DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

'The Crucified God; The Self Reimagined: Mapping the Death of God Motif in the Philosophical Anthropologies of Nietzsche and St Paul'

A Reappraisal of Friedrich Nietzsche’s Anti-Christianity with Continual Reference to Paul of Tarsus

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By Joshua D. Duff
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Mapping the Death of God Motif in the Philosophical Anthropologies of Nietzsche and St Paul:

A Reappraisal of Friedrich Nietzsche’s Anti-Christianity
With Continual Reference to Paul of Tarsus

By Joshua D. Duff

Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Bangor University
School of Philosophy and Religion
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This thesis offers a thorough reappraisal of Friedrich Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity as a sustained confrontation with the philosophical anthropology embedded in St Paul’s gospel. Historically, studies at the intersection of Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian tradition have focused upon his critique of Christian morality. Where attention has been given to the Paul-Nietzsche relationship, Nietzsche’s psycho-historical portrait of Paul is examined, while the content of Paulinism is largely neglected, and important intertextual resonances, structural similarities, and parallel motifs have gone unexplored. This inattention to Paul’s voice has become increasingly transparent in recent decades with Continental Philosophy’s so-called, ‘return to Paul’, and renewed efforts within the Pauline studies guild to map Paul’s relationship to the larger Western Philosophical tradition. This renaissance has furnished new insights into Paul’s radical theology, cosmology, and anthropology, thus preparing the ground for a fresh re-examination of the Nietzsche-Paul relationship. This study provides just such an examination, offering philosophically and exegetically ‘thick’ readings of their rival accounts of what it means to be human, and the nature of the subject’s symbolic thought-world.

I trace these rival programs through Paul and Nietzsche’s deployments of radical theological motifs—Paul’s Christ-event, and Nietzsche’s Death of God. These are universal events, which impact at the conjunction of anthropology and cosmology. They transvalue all symbolic social capital and reshape the existential geographies the self inhabits. For Paul, the Christ-event both deepened his anthropological pessimism, and broadened his eschatological hopefulness, for the Cross signalled the end of Sin’s unchecked hegemony in the flesh, and resolved the problem of the radical alterity between God and his morally-destitute image bearers. Furthermore, the kenotic nature of the Christ-event vilified egoism, calling for the death and recreation of the self—I have been crucified together with Christ (Gal. 2.20), and the formation of egalitarian communities—There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there
male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus (Gal. 3.28). For Nietzsche, the Death of God is the decisive end of this anti-natural programme—the end of the kenotic self-denial that ‘un SELFS man’, thus allowing for a restratification of society and the pathos of distance.

This study represents the most thorough exploration of the Paul-Nietzsche relationship to date, making key original contributions to the study:

1. By examining Nietzsche’s agōn with Paulinism diachronically through Nietzsche’s biography, I demonstrate that a period of marked ambivalence towards the Christian tradition comes to a close with Nietzsche’s own ‘return to Paul’ in the summer of 1880, when he read Hermann Lüdemann’s, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus. This event precisely marks the beginning of Nietzsche’s anti-Christian period, and the sudden appearance of some of his most important and distinctive ideas.

2. I go beyond previous studies by providing a reconstruction of Paul’s thought from both the Pauline corpus, and Nietzsche’s writings. This permits parallel ideas from Nietzsche’s oeuvre to be mapped onto Paulinism, and fills significant lacunae left by previous studies. The result is a larger and clearer context within which to understand why Nietzsche would finally locate his world-historical importance in his subversion of Christianity’s moral view of the self.

3. I contextualize enquiries into Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity over the course of more than a century of scholarship—from Salomé up to the present. I offer a fresh perspective on the question of Nietzsche as a religious thinker by locating Nietzsche alongside Paul where philosophical and religious enquiry into human nature converge. Indeed, Nietzsche embeds Christianity within the heart of the sweeping landscape of Western philosophy, blurring the lines between philosophy and religion.
Dedication:

For my wife, Joy Marie.

‘The woman is the glory of man’—St Paul

‘The perfect woman is a higher type of human being than the perfect man: also something much rarer’—Friedrich W. Nietzsche
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<td>(Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben) ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’</td>
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<td>SE</td>
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St Paul: (in canonical order)

Rom.  (ΠΡΟΣ ΡΩΜΑΙΟΥΣ) Epistle to the Romans

1 Cor.  (ΠΡΟΣ ΚΟΡΙΝΘΙΟΥΣ Α’) First Epistle to the Corinthians

2 Cor.  (ΠΡΟΣ ΚΟΡΙΝΘΙΟΥΣ Β’) Second Epistle to the Corinthians

Gal.  (ΠΡΟΣ ΓΑΛΑΤΑΣ) Epistle to the Galatians

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Eph.  (ΠΡΟΣ ΕΦΕΣΙΟΥΣ) Epistle to the Ephesians
Phil. (ΠΡΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΠΠΗΣΙΟΥΣ) Epistle to the Philippians
Col. (ΠΡΟΣ ΚΟΛΟΣΣΑΕΙΣ) Epistle to the Colossians
1 Thess. (ΠΡΟΣ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΕΙΣ Α’) First Epistle to the Thessalonians
2 Thess. (ΠΡΟΣ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΕΙΣ Β’) Second Epistle to the Thessalonians
1 Tim. (ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙΜΟΘΕΟΝ Α’) First Epistle to Timothy
2 Tim. (ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙΜΟΘΕΟΝ Β’) Second Epistle to Timothy
Titus (ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙΤΟΝ) Epistle to Titus
Philem. (ΠΡΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΜΟΝΑ) Epistle to Philemon

Other New Testament Sources: (in canonical order)
Mark (ΚΑΤΑ ΜΑΡΚΟΝ) The Gospel According to Mark
John (ΚΑΤΑ ΙΩΑΝΝΗΝ) The Gospel According to John

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J. D. Duff
10 April 2020
Good Friday, ‘Τετέλεσται’.
Chapter One

The Death of God, and Becoming Who You Are:
Rival Anthropologies of Event in
Nietzsche and St Paul

... (extracted text)

1.1 Introduction

There are no two giants of the Western tradition who stand in so perfect an opposition as do St Paul and Friedrich Nietzsche—the Apostle of Christ and the Antichrist. St Paul is celebrated as Christianity’s first and greatest theologian.³ His ‘untimely birth’ (1 Cor. 15.8) while en route to Damascus, remains a living metaphor for profound conversion. His missionary efforts brought the Christian message of the crucified and resurrected Jesus Christ across the Aegean Sea into Europe—an event that would forever shape Western culture. His extant

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¹ ‘I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me. The life I now live in the body, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me’ (Gal. 2.20).
² ‘Before God!—But now this god has died! You higher men, this god was your greatest danger. It is only now, since he lies in his grave, that you are resurrected. Only now the great noon comes, only now the higher man becomes—ruler [Herr]!’ Z ‘On the Higher Man’ § 2, p. 232 [KSA 4, p. 357].
³ A theme that is given fresh treatment in N. T. Wright’s recent tour de force, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013).
epistles reveal an extraordinarily energetic mind, a mastery of the Torah, and a vivid poetic imagination. As a result, St Paul came to be the principal architect of the symbolic thought-world of Christianity, proclaiming the most robust and authoritative interpretation of the Christ-event. He unflinchingly placed the Cross of Christ at the centre of the ancient world—a fusillade against the value systems of Rome, Greece, and Palestine. For Paul, and for all the Christian tradition that has followed him, the Christ-event marked a watershed for humankind—not merely as a path towards salvation, but as the inception of a new kind of subjectivity—the καινός ἄνθρωπος, the ‘new human’.

Nietzsche appears without rivals as Christianity’s most forceful detractor. Nietzsche had been spiritually and intellectually precocious child, groomed to be a third-generation minister in the Lutheran church—a theological tradition born of Luther’s return to Paul, and sustained by engagement with the Pauline corpus. Had Nietzsche followed this path, he would have laboured under Paul’s influence, as had Augustine, Luther, and Nietzsche’s forebears. Not content with either the simple faith of his mother, or the demythologized Christianity on offer in German universities, however, Nietzsche broke with his childhood faith, first demonstrating an ambivalence towards Christianity, and then an ever-deepening antipathy that came to dominate his whole philosophical programme. Throughout his middle and late periods, Nietzsche involved himself in a facet-by-facet examination of Pauline Christianity, tracing its roots and following its various branches through the Western tradition. He became convinced that the world of Christianity was not only built upon false metaphysical foundations, but that it was antagonistic to healthful, ascendant, ‘higher’ humanity. His short masterpiece, The Antichrist, proffers a rival interpretation of the Christ-event, and a radical reinterpretation of Pauline symbology. Nietzsche’s legacy is still in the making, but the breadth and depth of his influence is extraordinary. His work has made a permanent mark in the disciplines of philosophy of religion, philosophical anthropology, moral and political philosophy, religious psychology and

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4 Thirteen of the twenty-seven books in the Christian New Testament are explicitly attributed to Paul. Romans, 1st & 2nd Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1st Thessalonians, and Philemon are almost universally considered authentically Pauline. Scholars are divided on the question of the authenticity of Ephesians, Colossians, 2 Thessalonians, 1 & 2 Timothy, and Titus. I return to the question of primary source material, below.

5 A metaphor Paul applies to himself: σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων—‘wise master-builder/architect’ (1 Cor. 3.10).
sociology, and literature. His proclamation of the Death of God has forever impacted the Western consciousness.

Heirs of the Occidental tradition live in a post-Pauline, and post-Nietzschean world. The symbolic geographies we inhabit as selves are shaped, in part, by the Pauline-Nietzschean, Christian-Antichristian, dialectic—the clash between their antipodal interpretations of the significance of the event that was Jesus of Nazareth. It is important to recognize, therefore, that their relationship is one of deep and complex contrasts. That is to say, Nietzsche and Paul are united by the similarities of their respective projects—Paul’s vocation and Nietzsche’s task. As a minority of perceptive readers of Nietzsche have long recognized, their oeuvres call out for juxtaposition and sustained comparison, for they are both incisive diagnosticians of the problematic aspects of human subjectivity. As Alain Badiou rightly saw, they are rivals.6

This thesis offers a thorough re-examination and reappraisal of the Paul-Nietzsche relationship, organized around the parallel motifs and patterns in their respective approaches to philosophical anthropology. This study aims to map some of the most important and illuminating contrasts, and in so doing, to show how Nietzsche’s interaction with radical aspects of Pauline thought helped to shape his own legacy. I will argue here that Nietzsche’s return to Paul was a pivotal moment in his own development as a thinker, helping him to ‘uncover’ the complex axiological foundations of the Christian West—the revaluation of all values that Nietzsche credited with subverting the noble values of the First-Century Roman Empire, and having a pernicious effect on human becoming. My thesis here is that the confrontation that Nietzsche stages with Paulinism comes to be broadly coextensive with his central philosophical task of preparing humanity for healthful, authentic selfhood after the Death of God.

In the remaining pages of this chapter, I lay the groundwork for this study in four ways. First, I provide preliminary biographical sketches of St Paul and Nietzsche, and briefly trace their respective legacies. Second, I examine several loci at which St Paul and Nietzsche can be fruitfully compared. Third, I provide an overview of the project. Fourth, and finally, I outline several significant outcomes of this study.

1.2 The Death of God—as Daybreak

ἡ νύξ προέκοψεν, ἡ δὲ ἡμέρα ἤγγικεν. ἀποβαλώ θεα ὑπὸ τὰ ἐργά τοῦ σκότους, ἐνδυσώ θεα ὑπὸ τὰ ὅπλα τοῦ φωτός.

—St Paul, Letter to the Romans

1.2.1 St Paul—Apostle of the Crucified God.

St Paul is introduced in the early Christian tradition of Acts of the Apostles (hereafter, Acts) as Saul, then a young man, witnessing the stoning of Stephen with approval. The scene contains all the elements of a Girardian mimetic contagion—jealousy erupting in

7 ‘The night is almost gone, and the day is near. Therefore let us lay aside the deeds of darkness and put on the armour of light’, Rom. 13.12.
8 Scholarly opinion on the historical reliability of Acts of the Apostles diverges widely, with some seeing it as first-century history of the highest quality, others as pious but historically-unreliable propaganda, and others still as a mix of the two. There is, at present, burgeoning interest in the Second-Temple period, and Acts will continue to be subjected to intense scrutiny. Even so, there is no sign (and perhaps no hope) of widespread consensus emerging. With the diversity of views in mind, throughout this study I refer ecumenically to ‘the Acts tradition’. For an authoritative overview of the surrounding issues that helped to set the stage for the current debates, see: N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, vol. 1 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992); for a recent study that highlights the rhetorical and theological sophistication of Acts, see, C. Kavin Rowe’s, World Upside Down: Reading Acts in the Graeco-Roman World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); for a comprehensive and sure-footed treatment of all the issues in the scholarship surrounding Acts, see Craig S. Keener’s study in four volumes Acts: An Exegetical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015).
10 ‘But they cried out with a loud voice, and covered their ears and rushed at him with one impulse. When they had driven him out of the city, they began stoning him; and the witnesses laid aside their robes at the feet of a young man named Saul. . . . And Saul approved of their killing him.’ (Acts. 7.57-58, 8.1; cf. 22.20). There is an irony to Saul-Paul’s complicity in Stephen’s death because Stephen’s preaching had become controversial for depreciating the value of the holy place, the Mosaic law, and the customs of Palestinian Judaism in light of the work of the Christ (6.13-14). These were precisely the charges that came to be levelled against Paul at the height of his transcultural mission to the Nations (Acts 21.17ff).
lethal violence against a single, purportedly-innocent individual. Stephen’s martyrdom precipitated an outbreak of widespread persecution against the fledgling Christian sect then known as ‘the Way [ἡ ὁδός]’, and Saul was soon at the centre of the anti-Christian mission, working strategically to destroy the movement—until Damascus. Whatever happened on the road to Damascus—a matter of perennial curiosity and dispute, even for Nietzsche—changes Saul profoundly. Unlike the original twelve disciples, Saul did not have a history of close personal interactions with Jesus of Nazareth, and what knowledge he did have of the fledgling Messianic sect had convinced him that it was an existential threat to the faithful practice of Second-Temple Judaism. Paul experienced the resurrected Christ as an intense light that left him blind and groping—‘they led him by the hand into Damascus’ (Acts 9.8). Both the Pauline corpus and Acts highlight the apocalyptic significance of the event: the encounter with the then-crucified, now-resurrected Christ was a revelation that precipitated the deconstruction and reimagining of Paul’s world. Three days later ‘something like scales fell from Saul’s eyes’ (Acts 9.18). Years later, then the seasoned and controversial ‘Apostle to the Nations’, he would write to the church in Corinth, ‘whenever anyone turns to the Lord, the veil is taken away’ (2 Cor.

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12 Acts 8.1, 22.4; cf. Gal. 1.13ff, Phil. 3.6, 1 Cor. 15.9, 1 Tim. 1.13.
13 The full narrative account of Paul’s (or Saul’s) conversion is told most famously in Acts 9:1-19, and retold in, 22.1-21; 26.1-23. He refers to his conversion in Gal. 1.13ff, and 1 Cor. 15.8-10; cf. 1 Tim. 1.12-17.
14 Nietzsche’s original reconstruction of Paul’s conversion, which first appears in D § 68 [KSA 3, pp. 64-68], is discussed at several points below.
15 Although Paul, if a resident of Jerusalem, may have had knowledge of the historical Jesus prior to his crucifixion. Paul’s cryptic admission, ‘εἰ καὶ εγνώκαμεν κατὰ σάρκα Χριστόν, ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐκέτι γινώσκομεν [and even if we had known Christ according to the flesh, we no longer so know Him]’, may suggest as much, as argued in the recent study by Stanley E. Porter, When Paul Met Jesus: How an Idea Got Lost in History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
17 Paul refers to himself as ‘ἔθνον ἀπόστολος’ (Rom. 11.13; cf. Gal. 2.7-9). The Greek term, ‘ἔθνη’, was used to refer both to, ‘Gentiles’,—sometimes pejoratively in the sense of ‘pagan’—as those outside of the ethnic and religious boundaries of the covenant community of Israel, and also more broadly to ‘the Nations’—as I have generally preferred throughout this study. In a letter to Heinrich Köselitz (Peter Gast), Nietzsche explained that the term ἔθνη appeared frequently in the Septuagint, meaning ‘Heiden’, or, ‘Völker’ (eKGWB/BVN-1882,275 — Letter to Heinrich Köselitz: 30/07/1882).
When, in the *Acts* narrative, Paul later recounts the events of his conversion to Porcius Festus and King Agrippa, he recalls his commission: ‘I am sending you to them to open their eyes and turn them from darkness to light’ (*Acts* 26.17-18).19

Following his conversion, the Cross of Christ stood at the centre of St Paul’s *Weltanschauung*. While the passion narratives form the climax in each of the four Gospels, and assume a load-bearing role in St Peter’s preaching and writing,20 it was Paul’s philosophical and theological exegesis of the Christ-event that would most profoundly shape the symbolic landscape of the Christian thought-world. His programmatic statement for his mission in Corinth—that he was determined while with them to ‘know nothing but Christ and Him crucified’ (1 Cor. 2.2), need not be understood as a disavowal of philosophy *as such*,21 nor had Paul distilled his proclamation of the gospel down to the bare message of the crucified Messiah.22 Rather, Paul was determined to keep his thinking and preaching *rigorously cruciform*, and it is in the Pauline epistles that we find the most carefully detailed philosophy of the world-historical implications of the Christ-event. In this preliminary examination, I shall

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19 The reported response of Festus is comical: ‘Μαίνῃ, Παῦλε’—you speak like a madman, Paul!—he adds, ‘Your great learning is driving you insane’ (*Acts* 26.24).

20 The sermons attributed to St Peter in *Acts*, include some of the most interesting Petrine reflections on the crucifixion. There Peter focuses on the corporate guilt of Israel, for colluding with the Nations to kill the Messiah (‘you nailed to a cross by the hands of godless men and put Him to death’, *Acts* 2.23, 2.36, 3.13-15, 4.10-12, 10.39), and the preordained nature of the event, as a means by which sins would be forgiven. His single explicit reference to the crucifixion outside of *Acts*, *1 Peter* 2.24, demonstrates that he had no substantial disagreement with Paul in seeing the event as the means by which sins are forgiven and life is begun anew: ‘He Himself bore our sins in His body on the cross, so that we might die to sin and live to righteousness; for by His wounds you were healed’.

21 *Pace* Alain Badiou, who sees Paul the as an anti-philosopher on the basis of Paul’s statement that his Gospel was, ‘not in words of wisdom [οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου]’ (1 Cor. 1.17): ‘This maxim envelops a radical antiphilosophy; it is not a proposition capable of being supported by *philosophia*’, *St Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, 28. Luther, who famously referred to reason as, ‘that whore’, made himself and easy target of similar accusations.

22 The thematic complexity of Paul’s letters make such reductive readings impossible. Indeed, it would be especially unlikely given that the programmatic statement was written to the church in Corinth, where, according to the *Acts* 18:11, Paul had spent a full eighteen months (he would return at least twice more; cf. 2 Cor. 13.1, *Acts* 20.2-3).
look at Paul’s understanding of the crucifixion-resurrection event under the rubrics of plight and solution, and the revaluation of all values.

*Plight and Solution, in Light of the Christ-Event.*

The Cross of Christ is most commonly viewed as a soteriological symbol, associated with competing models of the atonement, but we find within Pauline soteriology an approach to anthropology that was contoured around the Christ-event. When the kenotic incarnation and crucifixion are brought together with the resurrection, this Christ-event provides the basis for new insights into the universal plight of human beings, and the unanticipated solution: the inauguration of a new kind of humanity. For St Paul, the radical disruption of the crucifixion-resurrection event was the decisive revelation of ‘God’s wisdom in a mystery’ (*I Cor. 2.7*), the inauguration of a new aeon in which God was reconciling His creation to Himself: ‘God was in

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23 We think, for example, of the Ransom Theory (Origen, et al.), *Christus Victor* (a common view in the patristic era), the Satisfaction Theory (Anselm), or Penal Substitutionary Atonement (Luther, Calvin). Each of these is an attempt to formally model the role of the crucifixion of Christ in St Paul’s soteriology. William Lane Craig’s, *The Atonement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), offers a concise treatment of the doctrine, drawing on biblical, theological, and philosophical resources. For an insightful, panoramic analysis of the significance of the crucifixion in contemporary theology and biblical exposition, see Fleming Rutledge’s, *The Crucifixion: Understanding the Death of Jesus Christ* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2015). See also Jürgen Moltmann’s classic study, Der gekreuzigte Gott (1972), translated into English as, *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology*, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1974).

24 This approach seeks to place Paul’s anthropology at the center of his theologizing about Jesus Christ, without wishing to diminish his evident commitment to the transcendent. Ludwig Feuerbach’s classic study, *The Essence of Christianity*, marks the reductionist extreme by reducing theological ideals to mere projections of anthropological ideals. Rudolf Bultmann’s Existentialist approach to Pauline theology centred on anthropology without wholly surrendering the transcendent aspect: ‘Every assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion about man and vice-versa. For this reason and in this sense Paul’s theology is, at the same time, anthropology’, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. 1, translated by Kendrick Grobel (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), 191. Even Bultmann’s approach raised suspicions, and his contemporary, Ernst Käsemann, wrote, ‘though Bultmann talks about the theological horizon of anthropology and the Christological root of soteriology “and vice versa”, he does not explain why this “and vice versa” never receives due attention’, ‘On Paul’s Anthropology’, in *Perspectives on Paul*, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 12.
Christ reconciling the world to Himself’ (2 Cor. 5.19). Paul’s soteriology—frequently systematized under the rubrics of plight and solution—begins and ends in his (Adam-Christ) anthropology. The plight, in corporate or universal terms, enters through ‘ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος [the first human]’—the Hebrew Bible’s Adam—in whom we all participate in our common humanity. For Paul, human beings bear the imago Dei, but are marked by the plight of sin and death—the result of the catastrophe of primeval Eden: ‘[sin] entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all people’ (Rom. 5.12). At the personal or individual level, Paul refers to members of Adam’s fallen race with the language of ‘ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος’—the ‘old human’, or, ‘the old self’—a selfhood, we will later see, that is

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26 The term plight, as I develop it throughout this study, refers broadly to the precarious position of the human self as a faltering moral agent subject to death, destruction, and the righteous judgement of God. Paul does not develop a doctrine of Hell such as we see in the teachings of Jesus, or The Apocalypse of John—a place of torment where sinners are punished in the afterlife (2 Thess. 1.8-10 is the closest parallel from the Pauline corpus; many scholars dispute the authenticity of the letter). Whether Paul held to such a doctrine is uncertain, but he is adamant that all of Adam’s descendants will stand before the ‘judgement seat of Christ’ (2 Cor. 5.10; Rom. 2.5, 2.16, 14.10, 14.12), and that the unjust will not ‘inherit the kingdom of God’ (1 Cor. 6.9-10). Nietzsche considers the doctrine of eschatological judgement to be among the most subversive and pernicious aspects of Paul’s legacy: ‘The invention of Paul, his means for establishing a priestly tyranny, for forming herds: the belief in immortality—that is to say the doctrine of “judgement” . . . , AC § 42, p. 165 [KSA 6, p. 217], emphasis original. The term solution is associated with the forgiveness of sins (1 Cor. 15.3; Col. 1.14), freedom from condemnation (Rom. 8.1), emancipation from the hegemony of the cosmic powers of sin and death (Rom. 6.18, 7.7ff), and ultimately with eschatological glorification and heavenly reward.

27 Leading Pauline scholar, E. P. Sanders, has it the other way around: ‘It is not Paul’s analysis of the nature of sin which determines his view, but his analysis of the way to salvation; not his anthropology, but his Christology and soteriology’, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1977), 481-482. The difference, in this case at least, is superficial. Sanders’ point is that Paul’s understanding of the salvation made available in Christ allowed him to work backwards to a (re)formulation of plight (he did not begin with an Augustinian phenomenology of conscience), but once he had the formulation, he expressed his soteriology in terms of the human self in relation to the Christ-event. We will return to this point below.

characterized by its subjugation to the hegemony of Sin in ‘the flesh’ [ἡ σάρξ].

This old self, which Paul roots genealogically in Adam, was created in the image of God, but corrupted by original sin, estranged from God, unable to fulfill its vocation—even a subjectivity at war with itself. The existential significance of the human plight is nuanced differently for the Nations on the one hand, and the covenant community of Israel on the other. Members of the Nations are slaves (Gal. 4.8), idolatrous (1 Cor. 12.2), alienated from God (Col. 1.21), condemned by natural law and conscience (Rom. 2.14-15), and—it is rarely stated but everywhere assumed—excluded from the covenant hopes of Israel (Eph. 2.12).

From a Judaic perspective, members of the covenant community of Israel enjoyed a special relationship with the God of Creation, because they were given God’s righteous requirements for human conduct, and God’s promise that faithfulness to the covenant would result in flourishing. One of the most provocative and subversive aspects of Paulinism is reflected in how little advantage he conceded to the archetypal, law-observant Israelite. For though the Law was a righteous guide, members of the covenant community of Israel were no less subject to the enslaving power of Sin in the flesh. The plight of the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, is the plight of everyman. Thus, because authentic Law observance was not possible for fleshly humanity (Rom. 8.3), those who aspired to Law observance were trapped in a pernicious dialectic of hope and despair. The Law both ignites a hope for righteousness and redemption, and illuminates the radical alterity between God and man, and trapping human beings in the existential dialectic pictured in Romans 7. Paradoxically, therefore, what appears to be the path from plight to solution ends in further problematizing the self’s existence. Here the presumed advantage of the covenant community evaporates: ‘What shall we conclude then? Do we

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29 ἡ σάρξ, literally ‘the flesh’ is a concept of central importance in Paul’s thought-world. It is frequently juxtaposed to τὸ πνεῦμα, ‘the spirit’, as two opposed forces that lie behind human behaviour. See, e.g., Rom. 8.5-8, Gal. 5.16-26. Nietzsche composed several detailed notes on the significance of flesh and spirit in Paul’s thought during the summer of 1880: KSA 9, 4[161], 4[162] (quoting from Gal. 5 and Rom. 7), 4[164], and 4[170].

30 Paul’s most vivid portrait of this condition of the cloven self appears in Rom. 7.14-25, which we will treat in greater detail below, and again in Chapters 3 and 5.

31 ‘Although I want to do good, evil is right there with me. For in my inner being I delight in God’s law; but I see another law at work in me, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within me. What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me from this body that is subject to death?’ (Rom. 7.21-24).
[Israelites] have any advantage? Not at all! For we have already made the charge that Jews and Gentiles alike are all under the power of sin’ (Rom. 3.9).

As the plight is associated with an anthropological type—Adamic humanity, or, ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος—so is the solution. Paul sees the whole sweep of the Christ-event as the dawn of new type of humanity that is modelled on, and incorporated into the person of Christ.32 Christ succeeds Adam as the progenitor of this new humanness: ‘So it is written: “The first man Adam became a living being”: the last Adam, a life-giving spirit. . . . And just as we have borne the image of the earthly man, so shall we bear the image of the heavenly man’ (1 Cor. 15.45, 49). Furthermore, for the new humanity, death is not the ultimate destiny: ‘For since death came through a man, the resurrection of the dead comes also through a man. For as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive’ (1 Cor. 15.21-22). The death of the old self is an existential death—a function of the Cross: ‘I have been crucified together with Christ, and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me’ (Gal. 2.20). I will argue that, for Paul, the acquisition of the new self has both a subjective, and an objective aspect; it is a present reality in both an existential and an ontic sense, and a future, eschatological reality where the natural body is exchanged for the glorified body; both are functions of Christ’s resurrection.33 In the time between the Cross and the Eschaton—which Paul sometimes refers to as the, ‘νῦν καιρός’ [the now-time, or the present time]34—the Christ-follower patterns their life according to the Christ-event: ‘The life I now live in the body, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me’ (Gal. 2.20). In Pauline terms, a person who dies with Christ, becomes a new creation,35 or a καινὴ κτίσις; the old things passed away; behold, new things have come’ (2 Cor. 5.17).36 ‘New human’, or ‘new self’ (Eph. 4.24, cf. Col. 3.9-10).

32 ‘[Our] old self [ὁ παλαιὸς ἡµῶν ἄνθρωπος] was crucified with Him’ (Rom. 6.6); cf. Gal. 2.20, 5.24, 6.14.
33 See, e.g., Rom. 6.8-10. I will treat this issue at length in the coming chapters.
35 ‘Therefore if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation [καὶ νῦν κτίσις]; the old things passed away; behold, new things have come’ (2 Cor. 5.17).
36 ‘New human’, or ‘new self’ (Eph. 4.24, cf. Col. 3.9-10).
Revaluation of All Values, in Light of the Christ-Event.

A second aspect of St Paul’s understanding of the Christ-event highlights Paul’s genius for axiological calculations. Paul believed that the crucifixion and resurrection necessitated a radical reshaping of the values of both Israel and the Nations—in Nietzschean terms, a Transvaluation, or ‘Revaluation of All Values’.37 As Nietzsche recognized, Pauline revaluation begins with the sweeping declaration of God’s ironic purposes shown in the Cross of Christ: the power in the weakness; the glory in the scandal; the wisdom in the folly. If the symbol of God’s foolishness and weakness (the Cross) is wiser and stronger than human wisdom and strength—the ideals of both Israel and the nations are depreciated to nothing. Therefore, a kind of transcultural negative equality is established as the root of Pauline universalism; both pious Israelites and wise Greeks38 must come to the Cross without appeal to any form of symbolic capital: ‘[so] that no one may boast before him’.39 What is true at the level of the cultural ideal is also true at the level of individual worth. Paul’s articulation of Christ’s substitutionary death is crafted to humble the proud:

[W]hen we were still powerless, Christ died for the ungodly. Very rarely will anyone die for a righteous person, though for a good person someone might possibly dare to die. But God demonstrates his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us (Rom. 5.6-8).

Because the salvation revealed in the Cross is predicated upon God’s unmerited love and grace, and not upon any other value, boasting in the accomplishments of the self is excluded.40 The Christ-event calls for a radical revaluation of individual merit, as Paul models: ‘If someone else thinks they have reasons to put confidence in the flesh, I have more. . . . But whatever were gains to me I now consider loss for the sake of Christ’ (Phil. 3.4, 7). The negative equality before the Cross, is then followed by a positive equality on the other side. The Christ-event

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37 Nietzsche recognized the Cross as a symbol of transvaluation in JGB § 46, p. 60 [KSA 5, p. 67], a section that comes under discussion frequently in this study.
38 Paul’s focus here on Greeks may be explained by the addressees’ location in Corinth, Greece, his recent interactions with philosophers in Athens shortly before entering Corinth, and the Greek culture’s emphasis on wisdom.
39 1 Cor. 1.29; cf. Rom. 3.17: ‘Where, then, is boasting? It is excluded’. ‘Boast [καυχάοµαι]’ is a quintessentially Pauline term (of its 38 canonical appearances, 36 are found within the Pauline corpus).
40 Rom. 3.27; cf. Paul’s satirical boasting in 2 Cor. 11.1ff.
imputes the infinite value of God’s Son onto each individual—a principle which undergirds both Pauline anthropology and ethics. When faced with the question about whether or not it was permissible for Christians to eat meat sacrificed to idols,\textsuperscript{41} Paul agrees that well-grounded believers can eat the meat, because ‘an idol is nothing at all’ (1 Cor. 8.4), and ‘the earth is the Lord’s’ (1 Cor. 10.26).\textsuperscript{42} His warning, however, is that stronger believers not exercise their freedom to the destruction of a weaker brother, ‘for whom Christ died’.\textsuperscript{43} Paul does not expand upon this argument, presumably because the image of the crucified Messiah carried his point. Moderns may think of value as something subjective, or market-relative—determined by what someone is willing to pay. Nietzsche validated this metric when he wrote, ‘The value [Werth] of a thing sometimes lies not in what one attains with it, but in what one pays for it—what it costs us’.\textsuperscript{44} This captures Paul’s sense, rather precisely. God ransomed sinners at an infinite cost, transferring to them an infinite and irreducible value. This was a fundamental conviction in Paul’s transcultural mission, where he worked to form small communities of Christ-followers, which reflected the diversity of cities like Corinth, Philippi, and Thessalonica—‘Here there is no Gentile or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all,

\textsuperscript{41} The discussion covers much of 1 Cor. 8-10; cf. Rom. 14.1-15.13. That Paul entertains this question at such length, is interesting in light of the proceedings of the Jerusalem Council, which had explicitly declared meat sacrificed to idols anathema for Gentile believers (Acts 15.29), thus settling the issue on the basis of church authority. Paul never mentions the council and clearly considers it an open question.

\textsuperscript{42} Cf. the remarkable concession in, Rom. 14.14, ‘I am convinced, being fully persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean in itself’. As John M. G. Barclay writes, ‘This constitutes nothing less than a fundamental rejection of the Jewish law in one of its most sensitive dimensions’; see, ‘Do We Undermine the Law?’, in Pauline Churches and Diaspora Jews (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2016), 50.

\textsuperscript{43} The surrounding context is illuminating: ‘Be careful, however, that the exercise of your rights does not become a stumbling block to the weak. For if someone with a weak conscience sees you, with all your knowledge, eating in an idol’s temple, won’t that person be emboldened to eat what is sacrificed to idols? So this weak brother or sister, for whom Christ died, is destroyed by your knowledge. When you sin against them in this way and wound their weak conscience, you sin against Christ’, 1 Cor. 8.9-12 (any emphasis in quotations of ancient sources is, rather obviously, my own).

\textsuperscript{44} TI § 38, p. 102 [KSA 6, p. 139], emphasis original. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, ‘The value or Worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price, that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power; and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another’, Leviathan, ‘Of Man’, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 51.
and is in all’ (Col. 3.11). Similarly, when Paul argued that prostitution was not appropriate for followers of Christ, he appealed to the cost of their redemption: ‘You are not your own; you were bought at a price. Therefore honour God with your bodies’ (1 Cor. 6.19-20).

Finally, for this initial survey, in the world reframed by the Cross, the kenotic self-giving Christ becomes the highest human ideal. The ideal of self-emptying, and the exaltation of servanthood is strongly supported in the Gospels as a central teaching of Christ, but it is Paul who advocates the ideal of the kenosis for the multi-ethnic churches outside of Palestine. It is in a letter addressed to Philippi, a Roman colony in Greece, that Paul gives the kenosis its fullest expression as an aspirational and ethical ideal:

In your relationships with one another, have the same mindset as Christ Jesus: Who, being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be used to his own advantage; rather, he made himself nothing by taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself by becoming obedient to death—even death on a Cross! Therefore God exalted him to the highest place and gave him the name that is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue acknowledge that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father (Phil. 2.5-11).

In Paul’s understanding of the kenosis, the path to power and exaltation is inverted, and the crucifixion-resurrection event becomes the new paradigm for actions within kingdom of God, wherein members do not work to consolidate their own power, but empty themselves for the other: ‘Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather, in humility value others above yourselves, not looking to your own interests but each of you to the interests of the others’ (Phil. 2.3-4). Further, as Christ’s self-emptying resulted in divine exaltation, so divine power

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45 For an influential reconstruction of the ‘social world’ of the early Pauline communities, see Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). His chapter, ‘The Social Level of Pauline Christians’ (pp. 51-73), would be of special interest to readers of Nietzsche’s AC, because it challenges the assumption that Christianity initially took root within the lower class.

46 Kenotic, and kenosis are derived from the Greek terms, ‘κενός [empty]’ and ‘κενόω [to empty]’, referring especially to the self-emptying of Christ in the incarnation and crucifixion (Phil. 2.7, quoted below).

47 See, Mark 10.42-45; cf. Matt. 20.25-28, for a particularly salient example.
supervenes upon human weakness: ‘I will boast all the more gladly about my weaknesses, so that Christ’s power may rest on me. I delight in weaknesses, in insults, in hardships, in persecutions, in difficulties. For when I am weak, then I am strong’ (2 Cor. 12.9-10). Nietzsche’s readers should have no difficulty in understanding Nietzsche’s interest in the inverted ideals of Pauline anthropology and ethics.

1.2.2 Nietzsche’s ‘Return to Paul’.

‘Nietzsche spricht jetzt wie aus einer neuen Welt. In dem Neuen bleibt eine verwunderliche Spannung dadurch, daß nun auch die Fixierung von Gedanken und Symbolen beginnt’.
—Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche

The Enigma of Nietzsche Reborn.

Karl Jaspers gives considerable space in his influential study of Nietzsche to exploring and commenting on a sudden disruption that marks Nietzsche’s turn into his most productive and important years of thinking and writing. Jaspers refers to this enigma as ‘the incisive experience of the year 1880’, a period of personal transformation and extraordinary innovation: ‘Anyone who reads his letters and other writings in chronological order . . . cannot escape an extraordinarily strong impression that Nietzsche underwent at this time the most profound change that he had ever experienced’. And further:

_The question which agitates the student of Nietzsche and which is basic for the comprehension of his life is the question concerning the significance of this incisive experience (1880-1883) . . . something takes place here which leads to the climax of Nietzsche’s creative work, something which produces results for which his previous disposition cannot account and which thus prevents his being fully_

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50 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 92; also, ‘the break of 1880’, 107.
51 Jaspers, Nietzsche, 91.
understandable and causes a strangeness that places him at an unbridgeable distance.\textsuperscript{52}

Jaspers carefully outlines some of the distinctive elements that rise out of this transformation, including dramatic changes in three areas. First, Nietzsche seems to develop a new style, which is ‘manifested by the forcefulness of his images, his increasingly mythical similes, the plasticity of his visions, the ring that his words now have, the impelling force of his diction, and the compactness of his language’, such that, ‘[n]ature and landscape become more charged with life, more laden with destiny; it is as though he were united with them, and they became like his own self’.\textsuperscript{53} Second, Nietzsche transitions from ‘mere contemplation and questioning’, to an active ‘determination to undermine Christianity, morality, and traditional philosophy, and substitute a new synthesis’.\textsuperscript{54} Third, Nietzsche’s writings reveal new ‘basic thoughts’—the idea of eternal recurrence, the metaphysics of the will to power, the radical thinking through of nihilism, the concept of the superman—now have for Nietzsche an extraordinary importance and mystery formerly unknown to him’.\textsuperscript{55} In Jaspers’ rather felicitous summary: ‘Nietzsche now seems to speak from a new world’.\textsuperscript{56}

While Jaspers does not settle the issue—and even laments the futility of those diagnoses on offer\textsuperscript{57}—he does suggest that the ‘spiritual transformation since 1880’ might coincide with ‘a newly arising biological event’.\textsuperscript{58} Further, because of the wealth of extant correspondence from this period, Jaspers confidently dates the beginning of this event with an atypical specificity—

\textsuperscript{52} Jaspers, \textit{Nietzsche}, 92 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{53} Jaspers, \textit{Nietzsche}, 103.
\textsuperscript{54} Jaspers, \textit{Nietzsche}, 103.
\textsuperscript{55} We hasten to add, Nietzsche’s newfound interest in the person and legacy of the Apostle Paul, and, the proclamation of the death of God; Jaspers, \textit{Nietzsche}, 103 (emphasis original).
\textsuperscript{56} Jaspers, \textit{Nietzsche}, 103.
\textsuperscript{57} For example, ‘In spite of the severity of the disorders, the long duration of this illness, and the consequent profound change in Nietzsche’s existence, a medical diagnosis that would combine the symptoms into an unequivocal, clearly recognizable picture of the illness is not available. There has been talk of migraine, of a psycho-neurotic process in connection with his estrangement from Wagner, of an organic process of disease of the nervous system, but the results are not clear’, 91. Likewise, ‘To designate the process as schizophrenia or as schizoid seems futile to me . . . we must speak here of a biological factor which eventually may come to be recognized as psychiatry advances’, \textit{Nietzsche}, 97.
\textsuperscript{58} Jaspers, \textit{Nietzsche}, 106, (emphasis original).
from ‘August, 1880, until its climax in July-August, 1881, and even up to his inspired states of mind during the years 1882 and 1883’. 59

*Nietzsche’s Daybreak.*

Jaspers is not alone in recognizing these developments. 60 Indeed, they are so dramatic they call out for explanation. The stylistic and thematic developments from the last of Nietzsche’s *Untimely Meditations*, to *Human, All Too Human*, had been abrupt, but with *Daybreak* we meet a Nietzsche very like the one known from his mature-period writings. The glimpses of the familiar Nietzsche we see in the early and early-middle period give way to the Nietzsche on his subversive mission of revaluing all values, and remaking the world in a new image. Ultimately, even Nietzsche himself wants to account for the changes. When we turn to *Eccé Homo*, the answer becomes clearer, through a riddle. Under the rubric, ‘Why I Am So Wise’, Nietzsche writes: ‘The good fortune of my existence, its uniqueness perhaps, lies in its fatality: I am, to express it in the form of a riddle, already dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living and becoming old’. 61 The riddle, that Nietzsche was ‘already dead as my father’ is clarified in the following paragraphs, in which he speaks of his father’s death at the age of thirty-six. 62 Nietzsche felt his experience paralleled his father’s in an unsettling way: ‘in the same year in which his life went downward, mine, too, went downward: at thirty-six, I reached the lowest point of my vitality—I still lived, but without being able to see three steps ahead’. 63 In 1879, Nietzsche’s health forced him to retire from his professorship, and he spent the next summer ‘like a shadow’, and the following winter, ‘as a shadow’. 64 ‘This’, he writes, ‘was my

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60 Walter Kaufmann’s account is less dramatic, though he recognizes this as a pivotal season in Nietzsche’s life: ‘In 1879, when Nietzsche resigned from the university, his health seemed broken completely. Yet Nietzsche celebrated the new vistas of his freedom in *Dawn*. . . . He had thought that he might die in 1880, at the age of thirty-six as his father had done; but now he felt that he had been restored to life and become capable of a new and halcyon gaiety’, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1950] 1974), 65.
61 *EH* ‘Why I Am So Wise’ § 1, p. 222 [*KSA* 6, p. 264], emphasis original.
62 ‘[H]e was delicate, kind, and morbid, as a being that is destined merely to pass by—more a gracious memory of life than life itself’, *EH* ‘Why I Am So Wise’ § 1, p. 222 [*KSA* 6, p. 264].
63 *EH* ‘Why I Am So Wise’ § 1, p. 222 [*KSA* 6, p. 264].
64 *EH* ‘Why I Am So Wise’ § 1, p. 222 [*KSA* 6, p. 264], emphasis original.

Duff, 36
minimum: the *Wander and His Shadow* originated at this time. Doubtless, I then knew about shadows’.65 During the following winter, while continuing to struggle with the health problems that forced his retirement, he wrote *Daybreak*, a book unlike anything he had produced. Here Nietzsche is offering an explanation of what Jaspers and others have recognized as a disruption and revolution in his work—partly a phenomenology of his life as a shadow, partly a mystical interpretation: at the lowest point of his life, Nietzsche passed through death as his father [als mein Vater bereits gestorben], and rose with ‘perfect brightness and cheerfulness, even exuberance of spirit’.66 This enigmatic picture he paints of having two natures, one having passed through death, appears again, at the end of the section: ‘In order to understand anything at all of my *Zarathustra* one must perhaps be similarly conditioned as I am—with one foot beyond life’.67 We might interpret Nietzsche’s riddle like this: he had expected to die like his father, and in a sense he did; but he rose again with ‘perfect brightness and cheerfulness, even exuberance of spirit’—his symbol for this existential death and rebirth is, of course, Dionysus.68

*Nietzsche’s Reading of Hermann Lüdemann.*

With the foregoing sketch in mind, we now note that it was during this critical period of development that Nietzsche made what I shall call throughout this project his *return to Paul*. In the months leading up to his dramatic change, there are a few indications that Nietzsche had experienced a revival of interest in Christian thought.69 In one case of special importance for this study, Nietzsche wrote to Franz Overbeck, requesting several books, among them, Hermann Lüdemann’s, *Die Anthropologie des Apostles Paulus*, which he finished reading sometime in the

65 *EH* ‘Why I Am So Wise’ § 1, p. 222 [*KSA* 6, pp. 264-265].
66 *EH* ‘Why I Am So Wise’ § 1, p. 222 [*KSA* 6, p. 265].
67 *EH*, ‘Why I Am So Wise’, § 3, p. 226 [Kaufmann’s translation of § 3 departs from the *KSA*; it is based upon the reconstructed text available in Erich F. Podach’s, *Friedrich Nietzsches Werke Des Zusammenbruchs* (Heidelberg: Wolfgang Rothe Verlag, 1961), 219-220].
69 Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck that he had recently reread Overbeck’s ‘Christlichkeit’ [*Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie*, 1873], ‘with very great joy’, adding that he had become more worthy of it in the intervening time, as he had been ‘thinking about many things—right and left’, eKGWB/BVN-1880,33 — Letter to Franz Overbeck: 22/06/1880. Nietzsche had originally read it shortly after its publication, and he referred to it five times in letters and once in a note, prior to his rereading.
month of July, reporting to Overbeck on July 22, 1880, that it was ‘a masterpiece in a very
difficult field’. That Nietzsche read Lüdemann’s study with more than passing interest is
indicated by a series of careful reading notes reflecting upon St Paul and Lüdemann’s work in his
journals, and the engagements with Paul in his published works—including one of his most
sustained reflections on Paul in *Daybreak* § 68, which was published the following year.
Though Nietzsche was reading widely on other topics at this time, and his notes continue to
reflect the diversity of his thought, I suggest here the modest thesis that Nietzsche’s return to
Paul proved to be a decisive point in his development as a thinker, and a decisive period in his
own self-overcoming. As has often been noted, it was not uncommon for Nietzsche to be
dramatically impacted by his reading material, and this encounter provided fresh material that
he would use to develop his own legacy as a kind of anti-Paulinism. This was a critical period
within which *Nietzsche was beginning to remap his symbolic world*, just as Paul had done after
Damascus. Indeed, I will argue in a later chapter that this decisive period of development in
Nietzsche’s career, which Jaspers despaired to diagnose, can be fruitfully compared to St Paul’s
conversion experience. In the Christian tradition, Paul’s encounter with the risen Christ
precipitated a radical development in his Weltanschauung. How exactly to account for the
changes in Paul remains a vexed (and fascinating) issue in Pauline studies, but few contemporary
scholars attribute this to a wholesale rejection of the Second-Temple Judaism he had zealously
guarded. Greater sensitivity towards the Jewish aspects of Paul’s writings reveals how he

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71 ‘Paulus’, used in reference to the Apostle Paul, appears only twice in Nietzsche’s writings
prior to reading his reading of Lüdemann (both times in 1879). After reading Lüdemann,
extPLICIT references to ‘Paulus’ appear more than a hundred times. Nietzsche reflects directly on
Daniel Havemann suggests that Nietzsche read through Lüdemann two times during the summer
the table appearing in Jörg Salaquarda, ‘Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigten: Nietzsche’s
Verständnis des Apostels Paulus’, in *Nietzsche*, 288-322. Wege der Forschung, Band 521
72 Granting Jaspers’ date of August, 1880, Nietzsche finished the study of St Paul and began
writing notes within days of this experience.
73 This irrespective of how critical he was of those who needed to read in order to think; see
Thomas H. Brobjør’s, ‘Nietzsche’s Reading and Private Library, 1885-1889’, *Journal of the

Duff, 38
reframed his (Jewish) symbolic world around the Christ-event. The drama of Paul’s life and mission rise from the debates that surrounded his radically new understanding of God’s relationship to Creation. Alan Segal’s insistence that Paul was, after all, a convert, and Daniel Boyarin’s provocative thesis in *A Radical Jew*, highlight from a contemporary Jewish perspective the far-reaching significance of the Christ-event in reshaping Paul’s symbolic thought-world.

In summary, then, we can outline the significance of Nietzsche’s return to Paul in three ways. First, it corresponds to a period of rapid personal development, which Nietzsche himself cryptically describes as a time in which he descended into a shadow existence, and then ascended—thus staging a confrontation with his own décadence. Lüdemann’s study was in many ways the perfect catalyst both for Nietzsche’s personal process of self-overcoming, and for his positive work towards overcoming Christianity and replacing it with the life-affirming symbol of Dionysus, because it brought Paul—who, mediated through the Reformation, had become the decisive religious figure of Lutheran Germany—into the critical light of a philologically-sophisticated study that resonated naturally with Nietzsche the philologist.

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74 While discussing Paul’s relationship to the theological categories of Second-Temple Judaism—monotheism, election, and eschatology—N. T. Wright offers the basic thesis that Paul’s uniqueness is accounted for by how he ‘rethought, reworked, and reimagined them around Jesus the Messiah on the one hand, and the Spirit on the other’, 611-612.

75 *Pace* Krister Stendahl, who argued that Paul was called rather than converted; see the titular essay in, *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 7ff. For Alan Segal, see his, *Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). I will return to this issue in Chapter 3.

76 Daniel Boyarin argues that Paulinism was a Judaism radicalized through Paul’s sympathies with Hellenistic dualism and universalism; *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

77 This was also the decisive point at which he began to deal more directly with his relationship to his father, from whom he may have been feeling a renewed distance in the wake of his estrangement from Wagner, two years prior. It has been frequently noted that Wagner, who was the same age as Nietzsche’s late father, may have served as a surrogate father for Nietzsche. Ronald Hayman’s excellent biography, *Nietzsche: A Critical Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), provides a detailed summary, along with surrounding events in, ‘Volte-Face’, pp. 190-220.

78 Nietzsche complained to Overbeck that Lüdemann, ‘was, unfortunately, no writer’, but he was clearly impressed with its scholarly precision. Lüdemann’s study is designed for a scholar’s scholar; in addition to its abstruse prose, it assumes the reader’s proficiency in Hebrew and Greek, with no transliteration or translation of primary texts. The significance of this is clear:
Second, the analysis of Paul’s anthropology, combined with Lüdemann’s provocative thesis that Paul’s *Hauptbriefe* revealed an evolution towards understanding the human person within a more Platonic metaphysic, laid the groundwork for Nietzsche’s later theories about Paul’s influence in universalizing Christianity. This was an especially important development because Paul’s anthropology became a key locus of Nietzsche’s conflict with Christianity, and it provided some of the explanatory resources Nietzsche needed to connect Jerusalem and Athens, as movements of *décadence*, and to lay the blame on Paul for taking a small, sectarian movement and transforming it into the phenomenon that had determined so much of Western history.

Third, Nietzsche’s return to Paul intersected with a period in which he developed and clarified some of the basic questions and tasks that occupied him through his late period and up to his collapse. His defining mission—the Revaluation of All Values—was then underway. Some of these new ideas seem to be designed as antipodes to those associated with Pauline (or Lutheran) Christianity. In the years following this conversion, Nietzsche began to use the term ‘antipode’ in the positive sense of ‘an opposite from which you can define yourself’. As Peter Bermann writes, ‘His combative style projected Nietzsche into the world of his contemporaries by pitting him against a series of self-selected antipodes. . . . But Nietzsche’s problem was to be that he lacked a powerful contemporary opponent. . .’. Paul, as a key architect of the Christian thought-world, as a diaspora Jew of considerable genius, as a transvaluator—was Nietzsche’s antipode par excellence.

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Nietzsche was returning to Paul’s Epistles—not as a pious Lutheran youth, but as a skilled philologist and philosopher—and finding in them the confluence of several streams of thought, which interested him immensely.

79 I return to the question of Lüdemann’s specific influence on Nietzsche—which I take to be significant—in Chapters 3 and 5.

80 In reference to a quotation of Ernest Renan about religion, he writes: ‘These sentences are so utterly *antipodal* to my ears and habits that on finding them my first wrath wrote in the margin “la niaiserie religieuse par excellence!”’ But my subsequent wrath actually took a fancy to them—these sentences standing truth on her head! It is so neat, so distinguished to have one’s own antipodes!’ *JGB*, § 48 (emphasis original).


82 *Pace* Heidegger, who writes that ‘during the last years of his creative life he labours at nothing else than the overturning of Platonism’, *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art*, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperOne, 1991), 154. Even granting the kinship Nietzsche
1.2.3 Nietzsche, Counter-Pauline Interpretation of the Crucified God.

In der That, wir Philosophen und „freien Geister” fühlen uns bei der Nachricht, dass der „alte Gott todt” ist, wie von einer neuen Morgenröthe angestrahlt; unser Herz strömt dabei über von Dankbarkeit, Erstaunen, Ahnung, Erwartung”.

— Nietzsche, The Gay Science

The third and final part of Human, All Too Human—The Wanderer and His Shadow—was written during Nietzsche’s metaphorical ‘death’; it was followed by a work that marked his new beginning: Morgenröte—Daybreak—from the shadows to the bright morning light. In the retrospective Nietzsche provides in Eccé Homo, he writes: ‘With this book [Daybreak] my campaign against morality begins’. Nietzsche’s relationship to Christianity is frequently reduced to his critique of Christian morality, but this is correct only insofar as we take morality in the broadest sense. Nietzsche was always interested in the anthropological types associated with moral frameworks: ‘Fundamentally my term immoralist involves two negations. For one, I negate the type of man that has so far been considered supreme: the good, the benevolent, the beneficent. And then I negate a type of morality that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself—the morality of decadence or, more concretely, Christian morality’.

recognized between Plato and Christianity, this reduction cannot cohere with the breadth of content on display in the final months of Nietzsche’s productive period.

83 ‘Indeed, we philosophers and “free spirits” feel, when we hear the news that “the old god is dead”, as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation’, GS § 343, p. 280 [KSA 3, p. 574].
84 EH ‘Dawn’ § 1 p. 290 [KSA 6, p. 329]. Cf. D § 2, pp. 1-2 [KSA 3, p. 12]: ‘I descended into the depths, I tunneled into the foundations, I commenced an investigation and digging out of an ancient faith, one upon which we philosophers have for a couple of millennia been accustomed to build as if upon the firmest of all foundations—and have continued to do so even though every building hitherto erected on them has fallen down: I commenced to undermine our faith in morality’.
85 As Brian Leiter does in, Nietzsche on Morality (New York: Routledge, 2002), 195.
86 EH—Why I Am A Destiny, 328. While Nietzsche does go on to declare the second point more decisive, that is because the first negation is included in the second. To reject a form of morality is to reject the human ideal associated with it.

Duff, 41
did not merely take issue with the moral philosophy of Christianity—pitting egoism against the Christian ethic of benevolence, for instance. Rather, Nietzsche’s concerns with Christian morality were a subset of his rejection of the most fundamental axiological commitments which undergirded St Paul’s thought-world. We have already seen how the centrality of the Cross within Paulinism made it possible to value human weakness as precisely the phenomenon upon which divine power would supervene. Paul’s reputation as an apostate and a subversive afforded him with many opportunities to develop a heightened sense of his own mortality, and he referred to his physical challenges and life-threatening circumstances just a little less frequently than did Nietzsche.87 However, the resurrection aspect of the Christ-event placed this all-too-human weakness, suffering, and mortality in a new light. This gave rise to some of Paulinism’s radical commitments to a cluster of questions related to anthropology—human nature, anthropological ideals, the future of humanity and super-humanity, and so forth. I argue here that it was this radical anthropology of event that lay at the root of Nietzsche’s *agôn* with Pauline Christianity. Section two of his commentary on *Daybreak* is especially illuminating in this connection: ‘My task of preparing a moment of the highest self-examination for humanity, a *great noon* when it looks back and far forward, when it emerges from the dominion of accidents and priests . . . . [This] is crucial for the future of humanity’.88

The question of Christian morality is so essential for the future of humanity, because it is precisely at the intersection of anthropology and axiology that Nietzsche sees Christianity as most destructive, and most enduring: ‘[h]umanity has so far been in the *worst* hands’,89 and we can see the proof of that enduring influence in that ‘what is unegoistic is everywhere assigned absolute value while what is egoistic is met with hostility’.90 Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the heart of *décadence*, is antipodal to the Pauline ideal grounded in the *kenosis*. While Paul esteems the Cross as the ultimate symbol of self-sacrificial benevolence, Nietzsche calls for a kind of egoism: ‘At this point the real answer to the question, *how one becomes what one is*, can no

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87 Rom. 8.36; 1 Cor. 4.9, 15.30-31; 2 Cor. 1.8-11, 4.7-12, 6.4-10, 11.23-33.
88 *EH* ‘Dawn’ § 2 p. 291 [KSA 6, p. 330], emphasis original.
89 Namely, ‘the priest (including those *crypto*-priests, the philosophers)’, *EH* ‘Dawn’ § 2 p. 291 [KSA 6, p. 331], emphasis original.
90 *EH* ‘Dawn’ § 2 p. 291 [KSA 6, p. 331]. Nietzsche adds, ‘Whoever is at odds with me about that is to my mind *infected*.—But all the world is at odds with me’.

Duff, 42
longer be avoided. And thus I touch upon the masterpiece of the art of self-preservation—of *selfishness*.\textsuperscript{91} Passages in which Nietzsche attacks the ideal based on the *kenosis* can be multiplied endlessly: ‘In the concept of the “selfless”, the “self-denier”, the distinctive sign of decadence, feeling attracted by what is harmful, being unable to find any longer what profits one, self-destruction is turned into the sign of value itself, into “duty”, into “holiness”, into what is “divine” in man’.\textsuperscript{92} St Paul’s corpus is full of examples of anti-egoism: ‘Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather, in humility value others above yourselves’ (*Phil*. 2.3). ‘Selfish ambition’ [ἐριθεῖαι], appears in Paul’s list of fleshly vices in *Galatians* 5.20, and in *Romans*, the community is warned that the self-seeking will face God’s judgement (2.8), while the believers are challenged to, ‘Be devoted to one another in brotherly love’ (12.10). To the Corinthians he writes, ‘No one should seek his own good, but the good of others’ (1 Cor. 10.24); he adds in his hymn about love, that ‘love is not self-seeking’ [οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῆς] (1 Cor. 13.5). Again, this early Christian virtue ethic is rooted in the Christ-event, where the *kenotic* death of Christ is the quintessential image of non-egoistic benevolence. Importantly, Paul advocates this ethic of selfless benevolence, not as a path towards salvation, but as a means of mapping the Christ-event onto lived experience by reconciling the members of his diverse communities, and thus extending the reach of Christ’s earthly kingdom.

