* employed to instantiate the discursive strategies in question. However, the right interpretation of a discourse

²⁰Here, the strategies are seen as (un) intentional plans of action mediated by communicator to achieve a certain social, political, psychological or linguistic goal(s) (see, Titscher et al, 2000, p. 158; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 94).

does not exist, the knowledgeable background and information of the readers, listeners or viewers influences their interpretation and critique, which can be more or less plausible but not 'true'. Before leaving this section, some other principles of this approach are summarised by Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 96) as follows:

- 1) The approach is interdisciplinary in the sense that it involves theory, methods, methodology, research practice and practical application.
- 2) The approach is problem-oriented.
- 3) Various theories and methods are combined, wherever integration helps to understand and explain the research project.
- 4) The research incorporates fieldwork and ethnography where required for a comprehensive analysis and theorisation of the object under investigation.
- 5) The research moves recursively between data and theory.
- 6) Several genres and public spaces as well as intertextual and interdiscursive relationships are studied.
- 7) The historical context is taken into account. Dealing with the historical context allows seeing the recontextualisation processes that link differing texts and discourses over time.
- 8) Tools and categories are not fixed. They must be elaborated for each analysis according to the specific problem under consideration.
- 9) Although grand theories often serve as a foundation, middle-range theories frequently supply a better theoretical basis in a specific analysis.
- 10) The results of the research should be made available to and applied by experts and be communicated to the public.

3.4.3.1. Critique, discourse, ideology and power

Like any other CDA approaches, the DHA considers the importance of critique, discourse, ideology and power as components of critical analysis. In terms of critique and critical theory, the DHA follows the critical thought of Frankfurt School, especially of Habermas (Wodak, 1995, p. 209). In this regard, Forchtner (2011) finds theoretically consistent links between the DHA and critical theory, mainly based on the work of the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt

School follows the premises of ‘Critical Theory’²¹ that the purpose of critique should be to change and improve society not solely to explain and understand it. In doing so, critique should be directed at the totality of society, incorporating its historical background, and society should be understood in terms of its relationship with all the major social sciences (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

By aligning itself with the Frankfurt School’s critical thoughts, the DHA differentiates itself from other critical analysis approaches (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; 2009). Of course, this should not be interpreted as a deviation from CDA’s general understanding of critique. The DHA remains in line with other critical discourse approaches. It adheres to the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory (Wodak, 2001; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). Another bridging point between the DHA and CDA is that the DHA sets out to reveal and demystify power structures, proposes alternatives by taking a self-reflective stance and justify the validity of certain interpretation(s) more than others. However, its unique nature is visible in its three-dimensional structure, which scaffolding its ability to carry out a ‘complex social critique’ (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 2001b; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; Žagar, 2010).

1. Text or discourse-immanent²² critique aims to unmask the inconsistencies, (self-) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in text/discourse internal structures, for example, logico-semantic, syntactic, cohesive, argumentation, etc., taking into account other previous knowledge in the interpretation process.
2. Socio-diagnostic critique exceeds the boundaries of the internal level of the text/discourse. It considers ‘know-it-all or know-it-better’ (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), investigating the concepts of ‘truth’, ‘deception’ and ‘reality’ within discursive practice. Specifically, the analyst (according to his or her standpoint/ background and contextual knowledge/social and political relations) detects the character of discursive practice, especially its explicit or implicit persuasive, propagandist, manipulative and populist features. Inasmuch, he or she should look carefully at the data, prudently applying

²¹ See Hortkeimer & Adorno 1991 and 1994 for a detailed discussion.

²² In this position, ‘immanent’ does not mean ‘without previous knowledge’. Interpretations usually involve a certain understanding and preconception of particular analytical instruments (Wodak, 2001, p.32).

analytical tools and meticulously reconstructing the discursive event context in order to present transparent and objective comprehensible interpretations and analyses (Wodak, 2001).

3. In contrast to the two dimensions mentioned above, the future- related prospective critique is associated with ethical practice. It focuses on the future social development of societies, aiming to change and transform aspects of the current situation via direct engagement or by referring to certain principles and guidelines, as in human rights, constitutions or the rejection of injustice and suffering. Nevertheless, justification of these estimations is required.

Regarding discourse understanding, the DHA perceives ‘discourse’ whether it is written, oral or visual as a form of social practice due to a dialectical relationship between discourse and society. It believes that discourse constitutes and is constituted by society. In this respect, one of the most salient distinguishing features of the DHA analytical framework is that it regards discourse as a dynamic semiotic entity that reflects its analyst’s perspectives. Like the Socio-cognitive Theory of van Dijk (1998), the DHA considers discourse to be ‘structured forms of knowledge’ that is not a closed unit of investigation, it is open to reinterpretation. In Reisigl and Wodak’s own words, discourse is “open and hybrid, and not closed systems at all” (2009, p.89), therefore, new topics, sub-topics and fields of action can be created specially by operating ‘*intertextuality*’ and ‘*interdiscursivity*’ (see El Nagger, 2012). This means the DHA recognises discourse as a complex bundle of both genre and text. In this regard, the most salient feature is the discourse-text distinction. Discourse is a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts. Whereas, text is part of the discourse production process that represents the physical or concrete realisation of discourse. In other words, text is the linguistic instantiation of its different forms: oral, written or visual, which are socially applied through certain ideologies. To give more accurate perspective of discourse analysis, the DHA adds the concept ‘fields of action’, the social site(s) in which discourse is circulated. According to Reisigl & Wodak (2009, p. 45), the field of action is “segments of the respective societal ‘reality’ which contribute to constituting and shaping the ‘frame’ of discourse.” This, in turn, justifies the pluralism of the aims and functions of discursive practices within the same area. In the political area, for instance, different functions can be displayed in relation to the fields of action, such as

self-representation, legislation, the manufacturing of public consent and so forth. Each of these functions is anchored to a certain ideology.

Several scholars have suggested different theoretical perspectives and analytical toolkits to investigate the ideological underpinnings of political discourse to scrutinise how power relations can be constructed, exercised, and legitimised in discourse(s), as power resides in text through certain ideologies. In the analytical framework of the DHA, ideology has a prominent position. It is seen as a means of establishing, maintaining and transforming unequal power relations through a particular discourse that is shared by members of a specific social group (Mohan, 2013, 2014). In discourse, ideology is discursively represented through mental representations, opinions, conventions, attitudes and evaluations. The DHA studies the ways (linguistic and non-linguistic) in which these ideologies are precipitated in discourse in order to demystify the (unequal) power relations. In term of the DHA, ideology is asymmetrical ways of designing and imposing various power relations through language by members of particular social groups over other members of social groups.

The conceptualisation of power has developed dramatically over time. Power is not only exercised by grammatical forms but also by a person's mastery of the social practices through means of the genre of a text or by the planning of access to particular public spheres (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 89). Following Weber (1980), the DHA realises the concept of power as "the possibility of having one's own will within a social relationship against the will or interests of others" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 89-90). Here, the DHA diverges from Fairclough's understanding of power as being 'productive' and follows van Dijk's understanding of it as being 'abusive'. Power can then be conceptualised as a covert operationalisation of biases. Within the aim of imposing visions or beliefs on other, power can be traced in political discourse, as political discourse is the domain in which political actors attempt to exercise power over others in order to attain their interactional goal at the micro level as part of their pursuance of their socio-political objective at the macro-level (Al-Tahmazi, 2016). Therefore, as aptly explained by Diamond:

Power is not just the ability to coerce someone or to get them to do something against their will, but rather, it is the ability to interpret events and reality, and have this interpretation accepted by others. (Diamond, 1996, p. 13).

Consequently, the analysis of the linguistic manifestations of power and its pursuit will uncover how the four speakers under the study secure their interests and naturalise their proposals. There are two ways in which power could be implemented (by political figures) in society. It is either by coercion ‘actional power’, where people gain control over others by using their authority (threats or promises or technology such as weapons), or, by discourse, where text is the domain of social struggles, in which different ideologies are promoted through language to set power relations (Wodak, 2009). In case of the current study, it is expected that the selected speakers practice the two ways of applying power. Furthermore, to their social positions (Presidents, Prime Ministers and Commander in chief), whereby coercion can be used, there is premeditation and an advisory team that is most often revises and edits their discourses.

3.5. Political discourse: definitions and functions

Critical studies have always been concerned with political discourse, where language is used in or about politics (Fetzer, 2013, p. 1). In politics, language is a crucial tool used by politicians to enable them to perform actions and promote agendas. Chilton and Schaffner (1997, p. 3) state that “the doing of politics is predominantly constituted in language” in which politicians are the central players in the political process, for example, presidents, prime ministers, parliaments and members of governments (van Dijk 1997). These players (politicians) use language to communicate their thoughts to the public and promote ideologies meet their interests and sociocultural perspectives. Specifically, they utilise a particular genre of political discourse: the political speech. This important category of contemporary political communication represents, as stated by Finlayson and Martin (2008, p. 44) “a snapshot of ideology in action”, especially in discourse of going to war. In this field, ideology becomes action through the strategic use of language (discursive strategies), and that necessitates serious rhetorical work that is most often carried out by political leaders (Oddo, 2011). ‘Call to arms’ discourse, i.e. the language used to exhort killing or dying, is one of the key ways leaders engage with war. Graham et al. (2004, p. 2001) convincingly argue that a ‘call to arms’ speech is an enduring tool leader have used in a crisis to exhort ‘the masses’ to kill and die for a cause, simultaneously strengthening a leader’s hold on power whilst weakening the longer-term position of their institutions in the field of power (see also, Bourdieu, 1998; Saul, 1992).

Political discourse has been broadly defined by many scholars. Reyes (2011, p. 783) for instance, defines political discourse in terms of speaking publicly. It is “those speeches events are commonly made in public forums in which politicians attempt to project their political agenda.” Dahlberg (2011, p. 41) expands the borders of political discourse to include all types of discourse. Dahlberg argues that “[d]iscourse theory is, at its core, a theory of politics: of the hegemonic formation of social relations - of discourses - that necessarily involve hierarchies of power and relations of inclusion and exclusion.” Conceptualising political discourse as such conflates the understanding of language of politics and the politics of language (Okulska and Cap 2011). In response, Hay, (2013) argues that politics should be analysed as a discursive, [rather] than the discursive as political, because analysing political discourse is “theoretically and empirically relevant only when discourse structures can be related to properties of political structures and process” (Van Dijk 2002, p.203).

Van Dijk (1997) acknowledges the problems associated with defining political discourse. He situates the political discourse in a dyadic setting: “aims, goals or functions” and discusses how these factors are linked to the wider scope of politics, political contexts. Van Dijk (1997) describes political discourse in terms of the language of different political domains, which include political systems, structures, processes, actors and values. It seems that van Dijk recognises political discourse as the language of politics rather than the politics of language. Consequently, politics can be seen as an identity of political discourse (VOCU, 2013).

From the perspective of the DHA, language on its own is powerless but rather seen as a means of establishing and maintaining power relations through its users. This means the illocutionary force of utterances depends on the speaker or writer’s social position, for example, Presidents acting as Commander in Chief, rather than on the utterances themselves. This may justify the reason why CDA focuses on powerful speakers. In this regard, van Dijk (1997, p. 13) values the role of actors in political communications. He states that all types of actors, whether they are “politicians or citizens, as well as their organizations and institutions, may take part in the political process, and many of them are actively involved in political discourse.” This means that politicians are not the only participants in political communication. Obviously, the same is true when it comes to understanding the field of ‘call to arms’ discourse, which also needs to focus on its audience, to whom (part) of the decision of going or not to war belongs. Hence,

some sort of justification is provided in order to convince them to go to war and sacrifice their lives or the lives of their loved ones.

Turning to the second characterisation, Chilton & Schaffner (1997, p. 212-213) identify four strategic functions that can be used to define political discourse. These strategic functions are namely, “coercion”, “(de)legitimization”, “dissimulation” and “resistance, opposition and protest”. Later, in his seminal work *Analysing political discourse: theory and practice*, Chilton (2004, p. 45-7) merges the last two strategies of “dissimulation” and “resistance, opposition and protest” into “(mis)representation” to be three strategic functions are intrinsically interconnected in political activity. In terms of coercion, political discourse is covertly associated with power. Through language, political actors intentionally use power through certain ideologies to influence the way others act in order to maintain their interests and goals (Wartenberg, 1990; Chilton, 2004; Hart, 2010). This can be done by using, for example, speech acts backed by sanctions, agenda setting, censorship, etc.

Political discourse has no coercive power unless it contains some sort of justification of the ideologies and thoughts that underlie the rhetoric of the discourse, to which speakers anchor their standpoints to legitimise their actions as reasonable and maintain “the right to be obeyed” (Chilton, 2004:46), and d-legitimise the opponent’s actors and events. In this respect, Chovanec (2010, p. 62) argues that legitimisation and de-legitimation are the main goals of political discourse at “the macro-level” and are “achieved through the use of several broad discursive strategies, realised by particular textual forms and structures as manifestations of the micro-level of discourse.” In this sense, the function of (de)legitimation is linked to the (mis)representation of actors and actions. Specifically, the goal is to legitimise self-positive representation and de-legitimise other-negative representation. In (mis)-representation, politicians, as Chilton (2004, p. 46) states, “control information, which is by definition a matter of discourse control.”

3.6. Interplay between political discourse and politics

Political discourse cannot be properly defined without a description of the field wherein it is practiced, debated and applied and an explanation as to how it might be associated with that field. Politics has been defined as either a “struggle” or “cooperation” (Chilton 2004, p. 3) or a

“quest for power” or “deliberative” (Hay 2007, p. 61-2; Fetzer, 2013, p. 9). In terms of deliberative or cooperation, politics is envisaged as cooperation among political actors and institutions that leads to decisions being made and feasible choices for action being identified (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 17). The same is true for the discourse that pertains to going to war since the decision presupposes the need for cooperation, understanding and justification in order to convince political actors/people to make decisions. Politics is also viewed as a struggle for power “between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it” (Chilton, 2004, p. 4). A good current example of this is the struggle for power is the conflict between terrorism and anti-terrorism as an ideology, thought and practice.

Politics has then been defined as two contradictory orientations, with one implying co-operation and the other entailing conflict. This contradictory puts much fog surrounded the definition of politics and analysing political discourse and classifying the ‘call to arms’ discourse in particular. Therefore, evoking Edelman’s (1976, cited in Lauerbach and Fetzer, 2007, p. 5) distinction between “an instrumental and an expressive dimension of politics”, which is consistent with Sarcinelli’s (1987, cited in Lauerbach and Fetzer, 2007, p. 5) “production and the presentation of politics” is logical to make this confusion clear. The instrumental dimension, i.e. the production of politics, refers to the process of making political decisions and actions, throughout which cooperation among political actors is required in order to resolve conflicts and/or make decisions. This cooperation usually takes place “behind the scenes, and the public very rarely has access to it” (Fetzer 2007, p. 5). Turning to the expressive dimension, i.e. the representation of politics, politics takes place on the public stage, often through the media, and conflict and antagonism are often expected, as in the case of the investigated data.

What we can take from the above discussion is that politics is the identity of political discourse, which cannot occur without the use of language. This interdependent relationship between politics and language necessitates a critical reading of political discourse in order to show how ideologies are often promoted and distorted through the delicate and skilful use of language, with each linguistic usage encoding ideological positions. Investigation into this genre is not solely realised through the analysis of overt forms of discourse; this requires the adaption of a critical perspective, as critical analysis not only entails deconstructing the constructions and rhetorical techniques used in discourse and their linguistic realisation. It is also unveiling the

ideological stance of the speaker and highlighting the social and political underpinnings of the speech. Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010, p. 56) state, “CDA goes much further towards addressing the ideological dimension of discourse.” they add, CDA is like a coroner who dissects a dead body in order to discover the cause of death; CDA performs an autopsy on the political discourse, spoken, written or visual, to identify the ideologies underlying it (Rashidi & Souzandehfar 2010, p. 55). In case of the study, by doing CDA, it is possible to detect: 1) the main discourse topic²³ that may be projected to be persuasive projects; and 2) how power is asymmetrically exercised and exploited by political actors in covert and strategic ways as persuasive projects to (de)legitimise actors or actions? CDA delves into how political discourse can shape and be shaped by the underlying power relations and hegemony in society (Foucault, 1981).

A critical analysis of political discourse can reveal the rationalisation and legitimisation processes of the political actors, demystifying what seems consensual and therefore indisputable (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). To that effect, several methodologies have been developed within Critical Discourse Studies to explore the interrelationship between politics, discourse and society (Baxter, 2010), an issue that has attracted considerable academic attention, culminating in numerous dissertations, theses, articles and journals. In this regard, Dunmire (2012, p. 736) maintains that academia cannot overlook the interrelationship between language and politics. He asserts that the “political turn in linguistics ran parallel to and was informed by a linguistic turn in political science.” Most of the research on political discourse has been theoretical and methodological (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Forchtner, 2011; Cap and Okulska, 2010; Cap, 2008; Chilton 2005, 2004; Reisigl 2007; Wodak, 1989, 2007, 2009, 2011; Wodak et al., 2013). However, political discourse has also been investigated empirically when researchers have focused on various aspects of the relationship between macro-politics and language. For instance, political leadership (Charteris-Black, 2011, 2007), identity construction in European politics (Wodak, 2009; Wodak et al., 2009), globalisation (Fairclough, 2006), discrimination, anti-semitism and the mass media (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; van Dijk, 1985, 2011; Wodak & Van Dijk 2000a; Essed 2000; Wodak & Richardson 2013).

²³ “The central themes in the texts around which discourses are organized in order to provide a particular elaboration of the issue at hand” (Kucukali, 2014, p. 8).

3.7. Discourse-oriented studies on ‘call to arms’ genre

Over the past two decades, CDA has proved itself to be a major new multidisciplinary approach to the study of political texts in the public sphere, especially when language is used to persuade audiences in relation to significant public issues (Huckin et al., 2012). In this connection, a sizable corpus of research on the War on Terror highlights the rhetoric of ‘call to arms’ discourse is available, it is desirable to review the relevant works to place my thesis in the context. In this connection a review of relevant works concerned with studies that consider the relationship between macro politics and language worth mentioning. These studies have utilised different critical frameworks to reach different goals and research questions. Some of them pay more attention to the general discursive strategies of legitimisation employed by political parties and actors in wartime rhetoric (Reyes, 2011; Rashidi & Souzandehfar, 2010; Oddo, 2011). Others are concerned with a particular aspect of political speeches, such as metaphors (Lakoff, 2003; Weintraub, 2007; Ferrari, 2007) or power and ideology (Graham et al., 2004; Balfaqeeh, 2007; Reyes, 2008), and others focus on presidential rhetoric, more specifically (Douglas Kellner, 2007).

Antonio Reyes (2011) investigates how language can be used as an instrument of control in order to justify and legitimise the War on Terror. The study based on CDA and analytically on Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). In his study, Reyes develops and proposes some key strategies for legitimisation²⁴ the War on Terror. He focuses on how these strategies, or discursive structures, are employed by political leaders to construct and shape language. Specifically, how George W Bush and Barack Obama justified the US military involvement in two different armed conflicts, Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2009). In his critical analysis, Reyes finds that it is possible to compare the perspective of the leaders of two political parties, the Republicans and Democrats, with different ideological positions.

For the same purpose, Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010) critically examine the discursive structures employed in the speeches of the US Democratic and Republican presidential candidates’ in the presidential primaries debate in 2008 regarding the legitimacy of the

²⁴ See methodology chapter, section 4.5. page

continuation of the war in Iraq. The researchers use van Dijk's (2004) comprehensive framework. The analysis is based on a reconceptualisation of the three discursive strategies of *politics, ideology and discourse*. The study investigates how the candidates of each party justify their position and persuade their audience through the use of certain ideological discourse structures. In particular, the study is an attempt to analyse the presentation of a single issue (the continuation of the war in Iraq) by three Republican Senators, John McCain, Mike Huckabee and Mitt Romney, and three Democrat Senators, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and John Edwards. The results of the research show that political discourse is a powerful weapon in an ideological battle, with subtle discourse structures being employed to promote the opposing ideologies of the two sides. The Republican candidates used discourse structures to justify the continued involvement of the US in the war in Iraq, whereas the Democratic candidates used the same technique to oppose this.

In an intertextual analysis of an 'Us' and 'Them' representation of 'call to arms' addresses, Oddo (2011) critically investigates the legitimisation strategies and thematic formations underlie the rhetoric of Franklin D. Roosevelt and George W Bush to legitimate a war. In doing so, Oddo draws on Thibault's (1991) critical intertextual analysis of four U.S. presidential speeches (two speeches of each president). In the analysis, John Oddo, (re)situates the addresses in their wider social and historical context to investigate how both presidents manipulated the public. Next, he demonstrates how both speakers use polarising lexical structures to create 'us' and 'them' superordinate thematic categories in order to covertly legitimise war. Finally, Oddo examines how representations of temporality, the past and future are employed in the selected speeches. The analysis concludes that "Bush is not an aberrant American president; he is one of many to have misled the public into war."

Other studies have delved into aspects of political speeches is Lakoff (2003). He believes it is crucially important to understand the cognitive dimension of political speeches. He focuses on the use of metaphors in political speeches. In his study, Lakoff examined the effect of certain metaphors, such as 'National as Person', 'International Community', and two narratives: 'The Self Defense Story' and 'The Rescue Story' in the discourse of 'call to arms'. He also considers the 'rational actor model', which dictates that "it is irrational to act against your interests and that nations act as if they were 'rational actors-individual people trying to maximise their 'gain'

and ‘assets’ and minimise their ‘costs’ and ‘losses’” (Lakoff, 2003, p. 1). In this study, Lakoff focuses on the Bush administration’s speeches during the Gulf war of 1991. In fact, of point, Lakoff aims to investigate how political actors through metaphors try to win public consensus.

Weintraub (2007) explores how metaphors contribute to the formation of an enemy and justify retaliatory actions. Weintraub makes a critical comparative analysis of presidential discourse produced at different points in times within one country. He analyses J. F. Kennedy’s speech on the Cuban Missile Crisis and George W Bush’s on the attacks of 9/11. Methodically, his study builds upon Lakoff and Johnson’s container schema and Graham et al.’s ‘call to arms’ framework. By analysing the content of the two speeches, Weintraub attempts to elucidate the rhetorical strategies used by the presidents at similar historical moments to establish a polemic relationship between the U.S. and their ideological enemies, Communism and terrorism, creating the ideology of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Although 39 years separated these presidential speeches, the analysis proves that they share a rhetorical thread.

Similarly, Ferrari (2007) aims to present a framework for a metaphor-based critical analysis of persuasion in George W Bush's public speeches to the nation (2001-4). In particular, Ferrari focuses on the persuasion strategies employed to promote the preventative war in Iraq. The study hypothesises that metaphors related to emotion constitutes the fundamental argumentative feature and crucial tool to address the matter of persuasion in text, contributing to identifying both the ideological root and the persuasive strategy of a given discourse in the long run. The study found that the potentialities of metaphor as a privileged cognitive tool for abstracting and constructing discourse strategies.

In their study *“A ‘call to arms’ at the end of history: a discourse -historical analysis of George W Bush’s declaration of war on terror”*, Graham et al., (2004) take a different approach to the study of Bush’s wartime rhetoric, placing it with war rhetoric at different points in history. The study situates Bush’s speech five days after the 9/11 attack with those of Pope Urban II (1095), Queen Elizabeth I (1588) and Adolf Hitler (1938). In specific, the researchers situate Bush’s appeal to support his War on Terror historically within the genre of ‘call to arms’. The researchers exemplify the structure, function and historical significance of such texts in western societies over the last millennium to identify the generic features of modern ‘call to arms’ texts.

They conclude that the generic structure of ‘call to arms’ discourses has not changed in any significant way since the last millennium. It is based on four powerful constituents. These are 1) the construction of a thoroughly evil Other, 2) an appeal to legitimate an external source of power, 3) an appeal for unification behind the greater good, and 4) an appeal to the significant of history in terms of culture and society

“A critical analysis of English and Arabic political speeches delivered during the war on Iraq” is the title of Balfaqeeh’s Ph.D. thesis (2007). Balfaqeeh highlights the notions of power and ideology in the context of the discourse of ‘call to arms’. She investigates some selected speeches of Bush, Blair, Saddam and Bin Ladin. She focuses on some discursive and formal strategies of political discourse, where the power and the speaker’s ideologies are employed to argue against each other. The outcomes of her research shed light on the ideologies of *religion* and of the *state* and the way; these are implemented through speeches to provide their own definitions of terrorism. In her thesis, it is possible to see argumentation and counter-argumentation on the legitimacy of the war in Iraq between 2002 and 2006 as part of the War on Terror

In another study, Reyes (2008) critically analyses a political speech made by Chavez at the UN in 2005. This study mainly focuses on the discursive strategies in Chavez’s discourse and correlates their discursive goals with their linguistic and paralinguistic means of realisation. The study shows how pronouns are used to create distance and help the speaker position himself in relation to specific utterances as goals of the political agenda (us vs. them; socialism vs. imperialism). The analysis is based on conversation analysis, particularly on Goffman’s concept of footing and Bakhtin’s of heteroglossia and double voicing. The author comes to the conclusion that through the use of pronouns and the lexical choices made Chavez indicates that his ideology is diametrically opposed to that of the USA.

The last study that I want to mention in this section puts special focus on presidential rhetoric. In this connection, Douglas Kellner (2007) investigates the rhetoric of the Bush-Cheney administration in the period following the 9/11 attacks, specifically, George W Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech made during the lead-up to the war on Iraq and the discourse during the war itself. In this study, Kellner hypothesises that the politics of lying is aided and abetted by the media and the rhetoric of the orators. To prove his hypothesis, Kellner uses George Orwell’s ideas as

a framework to prove that Bush's rhetoric is an instrument of the politics of lying that misleads people, and push them through fear to a right-wing agenda, i.e. going to war. Kellner also shows the dangers and limitations of the politics of lying, as in case of the Iraq war, which can be reversed and undermined by subsequent events in Iraq.

In conclusion, the above-mentioned studies provide some examples of the discursive strategies of legitimisation commonly used in political discourse during the wartimes. In addition, the studies also expand the reader's thinking abilities in terms of understanding an ideological discourse such as the discourse of war. However, as previously introduced, all these studies have focused either on Western, American in particular or European discourse and discourse producers. With the exception of Balfaqeeh (2007), a very little research has been done from an Eastern perspective and Iraqis in particular. Therefore, it is necessary to fill this gap research and introduce these (Middle Eastern) perspectives to the English language readership.

As one major aim of this research is to develop a suitable model of spoken discourse analysis, this research will demonstrate the analysis of four speeches with this model. The present study investigates some discursive aspects of 'call to arms' speeches as represented in American and Iraqi political discourse, where all of them aim to convince "people to kill and to die on behalf of some cause or other" (Graham et al., 2004, p. 200). The study will provide a critical analysis to examine 'call to arms' speeches made in western and eastern (Middle East) societies in relation to the motto of the War on Terror. In particular, the study examines four specific speeches: two by American presidents, namely, George W Bush and Barack Obama, and two by Iraqi Prime Ministers, Nouri Al-Maliki and Haider Al-Abadi. It hypothesises that the selected speakers had something special in their speeches and by a close analysis of their speeches, these features can be found out, and can be recommended for persuasive 'call to arms'.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND DATA

4.1. Introduction

This chapter reports on the data collected, methods and approaches that were used in this research project. The study will demonstrate how politicians frame their arguments as persuasive projects on the public to promote a war? The analysis will rely on the methodological categories of the DHA, including, *nomination*, *predication*, *perspectivization*, *argumentation* (*Topoi*), and *the strategies of intensification/ mitigation*, along with some legitimation studies (Van Leeuwen, 2007; Reyes, 2011) and social actors' representation (Van Leeuwen, 1996). The study will examine four contemporary examples of American and Iraqi 'call to arms' speeches delivered by leaders with differing ideologies during the time of the War on Terror, particularly George W Bush, Barak Obama, Nouri Al-Maliki, and Haider Al-Abadi. To attend the objective(s) of this chapter, section 4.2 explains the data of the study. Section 4.3 sets out the data selection process, explaining its criteria and sources. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 clarify the methodological bases and principles made in the research design. Finally, section 4.6, the conclusion brings the chapter to a close.

4.2. The data

The present work focuses on the study of discourse in politics i.e. the language used in or about politics. In particular, the study considers the policy-making speeches or 'deliberative' as classical rhetoricians have described, in the sense that it affects audience's attitude and behavior regarding some issues. The deliberative public speech is concerned with issuing a political decision(s) that is obtaining votes, e.g. going to war. The thesis also takes into consideration Reisigl & Wodak's (2001), "fields of action" as a helpful factor in order to categorise the given data. As such, political figures may cross between different fields of action to persuade people. Reisigl (2008) defines the "fields of action" as frameworks for social interaction.

4.3. Data, selection criteria and sources

Based on a qualitative method of analysis, four texts were selected from three different political events, *congress speeches*, *anniversary speeches* and *conference speeches* for critical analysis.

In this regard, Teddlie & Yu (2007, p. 80) maintain that purposive sampling can *have* two goals: 1) to find instances that are representative or typical of a particular type of case on a dimension of interest, and 2) to achieve comparability across different types of cases on a dimension of interest. The rationale for triangulated data is to seek objectivity and reliability of the research findings and to shunt subjective criticism of being biased or simply avoid politicising the issue of investigation instead of accurate analysis.

In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, there are extensive speeches were delivered by different political figures through a range of political occasions, in Congress, Parliament, Conferences, etc. to address a range of audiences under the motto ‘War on Terror’. Among the vast majority of the speeches of the War on Terror, the study investigates four speeches as exemplars for critical analysis with reference to American and Iraqi political discourse. A brief introduction to these speeches and speakers is given below.

1. George W Bush’s “The Declaration of the War on Terror”

This is the most famous speech by George W Bush, who held the office of the President of the United States for two terms from 2001 to 2009. This address was delivered to the US Congress on 20th September 2001, due to the attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York City on 11th September 2001, when two fully seated airplanes were hijacked and intentionally crashed into the WTC in New York City, causing the death of more than 3,000 people of different nationalities. This speech proved a turning point in the course of the War on Terror, as in this speech, Bush stood before the US Congress and declared an open war on terror and terrorists. (See appendix 1)

2. Barack Obama’s “Statement by the President on ISIL”

This speech was given by Barack Obama, the United States President (2009-2017). This address attracted significant public attention. It was delivered during the eve of the 13th anniversary of the 11th September 2001 attacks in the United States. In this address, President Obama, from the Cross Hall of the White House, on 10th September 2014 addressed the nation on the US counterterrorism strategy to thwart ISIL in Syria and Iraq. The address has faced harsh campaigns of criticism. It is accused of being a rush to a hazy war, a war, which had no clear vision of how it would end (Mazzetti, et al. 2014). For its importance in the global fabric of the

War on Terror, President Obama from the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., on 6th December repeats the speech. (See appendix 2).

3. Nouri Al-Maliki's "Statement at the American Congress"

This is the most famous speech of Al-Maliki, as it is the first an official representation of him and Iraq after 2003 in the international domain. Al-Maliki held the office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq for two terms from 2006 to 2014. In this address, Al-Maliki addressed the Congress of the US on 26th July 2006. This address has often been compared with the contextual dimension of Dr. Ayad Allawi's²⁵ address at the Congress of the US in 2004, when he thanked the Americans and the international community for their help and support asking them for more in fighting terrorists and terrorism in Iraq. The addresses both symbolised a new era in Iraqi political discourse, after the Saddam regime, the political system in Iraq has changed from an authoritarian regime to the democratic system. (See appendix 3).

4. Haider Al-Abadi's "Statement at North Atlantic"

Haider Al-Abadi is the current Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq and has been since September 2014 onwards. He delivered this address in a foreign ministerial conference in Brussels, Belgium, at the NATO Avenue on 3rd December 2014. It was the first Ministerial-level plenary session for the global coalition to counter terrorism - the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant²⁶ (ISIL). The address was given after three months of Al-Abadi's holding the office of the Prime Minister of Iraq. The purpose of this speech and of the conference was to mobilise the international community to counter ISIL in the world in general and in the Middle East and Iraq in particular. (See appendix 4).

According to the above brief introduction and explanation, the selected data is relevant to the central theme of the rhetoric of 'call to arms' in line with the purposes of this study. It covers two different phases of terrorism, namely: al Qaeda and ISIL or DAESH groups, and they officially and systematically represent ideas, perspectives, and proposals of 'call to arms'. Therefore, the general data selection criteria for the study are given in the following points:

²⁵ The interim Prime Minister of Iraq 2004-2005 and currently the Vice-President of Iraq since September 2014.

²⁶ It is an approximate historical geographical term referring to a large area in the Eastern Mediterranean.

1. The relevance of the speeches to the subject matter of the study and their richness in examples of discursive constructs and strategies that mobilise public opinions. In terms of field of action, the speakers aim at the formation of public opinion towards the preference of using military force. The speeches were well structured, and it is challenged to label them according to a single aspect of politics. All speakers integrate some aspects of polity (general principles about politics), policy (content-based politics) and politics (the determination of political interests and the formation of in- and out-groups).
2. The data are authentic by their authoritative source and formal context. They are produced by authorised persons –Presidents and Prime ministers and delivered at authoritative institutions, Congress, The White House, and NATO’s headquarters. The contextual setting of the data validates the authority of the speakers and that power allows them to present their speeches as truth. Consequently, the institutional authority of the discourse validates the truth or credibility of the speaker’s message, which in turn supports the justification of the action taken (Reyes 2011). Thus, it would be better to use the metalinguistic word “address” than “speech” in reference to the data in hand. As Klein (2000, p. 751) states, “the two metalinguistic English words ‘speech’ and ‘address’ are not always synonymous. Sometimes, ‘address’ denotes a higher degree of formality and/or consensuality than ‘speech’.
3. Selecting data (the speakers) from different cultural backgrounds, traditions, and ideologies provide a new context of comparison, cross-ideologically contrasting the way they build their persuasiveness from different ideological positionings, which in turn lends credibility and validity to the research findings.
4. It is also salient that these speeches have another opportunity to extend their scope of influence to address a wider audience and influence. This is so because they are televised and distributed via the news and social media.

The internet was the main source of these data. These data have been downloaded from trustworthy and reliable websites. The data analysed here were taken from the official websites of

the White House, CNN and Iraqi government website. For instance, the address of George W Bush has been downloaded from:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html.

The address of Barack Obama is available at

<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/transcript-Obama-syria-isis-speech/index.html>.

Al-Maliki's address is available at <http://www.cspan.org/video/?193589-1/iraqi-prime-minister-address>.

Finally, the address of Al-Abadi is downloaded from <http://pmo.iq/press/3-12-20142.htm>.

The reason for using the internet as a primary means of collecting the data was the availability of these addresses in good quality- audio and text formats. In order to enhance the reliability of the selected data, the transcript of each speech was carefully compared with its audio or video form. The transcripts were found comparable with the original audio or video version and were improved wherever required. The translations of the Iraqi texts were done by me, and their textual analysis is made from their original form and language (Arabic) to ensure the authenticity of the analysis and to enable us to compare the tools of persuasion used in the English and Arabic languages. However, the important sections of the Arabic data were translated into English just for the ease of those readers who are not familiar with the Arabic language.

4.4. DHA and its implementation: the framework of data analysis

Once an introduction to the speakers and context had been given at the beginning of each analysed chapter, the data were analysed according to the main principles of the DHA including, *nomination, predication, argumentation (topoi), perspectivization and the strategies of intensification/mitigation*. A separate analysis and discussion will be conducted for each strategy. The DHA integrates and triangulates knowledge about the history and the background of the socio-political fields in which discursive events (discourse) are embedded. As such, it looks at underlying power dynamics and the potential of agents (Wodak, 2009d, p. 38).

Triangulation in this sense is understood as an instrument creates links between different kinds of knowledge about the addressees (events) and speakers (agents) under investigation; this is because the DHA aims to analyse discourse on multi-contextual levels. Reisigl and Wodak (2009, p. 89), define discourse as:

- a) Related to a macro-topic (and to the argumentation of validity claims, such as truth and normative validity, which involve social actors with different points of view);
- b) A cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action;
- c) Socially constituted as well as socially constitutive

In terms of constituting the textual meaning and the structure of discourse, the DHA identifies three dimensions: these are the topics, discursive strategies, and linguistics realisation. All these three dimensions will be covered throughout the thesis to complement the linguistic analysis of the data. For each of the selected texts, I will:

- a) Look at the content and topics,
- b) Identify the discursive strategies and
- c) Examine the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realisations.

In a qualitative analysis like this study, the context has a significant impact on the process of persuasion. Therefore, the study will consider the four contextual levels of the DHA (see, Wodak, 2009d). By applying these levels, it becomes possible to understand the relationships between discourses, genres, and texts as well as how they change according to the socio-political context. These levels are:

1. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
2. Extralinguistic social/sociological variables;
3. The history and archaeology of texts;
4. The institutional frames of the context of a specific situation.

On the operationalisation level of the move from theory to applied discourse analysis, Reisigl & Wodak (2001. P. 93-95) propose set of discursive strategies (Table 4.1), involved in the positive self- and negative other- presentation, which are employed by this thesis for scrutinising

how persuasion has been produced, received and discursively realised in ‘call to arms’ speeches of two completely different backgrounded political discourses. Here, the strategies are seen as (un) intentional plans of action mediated by the speakers to achieve a certain social, political, psychological or linguistic goal(s) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009).

Strategy	Objective(s)	Device(s)
Nomination	Discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events and processes, actions	Membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc. Metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche Verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions etc.
Predication	Discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions (more or less positively and negatively)	Stereotypical, evaluative attribution of negative and positive traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) Explicit predicates or predicative nouns/ adjectives/ pronouns Collocations Explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures Allusions, evocations and

		presuppositions/ implicatures etc.
Argumentation	Justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	Topoi (see below for definitions and examples) Fallacies (this is beyond the scope of this thesis. To review these strategies and their impact on political discourses, see Kucukali (2014).
Perspectivation, Framing or Discourse Representation	Positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	Deictics Direct, Indirect or Free Indirect Speech Quotation marks, discourse markers or particles Metaphors Animating Prosody
Intensification and Mitigation	Modifying the illocutionary force and thus, the epistemic or deontic status of utterances	Diminutives and Augmentatives Modal particles, tag questions, subjunctives, hesitations, vague expressions Hyperboles, Litotes Indirect speech acts Verbs of saying, thinking, feeling etc.

Table 4. 1. Discursive strategies, their objectives and devices (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 95).

According to the above Table 4.1, the first discursive strategy is **nomination\refrential**, it looks at how social actors, objects, phenomena and events are named and referred to linguistically. Politicians are implemented to represent and construct social actors in order to demarcate

themselves from their political opponents. One way to do that is through the use of in-groups and out-groups in a categorical way, in which the study of pronouns has often been relevant at the border of syntactic and semantic persuasion by using (*you/yours and we/ours*), and for their prototypical polarisation (mental representation) of *Us* and *Them*. By this, a political actor assumes internal consensus and external dissensus towards the opposition of “a collective understanding that certain concepts, actions, and relationships are true or correct” (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p. 219). Some linguistic devices that are functional for this strategy are metaphors, metonymy and synecdoche.

The second one, **predication strategies**, characterise social actors according to the stereotypical, evaluative, attribution of positive or negative traits in linguistic form implicit or explicit predicates (KhosraviNil, 2010, p. 57). The main aim is to label actors positively (i.e., in-group) or negatively (i.e., out-group). In this case, the analysis focus on the lexicalisation of underlying conceptual meanings and the relation between meaning and form. Lexicalisation analysis is relevant in descriptions of *Selfe* and *Other* groups, as it is identifying them, referring to them and describing their actions and properties. As such, the strategies (nomination & predication) are loosely related one to another and one may predetermine the other. The relation between the two “is mediated by indexicality, which refers to the implicit correlation between linguistic choices and their conventionalized context of use.” (Ochs, 1996, p. 411).

The third one is **perspectivation**, it refers to instances where political actors try to express their detachment or involvement and position their point of view in line with their political interests. In a very broad sense, perspectivation can be viewed as “an intermediate stage before linguistic forms are realised playing a role in all micro/macro-linguistic choices that a text producer may make” (KhosraviNik, 2010, p. 57). In relevant for the study of perspectivation, style variation may be explained in terms of the opinions of the speakers and the ways they want to influence their audiences. Van Dijk (2000, p. 96) defines style, as the set of those sentences and discourse structures that are potentially variable as a function of context. Therefore, word or sentence order is studied.

The fourth one, **argumentation** is the means of persuading the audience (Fetzer, 2007, p. 1342), the process of justifying and legitimising actors, objects and phenomena. It is often reliant on

topoi, which can be defined as part of argumentation that belong explicitly or tacitly to the obligatory premises of an argument whereby the positive / negative attributions are justified in relation to certain social and political interests. Topoi are considered to be the content-related warrants or conclusion rules which connect the arguments with the conclusions and therefore provide justification (Reisigl & Wodak 2001, Kader, 2016). They justify the transition from the arguments to the conclusions (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), where the premises or assumptions that link the evidence(s) to certain conclusions are “neither (usually) explained nor challenged, because they are usually based on a taken-for-granted warrant – they can be made explicit as conditional or causal paraphrases, such as ‘if x, then y’ or ‘y, because x’” (KhsraviNik, 2010, p. 64). As such, the use of topoi minimises the risk of being biased and politicising the issues in question. Hence, Topoi can be viewed as ‘stereotypical’ arguments based on socially shared opinions generally implying “common sense reasoning schemes” for the sake of persuasion (Van Dijk, 2000; Forchtner, 2014).

In the meantime, it may be worth explaining that although topos has a root in a classical rhetoric and it can be read in one of two ways: a ‘place’ where arguments can be found or a ‘pragmatic procedure’ (Van Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 38), its first use within the framework of CDA is unique for the DHA analytical apparatus (Žagar, 2010, p. 5). It seems that the second interpretation, ‘pragmatic procedure’ is mainly found in the CDA (Hart, 2013). The DHA defines topoi as “content-related warrants which connect premises with conclusion” (Wodak, 2001b, p. 75), as ‘common-sense’ reasoning schemes typical for specific issues (van Dijk, 2000). Consequently, they justify the transition from the premise to the conclusion (Wodak, 2001). The conclusion, therefore, “need not be made explicit in the argument but may be presupposed to follow from the premise as a rational inference.” (Hart, 2013, p. 202).

In line with the DHA and its aspiration to raise critical awareness in the way language is used, the analysis views topoi as the heart of argumentation. Drawing on Bouvier (1993) and Anscomber (1995) topoi provide the standard, argument, typical that may be applied to many different situations to legitimise events, phenomena, places or people to present a common-

sense reasoning for persuasive ends. Hence, it is expected to find numbers of topoi that occur frequently in the selected texts. Therefore, some of them are defined and exemplified below²⁷.

Topos of burden: If an institution/individual/ is burdened by a specific problem, then one should act to diminish it.

[Saddam regime] damaged the political relations - in particular with its neighbours. We are correcting the damage inflicted by the politics of the previous regime, in particular with our neighbours (Al-Maliki L55-56).

Topos of reality: Tautologically, this infers that reality is as it is and a particular action should be performed.

The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan [therefore]. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda's vision for the world (Bush, 2001, L59-60).

Topos of numbers: If sufficient number/ statistical evidence is given, a specific action should be performed.

The civil war in Syria caused the displacement of approximately two million people, and now they are staying within our borders. We need the support of the entire international community to endure and heal the wounds of the victims of violence (Al-Abadi, 2014, L118-131).

Topos of history: Because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, hence one should forbid or allow a specific action in a specific situation.

They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole. (Bush, 2001- L44-46).

Topos of authority: If one refers to somebody/something in a position of authority, then the action is legitimate.

Many will be involved in this effort; from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty (Bush, 2001- L128-130).

²⁷ All the definitions provided are adopted from Wodak & Reisigl (2001: 74-80). However, some of them have been modified (responsibility, threat and danger) and generated as in the case of the topos of 'religion' by the analyst to fit the aim of the study. In contrast, all the examples given are taken from the samples used for the analysis. The original texts are available in the appendix.

Topos of danger & threat: If specific dangers or threats are identified, one should do something against them.

These terrorists are unique in their brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They enslave, rape, and force women into marriage. They threatened a religious minority with genocide. And in acts of barbarism, they took the lives of two American journalists — Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff. So, ISIL poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and the broader Middle East — including American citizens, personnel and facilities. If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States (Obama, 2014-L25-32).

Topos of definition/naming: If an action/a thing/a person is designated as X, it should have the qualities/ traits/attributes consistent with the meaning of X, for instance,

ISIL is not "Islamic." No religion condones the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of ISIL's victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state. It was formerly al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq (Obama, 2014:18-20).

Topos of justice: Equal rights for all, if not one should do something to make justice.

Afghanistan's people have been brutalized — many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leader's dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough. The United States respects the people of Afghanistan [...] but we condemn the Taliban regime (Bush, 2001: L 61-66).

Topos of urgency: Decisions or actions need to be considered/ weighed/ made very quickly because of an external, important and unchangeable event beyond one's own reach and responsibility.

If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States (Obama, 2014: L30-32).

Topos of responsibility: If a state /a group / a person is responsible for the emergence of specific problems; one should act in order to find solutions to these problems.

The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole (Bush, 2001- L 42-46).

Topos of religion: If religion does NOT practice as is it, negative consequences arise; one should do something to change.

Our faith says that who kills an innocent as it has killed all mankind. Thousands of lives were tragically lost on September 11th, where — when these imposters of Islam reared their ugly head (Al-Maliki, 2001: L23-25).

The fifth strategy is **intensification or mitigation**. This strategy helps to modify and qualify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances, the speaker's intention in producing that utterance. It is a commonplace strategy that topicalises and de-topicalises a certain point of view, therefore its influence can be seen at all levels of analysis from nomination to argumentation strategies (KhosraviNil, 2015).

It seems that the DHA methodological categories are used to justify or account for positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation processes by which the presenters (speakers) create their worldview that aims to secure the control of the proposed action(s) (Hart 2010) and legitimise their proposed actions and delegitimise the other's certain actions, concepts, and relationships (Valk, 2000). Therefore, the linguistic analysis of the as yet relatively under-investigated texts has to be analytically linked to these strategic functions. Of course, neither positive representation (in groups\inclusion), nor the strategies of negative representation (outgroups\exclusion) are simply linguistics matters. They are partly linguistics matters, and language establishes a significant aspect of them. Therefore, it believes that doing a CDA is useful as it accounts for the theoretical analysis of them, and through the reflexive appropriation of theory within practical life, to the practical response to them.

Besides, the analysis will also consider the strategy of **intertextuality and interdiscursivity** to cover the historical dimension of the study. By investigating elements of intertextuality and interdiscursivity as part of the historical facet that is essential to the DHA, it becomes clear how texts are related to each other through history, and how history affects the process of discourse construction. The DHA approaches the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, i.e., the history and intertextual references of terms and concepts that are used (Richardson &Wodak, 2009, p. 255).

Fairclough (1992, p. 84) defines intertextuality as “the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth.” Such connections show the influence of history on the construction of that text and influence of a text on history. He further, distinguishes two types of intertextuality: *manifest intertextuality* and *constitutive intertextuality*. The former means a text contains another text’s element explicitly, as in case of quotation marks. The latter is *constitutive intertextuality* or *‘interdiscursivity’*, which designates that different discourses are conventionally interrelated to each other in a communicative event such as discourse types, register, style, etc. It indicates that topic-oriented discourses are related to each other (Wodak, 2009, p. 39). For example, the discourse of war is related to other discourse topics or sub-topics, such as national security, finance or health, and so forth. This would confirm the DHA’s belief that discourse is “open and often hybrid, new sub-topic can be created at many points” (Wodak, 2009, p.90). Hence, intertextuality means that texts either are linked to other texts explicitly through reference to a topic/actor or implicitly through reference to the same event by for example transferring argument(s) from one text to another (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). We observe the process of de-contextualisation, if an element(s) transfers from its context and recontextualisation, when the respective element(s) is then inserted into a new context (see Kristeva, 1986; Fairclough, 1992; Wodak, 2009; Kader, 2016).

In political speeches, orators move between old and new texts and incidents in their speeches. For instance, in his speech in 2001, George Bush, the President of the United States, referred to various topics, actors, and events from other past and present texts, such as, the event of black Sandy, 1949, and the dramatic events of 9th September 2001 to create a persuasive and legitimate discourse to convince his audiences about the necessity of the War on Terror. However, it is still commonly supposed that media discourse is the vital ground of ‘intertextuality’, wherein journalists use various texts (oral, written and visual) from different disciplines in making reports.