Nietzsche understood that even though many of his contemporaries had abandoned hope in eschatological salvation *as such*, this ethic of benevolence still held sway over the Western moral imagination. Nietzsche’s final comment on *Daybreak* encapsulates his most basic concern: ‘With *Dawn* I first took up the fight against the *morality that would unself* man [Entselbstungs-Moral]’.\textsuperscript{93} Nietzsche’s coinage of ‘Entselbstung’, is illuminating. The term first appeared in a notebook entry on priestly morality—dated to the months following Nietzsche’s

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{91} *EH* ‘Why I Am So Clever’ § 9, p. 253 [*KSA* 6, p. 293].
  \item \textsuperscript{92} *EH* ‘Why I Am a Destiny’ § 8 p. 334 [*KSA* 6, p. 374].
  \item \textsuperscript{93} *EH*, ‘Daybreak’ § 2, p 292 [*KSA* 6, p. 332], emphasis added. Earlier in this section Kaufmann’s translation (almost criminally) excises an illuminating parenthesis: ‘—Welchen Sinn haben jene Lügenbegriffe, die Hülfsbegriffe der Moral, „Seele“, „Geist“, „freier Wille“, „Gott“, wenn nicht den, die Menschheit physiologisch zu ruiniren?—’ [‘what purpose have the lies of morality, “soul,” “spirit,” “free will,” “God,” if not to destroy humanity psychologically?’], *KSA* 6, p. 331; cf. Podach, Friedrich Nietzsche’s Werke Des Zusammenbruchs, 283.
  \item \textsuperscript{94} *KSA* 9:10[D58], p. 425.
\end{itemize}
reading of Lüdemann—and then more than twenty times overall. The term provides a vivid commentary on how Nietzsche sees traditional (Pauline-Christian) morality dehumanizing those who practice it.\textsuperscript{95} Nietzsche sees that Pauline Christianity very nearly makes an ideal out of weakness—celebrating the ‘thorn in the flesh’ as the condition upon which God’s power supervenes.\textsuperscript{96} The danger (or cruelty) of this, from Nietzsche’s perspective, is that the higher the types of humans, who are already the rare exception, and who face greater odds against turning out well,\textsuperscript{97} are especially victimized by the idealizing of self-sacrificial morality. Over time, the values of self-abnegation and benevolence eventuate in the proliferation of sick and degenerate types of humans: ‘a smaller, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, something eager to please, sickly, and mediocre has been bred, the European of today—’.\textsuperscript{98}

The whole of Nietzsche’s campaign against Christianity can be understood in this way: Christian morality is predicated upon an anthropology that is not only metaphysically absurd,\textsuperscript{99} but insidiously arranged so as to privilege lower types at the expense of higher types, and present consolation at the expense of future greatness. He writes, ‘When a decadent type of man ascended to the rank of the highest type, this could only happen at the expense of its countertype, the type of man that is strong and sure of life’.\textsuperscript{100} The solution that Paul proposed to humanity’s plight, became the plight in the world of Nietzsche the ‘Immoralist’; Paul’s hope of a new kind

\textsuperscript{95} Nietzsche’s terms of contrast, ‘Selbsterhaltung’, and, ‘Kraftsteigerung’, demonstrate the values of his naturalized anthropology—to which we will turn after a brief examination of Nietzsche’s own account of the ‘Death of God’.

\textsuperscript{96} Nietzsche is not entirely unfair here: recall Paul’s view of strength supervening upon weakness: ‘Three times I pleaded with the Lord to take it [the thorn in his flesh] away from me. But he said to me, ‘My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness.’ Therefore I will boast all the more gladly about my weaknesses, so that Christ’s power may rest on me. That is why, for Christ’s sake, I delight in weaknesses, in insults, in hardships, in persecutions, in difficulties. For when I am weak, then I am strong’, 2 Cor. 12.8-10.

\textsuperscript{97} BGE § 62, p. 74 [KSA 5, p. 81], ‘There is among men as in every other animal species an excess of failures. . . . the successful cases are, among men too, always the exception—and in view of the fact that man is the as yet undetermined animal, the rare exception’.

\textsuperscript{98} BGE § 62, p. 76 [KSA 5, p. 83].

\textsuperscript{99} ‘What mankind has so far considered seriously have not even been realities but mere imaginings—more strictly speaking, lies prompted by the bad instincts of sick natures that were harmful in the most profound sense—all these concepts, “God,” “soul,” “virtue,” “sin,” “beyond,” “truth,” “eternal life”. —But the greatness of human nature, its “divinity,” was sought in them’, EH ‘Why I Am So Clever’ § 10 p. 256 [KSA 6, pp. 295-296].

\textsuperscript{100} EH ‘Why I Am a Destiny’ § 5, p. 330 [KSA 6, p. 369].
of humanity was, for Nietzsche, a war against higher humanity—a, ‘Todkrieg gegen diesen höheren Typus Mensch’, as he would say in The Antichrist.\textsuperscript{101}

‘Gott am Kreuze’ versus ‘Got ist Todt’.

Nietzsche would come to credit exiled, and post-exilic Israel more broadly with beginning the ‘slave rebellion in morals’,\textsuperscript{102} but his important concept of the ‘revaluation of all values’ [Umwerthung aller Werthe], was closely associated with St Paul’s influence.\textsuperscript{103} Nietzsche’s study of Pauline anthropology in 1880 had solidified his conviction that Paul was the decisive figure in translating an isolated crucifixion into a subversive, transcultural phenomenon: ‘[without] the storms and confusions of such a mind, of such a soul, there would be no Christianity; we would hardly have heard of a little Jewish sect whose master died on the cross’.\textsuperscript{104} Of course, for Nietzsche, it is Paul’s interpretation that lends the event its significance. It is not merely the crucifixion of a messianic pretender, but the kenotic death of God: ‘Never yet and nowhere has there been an equal boldness in inversion, anything as horrible, questioning, and questionable as this formula: it promised a revaluation of all the values of antiquity’.\textsuperscript{105}

While looking at Paul’s axiological reading of the Christ-event, I argued that Paul understood the crucifixion event as a divine devaluing of natural values, which established a negative equality on one side of the Cross (‘boasting is excluded’), and a positive equality based on imputed (derivative) values. We will explore the importance of this reading for Paul in detail when we come to Chapter Three, but we can say now that this imputed equality—‘equal before God’, as Nietzsche puts it—was both central to Paul’s gospel of salvation by unmerited grace, and essential in Paul’s efforts to establish a new kind of counter-culture community. For Nietzsche, however, Paul’s ‘gospel’ becomes ‘the worst tidings’, the dysevangel, in two important ways that Nietzsche touches upon in the conclusion of The Antichrist. First, because Paul’s gospel turned kenosis, humility, and weakness into Christian virtues, societies under the spell of Christian values actively (but unreflectively) work to preserve décadence values, and

\textsuperscript{101} KSA 6, p. 171 (emphasis original).
\textsuperscript{102} BGE § 195, p. 108 [KSA 5, p. 117].
\textsuperscript{103} AC is a critical part of this larger project, as I will argue in ch. 6.
\textsuperscript{104} D § 68, p. 39 [KSA 3, p. 65].
\textsuperscript{105} BGE § 46 [KSA 5, p. 67].
degenerate types—treating strength and exceptionalism with suspicion, and (Nietzschean) egoism as essentially anti-Christian. So much of this was advanced under the symbol of the Cross, which Nietzsche treats to a sweeping revaluation: ‘[T]he Cross as the badge of recognition for the most subterranean conspiracy there has ever been—a conspiracy against health, beauty, well-constitutedness, bravery, intellect, benevolence of soul, against life itself . . .’. Second, because the Christ-event is seen as a cataclysm that flattens out the axiological stratification of society—seeing everyone as equally indigent before the Cross, and then made equal through an infusion of grace—those under the ongoing influence of these ideas are incapable of celebrating natural differences in rank: “Equality of souls before God”, this falsehood, this pretext for the rancune of all the base-minded, this explosive concept which finally became revolution, modern idea and principle of the decline of the entire social order is Christian dynamite’.107

Nietzsche came to invest much of his sense of his own significance in this critique of Pauline values. The very décadence values that Paul had inscribed on the Occidental consciousness with the ‘gruesome symbol’ of the crucified God, continued to hold fast in Europe—even as the observance of Christianity declined, and atheism became more widespread. Not only were cruciform values unchallenged in the dawning of a post-Christian Europe, they remained the very standards by which ‘emancipated’ individuals judged themselves: ‘They have got rid of the Christian God, and now feel obliged to cling all the more firmly to Christian morality. . . . When one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives oneself of the right to Christian morality’.108

It was in the face of this disconnect between the moral zeitgeist of the late 19th-Century, and the decline in Christian theism that Nietzsche famously proclaimed the Death of God. In what has become one of Nietzsche’s most famous aphorisms, we meet ‘The Madman’—not precisely representing Nietzsche himself,109 but a vehicle through whom he could highlight

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106 AC § 62, p. 196 [KSA 6, p. 253], emphasis original.
107 AC § 62, p. 196 [KSA 6, p. 252], emphasis original.
108 TI ‘Expeditions of an Untimely Man’ § 5, p. 79 [KSA 6, p. 113], emphasis original.
109 This is a stubbornly persistent misunderstanding in the popular reception of Nietzsche, and it is not absent from the scholarly literature. Henry Bayman, for example, associates the madman directly with Nietzsche, and argues that the proclamation of the Death of God holds only for the ‘Christian notion’ of God, and does not apply to theism, as such [‘Nietzsche, God, and
certain implications of the Death-of-God event. He writes: ‘Have you not heard of that Madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: ‘I seek God! I seek God!’ The imagery is deliberately paradoxical: it is the bright morning [hellen Vormittage], but the Madman lights a lantern—‘Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning?’ Furthermore, he is surrounded by atheists, but they are blind to the significance of the death of God, and only mock him. The Madman has advanced beyond the atheistic οἱ πολλοί of the marketplace as he sees the darkness closing in. As Heidegger rightly says, ‘The speech of the madman . . . has nothing in common with the opinions of those who are merely standing about and talking confusedly, who “do not believe in God”. For those . . . nihilism has not yet asserted itself at all . . .’. The earth breaks from its orbit around the sun—even as a new sun dawns. The startling imagery Nietzsche employs of grave diggers and sepulchres, and divine decomposition and putrefaction, functions like the scandal of the Cross: it is the gruesome imagery that prepares the ground for his ultimate task: The Revaluation of All Values.

Doomsday: the Consequences of Atheism’, in *Nietzsche and the Gods*, ed. Weaver Santaniello, 183-211 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); see especially pp. 184-185. A basic challenge to this view is that Nietzsche intentionally employs the device of an invented character through whom to proclaim this message—something he later does throughout Z to illustrate various perspectives in a post-death-of-God world. A more serious challenge, however, is that nowhere does the mature Nietzsche’s own voice begin to approach the anxiety or sense of despair we see in his Madman. Nietzsche’s quite different perspective on the death-of-God event is conveyed directly in *GS* § 343, ‘The meaning of our cheerfulness’—perhaps as an early corrective to this misunderstanding.  

110 *GS* § 125, p. 181 [KSA 3, p. 480].  
111 *GS* § 125, p. 181 [KSA 3, p. 481].  
113 See, ‘Embark!’ , where ‘sun’ serves as a metaphor for the good bestowed by a personal philosophy: ‘Consider how every individual is affected by an overall philosophical justification of his way of living and thinking: he experiences it as a sun that shines especially for him and bestows warmth, blessings, and fertility on him . . .’, *GS* § 289, p. 231 [KSA 3, p. 529].
'God Died: Now We Want—the Overman to Live'.

As the event around which the Pauline Weltanschauung orbits does not end with night of crucifixion, but with the dawn of resurrection—a new humanity, and bright new horizon of possibilities for human being—so it is with Nietzsche’s great event. While the Madman’s angst may be seen within Nietzsche’s world as one stage beyond the atheists of the marketplace, it is only a stage, and so it too must be overcome. When Nietzsche revisits the Death-of-God event in the fifth and final part of Gay Science, it is not with the pathos of the frantic Madman, but as ‘the meaning of our cheerfulness’. While he does not deny the event’s, ‘monstrous logic of terror’, his own outlook is full of wonder: ‘Indeed, we philosophers and “free spirits” feel, when we hear the news that “the old god is dead”, as if a new dawn shown on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation’. As Nietzsche revisits the Death-of-God imagery, he seems determined to provide some commentary on The Madman: the Death-of-God event is the setting or eclipsing of the sun; it brings shadows and gloom; it takes eyes that are strong and subtle to see the lengthening shadows, and to begin to imagine what may come. The Madman himself lit a lantern in the bright light of morning, and saw that the death of God would cause a cataclysm—humanness would have to be dramatically revalued and reinvented. But Nietzsche clearly wants to distance himself from this frantic seeker after God. Like Paul’s resurrection, the death of God is followed by a metaphorical dawn, with the horizon opening up to new kinds of becoming—new possibilities for human being. One far-reaching consequence of this event is that the egalitarian values of Pauline Christianity are rescinded, and higher types can once again rise to their rightful positions: ‘But now this god has died! . . . It is only now, since he lies in his grave, that you are resurrected. Only now the great noon comes, only now the higher man becomes—ruler!’

114 GS § 343, p. 279 [KSA 3, p. 573].
115 GS § 343, p. 279 [KSA 3, p. 573].
116 GS § 343, p. 280 [KSA 3, p. 574].
117 Book V of GS was finished in 1887, five years after the first edition was published.
118 ‘Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?’, GS § 125, p. 181 [KSA 3, p. 481].
119 Z-IV ‘On the Higher Man’ § 2, p. 232 [KSA 4, p. 357]. Nietzsche’s proclamation of the Death of God was frequently associated with the end of this Christian-Pauline theoretical basis for human equality. Late in Nietzsche’s productive period, as he was preparing to publish Antichrist, George Brandes began to promote Nietzsche’s work in Denmark, characterizing Duff, 48
1.3 Nietzsche and St Paul in Dialogue

1.3.1 The Death-of-God Motif as a Signpost to a Reimagined Anthropology.

The foregoing discussion serves as an introduction to how Nietzsche and St Paul use their respective ‘Death-of-God’ events in similar ways. In both cases, the event has profound, world-historical implications for what it means to be human. To stand authentically as humans before the event is to first consider the depth of its impact on our values—even re-evaluating the dogmas of our anthropology. In both cases, the proclamation refers to a recent historical event, and an ongoing existential reality. Paul and Nietzsche (along with Zarathustra and the Madman) compress the past, the present, and the future into the proclamation. In the coming chapters, we will see how Paul’s references to the Cross reveal the elasticity of the imagery in his development of Christian thought, as it becomes paradigmatic for God’s plans for all of creation, and especially for God’s image-bearers. Nietzsche further multiplies the ways in which this elastic motif can be put to service—critiquing and satirizing Paul’s proclamation, even as he confronts his contemporaries with spectre of divine death and the sudden loss of an existential horizon.

In both cases, the event stretches from the world-historical to the deeply personal, and even self-knowledge is linked to the death of God. For Paul, the disjunction created by the event is total: he is crucified with Christ—he no longer lives (Gal. 2.20); and yet, as his life is hidden in Christ,\(^\text{120}\) he discovers a new understanding of himself as an adopted child, known and loved by God.\(^\text{121}\) Though Nietzsche would claim in Eccê Homo that he was an atheist by instinct, and

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\(^\text{120}\) Col. 3:3; cf. M, § 68, p. 41 [KSA 3, pp. 67-68].
\(^\text{121}\) For examples of Paul’s eschatological imagery of childhood, see: Gal. 4.5-6; 1 Cor. 13.11; Rom. 8.14-16.

Duff, 49
not as a result of an event,\textsuperscript{122} his understanding of Christianity allowed him to see the most profound implications of life after the Christian God had become unbelievable. In March of 1885, Nietzsche, then nearing the height of his powers, wrote to Elisabeth upon news of her engagement to Bernhard Förster:

\begin{quote}
I am much too proud—as ever—to believe that a human could love me: this would assume, namely, that he knows \textit{who I am}. Just as little do I believe, that I will ever love anybody: that would assume, that I—for once—wonder of wonders!—found a person of my rank. . . . It is a shame that there is no God, and as a consequence, at least one Knower.\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

Even as Nietzsche anticipated a new dawn for humanity, his letters sometimes reflected a tragic loneliness for which his social isolation could not fully account. There is even a counter-Pauline logic to this letter. For Paul, the \textit{kenotic} death of Christ sanctioned a kind of love that transcended rank, and allowed for his socially-diverse communities to unite in love as they awaited Christ’s return: ‘For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face; now I know in part, \textit{but then I will know fully just as I also have been fully known}. But now faith, hope, love, abide these three; but the greatest of these is love’ (\textit{1 Cor}. 13.12-13).\textsuperscript{124} For Paul, the Knower lives, and loves him; for Nietzsche, it is a consequence of the Death-of-God event that this kind of spiritual consolation is irrecoverable in the first place, and a \textit{décadent} betrayal of life in the second.

\subsection*{1.3.2 Nietzsche and St Paul as Subversive Thinkers}

Nietzsche and Paul are also mutually-illuminating as subversive thinkers. They both wage an ironic warfare. Jeremiah’s commission echoes throughout their works: ‘See, I have appointed you this day over the nations and over the kingdoms, to pluck up and to break down, to destroy and to overthrow, to build and to plant’.\textsuperscript{125} For Paul, this meant tearing down idolatry

\begin{footnotes}
\item[122] ‘I do not by any means know atheism as a result; even less as an event: it is a matter of course with me, from instinct. I am too inquisitive, too \textit{questionable}, too exuberant to stand for any gross answer’, \textit{EH} ‘Why I Am So Clever’ § 1, p. 236 [\textit{KSA} 6, pp. 278-279]. This claim is, of course, suspect in light of the depth of the piety reflected in the \textit{juvenilia}.
\item[123] eKGWB/BVN-1885,583 — Letter to Elisabeth Nietzsche: Mid-March, 1885 (translation mine).
\item[125] \textit{Jer}. 1:10; cf. \textit{EH} ‘Why I Am A Destiny’ § 4; \textit{2 Cor}. 10.1-5.
\end{footnotes}
and anything in opposition to Christ: ‘The weapons we fight with are not the weapons of the world. On the contrary, they have divine power to demolish strongholds. We demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the knowledge of God, and we take captive every thought to make it obedient to Christ’ (2 Cor. 10.4-5). Both Acts and the Pauline epistles bear ample witness to the kinds of opposition Paul’s early mission faced. Paul’s theologizing was radically out-of-step with the surrounding pagan religious context, and simultaneously branded him as an apostate from the main streams of Second-Temple Judaism. These tensions were not merely theological, either. The Caesar Cult serves as just one salient example of how ancient religion blurred into politics. Another example appears in the legal actions taken against Paul by religious leaders among his fellow Israelites; these confrontations began with (theological) charges of heresy, but involved decidedly political strategies and institutions. What is at stake for Judaism as he proclaims Christ: the message of the crucified God destabilizes a way of life for Israel, relativizing the values of ethnic boundaries in light of the absolute Lordship of Christ. Furthermore, Paul understood—just as Nietzsche understood—that his preaching of the Crucified Messiah was an offence to all parties. Neither the world of Judaism, nor the world of Greeks and Romans could countenance a Crucified God. Mapping Paul’s relationship to these two complex religio-political contexts is a perennial challenge, but I will argue that Nietzsche’s perspective on Paulinism as a revaluation of Palestinian Judaism deserves closer attention than it has received.

For Nietzsche, the destructive force of his career as a thinker was ‘destroying the old tablets’, and resisting the ‘good’ people with their hostile posture towards anything new and creative: ‘The good must crucify the one who invents his own virtue! This is the truth! . . . The creator they hate the most; he who breaks tablets and old values, the breaker—him they call the lawbreaker. . . . [T]hey crucify the one who writes new values on new tablets, they sacrifice the

126 It has not gone unnoticed among Paul’s readers—ancient or modern—that his declaration that there is ‘one Lord, Jesus Christ [εἷς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός]’, could constitute a subversive challenge to the throne of Caesar. The political implications of Paul’s thought will be revisited in the third and fifth chapters.

127 These encounters appear regularly throughout Acts, including 9.23-25 (cf. 2 Cor. 11.32-33); 13.6-12, 50-52; 14.1-6, 19-20; 17.5-9, 13; 18.12-17; and finally, the entire section of 21.27-28.31, which recounts Paul’s extended trails before the religious leaders of Israel, and an assortment of Roman officials.

Duff, 51
future to *themselves*—they crucify all future humanity!*128* Indeed, creation itself was a
destructive force—‘we can destroy only as creators’.129* Much has been written about
Nietzsche’s possible influence on radical ideologies of the 20th-Century and, while I share the
consensus view that Nietzsche himself sought a more authentic good, he knew that by subverting
Christian values he risked opening the way to a more unrestrained cause of harm: ‘The
uncovering of Christian morality is an event without parallel, a real catastrophe. He that is
enlightened about that, is a *force majeure*, a destiny—he breaks the history of mankind in two.
One lives before him, or one lives after him’.130*

### 1.4 Special Considerations.

#### 1.4.1 The Horizon of This Study.

Readers familiar with the literature at the intersection of Nietzsche and Christianity are
aware of the ubiquitous protests in this literature against the relative silence, ambivalence, or
uneven treatment of this important area of Nietzsche’s legacy, but it is now evident that renewed
interest in St Paul’s legacy is serving as a catalyst for re-examinations and reappraisals of
Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity. A partial explanation for the dearth of the scholarship in this area
historically, is that the issue is complicated by *its irreducible interdisciplinary nature*. Indeed,
the Paul-Nietzsche relationship *itself* can be hard to situate: is it broadly philosophy? or
religious studies? Many will find that referring to ‘St Paul’s philosophy’, or ‘Nietzsche’s
theology’, has the infelicitous ring of a category error.131 Then there is the added difficulty of
situating the issue temporally: to refer to ‘Paul’s religious psychology’, or ‘Nietzsche’s
apocalyptic worldview’, seems decidedly anachronistic. When faced with the challenge of

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128 Z-III ‘The Old and New Tablets’ § 26, p. 171 [KSA 4, p. 266], emphasis original.

129 *GS* § 58, p. 122 [KSA 3, p. 422].

130 *EH* ‘Why I am a Destiny’ § 8, p. 333 [KSA 6, p. 373].

131 What is more, there is no clear distinction to be made in Paul’s thought between philosophy
and theology, as such. Paul’s ‘*Weltanschauung*’ is built upon what N. T. Wright has memorably
called, ‘robust creational monotheism’ (*Paul and the Faithfulness of God*, 201), which sees God
as the supreme, transcendent cause of creation, personalized in the creative activity of Christ
(*Col*. 1.15-17), and present in person of the Spirit. In such a framework, philosophy and
theology are inextricably linked. Heidegger would add that no such distinction could be made in
Western thought more generally, which he characterized as a tradition of ‘onto-theology’.

Duff, 52
bridging considerable temporal and disciplinary ‘distance’, we reasonably ask what is the value
of the study relative to the difficulties it poses. Is it a matter of bare historical reconstruction—
knowledge of historical minutiae as an end in itself—or do the consequences of such a study map
onto a larger domain, providing a fruitful path forward in other areas of understanding? If the
Paul-Nietzsche relationship is about interpreting a handful of notes and aphorisms, scattered
throughout the Nietzsche corpus, it will be more difficult to make the case that they merit such
attention—intrinsically interesting as they are.

Yet another difficulty associated with this area of research is that the Paul-Nietzsche
relationship can be catalogued as a smaller issue within the larger issue of Nietzsche’s critique of
Christianity, which can be seen within the larger issue of his relationship to organized religion
and spirituality, which can be understood within his metaphysics, ethics, and so-forth—issues
nested within issues like Russian dolls. What a deeper exploration of this connection shows,
however, is that the Paul-Nietzsche relationship provides a framework within which many of
these questions can be seen in a clearer light. Without Paul of Tarsus—genius revaluator,
incarnation of the priestly instinct, the villain of Nietzsche’s world—his anti-Christianity is
decidedly less clear. When Nietzsche broke with Christianity, he explored the geographies that
were available to him—those of Schopenhauer, Darwin, Voltaire, Wagner—but he later made a
significant return to the seminal texts of Christianity.

Today, both Nietzsche and Paul are the subjects of a vast literature in the disciplines that
bear their names, but, as is characteristic of thinkers of profound importance, their respective
influence extends well beyond ‘Nietzsche Studies’, or ‘Pauline Studies’, proper. St Paul’s
thought is the proper subject of New Testament Studies, systematic theology, and Rabbinic
Judaism, as well as political and moral philosophy, religious psychology, and so-forth.
Nietzsche’s work is relevant to many sub-disciplines of philosophy, literature, classics, religious
studies, history, psychology, and so on. Thus, this work is irreducibly interdisciplinary, and I
have sought throughout this study to respect the integrity and the advancements of these different
disciplines, even as I seek to elucidate the connections between these two very different figures.
This is a perennial challenge of interdisciplinary scholarship—to obtain fresh insights without
compromising old ones. I have sought thoroughness only at the intersection of Paul and
Nietzsche, but did not want to achieve depth without breadth, and the reader will hopefully see the efforts to provide substantive readings of both thinkers, as a basis for greater depth.

1.4.2 Concerning the Question of ‘Parallelomania’.

A unique challenge to this kind of interdisciplinary study, which seek to map shared ideas, themes, or patterns, is avoiding the excesses of so-called, ‘parallelomania’. In Samuel Sandmel’s influential article, ‘Parallelomania’, he defined the phenomenon as ‘that extravagance among scholars which first overdoes the supposed similarity in passages and then proceeds to describe source and derivation as if implying literary connection flowing in an inevitable or predetermined direction’. It has been commonplace in Pauline studies, for example, to assume that where there are apparent parallel statements in Paul and other extant rabbinic literature, that Paul was borrowing. This is not an indictment of interdisciplinary work, qua interdisciplinary work. When significant and illuminating comparisons can be made, they should be made. It is a caution against overly-easy comparisons, and assumptions of derivation or inter-textual echo.

Because the present study defends what may be considered a bold thesis—namely, that Nietzsche’s agôn with Paulinism came to be essentially co-extensive with the task of his mature period—I sense it is necessary to defend this project against the charge of parallelomania. I will limit my comments here to two essential points. First, in the case of this study, there can be no uncertainty as to direction of influence. The respective corpora of Paul and Nietzsche are not muddled together in the ancient past; the eighteen intervening centuries between Paul and Nietzsche ensure that all genuine parallels are cases of Nietzsche interacting with a long-established Pauline tradition.

Secondly, and more critically, the parallels examined in this study can usually be established with a very high degree of certainty. I will briefly highlight seven of these in turn:


133 This variety of parallelomania is in view throughout Sandmel’s article. Likewise, it has been common to uncritically make comparisons between Paul and his contemporaries—especially Philo and Seneca. This is not to say that legitimate and illuminating work cannot be done in this area—indeed it can, as a growing body of work comparing Paul and philosophy can attest.

134 Here I understand a genuine parallel is instantiated when a text or concept from Paulinism serves as the primary source material for the corresponding text or concept in Nietzsche’s work.
1) We know for certain that Nietzsche was at least reasonably well-acquainted with the Pauline corpus. We can ascertain from his writings that he read the *New Testament* in both *Koiné* Greek, and Luther’s German translation.

2) We can know for certain that Nietzsche studied secondary literature on Christian theology, the *New Testament*, and Pauline scholarship. Franz Overbeck connected him with Lüdemann’s, *Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus*—a philologically-sophisticated examination of Pauline anthropology.

3) We also understand that Nietzsche’s upbringing brought him under Paul’s influence—his pious Christian household, his education for the pastorate, and the Lutheranism that was such a major force in German culture.\(^{135}\)

4) We know that Nietzsche thought directly and carefully about Paul the person, and the content of his corpus of letters. He explicitly names Paul more than a hundred times, developed an original psycho-historical profile for Paul, and credited him as the genius behind the world-historical influence of Christianity.

5) We know that Nietzsche took special interest in Paul’s use of the Cross as a symbol of revaluation, referencing the Cross numerous times, directly addressing Paul’s applications, and offering his own alternative interpretations.

6) We can see that Nietzsche intentionally satirized the *New Testament* in the quasi-scriptural, quasi-apocalyptic style of *Zarathustra*. He proclaimed the death of God in ways that invited comparisons with Paul’s proclamation of the crucified Christ, and he proclaimed the Eternal Recurrence of the Same in a way that invites comparisons with the Pauline eschatology of the *Resurrection*.

7) Finally, Nietzsche was happy to view himself as a rival to, and Revaluator of, the Pauline tradition—most provocatively as ‘the Antichrist’, a title he applied to himself as early as the Spring of 1883.\(^{136}\) His final word in *Eccé Homo*, ‘—Have

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\(^{135}\) We will later see that Nietzsche sees Paul and Luther, along with Augustine, as advocates of the same *décadent* ideals.

\(^{136}\) eKGWB/BVN-1883,400 — Letter to Malwida von Meysenbug: 3./4. April 1883. In the same year, Nietzsche expressed satisfaction to Overbeck that a reader of *Zarathustra* had written to him, rightly associating the figure Zarathustra with the ‘long-promised Antichrist’ (eKGWB/BVN-1883,458 — Letter to Franz Overbeck: 26/08/1883).
I been understood?—Dionysus against the Crucified . . .’, invites the reader to consider Nietzsche’s oeuvre through this revaluing lens, which pits Nietzsche’s radical philosophy and theology against Paul’s.

All of this indicates that Nietzsche was positioned to be richly acquainted with, and influenced by, St Paul’s view of human nature, and his symbolic thought-world.

1.4.3 A Word on Primary Source Materials.

Much has been said about the source material for Nietzsche and Paul. While thirteen New Testament letters claim Pauline authorship, within critical biblical scholarship, there are disputes about the authenticity of six of these letters. The four ‘Hauptbriefe’—Romans, 1 & 2 Corinthians, and Galatians—have been considered the most certain in terms of Pauline authorship, and (gratefully), they are the most important for this study. I also make numerous references to Philippians, and several references to 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon, which are almost universally considered authentic. I occasionally refer to Colossians, which is disputed by some, and very occasionally to Ephesians, over which the Pauline guild is (rather hopelessly) divided. My thesis in no way depends upon the authenticity of the disputed letters, but I do consider those remaining letters valuable sources as either letters by Paul, or by early and astute readers of Paul. I have used the New International Version (NIV) throughout this project for English quotations of the New Testament; in a few cases I make small changes towards a more literal reflection of the Greek text. For the Greek text, I have consulted both the United Bible Society’s, UBS-4 text based upon the NA27 edition of the Nestle-Aland, Novum Testamentum Graece, and the Society of Biblical Literature’s Greek New Testament (SBLGNT). In a few cases I refer to Luther’s 1545 German translation of the New Testament, and the Rahlfs-Hanhart text of the Septuagint (LXX).

In Nietzsche’s case, the wealth of extant autograph manuscripts make authenticity less of a concern than the relative importance of the numerous texts. The sharpest dividing line runs

137 This is not to dismiss concerns about deletions, additions, and even suppressed manuscripts—often to protect the reputation of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, or to finesse certain of Nietzsche’s comments when politically expedient. These concerns are more serious in the case of AC and EH, both of which Elisabeth withheld from publication for several years. However, Nietzsche
between Nietzsche’s published works, and authorized manuscripts on the one hand, and his unpublished materials on the other. Heidegger’s work on Nietzsche prioritized the unpublished material, while Kaufmann believed in the superiority of those works that Nietzsche himself had deemed worthy of publication. Kaufmann has exerted so much influence on Anglophone scholarship, and his position on the unpublished materials was so vigorously defended, some hesitate to even gesture towards the unpublished material in the Nachlaß.\footnote{Despite Kaufmann’s concerns about the unpublished materials, he produced the authoritative English translation of *The Will to Power*—the posthumously-collected and edited volume of Nietzsche’s notes.} What is sometimes overlooked, however, is that Nietzsche’s notebook entries—even granting their unfinished character—are frequently more sober and judicious than his publications. While his published works are full of provocations, the notebooks reveal a penetrating thinker hard at work, trying to sort out genealogies of ideas, and locate different thinkers and ideas in a logical matrix. An example of this is his frequent recourse to long, numbered lists, wherein he tries to map out his own ideas in relationship to those of many other thinkers.\footnote{Examples of such lists can be found throughout KSA volumes; they are ubiquitous in volumes 12-13.} Additionally, the notebooks are critical for providing a larger context within which to understand the sometimes-polemical published works. For English quotations of Nietzsche works, I have used a combination of the Cambridge editions, Kaufmann’s translations, etc.\footnote{The specific texts are listed under the ‘Abbreviations’, above.} For German quotations and references, I have referenced both the standard Colli-Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA)*, in the 1988 print edition, and in the latest online critical edition, available at www.NietzscheSource.org.

1.5 Chapter Overviews.

1.5.1 Chapter 2: Nietzsche and St Paul Revisited.

Chapter Two contains a review of the relevant literature, examining studies touching on Nietzsche and the Christian tradition, more broadly, and then those that deal specifically with the Paul-Nietzsche relationship. I set out to accomplish three objectives: to locate the Paul-
Nietzsche relationship within the broader sweep of Nietzsche scholarship, to examine and evaluate the few detailed contributions to Paul-Nietzsche relationship itself, and finally, to briefly outline the original approach of this study. The chapter is organized around three distinct quests in the history of Nietzsche scholarship, through which I examine the rise and fall of interest in Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity. I survey a number of important historical touchpoints, and then interact with four major studies of the Paul-Nietzsche relationship in greater detail. Each of these studies focuses on reconstructing Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul, while neglecting Paul’s voice. I argue for the value of a more dialogical approach. *It is the unique contribution of this project to juxtapose exegetically, historically, and philosophically ‘thick’ readings of both figures.*

1.5.2 Chapter 3: *To Be Crucified with Christ.*

In the Chapter Three—the first of two broad forays into Paulinism—I work to lay out a pattern upon which Nietzsche can later be mapped, with a closer examination of Paul’s unique approach to philosophical anthropology. This begins with a study of St Paul’s famous conversion experience *en route* to Damascus (§ 3.2). The study of the Damascus event allows a reconstruction of Paul’s pre- and post-Damascus identities, and helps to answer the question of how his vision of the resurrected Christ gave rise to his unique revaluation and expansion of Second-Temple Judaism. This study also occasions an exploration of some of the perennial debates in Pauline scholarship, and a few of the key perspectives on Paul’s relationship to Judaism. While avoiding anachronisms, I approach the biblical text with some of Nietzsche’s concerns in mind, making a sustained effort to examine both thinkers within their respective historical contexts. I then move on to explore the foundation of Pauline universalism (§ 3.3), which I locate in two aspects of Pauline anthropology.

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141 Naturally, because Paul is present in Nietzsche’s writings, and because (Pauline) Christianity plays such a central role in Nietzsche’s thought, more scholarly effort has been directed toward examining the relationship from the perspective of Nietzsche scholarship than from Pauline scholarship. However, I do have occasion to touch upon the early development of critical Pauline studies, which was at speed in the nineteenth-century among Nietzsche’s contemporaries.

142 The only studies to focus primarily on the Paul-Nietzsche relationship have been those of Jörg Salaquarda, Didier Franck, Daniel Havemann, and Abed Azzam.
1.5.3 Chapter 4: (Re)Becoming Human.

In the Chapter Four, I turn to Nietzsche’s corpus, focusing upon the evolving relationship between Nietzsche’s interest in anthropology, and his emerging anti-Christianity, through the early and middle periods. I begin by examining The Birth of Tragedy, and the four essays published under the rubric of Untimely Meditations, arguing that a careful exploration of these early-period writings reveals an abiding interest in philosophical anthropology, but a surprising ambivalence towards the Christian religion. This changed after the publication of the fourth essay, ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’, and Nietzsche’s subsequent abandonment of Wagner’s mission for cultural renewal. I draw parallels between Nietzsche’s sudden sense of existential vertigo in Bayreuth, to Paul’s vision near Damascus; in both cases, one mission or task is abandoned, and a new mission begins. In my study of the middle-period publications, I show how Nietzsche’s new anthropological ideals begin to emerge, and how he attempts to articulate a new understanding of human being within its world. I conclude the chapter with a detailed study of Nietzsche’s developing understanding of St Paul and the role he played in Christian origins.

1.5.4 Chapter 5: The Anastasis Self.

I then return to the Pauline corpus to construct a sharper vision of the evental and subversive aspects of Paul’s anthropology. This project proceeds with careful readings of some of Paul’s most important texts, beginning with a look at the subversive logic of the Cross in 1 and 2 Corinthians. Paul understands the Cross to be invested with God’s wisdom and power—a devastating index for the failures of both Israel and the Nations. The Cross also functions as a kenotic paradigm within Paul’s ethical vision, and shapes Paul’s understanding of sufferings experienced in the νῦν καιρὸς. In the following section, I highlight a selection of Paul’s most important anthropological terms, arguing that Paul’s lexicon of anthropological terms is designed to map the Christ-event onto lived human experience. Thus, Paul’s purpose is not to provide an exacting account of the human person, but a powerful way to speak about the life that is invigorated by the presence of the Spirit of Christ. This chapter culminates in a test case of the reading of Pauline anthropology advanced throughout this project, in a study of the famed ‘Incident at Antioch’.
1.5.5 Chapter 6: Nietzsche as Antichrist.

Transitioning to the mature period in Nietzsche’s career, I begin (§ 6.2) with a deeper exploration of the roles the Death-of-God event, and the Eternal Recurrence play within the symbolic world of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, where Nietzsche openly satirizes the world of Paulinism, and advances his alternative vision. In the following section (§ 6.3), I turn to Nietzsche’s most important philosophical works, Beyond Good and Evil (hereafter, Beyond), and On the Genealogy of Morals (hereafter, Genealogy). There I look at Nietzsche’s crystalizing vision for the philosophy, and the philosophers of the future, arguing that Nietzsche understands this task as a strategic supersession of the residual role of the priest—typified by St Paul’s successful revaluation of noble values, with décadent values. I conclude with a careful study of Nietzsche’s mature understanding of St Paul in The Antichrist.

Nietzsche is peerless as an influencer on the post-Christian West, in Existentialism and Postmodernism, in deconstructionist theology, in literature, moral and political philosophy, and psychoanalysis. Ironically, however, the world that Nietzsche helped so much to shape has returned to do business with Paul. This is what makes the sustained comparison of St Paul and Nietzsche so important in the quest for a more complete understanding of the Western consciousness. It is not merely that we see in this juxtaposition a chiasmus of faith gained and lost—Paul the Antichrist-turned-Christian, and Nietzsche the Christian-turned-Antichrist—but how their antipodal interpretations of the seminal event of Christianity align with the movements of Christianity gained and lost in the intellectual conscience of the Occident.
Chapter Two

The Paul-Nietzsche Relationship Revisited: An Interdisciplinary Enigma in Historical Perspective

2.1 Introduction: The Nature of the Problem.

It is a central argument of this thesis that Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity evolved far beyond his critique of Christian morality, to become broadly coextensive with what he came to see as his central task: offering a new philosophical understanding of human self and her world—of ἄνθρωπος and κόσμος. Nietzsche saw this as, fundamentally, a project related to values, and he further saw that the highest values upon which culture had been built, were traceable to the priest, among whom Nietzsche numbered one of the central figures of Christian origins—Paul of Tarsus. I argue throughout this study that Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity may be fruitfully thought of as an ἀγῶν with Pauline anthropology, and so the mature Nietzsche cannot be understood apart from his ‘return to Paul’ in 1880, and the subsequent Revaluation of All Values on which he began to work.¹ This is why a careful juxtaposition of Nietzsche and St Paul can be so mutually illuminating. The Pauline corpus provides a dramatic foil for some of Nietzsche’s key

doctrines, and Nietzsche’s central task presses Paulinism with incisive enquiries into the natural consequences of cruciform values.

2.2 Three ‘Quests’ in the History of Nietzsche Scholarship.

While this study presents what might be thought a ‘maximal’ reading of the Paul-Nietzsche relationship, many of its claims are modest in light of recent developments in Continental philosophy, and this type of reading has very early roots in Nietzsche scholarship. Lou Andreas-Salomé’s classic study, *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werke* (hereafter, *Nietzsche*), published in the interim years between Nietzsche’s collapse and death, sought to interpret Nietzsche’s life and work through the lens of his loss of Christian faith. John Neville Figgis’ 1917, *The Will to Freedom*, an early theological engagement with Nietzsche’s work that is surprising for its depth and pathos, reveals the complexity of Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity. A third aspect of this discussion is represented in Ernst Bertram’s 1918, *Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie* (hereafter, *Mythology*) which draws several provocative parallels between Nietzsche and St Paul. Each of these early studies explore Nietzsche’s identity as Antichrist, raising some of the right questions, but falling short of providing the satisfying clarity that comes from juxtaposing ‘thick’ readings of each thinker.

I briefly compare these early forays with a second quest in Nietzsche scholarship, marked by the most influential commentators of the mid-20th Century—Walter Kaufmann, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger—who advanced Nietzsche scholarship dramatically, by reclaiming Nietzsche for philosophy. However, one of the costs associated with returning to Nietzsche after the horrors of the last century, was the aggressive depoliticising of his legacy that we see in the

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2 Though I do argue for a deeper Paul-Nietzsche connection than does Azzam, Havemann, or Salaquarda, in some cases, my thesis is no more radical or provocative than some of the profiles one offer from Taubes, Badiou, and other high-profile philosophers of the Continental tradition.


Nietzsche scholarship of this period, and Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity was muted as part of this effort. In recent decades, a number of important contemporary philosophers in the Continental tradition have taken interest in St Paul, frequently as a social or political subversive. One of the ironic results of this, ‘Return to Paul’, as it has come to be known, has been a renewed interest in Nietzsche anti-Christianity, precisely because Nietzsche’s agōn with Paulinism was so forceful. Influential works by, Alain Badiou, Jacob Taubes, and Slavoj Žižek, have directly addressed the Paul-Nietzsche relationship. These projects are considered avant-garde by the Pauline guild, but there are signs that Pauline scholars are beginning to take notice.

2.2.1 *The First Quest: the Gospel of Nietzsche According to Salomé, Figgis, and Bertram: Lou Andreas-Salomé—Nietzsche as a Tormented Religious Thinker.*

Lou Andreas-Salomé’s, *Nietzsche,* offered the first detailed analysis of Nietzsche’s thought, drawn from her reading of his published works, and her brief but close acquaintance

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6 This depoliticising effort is especially evident in Kaufmann, Jaspers, and Deleuze, but even Heidegger—who had his own problematic political entanglements—claimed in his famous 1966 interview (published after an interval of ten years) that it was his work on Nietzsche that contained his negative critique of the Third Reich: ‘1936 begannen die Nietzsche-Vorlesungen. Alle, die hören konnten, hörten, daß dies eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus war’ (‘Nur noch ein Gott kann uns Retten’, in *Die Spiegel*, vol. 30, no. 23 [May 31, 1976], p. 204).


8 Beyond the primary works of the Return to Paul, there is now a growing body of secondary literature addressing these unorthodox appropriations of Paul. For an excellent introduction to the phenomenon, which carefully charts the history of philosophical appropriations of Paul, see, Theodore W. Jennings, ‘Paul and Sons: (Post-modern) Thinkers Reading Paul’, in *Reading Romans with Contemporary Philosophers and Theologians,* ed. David Odell-Scott (New York: T&T Clark International, 2007).

9 *Sans EH,* and *AC,* which Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche withheld from publication until years after *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken* was published.
with Nietzsche himself.\textsuperscript{10} Salomé’s Nietzsche is a ‘religious genius’,\textsuperscript{11} with the spirit of an ‘apostle and proselytizer’,\textsuperscript{12} and obsessed with filling the void left by the Death of God: ‘His entire development, as it were, derived from his loss of belief and therefore from his emotions that attend the death of God. . . . The possibility of finding some substitutions for the lost God by means of the most varied forms of self-idolization constituted the story of his mind, his works, and his illness’.\textsuperscript{13}

Nietzsche had himself written that, ‘every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir. . . ’,\textsuperscript{14} and Salomé believed that this passaged characterised the relationship between Nietzsche the man and Nietzsche’s work perfectly.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, her study oscillates between biographical details and her own commentaries on how his life illuminated his philosophy. In light of his experience of the death of God, Salomé locates the essence of Nietzsche’s philosophy in his quest for the superior man, a personal quest that, ‘of necessity had to express itself in self-deification’.\textsuperscript{16} Salomé firmly repudiates any attribution of monstrous characteristics to Nietzsche’s Übermensch, and yet attributes to Nietzsche an assessment of humankind that borders on anti-humanism, if not misanthropy.\textsuperscript{17}

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\textsuperscript{11} Salomé, \textit{Nietzsche}, 24.

\textsuperscript{12} Salomé, \textit{Nietzsche}, 75. Several thinkers have highlighted this Nietzsche’s apostolic posture. Merold Wesphal writes, ‘Nietzsche himself, was something of a positive theologian and prophet. He is quite kerygmatic about his Dionysian faith and about the metaphysics of eternal recurrence that undergirds it’, ‘Nietzsche as a Theological Resource’, in Nietzsche and the Divine, 21.

\textsuperscript{13} Salomé, \textit{Nietzsche}, 26.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{BGE} § 6, p. 13 [\textit{KSA} 5, p. 19].

\textsuperscript{15} ‘The task of the biographer is to explicate the thinker through his person it applies in an unusual degree to Nietzsche because external intellectual work and a picture of his inner life coalesce completely’. Salomé, \textit{Nietzsche}, 4. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the English translation re-titled the work simply, ‘Nietzsche’, when the German original encapsulates the nature of the project.

\textsuperscript{16} Salomé, \textit{Nietzsche}, 27. She quotes from \textit{Z} in this connection, ‘Dead are all gods: now we want the overman to live’, \textit{Z} ‘On the Bestowing Virtue’ § 3, p. 59 [\textit{KSA} 4, p. 102], emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{17} ‘What in the past has been regarded as a transition from the lower to the higher and a retention of the characteristically human in idealized image, Nietzsche sees instead as a necessary and radical break’, Salomé, \textit{Nietzsche}, 117.
In Salomé’s analysis, Nietzsche ultimately fails to accomplish his aim of ‘a higher unity of his own being’, and he becomes instead a ‘divided self’, a ‘dual figure—half-sick and suffering; half-saved; a laughing and superior human’. This, she argues, was his self-deceiving means towards resolving the inner conflict left in the wake of his loss of God: ‘His various philosophies are for him just so many surrogates for God, which were intended to help him compensate for the mystical God-ideal outside of himself. His last years, then, are a confession that he was not able to do without this ideal’.

Not surprisingly, Salomé’s study met with mixed reviews, but this did not mean that it was especially provocative in its day. Salomé’s, Nietzsche, was in fact tame by comparison to some of the early manifestations of pro-Nietzscheism in Europe, which were trading in cultic and messianic language, while Nietzsche’s detractors on the other fringe wrote frantic denunciations. Despite certain excesses, Salomé remains a valuable, classic study that takes a maximal view of Nietzsche’s relationship to the Christian tradition.

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18 Salomé, Nietzsche, 24.
19 Salomé, Nietzsche, 89.
20 Salomé, Nietzsche, 88.
21 For a concise catalogue of the negative assessments, and a balanced response to Salomé’s portrait of Nietzsche as a religious thinker, see: Carol Diethe, ‘Lou Salomé’s Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Religiosity’, in Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 19 (2000): 80-88. Rudolf Steiner’s, Friedrich Nietzsche, ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit, published the following year, offered a portrait of Nietzsche that was nearly antithetical to that of Salomé’s. In the original preface, Steiner refers derisively to Salomé’s, ‘currently popular book’, and the ‘mystical monster she has made out of the superman. My book shows that in Nietzsche’s ideas nowhere is the least trace of mysticism to be found’ Rudolf Steiner, Nietzsche, ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit (Weimar: Emil Felber, 1895), viii. Steiner’s acrid appraisal of Salomé’s book, stemmed both from his deep disagreements with the mystical and religious elements in her portrait of the Übermensch, and his belief in the absolute centrality of the Übermensch to Nietzsche’s whole philosophical program: ‘Das Endziel von Nietzsches Wirken ist die Zeichnung des Typus “Übermensch” [The ultimate goal of Nietzsche work is the illustration of the type, ‘Übermensch’]’, viii.
John Neville Figgis—Nietzsche the Evangelist.

John Neville Figgis’ 1917 title, *The Will to Freedom*,\(^{23}\) serves here as an early and perceptive theological engagement with Nietzsche that helped to frame the scholarly discussion around Nietzsche’s relationship to Christian theology. Figgis, a political philosopher, historian, and Anglican priest, was a surprisingly sympathetic reader of Nietzsche,\(^ {24}\) even openly admiring him: ‘The passion of his flaming soul, his sincerity, his sense of beauty, his eloquence, the courage of his struggles with ill health, the pathos of that lonely soul craving for sympathy, his deep psychological insight and sense of prophetic mission—all these give him a spell which is hard to resist’.\(^ {25}\)

The question of why Nietzsche attacked Christianity is a recurring enigma in *The Will to Freedom*, which Figgis can never seem to unravel. On the one hand, ‘His picture of our holy religion is a caricature with hardly an element of likeness’,\(^ {26}\) and yet, ‘Nietzsche’s ideas have very much more affinity with the truly Christian conception of life than had the moral ideas of Strauss or of any other of the Pantheistic philosophers whom he superseded’\(^ {27}\) That is, Figgis seems to suggest that the chasm between an authentic Christianity and Nietzsche’s own philosophy is partly a deception of Nietzsche’s own invention. Though Figgis credits Nietzsche with developing a *positive* atheism,\(^ {28}\) he continues to convey the impression that Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity was based in ignorance and misunderstanding:

> He might have been undeceived, had he read a little more Church history, or even studied the New Testament which he so heartily despised. He could hardly then have ignored the words about abundant life and fullness of joy—while St Paul’s frequent references to joy in suffering would seem almost designed to meet

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\(^{23}\) Based on Figgis’ contribution to ‘The Bross Lectures’, in 1915.


\(^{26}\) Figgis, *The Will to Freedom*, 8 (emphasis added).

\(^{27}\) Figgis, *The Will to Freedom*, 143 (emphasis added).

\(^{28}\) Figgis, *The Will to Freedom*, 240.

Duff, 66
Nietzsche’s own experience. It is not the sense of weakness, but of power that is the most obvious thing in the psychology of the early Christians.29

Here Nietzsche is attacking a religion with ideas and a vision for human experience that seem designed for him. Indeed, Nietzsche’s ‘idealisation of heroism—his use of suffering, the religion of valour—is only the ancient doctrine of the Cross taught by Jesus Christ, palpitating in St Paul, and the whole New Testament’.30 In those contexts in which Nietzsche and Paul are juxtaposed, Figgis consistently emphasizes their similarities, and not their differences.31 And, just like Salomé before him (whom Figgis had read),32 and Bertram after, Figgis metaphorically characterizes Nietzsche as an ‘apostle’:

Nietzsche is an apostle preaching a new religion of redemption. For the doctrine of Nietzsche, no less than that of Christ or of Buddha, is a doctrine of redemption and deliverance. Nietzsche believes that man, especially European man, is in evil case. He preaches that he must be delivered from this. He holds that this needs a radical change of nature. It is a ‘new creature’ that is needed.33

In this remarkable passage, Figgis described Nietzsche in language we would more likely associate with St Paul’s biography. Paul is associated with an anthropological pessimism, the doctrine of redemption, and the belief that every person can become a ‘new creation’ in Christ (2 Cor. 5.17). Figgis goes further, ‘What, then, is the nature of this religion? Has it no object of worship? It has—Life’.34 The object of worship was an inevitable product of Nietzsche’s thinking, because: ‘No man ever lived who felt more the need of worship. That is part of the tragedy of his career. Having given up God, he spent the rest of his existence in making idols and then breaking them—Schopenhauer, Wagner, and the rest—till he settled down at last to the Übermensch and the Eternal return’.35

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29 Figgis, The Will to Freedom, 125; Figgis is also critical of Nietzsche’s lack of knowledge of the Middle Ages, 131.
30 Figgis, The Will to Freedom, 145.
31 See Figgis, The Will to Freedom, 9, 68, 125, 145, 305, and 307.
32 See, for example, Figgis, The Will to Freedom, 62-63, n 1.
33 Figgis, The Will to Freedom, 61. Again, ‘It is religion, even more than philosophy or even an ethic that Nietzsche preached. His attitude to the Universe is in one respect religious’, 62. Figgis’ position here seems to me very close to those born out in greater detail by Benson’s, Pious Nietzsche (see also, n 40), and Fraser’s, Redeeming Nietzsche (both discussed below).
34 Figgis, The Will to Freedom, 67 (emphasis original).
35 Figgis, The Will to Freedom, 19.
Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche ‘the Christian’.

While Figgis highlighted the enigma of Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity by juxtaposing Nietzschean themes with their Christian counterparts, Bertram’s classic study, Mythology, published in Germany during the following year, presses the similarities until the divisions break: ‘[Nietzsche] remained a Christian: indeed, his final exit appears to reveal him as “more Christian” than even his Schopenhauerian, Dionysian, Wagner-romanticism had been: The Antichrist is a theological polemic, just as Zarathustra is a late-Protestant Luther-poem’.36 Similarly to Figgis, Bertram locates a key locus of overlap between Nietzsche and the Christian tradition at the point of suffering: ‘there is no more genuine evidence for Nietzsche’s deeply ingrained Christianity than his relationship to suffering’.37 Bertram even draws Nietzsche’s theme of illness and suffering [Krankheit and Leiden] into the orbit of the Christian doctrine of the kenosis, as found in Paul’s writings:

The Christian idea of ‘illness’ that illness which Christ ‘took upon himself’ in the form of his becoming human constitutes, as the Passion, the innermost cultic core of the Christian doctrine of salvation and of all Christian metaphysics and is perhaps nowhere more fervently intensified, more central to the experience of conversion, than in the Pauline epistles; and it is precisely this idea of ‘illness’, this cult of Passion, as significant as it is necessary, that became the central idea, or rather the centremost experience, of the Christian Nietzsche.38

As the title suggests, Bertram’s work was never intended to be a systematic treatment,39 and he frequently trades in paradoxes. Nietzsche’s philosophy is both the ‘most anti-Christian philosophy to come out of Christian Europe’, and ‘in its innermost meaning a thoroughly Christian philosophy’.40 Here Bertram, with his evident eloquence, finds a solution to this paradox through Hegelian dialectic: Nietzsche’s philosophy is a synthesis, ‘a strange intermediary realm, a mediating third realm, for which the one world is always merely the symbol and apology for the other’, and it is ‘Only in light of this middle realm can we interpret the otherwise irresolvable contradictions that are solidified as a deep chasm between Nietzsche’s

36 Bertram, Mythology, 108.
37 Bertram, Mythology, 109.
38 Bertram, Mythology, 109.
39 As Kaufmann’s immortal polemics against it will never allow us to forget.
40 Bertram, Mythology, 110.
utterances, between the formulas of Greek will and Christian instinct’. Bertram’s picture of the Paul-Nietzsche relationship is similarly dialectical, with Paul haunting Nietzsche even as Nietzsche heaps his scorn on a falsified Paul. Indeed, Nietzsche is Paul, in a manner of speaking:

But he is also Paul, the man who overcame the law, the ‘Old Tablets’, the prophet, the servant the exegete of a new lord over souls. Not the same Paul, it is true, who the ‘Antichrist’ savagely interprets as a decadent character out of the most vengeful self-hatred using all of the instruments of a malignantly fanatical psychoanalysis. Not Paul the ‘dysangelist’, the histrionic ‘genius of hate’, the ‘chandala-type’, the power-obsessed invalid, the ‘greatest of all the apostles of revenge’.

Bertram thinks Nietzsche’s mistreatment of Paul, like his scornful quotation of 1 Corinthians, was designed to obscure the kinship of his own ideas with those of Paul. And, Nietzsche was regularly guilty of ‘crassly negative over-stylization’, with respect to figures like Paul. Once again, a Nietzschean psychoanalysis is given: ‘Nietzsche calls everything “Paul”, forms everything into the shape of his Paul, that he hates and combats in himself’.

**The First Quest: Summary and Analysis.**

This brief survey reveals the very early attempts to understand Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity, and anti-Paulinism. Within the first decades (even a few years, in the case of Salomé) after Nietzsche’s collapse—and well beyond the abusive denunciations (and euphoric approbations) of Nietzsche on the fringes—serious efforts were underway to understand Nietzsche’s complex relationship to Christianity, both in its primitive, 1st-Century context, and in its contemporary 19th-Century context. Salomé bore witness to Nietzsche’s positive estimation...
of the Lutheran-Pietist milieu of his youth, and cast his whole life and philosophy as the unfolding of a loss of faith after the Death of God. Figgis drew Nietzsche into Paul’s orbit and wondered why he did not recognize a kinship with Paul. Bertram doubts that Nietzsche has even broken entirely with the positive elements of a Christian mythology. In the period that follows these early readings are dramatically overshadowed by the deeper appreciations of Nietzsche’s contributions to Western philosophy, while his anti-Christianity is obscured by depoliticized readings.