4.5. Interdisciplinarity

It seems, that the primary question of the study is too broad to be addressed by a single academic method or approach, and as such, it requires an interdisciplinary analytical approach that is

specifically tailored to answer it. Klein (1990, p.196) effectively defines interdisciplinarity “a means of solving problems and answering questions that cannot be satisfactorily addressed using single methods or approaches”. In discourse analysis, the choice of analytical categories depends on their relevance to the research questions, problems, and aims of the research project (Van Dijk 2000). Therefore, and through the data analysis and discussion, I will also look at (de)legitimation in the ‘call to arms’ as the micro discourse of persuasion by using the strategies proposed by van Leeuwen (2007), and Antonio Reyes (2011). These strategies are *authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation, mythopoesis and an appeal to emotions*.

Van Leeuwen (2007) proposes four legitimisation strategies to account for why a particular action(s) should be done in a specific way. They are action-orientation legitimisations. These strategies were used first to analyse discourses about compulsory education. They are *authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis*. Similarly, in his study about the (de)legitimation in US Presidents’ speeches, Reyes (2011) gives insights into both actor and action-oriented legitimisation. He mediates intentionality between political discourses and (de) legitimisation, as the former is a pre-planned or planned discourse, whereby politicians systematically convey their agenda to (de)legitimise viewpoints or ideological positioning. Reyes (2011, p. 781) states that (de)legitimation can be discursively achieved through (1) an appeal to emotions (particularly fear), (2) presenting a hypothetical future, (3) rationalisation, (4) voices of expertise and (5) altruism. In this thesis, I would pay close attention to the appeal to emotions, as the other three strategies are inherently included in Van Leeuwen’s (2007). For instance, the strategy of hypothetical future is included in van Leeuwen’s theoretical rationalisation that takes the form of prediction. The strategy of rationalisation is similar to that of van Leeuwen’s instrumental rationalisation. The strategy of voices of expertise has the meaning of van Leeuwen’s authorisation in terms of expertise, and somehow the strategy of altruism is related to Van Leeuwen’s moral evaluation.

4.5.1. De- legitimisation and persuasion

The reason behind the analysis of (de)legitimation is to answer the question ‘why do people sacrifice their lives by going to war? Particularly, they know that war is a dangerous and often-deadly activity. This means, (de)legitimation strategies are intertwined with persuasive

argumentation which are not mutually exclusive. Hence, it believes that arguments cannot be persuasive without a justification of some sort. Incipient, arguments must be assigned legitimacy/justification in order to be persuasive, as they provide additional sub-categories for particular persuasion devices such as authorisation, moral evaluation, and emotions. Legitimation may be achieved by “arguments about voters’ wants, general ideological principles, charismatic leadership projection, boasting about performance and positive self-presentation” (Chilton, 2004, p. 46). On the other hand, de-legitimation is the “essential counterpart” of legitimation by means of which the other, i.e., al Qaeda, ISIL, Saddam is “presented negatively, and [its] techniques include the use of ideas of difference and boundaries, and speech acts of blaming, accusing, insulting, etc” (Chilton, 2004, p. 46).

In practice, (de)legitimation is intrinsically inherent in political discourses. (De) legitimation is a tendentious way of using language to represent particular political actors or actions in positive or negative attributions (Davies & Harré, 1990), through which the (de)legitimiser (politician) aligns himself with a particular positive interpretation for persuasive ends. For its relation to the concept of persuasion, Cap (2008, p. 39), envisages legitimation as one of the primary goals that political actors use to persuade people to accept a policy proposal and standpoint. Linking (de)legitimation with the social role and identity of the speakers, it is a “linguistic enactment of the speaker’s right to be obeyed” by appealing to the sources of power associated with a particular social role and with the political position they have, i.e., Presidents, Prime Minister, and Commander-in-Chief. Therefore, (de)legitimation deserves special attention in political discourse in general and call to arms in more particular. With (de)legitimation, political actors try to justify their political agenda, i.e., going to war, and to maintain or change the direction of politics (Reyes, 2011, p. 783). Language is, without a doubt, the most significant tool for these attempts. In this case, Berger & Lukmann (1966), convincingly argue:

Incipient legitimation is present as soon as a system of linguistic objectification of human experience is transmitted. For example, the transmission of a kinship vocabulary ipso facto legitimates the kinship structure. The fundamental legitimating ‘explanations’ are, so to speak, built into the vocabulary (Berger & Lukmann, 1966:112 cited in Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 91).

Like other critical analysts (van Dijk 1997; Martín Rojo & van Dijk 1997; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012), I understand (de)legitimation, a particular type of explanation and justification of actions, a political actor displays to account for power, enacted by arguments for persuasive ends. Because the meaningfulness of this thesis hinges on the plausibility of the assumption that persuasion is intrinsically related to (de)legitimation, it might be worthwhile to consider these strategies a little beyond the definition and give examples.

I. Authorisation:

In the case of legitimation by authority, Van Leeuwen (2007:94-97) distinguishes between six types of authority, as they are defined and exemplified below.

- **Personal authority**

Legitimation takes place by reference to a person who has a status or role in a particular institution. The Commander-in-Chief can be given as an example. It typically, takes the form of a “verbal process” (Halliday 1985:129), as in this example “I ordered our military to take targeted action against ISIL to stop its advances” (Obama 2014: L-41).

- **Expert authority:**

Contrary, to the personal authorisation, legitimacy is provided by expertise rather than status. This can be a military expert, as in the following example:

Tonight, I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend — Pennsylvania’s Tom Ridge. He will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks that may come (Bush 2001: L122-126).

- **Role model authority:**

In the case of role model authority, people (politicians) follow certain kinds of examples or events to be a model to legitimate their (future) actions or to believe certain things, as in this example:

Thousands of lives were tragically lost on September 11th, where — when these imposters of Islam reared their ugly head. Thousands more continue to die in Iraq today at the hands of the same terrorists who show complete disregard for human life (Al-Maliki 2006: L24-27).

- **Impersonal authority:**

Unlike the personal authority, impersonal authority does not refer to the authority of persons or the institutional status they vested. Indeed, it is already established in reference to policy, law, regulation, and law or adjectives and adverbs like “compulsory, regulatory or mandatory”. Contextually, this example may have the meaning of impersonal authority. “Tonight, I call on Congress again to give us additional authorities and resources to train and equip these fighters” (Obama 2014: L72-73).

- **The authority of tradition:**

In this kind of authority, legitimacy is provided by reference point to tradition, practice, custom, or habit. The answer to the why question is not “because it is compulsory” but because this is what “we always do” or “we have always done.” In Muslims’ society, the tradition of Qur’an and prophet’s sayings carry enough weight to go unchallenged. In his speech, (2006) Al-Maliki uses verses of the Qur’an to legitimise his thoughts and opinion, and de-legitimise Others’, “Our faith says that who kills an innocent as it has killed all mankind” (L23-24).

- **The authority of conformity:**

This type of legitimation authority distances itself from being the source of authority. It refers to other as a whole, as such the answer to the why question is not “because that is what we always do”, but “because others do it”, as in this example:

During the past, few weeks, we had made very close and effective contacts at a high level in Baghdad with all neighbouring countries. [...]. Through our work with these countries and other countries in the vicinity, we are in the process of forming a joint defense front; stand against ISIS, and developing a new strategy to deal with regional problems that lead to the spread of international terrorism (Al-Abadi 2014: L 86-87; 95-98).

II. Moral evaluation:

In this strategy, the evaluation of moral value is the parameter for legitimising the assessment of actions. Nevertheless, the evaluation of these values is implicit and not debatable and linked to specific discourses of moral values. In most cases, they are connected to general adjectives, like healthy, normal, and natural. However, Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 98) states it is hard to find

linguistically motivated methods to identify this kind of moral evaluation. The only method to recognise these moral values is by understanding their social, cultural and historical expressions- common sense cultural knowledge because these factors differ from society to society. This legitimates the use of the DHA, an analytical framework for this study, because “it allows an understanding of which cultural/ historical references are transferred to discourse in the form of moral evaluation as common values” (KucukaĬ, 2014, p. 116). Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 92) develops three ways to express the moral evaluation. They are: evaluation, abstraction and analogy.

Moral evaluation legitimisation implied by evaluative adjectives. These adjectives are “designative and attributive” (Leech, 1966, p. 130). They describe concrete qualifications of actions or objects and recommend them in terms of some domain of values (van Leeuwen 2007). In terms of abstraction, moral evaluation is achieved by indicating practices in a way that moralise them. It highlights a quality of a practice or one of its components-actions or reactions so that this quality is linked to the discourse of moral values, as when Al-Maliki legitimises the War on Terror, as “a battle between true Islam, for which a person's liberty and rights constitute essential cornerstones, and terrorism, which wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak.” (L 17-19). In more specific, the speaker highlights the evaluative adjectives (i.e., advantages/outcomes) of the War on Terror in terms of the social and cultural understanding of Islam, where person's liberty and rights constitute essential cornerstones. Finally, the third way of expressing moral evaluation is the analogy in discourses. It is based on making comparisons in order to legitimise or delegitimise a certain action. Hence, the answer to the question “Why must I do this in this way?” is ‘because “it is like another activity which is associated with positive values”, as in the first example below, or because it is “unlike another activity which is associated with negative values.” as in the second example.

This strategy of taking out terrorists, who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years.” (Obama 2014 L 111-113)

I want the American people to understand how this effort will be different from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will not involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil (Obama 2014 L107-109).

An analogy can also be oblique and explicit. It is oblique when it uses a term(s), which literally belongs to specific social practice to indicate an activity that belongs to a different social practice, like this example:

We have allocated a huge amount of money from our budget for these refugees, and the UN shouldered part of the burden of humanitarian aid, but we need the support of the entire international community to endure and heal the wounds of the victims of violence. (Al-Abadi L128-131).

In this example (underlined) the speaker uses the term belonging to the social practice of healthcare, but it is conceptualised by the speaker to refer to another social practice, i.e., the process of the economy. The comparison can also be made obviously, as in this example:

We have gone from a one-party state ruled by a small elite to a multi-party system where politics is the domain of every citizen and parties compete at all levels (Al-Maliki L80-82).

In this example, the undemocratic ideology is delegitimised, and a democratic and technocratic perception of policymaking is morally justified.

III. Rationalisation:

Here, the justification of practices\actions\claims is based on their cognitive validity or expediency. Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 101) distinguishes between two types of rationality. One is instrumental rationality, and the other is theoretical rationality. In the case of instrumental rationalisation, justification is grounded in Instrumental rationality can be goal-oriented, means-oriented or effect-oriented. In the case of goal-oriented instrumental rationality, purposes are constructed as conscious or unconscious motives, aims, intentions or goals. They can be explicitly realised, as in the first example, or implicitly, as in the second example. In the first example, the practice/decision of the speaker is clearly grounded on explicit goal “eradicate corruption and reinvigorate the military leadership.” While the second example implicitly rationalises the War on Terror for its potential positive benefits.

- 1- We have dismissed more than twenty-four military commanders as part of our efforts to eradicate corruption and reinvigorate the military leadership (Al-Abadi 2014 L53-55).

2- These strikes have protected American personnel and facilities, killed ISIL fighters, destroyed weapons, and given space for Iraqi and Kurdish forces to reclaim key territory. These strikes have also helped save the lives of thousands of innocent men, women and children (Obama 2014 L41-45).

In the case of effect-orientation, the outcomes of action are weighted. In some cases, the agents that are involved in the action can predict its outcomes. However, they are not only dependent on their actions. An example is:

They [nations] understand that if this terror [al Qaeda] goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, cannot only bring down buildings; it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments (Bush 2001 L142-144).

Another source of rationalisation is *theoretical rationality* whereby practices are legitimised according to the natural order of things. It is based, not on morally justified, purposeful or effective practice(s). Indeed, theoretical legitimation is based on some truth. Therefore, it presents an overt representation of the way ‘things are’. Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 104) suggests three types of this kind of legitimation.

The first one is the *definition* in which one action is defined in relation to another moralised action, and both of these actions must be generalised and objectivised. Besides that, these two actions are linked either through attributive verbs like is, constitutes, forms, etc. or significative verbs like signals, means, symbolises, etc. An example of definition is:

We will continue to draw on our substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks. [...]. We will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who have been displaced by this terrorist organization (Obama, L 84-85).

The second category of theoretical legitimation is the *explanation* of - defined and characterised- the actors that involved in the practice. It focuses on the description of the general attributes or habitual activities of the categories of actors in question, as in the following example:

We understand that Iraq needs governmental reforms, national reconciliation, economic and social as well as military action to defeat DAESH. Our new government takes the responsibility to carry out all these tasks (Al-Abadi, L26-28).

The final categorisation of theoretical legitimation is *predication*. In this form of legitimacy, the communication is based on actors’ experiences, who have a particular social position to take protective measures. That may justify the (mis)use of authority to take an action that protects

his group from expected detrimental force or action. Therefore, political actors often employ proximation, which is a “strategy that relies upon the speaker’s ability to present events on the discourse stage as directly affecting the addressee, usually in a negative or a threatening way” Cap (2010, p. 119). Although, these *predications* are no longer fixed, other experts or experiences can deny them. As an example of predication is:

DAESH is recruiting and training fighters from the West besides those who are being recruited from other areas. Therefore, it is only a matter of time until these highly-trained terrorists will return to the communities from which they came from to commit murder and cause destruction (Al-Abadi, L 112-16).

IV. Mythopoesis:

The fourth (de)legitimation strategy that is identified by Van Leeuwen (2007) is mythopoesis, i.e. storytelling. Accordingly, legitimation can be achieved in terms of telling stories. There are two types of storytelling which can be recognised in this strategy. The first one is *moral tales*, in which “protagonists are rewarded for their legitimate actions or for restoring legitimate order” (Van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 105). This form of the story can possibly be found in the discourse of going to war, as when President Obama licenses the use of force.

When we helped prevent the massacre of civilians trapped on a distant mountain, here's what one of them said: "We owe our American friends our lives. Our children will always remember that there was someone who felt our struggle and made a long journey to protect innocent people (Obama, L 145-148).

The second type of storytelling is *cautionary tales*. This form of story highlights the negative consequences of an action that does not conform to the norms of social practices, wherein their protagonists are involved in deviant activities, which lead to unhappy endings (Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 106). In the following example, the protagonists are the 1990s American Congress members, who made a mistake by disclaiming their support for the Shiites’ uprising against Saddam Hussein at the end of the 1991 Gulf War (see Reynolds (2006). In this part of the speech, Al-Maliki reminds the current Congress members of the consequences of this action.

For decades, we struggled alone for our freedom. In 1991, when Iraqis tried to capitalize on the regime's momentary weakness and rose up, we were alone again. The people of Iraq will not forget your continued support as we establish a secure, liberal democracy. Let 1991 never be repeated, because history will be more unforgiving. The coming few

days are difficult, and the challenges are considerable. Iraq and World countries both need each other to defeat the terror engulfing the free world (Al-Maliki, L 156- 162).

V. Appeal to Emotions

In addition to its function of persuading people. Reyes, argues that social actors appeal to emotions to legitimise, impose, debate, and construct certain perceptions of (un)reality, to contribute individually to form their community's vision of social behavior (Reyes 2011). Practically, this can be achieved by highlighting the negative representations of Other's actors and actions, which affect the cognitive structure of an audience's emotions. Therefore, political actors usually appeal to the emotions in order to create a consensus between themselves and their audiences. It allows them to form two social categorisations. The first one is an in-group category, which is based on shared feelings, practices or the past and an out-group, which does not share the same emotions with the political actors and their audience because they are against the proposed policy. As Reyes states:

The negative representation of social actors and the attribution of negative qualities to their personalities or their actions allow speakers to create two sides of a given story/event, in which speaker and audience are in the 'us-group' and the social actors depicted negatively constitute the 'them-group.' (Reyes 2011, p. 785).

Based on the above quotation, an appeal to emotions, fear in particular, is related to the macro-strategy of positive self and negative other representation. It may say that emotions can be used as predication and nomination strategies. Below, it is possible to see how emotions are used by Obama to legitimise the use of force.

These terrorists are unique in their brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They enslave, rape, and force women into marriage. They threatened a religious minority with genocide. And in acts of barbarism, they took the lives of two American journalists — Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff (Obama, L25-29).

4.6. Summary

This research follows the main premises of the DHA. It does that in order to be able to: a) analyse discourse in its wider social context; b) determine discourse topics which are functionalised in favour of non-discursive policy projects; c) show the relationship between the discursive and non-discursive spheres of politics by investigating how discursive strategies are used to persuade/ legitimise certain policy proposals/ actors/ political ideologies and trivialise/ deligitimise others.

In accordance with the aforementioned aims, I will first investigate the specific content and topics of discourses. These discourse topics, or topicality, can be seen as policy projects. Then, I will investigate discursive strategies (referential, perspectivization, argumentation, predication, nomination, intensification/ mitigation) to find out how the selected speakers try to achieve consensus for their proposals, the War on Terror and support it. In the third stage of analysis, I analyse the micro-level linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realisations which form the basis of discursive strategies.

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSING THE SPEECH OF GEORGE W BUSH

5.1. A brief profile of George W Bush

The orator of this speech is George W Bush, the 43rd President of the United States. He is the son of George Bush, the 41st President of the United States. It was only the second time in American history that a President's son went to the White House after John Quincy Adams, the sixth President, who was the son of John Adams, the second President of the United States (Balfaqeeh, 2007). George W. Bush was born in New Haven, Connecticut in 1946. He graduated from the prestigious Yale and Harvard Universities, where he earned his bachelor's degree in history and master degree in Business Administration, as he intended to join the oil business on his father's advice.

Later, Bush realised that politics was his true calling, and in his successful political career, he was elected to be the 46th Governor of Texas and served for two continuous terms in this office before holding the highest office of the President of the United States (Garran, 2004). Bush held the office of the President of the United States as a candidate of the Republican Party for two terms from 2001 to 2009. The main turning point of Bush's life was his decision to give up drinking and his faith transformation. He sees his faith as a "foundation that will never shift" in his life, and he "has made his religion a matter of public interest by referring to it frequently and asserting that it influences his public decision" (Singer, 2010, p. 97-98).

5.2. Context to the speech

The World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York City was attacked on 11th September 2001 when Bush was in his first term as the President of the United States. This terrorist attack, as Bush described it, happened after eight months of his first presidency term. As a result, Bush stood before the US Congress and declared an open war on terrorism. This War, as he declared, would continue until all terrorist groups are identified and defeated wherever they are. For this purpose, Bush delivered "The Declaration of War on Terror" on 20th September 2001 in the 107th session of the American Congress in Washington D.C. By this address, Bush tried to legitimatise the military action against terror, to persuade as much as possible national and international,

political and public supporters. The audiences of this address comprised members of Congress - Republicans and Democrats, political leaders, U.S. military leaders, and some families of the victims of 9/11, in addition to a few non-American political leaders, among who was Mr. Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of the UK between 1997 and 2007.

The contextual dimension of this address resonates F. D. Roosevelt's "*Pearl Harbour Address to the Nation*", delivered on 8th December 1941, which was a day of shock and confusion in the United States, due to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour the day before. This day is known by Americans as '*Black Sunday*'. F. D. Roosevelt addressed the US Congress to react against this surprise attack made by the Japanese Empire (see Mohan, 2013b for analysis of F. D. Roosevelt's speech "Pearl Harbour Address to the Nation"). Hence, Bush's address is comparable with Roosevelt's in context, content, and effect. They were both delivered by US presidents. They were addressed to the US Congress members. Both were organised around the deliberative type of oration, which aims at persuading the audience to accept the orator's view and act as per the orator's suggestion through voting. Both addresses were delivered in an official and highly formal venue, that is, the building of the US Congress. Both were successfully delivered in order to win the support of the audience for the necessity of military action. Politically, they were an official declaration of war.

5.3. Analysis and discussion

This analysis closely looks at (1) how social actors and actions have been named and described by using referential and predication strategies; (2) what perspectivization strategies have been used to show the speaker's perspective of involvement and detachment in the central issue of the speech; (3) how certain premises and proposals have been lead to certain conclusions; and (4) how certain issues have been highlighted or diluted by using the strategies of intensification and mitigation.

5.3.1. Referential and predication strategies

This part of the analysis investigates how social actors have been named and described for the discursive construction of their identity. These social actors include persons, institutions, objects and events, which have been identified and described strategically for the discursive construction of a persuasive discourse. Accordingly, actors were grouped into two categories—

positive-self and negative other according to the requirements of the persuasive purposes of the speaker. Certain words, such as, ‘we’, ‘Americans’, ‘our Union’, ‘the United States’, ‘fellow citizens’, ‘Muslims’, ‘Islam’, etc. can be grouped under the category of positive self. While, the negative-other comprises referents, such as, ‘they’, ‘terrorists’, ‘al Qaeda’, ‘Osama bin Laden’, ‘Taliban regime’, etc. A systematic analysis of these referential and predication strategies has been given here.

5.3.1.1. The Positive presentation of social actors and actions: Describing the in-group

In his speech, George W Bush clearly divides the social actors into the positive-self and the negative-other. All the references to the US (people, government and politicians, nation, or its allies) come under the positive self. References used for the positive-self clearly indicate that these references have been used with a view to enhancing the speaker’s character and trustworthiness (Ethos) and motivating the audience by appealing to the audience’s sense of dignity by boosting their self-image (L 3-15). We can see in the table below how the positive-self has been enhanced by attributing positive adjectives and actions.

Social Actors	References	Prototypical example
The speaker (as person and president)	I	See Table 5.2.
USA (as people)	Fellow Americans, American people We, You, Americans, Fellow citizens	-in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion (L7-8) -the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, and the giving of blood, the saying of prayers (L8-9) -loving and giving people (L10) -made the grief of strangers their own (L10) - known wars, known casualties, known surprise attacks (L36-39) -joined together on the steps of this Capitol (L17-18)
	Todd Beamer	-rushed terrorists to save others on the ground (L4-5) - exceptional man (L5)
	George Howard	- who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others (L197)
USA (as politicians/government)	Republicans and Democrats Speaker Hastert,	-You acted, by delivering \$40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military (L 18-20)

	Minority Leader Gephardt Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Lott	-your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our country (L22-23)
	Tom Ridge	-a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend (L123-125) - safeguard our country against terrorism and respond to any attacks that may come (L 126)
	Governor George Pataki and Mayor Rudolf Giuliani	Who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers (L175-177)
USA (As a nation)	Our union America the United States of America this country	-Strong (L12) democratically elected government -freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other (L88-90) -successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise (L159-160) -country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom (L12-13) -Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution (L 13) -freedom itself is under attack (L 41) - will make us proud (L133) -this country will define our times, not be defined by them(L182)

Table 5. 1. The positive presentation of ‘Self’

According to the above table 5.1 positive- self category comprises four categories of social actors. The first actor in this category is the speaker himself, referred to him as ‘I’ in the speech (see table 2). The second actor is the people of the US referred to as ‘we’, ‘you’, ‘Americans’, ‘fellow citizens’, and the ‘American people’. The third social actor under the positive-self category is the USA as government and politicians, referred to by the names of political parties, office bearers, and politicians. The fourth social actor is the USA as a nation, referred to as ‘our nation’, ‘America’ and ‘the United States of America’. All these categories and references have been attributed to positive qualities to enhance the image of the nation and the speaker.

The orator uses the pronoun ‘I’ 24 times, which shows that the speaker claims a lot of power and authority (Bramley, 2001). The speaker used the pronoun ‘I’ when he thanked people for different positive things they had done. Moreover, the pronoun ‘I’ has also been used to exercise some sort of power, the power of the US President. The use of the first person singular pronoun

indicates that the speaker owns all responsibility for the actions he takes. He seems to exercise his power and authority as a self-willed person and a very strong leader. When the speaker tried to take the audience into his confidence and assured them of their security, Bush addressed them on a personal level using ‘I’. The same pronoun can be seen when the speaker also shows his personal anger and determination to crush terrorism, as in “I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people” (L200-201). The use of ‘I’ shows that the speaker owns the responsibility at a personal level for dealing with the actions of the terrorists, not just as the President, but also as a person who has lost his dear ones. In this context, the 9/11 is a personal loss to the speaker and he has anger and determination to deal with those responsible for it. Hence, the use of ‘I’ creates scope for the required pathos to emotionally move the audience, to win their trust and support.

Attribution and predication with ‘I’	Action
-I thank the Congress for its leadership (L16) -I thank you for your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our country (L21-22) -I thank the world for its outpouring of support (L23) -I’m so honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America (L32-33) -I thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done and for what you will do (L164) -I thank you, their representatives, for what you have already done and for what we will do together (L166-167)	Thanking
-I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me — the Office of Homeland Security (L121-122) -I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend — Pennsylvania’s Tom Ridge (122-126) -I have a message for our military: Be ready (L131) -I’ve called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason (L132)	Showing authority
-I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children (L146) -I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat (L146-147) -I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here (L148) -I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your contributions (L151-152) -I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle (L155-157) -I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy (L157-158)	Taking audience into confidence
- also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world (L78-79) -I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children (L146)	Emoting

-I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others (L196-198) -I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it (L199-200) -I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people (L200-201)	
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Table 5. 2. Presentation of ‘I’

In the last parts of the address, particularly when Bush answers the question “What is expected of us?” (L145), the speaker portrays himself not just as a political leader or President, but as a ‘father’ who calms down his family in hard times, as in: “I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat” (L146-147). This can also be considered as an ideological marker for persuasion. In a nutshell, the use of ‘I’ not only shows the speaker’s power and authority, but also serves the purpose of appealing to the audience’s emotions and the showing speaker’s commitment.

On the other hand, the references like ‘we’ ‘you’, ‘fellow citizens’, ‘Americans’, ‘American people’ have been employed to refer to the USA as people. The analysis of predication strategies shows that the people of the US have been presented as generous, helpful, hard-working, patriotic, and humane (L 7-12; 64-66; 79). Their qualities have been highlighted by mentioning positive actions, like their donation of blood and money, their help in the rescue operation, their unfurling of flags, their lighting of candles and saying of prayers, etc. (see Table 5.1). They have been defined as “the loving and giving people” (L11). By referring to Americans in terms of intimacy and praising in several sentences, the speaker endears himself to the audience. He motivates the audience by boosting their morale and appreciating their qualities as human beings and as Americans. While on the other side, the qualities of Americans have been contrasted with the vices of the terrorists showing that this war is between virtues and vice (L60-90). The American people are fighting this war on the side of virtue, so they will certainly win this holy war. Some of these contrasting qualities can be touched in the following example:

They hate what we see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other (L87-90).

For referring to the USA as a political and democratic system, the speaker used various references, such as the republicans and the democrats, and the names of office bearers and political leaders (see Table 5.1). This way of positive self-representation, as Wodak & Reisigl (2005, p. 45) state is anthroponymy of collective proper names, is like a tactic Bush followed for persuading his live audiences to legitimatise the military action against terror. The speech was delivered in the 107th session of the American Congress and comprised members of Republicans and Democrats, political, social and military American leaders. Highlighting and glorifying the roles or the duties of individuals, who belong to certain audience groups, has an effective influence on the potential audience's reactions. Political unity and sense of duty toward the USA have been highlighted. The parties and leaders stand united despite differences in their political views to serve their country and deal with this threat of terrorism. By appreciating all politicians and their unity on the issue of 9/11, the speaker creates an environment of common consensus on the need of war against terror and closes all doors of discussion and debate (L16-22).

The USA has been referred to as a nation by using the words like, 'we', 'our union', 'the United States of America', and 'America'. The analysis of predication strategy shows that the US has been attributed to various positive qualities. The US is a vibrant democracy with freedom of religion and speech where people can discuss and disagree; hence it is the true home of freedom (see Table 5.1). Its enemy (al Qaida and Taliban) does not have these qualities as they are inhuman and cannot tolerate difference of faith and opinion (see Table 5.3). America is strong and successful because of hard work and creativity. Its freedom has been attacked and it has been called to defend it. Currently, it is facing terror threat, but it is strong enough to punish its enemies, which can be recognised in "we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done" (L11-13). Thus, America has been presented as a strong democratic country capable of punishing its enemy.

The use of 'we' 'our' and 'us' as a reference to in-group actors has an important discursive function as pronouns are used as a powerful rhetorical strategy in public speech. For instance, the use of personal pronouns shows the relationship between the speaker and the audience. It may indicate whether the speaker is friendly or dominating. It also gives sufficient hints of a speaker's power relation with the audience. It helps the speaker establishes a strong rapport with

the audience, as the speakers change their stance by using suitable pronouns in different parts of their speech according to their purpose(s) (Okamura 2009), which is very important for persuading them. For instance, the use of pronouns, ‘we’, ‘our’ and ‘us’ forms solidarity between the speaker and the audience (Okamura 2009, p. 17). That is what might make some politicians avoid using the singular personal pronouns, ‘I’, ‘my’, or ‘me’ (Pennycook 1993), as these pronouns are used where the speaker talks about some subjective issues and opinions or claims authority and power (see Bramley, 2001).

In this speech, the use of plural pronominal, or what Wodak & Reisigl (2005:45) refer to ‘*COLLECTIVISATION*’ strategy, constructs the ideologies of ‘*shared responsibility*’. Part of this effect can be seen in the five full repetitions of “we will come together” (L167-171), in which, Bush shows that he shares the collective belief and decision with Americans. Therefore, ‘We’ is used 45 times, ‘our’ 51 times, and ‘us’ 8 times. Even though their referents are often not obviously demarcated, the speaker tries to include the US as people, politicians and nation as referents. However, it seems that ‘we’ quite frequently includes the governmental bodies, like, the Congress, or Bush’s administration, as underlined in the following example, in which the speaker uses ‘we’ to refer to American administration:

We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism (L112-114)

Furthermore, ‘We’ also includes the American people as the direct reference, as exemplified in the following example. “We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own” (L9-10), and sometimes it also refers to the US as a nation, like in “we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom” (L12-13). In all these referents, the use of ‘we’ performs the integrative action of inclusion and alliance building. The collective force of ‘we’ adds gravity and power to claims and demands as in “Give the United States full access to terrorist camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating” (L75-76). By using the strategy of ‘*collectivisation*’, Bush engages the audience in feeling with him, deciding with him, and planning and acting with him.

The pronoun ‘you’ can be used either to refer to the audience or in a generic sense to convey generally admitted truth (Allen 2007). We can see the use of ‘you’ as an indefinite (generic)

pronoun in “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (L114-115). Within its unclear enemies and alliances, the speaker declares the war on any states that support terrorism. Bush uses this pronoun ‘you’ 19 times, mostly to refer to the definite social actor (the live audience), as when he appreciates the actions of the audience: “you did more than sing; you acted, by delivering \$40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military” (L18-20). In this context, the use of ‘you’ arguably serves to show the speaker’s authority to praise and to blame.

5.3.1.2. The negative representation of social actors and actions: Describing the out-group

The ‘Other’ has been referred to as ‘al Qaeda’, the ‘Taliban regime’, ‘the terrorists’ and ‘they’, where various negative deeds have been attributed to them. al Qaeda has been presented as a group of ‘terrorists’ and ‘murderers’ who have been responsible for “bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole” (L45-46). In terms of social representation actors, Bush identifies ‘Other’ within the principles of ‘*SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION*’ strategy where he attributes negative things to them. In addition, to that, the atrocities of al Qaeda are not just politically motivated but based on ethnic and communal hatred. Their directive is “to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans” (L51), and they do not hesitate to kill civilians including women and children, as they “make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children” (L51-52).

In terms of social actor representation, ‘Other’ includes two actors— the al Qaeda Organisation and its harbour, the Taliban regime, which were mentioned 6 times, each at different places of the address. Some other references have also been used to refer to the out-group actors. For instance, the words ‘terrorists’ occurs 13 times to refer to the al Qaeda organisation and its affiliates, ‘Afghanistan’ 4 times to refer to the Taliban regime, and ‘Osama bin Laden’ occurs twice as the leadership of al Qaeda. Each of these references has been described by using negative attributes and connotations, such as ‘danger’, ‘enemies’, ‘enemies of freedom’, ‘murderers’, and so on (Table 5.3). These attributions and more represent a reasonable answer to Bush’s question “*Who attacked our country?*” To that end, ‘other’ has been described as “terrorist organizations” (L43-44) and “murderers indicted for bombing American embassies” (44-45). They have been described as “Islamic extremists” (L48) who are trying to impose their

radical beliefs on people (L47-48). These terrorists “pervert the peaceful teachings of Islam (L50)” so they have been rejected by the majority of Muslim Clerics (L49). al Qaeda members have been called “traitors to their own faith” as they are “trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself”. The members of al Qaeda have been stripped of their identity as a Muslim by saying that they do many un-Islamic things, such as killing innocent people and not sparing even women and children (L52). Al Qaeda has been presented as anti-democratic and a great danger to world peace. The leaders of al Qaeda are self-appointed and with the help of the Taliban regime, they spread terror and bloodshed in the world. They have thousands of terrorists in more than 60 countries around the world. Al Qaeda trains these terrorists in the tactics of terror and sends them to various countries to kill innocent people and plan evil and destruction.

The negative image of the out-group actors has been intensified by using various emotionally charged expressions. The description of al Qaeda as “the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century” (L97-98) who sacrifice human life to serve their radical visions (L98) - abandoning every value except the will to power (L99) paints the out-group actor in a bleak colour against whom the animosity of the audience can easily be aroused. By using negative attributions, Bush establishes that terrorists are inhuman i.e. without civility, culture, humanity, morals or intelligence, hence force can be used against them. The speaker intelligently disassociates al Qaeda from Islam by claiming the organisation to be un-Islamic. This strategic presentation of the enemy strengthens the cause of the speaker to use military forces. The world community and the Americans would certainly like to crush such dangerous murderers who are trying to destabilize the lawful governments of many countries (L90-91).

Social Actor	References	Prototypical examples
Al- Qaeda	Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, Terrorists, They	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations (L43-44) -murderers indicted for bombing American embassies (44-45) -responsible for bombing the USS Cole (L45) -to terror what the mafia is to crime (L46) -its goal is remaking the world (L47) -imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere, terrorists (L47-48) - practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism (L48) - rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics (L49) - a fringe movement perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam (L50) -commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah - traitors to their own faith

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself -to kill Christians and Jews to kill all Americans (L51-52) -make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children (L52) -linked to many other organizations in different countries (L53-54) -thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries (L55-56) -trained in the tactics of terror (L57) -hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction (58-59) -supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country (L60) -commit evil (L81) - Their leaders are self-appointed (L88-89) -hate our freedoms — our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other (L89-90) -want to overthrow existing governments (L90-91) -want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa (92-93) -kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life (L93-94) -their pretences to piety (L96-97) -the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century (L97-98) -sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions (L98) -abandoning every value except the will to power (L99) - follow the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism (L100)
Taliban	Taliban Regime, It, They	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -(al Qaeda) supports the Taliban regime (L59-60) -brutalized (people) many are starving and many have fled (L61-62) -Women are not allowed to attend school (L62) -You can be jailed for owning a television (L62-63) - A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough (L64) -Their leaders are self-appointed(L88-89) - repressing its own people (L66-67) -threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists (L67-68) - aiding and abetting murder (L86) - committing murder (L86) - the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land (L70-71) American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned (L71-72) - terrorist training camp in Afghanistan (L73)

Table 5. 3. Negative presentation of ‘Other’

The second out-group actor is the Taliban Regime, which has also been referred to as ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘They’. They have been presented as the supporter and harbour of al Qaeda

(L59-60). The speaker paints them negatively by saying that the Taliban brutalizes its own people (L61-62). Furthermore, Afghans are not allowed to own a television and women are not allowed to go to school. It harbours terrorists and runs training camps for them. They are aiding and abetting murder (L86) and sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists (L67-68). Hence, rationally, the Taliban is as great a problem as al Qaeda. Hence, force should be used against them.

Like positive- self presentation, pronouns play a crucial role discursively in creating the identity of negative actors or actions. For instance, the pronoun ‘they’ has been used extensively by the speaker, mostly to contrast their negatives with the positives of the in-group in the ‘*We versus They*’ relationship. Generally, it was articulated 26 times, only 3 times it refers to a positive reference: First, when the speaker glorifies Americans as war experts, “Americans have known wars — but for the past 136 years, **they** have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941 they have been wars on foreign soil” (L36). Second, when he thanks some nations and international organizations for their positive response towards the War on Terror, “They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next” (L142). Third, when the orator explains why America is successful, “These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11th, and they are our strengths today” (160-161). Whereas, the remaining 23 uses, of ‘they’ refer to the negative actor(s) and as an agent for their actions, as in the following example, which shows how ‘they’ has been used with negative attributions:

They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions — by abandoning every value except the will to power they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And **they** will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies. Americans are asking (L97-101).

On the other hand, the collective possessive pronoun, ‘their’ has been singled out by the speaker for the same referents. It has been utilized 12 times to point out and criticize the negative ideologies of ‘Other’. A good example of this utilization can be seen in the following quotation:

The terrorists are traitors to their own faith (L82). [...]. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions — by abandoning every value except the will to power they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism (L98-100).

As we see in the analysis above, the out-group actors have been negatively identified and described as a strategy to pull down the image of the enemy and arouse the animosity of the audience against them. Having heard the pervious parts of the address, when the statements of threat and intimidation, were directed to the Taliban regime by the speaker as representative of the United States, one cannot anticipate any statements of praise towards Muslims or Islam, especially when al Qaeda, has been identified by the speaker himself as an Islamic movement. Shifting in representing the actors helps the speaker in establishing a strong rapport with the Muslim audience, which is very important for persuading them. Part of these statements can be captured in lines 69-78. However, Bush carefully moves to praise the Muslims of the world and of America in particular (Table 5.4). For instance, he appreciates ‘Islam’ as something that has values which the terrorists are planning to hijack when he says, “the terrorist, [...], trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself” (L82-83).

Social Actors	References	Prototypical examples
Muslims	Islam Muslim Arab friends Your faith	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -We respect your faith (L79) - [Islam] is practiced freely by many millions of Americans friends (L79-80) -Its teachings are good and peaceful, (L81) - Those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah (L81-82) -the terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself (L82-83) - The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends (L83) - The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded, [...], to the Islamic world (L139-140)

Table 5. 4. Presentation of Muslims and Islam.

Part of the strategy of *‘praising Muslims and Islam’* is affected by using positive attributions. Bush uses many worthy attributions (Table 5.4) to present Muslims and Islam as friends, not foes, alliances not enemies of his suggested action(s). He, then, redefines Islam with a series of positive characterisations, such as ‘peaceful teaching’, ‘respectful faith’, ‘good’ and ‘peaceful’. The orators mostly describe only those aspects, which suit their purpose of persuading the audience to some action or modification of the audiences’ view as the orator desires. The positive expressions, which Bush mentioned above about Islam and Muslims isolates terrorism

in general and al Qaeda's followers in particular from the arena of Islam and Muslims. Socially, Bush approaches the strategy of '*CATEGORISATION*' in presenting Muslims, when he refers to them by virtue of functionalising, identifying or appraising.

In addition, Bush boosts his appeal that terrorists do not represent Islam or Muslims by employing the strategy of '*PROBLEMATISATION*', where he attributes the terrorists with negative attributions and references (Table 5.3) and Islam with the positive ones (Table 5.4). He contrasts the extremism of the terrorists with Islam by saying that their faith is not Islamic, as they practice a "fringe form of Islamic extremism, rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics" (L48-49). These terrorists are in fact doing great harm to Islam as they are perverting "the peaceful teachings of Islam" (L50).

The next strategy that has been used for describing Muslims as a positive actor is the strategy of '*IDENTIFICATION*'. Identifying persons or groups of persons by naming them or ascribing their general status of social class membership is a strategy Bush uses to constitute the ideology that '*not all Muslims are terrorists*'. He uses the form of proper nouns when he refers to 'Osama bin Laden' as the leader of that terrorist group, the 'al Qaida organisation', and to the 'Taliban regime' as the harbour of terrorism. He never uses expressions like "terrorist Muslims", so that he could isolate the terrorists from their community identities and make them weak.

It is generally true that the identities of in-group and out-group actors can be discursively created to suit the persuasive purpose. In this process, the in-group actors are generally named and described using positive names and attributes, while the out-group actors are described negatively. By doing so, the speaker wins the positive attitude of the audience for the in-group actors and raises their animosity and anger against the out-group actors and actions.

5.3.2. The strategies of Perspectivization

Besides the strategy of '*predication*', whereby an orator describes and characterises a social actor and action, the strategies of perspectivization also play an important role in creating persuasive discourse, as they express the feelings and attitudes of the speaker towards certain issues. This part of the analysis, hence, concentrates on how the speaker under reference expresses his involvement\detachment to position his point of view for persuasive ends. Furthermore, the rhetorical power of pronouns in the discourse of involvement or detachment,

the analysis of perspectivation strategies also shows that the speaker expresses part of his involvement and positions his point of view by means of application of the description, syntactic markers, intensification, quotation and strategies of narration. In lines 102-140 & 168-179, the speaker describes the essential measurements of the proposed action. These descriptions were part of showing the speaker's involvement and position of using force, and part of answering, "*How will we fight and win this war?*" in which the orator details the answer. Part of this effect can be recognized in the following summary:

We will direct every resource at our command — every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war — to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network (L102-105).

On the other hand, Bush also refers positively to the War on Terror and its outcomes (Table 5.6) as part of the positive 'self'-representation, yet in a way that it expresses his feelings and attitudes. For example, it was described as being a 'justice', as in "we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done" (L14-15). This positive representation comes in two main dimensions. Firstly, it expresses the speaker's determination to crush the terror and terrorists. Secondly, it constitutes the ideology of '*Our war is lawful, Other's is not*'. In other words, the War on Terror is justifiable, lawful and legitimate, unlike the terrorists' war, which does not abide by any law of war. Once these two functions are realised, the other segment of local or global society, which opposes the resolution of war can be demonized and dismissed, because they are demonstrated as the ones that object to the will of people to protect themselves.

Another strategy related to the strategy of involvement is the syntactic markers of the active voice. The analysis found that Bush formulates his statements in an active voice. He seldom uses the passive voice, as it absents the role of the subject, which he seemingly is not looking for. The few passive structures he used in his speech have been balanced in such a way that they highlight the speaker rather than anything else, as in (underlined) "It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. It is my reminder of lives that ended and a task that does not end (L198). In contrast to the passive voice construction rule, the speaker highlights the role of the beneficiary (Bush) rather than that of the agentive (his mom).

On the other hand, the linguistic marker of emphasis in the form of repetition has also been used by the speaker to show involvement. Reisigl & Wodak (2005: 83) categorise the strategy of ‘repetition’ as part of maintaining involvement. Hence, Bush repeats the temporal expression-time deixis- ‘tonight’ 13 times, as in “tonight, I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me, the Office of Homeland Security” (L121-122). With this in mind, the strategy of repetition serves two functions: it shows that crushing terror is not just a duty of the speaker as the President of the US, but his personal commitment. Repetition of the commitment shows in repeated temporal phrases and indicates the intensity of his involvement. This involvement has been further enhanced by the use of the personal pronouns ‘I’ and ‘me’.

5.3.3. Argumentation strategies

This section of the analysis seeks answers to the following questions: What topoi have been used in this speech? In what ways have these topoi been used to realise the speaker’s persuasive ends to justify and then legitimate killing and death? We should understand at the very outset that topoi are primarily meant to be the content-related argument that drives the argument or arguments to a certain conclusion. The analysis and discussion of argumentation found the following topoi in the speech.

- **The topos of definition or name-interpretation**

Under this topos, actors are named and defined. They may be defined as positive, negative or neutral. It seems that the idea of this topos overlapped with the function of ‘nomination & predication’ strategies, where orators assign and then attribute or characterize the traits of social actors. In his speech, Bush has used two types of names for the out-group— enemy and terrorists/murderers. While the first term has been conceptualised in political terms, the second one can be interpreted from a socio-psychological perspective. He defines the out-group (al Qaeda) as “enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.” (L35). Here, the speaker defines the act of the 9/11 attacks as a war, not just a single crime one can forgive, therefore, one should make plans to defend his people. The second definition of ‘other’ is ‘*terrorists*’ or ‘*murderers*’. When Bush designates the executors as such, he reminds the people of the horrendous crimes the executors did. Meanwhile, he also wants to give political global hearers a glimpse of what might happen if terrorists are not defeated. They (terrorists) “cannot

only bring down buildings; it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments “(L43-44). Various premises have been presented to prove al Qaeda is an enemy to the USA in the following table:

Premise 1. The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda (L43-44)
Premise 2. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole (L44-46)
Conclusion: al Qaeda attacked the USA, so al Qaida is our enemy.

Table 5. 5. Who attacked the U.S.?

The first premise is based on the evidence gathered and the second premise is based on the similar previous actions of the named actor. It justifies the claim, emphasizing that sufficient evidence has been collected, hence the claim is well-founded. The second premise emphasizes the similar behaviour of the named actor in the past (analogy), which leads the audience to the conclusion on the basis of common-sense and the understanding of human nature that *“if someone behaved in a certain way in the past, he may again behave in the same way.”* To put it in context: Since Al- Qaeda attacked America’s embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the USS Cole, there is no doubt left that the claim supported by the evidence is acceptable. Because the offence has been done several times, “Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution” (L13).

Another claim can also be recognized within the topos of definition that is [America] is strong (L12). In presenting the self-positive representation (table 5.1), Bush attributes America as strong, this claim has three persuasive functions: a) It reinforces Americans - governments trust, b) It implies that victory is on the side of the Americans as America is strong, and c) It presents the policy of what America did or will do in facing times of war as a common good. Along with that claim, there are two parts of argumentation the speaker uses to prove his claim. First, *America was strong*, when he refers to some of the past war experiences Americans have (L36-41) had. With this in mind, Bush formulates this part of his argument in the rhetorical figure of emphasis of ‘epizeuxis’, whereby the same word or words are repeated two or more times in immediate succession for the purpose of emphasis. By mentioning these past experiences of war briefly (L63-41), Bush provides material proof to the hearers of what Americans were. The

second part is *America still strong* when he lists some of the Americans' reactions to encountering problems like war, as illustrated in table (5.1). By observing the rhetoric of the past and the present, the speaker shows the unity of Americans and their solidarity in times of crises.

- **The topos of religion**

Religion is a very powerful medium of connecting and motivating the audience. By camouflaging political ideologies in religion, the orators easily persuade the audience that the proposed actions and thoughts are pure and desirable (Mohan 2013b: 92). Various references to religion can be seen in this speech as examples of misuse of religion, Islam in particular in terms of the speaker's perspectives towards Islam and Muslims. These religious expressions have deftly been used to induce integrity, unity and the legality of the War on Terror, as when religion doesn't practice as is it, negative consequences arise; one should do something to stop these negatives outcomes.

Even though the United States is characterized by a diversity of religious beliefs, the majority of Americans identify themselves as Christians and Jews. As such, Bush adopts two premises. The first proves that both Christians and Jews are a target for killing by terrorists. Whereas, the second one comes to confirm the first premise. This can be summarized in the following diagram.

Premise 1: The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews (50-51)
Premise 2: They [terrorists] want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa (L92-93)
Conclusion: Christians and Jews are under threat, and they should be protected.

Table 5. 6. Christians & Jews are in danger.

Perhaps this part of the argument might be interpreted as a sort of discrimination the speaker practices against the non-Christians or Jews. He gives Christians and Jews more interest than other religious minorities in American society. This kind of discrimination is employed by Bush as if it is a persuasive strategy, to convince his hearers of Christians and Jews, who constitute the majority of Congress members or policymakers from whom Bush is seeking support. The

sense of discrimination also can be seen under the principles of ‘Nationality’, as in the following examples:

“The terrorists’ directive commands them, [...], to kill all Americans” (L51).

“They [the terrorists] hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world” (L94-95).

Nevertheless, there are some other aspects, which are not taken into account in this argumentation. For example, people from more than 80 nations died with Americans and on American soil in the 9/11 attacks (L28-31). This quantitative data presents material proof that terrorism does not recognize nationalities or religion, it proves that terror is a blind enemy.

Moreover, focusing on certain religion(s), i.e. Christians and Jews, also creates bad reactions from some of his other audiences, particularly those of the Muslims, especially after the speaker defined the attackers as *Islamic extremists*. The use of religion based on metaphors, nominations and attributions may lead to remarkable social, psychological and political consequences. In this context, Balfaqeeh (2007, p. 97) says that the US administration omitted some words from this speech from all the edited versions published in print or on the internet, due to possible bad reactions from the readers and audiences. One example is the word ‘*crusade*’, that Bush used to describe the nature of the 9/11 attacks, because of its offensive historical baggage of earlier wars between Christians and Muslims (Kellner 2007).

Perhaps, without omitting these words, Bush could have offended Muslims all over the world, as this word carries some negative shades of meaning for the Non-Christians. He could have been held guilty of constituting the ideology of *Islamophobia-Muslims are coming to kill Christians and Jews*, which does not have any sense. In fact, Muslims are the first victims of terrorism in the example of Afghanistan, and recently of Iraq, Syria, and Libya. However, this does not mean that the speaker has not used any strategy for winning the support of Muslims themselves over the world (see table 4). He tries to establish the idea that the fight against terrorism also guards the religion of Islam itself against being hijacked by the terrorist people themselves. He claims that al Qaeda is not faithful Muslims indeed (see table 3). The best expression of (t)his presupposition is the use of ‘fringe’ to describe their faith. According to Merriam-Webster, the meaning of ‘fringe’ is “an area of activity that is related to but not part of whatever is central or most widely accepted: a group of people with extreme view or unpopular

opinions.” By using ‘fringe’ Bush falsifies the terrorists’ allegations as being an Islamic organization or Muslims per se on the one hand and gives Muslims in particular the real reason for the War on Terror on the other hand.

A further claim can also be observed in this part of the discussion, which is Islam and Muslim are not our enemy, as “The United States, [...], have already responded with sympathy and with support from, [...], the Islamic world.” (L138-139). This declaration may serve a double function: 1) it may serve to win the Islamic World’s backing in fighting terrorism, 2) it may also reduce or fill the social gap, which might increase between Muslims and Non-Muslims, particularly in the United States, on the background of: “who attacks us is the al Qaeda -Islamic extremist organization.” Therefore, Bush warns his countrymen that “No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith” (L 149-151). This statement makes it concrete that Islam and Muslims all over the world are not an antagonist part of the War on Terror. Therefore, Bush emphasises that the United States’ enemy is “a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.” (L 84-85) Here, Bush implies the strategy of ‘specialisation’, when, he, apparently, detaches terrorism from Muslims anywhere, which was a common thought after declaring that the executors of the 9/11 attacks were affiliated to the Islamic terrorist organization.

Religious expressions have also been used quite aptly in the way Bush concludes his speech: “finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families” (L162). He focuses upon faith and speaks like a seer and a visionary, “Prayer has comforted us in sorrow and will help strengthen us for the journey ahead” (L163-164). Additionally, by repeating the name of God, Bush implies that God is on the side of America “we know that God is not neutral between them” (L203). By doing so Bush boosts the morale of his countrymen and wins the support of all God-loving people. It also enhances his patriotic image, as he is asking God to bless their homeland (underlined) — “may God grant us wisdom, and may he watch over the United States of America.” (L205-206). Perhaps the underlined can be paraphrased to that well-known statement of “God Bless America”, which is regularly used by politicians in the United States to establish trustworthiness and enhance character.

- **The topos of responsibility**

In answering the question “*who attacked our country?*” at length, Bush claims that al Qaeda is the responsible actor for the 9/11 attacks. He states that based on “the evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda” (L43-44). Here, the speaker runs simultaneously the speech act of statements (underlined) and the speech act of claim (in italics). By presenting it in this form, the speaker is trying to present this information as facts, which cannot be doubted. He also accuses them of bombing some of the US facilities in different parts of the world (underlined) “they are, [...], indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole” (L44-45). Therefore, Bush says “our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution” (L13). With these illustrations, Bush logically arranged his arguments to show who is responsible for the attacks. Since al Qaeda attacked various establishments of the US quite a number of times, declaring war on al Qaeda and such other terrorist groups is the logical solution.

Besides that, Bush holds the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to be partly responsible for the 9/11 attacks. He states that the Taliban regime is the partner of al Qaeda, which represents the terrorist vision of the Taliban regime. The Taliban regime recruits, harbours, supports and trains terrorists to plot evil and destruction around the world (L57). Bush, therefore considers the Taliban a hostile regime to the US. Consequently, Bush attracts the audience’s attention to the relations between al Qaida, and the Taliban regime on the one hand, and emphasises and intensifies the role of the Taliban regime in those attacks against America on the other hand, which in turn justify the War on Terror (i.e, the war on Afghanistan).

<p>Premise 1: [in] Afghanistan they are trained in the tactics of terror (L57),</p> <p>Premise 2: In Afghanistan, we see al-Qaida’s vision for the world (L60-61),</p> <p>Premise 3: It [Taliban regime] is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists (L67-68).</p> <p>Conclusion: The Taliban regime is al Qaeda’s partner, then it is our enemy [too].</p>
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Table 5. 7. Al Qaeda & the Taliban are partners in committing murder.

- **The topos of danger or threat**

Several instances of this argument scheme can be found in the speech under study. Let us mention just one example for its global persuasive effects. It is the ‘danger of inaction’ when Bush highlights terrorism as a global threat that threatens the entire world, not only America itself, he says: “if this terror goes unpunished”, it “cannot only bring down buildings,” it “can threaten the stability of legitimate governments” (L142-144). By globalizing the threat of terrorism, Bush persuades (by fear) the world community that a quick and strong action is urgently required; otherwise, the entire world will be at risk of terrorism. He builds his conclusion on the following premises:

Premise 1: [al Qaeda] committed an act of war against our country (L35-36),
Premise 2: al Qaeda is to terror, [...] its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical belief on people everywhere (46-48),
Premise 3: [they] command to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans (L50-51),
Premise 4: [they] make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children (L51-52),
Premise 5: Their [terrorists] leaders are self-appointed (L88-89),
Premise 6: They [terrorists] want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslims countries as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan (L90-92),
Premise 7: [they] kill not merely to end life, but to disrupt and end a way of life (L93-94),
Premise 8: They [terrorists] hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends (L94-95),
Premise 9: They [terrorists] heir of all the murderous ideologies of the 20 th century (L97-98).
Conclusion: al Qaeda is a threat threatens our nation and citizens, hence, al Qaeda is our real enemy.

Table 5. 8. The proofs of danger & threat.

Furthermore, when the speaker based his argument or arguments on stating the negatively evaluated and socially disadvantageous results of his opponent’s actions, he approaches the topos of *uselessness or disadvantage*. Inasmuch, he emphasizes that the War on Terror should begin now because the outcomes of not acting now will lead to regretful results (premises 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7). Hence, understanding the topos of *uselessness or disadvantage* as such, the War on Terror as an action could be classified under *the topos of usefulness or advantage*. Therefore, if there are positive outcomes of a decision\action, the decision\action should be supported and

accepted (Reisigl & Wodak 2005, p. 75). From the speaker's point of view, the War on Terror is a reasonable action that can prevent the terrorists from carrying out their plans. As such, the War on Terror is that sub-type of the topos of *usefulness or advantage*, when the advantages of it involve the advantage for all.

Premise 1: [the War on Terror] defeats the global terror network (L105), Premise 2: [the War on Terror] starves terrorists of funding, turn them one against another (L112), Premise 3: [the war on Terror] pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism (L113-114), Premise 4: [the War on Terror] protects Americans (L118), Premise 5: [the War on Terror] know the plans of terrorists before they act and to find them before they strike (L173-174), Premise 6: [the War on Terror] is freedom and fear are at war (L202). Conclusion: The War on Terror is the good that deserves unification and support.

Table 5. 9. The advantages of the War on Terror.

- **The topos of numbers**

The topos of numbers is also important in this section to conceptualize the idea of '*War is the safeguard*'. This scheme can be subsumed within the following conclusion rule: "If sufficient numerical/ statistical evidence is given, a specific action should be performed." Küçükali, 2014, p. 103). Under this scheme, the speaker gives figures and statistics related to the issue in question. We can see in the following illustrations that number has been effectively used in highlighting the size of potential threat terrorists may pose, "There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries" (L55-56) are hiding "in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction" (L58-59). Consequently, too many terrorist actions or attacks are expected. Hence, a specific action should be performed to "know the plans of terrorists before they act and to find them before they strike" (L173-174). By using the topos of number, Bush logically legitimises the use of force as a reasonable action to confront the threat. In so doing, he linguistically formulates his premises in terms of cause and effect. To put it in context: too many terrorists cause too many terrorist actions or attacks. Contextually, this conclusion is somehow related to the *topos of 'reality'*, which can be paraphrased through the following conclusion rule: "because the reality is like X, then Y should be done" (Charteris-Black, 2014:134).

Moreover, Bush does not use the topos of numbers just for connecting to the audience. This usage also indicates that Bush is an authoritative, powerful and an overly confident leader. It is

an appeal of a wartime President, who sees access to terrorists' training camps as being enough to defeat them, as in "Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating" (L75-76). Here, the speaker motivates and encourages the audience by showing trust in his presidency and the American forces (persuasion by ethos). On the other side, Bush employs numbers for positive effect. The overall positive use of the topos of numbers in this part can be summarized as follows:

<p>Premise 1: many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents, to intelligence operatives, to the reservists we have called to active duty (L128-130),</p> <p>Premise 2: many nations and many international organizations have already responded with sympathy and with support (138-139),</p> <p>Premise 3: we welcome two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers, Governor George Pataki and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani (L75-77).</p> <p>Conclusion: The USA has many supporters.</p>
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Table 5. 10. Topos of numbers

- **The topoi of humanitarianism, Justice and Abuse**

These topoi can be referred to in every situation where Bush argues against the inhuman, injustice and abuse actions the terrorists committed against humanity. In this situation, these topoi represent part of the negative. The following example shows the violation of human rights: "in places like Afghanistan where they [terrorists] are trained in the tactics of terror" (L57). Although, this would create a reaction towards the people of Afghanistan, "The United States respects the people of Afghanistan" and after all, "we [US] are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid." Here, Bush uses *the central processing route* of persuasion, where he presents a lot of information in the form of facts and figures to explain and elaborate his message that the War on Terror targets the Taliban regime and the terrorist networks, not the civilian people of Afghanistan.

The topos of humanitarianism is also closely connected to the topos of *justice*, "*equality for all*". One of the essential human rights is the right to education, however, in Afghanistan, this right is being breached by the Taliban regime, where "Women are not allowed to attend school". Therefore, when this right is abused, measures against the abuse should be taken. Here, by mentioning some of the breaches of human rights and justice, Bush infuses the topos of *abuse*.

By collocating these three topoi, Bush establishes that the Taliban regime has become a threat to peace and the wellbeing of the people of the world as well as to its own people in Afghanistan. This claim moves the argument(s) to the following conclusion rule: decisive steps, then, need to be taken to ensure humanity, freedom and equality, otherwise, these ‘breaches’ will continue for a long time. In this way, the suggested action, the “War on Terror” has been reasoned. The overall discussion of these topoi can be summarised as follows:

<p>Premise 1: Afghanistan’s people have been brutalized, many are starving, and many have fled (L61-62),</p> <p>Premise 2: women are not allowed to attend school (L62),</p> <p>Premise 3: you can be jailed for owning a television (L62-63),</p> <p>Premise 4: Religion can be practiced only as their leader dictates (L63),</p> <p>Premise 4: A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough (L64),</p> <p>Premise 5: They [terrorists] kill to disrupt and end a way of life (L93-94).</p> <p>Conclusion: Terrorists are inhuman and unjust as they abuse people.</p>
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Table 5. 11. Topoi of humanitarianism, justice and abuse.

- **The topos of authority**

In response to those breaches of humanitarianism, injustice and abuse by the Taliban regime and al Qaeda, Bush practices the *topos of authority*, as part of his rhetorical strategy. He exercises his personal authority - as the president of the US in choosing his speech acts. Inasmuch, he uses a series of deontic expressions in the form of six full imperative sentences to the Taliban below. It seems that Bush binds his official status with the authority of utterances he articulates (see Van Leeuwen 2008, p. 24). A good example of showing authority can be seen in “These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate” (L76-78). The following expressions show his exercise of authority at its best.

<p>Premise1: Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done (L14-15,</p> <p>Premise 2: tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban (L69-70),</p> <p>a) Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land (L70-71),</p>
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> b) Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned (L71-72), c) Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country (L72), d) Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan (L73), e) Hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities (L74), f) Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating (L75-76). <p>Premise 3: These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion (L76-77),</p> <p>Premise 4: The Taliban must act and act immediately (L77),</p> <p>Premise 5: Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists (L14-15).</p> <p>Premise 7: From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime (L116-117).</p>
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Table 5. 12. Topos of authority

In the table above, it can be seen that the speaker assumes the authority of the world community who can bring anybody to justice. Bush exercises the authority of commanding, instructing, forcing and threatening the Taliban, by using speech acts of demands and declarations, and using modalities of compulsion and urgency by using ‘must’. These deontic expressions (a, b, c, d, f, d) function as commands directed to the Taliban regime delivered formally by the representative of the US. In Searle's terms, command is a "directive" speech act, in which a direction is given to the hearer who is obliged to comply with what is said (Searle, 1969, p. 122), In other words, the hearer is not free, i.e., he has no choice but to act (premises 3 & 4).

Using a certain degree of modality - modal verbs & main verbs - was also part of Bush’s persuasive rhetorical effects. He does not give the Taliban regime the choice to do or not to do some act. By doing so the speaker presumes that he has (physical, psychological, or institutional) authority over the hearer. Rhetorically, Bush employed his rhetorical effects in terms of metonymy, when a thing is chosen for the metaphorical image, which is closely associated with the subject, even though it is not physically a part of him (Harris 2002, p. 3). Practically *the United State of America* (premise 2) is intended to mean the president of the United States. In political speeches ‘metonymies’ therefore, can be used to reduce or increase responsibility. By using that rhetorical strategy, Bush maintains and increases the power of these demands, as language has no power on its own, and it gains power through its users. Perhaps, that may justify why CDA investigates such powerful speakers.

In certain sense, some of Bush's statements can be understood to be a specific form of threat manipulated as a strategy for persuading the neutral nations to join the US coalition. For instance, he explicitly, threatens all the nations of the world as being a hostile regime to the US, if they harbour or support terrorism. Obviously, the sense of threat can be captured in "from this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime" (L115-117). Here, the use of 'any' (underlined) as a determiner shows the power of the speaker. It might be paraphrased into: *'it doesn't matter how many nations (will) support terrorism, we are strong enough to defeat them all'*. All this shows that the speaker exercises a lot of authority and power to impress his people and to terrorise the enemy of the US.

- **The topoi of history**

This argumentation strategy also benefits from the topos of history, where historical evidence discredits the opponents and their actions. This process of discrediting the Taliban regime in particular and terrorism in general starts with a direct analogy, where a contemporary situation(s) is compared with some similar or familiar historical event or myth. The speaker first relates the nature of the 9/11 attacks and the Pearl Harbour attack in 1941 by the Japanese to each other, as both were surprise attacks. Second, he describes the ideology of terrorists as Fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism. They "follow in the path of Fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism" (L99-100). Historically, these regimes committed many horrendous crimes against humanity. Besides that, al Qaeda is responsible for the implementation of past attacks against the US facilities "They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole" (L44-46).

Furthermore, the topos of history has not been employed, here, just to show the atrocities of the terrorists. However, it has also been used as a warning message to terrorists all over the world that they would also be crushed as the forces of the Japanese, Fascism and Nazism were crushed in the past. In Bush's words: "And they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies" (L100-101). Yet in a way, the historical examples (L37-39 & 97-101) show the malicious culture of terrorism, as being based on disrupting and ending a way of life. Therefore, in terms of the following conclusion rule: *because the culture of a specific group of people is as it is, much of 9/11 is then predictable*. The act of terror and their

threat have been counterbalanced by Bush's strong assertion, "*we're not going to allow it*" (L145) and then "*we stand in their way*" (97).

Up to now, Bush has been concerned with two strategic aspects of self-presentation and other-presentation in the light of history to uncover the dark history, murderous ideology and malicious culture of terrorism and terrorists. The speaker also, on the other hand, provides a reliable answer to "Why do they hate us?" The answer, which can be packed in one rhetorical sentence "*they stand against us because we stand in their way*" (L95-96). It is the use of a powerful rhetorical device, 'chiasmus', whereby the second part of the grammatical construction is paralleled by the first part, which is a hallmark device of making a powerful statement in political discourse (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 223).

5.3.4. The strategies of intensification/mitigation

This section studies what strategies have been used to intensify or mitigate certain issues in the speech for persuasive ends. The intention of amplifying the issue is quite important in public oratory. By amplifying the issue, the orator grasps the attention of the audience and brings them to the psychological state required for modifying their opinion regarding the issue and, hence, persuading them (Mohan 2013, p. 84). Partly the issues can be intensified and mitigated by using certain types of delivery styles by managing pitch, pause, intensity and pace of speech. However, this section focuses on how Bush uses linguistic strategies such as contrast, repetition, and the use of some amplifying words to intensify or mitigate central issues of the speech.

A comparison is one of the most important strategies in rhetoric for intensifying an issue. President Bush uses many contrastive situations to present an amplified picture of the suggested war. In this strategy, the orator tries to enhance and amplify the War on Terror by showing a contrast to many past wars. This strategy sensitizes the audience about the suggested war from a new perspective. The following example is worth quoting, as the orator contrasts the nature of the War on Terror with many other wars America has fought in the past:

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. (L105-108).

In this part of speech, it is noticed that Bush makes the strategy of contrast and compare go hand in hand with the strategy of elaboration. The strategy of elaboration draws the attention of the audience towards the aspects which are important for the orator's purpose. In elaboration, Bush mentions some procedures of the War on Terror. Perhaps, this is to arouse the emotions of enthusiasm in his audience and then, scaffolding the suggested action(s). Besides, it creates the emotions of fear and intimidation on the side of the terrorists and gives a re-assurance message to Americans. The following table briefly elaborates how America will fight the war on terror.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [War on Terror] involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes, • [War on Terror] is a lengthy campaign, • [War on Terror] unlike any other we have ever seen (L110), • [War on Terror] may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operation secret even in success (L110-111), • [War on Terror] starve terrorist of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest (L11-13) • [War on Terror] pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism (L133-114), • [War on Terror] begins with al-Qaida, but it doesn't end there (L85-86), • [War on Terror] will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated (L86-87), • [America will take] defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans (L118): • dozens of federal departments and agencies, like state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security (L118-120), • create a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me, the Office of Homeland Security (L121-122), • Announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security (L122-123), • [America will use] Many FBI agents, to intelligence operatives, to the reservist to active duty (1129-130).
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Table 5. 13. How the USA will fight the War on Terror

On the other hand, Bush also utilized the strategy of contrast and compare to intensify the issue of the attacks of 9/11 themselves. Before speaking about the War on Terror, Bush contrasts the intensity and criminality of the attacks to the past attack on the US. By comparing the situation of 9/11 and past war situations, Bush tries to highlight the intensity of the issue to arouse the emotions of anger, sorrow, or revenge in his audience, so that he could win their support for his war. Please note the following lines.

Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war, but not at the centre of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a

single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack (L36-41).

The next strategy that has been used for amplifying the issue of war is the strategy of repetition. In common talking repetition, may be boring, but in public speeches, it makes a very strong appeal to emotions. The repetition of “I will not” four times where Bush concludes his speech intensifies the commitment of the speaker to eradicate terror on one hand. On the other hand, it emotes and motivates the audience to support the War on Terror. It keeps the audience focused on the point and gives the impression that the arguments are too numerous to be doubted. Here, repetition is used as a device to put more emphasis on the issue. Bush uses a simple form of repetition, as in repeating a word or clause two or more times. The amplifying effect of repetition is remarkable in the following lines:

I will not forget the wound to our country and those who inflicted it. I will not yield, I will not rest, I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people. The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain (L199-202).

The fourth tool, Bush uses is the strategy of using some amplifying words. This strategy is very commonly practiced by public speakers for amplifying central issues of speech. These amplifying words are nouns, adjectives, adverbs and verbs, which add to the seriousness of the issue by giving it an emotional touch.

- Nouns: In the data, the best use of emotionally charged nouns has been done to intensify the criminality of al Qaeda. The al Qaeda has been identified as ‘enemies of freedom’, ‘murderers’, ‘traitors’ ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies’, and their ideology has been identified as ‘fascism’, and ‘Nazism’, and ‘totalitarianism’. In terms of actions, Bush refers to 9/11 as ‘tragedy’. Contextually, ‘tragedy’ projects a topic as something obnoxious or unpleasant. The use of ‘tragedy’ presents an amplified picture of the 9/11 events. By describing 9/11 in this way, the speaker evokes the audience’s feelings of sorrow and grief towards the casualties and their families’ one the hand and stirs their feelings of anger and revenge towards the terrorists on the other (Pathos) which enhances the idea of ‘war is the safeguard’,
- Adjectives: An adjective is used as a powerful tool for amplifying the issue of war. When describing the Americans and the USA, the speaker has used adjectives like

‘generous’ and ‘strong’ while for describing the Taliban and al Qaeda and their ideology, adjectives like ‘radical’, ‘fringe’ and ‘murderous’, etc. have been used. Their ideology has been called ‘Islamic Extremism’, however, Islam has been described as ‘good’ and ‘peaceful’. Adjectives can always mitigate or intensify the illocutionary force of the statement by describing nouns in a certain way. Here, it seems that Bush coincides between the use of adjectives and the strategy of showing hope for creating an emotional effect of enthusiasm on the audience so that they receive his message in the way he intends. Aristotle called it *pathos* and gave it a special emphasis on persuasion in public speech.

- **Adverbs:** Adverbs can intensify and mitigate the illocutionary force of propositions by modifying verbs or qualifying adjectives. The following illustrations show how Bush uses adverbs to intensify his suggested proposal:
 - “This is not, however, **just** America's fight, [...], this is the world’s fight” (L133-134).
 - “**Now**, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion” (L105-106).
 - “Close **immediately** and **permanently** every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan”.

As we see in the examples above, the adverbs of time intensify the sense of urgency of action and put a lot of pressure on the Taliban regime.

- **Verbs:** Verbs play an important role in shaping positions, as they are nuclear elements of a sentence. Please note how the verbs typed in boldface affect the force and intensity of the propositions:
 - 1- “By **aiding** and **abetting** murder, the Taliban regime is **committing** murder.”
 - 2- Our war on terror [...], will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been **found, stopped, and defeated**. (L86-87)
 - 3- These terrorists **kill** not merely to end lives, but to **disrupt** and **end** a way of life. (L95-96)

Another way of showing mitigation is the assertion of ‘we’ instead of ‘I’, as in: “we’re not deceived by their pretenses to piety” (L96-97), or ‘one’ instead of ‘you’ as in: “No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or

religious faith” (L149-151). It seems that Bush inserts ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ to include the members of governments or the public he addressed for the purpose of assertion. It hides the meaning that it is not just him alone who is willing to use force, but also all his allies and audience.

5.4. Summary

The chapter began with a brief introduction to the author and the speech to contextualize the data in terms of the socio-political standing of the speaker and the contextual intricacies of the speech. It followed the analysis of the speech in terms of DHA’s methodological categories, including *Referential, Predication, Argumentation, Perspectivation and Intensification/Mitigation strategies*. The first two strategies have been clubbed together considering the structural needs, they focused on how various social actors and actions in the speech have been identified and described. The in-group actors, such as, the USA, Americans, and allies have been identified using positive references and various humanitarian and political qualities, such as, strength, justice, patriotism, generosity, and humanity, which have been attributed to them. The out-group actors, such as al Qaeda and the Taliban Regime, have been identified using negative names and adjectives, such as terrorists, murderers, hijackers of Islam, etc. Perhaps, this can be interpreted as an attempt to inflame the feelings of anger and revenge against them, i.e., al-Qaida, which might be his primary goal in this speech.

Further, the speaker’s overall aim is to justify the use of force against terrorism and to persuade the people about the unfeasibility of avoiding the War on Terror. The speaker’s involvement and point of view regarding certain issues, such as terror and how to deal with it, have been studied under Perspectivation Strategies. Under Argumentation strategies, an effort has been made to investigate how various claims have been founded on certain premises to generate a conclusion in the speech. These premises and conclusions have been studied under various topoi, such as, justice, number, responsibility, threat, etc. Finally, the use of various strategies, such as contrast, repetition, etc. for enhancing and mitigating various issues and propositions in the speech, have been studied under Intensification/Mitigation strategies.

Rhetorically, Bush constituted his persuasive discourse on four questions, the aim of which is to create a dramatic effect and make points rather than to get answers. These questions are Who attacked our country? Why do they hate us? How will we fight and win this war? and What is

expected of us? The answers to these questions were provided through three macro-discourses. The first one is the discourse of glorification of the US, whereby Bush presents the virtues and strengths of his country and countrymen. The second one is the discourse of reassurance, whereby he tries to restore the trust of the Americans and Muslims in American power and justice so that they could feel safe. The third one is the discourse of the threat of terror to the world, whereby the speaker criminalises al Qaeda and justifies the use of force against them.

Bush, as a powerful orator, could successfully persuade the audience to support the proposed War on Terror, which started with military action in Afghanistan and continues to the present day. He mainly depends upon the strategies of pathos and ethos as a way of persuading his hearers. In a nut-shell, Bush persuaded his audience remarkably well by creating a powerful persuasive discourse. He used his strategies masterfully, always considering their psychopolitical effects towards realizing the persuasive goal. The best evidence of that is the warm applause of the audiences (30 times) during the speech. Moreover, Huddy et al., (2002, p. 447-8) report that after this speech, roughly 90 percent of public approved of military action in Afghanistan and, roughly 80 percent of the people polled in late September and early October 2001 favored military action against groups other than those in Afghanistan, including other countries 'sheltering' terrorists, people in other countries suspected of being terrorists, as well as terrorists not behind the 9/11 attacks.

CHAPTER 6: ANALYSING THE SPEECH OF BARACK OBAMA

6.1. A brief profile of Barrack Obama

Barack Obama was born of his mother from Kansas and a Kenyan father on August 4, 1961, in Hawaii. He has lived in many places including Indonesia. Obama attended Columbia University in New York and earned a law degree at Harvard University in Massachusetts. He and his wife, Michelle Obama who also worked as a lawyer and later for the University of Chicago, have two daughters, Sasha and Malia.

Serving in the Senate since 2004, Obama introduced bipartisan legislation, which allows Americans to learn online how their tax dollars are spent (Aschale, 2013, p. 7). He also serves on the Veterans' Affairs Committee, which helps oversee the care of soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the supporters of Obama are young people, African-Americans, poor citizens and the people who want change (Mohan, 2013, p. 105). Obama gave his campaign the slogans 'change has come' and 'yes we can', when America was facing the challenges of economic crisis and two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In August 2008, Barack Obama defeated Hillary Rodham Clinton, the former first lady, and became the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party (Wang, 2012, p. 256). Additionally, during the following months in 2008, he defeated McCain, the Republican Party's presidential candidate, and won the all three television debates held in Oxford (Mississippi), Nashville (Tennessee) and Hempstead (New York). And finally, he, relying on 333 electoral votes, won the final success and became the 44th American President and the first African-American President in American history.

6.2. Context to the speech

This speech is an official statement nationally televised from the State Floor of the White House. It was delivered by the 44th US President, Mr. Barack Obama on the 9th of September 2014. The purpose of the speech was to announce a new strategy of fighting terrorist groups like ISIL/ISIS. Politically, the speech was delivered on the eve of the 13th anniversary of the 11th September 2001, attacks. The day that reminds the world in general and Americans in specific of the severe

harm they suffered from terrorism. Perhaps, that may have paved the way for Obama's project of sustaining military campaigns against Islamic extremists, (ISIS). Especially, when ISIS was referred to by the speaker as "*al Qaeda's affiliate*" (L20), the perpetrators of the 11th September 2001 events (see chapter five). In practice, Obama evokes emotions to legitimise his actions or words.

This statement has come after years of urging caution by Mr. Obama about the perils of wading into the Syrian or Iraqi civil war. This attitude can be obvious when he describes the threat of ISIS as a regional threat or fratricidal conflicts as Baker (2014, p. 1) has described. Further to that, the civil war is "*one of the bloodiest in history*" (Obama 26 October 2002). Part of that is also in his election rally speeches, when Obama usually tried to avoid entangling the United States in a "dumb war"²⁸ (see Obama's speech on 26 October 2002). Hence, Obama has received much criticism of his political as well as his public campaigns against his unserious policy in dealing with the threat of terrorism. Obama, therefore, needs to do something to arrest the erosion of the public as well as political confidence in his war strategy. In an attempt to turn the tables, Obama announces a long-contemplated strategy for confronting ISIS, which would necessitate air strikes. This war-strategy or 'effort' as Obama preferred was described by Perter D. Feaver²⁹ as a "strong step in the right direction. The Speech was expected to be watched or heard by American people all over the United States as it was nationally broadcast, in which the speaker uses an official style to address them.

6.3. Analysis and discussion

The present section outlines a critical rhetorical analysis of the discursive strategies the US President, Barack Obama adopted to persuasively present his strategy of confronting terrorism. In doing this, DHA analytical tools have been applied, alongside how they have been applied for persuasive ends. This part introduces a detailed analysis of referential and predication strategies, strategies of involvement\detachment, argumentation strategies and strategies of intensification and mitigation.

²⁸ It is an adjective used by the Illinois Senator, Mr. Barack Obama to attribute the Iraq war 2003 as a rash war, a war that was based not on reason but on passion, not on principle, but on politics (Obama's speech on 26 October 2002)

²⁹ The former national security aide to Mr. Bush and President Bill Clinton (Baker 2014, p. 2).

6.3.1. Referential and predication strategies

Identifying and describing the social actors or actions with positive or negative attributions plays a decisive influence in creating the strategy of the in-group or out-group, the most popular persuasive strategy in public speeches. In that case, Obama distinguished the social actors into two groups in a way that fitted the purpose of ‘self’ representation versus negative ‘other’. Obama groups the terrorists of ISIS and al Qaeda and their affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen or Somalia and al-Assad’s regime under the label of the negative actor(s), where negative attributions were given. Whereas certain references, such as, ‘we’, Americans, America, our Union, the United States, etc. were grouped under the category of positive self, where positive characteristics are attributed. Lastly, Iraq and Syria³⁰ have also been invoked as favourable actors. The following presents a systematic analysis of these referential and predication strategies.

6.3.1.1 The Positive presentation of social actors and actions: Describing the in-group

In Obama’s speech, the positive self-representation encompasses mainly two categories of social actors. The first actor is the speaker himself, referred to as ‘I’, ‘my’ and ‘me’. This reference has more functions, such as showing authority, taking the audience in confidence and emoting the audience (Table 6.1), and then American\Americans\we and its realisation of ‘our’ and ‘us’ (Table 6.2). The positive referential strategies hence include a combination of themes that stretch from personal authority e.g. ‘As Commander-in-Chief’ to the glorification of America or Americans e.g. “American leadership is the one constant in an uncertain world” (L128). Therefore, this part focuses on the positive ‘self’ representation, that is, the use of ‘I’ or ‘we’, not in terms of who exactly is involved in this group, but how positively they are represented throughout the speech.

Attribution and predication with ‘I’
I welcome congressional support for this effort in order to show the world that Americans are united in confronting this danger (L102-104)
I want to speak to you about what the United States will do with our friends and allies to degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL (L1-3)

³⁰ Here, I mean the Syrians themselves or the moderate opponents, not the Syria presidency, which is already classified by the speaker as ‘Other’, whereas Iraq includes both people and government.

<p>I want you to know that the United States of America is meeting them with strength and resolve (38-39)</p> <p>I can announce that America will lead a broad coalition to roll back this terrorist threat (L51-51)</p> <p>I ordered our military to take targeted action against ISIL to stop its advances (L40)</p> <p>I have made it clear that we will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are (L58-59)</p> <p>I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq (L59-60)</p> <p>I deployed several hundred American service members to Iraq to assess how we can best support Iraqi security forces (L63-64)</p> <p>I will chair a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to further mobilize the international community around this effort (L82-83)</p> <p>I have the authority to address the threat from ISIL (L101)</p> <p>I [...] to use force against anyone who threatens America's core interests (L113-114)</p>
<p>I know many Americans are concerned about these threats (L38)</p> <p>I want you to know that the United States of America is meeting them with strength and resolve (38-39)</p> <p>I see the grit and determination and common goodness of the American people every single day — and that makes me more confident than ever about our country's future (L126-127)</p>
<p>I have said before; these American forces will not have a combat mission — we will not get dragged into another ground war in Iraq (L66-67)</p> <p>I call on Congress again to give us additional authorities and resources to train and equip these fighters (L72-72)</p> <p>I believe we are strongest as a nation when the President and Congress work together (L101-102)</p> <p>I want the American people to understand how this effort will be different from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (L107-108)</p> <p>I ask for your support in carrying that leadership forward (L141)</p> <p>I do so as a Commander-in-Chief who could not be prouder of our men and women in uniform — pilots who bravely fly in the face of danger above the Middle East, and service members who support our partners on the ground (L141-144).</p>

Table 6. 1. The use of 'I'.

From the above table (Table 6.1), we can see that the speaker functions the personal- singular pronoun 'I' to positively cover many actions on his part. He hence, frequently used 'I', (20 times), to generally show a lot of power and authority, especially, when he introduced himself as the Commander-in-Chief (L4, 140). Here, the speaker used the first person singular pronoun to indicate his own responsibility for all the actions he took, this is both as a self-willed person and a very strong leader. In addition, the speaker used the pronoun 'I' to establish his character as well, when he was welcoming and thanking the congressional support (L102-104). In lines 38-39 & 126-127, Obama creates a link between the wider population of Americans and his suggested action, which is to take them into his confidence. A good example of that feeling can be found in "I want you to know that the United States of America is meeting them³¹ with

³¹ Threats

strength and resolve” (38-39). Here, the use of ‘I’, as a means to take the audience into his confidence overlaps with the function of showing determination to crush terrorism and terrorists. Like Bush (L69-70), Obama talks to the audience via the rhetorical effects of *metonymy*, when he uses ‘*the United States of America*’ as a metaphorical image of ‘*the president of the United States*’, ‘*Commander-in-Chief*’ or ‘*I*’. In doing so, Obama maintains and increases the power of his declaration, as language has no power on its own, and it gains power through its users.

Another strategy of taking the audience into confidence is the strategy of distinction. Accordingly, Obama creates a clear distinction between past and present wars. In lines 107-108, Obama states that his proposed war policy is different “this effort will be different from *the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*. *It will not involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil.*” In this context, the use of the demonstrative ‘*this*’ and ‘*the noun phrase*’ *the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*’ arguably serves two functions, first it is an indirect criticism of his predecessor’s³² war-policy in Iraq and Afghanistan (also see Obama’s speech on 26 October 2002 & 30 January 2007). Second, it is an attempt to emote the audience that (t)his intended action is an ‘*effort*’ not a ‘*war*’ and “through a steady, relentless efforts take out ISIL wherever they exist” (L 109-110). The importance of this discourse ‘*this action is ‘effort’ not a ‘war*’ has the function of moving the direction of criticism from Obama’s policy in fighting terrorism to Bush’s war, where too many lives have been lost and too many billions have been spent.

The next positive social actor(s) the speaker presents in this speech, is the pronoun ‘we’. In this context, ‘we’ is used inclusively, meaning that Obama’s presidency or the speaker, does not distinguish themselves from the government or the wider population in taking decisions. In these parts, the pronoun ‘we’ is operationalised in order to show that the government and the people have shared policymaking. The meaning of ‘we’, then, refers to various referents stretching from the government - Obama’s presidency, military forces, and Congress members - to Americans themselves (Table 6.2). This group is mostly represented by their positive attributes and actions.

Social Actors	References	Prototypical example
Government Obama’s	We	-Over the last several years, we have consistently taken the fight to terrorists who threaten our country (L5-6),

³² George W Bush

presidency, military forces, Congress members and Americans.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -We took out Osama bin Laden and much of al Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan (L6-7), - We've targeted al Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen, and recently eliminated the top commander of its affiliate in Somalia (L7-8), -We've done so while bringing more than 140,000 American troops home from Iraq, and drawing down our forces in Afghanistan, where our combat mission will end later this year (L8-10), - we must remain vigilant as threats emerge (L14-15), - we have not yet detected specific plotting against our homeland (L33), we've conducted more than 150 successful airstrikes in Iraq (L41), - we cannot do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves, nor can we take the place of Arab partners in securing their region (L47-48), -We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy (L53-54), - we will conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against these terrorists (L55), - we will expand our efforts beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions, so that we're hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on offense (L56-58), - we will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are (L58-59), - We will increase our support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground (L62), - we can best support Iraqi security forces (L64), - we will send an additional 475 service members to Iraq (L55-56), - we will not get dragged into another ground war in Iraq (L67), - We'll also support Iraq's efforts to stand up National Guard Units to help Sunni communities secure their own freedom from ISIL's control (L69-70), - we have ramped up our military assistance to the Syrian opposition (L71-72), - we cannot rely on an Assad regime that terrorizes its own people (L73-74), - we must strengthen the opposition as the best counterweight to extremists like ISIL (L75-76), - we will continue to draw on our substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks (L78-79), -we will redouble our efforts to cut off its funding; improve our intelligence; strengthen our defenses; counter its warped ideology; and stem the flow of foreign fighters into and out of the Middle East (L79-81), - We will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who have been displaced by this terrorist organization (L84-85), -We cannot allow these communities to be driven from their ancient homelands (L87-88), - We are strongest as a nation when the President and Congress work together (L101-102).
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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We stand with people who fight for their own freedom (L97-98), -we rally other nations on behalf of our common security and common humanity (L98-99), - we live in a time of great change (L117), - we have felt and the grueling work required to bounce back, America is better positioned today to seize the future than any other nation on Earth (L120-121), -we welcome our responsibility to lead. From Europe to Asia, from the far reaches of Africa to war-torn capitals of the Middle East (L137-139), - We stand for freedom, for justice, for dignity (L139). - we helped prevent the massacre of civilians trapped on a distant mountain (L145), - That is the difference we make in the world (L149)
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Table 6. 2. The positive use of ‘we’.

The above table (6.2) shows the uses of ‘we’ to present the positive picture of the referents it referred to according to the context in which these referents are situated. However, in some cases, the evaluation of whether ‘we’ is positive or not depends not on the speaker’s perspective, but on the hearers, themselves. For example, between lines 47-48 Obama says: “we cannot do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves, nor can we take the place of Arab partners in securing their region”. Here, ‘we’ has two possible interpretations: it is positive from the Americans’ perspectives, where too many lives have been lost and too many billions have been spent during the last two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other side, it is a negative realization, as most Iraqis see that, especially, after signing the security agreement between Iraq and the United States.

Another strategy of showing the positive ‘we’ is the strategy of reporting or indirect speech. It is the hidden ‘we’ in which Obama reports one of those who survived with the help of US forces from ISIS. Here's what one of them said "We owe our American friends our lives. Our children will always remember that there was someone who felt our struggle and made a long journey to protect innocent people" (L146-148). This quotation shows indirect positive attributions towards the actor of ‘we’ [American soldiers] who prevents the massacre of civilians, as the speaker reported in “When we helped prevent the massacre of civilians trapped on a distant mountain” (L145).

In addition, the speaker presents America (nation) as part of ‘we’ via rhetorical repetition ‘anaphora’, when the first word or set of words in one sentence, clause, or phrase is repeated at or very near the beginning of successive sentences, clauses, or phrases (Harris 2013: 5;). In lines 128-136, Obama proudly, talks about America, by uttering repetitively “It is America” 5 times in full 5 sentences, all with positive attributes. He presents America as a social actor within the principle rule of ‘*CLASSIFICATION*³³’, when he gives a very strict sense of identifying it by ascribing its general status of social class membership:

Abroad, American leadership is the one constant in an uncertain world. It is America that has the capacity and the will to mobilize the world against terrorists. It is America that has rallied the world against Russian aggression, and in support of the Ukrainian peoples' right to determine their own destiny. It is America — our scientists, our doctors, our know-how — that can help contain and cure the outbreak of Ebola. It is America that helped remove and destroy Syria's declared chemical weapons so that they can't pose a threat to the Syrian people or the world again. And it is America that is helping Muslim communities around the world not just in the fight against terrorism, but in the fight for opportunity, and tolerance, and a more hopeful future (L128-136).

In common speaking, repetition may be boring, but in a situation like this, repetition makes a very strong appeal to emoting and motivating the audience, which in turn enhances the issue of war itself as an unavoidable policy to secure all these achievements. In this context, repetition is an appeal designed by the speaker to generate emotions in the audience, proudness in particular, which in turn influence people’s opinion and judgements (Fortenbaugh, 2007). Richard Dowis lays special stress on a variety of anaphora as an expression of related thoughts or ideas in a group of three or more, often with the same initial words or sounds (Dowis, 2001, p.17).

Furthermore, the analysis of positive representations shows that the speaker also gives some positive attributions in terms of positive other representations to two actors. The first to be presented is the new Iraqi government/forces, who is/are an active partner in rolling back the ISIS terrorist threat. One of these examples is in lines 56-58, when Obama says, “Working with the Iraqi government, we will expand our efforts beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions, so that we're hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on offense” (L56-

³³ Reisigl & Wodak (2005, p. 47) conceive the strategy of ‘classification’ in the very strict sense of identifying a person by ascribing her/him a general status of social class membership.

58). Secondly, Obama positively depicts the moderate Syrian opposition, ‘fighters’, as the best counterweight to extremists like ISIS, therefore, he will “call on Congress again to give us additional authorities and resources to train and equip these fighters” (L72-73). Linguistically, the speaker uses mainly two linguistic strategies to present the positive self/other representations. On the face of it, the speaker uses the strategy of *IDENTIFICATION*, as a hyperonym for personal reference, e.g. ‘Commander-in-Chief’, ‘I’, ‘Secretary Kerry’ or ‘he’. Additionally, the strategy of *COLLECTIVISATION*, when he focuses on using the collective deictic ‘we’ to refer inclusively to America as government, nation and people, or ‘these’ in reference to the Syrians’ opposition or by using some collective categories like, ‘Iraqi forces’ or ‘new Iraqi government’.

6.3.1.2. The negative representation of social actors and actions: Describing the out-group

In this part of the analysis, it seems that vagueness does not appear as part of Obama’s rhetoric. He clearly identifies the group of ISIL as a negative actor(s) and their actions as well. This discourse is constructed through what ‘they’ are (‘cancer’, ‘extremists’, ‘danger’, Killer), what ‘they’ do (‘execute captured prisoner’, ‘kill children’), what ‘they’ have done (‘the greatest threats’), or what ‘they’ could do (pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States’). In detail, various referents have been presented to display other’s brutal actions. Table (6.2) integrates all of these referents entitled ISIS/ISIL, where many of the negative qualifications have been displayed. For example, Proper names e.g. ‘Osama bin Laden’ or the ‘Assad regime’, deictic expressions, like ‘they’ or ‘these’, ideological anthroponyms as in ‘terrorists’ and so on.

In the context of negative representations, Obama also uses metaphors as an effective linguistic device of the referential and predication strategies. Obama describes ISIL the cancer that will take time to eradicate (L105). In metaphor a comparison is made by speaking of one thing in terms of another. It has an implied comparison between two different things in a way that isn’t literally true, but helps explain an idea or make a comparison, the literally interpretation would often sound very strange. Accordingly, Obama employed the medical term ‘cancer’ to emotive the audience (fear in particular) for persuasive ends. In relation to legitimisation by emotions of fear, Reyes states that:

Social actors can justify a call for action by appealing to emotions. Among those emotions, fear is key to attract our interlocutors' attention and legitimize actions, thoughts, words, ideologies etc. this legitimization is constructed linguistically through specific choices (Reyes 2011, p.792).

According to Richards (1965, p. 96), a metaphor has two parts – tenor and vehicle. The tenor is the subject to which attributes are ascribed (e.i., ISIL). The vehicle is the subject whose attributes are borrowed (i.e., cancer). All the metaphors have various layers of emotive connotations. These connotations affect the subconscious and the unconscious of the audience and finally result in certain responses. For instance, in Obama's metaphor there are several layers of connotations, such as the United State is a doctor, which is trying to eradicate this terminal illness from the patient (the Middle East and the world), and to prevent it evolving in a specific area (the broader Middle East). Lakoff & Johnson (2003, p. 4-5) argue that our conceptual system is essentially metaphorical in nature as we think in terms of metaphors. Due to this reason, metaphor has been efficiently used as a powerful rhetorical device by the public speakers.

Social actor	Prototypical example
ISIL / ISISL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a terrorist threat (L12), - trace of evil (L12), - small groups of killers have the capacity to do great harm (L13), - radical groups exploit grievances for their own gain (L16), - the group ISIL calls itself the "Islamic State" (L17), - ISIL is not "Islamic" (L18), - ISIL is certainly not a state (L19-20), - It was formerly al-Qaida's affiliate (L20), - It is recognized by no government, nor by the people it subjugates (L22), - Terrorist organization, pure and simple (L23), - It has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way (L23-24), - These terrorists are unique in their brutality (L25-26), - They execute captured prisoners (L26), - They kill children (L26), - They enslave, rape and force women into marriage (L26-27), - They threatened a religious minority with genocide (L27), - They took the lives of two American journalists Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff (L28-29), - ISIL poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria [...], including American citizens (30-31), - [they] carry out deadly attacks (L37), - Threat (L38), - Cancer (L105), - Extremists (L76),

	- Danger (L104), Those who offer only hate and destruction (L152-153).
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Table 6. 3. Negative social actor representation

The above table shows that the most common and central referential strategy the speaker uses to refer to ‘other’ is the excessive use of the proper noun of ‘ISIL’. It is constantly used 20 times all with a negative meaning. ISIL/ISIS or when it calls itself “*Islamic State*” is an acronym for ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant³⁴’, however, the name ISIS or the Arabic-derived term “*Daesh*” is more commonly used in politics and the media. Part of the strategy of using proper nouns is the use of ‘terrorists’ 7 times as a referential as well as predication factor. The speaker here, refers to ISIL/ISIS as terrorists relating to its ideology or culture, which is based on the “slaughter of all who stand in its way” (L23-24). Here, the referent ‘terrorists’ can be considered to be a specific form of predication strategies in addition to its function as a referent. Perhaps, that may elaborate why many critical analysts advise tackling the strategies of referential & predication in one part of the analysis. For example, Reisigl & Wodak (2005) state that predication strategies cannot neatly be separated from nomination strategies because:

In a certain sense, some of the referential strategies can be considered to be specific forms of predication strategies, because the pure referential identification very often already involves a denotatively as well as connotatively more or less deprecatory or appreciative labelling of the social actors (Reisigl & Wodak 2005, p. 45).

Part of the signalling and then labelling of the negative actors and actions is the strategy of using deictic expressions. For instance, the deictic ‘*they*’ has been used negatively 8 times out of 11. For example, it is used to reveal injustice or some inhuman behaviour from ISIL “they enslave, rape and force women into marriage (L26-27). Besides, ‘*these*’ has also been used 7 times out of a total of 16 times use to paint their global threat, as in “these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States” (L31-32). Moreover, in a certain sense, the collective possessive ‘*their*’ has also been used to present the negative ideology of ISIL, as in “these terrorists are unique in their brutality” (L25-26). In addition, the analysis of predication strategies also manifests that the speaker tackles the Middle East and North Africa in general in

³⁴ Historically, it refers to the region around Syria. It is an archaic French phrase for the “lands of the rising sun”, including modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine and Jordan (The Independent, Tuesday 23 September 2014).

negative attribution. Inasmuch, Obama considers them the gate, whereby the great threat comes from. For him “the greatest threats come from the Middle East and North Africa, where radical groups exploit grievances for their own gain, and one of those groups is ISIL (L15-1). Further to that, he describes them as the much bloodshed region, where terrorists are unique in their brutality (L25-26).

In order to expand on the aforementioned of negative actors and actions of terrorism, the speaker points and evaluates the Assad regime, the President of Syria since 2000 negatively. This referent is mostly represented similarly to the main group (i.e. terrorists) either by association, e.g. it is a “terrorist regime which terrorizes its own people” (L74), or negatively attribution, e.g. as an illegitimate regime, “a regime that will never regain the legitimacy it has lost” (L74-75). Politically, Obama presents two different attitudes: a positive attitude towards the Iraqi governments as being an active partner in degrading and destroying ISIL, as in “with a new Iraqi government in place, [...], I can announce that America will lead a broad coalition to roll back this terrorist threat” (50-52). Second, a negative attitude against an Assad regime as a foe rather than an ally. In Obama’s words: “In the fight against ISIL, we cannot rely on an Assad regime” (L73-74). Inasmuch, looking for another local ally –*moderate oppositions*- is required in order to apply Obama’s counterterrorism campaigns, therefore: “we must strengthen the opposition as the best counterweight to extremists like ISIL” (L75-76). By applying these two different political attitudes, Obama approaches the strategy of the in-group\out-group in presenting social actors.