2.2.2 The Second Quest: Nietzsche as Philosopher in Jaspers, Heidegger, and Kaufmann: Karl Jaspers—Nietzsche as the Philosopher of Existenz.

Jaspers’, Nietzsche: Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens (hereafter, Nietzsche), marked the beginning of a series of watershed events in Nietzsche studies in the 20th Century. Lecturing and writing on Nietzsche in the early years of Nazi Germany, Jaspers sought to ‘combat a series of misunderstandings on the part of the generations that have come under [Nietzsche’s] influence’, and to, ‘marshal against the National Socialists the world of thought of the man whom they had proclaimed as their own philosopher’. Jaspers, like Kaufmann after him, had an apologetic agenda, and a vision of Nietzsche’s stature as a philosopher that dwarfed the images produced by the authors surveyed above. Without lapsing into mythology, as Bertram did, Jaspers conceives of Nietzsche as a giant of Western thought: ‘perhaps the last of the great philosophers of the past’.

While Jaspers raises the stakes in Nietzsche, he simultaneously depreciates the importance of Nietzsche’s relationship to Christian thought in several ways. First, St Paul—the central villain of Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity—is almost wholly absent from Jaspers’ massive

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47 A witness later confirmed by the posthumous publication of EH.
49 Jaspers’ study appearing in 1935, a year before Heidegger delivered his first lectures on Nietzsche, approximately fifteen years before Kaufmann’s Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, and twenty-five years before the actual publication of Heidegger’s combined lectures as Nietzsche.
50 Jaspers, Nietzsche, xiii.
51 Jaspers, Nietzsche, xiii.
study. Jaspers makes only two passing references, where Nietzsche’s comments on Paul are said to be always negative, and once again when ‘Pauline Christianity’ is said to serve as an example of revenge. Secondly, Jaspers’ methodology—which consists of almost continual quoting of Nietzsche without referencing the sources—obsures Nietzsche’s development on key themes. As we will see, scholars who have examined the Paul-Nietzsche relationship closely, unanimously agree that Nietzsche’s relationship to St Paul must be examined in light of his development. Thirdly, and perhaps most surprisingly, Jaspers does not see Nietzsche as a very knowledgeable or penetrating critic of Christianity, both because he (allegedly) lacked specific knowledge of ‘theology, and critically investigated world history’, and because he, ‘unlike Kierkegaard—never penetrated the profundities of Christian theology’. As a result, Jaspers’ simultaneously clears new ground for understanding Nietzsche as a serious philosopher, while leaving Nietzsche’s relationship to Christianity confused.

Jaspers’, *Nietzsche und das Christentum*, a diminutive companion volume to his major study, does little to improve the situation, with one exception. Originally a lecture delivered to

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54 About which Kaufmann’s scornful treatment has become famous:
Jaspers adduces hundreds of quotations from Nietzsche, without distinguishing between what is early and what is late, between what Nietzsche himself published and what his sister fished out of his wastebasket; and Jaspers is never content until he has ‘also found the contradiction’. With this amazing and assuredly unscientific method which defies the canons of philology and history, all of Nietzsche’s definite ideas, theories, and arguments are easily dissolved and he is finally reduced to Jaspers’ conception of him: ‘endless reflection, sounding out and questioning everything without reaching a new foundation, except in new absurdities’ (*Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (New York: New American Library, 1975), 30-31 (emphasis original)).
55 This is especially true in the fine work of Jörg Salaquarda, and Daniel Havemann, whose studies we will examine below.
56 Here he reminds the reader that Nietzsche has busied ‘himself during his youth with the languages and texts of antiquity’, *Nietzsche*, 421.
an audience of theologians;\textsuperscript{59} it amounts to an apologetic for a more nuanced reading of Nietzsche’s anti-Christian elements, frequently juxtaposing conflicting passages to demonstrate that a literal reading leads to absurdity. Jaspers’ central thesis is that Nietzsche’s explicit rejection of the ‘essence’ of Christianity, runs in parallel to his ongoing dependence upon the ‘impulse’ of Christianity: ‘There is some basic flaw in man’, which Jaspers very reasonably suggests parallels the Christian doctrine of original sin.\textsuperscript{60} Jaspers writes, ‘his thinking in rooted in Christian impulse. But he immediately dropped the Christian substance: man’s relation to God’.\textsuperscript{61}

\textit{Walter Kaufmann—Nietzsche the Humanist.}

Kaufmann’s post-war publication, \textit{Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist},\textsuperscript{62} along with his numerous translations and commentaries, have had an incalculable impact on Nietzsche scholarship in the English-speaking world. By mortally wounding the ‘Nazi Myth’, and by locating Nietzsche within the humanist tradition, Kaufmann reinvigorated the then spiritless Nietzsche scholarship.\textsuperscript{63} Kaufmann’s major work includes a chapter, ‘Nietzsche’s

\textsuperscript{59} ‘This essay is based on a lecture delivered on May 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1938, at the invitation of the Wissenschaftliche Predigerverein in Hannover. It is published here as it was written then, without any change or addition’, \textit{Nietzsche and Christianity}, iv.

\textsuperscript{60} Jaspers, \textit{Nietzsche and Christianity}, 65 (emphasis original).

\textsuperscript{61} Jaspers, \textit{Nietzsche and Christianity}, 65. This work, given the stature of its author, is itself a puzzle. Jacob Taubes wrote, ‘Jaspers’, \textit{Nietzsche and Christianity}, I wouldn’t even accept as a master’s thesis’, in \textit{The Political Theology of Paul}, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 83. Likewise, Daniel Havemann gives Jaspers very little credit when he suggests that, ‘For Jaspers, Nietzsche’s confrontation [\textit{auseinandersetzung}] with Christianity is a confrontation with Jesus, not with Paul’, (trans. mine) in Der, ‘Apostel Der Rache’: \textit{Nietzsches Paulusdeutung} (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 10. A charitable reading of Jaspers might suggest that he was appearing before a group of theologians and thus had a clear apologetic agenda. Nevertheless, his works evince no special knowledge or interest in Nietzsche’s specific critique of Christianity.


\textsuperscript{63} Several scholars have noted the ‘quiet period’ in Nietzsche scholarship in the years following the Second World War. In light of the widely-known Nazi (mis)appropriations of Nietzsche’s work, Kaufmann’s apologetic victory was necessary for a return to Nietzsche with a \textit{good conscience}. The extensive literature on Heidegger’s association with the National Socialists provides an interesting contrast: Heidegger scholarship frequently gives the appearance of being
Repudiation of Christ’, which excels the treatment offered by Jaspers on every metric, and it is probably yet unrivalled in the extent to which it has shaped the contemporary understanding of Nietzsche’s relationship to Christianity. Kaufmann’s underlying thesis is implicit in the title of the chapter: Nietzsche rejects the Christ of faith, but not necessarily the historical Jesus of Nazareth. In Nietzsche’s terms, he rejects ‘the Crucified’, or, ‘God on the Cross’, as a falsification of the ‘Evangel’—first by the primitive Christian community, then by Paul of Tarsus, and then throughout history up to the institutional religion of Nietzsche’s contemporaries: the ‘resentful bourgeois morality that purports to be Christian even while it insists on throwing the first stone’.64 Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity, therefore, is not materially different from Goethe’s (the explicit comparison is made), or any other humanist with an eye for vice masked by religion.

St Paul, who makes only a brief appearance in Kaufmann’s discussion, is the person responsible for substituting, ‘faith in Christ for the Christlike life’.65 Kaufmann highlights Paul’s role in Nietzsche’s thought as Luther’s predecessor, who turned to faith partly as a result of personal failure.66 Here Kaufmann quotes from The Antichrist to highlight the original spirit of Christianity witnessed in the Evangel: ‘even today such a life is possible, for certain human beings even necessary: genuine original Christianity will be possible at all times’.67 Contrary to this spirit, we have the institutional religion of Paul: ‘The Christian religion, however, seems to him to be founded on Paul’s denial of this proposition—a denial that Nietzsche would explain by saying that Paul knew that for him such a life was not possible’.68

The strength of Kaufmann’s study of Nietzsche’s identity as ‘Antichrist’ is his mastery of Nietzsche’s writings; Salomé, Figgis, and even Bertram appear novitiates by comparison. The weakness of the study, however, is that Kaufmann blunts Nietzsche’s criticisms of Christianity by subtly turning them into an almost Kierkegaardian critique of institutional religion.

fraught with anxieties. In a post-Kaufmann world, Nietzsche scholars no longer need to apologize for reading, even admiring, Nietzsche.

Kaufmann leaves the reader with the impression that Paul plays a major role in shaping early institutional Christianity, and only a minor role in Nietzsche’s actual critique of Christianity, as though, having acknowledged Paul’s transformation of primitive Christianity into the institutional religion we recognize today, one can then go on to discuss the results without reference to the body of work purported to have accomplished this transformation.\textsuperscript{69}

\textit{Martin Heidegger—Nietzsche the Last Metaphysician.}

Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche, delivered at the University of Freiburg in the years 1936-1940,\textsuperscript{70} made a profound impact on Nietzsche’s reception in the second half of the 20th Century. We read in the preface to one popular collection of essays that it was ‘with the publication of Heidegger’s two-volume study, [that] Nietzsche finally emerged as one of the prodigious thinkers of the modern age. Perhaps it is a measure of the greatness in a thinker that he demands an equally profound critic to recognize the importance of his thought’.\textsuperscript{71} Heidegger’s lectures deepen the enigma of St Paul’s recession in the second quest, as Heidegger, a giant of twentieth-century philosophy in his own right, had carefully explored the writings of both Nietzsche and St Paul, and—apart from a single exception\textsuperscript{72}—he did not draw the two thinkers together for comparison.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, Heidegger made a significant impact on Christian

\textsuperscript{69} It is not uncommon to blame Plato for making instrumental use of Socrates; it is very uncommon indeed, to do so without making reference to Plato’s body of work.
\textsuperscript{70} Heidegger, \textit{Nietzsche}, xxxix. Published as \textit{Nietzsche} in two volumes, in 1961. All references to the translation by David Krell, et al.
\textsuperscript{72} At one point during his lectures on the letters of St Paul, where Heidegger is developing a theory for how the Pauline subject postures itself with respect to the world, he bluntly characterizes Nietzsche’s accusations of \textit{ressentiment} as mistaken: ‘The connections Paul [makes] should \textit{not} be \textit{ethically} understood. That is why it is a misperception when Nietzsche accuses Paul of \textit{ressentiment}. \textit{Ressentiment} in no way belongs to this realm; in this context one cannot speak at all of \textit{ressentiment}. If one enters into that kind of talk, one shows only that one has understood nothing’, \textit{The Phenomenology of the Religious Life}, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 86.
\textsuperscript{73} For an overview of Heidegger’s understanding of Paul, see Benjamin Crowe’s essay, ‘Heidegger on the Apostle Paul’, in \textit{Paul in the Grip of the Philosophers}, 39-56. Crowe characterizes Heidegger’s study of Paul as ‘a seminal moment in the development of his thought’, 40. Heidegger developed a positive conception of Paul, seeing in his letters a picture of a ‘primal Christianity’, whose authenticity was rooted in its ‘anxious concern’ for existence.
theology, both through his lectures on the phenomenology of religion, and the popularity of *Being and Time* among several prominent New Testament scholars and theologians.\(^{74}\) Over the course of these lectures, Heidegger’s task was to dislocate Nietzsche’s thought from the modern and the avant-garde, and situate him within the grand sweep of Western Metaphysics: ‘Nietzsche’s thinking proceeds within the vast orbit of the ancient guiding question of philosophy, “What is being?”’.\(^{75}\)

Heidegger treats Nietzsche’s corpus as an unfinished project, and focuses his efforts at making the doctrines of the Will to Power, and The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, the principle doctrines through which to unlock the rest of Nietzsche. In defining Nietzsche as the last metaphysician, his identity as Antichrist is depreciated to the point that Heidegger’s few comments about Christianity tend towards diminishing its ongoing importance: ‘To be sure, Christianity will in the future still be a phenomenon in our history. Through transformations, assimilations, and compromises it is in every instance reconciled with the modern world; and with every step forward it repudiates ever more decisively its former history-shaping force’.\(^{76}\)

2.2.3 The Third Quest: Broadening Horizons and the Reappearance of St Paul:

*Jörg Salaquarda, Nietzsche’s Understanding of Paul.*

The first significant study to focus primarily on Nietzsche’s perspective on Paul did not appear until the mid-1970’s, with Salaquarda’s exceptional article, ‘Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigten: Nietzsche’s Verständnis des Apostels Paulus’.\(^{77}\) Salaquarda examines Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul by contextualizing it within the development of Nietzsche’s thought across time. He acknowledges from the outset that Nietzsche’s references to Paul are *almost* uniformly

\(^{74}\) Especially, Rudolf Bultmann, though some recent scholarship has challenged the common assumption that Bultmann was profoundly influenced by Heidegger. For a compressed summary, see 597-589, n, 67, in David W. Congdon’s, *The Mission of Demythologizing: Rudolf Bultmann’s Dialectical Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2015).

\(^{75}\) Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. 1, 4.


negative, indeed, Nietzsche was given to, ‘polemicize against him with special vehemence’.

However, in Salaquarda’s analysis, the negativity of Nietzsche’s ‘explicit statements’ about Paul must be evaluated in light of Nietzsche’s larger perspective, within which we can see that, ‘Paul is interesting to Nietzsche as a “Christian” and as a “great man”’.  

Salaquarda builds his case on a sweeping, chronological account of Nietzsche’s reflections on Paul, which he sees as demonstrating a slow development into the late mature period: ‘It is not until *The Antichrist* that Nietzsche achieves an unequivocal differentiation of the roles of Jesus and Paul in the origin of Christianity, and at the same time arrives at an unrestrained opposition to the Apostle’.  

And again, ‘Nietzsche initially regarded Paul as one of the decisive figures in the origin of Christianity, and finally as the decisive figure alone’. If there is a kinship between Nietzsche and Paul, for Salaquarda, it is a kinship of greatness, ‘in the sense of one’s being elevated from the masses’. While Nietzsche sees Paul’s greatness as ruinous, he nevertheless recognizes its decisive impact on history: ‘Nietzsche’s estimation of Paul generally is the same as that of all “great men” whose “greatness” he views as the promotion of a *décadence* movement. He dealt in similar fashion with Socrates, with great theologians of antiquity and the Middle Ages, with the reformers, with the exponents of “modern ideas”, and with others’.

Salaquarda sees the final stage of development in Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul occur in 1888, when he begins to elevate himself and his revaluation project to a world-historical significance, and ultimately brings his yes-saying symbol of Dionysus into direct confrontation with what he saw as the ultimate symbol of *décadence*, ‘God on the Cross’. He recognizes, in his ‘reflections on the symbol of “the Crucified One” . . . that “God on the Cross” was and is far superior to all earlier and later symbols of *décadence* in terms of its power and range’. On this

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78 Salaquarda, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’, 100.
79 Salaquarda, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’, 103.
80 Salaquarda, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’, 104.
81 Salaquarda, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’, 106 (emphasis original).
84 Salaquarda, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’, 112.
basis, Nietzsche’s final word in *Eccé Homo*, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’, was a confrontation with Paul, who ultimately became a more important opponent to Nietzsche than Socrates.\(^{85}\)

The foregoing analysis allows Salaquarda to characterize Nietzsche’s understanding of his relationship to Paul, ‘in terms of neither a mere conflict nor a secret kinship, but rather in terms of a dialectical overcoming’.\(^{86}\) One of the most interesting hypotheses that Salaquarda brings to this discussion is a clarification of the nature of the dialectic itself:

Nietzsche’s *synthesis* is first of all a return to the thesis: the type of the ‘master morality’ is again to become valid. In a second sense, it is a negation of the antithesis: it opposes the values of *décadence* and seeks to overthrow their (exclusive) legitimacy. Thirdly, it is preservation: Nietzsche does not want a *mere* return to the “master morality,” but is interested in a forward movement in which the experiences of humanity on its way to the present are to be overcome and yet preserved.\(^{87}\)

I will return to this final point in connection with the discussion of Azzam’s recent work, which, in itself, is a testimony to the enduring influence of Salaquarda’s important study. For now, however, it is worth noting the advancements made here over the previous studies: Salaquarda provides an analysis that situates the Paul-Nietzsche relationship within the key movements of the mature Nietzsche’s thought.

*Tim Murphy—Nietzsche, Metaphor, and Religion.*

Tim Murphy’s recent study, *Nietzsche, Metaphor, Religion*, examines Nietzsche’s late period writings on religion with the tools of rhetorical analysis, and he takes issue with what he sees as an *overemphasis* on Paul’s role within Nietzsche’s understanding of the origins of Christianity. He quotes a representative passage from Salaquarda’s essay (examined above), and responds, ‘For this to be meaningful, Paul must be central, not peripheral to Nietzsche’s concerns. Again, only to a Christian dialectician can this inversion of affirmation and negation

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\(^{85}\) Salaquarda, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’, 116.

\(^{86}\) Salaquarda, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’, 116 (emphasis original).

\(^{87}\) Salaquarda, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’, 124 (emphasis original).
be comprehensible”. Murphy’s reading of *The Antichrist* places a greater emphasis on the role of the primitive (pre-Pauline) community of disciples in advancing the initial misreading Jesus:

To construct this catachretic narrative, Nietzsche uses the metaphor of text-and-interpretation for the early community’s activity of appropriating to itself the life, death, and teachings of Jesus: ‘Jesus’ becomes a text which is translated, appropriated, interpreted, reread, and rewritten by the communities which retroactively come to constitute ‘the church’. 

And,

The metamorphosis of Jesus into ‘Christ’, then, is constructed by an ‘overleaping of spheres’ from the set of foreconceptions (or source domains) available to the primitive community onto the complex psychology of the ‘founder’.  

Murphy’s fascinating rhetorical analysis notwithstanding, this does not represent a significant challenge to Salaquarda’s thesis. Indeed, there was a primitive (pre-Pauline) Christian community which reinterpreted the death of Jesus in light of their messianic expectations. The very fact that Paul’s vision on the road to Damascus occurred while he was en route to search for, and persecute, Jesus’ early followers, presupposes a pre-Pauline community to persecute. In *Daybreak* § 68, one of Nietzsche’s earliest, and most sustained examinations of Paul, Nietzsche labours to make it clear that he is being paradoxical when he speaks of Paul as the ‘first Christian’, because Paul was also a rather dramatic convert. This agrees with both the Lukan narrative in the *Acts of the Apostles*, and Paul’s testimony in his letter to the church in Galatia.

Even after granting the significance of Peter’s role in the pre-Pauline Christian community, it seems that Murphy’s thesis runs aground at three points. First, from *Daybreak* § 68 onwards, Nietzsche explicitly credits Paul as the founder of Christianity, without whom the world would know nothing of Jesus of Nazareth. Secondly, while Nietzsche does recognize Peter at several points, the priority of Paul in Nietzsche’s thinking is manifestly attested—not least by the number of Pauline themes which Nietzsche engages. The canonical Petrine and

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88 Tim Murphy, *Nietzsche, Metaphor, and Religion*, 192, n. 11.
89 Murphy, *Nietzsche, Metaphor, and Religion* 128.
90 Murphy, *Nietzsche, Metaphor, and Religion*, 129.
91 Saul-Paul’s conversion narrative begins, ‘Now Saul, still breathing threats and murder against the disciples of the Lord, went to the high priest . . .’, *Acts* 9.1. ‘For you have heard of my former manner of life in Judaism, how I used to persecute the church of God beyond measure and tried to destroy it; and I was advancing in Judaism beyond many of my contemporaries among my countrymen, being more extremely zealous for my ancestral traditions’, *Gal*. 1.13-14.
92 E.g., *D* § 60, *GM* I-16, *AC* § 43.

Duff, 78
Johannine letters, and the letter of James, appear to be of no interest to Nietzsche; he is especially interested in the four Gospels, *Acts of the Apostles*, the four Pauline *Hauptbriefe*, and *John’s Apocalypse*. Thirdly, even within the parameters Murphy constructs, Paul still emerges as the decisive figure: ‘incapable of affirmation, slave morality, ressentiment can only create via negation. Paul embodies this in that everything about Jesus on which he seizes, he reverses to his own ends, ends fuelled, says Nietzsche, by a hate-filled drive for domination and revenge’.93 Again, ‘The cosmic salvation figure, which history has come to know as “Christ”, was, according to Nietzsche, something Paul created out of material ready at hand and then stamped on (aufzuprägen) the person of Jesus’.94 Murphy ultimately credits Paul with the Christian myth of world history, the cosmic salvation figure of Jesus Christ, the expansion of Christianity to include the Nations (its universal aspect), the doctrine of the resurrection, the establishment of priestly tyranny, the doctrine of judgement, the symbol of ‘God on the Cross’, the sublimation of Hellenistic mystery cults, and the anti-Imperial sentiment in Christianity, namely, the *Christianity Nietzsche attacks in toto*. Salaquarda’s claim that Paul was, for Nietzsche, ‘the decisive figure’ in the founding of Christianity, appears to be untouched by Murphy’s challenges.

**Bruce Benson—The ‘Pious’ Nietzsche.**

Bruce Benson’s, *Pious Nietzsche: Decadence and Dionysian Faith*, brings contemporary advancements in Nietzsche studies to bear on some of the intuitions of the first quest. Benson’s central contention is that Nietzsche is a deeply religious thinker, who can be viewed as a founder of a kind religion, which seeks to overcome décadence.95 The Paul-Nietzsche relationship is brought to bear in the course of Benson’s, ‘Profiles in Decadence’, an examination of the decadent types of Socrates, Wagner, and Paul.96 Benson’s account is unique in that it

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93 Murphy, 134.
94 Murphy, 134-135.
95 Deliberately contra Nietzsche, who wrote in *Eccé Homo*, ‘there is nothing in me of a founder of a religion—religions are affairs of the rabble; I find it necessary to wash my hands after I have come into contact with religious people’, in ‘Why I Am a Destiny’, § 1, p. 326 [KSA 6, p. 365].

Duff, 79
views the Nietzsche-Paul relationship primarily through the lens of *décadence*. The result is a
Nietzschean critique of Paul, followed by a Nietzschean view of Nietzsche. Benson, who is a
more careful and sympathetic reader of Paul than the average Nietzsche commentator,
approaches Nietzsche’s sometimes scornful treatment of Paul with palpable scepticism. As a
result, he is ever pointing to Nietzsche’s hypocrisy. Like Salaquarda, Benson sees Paul as the
figure of principal importance to Nietzsche’s counter-*décadence* project:

If Nietzsche is right, then what we know as ‘Christianity’ is ultimately an
invention of Paul’s. Ignoring the ‘glad tidings’ preached by Jesus, he invented his
own tidings—ones deeply rooted in his hatred, his lust for power, and (most
important) his desire for revenge. Ultimately, Paul wants to take revenge upon
not only the Jewish law but life itself by retelling the story of Jesus to suit his own
purposes. Yet, if Nietzsche’s read of Paul is correct, then Nietzsche turns out to
be a ‘second Paul’, whose kinship to Paul is actually constituted by their
commonality. Of the three figures of decadence—Socrates, Wagner, and Paul—it
is Paul who turns out to be the most Important for Nietzsche.97

Benson offers criticism of Nietzsche’s reading of Paul at two points. First, Nietzsche’s
account of Paul’s founding of Christianity contains contradictory elements. Referencing a late
entry in the *Nachlaß* that contrasts with *Daybreak* § 68,98 Benson argues that Nietzsche’s Paul
was caught between being, ‘too simpleminded to realize that simply because a given
interpretation can make an event “sublime” doesn’t mean that it is true’, and ‘a mastermind’, but,
‘Nietzsche simply can’t have it both ways’.99 In other words, Nietzsche freely adapts his portrait
of Paul to suit his needs. Second, Benson is critical of Nietzsche’s apparent hypocrisy in that he
faults Paul for establishing a premise on the basis of its ‘sublime impetus’, and ‘proof of power’,
while that is, ‘precisely the move that Nietzsche himself wants to make’.100

In the end, Benson’s careful critique demonstrates the durability of a tradition in
Nietzsche studies that goes back at least as far as Salomé and Figgis. He shows that one can
understand how Nietzsche’s criticism of the Apostle Paul lies at the root of his concerns with the

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98 ‘Zur Psychologie des Paulus’, *WP* § 171 [*KSA* 13:14[57], pp. 244-245].
100 Benson does not provide an example, but he no doubt has something like this in mind: ‘What
is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man’, *AC* §
2, p. 125 [*KSA* 6, p. 170].

Duff, 80
broader phenomenon of Christianity, while demonstrating that Nietzsche’s reading of Paul reflects back upon himself.

*Morgan Rempel—Nietzsche the Psycho-historian.*

Morgan Rempel finds an original entry point for studying Nietzsche’s conception of Christian origins that sheds light on the Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul. First through an article exegeting *Daybreak* § 68, and later in his monograph *Nietzsche, Psychohistory, and the Birth of Christianity*, Rempel sets out to reconstruct Nietzsche’s ‘psychohistorical’ account of Christian origins. Rempel locates Nietzsche’s project in *The Antichrist*, and related materials, within the spate of some 60,000 historical Jesus studies published in the nineteenth century, and he casts Nietzsche as a predecessor of the psychohistorical work typically associated with Sigmund Freud. Through a careful reconstruction of Nietzsche’s wedge strategy, by which he divided, ‘the one Christian’, from the true, ‘founder of Christianity’, Nietzsche’s perspective on Paul takes shape. Here we examine two noteworthy examples of how Rempel’s argument develops. First, in his exegesis of *Daybreak* § 68, Rempel focuses on Nietzsche’s psychological characterizations of Paul as,

Simultaneously (a) ‘voracious for this highest distinction the Jews were able to conceive’, but (b) unable to live up to the rigorous demands built in to such a distinction (the perfect man of the spiritual ideal’), and (c) at first seemingly not yet consciously aware of his inability to live up to this ‘highest distinction’, the young Saul, *Daybreak* 68 observes with great interest, initially plays the part of the ‘fanatical defender and chaperone of this God and his law, on the march for transgressors and doubters, harsh and malicious toward them and with the extremest inclination for punishment’.

What is remarkable about this psychohistorical profile, according to Rempel, is that it is ‘thoroughly in accord with New Testament evidence’. Rempel then adduces as evidence, the

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pre-Damascus Paul’s approval of Stephen’s execution, his general persecution activities, and finally Paul’s testimony before King Agrippa.\textsuperscript{105}

Secondly, reading \textit{Daybreak} § 68, through the lens of \textit{The Antichrist}, Rempel argues that Nietzsche’s Paul is a non-believer:

\begin{quote}
It is highly doubtful that Nietzsche’s Paul believes in the resurrection and immortality-securing ‘sacrificial’ death of Jesus for the sins and guilt of others. Indeed, given the \textit{Antichrist}’s ongoing portrayal of a shrewd and tireless Apostle whose ‘Christianity’ emerges not from religious conviction but an extraordinary thirst for power, it seems reasonable to conclude that Nietzsche’s Paul does not even believe in the existence of the ‘other wold’ which to this day remains so bound up with Christianity.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

This does seem to counter the main thrust of \textit{Daybreak} § 68, which locates the impetus for Pauline Christianity in Pauline psychology—and specifically Paul’s need to unburden his conscience.\textsuperscript{107} This remains a possible reading, however, and Rempel cites the best evidence for it:

\begin{quote}
To regard as honest Paul whose home was the principal centre of Stoic enlightenment when he makes of a hallucination the \textit{proof} that the redeemer is \textit{still} living, or even to believe his story \textit{that} he had this hallucination, would be a real \textit{naiiserie} on the part of a psychologist: Paul willed the end, \textit{consequently} he willed the means. . . . What he himself did not believe was believed by the idiots among whom he cast his teaching.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

Indeed, we see in this broader mission the very ‘genius of Paul’; that is his, ‘acute understanding not only of the needs of this broad constituency, but of the ideas and images capable of exploiting these powerful needs, hopes, and desires that distinguishes the Apostle’s “translation” of primitive Christianity from that of so-called first Christians’.\textsuperscript{109}

\textit{Giles Fraser—Nietzsche’s Quest for Redemption.}

Giles Fraser’s, \textit{Redeeming Nietzsche: On The Piety of Unbelief}, is a careful, theologically sure-footed examination that is relevant to this discussion in that it brings

\textsuperscript{105} Rempel, ‘D 68’, 53. These events are narrated in \textit{Acts} 7.58, 8.1-3, and 26.9-11, respectively.
\textsuperscript{106} Rempel, \textit{Nietzsche, Psychohistory, and the Birth of Christianity}, 127.
\textsuperscript{107} I challenge this reading of Paul as an unbeliever in ch. 7, below.
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{AC} § 42, quoted in Rempel, \textit{Nietzsche, Psychohistory, and the Birth of Christianity}, 127.
\textsuperscript{109} Rempel, \textit{Nietzsche, Psychohistory, and the Birth of Christianity}, 117.
Nietzsche into the orbit of Pauline Christianity, thematically. In seeking a common thread in Nietzsche’s thought from his formative years in a Pietistic home, through his late period writings, Fraser argues that, ‘Nietzsche is obsessed with the question of human salvation. . . . And despite the fact that he becomes an atheist, he continues passionately to explore different ways in which the same basic instinct for redemption can be expressed in a world without God’. Fraser’s monograph, then, seeks to understand Nietzsche’s corpus as, at bottom, ‘soteriology: experiments to design a form of redemption that would work for a post-theistic age’. This is not, however, an attempt to Christianize Nietzsche, because,

What Nietzsche hates, above all, is the cross and the Christian story of redemption. And what is particularly galling to Nietzsche about ‘metaphysics’ is the way Christian theologians have managed to score the shape of the cross into the basis of the European imagination—that is, he hates the way in which corrupt Christian values have become inscribed into the fabric of our world view, indeed into our very grammar.

Fraser argues that Nietzsche’s focus on the soteriological question, would be consonant with ‘the instincts of his Lutheran Pietistic upbringing’, wherein the “‘first question” of theology is not “Does God exist?” but rather something like “How are we saved?”’ Therefore, Nietzsche thinks philosophically within a Lutheran paradigm, which inherited from its founder a soteriological impulse. Nietzsche’s atheism allowed him to ‘define an identity for himself rather than seeking always to be a copy of his father’, even while drawing him into a new quest for salvation in ‘his desperate desire to overcome the crippling recognition that human life is cruel and absurd’.

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110 Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 2.
111 Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 2.
112 Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 21.
113 Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 30.
114 Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 34.
115 Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 43.
116 Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 61.
Alain Badiou—St Paul the Father of the Universal Subject.

Alain Badiou’s slim but philosophically-potent volume, Saint Paul: La foundation de l’universalisme (hereafter, Saint Paul), was a key catalyst in the ‘return to Paul’, in Continental philosophy—a resurgence of interest in Paul as an intellectual and philosophical resource for solving contemporary issues. Badiou’s approach to Paul, therefore, is wholly secular: ‘irreligious by heredity’, he disavows any religious interest in Paul. Badiou writes, ‘For me, truth be told, Paul is not an apostle or saint. I care nothing for the Good News he declares, or the cult dedicated to him. But he is a subjective figure of primary importance’. Badiou’s Paul is, ‘a poet-thinker of the event’, and, ‘militant figure’, who declares the subversive message that the, ‘universal logic of salvation cannot be reconciled with any law, be it one that ties thought to the cosmos, or one that fixes the effects of an exceptional election’. Paul’s radical event—for Badiou this means Resurrection—cuts across racial, social, and political boundaries, providing a genuine evental basis for a universality. This truth procedure, which is established by faith in ‘the subjective sign of the event proper that is the Resurrection of Christ’, undermines the tendency of our contemporary political systems to either reduce the subject to the status of a consumer within a capitalist economy, or to endlessly splinter individuals into smaller communities, and more specified identities. For Badiou, this is the

118 As Alain Gignac puts the matter, these approaches treat ‘the biblical texts as if it were any other human artifact’, and, ‘evacuate any reference to the transcendent, and use the very structure of Pauline thought to lay the foundations of a new political project’, ‘Taubes, Badiou, Agamben: Contemporary Reception of Paul by Non-Christian Philosophers’, in Reading Romans with Contemporary Philosophers and Theologians, ed. David Odell-Scott (New York: T&T Clark International, 2007), 158, 156. It hardly needs to be said that this ‘reference to the transcendent’ was of no small significance in Paul’s symbolic thought-world.
119 Badiou, Saint Paul, 1.
120 Badiou, Saint Paul, 2.
121 Badiou, Saint Paul, 42.
122 Badiou, Saint Paul, 9.
123 Badiou, Saint Paul, 17.
124 Alain Gignac says in this connection: ‘By renouncing the concrete universal truths in order to affirm the right of racial, religious, national, or sexual minorities, the current epoch no longer has any tools to obstruct the abstract homogenization of the circulation of capital and its complete disregard for persons’, ‘Taubes, Badiou Agamben’, 175-176. On the multiplication of identities, see especially, Saint Paul, 10-11.
plight of the modern subject: ‘Cornered between monetary abstraction and petty national, religious, or racial identities, we are no longer alive’.\textsuperscript{125}

Badiou’s Paul is the antiphilosopher \textit{par excellence}, laughed out of Athens (if he was ever there) for speaking of the resurrection from the dead,\textsuperscript{126} and yet there is a logic in Paul’s universalism that Badiou finds powerful:

Paul’s general procedure is the following: if there has been an event, and if truth consists in declaring it and then in being faithful to this declaration, two consequences ensue. First, since truth is eventual, or of the order of what occurs, it is singular. It is neither structural, nor axiomatic, nor legal. . . . Second, truth being inscribed on the basis of a declaration that is in essence subjective, no preconstituted subset can support it; nothing communitarian or historically established can lend its substance to the process of truth. [Thus, it is] offered to all, or addressed to everyone, without a condition of belonging being able to limit this offer or this address.\textsuperscript{127}

In Paul’s words, ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free man, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (\textit{Gal.} 3.28; cf. \textit{Col.} 3.11).

In the course of offering this positive assessment of Paul’s universalism, Badiou brings Nietzsche into the discussion in his chapter titled, ‘The Division of the Subject’. After quoting from \textit{The Antichrist} § 42, Badiou writes of Nietzsche’s critique, that it is ‘not inaccurate’, both because Paul does not believe in a \textit{historical truth}, and because it is the, ‘motif of the Resurrection’, that brings Paul to value the Christ.\textsuperscript{128} However, Badiou also locates two errors in Nietzsche’s reading of Paul, first, in Nietzsche’s accusation that Paul ‘deprived life as such of its centre of gravity’.\textsuperscript{129} This, for Badiou, is ‘to maintain the very opposite of the apostle’s teaching, for whom it is here and now that life takes revenge on death, here and now that we can live affirmatively, according to the spirit, rather than negatively, according to the flesh, which is the thought of death’.\textsuperscript{130} Second, Nietzsche, ‘goes completely astray when he turns Paul into the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\item Badiou, \textit{Saint Paul}, 17, 27.
\item Badiou, \textit{Saint Paul}, 14.
\item Badiou, \textit{Saint Paul}, 61.
\item Referring here to, \textit{AC} § 43.
\item Badiou, \textit{Saint Paul}, 62.
\end{thebibliography}
archetypal priest, power subordinated to the hatred of life’. Ultimately, what seems incredible, to Badiou, is that Nietzsche would not recognize the parallels between Paul’s project and his own:

Does not Nietzsche himself want to ‘shift the centre of gravity’ of men’s life [sic] beyond their contemporary nihilistic decadence? And does he not require for this operation three closely related themes of which Paul is the inventor: to wit, that of the self-legitimating subjective declaration (the character of Zarathustra), the breaking of History in two (‘grand politics’), and the new man as the end of guilty slavery and affirmation of life (the Overman)? . . . If Nietzsche is so violent toward Paul, it is because he is his rival far more than his opponent. The result being that he ‘falsifies’ Paul at least as much as, if not more than, Paul ‘falsified’ Jesus. Badiou makes no effort to present Paul in the orthodox pattern, and at times, his portrait is missing more than merely details. Badiou’s Paul ‘reduces Christianity to a single statement: Jesus is resurrected’, which glosses over the load-bearing significance of the Cross throughout Paul’s letters. Even if we maintain that the significance of the Cross is derivative upon the resurrection, it can just as easily be maintained that, for Paul, the significance of the resurrection is derivative upon Christ’s death on the Cross. Indeed, Paul’s philosophical anthropology consistently incorporates both aspects of the Christ-event, wherein the subject is co-crucified [συσταυρόω] with Christ, and thinks of herself or himself as participating (first existentially, and then, in the eschaton, bodily) in Christ’s resurrection. This uneven treatment of Paul’s symbols and themes is common in such ‘instrumental’ uses of Paul.

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131 Badiou, Saint Paul, 71.
132 Badiou, Saint Paul, 61.
133 Badiou, Saint Paul, 4.
134 As I have occasion to say at several points in this thesis, Paul supplied a quite different précis of the gospel in I Cor. 2.2, ‘For I resolved to know nothing while I was with you except Jesus Christ and him crucified’, which is not in contradiction to, nor a mere supplement to, the précis of the gospel in I Cor. 15.3-8.
135 Gal. 2.20; cf. 5.24, 6.14; Rom. 6.6; Phil. 3.10; Col. 2.12.
136 Col. 2.12, 3.1; Rom. 6.5, 6.8; 2 Cor. 4.10-11.
Jacob Taubes—The Anti-Imperial St Paul.

Jacob Taubes, Die Politische Theologie des Paulus\textsuperscript{138}—the transcript of a few of the late Taubes’ lectures—casts Paul as the anti-imperial, and messianic thinker, \textit{par excellence}: ‘The Letter to the Romans is a political theology, a political declaration of war on the Caesar’.\textsuperscript{139} Here Taubes is close to one of Nietzsche’s primary images of Paul: 
\textit{Paul as the anti-Rome reevaluator of noble values}. Indeed, Taubes writes that, ‘Nietzsche has been my best teacher about Paul’,\textsuperscript{140} and, ‘what Nietzsche discovered in Paul, [was] the genius of the transvaluation of values . . . ’.\textsuperscript{141} Following Nietzsche, Taubes views Paul as the originator of Christianity, citing the comparison that Paul draws between Moses and himself, and Paul’s larger project of raising up a people.\textsuperscript{142} Taubes sees no emphasis on creation in the New Testament (only redemption),\textsuperscript{143} so he takes Nietzsche to be broadly correct in attributing to Paul a kind of nihilism.\textsuperscript{144} However, Nietzsche’s insight into Paul leads to a dialectic in Nietzsche’s own thinking:

\begin{quote}
[Nietzsche] actually ties himself up in a very deep contradiction. He has a criterion for the status of man. The status of a man is measured according to how he succeeds in forming the values of other men super-globally and over centuries, in imposing upon them his own values. Now, I say, if this is the case: Who has determined the values of the Occident, in Nietzsche’s own sense, more deeply than Paul? So he must be the most important man. Because what did Nietzsche want? The transvaluation of values. Well, so there we have someone who pulled it off! And on this point, Nietzsche is very envious too. So he has to say: this guy pulled it off because the poison of resentment holds sway within him.\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

The problem with this critique, however, is that Nietzsche does not measure a person purely on their capacity to create values; his assessment of \textit{nature of those values} is equally important. Paul succeeds in a revaluation—a function of his axiological genius—but he sets in place

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\textsuperscript{139} Taubes, \textit{The Political Theology of Paul}, 16. Taubes gives credit to Bruno Bauer’s, \textit{Christus und die Caesaren}, for this insight. Bauer, a Hegelian philosopher and historian, advanced some radical theories in nineteenth-century biblical criticism. Nietzsche was aware of Bauer’s early interest in his work (EH ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’ § 2).
\textsuperscript{140} Taubes, \textit{The Political Theology of Paul}, 79.
\textsuperscript{141} Taubes, \textit{The Political Theology of Paul}, 26.
\textsuperscript{142} Taubes, \textit{The Political Theology of Paul}, 40, citing 2 Cor. 3.1ff.
\textsuperscript{143} Taubes, \textit{The Political Theology of Paul}, 60.
\textsuperscript{144} Taubes, \textit{The Political Theology of Paul}, 72.
\textsuperscript{145} Taubes, \textit{The Political Theology of Paul}, 79.
\end{flushright}
unnatural, décadence values. It is precisely this revaluation that makes Paul such a catastrophe in the history of the West.

2.3 Three Important Studies of the Nietzsche-Paul Relationship.

2.3.1 Didier Franck—A ‘Heideggerian’ Nietzsche Versus Paul.

Didier Franck’s, *Nietzsche et l’ombre de Dieu*\(^{146}\) explores Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity through a vertigo-inducing genealogy tracing the entry of Pauline Christianity into the Western philosophical consciousness. This results in a kind of refinement of Heidegger’s enigmatic but influential reading of Nietzsche. Franck begins with Heidegger’s concerns with onto-theology, and specifically with reference to the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of the *imago Dei*—that humans are made in the image of God, and as lords of creation—and its complicity in the problem of technology. He then partly diverges from Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche precisely over the alleged centrality of Platonism and Western metaphysical tradition in Nietzsche’s mature thought.\(^{147}\) Nietzsche’s thought, Franck avers, is ‘the sight of a confrontation with a system of values that permits the conjunction of Athens and Jerusalem’.\(^{148}\)

Franck recognizes in Nietzsche a concern to establish a ‘new justice’, and argues that he is attempting to supplant the justice of *divine revelation* (not, therefore, the justice of Greek philosophy) in the wake of the Death of God.\(^{149}\) This task stages a confrontation with St Paul, for whom the gospel is precisely a revelation of a new *justice of God* [δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ].\(^{150}\) This leads to Franck’s foray into Pauline anthropology, wherein he attempts to draw an anthropological insight from Paul’s key metaphor for the church—‘the body of Christ’.

Reflecting on 1 Corinthians 12, Franck writes, ‘The unity of the body is thus that of the


\(^{149}\) Franck, *Nietzsche and the Shadow of God*, 35. In this connection, Franck quotes from *GS* § 289.

\(^{150}\) See, e.g., *Rom*. 1.17, ‘For in the gospel the righteousness [justice, δικαιοσύνη] of God is revealed—a righteousness that is by faith from first to last, just as it is written: “The righteous [just, δίκαιος] will live by faith”’; cf. 3.21-31. The semantic field of Paul’s Greek, ‘δικαιοσύνη’ encompasses the sense of both ‘righteousness’ and ‘justice’; see *BDAG*, pp. 246-249.
relationship to self of its multiple members. Yet the relation to self constitutes the I.\(^{151}\) The unity of the self is broken in the ‘rupture between man and God’,\(^{152}\) and it is exacerbated by the Mosaic law: ‘If the inward man that I am basks in God’s law while being riveted to sin, the division of the self and the body’s turning against itself both arise from the clash between flesh and spirit for the mastery of my members’.\(^{153}\) Thus the work of Christ is needed to open a new path towards a unified self—but, again, Nietzsche has declared that ‘God is dead’, rendering Paul’s gospel justice obsolete. This forms the context for Franck’s percipient juxtaposition of Pauline Resurrection and Nietzschean Recurrence, under the rubric of, ‘One vision out of another’, tracing the coincidence of Nietzsche’s developing interpretation of Paul and his discovery of the Eternal Recurrence,\(^{154}\) with this very provocative comparison:

In 1885, Nietzsche—who, we repeat, understood Christianity on the basis of Paul’s Gospel—defined his task in this way: ‘to overcome everything that is Christian by way of something that is sur-Christian [Überchristliches], and not simply by ridding ourselves of it—for the Christian doctrine was the counter-doctrine that opposed the Dionysian doctrine’. The Dionysian doctrine of eternal recurrence could be anti-Christian and sur-Christian only by being grounded on a sur-resurrection, since Christianity was itself grounded upon the resurrection. From this it follows that eternal recurrence is the knowledge which, by opening the possibility of a new incorporation, invalidates the resurrection in Christ and gives to the expression ‘the eternal weight of glory’\(^ {155}\) an entirely other meaning.\(^ {156}\)

This confrontation with revelation, however, does not require that Nietzsche’s task is religious or theological, as such: ‘A thought may have theological implications without necessarily being encompassed in the sphere of the theology at which it aims’, and, furthermore, ‘Nietzsche did not want merely to maintain the rank of philosophy but above all to raise it, and this is one of the reasons why he engaged in an unprecedented struggle with the revelation whose power, i.e.,


\(^{152}\) Franck, *Nietzsche and the Shadow of God*, 43.


\(^{155}\) A reference to 2 Cor. 4.17.

grandeur, he knew he must never or almost never underestimate’.  

But, if Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity is not essentially within the compass of onto-theology—as Heidegger seemed to suggest—he philosophical predecessors, from Kant, through Hegel, to Schopenhauer, had been. Indeed, Franck maps a point of coincidence between revelation and metaphysics in those anthropologies that locate the human essence in the will: ‘[T]he determination of the being and essence of human beings as will inscribes metaphysics into revelation by inscribing revelation into metaphysics. This double movement . . . characterizes the entirety of German Idealism on which it closely depends’. 

Franck focuses primarily upon Nietzsche for the duration of the work, seeking to demonstrate the way Nietzsche’s twin doctrines of the Will to Power and Eternal Recurrence allow for active forces to displace of merely passive ones. Franck sees in Nietzsche a challenge being levelled at the heart of Paul’s theism: ‘The Christian body is thus essentially and exclusively reactive and, in the presence of God, it is impossible to distinguish between the quantity and quality of forces by interpreting their difference of power, their hierarchy, as a difference of value’. Thus, Paul’s doctrine of the bodily resurrection is a reaction to life, which seeks—in its weakness, and hostility towards life—to preserve itself by making of the Christ-event a mechanism for power over death. Nietzsche’s anti-Christian doctrines, on the other hand, can—in the absence of God—actively will life: ‘Consequently, it is very clearly against the resurrectional power of God that the power unfolded by eternal recurrence must be measured’. 

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158 Heidegger writes, ‘Nevertheless, as a mere countermovement it necessarily remains, as does everything “anti”, held fast in the essence of that over against which it moves’, ‘Nietzsche’s word . . . God is Dead’, 61. In the introduction I offered my own solution to Heidegger’s paradox taken from _EH_: Nietzsche recognizes that he is a décadent, and a new beginning—dying and then living on. 
159 Franck, _Nietzsche and the Shadow of God_, 99. Schopenhauer, it must be noted, is of special interest because he succeeded in moralizing an atheistic metaphysic, which would preserve the same life-denying ideals for which Nietzsche faulted Christianity (pp. 99-100). 
160 Franck, _Nietzsche and the Shadow of God_, 144. 
161 _NB_: this same point can be stated positively, as Badiou does above. 
162 Franck, _Nietzsche and the Shadow of God_, 337.
Franck, a student of Paul Ricoeur, is often an insightful reader of the New Testament, though several key points of his argument rest on doubtful readings of Paul. First of all, in his discussion of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, he accuses Paul of ‘an illegitimate leap’ wherein Paul fails to demonstrate that Israel’s attempt to be justified through the Law, ‘misunderstands divine justice, or that it is perverse and sinful in essence’. But Paul’s argument is not that Israel rejected God’s justice wholesale, but that, as Adamic humanity, Israel could not achieve the ‘justice of the law’ [δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου] because of the weakness of the flesh. Thus, the necessity of the Christ-event was the logical consequence of Paul’s esteem for the moral Law on the one hand, and his anthropological pessimism on the other. Second, as we saw above, Franck takes 1 Corinthians 12 as his point of departure into his discussion of Pauline anthropology, leading to an emphasis on the body as a unified (or unifiable) multiplicity of members—a collection of ‘drives’. But here, of course, it is the corporate body of Christ—a metaphorical body—that is in view, and within the domain of Paul’s metaphor, the members of the mystic body are simply discrete human persons whose diverse wills must be unified by the power of the Spirit. We cannot, therefore, simply leave the ecclesiology aside and expect to arrive securely at Paul’s view of the human qua human. We are on more secure ground to follow Paul’s emphasis on the two ‘minds’ articulated in Paulinism—the mind of the flesh and the mind of the Spirit—as two broad categories of motivation.

Daniel Havemann—Nietzsche the Apostle of Revenge.

Daniel Havemann’s, Der ‘Apostel der Rache’: Nietzsches Paulusdeutung, is unique among those surveyed here in that he approaches the Nietzsche-Paul relationship from the perspective of historical theology and New Testament scholarship. The primary aim of Havemann’s study is to reconstruct Nietzsche’s unique perspective on Paul, within the context of

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163 Franck, Nietzsche and the Shadow of God, 46-47.
164 Rom. 3.19-20, 7.18, 8.3-4; Gal. 2.16, 21, 5.4.
165 The illegitimacy of a move from ecclesiological metaphors to anthropology seems so self-evident, one is surprised to find it playing such a significant role within Franck’s study.
166 This will be a major theme in the following chapter.
167 Havemann sees this as a corrective, noting that the auseinandersetzung between Nietzsche and Christianity has been led primarily by philosophers, and not those with specialized training in the Christian religion, Der ‘Apostel der Rache’, 1-2.

Duff, 91
the critical Pauline scholarship that first appeared in 19th-century Europe. Thus, Havemann begins his study with a compressed survey of this phenomenon, beginning with questions about Paul’s relationship to the first Christian apostles. The Hegelian thesis of Ferdinand Christian Baur, postulated a dialectical opposition between the Pauline and the Petrine missions, while the counter-thesis proffered by Albrecht Ritschel, emphasized early catholicity. During this same period, other questions emerged, relating to Paul’s relationship to Hellenism, and Palestinian Judaism, and even Paul’s possible involvement in early syncretism. Havemann then proceeds with a survey of early psychological explorations of Paul’s Damascus vision, and early models of Paul’s relationship to Jesus of Nazareth. This historical contextualization of Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity reveals how Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul and Jesus was influenced by those he was reading, including Renan, Strauss, Tolstoy, Lagarde, Overbeck, and most significantly for this study, the work of Lüdemann.

In the second part of his thesis, Havemann examines Nietzsche’s early understanding of Paul, focusing primarily on Daybreak § 68, where Nietzsche reveals his most important discovery: ‘Nietzsche interprets the overcoming of the Law through Paul as an act of Ressentiment’. Although the term, ‘ressentiment’, would not appear in Nietzsche’s published writings until his Genealogy of Morals, the ‘Grundstruktur dieses Begriffs’ is already present in Daybreak, perfectly illustrated by Paul. Havemann sees Nietzsche’s Paul as an individual

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168 As Havemann notes, ‘Until [the 19th Century] one so viewed the New Testament, indeed the whole of Holy Writ, as a unity, that the question of the distinct theology of the various authors was not even posed’, Der ‘Apostel der Rache’, 21. This is precisely what Nietzsche was referring to when he wrote in D § 68 that, ‘All the world still believes in the writings of the “Holy Spirit” or stands in the after-effect of this belief. . . . That it also contains the history of one of the most ambitious and importunate souls, of a mind as superstitious as it was cunning, the history of the apostle Paul—who, apart from a few scholars, knows that?’
170 For Havemann’s discussion of these issues, see Der ‘Apostel der Rache’, 31-52).
171 Havemann, Der ‘Apostel der Rache’, 53-85. Havemann’s discussion of these issues—all of which were beginning to crystallize in the 19th Century—feature brief treatments of figures that will be familiar to Nietzsche’s readers, including Strauss, Renan, Lüdemann, and Overbeck, and help to set the stage for Nietzsche’s own reconstruction of the birth of Christianity
172 Havemann, Der ‘Apostel der Rache’, 96 (emphasis original).

Duff, 92
with an enormous will to power,\textsuperscript{174} who yet lacks (moral) power over himself. Here we witness Lüdemann’s influence. While Nietzsche’s reading of Renan had acquainted him with the historical questions surrounding Paul and his sources, Lüdemann’s work bears specifically upon Paul’s psychology—a matter of special interest for Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{175} Interestingly, Havemann cites evidence that Nietzsche read \textit{Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus} two times during the summer of 1880,\textsuperscript{176} and illustrates the rather remarkable similarity of an extended passage of Lüdemann’s study and \textit{Daybreak} § 68, which shows how much Nietzsche’s early understanding of Paul drew from Lüdemann—especially in connection with Paul’s alleged sense of powerlessness with respect to the demands of the Law.\textsuperscript{177}

In the third (penultimate) section of his thesis, Havemann examines Nietzsche’s late-period perspective on Paul, beginning with an analysis of Nietzsche’s polemical style:

‘Nietzsche critique of Paul and Christianity is \textit{constantly unfair}. And, he does this \textit{purposefully}, because Nietzsche is working to highlight the disparity between the two systems of values.\textsuperscript{178} Havemann proceeds with a careful interpretation of Nietzsche’s disserverment of Jesus and Paul,\textsuperscript{179} then a faithful interpretation of Nietzsche’s explicit engagement with Paul, and Pauline themes, in \textit{The Antichrist}.\textsuperscript{180} Havemann concludes his project by making a few suggestions for a kind of non-moral reading of Paul’s doctrine of justification by faith: ‘Justification, as Paul understands it, stands beyond every morality: it \textit{places} one beyond morality’.\textsuperscript{181}

The most significant aspect of the Nietzsche-Paul relationship, according to Havemann, is Nietzsche’s discovery—in and through his study of St Paul—of how the gospel of the

\begin{itemize}
\item [174] Havemann treats the doctrine of the will to power as a ‘desire for power’, \textit{Der ‘Apostel der Rache’}, 97.
\item [176] Havemann, \textit{Der ‘Apostel der Rache’}, 100, n. 40.
\item [177] Havemann, \textit{Der ‘Apostel der Rache’}; the passages are juxtaposed on p. 103. We will revisit this issue in later chapters.
\item [178] Havemann, \textit{Der ‘Apostel der Rache’}, 144 (emphasis original).
\item [179] The concept of \textit{ressentiment} proves key to Havemann’s reconstruction of Nietzsche’s view of Paul and Jesus. As simply as possible: Paul was animated by ressentiment, and Jesus of Nazareth was not.
\item [180] I have offered here a highly-compressed \textit{précis} of two important chapters in Havemann’s thesis. I have reserved more specific remarks for several points of interaction with Havemann in my own treatment of \textit{The Antichrist}.
\end{itemize}
Crucified God empowered a spirit of *ressentiment*. In the previous chapter, I argued that Nietzsche’s reading of Lüdemann was a significant event—a ‘return to Paul’ that corresponded with a personal crisis, and led to the solidification of his anti-Christian task and identity. This much has not been taken for granted among other scholars, most of whom do not even mention Nietzsche’s reading of Lüdemann. Even among studies focusing on the Nietzsche-Paul relationship, little effort has been spent exploring the significance of Nietzsche’s careful study of Pauline anthropology. Salaquarda mentions the encounter, and reflects briefly on what seems to have interested Nietzsche about the work, but he attributes to it no special significance. Franck gives slightly more space to considering the coincidence between Nietzsche’s encounter with Lüdemann, and his sudden interest in Christianity, and ‘sur-Christianity’. Azzam makes no mention of Lüdemann, at all. Havemann, to his credit, explores this connection carefully.

Havemann’s study is a valuable contribution to this area of enquiry—not least in how it clarifies Nietzsche’s relationship to the relevant 19th-Century biblical and theological scholarship. Nietzsche was not alone in developing a ‘critical’ perspective on the origins of Christianity, and yet, very few studies have done the work of situating Nietzsche’s perspective on Christianity within its proper, historical context. The result of Havemann’s work is a clearer sense of where Nietzsche is original and where he is not. If Nietzsche’s attitude towards the *New Testament* had already been shaped by his reading of Strauss, his Christology is now shown to have depended heavily upon Dostoevsky’s, *The Idiot*, and Tolstoy’s, *My Religion*; his reading of the Hebrew Bible had been influenced by Julias Wellhausen’s, *Geschichte Israels*; finally, his understanding of Paul was shaped by his careful reading of Overbeck, Renan, and Lüdemann. In each of these cases Nietzsche is shown to be a man of his time, working within the surrounding currents of critical scholarship, and the broader religio-philosophical imagination characteristic of the late 19th Century.183

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182 Wellhausen’s work was originally published in 1878, and then republished in 1882 under the more familiar title, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels*. Nietzsche first mentions Wellhausen (without comment) in *KSA* 10:15[60], p. 494, and then pens several pages of detailed reflections on the work in *KSA* 13:11[377], pp. 169-174.

183 The majority of these works were published (or translated into French, in the case of *The Idiot*) within a period of about ten years leading up to the publication of *The Antichrist*.
Abed Azzam—Nietzsche, Paul, and the Katechon.

Abed Azzam’s recent study, *Nietzsche versus Paul*, begins by briefly outlining the challenge of the quest for the ‘essential-Nietzsche’, pointing to Heidegger and Deleuze as examples of leading interpreters whose respective understandings stand in strict contradiction. What these two ‘diametrically-opposed’ readers have in common, Azzam argues, is that they both seek to uncover the essential-Nietzsche, and their respective attempts betray a tacit agreement that Nietzsche can best be located within the horizon of Western philosophy. Azzam argues, however, that these are only partial readings of Nietzsche, because ‘the undeniable fact remains that the negative standpoint which Nietzsche’s writings take is primarily that of the Antichrist and not that of the anti-Plato’, and so ‘a final judgment about the possibility of fleshing out the essential-Nietzsche cannot be made unless Nietzsche’s Antichrist is first examined’.