6.3.2. The strategies of Perspectivization

Up to now, two strategic aspects of self-positive and other-negative representation has been mentioned. They all have an important effect on the discursive persuasion of persons. These strategies, partially, represent or reflect the speaker’s position, point of view or attitude towards the actors or actions in the discourse. This section focuses on the methods the speaker uses to position his views about the topic under discussion.

The discourse of criticism of ISIL, its thoughts and aims, expresses Obama’s opinion and views about them. He boosts his position and view through the position he has and the aim he is looking for. He presents himself positively as Commander-in-Chief, who aims to protect his

people, “As Commander-in-Chief, my highest priority is the security of the American people” (L 4). This is in addition to the use of the personal pronoun ‘I’, which indicates the President of the United States, as in “I will chair a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to further mobilize the international community around this effort” (l82-83). By his authority and position as the Commander-in-Chief and President of the United States, Obama placed weight in his involvement in the discourse of war.

Obama appeals to the strategy of trustworthiness, which enhances his self-image through the acts of patriotism. Besides, the very acts of involvement that the speaker follows are in the reporting, description and narration of utterances or events. After presenting himself as Commander-in-Chief, and discussing the core of the speech, Obama reports some of the landmark achievements that the American forces have recently achieved during his period (Table 6.10). Mentioning these military accomplishments before discussing the main topic of the speech is a way to provide material proof to the audience of Obama’s expertise in running a war. The war, which aims to protect the United States from future dangers, the danger, which “If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States” (L31).

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Over the last several years, we have consistently taken the fight to terrorists who threaten our country (L5-6), 2. We took out Osama bin Laden and much of al Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan (L6-7), 3. We've targeted al Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen, and recently eliminated the top commander of its affiliate in Somalia (L7-8), 4. We have done so while bringing more than 140,000 American troops home from Iraq, and drawing down our forces in Afghanistan, where our combat mission will end later this year (L8-10). <p>Conclusion: Obama is an expert commander has an ability to lead the United States to victory.</p>
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Table 6. 4. Obama is an expert commander.

Another involvement strategy the speaker appeals to is the strategy of praising. Obama encourages and motivates the American military forces by praising their efforts in bringing this favourable victory. He gives them the full credit of his strengthening situation by using the inclusive first-person pronoun ‘we’. By doing so, Obama boosts team spirit and cooperation, which is a very way strategy to persuade people and gain their support regarding the need for that suggested war. Besides, he legitimatizes his involvement through the authority of an expert,

or ‘Voice of expertise’, the authority that was enacted through the institutional position he represented.

The next strategy, where Obama crosses his involvements in the discourse of going to war, is the strategy of description. This strategy is also related to the macro-strategy of positive self and negative other representation. In a negative way, Obama expresses his opinion of ISIL as being “Not Islamic [...] nor State” (L18-24). There is “No religion which condones the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of ISIL's victims have been Muslim” (L18-19). ISIL is recognized by “no government, nor by the people it subjugates. It is a terrorist organization, pure and simple” (L22-23). For instance, in lines 25-29, it seems that Obama outlines his negative attitudes towards ISIL on one hand, and tries to legitimise the use of military force against them on the other hand:

These terrorists are unique in their brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They enslave, rape, and force women into marriage. They threatened a religious minority with genocide. And in acts of barbarism, they took the lives of two American journalists — Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff (L18-24).

Part of the placing the speaker’s attitudes in discourse is the strategy of positive self-presentation, where Obama declares “America is better positioned today to seize the future than any other nation on Earth” (L120-121). Perhaps this declaration can be interpreted as an endeavour to reassure the audience (Americans) on one hand, and to show the United States preparedness to fight on the other. In either case, the negative and positive representations Obama expresses overtly involve the willingness to use force.

Another method in which the speaker arranges himself in a positive way is the strategy of narration. In lines 146-148, Obama narrates an utterance of one of those people, who was saved by the American forces from ISIL’s massacre. By these lines, Obama maintains and intensifies the use of power as a means of saving innocents on one hand and emphasizes the humanitarianism agenda of his intended war or effort as he likes to call it. Here, is the thankful words of the survivor “We owe our American friends our lives. Our children will always remember that there was someone who felt our struggle and made a long journey to protect innocent people” (L146-148). In terms of persuasion the above statement triggers the emotions of the audiences, (i.e., proudness) towards their military forces and their humanitarian missions

which in turn affect the audiences' future reaction to strengthen and legitimate the speaker's point. This means that appeals to emotions or 'pathos' play an important role in the call to arms discourse. Social actors appeal to emotions in order to impose, debate, legitimise and construct certain perceptions of reality, to contribute individually to form their community's vision of social behaviour (Reyes, 2011, p. 788). In political discourse, political actors usually appeal to emotions in order to create a consensus between themselves and the masses so that they can form an in-group based on shared feelings, practices or the past and an out-group which does not share the same emotions with the political actor (and relatedly with the masses) because they are against the proposed policy. As Reyes states:

The negative representation of social actors and the attribution of negative qualities to their personalities or their actions allow speakers to create two sides of a given story/event, in which speaker and audience are in the 'us-group' and the social actors depicted negatively constitute the 'them-group'. (2011, p. 785)

In addition to that, it is also possible to say that 'tonality' has a high degree of involvement. Following the election rally speeches of Obama's presidential campaigns, there is a big shift in the tone between these speeches, and the speech under reference. His tone is noticeably low in this speech, which is intended to intensify the impression of seriousness, while he sounds more cheerful, enthusiastic and stronger in the election rally speeches.

6.3.3. Argumentation strategies

Argumentation is the strategy of logical persuasion. This section in particular, keeps track of what and how argumentation strategies or topoi, content-related argument schemes- have been used by Obama in order to connect claims or proposals to the conclusion he wants to prove; that this war is an effort to degrade terrorism and is not combat war. It is noticed that Obama through his election rally speeches presented himself as an anti-war presidential candidate³⁵. Therefore, in this situation, a series of argumentation strategies are expected to be used in this speech by the speaker to convince the audience that the use of force is the unavoidable choice. Consequently, the analysis found the following topoi, which the speaker uses for that purpose.

- **The topos of definition or topos of name –interpretation**

³⁵ See Obama's speeches on 26 October 2002 & 30 January 2007

This topos can be traced back to Obama's endeavors of self-and other- social actors and actions interpretation for persuasive goals. To be precise, Tables 6.1 & 6.2 presented the positive representations, whereas, table 6.3 outlined the negative ones. These three tables clearly show the reference(s) and its attribution. That means a close relationship between referential strategies and the strategies of argumentation is expected, like the already intertwined association between the referential and predication strategies. In political discourse define actors or actions plays an important role in persuading the masses, as it most often aims to legitimate their actions/decisions/practices and delegitimize their opponent's through the positive\negative attributions the definition involves. In terms of negative definition, Obama negatively defines ISIS in order to justify his suggested war and then to convince the world community in general and Muslims in particular to support this war. This definition comes as part of the negative representation of ISIL\ISIS:

[ISIL is] Not "Islamic." No religion condones the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of ISIL's victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state. It was formerly al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq and has taken advantage of sectarian strife and Syria's civil war to gain territory on both sides of the Iraq-Syrian border. It is recognized by no government, nor by the people it subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple (L18-19)

The above excerpt then is linked through synonyms to the content meaning to Bush's ³⁶ statements towards Islam and Muslims (see Table 5.4). According to Thibault (1991) the intertextuality does not necessitate a text to cite or allude to other text(s) or to share any keywords of another text to be considered intertextual. Indeed, it needs only share, abstract semantic patterns or formations (Lemke 1995), which may be "thought of as generic meanings that underline the specific wordings in a given text." (Oddo 2011, p. 290). In an endeavor to define the action(s) positively, Obama recognizes the broad American leadership "*the one constant in an uncertain world*" (L128). Perhaps, he based his positive interpretation on the following premises:

<p>Premise 1: It is America that has the capacity and the will to mobilize the world against terrorists (L128-129),</p>

³⁶ Bush's speech on 20th of September 2001.

<p>Premise 2: It is America that has rallied the world against Russian aggression, and in support of the Ukrainian peoples' right to determine their own destiny (L129-132),</p> <p>Premise 3: It is America — our scientists, our doctors, our know-how — that can help contain and cure the outbreak of Ebola (L131-132),</p> <p>Premise 4: It is America that helped remove and destroy Syria's declared chemical weapons so that they can't pose a threat to the Syrian people or the world again (L132-134),</p> <p>Premise 5: It is America that is helping Muslim communities around the world not just in the fight against terrorism, but in the fight for opportunity, and tolerance, and a more hopeful future (L134-136).</p> <p>Conclusion: therefore, America is strong enough to defeat terrorism, and then it is safe.</p>
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Table 6. 5. America is safer.

In the above premises, generally, Obama practices repetition as a rhetorical tool, in order to take Americans as well as Muslims all over the world into his trust. In addition, to show American ability in leading that suggested coalition successfully, he boosts this argument by the rhetorical tool ‘analogy’. In premises (2&4), Obama refers to some past positive/ landmark actions that the United States has done before. Then, the rhetorical effects of Obama can be seen in motivating the emotions of proudness on the side of Americans on one hand, and to show Muslims that America is an active ally, not only in their fight against terror, but also in fighting for opportunities, and tolerance, and a more hopeful future on the other.

- **The topos of authority**

In the opening unit of the speech, Obama has the sub-intention of connecting to the audience with formality using the tone “My fellow Americans” (L1). For realizing this intention, Obama uses the strategies of thanking the military and counterterrorism professionals as a way to says, “America is safer” (L11). He, after connecting to the audience and establishing his trustworthiness, directly, introduces “what the United States will do with our friends and allies to degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL” (L1-3). In this discussion, Obama refers to himself as ‘*Commander-in-Chief*’ to support his arguments. This is a position that holds higher authority and power over the audience. With this in mind, Obama applies, in particular, personal authority (van Leeuwen 2007), when he directly refers to his position, status or role, in particular, an institution. “*I do so as a Commander-in-Chief*” (L141-142) as part of

the strategy of legitimation. In political discourse, legitimation deserves special attention, as it is a strategy by which political actors try to justify their political agenda (Reyes, 2011, p. 783). Taking it in context, going to war is not Obama's personal agenda or interest, but "my highest priority is the security of the American people" (L4). Here, Obama rationalizes the intended action according to the goals and effects of that action (securing the American people). In terms of Habermas (1985), Obama conceptualizes the security of the Americans as an instrument for rational persuasion. Habermas (1985) distinguishes between two types of rationality: '*instrumental rationality*' and '*theoretical rationality*'. The former, legitimises practice according to its goals, uses or effects, whereas the latter legitimises practice in relating to the natural order of things.

The most effective linguistic expression of authority can be seen in the use of conditional sentences, as in "If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven." Consequently, Obama outlines the military progress made by the American forces against terror (L5-11). To conclude, Obama shows his authority by two methods: direct and indirect. Directly, via the position of 'Commander-in-chief', and indirectly, by proudly summarizing some military landmark achievements that were achieved during his period in office. These are some of the examples where Obama indirectly refers to his authority:

1. "We have consistently taken the fight to terrorists who threaten our country" (L5-6).
2. "We took out Osama bin Laden and much of al Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan" (L6-7).
3. "We've targeted al Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen, and recently eliminated the top commander of its affiliate in Somalia" (L7-8).
4. "We've done so while bringing more than 140,000 American troops home from Iraq and drawing down our forces in Afghanistan, where our combat mission will end later this year" (L8-10).

Table 6. 6. Indirect authority sources.

In all of these examples (Table 6.7), the speaker uses the inclusive pronoun 'we', which seems to include himself as 'Commander-in-Chief' and 'the US forces'. The use of the reference 'we' in these examples does not only show the authority of the Commander-in-chief and the American forces, but also persuades the audience that the intended action, '*counterterrorism*

strategy’ is capable of preventing the ISIL threat by pretending to be an expert authority, whereby, he provided expertise in fighting terrorism in addition to his status. Van Leeuwen (2007) considers ‘authorisation’ as one legitimisation strategy, besides the strategies of *moral evaluation*, rationalisation and *mythopoesis* (see methodology chapter, section 4.5), which justifies why a certain action(s) should be done in a certain way. Another example of applying authority is that political reaction that is directed at the Al-Assad regime. In lines 73-75, Obama classifies who is a terrorist and who is not. He insists that Al -Assad regime is a terrorist regime that terrorizes its people, therefore, “we cannot rely on an Assad regime.” (L73), and because it is “a regime that will never regain the legitimacy it has lost.” (L74-75).

- **The topoi of danger and threat**

In Table (6.2), Obama has presented that ‘Other’, ISIL\ISIS in a way that leaves no doubt about making the audience accept and then support whatever approach he suggested, just to create a threat out of their borders. He based his argument(s) on the conditional rule of the topoi of threat “*If there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them.*” The orator tries to defame the opponent, ISIL/ISIS (Table 6.3), to support the claim that ISIL\ISISL is a terrorist organization that constitutes a threat and danger, not only to the Middle East but to Americans themselves too. To prove this claim, two crucial premiseses have been argued by the speaker.

<p>Premise 1. They took the lives of two American journalists — Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff (L28-29). Premise 2. Our Intelligence Community believes that thousands of foreigners — including Europeans and some Americans — have joined them in Syria and Iraq. [...], these fighters could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks (L34-37).</p>

Table 6. 7. Proof of danger and a threat to the USA.

From Table (6.8) above, Obama tries to apply two different persuasive tools to prove his claim. In premise 1, he applies the use of paradigm, the use of examples, to lead the audience to a certain conclusion. Paradigm is the use of examples, fables and parables to lead the audience to some conclusion. Here, the use of paradigm or example has been operationalised by Obama as a witness to his arguments, especially when it comes at the end of arguments (see Kennedy 2007, p. 161-64). In the second premise, Obama uses the figure of enthymeme, to credit his

arguments, which is based on the maxim of *'Intelligence Community'*. Literally, enthymeme means something “held in the mind” (Kennedy, 1994, p. 59). In practice, if that maxim is true, the use of force must be a consequence. Obama uses the modes of paradigm and enthymeme to present logical persuasive arguments, as these two modes make up the core of logical persuasion (Van Dijk, 1985, p.120).

- **Topoi of disadvantage\advantage**

Regarding facing ISIL\ISIS threats, it seems that Obama sees inaction against them as part of a plan to increase their threat beyond their region (Syria & Iraq). As inaction or delay will lead to negative consequences, not only for the people of Iraq and Syria but also for American citizens, personnel and facilities too. He, therefore, patterns the idea of inaction as a disadvantage in the full conditional sentence, “If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States” (L31-32) as it shows the disadvantage of inaction or delays against the decision of action (underlined). On the other side, the conditional structure the speaker uses can also be understood as an advantage strategy to boost and support the action that prevents the disadvantage scenario (underlined). With this in mind, the speaker relates the topoi of advantage within the meaning of *'topos of urgency'*, when decisions or actions need to be considered or weighed up very quickly, because of their positive consequences, the meaning, can be understood in the next lines:

While we have not yet detected specific plotting against our homeland, ISIL leaders have threatened America and our allies. Our Intelligence Community believes that thousands of foreigners — including Europeans and some Americans — have joined them in Syria and Iraq. Trained and battle-hardened, these fighters could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks. (L30-37).

The above lines can be also seen as a way of legitimization via *'hypothetical future'*. In which the political actor has presented hypothetically the worst possible scenario if a certain action(s) is not considered. Hence, Obama displays the present ‘have’ & ‘believes’ as a time frame for making the decisive decision to act, which is related to a past cause (the events of 9/11) and a consequence that may occur in the future (“these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States” L31-32). Within the context of the war on terror, the cause of Obama’s suggested fight is the past (9/11 events), to avoid repeating it in the future. In this way, two scenarios may be realised:

- a) The past (9/11) will repeat itself, if the suggested action is not considered, “If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States” (L31-32).
- b) America is safer if the speaker’s suggestion is enacted “This strategy, [...], is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years” (L111-113).

Besides that, the speaker enhances the advantage of his strategy through the strategy of analogy. It is the same plan that proved its success in Yemen and Somalia for years. Obama motivates the strategy of ‘analogy’ as a way to legitimise his suggested strategy of war. Analogy means making comparisons in order to legitimise or delegitimise a certain action (Küçükali, 2014, p. 112). It is the answer to the question ‘Why should I do it?’ is ‘because it is like another activity which is associated with positive values’ (or the reverse as in case of Bush’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). Küçükali (2014) adds that sometimes analogy is done implicitly by using a term which implicitly belongs to one social practice in order to refer to an activity that belongs to another social practice, like the reference to ‘Sunday 1941’ in Bush’s speech on 9/11 to build an analogy between the current situation and the events of 9/11 and those of Japanese’s attack on Pearl Harbour. The analogies can also be made explicit to provide a clear answer to ‘Why should Obama follow that strategy?’ Explicitly, this is ‘because it is like a strategy which is already practiced before with positive values and outcomes.’ In Obama’s words “This strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years” (L109-113). Hence, the advantage(s) brought by Obama’s strategy of war (i.e. efforts) was operationalised by the legitimisation tool of ‘analogy’ which was part of the positive representation of in-group actors. In terms of argumentation, an analogy is an argument scheme in which the standpoint is defined by an argument that mentions something that something referred to in the standpoint is similar previous one (van Rees, 2009, p. 49). With these arguments, the speaker invokes an appeal to the beliefs and values of the audience which in turn convince them to support his suggested war. van Eemeren, et al., (2007) state that analogy is that type of argumentation whereby someone tries to convince someone else by showing that something is similar to something else:

The argumentation is presented as if there were a resemblance, an agreement, a likeness, a parallel, a correspondence or some other kind of similarity between that which is stated in

the argument and that which is stated in the standpoint. (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 97)

- **Topoi of Justice & humanitarian**

In this part of the analysis, it is worth integrating the topoi of Justice and humanitarian in one part of the analysis. This is because they are intertwined and related principles. It seems that the speaker structures his arguments on the meaning of contrast and comparison between the social actors\actions he categorized. Specifically, it is the injustice and inhuman actions ISIL did\do will do (Table 6.3); which can be categorised under the principle rule of the topos of abuse against the people of Iraq and Syria, and the justice and humanitarian actions of the American people or America on the other side (Table (6.3). Obama formulates the discourse of justice and humanitarianism in three ready-made topics, freedom, justice and dignity. These topics intensify the American humanitarianism side in one hand, and denigrate ISIL's ones on the other hand, for persuasive goals. These topics can be recognized in two-declaration acts. The first one explains why America is carrying that leadership³⁷ forward. That is because “we stand for **freedom**, for **justice**, for **dignity** [...], that has guided our nation since its founding “(L139-140). By referring to the inclusive ‘we’ (America & Americans), the principle argument **of responsibility** is overlapped, when (X) is responsible for the emerging specific problem, one should act in order to find solutions to these problems (Reisigl & Wodak 2005, p. 78). Because ISIL\ISIS breaches all of these principles (L26-29), America has declared its responsibility to stop and defeat them. Besides, the intended action(s) of the speaker will benefit those³⁸ who have lost their freedom, justice, and dignity; as the action, will make their lives better. In this situation, Obama is trying to evoke the positive perspective of the altruistic behaviour of the audience as a way to legitimise the intended action.

This strategy of legitimisation of ‘altruism’ can be practically exemplified into Lakoff's definition of the plot of a story. In terms of this story “the Fairy Tale of the Just War”, there are three actors: the villain is ISIS (the scenario is in Iraq and Syria), the victim (the Iraqis and Syrians), and the hero is (the United States, or in particular Obama's war), the belligerent, who is committed to liberty, security and freedom, and will fight any threat to these principles. In

³⁷ Global Coalition headed by America to defeat terrorism in the Middle East.

³⁸ With reference to the people of Iraq and Syria.

this scheme of argument, Obama contextualises Bush's statement that "we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom." (See chapter 5 for details). Further, Obama enhances the principle of positive responsibility via the use of the speech act of 'statement'. He implicitly declares personal commitments to providing humanitarian needs to the affected people of ISIL's terrorist works. These argumentation schemes can be touched in the meaning of the fourth part of Obama's suggested strategy:

- I. "We will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who have been displaced by this terrorist organization" (L84-85).
- II. "We cannot allow these communities³⁹ to be driven from their ancient homelands" (L87-88).

Obama, in this part of the argument(s), does not mention any plan or process of how he will achieve I & II. The above examples can, however, be interpreted in terms of two persuasive goals. First, it is a way to direct the audience away from the idea that this is not a war, it is an effort to confront ISIL. Second, it is an indirect message that Obama does not want to go through this war, but he is obliged to in order to protect the values that have guided his/their nation. Within this context, it would be possible to argue that Obama operationalizes the strategies of '*moral values*' as a means to legitimate his proposal. Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 98) indicates that it is hard to identify these strategies linguistically, as they are related to common sense cultural knowledge. This is the reason why the DHA becomes relevant, as it considers the cultural and historical references that are transferred to discourse in the form of moral evaluation as common values.

Another example is related to Americans' humanitarian responsibility and is the use of quotation, whereby Obama labels his opponents, ISIL\ISIS, as being against freedom, justice and dignity.

We owe our American friends our lives. Our children will always remember that there was someone who felt our struggle and made a long journey to protect innocent people (L146-148).

This quotation narrates how the American forces helped prevent one of ISIL's massacres of civilians by trapping people on a distant mountain. Here, the logic of argument takes the form of testimony, as it is spoken by one of the survivors. Testimony is a powerful tool of persuasion since man is a rational creature and wants proof before believing in something. This is persuasion where no effect from the speaker's potential use of language can be affected. By this quotation, Obama also wants to state that the United States is committed to liberty, security and freedom, and will fight any threat to these principles.

- **The topos of number**

The topos of number is also important in this section. It proves a specific potential danger and threat threatens the audience; hence specific measures should have to be performed to protect them and their personal and public facilities because if sufficient numerical/ statistical evidence is given, a specific action should be performed. Between lines 34-37, Obama uses the topos of number '*thousands*' to come to the conclusion that specific action should be considered. In such a case, Obama implies that there are '*thousands*' of potential threats or timed bombs that may explode and threaten the national security of America and Americans at any time. Below, it is possible to see how the speaker integrates the topos of number to lead (his) argument to certain decision or action.

Our Intelligence Community believes that thousands of foreigners — including Europeans and some Americans — have joined them in Syria and Iraq. [...], these fighters could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks (L34-37).

In more particular, Obama and through the authority of '*Intelligence Community*', as an expert authority strengthens the effect of numbers as an evidence is given to necessitates a specific action(s) to avoid the negative or unpleasant consequences may develop from it. Contextually, the topos of numbers is used as a warrant to take the argument to a certain conclusion (i.e., a specific action should be performed). In this context, it may be argued that an appeal to emotions, fear in particular, has been practiced by the speaker as a related method of legitimisation particularly in the meaning of "these fighters could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attack". Reyes defines the emotion of fear as a relevant strategy to legitimise political goals, because of its effect in skewing the audience's opinions (Reyes

2011, p.785). The topos of numbers was operationalised by the speaker to maintain and confirm the threat of the ‘other’s’.

6.3.4. The strategies of intensification/mitigation

In keeping with my analysis of remarks concerning the strategy of ‘Perspectivization’, where Obama expresses his attitudes or points of view, which were mostly made by intensified utterances, I offer, in this section, a close analysis where the speaker intensifies or mitigates the illocutionary force of utterances for persuasive purposes. Although, Obama has introduced himself as the Commander-in-chief, where intensified utterances are usually presented, some mitigated expressions are presented too. Perhaps, these mitigated expressions are used in order to persuade, reassure or take the audience in his confidence. In this data, there are different forms of mitigation strategies, among these are:

1. Insert ‘we’ instead of ‘I’: In this data, the orator frequently uses ‘we’, while ‘I’ is preferable or closer to the position of a ‘Commander-in-Chief’ to whom the speaker attributed himself in the opening part of the speech. For instance, in marking the landmark achievements that were achieved during his leadership, Obama uses ‘we’ rather than ‘I’. These changes in pronouns, between lines 5-10, mitigate the position of Commander, on one side, and align him with the people, in particular with the American troops, on the other side. In political discourse, the in-group strategy is a very useful method to persuade the audience. Among many of these examples, consider the following ones, whereby Obama generalizes his personal opinion by using ‘we’, which includes Obama and different groups of his government bodies, especially the military leaders.

Still, we continue to face the terrorist threat. We can't erase every trace of evil from the world, and small groups of killers have the capacity to do great harm. [...] And that's why we must remain vigilant as threats emerge. (L12-15).

After showing power and authority by listing these remarkable achievements (L5-16), Obama comes back to mitigate them by negotiating their ability to erase every trace of evil “We can't erase every trace of evil from the world” (L12). In the second part of the above example, the speaker according to his position as ‘Commander-in-Chief’ has the

power (Bourdieu 1991) to direct (he ‘must’) his group towards the intended future course of action. In this regard, emotion (fear in particular) appears again as a methodology the speaker follows to persuade the audience to accept or adopt that course of future action(s). One of the methodologies is the use of charging verbs. Obama instigates the emotions (fear) of his audience through the use of (still & emerge), the matter which motivates them to accept his proposal, just to be in safe from that threat or danger.

2. Verbs of feeling and thinking: it seems that the speaker manipulates the verbs of feeling and thinking (want & know in particular) to achieve different discursive goals. In all of these uses, Obama mitigates actor(s) and action(s). He, in spite of his position ‘Commander-in-Chief’ shares with the public about the role of the United State in his suggested fight, as in “tonight I want to speak to you about what the United States will do with our friends and allies to degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL” (L1-3). This strategy not only mitigates his position as ‘Commander-in-Chief’, indeed, it enhances his trustworthiness and character. His trustworthiness is also enhanced by the use of the thinking verb ‘know’ to take the audience (Americans in particular) into his confidence “I know many Americans are concerned about these threats” (L38). This example shows how Obama is passionate towards his people by using his personal thoughts and emotions. Therefore, in an attempt to assure the audience, the speaker mitigates the threat of terrorism by saying “Tonight, I want you to know that the United States of America is meeting them with strength and resolve” (L38-39).

6.4. Summary

The objective of this chapter was to examine the persuasive constructions and strategies that could be discursively produced, perceived and evaluated across the DHA discursive strategies of nomination, predication, perspectivation, argumentation and intensification/ mitigation in the speech of the US President Barack Obama. Focusing on how persuasive discourse was argumentatively structured and linguistically realised. The chapter started by a brief introduction to the speaker to introduce part of his social and political life. Like the previous chapter, the first level of discursive analysis, i.e., the analysis of nomination and predication strategies

demonstrated that the speaker employed various referents and attributions to refer and characterize the social actors and actions in a way to fit the purpose of self-positive and other-negative representation.

In the analysis of perspectivation strategies, where Obama employed various linguistic devices to express his involvement /detachment to position point of view towards the social actors and actions the speech was considered. It continues in the third level of the discursive analysis, Obama and through certain topoi constructed the logical and persuasive arguments that legitimised self-actors and actions and delegitimised others' actors and actions. The last level in the discursive analysis, i.e. the strategies of intensification\ mitigation, the orator employed various linguistic tools to intensify and sometimes to mitigate the illocutionary force of statements, such as negation, insert 'we' instead of 'I', verbs of feeling and thinking, and presupposition and implication.

In this data, the analysis revealed that the persuasive discourse used by Obama appears to be organized by three main macro-discourses. The first discourse is the discourse of the successful policy preferences of Obama's administration in fighting terrorism, which Obama tried to prove by the rhetorical figure of *analogy*. He instrumentalised the strategy of analogy to help prove the success, "this strategy, [...], is one of that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years." In addition, the topoi of authority and number are seen. In authority, Obama played the role of a Commander-in-Chief, who 'orders' & 'deploys', he intensifies the illocutionary force of utterances. The topos of number is also operationalised to indicate the success of that strategy on one hand and to prove its nature, as it is an "additional action" not a war (lines 62-70) on the other hand.

In terms of the discourse of criticism, Obama explicitly criticised his predecessor's (Bush) war policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the second macro-discourse, the 'criticism of predecessor's war strategy', Obama draws a distinction between the war strategy he wants to be applied and the two wars' strategy of his predecessor. In so doing, he structured (t)his appeal very much about what he *would not do* rather than *what he would do* "we cannot do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves" (L47). It seems that the negation '*would not do*' is part of Obama's rhetoric to reassure the public that his intended mission will not have a combat mission as a

strategic way to gain their support. The third persuasive discourse is the discourse of glorification, whereby Obama glorified the abilities and capacity of the US people, government and military forces in defeating terrorism, wherein the topoi of definition, justice and humanitarian are seen.

In these three discourses, the orator has tackled many persuasive methods in order to advance (his) the suggested war policy. Among these strategies are the appeal of emotion and logic. Emotions are directly linked to 'fear', where ISIL, for example, was described as a 'cancer', the disease, which needs urgent medical/surgical interference to salvage a patient's life (the world). Further, part of Obama's pathos strategy is the sub-strategy of threat. He through a conditional expression threatened the 'Other'. "If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven" (L 60-61). This strategy not only stirs the audience's emotion; it also enhances the speaker's character (trustworthiness) as being a patriotic leader, who can achieve a victory.

The analysis also showed that Obama employed numbers and trustful sources, like 'Intelligence Community', and witnesses, 'quotations' as paradigms to make a persuasive appeal. Moreover, in the case of persuasion, timing the speech as such is an ad hoc, persuasive model. It gives rise to the mental models of the Americans in particular and the world in general that have a special place in their episodic memory, which is well recalled even much later, such as the monumental events like the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 11th September 2001 or any other terrorist attacks. Such events and those similar gear the attitudes of people towards the speaker's proposal. Speakers may do so for the issue of terrorism by associating increased terrorist's attacks with an increasing delinquency to vote in favor of antiterrorism policies (see Chomsky, 2003; Side, 2007). Hence, by formation and modification of the audience's attitudes or ideologies, speakers do not need to engage in multiple persuasion attempts. All in all, Obama uses the discursive sphere effectively to maintain the already war-strategy that the United States has carried out for years in Yemen and Somalia, and now in Iraq and Syria.

CHAPTER 7: ANALYSING THE SPEECH OF NOURI AL-MALIKI

7.1. A brief profile of Nouri AL-Maliki

Nuri Kamil Al-Maliki held the office of the Prime Minister of Iraq between 2006 and 2014, and later became the Vice-President of Iraq. He was born on July 1, 1950, in Hindiya, Iraq. He attended Salahaddin University and earned his bachelor's degree in Islamic Studies in 1973 and Masters degree in Arabic Literature in 1992⁴⁰. He is married and has four daughters and a son. By religion, Al-Maliki is a Shia Muslim. In 1968, he joined the 'Dawa Party', an Islamic party which opposed Saddam's regime. He was to be sentenced to death in 1979 for opposing Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party, which forced him to flee from his country. During his exile, he took refuge in many countries including Iran and later in Syria, wherefrom he directed his anti-Saddam activism in Iraq.

As soon as the coalition forces headed by the US overthrew Saddam's regime in 2003, Al-Maliki returned to Iraq from Syria and became a member of the De-Baathification Commission, which worked to sanitize the military and government of Iraq from the Baathists. He was elected as a member of the new Iraqi Parliament. During his first tenure as the Member of Parliament, he chaired the Security and Defence Committee of the National Assembly and worked as an adviser to the former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. On 22nd April 2006, Al-Maliki was chosen by the United Iraqi Alliance, the Shiite-dominated coalition, to hold the office of Prime Minister after Ibrahim al-Jaafari. In this way, Al-Maliki was the first democratically and constitutionally elected Prime Minister of Iraq. He held the office of Prime Minister for two terms between 2006 and 2014. Although, his party, Dawa, won the majority, by winning 92 seats of 328 in the last parliamentary elections in April, 2014, he withdrew his candidacy for the third term and recommended Dr. Haider al-Abadi to hold the office of Prime Minister. Currently, Al-Maliki is the Vice-President of the Republic of Iraq.

⁴⁰ Taken from <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/10/world/meast/nuri-al-maliki---fast-facts> (accessed on 2\6\2016)

7.2. Context to the Speech

This speech was delivered in the American Congress Avenue by the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Al-Maliki on 26th July 2006, two months after becoming the elected Prime Minister of Iraq. Since this speech was delivered in the joint session of Congress in the Chamber of the US House of Representatives, the expected audiences were Democrat and Republican Senators. Moreover, the speech was video-recorded and broadcast on electronic media, people all over the world watched it, listened to it and read it in original form and in translations.

This was the first time, where an elected Iraqi politician had addressed the US Congress and declared allegiance with the US and the allied countries in fighting terror. The speaker, therefore, tries to prove to the American and the world audience that Iraq after Saddam's regime is different. Another agenda of the speaker was to motivate the international community in general and the US specially to increase their support for Iraq in its war on terror. Hence, contextually this speech echoes Dr. Ayad Allawi's speech in 2004 at the US Congress, in which he, as the interim Prime Minister of Iraq, thanked the US and the world community and asked for more help and support.

In spite of his thanking and extolling the USA, Al-Maliki got unexpected reactions from the audiences. Democrats, in particular, were very incensed against him and some of them threatened to boycott the speech. Their unexpected attitude towards the speech was based on the speaker's position regarding the Israel-Hezbollah conflict the previous week, in which Al-Maliki had condemned Israel's "hostile act" in Lebanon and criticized the international community for not doing enough to stop it (Flaherty⁴¹ 2006:5). These statements make some senators very angry so that they were in the mood to boycott the speech. For instance, the House Democratic leader, Nancy Pelosi stated that she would boycott the speech unless Al-Maliki disavowed his critical comments of Israel. Moreover, more than 20 Democrats sent a letter to the GOP House leadership to rescind Al-Maliki's invitation to address Congress (Flaherty 2006, p. 5). Whereas, the Senate's top Democrat, Harry Reid, affirmed that Al-Maliki repeatedly said that "his government opposed terrorism everywhere in the world" (Reynolds 2006). In the same

⁴¹ Associated Press writer

vein, the White House press secretary, Mr. Tony Snow stated that Al-Maliki is the head of a sovereign state and he has the ability to say what he thinks.” (Stout 2006, p. 2).

As far as the reactions of the audience during the speech are concerned, they were mixed. The speaker was mostly applauded, but his speech was also disrupted by slogan shouting. A young woman⁴² briefly heckled the speech by booing, “*Iraqis want the troops to leave! Bring them home now!*” which annoyed the Speaker J. Dennis Hastert and he ordered the Capitol Police to take her out the auditorium. In spite of all those different articulations of disagreement, the speaker ostentatiously presented himself as the first democratically and constitutionally elected Prime Minister of Iraq. These charged words (democratically, constitutionally and elected) strengthen his credibility and trustworthiness as they have been historically the principles that the United States has called for.

Globally, this speech started a debate concerning its sincerity. For instance, Fred Kaplan⁴³, the American writer, posed the following questions, *Did Bush’s aides write the speech? Or Did the White House write al-Maliki’s speech to Congress?* Moreover, the White House spokesman Tony Snow said that there had been “conversations about the speech” ahead of time from which one could reasonably infer that the speech had been heavily edited (Kaplan, 2006).

7.3. Analysis and discussion

This section concentrates on how persuasive discourse has been created with the use of five central strategies of the DHA. We shall see how various actors and actions have been named under nomination strategies and how various qualities and attributes have been attributed to these actors and actions under predication strategies. Under perspectivization strategies, we shall see how the speaker’s perspectives in describing various actions and issues are presented; while under argumentation strategies, we shall investigate how various spans have been used to prove certain claims and conclusions through the use of ‘Topoi’. Finally, what is also worthy of note here are the strategies used for intensifying and mitigating certain issues which will be

⁴² Medea Benjamin, is a co-founder of CODEPINK, an anti-war group (Gettysburg Times 2006, p. 4).

⁴³ Taken from

https://m.reddit.com/r/slate/comments/b87r/false_consciousness_about_iraq_did_the_white/ (accessed 10/07/2016)

investigated through the analysis of the perspective of the linguistic representation of the actors and actions.

7.3.1. Referential and predication strategies

The general aim of the strategies of referential and predication is to identify and define actors and characterize their actions in terms of self-positive and other-negative representations. In public speeches (political in particular), referential and predication strategies are used to form the in-group and out-group identities of actors and action, the matter which influences the audience's perception of those actors and actions. In doing so, good and positive things are attributed to the in-group actors (friends, allies) of the speaker, while negative things are attributed to the out-group actors of the speaker (others- opponents, or enemies) (van Dijk 2006a, p. 737). Accordingly, Al-Maliki refers to America, (people and government), Iraq (Iraqis and the new (his) government), and the War on Terror in positive terms, as a part of the in-group and 'self-positive' strategies (Table 7.1). By contrast, he refers to 'terrorism/terrorists' and the 'Saddam regime', 'the attacks of 11/9', and so forth in negative terms as a part of the out-group and 'other-negative' strategies (Table 7.3).

7.3.1.1 The Positive presentation of social actors and actions: Describing the in-group

The speaker opens his speech by addressing the audience in positive terms by identifying and greeting them, "your Excellency, the Speaker of the House, Mr. Vice President, honorable ladies and gentlemen, members of Congress" (L2-3). In an attempt to establish the in-group identity with the audience, the speaker expresses his pleasure in addressing the immediate audience, the Americans' elected representatives. He strengthens the in-group identity with the US and its people by thanking them for their continued resolve in supporting and helping the Iraqi people and affirming to them that "Iraq will not forget those who stood with him and who continue to stand with him in times of need" (L8-9).

Before, proceeding the purpose of the speech, the speaker proudly introduces himself, "the first democratically and constitutionally elected Prime Minister of Iraq" (3-4). By referring to himself as such, Al-Maliki strengthens his credibility and trustworthiness, as these references give him the right to speak on behalf of the Iraqi people. In addition, he connects to the audience, as these indexes carry a high value within the American cultural model. Therefore, the speaker

capitalizes on that statement in order to efficiently establish the in-group identity with the American audience. To understand positive-self strategies, we can see the following table (Table 7.1) which illustrates how the speaker positively, refers to and attributes certain actors and actions.

Actors/actions	References	Prototypical example
America: people, government bodies, Congress members	You	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -the elected representatives of the American people (L4-5) - supporting our people in ousting a dictatorship (L7-8) - Thank you for your continued resolve in helping us fight the terrorists plaguing Iraq (L9-10)
Iraq/ Iraqis	Iraq, Iraqis, Iraqi people, our people, their, we	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Iraq will not forget those who stood with him and who continues to stand with him in times of need (L8-9) -our people aspire to liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law (L11-12) - Iraq is the front line in this struggle, and history will prove that the sacrifices of Iraqis for freedom will not be in vain (L30-32) - Iraqis are your allies in the war on terror (L32) -History will record their bravery and humanity (L32-33) - Iraqis have tasted freedom and we will defend it absolutely (L38-39) -a country which respects international conventions and practices and non-interference in the internal affairs of others, relies on dialogue to resolve differences, and strives to develop strong relations with every country that espouses freedom and peace (L46-49) - Iraq has gone from a dictatorship to a transitional administration, and now to a fully-fledged democratic government (L58-59)

		<p>- by the courage of our people who defied the terrorists every time (L60)</p> <p>- Today Iraq is a democracy which stands firm because of the sacrifices of its people and the sacrifices of all those who stood with us in this crisis from nations and countries (L65-67)</p> <p>- Iraqis of all persuasions took part in the unanimously democratic election(L69)</p> <p>- Iraqis succeeded in forming a government of national unity based on an elected parliamentary foundation (L72-73)</p> <p>-Our Iraqi forces have accomplished much and have gained a great deal of field experience to eventually enable them to triumph over the terrorists (L129-130)</p>
War on Terror	War on Terror, vanguard, battle, struggle	<p>- The war on terror is a real war against those who wish to burn out the flame of freedom (L14-15)</p> <p>- a battle between true Islam, [...], and terrorism, which wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak (L17-19)</p> <p>-Iraq is the front line in this struggle (L30-31)</p>
The casualties of 9/11	Your loss	- the loss of all mankind (L27-28)
The casualties of Iraq	Our loss	- [...]is lost for all free people (L28)
Iraqi Democracy (preliminary election)	The ballot box	-our people, who defied the terrorists every time they were called upon to make a choice by risking their lives for the ballot box (L60-62).

Table 7. 1. The positive representation of actors and actions.

From Table 7.1., it can be seen that the positive predication is an umbrella term that does not limit itself to the attributes of the actors but extends to include their actions too. In lines 7-8, Al-Maliki implicitly appreciates the American invasion/war on Iraq of 2003 for its contribution to ousting the dictatorship⁴⁴ from Iraq. He refers to and attributes it positively as the war of “*liberation*”. This meaning has been voiced again and again. For instance, in lines 79-80 he talks about the growth of Iraq saying, “Since liberation, we have witnessed great

⁴⁴ In reference to Saddam’s regime

accomplishments in politics, the economy and civil society” (L79-80). In political discourses, for many reasons, politicians don’t need to say everything they believe explicitly, indeed a large part of the discourses may be inferred by the audience themselves (van Dijk, 2006, p. 737).

In the same spirit, the speaker also attributes the War on Terror, as “a real war against those who wish to burn off the flame of freedom” (L14-15), where he affirms that freedom, liberty and human rights constitute essential factors of the true Islam. Describing the War on Terror and Islam in that way, the speaker tries to absolve Islam in general and Iraqis in particular of being part of terrorism or supporting it. In fact, the speaker tries to match the goals of Islam and that of the War on Terror. This means that the speaker implicitly legitimises the War on Terror through the impersonal authority of Islam. To emphasize this meaning, the speaker uses the strategy of elaboration:

Let me be very clear: This is a battle between true Islam, for which a person's liberty and rights constitute essential cornerstones, and terrorism, which wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak (L17-19).

It was said earlier that the speech was delivered after two months of the speaker being the Prime Minister of Iraq. Therefore, part of the speech was organized to generate a positive impression to the Iraqis about the speaker’s future administration or government. He, therefore, nominates and describes Iraqis as “*courageous people*”, the people who defied the terrorists by risking their lives when they came out to vote despite threats to their lives (L60-63). They are the same courageous people, who revolted against the dictatorship of Saddam’s regime in 1991 (L158). It is worth mentioning here, that after the Gulf–War of 1991 when the coalition forces headed by the US forces defeated the Iraqi army in Al-Kuwait, some Iraqis tried to capitalize on the momentary weakness of Saddam’s regime and revolted against it. They (Iraqis) thought that the American forces would support their revolution against Saddam Hussein, but unfortunately, they (Iraqis) found themselves alone without any international support. In this context, Reynolds (2006) points out that the United States disclaimed its support for the Shiites’ uprising against Saddam Hussein and, contrary to people’s expectations, they withdrew from Iraq at the end of the Gulf War. Based on that fact, the speaker says, “Let 1991 never be repeated” (L59).

In political discourses, metaphors work dialectically between the speaker and audiences (Ana 1999). The “1991” has two connotations. It is a negative connotation for the side of the

Americans, as they disclaimed their support for the Iraqi people at that time (mitigation of positive actor). While, it is a positive connotation for the side of the Iraqis, as it represents their struggle against the dictatorship of Saddam's regime (intensification). This historical parcel has two functions. First, it mitigates the side of the US and intensifies the side of the Iraqis.

In referential strategies, the speaker uses pronouns very strategically. For instance, the personal pronoun 'I' has been used 12 times, and its realization 'me' 4 times, and 'my' 1 time. Functionally, the speaker uses 'I' to show authority, take credit for good things, thank the audience, take the audience into their confidence, and make assertions (Table 7.2).

Attribution and predication with 'I'
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It is with great pleasure that I am able to take this opportunity (L3-4) - I thank you for affording me this unique chance to speak at this respected assembly (L5-6) - Let me begin by thanking the American people, through you, on behalf of the Iraqi people, for supporting our people and ousting the dictatorship (L6-8) - I would like to thank them⁴⁵ very much for all their sacrifices (L68) - [...]. They are as much for me the pinnacle embodiment of my faith and religion, and they are for all free spirits (L13-14) - I know that some of you here question whether Iraq is part of the war on terror. Let me be very clear (L16-17) - I am proud to say that a quarter of Iraq's Council of Representatives is made up of women (L102-103) - I believe these human rights are not an artefact construct reserved for the few. They are the divine entitlement for all (L42-43) - My presence here is a testament to the new politics of a democratic Iraq (L56) - [...], I am able to take this opportunity to be the first democratically and constitutionally elected prime minister of Iraq to address you (L3-4) - I launched the National Reconciliation Initiative, which aims to draw in groups willing to accept the logic of dialogue and participation (L118-120) - I remain determined to see this initiative succeed (122) - I have on many occasions stated my determination to disband all militias without exception and reestablish a state monopoly on arms, and to guarantee citizens' security, so that they do not need others to provide it (L133-135) - I will not allow Iraq to become a launch pad for al Qaida and other terrorist organizations (154-155) - I will not allow terror to rob Iraqis of their hopes and dreams (L155-156) - I will not allow terrorists to dictate to us our future (L156).

Table 7. 2. Functions of the personal pronoun 'I'.

⁴⁵ Iraqi people and all who, nations and countries stood with them in their crisis.

The above Table (7.2) illustrates how the speaker used ‘I’ for various discursive purposes. ‘I’ has been used for thanking 4 times, for ensuring 5 times, and for asserting 7 times. In political speeches, an assertion is an indispensable element of discourse for its *sociopsychological* effects. Cap (2006, P. 28) believes that the speech act of assertion is a cornerstone not only for legitimisation but also for persuading the hearers. For instance, in lines 154-156, the speaker asserts that he “will not allow” three times. By this chain of the assertion, the speaker expresses his (government’s) ideological commitments, which are in line with the cognitive map of the audience that comprises their psychological, political, social predispositions. This regularity is captured in the theory of the latitude of acceptance, where the audience receive the attitudes they consider according to their cognitive map (see Jowett & O’Donnell 1992). This strategy not only establishes the acceptability of the speaker, but also accomplishes his goal of soliciting the audience and getting their active participation, which is indicated by their warm applauding. By sharing ideas and beliefs with the member of the audience, the speaker establishes his cultural background to legitimatise his future actions.

The pronoun ‘we’ is a multi-function tool in this speech. Generally, it has been used 31 times throughout the speech. It has been used 20 times to refer to the speaker and his administration, 8 times to himself and his People – the Iraqis, and 3 times to include the live audience, the supporters of the War on Terror – the Americans. Therefore, it may say that Al-Maliki uses ‘we’ exclusively 20 times when he excludes himself from the audience. That may be justified, as it was the speech which was delivered after two months of being Al-Maliki the Prime Minister, in order to leave a positive impression about his future administration. He also uses ‘we’ inclusively 11 times, on the basis that Iraqis are also his remote audience through the media.

The pronoun ‘we’ has been used to perform various speech acts, such as thanking the audience and the USA, criticising Saddam’s regime, presenting the achievements of the speaker’s administration (the discourse of successful policy), and showing commitment. These functions are loosely related to one another and one may predetermine the other, as in case of the action of criticising Saddam’s regime and the speaker’s achievements (Table 7.3.).

Attribution and predication with 'we'
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -We are grateful for this (L77-78). - We have made progress, and we are correcting the damage inflicted by the politics of the previous regime, in particular with our neighbors (L54-56) - We have gone from a one-party state ruled by a small elite to a multi-party system where politics is the domain of every citizen and parties compete at all levels (L80-82) - We have gone from mass graves and torture chambers and chemical weapons to the rule of law and human rights (94-95) - We have gone from a one-party state ruled by a small elite to a multi-party system where politics is the domain of every citizen and parties compete at all levels (L80-82) - we are building the new Iraq on the foundation of democracy, and are erecting it through our belief in the rights of every individual (L35-36) -- we are determined to build our nation, a land whose people are free, whose air is liberty, and where the rule of law is supreme (L44-45) - We will defend it [freedom] absolutely (L38-39).

Table 7. 3. Functions of 'we'.

From Table (7.3) it can be noticed that the speaker uses 'we' to show how his government is different from the previous one. This pronoun 'we' seems to be very unique in the sense that it has a certain ambiguity that plays an important role in creating the discourse of solidarity and sharing of responsibility. Generally, the speaker tries to share responsibility with the audience and his countrymen. For example, when he repeats his determination to establish the democratic values of "freedom, liberty, and equality" (L38-39, 149-150), he seems to share responsibility with the US and the audience. The speaker uses 'we' to intensify the position of his government.

The use of 'we' does not limit itself solely to taking credit for establishing human rights and freedom in Iraq, but also to highlight the political reforms and economic developments undertaken by the speaker and his government. On the political side, the speaker depicts his government as the 'corrector' that corrects the mistakes (abuse) of the past government, as in "We have made progress, and we are correcting the damage inflicted by the politics of the previous regime, in particular with our neighbors" (L54-56). Regarding economic development, he says, "What used to be a command economy in Iraq, we are rapidly transforming into a free market economy" (L85-86). To support his claim, he says, "in the past three years, our GDP per capita has more than doubled" (L86-87). In this way, the speaker uses proof of the success of

his government and takes credit for this success by using the pronoun ‘we’. Moreover, in lines 77-78, the speaker also uses ‘we’ to thank the audience (American particularly) for their support (L77-78), whereby ‘we’ refers to himself and the people of Iraq (inclusive).

Moreover, Al-Maliki, through the use of ‘we’, creates a new discourse of ‘*determination*’. With the repetitive use of ‘we’, he shows the strong commitment of his government and his people to act in order to spread security and stability that will positively affect not only the local environment but also the regional and international environment. One striking example of this intention is found in the following excerpt:

نعمل مع الأحرار في العالم بجد من أجل أن يعود العراق ليأخذ مكانته الذي يستحقه ويلعب دوره الإيجابي في محيطه الإقليمي والدولي في بسط الأمن والاستقرار.

We are working diligently with free people in the world to return Iraq to the position it deserves and to play a positive role in its regional and international environment as a key, active player in spreading security and stability (L48-51).

Based on the example above, it can be said that the orator employs ‘we’ for positive self-presentation to create the discourse of success, power and prosperity. ‘We’ has also been used to enhance the image of the audience by thanking them for their support and good actions in protecting the freedom of people in Iraq. The use of inclusive ‘we’ maintains the strategy of sharing goals and showing an association, which connects the speaker to the audience and makes the audience agreeable and receptive to the speaker’s message. He, euphemistically, describes them as “*the free people in the world*”. In political speeches, praising the audience and their activities is a trend politicians follow to create a positive impact upon the audience’s attitudes.

Furthermore, the speaker also uses the possessive adjective ‘our’ with positive attributions. It has been used 25 times, mostly to praise Iraqis and their activities. It has also been used for sharing identity between the speaker and the audiences. Such is the case when he says, “But let our enemies not mistake our outstretched hand for forgiveness as a sign of weakness” (L122-123). The second ‘our’ (underlined) in the example above refers to the “*National Reconciliation Initiative*” the speaker had launched, which “aims to draw in-groups, willing to accept the logic of dialogue and participation” (L119). Therefore, the speaker refers to it as an “olive branch” (L120), as a metaphorical expression for its humanitarian and democratic love of peace and reconciliation.

Like ‘we’, the possessive adjective ‘our’ is also multi-functional. It is used as a part of goal sharing and showing an association with the audience and also for showing power and authority and for owning the responsibility for actions.

1. Our Iraqi forces have accomplished much and have gained a great deal of field experience to eventually enable them to triumph over the terrorists and to take over the security portfolio and extend peace throughout the country (L129-132).
2. Our faith says that who kills an innocent as it has killed all mankind (L23-24)
3. By the courage of our people, [...] by risking their lives for the ballot box, they have stated over and over again with their inked-stained fingers waving in pride that they will always make the same choice (L 63).

7.3.1.2. The negative representation of social actors and actions: Describing the out-group

Al- Maliki mainly identifies two main actors as negative-other: The Saddam regime and the terrorists (Table 7.3). He considers them as a different kind of terror that threatened and is threatening the security and stability of Iraq and the world. This can be recognized in “We faced tyranny and oppression under the former regime [Saddam’s regime], and we now face a different kind of terror” (L152-153). Then, he forcefully says, “we did not bow, and we will not bow now” (L153-154). Here, the speaker formulates his persuasive rhetoric on tensed action verbs in particular and the use of negation. He first uses the past verbs (faced, did) to assure the audience that the period of Saddam’s regime is gone, and the future verb (will) to assure the audience that the Iraqi people are able to defeat the present terror as they did before in the case of Saddam’s regime. In addition to that, the speaker also uses the negative marker ‘not’ to show the determination of his government and people to fight hard and curb all the challenges that may stand in the way of democracy.

Actors/actions	References	Prototypical example
Terrorists/Terrorism	Terrorism, terrorists, terror, Zarqawi ⁴⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - plague (L10) - those who wish to burn out the flame of freedom (L15) - terrorism wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak (L18-19) -[it] wages a war on Islam and Muslims and values (L19-20) - [it] spreads hatred between humanity. Contrary to what's come in our Qur'an (L20-21) - The truth is that terrorism has no religion (L23) - imposters of Islam (L25) - ugly head (L25) - same terrorists show complete disregard for human life (L27) - extremists (L47) - [they] bent on either destroying democracy or Iraq (L59-60) - who value no life and who depend on the fear their wanton murder and destruction creates (L106-107) - They have poured acid into Iraq's dictatorial wounds and created many of their own (107-108) - They hope to undermine our democratically elected government through the random killing of civilians (109-110) - They want to destroy Iraq's future by assassinating our leading scientific, political and community leaders (110-111) - they wish to spread fear (111-112) - threat to every free country in the world and their citizens (L113)

⁴⁶Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, was the mastermind behind hundreds of bombings, kidnappings and beheadings in Iraq. He was killed by an airstrike – north of Baghdad on Wednesday, 8 June 2006.

The Saddam regime	dictatorship, Saddam, previous regime, former regime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - who destroyed it [the foundation of democracy and human rights] through his abuse of all those rights (L37) - damage [the regional and international political relations] (L55) - dictatorship (L58) - one-party state ruled by a small elite (L80) - a state-controlled media (L82) - a command economy (L85) - [it is] mass graves and torture chambers and chemical weapons (L94).
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Table 7. 4. The identification and attribution of Other-Negative Actors

The above Table (7.4) shows the illustrations from the speech in which the speaker identifies and describes the out-group actors and their actions. In this respect, the word ‘terror’ is used 13 times, ‘terrorists’ 8 times, ‘terrorism’ 3 times, ‘extremist’ twice, and al-Zarqawi once. On the other hand, the pronoun ‘they’ has been used 4 times and ‘those’ once for the same goal. All of these nouns and pronouns and their actions have been described negatively. The terrorists have been identified as a ‘plague’, ‘Impostors of Islam’, ‘Ugly head’ and ‘threat’ to freedom and peace. They are abusing Islam by killing the innocent, spreading hatred and fear, and threatening peace and the democratic values of the world. The Saddam regime has been identified by the speaker as a ‘dictatorship’, a ‘rule of small elite’ and it has been attributed with various negative actions, such as, an ‘abuser of human rights’, ‘political genocide indicated by the mention of mass graves’, ‘spoiling international relations’, ‘throttling freedom of media’, and ‘torturing innocent people by using chemical weapons’. The following table highlights the negative images of the out-group, Saddam’s regime and the terrorists in relation to the in-group actors and the speaker’s administration.

US-the Speaker’s regime	Other –Saddam’s regime	Other- terrorism/terrorists
We are rebuilding Iraq on a new, solid foundation, that of liberty, hope and equality (L149)	[It] abused of all those rights (L35-37)	They want to destroy Iraq's future by assassinating our leading scientific, political and community leaders (L110-111)

we are correcting the damage inflicted by the politics of the previous regime, in particular with our neighbors (L55-56)	[It] damaged the political relations- in particular with neighbors (L55-56)	[Terrorism] spreads hatred between humanity (L20)
[It is] a fully-fledged democratic government (L57-59)	[It was] a dictatorship regime (L57)	[The terrorists] wish to spread fear (L111-112)
[It is] a multi-party system where politics is the domain of every citizen and parties compete at all levels (L80-82)	[It was] a one-party state ruled by a small elite (L80)	The terrorists are bent on either destroying democracy or Iraq (L59-60)
[media is] completely free and uncensored (L82-83)	[It was] a state-controlled media (L82)	
[It is] a free market economy (L86)	[It was] a command economy (L85)	
[It is] a rule of law and human rights (L95)	[It was] mass graves and torture chambers and chemical weapons (L94).	[The terrorists] wish to burn out the flame of freedom (L15)

Table 7. 5. US Vs. THEM.

This Table (7.5) may serve dual persuasive purposes — it presents a negative picture of the past regime, and by contrast, it gives a positive picture of the speaker’s government. The rule of law, a free market economy, and a free media in Al-Maliki’s administration have been contrasted with genocide, a command economy and state-controlled media in Saddam’s regime. The establishment of the democratic values of equality, liberty, and fraternity of the speaker’s administration has been contrasted with the abuse of human rights in the dictatorship of Saddam’s regime. However, the meaning of Table (7.5) has been epitomized in the following chain of contrastive pairs:

الأمل بدلاً من الخوف والحرية بدلاً من القمع والسمو بدلاً من الأذعان والديمقراطية بدلاً من الدكتاتورية والاتحادية بدلاً من استبداد المركز.

Hope over fear, liberty over oppression, dignity over submission, democracy over dictatorship, federalism over a centralist state” (L63-65).

In the above example, each pair of that contrastive chain has the meaning of distance and solidarity (Meadows 2007, p. 6). For instance, the pair “*democracy over dictatorship*” means the speaker’s solidarity to the principle of democracy, freedom and human rights, while, ‘dictatorship’ represents the speaker’s distance from Saddam’s regime, where the speaker himself was one of its victims (see section 7.1).

Overall, the speaker negatively refers to the period of Saddam's general management of human rights, politics- regional & global political relations, and economic issues. In practice, he adopts the rhetorical strategy of (US versus THEM⁴⁷) as a method of persuading the audience. Structurally, the discourse of US versus THEM can be understood through the rhetorical contrastive organisational mode (i.e., the strategy of contrast and comparison). Contextually, the speaker's regime versus Saddam's regime and terrorism/terrorists versus Islam/Muslims have been strategically contrasted. These negative and positive representations will be continued to be considered in the analysis of the next strategies.

7.3.2. The strategies of Perspectivization

Language is not always neutral and an unbiased medium of presenting and evaluating actors and actions, as it carries the attitudes and emotions of its users (politicians in particular). The attitudes and emotions expressed by the speaker also affect the attitudes and the emotions of the audience. In relation to emotions, Elster affirms that:

A crucial fact about emotions is that they have the capacity to alter and distort the cognitive appraisal that triggered them in the first place. The object of an emotion is the emotionally distorted picture of its cause. This feedback from emotion is a key to the dynamics of the emotions. (Elster, 1994, p. 27)

These attitudes and emotions may not always involve voluntary efforts and strategies on the part of the speaker. Nevertheless, in political speeches, the politicians, who are aware of the power of language, use language strategically to suit their purpose of persuasion or dissuasion. In fact, it is never the words (language) themselves that should be dubbed evil or good, the responsibility for any damage (means of expressions) still lies with the users' intentions (Sornig, 1989, p. 96). This discursive use is manifested in critical discussions of self-positive/other-negative dichotomies. The perspective and point of view of the speaker in relation to certain issues influence the construction of persuasive discourse. The speaker clearly expresses his perspective in relation to the US and its citizens, Iraq and its democracy, the Saddam regime and terrorism, and the ongoing War on Terror.

Through the strategies of nomination and predication we have seen how the speaker identifies and describes certain actors and actions in positive and negative terms as per the need of his

⁴⁷ Saddam's regime

persuasive discourse. In doing so, he also expresses his perspective and attitude towards those actors and actions. For example, in line 23, he describes ‘terrorism’ as “*has no religion*”. Here, he first expresses and then confirms his faith and belief towards “*who kills an innocent*” (L24), because his religion says, “*Who kills an innocent as it has killed all mankind*” (L24). Here, he clearly states his perspective about Islam, as such, the speaker defines the ‘terrorists’ as ‘killers’ and ‘the casualties of 9/11 assaults and Iraqis as ‘innocents’. These, two opposite words (innocent X killer) have two persuasive functions. First, they invoke the audience’s emotions of sorrow and revenge simultaneously, and they confirm the speaker’s negative attitudes towards the ideology of terrorism. Strategically, the speaker detaches (Reisigl & Wodak 2001, p. 82) himself/the body he represents as being a terrorist or a supporter of terrorism. In other words, he intensifies his position as an anti-terrorist by criticizing and condoning their actions and the behavior of killing the innocents.

The other occasion in which the speaker expresses his involvement is that of the description of going to the ballot box (L 62). In this discourse, the speaker describes Iraqis and their determination to go to the first Parliamentary elections as part of the showing of his engagement in that brave event. He presents himself as the outcome of that brave action that presented him as the first democratically and constitutionally elected Prime Minister of Iraq. The speaker becomes more effective by adjusting his perspective of the democratic values of equality, liberty and fraternity according to the ideological perspective of his immediate audience. The ideology and perspective match between the speaker and the audience and this results in a better, more persuasive effect. This strategy endears the speaker to the audience and makes the audience receptive to the speaker’s persuasive discourse. This strategy is in line with Sornig’s view. He (1989, p. 96). says that persuasion can be voiced in speaker-hearer relationships in which the speaker cognitively gets the audience to identify himself with the view they proffered.

In lines 164-165, Al-Maliki concludes his speech by promising that, “Iraq will be the graveyard for terrorists.” (ثقفوا أن العراق سيكون مقبرة للإرهابيين). Here the speaker implicitly, pledges himself and the audience to take further actions in order to defeat terrorism. In political speeches, the speech act of ‘promise’ has its persuasive outcomes, as the speaker commits himself to do something that the listener wants. The repetition of the promise and commitment of destroying the terrorism and terrorists weighted the speaker’s future argument. Moreover, the speaker also

uses ‘repetition’ as a method, perhaps to highlight\intensify his position, as the Commander-in-Chief, and to express his personal determination about confronting terrorism. In Al-Maliki’s words: “Trust that Iraq will be a grave for terrorism and terrorists. Trust that Iraq will be the graveyard for terrorism and terrorists” (L164-165).

Al-Maliki also attempts to show his involvement in developing and promoting Iraq as part of the War on Terror’s plan through the strategy of reporting some of the developments that have taken place during his period. Between lines 86 and 91, he refers to the economic prosperity that achieved after Saddam’s regime. He proudly, says that Iraqis GDP⁴⁸ doubled during the last three years. This discourse ‘financial development’ helps the speaker in establishing the general discourse of his successful policies on the one hand, and on the other hand, prepare a good foundation for criticising the financial policies of Saddam’s regime (L86-91).

Religion is a good expressive method whereby politicians express their negative or positive attitudes and feelings about certain actors and actions. In Arabic political discourse, politicians (Muslims in particular) refer to religion or religious expressions as a part of their persuasive rhetoric. They use some of the Qur’anic verses or prophets’ sayings as prototypical examples to legitimise or delegitimise certain thoughts, actors and actions. For instance, in relation to the 9/11 attack, the speaker says: Our faith says, “Who kills an innocent as it has killed all mankind” (L24). By this religious verse, Al-Maliki denies the terrorists as being Muslims or terrorism as an ideology of Islam, as they totally contradict the principle of Islam and muslims’ behaviours. The speaker uses Qur’anic verses not only to confirm his attitude and impute the terrorists and terrorism, but also to warn those (Islamic countries) who shelter and support terrorism and terrorists. Though the live audiences were not Muslims (mostly Americans) the use of religion in this context is effective. It evidences al Qaeda and its followers are killers, which in turn legitimates and justifies the use of military force against them. Therefore, the effect of religion is not reducible to Muslims audience since the current audience respect and value that religion, and the best demonstration of that is the speech of Presidents Bush and Obama respect Islam as religion, thought and ideology. Besides, the speech also was directed to attract the attention of the Arab world in general Muslims in particular.

⁴⁸ Gross Domestic Product, is a measure of average income per person in a country.

7.3.3. Argumentation strategies

This part deals with the use of argumentation strategies for creating a persuasive discourse. This part of the analysis will focus on how the speaker leads his audience to the intended conclusions by presenting certain premises logically. It will investigate how various topoi have been used to prove and justify the positive/negative references and attributions to the actors and actions that the speaker has applied. The analysis of the argumentation strategies used in this speech demonstrates how the out-group actors and their ideologies have been discursively refuted, and the in-group actors and their ideologies have been positively reinforced through the use of a limited number of “typical content-related argument schemes” called topoi (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, p. 75). The speaker builds his arguments based on the following topoi.

- **Topos of danger and threat**

The speaker bases his argument against terrorism and in favour of the War on Terror on the topos of danger and threat. Al- Maliki argues that the terrorists are a threat to national and international security and stability; hence, they need to be neutralized. In doing so, Al- Maliki equates terrorism to ‘plague’ (الطاعون) (a serious, potentially life-threatening infectious disease) that has endangered not only the peace and security of Iraq but also of the whole world. Hence, this social plague needs to be treated. Here, the speaker uses the language not only as a tool of communication, but also as a tool to legitimise a certain proposition(s). Strategically, the speaker tries to stir the emotions of fear and anger to convince the audience. Implicitly, he refers to the possibility of the infection of the disease (terrorism-thoughts and actions) reaching the audience’s home. Table 7.6 shows the potential threat and danger to the world from the terrorists in which the orator based on his conclusion.

Premise 1: [terrorism] spreads hatred between humanity (L20)

Premise 2: Terrorism has no religion (L23)

Premise 3: Thousands of lives were tragically lost on September 11th (L24-25)

Premise 4: Terrorists show complete disregard for human life (L26-27)

Premise 5: [terrorists] value no life and who depend on the fear their wanton murder and destruction creates (L106-107)

Premise 6: They wish to spread fear (L111-112).

Premise 7: They want to destroy Iraq's future by assassinating our leading scientific, political and community leaders (L110-111)

Premise 8: The terrorists who are bent on either destroying democracy or Iraq. (L59-60)

Premise 9: They hope to undermine our democratically elected government through the random killing of civilians (L109-110)

Conclusion: Terrorism threatens every free country and their citizens in the world.

Table 7. 6. The topos of danger and threat.

We can see in the table above that, the most premises (1, 4, 5 and 6 in particular), aim at invoking the world audience's emotions of fear and anger so that he can rally the world community to support the War on Terror. To enhance the effect, the speaker refers to the attacks of 11/9 (premise 3) due to their metaphorical effect on the threat of terrorism. The speaker reminds the audience what terrorists can do and what they have done to make sure that they understand the urgency of acting against terrorism. Indirectly it serves the purpose of getting more financial support for fighting terrorism, as it is for the welfare of the audience. On the local domain, the speaker warns the Iraqi people about the threat of terrorism (premises 7, 8 and 9) by asserting that terrorism has no religion (premise 2). Publicly, al Qaeda, on more than one occasion, declared that it has been established to protect Muslims' rights, while in fact it "wages a war on Islam and Muslims" (L19). Hence, Premise 2 can be also understood as an advisory message to those who consider al Qaeda as an Islamic Organization.

Interestingly, the speaker uses numbers to put more focus on threat and danger of 'other' (i.e., terrorism), against the 'Self' as in the following example:

الاف من الارواح التي زُهِقت بشكل مأساوي في الحادي عشر من سبتمبر عندما اطل ادعاء الاسلام وجوهم القبيحة على العالم. والاف أكثر يموتون اليوم وبشكل مستمر في العراق على ايدي الارهابين أنفسهم الذين يظهرون استهانه لا مثيل لها لكل قيم ومعاني الحياة الانسانية.

Thousands of lives were tragically lost on September 11th when these impostors of Islam reared their ugly head. Thousands more continue to die in Iraq today at the hands of the same terrorists who show complete disregard for human life. (L24-26).

In the above example, the speaker rhetorically employs numbers to strengthen the topos of 'threat and danger, which in turn touches the emotional chords of his audience. The speaker refers to the tragic losses of thousands of lives, to structure the discourse of criminalisation and victimisation. For victimisation, the speaker places emphasis upon the outcome of the terrorist act (*thousands of lives were tragically lost*), whereas the criminalisation was done by identifying

the actor and the action (terrorists who show complete disregard for human life). In this sense, the speaker emotionally legitimises the War on Terror, and delegitimises the action of the terrorists, the attack of 11/9.

By referring to the number (thousands), the speaker, in fact, tries to show empathy for those who suffered during the attacks, which in turn shares the responsibility to stop these attacks in future, as both the Americans and the Iraqis suffered heavy losses due to terrorist acts. In terms of the Aristotelian persuasive rhetoric, the speaker tries to persuade the audience through the strategy of 'Pathos' by stirring their emotion of anger and revenge in particular. Moreover, the second part of the example, "*Thousands more continue to die in Iraq today at the hands of the same terrorists*", has been structured to legitimise the speaker's future action(s) against the terrorists. In terms of Leeuwen (2007, P. 98), the speaker followed the strategy of moral evaluation to legitimise the War on Terror in Iraq. This rhetorical strategy has also been used to verify the fact that the terrorists do not discriminate between the Americans or the Iraqis in their attacks. They are as much the enemy of the Muslims as of the Christians and other communities. In particular, the speaker simultaneously based his argument on the actor and action-oriented legitimisation to present a logical persuasive discourse in favour of the war on terror.

- **The topos of responsibility**

Another strategy the speaker adopted to convince the audience to support the war is based on the topos of responsibility. He states that terrorism is not a local (Iraqi) problem, but it threatens all free countries. Hence, this is the collective responsibility of all the nations to fight terrorism. This meaning can be seen in the following example.

"لا تتصورو بأن هذه المشكلة عراقية أن جبهة الإرهاب تمثل تهديد لكل بلدان وشعوب العالم الحر"

Do not think that this is an Iraqi problem. This terrorist front is a threat to every free country in the world and their citizens (L112-113).

In the above example, the speaker generalises the threat of terrorism to stir the addressees' sense of fear. He presupposes that such a threat exists around everybody. To realise this effect, he uses the construction of negation (don't-لا). Rhetorically, here, the form of negation intensifies and confirms the speaker's point and mitigates and rejects the claims of those who think that terrorism is a regional problem. Therefore, the speaker affirms, "*this terrorist front is a threat*

to every free country in the world and their citizens” (L112-113). By intensifying the threat (enemy’s action), the speaker appeals to fear responses to legitimise certain action(s) (Cap 2013, P. 4). In this case, an appeal to fear was capable for persuading the audience to consider the speaker’s suggestion of the because the American audience have already experienced how dangerous a terrorist attack could be, as they lost the lives of their beloved people in the 11/9 attacks. The following table (7.6) illustrates how the speaker constructs the discourse of responsibility on the foundation of the common threat.

Premise 1: Thousands more continue to die in Iraq today at the hands of the same terrorists of [11/9 attackers] (L26)
Premise 2: It is your duty and our duty to defeat this terror (L29-30)
Premise 3: Iraqis are your allies in the war on terror (L31-32)
Premise 4: The fate of our country and the world’s countries is tied to each other (L33)
Premise 5: This terrorist front is a threat to every free country in the world and their citizens (L112-113)
Premise 6: What is at stake is nothing less than our freedom and liberty (L113_114)
Premise 7: Confronting and dealing with this challenge [terrorism] is the responsibility of every liberal democracy that values its freedom (L114-115).
Conclusion: It is the collective responsibility of all nations to fight terrorism.

Table 7. 7. Topos of responsibility.

In the same spirit, the speaker states that the armed militias in Iraq are not dissimilar to the threat of the terrorists. They are both threatening the security and stability of Iraq. This can be understood in the excerpt below.

"الأمر الآخر الذي يُعيق الاستقرار في العراق هو وجود الميليشيا المسلحة"

“The other impediment to Iraq's stability is the armed militias” (L123-133).

In this excerpt, the speaker argues that the threat of the armed militias is balanced against the threat of the terrorists, as they both impede the security and the stability of Iraq. This meaning can be semantically transpired through “*other impediment*, ”الأمر الآخر” which connects the threat of armed militias to what has been said before about the causes of instability and insecurity in Iraq. It seems that the above example was part of the discourse: “the greatest threat Iraq’s people face is terror” (L105-106). Hence, it can be said that the speaker persuades the audience to feel

a collective responsibility to fight terrorism, as it is a common threat to all free nations. The discourse of responsibility has been strengthened by frequent appeals to the emotions of fear and anger.

- **The topos of authority**

The conditional rule of the topos of threat⁴⁹, and topos of responsibility necessitate the need for something to stop terrorism. Accordingly, the speaker exercises some sort of authority to fight the threat of terrorism. In lines 133-135, he states his determination to disband all armed militias. The linguistic realization of (t)his intention was through the speech act of ‘declaration’. Please note the following example:

لقد أعلنت في أكثر من مناسبةٍ تصميمي على حزم كل الميليشيات وبدون استثناء وحصر السلاح بيد الدولة لضمان أمن
المواطنين حتى لا يحتاجوا لآخرين للدفاع عنهم

I have on many occasions stated my determination to disband all militias, without exception and reestablish a state monopoly on arms, and to guarantee citizens security so that they do not need others to provide it (L133-135).

The data above shows that the speaker tries to influence and persuade the audience (Americans and Iraqis in particular) through the speech act of declaration by restoring their trust in him. The persuasive effect of that act is based on the fact that some of those militias were accused of or participated in killing hundreds of Americans troops in Iraq, which annoyed the Americans themselves. In the same spirit, many of the Iraqis were (are still) the victims of the same militias. In the same context, the speaker promises the audience that he will not allow “Iraq to become a launch pad for al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations “neither terror “robs Iraqis’ hopes and dreams” or terrorists “dictate [Iraqis] us our future” (L154-156).

Another strategy, the speaker uses to show power and authority is the strategy of ‘nomination’, especially the ‘proper noun’. In line 124, Al-Maliki refers to Al- Zarqawi⁵⁰, the field leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, as part of the discourse of that successful policy. In fact, through nomination,

⁴⁹See methodology

⁵⁰ He was a militant Islamist, originally from Jordan. He formulated Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, which was affiliated to the al Qaeda terrorist organization. Practically, he was the field leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. He was responsible for a series of bombings, beheadings and attacks in Iraq until his death in June 2006 in Iraq.

al-Maliki first draws the audience's attention towards himself and his successful policies, and then in a decisive manner, he threatens "Whoever chooses violence against the people of Iraq" (L122-123) will await the same fate as the terrorist Zarqawi. This supports his claim that "Iraq is in the front line in this struggle, and history will prove that the sacrifices of Iraqis for freedom will not be in vain" (L 30-31).

The topos of authority also benefits from the strategy of contrast. By which, the speaker criticizes the unsuccessful policies of Saddam's regime on one hand and creates the discourse of his successful policies on the other hand. Structurally, the discourse of (un)successful policies mainly follows the contrastive rhetorical mode, wherein culture, the social, political and economic life of Iraqis in the speaker's regime has been contrasted with the period of Saddam's regime (Table 7.3). For instance, on the topic of politics and human rights, the speaker says:

نحنُ نبني عراق جديد على أساسٍ ديمقراطي ونشيدة من خلال اعتقادنا بالاعتماد على حقوق الإنسان بعكس ماكان يفعل
صدام بتدميره عن طريق انتهاك كل تلك الحقوق

We are building the new Iraq on the foundation of democracy, and are erecting it through our belief in the rights of every individual, just as opposite to Saddam, who destroyed it through his abuse of all those rights (L35-37).

In this example, the sentiment of contrast is clearly voiced through using two contrastive main verbs (build يبنى X destroy يهدم) attributing the positive one to his regime and the negative to the Saddam regime and the terrorists. These two verbs set up the distinct lines of division between the US/THEM categories through linguistic expression used to contrast as underlined in the above lines.

- **Topoi of abuse, justice and humanitarianism**

The speaker uses the topos of abuse, topos of justice and the topos of humanitarianism to justify the military action against the terrorists and the Saddam regime. These topoi give the speaker the moral grounds to support the War on Terror. The speaker refers to the history of abuse and injustice when he says the following words.

لقد أنقلنا من المقابر الجماعية وغرف التعذيب والأسلحة الكيماوية الى سيادة القانون واحترام حقوق الإنسان. أنقلنا من
مصادرة الحريات الى فضاء واسع من الحرية.

“We have gone from mass graves and torture chambers and chemical weapons to a flourishing — to the rule of law and human rights” (L94-95).

The above example shows that the speaker relies on some historical events that take place during the period of Saddam’s regime to elaborate and evidence the abuse and injustice that Saddam’s regime had practiced against his own people. For instance, the “mass graves and torture” is a reference to the random killing the regime had practiced against the Iraqi people (the southerners in particular, during the coup of 1991). On the other hand, the “chemical weapons” is a true reference to the use of these weapons by Saddam’s regime to attack the Iraqi Kurds⁵¹. Then, within the topoi of history, abuse, justice and humanitarianism, the speaker enhances the discourse of the criminalisation of Saddam’s regime and victimization of the Iraqi people.

In short, the political orator builds upon the topoi of threat, abuse, justice, history and humanitarianism to claim that Saddam’s regime was a terrorist regime that terrorized and brutalized its people. This conclusion has an international dimension, it justifies and legitimises the invasion/war on Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of the Saddam regime, which can be recognized in the words of thanking the speaker expresses:

دعوني أبدء بشكر الشعب الأمريكي، باسمي وباسم الشعب العراقي ومن خلالكم على دعمه لشعبنا للخلاص من الدكتاتورية.

Let me begin by thanking the American people, through you, on behalf of the Iraqi people, for supporting our people in ousting the dictatorship (L6-8).

- **The topos of religion**

Religion has always played a vital role in the politics of the Middle East. Citing Qur’anic verses always helped the politicians in legitimatizing or delegitimizing certain actors and actions. The speaker expertly uses the topos of religion as an active argumentative tool to legitimise the actions of the in-group actors and de-legitimise the actions of the out-group actors (see Table 7.7). The Prime Minister cites from the Qur’an and uses 13 references to religion under the strategy of topos of religion. By doing so, he not only scrutinizes the actions of his opponents

⁵¹On March 16, 1988, Saddam’s regime bombed Halabja, southern Kurdistan, with chemical weapons. This attack killed between 3200 and 5000 people, and more than 7000 were injured, most of them were civilians. This attack is globally classified as a genocide.

in the light of religious principles but also establishes himself as a religious scholar who takes his decision by the principles of the Holy Book.

Religious expression	God	Religion	Qur'an	Muslims	Islam	Islamic	Faith
Frequency	2	3	1	1	3	1	2

Table 7. 8. Frequencies of religious expressions.

He criticises the actions of the terrorists as anti-Islamic because Islam never supports the killing of innocent people. The terrorists try to cover their heinous crimes of genocide under the principles of religion by misinterpreting them to suit their purpose. By doing so, the speaker distances himself from terrorists and their acts and criticises their killing of the innocent people. In Iraq, people usually trust and respect religion. They often scrutinize the actions and their legality and acceptability in the light of their religious principles. The speaker understands this very well, so he uses religion to delegitimise the terrorists' actions and legitimise his support for the war on terror. For instance, in order to negate the idea that terrorism is an Islamic ideology and terrorists are Muslims, the orator cites some of the Qur'anic verses.

1. على عكس ما جاء في قرآننا: إِنَّا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ مِنْ ذَكَرٍ وَأُنْثَىٰ وَجَعَلْنَاكُمْ شُعُوبًا وَقَبَائِلَ لِتَعَارَفُوا^{٢١} إِنَّ أَكْرَمَكُمْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ أَتْقَاكُمْ

Contrary to what's come in our Qur'an: Contrary to what's come in our Koran, which says we have created of you — of male and female and made you tribes and families that you know each other, surely noblest of you in the sight of God is the best conduct (L20-23).

2. فديننا يقول: مَنْ قَتَلَ نَفْسًا بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ أَوْ فَسَادٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَكَأَنَّمَا قَتَلَ النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا (سورة المائدة - الآية 32)

Our faith says that who kills an innocent as it has killed all mankind (L23)

3. قال الله تعالى في محكم كتابه: وَلَقَدْ كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ (سورة الأسراء - الآية 70)

God says in the Koran: And we have certainly honored the children of Adam (L41-42).

The verses given above are rhetorically balanced to present a persuasive argument(s). In example 1, the speaker preceded the Qur'anic verse by the adverb 'contrary' (على العكس) to balance its content on two opposite poles. On one hand, it denies the idea of discrimination among people in terms of religion, gender and race on one side, and on the other side, it affirms that 'nobility' is the criterion of people's evaluation. In example 2, the speaker uses the verse to

refute the ideology of terrorism (KILLING). Under the topos of religion, the speaker establishes that terrorism is fake Islam and waging war on this fake Islam is justified, as in the following example:

انها معركة بين اسلام حقيقي تتشكل فيه حرية الإنسان وحقوقه متبنيات أساسية، وبين الأارهاب الذي يتلف بعبانة الإسلام وهو في الحقيقة يشن حرباً على الإنسانية والإسلام والقيم والمبادئ.

This is a battle between true Islam, for which a person's liberty and rights constitute essential cornerstones, and terrorism, which wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak; in reality, wages a war on Islam and Muslims and values (L16-19).

The third verse confirms the previous two verses (1 &2), in which Islam honors all human beings without exception. The persuasive influence of the topos of religion can be outlined under four points:

- It emphasises the idea that terrorism has no religion as it (terrorism) doesn't discriminate in choosing its victims,
- It proves that sincere Muslims are not terrorists and terrorism is not an Islamic ideology,
- It reveals the ideological background of the speaker or the party, which he belongs to (see section 7.1). Accordingly, Schaffner (1997, p. 2) affirms that in public speeches, politicians do not express their own ideologies, but the ideology of the parties they belong to.
- According to Aristotle, the topos of religion works as examples (paradigm) presented in the rhetorical mode of 'contrast' for logical persuasion. Table (7.9) below illustrates the premises the speaker has based his conclusion on, which is that terrorism has no religion.

Premise 1: terrorism wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak (L19),

Premise 2: [terrorism] wages a war on Islam and Muslims (L19),

Premise 3: [terrorism] spreads hatred between humanity (L20),

Premise 5: [terrorists are] imposters of Islam (L25),

Premise 6: [terrorists kill(ed)] thousands of lives [9/11 and in Iraq] (L24-27).

Conclusion: Terrorism is not an Islamic ideology and terrorists are not faithful Muslims.

Table 7. 9. Topos of religion.

- **The topos of advantage**

In this part of the argument, Al-Maliki employs the topos of urgency, in order to show the (dis)advantage of fighting and defeating terrorism. Each of these topoi is rhetorically balanced to justify/legitimise the soundness and plausibility of the decision of fighting and destroying the terrorists. In the discourse of urgency, for instance, Al-Maliki very decisively asserts that “*we are in this battle*⁵² *vanguard for defending the values of humanity*” (L14-15). In which, “*Iraq is the front line is this struggle*⁵³” (L29). He goes further in the next sentence “*Iraqis are your allies in the war on terror*” (L30-31). Here, the speaker shows the audience (the Americans in particular) and the international community as his, and consequently the Iraqis’ friend and allies through polarized terms like ‘*we are your allies*’.

Hence, the speaker concludes, “*If it continued partnership we have the strength of mind and commitment to defeat the terrorists and their ideology in Iraq, they will never be able to recover*” (L116-118). Indirectly he wants to say that as an alliance they are in an advantageous position and can defeat terrorism once and for all. If they fail to understand the urgency of action, they will have to live under the threat of terror. Once again, the speaker employs a positive presentation to glorify the audiences by seeking their help. Therefore, he says: “*Members of the Congress, in these efforts, we need the help of the international community.*” (L143-144) Calling for unity against terrorism is a powerful strategy for rallying the international community against the terrorists.

In lines 32-34, through rhetoric, Al-Maliki warns the international community, “should democracy be allowed to fail in Iraq and terror permitted to triumph, and then the war on terror will never be won elsewhere.” (L33-35). Structurally, the speaker mainly follows the problem/solution rhetorical mode to highlight the need and urgency of supporting the War on Terror in Iraq. The rise of terrorism and the failure of democracy in Iraq will be a great disadvantage. Practically, if terrorism is not crushed in Iraq in time, it will become a great problem and then “*the war on terror will never be won elsewhere*”. In this context, the speaker reminds the audience of the scenario of 1991, when Iraqis were alone in fighting Saddam’s regime, advising them that 1991 must never be repeated⁵⁴. By reminding the audience about

⁵² War on Terror

⁵³ War on Terror

⁵⁴ See page 158

1991, the speaker is making use of paradigm to naturalize his demand for financial and military support. If Iraq is given proper support, it will triumph over terrorism and the life of future generations will be safe and secure. The benefits of his proposal can be summarized in the following table.

Benefit 1: Future Iraqi generations can live in peace, prosperity and hope (L37-38),
Benefit 2: [It] forms the necessary basis for the withdrawal of multinational forces (L127-128),
Benefit 3: Iraq's forces are fully capable[then] the job of the multinational forces be complete (L128-129),
Benefit 4: take over the security portfolio and extend peace through the country (L131-132),
Benefit 5: tackle the unemployment, which will weaken the terrorists (L141).

Table 7. 10. The advantage of supporting Iraqis' War on terror.

Moreover, the discourse of advantage & disadvantage is also conceptualised to serve the discourse of successful policy or preference. In this regard, the speaker focuses on the discourse of economic development as an advantage of his government. In any political change, the discourse of economy is very effective; therefore, politicians create the discourse of economic development carefully for their benefit (Küçükali, 2014). The speaker establishes the discourse of economic development by saying that "*we are making great economic strides*" (L93). In these circumstances, economic success depends on strong leadership and performance so indirectly the speaker claims that he is a successful leader.

For making an appeal to logic, the speaker directly links the growth of GDP per capita (L86-89) to his successful economic policies. In practice, the discourse of economic prosperity is presented as being a result of the speaker's strong leadership and performance in making the necessary political reforms in the economy. This argumentation strategy also benefits from the topos of power and authority. In that discourse, the source of legitimating is rationalization, whereby the speaker explains the results on the basis of statistical comparison so that they can be objectified (Table 7.11).

Plan: we are rapidly transforming into a free market economy (L85-86)
Result 1: In the past three years, our GDP per capita has more than doubled (L86-87)
Result 3: Standards of living have been raised for most Iraqis as the markets witness an unprecedented level of prosperity (L87-89)

Result 4: It is expected that our economy will continue to grow (L87)
Result 5: Many individuals are buying products and appliances which they would never have hoped to afford in the past (L89-90).
Conclusion: The speaker's government is competent and the previous was/is incompetent.

Table 7. 11. The Discourse of Economic Development.

7.4. Summary

The aim of this chapter was to examine how persuasive strategies could be discursively produced, and evaluated across the speech of Al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq (2006-2014). The overall aim of the speech was to persuade the international community in general and the Americans in particular to increase their support for Iraq in its War on Terror. Besides, an additional goal is to resolve on the side of Iraq (people & government) of being still part of the War on Terror, whereby the speaker proved that Iraq is a front line of the War on Terror and is a trustful partner in fighting terrorism. The focus of the analysis was on understanding how the positive/negative representations were argumentatively structured and linguistically realized in relation to discursive strategies including, nomination, predication, perspectivation, argumentation and the strategies of intensification and mitigation.

In terms of the nomination and predication strategies, the analysis found that the speaker used a range of linguistic devices in a way to maintain the purpose of the in-group and out-group categorization, in which the use of pronouns, charged words of nouns and adjectives are prominent. In these parts of the analysis, the discourse of thanking was seen, where a lot of thankful words and appreciation have been said to the American people and government, the world-audience and the Iraqis. In addition to the use of the personal singular pronoun 'I', which usually reflects the speaker character in discourse, Al-Maliki positioned his points of view and expressed his involvement and detachment through various linguistic realizations, such as speech acts, repetition and reporting actions. The most effective strategy the orator employed was the use of religious expressions, as it reflects the speaker's ideology and background. It is noticed that Al-Maliki belongs to the 'Dawa Party', which has its roots in the political Islamic tradition.

The analysis of the argumentation strategies showed that Al-Maliki based his conclusions on the rhetorical contrastive organisational mode. In most topics, Al-Maliki used different contrastive pairs to highlight the discourse of successful policies and economic development, which represented how the speaker's successful policies resulted in bringing prosperity to Iraq. These positive outcomes have been compared with the past management of Saddam's regime and the current terrorist's activities. In this discourse, the main argumentative strategy of advantage is seen. Lastly, the analysis of intensification or mitigation of the illocutionary force of statements found that the speaker intensified the discourse of criminalization and victimization, to which he linked to the discourse of determination as represented in the use of speech acts and saying verbs wherein Al-Maliki argued about the Iraqis' (people and government) intention to defeat terrorism and rebuild a new democratic Iraq.

CHAPTER 8: ANALYSING THE SPEECH OF HAIDER AL-ABADI

8.1. A Brief profile of Haider Al-Abadi

Haider Jawad Kadhim Al-Abadi is an Iraqi politician who has been the incumbent Prime Minister of Iraq since 8th September 2014 onwards. He was born on 25th April 1952, in Baghdad, Iraq. Socially, he is married and has three sons. In the course of religion, Al-Abadi is Muslim, Shia. Politically, he entered politics in 1967, as an active member of the Dawa Party-an Islamic roots party. Two of his brothers were executed by Saddam's regime for belonging to the Dawa Party⁵⁵. Therefore, he flees from Baghdad to live with his family in London, wherefrom he directed his anti-Saddam activities. In terms of culture and education, Al-Abadi earned a Bachelor degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Technology in Baghdad in 1975. Then, MA and Ph.D. degrees in Electrical Engineering from Manchester University, UK⁵⁶ in 1980. He remained in the UK, until 2003, when Saddam regime has been collapsed by the coalition forces headed by the U.S.

Al-Abadi returned to Iraq in 2003 to participate in the post-Saddam government. In the first government after the Saddam regime, Al-Abadi served as a Minister of Communication from 2003 to 2004. Then, in parliament as a candidate of the Dawa Party for two terms from 2005 to 2014. In the first term, in December 2005, Abadi chaired the parliamentary committee for Economy, Investment, and Reconstruction. While, in the second term, 2010, he chaired the Finance Committee. Then, on 11th August 2014, Abadi was selected by President Fouad Massoum⁵⁷ to be the new Prime Minister of Iraq and was given 30 days to present a new government for MPs' approval. In September 2014, Al-Abadi, with parliamentary approval became the 49th Prime Minister of Iraq.

⁵⁵ Taken from: <http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/08/11/haider-al-abadi-bio> (accessed on 03/10/2016).

⁵⁶ Taken from: <http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/iraqs-new-prime-minister-graduate-7598267> (accessed on 03/10/20146).

⁵⁷ He is an Iraqi; Kurdish politician has MPs' approval to become the President of the Republic of Iraq on 24 July 2014. He is the second Kurdish President after Jalal Al-Talabani (2005-2014). Although there is no constitutional article about the ethno-sectarian allocation of the supreme governmental offices, the Iraqi consociational system customarily allocates the presidency to a Kurdish person, the premiership to a Shiite person, and the Speakership to a Sunni person (see Al-Tahmazi 2016, p. 12-13).

8.2. Context to the speech

The Iraqi Prime minister, Haider Al-Abadi delivered this speech as one of series formal speeches he gave in order to mobilize the international community to counter ISIL/DAESH in Iraq and the Middle East in particular and the world in general. Specifically, the speech was spoken to an unprecedented representative of over 60 countries worldwide, the members of the global coalition for confronting terrorism. It was the first Ministerial-level plenary session for the global coalition to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The conference (The Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial) was held in Brussels, the capital of Belgium on 3 December 2014, at the avenue of North Atlantic (NATO). Politically, the speech was given after three months of being Al-Abadi the Prime Minister of Iraq.

The live audience of the speech was about 60 foreign ministers from different countries around the world, this is in addition to the US President, Mr. Barack Obama. Besides, the world audience, it was also broadcast via the mass media (Iraqis in particular). The Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial conference was organised, advised and sponsored by the US Secretary of State, John Kerry. The object of the conference was to advance the substantive deliberations to degrade and defeat ISIL/DAESH in the Middle East and the World. This speech –and other like it - the UN Security Council meeting on 24th September 2014, and the World Economic Forum in Germany, 23rd January 2015, was part of Al-Abadi's endeavor to gain a broad national and international support to his War on Terror.

8.3. Analysis and discussion

To prove its functionality, the speech should persuade its audience, as any political activity is designed for persuasion more than information (Miller 1991, p. 390; Dedaić 2006, p. 700). In the following portion of the analysis, we shall see how various actors and actions have been named under nomination\referential strategies and how different qualities and attributes have been attributed to these referents (actors and actions) under predication strategies in a way to fit the purpose of classifying in-group and out-group social actors and the representations of their actions. Under perspectivization strategies, the speaker's perspective in describing various activities and issues are considered, which represents the speaker's points of view, involvement or detachment of actors and actions. While under argumentation strategies, we shall investigate

how various spans have been used by the speaker to provide certain claims and conclusions on the side of his interest. Finally, strategies used for intensifying and mitigating actors and activities will be examined under intensification/mitigation strategies. These strategies are usually combined with the analysis of the perspective of the linguistic representation of the players and actions from referential to argumentation strategies, so there is no separate section of these strategies.

8.3.1. Referential and predication strategies

The first main aspect of the analysis is to examine the linguistic content, along the line of referential and predication strategies, is available in the text and the combinations and the thematic categorizations they represent. This is to investigate the rhetorical techniques by which the speaker represents membership in the semantic categories of in-group and outgroup. It precisely explores who is involved in each category, who is on our side and who is on their side. Inasmuch, several thematic-semantic formations emerge. For instance, “The attendees at this meeting are [...] countries around the world” (L9-10), the in-group is constructed as the broad and inclusive group. This kind of presentation tends to legitimate the suggested actions (decisions) by reference to conformity (see Van Leeuwen 2007). Meanwhile, in the “[DAESH is] not Islamic nor a state” (L 7), the speaker presents their side as relatively small; they are represented as an individual group – ‘entity,’ ‘gangs.’ They are the out group de-authorization (claims of the minority). The following sections detail the thematic formations of the ‘in’ and ‘out’ group categorization.

8.3.1.1 The Positive presentation of social actors and actions: Describing the in-group

The in-group, who is on our side of this speech, includes the live audience, i.e. the representatives of the 60 countries worldwide, and the Iraqi people and government further to the speaker himself (Table 8.1). Table 8.1 has focused on the representation of OUR actors and actions in the speech. Regarding the actors, they are ‘ladies and gentlemen’ (3 times), ‘dear friends’ (1 time), ‘Brothers and Sisters’ (1 time). These forms of representation play a fundamental role in the discourse of persuasion.

Actors/actions	References	Prototypical example
The speaker	I	see table
The audience	Ladies and gentlemen (3 times), Dear Friends, brothers and sisters, you	-Thank you [the live audience] all for attending this meeting and for everything made by your countries to support Iraq and its people (L2-3)
US Administration	His Excellency the Secretary of State, John Kerry. United States.	-I thank His Excellency the Secretary of State, John Kerry, for holding this meeting (L4-5) -We are grateful for the support that the United States (L24).
Security forces and partners	Iraqi security forces International coalition & Peshmerga forces	-The Iraqi security forces and its partners are making steps forward (L77) -thanks to the support of the international Coalition forces [...] and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces (L77-78).
Iraqi government	Our government, new government, we	-Our new administration takes the responsibility for carrying out all these tasks (L28) -new government includes representatives of all political and social blocs (L31-32) -Our government has a successful implementation of the program (L32-33) -We are making progress in the programs [...] to achieve all our obligations to the Iraqi people L34-35) -We aim to address the problems of all the components of the Iraqi people (L43-44) -Forming a joint defence front standing against DAESH (L96) -Protect the democratic gains (L98)

Table 8. 1. Positive actors and action representations.

As indicated in Table 8.1, when it comes to the image of US/OUR actors, relatively positive or neutral lexical resources are typically used. In context, the speaker refers and characterises the

audience in a positive and respective sense, demonstrated in the way he begins and ends his speech. He starts with thanking them and appreciating their activities, as in respectively, “thank you all for attending this meeting and for everything made by your countries to support Iraq and its people” (L2-3) and “we are grateful for the support that the United States and any other member of the coalition”, (L 24-25). He ends the speech by trusting them, as in “I am optimistic by your presence and your participation here today, which you will do your best” (L136-137). In situations like this, thanking, appreciating and trusting the audience and their actions is a trend politician has used for its impacts on the emotions of the audience. By thanking, appreciating and trusting the audiences and their practices, the speaker represents them positively and maintains their membership to the in-group.