Azzam’s work can be seen as a critical extension of, and engagement with, Salaquarda’s classic study. Beginning with the ancient Greek tragedy and early Judaism, Azzam traces the courses of these two streams into the Platonic and the Priestly turns, to their confluence in early Christianity, through Modernity (Hegel, in particular), and up to the arrival of the Antichrist (that is, Nietzsche, himself). Azzam’s assiduous genealogy seeks to demonstrate how Christianity came to represent the apotheosis of several negative trends in Western thought, fraught with décadence and ressentiment, and how Nietzsche’s last word, ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified’, came to encapsulate the breadth of his anti-Christian revolt. Like Franck, and Salaquarda, Azzam finds Christianity to be intertwined with broader cultural and philosophical movements, and so a critique of Christianity becomes a critique of the entire Western tradition—that is, Nietzsche comes to relate to Western philosophy insofar as he recognizes Western philosophy’s relationship to Christianity. From this primary thesis, Azzam draws out several important sub-theses that clarify Nietzsche’s relationship to the Christianity of St Paul (I will mention them

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here only briefly, and return to them below). First, early Christianity is the point of convergence for two genealogies that Nietzsche develops with care, namely, the history of the Greeks and the history of Israel. Second, Paul appears as the proto-Nietzschean revaluator, whose revaluation of noble morality will require Nietzsche’s counter-revaluation of slave morality. Third, Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic reading of Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus enables a more penetrating insight into the psychology of Socrates. Fourth, Nietzsche’s move to overcome the history of nihilism, and return to Dionysian innocence, is robbed from the playbook of St Paul, who validated Christianity as a return to the faith of Abraham. Fifth, and finally, Azzam draws on the Pauline concept of the ὁ κατέχων (the one who delays) which, he argues, Nietzsche applied to the mode of Western philosophy typified by Hegel.

Azzam begins his project of exploring Nietzsche’s perspective on the history of Christianity by tracing the development of the Greek stream of thought through three stages: beginning with the ancient Greeks, through the Socratic turn, and finally to Platonism, wherein ‘the ground was prepared for Christianity’. Azzam argues that, ‘ancient Greek religion establishes the axis around which the history of Christianity evolves through time. . . . the axis around which the history of Christianity revolves is that question in front of which man ends up affirming or negating life’. Nietzsche consistently assessed Dionysian tragedy in a positive way, saying in Twilight that it rejoices ‘in its own inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of the highest types’. It is through the exuberant artistic approach of the Dionysian sacrifice, that the Greeks were able to resolve their pessimism in an affirmation of life. Because the Dionysian is the beginning point of the history of pessimism, however, it lacks self-awareness (or, it is characterized by naivety and innocence), and so it is vulnerable to subsequent axiological reassessment. In light of the Platonic and Christian Weltanschauungen, the affirmation of suffering is an affirmation of evil, and thus the Dionysian itself will come to be categorized as evil. The crucial turn in this evolution corresponds to the appearance of Socrates.

188 Azzam, Nietzsche Versus Paul, 1; cf. BGE § 49.
189 Azzam, Nietzsche Versus Paul, 2-3.
190 Azzam, Nietzsche Versus Paul, 6, cf. TI, ‘What I Owe to the Ancients’ § 5.
191 It should be noted here, that Azzam carefully distinguishes between the Dionysus of Nietzsche’s earlier BT, which contrasted with Apollo, and the Dionysus of his late period a la TI, which represented a ‘synthesis of the two’, see, Nietzsche Versus Paul, 5.
In the second genealogy of pre-Christian history, Azzam traces Judaism from its beginnings through the priestly turn. The significance of the early Judaism is clear: ‘Nietzsche characterizes Early Judaism in the same terms in which he characterizes ancient Greek religion, in terms of a religion of thankfulness [that] results from one’s feeling of satisfaction from a life of joy’. The advent of priestly Judaism, parallels the Socratic turn, representing for Nietzsche a diminishing of the people’s affirmation of life and ‘the natural values of noble-morality in the unnatural values of slave-morality’. Here Azzam brings to light Nietzsche’s conception of the Jewish people’s dual identity: they are (objectively) a slave people, but they are (subjectively) a chosen nation—thus the priest is both noble and slave.

Azzam then turns to focus more directly at St Paul’s role, with a fascinating comparison between Socrates and Paul. The ‘initial stage’ for Socrates had been the perspective of rationality as primary; for Paul, it was his zealous focus on fulfilling the requirements of the Law. But both Socrates and Paul face crises: Socrates finds that he, like the noble Athenians, is a creature of instinct, and not capable of being a thoroughgoing rationalist. Similarly, Paul finds that he—for all his efforts—cannot fulfil the law. For Socrates, the way out of this dilemma is to make reason subject to the instincts. For the tortured Paul, however, law fulfilment becomes unreasonable and reason is applied towards making Christ and the Cross the instruments for destroying the law. This leads to Azzam’s primary thesis:

My thesis defended hereafter is that the significance of Paul for Nietzsche is constituted by Paul being Nietzsche’s exemplar. Nietzsche’s Paul is the practical positive-maker of slave morality, whose place Nietzsche sought to occupy as the practical positive maker of noble-morality, insofar as Nietzsche rejects the Pauline claim concerning Christianity’s inversion of Judaism.

Thus far, Azzam’s thesis is very close to the one defended by Salaquarda. He departs from Salaquarda, however, in asserting that Nietzsche’s attempt to overcome Christianity is not an overcoming-preservation, as Salaquarda had it, but an overcoming-without-preservation: ‘Nietzsche wants a return to Dionysus. Nietzsche does not want to preserve the history of Christianity. As Paul wanted to conceal noble-morality, the new Paul (Nietzsche) wanted to

194 Azzam, Nietzsche Versus Paul, 82-85.
195 Azzam, Nietzsche Versus Paul, 85.
forget slave-morality”.\textsuperscript{196} This is a clear departure from Salaquarda, who argued that, “Nietzsche does not want a \textit{mere} return to the “master morality”, but is interested in a forward movement in which the experiences of humanity on its way to the present are to be overcome and yet preserved”.\textsuperscript{197} While Azzam marshals significant evidence in favour of his position—not least in his valuable discussion of the modern \textit{katechon}—strong evidence remains for Salaquarda’s position. For example, in a note dated Spring-Fall, 1887, Nietzsche writes:

\begin{quote}
I have declared war on the anemic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not with the aim of destroying it but only of putting an end to its tyranny and clearing the way for new ideals, for \textit{more robust} ideals—The continuance of the Christian ideal is one of the most desirable things there are—even for the sake of the ideals that want to stand beside it and perhaps above it—they must have opponents, strong opponents, if they are to become strong.—Thus we immoralists require the power of morality: our drive of self-preservation wants our \textit{opponents} to retain their strength—it only wants to become \textit{master over them}.\textsuperscript{198}
\end{quote}

Here, and elsewhere,\textsuperscript{199} Nietzsche allows for the continuation of the of the Christian ideal as a way of building strength and resilience among free spirits.

\section*{2.3 Summary and Conclusions: Where do We go from Here?}

\subsection*{2.3.1 Evaluation.}

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Nietzsche’s relationship to Christianity, and to the Apostle Paul, is a problem with a complex history. From the pioneering commentators who puzzled over Nietzsche’s vilification of St Paul, through the relative ambivalence of major figures like Jaspers, Kaufmann, and Heidegger, to the late burgeoning of interest in both Nietzsche’s relationship to religion, and Paul’s relationship to Western philosophy, the intersection of Nietzsche and St Paul is now being recognized as a locus of important questions. The connection is by no means exhausted, however, and there are several deficiencies, which this study seeks to address.

\textsuperscript{196} Azzam, \textit{Nietzsche Versus Paul}, 91.

\textsuperscript{197} Salaquarda, “Dionysus versus the Crucified One”, 124.

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{WP} § 361, p. 197 \textit{[KSA 13:10[117], p. 523].}

\textsuperscript{199} See, \textit{D} § 192, where Nietzsche values ‘perfect opponents’.

Duff, 98
2.4.2 Towards a ‘Thick’ Reading of St Paul.

First, one of the things which has been remarkably consistent in the literature treating the Paul-Nietzsche relationship has been a focus on reconstructing Nietzsche’s perspective on Paul, without giving voice to Pauline corpus itself. Quotations from the St Paul’s letters are remarkably rare in the Nietzsche scholarship exploring this area, and this deficiency even extends to much of the literature associated with the ‘return to Paul’. This is not to say that Paul needs to be more vigorously defended, but that the Pauline corpus remains a largely unexplored resource that could shed needed light on Nietzsche’s critique. Nietzsche’s invectives against Paul do not render the Pauline corpus irrelevant—as though they represent the final word on Paul; on the contrary, they make a deeper exploration of Paul’s writings a more interesting prospect, and a matter of more pressing concern.

A related aspect of this deficiency is the lack of cooperation across disciplinary boundaries. Salaquarda’s work would only be relevant to Pauline scholars as an interesting case of antagonism against Paul. Franck’s study is of interest to philosophers at the intersection of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Havemann contextualizes Nietzsche’s ‘Paulusdeutung’ within 19th-Century theology. Azzam translates the issue into the concerns of contemporary political philosophy. Taking a larger view, the ‘return to Paul’ has been marked by its carefree appropriation of bits and pieces of Paul’s thought, without reference to ‘der Kern’ of Paulinism; as Badiou shrugged, ‘I care nothing for the Good News he declares or the cult dedicated to him’.

2.4.3 Moving Beyond the Philosophy-Religion Dichotomy.

Secondly, this area of enquiry has been beset by a religion vs. philosophy dichotomy that has not, in the main, provided a space within which the differences between Nietzsche and Paul can be brought out and settled. The first quest often persisted in asking religious questions of Nietzsche, and the second quest focused on philosophy, but neither resulted in much fruitful engagement in this area. In the context of the religion vs. philosophy dichotomy, we can too easily miss some of Nietzsche and Paul’s commonalities: the extraordinary scope of their vision for humankind, their insights into the nature of power, and their shared genius for understanding axiological structures that undergird so much of the human experience.
Chapter 3

To Be Crucified with Christ: The Untimely Death and Rebirth of Saul of Tarsus; Towards an Anthropology of Event

...οὗτος εἰς τὸν ἔν Χριστῷ, καινὴ κτίσις· τὰ ἀρχαῖα παρῆλθεν, ἵδοι γέγονεν καινά·
—St Paul, 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians

...συνετάφησεν οὖν αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὡσπερ ἐγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρός, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπάτησομεν.
—St Paul, Epistle to the Romans

3.1 Introduction.

Sometime in AD 53-54, approximately two decades after the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth, St Paul wrote to the community he had founded in Corinth of Achaia:

For what I received I passed on to you as of first importance: that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas, and then to the Twelve. . . . [A]nd last of all he appeared to me also, as to one abnormally born [τῷ ἐκτρώματι]. For I am the least of the apostles and do not even deserve to

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1 'Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, the new creation has come: Look! The old has gone, the new is here!' (2 Cor. 5.17).
2 'We were therefore buried with him through baptism into death in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, we too may live a new life' (Rom. 6.4).
3 That is, the disciple Peter; ‘Cephas’ [Κηφᾶς], transliterates the Aramaic form of the Greek ‘Peter’ [Πέτρος].

Duff, 100
be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God. But by the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace to me was not without effect. No, I worked harder than all of them—yet not I, but the grace of God that was with me (1 Cor. 15.3-5, 7-10).

This passage provides a fitting point of departure for our closer examination of Paul, containing as it does précis of both his gospel kerygma [κήρυγμα] (vv. 3-5), and his complex identity (vv. 7-10). Here are two pillars of the Christ-event—the crucifixion and resurrection of the Messiah—which were foundational to Paul’s re-created symbolic world. Here, too, are the juxtaposed themes of human unworthiness ‘I am the least of the apostles [εἰμὶ ὁ ἐλάχιστος τῶν ἁπόστολων]’, and divine magnanimity ‘by the grace of God I am what I am [χάριτι δὲ θεοῦ εἰμὶ ὁ εἰμὶ]’, which mark Paul’s own ‘untimely birth’ as persecutor-turned-Apostle—Antichrist-turned-Christian.

The addressees, a community in Southern Greece established during the second Pauline mission, marked the westward reach of Paul’s labours in the gospel up to the early 50s AD, and just antedate the announcement of Paul plans for a mission to Spain (Rom. 15.23-29).

St Paul’s theologizing, and the system resulting from that process—Paulinism as I will frequently refer to it here—was the most influential interpretation of the Christ-event in the early community of Christ-followers. Nietzsche would come to radicalize this point, calling Paul ‘the first Christian, the inventor of Christianness!’ Much apart from Nietzsche’s provocative thesis, however, Paul’s centrality in Christian origins is beyond dispute—canonical letters attributed to Paul outnumber all those attributed to Peter, James, John, Jude, and the anonymous author of Hebrews by a considerable margin. Paulinism exercised a great deal of influence upon the early church fathers, it undergirded St Augustine’s refutations of Pelagius, and served as a key catalyst for Martin Luther’s break with the church in Rome—an event that profoundly shaped

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4 Here I follow the convention of referring to Paul’s philosophical and theological activity as ‘theologizing’ in an effort to avoid anachronism.
5 D § 68, p. 42 [KSA 3, p. 68], emphasis original.
6 Thus, from among the apostles it was only the Apostle John who enjoys a comparable representation in the Christian Bible, with three letters, a gospel, and—according to some traditions—perhaps also the Apocalypse of John. The anonymous author (traditionally Luke the physician) of the two-volume history, Luke-Acts, is the most prolific canonical author by sheer word count, though he is a second-generation Christian from within Paul’s circle of influence.
7 St Augustine’s, De peccatorum meritis et remissione libri III, draws heavily from the Hauptbriefe.
Nietzsche’s Germany, and Nietzsche’s intellectual and spiritual heritage as the son of a line of Lutheran churchmen. In recent years, Paulinism has experienced an unlikely resurgence in the recent phenomenon now known as the, ‘return to Paul’, a small renaissance in Continental philosophy, wherein eminent philosophers—Alain Badiou, Jacob Taubes, Giorgio Agamben, and Slavoj Žižek, among others—have come out as untimely-born admirers and appropriators of Paul. This resurgence of philosophical interest in Paulinism, is an ironic aspect of Nietzsche’s legacy, because it was Nietzsche who showed the degree to which philosophers were complicit in perpetuating Christian values. Because Nietzsche wrote himself into the genealogy of Paulinism as the Antichrist, a philosophical engagement with Paul is simultaneously an engagement with Nietzsche. Understanding and mapping St Paul’s significance as an antipode in Nietzsche’s world, requires a dual excavation—of Paulinism in light of Nietzsche, and Nietzsche in light of Paul. This project endeavours to supply sufficiently ‘thick’ readings of each perspective to clarify the significance of the Paul-Nietzsche relationship.

In this chapter—the first of two deeper explorations of Paulinism—I begin an examination of the unique circumstances of St Paul’s conversion to nascent Christianity, asking how that event shaped his understanding of the human self or subject, and how he situates the self within its symbolic world context. I do this in two stages. In the first stage, I reconstruct Paul’s pre-Damascus and post-Damascus identities, based upon evidence from Paul’s epistles, and Acts of the Apostles, and then I argue that Paul’s encounter with the Christ-event served to radicalize and universalize his anthropological pessimism. In the light of Damascus, Paul begins to carefully articulate the absolute moral destitution of the self, irrespective of one’s status with respect to the Mosaic covenant. This dark view of human nature, I will suggest, is an

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8 Ola Sigurdson reflects a different perspective when she prefaces her discussion of Badiou, Taubes, Agamben, and Žižek’s secular appropriations of Paul with a comment on the Nietzsche’s hostility: ‘Let me begin with the assertion that philosophical interest in Paul is not self-evident, at least not since Friedrich Nietzsche poured out his poison on the apostle in a section of Daybreak from 1887 [sic]’, ‘Reading Žižek Reading Paul’, in Reading Romans with Contemporary Philosophers and Theologians, ed. David Odell-Scott (New York: T&T Clark International, 2007), 215. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s abiding concern with Paulinism, in the midst of the theological and philosophical revolutions of the late 19th-Century, bears witness to Paul’s enduring relevance to certain aspects of philosophy. One level of irony lies in the way post-Christian philosophers have returned to Paul to find resources for buttressing values that have been destabilized through the loss of transcendence.

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impetus for Paul’s oftentimes polemical defences of his universal mission to the Nations [τὰ ἔθνη]. This is expressed, first, in Paul’s radically pessimistic pre-Christ-event anthropology, wherein all of humanity participates in the first Adam’s deception, sin, and death. Indeed, the whole κόσμος has been brought to trial before God.\(^9\) This pessimism was not an anti-humanistic impulse, but the result of a sudden disruption in Paul’s symbolic world, and the correspondingly abrupt loss of confidence in his status as a law-keeper.

This study of the significance of Paul’s conversion will prepare the ground for a more fruitful interaction with Nietzsche’s early- and middle-period writings—including his own reflections on Paul’s conversion, as a fateful event in the origins of Christianity. We will see that Nietzsche was on a fruitful path when he attributed singular significance to the Damascus event. Where I question Nietzsche’s reconstruction, however, is in his attributing to Paul a troubled conscience under the Law. A second trace of the Damascus event is found in Paul’s equally extreme optimism that those who participate in the life of Christ, the second Adam, where glad tidings follow on the heels of this indictment: God has vindicated Jesus Christ by raising Him from the dead [ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, Rom. 1.4]. By making the Christ-event central to his kerygma, Paul’s mission became a sustained engagement with the prevailing values of both the Greco-Roman, Second-Temple Judaic thought-worlds. Pauline theologizing is a case of witnessing the Christ-event, and recognizing its axiological significance, and calling others to live in authentic relationship to the event. The Christ-event, therefore, is the axiological centre of gravity for Paul’s philosophical anthropology.

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\(^9\) Rom. 3.19: ‘Now we know that whatever the law says, it says to those who are under the law, so that every mouth may be silenced and the whole world held accountable to God [ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ]’. Here Paul is establishing the thesis that neither Israel nor the Nations will be justified through the works of the Law.
3.2 The Conversion of St Paul

‘τούτο γνώσκοντες ὅτι ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη, ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ...’

—St Paul, Epistle to the Romans

3.2.1 Saul the Pharisee in Tarsus, Jerusalem, and Damascus.

St Paul, much like Nietzsche, was a personal writer\(^\text{10}\)—the most personal writer in the New Testament by a wide margin. His letters contain a relative wealth of autobiographical material, and in no other writer is the image of the Crucified Christ so tightly linked to the quest for personal identity. Indeed, the whole of life in the νῦν καιρὸς (the now-time, or the present time) is lived in the dawning light of that event.\(^\text{11}\) But before Paul became the most outspoken and authoritative exponent of the gospel [εὐαγγέλιον], he had seen the fledgling Christian community—known then as ‘the Way’ [ἡ ὁδὸς]—as an existential threat to the Palestinian Judaism he faithfully observed and zealously guarded, and so he became a leader of a violent anti-Christian mission: ‘For you have heard of my previous way of life in Judaism, how intensely I persecuted the church of God and tried to destroy it’ (Gal. 1.13). The Acts tradition depicts Paul on such a mission when he experienced his vision of the resurrected Christ. Paul’s letters are spare on the details: ‘God, who set me apart from my mother’s womb and called me by his grace, was pleased to reveal his Son in me so that I might preach him among the Gentiles’ (Gal. 1.15-16). By any measure, the conversion of Saul-Paul ranks as one of the most significant events in the early years of Christianity. F. F. Bruce wrote, ‘No single event, apart from the Christ-event itself, has proved so determinant for the course of Christian history as the

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\(^{10}\) Figgis makes the explicit comparison in, *The Will to Freedom*, 9: ‘No thinker was ever more personal than Nietzsche—not even Saint Paul’.

\(^{11}\) As Giorgio Agamben’s, *The Time That Remains*, faithfully reminds us, Paul’s sense of life between the resurrection of Christ, and the eschatological resurrection of all believers, is a sense of time ‘contracted’: ‘For Paul, the contraction of time, the “remaining” time (1 Cor. 7.29: “time contracted itself, the rest is”) represents the Messianic situation par excellence, the only real time’, 5-6.
conversion and commissioning of Paul'. Nietzsche went one step further; he saw it as the most significant event. I will argue here that Paul’s conversion is a confrontation between Paul and the Christ-event, which fundamentally revalues, and therefore restructures his view of the self and its world.

_Saul of Tarsus—Pharisee and Antichrist._

Drawing together the biographical details from Paul’s letters, and _Acts of the Apostles_, we are able to construct a picture of Paul’s life prior to his conversion with a greater specificity than any other _New Testament_ figure, apart from Jesus of Nazareth: Paul was an Israelite, from the tribe of Benjamin, born in Tarsus of Cilicia, circumcised on the eighth day in keeping with the Torah’s requirements, the son of a Pharisee, a tentmaker by trade, a Roman citizen, educated as a Pharisee in Jerusalem, under the instruction of Gamaliel, and a violent opponent of the early church. Further, Paul characterizes his participation in Judaism as extremely _extremely_ 

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13 Beyond its importance in the early centuries of the church, Paul’s conversion also ranks as one of the most formative events for the religious imagination of the West.
14 _Gal. 2.15; Rom. 9.3, 11.1, 14; Phil. 3.5; 2 Cor. 11.22; Acts 21.39, 22.3._
15 _Phil. 3.5; Rom. 11.1._
16 _Acts 9.11, 21.39, 22.3, cf. 9.30, 11.25._ The question of how Paul’s roots in Tarsus might have influenced the development of his thinking is tantalizing in light of Strabo’s description of its intellectual climate, early in the first century: ‘The inhabitants of this city apply to the study of philosophy and to the whole encyclical compass of learning with so much ardour, that they surpass Athens, Alexandria, and every other place which can be named where there are schools and lectures of philosophers’, _The Geography of Strabo_, 14.5.13. We will return to this question in ch. 4, when we consider Nietzsche’s own comments on the connection.
17 _Phil. 3.5._
18 _Acts 23.6._
19 _Acts 18.3._ Paul speaks at several points about his (free) decision to work for a living—e.g., _1 Cor. 9.6ff; 1 Thess. 2.9._
20 _Acts 16.37-38, 22.25-29, 23.27._
21 _Phil. 3.5, Acts 23.6, 26.5._
22 _Acts 22.3._
23 _Gal. 1.13; Phil. 3.6; 1 Cor. 15.9; Acts 8.3, 9.1ff, 22.4, 26.9ff._

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zealous, advanced, and faultless. Additionally, Acts depicts the pre-Damascus Paul as reasonably well-connected with the religious authorities in Jerusalem. Finally, we can add that he wrote in fluent κοινὴ Greek, and could speak in Aramaic [τῇ Ἑβραΐδι διαλέκτῳ], and, very likely, could read the Torah in Hebrew, though he quotes the Greek Septuagint (LXX) with greater frequency. In summary, Paul was a diaspora Israelite, with marks of Hellenization, yet zealously engaged in studying and defending the worldview and identity of Palestinian Judaism. In his words, ‘a Hebrew of Hebrews’ (Phil. 3.5).

Stephen the Martyr—Paul’s Precursor.

Given the foregoing sketch, it is significant that Paul’s appearance in the narrative history of Acts coincides with the martyrdom of Stephen—the first outbreak of deadly violence in opposition to the Christian message. Prior to the appearance of Stephen, members of the Petrine ministry had received threats and corporal punishment (chs. 4-5), but the violence escalated sharply in connection with what was perceived as Stephen’s more dangerously subversive message. The accusation was that he spoke blasphemy against Moses and God, and that he spoke against the holy place, and the Law, or, the ‘customs handed down by Moses’ (6.11-14). Stephen’s offence, therefore, was subverting the symbolic pillars upon which the world of Second-Temple Judaism was built. Stephen’s defence before the Sanhedrin and his accusers (Acts recognizes a pre-Damascus Paul among the witnesses) was an ingenious compilation of seemingly-innocuous stories from the Torah, but orchestrated in such a way as to constitute an

24 For a detailed reconstruction of Saul of Tarsus’ relationship to the Second Temple tradition of ‘zeal’ exemplified by Mattathias Maccabeus, see Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 80-90. Wright argues that the pre-conversion Paul was a Shammaite Pharisee (Gamaliel was a representative of the more moderate ‘House of Hillel’), whose very identity was grounded in ‘the active propagation of the ancestral way of life and its defence against attack . . .’, 89. And so, he would have viewed his fierce persecution of the early Christian sectarians as a positive act—judged within the larger narrative of Israel’s history. In post-Damascus hindsight, the act is, of course, revalued as wholly negative.
25 Gal. 1.13-14; Phil 3.6.
27 Acts 22.2.
28 ‘Opposition arose, however, from members of the Synagogue of the Freedmen . . . who began to argue with Stephen. But they could not stand up against the wisdom the Spirit gave him as he spoke’, Acts 6.9-10.

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indictment of the religious leaders, and a *Torah*-based challenge to non-Messianic Judaism. Stephen was stoned to death (7.57ff), with Saul-Paul’s approval (8.1), and, ‘Saul began to destroy the church. Going from house to house, he dragged off both men and women and put them in prison’ (8.3).

The account of Stephen’s death introduces a supporting narrative in *Acts*—one of disproportionate violence against the expansion of the gospel, which culminates in the violent opposition that confronts Paul when he returns to Jerusalem decades later, after completing his mission to Ephesus in Asia Minor. The charges levelled against Paul were like those levelled against Stephen, and so were the results: his proclamation of the Christ-event is perceived as a direct assault upon the world of Judaism and the Jewish identity, and violence rapidly escalated (21.27-29). Indeed, Paul’s mission frequently met with violent opposition from his countrymen, and their concerns about Paul’s transcultural mission were not entirely groundless. We turn now to the event itself.

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29 Several details of the mission are recounted in *Acts* 19, including a riot over concerns that Paul’s mission, which was sharply critical of idolatry, would negatively impact the reputation of the goddess Artemis, and the sale of silver shrines. Paul makes Delphic references to life-threatening challenges in Ephesus in *1 Cor.* 15.2, and *2 Cor.* 1.8-11.

30 Baur, rightly recognizes Stephen as a forerunner of Paul, but for the wrong reasons. Baur sees Stephen as the first member of the Jerusalem church to express ‘the antagonism between Christianity and Judaism’, and he faults Second-Temple Judaism as mere ‘formalism composed of outward rites and ceremonies’ (*Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ*, 42, 47). The kinship between Stephen and Paul is located, rather, in how their proclamation of the Christ-event destabilized Judaism by revaluing and restructuring Israel’s symbolic world and praxis. Paul and Stephen, in the tradition of Jesus of Nazareth, do not repudiate Judaism but expand it. For Paul especially, one cannot stand in an authentic relationship to the Cross of Christ, and yet consider the outward symbology of Second-Temple Judaism, which functioned as ethnic identity and boundary markers, to be essential for justification before God.

31 *Acts* reads, in part, ‘Jews from the province of Asia saw Paul at the temple. They stirred up the whole crowd and seized him, shouting, “Fellow Israelites, help us! This is the man who teaches everyone everywhere against our people and our law and this place’”, 22.27-28; cf. 22.20-24, where James warns Paul of his unfavourable reputation among Christ-following Israelites, recommending measures for damage control.

32 Paul’s mention of Stephen’s martyrdom in his defence before the crowd in Jerusalem (22.20), strengthens the comparison.

33 Paul, as the victim of conspiracies and riots, is a major motif in *Acts*: 9.23-25 (Damascus), 9.29 (Jerusalem), 13.49-50 (Pisidian Antioch), 14.2-5 (Iconium), 19-20, (Lystra), 16.19-23 (Philippi), 17.5-9 (Thessalonica), 13-15 (Berea), 18.12-13 (Corinth), 19.23ff (Ephesus), 20.3 (Macedonia), 21.27ff (Jerusalem), 23.12ff (again, Jerusalem), and 24.2-9 (Caesarea).
The Damascus Event.

The wave of violent persecution following Stephen’s death—with Saul-Paul playing an active role—resulted in the first Christian diaspora (*Acts* 8.1-4). When the persecution failed to quell the Christian sect—and even increased its geographical reach—Saul was given a letter of commission by the high priest in Jerusalem to travel the northward trade route to Damascus, to arrest any Christians he might find (*Acts* 9.1-2). Saul’s experience *en route* is a pivotal event in *Acts*, where it is narrated at length three times (9.1-19, 22.1-21, 26.1-23), and marks the expansion of the gospel to encompass the Gentile nations. Each of the three accounts report an explicit divine commission that serves as a fulcrum to validate the controversial mission to the Gentiles (9.15, 22.21, 26.17-18).34 The most detailed account is narrated in *Acts*, but Paul’s own references to the event serve the same purpose—namely, to justify his reappraisal of the Christ-event as a transcultural phenomenon. We see this clearly in *Galatians*, a letter defending the full equality of non-law-observant converts to Christianity. Paul clearly roots much of the authority of his Gospel and mission in the radical nature of his conversion. Beyond the apologetic aims of *Acts*, or the authority this event lends to Paul’s mission, the event clearly shapes Paul’s understanding of the broader significance of the Christ-event itself. It is critical for Paul that his vision is an encounter with the *crucified and resurrected* Jesus—the Jesus of a κόσμος-transforming event—and his mind and preaching will remain captive to precisely this Jesus. Nietzsche, as we will later see, will even make the radical proposal that we witness here the birth of the *first* Christian—that we would know nothing of Christianity were it not for Paul’s reforms.35 Nietzsche clearly has Paul’s universalism in view—for it is with Paul that Christianity will leave Palestine and make its westward advance towards Rome—but he also traces aspects of Paul’s distinctive anthropology to Damascus. The most important question, of course, is *how did Paul’s conversion contribute to his unique and radical articulation of the Gospel?* There is no consensus view, but James Dunn may be right to attribute maximal

34 See F. C. Baur’s classic treatment of the Damascus conversion, which labours to highlight the author’s apologetic aims in these passages: *Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ*, 61-89.

35 D § 68. Nietzsche knows that he is being paradoxical, but his point is that Paul’s conversion marks the beginning of Christianity as we have come to know it. I develop this important point at greater length in chs. 4 and 6.
significance to the event: ‘It can even be argued that Paul’s theology as a whole was simply an unfolding of the significance of the initial christophany’. It is to the question the unique significance of the Damascus event to which we now turn.

3.2.2 The Significance of the Damascus Event in the Development of Paulinism.

‘Paul belongs to that rare class of men whose lives, by a single event, are cut clean in two’.

—William Wrede, Paul.

Conversion or Commissioning?—A Brief Survey of Models.

What, then, was the significance of the Damascus event for Paul and his theology? Alain Badiou frames the question this way: ‘Is the term “conversion” appropriate to what happened on the road to Damascus?’ Conversion is a model frequently applied to the Damascus event, but Badiou wants stronger language: ‘It was a thunderbolt, a caesura, and not a dialectical reversal. It was the conscription of a new subject . . .’. Badiou’s proposal—that ‘conversion’ cannot capture the radical nature of the event—finds its antipode in Krister Stendahl’s watershed essay, ‘Paul Among Jews and Gentiles’, where he argues that the language of conversion misunderstands the event—in effect overstating the case. Stendahl writes:

Here is not that change of ‘religion’ that we commonly associate with the word conversion. Serving the one and the same God, Paul receives a new and special calling in God’s service. God’s Messiah asks him as a Jew to bring God’s message to the Gentiles. The emphasis in the accounts is always on this assignment, not on the conversion. Rather than being ‘converted’, Paul was called to the specific task—made clear to him by his experience of the risen Lord—of apostleship to the Gentiles, one hand-picked through Jesus Christ on behalf of the one God of Jews and Gentiles.

This is a minimalist reading—one could hardly diminish the significance of the Damascus event any further; it was merely the site of Paul’s unique calling and commissioning. From a

37 Badiou, Saint Paul, 17.
38 Badiou, Saint Paul, 17.
contemporary vantage point, it is evident that Stendahl was reacting to a wide-spread tendency of psychological conversion models to depreciate Paul’s Jewishness.\footnote{40} This caution should be heeded, but to characterize the event as a calling, can obscure the fact that Paul’s mission to the Nations would be perceived as even more scandalous and subversive than what he had been (violently) opposing.\footnote{41}

A more moderate proposal is that offered by Alan Segal, who agrees with Stendahl that Paul’s post-Damascus mission is to include Gentiles (and not to reject Judaism), but Segal rightly maintains that, ‘Viewing Paul as a convert is a productive model’,\footnote{42} and that, ‘the primary fact of Paul’s personal experience as a Christian is his enormous transformation, his conversion from a persecutor of Christianity to a persecuted advocate of it’.\footnote{43} Segal recognizes the fact that, ‘In the West, Paul typifies conversion, even outside religious contexts’.\footnote{44} Segal holds the Damascus event to be a mystical experience of Christ that leads Paul to dramatically reframe his understanding of Judaism: ‘A radical change in point of view necessarily means overturning previous beliefs and arguments. Paul does not forget his Jewish past; rather, he inverts the values of his past in a way that is consonant with his new commitments’.\footnote{45} Thus Paulinism emerges from Second-Temple Judaism as a revaluation, and expansion of Judaism based upon the unique revelation of the Christ-event. Segal traces the development of Paul’s convert identity through the Pauline corpus and into \textit{Acts}, suggesting that accounts of Paul’s experience were moulded over time to serve as a useful paradigm for all Christian conversions.\footnote{46}

\footnote{40} See the discussion in, Keener, \textit{Galatians: A Commentary} (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2019), 76-78.  
\footnote{41} Yes, Paul is commissioned to witness to Christ messiahship, \textit{but}, this requires him to cease his violent opposition to the messianic movement \textit{and join it}. ‘Conversion’ is used to signify precisely this kind of reversal. In other words, Paul’s commissioning entails a rather dramatic conversion, but this conversion does not entail a rejection of, or escape from, Judaism.  
\footnote{42} Segal, \textit{Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee}, 117.  
\footnote{43} Segal, \textit{Paul the Convert}, 6.  
\footnote{44} Segal, \textit{Paul the Convert}, 3.  
\footnote{45} Segal, \textit{Paul the Convert}, 125.  
\footnote{46} See, especially, ‘Paul and Luke’, pp. 3-33 in, A. Segal, \textit{Paul the Convert}. Three live metaphors may be traced to the \textit{Acts} accounts of Paul’s conversion: ‘scales falling from one’s eyes’ is a metaphor for sudden enlightenment; ‘kicking against the goads’ is a metaphor for fighting destiny; and ‘a Damascus road experience’ is a general metaphor for a dramatic conversion.
The use (and perhaps abuse) of Paul’s Damascus experience as a paradigm for conversion is highlighted in the traditional perspective on Paul associated with Augustine and Luther—both of whom experienced strong feelings of sin and guilt prior to their own conversions.47 This is the broad tradition in which Nietzsche stands, and he directly compares Paul’s pre-conversion psychological state with that of Luther, who, ‘wanted in his monastery to become the perfect man of the spiritual ideal’, but for whom the perception of his own moral impotence turned to hatred of the moral strictures of Catholicism.48 Thus, for Nietzsche, ‘[Paul] discovered in himself that he himself—fiery, sensual, melancholy, malevolent in hatred as he was—could not fulfil the law . . . The law was the cross to which he felt himself nailed: how he hated it!’49 Less polemical approaches suggest that Paul’s conversion dramatically impacted his understanding of the status of the Mosaic law. Jürgen Becker writes that Paul’s vision made one thing clear to him: Paul was not to change or persecute Christians for the sake of the law; rather, he himself, against his legalistic stance, had to learn a new understanding of God and to change himself, because the Jesus on whom Christians based their illegalities was alive and impressed this fact on him in a special way. Hence he felt himself sent as an apostle who was supposed to missionize especially the Gentiles without regard to the law.50

According to this view, the Damascus event marks a radical shift in Paul’s understand of the Law as the sole and sufficient path to justification before Israel’s God. Becker postulates an antinomian sect in Damascus who claimed the risen Christ offered salvation apart from the Law.51 Thus, while trying to eliminate a movement that he sees as dangerously transgressive,
Paul meets the living Christ, and thus the underlying logic of Paul’s anti-Christianity met with a compelling defeater.\footnote{52} In this way, the doctrine of justification, which the Augustinian-Lutheran tradition places at the centre of Paul’s theological programme, emerges as a logical consequence of Paul’s own failure to fulfil the requirements of the Law. Therefore, the \textit{plight} of personal, moral failure under the law, meets its \textit{solution} in the grace of the risen Christ—justification is found in Christ, apart from the Law. This was the \textit{de facto} centre of Paulinism from Augustine to Rudolf Bultmann—never precisely the same, but having in common a deep pessimism about moral striving under the Law. As Bultmann writes, ‘[Paul’s conversion] was obedient submission to the judgement of God, made known in the cross of Christ, upon all human accomplishment and boasting’.\footnote{53}

The traditional Lutheran view’s influence, and apparent plausibility, met with a formidable challenge in E. P. Sander’s, \textit{Paul and Palestinian Judaism}, which proved to be another watershed event in Pauline studies,\footnote{54} precisely because of how it exposed the tendency among Protestant scholars to employ a caricatured Judaism\footnote{55} as a foil for Paulinism. To represent Paul’s theology of grace as antithetical to Judaism, Sanders argued, was to create a perversely false dichotomy. This did not mean, however, that Sanders saw no distinction between Judaism and Paulinism; they did diverge as separate ‘patterns of religion’. At the heart of Sander’s reading of Paul was his reconstruction of the divergence of two major patterns of religion, which stood in dialectical tension: \textit{covenantal nomism}, and \textit{participationist}
eschatology. ‘Covenantal nomism’ is Sanders’ designation for the broadly-similar patterns of religion we witness in Palestinian Judaism more generally, while Paulinism is characterized as participationist eschatology. Paul’s rejection of Judaism, therefore, is not based on a works vs. faith dichotomy, but on this fundamentally different pattern of religion. Paul’s message, according to Sanders, is essentially this: ‘What God is doing is of cosmic significance and affects “all things”, and it is this that Paul preaches about; but individuals will be affected differently, depending on whether or not they believe’.56 This leads to Sanders’ famously unsatisfying statement: ‘this is what Paul finds wrong with Judaism: it is not Christianity’.57 According to Sanders, therefore, Paul began with the solution he found in Christ, and then constructed an ad hoc articulation of plight.58

The ‘New Perspective on Paul’ is a post-Stendahl, and post-Sanders reappraisal of the traditional Lutheran Paul, which has helpfully emphasized Paul’s ministry of reconciliation between the Jews and Gentiles. Dunn allows that Paul, ‘did think of his conversion as a conversion from Judaism’, but only from the ‘Pharisaic Judaism . . . which kept itself separate from other Jews, not to mention Gentiles’ and which responded with ‘violent hostility to anyone who threatened to cause a breach in the palisades and iron walls of the Torah given to protect and sustain Israel’.59 Paul converts, therefore, to a messianic Judaism which welcomes members of the Nations to table fellowship in Jesus’ name. Similarly, N. T. Wright has argued that the effect of the Damascus event was that, in encountering the risen Christ as the solution to Israel’s plight, Paul’s soteriology developed from one sense of plight, to a new, deeper sense of plight.60

The emphasis for Wright is that Paul had been, and remained, a thoroughly Jewish thinker, and so the Damascus event led Paul, not to a rejection of his Judaism, but to its careful reappraisal:

56 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 446 (emphasis original).
57 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 552 (emphasis original).
58 D. Boyarin writes, ‘Sanders is absolutely correct in his statement that the only flaw that Paul finds in Jews is that they are not Christians. However—and this is a very big qualification—“not being Christian” is, on my understanding, not an arbitrary, Christological, or purely formalist disqualification . . .’, A Radical Jew, 206. The difference for Boyarin is that he believes Paul’s plight does proceed his solution, and so discovering the solution in Christ could not have resulted in ad hoc theologizing.
60 N. T. Wright, Climax of the Covenant, 261.
[H]owever we describe what happened to Paul on the road to Damascus (‘conversion’ ‘call’?), its effect was not that he rejected everything about his Jewish life and thought and invented a new scheme, with or without borrowed non-Jewish elements, but that he thought through and transformed his existing Jewish worldview and theology in the light of the cataclysmic revelation that the crucified Jesus had been raised from the dead.  

In the wake of this revelation, Paul, ‘rethought, reworked and reimagined’ the categories of Second-Temple Judaism ‘around Jesus the Messiah on the one hand and the spirit on the other’. The result of this personal theological reformation was a more radical sense of plight to match the radical solution found in Jesus: ‘The real problem was Sin and Death—enemies that could be tracked . . . all the way back to Adam’. Like Dunn, Wright will come to emphasize an understanding of ‘works of the law’ that focuses on Jewish identity markers, which means the abrogation (or fulfilment) of the works of the Law in Christ allows for an open invitation to table fellowship between Israel and the Nations.

Finally for this brief survey, Daniel Boyarin’s, *A Radical Jew*, offers a variation on Dunn’s analysis that posits a pre-Damascus dialectic in Paul’s understanding of Hellenized Judaism: ‘The culture itself was in tension with itself, characterized both by narrow ethnocentrism and universalist monotheism’. Boyarin continues, ‘My fundamental idea . . . is that what motivated Paul ultimately was a profound concern for the one-ness of humanity’, and ‘Paul was . . . troubled by, critical of, the ‘ethnocentrism’ of biblical and post-biblical religion, and particularly the way it implicitly and explicitly created hierarchies between nations, genders, social classes’. The significance of Damascus, therefore, was Paul’s epiphany that this tension could be resolved through a κατὰ σὰρκα/κατὰ πνεῦμα dualism that provided a path towards universalism while yet preserving the ongoing spiritual [κατὰ πνεῦμα] priority of Judaism.

Boyarin’s model fits with the universal mission that we have come to associate with Paul, and with his unique status among the apostles as a child of the diaspora. Jesus of Nazareth, and

64 For discussions of ‘table fellowship’, see pp. 93, 359-361,
his twelve original disciples, were born and raised in Palestine, and presumably less subject to Hellenizing influences than someone like Paul, who hailed from far outside the borders of Palestine in Tarsus. The challenge this view meets, however, is that Paul’s letters and *Acts* reveal a pre-Damascus Paul who was zealously opposed to even the most subtle destabilization of the Jewish identity. *Paul was not—so far as the text reveals—critiquing Pharisaic Judaism as too narrow.*

The Collision of Plight and Solution.

With the preceding survey in mind, we can see that much of the debate around Paul’s conversion—including Nietzsche’s own reflections on the event—turns on the question of how precisely the Damascus event restructured his theology—including the sense of *plight* and *solution* within his soteriology, and any necessary reappraisal of Judaism. Prior to Damascus, Paul was a zealous defender of the Law; after Damascus, Paul announced a Messianic path to salvation apart from the works of the Law, and quite apart from ‘boasting’ (*Rom. 3.27; 1 Cor. 1.29*). The views surveyed here differ by degree: Stendahl and Badiou offer the minimal and maximal views, respectively—denying on the one hand that Paul was ‘converted’, and affirming on the other hand that Paul was reconstituted as a wholly new subject. The various views also differ in terms of the order of events—Sanders has put solution chronologically prior to plight, and accused R. Bultmann (and by implication, the whole Augustinian-Lutheran tradition) of having Paulinism in the wrong order. The view I now offer is a more modest proposal than those which hypothesize the sudden appearance of whole doctrines at Damascus, and takes a different approach to the temporal unfolding of plight and solution. My modest proposal, is that *the Damascus event was the collision of plight and solution.* While Paul’s vision forever settled the matter of *solution*, it simultaneously put the plight into sharper relief: Paul—zealous, and faultless with respect to the Law—stood morally destitute as a persecutor of God’s anointed. The Second Adam became a foil for Paul’s First-Adam nature. On this model, Damascus was a deconstruction, even as it profoundly formed Paul’s theological imagination. It was only out of such a collision that Paulinism could begin to emerge.
Prior to Damascus, Paul had felt himself safely ensconced within the symbolic world of Second-Temple Judaism. He held himself to be faultless before God because of his faithfulness to the covenant (Phil. 3.4-6), and his ethnocentric zeal (Gal. 1.14). As Stendahl, Schweitzer and others have argued, Paul offers no clear statement suggesting that he had struggled with a troubled conscience prior to his conversion; rather, he speaks of his deep convictions and secure standing within Judaism. Beyond this, insofar as one accepts something like Sanders’ reconstruction of ‘covenantal nomism’, there is still less reason to believe that guilt was a prevailing feature of the Judaic religious consciousness outside of Christianity. Lacking explicit commentary from Paul, these last statements remain tentative. Nevertheless, even if Paul did not struggle with a guilty conscience, this does nothing to diminish Paul’s conversion, or his radical reappraisal of his former life in Judaism. Indeed, Paul’s most favourable statement about his previous life in Judaism contains a glaring irony. I quote the passage here at length:

Watch out for those dogs, those evildoers, those mutilators of the flesh. For it is we who are the circumcision, we who serve God by his Spirit, who boast in Christ Jesus, and who put no confidence in the flesh— though I myself have reasons for such confidence. If someone else thinks they have reasons to put confidence in the flesh, I have more: circumcised on the eighth day, of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrews; in regard to the law, a Pharisee; as for zeal, persecuting the church; as for righteousness based on the law, faultless (Phil. 3.2-6).

Stendahl’s efforts to derive from these verses proof of a robust conscience run afoul of Paul’s main point in the passage: he has abandoned the confidence he once placed in the flesh because it was a misplaced confidence. Herein lies the double irony in the passage. First, that Paul can boast of excelling his opponents on their chosen terms: on their perspective, he was a faultless, law-observant Israelite. Secondly, Paul’s list of his credentials included his zealous persecution of the church, which was tantamount to persecuting God’s anointed. Thus, Paul came to know that conforming one’s life to the strictures of the Mosaic covenant could not secure one within God’s favour, and the works of the Law could not provide a secure justification. In epistemological terms, Paul’s vision of the risen Christ was the decisive defeater for the matrix of beliefs and values that constituted his symbolic world, and his existential sense of place and identity within it. He thus offered himself as proof that one could be rigorously law-observant,
and yet be a violent blasphemer.\textsuperscript{67} This was an \textit{evental} shift—not the result of an abstract soteriological reflection. To meet the risen Christ was to demolish the world in which Paul’s confident anti-Christianity made sense, and to have his theological imagination reinvigorated. Paul did not begin with a plight and then go in search of a solution, \textit{but neither did he arrive at a solution and go in search of a plight}. Plight and solution emerge and collide in the christophany. Therefore, the standard demarcation between Bultmann’s view, and Sanders’, blurs and fades under scrutiny.

\textit{St Paul’s Transvalued Identity.}

Bultmann said of Paul’s conversion that it ‘was the resolve to surrender his whole previous self-understanding, which was called into question by the Christian message, and to understand his existence anew’.\textsuperscript{68} By the end of Paul’s third missionary journey, he had finished writing the \textit{Hauptbriefe}—Romans, 1 & 2 Corinthians, and Galatians—which contended strongly against the necessity of circumcision, food laws, and religious holidays, and unflinchingly declared the ‘new covenant [καινὴ διαθήκη]’\textsuperscript{69} vastly superior to the Mosaic covenant. In Galatians, Paul explicitly denied the efficacy of the Law,\textsuperscript{70} declared circumcision worthless,\textsuperscript{71} and said that those seeking justification through the Law were ‘under a curse’ (\textit{Gal. 3.10}). Non-messianic Judaism, was spiritually descended from Hagar, and now, ‘in slavery with her children’ (\textit{Gal. 4.25}). Indeed, one searches Galatians in vain for an unequivocally-positive statement about the Mosaic Law. In Romans, Paul offers a more nuanced understanding of the role of the Law, while consistently denying that Israel’s history afforded her any soteriological advantage (v. 3.9). Later epistles from the prison period show that Paul did not soften the controversial aspects of his message as a result of political tensions with non-Messianic Judaism—whether from the uprising in Jerusalem that led to his arrest (\textit{Acts 21.27ff}), or similar

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} As Paul was characterized in \textit{1 Tim. 1.13}, ‘Even though I was once a blasphemer and a persecutor and a violent man, I was shown mercy because I acted in ignorance and unbelief’.
\item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{1 Cor. 11.25}; \textit{2 Cor. 3.6}; cf. \textit{Luke 22.20}.
\item \textsuperscript{70} \textit{Gal. 2.16}, 3.11; cf. \textit{Rom. 3.20}.
\item \textsuperscript{71} \textit{Gal. 5.6}, 6.15; cf. \textit{I Cor. 7.19}.
\end{itemize}
events elsewhere—for he showed in his later writings that he was capable of startling depreciations of his former advantages in Judaism:

But whatever were gains to me I now consider loss for the sake of Christ. What is more, I consider everything a loss because of the surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord, for whose sake I have lost all things. I consider them garbage, that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own that comes from the law, but that which is through faith in Christ—the righteousness that comes from God on the basis of faith. I want to know Christ—yes, to know the power of his resurrection and participation in his sufferings, becoming like him in his death, and so, somehow, attaining to the resurrection from the dead (Phil. 3.7-11).

If Paul’s pre-Damascus identity had been secured in his ethnocentric zeal, after Damascus, he was marked by his non-messianic countrymen as a dangerously subversive thinker and leader. While the author of Acts carefully narrates the account of Paul’s life and mission in a way that communicates Paul’s relative innocence, it nevertheless reveals the deep tensions between Paul’s mission and every rival account of the world. In other words, the concerns of Paul’s detractors were not wholly unfounded. If Paul’s proclamation of the Christ-event remapped and revalued the central pillars of Israel’s symbolic world (the Patriarchs, Moses, the Torah, the centrality of Jerusalem, the sacredness of the temple, and so-forth) the ancient and distinctive symbolic praxis of a people group (cultic rituals, worship, circumcision, prayers, Sabbath-observance, pilgrimages to holy sites, etc.) would be destabilized, and potentially lost. As Lawrence Schiffman writes, ‘the juridical basis for the Gentile domination of Christianity was laid in the time of Paul, when the legitimacy of Gentile Christianity was established’. This was the inevitable consequence of revaluing the Jewish identity in light of the Christ-event.

Critical Acts scholarship has hitherto been dominated by approaches that emphasized its apologetic aspect. It is evident that the anonymous author of the two-volume history of Luke and Acts was a great admirer of Peter and Paul; it is equally clear that the enemies of the Christian mission are characterized in uncomplimentary ways: jealous, irrational, overtly hostile. None of this means, however, that the fears of Paul’s opponents were not well-founded. As C. Kavin Rowe has recently argued in, World Upside Down: Reading Acts in the Graeco-Roman Age, Acts scholarship has tended to miss the way Acts highlights the fundamental incompatibility between Christian mission and other worldviews.

Lawrence H. Schiffman, Who Was A Jew? (Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 1985), 75. Further, ‘Had the rabbis relaxed these standards, accepting either the semi-proselytes or the earliest Gentile Christians into the Jewish people, Christians would quickly have become the majority within the expanded community of ‘Israel’, Judaism as we know it would have ceased
The nature of Paul’s relationship to the non-Messianic Judaism has been one of the most controversial aspects of Paul’s life and thought, and it remains a contentious issue in Pauline studies today. The author of Acts seems to invite the reader to see Paul as a microcosm of its larger narrative: the zealously-ethnocentric Israelite par excellence is commissioned for the trans-cultural, and increasingly non-Israelite mission, just as a purely Jewish messianic movement grew into a transcultural, and increasingly non-Israelite phenomenon.\textsuperscript{74} Luther, who has been frequently accused of reading Paul’s relationship to Judaism in the light of his battle with the Church in Rome,\textsuperscript{75} allowed only that Paul would practice certain aspects of the Law (circumcision, for example), for the sake of the ‘weak in faith’,\textsuperscript{76} being firmly convinced that the Law had been abrogated by the Cross of Christ. As critical New Testament scholarship began to emerge early in the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century, Ferdinand Christian Baur, of the Tübingen School, offered an influential solution by construing the history of the early church within the framework of Hegelian dialectic: the Pauline thesis outlined in the \textit{Hauptbriefe} was the universal religion, breaking free from narrow, Jewish exclusivism. An unfortunate by-product of the influence of Luther and Baur in the dogmatic and critical traditions has been an evident Hellenistic bias, and the tendency towards understanding Paulinism, and therefore Christian identity more broadly, and \textit{negatively} with respect to Judaism. Paul, is thus treated as the champion of the universal religion of grace and Spirit, militantly opposed to exclusivist Israel, with its soteriology of works-based righteousness, and misplaced confidence in the flesh.

One of the most conspicuous characteristics of contemporary Pauline scholarship, is its more positive perception of Israel, and its concern for understanding Paul as a unique voice within the milieu of Second-Temple Judaism. W. D. Davies’ landmark study \textit{Paul and Rabbinic Judaism} (1948), was an effort to show that ‘despite his Apostleship to the Gentiles, [Paul] 

\textsuperscript{74} Already, by the composition of \textit{Romans}, Paul was articulating a nuanced understanding of the relationship between the Israel and the Nations (e.g., 2.17ff, 3.9ff), and clarifying his position on Israel’s unbelief and the noteworthy success of the transcultural mission (see especially, chs. 9-11).

\textsuperscript{75} This is a common accusation in N. T. Wright’s work on Paul, especially his work on justification.

\textsuperscript{76} We will revisit the issue of the ‘weak in faith’ [Τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει, \textit{Rom.} 14.1] in § 3.3.6, below.
remained, as far as was possible, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, and baptized his Rabbinic heritage into Christ’. Sanders work in this area has made a profound impact. The success of the ‘New Perspective’ movement bears witness to Davies’ and Sanders’ extraordinary influence on this question. As William Campbell writes,

A great achievement of recent Pauline scholarship is the recognition and demonstration of how Jewish issues and Judaism have, throughout the centuries, been used as a foil in inner-Christian debates. Often there has been little real interest in Judaism as such but only in its perceived links with Christianity. It would appear that nascent Christianity needed to negate Judaism in order to confirm its own identity. Insecurity in this identity meant that Jewish stereotyping and negative self-definition became part and parcel of Christian tradition.

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3.3 The Foundations of Pauline Universalism.

‘War durch das Ereigniss vor Damaskus zunächst darüber kein Zweifel mehr möglich, dass der gekreuzigte Jesus ein übermenschliches Wesen . . .’

—Hermann Lüdemann, Anthropologie

‘εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἕνος παραπτώματι ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσεν διὰ τοῦ ἕνος, πολλῷ μᾶλλον οἱ τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης λαμβάνοντες ἐν ζωῆ βασιλεύσουσιν διὰ τοῦ ἕνος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ’.

—St Paul, Letter to the Romans

3.3.1 The Universal Mission—Theological and Practical Considerations.

St Paul’s mission to the Nations presented unique challenges, which were not directly faced by the original mission in Jerusalem. According to Acts, the Petrine-Johannine mission’s activity centred around the temple, and was directed exclusively towards ethnic Israel, with the exception of the brief and anomalous mission to the house of Cornelius led by Peter. Luke portrayed the Petrine mission as powerful and controversial, frequently creating friction with the religious leaders in Jerusalem. However, the circumstances of the mission in Jerusalem made it possible for the original apostles to announce the Messiahship of Jesus as law-observant Israelites, incorporating Christ into the existing world of Palestinian Judaism, without needing to consider the broader implications of the Christ-event for the Nations. Paul’s transcultural

79 ‘It was first through the event near Damascus that it was no longer possible [for Paul] to doubt, that the crucified Jesus was a superhuman being’, 110.
80 ‘For if, by the trespass of the one man, death reigned through that one man, how much more will those who receive God’s abundant provision of grace and of the gift of righteousness reign in life through the one man, Jesus Christ!’, Rom. 5.17.
81 Acts 2.46, 3.1, 11, 5.12, 42.
82 Including, many Israelites from the diaspora who would come to Jerusalem to worship at the temple (Acts 2.5-11).
83 Acts 10:1ff. Luke is at pains to show that the event was very unusual, and that Peter was uncomfortable interacting so closely with Gentiles—even telling his hosts that it was ‘not customary [ἄθεμωτόν]’ for a Jew to visit a Gentile (v. 28).
84 This is not to ignore the challenges of establishing equitable relations between Hellenized and native Israelites (Acts 6.1-4), or the reality of conflict with outsiders, which Luke recounts at length (e.g., the Petrine mission’s conflict with the Sanhedrin in Acts 4-5).

Duff, 121
mission did not enjoy the stabilizing factors of centralized worship, or shared ethnic identity. He was ‘the apostle to the Nations [ἐθνῶν ἀπόστολος]’ (Rom. 11.13), and, as such, ‘under obligation both to Greeks and to barbarians, both to the wise and to the foolish’ (Rom. 1.14; cf. 1 Cor. 9:16). Because Paul’s mission was transcultural, he needed to articulate a transcultural Gospel, and provide pastoral care for the culturally-diverse communities that resulted from his preaching. Paul responds to the challenges facing his mission to the Nations by articulating a broader vision of the scope of the Messiah’s reign, wherein Jesus Christ was not only Israel’s long-awaited Messiah, but the firstborn of God’s new creation, and the prototype and progenitor of a new kind of human subject. This enlarged vision of the significance of the Christ-event meant, retrospectively, that there was a correspondingly-large plight.