Thanking the audience may go beyond the mere use of euphemistic words about the public or their countries. It suggests that the speaker is honest, principled and trustworthy by other discursive means. He, after that, addresses them in a highly persuasive and respective way, such as ‘friends,’ ‘partners,’ and so forth. Moreover, in lines 131-132, the speaker indicates them as being “*brother and sisters.*” Here, the speaker tries to establish a personal relationship with his live hearers to win their response to the difficulty of defeating the threat of terrorism without their support and help.

The consistent picture that the orator emphasizes is that of a brother who needs his other brothers’ and sisters’ help. In Arabic societies, the statement “brother and sisters” has its cognitive influence on the hearers’ positive reaction(s). In practice, the speaker uses the strategy of kinship to construct the ideologies of ‘*shared responsibility.*’ This strategy of ‘kinship’ does not only bring the speaker closer to the audience, but it also stresses the fact that they all belong to the same group. They are the members of the “defense front” (L96), who are fighting a common enemy (terrorism) for common reasons (peace, prosperity, security freedom, faith). In the same sprite of real representation, Al-Abadi takes the audience, who are identified in the speech ‘dear friends’, ‘brother and sisters’ and ‘partners.’ In terms of Van Leeuwen’s social actors’ representation (1993 and 1996), Al-Abadi represents the conference’s attendees (social actor) by functionalising, identifying or appraising them. It was an endeavor to evoke their collective responsibility for a common enemy. Inasmuch, he addresses them with “our presence today shows that we have a common goal to defeat DAESH (L20)”.

In the same breath, the speaker uses the strategy of *'IDENTIFICATION,'* which entails identifying persons or groups of persons by naming them or ascribing to their general status of social class membership. This was a method Al-Abadi used to enhance the ideology of “shared responsibility.” For instance, in line 52, Al-Abadi describes the Kurds⁵⁸ “Iraqi Kurdish brothers” advising them to “put all the past conflicts aside” (L52). Here, in this example, Al-Abadi addresses the Kurds’ long-term memory, which is based on individual unhappy past events. He further thanks them for their cooperation in taking steps forward, “The Iraqi security forces and its partners are taking steps forward thanks to the support they receive [...], through close coordination with the Kurdish Peshmerga forces⁵⁹” (L77-80). Therefore, the speaker considers the Kurdistan Regional Government, “a major partner in this battle” (L66).

Meanwhile, the speaker does not forget to mention himself ‘I’ and the government or the people he represents (Iraqis) ‘we’ or the army he leads, as a way of establishing the discourse of *commitment and cooperation in the war on terror*. When it comes to the past, Al-Abadi tends to deploy meanings that realize an ‘Iraqi Heroism,’ thematic formation consistent with Van Dijk (1998) general semantic strategy of positive Self-presentation. Accordingly, Al-Abadi presents Iraqi forces’ past actions as habitually valiant and magnificently successful. He after that, typically, slips into showing such current and future activities as stunningly positive. In the forthcoming excerpt, I have underlined verbs in the past tense and **emboldened** verbs in the present and future tense:

واستطعنا ان نستعيد طرقا استراتيجية ومواقع اخرى وحررنا مدنا بأكملها، نحن ماضون قدما في حربنا من اجل تحرير كل شبر من اراضيها وكل شريحة من شرائح مجتمعنا، سوف نطرد عصابات داعش من ارضنا الكريمة، ونعيد الحياة الى المدن المحررة.

We were able to restore strategic roads and other sites, and we liberated whole cities. We promised our people of this truthful vow, we **are moving** forward in our war for the liberation of every inch of our lands, and every segment of our society, we **will expel** DAESH gangs from our precious lands, and we **will retrieve** life to the liberated cities. (L79-84).

Representation of time as such (moving from the past to legitimate present and future), Al-Abadi rhetorically follows (Cap’s temporal proximization 2010, 2008) as a legitimization technique to intensify the Iraqi place in the War on Terror, in order to persuade the audience about his

⁵⁸ The Kurdistan Regional Government is the predominantly Kurdish region of Northern Iraq established since 1992. It involves three provinces: Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok.

⁵⁹ The official military forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

proposal. In a more personal, and thorough speech act of assertion, Al-Abadi firmly, maintains that position. He asserts an unspecified and ongoing commitment, which presumably also includes heroism. In the following example, the orator uses the personal singular ‘I’ and plural ‘we’ pronouns as a rhetorical device to highlight the ongoing commitment.

وانا هنا اؤكد ان حكومة العراق وشعبه ملتزمان بتأدية ما علينا في هذا السياق، بيد اننا نعلم ان القتال على الارض هو مسؤوليتنا الاولى والاخيرة.

I am here to assure you that the Government of Iraq and its people are committed to what **we** have to perform in this context, [and] **we** know that fighting on the ground is our first and last responsibility” (L22-26).

Then, the speaker carefully moves to the discourse of *successful policy*, as a way to enhance that position (membership) to the front of the War on Terror; on the one hand, and to attract the attendees’ attention. Through the discourse of successful policy, Al-Abadi employs two powerful rhetorical devices: ‘we’ and ‘our.’ In the case of ‘we’ for instance, he represents himself a part of the large group. The use of first-person plural pronouns is one of the more efficient linguistic familiar strategies in political discourse “to enhance solidarity, to manufacture consensus and to rebuild allegiances” (Geffroy, 1985, cited in Rojo & Van Dijk 1997, p. 557).

The plural personal pronoun ‘we’ has two indications. It is inclusive when it refers to the speaker himself and the audience, by which the speaker invites the audience to take his perspective on the case. It is exclusive, when it indicates the speaker and his government. There are in all (57) uses of ‘we’ in the speech under investigation. Contextually, it can be distinguished in 53 cases of ‘we’ representing the speaker himself and his (the Iraqi) government (Table 8.2). Only 4 cases include the speaker and the live audience, as in examples 1, 2, 3 and 4 below. Perhaps, the imbalance of using ‘we’ related to the speaker’s rhetorical tactic to enhance his character and administration (ethos), especially as the speech was given after three months of being him the Prime Minister of Iraq, to persuade the audience with his leadership in fighting terrorism and then supporting his proposal.

1) We should perform our best (L104).

2) We have a common goal to defeat DAESH which requires collective regional and international efforts. (L 22).

3) We will not be able to defeat the malicious international terrorists who are living on failure, only after rebuilding a stable and secure Iraq in the Middle East that is safe and stable. (L131-133). Justifying, that “DAESH represents our common enemy, therefore, defeating DAESH is our common endeavour too” (L133-134).

4) Now we are exchanging ideas but tomorrow, and whenever necessary, we have to translate our words into deeds. (137-138).

Attribution and predication of the exclusive ‘we.’
<p>-We were able to form a new government that includes representatives of all political and social blocs (L31-32)</p> <p>-We are making progress in the programs that we proposed during the first six months to achieve all our obligations to the Iraqi people (L34-35)</p> <p>-We are working on national reconciliation in multiple places (L37-38)</p> <p>-We are forging cooperative relations with the tribes in Salahuddin, Anbar, and Nineveh [...], and currently they are fighting alongside the Iraqi security forces (L38-41)</p> <p>-We are also working on modifying the Justice and Accountability Law (L41-42)</p> <p>-We have also reached a temporary agreement with the KRG (L49-50)</p> <p>-We have started to build our security forces professionally (L53-54)</p> <p>-We have dismissed more than twenty-four military commanders as part of our efforts to eradicate corruption and reinvigorate the military leadership (L54-55)</p> <p>-We have made progress in the establishment of National Guard troops (L56-57)</p> <p>-We are working on having all armed groups under the control of the government (L 60-61)</p> <p>-We are working with the United States and our international partners to train and equip tribal fighters (L71-72)</p> <p>- we are enhancing our relations with all neighbouring countries (L85)</p> <p>- We had made very close and useful contacts at a high level in Baghdad with all neighbouring countries (L78-88).</p>

Table 8. 2. The exclusive ‘we’.

Besides the above, the pronoun ‘our’ is articulated (36) times. It is a linguistic device the speaker uses for annexing others into his group such as “our people,” “our society,” “our common enemy” and so forth. In the following example, the speaker integrates ‘we’ and ‘our’ (in bold) as a rhetorical device to enhance solidarity by ‘we’ and rebuild allegiances via ‘our’

ونتفهم ان العراق بحاجة الى اصلاحات حكومية ومصالحة وطنية واعادة بناء اقتصادي واجتماعي الى جانب العمل العسكري لهزيمة داعش. ان حكومتنا الجديدة تأخذ على عاتقها القيام بجميع هذه المهام في الوقت عينه

We understand that Iraq needs administrative reforms, national reconciliation, economic and social rebuilding as well as military action to defeat DAESH. **Our** new government takes responsibility for carrying out all these tasks (L26-28).

Seemingly, the above excerpt serves two functions. By means of applying ‘we’ the speaker shows the knowledgeable government and capable leader via ‘our’. One more example of a knowledgeable leader and government can be seen in the following example:

نعمل مع الامم المتحدة للاستفادة من خبرات الدول الاخرى التي تبنت مثل هذا النظام لنضمن ايجاد الحل الصحيح للعراق.

We have made progress in **the establishment of National Guard troops**. We are working with *the United Nations to take advantage of the experiences of other countries that have adopted such a system* to ensure we find the right solution for Iraq (L56-59).

The above example not only shows a knowledgeable government, and the capable leadership the speaker has. It also legitimates the speaker’s action in terms of rationality, which is based on the specialist authority of The United Nations, which is the key to legitimation. It elaborates the domains of knowledge (*underlined*), which can be used for the purpose of legitimation (**bolded**). Personally, this activity, on the other hand, strengthens the speaker’s character on the side of the audience, which is best illustrated through its purpose, which is “to ensure we find the right solution for Iraq.” Besides, the orator boosts his character through the strategy of thanking and showing power and authority, as exemplified in the following examples respectively:

نحن ممتنون للدعم الذي تقدمه الولايات المتحدة وأي عضو اخر في الائتلاف .

We are grateful for the support that the United States and any other member of the coalition

(L 24-25).

اننا نحارب أكبر المنظمات الارهابية الدولية الممولة والمنظمة والمجهزة بأفضل ما يكون على مستوى العالم. سوف نطرد عصابات داعش من ارضنا الكريمة، ونعيد الحياة الى المدن المحررة.

We are fighting one of the biggest funded organized and perfectly equipped international terrorist organizations in the world (L102-104), and “We will retrieve life to the liberated cities (L79-84).

Accordingly, the personal pronoun ‘I’ also was used (7) times to deliver different thematic functions: to thank the audience; take them into the speaker’s confidence and show the authority and assertion of the speaker, as illustrated in Table (8.3). The elements of these contexts in which ‘I’ is used, is essential, to refer to the position of the Prime Minister and a Commander-in-Chief. In many ways, the legitimacy is not only of the speech itself but the speaker’s character as well. Here, the legitimacy of (Table 8.3) is indexed and reproduced by the speaker’s power and status “*On behalf of the Iraqi people*” (L12-13), and the Society (NATO) at large.

Attribution and predication with ‘I’
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -I thank you all for attending this meeting and for everything done by your countries to support Iraq and its people (L1-2) - I also would like to thank the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for hosting this conference in their headquarters (L3-4) - I thank His Excellency the Secretary of State, John Kerry, for holding this meeting (L4-5). - I can promise you that your help in this area will not go in vain (L75-76) - I am optimistic by your presence and your participation here today, that you will do your best (L36-37) - I am here to assure you that the Government of Iraq and its people are committed to what we have to perform in this context⁶⁰ (L22-24) - I signed a directive, which obligates the security forces and the Ministry of Justice to protect human rights (L45-46)

Table 8. 3. The functions of ‘I.’

8.3.1.2. The negative presentation of social actors and actions: Describing the out-group

The first question that may be raised in describing the out-group is what words (lexical style) are being used to describe the ‘Other’, i.e. DAESH. The ‘Other,’ and who is on their side has been nominated as the terrorists and referred to in this way, such as ‘danger,’ ‘entity,’ ‘DAESH,’ and ‘enemy,’ where various harmful deeds have been attributed to them (Table 8.4). Table 8.4 lists a synonymous set of relatively negative representation so that ‘other’ appears inexcusable and unprovoked, i.e., ‘mass murder,’ ‘enslavement of women and children.’

⁶⁰ Fighting terrorism

Throughout the speech, the ‘Other’ is systematically referred to as ‘DAESH.’ Analysing the lexical frequency shows that the word DAESH is the most malignant form of OTHER, as it is repeated almost 33 times. This expression is virtually only used in its singular form. However, it has the general plural meaning of terrorism. The physical process of DAESH in specific is described in negative terms, such as ‘the radical ideas,’ ‘practices of barbarism,’ ‘atrocities,’ ‘beheadings,’ ‘mass murder,’ ‘enslavement of women and children,’ and the like. Based on that, the word DAESH has a pre-existing ideological meaning, which is recognized, when it is re-utilized in particular future discourse(s). In terms of social representations of actors, (Van Leeuwen 1996), Al-Abadi identifies ‘Other’ within the principles of ‘*SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION*’ strategy. This meaning is evident where he attributes them, DAESH, with negative attributes, as in: “DAESH does not only threaten the countries and peoples of the Middle East but threatens all who refuse to accept the radical ideas and the practices of barbarism anywhere” (L11-13).

Originally, the word ‘DAESH’ is a transliteration of the Arabic acronym that is equivalent to the English ISIS, which means “the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.” The US President Barack Obama ⁶¹ (2014) defines DAESH as “radical groups that exploit grievances for their own gain.” DAESH is fair, a new notion in the dictionary of terrorism since it was reactivated after the attacks of 9/11. Thereafter, several world political leaders, such as President Barack Obama and the US Secretary of State, John Kerry have used DAESH, when they refer to terrorism in the Middle East in particular. It was originally proposed by Arab politicians in 2013. They also first used it as an attempt to delegitimise/ mock/ insult their (ISIS) state and individuals. This tendency to ‘delegitimise/ mock/ insult their state and individual’ is best exemplified by Al-Abadi, as in the following example: “Because this entity is not an Islamic nor a state, it does not deserve to be called in an official name, so it is called DAESH an abbreviation of the word in the Arabic language” (L7-9).

That means, the speaker does not only degrade the other/DAESH, but also delegitimises them of being a state or Muslims as well. Language hence is a crucial tool (de)legitimation of particular actors and actions. To that end, leaders (politicians) increase their language ability to

⁶¹ See chapter 6.

galvanize public support for plans and decisions (Weintraub 2007, p. 48). Precisely, his negative description of “the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” AL-Abadi implies its lack of social status, authority, and legitimacy. It is worth mentioning that recently, DAESH used violence (lashing or sometimes killing), on anyone who called them as such.

Actors/actions	References	Process/Activity	Attributes/predications
Terrorism/Terrorists/ DAESH	Danger, this entity, DAESH, common enemy, extremist, gangs	Loosely threat/un border threat	- this entity is not an Islamic nor a state it does not deserve to be called in an official name (L6-7)
		Threat	- DAESH does not only threaten the countries and peoples of the Middle East, but threatens all who refuse to accept the radical ideas and the practices of barbarism anywhere (L11-13)
		Murder	-DAESH does not differentiate between people in committing atrocities, and that the beheadings and mass murder and enslavement of women and children have been targeting people from all ethnic groups and religions, regardless of their affiliations and geographic boundaries (L14- 17)
		Dominate	- DAESH is recruiting and training fighters from the west besides those who are being recruited from other areas (L17-19).

Table 8. 4. The Negative representation of ‘Other.’

In the above Table (8.4), Al-Abadi presents a categorical description of the Other’s past, current and future transgressions. This way of representation of the Other’s actors and actions urge the audience to support a violent foreign policy against them. Notice how their actors are characterized by immoral negative epithets: enemy, gangs, and danger. More importantly, see how the process/activity about them is described: threat, murder, and dominate, which prove that DAESH is inhuman i.e. without civility, culture, humanity, morals or intelligence. Accordingly, the above table also de-legitimizes DAESH and their activities. It does so through appealing not only to the breach of human rights (L14), and the transgression of the laws of wars (L15-17), but also to threatening the democracy itself (L11-13). Here, Al-Abadi likes to raise the specter of a dominated by them/DAESH, to convince the audience that violence against them is justified. On the other hand, the table verifies Sarfo’s & Krampa (2013, p. 381) assumption that some words, even when they are uttered in isolation of their context and collocation with other words, they have the tendency to communicate some meaning purpose, i.e. threat. The above table shows that the speaker projects different kinds of words to create a bad picture of DAESH. It is noteworthy that these words were solely lexical or content words that belong to the class of nouns and adjectives, like, ‘barbarism,’ and ‘radical.’ The negative presentation of others can be seen in the following example:

وما هي الامسألة وقت حتى يعود هؤلاء الارهابيون المدربون تدريبا عاليا الى المجتمعات التي اتوا منها ليرتكبوا جرائم القتل والتدمير.

These highly trained terrorists [DAESH’s fighters] will return to the communities from which they came to commit murder and cause destruction (L19-21).

اننا نحارب أكبر المنظمات الارهابية الدولية الممولة والمنظمة والمجهزة بأفضل ما يكون على مستوى العالم

We are fighting one of the biggest funded organized and perfectly equipped international terrorist organizations in the world (L102-103).

With the help of application, the above examples present dual persuasive functions. By applying the former, the speaker ferments the audience’s emotions and fear in particular. Expectedly, the audience will choose an action or behaviour most likely lead to avoiding future attacks by those returnee fighters (see Dillard 1994). That is, not only persuade the audience but also at the level of legitimization; it legitimates the claim itself. Moreover, the second part of the same example

(underlined) can be seen as a legitimization endeavour (hypothetical future, i.e., “*will return*”) that legitimates or justifies future arguments, i.e., the collective regional and international efforts that are required. Whereas, the second example is applied to serve the function of showing power “*we are fighting the biggest*” as a means of legitimization - personal authority - the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

Following these arguments (italics above), the speaker constitutes part of the discourse of commitment and cooperation in the War on Terror through the word (BUT) which displays a sort of personal power and commitment by guaranteeing that fighting on the ground is our (Iraqis) first and last responsibility “But, we know that fighting on the ground is our first and last responsibility” (L25). Here, ‘our’ also includes the speaker himself further to the Iraqis. This commitment, in particular, may go beyond the mere of showing power, authority or solidarity. Indeed, it is an assertion of self-evident truth. Meanwhile, it has two meanings to two different audiences. Locally, it is a reassuring message to the ears of those Iraqi political clots and parties, especially the Islamic one, who refuse any foreign ground combat mission in Iraq to help in freeing the Iraqi controlled lands from DAESH. In terms of global meaning and audience, it is a replay message to Obama (underlined) (10/09/2014) when he says, “American power can make a decisive difference, but we cannot do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves.” especially, when Obama was one of the conference’s attendees. Meanwhile, it is an acquittal message (rebuttal message) to any, who accuse Iraq or Iraqis of being part of terrorism.

8.3.2. The strategies of Perspectivization

In public speeches, politicians try to introduce themselves as honest, principled and trustworthy (Lui & Standing 1989). They do so through selective discursive, which means that they position their involvement and detachment and express their points of view in accordance with their political perspectives and agenda. This section of the analysis investigates the linguistic devices that the speaker employs in order to express his involvement and detachment from certain actors and actions and position points of view for persuasive ends. To that ends, the analysis found that Al-Abadi expresses his involvement, detachment and points of view by reporting, elaborating, justifying and explaining a set of official acts. For instance, he positively reports the outcomes

from a meeting that was held with some vicinity leaders (L87-92), as part of his official endeavours to wake up and mobilize Arabs leaders about the international threat of DAESH.

ولقد توصلنا الى اتفاقات بشأن تعزيز تعاوننا الامني والاستخباراتي من اجل هزيمة داعش ونسعى الى توسيع التعاون في مجالات الاقتصاد والنفط والاستثمار والتجارة وحماية الحدود. ومن خلال عملنا مع هذه البلدان ودول اخرى في الجوار، اننا بصدد تشكيل واجهة دفاعية مشتركة تقف بوجه داعش وبصدد بلورة ستراتيجية جديدة لمعالجة المشاكل الاقليمية التي تؤدي الى تفشي الارهاب الدولي.

We seek to expand cooperation in the fields of economy, oil and investment, trade and border protection. Through our work with these countries and other countries in the vicinity, we are in the process of forming a joint defense front; to stand against DAESH, and develop a new strategy to deal with regional problems that lead to the spread of international terrorism (L94-98).

In the discourse of involvement and detachment, one primary function of pronouns is their ability to include and exclude others. In the above excerpt, Al-Abadi uses ‘we’ to position himself on the War on Terror. He presents himself or Iraq as part of the regional coalition in fighting terrorism, in a way, he engages the participants (political leaders of vicinity). Here, ‘we’ is inclusive, by which, the speaker establishes in-group authorization (claims of the majority). Another way to locate his position and involvement is the use of collective words and statements, like ‘a common goal,’ and ‘common enemy’, that allows the speaker to reinforce a membership of the in-group.

In an attempt to address that goal, the speaker makes sure to drive his proposal to appear not only as personal interests (altruism). He affirms, “**We are not only fighting for the people of Iraq, but we are fighting for all the peoples of the world**” (L75-77). Based on that, Al-Abadi legitimises the proposal as a common good that will defeat terrorism (see Reyes 2011, p. 787), and then persuade the audience through the strategy of Ethos. In this response, Martin Rojo and Van Dijk (1997, p. 528) argue that “institutional actions and politics are typically described as beneficial for the group or society as a whole.” Here, in the above example, the group or society includes the audience or the countries they represent, in a broad sense, the peoples of the world.

The legitimisation strategy ‘altruism’ is often loaded with the meaning of what Aristotle considers the Ethos, more specifically ‘the goodwill.’ Al-Abadi makes clear that fighting DAESH is not exclusively an Iraqi war (**bold**), but it is a world war, as Iraqis struggle instead of the entire world (underlined). This presentation allows the speaker to present his goal as his

audience's goals. In this regard, Joseph (2006, p.13) states, "the inspiring orator can lead people, or rather mislead them, into believing that the narrow self-interests of the governing party are actually the interests of the people as a whole". By this strategy, Al-Abadi moves to expand in-group, which works to legitimate force by grounding to conformity (Van Leeuwen 2007).

Moreover, Al-Abadi presents the decision of formulating '*a joint defence front*,' as rationally considered, the right thing they do (Reyes 2011, p. 798). This decision as a social practice occurs within a shared belief system among the participants. As the world wakes up to the fact that terrorism does not only threaten the countries and people of the Middle East, but it threatens all who believe in democracy, freedom and human rights anywhere (L 10-13). Based on that belief system, the in-group is often presented as broad and united. In terms of persuasion, this strategy 'rationality' reinforces the speaker's future arguments by reassuring the current audiences that his proposal was already supported. The support can be stated through reporting the outcome (underlined) of the past meetings the speaker had held before, which can be outlined in forming a joint defence front; standing against DAESH and developing a new strategy to deal with regional problems that lead to the spread of international terrorism.

It is in this light, the speaker identifies those meetings as a *modus operandi* that was defined and shaped by and from those leaders, and the participants are partisans' views of the event, and have a consensus to formulate that activity. Hence, the speaker legitimates that activity (meetings) and its results that are related to their actors' agreement. As Van Leeuwen & Wodak (1999, p. 105) point out, something is legitimate when "*everybody does it or says so.*" In this strategy, the speaker makes the further step to share responsibility with other vicinity leaders by claiming: "*We have reached agreements*" (L93). In terms of its powerful effects, Rojo & Van Dijk (1997, p. 537) assert that this consensus strategy in addition to its persuasive impact, "is in fact the core of an attempt to establish attitudinal hegemony."

Another material proofs the speaker presents to scaffold the credibility of his involvement can be seen in this excerpt:

اذ نقوم بصياغة علاقات تعاون مع العشائر في صلاح الدين والانبار ونيوى وهي مناطق تقع معظمها تحت سيطرة داعش حيث يتم تجهيز هذه العشائر بالسلح وهي تقاتل حاليا جنبا الى جنب القوات الامنية العراقية.

We are forging cooperative relations with the tribes in Salahuddin, Anbar, and Nineveh;
most areas of these provinces are under the control of DAESH. These tribes are being

equipped with weapons and **currently, they are fighting alongside the Iraqi security forces** (L37-41).

The above example is also presented as part of the speaker's favourable policies that were adopted as part of the War on Terror. By means of application of this example, Al-Abadi enhances his involvement in the War on Terror and maintains his successful policies as well. The persuasive effects of this case are defined in terms of a motivation-response framework (see Simons & Jones 2011:48), i.e., the acts (underlined) are characterized as motivation that changes, shapes, or reinforces a response (**bold**). According to Walton (2007, P. 48) the act of response (underlined), can be defined in terms of an input that we can empirically observe (**bold**), that shows some change (persuasion) in the behavior of the receivers (*italic*). Besides, the above example, the speaker's voice uses not only the tone of authority (Reyes 2011, p. 786) but also, he extends his position and leadership, as well as the endorsement of his actions.

Elaboration is another strategic manoeuvre used by the speaker to maintain, support and reproduce his involvement in the discourse of *commitment and cooperation in the War on Terror* and the discourse of *successful policy* as well. In lines 86-98, Al-Abadi details the process of enhancing relations with neighbouring countries (L85). He nominates those countries and their leaders. This is further to the contextual elements of where and when those meetings were held. Thereafter, he underlines the outcomes of those endeavours (meetings). For other examples of elaboration see also (L45-49 and 60-64). On the other hand, the very act of persuasive involvement implies an attempt to justify decision(s) or action(s) e.g. an official act on a particular issue. The elementary form of such justification appears in complex sentences in which one clause refers to an official act and another clause to the sufficient reason/consequences for such an action. It answers the explicit or implicit 'why' question, as shown in these two examples:

Action 1: "We are also working on modifying the Justice and Accountability Law" (L40-41).

Consequences: "facilitate the re-integration of a large number of former government officials who have not committed crimes against the Iraqi people" (L42-44).

Action 2: "We have dismissed more than twenty-four military commanders" (L54).

Consequences: "build our security forces professionally [...], and eradicate corruption and reinvigorate the military leadership" (L53-55).

Through the above two actions (I & 2), the Prime Minister justifies and legitimates his involvement through the 'effect process' (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999:106) or the results of such acts, such as 'facilitate,' 're-integration,' 'build,' 'eradicate,' and 'reinvigorate'. These activities are legitimised in relation to the social actor, the speaker himself (actor-based) besides the activities themselves (action-based). This is because those activities address the problems of all the components of the Iraqi people and they are issued by an authority actor - the Prime Minister. As such, the above example has met part of the legitimation and persuasion requirements as well. In this regard, Rojo & Van Dijk (1997, p. 530) point out that justification discourse can only have a legitimation function "if several contextual factors are satisfied, such as the power and authority of the speaker, institutional setting, etc." In this situation, there are two types of context: a local or specific one that are constituted by the speaker's position - the Prime Minister, the Commander in Chief, and a global or structural one, which are constituted by the participants (ministerial authority) further to the authority (impersonal) of NATO, where the meeting was held.

By means of application of the former act 2, the speaker further positions his unsatisfactory view about the past administration of Al-Maliki's government (L44-45). It can be paraphrased into: The Al-Maliki administration did not probably (maladministration) address the problems of all the components of the Iraqis. The key element of this criticism is the active verb "modifying," While, the latter shows the professionalism of the speaker. Hence, it can be said that the speaker employs the discourse of criticism to serve two functions. First, to express his negative view towards the performance of Al-Maliki's past government. Second, to make it (Al-Maliki's government) a standard on which the audience can evaluate the speaker's administration and leadership. The persuasive effect of that criticism based on the speaker emphasises that his cabinet has these characteristics, whereas Al-Maliki's does not. That may meet the interests of those who were not familiar or who did not satisfy Al-Maliki's administration, and they are many. Relevant to this analysis is that criticism of the previous government's performance is a strategy politician depend on even if they belong to same party for persuasive goals. Of particular note is that the speaker, Al-Abadi, and Al-Maliki belong to the same party (Dawa). As such, this refutes Schaffner's (1997, p. 3) conclusion that in public speech, politicians represent their parties, not themselves.

By explanation, the speaker also expresses his view and attitudes towards certain actors and activities; further to enhance, the listener understands (Henkemans, 2001) about the criminal ideology of ‘Other.’ To put it in the speaker’s words:

وبالنيابة عن الشعب العراقي [...]، يمكنني ان أؤكد لكم ان داعش لا يميز بين أحد في ارتكابه للأعمال الوحشية، وان قطع الرؤوس والقتل الجماعي واستعباد النساء والاطفال قد استهدف اناسا من كافة الاثنيات والاديان بغض النظر عن الانتماءات والحدود الجغرافية.

On behalf of the Iraqi people [...] I can assure you that DAESH does not differentiate between people in committing atrocities and that the beheadings and mass murder and enslavement of women and children have been targeting people from all ethnic groups and religions, regardless of their affiliations and geographic boundaries (13-17).

One of the instruments political figures employ in public speaking is the use of personal experiences. The above excerpt does not only explain or define who the ‘Other’ is. Indeed, it is a rhetorical structure the speaker employs to legitimise his opinions regarding future actions and decisions. The construction of generalization in discourse, about the threat of terrorism, e.g. ISIS is grounded in personal experiences (underlined). Argumentatively, Al-Abadi functions his personal experiences (e.g. an eye-witness) or (I know because I was there) to be an effective logical persuasive appeal to the mind and the emotions of the audience. In terms of Bourdieu’s work (1998), Al-Abadi is presenting himself as a “medium’ (underlined). He does not state his independence. He speaks in the name of Iraqis. He takes the role of someone who has special insight, of someone who can reveal the truth (Rojo & Van Dijk 1997, p. 555) that is to avoid being biased or unfair via his personal interests. That does not directly mitigate his personal responsibility of that description, but also claims moral legitimacy, as a trustworthy, credible and reliable speaker, which in turn confirms his power and authority (Nesler et al., 1993, cited in Rojo & Van Dijk 1997, p. 555). He maintains his personal authority via the second part of the same example “I can assure you.”

8.3.3. Argumentation strategies

Of course, argumentation is a major feature of justification especially of going to war, as “warfare demands organization and mobilization, as well as the circulation of beliefs about the enemy and justifications for need to kill and die.” (Michael Billig 2003, p. ix), and argumentation serves the justification of validity claims either by truth or normative rules (Kopperschmidt,

2000, p. 59). To be more logical and persuasive, claims require support by various argumentative patterns or topoi in order to transfer them to a certain conclusion(s). In persuasive discourse, topos is “the building blocks on which actors must draw to persuade or convince the listener” (Forchtner 2014, p. 25). Hence, this part of the analysis focuses on examining those topoi the orator uses to connect claims and move them to certain conclusion(s) in order to convince the audience about specific proposals in accordance with specific perspectives and agendas. The analysis and discussion of argumentation strategies the speaker employed in the speech found the following topoi.

- **The topos of danger & threat**

Depending on the conditional sentence if *there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them*. The speaker tries to prove that ISIS/DAESH is a common enemy threatening the international security of the world to necessitate the negative/unpleasant realities of the war against them as the good that deserves unification behind it. Implicitly Al-Abadi places ISIS/DAESH and al Qaeda within the same group as they share the aims, thoughts and principles (Table 8.5). Hence, similar actions could be proposed today by ISIS/DAESH if the speaker’s proposal does not consider. The following table (8.5) represents the premises the speaker perhaps depends on to conclude that ISIS/DAESH is a global threat and danger.

Premise 1: DAESH does not differentiate between people in committing atrocities, beheading and mass murder (L13-14),
Premise 2: DAESH enslaves women and children from all ethnic and religious groups, regardless of their affiliations and geographic boundaries (L15-16),
Premise 3: DAESH is recruiting and training fighters from the West besides those who are being recruited from other areas (L17-18),
Premise 4: [DAESH is] highly skilled terrorists will return to the communities from which they came to commit murder and cause destruction (L19-20),
Conclusion: DAESH is a common enemy and its defeated is a common goal.

Table 8. 5. ISIS/DAESH is a threat and danger.

Through this table (8.5), the speaker tries to generalise the threat of DAESH not only geographically, in the Middle East, but also ethnically (premise 2). The orator is attempting to prove that the threat of terrorists/ DAESH is not only threatening Muslims but all ethnic and

religious affiliations. Not much later, the threat of that small group, ‘entity’ is expanded to include, “all who refuse to accept the radical ideas and the practices of barbarism anywhere” (L11-12). Above all, particularly in the adverb “anywhere,” Al-Abadi addresses two audiences - national and international, in turn, it serves the crisis - the threat of DAESH. Importantly, Al-Abadi’s rhetorical work in the above example, in which he expands the risk of DAESH to include all civilized, democratic people, allowed him to expand the in-group category. Aristotelian, it is a persuasive method (pathos-that incites fear emotions) to engage the world in a political and military conflict, Al-Abadi explains the nature of the threat to the quotidian. It can be paraphrased into ‘terrorism is not only contained within the borders of the Middle East, but terrorism cannot be located on a map.’ The imprecision of terror borders serves the speaker to frame and legitimise the necessity of collective regional and international efforts against an ideologically defined enemy. Without this emotional appeal to the live audience (the participants) ‘the feeling of being unsafe,’ it is hard for the speaker to build a case for military and economic support.

In turning to the emotion of fear, seemingly, in this discourse, emotions - fear, in particular, are the building blocks of constituting the topos of threat and danger. It serves for dual functions. In terms of persuasion, it is a parallel response model (Cameron 2009, p. 310) that the speaker applies to persuade his audience, such as their emotional responses and desires to eliminate the threat and danger that occur upon exposure to a fear appeal (Witt 1992, 1994). For Aristotle (1982, p. 3), Pathos/emotion denotes a salient, yet usually, potential premise(s) on which persuasive argument(s) rely (premises 1, 2, 3 and 5). On the other hand, the emotion of fear is also an implicit premise on which the speaker legitimises individual claims. More specifically, he establishes the discourse of a hypothetical future as a strategy to legitimate his proposal “our presence today shows that we have a common goal to defeat DAESH which requires collective regional and international efforts.” If not the premise (4) will be the future, fearful scenario. However, the speaker does not forget to mention himself in the sense of power and authority.

- **The topos of power and authority**

In this discourse, the speaker practices two sources of power to weigh his proposition(s), which in turn make it more legitimate and persuasive. These are personal and impersonal powers. At the beginning of the speech, the speaker thanks the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

for hosting this conference in their headquarters (L3-4). Then, he introduces the attendees as the foreign ministers from countries around the world (L9-10). By focusing on the Avenue (NATO's headquarter) and the status of the participants (foreign ministers), the speaker strengthens his impersonal authority through the authority of NATO, as well as the power of the participant's position and status.

In line with the personal authority, the speaker implicitly acquires the power of the Iraqi people as he presents himself "*On behalf of the Iraqi people*" (L12-13). The persuasive forces of this presentation are twofold: first, by introducing himself as such, he introduces himself as part of a large group - Iraqi people (in-group). Second, he implicitly introduces himself as the democratically and constitutionally elected representative of Iraq. This presentation is a rhetorical figure called '*metonymy*,' which aims at the conciseness of a concept by a single word or words that are closely related to that concept. In the forthcoming example Al-Abadi, then, boosts this idea, when he presents himself and the team he chairs as the guard, who protects and secures these democratic gains. As such, he attracts the attention and intimacy of those attendees, who believe in democracy and freedom.

في العراق اليوم، تبذل شتى الجهود لحماية المكتسبات الديمقراطية، سواء من خلال اعادة تشكيل حكومتنا ومصالحة مجتمعنا، او من خلال مقاومة داعش واعادة علاقاتنا مع الدول المجاورة لنا

Today in Iraq, various efforts are being made to protect the democratic gains, whether through reshaping our government and our society's reconciliation or through resisting DAESH and restoring our relations with our neighbouring countries (L98-101).

To convince the audience for more support, Al-Abadi mitigates that power when he argues, "the challenges we face cannot be confronted by only one country (L101-102), see also L 73). This is even though the meaning of mitigation, which the example involves, is still potent to the speaker or the country he represents. It presents DAESH as a burden which no one can challenge alone. Nonetheless, the Iraqis did. Persuasively, the benefits of that mitigation are twofold: first, it motivates the attendees' sense of fear (persuasion by fear). Second, it is an interdiscursive device; as it eases the link to the other topic or sub-topics, specifically the discourse of need.

'*The discourse of need*' will be dealt with in more detail later. It is possible to see discourse through a cluster of multi argumentative strategies at once. They are the topoi of burden, finance, humanitarianism and the dis/advantage topoi. Contextually, the discourse of need can be

outlined into six discourse topics. They are: 1) supporting military operations, 2) increasing the capacity of building, and training; 3) stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; 4) cutting off ISIL/DAESH's access to financing and funding; 5) addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises; and 6) delegitimation of ISIL/DAESH's ideology. Inasmuch, Al-Abadi re-contextualizes the speech of Al-Maliki⁶² during the conference of anti-terrorism, which was held in Baghdad 12-13 March, 2014.

- **The topos of burden**

The words such as “governmental reforms,” “national reconciliation,” “economic and social rebuilding” (L26-27) indicate that Al-Abadi has a policy preference, which is burdened by terrorism or DAESH specifically. He depicts terrorism or DAESH as a burden on progress not only for the Iraqis or the Middle East, but also for the world. Therefore, collective regional and international efforts are legitimised/required to diminish it. In so doing, Al-Abadi goes with the conditional statement of the topos of burden, if an institution is burdened by a specific problem, then one should act to diminish it (Kucukali, 2014, p.103).

Through the speech, the speaker asserts that Iraq and Iraqis are the front lines in fighting terrorism (L22-24). That may justify or naturalize Al-Abadi's demand that “we will need the broad support of our brothers and partners in this aspect” (L73-74). Simply, because, “when we [Iraq] fight DAESH, we are not only fighting for the people of Iraq, but we are fighting for all the peoples of the world” (L75-77). By doing that, (underlined), the speaker not only justifies why the world should support him but also legitimises, sustains and motivates the supporters [participants] to offer more, as a common good that will save the world. This legitimization strategy is called moral evaluation (Van Leeuwen 2007, p. 97). The evaluation whether this or that action is moral or not is linked to specific discourses of moral values – a sociocultural view. In the case of Arabic discourse and Iraqi in particular (underlined), it is a moral value and one should reward it. Hence, the speaker uses ‘we need’ 13 times distributed over four discourse topics: military, ideology, finance and humanitarian aids and support. To make it more persuasive, the discourse of “we need” is based on a problem-solution formulation. As such, Al-

⁶² For more about the speech of Al-Maliki see: www.al-monitor.com/pulse/.../iraq-baghdad-anti-terror-conference.htm

Abadi introduces the matter of confronting terrorism as a challenge (problem) that is only solved by a chain of ‘needs’. For instance, military wise:

PROBLEM/ BECAUSE “our security forces lack the complete training and arming” (L73).

SOLUTION/ WE NEED 1) “broad support of our brothers and partners in this aspect (L 73-74) and 2) “air force backing, training, arming and building the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces” (L104-105). 3) The support of neighboring countries and allies in the struggle to put an end to the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq. (L106-107). This is because “Iraq should not be a training ground for terrorists coming from and returning to every spot where problems exist on earth” (L108-109). This example is a clear recontextualisation of Al-Maliki’s words “I will not allow Iraq to become a launch pad for al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.” (See Appendix 3, lines 154-156).

In the same structure, the speaker presents the need to fight corrupted ideologies and stop uncontrolled financial transactions as part of the War on Terror, as respectively illustrated in the following examples.

PROBLEM/BECAUSE: “[the] extremist violence is inspired by the corrupted ideologies” (L113-114).

SOLUTION: “we need from the neighbouring countries in the Middle East and North Africa to combat DAESH’s concepts of ideologies.

However, the speaker does not clarify the nature of these corrupted ideologies and how they relate to terrorism or DAESH in particular. While he does not hesitate to identify the source of these ideologies: The Middle East and North Africa. Meanwhile, the orator asks for financial support and supporters in the fight, as it will limit their expansion:

PROBLEM/BECAUSE: “DAESH not only attracts fighters from all over the world but also receives its funding from many countries around the world as well” (L109-110).

SOLUTION: “we need from the international community, including its financial institutions, to freeze the funding of DAESH and direct a call to stop the unrestricted movement of money and ammunition to those international terrorists (L111-113). In line with the discourse of ‘we need’ Al-Abadi sees the humanitarian aids as part of fighting terrorism, as it contributes to recruiting refugees who have been displaced because of terrorism in other waves of acts of extremist violence

(L115-118). Therefore, he motivates the international community to increase their humanitarian support to address the humanitarian crisis caused by DAESH.

- **The topos of finance**

“The civil war in Syria caused the displacement of approximately two million people, and now they are staying within our borders” (L118-120).

By the above quotation, the speaker equates the refugees of Syria as a burden on the budget of Iraq and its financial policies. The *topos of numbers* (underlined) is important in this section, where economic damage is proved in terms of the figure of those refugees (underlined), especially, when “they are staying within our borders.” The key element of this financial burden is that “We have allocated a huge amount of money from our budget for these refugees” (L128-129). However, this does not simply mitigate the speaker’s personal, moral or religious responsibilities about the Syrians refugees, it is a rhetorical strategy the speaker uses in order to share responsibility with other neighbouring countries and partners to address the humanitarian crisis caused by terrorism/DAESH. Meanwhile, this example also comes to support the negative representation of Other-DAESH. Argumentatively, this endeavour is based on the following conditional statement: if sufficient numbers are given, a specific action should be performed. Contextually, this action can be realized in the following part of the discourse of ‘we need’: “we need the support of the entire international community to endure and heal the wounds of the victims of violence” (L130-131).

One more example of the topos of finance the speaker employs to convince the audience of a reconstruction fund to reconstruct the Iraqi liberated areas from the control of DAESH can be seen in Table 8.6 below. It is worth saying that DAESH bombs most of the public buildings, houses and roads of the areas it has controlled, such as Anbar, Fallujah, Mosul, Tikrit and so forth. Therefore, Al-Abadi urges the international community to increase their financial support as a successful policy to encourage the residents of these liberated areas to return to their home (L122-125).

Premise 1: [DAESH] displaces approximately two million people and now they are staying within our borders (L119-120),

Premise 4: we have allocated a huge amount of money from our budget for these refugees (L128-129)

Premise 2: [The] liberated areas from the control of DAESH need an urgent rebuilding campaign (L122-123),
Premise 3: [DAESH] ceases Iraqi's oil Northern exports (L128).
Conclusion: DAESH is a burden to the Iraqi financial progress policy.

Table 8. 6. The topos of finance.

This argumentation strategy (finance) also benefits from the *topos of definition*. The word 'reconstruction' explicitly, defines the speaker and his administration policy, the policy of rebuilding campaigns'. Meanwhile, it implicitly defines the negative policy, the policy of deconstruction, the other/ DAESH adopted. By rhetorically dehumanizing the other/ DAESH, Al-Abadi shapes his listeners' psychological preparedness for funds engagements, supporting that with the following statement:

ايتها الاخوات والاخوة؛ لن نتمكن من هزيمة الارهابيين الدوليين الحاقدين الذين يعتاشون على الفشل الا بعد اعادة بناء عراق آمن ومستقر في شرق اوسط آمن ومستقر، وبما ان داعش يمثل عدوا مشتركا لنا ينبغي ان تكون هزيمته هي مسعانا المشترك ايضا.

BROTHER AND SISTER, we will not be able to defeat the malicious international terrorists who are living on failure, only after *rebuilding a stable and secure Iraq in the Middle East that is safe and stable*, since **DAESH represents our common enemy, **therefore, defeating DAESH is our common endeavour too** (L131-133).**

Through the precise selection of words (underlined), and the appeal to an assumed set of universal values (**bold**) the speaker solicits support from his audiences. These words in turn "serve to appeal to external sources of legitimisation" (Graham, et al., 2004, p.199). Of particular note is the rhetorical device 'we,' which it is inclusive in nature, as it includes the speaker and the addressees, the conference's attendees. Moreover, another rhetorical movement of legitimization/persuasion can be seen in this above excerpt. Indeed, the instance of temporal proximization (future – present). In particular, Al-Abadi reports that what will happen in the future (underlined) are the exhortations of what must happen now (*italic*). Meanwhile, he tends to present a grandiose vision of the distal future, indeed in the instance of spatial proximization (Cap, 2006, 2008, and 2010). The stability and security of Iraq are represented as the stability and security of the entire world.

The implication of that representation is that in order to secure positive values (security, peace, freedom, prosperity, faith) for all the people in the distal future, the world community (the

attendees) must presently engage in supporting Iraq and its battle against terrorism. Again, the covert implication is that we must take immediate action to stop terrorism, i.e., DAESH. By unpacking the implicit and explicit meanings of the above utterance, it is easy to see that supporting Iraq is the only way to prevent a dreadful future, as the speaker suggests that this future will come about if we (the speaker and the attendees) fail to build a stable and secure Iraq in the Middle East.

This conclusion also comes close to the topos of advantage, indicating an advantage - if there are positive consequences from a decision, the decision should be accepted. Intertextually, this conclusion is linked through synonyms to the content meaning of Al-Maliki's. As Thibault (1991) suggests, intertextuality does not necessitate a text to cite or allude to other text(s) or to share any keywords of another text to be considered intertextual. Indeed, it needs only share, abstract semantic patterns or formations (Lemke 1995), which may be "thought of as generic meanings that underline the specific wordings in a given text." (Oddo 2011, p. 290). Based on Oddo's suggestion, the above example is intertextual, as it shares the thematic formations of the forthcoming example of Al-Maliki's words. (See appendix 3, lines 33 to 35).

أن مصير بلدنا وبلدان العالم مرتبط ببعضه إذا سمح للديمقراطية ان تفشل في العراق وللارهاب أن ينتصر فلن نحقق النصر ولن نحققه ابداً في الحرب علياً في المناطق الاخرى في العالم.

The fate of our country and the world's countries is tied to each other. If democracy is allowed to fail in Iraq and terror permitted to triumph, then the war on terror will never be won elsewhere (Al-Maliki 2006 (L33-35).

8.4. Summary

The chapter examined the conference speech of the incumbent Prime Minister of Iraq, Dr. Haider Al-Abadi. This speech was delivered via the first Ministerial-level plenary session on 3 December 2014, at the avenue of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The reason for holding the conference is to counter the threat and danger of terrorism in the Middle East, especially the terrorist effects of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) or DAESH. The most perennial aim of the speech was to motivate the international community to the danger of terrorism (ISIS) not only to the Middle East but to the entire world, therefore, the Iraqi War on

Terror should be supported, because “we [Iraq] are not only fighting for the people of Iraq, but we are fighting for all the peoples of the world” (L75-77). Hence, terrorism (ISIS) is “our common enemy therefore defeating DAESH is our common endeavor too” (L134). That way justified the discourse of ‘we need’, that the speaker constructed whereby Al-Abadi appealed to the audience of the world community for more military and financial support, justifying these requirements through a cluster of multi-argumentative strategies of burden, finance, humanitarianism and the dis/advantage topoi.

Likewise, as in the three previous chapters, the chapter in hand began with a brief introduction to some aspects of the speaker’s social and political life. It then introduced some general remarks of the context in which the speech was located. In terms of the discursive analysis, the chapter focused on the discursive strategies in accordance with the DHA central strategies of nomination, predication, perspectivation, argumentation and intensification/ mitigation, and how the speaker employed them as persuasive projects. The analysis of nomination strategies showed that the orator operationalized the strategies of positive self and negative other representations to categorise the social actors and actions in terms of in-group and out-group categorisation. In these strategies, the significance of pronouns is seen, especially ‘we’/‘they’ and ‘us’ and ‘them’. It continues in the predication strategies, where positive attributions are attached to the in-group, and negative characterizations are related to the out-group category.

The analysis also investigated the speaker’s perspectivisation of actors and actions. It investigated the linguistics devices the speaker instrumentalised to express his involvement or detachment of actors and action and position his point of view accordingly. Through the strategies of perspectivation, the discourse of successful policy and commitment and cooperation are significant. In the discourse of *successful policy preferences*, Al-Abadi tried to prove that the implemented policies were successful in defeating terrorism/ DAESH, hence, they deserve the utmost national and international support. The discourse of *commitment and cooperation in the War on Terror* showed that the Government of Iraq and its people are committed to what they have to perform in order to defeat terrorism. As such, the speech was the presentation of the Iraqi’s government plans to defeat ISIL/DAESH in which the speaker suggested a combination of security, political, economic and ideological plans to hinder terrorism.