In the foregoing exploration of Paul’s transformation at Damascus I argued that it would be natural for Paul’s sudden sense of moral destitution to catalyse a radicalization of his anthropological pessimism. *Given the fallenness of human nature, even zealous Torah-observance can miscarry perilously.* Here we see how naturally Paul’s own experience served as a foundation for his trans-cultural gospel mission: Paul’s deeper sense of plight, allowed him to articulate a more radical solution. Thus, Paul’s εὐαγγέλιον is not merely the solution to Israel’s precarious socio-political status—whether they viewed it as a protracted state of exile, or simply as a season of general Gentile dominance, per Danielic prophecy or Jesus of Nazareth’s Olivet reference to the ‘times of the Gentiles’ (Lk. 21.24). Rather, the gospel was the solution to a universal human plight, predicated upon the precariousness and destitution of human life since sin and death entered through the universal ancestor, Adam. Paul pictures the whole of the human race as Adam’s descendants. All law-observant Jews, and all the Nations, are trapped within a cosmic drama, suffering under the hegemony of the personified actors ἁμαρτίας and θάνατος—Sin and Death. All parties, through the Christ-event, may enter into the, ‘glorious freedom of the children of God’ (Rom. 8.21). In Paulinism, people are not primarily Jew or

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85 For a careful explication of the theme of on-going exile in Second-Temple literature, see Wright, *Paul and the Faithfulness of God*, 114, and 139-162. In brief: ‘[There] is every indication that Pharisees, like many other Jews of the period, saw their own time within this narrative as one of continuing exile awaiting the final promised rescue. The exile in Babylon had only been the first stage of a much longer process of God’s people being enslaved to the pagans’, 114 (emphasis original).
Gentile, male or female—they are led by the Spirit, or enslaved to the flesh; they are living or they are dead.\textsuperscript{86} We turn now to a further examination of Paul’s universalism.

3.3.2 The Adam-Christ Typology in Pauline Anthropology.

It is essential both to St Paul’s gospel, and to the whole schema of Pauline anthropology, that the Christ-event discloses in Jesus Christ a new type of human being, and that the God of Israel has invited humans everywhere to experience this new type of humanity—both as a new existential modality in the νῦν καιρὸς, and as a transfigured somatic existence in the eschaton.\textsuperscript{87} This way of thinking is already familiar to Nietzsche’s readers, who find his anthropological reflections so often concerned with contrasting, and loosely classifying, ‘types’ of humans (strong vs. weak; high vs. low, and so-forth), and exploring different existential modalities (Christian vs. Dionysian; the décadent vs. the ascendant, among others). Paul’s reflections on the Adam of Genesis as the prototypical human being, from whom all of humanity descended, and in whom each human subject participates in its fallen creatureliness,\textsuperscript{88} was one of his key

\textsuperscript{86} Two of the most important terms in Paul’s lexicon for describing the human effects of the Christ-event are ζωή and θάνατος—life and death. The imagery of life and death runs throughout the Pauline epistles. Clearly, θάνατος is a reflection of Paul’s anthropological pessimism. Paul occasionally refers to natural death (Phil. 1.20), or the risk of natural death (2 Cor. 1.9-10; Phil. 2.30; Paul also uses the adjective, νεκρός, to refer to a corpse, or to the results of natural death), but more often θάνατος connotes something darker about the human condition. Θάνατος characterizes all human life in the first Adam, through whom death entered the cosmos: ‘Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death [θάνατος] through sin, and in this way death [θάνατος] came to all people, because all sinned’ (Rom. 5.12). Paul frequently relates ἁµαρτία and θάνατος—sin and death. They are personified as malicious and powerful characters acting within the cosmos: ‘Death reigned [ἐβασιλεύσειν θάνατος] from the time of Adam’ (Rom. 5.14; cf. v. 17), and, ‘Sin reigned [ἐβασιλεύσειν ἁµαρτία] in death’ (Rom. 5.21). Death is related to condemnation, and so Paul characterizes his ministry among the dying as having the ‘aroma from death to death [ἐκ θανάτου εἰς θανάτον]’ (2 Cor. 2.16).

\textsuperscript{87} So John Ziesler: ‘Christ is not merely the inaugurator of new—or renewed—religion, but of a new humanity, a new start to the human race’, Pauline Christianity, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 53.

\textsuperscript{88} How precisely human beings universally participate in Adam is the subject of a considerable and rapidly-growing literature. Paul insists that it was through Adam’s transgression that sin and death spread to all people (Rom. 5.12ff; 1 Cor. 15.21ff). The most plausible interpretation, prima facie, would be that Paul viewed Adam and Eve as the first human pair from whom all human beings descended (cf. Gen. 3.20); thus, a transgressive human nature is a universally-inherited condition, by nature of this common ancestry. An alternative view argues that Paul is

Duff, 123
insights into the *Torah*, which enabled the conceptualization of a universal anthropological plight within which to root his (universal) soteriology. In Pauline use, the primordial man functions as a *genealogical explanation* for a universal human condition, and so the first-Adam imagery is pregnant with anthropological pessimism. But, Paul’s symbolic world was populated by two archetypal Adam figures, which represented sharply contrasting types, and contrasting existential modalities—liveable modes of being that are patterned after their corresponding prototypes—the primordial Adam known from Israel’s creation narratives, and Jesus, the eschatological Adam disclosed in the Christ-event. As the *natural progenitor* of the human race, the primordial Adam of *Genesis* was, ‘a type [*τύπος*] of the one to come’ (*Rom. 5.14*), namely Jesus Christ, the *spiritual progenitor* of the ‘new human’. Thus, the Adam motif was at work on both sides of the Cross—in Paul’s anthropological pessimism and in his eschatological optimism. The first Adam’s catastrophe is transformed by the Christ-event into the euchatastrophe of human history. Paul outlines the typological relationship between Adam and Jesus Christ in *Romans 5*, and 1

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only making illustrative use of the literary Adam—as a modern might make illustrative use of the prodigal son, or Odysseus—without assuming the *Gen.* account to be conveying brute facts about human ancestry. Scot McKnight writes, ‘The early church father Jerome, ever fiddling with the text and not so good in Greek, translated “because [*ἐφ’ ὧ*] all sinned” as “in whom [*in quo*] all sinned”; then Augustine made nothing less than an extensive case for the theory of original sin and original guilt, and we’ve been stuck with both of them and that theory ever since’, *Adam and the Genome* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2017), 173. McKnight prefers the latter interpretation, that Adam is the *archetypical* sinner.

Recent literature on the Adam-Christ typology has reasonably credited Paul with giving Adam a theological significance he enjoys nowhere else in the Hebrew or Christian Scriptures. However, there is some evidence that the ‘Son of Man’ title that appears frequently in all four Gospels as Jesus’ preferred self-designation may have been a coded reference to the primordial man, Adam. The double article form of ‘ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἄνθρωπου’ literally reads ‘the son of the man’, which invites a comparison with the *LXX*, which refers to Adam simply as, ‘ὁ ἄνθρωπος’. Thus, Joel Marcus writes: ‘Adam is “the man” par excellence, the first man, the person who determines all subsequent human destinies both by his very existence and by his act of disobedience. The term “The Son of the Man” would, on the analogy of “the Son of David”, indicate a person who was descended from that first man but who was also, in a way, on a par with or even greater than him’; see, ‘SON OF MAN AS SON OF ADAM’, *Revue Biblique* (1946-) 110, no. 1 (2003): 38-61. www.jstor.org/stable/44090738, 45.
Corinthians 15, and we will look briefly at each passage before drawing out their wider significance for this study.

The First Adam and Last Adam of 1 Corinthians 15.

Adam first appears in the Pauline corpus in the context of the major clarification and defence of the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15, where he serves two key purposes in Paul’s argument. The first is to contrast Adam and Christ as sources of the inevitability of death, and of the hope of resurrection life, respectively: ‘But Christ has indeed been raised from the dead, the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep. For since death came through a man, the resurrection of the dead comes also through a man. For as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive’ (vv. 20-22). Secondly, the juxtaposition of the two Adams makes vivid the radical alterity between ‘natural body [σῶµα ψυχικόν]’, and the ‘spiritual body [σῶµα πνευµατικόν]’: ‘The body that is sown is perishable, it is raised imperishable; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body’ (vv. 42-44). While the believer experiences transformation in the νῦν καιρὸς (Rom. 12.2) one also lives in expectation of a somatic transfiguration from the natural, first-Adam body, into the pneumatic body: ‘And just as we have borne the image of the earthly man, so shall we bear the image of the heavenly man’ (v. 49).

Here we see Paul’s vision for the glorified eschatological state of those who are resurrected in Christ, when the sin and death that have fraught first-Adam humanity are destroyed at last.90 While participation in the death of Christ allows for a reconstituted subjectivity (Gal. 2.20; 2 Cor. 5.17), but the resurrection of Christ opens up the eschatological hope of a new creation, where the spiritual person [πνευµατικὸς] who still experiences corporeal life in the mortal ‘natural body [σῶµα ψυχικόν] can enter fully into an imperishable corporeal existence [σῶµα πνευµατικόν], for ‘the dead will be raised imperishable’ (v. 52).

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90 Cf. vv. 53-58. It is important to note that, for Paul, the historical event of the resurrection of the Son of God is the necessary and sufficient condition for overcoming the power of sin and death. Paul insists earlier in the chapter, ‘And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ are lost. If only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are of all people most to be pitied’ (vv. 17-19).
St Paul, like Nietzsche after him, had a vision of a vastly higher type of human being on the horizon, and because this vision for humanity was based upon the resurrected Christ, it might be traced (at least in part) to Paul’s vision en route to Damascus.91 Lüdemann saw Paul’s Damascus vision of the resurrected (and transfigured) Christ reflected in 2 Corinthians 4.4, 6—’the light of the gospel that displays the glory of Christ, who is the image of God’; ‘the light of the knowledge of God’s glory displayed in the face of Christ’. It should be of special significance to Nietzsche’s readers that Lüdemann characterized Paul’s Damascus encounter with the resurrected Christ as an encounter with ‘a superhuman being [ein übermenschliches Wesen]’, so characterizing Paul’s vision of Christ in terminology we often associate with the highly stylized visionary anthropology of Zarathustra.92 Nietzsche knew of Paul’s expectations of participating in this übermenschlich Daseinsformen, even ridiculing Paul on this point in Daybreak.93 Paul frequently reflects the conviction that believers should live into their eschatological expectations—becoming who they are. As Felipe de Jesús Legarreta-Castillo writes: ‘With the Adam typology Paul challenges the believer to participate in the present in the resurrection of Christ through a new lifestyle, that of Christ. Although to rise with Christ is a future event, it can be anticipated in the present through ethical behaviour’.94 It is not difficult to see how neatly Castillo’s summary fits into Nietzsche’s middle-period reading of Paul, and the moral impulse that lies at the centre of Christian anthropology.

91 Nietzsche wrote in D § 49, ‘Formerly one sought the feeling of the grandeur of man by pointing to his divine origin: this has now become a forbidden way, for at its portal stands the ape. . . . One therefore now tries the opposite direction: the way mankind is going shall serve as proof of his grandeur and kinship with God. Alas this, too, is vain! At the end of this way stands the funeral urn of the last man and gravedigger (with the inscription “nihil humani a me alienum puto”).
92 H. Lüdemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 110.
93 D § 68, ‘Yet but a brief time within this decay!—that is the Christian’s lot, before, becoming one with Christ, he arises with Christ, participates with Christ in divine glory and becomes a ‘son of God’, like Christ.— With that the intoxication of Paul is at its height, and likewise the importunity of his soul . . .’; cf. KSA 9:4[253], 162.
94 Felipe de Jesús Legarreta-Castillo, The Figure of Adam in Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 4.
The Adam-Christ Typology of Romans 5.

The Adam motif reappears in Romans 5.12-21, where the Adam-Christ juxtaposition clarifies the pessimistic and optimistic halves of Paul’s evental anthropology: ‘For if, by the trespass of the one man, death reigned through that one man, how much more will those who receive God’s abundant provision of grace and of the gift of righteousness reign in life through the one man, Jesus Christ!’ (v. 17). Here Paul is drawing out the material consequences of the doctrine of justification, mapping them onto the believing subject’s experience of life in the νῦν καιρὸς.95 Throughout the chapter Paul is labouring to show how the Christ-event has resolved the existential precariousness of human being, and the Adam typology highlights the catastrophic and eucatastrophic events associated with the progenitors of the old and the new humanity that come into focus in Romans 6. The believing subject can experience existential security precisely because the depth of the Adamic plight allows for a solution that displays the loving and saving character of God, as Žižek clearly sees, summarizing the Adam typology to this end:

The key to Saint Paul’s theology is repetition: Christ as the redemptive repetition of Adam. Adam has fallen, Christ has risen again; Christ is therefore ‘the last Adam’ (1 Cor. 15.45-49). Through Adam, as sons of Adam, we are lost, condemned to sin and suffering; through Christ, we are redeemed. This, however, does not mean that Adam’s fall (and the subsequent instauration of the Law) was a simple contingency—that is to say, that, if Adam had chosen obedience to God, there would have been no sin and no Law: there also would have been no love.96

We may conclude this section by making three important observations. First, the similarity between Paul and Nietzsche’s contrasting of ‘types’ is not merely superficial, but relates to the most basic way that they view human beings as subject to controlling forces—as essentially, and predictably, living from among the limited possibilities open to them—whether flesh or Spirit; décadence or health. Paul’s use of the ‘slavery to sin’ trope in Romans 6 betrays no confidence in the Adamic subject’s ability to live into a new modality apart from intervening

95 Lüdemann, as we will see, interprets Rom. 5.1ff, as the beginning articulation of Paul’s own soteriology, after having disingenuously paid homage to forensic justification in chs. 1-4. I understand Paul’s muted shift from forensic to participatory language in Rom. 5-8 as the natural result of his temporal shift from the past (the precarious moral condition resolving in justification through the Christ-event) to the present (participation with Christ through the Spirit, anticipating eschatological transformation).


Duff, 127
grace, and this has been axiomatic for Paulinism throughout its genealogy of Augustinian and Lutheran readings. Nietzsche approaches anthropology from radically different metaphysical commitments, and yet he appears similarly pessimistic about décadent types, who can only ‘become who they are’ due to immutable physiological factors. Secondly, we see how radically different Paul and Nietzsche’s respective interpretations of the Christ-event ultimately must be. For Paul, the Christ-event contextualizes the human plight within a world governed by a loving Creator who infuses his creation with a grace that opens a new existential horizon: ‘The life I now live in the body, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me’ (Gal. 2.20). For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the death of God not only disenchants the post-Pauline world of such hopes, but it re-envisions the human self as subject to a plight that is just as deep and inescapable—as, ‘der letzte Mensch’, in Zarathustra’s memorable characterization. Indeed, as Nietzsche’s portrait of Paul seeks to illustrate, the gospel itself can only be the product of the weak and sick self who seeks to remake the world to its own advantage. Thirdly, the Adam-Christ typology reveals Paul’s attempt to subvert competing soteriologies—whether pagan or non-messianic Judaic. His focus on a universal plight is a genealogical subversion of attempts to locate salvation anywhere apart from Christ. Indeed, by making humanity universally transgressive in its Adamic nature, Paulinism exerts special pressure on non-messianic Judaism because of its nomocentrism. As Stephen Westerholm writes, ‘Because the sinfulness of Adamic humanity embraces Jews as well as Gentiles, the Sinaitic covenant is in fact a covenant of “condemnation” and “death”’. This last point requires further exploration.

3.3.3 The Moral and Ontic Hierarchy of Σάρξ and Πνεῦμα.

Paul frequently juxtaposes the terms σάρξ and πνεῦμα—flesh and Spirit—in reference to widely diverging qualities. They present translation and exegetical challenges because both

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97 As we have seen, Leiter treats Nietzsche as something of a fatalist, who views individuals as subject to living out the limited possibilities afforded by the physiological ‘type-facts’ that characterize them from birth onwards.

terms are polysemic in Paul’s usage, appearing in important contexts in different ways, which suggest ontological, ethical, and even aesthetic gradations in Paul’s thought-world. Furthermore, the terms are so woven into the fabric of Paulinism and Pauline studies that, as R. Jewett says, ‘To trace the discussion . . . of the flesh-Spirit categories is to touch on every important phase of Pauline research’.99 Three broad patterns emerge from any close study of these terms that can account for most of the appearances in his corpus. First, the terms are used for contrasting ontic domains: σὰρξ is frequently used represent material realities, such as issues related to corporeal existence, while πνεῦμα is used to represent immaterial, or spiritual realities. Secondly, the terms are used for contrasting ethical domains: σὰρξ frequently has a negative moral connotation in Paul’s use, while πνεῦμα is more often associated with virtue and the immanent presence of God in the believer’s life. Thirdly, the terms are axiologically stratified: σὰρξ consistently appears lower on the ontic hierarchy than πνεῦμα.

These patterns, which generally hold across Paul’s usage, raise the question of whether there is an ontological dualism shaping Paul’s cosmology and anthropology, and, if there is a dualism, whether it may be the result of Hellenizing influences. This is an interesting question in light of the report in Acts that Paul was a diaspora Jew, born in Tarsus,100 a city with a reputation for the study of philosophy—again I quote Strabo: ‘The inhabitants of [Tarsus] apply to the study of philosophy and to the whole encyclical compass of learning with so much ardour, that they surpass Athens, Alexandria, and every other place which can be named where there are schools and lectures of philosophers’ (The Geography of Strabo, 14.5.13).

The question of whether or not Paul used the ontological framework of Platonism to shape early Christian cosmology and anthropology is an especially important one for this study, because Nietzsche maintained the view that Paul was the most important architect of Christianity as we know it, and because he believed that Greek philosophy exercised a great deal of influence on Christian thinking. Nietzsche wrote in Beyond, that ‘Christianity is Platonism for “the

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100 Acts 9.11, 9.30, 11.25, 21.39, 22.3. The extent to which Paul’s roots in Tarsus had allowed for Hellenization depends partly on when Paul made his move from Tarsus to Jerusalem. In 22.3 Paul says he was, ‘born in Tarsus of Cilicia, but [ἀνατεθραμμένος] in this city [Jerusalem]’—ἀνατεθραμμένος may mean ‘raised’ or ‘educated’.
people””, 101 and, as we will see in the next chapter, he thought it characteristic of Pauline cosmology and anthropology to be detached from reality. D. Boyarin’s, *A Radical Jew*, is one of the most forceful defences of the view that Paul was a dualist in keeping with a broadly Hellenized, First-Century Judaism. In Boyarin’s usage, ‘Hellenization’ is not a term of opprobrium, 102 especially since it was precisely in the combination of Paul’s Hebrew monotheism, and his Hellenistic-Platonic concern for the universal human, that Paul found the key to a more inclusive Judaism: ‘One could say with only a little extravagance that if Judaism is the mother of the “Universal Man”, then Hellenism is the father, and Paul the *shadkhen* who made the match’. 103 Here is Boyarin’s reimagining of the Damascus event:

> Walking, troubled and musing, all of a sudden Saul has a moment of blinding insight, so rich and revealing that he understands it to have been, in fact, an apocalypse: That very sect, far from being something worth of persecution, provides the answer to the very dilemma that Saul is facing. The birth of Christ as a human being and a Jew, his death, and his resurrection as spiritual and universal was the model and the apocalypse of the transcendence of the physical and particular Torah for Jews alone by its spiritual and universal referent for all. At that moment Saul died, and Paul was born. 104

Like Nietzsche, Boyarin treats Paul’s conversion as an epiphany that resolves an internal struggle. It was Paul’s *σὰρξ—πνεῦμα* dualism that gave rise to Paul’s unique hermeneutic, and unique universal gospel: ‘It was Paul’s genius to transcend “Israel in the flesh”’. 105

N. T. Wright has been the most outspoken critic of such dualist readings of Paul 106—in one place summarizing ten different types of dualism on offer in the first century, and then arguing with respect to the common cosmological and anthropological dualisms we associate with Plato, that, ‘Philo . . . provides the exception that proves the rule’, because, ‘most Jews

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101 *BGE*, ‘Preface’, p. 2 [*KSA* 5, p. 12].
102 ‘Let me hasten to add that I do not by this intend a Hellenistic Judaism which is somehow less pure than a putative “Palestinian” Judaism. I hold, rather, that all of Palestinian Judaism was also Hellenized to a greater or lesser extent. . .’, *A Radical Jew*, 6-7.
106 Wright has high praise for Boyarin’s work, but ultimately rejects it as a misreading of Paul. See, Wright’s review of the work in *Pauline Perspectives*, 126ff.
would have rejected both in favour of a more integrated cosmology and anthropology’. To be a monotheist is to believe that a good God created the phenomenal world, and so it cannot be inherently bad; as Paul says in reference to his freedom of observing kosher laws, ‘I am convinced, being fully persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean in itself’ (Rom. 14.14). In the ethical opposition of σὰρξ—πνεῦμα in Galatians, Wright shows no patience for a dualistic reading—in part because many of the ‘works of the flesh [ἔργα τῆς σαρκός]’ Paul lists, ‘could be practiced by a disembodied spirit (jealousy, etc.)’.

T. Engberg-Pedersen offers a very different Hellenization thesis, in which Paul is not under the spell of Platonic dualism, but Stoic-monism. Engberg-Pedersen sees Paul as a thoroughgoing materialist, in a Stoic sense. Reading 1 Corinthians 15, for example, Engberg-Pedersen understands Paul to mean that the flesh-and-blood [σῶμα ψυχικόν] is materially transubstantiated into a body composed of material spirit [σῶμα πνευματικόν]: ‘Paul had the idea that ‘this’ individual body of flesh and blood, this ‘clay’ body made out of earth, will be transformed so that what is self-identically the very same body will become a body made up of pneuma’. Engberg-Pedersen will go so far as to say that ‘[in] Paul there is no idea of a separation of the soul from the body. . . . Here Paul is almost more monistically Stoic than the Stoics themselves’.

Neither Boyarin’s, nor Engberg-Pedersen’s theses have been widely accepted among Paulinists, and, though enlightening comparisons between Christianity and Stoicism continue to
be made, it is one thing to be broadly Hellenized, and another entirely for your cosmology and anthropology to be commensurate with another worldview. As C. K. Rowe has argued, ‘The stories that make Stoic/Christian commitments intelligible as Stoic/Christian commitments do not overlap or run parallel in the way that would be required for the existence of commensurable commitments or shared agreements’. Indeed, throughout this study I have sought to emphasize how Paulinism is rooted in and determined by the Christ-event. The contours of Paul’s world are shaped by a landslide of incommensurable symbols—Creation, Adam and the race of ‘old humanity’, Moses and Law, the covenant of circumcision, and the malicious characters of Sin and Death, the revaluation of Israel, circumcision, Temple, and kosher laws, the incarnation, kenosis, the Cross, resurrection, the exalted Messiah, the new human, the urgency of the νῦν καιρὸς, the unfolding of new creation—this distinctive symbolic landscape cannot be explicitly shared by proponents of other worldviews because the Christian-Pauline worldview is itself a mapping of the singularity that is the Christ-event. As a consequence of this field of non-overlapping symbology, these other worldviews are nothing less than witnesses to different worlds. In this sense, Badiou’s reading of Paul is on safer ground than syncretistic readings because it allows the Christ-event its central world-and-self-shaping role. Stoicism, Platonism, and other contemporary worldviews did have concerns that overlapped with those of Christianity, and, equally, points of agreement that created opportunities for social co-operation with the early Pauline communities, but these did not exist because of similarities at the worldview level—they existed despite dramatic differences.

**Ontic Uses of ‘Ἐν Σαρκὶ’ and ‘Κατὰ Σάρκα’**

Human persons, prior to new creation, comport themselves as flesh [σάρξ]. Flesh language is ubiquitous throughout the Pauline corpus, and it can be used in a variety of contrasting ways. Flesh can be used in reference to natural descent, or the biological (apart from the spiritual), as in, ‘Abraham, our forefather according to the flesh’ (Rom. 4.1), and more generally to depict the whole life lived apart from the presence of God, ‘Those who live according to the flesh have their minds set on what the flesh desires’ (Rom. 4.5), or subject to

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112 C. K. Rowe, *One True Life*, 224.
death, thus, ‘When you were dead in your sins and in the uncircumcision of your flesh, God made you alive with Christ’ (Col. 2.13). Most commonly, flesh language imagines the physical frailty, and moral precariousness of the human condition. Paul warns his detractors in Corinth that he lives ‘in the flesh’ (e.g., he is subject to human frailty), he does not wage war ‘according to the flesh’ (e.g., his ministry derives power from another source, and is not circumscribed by the limiting factor of the flesh).

While the flesh is usually disparaged in Paul’s usage, his distance from Platonism and Gnosticism may be seen in his uncompromising view of the importance of bodily existence in the resurrection (1 Cor. 15.42-44; 2 Cor. 5.1-5), and he believes, contra Gnosticism, that what is done in the body matters because of its continuity with the resurrected body (1 Cor. 6.13-20). This has been a complicated issue in the history of New Testament interpretation, in part because it has been commonplace to blur Paul together with Augustine, who is then treated as a thoroughgoing Platonist.\footnote{For a balanced treatment of Paul and Augustine’s views of the flesh, in light of their insistence on bodily resurrection, see Paula Fredriksen’s, ‘Vile Bodies: Paul and Augustine on the Resurrection of the Flesh’, in 

Even Augustine, however, who contributed to the early syntheses of Platonic and Christian ideas,\footnote{Augustine, The City of God § 14.1, p. 441.} rejected the Platonic debasement of the flesh \textit{qua} flesh on 
\textit{Scriptural grounds}—believing that an original sin of the soul had corrupted the morally neutral flesh.\footnote{Augustine, The City of God § 13.24, p. 436; cf. Confessions § 10.10, p. 253.} He does, however, take the flesh to be the lower aspect of man, and the soul to be the higher part,\footnote{Rom. 1.3. Other neutral uses deal with heredity, Rom. 4.1, 9.3, 11.13, and, following Gen. 2.24, the biological unity of coition, I Cor. 6.16, Eph. 5.31.} rightly reading ‘flesh’ as a Pauline synecdoche for the human person in their natural capacities prior to grace.

The possibility of a morally neutral flesh in Paul’s usage is most firmly established in his attribution of flesh to Christ: ‘a descendant of David \textit{according to the flesh}’ [κατὰ σάρκα],\footnote{Rom. 1.3.} and by the fact that prior to natural death or the Parousia, there is an inescapable fleshly aspect to existence. Paul characterizes life in the νῦν καιρὸς variously as, ‘\textit{in the flesh}’ [ἐν σαρκὶ], or, ‘\textit{according to the flesh}’ [κατὰ σάρκα]’. In its extra-moral sense, to live in the flesh is merely to

experience mortal, corporeal embodiment, with its attendant weakness, temptations, vulnerability, and so-forth. Paul will warn his parishioners to, ‘put no confidence in the flesh’ (Phil. 3.3), his famous ‘litany of woes’ catalogues the dangers and physical hardships he had suffered, and the vulnerability he felt while on mission (2 Cor. 11.16ff), and he understood his ‘thorn in the flesh’ as a conspicuous reminder of his dependence upon God’s supervening power (2 Cor. 12.7-10). Such uses do not imply a negative moral status for a life lived the ‘in the flesh’; indeed, having been crucified with Christ, Paul says, ‘The life I now live in the flesh [ἐν σαρκί], I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me’ (Gal. 2.20). In much the same way, ‘κατὰ σάρκα’, can have an extra-moral usage, referring to human descent, as Jesus of Nazareth was, ‘born of the seed of David according to the flesh [τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα]’ (Rom. 1.3), or to Israel’s natural descent from Abraham (Rom. 4.1), or to intra-racial relationships (Rom. 9.3; 1 Cor. 10.18).

Moral Applications of ‘Ἐν Σαρκὶ’ and ‘Κατὰ Σάρκα’.

However, both forms can have contrasting pejorative moral usages—though they are much more common in the accusative than in the dative case. We have seen ἐν σαρκὶ used to denote the physical, mundane aspect of human, corporeal existence, but it also has a more theologically pregnant usage in Paul, referring to the kind of human subjectivity that is under the influence of the flesh—the very self who dies with Christ in co-crucifixion:

118 Though life ἐν σαρκὶ also affords Paul with opportunities for positive work in the cause of the Christian mission: ‘For to me, to live is Christ and to die is gain. If I am to go on living in the body [ἐν σαρκί], this will mean fruitful labour for me. Yet what shall I choose? I do not know! I am torn between the two: I desire to depart and be with Christ, which is better by far; but it is more necessary for you that I remain in the body [ἐν σαρκί]’ (Phil. 1.22-24).

119 Boyarin argues that ‘Life and interpretation κατὰ σάρκα become pejoratively marked only when they have the negative social effects in Paul’s eyes of interrupting the new creation of the universal Israel of God’, A Radical Jew, 73.
So, my brothers and sisters, you also died to the law through the body of Christ, that you might belong to another, to him who was raised from the dead, in order that we might bear fruit for God. For when we were in the realm of the flesh [ἐν σαρκὶ], the sinful passions aroused by the law were at work in us, so that we bore fruit for death. But now, by dying to what once bound us, we have been released from the law so that we serve in the new way of the Spirit, and not in the old way of the written code (Rom. 7.4-6).

This is a fundamentally different application of the term from those surveyed above, and this particular use in Romans seems to have caught Nietzsche’s attention while he was reading Lüdemann and studying Paul’s letters. He wrote in a note dated to the summer of 1880, “‘Im Fleische sein’ heißt ‘im Gesetze sein’”, and thus, ‘To die to evil is also to die to the law’, which is not a direct quotation of Paul, but accords well with the logic of this passage. Nietzsche also knew of the conceptual range of ‘ἐν σαρκὶ’, because he quoted from Gal. 2.20 in the same note, and throughout the notebook entry, Nietzsche was trying to work out the logic of Paul’s death to the flesh and law, which, as we have already seen, reappeared in D § 68 as a key breakthrough in Paul’s development of Christianity. Nietzsche made the important discovery here that participatory death with Christ meant the death of that self which dwells within the law’s jurisdiction. This is broadly consistent with Paul’s usage, where Paul will speak of believers who clearly live ‘ἐν σαρκὶ’ (in the sense of their corporeality), as living ‘not in the flesh but in the Spirit [οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν σαρκί ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι]’ (Rom. 8.9), or where ἐν σαρκὶ refers to a mode of being that is incapable of a life pleasing to God (Rom., 8.8; cf. 7.18).

120 KSA 9:4[219], cf. the expansion of the logic in D § 68.
121 Nietzsche provides his own loose translation of the Greek (it bears no resemblance to Luther’s): ‘Ich lebe nicht mehr ich, sondern Christus lebt in mir. Was ich noch im Fleische lebe, das lebe ich im Glauben an ihn. . ’. Nietzsche also paraphrases vv. 17-18, ‘Wenn ich jetzt das Gesetz wieder aufnehmen wollte (so daß ich mich ihm unterordne), so mache ich Christum zum Mithelfer der Sünde’.
122 D § 68, p. 41 [KSA 3, p. 67]. What is remarkable here, is that Nietzsche’s focus on Paul’s anthropology led him to emphasize the participatory nature of Pauline soteriology long before the participatory models of A. Schweitzer and others rose to prominence. It is similar, in fact, to the current model proposed by Michael J. Gorman: ‘I want to suggest that for Paul there is one soteriological model: justification is by crucifixion, specifically co-crucifixion, understood as participation in Christ’s act of covenant fulfilment’, Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul’s Narrative Soteriology (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2009), 43-44.
Pejorative uses preponderate in the accusative form, where ‘κατὰ σάρκα’ and ‘κατὰ πνεῦμα’ are juxtaposed as two contrasting (or conflicting) sources of motive force for human behaviours. This is seen in Galatians 5.13ff, as mentioned above, where the subject who is responding to the fleshly impulse exhibits vice, while those led by the Spirit produce the virtuous, ‘fruits of the Spirit’. This is seen, too, in the early verses of Romans 8—a passage of supreme importance for understanding Paul. I quote it here at length because it bears out the ways flesh is featured within Paul’s world, and the importance of the flesh-Spirit opposition:

For what the law was powerless to do because it was weakened by the flesh [διὰ τῆς σαρκός], God did by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh [ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκός ὁμορθίας] to be a sin offering. And so he condemned sin in the flesh, in order that the righteous requirement of the law might be fully met in us, who do not live according to the flesh [κατὰ σάρκα] but according to the Spirit [κατὰ πνεῦμα]. Those who live according to the flesh [κατὰ σάρκα] have their minds set on what the flesh desires; but those who live in accordance with the Spirit [κατὰ πνεῦμα] have their minds set on what the Spirit desires (Rom. 8.3-5).

Hermann Lüdemann’s Thesis.

The flesh-Spirit opposition was a subject of central focus in Hermann Lüdemann’s work on Pauline anthropology. Lüdemann’s thesis was that Paul had begun with a Judaic, monistic perspective, which conceived of flesh and Spirit as the difference between human being and the Divine in terms of immanence and transcendence, but he later adopted a quasi-Hellenistic, dualistic metaphysic around the σὰρξ—πνεῦμα opposition because it was necessitated by his soteriology.123 According to Lüdemann, Paul came to believe that participation in new creation was the true centre of salvation in Christ, while the central framework of Judaic soteriology was juridical-forensic, and could only countenance justification through the satisfaction of the Law. Lüdemann sees that in the earlier work of Galatians, Paul abruptly dismisses the juridical-forensic perspective,124 while in the later work of Romans 1-4, Paul carefully constructs a soteriology of forensic justification. The enigma that Lüdemann labours to highlight is that the earlier letter of Galatians advances its argument on the more radical implications of the Christ-event: ‘I have been crucified with Christ’ (2.20); ‘There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave

124 Lüdemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 204.
nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (3.28); ‘May I never boast except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world’ (6.14); ‘Neither circumcision nor uncircumcision means anything; what counts is the new creation’ (6.15). The soteriology in Galatians envisions a new creation that dramatically outshines the former horizon of possibilities in Second-Temple Judaism. In Romans 1-4, however, the triumph of Christ is not the objective reality of new creation, but the subjective satisfaction of God’s justice resulting in peace with God—summarized by the hinge passage appearing in the last verse of chapter four, and first verse of chapter five: ‘He was delivered over to death for our sins and was raised to life for our justification. Therefore, since we have been justified through faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ’ (4.25-5.1). Lüdemann writes, ‘In essence: the δικαίωσις of Rom. 3. 4 [sic] is nothing more than a bare verbal declaration, a mere, ‘actus forensis’, which produces no objectively real change in the person’.125

In Romans 5.2, 5, however, the radical, new creation paradigm emerges again into view: ‘And we boast in the hope of the glory of God’, indeed, ‘God’s love has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us’. Again, Lüdemann: ‘Here with the πνεῦμα we have the objective potency of δικαιοσύνην and of ἁγιασμός in the human person and the frame of merely ideational imputation is left behind’.126 From this point forward, Paul’s soteriology is characterized by the objective reality of participation with Christ in the new creation. Paul’s argument in Romans 5-8 is rooted in his anthropology, and its trademark σὰρξ—πνεῦμα dualism. Paul initially entertains the forensic soteriology—from the ‘perspective of the Judaic-juridical consciousness [jüdisch-gesetzlichen Bewusstseins]’—merely because he comes to recognize that, ‘the Judaic-juridical consciousness could only be overcome on its own ground’.127 That is, Paul could not unify the early Christian communities around a new-creation soteriology, unless he first showed that Christ fulfilled what Paul now diplomatically refers to as, ‘the righteous requirement of the Law’ (Rom. 8.4).

125 Lüdemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 161.
126 Lüdemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 162.
127 Lüdemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 206.
Paul’s own conviction (represented in Galatians and 2 Corinthians 3), was that, ‘The Law, considered on its own, was neither compulsory nor a cause of legal indebtedness’, and had for Israel only a ‘temporary and provisional character’. What needed to be overcome, therefore, was precisely the juridical consciousness, which ‘from the perspective of the Law and its demands, is trapped in a deception’. In Romans, we see the mature Paul at work, overcoming the rival soteriology in two stages. First, Paul articulates the doctrine of forensic justification in a way that illustrates Christ’s satisfaction of its legal demands. Second, having satisfied the demands of the ‘Judaic-juridical consciousness’, and reassured his readership of the safe status they have in God’s love (Rom. 5.1-11; 8.31-39), Paul now begins to develop an argument for a soteriology characterized by participation with Christ in the new creation based on a dualistic flesh-Spirit anthropology that will occupy him throughout Romans 5-8. Thus, Pauline soteriology, according to Lüdemann, advances a subversive anthropology, within a subversive form of discourse about the Law. The advance that Paul makes between Galatians and Romans was made precisely through the perfecting and systematizing of his anthropology so as to undermine forensic (subjective) soteriology.

3.3.4 The Precariousness of Human Existence in Moral Space.

Prior to his conversion, Paul would have shared the general view of Palestinian Judaism, that the Nations faced the righteous judgement of God for their sins. This is evident from his pre-Damascus attempts to protect the ethnic and religious purity of Judaism, and from his post-Damascus language about judgement. Paul’s abortive attempt at living righteously through covenant faithfulness had disabused him of any shred of ethnic chauvinism. When Paul said in Romans, ‘The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of people, who suppress the truth by their wickedness’ (1.18), few practicing

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128 The latter claim has strong support from Gal. 4, and 2 Cor. 3; that the Law was no cause of legal indebtedness, is the more controversial assertion. H. Lüdemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 207.
129 Lüdemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 207.
130 The survey of Second-Temple literature in Sanders’, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, is a valuable resource for understanding how various subsets within Judaism viewed the fate of the Nations, pp. 33-426.
131 Gal. 1.13-14; Phil. 3.5-6; Acts 22.3-5.
Israelites would have disagreed. But the roots of Paul’s pessimistic anthropology now encompass Israel, even faithful Israel—even the Torah itself—which has been rendered powerless due to human weakness.

*The Dark Role of the Νόμος.*

In cases where Paul speaks of his prior life in Judaism, he sees his covenant faithfulness as profoundly inadequate to safeguard against sin.\(^ {132} \) Paul’s encounter with Christ provided the epistemological clarity to see that he had known Christ ‘according to the flesh’ \([κατὰ σὰρκα]\)\(^ {133} \) and had violently persecuted Christ and His followers. With this insight, Paul expands his anthropological pessimism to include those under the Law, and to deepen his understanding of how Israel and the Nations stood before God: ‘All who sin apart from the law will also perish apart from the law, and all who sin under the law will be judged by the law’ \((Rom. 2.12)\). The Nations are held accountable to natural law, and the dictates of conscience;\(^ {134} \) the covenant community of Israel is judged by the standards of the Law;\(^ {135} \) but ‘Jews and Gentiles alike are all under the power of sin’ \((Rom. 3.9)\).\(^ {136} \) Ironically, because we become conscious of sin through the Law \((Rom. 3.20; 7.7)\), the arrival of the Law with its sharpened boundaries *increased* the transgression of those boundaries \((Rom. 5.20; 7.13)\),\(^ {137} \) and deepened the plight of the subject who is within the Law’s jurisdiction.\(^ {138} \) The ironic dilemma of the Law is bought out clearly by Paul’s forensic language: ‘The Law was brought in so that the trespass might increase’ \((Rom. 5.20)\). Paul’s most famous articulation of this principle appears in *Romans* 7:

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\(^ {132} \) *Pace,* Boyarin, who comments on this passage that “‘The flesh’—σὰρξ—carries not the slightest shred of sinfulness, human arrogance, or any of the other burdens that translators lay upon it”, *A Radical Jew,* 82. The sinfulness is signalled by, ‘persecutor of the church’.

\(^ {133} \) 2 Cor. 5.16, a cryptic reference to his pre-conversion understanding of the person and work of Christ, blind to the world-historical significance of the Christ-event.


\(^ {135} \) *Rom.* 3.19, 2.12; *Gal.* 3.10, 5.2-4.

\(^ {136} \) Here Paul strings together nine (!) different passages from the Hebrew Bible to demonstrate the power of (personified) Sin’s grip on each human person: ‘There is no one righteous, not even one . . .’

\(^ {137} \) Cf. *Gal.* 3.19, ‘Why, then, was the law given at all? It was added because of transgressions until the Seed to whom the promise referred had come’.

\(^ {138} \) Cf. *Gal.* 4.1-5.

Duff, 139
Once I was alive apart from the law; but when the commandment came, sin sprang to life and I died. I found that the very commandment that was intended to bring life actually brought death. For sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the commandment, deceived me, and through the commandment put me to death (Rom. 7.9-11).

The *advantage* Israel enjoyed in the possession of the Law (*Rom. 3.2*), was ultimately *no advantage* because the more basic classification of Adamic humanity is under the control of Sin.139 Adamic humanity is characterized by its entanglement in sin and death; it is ‘fleshly’, and therefore vulnerable to deception and enslavement.140 Given this nature, the Law can only deepen the human plight, for ‘all who sin under the law will be judged by the law’ (*Rom. 2.12*). Sin, death, and Law feed into each other: ‘The sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law [τὸ δὲ κέντρον τοῦ θανάτου ἢ ἁμαρτία, ἢ δὲ δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ νόμος]’ (*1 Cor. 15.56*). Within the judicial-forensic context created by the Law, ‘the wages of sin is death’ (*Rom. 6.23*; cf. vv. 16, 21), which leads logically to Paul’s characteristically audacious revaluation of Mosaic covenant, as, ‘the ministry that brought death [διακονία τοῦ θανάτου], which was engraved in letters on stone’ (*2 Cor. 3.7*). Indeed, one uniquely Pauline answer for the role of the Law is that, ‘The law was brought in so that the trespass might increase’ (*Rom. 5.20*), and, ‘Scripture has locked up everything under the control of sin’ (*Gal. 3.22*).

Paul’s apparently reckless rhetoric about his heritage amounting to so much garbage [σκύβαλον]141 on the one hand, while continuing to treat the Torah as authoritative, and claiming to ‘establish the law,’142 on the other, constitutes one of the deepest enigmas haunting the Pauline corpus. The issues are complex, but the paradox seems unresolvable if insufficient attention is paid to Paul’s anthropology. Some have mistakenly taken Paul’s deprecations of his experience

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139 *Rom. 3.9, 19, 7.14, 8.3, 11.32.*
140 Note the frequent occurrence of ‘vice lists’ in the Pauline corpus: *Rom. 1.29–31; 13.13; 1 Cor. 5.10–11; 2 Cor. 6.9–10; 12.20–21; Gal. 5.19–21; Eph. 4.31; 5.3–5; Col. 3.5, 8; 1 Tim. 1.9–10; 2 Tim. 3.2–5; Titus 3.3.*
141 Σκύβαλον is a *hapax legomenon* in the *NT* and has been treated to some very colourful word studies, with even *BDAG* allowing *crap* as an appropriate gloss (the *Authorized* reads *dung*). Its etymology is straightforward, combining ‘κύων’, meaning *dog*, and ‘βάλλω’, the common verb for *throw*—literally—‘that which is thrown to the dogs’. It is especially fitting in this passage, where Paul has referred to the circumcision movement as ‘the dogs’ (v. 2).
142 *Rom. 3.31*, ‘Do we then nullify the Law through faith? May it never be! On the contrary, we establish the Law’.

Duff, 140
in Judaism as a rejection of Judaism, as such, but Paul never abandons Judaism. As Michael Gorman writes, ‘For Paul there is nothing wrong with Judaism. But there is something wrong with humanity—Gentiles and Jews, males and females, slave and free—and only the Jewish God and his Messiah, can fix the problem. In fact, Judaism is for Paul the solution—only it is a restored, renewed, inclusive, eschatological, messianic Judaism’. In fact, the privileges Paul accorded to Israel were many: ‘Their is the adoption to sonship; theirs the divine glory, the covenants, the receiving of the law, the temple worship and the promises. Theirs are the patriarchs, and from them is traced the human ancestry of the Messiah [ἐξ ὧν ὁ χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα], who is God over all, forever praised! Amen’ (Rom. 9.4-5). Ironically, however, the unique status of Israel as God’s covenant people positioned them to witness the precariousness of the human condition in an intensified way.

Paul views the self as subject to forces beyond itself. This understanding undergirds much of Paul’s paraenesis, where the moral precariousness of life in the νῦν καιρὸς is always hauntingly in view: ‘the flesh desires what is contrary to the Spirit, and the Spirit what is contrary to the flesh. They are in conflict with each other, so that you are not to do whatever you want’ (Gal. 5.17). The self may be living in accord with the flesh and so produce sin and vice, or it may be in accord with the Spirit resulting in virtuous living. Here is the essential point: cosmology and anthropology are inextricably linked in Paul’s thought, because, as Käsemann wrote, the body is ‘man as a non-isolable existence’, because, ‘this earthly existence of ours is always characterized by membership and participation’. Sarah Harding develops this thesis in this exceptional passage:

It is the permeable self that integrates humans with the cosmos and implicates them in the eschatological dynamic in its progress toward the telos. Humans are thus receptive to powers that dominate the cosmos and determine their ethical orientation and identity as believers or nonbelievers. Without this permeability,

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144 The most significant examples appear in Rom. 8, and Gal. 5.
these powers would be inefficacious. . . . Identity is a function of participation in cosmological powers.  

That is, the self can only be understood in and through its cosmic context. This includes the vertical dimension of creational monotheism, and its horizontal dimension of interaction with Israel, the Nations, and, most importantly for Paul, other members of the body of Christ. Paul would have no use for the Cartesian abstraction of the self from its world.

In St Paul’s mind, the Law is not evil, but powerless to save; Sin has laid siege to the Torah, using it to increase its own power to bring death. As Barclay writes, ‘There are no exceptions: all (Jew and Gentile) are under the rule of sin, which holds the cosmos in subjection. Even the Torah is frustrated by this enslaving power (Rom. 7), a further reason why there can be no justification within its terms’. Sin in the flesh is the problem with the Law in that it robs the Law of any saving power it might have possessed: ‘by the works of the Law no flesh will be justified in His sight’ (Rom. 3.20); because, ‘the law was powerless . . . because it was weakened by the flesh’ (Rom. 8.5-6). Again and again, it is Adamic humanity’s moral frailty, and the moral vulnerability that fleshly embodiment entails, which renders the Law ineffectual, and thus necessitates the new soteriological economy inaugurated in the Christ-event: ‘For what the law was powerless to do because it was weakened by the flesh, God did by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh’ (Rom. 8.3). On this point Paul is adamant: ‘if righteousness could be gained through the law, Christ died for nothing! (Gal. 2.21; cf. 1.16; ). We will return to

146 Harding, Paul’s Eschatological Anthropology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 87. Similarly, the recent work by Susan Eastman, ‘For Paul, these opposing relational loci are the only alternatives in human existence; there is no place where an autonomous ‘individual can stand aside and evaluate, let alone choose, between different possible identities. There is no freestanding “self” in Paul’s cosmos, nor is there a neutral environment within which human beings may act out their personal lives. Rather, Paul’s anthropology is participatory all the way down. It does not mean, however, that there is no “self”’ (Eastman, Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2017], 8-9).

147 The language in Galatians is still more shocking: ‘But Scripture has locked up everything under the control of sin’, 3.22.


149 It is interesting that in the, ‘incident at Antioch’, Paul does not take issue with Peter over theory but praxis. Paul attributes to Peter the same soteriology: ‘We who are Jews by birth and not sinful Gentiles know that a person is not justified by the works of the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ. So we, too, have put our faith in Christ Jesus. . . ’ (Gal. 2.15-16).
Paul’s understanding of the flesh, below, but first we turn briefly to examine Paul’s positive vision for the Law.

Respecting Nuance—Paul’s Positive Vision of the Law.

Despite his often grim assessment of human existence under the Law, Paul is not an antinomian. He speaks positively about the Law in three ways. First, the content of the Law is variously characterized as holy, righteous, spiritual, and good (Rom. 7.7ff; 8.4). Secondly, the Law serves a heuristic function in bringing the self to a necessary awareness of sin (Rom. 7.7)—hence the Authorized Version’s famous rendering of Gal. 3.24: ‘the law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ’. It is the Law which helps the subject to unambiguously diagnose their spiritual condition: ‘in order that sin might be recognized as sin’, and that, ‘through the commandment sin might become utterly sinful’ (Rom. 7.13). Thirdly, and of manifest importance, the Law establishes the negative equality that undergirds Paul’s universalism: ‘For God has bound everyone over to disobedience so that he may have mercy on them all’ (Rom. 11.32). Again, from Romans: ‘Now we know that whatever the law says, it says to those who are under the law, so that every mouth may be silenced and the whole world held accountable to God’ (3.19).

When Acts narrates Paul’s mission to Thessalonica, it says he went into the synagogue and, ‘he reasoned with them from the Scriptures, explaining and proving that the Messiah had to suffer and rise from the dead’ (17.2-3). Paul’s mission to Corinth began a short time later, and in his retrospective on his early mission in Corinth, he writes, ‘I resolved to know nothing while I was with you except Jesus Christ and him crucified’ (1 Cor. 2.2). With the foregoing analysis of sin, death, and Law, it becomes clear why the Cross is of such inordinate significance within Paul’s symbolic world. The Cross is, in many respects, the key to Paulinism. Paul used the Cross as a tool of pessimistic revaluation: in the ‘word of the Cross [Ο λόγος γάρ ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ]’, the Cross functions as a signpost pointing to the world’s folly: the Jews, Greeks, and

Θανάτου Σταυροῦ.

Duff, 143
the ‘rulers of the age [ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος]’ (1 Cor. 2.8) acted in ignorance when they crucified the Lord of glory. Likewise, the Cross serves as an index of misplaced confidence in the moral capacities of self. He had written to Corinth that it was a ‘scandal [σκάνδαλον]’ to the Jews, and in his letter to Galatia, he attributes the backlash against his gospel to the ‘scandal of the Cross [σκάνδαλον τοῦ σταυροῦ]’ (Gal. 5.11), adding: ‘Those who want to impress people by means of the flesh are trying to compel you to be circumcised. The only reason they do this is to avoid being persecuted for the Cross of Christ’ (Gal. 6.12). Thus, the thoroughgoing anthropological pessimism we see again and again in Paul is located at the root of his conflicts with those who wish to continue to make social transactions on the symbolic capital of Second-Temple Judaism.

The Cross lies at the centre of the gospel’s resolution to the toxic combination of the Sin in the flesh and Law. Galatians contains some of Paul’s most potent formulations of the bankruptcy of the Law as a path to justification: ‘For all who rely on the works of the law are under a curse, as it is written: “Cursed is everyone who does not continue to do everything written in the Book of the Law”’ (3.10). It is on the Cross that, ‘Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us, for it is written: ‘Cursed is everyone who is hung on a pole’ (3.13). Similarly, Romans 3.21-31, has been considered the heart of Paul’s forensic articulation of the gospel, because it lays out the logic of the crucified Messiah in such a way that Paul’s rather grim anthropology can be resolved through the work of Christ, by properly situating the giving of the Law within the metanarrative of salvation history. I quote the passage only in part: ‘There is no difference between Jew and Gentile, for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and all are justified freely by his grace through the redemption that came by Christ Jesus. God presented Christ as a sacrifice of atonement, through the shedding of his blood—to be received by faith’ (vv. 22-25). This justification comes by faith, apart from the Law (vv. 21-22), and so boasting in personal efforts is excluded (v. 27). The forensic justification afforded through the Cross allowed God to be ‘just and the one who justifies’ (v. 26), and so the Paulinist can say she is justified ‘apart from the Law’ (v. 21), and yet she ‘uphold(s) the Law’ (v. 31). In several ways this passage serves as a précis of Paulinism, with its characteristic inversions. The universal Adamic condition—‘all have sinned’—decisively negates any advantage the covenant community of Israel might have enjoyed as a result of the
Law,\textsuperscript{150} and yet, the Crucified Messiah is narrated into the symbolic thought-world of Judaism as the \textit{necessary} outcome of its story: Death comes through Adam $\rightarrow$ Death reigns until Moses $\rightarrow$ the covenant of Death comes through Moses $\rightarrow$ Death reigns through transgressions $\rightarrow$ ‘all are justified freely by his grace through the redemption that came by Christ Jesus’. Critically, \textit{Paul’s gospel universalism is drawn out of Judaism as he understands it: Israel shares in the plight of the Nations through Adam, and the Nations share in the solution offered through Israel’s Messiah.}\textsuperscript{151}

\section*{3.4 Conclusion}

Throughout this chapter, I have argued for a logical continuity between St Paul’s conversion, his anthropological pessimism, and his universal mission. According to this model, Paul experienced his Damascus vision as a direct, personal encounter with the Christ-event that transvalued (depreciated to the point of bankruptcy) the symbolic socio-religious capital he had earned through his zealous adherence to the Mosaic covenant. Paul’s commissioning for the mission to the Nations entailed a dramatic conversion, and catalysed a radicalization of his anthropological pessimism.

\textsuperscript{150} As Boyarin succinctly puts it, ‘Having the Law makes [Israel’s] salvation more difficult, not easier’, \textit{A Radical Jew}, 162.

\textsuperscript{151} Ultimately, this very situatedness of the Christ-event within Paul’s theological imagination presents a problem for many of the appropriations of Paulinism from contemporary philosophy. Insofar as Badiou, Žižek, and others, seek in Paul a path towards a universal subjectivity without following Paul’s understanding of the key symbolic coordinates by which Paul maps the self, there is a kind of superficiality to their encounters with Paul.
Chapter 4

(Re)Becoming Human: Anthropological and Anti-Christian Trajectories in Nietzsche’s Early and Middle Periods

‘Ich kenne den Atheismus durchaus nicht als Ergebniss, noch weniger als Ereigniss: er versteht sich bei mir aus Instinkt’.

—Friedrich Nietzsche, Eccé Homo.

4.1 Introduction.

Nietzsche wrote in the final days of his productive period, ‘I do not by any means know atheism as a result; even less as an event: it is a matter of course with me, from instinct’.\(^1\) While we need not uncritically assume the veracity of this account\(^2\)—his own juvenilia evince a childhood faith of Pascalian guilelessness—it does suggest a disjunction between what we might call the becoming of Nietzsche (the theme of Eccé Homo), and the becoming of the Apostle Paul. According to Acts, Paul was transfigured from persecutor to Apostle in one blinding encounter with the resurrected Christ. Nietzsche’s development contrasts with Paul’s in how it unfolds

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\(^1\) EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever’, § 1, p. 236 [KSA 6, p. 278].

\(^2\) Indeed, EH presents Nietzsche’s readers with a number of challenges, both textual-critical and interpretive. The textual-critical concerns arise largely because the work was published posthumously, and Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche was not above tampering with her brother’s finished manuscripts. On this point, Gary Shapiro writes, ‘Eccé Homo has always been the most contested and controversial of Nietzsche’s writings. Tendentiously edited and censored by his sister and Peter Gast, it has been the subject of sharp polemics among scholars who have attempted to establish an authentic text’, Nietzschean Narratives (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 142. The interpretive challenges are due largely to EH’s eccentric style, including grandiose claims about Nietzsche’s importance.
across time, and understanding Nietzsche’s developing anti-Christianity requires us to pay careful attention to chronology. While he did have periods of reorientation, and breakthrough events of profound significance his discovery of the Eternal Recurrence—'Beginning of August 1881 in Sils-Maria, 6,000 feet above the sea, and much higher above all human things'—is a salient example of such, even prompting (somewhat misguided) comparisons with St Paul’s Damascus. There appears to have been no abrupt crisis of faith in Nietzsche’s move from childhood piety to the atheism of his adulthood.

Throughout the previous chapter, I argued for a logical continuity between St Paul’s conversion, his anthropological pessimism, and his universal mission. According to this model, Paul experienced his Damascus vision as a direct, personal encounter with the Christ-event that transvalued the symbolic capital he had earned through his zealous adherence to the Mosaic covenant. Paul’s commissioning for the mission to the Nations entailed a dramatic conversion, and catalysed a radicalization of his anthropological pessimism. Somewhat surprisingly, this reconstruction of the foundations of Paulinism is very close to the reading Nietzsche will begin to develop in his middle-period writings. We will see that Nietzsche’s early reflections on Paul highlight the significance of Paul’s conversion, his anthropological pessimism, and the revaluation of the Mosaic covenant. This highlights much of Pauline deconstruction, and these early reflections on Paul correspond to a period of Nietzschean deconstruction.

In chapters 5 and 6, I will return to Paul and then again to Nietzsche to discuss their positive new visions for human being following their proclamations of radical theological events. I will argue that Nietzsche’s later works demonstrate a complex engagement with this robust version of Paulinism, which allows us to map his most famous late-period anthropological concepts onto the symbolic world of St Paul. Here I will go beyond previous studies on the Nietzsche-Paul relationship in demonstrating the implicit anti-Paulinism at the heart of Nietzsche’s mature thought, veiled in his own unique anthropology of event. My thesis is that Nietzsche increasingly positioned himself opposite of Christianity as deeper engagements with radical aspects of St Paul’s thought served as a foil, helping him to clarify what he perceived as

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3 KSA 9:11[141], p. 494.
4 E.g., Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 120; Azzam, *Nietzsche versus Paul*, 85.
his own great task: a new account of human being and its (symbolic) world—*a revaluation of all values*—which would foster authentic and healthful human becoming.

Before I turn to make that case, however, some groundwork must be laid. The present chapter makes three essential arguments. First, I examine *The Birth of Tragedy*, and four essays published under the rubric of *The Untimely Meditations*, through the lens of *EH*, finding behind these texts the radix of major trajectories in Nietzsche’s anthropology and anti-Christianity, which can be traced diachronically through his middle and mature periods. The early-middle period writings, especially *Human, All-Too-Human*, follow his early offerings as a kind of crisis—a period of reorientation with respect to these questions.⁵ Though it has not been common to foreground *anthropology* in studies of Nietzsche and the Christian tradition,⁶ I hope to show that the hypothesis is as fruitful here as it is when applied to the letters of St Paul.⁷ From whatever perspective we view Nietzsche—as the great human(ist), the last metaphysician, or the philosopher of *Existenz*⁸—we see Nietzsche wrestle creatively with what it will mean to be human following the Death of God, and what kind of world we will create. In this way, Nietzsche’s corpus functions much like St Paul’s; it bears witness to a kind of human plight, and then to the Death of God as a disruption in the course of human becoming. Like Paul, Nietzsche is at once confronting, and subverting the assumptions and values of his contemporaries, and mapping out the topography of a reimagined symbolic world. As a cultural critic, Nietzsche was aiming to destabilize the *décadent* bourgeois identity, and to create something new in its place.

Second, I further examine what I have called Nietzsche’s ‘return to Paul’, an event in the summer of 1880, which intersects with the crystalizing of Nietzsche’s abiding sense of task. In this neglected period of Nietzsche’s career, his development as a more creative and subversive

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⁵ Cf. *EH*, ‘Human, All-To-Human’, § 1, p. 283 [KSA 6, p. 322].
⁷ Speaking precisely, neither has it been common to approach Paul the Apostle *qua* cultural or philosophical anthropologist. As we have seen (and will see), however, Paul’s gospel—his proclamation of the Christ-event—was mapped onto a surprisingly robust account of human nature.
⁸ I am alluding here to the influential readings of Kaufmann, Heidegger, and Jaspers, respectively.
thinker is synchronous with his dawning appreciation for the importance of his relationship to Christianity, and the rapid proliferation of quarrels Nietzsche takes up with Pauline Christianity. In 1880, Christianity is transformed in Nietzsche’s thought, from pious myth, into dehumanizing philosophy. This I read as a quantum leap in Nietzsche’s thought, where he has moved beyond Christianity, not by ‘subtraction’, but through a subversive critique, and through re-creation. Borrowing soteriological terms from Paul’s interpreters, we could say that the middle period is where Nietzsche begins to articulate the plight to which his mature writings offer a solution. Again, Nietzsche’s commentary in Eccé Homo, provides the key for reconstructing this trajectory.

Third, and finally, I carefully reconstruct Nietzsche’s early interpretation of Paul, including a more thorough exegesis of Daybreak § 68—one of his most detailed engagements with Paul—than has yet been offered. Here I contextualize Nietzsche’s interpretation of Paul both within the growing critical scholarship of his contemporaries (from Ferdinand Baur to Albert Schweitzer), and within the Pauline corpus. This dual contextualization clarifies the nature and significance of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Paul. Additionally, that aspect of Nietzsche’s theory of Christian origins which has been most widely appreciated—his contrasting portraits of Jesus and Paul—is not the most important aspect of Nietzsche historical revision. In some cases, Nietzsche’s interpretation only confirms the broadly-held assumptions of the dominant Tübingen School. It becomes more interesting, and at least potentially more subversive, when it is read within the context of Nietzsche’s own developing philosophy of the

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9 The Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor, repeatedly reminds us in his tour de force study of secularism that ‘subtraction stories’ cannot account for the developments we see between (earlier) religious and (current) secular identities. Taylor writes, ‘Against this kind of story, I will steadily be arguing that Western modernity, including its secularity, is the fruit of new inventions, newly constructed self-understandings and related practices, and can’t be explained in terms of perennial features of human life’, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 22. Nietzsche’s work, I would suggest, is the example par excellence of, ‘new inventions, newly constructed self-understandings and related practices . . .’ in the post-Christian age.

10 Seeing Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul within the broader context of 19th-Century Pauline studies, has usually been a matter of neglect. Before the present work, it was only Daniel Havemann’s monograph, Der ‘Apostel Der Rache’: Nietzsche's Paulusdeutung, which provided this illuminating step.
human person. This is where Nietzsche’s return to Paul, and crystallizing anthropological insights and vision, illuminate his larger body of work.

4.2 Anthropology and Anti-Christianity in the Early Nietzsche.

‘Tiefes feindseliges Schweigen über das Christenthum im ganzen Buche’.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Eccé Homo

—Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science

4.2.1 The Birth of Tragedy, and Nietzsche’s, ‘Profound Hostile Silence about Christianity’.

The Birth of Tragedy (hereafter, Birth)—vehicle to the young Nietzsche’s original theory on pre-Socratic, Greek aesthetics—offered a psychological account for the birth and death of Attic tragedy. Aspects of Birth were later a source of embarrassment to Nietzsche, whose own commentary, ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism’, contains the memorable assessment of the work as, ‘strange and almost inaccessible,’ and, ‘badly written, ponderous, embarrassing, image-mad and image-confused, sentimental, in places saccharine to the point of effeminacy…’ In Eccé Homo, Nietzsche further distances himself from the essay’s popular legacy as ‘an event in the life of Wagner’, and laments the vestiges of Schopenhauer and Hegel’s influence. Though it is commonly acknowledged that the essay compares unfavourably to his later work, there are two aspects of the work, which are especially relevant to the current study: the way Birth highlights Nietzsche’s emerging quest for what is healthfully, and authentically human, and his apparent

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12 ‘Good luck in fate.— The greatest distinction that fate can bestow on us is to let us fight for a time on the side of our opponents. With that we are predestined for a great victory’, GS § 323, p. 255 [KSA 3, p. 552].
13 BT, ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’, § 1, p. 17 [KSA 1, p. 11].

Duff, 150
ambivalence towards Christianity—most notably in light of his averring in *Eccé Homo* that there was in *Birth* a ‘profound, hostile silence about Christianity’.

Throughout the pages of *Birth*, it is clear that Nietzsche’s anthropological questions and convictions are already taking form. Indeed, he seems to peer *through* cultural phenomena to get a glimpse of noble human being and its world. The healthy synthesis of the Apollonian and Dionysian forces at the heart of *Birth* was never *merely* an aesthetic theory; in the mature Nietzsche’s view, the essay’s enduring legacy was its ‘psychological analysis’ of the healthy Dionysian type, and the critique of Socratism as ‘an instrument of Greek disintegration’.\(^{16}\) Further, Nietzsche ultimately marks *Birth* as the beginning of his ‘attempt to assassinate two millennia of antinature and desecration of man’.\(^{17}\) In our study of Pauline anthropology, we will see that, beginning from the Christ-event, St Paul’s distinctive anthropology was inseparable from the value-matrix of his recreated symbolic world—and his genius, was his dexterity in working out the axiological implications of complex symbols. Like Paul, Nietzsche seems to instinctively frame his task the same way—recognizing the importance of the relationship between the human self and values, and between values and symbols. Indeed, the very emergence of the healthy type of the tragic man required a new religious symbolism:

> The essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; we need a new world of symbols; and the entire symbolism of the body is called into play, not the mere symbolism of the lips, face, and speech but the whole pantomime of dancing, forcing every member into rhythmic movement. Then the other symbolic powers suddenly press forward, particularly those of music, in rhythmics, dynamics, and harmony. To grasp this collective release of all the symbolic powers, man must have already attained that height of self-abnegation which seeks to express itself symbolically through all these powers . . .\(^{18}\)

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\(^{16}\) *EH*, ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, § 1, p. 271 [*KSA* 6, p. 310].

\(^{17}\) *EH*, ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, § 4, p. 274 [*KSA* 6, p. 313].

\(^{18}\) *BT*, § 2, pp. 40-41 [*KSA* 1, pp. 33-34]. Nietzsche seems interested, especially, in the symbolism that reflects healthy anthropological values: ‘[The] satyr was the archetype of man. . . [H]ere true human being was disclosed, the bearded satyr jubilating to his god’ (*BT*, § 8, p. 61 [*KSA* 1, p. 58]). NB: the Dionysian reveler’s healthy ‘height of self-abnegation’ [Selbstentäusserung], provides an interesting contrast with the *unhealthy* ‘selflessness’ [Selbstlosigkeit] Nietzsche attributes to Christian morality—a topic to which we will return below.

Duff, 151
The death of tragedy was signalled by the appearance of Socrates, whom Nietzsche recognizes as a new ‘Daseinsform’, a previously unheard of ‘type’—the ‘theoretical man’ [theoretischen Menschen]. Socrates is no less than, ‘the one turning point and vortex of so-called world history’. The problem with Socrates at this point in the development of Nietzsche’s thought, is that he marks the end to the healthy synthesis of pessimistic tragedy, and the ascendancy of scientific optimism. Socratic optimism passionately embraces the world, but only as a consequence of its insatiable quest for truth, and its naïve conviction that the world can be fully understood:

By contrast with this practical pessimism, Socrates is the prototype of the theoretical optimist who, with his faith that the nature of things can be fathomed, ascribes to knowledge and insight the power of a panacea, while understanding error as the evil par excellence. To fathom the depths and to separate true knowledge from appearance and error, seemed to the Socratic man the noblest, even the only truly human vocation.

Here we see that Nietzsche views the appearance of this new type as a competing answer to what it means to be human, which destabilizes and subverts the healthful, tragic identity of the Apollonian-Dionysian synthesis, just as the new creation identity at the heart of Paulinism threatened to destabilize the complex identity of Second-Temple Judaism. While a careful reading of Birth reveals a more nuanced understanding of Socrates than is sometimes recognized, Nietzsche clearly attributed to Socrates an irreversible development: ‘the optimistic element which, having once penetrated tragedy must gradually overgrow its Dionysian regions and impel it necessarily to self-destruction—to the death-leap into the bourgeois drama’.

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19 BT, § 15, p. 94 [KSA 1, p. 98], emphasis original.
20 BT, § 15, p. 96 [KSA 1, p. 100].
21 BT § 15, p. 97 [KSA 1, p. 100], emphasis added.
22 Nietzsche’s sustained concern with the type, ‘theoretical man’, is evident in each of the untimely essays.
23 This was a point Kaufmann laboured to make throughout his work on Nietzsche; see, e.g., ‘Nietzsche’s Attitude Toward Socrates’, in Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, pp. 391-411.
24 BT § 14, p. 91 [KSA 1, p. 94]. A fruitful comparison can be made between this last point and Nietzsche’s looming pronouncement upon David Strauss, whose work, The Old and the New Faith, extolled the virtues of German art and culture.
In stark contrast with the middle-period, and late-period writings, *Birth* contains no explicit engagement with St Paul, or the Christ-event, and in those few cases in which Christian figures are mentioned (early Christian saints; Luther), we search in vain for evidence even of an implicit hostility.25 This seems, *prima facie*, to present a serious challenge to Nietzsche’s late self-reflections. Nietzsche does offer at least a partial explanation—that he maintained silence about Christianity because it ‘negates all aesthetic values—the only values recognized in [Birth].’26 Thus, it was anti-Christian insofar as it neglected to give space to, or even acknowledge, the moral values so important to Christianity more broadly, and Paulinism specifically. By focusing on aesthetics, and then on the respective health or decadence of each contrasting *Daseinsform*, he had framed the discussion as a matter of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’—*not* ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. With its advantage of hindsight, however, Nietzsche’s rereading of *Birth* presents us with a paradox—the Nietzsche who leaves us with the famous precis of his legacy: ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified’, introduces the ‘Dionysian phenomenon’27 without reference to the Crucified. That is, Nietzsche did not originally frame the Dionysian phenomenon as essentially anti-Christian.28 On the other hand, one of the striking features of *Birth* is Nietzsche’s frequent recourse to the soteriological language of his Protestant-Lutheran milieu: justification, redemption, glorification, transfiguration.29 This has provided some warrant for the

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25 ‘Profound, hostile silence about Christianity throughout the book’, *EH* ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ § 1, p. 271 [KSA 6, p. 310]. Nietzsche provides a single exception: ‘There is only one allusion to Christian priests as a “vicious kind of dwarfs” who are “subterranean”’. Kaufmann’s commentary (p. 271, n. 7) reads: ‘At the end of section 24. But the quotation is inexact, and the interpretation—that priests were meant—is questionable’.

26 *EH*, ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, § 1, p. 271 [KSA 6, p. 310]. Similarly, ‘Perhaps the depth of this antimoral propensity is best inferred from the careful and hostile silence with which Christianity is treated throughout the whole book—Christianity as the most prodigal elaboration of the moral theme to which humanity has ever been subjected’, ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ § 5, p. 23 [KSA 1, p. 18].

27 *EH* ‘Why I Am A Destiny’ § 9, p. 335 [KSA 6, p. 374].

28 Nietzsche may have forgotten his brief but illuminating comparison of ‘Greek cheerfulness’ with the ‘profound and formidable natures of the first four centuries of Christianity’, the latter of which perceived the temporally-disassociated hedonism of the post-tragic, comedic Hellene as an ‘anti-Christian ethos’ [antichristliche Gesinnung], *BT* § 11, p. 78 [KSA 1, p. 78]. This fascinating reference marks the earliest occurrence of the ‘anti-Christ__’ motif in Nietzsche’s corpus.

29 The explicit soteriological language—here and elsewhere—seems to accord well with G. Fraser’s provocative thesis that Nietzsche was ‘obsessed’ with redemption. The case is complicated, as we will see, by Nietzsche’s narrowing expectations for cultural renewal, and by
notion that Nietzsche is subconsciously struggling against his lost Christian faith, or that Nietzsche is heir to the Christian (Pauline-Augustinian) sense that mankind is somehow in need of redemption. A possible way to thread the needle of this paradox is to see how Nietzsche viewed his early period as the seedbed of an ambitious counter-vision to Christianity. He will later see that this early trajectory will effectively necessitate his confrontation with Paulinism, for the very reason that St Paul’s philosophical anthropology is fleshed out in precisely the same manner, yet with an antithetical symbology. Neither thinker has time for Cartesian-type abstractions; human being cannot be abstracted from its world. When Nietzsche and Paul see man, they see the hosts of spiritual and cultural sickness, and they see the possibility for health and cultural renewal; they see plight and embryonic potential for solution.

4.2.2 David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer—and ‘Cultural’ Philistine.

‘Ich bin der erste Immoralist’.

—Friedrich Nietzsche, Eccé Homo

Nietzsche prefaces his discussion of David Strauss [Strauss] with a paradox related to the fallout of the Franco-Prussian War; it could easily be mistaken for an aphorism from Human: ‘a great victory is a great danger. Human nature finds it harder to endure a victory than a defeat; indeed, it seems to be easier to achieve a victory than to endure it in such a way that it does not in fact turn into a defeat’. A Reich in the state of ascension, could be coextensive with a culture in crisis—one populated with decadent types. This essay’s oftentimes pitiless satire represents a dramatic shift in tone from Birth, but Nietzsche continues to move forward on the same path. Indeed, the essay can be read as an apology for the ongoing necessity of a (re)birth of

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his explicit disavowal of any interest in the question of redemption, as such (EH ‘Why I Am So Clever’ § 1, p. 236 [KSA 6, p. 278].

30 A theory which has enjoyed support since at least Lou Salomé’s, Nietzsche.

31 This, was Jaspers’ thesis, but it received its best articulation in G. Fraser’s work.

32 ‘I am the first immoralist’, EH, ‘Untimely Meditations’, § 2 [KSA 6, p. 319].

33 Strauss’, Der alte und der neue Glaube, the primary focus of Nietzsche’s critique, also begins with a discussion of the religious and cultural climate of post-war Germany. The naïve optimism of Strauss’ assessment was, in part, what raised Nietzsche’s ire.

34 DS, § 1, p. 3 [KSA 1, p. 159].

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the tragic spirit. And, like Birth, Nietzsche’s first ‘untimely’ essay can be read as a study of how our respective symbolic worlds can affect the possibilities of human becoming. In Birth he had juxtaposed the tragic (Dionysian-Apollonian) and the theoretical (Socratic-Scientific) types of Greece; here he describes and critiques the post-war zeitgeist through his mockery of David Strauss as the archetypical ‘cultural’ philistine [Bildungsphilister].

Nietzsche’s relationship to the work of Strauss was more complex than a prima facie reading of this polemical essay might suggest. Strauss’ massive historical-critical study, Das Leben Jesu, had been instrumental in the young Nietzsche’s developing understanding of some of the problems associated with Christian origins, and Strauss’ examination of the post-Christian foundations of German culture was a project running parallel to Nietzsche’s whole body of work. In the light of our discussion of Birth, however, I propose that two aspects of Strauss’ project conflicted with what Nietzsche was trying to accomplish at this stage of his career: first, Strauss’ naïve (from Nietzsche’s perspective at least) assumptions about morality as an essential and enduring dimension of human being, and his embodiment of Socratic-scientific optimism in the face of a cultural crisis.

Strauss’ project assumed the ‘inevitable dissolution of the old’ faith, while continuing to ground human nature in a now-unsupported morality. Strauss frames his project partly as a question of whether the new worldview [Weltansicht] he describes is ‘more or less suited as the basis for a truly human, that is, moral, and therefore happy life’. In light of this dimension in Strauss’ work, it is not surprising that Nietzsche distinguished himself from Strauss by claiming

35 And Nietzsche rightly acknowledged that Strauss’ study of the life of Jesus was an impressive work of scholarship: ‘The time is far distant when I too, like every young scholar and with the clever dullness of a refined philologist, savoured the work of the incomparable Strauss. I was then twenty years old: now I am too serious for that’, AC § 28 [KSA 6, p. 199]. Albert Schweitzer wrote in his own classic study, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, ‘Considered as a literary work, Strauss’s first Life of Jesus is one of the most perfect things in the whole range of learned literature’, trans. W. Montgomery (1911; repr., Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2014), 78.
36 Indeed, there is much in Der alte und der neue Glaube with which Nietzsche would have essentially agreed—for example, Strauss’ criticism of those Christians who cling to an exhausted Christianity for the consolation it offers. See, especially, Der alte und der neue Glaube, 9th edition (Bonn: Emil Strauß, 1877) § 111, pp. 251-253.
37 Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, 7 (emphasis mine).

Duff, 155
outright the identity of an immoralist. Strauss also celebrates the cultural achievements of Germany, while serving as the example par excellence of Socratic optimism and hypocritical, revisionist Christianity. Nietzsche’s sardonic tone here calls to mind his depiction of the smiling and blinking last men of Zarathustra, who had deceived themselves into treating their accomplishments as cultural sophistication.

Nietzsche’s savage assessment of Strauss’ deficiencies as a stylist, and his catalogue of grammatical errors was proffered in service of the main point of the essay: the German elite, for all their erudition, were incapable of seeing that their spirit and culture were fragmented and declining. Nietzsche’s attacks on Strauss’ style were not mere ad hominem—they were substantive insofar as they were marshalled against Strauss’ pretence to cultural sophistication, a load-bearing aspect of his essay. Nietzsche would later celebrate the essay’s ‘extraordinary success’, as a scandal to his contemporaries. Nietzsche writes from the safety of his position as a satirist, he clearly does succeed in diagnosing the plight—a kind of self-deceived, inauthentic way of being—‘For “All seeking is at an end” is the motto of the philistines’. His later work, as we will see, develops the solution to this plight.

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38 Nietzsche wore term immoralist as a badge of honour because it signalled his radical departure from so much of the Western philosophical tradition. In a notebook entry from 1887, ‘Unter Moralisten’, he lists ‘the great moral philosophers’—Greek, Italian, French, German, and English thinkers—to underscore the philosophers’ service in the cause of morality: KSA 12:9[11], p. 344.

39 Both throughout his book, and in a long appendix offering exultant praise for various German artists.

40 EH ‘The Untimely Ones’ § 2, p. 277 [KSA 6, p. 317]. Nietzsche’s German, ‘ausserordentlichen Erfolg’, is no doubt hyperbolic, though the stir created by essay would not be equalled by his later publications until after his collapse. We will see that by the time Nietzsche is composing EH, he is expecting his AC—then in manuscript form—to be a sensation throughout Europe.

41 DS § 2, p. 10 [KSA 1, p. 168].
4.2.3 On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life: Know Thyself.

The second untimely essay, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ (History for Life) explores two themes that illuminate both Nietzsche’s vision for a healthy humanity, and more broadly, his early approach to anthropology. Here Nietzsche addresses the need to gauge the ‘plastic power’ of human being, and the role of the historical and the unhistorical in the cultivation of healthy being. By ‘plastic power’, Nietzsche means ‘the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds’. Human being is, therefore, mutable, and it is possible to participate in its cultivation. The purposeful regulation of the historical and unhistorical is a way to provide for healthy becoming. Nietzsche writes:

And this is a universal law: a living thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful only when bounded by a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself, and at the same time too self-centred to enclose its own view within that of another, it will pine away slowly or hasten to its untimely end.

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42 ‘[L]ife is made sick by this dehumanized and mechanical grinding of gears, the “impersonality” of the labourer’, EH ‘The Untimely Ones’ § 1, p. 176 [KSA 6, p. 316].
43 UDHL § 1, p. 62 [KSA 1, p. 251].
44 Within limits. Nietzsche will develop a qualified understanding of the will, decisively rejecting the notion that one has the freedom to ‘pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness’, (BGE § 21). A Sartrian anthropology, which maximizes the responsibility of the individual to determine what he or she is, is a non-Nietzschean radicalization of this idea.
45 UDHL § 1, p. 63 [KSA 1, p. 251]. This impulse is not far removed from St Paul’s purposeful forgetfulness: ‘But one thing I do: Forgetting what is behind and straining toward what is ahead, I press on toward the goal to win the prize for which God has called me heavenward in Christ Jesus’ (Phil. 3.13-14). The impulse is radicalized in Paul’s case, because history had undergone the revaluation of the Christ-event, which radically recontextualized Israel’s history and sharpened the goal of human becoming through its eschatology. We will return to the issue of the temporal horizon in Nietzsche and Paul in a later chapter.

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In the light of this universal law, the strongest postures with respect to history include the ‘unhistorical’, and the ‘suprahistorical’, which are both signs and sources of strength, because they recognize that life is more fundamental than history, and they press history into the service of human becoming, rather than allowing human being to disintegrate under the enormous weight of the past. Nietzsche recognized that the unregulated, mass-consumption of historical data, ‘without hunger for it and even counter to one’s needs’, was resulting in the ‘chaotic inner world’ of his contemporaries. Further, Nietzsche suspects that the ‘historical culture’, which prides itself in its indiscriminate consumption of history, is a culture operating tacitly from the assumption that it has reached old age—a vestige of Christian eschatology: ‘In this sense we are still living in the Middle Ages and history is still disguised theology.’

Here, as in both of the previous essays, we can see how Nietzsche locates human being within its symbolic world. The mutability of human being signals both its enormous potential, and its vulnerability; it is fundamentally historical in character, and, therefore, it must become within a temporal horizon. It cannot, however, thrive within an unbounded horizon—the jumbled chaos of unfiltered history. Nietzsche recognized that the ‘disadvantage’ of Germany’s drive to accumulate historical data was that its valuation was exactly backwards—it treated history as more fundamental than life. The corrective is to hear the hard saying of the Delphic oracle: ‘know yourself’. By valuing self-knowledge over historical knowledge, and by recognizing the plastic power of human nature, we can contribute to the cultivation of an authentic humanity: ‘But at the end-point of their cure they will have become human again and have ceased to be merely aggregates of humanlike qualities—that is something!’

46 UDHL § 4, p. 78 [KSA 1, pp. 272-273].
47 See, especially, UDHL § 8 pp. 100-104 [KSA 1, pp. 302-308].
48 UDHL § 10, p. 122 [KSA 1, p. 333].
49 UDHL § 10, p. 122 [KSA 1, p. 332].
4.2.4 Schopenhauer as Educator: Towards the ‘Higher’ Self.

‘[I]st in “Schopenhauer als Erzieher” meine innerste Geschichte, mein Werden eingeschrieben. Vor Allem mein Gelöbniss!’

—Friedrich Nietzsche, Eccé Homo

In the hindsight of Eccé Homo, Nietzsche sees the titles, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ (hereafter, Schopenhauer), and ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’ (hereafter, Bayreuth), as so much misdirection: ‘Now that I am looking back from a certain distance upon the conditions of which these essays bear witness, I do not wish to deny that at bottom they speak only of me’. Among these early essays, Schopenhauer provides some of Nietzsche’s clearest articulations of Nietzsche’s personal quest for an authentically human identity. In the face of the temptation to think and act as a member of the herd, Nietzsche offers the challenge: ‘be your self!’ [sei du selbst]—though this comes with a special challenge. As in the Pauline-Augustinian tradition, there is in Nietzsche a well-developed sense of the hiddenness of the self: ‘How can man know himself? He is a thing dark and veiled; and if the hare has seven skins, man can slough off seventy times seven and still not be able to say, “this is really you, this is no longer outer shell’.” The commitment articulated in the previous essay to the necessity of a temporal horizon, and the risk associated with the historical, are present in this essay, while the path towards the cultivation of healthy human being is further crystalized: in the chaos of the present, how can we ever know that we have removed all the masks, and discovered who we really are?

The beginning of an answer to the hiddenness of the self is offered in an examination of values: ‘Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft...?’ for ‘your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to

50 ‘[I]n Schopenhauer as Educator my innermost history, my becoming, is inscribed’, EH ‘The Untimely Ones’ § 3, p. 281 [KSA 6, p. 320].
51 EH § 3, p. 281 [KSA 6, p. 320].
52 SE § 1, p. 127 [KSA 1, p. 338].
53 SE § 1, p. 129 [KSA 1, p. 340]; cf., ‘We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge—and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves—how could it happen that we should ever find ourselves?’ (GM ‘Preface’ § 1).

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be’.\textsuperscript{54} That is, the true self is not to be discovered in some pure essence (ideal), once the false selves are peeled away, but in association with its highest values—within the axiological matrix of its own world. Nietzsche sought a philosopher whom he could trust to ‘nourish all the forces which exist in his pupil and bring them to a harmonious relationship with one another’, who would help him to become ‘simple and honest’.\textsuperscript{55} The challenge to healthy becoming is further clarified in Nietzsche’s insightful reading of the zeitgeist as a toxic admixture of Christianity and antiquity:

The explanation of this spiritlessness and of why all moral energy is at such a low ebb is difficult and involved; but no one who considers the influence victorious Christianity had on the morality of our ancient world can overlook the reaction of declining Christianity upon our own time. Through the exaltedness of its ideal, Christianity excelled the moral systems of antiquity and the naturalism that resided in them to such a degree that this naturalism came to excite apathy and disgust; but later on, when these better and higher ideals, though now known, proved unattainable, it was no longer possible to return to what was good and high in antique virtue, however much one might want to. \textit{It is in this oscillation between Christianity and antiquity, between an imitated or hypocritical Christianity of morals and an equally despondent and timid revival of antiquity, that modern man lives, and does not live very happily.}\textsuperscript{56}

While Nietzsche is not yet interacting explicitly with Paulinism, we see here evidence of a development in his thinking. Compared to the previous three essays, where Nietzsche touched upon Christianity only in passing, we see here a more direct engagement. The world of contemporary Germany—lacking culture, and lacking any value in, or capacity for, the unhistorical or suprahistorical—was the product of Christianity’s subversion of the values of antiquity. It is a theme in which Nietzsche later makes great strides: the morality of Christianity has replaced the aesthetics of antiquity, cutting off the retreat from exhausted Christianity into the world of antiquity. The significance of this, I suggest, is that we see here a developing ‘middle point’ in Nietzsche’s understanding of Christianity that recognizes the victory, and the importance Christianity had as a catalyst for cultural renewal, but without the subversive force of

\textsuperscript{54} SE § 1, p. 129 [KSA 1, pp. 340-341].
\textsuperscript{55} SE § 2, pp. 130, 133 [KSA 1, pp. 342, 346 (emphasis original)]. There is much here that calls to mind biblical imagery; we have already seen glimpses of Paul’s imagery of the multiple selves, which are crucified, put off, put on, etc. (we will return to this theme in ch. 5), and ‘seventy times seven’ is of course an allusion to the words of Christ in Matt. 18.22.
\textsuperscript{56} SE § 2, pp. 132-133 [KSA 1, p. 345] (emphasis mine).
his later work, where Nietzsche had become convinced that Christianity was not merely an unattainable ideal, but a sign of decline and sickness.

Nietzsche’s vision for overcoming the spiritlessness of his time, is the creation of a culture which prioritizes the individual—which cultivates those higher expressions of human nature who transcend the animal condition: the philosopher, the artist, and the saint.57 ‘It is the fundamental idea of culture’, because it is only in these higher expressions that nature finds the telos of its own evolution, coming to its metaphysical end—self-knowledge.58 Indeed, Nietzsche envisions the whole task of mankind as the cultivation of great individuals, and this means creating conditions within which the ‘redemptive men [erlösenden Menschen]’—the highest individual examples of the species—can come into existence.59 The proper posture of the individual with respect to culture is: ‘I see above me something higher and more human than I am; let everyone help me to attain it . . .’.60 Importantly for this study, Christianity is once more visited as an example of a cultural impulse towards the cultivation of a higher type, but balanced with a critical assessment of Christianity in its latest form:

Christianity is certainly one of the purest revelations of the impulse to culture and especially of the impulse to the ever-renewed production of the saint; but since it has been employed in a hundred ways to propel the mills of state power it has gradually become sick to the very marrow, hypocritical and untruthful, and degenerated into a contradiction of its original goal.61

57 SE § 5, p. 160 [KSA 1, p. 382].
58 SE § 5, p. 160 [KSA 1, p. 382].
59 SE § 6, pp. 161-162 [KSA 1, pp. 383-384]. There is much in common here with later discussions of higher men in Zarathustra, whom Nietzsche envisions entering a new dawn after the Death-of-God event.
60 SE § 6, p. 161 [KSA 1, p. 385].
61 SE § 6, p. 166 [KSA 1, p. 389] (emphasis mine).
4.2.5 Richard Wagner in Bayreuth: The Great Future of the Event.

‘Die Schrift ‘Wagner in Bayreuth’ ist eine Vision meiner Zukunft...’.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Eccé Homo

In ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’, Nietzsche revisits the subject of Birth after an interval of more than four years. Juxtaposing certain biographical details with its overwrought style, it has been natural to read Bayreuth as the nadir of Nietzsche’s career. Challenging this appraisal, however, is Nietzsche’s own commentary in Eccé Homo—a revisionist reading that brusquely dissociates the essay from its namesake, while celebrating it as a foreshadowing of the ‘event of Zarathustra [Ereigniss Zarathustra]’, and a vision of Nietzsche’s own future. Considered in light of the question of the human subject within a symbolic geography, Bayreuth marks an advance in Nietzsche’s thought in the way it highlights the significance of event. The essay begins, ‘For an event to possess greatness two things must come together: greatness of spirit in those who accomplish it and greatness of spirit in those who experience it. No event possesses greatness in itself. .’ There is also some internal evidence suggesting Nietzsche had already begun to modify his expectations for cultural renewal, in the interval between Birth and Bayreuth. If Birth anticipated broad cultural renewal through the (re)birth of the tragic spirit, here the ‘event’ is envisioned as a more selective phenomenon—for ‘a few lonesome souls [ein paar einsame Seelen]’, while ‘die Vielen’ prefer the smoke and shadows to the light.

As with the other essays of this period, Nietzsche’s brief comments related to Christianity are nuanced, and not wholly uncharitable. Luther is praised alongside Beethoven and Wagner as

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62 ‘The essay Wagner in Bayreuth is a vision of my future . . .’, EH ‘Die Unzeitgemässen’ § 3, p. 281 [KSA 6, p. 320].
63 These biographical details include both his impending emancipation from Wagner, and his poor health, which had forced him to take a year-long sabbatical from the University of Basel.
64 EH ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ § 4 p. 274 [KSA 1, p. 315].
65 RWB § 1, p. 197 [KSA 1, p. 431].
66 RWB § 6, p. 221 [KSA 1, p. 464]. In EH, Nietzsche avers, ‘The last thing I should promise would be to “improve” mankind’ (“Preface” § 2, p. 217), suggesting both his desire to distance himself from the other “improvers of mankind” he elsewhere scorned (TI “The “Improvers” of Mankind” §§ 1-5), and that the conviction expressed here—that Nietzsche’s future was perhaps for only a few souls—had reached its apogee.
a paradigm of, ‘German cheerfulness [deutsche Heiterkeit]’, and the reformers more broadly are treated as a positive model of seriousness with respect to their task.\(^67\) Nietzsche persisted in his judgement—implicit in Strauss and explicit in Schopenhauer—that the contemporary institutional manifestations of Christianity had, ‘degenerated to hypocrisy and superficiality’.\(^68\) Nietzsche again employs soteriological metaphor liberally—language that he does not entirely eschew in the hindsight of Eccé Homo.

Bayreuth envisions—in Nietzsche’s richly cultic-soteriological language—‘the act of a tremendous purification and consecration of humanity’.\(^69\) This is a reference to § 6, where he depicts modern humanity as virtueless consumers, and vulgar historians, trying to soothe their bad conscience. Modern art is used as a soporific, or an intoxicant—‘to silence the conscience, by one means or the other! To help the modern soul forget its feeling of guilt, not to help it return to innocence! [zur Unschuld zurück verhelfen]’.\(^70\) In Nietzsche’s vision, rescuing art will require nothing less than rescuing human being, for innocent art requires innocent being—thus, there must be ‘two tremendous acts of purification and consecration’.\(^71\) This twofold purification event, Nietzsche comes to associate with himself, and with, perhaps, those few lonesome souls. As we read in Eccé Homo, ‘in all psychologically decisive places I alone am discussed—and one need not hesitate to put down my name or the word “Zarathustra” where the text has the word “Wagner”’.\(^72\) Eccé Homo—behold the man!

\(^{67}\) *RWB* § 8, p. 232 [*KSA* 1, p. 480] (emphasis original).

\(^{68}\) *RWB* § 8, p. 229 [*KSA* 1, pp. 475-476] (emphasis original).

\(^{69}\) *EH* ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ § 4, p. 275 [*KSA* 6, p. 315]. It is interesting that Nietzsche seems to have been more embarrassed about *BT* than the follow-up essay. It may be that it was his reading of *RWB* as a shrouded autobiography was what made the critical difference.

\(^{70}\) *RWB* § 6, p. 220 [*KSA* 1, p. 463] (emphasis added).

\(^{71}\) *RWB* § 6, p. 220 [*KSA* 1, pp. 463-464].

\(^{72}\) *EH* ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ § 4 p. 274 [*KSA* 6, p. 314]. Indeed, reading *RWB* as a prophetic disclosure of Nietzsche’s future produces passages that are strikingly-similar to the spirit and tone of *EH*:

‘To make [my] work, as a sacred deposit and true fruit of [my] existence . . . the property of mankind, to lay it down for a posterity better able to judge it, has become to [me] a goal which takes precedence over all other goals and for the sake of which [I wear] the crown of thorns which shall one day blossom into a laurel-wreath’ (*RWB* § 10, pp. 245-246 [*KSA* 1, p. 498]).
4.2.6 Anthropolgy and Anti-Christianity in Nietzsche’s Early Period: Summary and Initial Conclusions.

In the early period, the trajectory of Nietzsche’s work, which culminates in attributing world-historical significance to his own life, is clearly developing on several fronts. By the time he publishes *Schopenhauer and Bayreuth*, he is already narrowing his vision for cultural renewal to the select few, refining his portraits of great human ‘types’, and arguing unflinchingly that the role of culture is to serve and develop these higher types.\(^{73}\) This put him cross-current of the late-nineteenth-century’s zeitgeist, where Straussian ‘Cultural Philistines’ were naively celebrating what Nietzsche intuited to be a foundationless culture. The quest for deeper insight into human nature that would take explicit form in *HH* is revealed in his reflections on cultural renewal, which, ultimately, are about the possibility of higher, and higher expressions of humanity in new types.

Reading Nietzsche’s early work through the lens of his commentary in *Eccé Home*, helps the reader to recognize and chart these developing trajectories, but the lens also presents its own challenges. Nietzsche is clearly not averse to even the most negative self-assessment (his excoriating review of *Birth* in, ‘An Attempt at Self-Criticism’, *alone*, establishes the point). However, he is interested in representing the continuity of his biography under the rubric of ‘*How One Becomes What One Is*’, and this results in both clarifying autobiographical insights, and obscuring anachronisms. For a salient example of the former, we note his discovery that his third and fourth meditations were really autobiographical. As I argued above, this lens provides a fruitful reading of the third and fourth meditations, and it is not improbable on historical grounds. Indeed, a wealth of biographical data—in the form of extant letters and the *Nachlaß*—supports the reading that Nietzsche wrote the third and fourth meditations on the threshold of his emancipation from those mentors, whom on *prima facia* grounds, they appear to esteem.

On the other hand, *Eccé Homo*’s thematic focus on Nietzsche’s becoming, seems to partly obscure his early relationship to Christianity. Again, we find little support for Nietzsche’s claim that this period exhibits a ‘hostile silence about Christianity’. As we survey the texts at this stage in Nietzsche’s development, he appears to have rather ambivalent feelings about

\(^{73}\) This also put Nietzsche cross-wise of Straussian anthropology, which located the essence of humanity in relationship to morality, and in a sense of humble awe before the cosmos.

Duff, 164
Christianity; Christian values are presented throughout this period, not as ignoble, or
dehumanizing, so much as exhausted, unrealized, or corrupted. This is not to diminish
Nietzsche’s Anti-Christian aspect, but to contextualize it with a *diachronic* sensitivity—to avoid
the error that flattens out the contours of Nietzsche’s developing picture of human being and its
world. And, perhaps more important than the dearth of evidence for hostile Anti-Christianity, is
the conspicuous absence at this point in Nietzsche’s career of any *theoretical basis* for such an
appraisal. This would change dramatically as Nietzsche came to re-examine some of the central
aspects of the first Christians, and Pauline Christianity, but that is a *development* which only
begins to become clear in Nietzsche’s middle period—to which we now turn.

### 4.3 Nietzsche’s Middle Period: The New Ideal of the Free Spirit.

I observed above that, while Nietzsche did not know atheism as an *event*, he nevertheless
experienced periods of profound reappraisal and reorientation. The publication of *Human, All-
Too-Human*, signals one of the most dramatic reorientations of Nietzsche’s career. While other
works were published with conspicuous (even jarring) changes in tone, the differences were
more stylistic than they were substantive. On the heels of his rhapsodizing in *Bayreuth*,
however, we appear to find a very different kind of thinker. The philosophical shift discernible
between the early period writings and the middle period is marked by his rejection of
metaphysics, transcendence, idealism, the cult of genius, and Romanticism. Methodologically,
Nietzsche became more guarded and more scientific—less open to accusations of naivety.

The challenge of Nietzsche’s so-called middle period also involves its lack of what seems
so essential to Nietzsche. Ruth Abbey’s valuable study, *Nietzsche’s Middle Period*, begins with
the concession that a ‘Nietzsche without the will to power, Apollo and Dionysus, the
master/slave dyad, *ressentiment*, Zarathustra, the *Übermensch*’, seems like a contradiction.
Indeed, these themes and others, which constitute Nietzsche’s most distinctive, and, arguably

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74 The publication of *BGE*, following *Z*, is perhaps the most famous example of a dramatically
different approach to the same philosophical problems. But, as Nietzsche wrote to Burckhardt,
*BGE* was saying ‘the same things as . . . *Zarathustra*, but differently, very differently’,
eKGWB/BVN-1886,754 — Letter to Jacob Burckhardt: 22/09/1886).

Duff, 165
most important ideas, are largely absent from the three works which make up this period of reorientation and development. However, the middle period is precisely that—a season of development—and the three works represent an evolution which—as Nietzsche was at pains to demonstrate—were essential to his finally becoming acquainted with his own ‘task’. Nietzsche himself regarded the period bounded by *Human* and *Gay Science* to be oriented towards construction of ‘a new image and ideal of the free spirit’—a project with which he was evidently reaching satisfaction by the publication of fourth book of *Gay Science.*

Before we turn to an examination of the three major publications of the middle period, I offer here a comparison with the life of St Paul that may illuminate the disruption in Nietzsche’s development. We saw in the last chapter how Paul’s Damascus road experience disrupted his anti-Christian mission—*his task*—and destabilized the symbolic world within which he oriented himself. Paul the Apostle proved so controversial because of how his philosophy of the Cross overshadowed the symbolic pillars of Second-Temple Judaism. While some commentators have suggested a comparison be made between Paul’s Damascus, and Nietzsche’s epiphany at Sils-Maria, this comparison is based on a superficial reading of both events. Nietzsche’s experience at Sils-Maria was not a transformative disruption, but an ecstatic, creative breakthrough; Paul’s Damascus, on the other hand, was not an ecstatic, creative breakthrough, but rather a confrontation that radically disoriented him and left him with a sense of existential destitution.

I would argue, therefore, that Nietzsche’s awakening at Bayreuth is an event that provides a more illuminating parallel. In both cases, we have a reappraisal of the self, and the demolition and creation of symbolic thought-worlds.

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76 As Nietzsche described the project on the back cover of the published volume of *GS.* Quoted in, *GS,* trans. W. Kaufmann, 30. Nietzsche clearly considered *GS* the conclusion to this project; however, he did revisit *GS* with the addition of the fifth book in 1887.

77 The earliest example appears in Carl Albrecht Bernoulli’s classic, *Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche, eine Freundschaft* (Eugen Diederichs, 1908), 316: ‘Nietzsche had thus experienced his own day of Damascus in that first summer at Sils; something like scales fell from his eyes; he took the step from no to yes; from Saul came Paul; from the pessimist came the optimist’. Azzam revisits this passage and expands upon it in, *Nietzsche Versus Paul,* 85ff.

78 Cf. the first *Acts* account of Paul’s conversion, where he is blinded and eats and drinks nothing for three days, with Paul’s very different reference to a later, ecstatic experience in 2 Cor. 12.2ff, where he was ‘caught up to the third heaven’, and, ‘was caught up to paradise and heard inexpressible things, things that no one is permitted to tell’. 

Duff, 166
We can thus read the three works of Nietzsche’s middle period as analogous to Paul’s reorientation following his Damascus vision. Paul’s vision of the resurrected Christ forced a revaluation of the central symbols of his identity as an Israelite—the temple, the Torah, and the covenant marked by circumcision grow suddenly pale in the transvaluing light of the crucified and resurrected Christ. But, we may easily imagine that when the Christ-event was centralized within Paul’s world, the ‘scales fell from his eyes’, and he had to begin the process of reworking his Judaism around the Christ-event. Nietzsche’s sudden break with Wagner came with the conviction that he had not only squandered his time, but that much of his life’s work to that point was symptomatic of his own sickness. Nietzsche’s middle period was about reconceptualising his own task, finding a new vantage point from which to write and think. At first, this situated the Nietzsche of the early-middle period within a very stark symbolic landscape. Whatever may be said in favour of Human, it is the least imaginative of Nietzsche’s major works—it takes the fewest risks. It is an exercise in sustained no-saying—more an act of demolition than of creation. The second work of the middle period, Daybreak, is a radical step forward in terms of Nietzsche’s development towards his mature period. I argue that this development is catalysed, in part, by his ‘return to Paul’, where he begins to study Paul, and finds in his radical Christianity a valuable antipode. Finally, The Gay Science, brings the middle period to a close by situating Nietzsche’s ‘free spirit’ comfortably in the new world between the Death-of-God event, and the existential-eschatological horizon of the eternal recurrence.
4.3.1 Monument to a Crisis: Human, All-Too-Human.

The Nietzsche we meet beginning with the publication of Human, has undergone a substantive reformation.\(^79\) While the Nietzsche of the early works appears to be engaged in a kind of counter-Enlightenment project—combating Europe’s cultural disenchantment—here he seems to abandon those efforts, adopting instead an almost scientistic rationalism.\(^81\) In the brief survey of some of the key early period writings above, I argued that Nietzsche’s claim in Eccé Homo to an early anti-Christianity was anachronistic; Nietzsche’s early engagements with Christianity suggest a general ambivalence towards the Christian religion, and we discern no theoretical basis for any ‘profound hostility’. Here in Human, however, he demonstrates a marked impatience with a range of aspects with the Christian religion, including a new sensitivity to its central symbols and values. Developing in parallel to his growing anti-Christianity is his evolving anthropology. He has abandoned wholesale the romanticism and idealism characteristic of his earlier works; the anthropological ideals held up in Schopenhauer,

\(^79\) ‘[T]he title means: “where you see ideal things, I see what is—human, alas, all-too-human!”—I know man better’, EH ‘Human, All-Too-Human’ § 1, 283 [KSA 6, p. 322].

\(^80\) The abrupt shift here, and the discernable shift from GS to Z, has been met with the widespread tendency to treat Nietzsche’s works as belonging to three distinct periods—a practice which was well developed in Salomé’s, Nietzsche, but not absent from Nietzsche’s commentaries on his own writing. Few philosophical figures (Wittgenstein is a notable exception) require so much sensitivity to chronology, and it is not without reason that Karl Löwith wrote, ‘[The mature] alone contains Nietzsche’s genuine philosophy’, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, trans. by J. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 23.

\(^81\) The period resulting in HH is sometimes called Nietzsche’s ‘positivistic’ period, though the label may not neatly fit. Jonathan Cohen’s article, argues that while HH is not consistently positivistic, it does represent a break with the anti-positivism of his early period, and contrasts sharply with the perspectivism of his later works. See, ‘Nietzsche’s Fling with Positivism’, 101-107, in eds. B. E. Babich and R. S. Cohen, Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science: Nietzsche and the Sciences II (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
are ‘coolly placed on ice’—the genius, the saint, and the hero, freeze to death.\(^{82}\) Where Nietzsche had previously valued artistic and cultural renewal as the path towards shaping the plasticity of human being, he now makes science central to his methodology, and, in a departure from the spirit of History for Life, he is concerned with facticity in a new way. In addition to all the above, he is at pains to distance himself from his former mentors, Wagner and Schopenhauer, and from the cult of genius, more generally.\(^{83}\) Human is a work of deconstruction—of conquest—and on every front Nietzsche works to desacralize human being.

Accounting for these changes has been one of the perennial problems of Nietzsche studies. Several illuminating approaches to Human are on offer, and one of the common features of many of the commentaries on this period, is the attempt to account for the unique atmosphere of Human itself. Salomé, who first became acquainted with Nietzsche towards the end of his middle period, argued at length that Human should be understood as a kind of violent—but temporary—self-conquest: ‘Through the need to embody in human form purely scientific thoughts derived from positivism, he entangled himself in creating a portrait of a specific personality very much his opposite, and he even tortured himself to sharpen the features of that portrait’.\(^{84}\) Kaufmann, though not private about his preference for Nietzsche’s later works,\(^{85}\) valued Human and the two major works that followed as marking a season of free-spirited experimentalism, where, ‘Nietzsche is deliberately anti-dogmatic and accumulates his observations with an open mind. He is, as it were, performing the countless experiments on which later theories might be built’.\(^{86}\) Similarly, Arthur Danto, whose influential essay, ‘Becoming Nietzsche’, argues that Human, while comparing unfavourably to the later works,

\(^{82}\) EH, ‘Human, All-Too-Human’, § 1, p. 284 [KSA 6, p. 323].
\(^{83}\) On Nietzsche’s changing relationship to his mentors and the cult of genius, see Carl Pletsch, Young Nietzsche: Becoming a Genius, especially, ‘Redefining Genius’, pp. 205-217.
\(^{84}\) Salomé, Nietzsche, 73. Nietzsche, too, allows for a certain intentional artificiality in HH: Just as a physician places his patient in a wholly strange environment so that he may be removed from his entire ‘hitherto’, from his cares, friends, letters, duties, stupidities and torments of memory and learn to reach out his hands and sense to new nourishments of memory and learn to reach out his hands and sense to new nourishment, a new sun, a new future, so I, as physician and patient in one, compelled myself to an opposite and unexplored clime of the soul, and especially to a curative journey into strange parts, into strangeness itself . . .
\(^{85}\) E.g., EH ‘Editor’s Introduction’ § 1, p. 201.
\(^{86}\) Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 92.
marks the beginning of Nietzsche’s engagement with the ‘canonical questions of philosophy’—his first foray betraying both his philosophical genius, and his divided interests.\textsuperscript{87} Ruth Abbey, too, who approaches \textit{Human} as, ‘the genealogist’s apprenticeship’, focusing on the early appearances in \textit{Human} of themes that would occupy Nietzsche into his mature period.\textsuperscript{88} In Paul Franco’s recent study, \textit{Human} is viewed as a transitional work, marking the beginning of Nietzsche’s exploration of the ‘possibility of erecting a genuine culture on knowledge’, making it a critique of the romanticism that characterized his earlier period.\textsuperscript{89} This results, for Franco, in an attractive portrait of Nietzsche: ‘a Nietzsche who is a friend of the Enlightenment and of science, a Nietzsche who preaches modesty and moderation instead of passionate excess and Dionysian frenzy’.\textsuperscript{90} Other studies have focused on \textit{Human} as Nietzsche’s engagement with Kantian idealism,\textsuperscript{91} or with the existential implications of Darwinism.\textsuperscript{92}

What each of these studies have in common is the notion that the Nietzsche we meet in \textit{Human} is undergoing a development that results in his distinctive mature philosophy—his task. Nietzsche’s own characterization of the work as a ‘monument to a crisis’ is followed by a protracted discussion of his emancipation from Wagner, and then, so as not to be misunderstood, the confession:

\textsuperscript{87} Arthur C. Danto writes, ‘The problem of the book lies in its divided intentions: the intention to revise philosophy and the intention, as it were, to revise humanity as a moralist rather than an analyst of the deep nature of morality itself’; see, ‘Beginning to Be Nietzsche: On \textit{Human, All Too Human}’, in \textit{Nietzsche As Philosopher}, trans. Marion Faber (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 243.

\textsuperscript{88} See, especially, ‘The Genealogist’s Apprenticeship’, pp. 3-16 in Ruth Abbey’s, \textit{Nietzsche’s Middle Period}.


\textsuperscript{90} Franco, \textit{Nietzsche’s Enlightenment}, x.

\textsuperscript{91} So, Carl B. Sachs in, ‘The Collapse of Transcendence in Nietzsche’s Middle Period’, doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, published online: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/98r9n1c0.

What reached a decision in me at that time was not a break with Wagner: I noted a total aberration of my instincts of which particular blunders, whether Wagner or the professorship at Basel were mere symptoms. I was overcome by impatience with myself; I saw that it was high time for me to recall and reflect on myself. All at once it became clear to me in a terrifying way how much time I had already wasted—how useless and arbitrary my whole existence as a philologist appeared in relation to my task. I felt ashamed of this false modesty.  

The sense of dislocation at Bayreuth, therefore, was later taken to be a moment of existential clarity—a sudden awakening to years of self-alienation. Ironically, in light of the essay bearing the name, Bayreuth itself proves in Nietzsche’s estimation to be a great event after all, but it is an event for Nietzsche alone—as a moment of self-diagnosis, and a clarification of his task. Wagner was then demoted to a mere symptom of Nietzsche’s own self-alienation. That art and myth are not up to the task of revitalizing a sick people, was brought home to Nietzsche by his sense of sickness and self-estrangement at Bayreuth; his poor health was the decisive disconfirmation of his early work: ‘[m]y knowledge essentially lacked realities and my “idealities” were the Devil’s good!’ It also left him questioning the capabilities of Wagner, and the motives of the many bourgeois attendees of Wagner’s concerts, who were really engaging the movement on a shallow level: ‘The people really demands of tragedy no more than to be thoroughly moved so as for once to have a good cry’. Though Nietzsche assumes a very guarded posture throughout the work, the catalyst for Human was very personal. Suffering from poor health, and nearing the age at which his father had died, he believed his past decade to

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93 EH ‘Human, All-Too-Human’ § 3, p. 286 [KSA 6, p. 325].
94 EH ‘Human, All-Too-Human’ § 3, p. 286 [KSA 6, p. 325]. Nietzsche followed this confession with the account of how a ‘truly burning thirst’ took hold of him, and he ‘pursued nothing more than physiology, medicine, and natural sciences . . .’.
95 HH § 166, pp. 88-89 [KSA 2, p. 156].
96 Ronald Hayman’s fastidious accounting of Nietzsche’s failing health, reconstructed from personal correspondence and diaries, is essential reading for a full appreciation the middle period. See, Nietzsche: A Critical Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 190-220.
97 His, father’s ‘wicked heritage . . . predestination to an early death’, EH ‘Human, All-Too-Human’ § 4, p. 287 [KSA 6, p. 326]. Nietzsche feared that he might die at the age of 36, as his father had done (Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 65).
have been wasted. *Human*, therefore, is his way of redeeming that season of life—to become the physician who heals himself—beginning with a careful exploration of human nature.

Throughout *Human*, Nietzsche is at work desacralizing human being by pointing relentlessly to the all-too-human. While Nietzsche has not yet given Modernity’s greatest event in its more provocative formulation, ‘the death of God’, he is already processing the implications of the rise and fall of Christianity. In an aphorism which prefigures later expressions of the death of God motif, Nietzsche outlines the ‘enormous task’ of the near future: ‘Since man no longer believes that a God is guiding the destinies of the world as a whole, or that, despite all apparent twists, the path of mankind is leading somewhere glorious, men must set themselves ecumenical goals, embracing the whole earth’. Here Nietzsche was pointing to the vacuum created by the recession of Christian faith—specifically the loss of belief in divine providence, and the loss of an eschatological telos. Nietzsche goes on to criticize Kantian morality, which could not provide a path forward, because, as a species of Christian morality, it lacked the requisite knowledge of mankind to make accurate judgements about healthy long-term goals. To develop a more scientific basis upon which to make those judgements, would be an enormous task, the creation of a scientific knowledge ‘surpassing all previous knowledge’, which Nietzsche saw as ‘the enormous task of the great minds of the next century’. Naturally, this larger project required an intensified focus on the more fundamental questions of anthropology: ‘[M]ost of all we lack the art of psychological dissection and calculation in all classes of society, where one hears a lot of talk about men, but none about man’. Unmistakably, Nietzsche considered *Human* to be an effort in support of this larger task; *Nietzsche begins to glimpse his significance in relationship to the decline of Christianity.*

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98 Of the period in the late 1870s, when Nietzsche was finishing the last part of *HH*, he wrote: ‘The energy to choose absolute solitude and leave the life to which I had become accustomed; the insistence on not allowing myself any longer to be cared for, waited on, and doctored—that betrayed an absolute instinctive certainty about what was needed at that time. I took myself in hand, I made myself healthy again...’ (EH ‘Why I Am So Wise’ § 2, p. 224 [*KSA* 6, p. 266].

99 *HH* § 25, p. 25 [*KSA* 2, p. 46], cf. *HH* § 179.

100 This suggests that Nietzsche was well-attuned to the apocalyptic-eschatological aspect of the early Christian church, as well as its enduring influence.

101 *HH* § 25, p. 25 [*KSA* 2, p. 46], cf. *HH* § 179.

102 *HH* § 35, p. 39 [*KSA* 2, p. 57].
While we find continuity between his early and middle periods in his abiding interest in human nature and culture, *Human* is unique in how it diverges methodologically from his earlier writings. Here he is already going about his great task of ‘translating mankind back into nature’, and remaining ‘faithful to the earth’. And yet, Nietzsche was coming to recognize that the sacred fictions associated with our view of man—the vestigial elements of Christianity’s influence—are not easily subtracted from cultural memory. Importantly, the path Nietzsche was taking forward was not merely made through subtraction—that is, to rid himself of idealism, metaphysics, or romanticism, or those persisting vestiges of Christianity—but through the creation of new knowledge about human being. Before the project of creation could get underway, he had to make a conquest of what was incompatible with his new vision of the world. He had been savage in his critique of David Strauss’ harmonization of Christianity and contemporary culture; now he was facing the problem on a broad front, condemning any engagement with Christianity as a form of ‘romantic regression’; indeed, ‘one can no longer have any association with it without incurably dirtying one’s intellectual conscience and prostituting it before oneself and others’. Even moments of artistic transcendence are abruptly dismissed as tests of intellectual character; in a surprising revaluation, he stands his early work on its head by claiming that, ‘science requires nobler natures than does poetry’. Worship, too, is rooted in the scientific ignorance of a people where ‘Any conception of natural causality is altogether lacking’. While in *History for Life* Nietzsche had allowed a more flexible approach to history in the service of life, in *Human* he is scornful: ‘When on Sunday morning we hear the

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103 *BGE* § 230 [KSA 5, p. 169]. Cf. Brian Leiter’s central thesis is that Nietzsche is attempting to provide a naturalistic account of man: ‘Nietzsche belongs not in the company of postmodernists like Foucault and Derrida, but rather in the company of naturalists like Hume and Freud—that is, among, broadly speaking, philosophers of human nature’, *Nietzsche on Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 2, (emphasis original).
104 *Z*-Prologue § 3 p. 6 [KSA 4, p. 15], emphasis original.
105 *HH* § 109, p. 61 [KSA 2, pp. 108-109], emphasis original; cf. *GS* § 2, ‘The intellectual conscience’.
106 *HH* § 153, p. 82 [KSA 2, p. 145].
107 *AOM* § 206, p. 262 [KSA 2, p. 467].
108 *HH* § 111, p. 63 [KSA 2, p. 112], emphasis original.
bells ringing we ask ourselves: is it possible! this is going on because of a Jew crucified 2,000 year ago who said he was the son of God’.  