In argumentation analysis, Al-Abadi did not hesitate to use various argumentative tools to mobilise the world community to the fact that DAESH does not only threaten the countries and peoples of the Middle East but it also threatens all who refuse its radical ideas and the acts of barbarism anywhere. To move this claim to a conclusion, the topoi of threat and danger, the emotion of fear in particular, and the topos of burden are employed. In this part, the speaker does not only identify DAESH as a physical (security or military) threat but also an ideological menace inspired by the ideology of beheadings and mass murder and the enslavement of women and children. The speaker hence, introduced terrorism an enemy without clear borders that may extend beyond the boundaries of the Middle East, if his suggested plans are not considered.

Overall, the speaker did not hesitate to use the possible persuasive discursive means to gain the utmost support for his suggested proposals. He employed the DHA methodological strategies effectively to gain unconditional support. In this case, the attendees' reactions (i.e., the decisions of support), are a logical parameter one can depend on to evaluate the persuasiveness/success of the speaker or the speech to convince the audience. Based on that fact, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry stated through a press conference⁶³, pledged their full support for the government and the people of Iraq in their efforts to fight terrorism and help, assist refugees and displaced individuals, and enable them to return to their homes. The participants of the Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting decided that the efforts of the global coalition should focus on multiple lines of effort⁶⁴, as pointed out below:

1. Supporting military operations, capacity building, and training;
2. Stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters;
3. Cutting off ISIL/DAESH's access to financing and funding;
4. Addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises; and
5. Exposing ISIL/ DAESH's true nature (ideological delegitimation).
- 6.

⁶³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PznZSwSvr4U>.

⁶⁴ <https://id.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-issued-by-partners-at-the-counter-isil-coalition-ministerial-meeting-2/>

CHAPTER 9: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

9.1. Introduction

In the previous four chapters, I analysed the speeches of Bush and Obama, as examples of the American call to arms discourse, whilst speeches of Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi for the Iraqi call to arms were used as examples, and discussed the DHA discursive strategies, and their implementation by the selected speakers, and the way they are conveyed in their chosen speeches to be persuasive projects. This chapter, hence, aims to present a comparative analysis based on the previous four chapters. It will be more specific in the implementation of the strategies of *nomination*, *predication*, *perspectivization* and *argumentation* in the context of the War on Terror, and the four speakers studied.

The four selected speakers have completely different backgrounds, whether as to their experiences as politicians, their cultural and historical backgrounds, their beliefs, the specific parties and governments they represent or the ideologies they adopt. Therefore, their employment of these discursive structures and arguments over their audience and their enemies, is implemented in different ways according to the language they use, which in turn, provides a new context of comparison, cross-ideologically contrasting the way the speakers build up their arguments from different ideological positioning, and power relations. Therefore, the chapter also discusses the notions of power and ideology and their implementation in the discourse of war, and the way they can be reflected through language, and their implementation by the selected speaker over their audience and their enemies for persuasive ends. This is because CDA is devoted to the study of the covert influence of language, where power relations, abuse and social inequality are practiced by language users (Oswald, 2016, p. 518).

9.2. A Comparative Analysis of Discursive Strategies

The previous four chapters showed that each speaker applied his own personal rhetoric that affects the strategic use of language and the linguistic choices he made throughout the speech to present a persuasive call to arms discourse. Besides, the DHA analysis and discussion revealed that the discourse used by the speakers under the study appeared to be organised by a

global strategy of positive self- and negative other-representations. The speakers formulated their ideological aims and power relations on the positive representation of ‘the Self’, and the negative representation of ‘the Other’ to maintain the positive in-group and the negative out-group. Therefore, this part of the analysis looks closely at the way in which the ‘in’ and ‘out’ group membership is established across the four speakers.

9.2.1. Referential and predication strategies

This part looks at how social actors, objects, phenomena and events are named and referred to linguistically according to the speakers’ evaluation of positive or negative traits and attributions in line with the speakers’ political interests. As we have seen in the previous four chapters, there are many linguistic devices the four speakers use in terms of the referential and predication strategies to maintain the ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups membership. In this respect, I focus on two of those linguistics devices, which seem to be more influential in the analysed texts: the use of proper nouns and the use of pronouns.

In terms of the use of pronouns, a close analysis of the use of pronouns in the selected speeches shows a strong similarity particularly in the use of the plural collective pronouns ‘we’, ‘our’ and ‘us’, to establish and maintain the in-group membership, all with positive characterisations and attributions. This is illustrated in the increased use of the first personal plural pronoun ‘we’ than the first personal singular (I) (see Table 9.1). This reflects two different factors; firstly, the attempt to globalize the decision of war from the speakers themselves and their governments to the public (audience), secondly, the political mood and their positions in the war. In addition, the strategy of ‘we’ develops and straightens the relationship between the speaker and the audience, which is often accompanied by emotive appeals. It stirs the emotions of the audience, as they have the same goal and association with the speaker.

	George W. Bush	Barack Obama	Nouri Al-Maliki	Haider Al-Abadi
1st person plural	45	47	31	57
1st person sing.	28	26	17	7
2nd person	33	5	20	15

3rd person plural	35	19	11	9
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Table 9. 1. The use of pronouns across the speakers.

On the contrary, the third person plural pronouns ‘they’, ‘their’ and ‘those’, show a common reference to the out-group membership. It puts the referents and their practices outside the speaker’s group membership and those who are loyal to him. In the use of the third person plural, a clear constancy has been noticed in the speeches of Bush and Obama, to indicate ‘otherness’ (i.e. out-group). Whereas, this is not the case to the Iraqis. These pronouns have sometimes been used to indicate ‘other’ and sometimes to indicate ‘self’ and the persons to whom they refer. For instance, while Al-Maliki uses ‘they’, ‘those’ and ‘their’ to indicate the ‘in’ and ‘out’ group simultaneously, Al-Abadi uses these pronouns only to thank and appreciate the in-group to maintain the membership and advance the discourse of ‘we need’.

A further observation is the use of the second person pronouns ‘you’ or ‘your’, showing a closer similarity between the Iraqi speakers. They use ‘you’ or ‘your’ to thank, share goals and show association with the in-group. Whereas, Bush uses ‘you’ or ‘your’ sometimes to thank the in-group, and other to warn the out-group, and the same can be said about Obama.

One more sharing strategy to maintain the ‘in’ and ‘out’ group membership is the use of nouns and proper nouns. The speakers have been found using nouns and proper nouns as a strategic way to share goal, show association and thank by addressing the audience by name and designation to emphasise the in-group membership. The employment of this strategy depends upon the level of formality, the occasion and the issue of the speech. Bush, Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi have used the strategy of addressing the audience by name and designation, due to the formal context in which their speeches were delivered. This strategy shows a high level of formality and has directness in inviting the attention of the audience. Addressing the audience by their name or the designation they hold has been a popular practice among the public speakers (Mohan, 2013, p. 94), in which the speaker tries to connect to the audiences by acknowledging their presence and seeking their attention by directly addressing them in the very beginning of a public speech. By mentioning the designations of the audience, the speaker tries to connect to the audience in a formal and professional setting; it puts the audience in a certain power relationship and professional relationship with the orator.

In a similar fashion, Obama also tries to establish a similar effect, but with a more informal tone. He introduces a more personal tone through his repeated use of “My”, and by referring directly to his personal passion and pointing out that going to war is a personal decision taken by himself as a ‘Commander-in-Chief’ to protect his people. By this aim, Obama legitimises and justifies and then persuades the public to use of military action and then people support him.

On the other hand, the speakers also use proper nouns with a series of negative adjectives to portray and emphasise the current and potential danger and threat of the out-group on the entire world. This discourse is constructed through what ‘they’ are (‘cancer’, ‘extremists’, ‘danger’, ‘Killer’), what ‘they’ do (‘execute captured prisoner’, ‘kill children’), what ‘they’ have done (‘the greatest threats’), or what ‘they’ could do (pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States’). With this string of questions, the four speakers legitimise or justify the War on Terror. Socially speaking, the four speakers predicate ‘the other’ (actors and actions) within the principles of *‘SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION’*, where ‘the other’ was depicted as thoroughly evil.

Bush and Al-Maliki had a variety in their out-group members in terms of the subjects and practices. To begin with, Bush refers to the Al-Qaida Organization and its harbour, the Taliban regime 6 times, and the ‘terrorists’ 13 times, and ‘Osama bin Laden’ twice as the leader of Al-Qaida. The same can be said about Al-Maliki. He mainly identifies two main actors as negative-other: The Saddam regime and the terrorists. He refers to terrorists 15 times, and once each for the Saddam regime and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Whereas, the out-group in Obama and Al-Abad’s speech remains almost the same throughout their speeches. The most common and central ‘other’ is the excessive use of the proper noun of ‘ISIL’. In relation to Obama, ISIL is constantly used 20 times, all with negative interpretations, while, it was used 33 times in relation to Al-Abad’s speech, also with negative attributes.

9.2.2. The strategies of Perspectivization

As we have seen from the previous four chapters, the speakers tried to enhance their characters in their speeches in order to establish their trustworthiness through the feelings and positions they expressed. In so doing, each political actor positioned his points of views, feelings and

attitudes in line with the in-group interests, to maintain his involvement and membership, and the detachment of the out-group membership. Aristotle gave considerable weight to the intention of the public speakers to establish trustworthiness in public speeches, as this strategy helped in persuading the audience. Through attestations of mainly positive traits, each speaker presents himself as a defender of his people, human rights and to promote democracy to surround himself as much as possible with partners to enlarge his in-group membership.

The common strategy applied by the selected speakers to express feelings and attitude is the use of the personal singular pronoun 'I', (Table 9.1) which has traditionally been attached to ego, authority and the power of the speaker (Mohan, 2013, p. 185). This is illustrated by the increased use of the first person non-inclusive pronoun 'I' and 'my' mostly in the repetitive clauses, when the speaker visualises their personal determination to defeat the 'other' (i.e., terrorism), and thanking the audience and their government to sponsor and support the War on Terror. Consequently, the speaker maintains the in-group membership. In this context, the use of the personal pronoun reflects two different factors; firstly, it expresses the speaker's personal feelings and attitudes towards the use of military force, and secondly, it reflects the speaker's power and authority in leading the war and securing victory.

In terms of showing power and authority, table (9.1) indicates that the American speakers, Bush and Obama, display more power and authority in their speeches than the Iraqis, Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi do in their speeches. It also indicates that Al-Abadi is more ambiguous and less authoritative in his speech than Al-Malik. This can be attributed to the nature and the purpose of Al-Abadi's speech, in which he is looking for help and assistance rather than showing power or authority. Additionally, the speaker uses 'we need' 13 times distributed over four discourse topics: military, ideology, finance and humanitarian aids and support.

Another shared perspectivization strategies employed by the speakers to express their involvement and detachment, is the syntactic markers of the active voice. They seldom use the passive voice, as it absents the role of the subject, which they seemingly are not looking for. Indeed, they are looking to introduce themselves forward as defenders of their people and country. In relation to Bush, few of the passive structures he used in his speech have been balanced in such a way that they highlight the speaker rather than anything else, as in

(underlined) *“It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. It is my reminder of lives that ended and a task that does not end”* (L198). In contrast to the passive voice construction rule, Bush highlights the role of the beneficiary (Bush/himself) rather than that of the agentive (his mom).

The speakers have been observed using the strategies of naming trustworthy people and places, quoting from trustworthy sources, mentioning previous good actions and gravity in tone and style. To take this a step further, Haider Al-Abadi uses the strategy of naming trustworthy people when he alludes the participants and the organizer of the conference and the place where the conference was held (NATO), as a strategic way to enhance his reliable feelings and attitudes to combat terrorism. By using this strategy, the speaker borrows trustworthiness and power from the trustworthy people he mentioned in the opening part of his speech, by which he enhances his involvement with them and detachment from otherness.

In terms of the strategy of quoting from trustworthy sources, this has been identified particularly in the speech of Nouri Al-Maliki. Using quotations from trustworthy sources enhances the character and trustworthiness of the orator so skillful orators quote from religious scriptures and other authentic sources (Mohan, 2013, p. 261). Quoting from the Qur’an and other religious scriptures establishes the purity of the orator’s character in Arabic rhetoric. Al- Maliki uses this strategy very effectively by quoting from the Qur’an to first establish his trustworthiness and justify his proposal and legitimise the War on Terror and delegitimise the ‘others’ practices and actions (i.e. September attacks).

Obama uses the strategy of previous good actions and achievements very effectively. He begins the speech quoting examples of previous military landmark achievements, arousing nationalistic feelings by saying, *“America is safe.”* by which he enhances his character and establishes his trustworthiness, showing that he is a patriot. In addition, he adds some patriotic and emotive fervour to his speech by using the collective personal pronoun ‘we’, which seems to include himself as ‘Commander-in-Chief’ and ‘the US forces’, rather than the personal singular pronoun ‘I’ or a ‘Commander-in-Chief’.

In terms of the gravity in tone and style, Bush tries to express his personal relationship with his audience demonstrated in the way he advises his people and warning the enemy. The constant

picture that he emphasizes is that of a father and his family. By which Bush enhances his personal character not only as the President of the United States, but a father, who tries to relaxify his sons and daughters of these fatal situations, as visualised in the following example:

I ask you to live your lives and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat. I ask you to uphold the values of America and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. (L146-149).

9.2.3. Argumentation strategies

In this part of the analysis, we investigate the ways in which topoi are employed by the speakers to move claims and proposals to certain conclusions in line with the speakers' interest. In terms of arguments, all four speakers argue through a time frame connecting certain past, present and future situations to emphasise subjects, events and maintain the 'in' and 'out' group membership. The analysis and discussion of the four previous chapters found that the speakers presented their arguments in terms of the discourse of a thoroughly evil Other, as a strategic way to legitimise their conclusion. To put it in other words, the speakers employed topoi as a rhetorical device to present a problem(s) (i.e. the threat of terrorism) and the solution as well (i.e. the War on Terror).

Regarding the discourse of a thoroughly evil Other, the speakers depict the present as a period that requires making crucial decisions or actions to avoid the past problem from repeating itself in the future. The four speakers display the future in two different scenarios. While, it is successful and secure when their proposal (i.e. the War on Terror) is authorized, the past will repeat itself if it is not in reference to the 9/11 attacks (i.e., attacks, killing, death etc.). Dunmire (2007) signifies the importance of future in political discourse and in fact, this is what the four speakers did in their speeches:

The function of political discourse to project and shape conceptions and visions of the future has long been recognized by political and cultural scholars and critics. Creating representations of what people can be led to expect of the future is an especially potent means by which political actors shape the political cognition and behaviour of large numbers of people (Dunmire, 2007, p. 21).

The four speakers use the specter of the 11th of September attacks to emphasize the potential threat of terror as a strategic way to justify and legitimise the use of force against that threat in favour of the War on Terror through a series of topoi. In this respect, none of the four speakers hesitated to do or to say whatever he could to intensify the hypothetical threat of ‘other’ to make the audiences believe that the War on Terror is an unavoidable choice in order to have security at home and enjoy freedom and liberty. Typically, the speakers provide good reasons, grounds, or acceptable motivations of heritage and historicity of past or present events to support their future arguments. This can be seen in the arguments of all four speakers mainly through the employment of topoi of threat and danger, responsibility, definition, history, abuse, disadvantage, burden, finance and number, the growth of terrorism as a hazard that threatens the entire world.

In terms of Bush, the major speaker during the War on Terror, the threat of al Qaeda has been historically associated to the threat of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism and some historic practices to highlight the current situation. The same can be said about Al-Maliki. He relates the threat of terrorism to the threat of Saddam’s regime to the Iraqis and the world. The construction of a thoroughly evil other (i.e. the spectre of other) is also used by Obama, and Haider Al-Abadi in many aspects of their speeches, particularly through the topoi of danger and threat.

The speakers, on the other hand, also employ topoi to establish grounds for using military force as part of a large quest that aims to protect freedom and liberal values from terrorism aspirations of radical groups like al Qaeda or ISIS (DAESH), serving the interest of the speakers, and promoting the policy of anti-terrorism. This can be seen in the use of the topoi of responsibility, humanitarianism, religion and advantage. For instance, in the case of the topoi of responsibility, Bush reminds the audience (American in particular) of their responsibility to defend freedom because “we [America] are a country, [...] called to defend freedom.” (L12-13) This extract implies a metaphorical idea that the US is the centre of freedom, and America is a trained soldier, who is ready to fight whenever his/her principles are attacked. Then, it is the duty of the US to protect freedom by taking strong military action against the enemies of freedom. Here, the topos of ‘responsibility’ refers to the second hypothetical future scenario from which the audience can infer that some military action(s) is necessary.

The same can be said about Obama, who enhances the principle of positive responsibility of the War on Terror via the topos of humanitarian. He implicitly declares that the War on Terror will provide humanitarian needs to the affected people of ISIL's terrorist works. In terms of the Iraqi speakers, we can see Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi not only justify why the world community should support the War on Terror but also legitimise (i.e., moral evaluation), sustains and motivate the supporters to offer more, simply because "we [Iraq] fight DAESH, we are not only fighting for the people of Iraq, but we are fighting for all the peoples of the world." (Al-Abadi, L75-77).

Another aspect of a comparison between the four speakers is the rhetorical structure of their speeches. It found that each speaker formulates his speech in a way to advance and expand persuasive arguments. For instance, Bush formulates his speech in terms of four rhetorical questions, by which he steps further to criminalize the 'other' and victimize the 'self', which in turn, legitimises and justifies the use of force against the criminals (i.e. al Qaeda). For instance, *who attacked our country? Why do they hate us? How will we fight and win this war? and What is expected of us?*

The structure in Obama's speech has been formulated in the use of negation. Rhetorically, Obama weighted his argument to be more acceptable (i.e. persuasive) especially by Americans by using a simple structure of negation 'not', which it is repeated (13 times).

As I have said before, these American forces will **not** have a combat mission — we will **not** get dragged into another ground war in Iraq. But they are needed to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment (L66-68). Therefore, it will **not** involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil (108-109).

On the other side, we can see that Al-Maliki focuses on the strategy of the contrastive organisational event, contrastive pairs in particular to compare the previous situations in Iraq to the current one, and his predictions of good consequences for the Iraqis and the world audience beyond supporting and backing the War on Terror.

الأمل بدلاً من الخوف والحرية بدلاً من القمع والسمو بدلاً من الأذعان والديمقراطية بدلاً من الدكتاتورية والاتحادية بدلاً من استبداد المركز.

Hope over fear, liberty over oppression, dignity over submission, democracy over dictatorship, federalism over a centralist state (L63-65).

While, Haider Al-Abadi, formulates his speech on the discourse of successful policy and commitment and cooperation. In the discourse of *successful policy preferences*, Al-Abadi tried to prove that the implemented policies were successful in defeating terrorism/DAESH; hence, they deserve the utmost national and international support. The discourse of *commitment and cooperation in the war on terror* showed that the Government of Iraq and its people are committed to what they have to perform in order to defeat terrorism. As such, the speech was the presentation of the Iraqi's government plans to defeat ISIL/DAESH in which the speaker suggested a combination of security, political, economic and ideological plans to hinder terrorism.

وقد بدأت نتائج جهودنا تتجلى للعيان

The outcomes of our efforts have begun to be seen. (L28).

One last point which needs to be stated is the strategy of intertextuality, namely how texts are related to each other through history, and how history affects the process of discourse construction. In this respect, all the speaker intertextualize the idea that 'Other' is not Muslim and not a state, and that the War on Terror is the war of all who believe in democracy, freedom and human rights. However, it is the Iraqi speakers rather than the Americans who employ this strategy in their speeches.

9.3. Ideological analysis

In this particular part of the analysis, the notion of ideology in relation to language will be discussed in terms of two main ideological aspects that are highlighted in the data. While the first one is the ideology of religion, the second one is the ideology of the state.

9.3.1. Religion as an ideology

Despite the fact that the four speakers represent different political discourse, common strategies can be seen among them. One of these strategies is the use of religion and religious expressions to influence the audiences. Singer (2004, p. 98) states, "political leaders are generally careful to keep their religious beliefs - if they have any - separate from public life. They rarely, if ever, mention God or their religious faith." However, two of our selected speakers, Bush and Al-

Maliki, have tried to frame the War on Terror in terms of being a religious war, which can be seen in words choice and quotations, which is not something commonly seen in the speech of Obama and Al-Abadi. In the speech of Al-Abadi there are no religious references or expressions, while, it is limited to “My God bless America” in case of Obama’s speech. Obama concludes his speech by “May God bless our troops, and may God bless the United States of America” (L136). Additionally, “God Bless America” is the name of an old song is seen by Americans almost as a second national anthem, and regularly used by patriots in the United States. So, perhaps Obama is pulling emotional strings here and reminding Americans of their shared heritage and how everything they do is for the 'American Dream'.

In Bush’s speech, the War on Terror was described as the war between good and evil, where sacrifices are made by people of goodwill to save the innocent people. He does not hesitate to put the War on Terror in the context of a ‘new crusade’ to emote the audience (particularly in the case of revenge), as we can see in “the terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans” (Bush, L 50-51). Another religious reference previously used by Bush is the appeal to the God, which conceptualises the War on Terror as the war of God, and God will support it. His argument applies to the request in his speech asking God to support (his) the War on Terror against the terrorists, as shown in the following examples:

Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America (Bush, L 202-206).

Al-Maliki also tries to establish a similar effect. We notice many religious references in his speech which starts by using specific word choice and *Qur'anic* verses (i.e. Muslim’s Holy book) to support his argument which all come from his religious background and tradition, which have been led by ‘Dawa party’, the party he belongs to (see chapter seven). In terms of charged words, Al-Maliki in accordance with his faith and religion, defines the War on Terror as:

انها معركة بين اسلام حقيقي تتشكل فيه حرية الانسان وحقوقه متبنيات أساسية، وبين الارهاب الذي يتلف بعباءة الاسلام وهو في الحقيقة يشن حرباً على الإنسانية والاسلام والقيم والمبادئ

[And] it is a battle between true Islam, for which a person's liberty and rights constitute essential cornerstones, and terrorism, which wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak; in reality, wages a war on Islam and Muslims and values (L14-19).

Other examples of religious rhetoric in the speech of Al-Maliki, are the use of basmala formula “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful”, and verses of the Qur’an to criminalize the ‘other’ in one hand, and to justify and legitimise the War on Terror on the other hand, as in the following example:

مَنْ قَتَلَ نَفْسًا بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ أَوْ فَسَادٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَكَأَنَّمَا قَتَلَ النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا (سورة المائدة - الآية 32)

Whoever kills a person unjustly, it is as though he has killed all of mankind (L23).

9.3.2. The ideology of the State

Despite the fact that the speakers represent different ideological and cultural backgrounds, almost all of them refer once or twice to the ideology of the 'state' and what they 'as a country' are fighting for. Though Bush's and Al-Maliki's ideological characteristics come from their religion and faith, they also touch upon the ideology of the 'State' (i.e., what they 'as a country or government' are fighting for). In the speech of Bush, the influence of the 'State' appears in the text through the reference to the notions of 'liberty', 'human rights', 'democracy', 'freedom' and the duty of America to protect these principles because “we are a country [...] called to defend freedom” (l 12), and “freedom itself is under attack” (L 39). The speaker enhances this ideology by conceptualizing America the guard (soldier) who protects the center of freedom. Therefore, “we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done” (L 13-14). In American political discourse, this state related ideology was not born within the period of the War on Terror, rather, the whole arguments were adopted since the War of Independence.

The same can be said about the speech of Al-Maliki. In his speech, we come across words such as 'liberty', 'human rights', 'democracy' and 'freedom', but are overtaken by religious rhetoric that comes from his religious background and tradition. The speaker correlates between these notions and the principle of Islam, so the War on Terror is unconsciously justified, and then legitimised in light of the principles of Islam, as in the following example:

The war on terror is a real war against those who wish to burn out the flame of freedom, and we are in this battle vanguard for defending the values of humanity (L121-16).

The speaker also increases the influence of the 'State' ideology on the remote audience (Iraqis in particular), by mentioning 'Iraq' 54 times as a country fights, instead of the world, to protect democracy and freedom anywhere. As such, Iraq deserves much backing and support from the national and international community.

In Obama's speech, the state-related ideology is emphasised in the statement of threat and a warning he delivered against those who threaten or are thinking of threatening America. In a conditional structure, Obama formalises his statement in the context of a warning act, as in "If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven" (L60-61). The warning act that he issues directly is justified because "my highest priority is the security of the American people" (L4) and "this is a core principle of my presidency" (L60). This conditional warning statement sums up Obama's understanding of the 'state' and his mission and responsibility as a leader aims to protect his people. Hence, he emphasises the word America or Americans 14 times, all with positive attributions. Like Bush, the influence of the 'State' is also appearing in the text of Obama throughout the reference to the notions of 'liberty', 'human rights', 'democracy', 'freedom' and the American responsibility to protect these principles.

In the case of the fourth speaker in the analysis, Al-Abadi conceptualises the concept of 'state' within the framework of the 'government' he headed. In this context, Al-Abadi refers to his government of Iraq 12 times, all with positive characterisation in different themes. The influence of the 'state' ideology can be illustrated in the concept of the hero who protects the democratic gains, as in the following:

I am here to assure you that the Government of Iraq and its people are committed to what we have to perform in this context. (Al-Abadi, L22-23).

9.4. The Exercise of Power in the War

In her book *The War of Words*, Sandra Silberstein argues about the exercise of power in political discourse. In respect, she states:

In assuming the role of a wartime commander-in-chief, a president is exercising extraordinary powers, powers that are comfortably granted in a democracy only in the context of a very strong consensus. Speeches designed to minimize dissent and build unity will necessarily report selectively... The potential for this selectivity is created by

the fact that only the president has the access to the information that will determine whether military action will be taken (Silberstein, 2002, p. 14).

As discussed and explained in the previous four chapters, the speakers exercise power through language in many ways. In this respect, power can appear through the personal and impersonal, and the power of selectivity, as referred to by Silberstein, by which the speakers weigh their proposition(s), which in turn make it more legitimate and persuasive. The power of selectivity (i.e. choice of what to reveal and hide in terms of what is going on) can be seen as a technique that was employed by Bush, Obama and Al-Abadi to build-up their war. They rely on this selectivity to formulate their arguments on the existence of terrorism around the audience (i.e. potential threat) something and share it with the audience, as in the following examples:

The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole. (Bush, L43-46).

Our Intelligence Community believes that thousands of foreigners — including Europeans and some Americans — have joined them in Syria and Iraq. Trained and battle-hardened, these fighters could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks. (Obama, L34-37).

DAESH is recruiting and training fighters from the west beside those who are being recruited from other areas, [...], these highly trained terrorists will return to the communities from which they came from to commit murder and cause destruction. (Al-Abadi, L 17-20).

In respect of the personal power or ‘speaker-related’ way, the speakers refer to themselves in terms of their official positions. This form of power is illustrated through the speaker's reference to himself. These direct references to their authority aim at obliging the audience to listen and respect the authority which comes with their positions, and to trust them and the decisions they make. Similar use of power can be seen in the indirect reference of the speaker to his own authority and power through the power of external sources. These sources are inherently good, and the ultimate moral within the societal order of the discourse of the day. This can be illustrated in the speech of Bush through the audience’s power and authority (i.e. Republicans and Democrats), and Al-Maliki’s speech through religion, and the power of place (NATO) as in the case of Al-Abadi’s speech.

Power can also be exercised through having the power to expose the ‘other’ (i.e. enemy), as they do not reveal the whole truth. This can be illustrated in the speeches of all the speakers that al Qaeda/ISIS is not Islamic and not a State and their followers are not Muslims.

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics — a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam (Bush, L 48-50).

ISIL is not "Islamic." No religion condones the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of ISIL's victims have been Muslim. And ISIL is certainly not a state (Obama, L18-20).

terrorism, which wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak; in reality, wages a war on Islam and Muslims and values and spreads hatred between humanity (Al-Maliki, L19-20).

It is not an Islamic nor a state it does not deserve to be called in an official name, so it is called DAESH an abbreviation of the word in the Arabic language (Al-Abadi, L7-8).

9.5. Summary

The aim of this chapter was to lay out the application of discursive strategies and their arrangement in terms of the American and Iraqi call to arms discourses to legitimise the War on Terror. The chapter explored the interrelation between the use of language and legitimation, foregrounding the strategic functions of the persuasive call to arms speeches that serve the wartime’s speaker to the pursuit of war legitimacy. The comparison was based on four discursive strategies, including *nomination*, *predication*, *perspectivization* and *argumentation*, and their implementation in the context of the War on Terror, by four different political figures.

Regarding the first two discursive strategies, *nomination and predication*, the analysis shows that the four speakers employed a wide range of nouns and pronouns attached with positive and negative attributions, as linguistic devices to establish and maintain the in-group and out-group membership. In terms of the use of pronouns, the analysis indicates a prominent use of the plural collective pronouns ‘we’, ‘our’ and ‘us’, to establish and maintain the in-group membership, all with positive characterisations and attributions. Whereas the third person plural pronouns,

‘they’, ‘their’ and ‘those’, show a common use in reference to the out-group. It puts the referents and their practices outside the speaker’s group membership and those who are loyal to him.

Regarding the use of nouns and proper nouns, the speakers also use nouns attached with a series of negative adjectives to portray and emphasise the danger and threat of the out-group. This discourse is constructed through what ‘they’ are (‘cancer’, ‘extremists’, ‘danger’, ‘Killer’), what ‘they’ do (‘execute captured prisoner’, ‘kill children’), what ‘they’ have done (‘the greatest threats’), or what ‘they’ could do (‘pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States’). With this string of questions, the four speakers justify and then legitimise the War on Terror.

At the third strategy, perspectivization, all the speakers tried to enhance their trustworthiness and character through certain feelings and attitude in two contrastive strategies. The first strategy is the strategy of involvement, in which the speakers express feelings and attitude in line with the in-group interests to maintain in-group membership. The second strategy is the strategy of detachment thereof the speakers express feelings and attitude maintain their detachment of the out-group membership. The analysis also found that the speakers enforced their places in the discourse of war through the increased use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ in the act of promising and warning, especially by the American speakers more than the Iraqis. Another sharing strategy is the syntactic markers of the active voice, naming and quoting trustworthy people, places and sources, as in the case of the Bush, Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi speeches. Finally, the strategy of mentioning previous landmarked actions or achievements was indicated mainly by Obama’s speech.

Finally, argumentation was the fourth strategy, in which all the speakers relied on their expectations for the future. The four speakers portrayed the future in two different scenarios. While it is a successful future when the War on Terror is authorized, the past will repeat itself if the War on Terror is not authorized. The speakers argued to enhance the audience’s fear of the potential threats tacking the horror of the September attacks to this purpose and tried to emphasize the potential threat of terror attacks as seen in the series of topoi they used. Mainly through the employment of topoi of threat and danger, responsibility, definition, history, abuse burden, disadvantage, burden, finance and number will the growth of terrorism be seen.

The speakers use topoi as a pretext for instigating the war because they were used as a mirror to reflect the problem (i.e. terrorism) and the solution as well (the War on Terror). On the other hand, the speakers utilized topoi to establish grounds for using military force as part of a large quest that aims to protect freedom and liberal values from terrorism aspirations of radical groups like al Qaeda or ISIS (DAESH), serving the interest of the speakers, and promoting the policy of anti-terrorism. By topoi, the speakers try to convince people with their proposals and ensure them that victory is on their side. This can be seen in the use of the topoi of responsibility, humanitarianism, religion and advantage.

In terms of the influence of the ideology on the language of the four speakers, it shows that all of them hold the usual themes, 'freedom', 'liberty' and the 'right leadership', yet each of the speakers has a different understanding of this 'freedom' that they wish to achieve while probably using similar methods of power to achieve it.

Chapter 10: DISCUSSION

10.1. Introduction

The present investigation critically analyses the discourse and the generic structure of the ‘call to arms’ of American and Iraqi political discourses. The study presents a critical analysis of how persuasion was produced and discursively realised in ‘call to arms’ speeches of two American presidents, namely, George W Bush and Barack Obama, and two Iraqi Prime Ministers, Nouri Al-Maliki and Haider Al-Abadi. However, the initial motivation of the study is to understand the ways in which the selected wartime speakers construct a persuasive ‘call to arms’ discourse through specific discursive strategies, which are (re)conceptualized as persuasive projects that lead the public into war.

In line with these aims, this chapter provides an overview of data findings. It then, critically engages with the findings and discusses and evaluates them in contrast to previous studies, and in the context of existing knowledge on persuasion in political discourse and the discourse of the ‘call to arms’ in particular. The discussion and evaluation of findings in relation to previous studies then allows for the critical assessment of the findings, as well as interprets them in light of the discursive level of analysis.

10.2. Results revisited in light of the discursive analysis and wider ‘call to arms’ studies

The DHA analysis and discussion revealed that the discourse of ‘call to arms’, as represented by the four selected speakers, appeared to be organised by a global strategy of positive self- and negative other- representations. The four speakers formulated their ideological aims on the positive representation of ‘the Self’ and the negative representation of ‘the Other’, as a result of which relations of inclusion and exclusion are invariably present, which in turn determine the way the in-group and out-group are presented depending on the speaker’s intention in the discourse. In this respect, the four orators used several linguistic devices that set-up the strategy of the positive self- negative other- representation. One of these linguistic categories is the use of deictic expressions, such as ‘we’ and ‘our’ in opposition to ‘they’ and ‘other’, by which the speakers established and maintained two distinct groups: namely the ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups. This

result echoes the result of Reyes's (2008), who found that pronouns are used to create distance and help speakers to position themselves in relation to specific goals and political agenda.

In the case of the in-group, the 'we' or 'our' were the most recurring and salient reference, the speakers made the perceivers conceptualise group identity as insiders. While on the other hand, the use of 'they' or 'other' would designate an out-group. Van Dijk, as an outstanding political discourse analyst and a 'cognitive activist', emphasised the salient role of the macro strategies of 'positive self-representation' and 'negative other-representation' in 'Polarising' in-group versus out-group ideologies in political discourse. In an intertextual analysis of legitimization in four 'call to arms' speeches including Franklin D Roosevelt and George, Oddo (2011), concludes that in spite of both speakers misleading their public into war, the 'in' and 'out' groups are superordinate thematic categories that covertly legitimatise war.

Drawing on a pragma-cognitive perspective, Wirth-Koliber (2016) examines the diversity and dynamic personal relationships represented in political speeches. The study found that the construction of 'Us'\in-group and 'Them'\out-group is the deictic center of a political speech in relation to warn, to persuade, to accuse, and so forth. The only study I want to mention in this context to credence my research finding is Hodges & Nilep (2007, p. 161), who define the political discourse during wartimes as the discourse of "taking sides", and a good demonstration of that definition is Bush's statement "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (L114-116).

The same is held for the representation of the in-group and out-group actors and their actions. The predication strategies employed in 'Self' and 'Other' representations can be categorized into predications of actors and actions. It associates the 'named' categories to negative consequences in the case of the 'out-group' or positive ones in the case 'in-group' (Khosravi Nik, 2010, p. 57). Perhaps most notably, in common across the four selected speakers, negatively valued nouns, adjectives and processes are almost exclusively utilized to present the 'other', (i.e., out-group) and their actions. Meanwhile, relatively positive nouns, adjectives and processes are typically selected to introduce the 'Self' (i.e., in-group) and their decisions and actions. Through attestations of mainly positive traits, the four speakers represented themselves or the practices and decisions they were looking for that would protect their people, human

rights and promote democracy, as having international dimensions and support, which are inherently good. The good that deserves the negative realities of war, hence the unification behind it, is moral value.

Whereas, the ‘they’ or the ‘out group’ and their actions, are qualified in the predicates in negative terms. Each of these negative predications tends to justify the War on Terror, on one hand, and euphemises the killing and dying that the use of such war compels on the other. al Qaeda, for instance, is negatively evaluated and qualified through undesirable adjectives, such as ‘terrorists’, ‘radical’, ‘murderers’ ‘enemy’ or ‘enemies of freedom’, and they are also linked to negative predicate nouns such as ‘Islamic extremism’, ‘terror’, ‘barbarism’ and ‘Terrorism’. In addition to that, their actions are an ‘act of war’, ‘kill all Americans’, ‘make no distinction between military and civilians’.

For the importance of social representations in interaction and persuasive discourse, the analysis found that the goal of the Iraqi speakers does not deviate from that of the Americans. In both, the speakers attempt to control the shared social representations of particular actors and events. Socially speaking, the four speakers predicated ‘the other’ (actors and acts) within the principles of ‘*SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION*’ (Van Leeuwen, 2008), where ‘the other’ was depicted as thoroughly evil and aberrant. The representations-the Negative-Other in particular, controlled the individual’s actions and sayings in many future situations. Therefore, in all texts, criminalization versus victimization discourse is emphasised before discussing the main goal of the speeches. Once the audience’s attitudes are influenced, for instance on terrorism, no further persuasive attempts may be necessary in order for people to act according to these attitudes, for example, to vote in favour of the speakers’ forthcoming military engagements.

In other words, the four speakers generally focused on social cognition to solicit support from their people. This seems to agree that persuasion “primarily acts on the individual’s attitudes, by which we generally understand an individual’s beliefs about an object, his evaluation of it, and his intentions towards it” (Sandell, 1977, p.70). The analysis and discussion showed a strong ‘in’ and ‘out’ group, dichotomisation is systematically substantiated through the referential and predication strategies. Therefore, keeping these analytical levels separate and independent from each other is hardly feasible as these levels always have ‘dialogic’ relations

to one another in representing social actors and their action to determine the ‘in’ and ‘out’ group; hence, I integrated these strategies into one stage of analysis.

The DHA also allowed for the investigation of the speakers’ perspective, when they demonstrated their positions and points of view to demonstrate their involvement and closeness to the in-group, compared with their distance from the out-group. It also serves to influence the perpetuating and reinforcement of the speakers’ ideology (KhosraviNik, 2010, p.58). The analysis illustrates that all the speakers projected themselves forwards as defenders of their people through the eloquent use of different linguistic tools. For instance, Bush positioned his point of view by means of application of description, syntactic markers, intensification and the strategies of narration. In the same vein, Obama tried to establish a similar effect, but via the use of reporting, the use of description and narration of utterances or events and negation. Al-Maliki, on the other hand, expressed his attitudes and views mainly through four strategies: namely religious references (Qur’anic verses), description of events, reporting of developments and speech acts. By adopting comparable language to Al-Maliki, Al-Abadi followed a similar effect, but he did not use narratives from the religion, such as ‘Qur’anic expressions’, as Al-Maliki had done, even though they belong to the same Islamic political party, ‘*Dawa*’. This suggests that politicians, to satisfy the purpose of the speech (i.e., persuasion), together with the audience’s social, cultural and political background, might represent themselves, and not the ideologies of the party to which they belong. This conclusion differs from the finding of Schäffner (1996, p.203), whose perspective was that in public speeches, politicians do not represent themselves, rather the governments or the parties they belong to.

The DHA analysis and discussion also found that the discourse of the ‘call to arms’ is the discourse of reason, argument and legitimation, typically by drawing upon topoi to provide good reasons, grounds or acceptable motivations of heritage and provenance of past or present events. Khosravi- Nik (2015, p. 64) views topoi as highly conventionalised argumentation places, in which warrants – assumptions that link the evidence to the conclusions – are neither (usually) explained nor challenged. He adds that topoi are usually based on a taken for granted warrant – they can be made explicit, as conditional or causal paraphrases, such as ‘if x, then y’ or ‘y, because of x’.

The speakers feed their argumentation on an unlimited number of topoi to build what could be considered a persuasive conclusion(s) along with their socio-political perspectives, through which in turn justifies their positive and negative attributions of persons or groups. Each of these topoi was conceptualised by the speakers to be a belief system to (de)legitimise or (dis)agree with certain past/present/future activities that motivate people's advocacy to the speakers' suggestions. This is to establish grounds for using military force as part of a large quest that aims to protect freedom and liberal values from terrorist aspirations of radical groups, such as al Qaeda or ISIS (DAESH), serving the interest of the speakers, and promoting the policy of anti-terrorism. For instance, in the case of the topoi of threat and danger, responsibility, burden and the amount of growth of terrorism are seen and described as a hazard that threatens the entire world.

By topoi, the speakers negatively derogate and, hence, delegitimise the other's actions and actors as well, and convince people with their proposals mainly through sets of topoi include in-group victimization versus out-group criminalization. Meanwhile, the speaker operationalised these topoi to legitimate the 'War on Terror'. This means that the process of persuasion is conditioned by the context of the socio-political environment of a speaker, which is an indispensable component of the DHA framework. As an example, Al-Maliki tries to derogate and delegitimise the other's actions and actor through the topoi of religion and religious expressions. In particular, he employs Qur'anic verses to prove that al Qaeda is not an Islamic movement, and its followers are not Muslims and their actions or behaviours are not those of Muslim culture and behaviour. Meanwhile, the use of religion in such a way absolves Muslims in general of being terrorists and Islam of being a terrorist ideology.

It could be suggested that the discourse of 'call to arms' relies largely on the use of topoi (see the analysis chapters), where topoi were used as obligatory explicit or inferable, premises (van Eemeren et al., 1987; 1996), for the sake of persuasion. Persuasion is defined as "the means of intentionally influencing a person so that she or he adopts, fixes or changes her or his way of perception, attitudes and views" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p.69). These changes of perception, attitudes and views are a result of "manipulation of other's minds", of the "manufacturing of consent", or of "artificial activity" (Mulholland, 1994, p.47) or by "empty words and misleading arguments" (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 4). By contrast, I re-conceptualized the way of persuasion

as an interactive process of communication that depends on reason, argument and legitimation. This is because I believe that: 1) war is a social practice that is a dangerous and often-deadly activity, and it must be assigned reason, argument and legitimation before undertaking it. 2) The audience of all the speakers were experts in politics (i.e. policymakers) and had knowledge of the negative realities of war and were not ordinary people that one could persuade (deceive/manipulate) via rhetoric.

Hence, it could be suggested that the second conceptualisation of the way of persuasion is more suited to understanding the discourse of the ‘call to arms’ and evaluate the agenda of the given speakers, and to be a theoretical ground for analysing the selected data, along with to avoid/reduce the possibility of being biased in analysis and conclusion. Thus, critical examination of the employment of topoi in speakers’ argumentation constituted the main part of analysis of strategic persuasive arguments in characterisation of ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups. In this regard, much of the academic social and political studies, such as (Al-Tahmazi, 2016; Kader, 2016; Khosravi Nik, 2002, 2010, 2015; Küçükali, 2014) had valued the crucial role of topoi as a strategic way to legitimate actors and actions for persuasive ends.

However, I realise that some may object to define the discourse of ‘persuasion’ in terms of ‘reason’, ‘argument’ and ‘legitimation’. For instance, Oddo (2011, p. 287), states at all times political leaders mislead the public into war through a manipulative discourse. In his study *“War legitimization discourse: Representing ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in four US presidential addresses”*, Oddo presents an inter-textual analysis of legitimation in four ‘call-to-arms’ speeches by Franklin D Roosevelt and George W Bush. He concludes that, in spite of popular mythology, Bush is not an aberrant American president; he is one of many to have misled the public into going to war. And others like Antonio Reyes (2011), agree with it. Reyes (2011), examines some examples of ‘call to arms’ speeches given by George W Bush and Barack Obama during the ‘War on Terror’, and concludes that ‘call to arms’ discourse is a discourse of cause to legitimise.

With regards to the use of mitigation and intensification strategies, it found that the American speakers intensified and mitigated certain actors and activities for persuasive ends through using specific words, such as nouns, pronouns, adjectives, adverbs and verbs and negation. Therefore,

they were analysed and discussed in separate sections. While, the analysis of the Iraqi data showed that most frequent strategies of Iraqi speakers are the use of speech acts and verbs of saying, where their influence can be seen at all levels of analysis from referential to argumentation strategies. Hence, no separate sections headed '*mitigation and intensification strategies*' appear in chapters 7 & 8.

To take this point one further step, the analysis and discussion found a significant use of questions in place of assertions and verbs of feeling and thinking and adverbs in the rhetoric of American Presidents. While on the other side, the Iraqi political leaders were limited to the repeated use of verbs of saying, and the effective use of speech acts, which can also be seen as a traditional characteristic of Arabic rhetoric. The most frequent of these speech acts included blaming, accusing or insulting the 'Other' (terrorists), which can be seen as part of the speakers' determination to explain themselves and emphasize their personal beliefs and convictions. This echoes with the result of Balfaqeeh's (2007). She critically analysed some English and Arabic political speeches delivered during the war on Iraq. As such, a speech act is a potential de-legitimation of the way others act because it presented them negatively, and at the same time a legitimation of the Self-act because it introduced the speaker positively, which in turn fuels audiences' mobilisation in deploying more support.

Moreover, the analysis showed that the American informants insert 'we' instead of 'I' as an indirect micro-mitigation; while in the meantime, the Iraqi informants insert 'we' instead of 'I' as indirect micro-intensification strategy. It seems to be an assertion of 'I' or the 'members of the government and myself', instead of 'we', such as:

We are working diligently with free people in the world to return Iraq to take the position it deserves (Al-Maliki, L49-50).

We are making progress in the programmes that we proposed during the first six months to achieve all our obligations to the Iraqi people (Al-Abadi, L33-34).

The last finding that I want to highlight puts special focus on the American speakers' use of analogy (i.e., previous wars) as a common place strategy to topicalise and de-topicalise their point of view about the War on Terror. In this connection, Bush refers to some previous wars to intensify (his) the War on |Terror, as in the following:

This war will not like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes (Bush, L 105-109).

The same can be seen in terms of Obama's perspective about the use of force, but to mitigate his strategy of the War on Terror, as illustrated in the following example:

I want the American people to understand how this effort will be different from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will not involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil. This counterterrorism campaign will be I through a steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever they exist, using our air power and our support for partner forces on the ground (Obama, L 107-111).

The above examples and many more reflect the socio-cultural context where discourses were embedded. These examples invoke Hall's (1989) concepts of high context and low cultural contexts, which refer to how people (i.e., discourse producers) communicate in diverse cultures to affect not only the way arguments transmission, but also the communication and relation patterns. Differences can be derived from the extent to which meaning is transmitted through actual words used or implied by the context (MacLachlan, 2010). For instances, the American speakers intensified and mitigated certain actors and activities for persuasive ends through using specific words, such as nouns, pronouns, adjectives, adverbs and verbs and negation. Whereas, the analysis of the Iraqi data showed that most frequent strategies of Iraqi speakers are the use of speech acts and verbs of saying, where their influence can be deduced at all levels of the analysis from referential to argumentation strategies. This, in turn, leaves more leeway for emotions and less space for neutrality (Hall, 1989, p. 106). It also was noticed that American nationalism (the Nation-State), was the most significant legitimating source of external power, while the analysis so far showed that the Iraqi, Al-Maliki for instance, employed religion (God and Qur'anic verses) as an external power.

This result echoes and confirms Khatib's conclusion that "Arabic cultures are considered high context in terms of a communication style and American/European cultures are low context." In terms of the high context cultures, a lot of unspoken information is implicitly transferred during communication and must be deduced from the context and interpreted by the receiver (Khatib, 2015). They start their argument with an introduction or side information to send an

implicit message before getting to the core topic. Low context cultures, as in case of the American speakers, information delivered through clear, direct and explicit approach, the way which leaves less leeway for emotions and more space for neutrality (Khatib, 2015). Hence, it is possible to say that this analysis and its findings can be seen as a form of comparison between English and Arabic speakers.

In conclusion, the study presented four different texts whereby the speakers argued in diverse linguistic choices to promote public support towards a war, and even then, there were obvious differences in context, style and representation. In fact, the analysis views the American ‘call to arms’ rhetoric as not being too far a departure from the Iraqi ‘call to arms’ rhetoric. Sufficient evidence exists to suggest beyond doubt that the composition of the ‘call to arms’ core structures of all four orators meet the criteria of the four identically (generic) forceful constituents. These constituents are not changed in any significant way since the last millennium (see Graham et al., 2004). Firstly, all agree on the construction of the thoroughly evil, despicable and abhorrent ‘Other’. Secondly, they call upon their people to approve the use of force to legitimately employ an external source of power to eradicate the threat of terrorism. Thirdly, by appealing for a united front, they convince their audience that their actions are for the greater good and are justifiable and fourthly, they appeal for history in terms of culture and society. The following four sub-sections illustrate how the speakers in this study implemented these four powerful constituents.