In some respects, *Human* appears to be a failure. If Nietzsche was flirting with positivism, as many have suggested, the infatuation was short-lived; his moral philosophy would undergo significant changes; and, his emerging anti-Christianity wholly lacks the sophistication, even of the two works that follow. Nietzsche’s view of Christianity in *Human* is the least nuanced, and the most dismissive of the metaphysical claims of Christianity, and its religious psychology, but Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity was not merely the result of his new-found methodological naturalism. Christianity also offended on an axiological level: ‘sin perpetrated against a god atoned for by a god; fear of a Beyond to which death is the gateway; the figure of the Cross as a symbol in an age which no longer knows the meaning and shame of the Cross—how gruesomely all this is wafted to us, as out of the grave of the primeval past!’

Despite such dismissive statements about religion, however, the Nietzsche of *Human* was not entirely without sympathy for what Christianity offered. In an admission that seems to border on the prophetic, Nietzsche writes: ‘How one would like to exchange the false assertions of the priests . . . for truths that would be as salutary, pacifying and beneficial as those errors are!’ It is, in a sense, a *tragedy* that the dogmas of religion and metaphysics are not available as comforts, for the vulnerabilities of man: ‘thus arises the danger that man may bleed to death from knowledge of truth’. Similarly, Nietzsche allowed that Christianity could be good for the

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109 *HH* § 113, pp. 65-66 [*KSA 2*, pp. 116-117].
110 In their introduction to the Cambridge edition of *D*, Leiter and Clark recognize a shift from the egoism of *HH*, to a more complex moral theory which allows for moral motivations in *D*. ‘Only when *Daybreak* admits the existence of moral motivation can Nietzsche begin his actual campaign against morality’, xxvi.
111 Given Nietzsche’s sometimes scoffing and dismissive posture towards Christianity in *HH*, it is not surprising, that Figgis, in his very early theological engagement with Nietzsche, wrote of *HH* that ‘The book is really Nietzsche at low-water mark’ (p. 37, n. 1).
112 *HH* § 113, p. 66 [*KSA 2*, p. 117].
113 *HH* § 109, p. 60 [*KSA 2*, p. 108]. This hint of nostalgia is quickly followed-up with Nietzsche’s insistence that we maintain a clean intellectual conscience. On the title of this aphorism, cf. *Eccles*. 1.18, ‘For with much wisdom comes much sorrow; the more knowledge, the more grief’.
114 *HH* § 109, p. 60 [*KSA 2*, p. 108].
exhausted cultures of antiquity, but poisonous to the young and vibrant barbarians. Nor is Christianity wholly without contemporary value; for some weaker natures it is a path towards the sublimation of weakness into virtue, though the practice of the ‘everyday Christians’ is wholly unmatched with the beliefs actually espoused by Christianity. Finally, Christianity has become central in how decisive a test it is in relationship to Nietzsche’s new ideal of the free spirit: ‘To test whether someone is one of us or not—I mean whether he is a free spirit or not—one should test his feelings towards Christianity’. To put it another way, the free spirit is antipodal to the Christian view of the human.

4.3.2 Daybreak: ‘A Whole World of New Days’.


‘Diese “Morgenröthe” ist kein blasses, kaltes, rückwärts leuchtendes Aufklärungslicht mehr, — hinter ihr erhebt sich schon eine wärmende, Lebenzeugende Sonne . . .’.

—Lou Salomé, Nietzsche in Seinem Werken, 135

Nietzsche wrote of Daybreak: ‘This Yes-saying book pours out its light, its love, its tenderness upon ever so many wicked things; it gives back to them their “soul”, a good

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115 AOM § 224, pp. 268-269 [KSA 2, p. 479].
116 HH § 115, pp. 66-67 [KSA 2, p. 118].
117 This brings Nietzsche close to Overbeck’s critique of German cultural Christianity in, How Christian is Our Theology? Nietzsche argues that greater commitment would be warranted, were the actual claims of Christianity true, HH § 116, p. 67 [KSA 2, pp. 118-119].
118 WS § 182, p. 354 [KSA 2, p. 630].
119 ‘Where does its author seek that new morning, that as yet undiscovered tender red that marks the beginning of another day—ah, a whole series, a whole world of new days? In a revaluation of all values . . .’, EH ‘Dawn’ § 1, p. 290 [KSA 6, p. 330], emphasis original.
120 ‘The “daybreak” is no longer a pale, cold, retrospectively illuminating work of instruction; behind it already rises a life-giving sun’, Nietzsche, 83.
conscience, the lofty right and privilege of existence’. In the above examination of Human, I suggested that the work be read as an act of demolition—of focused and purposeful deconstruction—where he was unmasking the all-too-human behind so many existing ideals to prepare the ground for his new ideal of the free spirit. Daybreak, while carrying on his inquiry into the all-too-human, is a very different book. The whole atmosphere is different. Gone is gloomy, enervate spirit, and over-cautious positivism of the previous work. As Salomé would put it, Nietzsche had ‘succeeded in overcoming [his] exaggerated intellectualism . . . without loosening [sic] the rigor of his search for knowledge’. There is a cheerfulness to Nietzsche’s critique of morality throughout Daybreak—the joy of discovery and subversive critique he witnessed in the preface he returned years later to write. Nietzsche also made clear progress on two related fronts. First, his philosophical anthropology has taken a constructive turn; and his view of the self as a rich complex of competing drives and instincts has reached new levels of sophistication. Secondly, Nietzsche’s anthropology, with its inbuilt denial of free agency, sets the stage for a more nuanced campaign against Christianity, as Nietzsche now has a framework within which he believes he can critique the Christian morality’s false assumptions about moral agents. Nietzsche’s anthropology and anti-Christianity are, therefore, synergetic. Nietzsche’s relationship to Christianity has grown more nuanced, more complex—and as he recognized in his 1886 preface—more subversive. St Paul, too, appears in Daybreak, as part of Nietzsche’s campaign against Christianity, both as an exemplar of Christianity’s problematic assumptions about human being, and as a test subject for Nietzsche’s own views. In the following section, we

121 EH ‘Dawn’ § 1, pp. 290-291 [KSA 6, p. 330].
122 Salomé, Nietzsche, 80.
123 Nietzsche begins his 1886 preface, ‘In this book you will discover a “subterranean man” at work, one who tunnels and mines and undermines’ (§ 1, p. 1), ‘I have descended into the depths, I tunneled into the foundations, I commenced an investigation and digging out of an ancient faith . . . and have continued to do so even though every building hitherto erected on them has fallen down: I commenced to undermine our faith in morality’ (§ 2, pp. 1-2).
124 For a detailed, and chronologically-sensitive analysis of Nietzsche’s understanding of the drives, with a wealth of quotations, see pp. 251-318 in Graham Parks, Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1994). Parks traces the roots of the drive-theory all the way back to the years before BT, but sees the publication of D as a point of breakthrough: ‘Careful consideration of a series of aphorisms in the second book of that text [D] reveals a remarkable revisioning of the I in terms of drives’ (289).

Duff, 176
will look briefly at these two points of development, while saving Nietzsche’s critique of Paul for our final section.

If Nietzsche had not entirely taken the ego for granted in Human—either in terms of his naturalistic anthropology, or in relation to his ethical egoism—in Daybreak he revisits the notion of the ‘ego’ or the ‘self’, and now more clearly envisions the complex machinery of hidden drives which manifest themselves as subjectivity: ‘However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which constitute his being.’

Even the tools of our language are of little help in cataloguing these drives, because, ‘Anger, hatred, love, pity, desire, knowledge, joy, pain—all are names for extreme states: the milder, middle degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us, and yet it is they which weave the web of our character and our destiny’. Our noetic limitations extend beyond the realm of self-knowledge, to encompass our view of the world. In an aphorism titled, ‘In Prison’, he locates human being within the limited horizon determined by sensations, ‘The habits of our senses have woven us into lies and deception of sensation: these again are the basis of all our judgments and ‘knowledge’—there is absolutely no escape, no backway or bypath into the real world [wirkliche Welt]!’

These noetic limitations suggest that, although human being is mutable (or plastic), self-cultivation would have to take place through the starving or nourishing the various drives. Nietzsche is quick to add, however, that, ‘all the laws of their nutriment remain wholly unknown’ to us, and so the process is usually left to chance. Under the rubric of ‘self-mastery’, Nietzsche discusses six methods for ‘combating the vehemence of a drive’, but even the will to self-mastery cannot stem from a neutral ego, but only from yet another competing drive:

\[ \text{That one desires} \]

That one desires to combat the vehemence of a drive at all, however, does not stand within our own power; nor does the choice of any particular method; nor does the success or failure of this method. What is clearly the case is that in this entire procedure our intellect is only the blind instrument of another drive which

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125 This is not to say that no traces of egoism remain; see, e.g., §§ 108, 145,
126 D § 119, p. 74 [KSA 3, p. 111].
127 D § 115, p. 71 [KSA 3, p. 107], emphasis original.
128 D § 117, p. 73 [KSA 3, p. 110].
129 D § 119, p. 74 [KSA 3, p. 111].
is a rival of the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us: whether it be the drive to restfulness, or the fear of disgrace and other evil consequences, or love.\(^{130}\)

In fact, given the mutability of human being, ‘erroneous’ self-knowledge, which is based on the most visible manifestations of our drives, is more likely to contribute negatively to the cultivation of our character:

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\text{We are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance with the states for which alone we have consciousness and words, and consequently praise and blame; those cruder outbursts of which alone we are aware make us misunderstand ourselves, we draw a conclusion on the basis of data in which the exceptions outweigh the rule, we misread ourselves in this apparently most intelligible of handwriting on the nature of our self. Our opinion of ourself, however, which we have arrived at by this erroneous path, the so-called ‘ego’, is thenceforth a fellow worker in the construction of our character and our destiny.}^{131}\]

Even virtues fall under the hegemony of the drives: ‘The beginnings of justice, as of prudence, moderation, bravery—in short, of all we designate as the Socratic virtues, are animal: a consequence of that drive which teaches us to seek food and elude enemies’.\(^{132}\)

As a consequence of this complex account of human being, there is, for the Nietzsche of \textit{Daybreak}, no free will.\(^{133}\) He categorically denies—as a ‘primeval delusion’—that we even know ‘\textit{how human action is brought about}’, and he condemns as ‘that profoundest of errors, that “right knowledge must be followed by right action”’.\(^{134}\) This emerging philosophical

\(^{130}\) \textit{D} § 109, p. 65 [\textit{KSA} 3, p. 98], emphasis original.

\(^{131}\) \textit{D} § 115, pp. 71-72 [\textit{KSA} 3, pp. 107-108], emphasis original.

\(^{132}\) \textit{D} § 26, p. 21 [\textit{KSA} 3, p. 37].

\(^{133}\) Indeed, even the term ‘will’ is problematic insofar as it suggests a unified centre of conscious decision—Nietzsche routinely rejects such anthropological articles of faith. As Michel Haar writes, ‘there is no fixed and defined centre (the centre is always shifting and it cannot be grasped), but rather a plurality of elementary “wills”—which is to say unconscious impulses, forever in conflict, alternately imposing themselves and subordinating themselves’, ‘Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language’, in \textit{The New Nietzsche} (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 10.

\(^{134}\) This is a view Nietzsche attributes, in this instance, to Socrates and Plato; \textit{D}, § 116, p. 72 [\textit{KSA} 3, p. 108], emphasis original. This may be a point at which St Paul is closer than Nietzsche may want to admit. As we saw in the previous chapter, Paul argues that the presence of hidden forces within the self (especially the flesh) lead to behavior that can be disconnected from the subject’s felt desires. Nietzsche knew this, of course, because he had alluded to this passage in \textit{D}

\textit{Duff}, 178
anthropology has presented a challenge to Nietzsche’s commentators due to its apparent fatalism—especially given the very real sense of individual responsibility we see throughout Nietzsche’s corpus. Leiter defends the naturalistic and deterministic aspects of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, arguing that Nietzsche sees the destinies of individual persons to be pre-determined by their corresponding ‘type-facts’—immutable, physiological conditions that, to a large degree, predetermine individual becoming.\(^\text{135}\) Robert Solomon, among others, has argued that Leiter’s interpretation is too deterministic, and that ‘Nietzsche’s fatalism and Nietzsche’s “self-making” are ultimately two sides of the same coin and not at odds or contradictory’.\(^\text{136}\) Most importantly for Nietzsche, however, is how Christianity fares under this critique, and, it fares poorly on all accounts.

Christianity, to begin with, has unleashed a host of lies, deceptions, and prejudices, which Nietzsche tirelessly examines throughout Daybreak: ‘Christianity . . . introduced into the world sinfulness one has lyingly made up . . .’,\(^\text{137}\) the fear of God, ‘who sees into the heart’,\(^\text{138}\) belief in


\(^{\text{137}}\) D § 29, p. 22 [KSA 3, p. 39], emphasis original. The charge of mendacity becomes increasingly important as Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity nears its final stages. Nietzsche is so forceful in his accusations, some interpreters (e.g., M. Rempel) have taken Nietzsche to mean that Paul and other early Christians wilfully fabricated the core teachings of Christianity in an elaborate bid for power. I will argue that the issue is more psychologically-complex than that; Nietzsche sees Paul as a deceiver, and a self-deceiver.

\(^{\text{138}}\) Here Nietzsche is referring to a recurring theme in the Hebrew and Christian Bibles: 1 Sam. 16.7, 1 Chron. 28.9, Psalm 139, Luke 16.15, and, in the Pauline corpus, 1 Cor. 4.3-5, and Rom. 7.7ff. This may be a point at which St Paul is closer than Nietzsche may want to admit. As we saw in the previous chapter, Paul argues that the presence of hidden forces within the self (operating through the flesh) lead to behavior that can be disconnected from the subject’s felt desires. Nietzsche knew this, of course, because he had alluded to this passage in D § 68. Somewhat ironically, Paul would likely have sided with Nietzsche against Socrates, Plato, and Schopenhauer on this point.

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the divine origin of humanity, belief in the ‘perilousness’ of existence, and the torments of the soul in Hell—to provide only a sample of Nietzsche’s judgements. Ultimately, Christian morality, with its false epistemology, detaches the subject from the actual world, creating an imaginary world in its place. We can already see from our (ongoing) reconstruction of Paulinism how squarely this critique of the symbolic thought-world lands. The need for Nietzsche’s war on Christian morality also becomes clear. In the second book of Daybreak, Nietzsche revisits the question of ecumenical goals, which he had first raised in Human, All-Too-Human. Here, again, the idea of ‘preservation and advancement’ is made from the perspective of morality: ‘the goal of morality is defined [as] the preservation and advancement of mankind’, but Nietzsche presses, ‘Preservation of what? . . . Advancement to what?’

As in Human, All-Too-Human, the fundamental question of anthropology comes to the fore. So long as European morality remained under the spell of the Christian worldview, it would continue to prescribe and reward behaviour rooted in fictions. Again, ‘Only if mankind possessed a universally recognized goal would it be possible to propose “thus and thus is the right course of action”: for the present there exists no such goal. It is thus irrational and trivial to impose the demands of morality upon mankind’. As he would later write in Eccé Homo, ‘The question concerning the origin of moral values is for me a question of the very first rank

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139 D § 49, p. 32 [KSA 3, pp. 53-54], emphasis original. Gen. 1.27 provides a foundational statement of Judaeo-Christian anthropology—that human beings were created in God’s image: ‘So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them’. One of the clearest allusions to this passage in the Pauline corpus comes from Col. 3.9-10: ‘[Y]ou have taken off your old self with its practices and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the image of its Creator. Here there is no Gentile or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all, and is in all’, cf. 1 Cor. 11.7; Gal. 3.28.

140 D § 57, p. 35 [KSA 3, p. 59].

141 D § 77, p. 46 [KSA 3, pp. 74-75].

142 Nietzsche writes, ‘[O]ne spoils one’s sense for reality and one’s pleasure in it, and in the end accords reality a value only insofar as it is capable of being a symbol. Thus, under the spell of the morality of custom, man despises first the causes, secondly the consequences, thirdly reality, and weaves all his higher feelings (of reverence, of sublimity, of pride, of gratitude, of love) into an imaginary world: the so-called higher world. And the consequences are perceptible even today: wherever a man’s feelings are exalted, that imaginary world is involved in some way’ (D § 33, pp. 24-25 [KSA 3, pp. 42-43], emphasis original).

143 D § 106, p. 61 [KSA 3, p. 93], emphasis original.

144 D § 108, p. 63 [KSA 3, p. 96].
because *it is crucial for the future of humanity*. Nietzsche’s century, having long given up wholesale adherence to the Christian worldview, continued ‘to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation, evaluation!’ This last vestige of Christianity would assume an increasingly important place in Nietzsche’s task, for ‘All actions may be traced back to evaluations . . .’ *If values lie causally upstream of human behaviour*, a revaluation of all values is a necessary project for overcoming the false world of Christianity. The notion that unbelievers can maintain some of the ritual aspects of Christianity without significant consequences is, ‘the thoughtless prejudice. The thoughtless error!’

Certainly nothing in *Daybreak* precludes the possibility of further discoveries, and, despite the rather grim picture Nietzsche painted of human agency, he felt he had every reason to remain cheerful: ‘There are so many experiments still to make! There are so many futures still to dawn!’ Nietzsche’s task was to open up new possibilities—a new dawn—for the individual by first subverting the stubbornly-persisting vestiges of Christianity. While Nietzsche’s moral philosophy would undergo further developments, including his conception of ‘herd morality’, he is already concerned with the manner in which Christian morality privileges groups over the individual: ‘What is wanted—whether this is admitted or not—is nothing less than a fundamental remoulding, indeed weakening and abolition of the *individual* . . .’ Or, as he later put it, ‘The loss of the centre of gravity, resistance to the natural instincts—in one word, “selflessness”—that is what was hitherto called *morality*.—With *Dawn* I first took up the fight against the morality that would un-self man’.

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146 *D* § 57, p. 35 [*KSA 3*, p. 59].
147 *D* § 104, p. 61 [*KSA 3*, p. 92].
148 *D* § 149, p. 97 [*KSA 3*, p. 141], emphasis original.
149 *D* § 187, p. 110 [*KSA 3*, p. 160].
150 *D* § 132, p. 83 [*KSA 3*, p. 124].
151 *EH* ‘Dawn’ § 2, p. 292 [*KSA 6*, p. 332].

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4.3.4 The Gay Science: We Can Destroy Only As Creators.

With the publication of The Gay Science, Nietzsche is on the threshold of his mature period—both chronologically, and thematically. Like Daybreak—and unlike Human—Gay Science is cheerful and imaginative, without posing a threat to ‘intellectual conscience’. Expanding upon the work he began in Daybreak, Gay Science places Nietzsche’s ‘free spirit’ (and his antipodes) within the broader horizons of the ‘world as it concerns man’. The atmosphere is thoroughly Nietzschean, and here we have ‘Nietzsche’s first and perhaps his most complete attempt to take seriously the proposition . . . “God is dead”—and to reckon with its many consequences. . .’. In the new preface, written near Genoa in the fall of 1886, the author is confident that his health has returned. As with Daybreak, Nietzsche characterized his recovery with an ironic illusion to St Paul’s world: it was a kind of resurrection. We have seen that Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity developed in parallel to his own reorientation during the middle period, which is marked generally by both heightened antipathy towards the effects of vestigial Christianity, and his more complex anthropology—again, these developments are synergetic.

If there is a breakthrough between Daybreak and Gay Science, it is related to Nietzsche’s discovery that his task of destruction is also the task of creation—that ‘We can destroy only as creators’. Gay Science may be positioned in Nietzsche’s middle-period development as

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152 ‘[I]n almost every sentence profundity and high spirits go tenderly hand in hand’, EH ‘The Gay Science’ § 1, p. 292 [KSA 6, p. 332].
153 GS § 2, pp. 76-77 [KSA 3, pp. 373-374].
154 GS § 301, p. 242 [KSA 3, p. 540].
155 So Kaufmann, ‘The book is a microcosm in which we find almost all of Nietzsche . . .’, GS—Editor’s Introduction’ § 7, p. 25.
157 See, e.g., GS ‘1886 Preface’, § 1, p. 33 [KSA 3, p. 346].
158 GS § 58, p. 122 [KSA 3, p. 422].
follows: *Human* is an act of demolition; *Daybreak* marks a constructive turn, where new knowledge of human being is advanced; *Gay Science* builds upon these insights (the role of complex physiological realities that lie well below the surface of human consciousness), and the various noetic limitations (the bounded horizon, the hiddenness of the instincts and drives) to a place where he had settled upon a kind of *imaginative anti-realism* with respect to the worlds projected by the human mind. Here a kind of ‘world-creation’ could be carried out with a clean intellectual conscience, guided by *non-metaphysical values*. Similarly, human life itself could be a medium for the artist: ‘[W]e want to be the poets of our life—first of all in the smallest, most everyday matters’. Two key facets of this reading are born out in two important aphorisms, which appear together at the beginning of book two. In the first, ‘*To the realists*’, Nietzsche satirizes the notion that ‘the world really is the way it appears’, as if it ‘stood unveiled’ before the observer, when in fact the observers are ‘passionate and dark creatures . . . still far too similar to an artist in love’. Standing between the observer and the world is the deep and complex matrix of inherited values:

> Your sobriety still contains a secret and inextinguishable drunkenness. Your love of ‘reality’, for example—oh, that is a primeval ‘love’. Every feeling and sensation contains a piece of this old love; and some fantasy, some prejudice, some unreason, some ignorance, some fear, and ever so much else has contributed to it and worked on it. . . . Subtract the phantasm and every human *contribution* from it, my sober friends! If you *can*! If you can forget your descent, your past, your training—all of your humanity and animality. There is no ‘reality’ for us—not for you either, my sober friends.

There is, therefore, no direct epistemic access to the *real* world. Rather, we view the world in all our inherited complexity as artists and lovers—as *creators*. Nietzsche even confessed an unease he felt at the consequence, that, ‘what things are *called* is incomparably more important than what they are’—appearance eclipses essence—and the names given are ‘almost always wrong and arbitrary, thrown over things like a dress and altogether foreign to their nature . . .’. He

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159 ‘I am still waiting for the philosophical *physician* . . . to risk the proposition: what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all “truth” but something else—let us say, health, future, growth, power, life’, *GS* ‘1886 Preface’ § 2, p. 35 [*KSA* 3, p. 349], emphasis original.

160 *GS* § 299, p. 240 [*KSA* 3, p. 538].

161 *GS* § 57, p. 121 [*KSA* 3, p. 421], emphasis original.

162 *GS* § 57, p. 121 [*KSA* 3, p. 421], emphasis original.

163 *GS* § 58, pp. 121-122 [*KSA* 3, p. 422], emphasis original.
concludes: ‘We can destroy only as creators. —But let us not forget this either: it is enough to create new names and estimations and probabilities in order to create in the long run new “things”’. 164

Nietzsche’s argument in these two sections is not merely restating the Kantian thesis that the noumenal world, or the ‘Dinge an sich’, permits no direct epistemic access. The disjunction between ‘reality’ and the would-be knower is radicalized by Nietzsche’s complex account of the self; the world of human experience is so mediated through the valuations and creative impulses which lie below the surface of consciousness, that the objects of our worlds can only be the ‘misty shrouds of delusions’, of our own creation. Furthermore, human being is so often content to dwell within the arbitrary or the delusional world until another act of creation comes to overthrow it. 165 This imaginative anti-realism is most clearly pronounced with respect to the axiological dimension of our symbolic worlds, where we supply the world with values in the service of our own concerns:

We who think and feel at the same time are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colours, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations. . . . Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature—nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, as a present—and it was we who gave and bestowed it. Only we have created the world that concerns man! 166

It may appear that Nietzsche’s epistemological conservatism constitutes a counsel of despair, but the Nietzsche of Gay Science flatly denies that all representations of the world, or that all

164 GS § 58, p. 122 [KSA 3, p. 422].
165 There are several suggestions in GS that, in the absence of alternative creations, we can do no other: e.g., ‘without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life’, § 121, p. 177 [KSA 3, p. 478], cf. § 1, p. 75 [KSA 3, p. 372], ‘Gradually, man has become a fantastic animal that has to fulfill one more condition of existence than any other animal: man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he exists; his race cannot flourish without a periodic trust in life—without faith in reason in life’.
166 GS § 301, p. 242 [KSA 3, p. 540]. Similarly, ‘The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms’, GS § 109, p. 168 [KSA 3, p. 468].

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postures with respect to science may be placed upon an equal footing.\textsuperscript{167} In, ‘The intellectual conscience’, Nietzsche’s expresses his consternation over the apparent lack of concern among his contemporaries for certainty: ‘what is good heartedness, refinement, or genius to me, when the person who has these virtues tolerates slack feelings in his faith and judgments and when he does not account the desire for certainty as his inmost craving and deepest distress—as that which separates the higher human beings from the lower’.\textsuperscript{168} For Nietzsche, even a ‘pious’ contempt for reason is preferable to the person who can ‘stand in the midst of . . . this whole marvellous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence without questioning, without trembling with the craving and the rapture of such questioning . . .’.\textsuperscript{169} Nietzsche’s quest for certainty is clearly not a pursuit of truth—understood as a metaphysical value—but neither is he concerned with the positivist value of facticity: ‘We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live . . .’, but, ‘Life is no argument. The conditions of life may include error’.\textsuperscript{170} What Nietzsche seeks is the freedom of creation that works in harmony with natural necessities.\textsuperscript{171} In the extraordinary aphorism, ‘Long live physics!’, Nietzsche revisits the concerns for cultivating the self, which animated his early period, without any ‘romantic regression’:

\begin{quote}
We, however, want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves. To that end we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicians in order to be able to be creators in this sense—while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been based on ignorance of physics or were constructed so as to contradict it. Therefore: long live physics! And even more so that which compels us to turn to physics—our honesty!\textsuperscript{172}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{167} This point has a broader application with respect to much of Nietzsche’s perspectival epistemology. To deny the existence of a single, transcendent perspective (traditionally ascribed to the God of theism—\textit{GM-III} § 12) situates all perspectives within the limiting conditions of immanence, but this does not entail that all perspectives are therefore equal. On this point see, Bernd Magnus, ‘The Deification of the Commonplace: Twilight of the Idols’, in \textit{Reading Nietzsche}, 152-181.

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{GS} § 2, p. 76 [\textit{KSA} 3, p. 373].

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{GS} § 2, p. 76 [\textit{KSA} 3, p. 373].

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{GS} § 121, p. 177 [\textit{KSA} 3, p. 478].

\textsuperscript{171} As R. Schacht puts it, ‘what Nietzsche undertakes to do in \textit{The Gay Science} is to show how he proposes to carry out the task of “naturalizing” our conception of humanity and redirecting our thinking about human possibility’, and the book’s, ‘point of departure and constant return . . . is human life and possibility’, ‘Nietzsche’s \textit{Gay Science}’, 71-72 (emphasis original).

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{GS} § 335, p. 266 [\textit{KSA} 3, pp. 563-564].
The tensions apparent between Nietzsche’s (qualified) anti-realism, and the value he ascribes to a clean intellectual conscience, are at least partly mitigated in the parallel development of his anthropology and anti-Christianity. In essence, the axiological vestiges of Christian worldview are just the ‘misty shrouds of delusion’ at which Nietzsche’s subversive creativity is aimed. Nietzsche can allow that Christianity has made contributions in human history that were valuable in their times, or that contributed to valuable developments, but on the whole, Christianity creates a world that is ugly: ‘The Christian resolve to find the world ugly and bad has made the world ugly and bad’. Similarly, St Paul’s ‘evil eye for the passions’, sought in humanity ‘the dirty, disfiguring, and heartbreaking’. And so, Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity is made on the basis of contrary values: ‘What is now decisive against Christianity is our taste, no longer our reasons’.

Leading up to his single most famous aphorism, The madman, Nietzsche begins an exploration of some of the creative work that must be done in the vacuum created by the ongoing recession of Christianity: ‘God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.—And we—we still have to vanquish his shadow, too’. These shadows include our habits of anthropomorphizing nature and deifying human being—habits of which St Paul might be accused of being supremely guilty. Here Nietzsche’s impatience is palpable: ‘When will all these shadows of God cease to darken our minds? When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When may we begin to “naturalize” humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?’

Here the madman’s striking proclamation of the Death-of-God event serves a load-bearing role in Nietzsche’s programme by capturing the world-historical implications of Modernity’s greatest event:

What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not

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173 As an example of the latter, Nietzsche credits Christianity’s moral scepticism with aiding the enlightenment by destroying faith in virtue, GS § 122, p. 178 [KSA 3, p. 478].
174 GS § 130, p. 185 [KSA 3, p. 485].
175 GS § 139, p. 189 [KSA 3, pp. 488-489].
176 GS § 132, p. 186 [KSA 3, p. 485].
177 GS § 108, p. 167 [KSA 3, p. 467].
178 GS § 109, pp. 167-169 [KSA 3, p. 468-469].
plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through and infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning?179

The anthropological implications of the Death of God, later born out in more detail in Zarathustra, are also signalled: ‘Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?’180 The Death of God is that crisis which naturally intersects with the human being’s emergence from innocence into the infinite, and it is an event that radically destabilizes the ‘world that concerns man’, just as Paul’s proclamation of the Christ-event destabilized the symbolic worlds of Palestinian Judaism, Greece, and Rome.181

The introduction of the eternal recurrence as, ‘The greatest weight’, suggests a second point of implicit critique of Paulinism, which will be expanded upon in Nietzsche’s mature period. The interpretive issues surrounding the doctrine are complex—as the surfeit of scholarly discussion here attests—and I will reserve comments on the more technical aspect of the motif for the next chapter. Here, however, I want to offer a brief sketch of how this earliest articulation of the idea corresponds to the role the resurrection plays in St Paul’s symbolic world. The eternal recurrence is proposed as a sort of existential thought experiment:

179 GS § 125, p. 181 [KSA 3, p. 481].
180 GS § 125, p. 181 [KSA 3, p. 481]. Paralleling the notion of Pauline co-crucifixion, there is a sense here in which the human subject dies with God: ‘Nietzsche has long been acknowledge by many as the harbinger not only of the “death of God” but also the “death of Man”. . . . [Nietzsche], perhaps more thoroughly than any other thinker before or since, probed the multiple levels of implication linking God and Man beyond the simple opposition of theism and humanism, in relentlessly exploring the consequences of “Man” of the “death of God”’, John Lippitt and Jim Urpeth, ‘Introduction’, in Nietzsche and the Divine (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), vii. For a further development of the death of the subject, see, Brian Schroeder, ‘Apocalypse, Eschatology, and the Death of God’, in Nietzsche and Levinas, ed. Jill Stauffer and Bettina Bergo (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 232-248.
181 So, Alistair Kee, who writes that for Nietzsche the death of God ‘involves the loss also of every moral landmark, every aesthetic point of reference, the loss of that epistemological framework in which we know the world and ourselves’, Nietzsche Against the Crucified (London: SCM Press, 1999), 30; cf. 31. As I argue throughout this project, there is a vacuum created by the loss of this framework within which we understood kosmos and anthropos, within which Nietzsche’s philosophy of the future must be understood.

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What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it. . . . The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!’

Would you now throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: ‘You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine’. If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you.182

What has only rarely been acknowledged is that Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence fits into his overall philosophical programme in much the same way that the resurrection fits into Paul’s.183 There are several clues that are suggestive. First, in dealing with the existential horizon, Nietzsche uses here the metaphor of mass—weight. In one of Paul’s most extraordinary passages on how the hope of resurrection bears upon life in the νῦν καιρὸς, he writes:

[W]e do not lose heart. Though outwardly we are wasting away, yet inwardly we are being renewed day by day. For our light and momentary troubles are achieving for us an eternal glory that far outweighs them all. So we fix our eyes not on what is seen, but on what is unseen, since what is seen is temporary, but what is unseen is eternal.184

For Paul, the promise of resurrection determined the existential horizon; hardships and troubles in the now-time were, ‘light and momentary’,185 when viewed from the perspective of resurrection life. In the mature period, especially in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence will develop as a direct challenge this perspective—as an alternative (quasi)eschatological horizon. In addition to his introductions of the death of God, and the eternal recurrence, Nietzsche concluded the original edition of The Gay Science by introducing...

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182 GS § 341, pp. 273-274 [KSA 3, p. 570].
183 As we saw in chapter two, Didier Franck’s, Nietzsche and the Shadow of God, is an important exception.
184 2 Cor. 4.16-18. The Authorized Version has the justly famous translation, ‘a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. . .’.
185 παραυτίκα—‘momentary’ is a hapax legomenon in the NT. ἐλαφρόν—‘light’ (BDAG)—the word occurs only one other time in the NT, where Jesus says, ‘Come to me, all you who are weary and burdened, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light [ἐλαφρόν]’, Matt. 11.28-30.

Duff, 188
his ideal free spirit, *Zarathustra*, which would develop, in the following year, into Nietzsche’s reimagined world. I will begin chapter 6 with a deeper exploration of how some of these themes are developed in *Zarathustra*, but we turn now to a concluding examination of Nietzsche’s developing portrait of St Paul, as it appears in the middle period.

### 4.4 Nietzsche’s Developing Perspective on St Paul.

With the foregoing discussion in mind, we are now better positioned to examine Nietzsche’s developing understanding of St Paul. I argued above that Nietzsche’s ‘return to Paul’, in the form of his careful study of Pauline anthropology, intersected with a critical point in his own development. One indication of the sudden importance Paul took on for Nietzsche, is the fact that, of all of Nietzsche’s (dozens of) references to Paul, only two predate his reading of Lüdemann’s work. They are both riddles that cast Paul in an ironic light, and we will look at each in turn.

#### 4.4.1 St Paul, The ‘Immoralist’.

Nietzsche’s first reference to Paul is found in a brief notebook entry dated to July-August, 1879: ‘*Paul*—one of those great immorals in which the Bible is richer than one might think’. Geuss and Nehamas, editors of the Cambridge volume on the early notebooks, offer the helpful commentary that this is, ‘Presumably a reference to the “antinomian” strand in the writings of Paul, the emphasis on “faith”, “love”, and “spirit” as against the “letter of the law” (see Roman [*sic*] 3.27-30; 2 Corinthians 3.6-7)’.

Indisputably, one of the most significant contributions that Paul made to the developing understanding of Christianity was his ongoing campaign for the fulfilling, relativizing, and even abrogation of aspects of the Mosaic

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186 *KSA* 8:42[57], p. 605.
Law—upon which the full inclusion of the Nations within the Christian community was predicated. As we will see in our discussion of Daybreak § 68, below, this aspect of Paulinism—Paul as destroyer of the law [den Vernichter des Gesetzes]—was an object of fascination for Nietzsche—in part because it invited a psychological explanation.

What Nietzsche is highlighting in this early note is the rich irony present in the fact that Paul—the Apostle, the saint, the moral authority—was really the one who destroyed the very Law that could prove him a transgressor. Nietzsche’s reflections on morality, as well as his broader reflections on values, took note of the tendency for iconoclasts, including moral and religious innovators, to appear wicked by the standards of their contemporaries. As he later wrote:

In every teacher and preacher of what is new we encounter the same ‘wickedness’ that makes conquerors notorious, even if its expression is subtler and it does not immediately set the muscles in motion, and therefore also does not make one that notorious. What is new, however, is always evil, being that which wants to conquer and overthrow the old boundary markers and the old pieties; and only what is old is good.

This is the dialectic of innovation by revaluation: you cannot break the tablets without transgressing them; innovators are always, axiologically speaking, untimely. Old pieties stand in judgement of proponents of revaluation. We can hardly fail to recognize the kinship between Nietzsche and Paul at this point—both as ‘immoralists’, and as co-discoverers of this dialectic. Subsequent to Damascus, St Paul had his Kierkegaardian moment, when he took the ‘leap to faith’ out from under the custody of the Law to be ‘crucified with Christ’ (Gal. 2.20). There could be no return: ‘If I rebuild what I destroyed, then I really would be a lawbreaker’ (Gal.

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188 ‘But if, in seeking to be justified in Christ, we Jews find ourselves also among the sinners, doesn’t that mean that Christ promotes sin? Absolutely not! If I rebuild what I destroyed, then I really would be a lawbreaker’, Gal. 2.17-18. This suggests that Paul saw an ongoing risk of regulations subverting the freedom found through justification by faith—even that those justified by faith were in fact lawbreakers.

189 GS § 4, p. 79 [KSA 3, p. 376]. The agricultural metaphor in this aphorism provides a valuable perspective on Nietzsche’s view of his task, which could be construed as providing a revolutionary approach to personal and cultural renewal that could thrive in the depleted soil of 19th-Century Europe: ‘The good men are in all ages those who dig the old thoughts, digging deep and getting them to bear fruit—the farmers of the spirit. But eventually all land is exploited, and the ploughshare of evil must come again and again’.

Duff, 190
We can see how Paul’s revaluation around the Cross of Christ led to his distinctive style of discourse, in which he deftly shifted from one value system to another in his defence of Christianity: if his opponents were Israelites—he had been a better one, though it had counted for nothing (Phil. 3.1ff); if his opponents were the ‘super-apostles’ he was ‘not in the least inferior’, even though he was ‘nothing’ (2 Cor. 12.11). Likewise, Nietzsche, who was happy to embraced this paradox by referring to himself as both, ‘the first decent human being’, and, ‘the most terrible human being. . . . the first immoralist’. Nietzsche was clearly thinking of himself, but he may have been thinking of Paul (and Socrates), too, when he wrote, ‘Whoever has overthrown an existing law of custom has hitherto always first been accounted a bad man. . . .’ The paradox is resolved when the new values predominate, justifying themselves. Thus, Nietzsche’s first reflection on Paul—though it was never published—proved to be an interesting analogy to Nietzsche’s own task.

4.4.2 St Paul, The Persecutor of God.

The second comment on Paul appears in The Wanderer and His Shadow (hereafter, Wanderer), under the title, ‘The Persecutor of God’, which I quote here in full:

Paul conceived the idea, and Calvin appropriated the idea, that countless numbers from all eternity have been condemned to damnation and that this lovely universal plan was thus instituted so that the glory of God might be revealed in it; Heaven and Hell and humanity are thus supposed to exist so as to—gratify the vanity of God! What a cruel and insatiable vanity must have flickered in the soul of him who first conceived or first appropriated such a thing!—Paul thus remained Saul after all—the persecutor of God.

Here the riddle is dark, in keeping with the depressed timbre of Wanderer, and the severity of the circumstances under which it was written. The title is drawn from Paul’s vision on the road to

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190 EH ‘Why I Am a Destiny’ § 1-2, pp. 326-327 [KSA 6, pp. 365-366].
191 D § 20, p. 18 [KSA 3, p. 33]; cf. WS § 19, p. 310 [KSA 2, p. 553].
192 WS § 85, pp. 331-332 [KSA 2, p. 591].
193 ‘Then—it was 1879—I retired from my professorship at Basel, spent the summer in St Moritz like a shadow, and the next winter, than which not one in my life has been poorer in sunshine, in Naumburg as a shadow. This was my minimum: the Wander and His Shadow originated at this time. Doubtless, I then knew about shadows’, EH, ‘Why I Am So Wise’, § 1, p. 222 [KSA 6, pp. 264-265].

Duff, 191
Damascus, where he hears the voice of Jesus ask, ‘Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?’

The quotation in Acts is taken to mean that Christ identified closely with those suffering the persecution at the hand of Saul, who believed he persecuted the fledgling Christian church with divine justice. When Nietzsche avers that Paul conceived the connection between eternal damnation and the glory of God, he is probably alluding to Romans 9, where Paul addresses the question of the justice of God’s election—which, as Paul recognized, could appear somewhat arbitrary:

> What if God, although choosing to show his wrath and make his power known, bore with great patience the objects of his wrath—prepared for destruction? What if he did this to make the riches of his glory known to the objects of his mercy, whom he prepared in advance for glory—even us, whom he also called, not only from the Jews but also from the Gentiles?

Nietzsche says only that Paul ‘conceived’ of the idea, probably because it is clearly framed as a rhetorical question. Calvin, on the other hand, was committed to what came to be called ‘double predestination’—the view that God sovereignly predestines people both to Heaven and to Hell. The flash of vanity Paul projected onto God. Here the irony is that Paul the Christian, conceived of an idea that has persecuted more people than Saul the Pharisee ever could have. In the cases of both the pre- and post-Damascus Paul, Nietzsche sardonically suggests, Paul, in his zealous piety, projected his own cruelty and vanity upon God, by his conception of a kind of eschatological violence against all unbelievers.

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195 Rom. 9.22-24. Here Paul is engaged in trying to account for the surprising turn in history from an Israel-centered community of faith, to a community preponderated by Gentiles.
196 It is a first-class conditional construction in the Greek, ‘εἰ δὲ θέλων ὁ θεὸς . . .’ [What if God, desiring . . .?], suggesting that Paul is not necessarily committing himself to the view, but highlighting the absurdity that God should be answerable to a merely human sense of justice.
197 Some theologians have resolved the apparent injustice by arguing that divine election is predicated on God’s foreknowledge of each human agent’s free choice in response to Christ, but Calvin denied this harmonization on exegetical and philosophical grounds. See, e.g., John Calvin, Institutes, vol. 3, ch. 21 § 1ff.
198 The concept of final judgement appears to be of perennial interest to Nietzsche—both in how it reveals the ‘darker’, apocalyptic side of the early Christian community (e.g., D § 71; AC § 38, 44, cf. KSA 12:10[201]), and in how a demythologized version of the concept had secured itself in the collective consciousness of modern Europeans (UH § 8).
4.4.3 Daybreak § 68: ‘Saint’ Paul, the First Christian.

The two early reflections on Paul, above, may be thought of as ironic riddles—they are darkly humorous, but they suggest only passing interest, and would require little more than a superficial understanding of the texts they allude to. Neither of these reflections would require specialized knowledge of the live debates among the critical New Testament scholars of Nietzsche’s day. Following his reading of Lüdemann, however, Nietzsche’s reflections on Paul reflect a newfound desire to understand Paul both as the subject of Nietzsche’s own psychological investigations, and as a subject fully situated within his first-century world. As a result, Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul now shows deep, intertextual engagement with the main letters of the Pauline corpus. Here we examine Daybreak § 68, ‘The first Christian’, section by section—contextualizing Nietzsche’s longest and most interesting middle-period engagement with Paulinism within Nietzsche’s developing theories about religion and morality, and within Paulinism itself.

Naïve Appropriations of Paul in 19th-Century Europe.

Nietzsche recognized that the preponderance of his contemporaries had not yet lost their connection to the New Testament. Some, including members of Nietzsche’s immediate family, believed these documents to have been inspired by the Holy Spirit; others, including critical New Testament scholars like David Strauss, and Franz Overbeck, had demythologized the text while maintaining convictions about its ongoing moral relevance:

All the world still believes in the writings of the ‘Holy Spirit’ or stands in the after-effect of this belief: when one opens the Bible one does so to ‘edify’ oneself, to discover a signpost of consolation in one’s own personal distress, great or small—in short, one reads oneself into and out of it. That it also contains the history of one of the most ambitious and importunate souls, of a mind as superstitious as it was cunning, the history of the apostle Paul—who, apart from a few scholars, knows that?

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199 Which is not to imply that they betrayed a superficial understanding. The young Nietzsche’s familiarity with Scripture famously earned him the nickname, little pastor.

200 The traditional doctrine of inspiration to which Nietzsche refers is suggested by 2 Tim. 3.16, and 2 Peter 1.21.
As Nietzsche sees it, the whole world continues to seek edification and consolation in the writings of Paul, despite growing secularism, receding belief in the divine origins of Scripture, and the growth of critical scholarship. The latter point is important for understanding Nietzsche’s comments. At the time of Nietzsche’s writing, critical New Testament scholarship had seen a century of development, and Ferdinand Baur’s epoch-making work, *Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi*, which had by then been in print for over three decades, had firmly established Baur’s fame and the authority of the Tübingen School. What has seldom been appreciated in Nietzsche scholarship is that the critique of Paul proffered in *Daybreak* would not have risen to the level of scandalous among New Testament professors in the halls of Tübingen. Virtually every issue that Nietzsche’s reconstruction touches upon was by then the subject of careful and sophisticated scholarship.  

Nietzsche was introduced to critical New Testament scholarship years earlier through reading Strauss, Renan, Overbeck, and others, and he had more recently given high praise to Lüdemann’s impressive work on Pauline anthropology (its graceless prose notwithstanding). Thus, Nietzsche recognizes at the outset that he is not claiming complete originality when he credits Paul with the founding of the Christian religion. Baur’s *Paulus* (1845), had bluntly stated: ‘That Christianity, in the universal historical importance which it achieved, was the work of the Apostle Paul is undeniably a matter of historical fact’. Similarly, Ernst Rénan’s, *Saint Paul* (1869), a copy of which Nietzsche had apparently procured for Cosima Wagner, included a detailed analysis of the Pauline corpus, commenting on each letter’s claim to authenticity, and arriving at conclusions largely in accord with contemporary New Testament scholarship. As we have already seen, Lüdemann’s work on Pauline anthropology was focused, in part, on how

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201 This point could be easily missed, especially for non-specialists, who rarely have occasion for deeper acquaintance with the vast technical literature of NT scholarship. It is, in its breadth and complexity, astonishing. Paul’s longest letter is only about twenty pages of printed text, and yet, dedicated exegetical commentaries which exceed 1,000 pages are commonplace.


204 In a letter addressed to Wagner in 1973, Nietzsche writes, ‘To the venerable wife I send, with my best wishes, Paul [den Paulus] by Rénan . . .’, eKGWB/BVN-1873, 304.
Paul’s use of anthropological terms demonstrated that he was translating the message of Christianity into the technical language, and therefore the philosophical categories of the Greeks. The Hegelian scholar, Bruno Bauer, had already tested the radical limits of Pauline studies with his thesis in *Kritik der paulinischen Briefe* (first edition published, 1850), that none of the Pauline epistles—not even the *Hauptbriefe*—were authentic, but evinced a Stoic falsification of the historical Paul as represented in *Acts*. More recently, Bauer had published, *Christus und die Cäsaren. Der Ursprung des Christentums aus dem römischen Griechenthum* (1877), which examined the problem of Greco-Roman influence on primitive Christianity, within an enlarged frame of reference.205

Examples could be multiplied endlessly, but the point of importance is that the issues Nietzsche addresses were being discussed everywhere among his enlightened contemporaries. When, for example, Nietzsche writes, ‘That the ship of Christianity threw overboard a good part of the Jewish ballast, that it went and was able to go among the heathen—that is a consequence of the history of this one man . . .’, he was gesturing somewhat obliquely to the relativizing of the Jewish identity markers that took place within Paul’s universal mission206—a controversy tirelessly attested to in Paul’s letters and *Acts*. It was an issue, then as now, among Pauline specialists: what precisely was Paul’s role, and purpose in the development of the earliest group

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205 *Kritik der paulinischen Briefe*, third edition (Berlin: Gustav Hempel, 1952); see also, *Christus und die Cäsaren* (Berlin: Eugen Grosser, 1877). Bauer and Nietzsche knew each other, at least by reputation. They had both published sharply critical attacks on David Strauss, and Nietzsche references Bauer as, ‘one of my most attentive readers’, in this connection (EH ‘The Untimely Ones’ § 2, p. 278). Web-based articles on Bauer sometimes include an apocryphal account of a meeting between he and the young Nietzsche, in which they supposedly discussed Strauss.

206 Pace Jacob Golomb, who comments on this passage, ‘Because of [Paul’s] teachings, many of the positively powerful aspects of the ancient Hebrews as expressed in the Old Testament were obliterated. And thus, following the introduction of the concepts of “sin”, “guilt”, and “bad conscience” by Paul and his followers, their strong sensuality underwent a process of “the annihilation of the passions” (GS § 139) and “denaturing of natural values” (AC § 25), ‘Nietzsche’s Positive Religion and the Old Testament’, in *Nietzsche and the Divine*, 44. We will see that this commentary misunderstands Paul’s place within the Israel’s decline. The ‘priestly turn’ that Nietzsche (following Julius Wellhausen) traced through post-exilic Judaism, antedated Paul of Tarsus by centuries.
of Christ-followers from its initial (Judaic) particularity to the universal religion that we recognize as Christianity? 207

Nietzsche’s more interesting and important point, however, connects to the centre of Nietzsche’s task—just now emerging into view—of vanquishing the shadows of God: despite widespread and growing secularism, people continued to go to Paul’s works for personal edification and consolation, effectively blind to the turgid waters of their author’s mind. The continued existence of Christianity hung on this pious fiction (or its ‘after-effect’)—if people read Paul’s letters as the writings of Paul in all his troubled complexity, and not as the writings of the Holy Spirit, Christianity could not maintain its hold on the European imagination. Nietzsche, who sought psychological insight into Christianity, led the way in approaching the Pauline corpus, neither looking for consolation (as laypeople do), nor in hopes of demythologizing Paul to rescue him for the next generation (as many scholars were wont to do); rather, Nietzsche came to Paul’s writings asking how Paul’s problematic psychology might illuminate the religious impulse more broadly. This unique tack afforded Nietzsche access to a different set of potentially more interesting and subversive issues.

The ‘Wretched Man’ Under the Mosaic Law.

Nietzsche saw something seductive in the ideals of religion, but he also knew that when the ‘conscientious and fearful’ find themselves unable to live up to the ideals enshrined in the Law, they will default to anthropological pessimism: ‘we are weak and sinful through and through and in the depths of us incapable of morality . . .’. 208 Whether or not this is a basic impulse of Paulinism, it is axiomatic in the Augustinian-Lutheran reading of Paul. In the last chapter, I argued that part of the significance of the Damascus event was Paul’s inevitable sense of personal, moral destitution—despite his zealous observance of the Law (§ 3.2.2), and that Paul

207 This remains one of the defining debates over which the major schools of Pauline interpretation diverge from one another. Very broadly, the traditional Augustinian-Lutheran, and Apocalyptic approaches emphasize greater discontinuity between the old and new covenants, while the New Perspective, and the Paul-within-Judaism readings emphasize greater continuity. Nietzsche’s view is traditional-apocalyptic in terms of his understanding of Pauline soteriology, but we will see that his mature view comes to emphasize the natural development of Christianity out of the (axiological) ‘soil’ of Judaism.

208 D § 21, p. 18 [KSA 3, p. 33].

Duff, 196
articulated a careful account of the precariousness of existence within the moral space encompassed by the Law. Nietzsche saw clearly how Christianity, ‘brought into life a quite novel and limitless perilousness . . .’,\(^{209}\) but argues that ‘Christianity wanted to free men from the burden of the demands of morality, by as it supposed, showing a shorter way to perfection . . .’.\(^{210}\) We see here the soteriological language of plight and solution, which call to mind the intertwined doctrines of original sin, and forensic justification. Paul, Nietzsche argues, ‘suffered from a fixed idea, or more clearly from a fixed question which was always present to him and would never rest: what is the Jewish law really concerned with? and, in particular, what is the fulfilment of this law?’\(^{211}\) Much of Paul’s greatest letter, Romans, advances a treatise on this subject, offering Paul’s most nuanced argument for reframing the role of the Law in light of the Christ-event.\(^{212}\) Paul’s pre-Damascus zeal for the fulfilment of the Law lay at the centre of his identity,\(^{213}\) but on this point Nietzsche’s interpretation takes an interesting turn:

> Paul had become at once the fanatical defender and chaperone of this God and his law, and was constantly combating and on the watch for transgressors and doubters, harsh and malicious towards them and with the extremest inclination for punishment. And then he discovered in himself that he himself—fiery, sensual, melancholy, malevolent in hatred as he was—could not fulfil the law, he discovered indeed what seemed to him the strangest thing of all: that his extravagant lust for power was constantly combating and on the watch for transgressors and goad.\(^{214}\)

Nietzsche’s thesis was that what we have called ‘Paulinism’ was the natural result of an individual who experienced suffering on account of a troubled religious consciousness. For Nietzsche’s claim that, ‘Many things lay on [Paul’s] conscience—he hints at enmity, murder,

\(^{209}\) D § 57, p. 35 [KSA 3, p. 59], emphasis original.
\(^{210}\) D § 59, p. 36 [KSA 3, pp. 59-60], emphasis original.
\(^{211}\) D § 68, p. 40 [KSA 3, p. 65].
\(^{212}\) ‘For Christ is the fulfilment [τέλος] of the law unto righteousness [or justice] for all who believe’, Rom. 10.4. Paul’s earlier letter, Gal. (the favorite of Luther), treats some of the same issues, in a more polemical fashion, ‘Before the coming of this faith, we were held in custody under the law, locked up until the faith that was to come would be revealed. So the law was our guardian until Christ came that we might be justified by faith. Now that this faith has come, we are no longer under a guardian’ (3.23-25); ‘For all who rely on the works of the law are under a curse . . . . Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us, for it is written: “Cursed is everyone who is hung on a pole”’, Gal. 3.10, 13.
\(^{213}\) Gal. 3.14; Phil. 3.4-6.
\(^{214}\) D § 68, p. 40 [KSA 3, p. 65].
sorcery, idolatry, uncleanliness, drunkenness and pleasure in debauch . . .’, the evidence less substantial. We have seen that the four Hauptbriefe do contain references to Paul’s life as a persecutor of the Church, and it is on this basis that Paul refers to himself as the ‘least of the apostles’ (1 Cor. 15.9). We can even locate Nietzsche’s exact source through a notebook entry dated to the summer of 1880, where Nietzsche provides the same list with the addition of the Greek words, ‘φαρμακεία [witchcraft]’, and, ‘κῶμοι [orgies]’, in parentheses. The exact forms of both words appear together only in Galatians 5.20-21, where Paul writes: ‘The acts of the flesh are obvious: sexual immorality, impurity and debauchery; idolatry and witchcraft; hatred, discord, jealousy, fits of rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, factions and envy; drunkenness, orgies, and the like’. Taken in context, the passage in Galatians is paraenetic and not intended to be autobiographical. Paul frequently catalogues vices in paraenetic, didactic, and polemical contexts, but Nietzsche read these as ‘hints’ of what Paul had weighing on his own conscience prior to the Damascus event. This is a step that proceeds naturally from an Augustinian-Lutheran reading of Romans 7, and this seems to be just what Nietzsche had in mind—reading Romans 7 as Paul’s autobiographical phenomenology of conscience. Paul writes: ‘I have the desire to do what is good, but I cannot carry it out. For I do not do the good I

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215 However, in both Gal. 1.13, and Phil. 3.6, Paul’s history as a persecutor is used as evidence of his former zeal for the Law, which would have been deemed commendable from the perspective of his Judaizing opponents. Cf. the identical usages in Acts 22.4-5, 19-20; 26.9-11.

216 The famous, ‘worst of sinners’, passage might have been the best evidence for Nietzsche’s portrait, but it appears in the pastorals, which were almost universally considered deuteroc- Pauline by Nietzsche’s contemporaries:

> Even though I was once a blasphemer and a persecutor and a violent man, I was shown mercy because I acted in ignorance and unbelief. The grace of our Lord was poured out on me abundantly, along with the faith and love that are in Christ Jesus. Here is a trustworthy saying that deserves full acceptance: Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners—of whom I am the worst. But for that very reason I was shown mercy so that in me, the worst of sinners, Christ Jesus might display his immense patience as an example for those who would believe in him and receive eternal life (1 Tim. 1.13-16).

Cf. Eph. 3.8, ‘I am less than the least of all the Lord’s people’.

217 *KSA* 9:4[170], p. 144.

218 For vice lists in the Pauline corpus, see: Rom. 1.29–31; 13.13; 1 Cor. 5.10–11, 6.9–10; 2 Cor. 12.20–21; Gal. 5.19–21; Eph. 4.31; 5.3–5; Col. 3.5, 8; 1 Tim. 1.9–10; 2 Tim. 3.2–5; Titus 3.3.

Duff, 198
want to do, but the evil I do not want to do—this I keep on doing’. Nietzsche did not explicitly detail his own exegesis of Romans 7, but his quasi-Lutheran emphasis on the antinomian tendency in Paul’s thought suggests that he views the passage as Paul’s autobiographical retrospective—reflecting on a now-past condition. In the previous chapter, we saw that Stendhal’s watershed article, ‘The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West’, argued that Paul the Christian consistently exhibits a ‘robust conscience’, and the majority of contemporary Pauline scholars caution against reading Paul through a (distorting) Augustinian lens. But Nietzsche seems to hold to a version of the view currently favoured within Pauline scholarship sees the wretched man in a pre-justification state, with Paul either reflecting back onto his pre-Damascus religious consciousness with the eyes of faith, or reflecting the Christian perspective of the archetypical, law-observant Israelite, who is fraught with anxiety over their frightful predicament vis-à-vis the Law—its sharply-defined boundaries enticing the flesh into transgression, and their willing of the good rendered impotent by the presence of sin in the flesh.

Following the logic of Romans 7, Nietzsche raised the very questions that Paul was working there to address: ‘Is it really “carnality” which again and again makes him a transgressor? And not rather, as he later suspected, behind it the law itself, which must

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219 Here quoting vv. 18-19; the whole passage, vv. 7-25, is relevant. Cf. Nietzsche’s statement of a similar principle in D § 22: ‘The most confident knowledge or faith cannot provide the strength or the ability needed for a deed, it cannot replace the employment of that subtle, many-faceted mechanism which must first be set in motion if anything at all of an idea is to translate itself into action’.

220 See § 3.3.2, ‘The ‘Wretched Self’ of Romans 7’. Elsewhere, Paul presents his pre-conversion self as faultless with respect to the Law (Phil. 3.6), and as having a clear conscience before God as a Christian (1 Cor. 4.4). I have argued that the situation is more complex than these two passages, taken in isolation, might suggest.

221 Badiou demurs: ‘[Paul] is manifestly speaking about himself, almost in the style of Augustine’s Confessions . . .’, Saint Paul, 81.