10.3. The construction of a thoroughly evil other.

The analysis and discussion of the previous four chapters found that *Other* representations were inherently tethered, either by association to analogy of similar infamous historical events, e.g. ‘the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies’, or autocratic/totalitarian regimes, e.g. ‘fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism’, and tyrant characters, e.g. ‘Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein’. These were examples the speakers employed to vilify the other, the enemy that must be wiped from the face of the earth for their historical evil consequences, where negative references and characterizations were the main bulk in terms of recurrence to their personalities, actions and behaviors. In many respects, ‘taken the lives of Journalists’, ‘raping women and children’ are all fatal incidents that immediately capture attention, instill fear and cause decision-makers to re-evaluate what they have taken for granted for a long time.

As such, the ‘other’ is displayed through the Foucauldian concepts of ‘division and rejection’ (Foucault, 1972), wherein the given speakers established an inclusive ‘us’ and an exclusive ‘them’ (Reyes, 2008, 2011).

Focusing on those fatal incidents also enhanced the speakers’ moral superiority and credibility for its phenomenological potential that shapes arguments into meaning-endowed structures. These connections serve to influence the live audience (individuals) and their unique personal models. Indeed, they affect people’s social cognition. Social cognition is a sub-topic of social psychology that focuses on how people process, store, and apply information about other people and social situations at a group level or on a one-to-one basis (Frith & Blakemore, 2006, p. 138). Accordingly, the four speakers focused on particular notorious examples to constitute and maintain the discourse of thoroughly evil ‘Other’. Some of these examples are below:

The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children (Bush, L5052).

Terrorists are unique in their brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They enslave, rape, and force women into marriage. They threatened a religious minority with genocide. And in acts of barbarism, they took the lives of two American journalists Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff (Obama, L25-29).

Terrorism, which wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak; in reality, wages a war on Islam and Muslims and values and spreads hatred between humanity (Al-Maliki, L18-20).

DAESH does not differentiate between people in committing atrocities, and that the beheadings and mass murder and enslavement of women and children have been targeting people from all ethnic groups and religions, regardless of their affiliations and geographic boundaries (Al-Abadi, L13-16).

These examples have made a very emotional and strongly opinionated mental model held by the audience about their future or (at least the future of what the ‘Other’ (i.e. DAESH) hopes to achieve), the possibility of violence, aggression and death. Hence, the speakers displayed the present as a crucial factor to legitimate the ‘War on Terror’, as related to a cause that occurred in the past and to avoid repeating it in the future. In this context, Reyes (2011, p.793) highlights the importance of timeline in the ‘call to arms’ discourse in which social representation is a very emotional strategy that made a strong impact on the audience’s mental models. The speakers used this in order to gear their people’s mental models as desired. Thus, the generalization of

fear is dramatically legitimating military intervention. It is also in this sense that persuasion is a discursive practice that involves both cognitive and social dimensions.

10.4. Legitimizing external sources of power

Each of the four texts that were presented in the analysis chapters contains key features for legitimating an external source of power invoked by the orators. These sources are inherently good, and the ultimate moral within the societal order of the discourse of the day. Taking this one step further, the analysis and discussion showed that the speakers, in addition to their political and social positions, drew on various external legitimating forces to get people to lay down their lives for a particular reason external to their personal aims and interests.

In the case of the American orators, it was noticed that American nationalism (the Nation-State), was the most significant legitimating source of external power, while the analysis so far showed that the Iraqi, Al-Maliki for instance, employed religion (God and Qur'anic verses) as an external power. That would establish a mental model held by the audience that the war they are calling for is not of his willing but is the will of God. Whereas, country, state, democracy and human rights were external sources of power for Al-Abadi in order to legitimate his exhortations. Operationalizing power as such (behind discourse, e.g. the power of text, and in discourse, e.g. the pre-existing social structure) serves to fuel a mobilization in deploying discursive sources in the promotion and defence of such principles and foundations.

10.5. Unification behind the greater good

Each of the extracts that were presented by the four speakers is an appeal for the discursive unification of self (we and our, the inside group) in opposition to the 'Other' (terrorism, al Qaeda, ISIS). It serves a double purpose. While, on the one hand, it strongly opposes the activities and behaviours of the terrorists, the 'Other', it seeks to construct and promote the speaker's proposals. The speakers connected between the external legitimating force (source of power) and their action (anti-terrorism) to surround themselves as much as possible with partners in order to support their suggested 'War on Terror'. From the benefit of religion as a greater good and source of unification (God and Qur'anic verses), the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki legitimated the use of force against terrorists and terrorism on one hand. Additionally,

he persuaded the world in general, and the Islamic world in particular, that terrorists are not Muslims, and terrorism is not an Islamic ideology. Therefore, the use of military intervention against them is justified in accordance with the principles and foundations of Islam and faithful Muslims. This indicates that the speaker and Muslims, in general, are the background to Islam and its principles in their Self-identity and oppose it to the group of ‘Other’ (terrorists and terrorism).

Similarly, the US Presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama employed the aim of defending freedom, a greater good for unifying the Americans and the world behind the suggested ‘War on Terror’, as it will fight “enemies of freedom” (L35) and “we [Americans] are called to defend freedom.” (L12-13). This fuels a mobilisation in deploying a discursive source of support in the promotion and defence of such foundations and identity, including the campaign for defending freedom, as it tacitly represented the ‘Other’ with being uncivilised, ignorant and primitive.

10.6. The significance of history in relation to culture and society

The analysis and discussion of the texts that were analysed found that each speaker drew connections between the exhortations being voiced and the popular historical consciousness of the audience. This result has been supported by Halliday (1993), who states, “for an audience to understand what the orator is persuading them to do, it must be linked to a popular perception of what has previously occurred within their social system” (Halliday 1993, quoted in Graham et al., 2004, p. 209). As a case in point, the US former President Obama reminded the American people about the act of barbarism the ISIS groups committed when they took the lives of two American journalists — Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff. Along with other specific examples, this refers to events, which took place in 1991. In his speech to the US Congress members, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Al-Maliki, reminded the live audience present (Members of the US Congress) as well as the world of the negative consequences of not supporting Iraqis in 1991, and as such Al-Maliki therefore, advised them never to allow the events of 1991 be repeated. Inasmuch, focusing on the rhetoric of the past and the present serves a double purpose. While on the one hand, it seems to be an essential factor of extreme hortatory discourse to use force to hinder repeated actions like these in future (hypothetical future), it is an appeal to emote the audience, specifically by fear. In line with a historical understanding of these events and as seen

historically, it is one of the recurring categories of ‘Other’, as opposed to the representation of the Self and vice versa.

10.7. Summary

The aim of this chapter was to summarize and then discuss the findings of the analysed four chapters in light of the discursive analysis, literature review and existing knowledge of persuasion and ‘call to arms’ discourse. The discussion of the results viewed that American rhetoric is not too much of a departure from the Iraqi ‘call to arms’. It seems plausible to believe that both respond to four similar and similarly powerful constituents previously mentioned. Theoretically, the study found that persuasion is an interactive process of communication that depends on reason, argument and legitimation. It also found that persuasion is inherently a pre-planning communication activity, not accidental ones. Methodologically, the study found, the discursive strategies, provided by the DHA can provide a fruitful framework for the analysis of ‘call to arms’ discourse to guide the investigation of how given speakers frame their arguments (nature and quality) in order to convince the public of the virtue of the ‘War on Terror’ so that they will support it.

CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION

The main objective of this thesis was to advance the understanding of the ways in which political figures (wartime leaders) maintain and expand discursive structures and strategies through a set of linguistic processes/mechanisms as a strategic tool to promote a war. Ultimately, at a broader level, this was meant to shed light on how ‘call to arms’ speeches are persuasive within political discourse, and how these speeches are perpetuated by means of public speeches. In order to achieve these aims, the study approached some selected American and Iraqi ‘call to arms’ speeches which were delivered during the War on Terror, from a critical discourse analytical perspective. In this respect, four specific speeches: two by American Presidents, namely, George W Bush and Barack Obama, and two others which were delivered by two Iraqi Prime Ministers, Nouri Al-Maliki and Haider Al-Abadi were analysed with the methodological tools provided by the DHA (Resigil & Wodak, 2001).

The study re-conceptualised discursive strategies as persuasive projects and analysed them with the help of the DHA methodological categories including, *referential*, *predicational*, *perspectivization*, *argumentative strategies (Topoi)* and *the strategies of intensification and mitigation* in order to examine the discursive structures and strategies that were employed by the four selected speakers during their chosen speeches to present a persuasive call to arms discourse. Furthermore, these speeches were analysed to identify how these discursive structures and strategies are conceptualized by them to be persuasive projects to promote a war. To that effect, the thesis attempted to answer the following overarching research question:

What are the nature and quality of discursive strategies used in ‘call to arms’ speeches on the War on Terror as represented in an influential American and Iraqi political discourse?

This primary research question operationalized by three sets of subordinate methodological, empirical and theoretical questions to guide the analytical focus of this thesis. In terms of the methodological perspective, the study dealt with the potential operationalization of the empirical aims of the thesis. It explored the possible methods/approaches that fill the gap between the context of production and reception/evaluation of persuasion in the discourse of ‘call to arms’.

When considering the evaluation of persuasion, it was innovatively bridged by employing Atkinson's (1984) perspective, where the audience's reaction of applauding or shouting are stances of a speaker's gains (persuasion). This facilitated the cross fertilisation between two, often perceived as unrelated, approaches, viz pragmatics (in this case persuasion) and CDA. The CDA studies concentrate on speakers rather than listeners as an integral element of their investigations. This cross-fertilization made it analytically possible to trace the attitudinal and affective repercussions, and the moral implications of the different arguments, which seek pragmatically, (speaker-hearer interaction) to reject Others and accept Self.

Additionally, the study provided fresh insights into DHA in two ways. Firstly, it identified sets of topoi, content-related argumentation schemes (Kienpointner, 1992; Van Eemeren et al. 1996) which were used as stereotypical arguments in the analysed data. These sets of topoi were in-group victimisation versus out-group criminalisation, and in-group authorisation (claims of majority) versus out-group de-authorisation (claims of the minority). Secondly, the thesis also made another significant contribution to the application of the DHA. Originally, the DHA was established to investigate the discourse of discrimination and racism (Reisigl and Wodak 2000; Wodak and Meyer 2001, 2014; Kader, 2016), and the discursive constructions of national identity (Wodak et al 1999; De Cillia et al 1999; Khosravi Nik & Zia, 2014; Aydin-Duzgit, 2015). The focus of this research on persuasion in 'call to arms' discourse highlights the potential application of the DHA to an area outside its traditional playing field. Furthermore, the thesis also tested the DHA approach by using its methodological tools to analyse two different languages (i.e., English and Arabic).

In terms of a theoretical perspective, the study highlighted an important perspective in terms of the genre of the 'call to arms' itself and persuasion studies. With regard to the 'call to arms' genre, the study sheds light on the nature and quality of discursive strategies used in Iraqi (Middle-Eastern) 'call to arms' discourse on the War on Terror as represented by influential Iraqi political leaders (Al-Maliki and Al-Abadi) words in relation to two American Presidents (Bush and Obama) in these emerging fields of scholarship. The other significant perspective to the study of persuasion that the thesis established was the (re)conceptualization of the notion of persuasion as a discourse of reason, argument and a necessary association to legitimization. Empirically, the study provides an interdisciplinary perspective for understanding and

evaluating persuasive ‘call to arms’ discourses. To summarise, the study developed an analytical framework to address the processes involved in persuasion, which allows us to reconsider the nature of persuasive ‘call to arms’ discourse. Working within the general guidelines of CDA and the instruments of DHA, the general orientation of this thesis was towards explicating how ‘call to arms’ discourse may come to perceive persuasive politics within two different socio-political discourse. In this respect, the study reveals that each of the under-investigated speakers practices his own rhetoric/technique to persuade and influence his audience to promote the War on Terror. However, the analysis of the data demonstrated that the American ‘call to arms’ rhetoric is not too much of a departure from the Iraqi ‘call to arms’. Hence, it can be possible to perceive a number of characteristics that characterize their speeches.

The first is that all four speakers fuel fears of a hypothetical future on the audience to lead them into war. They are "creating representations of 'what people can be led to expect of the future', which is an especially potent means by which political actors shape the political cognitions and behaviour of large numbers of people" (Hodges & Nilep, 2007, p. 21). In so doing, the speakers drew upon what are inherently tethered, whether by association or not, to negative historical events, e.g. ‘the same murderers’, authoritarian regimes, e.g. ‘fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism’, and infamous individuals, e.g. ‘Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein’. This potential threat is recognized throughout the construction of a thoroughly evil ‘Other’, which was used as a pretext for instigating the war and/or supporting it.

The second is what can be described as the de-legitimation of the enemy actors and actions common to all four speakers. The ‘Other’ (enemy) was described as “enemies of freedom”, “traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself”, ‘entity is not Islamic nor a state, and they ‘wrap themselves in a fake Islamic cloak’. This strategy of de-legitimation emphasizes the negative representation of the ‘Other’. This, on the other hand, describes the speakers’ war in terms of legitimated actions for its inherent good, and the ultimate morale within the societal order of the discourse of the day. The good that makes the unpleasant realities of war seem necessary and acceptable.

The third is that the four speakers deployed moralised lexico-grammatical resources (Oddo, 2001) to advance the semantic categories of the in-group and out-group related to central ideological polarization (such as religion, democracy, freedom and human rights), which were

operationalized as external sources of power. Hence, the speakers formulate their speeches in terms of the strategy of taking sides. This strategy is widely used when the discourse of war “becomes particularly apparent at times when a war, or a nation's active participation in a war, is at stake” (Hodge & Nilep, 2007, p. 161), usually through the principle of ‘incitement and intimidation’.

The fourth is that even though Aristotle’s means of persuasion were outlined more than 2300 years ago, they are still relevant in our contemporary rhetoric, and at any stage of the analysed data. These structural principles are *logos*, the rational argument; *pathos*, the arousing of the audience’s emotions and *ethos*, the speakers’ character.

To summarise, all the selected four speakers share the use of expectation of the hypothetical future of potential threat, de-legitimation of the enemy and legitimation of the self, moral argument, and the use of ideological polarising, such as religion, democracy, and freedom as strategies/persuasive ways to win over their audience’s support. Hence, the American ‘call to arms’ rhetoric is not dissimilar to the Iraqi ‘call to arms’ rhetoric at least in the discourse of the War on Terror.

11.2. Limitations and challenges

There are some limitations and shortcomings, which restricted the scope and border of this thesis. Therefore, these limitations and shortcomings should be highlighted in order to guide potential studies. Firstly, the study limits itself to the American and Iraqi political discourse as contemporary examples of ‘call to arms’ discourse. Secondly, the nature of the design and aim of the thesis made it difficult to produce largescale quantitative results. Therefore, the research had a predominantly micro-analytical perspective that drew on qualitative analysis, thereof, the findings can not be generalized (Blumberg et al., 2008). Thirdly, the thesis mirrors only male persuasive strategies in the ‘call to arms’ discourse. This was as a result of the selected samples. Finally, some Paralinguistic strategies such as (pace of delivery, pitch, pause, and intensity), which are widely used in public speeches for persuasive ends, could not be shown in the analysed texts. The constraints of the length of time in the research have not allowed me to conduct these strategies, and they must be left to later researchers.

11.3. Potential for further research

As the thesis provides a cross-connection of views between language and politics, there is much potential for further research that can develop from this thesis. In this respect, a potential study can be carried out to investigate the persuasive strategies used in the speeches of male and female speakers in the domain of politics. This type of work can provide an idea regarding the preferences of persuasive strategies in terms of gender. Moreover, it would be useful to investigate a quantitative study that traces ‘call to arms’ discourses over a long period of time in certain political discourse, which can allow for a better understanding of self-positioning in a variety of political discourses that have extensive effective possibilities. There is also the potential to conduct a comparative study that analyses political persuasiveness discourse in two different political party speakers in terms of production or reception, or both, to identify cross-ideological variations, in terms of the political underpinnings and argumentative structures that shape the discourse of these parties.

Likewise, along with the number of academic studies that have positioned themselves between language and politics, I hope this thesis will increase and contribute to the understanding of language as an instrument of symbolic power and a tool of control at times of war or when a nation is actively participating in a war. This was my first and foremost aim in undertaking this research.

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APPENDICES: THE ANALYZED TEXTS

Appendix 1: The speech of George W Bush

1 Mr. Speaker, Mr. President Pro Tempore, members of Congress and fellow Americans:
2 In the normal course of events, Presidents come to this chamber to report on the state
3 of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the American
4 people. We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on
5 the ground — passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you please
6 help me to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight. We have seen the state of our Union
7 in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the
8 lighting of candles, and the giving of blood, the saying of prayers — in English, Hebrew, and
9 Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of
10 strangers their own. My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for
11 itself the state of our Union — and it is strong. Tonight, we are a country awakened to danger
12 and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether
13 we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.
14 I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of America was touched
15 on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of
16 this Capitol, singing “God Bless America.” And you did more than sing; you acted, by
17 delivering \$40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military. Speaker
18 Hastert, Minority Leader Gephardt, Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Lott, I thank you for
19 your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our country.
20 And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of support. America
21 will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at Buckingham Palace, on the
22 streets of Paris, and at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate. We will not forget South Korean children
23 gathering to pray outside our embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque
24 in Cairo. We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa
25 and Latin America. Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own:
26 dozens of Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis; more than 250 citizens of India; men and women
27 from El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan; and hundreds of British citizens. America has no
28 truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together in a great cause. I’m so

29 honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with
30 America. Thank you for coming, friend.

31 On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.
32 Americans have known wars — but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil,
33 except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war — but not at the
34 center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks — but
35 never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day — and
36 night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

37 Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? The
38 evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations
39 known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in
40 Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole. Al Qaeda is to terror what the
41 mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world — and
42 imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. The terrorists practice a fringe form of
43 Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim
44 clerics — a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists’
45 directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no
46 distinction among military and civilians, including women and children. This group and its
47 leader — a person named Osama bin Laden — are linked to many other organizations in
48 different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of
49 Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited
50 from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan,
51 where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide
52 in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction. The leadership of al Qaeda has great
53 influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country.
54 In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda’s vision for the world. Afghanistan’s people have been
55 brutalized — many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school.
56 You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate.
57 A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough. The United States respects
58 the people of Afghanistan — after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid —
59 but we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening

60 people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and
61 abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. And tonight, the United States of
62 America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all
63 the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American
64 citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers
65 in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in
66 Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to
67 appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can
68 make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or
69 discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or
70 they will share in their fate. I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the
71 world. We respect your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by
72 millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful,
73 and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists
74 are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is
75 not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network
76 of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda,
77 but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
78 found, stopped and defeated. Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we
79 see right here in this chamber — a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-
80 appointed. They hate our freedoms — our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our
81 freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They want to overthrow existing
82 governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want
83 to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions
84 of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of
85 life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and
86 forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way. We are not deceived
87 by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the
88 murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions
89 — by abandoning every value except the will to power they follow in the path of fascism, and
90 Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in

history's unmarked grave of discarded lies. Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command — every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war — to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network. This war will not like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me — the Office of Homeland Security. And tonight I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend — Pennsylvania's Tom Ridge. He will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks that may come. These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows. Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I've called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud. This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all

122 who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us.
123 We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking
124 systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many
125 international organizations have already responded—with sympathy and with support. Nations
126 from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO
127 Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized
128 world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their
129 own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down
130 buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what—we're
131 not going to allow it. Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live
132 your lives, and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be
133 calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat. I ask you to uphold the values of
134 America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and
135 our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or
136 unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith. I ask you to continue to
137 support the victims of this tragedy with your contributions. Those who want to give can go to a
138 central source of information, libertyunites.org, to find the names of groups providing direct
139 help in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The thousands of FBI agents who are now at
140 work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it. I ask for your
141 patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security; and for your
142 patience in what will be a long struggle. I ask your continued participation and confidence in
143 the American economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not
144 touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise
145 of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11th, and they
146 are our strengths today.

147 And, finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families, for those in
148 uniform, and for our great country. Prayer has comforted us in sorrow, and will help strengthen
149 us for the journey ahead. Tonight I thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done
150 and for what you will do. And ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I thank you, their
151 representatives, for what you have already done and for what we will do together. Tonight, we
152 face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to improve air safety, to

dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency. We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike. We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy, and put our people back to work. Tonight we welcome two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers: Governor George Pataki, and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. As a symbol of America's resolve, my administration will work with Congress, and these two leaders, to show the world that we will rebuild New York City. After all that has just passed — all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes that died with them — it is natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world. Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom — the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time — now depends on us. Our nation — this generation — will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened. We'll remember the moment the news came — where we were and what we were doing. Some will remember an image of a fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever. And I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended, and a task that does not end. I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people. The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is

184 certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God
185 is not neutral between them. Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice —assured
186 of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us,
187 may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.
188

Appendix 2: The speech of Barack Obama

1 My fellow Americans, tonight I want to speak to you about what the United States will do with
2 our friends and allies to degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL. As
3 Commander-in-Chief, my highest priority is the security of the American people. Over the last
4 several years, we have consistently taken the fight to terrorists who threaten our country. We
5 took out Osama bin Laden and much of al Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
6 We've targeted al Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen, and recently eliminated the top commander of its
7 affiliate in Somalia. We've done so while bringing more than 140,000 American troops home
8 from Iraq, and drawing down our forces in Afghanistan, where our combat mission will end
9 later this year. Thanks to our military and counterterrorism professionals, America is safer. Still,
10 we continue to face a terrorist threat. We can't erase every trace of evil from the world, and
11 small groups of killers have the capacity to do great harm. That was the case before 9/11, and
12 that remains true today. And that's why we must remain vigilant as threats emerge. At this
13 moment, the greatest threats come from the Middle East and North Africa, where radical groups
14 exploit grievances for their own gain. And one of those groups is ISIL — which calls itself the
15 "Islamic State." Now let's make two things clear: ISIL is not "Islamic." No religion condones
16 the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of ISIL's victims have been Muslim. And ISIL
17 is certainly not a state. It was formerly al Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq, and has taken advantage of
18 sectarian strife and Syria's civil war to gain territory on both sides of the Iraq-Syrian border. It
19 is recognized by no government, nor by the people it subjugates. ISIL is a terrorist organization,
20 pure and simple. And it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way. In a
21 region that has known so much bloodshed, these terrorists are unique in their brutality. They
22 execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They enslave, rape, and force women into
23 marriage. They threatened a religious minority with genocide. And in acts of barbarism, they
24 took the lives of two American journalists — Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff. So ISIL poses a
25 threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and the broader Middle East — including American
26 citizens, personnel and facilities. If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat
27 beyond that region, including to the United States. While we have not yet detected specific
28 plotting against our homeland, ISIL leaders have threatened America and our allies. Our

29 Intelligence Community believes that thousands of foreigners — including Europeans and some
30 Americans — have joined them in Syria and Iraq. Trained and battle-hardened, these fighters
31 could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks. I know many Americans
32 are concerned about these threats. Tonight, I want you to know that the United States of
33 America is meeting them with strength and resolve. Last month, I ordered our military to take
34 targeted action against ISIL to stop its advances. Since then, we've conducted more than 150
35 successful airstrikes in Iraq. These strikes have protected American personnel and facilities,
36 killed ISIL fighters, destroyed weapons, and given space for Iraqi and Kurdish forces to reclaim
37 key territory. These strikes have also helped save the lives of thousands of innocent men,
38 women and children. But this is not our fight alone. American power can make a decisive
39 difference, but we cannot do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves, nor can we take the
40 place of Arab partners in securing their region. And that's why I've insisted that additional U.S.
41 action depended upon Iraqis forming an inclusive government, which they have now done in
42 recent days. So tonight, with a new Iraqi government in place, and following consultations with
43 allies abroad and Congress at home, I can announce that America will lead a broad coalition to
44 roll back this terrorist threat. Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy,
45 ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy. First, we will conduct
46 a systematic campaign of airstrikes against these terrorists. Working with the Iraqi government,
47 we will expand our efforts beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions, so
48 that we're hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on offense. Moreover, I have made it clear that
49 we will hunt down terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are. That means I will not
50 hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my
51 presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven. Second, we will increase our
52 support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground. In June, I deployed several hundred
53 American service members to Iraq to assess how we can best support Iraqi security forces. Now
54 that those teams have completed their work — and Iraq has formed a government — we will
55 send an additional 475 service members to Iraq. As I have said before, these American forces
56 will not have a combat mission — we will not get dragged into another ground war in Iraq. But
57 they are needed to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment.
58 We'll also support Iraq's efforts to stand up National Guard Units to help Sunni communities
59 secure their own freedom from ISIL's control. Across the border, in Syria, we have ramped up

our military assistance to the Syrian opposition. Tonight, I call on Congress again to give us additional authorities and resources to train and equip these fighters. In the fight against ISIL, we cannot rely on an Assad regime that terrorizes its own people — a regime that will never regain the legitimacy it has lost. Instead, we must strengthen the opposition as the best counterweight to extremists like ISIL, while pursuing the political solution necessary to solve Syria's crisis once and for all. Third, we will continue to draw on our substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks. Working with our partners, we will redouble our efforts to cut off its funding; improve our intelligence; strengthen our defenses; counter its warped ideology; and stem the flow of foreign fighters into and out of the Middle East. And in two weeks, I will chair a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to further mobilize the international community around this effort. Fourth, we will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who have been displaced by this terrorist organization. This includes Sunni and Shia Muslims who are at grave risk, as well as tens of thousands of Christians and other religious minorities. We cannot allow these communities to be driven from their ancient homelands. So this is our strategy. And in each of these four parts of our strategy, America will be joined by a broad coalition of partners. Already, allies are flying planes with us over Iraq; sending arms and assistance to Iraqi security forces and the Syrian opposition; sharing intelligence; and providing billions of dollars in humanitarian aid. Secretary Kerry was in Iraq today meeting with the new government and supporting their efforts to promote unity. And in the coming days he will travel across the Middle East and Europe to enlist more partners in this fight, especially Arab nations who can help mobilize Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria, to drive these terrorists from their lands. This is American leadership at its best: We stand with people who fight for their own freedom, and we rally other nations on behalf of our common security and common humanity. My administration has also secured bipartisan support for this approach here at home. I have the authority to address the threat from ISIL, but I believe we are strongest as a nation when the President and Congress work together. So I welcome congressional support for this effort in order to show the world that Americans are united in confronting this danger. Now, it will take time to eradicate a cancer like ISIL. And any time we take military action, there are risks involved — especially to the servicemen and women who carry out these missions. But I want the American people to understand how this effort will be different from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will not

involve American combat troops fighting on foreign soil. This counterterrorism campaign will be I through a steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever they exist, using our air power and our support for partner forces on the ground. This strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years. And it is consistent with the approach I outlined earlier this year: to use force against anyone who threatens America's core interests, but to mobilize partners wherever possible to address broader challenges to international order. My fellow Americans, we live in a time of great change. Tomorrow marks 13 years since our country was attacked. Next week marks six years since our economy suffered its worst setback since the Great Depression. Yet despite these shocks, through the pain we have felt and the grueling work required to bounce back, America is better positioned today to seize the future than any other nation on Earth. Our technology companies and universities are unmatched. Our manufacturing and auto industries are thriving. Energy independence is closer than it's been in decades. For all the work that remains, our businesses are in the longest uninterrupted stretch of job creation in our history. Despite all the divisions and discord within our democracy, I see the grit and determination and common goodness of the American people every single day — and that makes me more confident than ever about our country's future. Abroad, American leadership is the one constant in an uncertain world. It is America that has the capacity and the will to mobilize the world against terrorists. It is America that has rallied the world against Russian aggression, and in support of the Ukrainian peoples' right to determine their own destiny. It is America — our scientists, our doctors, our know-how — that can help contain and cure the outbreak of Ebola. It is America that helped remove and destroy Syria's declared chemical weapons so that they can't pose a threat to the Syrian people or the world again. And it is America that is helping Muslim communities around the world not just in the fight against terrorism, but in the fight for opportunity, and tolerance, and a more hopeful future. America, our endless blessings bestow an enduring burden. But as Americans, we welcome our responsibility to lead. From Europe to Asia, from the far reaches of Africa to war-torn capitals of the Middle East, we stand for freedom, for justice, for dignity. These are values that have guided our nation since its founding. Tonight, I ask for your support in carrying that leadership forward. I do so as a Commander-in-Chief who could not be prouder of our men and women in

121 uniform — pilots who bravely fly in the face of danger above the Middle East, and service
122 members who support our partners on the ground.

123 When we helped prevent the massacre of civilians trapped on a distant mountain, here's what
124 one of them said: "We owe our American friends our lives. Our children will always remember
125 that there was someone who felt our struggle and made a long journey to protect innocent
126 people." That is the difference we make in the world. And our own safety, our own security,
127 depends upon our willingness to do what it takes to defend this nation and uphold the values
128 that we stand for — timeless ideals that will endure long after those who offer only hate and
129 destruction have been vanquished from the Earth. May God bless our troops, and may God
130 bless the United States of America.

Appendix 3: The speech of Nouri Al-Maliki

1 In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Your Excellency the speaker of the
2 House, Mr. Vice President, honorable ladies and gentlemen, members of Congress, it is with
3 great pleasure that I am able to take this opportunity to be the first democratically and
4 constitutionally elected prime minister of Iraq to address you, the elected representatives of the
5 American people. And I thank you for affording me this unique chance to speak at this respected
6 assembly. Let me begin by thanking the American people, through you, on behalf of the Iraqi
7 people, for supporting our people in ousting dictatorship. Iraq will not forget those who stood
8 with him and who continues to stand with him in times of need. (Applause.) Thank you for your
9 continued resolve in helping us fight the terrorists plaguing Iraq, which is a struggle to defend
10 our nascent democracy and our people who aspire to liberty, democracy, human rights and the
11 rule of law. All of those are not unfamiliar values; they are universal values for humanity.
12 (Applause.) They are as much for me the pinnacle embodiment of my faith and religion, and
13 they are for all free spirits. The war on terror is a real war against those who wish to burn out
14 the flame of freedom, and we are in this battle vanguard for defending the values of humanity.
15 (Applause.) I know that some of you here question whether Iraq is part of the war on terror. Let
16 me be very clear — this is a battle between true Islam, for which a person's liberty and rights
17 constitute essential cornerstones, and terrorism, which wraps itself in a fake Islamic cloak; in
18 reality, wages a war on Islam and Muslims and values — (applause) — and spreads hatred
19 between humanity. Contrary to what's come in our Koran, which says we have created of you
20 — of male and female and made you tribes and families that you know each other, surely noblest
21 of you in the sight of God is the best conduct. The truth is that terrorism has no religion. Our
22 faith say that who kills an innocent as it has killed all mankind. Thousands of lives were
23 tragically lost in September 11th, where — when these imposters of Islam reared their ugly
24 head. Thousands more continue to die in Iraq today at the hands of the same terrorists who show
25 complete disregard for human life. Your loss on that day was the loss of all mankind, and our
26 loss today is loss for all free people. (Applause) And wherever human kind suffers a loss at the
27 hands of terrorists, it is a loss of all humanity. It is your duty and our duty to defeat this terror.
28 Iraq is the front line is this struggle, and history will prove that the sacrifices of Iraqis for

29 freedom will not be in vain. Iraqis are your allies in the war on terror. (Applause.) And history
30 will record their bravery and humanity. The fate of our country and the world countries is tied
31 to each other. If democracy be allowed to fail in Iraq and terror permitted to triumph, then the
32 war on terror will never be won elsewhere. Mr. Speaker, we are building the new Iraq on the
33 foundation of democracy, and are erecting it through our belief in the rights of every individual,
34 just as opposite Saddam, who destroyed it through his abuse of all those rights, so that future
35 Iraqi generations can live in peace, prosperity and hope. Iraqis have tasted freedom, and we will
36 defend it absolutely. (Applause.) Every human possesses inalienable rights as it is stated in the
37 International Convention of Human Rights. They transcend religion, race and gender, and God
38 says in the Koran, and surely we have honored all children of Adam. I believe these human
39 rights are not an artifact construct reserved for the few; they are the divine entitlement for all.
40 (Applause.) And it is on this unwavering belief that we are determined to build our nation, a
41 land whose people are free, whose air is liberty, and where the rule of law is supreme. This is
42 the new Iraq, which is emerging from the ashes of dictatorship, and the carnage of extremists,
43 a country that respects international conventions and practices non-interference in the internal
44 affairs of others, relies on dialogue to resolve differences, and strives to develop strong relations
45 with every country that espouses freedom and peace. (Applause.) We are working diligently
46 with free people in the world to return Iraq take the position it deserves. And to play a positive
47 role in its regional and international environment as a key, active player in spreading security
48 and stability, to give an example of positive relationship between countries through
49 denouncement of violence and resorting to constructive dialogue solving problems between
50 nations and peoples. We have made progress, and we are correcting the damage inflicted by
51 politics of the previous regime, in particular with our neighbors. My presence here is a testament
52 of the new politics of a democratic Iraq. (Applause.) Ladies and gentlemen, in a short space of
53 time, Iraq has gone from a dictatorship, to a transitional administration, and now to a fully-
54 fledged democratic government. This has happened despite the best efforts of the terrorists who
55 are bent on either destroying democracy or Iraq. But by the courage of our people, who defied
56 the terrorists every time they were called upon to make a choice by risking their lives for the
57 ballot box, they have stated over and over again with their inked-stained fingers waving in pride
58 that they will always make the same choice. (Applause.) Hope over fear. Liberty over
59 oppression. Dignity over submission. Democracy over dictatorship. Federalism over a centralist

60 state. Let there be no doubt. Today Iraq is a democracy which stands firm because of the
61 sacrifices of its people and the sacrifices of all those who stood with us in this crisis from nations
62 and countries. (Applause, cheers.) And that's why I thank you. I would like to thank them very
63 much for all their sacrifices. Iraqis of all persuasions took part in an unanimously democratic
64 election for the first parliament formed under the country's first permanent constitution, after
65 eight decades of temporary constitutions and dictatorship, a constitution written by the elected
66 representatives of the people and ratified by the people. Iraqis succeeded in forming a
67 government of national unity, based on an elected parliamentary foundation and includes all of
68 Iraq's religions, ethnicities and political groupings. The journey has been perilous, and the future
69 is not guaranteed. Yet many around the world who — underestimated the resolve of Iraq's
70 people and were sure that we would never reach this stage. Few believed in us. But you, the
71 American people, did, and we are grateful for this. (Applause.) The transformation in Iraq can
72 sometimes be forgotten in the daily futile violence. Since liberation we have witnessed great
73 accomplishments in politics, the economy and civil society. We have gone from a one-party
74 state ruled by a small elite to a multi-party system where politics is the domain of every citizen
75 and parties compete at all levels. (Applause.) What used to be a state-controlled media is now
76 completely free and uncensored — something Iraq had never witnessed since its establishment
77 as a modern state, and something which remains alien to most of the region. What used to be a
78 command economy in Iraq we are rapidly transforming into a free market economy. In the past
79 three years, our GDP per capita has more than doubled, and it is expected that our economy
80 will continue to grow. Standards of living have been raised for most Iraqis as the markets
81 witness an unprecedented level of prosperity. Many individuals are buying products and
82 appliances which they would never have hoped to afford in the past. And in keeping with our
83 economic visions of creating a free market economy, we will be presenting to parliament
84 legislation which will lift current restrictions on foreign companies and investors who wish to
85 come to Iraq. (Applause.) While we are making great economic strides, the greatest
86 transformation has been on Iraqi society. We have gone from mass graves and torture chambers
87 and chemical weapons to a flourishing — to the rule of law and human rights. And the human
88 rights and freedoms embodied in the new Iraq and consolidated in the constitution have
89 provided a fertile environment for the ever-growing number of civil society institutions —
90 (applause) — which are increasing in scope and complexity and provide a healthy reflection of

91 what is developing beneath the violence. The rights chartered in the constitution will also help
92 consolidate the role of women in public life as equals to men — (applause) — and help them
93 to play a greater role in political life. (Applause continuing.) I am proud to say that a quarter of
94 Iraq's Council of Representatives is made up of women. But we still have much to accomplish.
95 Mr. Speaker, — Mr. Vice President, our nascent democracy faces numerous challenges and
96 impediments, but our resolve is unbreakable and we will overcome them. The greatest threat
97 Iraq's people face is terror, terror inflicted by extremists who value no life and who depend on
98 the fear their wanton murder and destruction creates. They have poured acid into Iraq's
99 dictatorial wounds and created many of their own. Today, Iraq is free and the terrorists cannot
100 stand this. They hope to undermine our democratically elected government through the random
101 killing of civilians. They want to destroy Iraq's future by assassinating our leading scientific,
102 political and community leaders. Above all, they wish to spread fear. Do not think that this is
103 an Iraqi problem. This terrorist front is a threat to every free country in the world and their
104 citizens. What is at stake is nothing less than our freedom and liberty. Confronting and dealing
105 with this challenge is the responsibility of every liberal democracy that values its freedom. Iraq
106 is the battle that will determine the war. If in continued partnership we have the strength of
107 mind and commitment to defeat the terrorists and their ideology in Iraq, they will never be able
108 to recover. (Applause.) For the sake of success of the political process, I launched the National
109 Reconciliation Initiative, which aims to draw in groups willing to accept the logic of dialogue
110 and participation. This olive branch has received the backing of Iraq's parliamentary blocs and
111 support further afield from large segments of the population. I remain determined to see this
112 initiative succeed. But let our enemies not mistake our outstretched hand for forgiveness as a
113 sign of weakness. Whoever chooses violence against the people of Iraq, then the fate that awaits
114 them will be the same that of the terrorist Zarqawi. (Applause.) While political and economic
115 efforts are essential, defeating terror in Iraq relies fundamentally on the building of sound Iraqi
116 force, both in quantity and capability. The completion of Iraq's forces forms the necessary basis
117 for the withdrawal of multinational forces, but it — only then, only when Iraq's forces are fully
118 capable will the job of the multinational forces be complete. Our Iraqi forces have accomplished
119 much, and have gained a great deal of field experience to eventually enable them to triumph
120 over the terrorists and to take over the security portfolio and extend peace through the country.
121 The other impediment to Iraq's stability are the armed militias. I have on many occasions stated

my determination to disband all militias, without exception — (applause) — and reestablish a state monopoly on arms, and to guarantee citizens security so that they do not need others to provide it. It is imperative that the reconstruction starts now. While small sections of central Iraq are unstable, large sections have remained peaceful but ignored for far too long. These were most deprived areas of Iraq under the previous regime, and have been the most valiant in Iraq's struggle for freedom. We need to make an example out of these stable areas as models for the rest of the country. (Applause.) Reconstruction projects in these areas will tackle unemployment, which will weaken the terrorists. They will become prototypes for other, more volatile regions (to) aspire to. Undoubtedly, reconstruction in these areas will fuel economic growth and show what a prosperous, stable, democratic and federal Iraq would look like. Members of the Congress, in this effort, we need the help of the international community. Much of the budget you had allocated for Iraq's reconstruction ended up paying for security firms and foreign companies, whose operating costs were vast. Instead there needs to be a greater reliance on Iraqis and Iraqi companies, with foreign aid and assistance to help us rebuild Iraq. (Applause.) We are rebuilding Iraq on a new, solid foundation, that of liberty, hope and equality. Iraq's democracy is young, but the will of its people is strong. It is because of this spirit and desire to be free that Iraq has taken the opportunity you gave us, and we chose democracy. We faced tyranny and oppression under the former regime, and we now face a different kind of terror. We did not bow then, and we will not bow now. (Applause.) I will not allow Iraq to become a launch pad for al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. I will not allow terror rob Iraqis of their hopes and dreams. I will not allow terrorists to dictate to us our future. (Applause.) For decades we struggled alone for our freedom. In 1991, when Iraqis tried to capitalize on the regime's momentary weakness and rose up, we were alone again. The people of Iraq will not forget your continued support as we establish a secure, liberal democracy. Let 1991 never be repeated, because history will be more unforgiving. (Applause.) The coming few days are difficult and the challenges are considerable. Iraq and World countries both need each other to defeat the terror engulfing the free world. In partnership, we will be triumphant because we will never be slaves to terror, for God has made us free. (Applause.) Trust that Iraq will be a grave for terrorism and terrorists. (Applause.) Trust that Iraq will be the graveyard for terrorism and terrorists. Thank you very much.

Appendix 4: The speech of Haider Al-Abadi

1 Greeting, Ladies and Gentleman

2 Thank you all for attending this meeting and for everything made by your countries to support
3 Iraq and its people. I also would like to thank the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
4 for hosting this conference in the headquarters. I thank His Excellency the Secretary of State,
5 John Kerry, to hold this meeting on how the international community's response to danger
6 resulting from what is called The Islamic state in Iraq and the Sham. Because this entity is not
7 an Islamic state and does not deserve to be called in an official name, so it is called DAESH an
8 abbreviation of the word in the Arabic language. The attendance at this meeting are about 60
9 foreign ministers from countries around the world - confirms that the world has woken to the
10 fact that ISIS does not only threatens the countries and peoples of the Middle East , but threatens
11 all who refuse to accept the radical ideas and the practices of barbarism anywhere . On behalf
12 of the Iraqi people, who have suffered for a long time, I can assure you that ISIS does not
13 differentiate between people in committing atrocities, and that the beheadings and mass murder
14 and enslavement of women and children have been targeting people from all ethnic groups and
15 religions, regardless of their affiliations and geographic boundaries. It is obvious to the audience
16 that ISIS is recruiting and training fighters from the west beside those who are being recruited
17 from other areas, therefore it is only a matter of time until these highly trained terrorists will
18 return to the communities from which they came from to commit murder and cause destruction.

19 Ladies and Gentlemen, Our presence today shows that we have a common goal to defeat ISIS
20 which requires collective regional and international efforts, I am here to assure you that the
21 Government of Iraq and its people are committed to what we have to perform in this context.
22 We are grateful for the support that the United States and any other member of the coalition,
23 but we know that fighting on the ground is our first and last responsibility, and we understand
24 that Iraq needs governmental reforms, national reconciliation, economic and social rebuilding
25 as well as military action to defeat ISIS. Our new government takes the responsibility to carry
26 out all these tasks. At the same time, the outcomes of our efforts has begun to be seen. After the
27 Free National and fair elections last April, with the support of all religious and ethnic

components, we were able to form a new government that includes representatives of all political and social blocs. Our government has a successful implementation of the program, prepared for the first three months; also, we are making progress in the programs that we proposed during the first six months to achieve all our obligations to the Iraqi people. The Council of Ministers has reviewed the General Budget, which should be sent to the House of Representatives for ratification soon that is considered faster than the previous years. We are working on national reconciliation in multiple places, as we are forging cooperative relations with the tribes in Salahuddin, Anbar and Nineveh; most areas of these provinces are under the control of ISIS. These tribes are being equipped with weapons and currently they are fighting alongside with the Iraqi security forces. We are also working on modifying the Justice and Accountability Law, which refers to the Al-Baath Party eradication, to facilitate the re-integration of a large number of former government officials who have not committed crimes against the Iraqi people, as we aim to address the problems of all the components of the Iraqi people. This week I signed a directive, which obligates the security forces and the Ministry of Justice to protect the human rights, which is mentioned in the Constitution concerning the detainees in the Iraqi prisons. It includes the establishment of a central register for all detainees that should indicate the reason of their arrest and a timetable for presenting them to the courts. We have also reached a temporary agreement with the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) that will pave the way to a long-term agreement concerning Iraq's natural resources, this is an important step in the right direction, and we are committed with our Iraqi Kurdish brothers to put all the past conflicts aside. Dear Friends, We have started to build our security forces professionally, as we have dismissed more than twenty-four military commanders as part of our efforts to eradicate corruption and reinvigorate the military leadership. For the purpose of inclusion of a greater number of Iraqis in the collaborated defense, we have made progress in the establishment of National Guard troops. We are working with the United Nations to take advantage of the experiences of other countries that have adopted such a system to ensure we find the right solution for Iraq, to guarantee respect for law enforcement. We are working on having all armed groups under the control of the government, as it will integrate some individuals in these groups, wherever possible, within the Iraqi security forces and the National Guard. We assure our constitutional commitment not allowing any armed group or militia to operate outside or in parallel with the Iraqi security forces. It is not allowed to use any weapons

outside the control of the Iraqi government. Since Daesh is a threat to all of us, we consider Kurdistan Regional Government, a major partner in this battle, and we strongly welcome the efforts aimed at training and arming Kurdish forces to ensure an untroubled performance, along with the Iraqi security forces. We will continue our work to ensure there is no any delay or stoppage in this matter, from our side there has not been any deliberate delay or procedural stoppage concerning this particular matter. Moreover, we are working with the United States and our international partners to train and equip tribal fighters in the time that we are doing the integration of the popular Mobilization Forces to the Iraqi security forces. Let me be clear with you, that our security forces lack the complete training and arming, we will need broad support of our brothers and partners in this aspect. I can promise you that your help in this area will not go in vain, because when we fight Deash, we are not only fighting for the people of Iraq, but we are fighting for all the peoples of the world. The Iraqi security forces and its partners are making steps forward thanks to the support they receive from the international coalition and through close coordination with the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the aids of all levels of the Iraqi society. We were able to restore strategic roads and other sites and we liberated whole cities. We promised our people of this truthful vow, we are moving forward in our war for the liberation of every inch of our lands, and every segment of our society will expel ISIS gangs from our precious from our lands, and we will retrieve life to the liberated cities. Ladies and Gentlemen, Diplomatic wise, we are enhancing our relations with all neighboring countries, so that we can together fight our common enemy (ISIS) more effectively. During the past few weeks, we had made very close and effective contacts at a high level in Baghdad with all neighboring countries. With the prince and the Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait, the Iranian president, Mr. Rouhani, His Majesty King Abdullah II, Prime Minister of Jordan in Amman, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz in Riyadh, the head of Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu, and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. We have reached agreements on strengthening cooperation and security intelligence to defeat ISIS; we seek to expand cooperation in the fields of economy, oil and investment, trade and border protection. Through our work with these countries and other countries in the vicinity, we are in the process of forming a joint defense front; stand against ISIS, and developing a new strategy to deal with regional problems that lead to the spread of international terrorism. Today in Iraq, various

90 efforts are being made to protect the democratic gains, whether through reshaping our
91 government and our society reconciliation, or through resisting ISIS and restore our relations
92 with our neighboring countries. However, the challenges we face cannot be confronted by only
93 one country, we are fighting one of the biggest funded organized and perfectly equipped
94 international terrorism organizations in the world. Thus, my message to all of you is, we should
95 preform our best, and we need your support. Military wise, we need the air force backing,
96 training, arming and building the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces. We also need the
97 support of neighboring countries and allies in the struggle to put an end to the infiltration of
98 foreign fighters into Iraq, however for our sake and for your sake, Iraq should not be a training
99 ground for terrorists coming from and returning to every spot where problems exist on earth.
100 ISIS not only attracts fighters from all over the world, but also receives its funding from many
101 countries of the world as well, so we need from the international community, including its
102 financial institutions, to freeze the funding of ISIS and directs a call to stop the unrestricted
103 movement money and ammunition to those international terrorists. That extremist violence is
104 inspired by the corrupted ideologies; therefore, we need the neighboring countries in the Middle
105 East and North Africa to combat ISIS concepts of ideologies. We also need the support of the
106 international community in addressing the humanitarian crisis caused by ISIS, in order not to
107 recruit refugees who have been displaced because of terrorism in other waves of acts of
108 extremist violence. Terrorist acts of ISIS and civil war in Syria caused the displacement of
109 approximately two million people and now they are staying within our borders. We need
110 humanitarian aid to meet their needs, especially with the coming of winter. On the other hand,
111 the liberated areas and the areas that are about to be liberated from the control of ISIS need an
112 urgent rebuilding campaign. Therefore, in order to encourage the residents of the liberated areas
113 to return to their homes, creating job opportunities and addressing some of the direct causes for
114 the emergence of ISIS. We need a reconstruction fund, Unfortunately, Iraq is suffering from a
115 lack of funding because of the declining oil exports due to the low prices and the ceasing of
116 Iraq's Northern exports since the taking over of ISIS on the Mousel. We have allocated a huge
117 amount of money from our budget for these refugees, and the UN shouldered part of the burden
118 of humanitarian aid but we need the support of the entire international community to endure
119 and heal the wounds of the victims of violence. Brothers and Sisters, We will not be able to
120 defeat the malicious international terrorists who are living on failure, only after rebuilding a

121 stable and secure Iraq in the Middle East that is safe and stable, since ISIS represents our
122 common enemy therefore defeating ISIS is our common endeavor too. In our current struggle,
123 the Iraqi government and its people are doing their best, I am optimistic by your presence and
124 your participation here today, that you will do your best, now we are exchanging ideas but
125 tomorrow, and whenever necessary, we have to translate our words into deeds.