222 So Bultmann: ‘Paul so depicts the situation of man under the Torah as it has become clear to a backward look from the standpoint of Christian faith’, Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1, 247. Käsemann takes an even broader perspective: ‘The tortured cry of Rom. 7.24 is therefore what the apostle hears from the lips of all natural life: “Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?”’, ‘On Paul’s Anthropology’, 1-31, Perspectives on Paul, 16.

223 Nietzsche’s, ‘Fleischlichkeit’, referring of course to Paul’s important terminology of, ‘σάρξ [flesh]’, and, ‘σάρκινός [fleshly]’.

Duff, 199
continually prove itself unfulfillable and with irresistible magic lures on to transgression?"224 Nietzsche’s question about Paul’s understanding of ‘carnality’ and the Law, is probably the greatest interpretive challenge in the whole of § 68. Nietzsche’s notes from this period reveal his considerable efforts to sort out the logic of this important facet of Pauline anthropology. The lexical Greek form of flesh, ‘σάρξ’, appears an even dozen times in the Nachlaß225—each time during the summer of 1880, when Nietzsche was working his way through Lüdemann’s Anthropologie, and often in association with a constellation of related Pauline terms: ‘sin [ἁμαρτία]’, ‘transgression [παράβασις]’, ‘spirit [πνεῦμα]’, and with Nietzsche’s German substitutions for Law [Gesetz], guilt [Schuld], and death [Tod]. In one of the earliest notes, Nietzsche deals somewhat cryptically with the problem of Romans 7: “The flesh must be taken away” [thinks] Paul. The resistance of the inner man226 merely with knowledge of the Law and joy in it is insufficient, fully impotent’.227 So Nietzsche sees in Paul a frustrated bondage of the will. Here Luther, who ‘wanted in his monastery to become the perfect man of the spiritual ideal . . . who one day began to hate the spiritual ideal and the Pope . . .’,228 serves as an illustration of the same suffering on account of unappeasable religious fanaticism.229 For Paul, Nietzsche writes: ‘The law was the cross to which he felt himself nailed: how he hated it! how

224 D. Havemann writes of Nietzsche’s reading of Lüdemann: ‘The point, which would later be widely considered the chief insight of [Anthropologie]: the existence of two rival approaches to soteriology, appears not to have stood out to Nietzsche, or not to have been important; in any case, one finds no evidence of it in notes from either reading, or in his later comments’, Der ‘Apostel der Rache’, 100, n. 41. If correct, this would be extraordinary, especially given the way Lüdemann attacks the problem of these rival approaches with such relentless energy. But this passage suggests that Nietzsche was aware of Lüdemann’s thesis, even if he did not precisely adopt it.


226 That is, ‘inner Menschen’, referring to Paul’s, ‘ἔσω ἄνθρωπον’, Rom. 7.22.


228 D § 68, p. 40 [KSA 3, p. 66], emphasis original.

229 Nietzsche’s close association of Paul and Luther may have gone unchallenged in his 19th-Century Lutheran Germany, but, from the perspective of contemporary Pauline studies, this view has become an unpopular historical artefact. Written today, Nietzsche’s argument about Paul’s troubled conscience would simply miscarry. Ola Sigurdson, having briefly outlined Nietzsche’s attack on Paul, writes: ‘we are far from the very premises of Nietzsche’s very negative assessment of Paul. The premises for reading Paul today could then be very different from Nietzsche’s at least quasi-Lutheran views’, ‘Reading Žižek Reading Paul’, 218.
he had to drag it along! how he sought about for a means of destroying it—and no longer to fulfil it!’

In his notebook, Nietzsche neatly summarizes the dialectic of flesh, sin, and Law: ‘[Paul] has assumed the sensual, sinful human body; the human sin-flesh. It is ἁµαρτία: it reigns over the πνεύµα ἀν<ἱ>ρ<ω>πού before the appearance of the Law, without its knowledge, and after the appearance of the Law with its knowledge, resulting in παράβασις’. Nietzsche thought he had here captured the Pauline notion of plight. How, therefore, might a zealous Israelite like Paul find freedom from the strictures of the Mosaic covenant, and so relieve his burdened conscience? Nietzsche associates Paul’s solution with the Damascus event.

The Damascus Event as an Antinomian Epiphany.

Nietzsche has now excavated Paul’s religious consciousness, and found that Paul was motivated by a desire for power, and a sense of ressentiment against the requirements of the Law, which he believed to be unfulfillable given human nature. This was the plight; he now turns to the solution:

And at last the liberating idea came to him, together with a vision, as was bound to happen in the case of this epileptic: to him, the zealot of the law who was inwardly tired to death of it, there appeared on a lonely road Christ with the light of God shining in his countenance, and Paul heard the words: ‘Why persecutest thou me?’ What essentially happened then is rather this: his mind suddenly became clear: ‘it is unreasonable’, he says to himself, ‘to persecute precisely this Christ! For here is the way out, here is the perfect revenge, here and nowhere else do I have and hold the destroyer of the law!’

Here Nietzsche offers his own interpretation of the Damascus event: it was Paul’s personal epiphany that the Christ-event could be interpreted as the destruction of the very Law that oppressed him. This involved an element of self-deception in that there was no ‘event’ outside of Paul’s mind, but in an earlier section in Daybreak, Nietzsche hypothesized a psychological mechanism in the founders of religions, in which personal ideas are—as if by necessity—sublimated into divine revelation: ‘he suddenly acquires his new idea, and the happiness engendered by a great hypothesis encompassing the universe and all existence enters his

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230 D § 68, p. 41 [KSA 3, p. 66], emphasis original.
232 D § 68, p. 41 [KSA 3, pp. 66-67], emphasis original.
consciousness with such force he does not dare to consider himself the creator of such happiness and ascribes the cause of it, and again the cause of the cause of this new idea to his god: as his god’s revelation. Nietzsche’s characterization of an idea with a cosmic scope fits perfectly with what we have seen in Paulinism. Paulinism, for Nietzsche, is essentially this: it is overcoming the existential agony caused by Judaism’s world-historical invention—the holy God, and the oppressive fear of transgression caused by the enmity of law and flesh. One of the most fascinating aspects of Nietzsche’s reading of Paul, is the twofold effect of Paul’s discovery. According to his reading, when Paul discovers in the crucifixion of Christ the destruction of the Law, ‘at a stroke he feels himself recovered, the moral despair is as if blown away, destroyed—that is to say, fulfilled, there on the Cross!’; indeed, ‘all at once he is the happiest of men’. And yet, Paul is still ‘Sick with the most tormented pride . . .’.

Nietzsche finishes his account with a fascinating, and tightly-compressed collection of ideas that are ringing with allusions to the Pauline corpus, reflecting his general familiarity with Paul’s writings: Nietzsche’s precis, ‘To die to evil—that means also to die to the law; to exist in the flesh—that means also to exist in the law!’ captures some of the essential logic of Romans 6-7, where Paul argues that ‘We are those who have died to sin’, and ‘you also died to the law through the body of Christ. . . . [W]hen we were in the realm of the flesh, the sinful passions aroused by the law were at work in us’. Again Nietzsche: ‘to become one with Christ—that means also to become with him the destroyer of the law; to have died with him—that means also to have died to the law!’ Here Nietzsche focuses in on a key aspect of Paul’s anthropology, and the allusions pointing toward what we have seen is one of the most important passages of Paul’s view of the self: ‘For through the law I died to the law so that I might live for God. I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me’ (Gal. 2.19–20).

As we saw in the previous chapter, Paul’s central justification motif employs juristic or forensic language, calling to mind the image of a courtroom setting where the verdicts of ‘guilty [ἀδικία]’, and, ‘not guilty [δίκαιος]’, are pronounced upon the defendant. We also observed the parallel motif of participation with Christ—an existential re-enactment of the Christ-event. As Nietzsche was keenly aware, the logic of Paul’s argument in Galatians, was that law-observance

\[233\] D § 62, p. 38 [KSA 3, p. 62], emphasis original.
\[234\] Quoting from Rom. 6.2, and 7.4-5.

Duff, 202
itself could never serve as a path to justification because of human weakness (the flesh). Participation in the Christ-event becomes Paul’s solution: ‘For we know that our old self was crucified with him so that the body ruled by sin might be done away with, that we should no longer be slaves to sin—because anyone who has died has been set free from sin’. Paul does not mean that those who participate existentially in the death of Christ will cease to sin, but that they are no longer enslaved to sin, and can now fearlessly face death and the approaching judgement. When anthropology is reframed around the Christ-event, the catastrophic combination sin, flesh, and Law give way to a new freedom in the Spirit, which producesvirtuous behaviour without the liabilities—the precariousness—of life under the Law: ‘[I]f you are led by the spirit, you are not under the law’.  

In this subsection of § 68, with its remarkable number of apropos allusions to Paul’s Hauptbriefe, Nietzsche is examining the heart of Paulinism. His reading of selections from Paul’s texts is consistently Augustinian-Lutheran in its orientation; both Augustine and Luther read Paul as someone who shared their sense of existential oppression under moral strictures. What is uniquely Nietzschean about this reading is Nietzsche’s attempt to understand the emergence of Christianity as a phenomenon with roots in Paul’s troubled conscience. Nietzsche was not attempting to refute Paul’s gospel, per se, but to re-imagine Paulinism by disenchanting the context from which it emerged.

_Damascus Reimagined—Lüdemann’s Influence on Nietzsche._

With Nietzsche’s psychological and antinomian interpretation of the Damascus event in view, we can now see the close parallels in Lüdemann’s treatment. Lüdemann, like Nietzsche, understood Romans 7.7ff to be an autobiographical account of Paul’s pre-Christian religious consciousness, and, like Nietzsche, he understood the pre-Damascus Paul to be tormented by his failure to meet the requirements of the Law:

> With this question, we stand at the beating heart of the Pauline Christian consciousness. Once a desperate failure with his feverish striving to fulfil the

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235 Rom. 6.6-7; cf. 8.10; Gal. 2.19-21, 5.24, 6.14; 2 Cor. 5.14.  
236 Gal. 5.18; cf. 5.23; Rom. 6.14, 7.4.  
237 As Nietzsche once said, ‘What have I to do with refutations?’, _GM_ ‘Forward’ § 4 [KSA 5, p. 250].  
238 H. Lüdemann, _Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus_, 110.
Law, which, at first empirically, and later in principle, proved an impossible means to obtaining salvation, or a feeling of God’s pleasure; frightened to the death, and in a state of despair, so that his religious consciousness was dark and forlorn (Rom. 7.10), he was enlightened by means of a direct, divine revelation; he recognized a means of escape from this darkness, to clearly see God’s plan of salvation, and indeed thereby that, ‘God has shown his light in our hearts’, the light of the knowledge of God in the face of Jesus Christ (2 Cor. 4.6).²³⁹

The linguistic and thematic parallels are so striking in the original German, that Havemann juxtaposed page-length selections from the two accounts, and stopped just short of accusing Nietzsche of plagiarism.²⁴⁰ We can see that Lüdemann’s hypothesis differs primarily in terms of causation: he allows that Paul ‘was enlightened by means of a direct, divine revelation . . .’, while Nietzsche reduces the event to natural causes. We saw in the previous chapter that Lüdemann went on to argue that Paul’s vision and conversion set in motion a progressive development in his ontology from a Hebrew-monistic to a more Hellenistic, and quasi-dualistic flesh-Spirit opposition in his anthropology. This is based, in part, on the glorious nature of the being Paul witnesses on his way to Damascus. Lüdemann saw 2 Corinthians 4.6 as a reflection of Paul’s Damascus vision, where Paul writes that God, ‘made his light shine in our hearts to give us the light of the knowledge of God’s glory displayed in the face of Christ’. Lüdemann took the vision of the glorified Christ to be so decisive for Paulinism because the crucifixion had appeared to be a defeater of Jesus of Nazareth’s messianic claims. The resurrection was a vindication. After Damascus, it was no longer possible to doubt that ‘der gekreuzigte Jesus [war] ein übermenschliches Wesen’, even, ‘ein gottgleiches Dasein’.²⁴¹ It was out of this dialectical collision of apparent defeat and actual vindication that Paul’s mind began to develop the distinctive understanding of the Christ-event—the revaluation of all values—that undergirds the whole of Paulinism.

There are indications that this reading particularly sparked Nietzsche’s interest. Nietzsche quoted from 2 Corinthians 4.6 in his notes on Lüdemann, saying ‘the proof for Paul was the appearance at Damascus: the light of God shining on the face of Jesus’.²⁴² The passage

²³⁹ Lüdemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 110.
²⁴⁰ Havemann, Der ‘Apostel der Rache’, 103.
²⁴¹ Lüdemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 110.
appears again in *Daybreak* § 68, where Paul saw, ‘Christ with the light of God shining in his countenance . . .’. Then Nietzsche writes, ‘Hitherto that shameful death had counted with him as the principal argument against the ‘Messiahdom’ of which the followers of the new teaching spoke: but what if it were necessary for the abolition of the law!— The tremendous consequences of this notion, this solution of the riddle, whirl before his eyes . . .’. So again, *it was this resolution to the paradox of the crucified and resurrected Messiah that led to Paul’s distinctive articulation of the gospel as the abrogation of the Law through the Christ-event.*

**Paul’s Expectations of Übermenschlich Being**

To encounter the ‘übermenschliches’ and ‘gottgleiches’ Christ, was to encounter the one to whom Paul would later refer in *1 Corinthians* 15.45, as: ‘the last Adam, a life-giving spirit [πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν]’—as the progenitor of a new kind of humanity. Nietzsche concludes § 68 with a summary of what Paulinism had to say about life in the νῦν καιρὸς, and it reflects Paul’s eschatological expectations of bodily and spiritual transformation:

> Yet but a brief time within this decay!—that is the Christian’s lot, before, become [sic] one with Christ, he arises with Christ, participates with Christ in divine glory and becomes a ‘son of God’, like Christ.—With that the intoxication of Paul is at its height, and likewise the importunity of his soul—with the idea of becoming one with Christ all shame, all subordination, all bounds are taken from it, and the intractable lust for power reveals itself as an anticipatory revelling in divine glories.”  

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**4.5 Summary and Conclusions: Paul’s Subversive Anthropology of Event.**

Previous studies of the Nietzsche-Paul relationship have paid insufficient attention to the irony present in these early reflections on Paul—an irony Nietzsche expects his readers to grasp. In the receding shadows of Christendom, it is natural to hear Nietzsche stating the obvious—namely, that Paul was an unpleasant, power-hungry person. But this is a mere caricature of

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243 D § 68, pp. 41-42 [KSA 3, p. 68], emphasis original. We often seen in Paul’s writings a grim view of the human plight resolve into poetic accounts about future glories, as in Romans 8.18-21.  
244 The many recent publications that assume anti-Pauline sentiments, suggest that a critical view of Paul is less the exception than the rule, e.g.: Karen Armstrong, *The Apostle We Love to Hate* Duff, 205
Paul that is not in keeping with the ancient evidence, nor does it appreciate the nuances in Nietzsche’s understanding. Given Nietzsche’s recognition at the outset of § 68 that so many turn to Paul’s writings for edification and consolation, it is clear that Nietzsche intends his complex portrait of Paul to help his readers reconsider long-held assumptions. Paul had been the heroic, militant Apostle of freedom in Nietzsche’s Germany, and, despite growing secularism, his letters continued to be read widely. In Nietzsche’s developing perspective, for all of Paul’s ‘fire and eloquence’, he was a blind guide. This insight into the Pauline religious consciousness clearly resonated deeply with Nietzsche as he began to experience the return of his own health, to overcome the sense of self-estrangement he experienced so suddenly at Bayreuth, and to realize the world-historical significance of his own task of wresting humanity out of ‘the worst of hands’:

The demand that we should believe that everything is really in the best of hands, that a book, the Bible, offers us definitive assurances about the divine governance and wisdom in the destiny of man, is—translated back into reality—the will to suppress the truth about the pitiable opposite of all this; namely, that humanity has so far been in the worst of hands and that it has been governed by the underprivileged, the craftily vengeful, the so-called ‘saints’, these slanderers of the world and violators of man.246

While it is natural to take Nietzsche early reflections on Paul as overtly hostile—they are, after all, the product of the mind behind The Antichrist—I am suggesting here that such a reading is anachronistic. Nietzsche’s most famous, and most powerful, arguments against Christianity were the products of extended reflection; they developed across time. There is nothing in these passages from the middle period that would betray the degree of animus we see in Nietzsche’s late-period publications. On the other hand, we also see that Nietzsche’s reflections on Paul were laying the foundation upon which the later structure of Nietzschean anti-Christianity was built.

(Boston: New Harvest, 2015); Daniel Kirk, Jesus Have I Loved, but Paul?: A Narrative Approach to the Problem of Pauline Christianity (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011); Patrick Gray, Paul as a Problem in History and Culture: The Apostle and His Critics through the Centuries (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016).

245 D § 192, p. 113 [KSA 3, p. 165].
Chapter 5

The Anastasis Self: Mapping the Pauline Subjectivity Within Its World

5.1 Introduction.

St Paul wrote to the church in Rome, ‘We were therefore buried with him through baptism into death in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, we too may live a new life. For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we will certainly also be united with him in a resurrection like his’ (6.4-5). An examination of the broader context reveals the familiar Pauline synthesis of the didactic and the paraenetic: Paul

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1 ‘Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, the new creation has come: Look! The old has gone, the new is here!’ (2 Cor. 5:17).
2 ‘[Y]ou have taken off your old self with its practices and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the image of its Creator. Here there is no Gentile or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all, and is in all’ (Col. 3.9-11).
articulates the Christ-event as both the pattern upon which the believer’s experience is modelled, and as the normative pattern upon which it ought to be modelled. For Paul, therefore, the believer is called to reflect upon the Christ-event, as they become who they are in Christ. Here we see the two central aspects of the Christ-event, appearing as key phenomena within the Christ-follower’s subjective experience of life in the νῦν καιρὸς is to be measured and understood. In Chapter 3, we began our study of Pauline anthropology with an exploration of Paul’s Damascus road experience (§ 3.2), seeking a link between Paul’s conversion and his boldly-transcultural gospel—the ‘gospel of the uncircumcised’ [εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἄκροβυστίας] (Gal. 2.7)—and his controversial mission as the, ‘Apostle of the Nations’ [ἐθνῶν ἀπόστολος] (Rom. 11.13). I argued there that while whole doctrines may not have emerged in this event, Paul’s vision of the living Christ was a radical disruption of his religious consciousness—delivering a defeater for his anti-Christian interpretation of Judaism. This defeater resulted in a sense of personal-existential destitution before the God of Israel, and the Law, because it was precisely in and through his zealous religious praxis—ironically characterized as ‘faultless’ (Phil. 3.6)—that he had resisted Israel’s Messiah. To turn to Christ, therefore, was to accept his moral indigence, and be crucified with Christ (Gal. 2.20). Thus Damascus was a radicalization of Paul’s anthropological pessimism, which naturally led to 1) his dramatic revaluation and expansion of his vision of Judaism, and 2) the articulation of a universal human plight, which he traced genealogically to the Adam of the Hebrew Scripture’s primeval account of origins. I developed this thesis further by examining some of Paul’s most important concepts, including his Adam-Christ typology, his revaluation of the role of the Law, and the flesh-Spirit opposition that runs throughout the Pauline corpus.

In Chapter Four, we turned our attention back to Nietzsche, beginning a diachronic study of two essential themes: philosophical anthropology and anti-Christianity. Throughout my exploration of Nietzsche’s writings from Birth, through to the final form of Human—the period from 1872 through 1880—I argued that we see continuity in Nietzsche’s interest in philosophical anthropology, but discontinuity with respect to his anti-Christianity. Birth and Human may be understood as very different approaches to addressing one and the same concern; the former

appears naively constructive and romantic, while the latter is deconstructive and pessimistic—both demonstrate Nietzsche’s abiding concern for healthful, ascendant human existence. The second theme, however, Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity, is conspicuously absent from the early-period writings, and only begins to emerge with Human. Indeed, throughout this period, Nietzsche’s published works articulate no satisfying theoretical basis for anti-Christianity, as such—despite his claims to the contrary in Eccé Homo.

In the second and third parts of chapter 4, I explored the early appearances of two key features of Nietzsche’s developing symbolic world—the Death of God, and the eternal recurrence—both of which appear in the months following Nietzsche’s renewed interest in St Paul. I then provided a detailed examination of Nietzsche’s early understanding of Paul, arguing that these early reflections were characterized more by irony than by animus: he wished to highlight the psychology of Paul in a way that made his dramatic (and successful) expansion of Christianity the history of an error to which Paul’s was psychologically predisposed. This early study was the seedbed for the later Nietzsche’s more radical, and hostile anti-Christianity.

We now return to our study of St Paul. Having laid the groundwork for Pauline deconstruction, we are now positioned to further explore his positive vision of the Christian subjectivity within the symbolic world of nascent Christianity. I will argue here that Paul’s articulation of the believer’s subjectivity in the νῦν καιρὸς—what I am calling the ‘anastasis self’—continues Paul’s subversive anthropology of event. It is a reading of the Christ-event as an euchatastrophe for human being that is carefully mapped within a larger cosmic context—precisely as Nietzsche would come to say—as a ‘revaluation of all the values of antiquity’.

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4 Throughout this work, I have sought a balanced view that takes EH seriously, while not ignoring its eccentric and highly stylized character. In the coming chapter, I will examine Nietzsche’s motivations for writing EH in connection with the publication of AC, but I do not treat it as mere propaganda, nor do I dismiss it as so much evidence of Nietzsche’s failing mind. On my reading, the author of EH is Nietzsche in rare form: lucid, witty, and capable of sober self-criticism—dramatically different from the inhabitant of a dream world who composed the ‘letters of insanity’. In the case at hand, it seems best to acknowledge the absence of any serious anti-Christian animus in the early period, and to see his claims to covert instances of such sentiments as his attempt to show continuity in his ‘becoming who he is’.

5 Or, as he will later say, ‘the history of progressively cruder misunderstanding of the original symbolism’, AC § 37, p. 159 [KSA 6, p. 209], emphasis original.

6 BGE § 46 p. 60 [KSA 5, p. 67].
5.2 The Subversive Logic of the Cross.

‘ἔμοι δὲ μὴ γένοιτο καυχᾶσθαι εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ κυρίου ἤμων Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, δι’ οὗ ἔμοι κόσμος ἐσταύρωται κἀγὼ κόσμῳ’.
—St Paul, Letter to the Galatians

‘Christus am Kreuze’ ist das erhabenste Symbol — immer noch. —
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Fall 1885.

5.2.1 The Cross of Christ as Wisdom and Power.

The two halves of the Christ-event—the Cross and the resurrection—feature prominently in the extant Corinthian correspondence, showing Paul’s broader application of the divine death motif in the more complex religious-philosophical milieu of Corinth in Southern Greece. The two letters contain Paul’s most sustained treatments of the antagonism between the gospel and Greco-Roman values. Not surprisingly, the two extant letters to Corinth would be of particular interest to Nietzsche. As in Galatians, Paul appeals to the Christ-event in an effort to unify a fracturing Christian community—with factions forming around Peter, Apollos, Christ, and Paul himself. In Galatians, Paul assails his congregation for allowing others to use their ethnic identity markers as symbolic social capital—calling Christ-followers to live authentically within the world shaped by the death and resurrection of the Son of God. Here in 1 Corinthians, Paul’s argument takes a broader scope, while still directing it against his interlocutors’ failure to

7 ‘May I never boast except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world’ (Gal. 6.14).
8 ‘Christ on the Cross is the most sublime symbol—even now’, KSA 12:2[96] p. 108.
9 Internal evidence suggests that we have lost at least two letters from Paul to Corinth (1 Cor. 5.9, 2 Cor. 7.8), and at least one letter from Corinth to Paul (1 Cor. 7.1). These comments likely prompted the composition of the pseudepigraphal texts, ‘Letter of the Corinthians to Paul’, and, ‘Third Letter to the Corinthians’, both of which appear in the second-century apocryphal work, Acts of Paul; see, The Writings of St Paul, trans. J. K. Elliott, ed. Wayne A. Meeks and John T. Fitzgerald (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2007), 144-147.
10 See vv. 1.10-17, especially v. 12, ‘What I mean is this: One of you says, “I follow Paul”; another, “I follow Apollos”; another, “I follow Cephas [Peter]”; still another, “I follow Christ”’.
11 We will return to examine the, ‘Incident at Antioch’, in detail, below.
recognize the axiological implications of the Cross. In the world reshaped by the Cross, Paul argues, it absurd to value one type of person over another (3.21).

Paul introduces this rhetorically-charged section of the letter with his paradoxical statement about the centrality of the Cross of Christ: ‘For the message of the Cross [Ὁ λόγος . . . τοῦ σταυροῦ] is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God’ (1.18). By making ‘Christ crucified’ [Χριστὸν-ἔσταυρωμένον] the axiological centre of gravity in his world, Paul is engaging in an ironic inversion of both Greco-Roman, and Judaic values. The prima facie absurdity of the message that the Cross is really wisdom and power is unflinchingly held up as an index of the weakness and folly of human achievement. The deliberate paradox of the conjunction, ‘Χριστὸν-ἔσταυρωμένον’, was a calculated rhetorical affront to the sensibilities of his detractors. The Cross was the peerless symbol of the human contempt; the Messianic title, was pregnant with a sense of divine favour; in the Cross of Christ, divine and human valuations reach a violent collision:

Where is the wise person? Where is the teacher of the law? Where is the philosopher of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not know him, God was pleased through the foolishness of what was preached to save those who believe. Jews demand signs and Greeks look for wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block [σκάνδαλον] to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than human wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than human strength (1 Cor. 1.18-25).

The (rhetorical) roll call—‘Where is the wise person? . . .’—indicates that Paul was not focused on a single type of interlocutor as he had been in other cases. Rather, his critique encompasses the values which stabilized the identities of both Israelites and Greeks. The archetypical Israelite

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12 Paul’s argument continues through to its ironic climax in 4.13, but colours the whole of the Corinthian correspondence, where the Cross continues to function as a symbol of a revaluation of values.
13 John Caputo writes, ‘We have to appreciate the huge paradox packed into [the “logos of the Cross”], which expresses a very considerable incredulity about what counts as a logos in the world’, The Folly of God: A Theology of the Unconditional (Salem, OR: Polebridge Press, 2006).
14 Literally, ‘anointed one’.
15 Here he names ‘the wise man’, ‘the teacher of the law’, and ‘the philosopher of this age’—which, unlike the antinomian and judaizing sects of Gal., are not inherently negative. His point is not that each of these types have come under the same process of revaluation.
seeks signs [σημεῖα], but, like Paul on the road to Damascus, is confronted with the scandal of the crucified and resurrected Messiah. The archetypical Greek seeks wisdom [σοφίαν] and is confronted with the preposterousness of ‘ὁ λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ’—a cruciform logic that subverts all human claims to achievement.¹⁶ Both Jews and Greeks seek power, and they are confronted with the appalling symbol of divine weakness in the crucified God. But, what appears to be weakness and folly ultimately proved to defeat what was thought to be wisdom and strength. As Caputo writes, ‘It is precisely the soaring brilliance of Paul that has thematised the weakness of God, the scandal of God made manifest in weakness. But at the same time that Paul champions the idea of the weakness of God, he does so precisely in the service of the genuine power of God’.¹⁷ Indeed, Paul knows nothing of a weak or foolish God, and he is convinced that the apparent, or perspectival, folly and weakness of the Cross represent the divine inversion of fleshly wisdom and power. The Cross is God’s indictment of the wisdom of the world [τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ κόσμου], precisely because it accomplished what the world’s wisdom and power had hitherto failed to accomplish: namely, true knowledge of God leading to salvation (1.18-21).¹⁸ Thus, God was pleased to save through a process of apparent weakness and folly. Paul’s paradoxical language presses his interlocutors to adopt a perspective that is the direct inverse of the world’s valuations, by which the Cross can be rightly perceived as, ‘Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God’ (1.24).

¹⁶ At several points throughout this project, I have joined others (e.g., John D. Caputo) in glossing Paul’s expression, ‘ὁ λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ’, as ‘the logic of the Cross’, rather than the more common translations, ‘message of the Cross’ (NIV, NET, CEB, NRS), and, ‘word of the Cross’ (NASB, ESV, CSB, WYC, WEB). I have chosen logic in order to highlight Paul’s careful thinking through of the implications and entailments of the Christ-event. Cf. Rom. 12.1, ‘λογικὴν λατρείαν [logical/rational/reasonable/appropriate worship]’.

¹⁷ Caputo, The Weakness of God (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 45. Similarly, Jennings, who rightly sees Paul’s inversion: ‘But this same weakness and folly . . . ultimately displays the stupidity and impotence of the “rulers of this age” who are also known as “weak and beggarly elemental structures of the cosmos” (Gal. 4.8-9)’, ‘Paul and Sons: (Post-modern) Thinkers Reading Paul’, 102.

¹⁸ Here N. T. Wright sees Paul strategically locating the Christ-event within the controlling narratives of all cultures: ‘God’s folly! But, we note, God’s folly: the crucified Messiah was God’s answer to the problems both of Israel and of the world. This, again, is not a freestanding narrative about Jesus. It is the insertion of Jesus into the longer narratives of Israel and the world . . .’, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 522; cf. 899,
As his argument against factionalism progresses, Paul points to both the Corinthians and his own ministry as evidence of the disjunction between the valuations of the Cross and human standards [κατὰ σάρκα]: ‘Not many of you were wise by human standards; not many were influential; not many were of noble birth’ (1.26). Likewise, Paul’s proclamation of the Cross was ‘not with wisdom and eloquence’ (1.17), but with ‘weakness with great fear and trembling’ (2.3). Paul’s programmatic statement for his mission in Corinth, ‘For I resolved to know nothing while I was with you except Jesus Christ and him crucified’ (2.2), demonstrates the depth of his resolve to make the Cross the axiological centre of gravity in his world. The word of the Cross is either so much preposterousness, or it is wisdom itself; Paul’s argument leaves no middle ground.

The remainder of the Corinthian correspondence gives rich expression to Paul’s cynical view of humanity, and his still more cynical view of human valuations. We will see that in Galatians, his crucifixion with Christ was his death to the world, and the world’s death to him (Gal. 6.14)—an end to trying to please humans (Gal. 1.10). Here he knows that by human assessments he may be ‘the scum of the earth, the garbage of the world’ (4.13), but he views the scorn of the cosmos through a very pessimistic lens: none of the ‘rulers of this age [ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου]’ understood God’s wisdom, ‘for if they had, they would not have crucified the lord of glory’ (2.9). Mere humanity [ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος] rejects God’s wisdom as folly as well.

19 Paul’s depreciations of wisdom and eloquence seem out of place in what is certainly a rhetorical masterpiece, but, Paul may not have been a skilled public speaker. According to his own testimony in 2 Cor. 10.10, the counter-mission in Corinth claimed that ‘His [Paul’s] letters are weighty and forceful, but in person he is unimpressive and his speaking amounts to nothing’; Paul does not attempt to refute the charge, other than to say, ‘I may indeed be untrained as a speaker, but I do have knowledge’, 11.6.

20 One typical example: ‘I wrote to you in my letter not to associate with sexually immoral people—not at all meaning the people of this world who are immoral, or the greedy and swindlers, or idolaters. In that case you would have to leave this world’, 5.9-10.

21 1 Cor. 3.18ff, 4.8-13, 5.2-6; 2 Cor. 10.7ff.

22 There is a lively discussion surrounding the identity of the ‘rulers of this age’. If Paul has specific rulers in mind, his thinking is properly theopolitical; if he is thinking of the dark, unseen powers on the cosmic scale, his thinking is more properly apocalyptic with, perhaps, secondary political implications. It is likely a category-frustrating mixture of the two. N. T. Wright sees mysterious forces at work in Paul’s world, but suggests the, ‘ruler of this age’, include, ‘Caiaphas, Pilate and the power-systems which they represented . . .’, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 1,068. John Barclay takes a very wide frame of reference, cautioning against misplaced confidence in our own taxonomies:
because of its own blindness (2.14), but the spiritual [ὁ πνευματικὸς] are not subject to ‘merely human judgments’ (2.15), for they possess the mind of Christ [νοῦν Χριστοῦ] (2.16). As Paul returns to explicitly address his pastoral concerns, this distinction between the spiritual and mere humanity is applied to the Corinthians themselves:

Brothers and sisters, I could not address you as people who live by the Spirit [πνευματικοῖς] but as people who are still worldly [or fleshly, σαρκίνοις]—mere infants in Christ. I gave you milk, not solid food, for you were not yet ready for it. Indeed, you are still not ready. You are still worldly. For since there is jealousy and quarrelling among you, are you not worldly? Are you not acting like mere humans [κατὰ ἰδιωτικόν περιπατεῖτε]? For when one says, ‘I follow Paul’, and another, ‘I follow Apollos’, are you not mere human beings? (3.1-4).

Here Paul’s anthropological types, πνευματικοῖς and σαρκίνοις, point to different modalities of human existence. The factions in Corinth, which naturally formed around different personalities,23 were Paul’s proof that they were not operating under the paradigm of the Cross. They were boasting like mere humans: ‘[W]ho makes you different from anyone else? What do you have that you did not receive? And if you did receive it, why do you boast as though you did not?’ (4.7). In the conclusion of his argument (4.8-13), Paul satirizes the Corinthians’

‘The world’ or ‘this age’ (1 Cor. 1-2; Gal. 1.4) is a Pauline category that can be used to characterize both political rulers (1 Cor. 2.6-8) and the cultural systems by which they operate (‘wisdom’ and ‘power’, 1 Cor. 1.20): it is sufficiently comprehensive to include Roman power, but its defining characteristics are by no means ‘Roman’. Thus the ‘principalities’ and ‘powers’ discussed by Paul are entities which defy our normal taxonomies. They are not simply ‘anthropological’ since they cover the whole gamut of existence, from death to social disintegration to the corruption that infests the whole cosmos (1 Cor. 15.26; Rom. 8.18-39); to call them ‘cosmic’ might suggest that they hover in some extra-human sphere, and not (also) in human lives on the earthly stage. Paul’s language of ‘powers’ thus denotes comprehensive features of reality which penetrate (what we call) the ‘political’ sphere, but only as it is enmeshed in larger and more comprehensive force-fields (‘Why the Roman Empire was Insignificant to Paul’, 384).

23 In a culturally-diverse port city like Corinth, factions would form naturally, and it is not difficult to imagine how the different leaders whom Paul names—himself included—might have appealed to those hailing from different cultural contexts. Apollos was a Jewish rhetorician from the Alexandrian school who reportedly debated with orthodox Jews in Corinth shortly after Paul’s departure; Cephas, or Peter, was famous as a prominent leader the church in Jerusalem, and a member of the original twelve; Paul was the founder of the community; the ‘I follow Christ’ crowd may have prided themselves in discovering a short-circuit that allowed them to ignore church leaders.
boasting by mockingly adopting their perspective, and pressing it to the point of absurdity: ‘Already you have all you want! Already you have become rich! You have begun to reign—and that without us!’ (4.8), while teasingly lamenting his sufferings: ‘For it seems to me that God has put us apostles on display at the end of the procession, like those condemned to die in the arena. . . . We have become the scum of the earth, the garbage of the world—right up to this moment’ (4.9, 13).

In 1 Corinthians, Paul is laying the foundation of the Christ-event (3.10-11), pointing to the paradox of ‘Christ-crucified’ as an indictment of the world’s ‘merely human’ values. The paradox invites the interlocutor into an axiologically-inverted perspective, in which the weakness and folly of the Cross are envisaged as a subversive message of wisdom and power. To live under the insignia of the Cross, is to accept the cruciform life, and to measure by cruciform values. The resolve to know nothing except ‘Χριστὸν-ἐσταυρωμένον’ reflects the conviction that God’s wisdom, power, and even his pleasure, paradoxically coincide with the symbol par excellence of the world’s contempt. Furthermore, new creation life is grace, gift [χάρις]: ‘What do you have that you did not receive?’ (4.7, cf. 15.10), and as recipients of grace, ‘no one may boast before him’ (1.29). Here Paul recalls the words of Jeremiah the prophet, ‘Therefore, as it is written: “Let the one who boasts boast in the Lord”’ (1.31, cf. Jer. 9.24).

5.2.3 Paul’s Cruciform Will to Weakness.

In Paul’s symbolic world, the Christ-event is not merely an isolated phenomenon, and the Cross does not function from a safe distance. Rather, its suffering and shame encompass the life of the Christian: ‘I bear on my body the marks (στίγματα) of Christ’ (Gal. 6.17); ‘I fill up in my flesh what is still lacking in regard to Christ’s afflictions’ (Col. 1.24); ‘I face death every day’ (1 Cor. 15.31). On the other hand, the power of Christ’s resurrection is also a present reality: ‘Though outwardly we are wasting away, yet inwardly we are being renewed day by day’ (2 Cor.

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24 Gal. 6.17. Given Paul’s catalogue of suffering in 2 Cor. 11.23-33, which includes, ‘Five times I received from the Jews the forty lashes minus one. Three times I was beaten with rods, once I was pelted with stones, three times I was shipwrecked . . .,’ the ‘στίγματα’ were not merely metaphorical. For an examination of the Paul’s rhetorical use of his sufferings in light of his honour/shame culture, see Jennifer A. Glancy, ‘Boasting of Beatings (2 Corinthians 11:23-25)’, in Journal of Biblical Literature 123, no. 1 (2004): 99-135. doi:10.2307/3268552.
‘dead to sin but alive to God in Christ Jesus’ (Rom. 6.11); ‘having died to what bound us. . . we serve in the new way of the Spirit’ (Rom. 7.6). The two halves of the Christ-event—divine death in shame and weakness; resurrection in glory and power—are the warp and the woof determining the textures of existence in the νῶν καρός: ‘For just as the sufferings of Christ overflow to us, so also through Christ our comfort overflows’ (2 Cor. 1.5).25 Such suffering is not an aspect of Paul’s pessimism; the full force of his anthropological pessimism is concentrated on what causes a person to stand in opposition to the Messiah. His positive revaluation of suffering is based upon two theoretical bases. First, the felt effects of suffering are contrasted to the glory on the eschatological (and, functionally, existential) horizon. Thus, ‘I consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us’ (Rom. 8.18), and ‘For our light and momentary troubles are achieving for us an eternal glory that far outweighs them all’ (2 Cor. 4.17). Second, Paul envisioned suffering as the path to a deeper ‘fellowship’ with Christ: ‘I want to know Christ and the power of His resurrection and the fellowship of His sufferings, being conformed to Him in His death. . . .’ (Phil. 3.10). Taken together, Pauline communities could ‘glory’ in their sufferings (Rom. 5.3; cf. Eph. 3.13). Thus, the Christ-event assumes a paradigmatic function in Paul’s thought-world, mapping onto the lived experience of believers: ‘For to be sure, he was crucified in weakness, yet he lives by God’s power. Likewise, we are weak in him, yet by God’s power we will live with him in our dealing with you’ (2 Cor. 13.3-4).26 Paul is ready to admit to his own experience of weakness, fear, and trembling.27 But, God’s power supervenes upon such weakness: ‘Therefore I will boast all the more gladly about my weaknesses, so that Christ’s power may rest on me. That is why, for Christ’s sake, I delight in weaknesses, in insults, in hardships, in persecutions, in difficulties. For when I am weak, then I am strong’ (2 Cor. 12.9-10). These paradoxical images of weakness and power demonstrate that the cruciform self is at the same time the anastasis self.

25 Cf. Phil. 1.29-30; Col. 1.24; Rom. 8.17.
26 It becomes clearer still that Paul is thinking of the Christ-event when he refers to the life-threatening circumstances he suffered in Asia (possibly the riot depicted in Acts 19.23ff): ‘Indeed, we felt we had received the sentence of death. But this happened that we might not rely on ourselves but on God, who raises the dead’ (2 Cor. 1.9).
27 ‘I came to you in weakness with great fear and trembling’ (1 Cor. 2.3); ‘If I must boast, I will boast of the things that show my weakness’ (2 Cor. 11.30); ‘As you know, it was because of an illness that I first preached the gospel to you, and even though my illness was a trial to you, you did not treat me with contempt or scorn’ (Gal. 4.14-15a).
5.2.4 *Paul’s Cruciform Ethical Vision.*

The way the Christ-event reshaped Paul’s world translated into a uniquely-Pauline ethical vision for his converts, modelled on the *kenotic* life of Christ, and grounded in the Christ-event as a whole. Thus his paraenesis in *Romans* 12 pictures the practical life of the believer as a radical alternative to the ‘pattern of this world’: ‘Therefore, I urge you, brothers and sisters, in view of God’s mercy, to offer your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God—this is your true and proper worship. Do not conform to the pattern of this world, but *be transformed* by the renewing of your *mind* [μεταμορφοφόροσθε ἡμών]’ (*Rom.* 12.1-2). Paul adjures his converts, ‘Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good’ (*Rom.* 12.21). If a kenotic self-sacrifice is the logical *λογικὴν* act of worship in light of the Christ-event, Paul also casts a unique ethical vision for the horizontal axis of human relationships, as his (audacious) précis of the Torah demonstrates: ‘Let no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing debt to love one another, for whoever loves others has fulfilled the law. . . . Love does no harm to a neighbour. Therefore love is the fulfilment of the law’ (*Rom.* 13.8, 10).28

*The Strong versus the Weak.*

One of greatest challenges to unity faced by the early Christian communities was the diversity of ideas about Christian behaviour in what Paul calls ‘disputable opinions’ [διακρίσεις διάλογων] (*Rom.* 14.1). Paul’s categories of ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak’, correspond to the differing levels of freedom of conscience that people experienced through faith.29 Thus, ‘One person’s faith allows them to eat anything, but another, whose faith is weak, eats only

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28 This is indeed a liberal compression of the Law, though Taubes may be seeing more than is there when he states that this passage is ‘polemical against Jesus’, *The Political Theology of Paul*, 52. Paul is not challenging the centrality of love for God, but, having already spoken about how one properly responds to God, he is now providing a vision for human relationships. If, as Jesus said, the greatest commandment in the law is to ‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind’ (*Matt.* 22.37), Paul’s cultic image of self-sacrifice is a graphic depiction of that life-encompassing love.

29 As Meeks rightly says, “The strong” adopt a weak-boundary position: they need no taboos against idolatry in order to protect their Christian faith. . . . “The weak,” on the other hand, are accustomed to associate the eating of meat with participation in the cults of pagan gods; for them, “idolatry” is real and dangerous’, *The First Urban Christians*, 98.
vegetables’ (Rom. 14.2, cf. v. 5). Paul numbers himself among the strong: ‘I am convinced, being fully persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean in itself’ (Rom. 14.14), and yet the confidence Paul found in Christ to revalue kosher laws, or the observance of Sabbath or holy days, did not settle the issue of behaviour within the complex social context of the Church, for the death of Christ has another major anthropological implication: as a substitutionary death, it imputes an absolute value onto each individual such that there is no place for axiological stratification within the human community. Thus, ‘If your brother or sister is distressed because of what you eat, you are no longer acting in love. Do not by your eating destroy someone for whom Christ died’ (Rom. 14.15; cf. v. 20; 1 Cor. 8.11). The implicit argument—that the death of the Son of God transfers an inviolable value on the individual—is not expanded upon. Paul simply states it, allowing the image of Christ-crucified to do its work.

Συνείδησις—On Matters of Conscience.

On the thornier issue of whether Christians could eat meat which had become tainted through association with idolatry, Paul frames the discussion in terms of knowledge [γνῶσις] and love [ἀγάπη]. When speaking to followers of Christ, Paul’s cynical view of humanity gives way to a cautious optimism—virtuous living is now a genuine human possibility, though Paul’s optimism was measured by a realism because of the ongoing risk of defaulting to a fleshly, appetitive modality. Paul first contextualizes the issue of meat sacrificed to idols within the world of creational monotheism—Judaism expanded around Jesus Christ: ‘there is but one God, the Father, from whom all things came and for whom we live; and there is but one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things came and through whom we live’ (1 Cor. 8.6), and, ‘An idol is

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30 As Barclay notes, ‘This constitutes nothing less than a fundamental rejection of the Jewish law in one of its most sensitive dimensions. . . . The law’s regulations on this matter and the long history of interpretation of those regulations are here so summarily dismissed as not even to receive mention’, in, ‘Do we undermine the Law?’ in Pauline Churches and Diaspora Jews, 37-59 (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2016), 50.

31 The fundamental equality of all human beings in Christ, naturally develops into a dogma of increasingly-secular forms of humanism. Nietzsche, and Žižek after him, recognized this fundamental value as an inheritance from the Pauline-Christian tradition, though they differ radically on whether the value should be preserved. I will return to this point in the next chapter.

32 This appears to be a bold expansion of the Sh’má Yisrael (Deut. 6.4) to include Christ in Israel’s monotheistic confession.
nothing at all’ (*I Cor.* 8.4).\textsuperscript{33} This confident monotheism opens the theoretical possibility of eating meat sacrificed to idols, though all freedom found in Christ needed (again) to be checked by the *kenotic* pattern of Christ’s life, with care that no individual for whom Christ died is destroyed by a Christian’s use of freedom (*I Cor.* 8.11).

Paul’s own practice in making ethical decisions within social contexts provides a striking example of his transvalued identity:

Though I am free and belong to no one, I have made myself a slave to everyone, to win as many as possible. To the Jews I became like a Jew, to win the Jews. To those under the law I became like one under the law (though I myself am not under the law), so as to win those under the law. To those not having the law I became like one not having the law (though I am not free from God’s law but am under Christ’s law), so as to win those not having the law. To the weak I became weak, to win the weak. I have become all things to all people so that by all possible means I might save some. I do all this for the sake of the gospel, that I may share in its blessings (*I Cor.* 9.19-23).

In order to operate out of this elastic identity, the Christ-event needed to enact a dramatic revaluation of the boundary markers that Paul had once guarded.

In some cases, Paul’s ethical injunctions are more universal—having much in common with non-Christian sources. In a study of *Colossians*, one of the most ‘Christologically-focused’ letters in the Pauline corpus, Barclay points to the letter’s very Greco-Roman household code, most of which ‘could have been, and indeed was, taught by moralists in both the Jewish and the non-Jewish Hellenistic traditions of the first century’.\textsuperscript{34} Barclay demonstrates, however, how Pauline Christocentrism functions as a new hermeneutic, which is able to, ‘bring even the mundane duties of everyday relationship under the Lordship of Christ [so that] the tendrils of the Christ-event spread out, as it were, to cover the whole surface of life’.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, the Christ-event affords a universalized, trans-cultural perspective from which to understand ethical activity. ‘This culture-spanning consciousness has given the early Christian movement a certain reluctance to ties the expression of the Christian faith too tightly to any single, culturally

\textsuperscript{33} Paul’s dismissive comments about idolatry stand in continuity with a long O.T. tradition, e.g., *Is.* 44.9-11.

\textsuperscript{34} Barclay, ‘Ordinary but Different: Colossians and Hidden Moral Identity’, in *Pauline Churches and Diaspora Jews*, 241.

\textsuperscript{35} Barclay, ‘Ordinary but Different’, 247.
particular, practice’. Similarly, Wright has recognized this universalism in Paul’s ‘robust creational monotheism’, in which Paul claims to ‘take every thought captive to make it obedient to Christ’ (2 Cor. 10.5): ‘This is not simply a cavalier attitude, grabbing anything that looks useful. It is based on Paul’s robust creational monotheism: all the wisdom of the world belongs to Jesus the Messiah in the first place, so any flickers or glimmers of light, anywhere in the world, are to be used and indeed celebrated within the exposition of the gospel’.37

On Voluntary Death.

What is ethically normative has an evental anthropological underpinning. For Paul, Christian discipleship in the νῦν καιρός, is a matter of putting the Adamic humanity to death, and putting on the new humanity in Christ.38 On one hand, Paul frequently makes reference to this practice as though it were an existential re-enactment of the Christ-event: ‘For you died, and your life is now hidden with Christ in God’ (Col. 3:3), or, ‘Those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires’ (Gal. 5:24), or, ‘For Christ’s love compels us, because we are convinced that one died for all, and therefore all died’ (2 Cor. 5:14). As J. Moltmann puts it, ‘Faith in the crucified Christ leads to an existence which is in conformity with the Cross and with Christ. The Cross of Christ is taken up existentially as one’s own Cross’.39

On the other hand, this existential, participatory element coincides with something that is ontologically significant: ‘Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, the new creation has come: The old has gone, the new is here!’ (2 Cor. 5:17), and, ‘Therefore we do not lose heart. Though outwardly we are wasting away, yet inwardly we are being renewed day by day’ (2 Cor. 4:16).

For Paul, therefore, the reality of dying vicariously through Christ and rising with Christ in resurrection power, is the logical undergirding of this energetic ethical vision: ‘We were therefore buried with him through baptism into death in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, we too may live a new life’ (Rom. 6.4). The presence of the Spirit empowers the disciple to put the adamic nature to death, and surrender the body over

36 Barclay, ‘Ordinary but Different’, 251.
37 Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, 201.
38 That Paul’s language, which is clearly existential on one level, is not merely metaphorical, is indicated by 1 Cor. 15, where the discussion of the resurrection body is clearly meant ontologically.
39 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, 60.
the Christ as a living sacrifice [θυσίαν ζῶσαν], resulting in virtuous living.\textsuperscript{40} The Pauline triad of theological virtues: faith, hope, and love, regularly appear in eschatological contexts, helping to bridge the gap between the resurrection of Christ and the parousia, and giving Pauline communities a distinctive pathos in the context of suffering.\textsuperscript{41} The possibility of virtue is attributed to the presence of the Spirit, who is present in the life of every Christian, standing in opposition to the flesh, which remains present in the now-time νῦν καρός: ‘So I say, walk by the Spirit, and you will not gratify the desires of the flesh’ (Gal. 5.16). Significant for the present study is the fact that Paul does not merely approach the question of virtue and vice as a moralist; rather, virtue and vice are understood within his anthropology, and cosmology. Again, the possibilities open to human existence are re-framed around Christ-event: insofar as the ‘the old self’ [παλαιὸς-ἄνθρωπος] has been crucified together with Christ, the enslaving power of the flesh is broken (Rom. 6.6), and the new self is able to walk freely in the Spirit (Gal. 5.18).

5.3 St Paul’s Lexicon of Anthropological Terms.

‘Αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης ἁγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὅλωσις καὶ ὅλοκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχή καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμέντο εἰς τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τηρηθείη’.

—St Paul, \textit{1st Letter to the Thessalonians}\textsuperscript{42}

“‘Leib bin ich und Seele’ — so redet das Kind’.

—Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{Zarathustra}\textsuperscript{43}

We turn now to a closer examination of a selection of St Paul’s most important anthropological terms. It has been commonplace in many studies of Pauline anthropology to

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Rom}. 12.1ff is perhaps Paul’s best portrait of the Christian life as he imagines it, weaving together many familiar Pauline themes including personal transformation, gifts of the Spirit, and the unity of the body of Christ.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{I Cor}. 13.13; \textit{Gal}. 5.5-6; \textit{Col}. 1.5; \textit{I Thess}. 1.3, 5.8.

\textsuperscript{42} ‘May God himself, the God of peace, sanctify you through and through. May your whole spirit, soul and body be kept blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ’ (\textit{I Thess}. 5.23).

\textsuperscript{43} ‘Body I am, and soul’—so speaks the child’, Z-I, ‘The Despisers of the Body’, p. 22 [\textit{KSA} 4, p. 39].
give primacy of place to term-by-term analyses. My purposes here do not require an exhaustive survey of Paul’s lexicon—we have already dealt with many of these terms elsewhere in this study. Rather, I bring several terms into focus in order, first, to clarify Paul’s vision of the human subject, and, second, to highlight the nature of Paul’s usage, asking how this usage sheds light on Pauline anthropology more generally. I will suggest that Paul’s usage is non-technical, and intended to give the nascent community of Christ-followers a language for mapping the Christ-event onto their lived experience of Christian discipleship.

5.3.1 The ‘Εσω Άνθρωπος’ and the ‘Έξω Άνθρωπος’.

We will begin here with the terms by which Paul distinguishes between what we might broadly construe as the private and public aspects of the person—an inner aspect [ἔσω], and an outer aspect [Έξω]. These terms appear infrequently, but with important associations, and they relate to aspects of the human person which are often addressed, making them a fitting point of departure.

The ‘Εσω Άνθρωπος’ and the ‘Έξω Άνθρωπος’ in Romans 7.

In Romans 7, we are introduced to a dispirited subject trapped within the dialectic of (personified) Law and Sin. Paul writes, ‘For in my inner being [ἔσω άνθρωπον] I delight in God’s law; but I see another law at work in me, waging war against the law of my mind [νοός] and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within me’ (7.22-23). Here we see the ἔσω aspect is related to the νοῦς; the ἔξω aspect is not addressed explicitly, but it may be associated with two statements about the fleshly and somatic aspects of the person: first, ‘I myself am fleshly [ἐγὼ δὲ σάρκινός εἰμι]’ (7.14), and, second, ‘the body of death [σώματος τοῦ θανάτου]’ (7.24). Much of the drama of the passage is created by the subject’s experience of a cleft within himself or herself, though it is not a division that falls neatly along material versus immaterial lines. The impulse to violate the Law is thought to be foreign to the self, and yet it has taken

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44 This is true, for example, of the valuable work done by many of the authors we have interacted with throughout this study: Lüdemann, Bultmann, Jewett, Harding, Chen, Son, and others.

45 Harding makes the bold suggestion that the anthropology of Rom. 7.7-25, ‘does not need to cohere with Paul’s other anthropological utterances—whether it does or not is not his concern’, for, ‘By exculpating the law from sinfulness its exclusive purpose is achieved and its function exhausted’, Paul’s Eschatological Anthropology, 226. This leads Harding to a sweeping
up residence within the subject (7.17, 20), frustrating the subject’s sense of moral agency. In seeking to do good, the self discovers that they are liable to the destructive whims of Sin, which exerts influence through the flesh (vv. 17, 20, 23), and uses the righteous commandments with their defined boundaries to lure the self into transgression: ‘For sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the commandment, deceived me, and through the commandment put me to death’ (v. 11; cf. v. 8). In a perverse twist of irony, the Law, which is variously characterized throughout this passage as ‘holy’, ‘spiritual’, ‘righteous’, and ‘good’, functionally deepens the precariousness of fleshly embodiment, because the fleshly self is vulnerable to deception, and easily commandeered by Sin: ‘the very commandment that was intended to bring life actually 

dismissal of every attempt to identify the subject of the passage: ‘the subject of Rom. 7.7-25 is not Paul, not Adam, not Israel, not Everyman, or indeed anyone or anything . . . ’, 228. If none of these traditional subjects fit precisely, why not argue, as Valérie Nicolet Anderson does, that Paul creates a composite character who can bring together imagery from Adam in Eden, Israel at Sinai, and even hints of Paul’s biography? See, ‘Tools for a Kierkegaardian Reading of Paul’, in Reading Romans with Contemporary Philosophers and Theologians, ed. David Odell-Scott (New York: T&T Clark International, 2007), 259ff. The answer, in this case, may be that consistency demands this move from Harding because the image of the subject in Rom. 7 cannot inhere within her larger reconstruction of ‘eschatological anthropology’, wherein the whole person is either under the power of flesh and sin, or under the power of the Spirit. The dispirited self of Rom. 7, appears to be the locus of a muddled conflict between flesh and Spirit—neither of which maintains an exclusive hegemony. The problem with circumscribing the relevance of Rom. 7 to an argument about the Law, however, is that this hermeneutical move becomes a universal acid. Arguably all of Paul’s anthropological reflections appear in the service of buttressing other theological commitments, so Harding’s dismissal of any anthropological import of this passage alone appears to be a case of special pleading within her otherwise rigorous, and systematic approach. Furthermore, the passage has an existential and theological gravitas that seems to demand broad integration; as A. Van Den Beld writes of the passage: ‘[7:14-25] is consistently regarded as a crucial part of Paul’s theology’ (Van Den Beld, A., and T. Van Den Beld, ‘Romans 7:14-25 and the Problem of Akrasia’, Religious Studies 21, no. 4 (1985): 495-515. www.jstor.org/stable/20006224, 495). See also James Dunn’s comment:

Romans 7 is one of those key passages in Paul's writings which offers us an insight into a whole dimension of Paul's thought and faith. Even more important, it is one of the few really pivotal passages in Paul's theology; by which I mean that our understanding of it will in large measure determine our understanding of Paul's theology as a whole, particularly his anthropology and soteriology (James Dunn, ‘Romans 7, 14-25 in the Theology of Paul’, Theologische Zeitschrift September/October 1975).

46 Cf. the parallel sentiment expressed in Ovid’s, The Metamorphoses, VII, ‘If I could, I would be more rational. But a new power draws on me, against my will; and Cupid persuades one thing, reason another. I see which is the more proper course, and I approve of it, while I follow the wrong one’; trans. H. T. Riley (Digireads Publishing, 2017), 206.
brought death’ (v. 10). Paul avoided condemning the Law, while subverting any hopes of justification through the Law, and he did this by highlighting the precariousness of the self’s existence as a microcosm of this cosmic conflict. The rift between the inner and the outer aspects of the subject creates the paradoxical situation of acknowledging the goodness of the Law, and yet violating it. As Nietzsche characterized the problem in his notes, ‘The resistance of the inner being [inneren Menschen] with mere knowledge of the Law and joy in it is insufficient, indeed powerless’.  

_The ἔσω ἀνθρωπος’ and the ‘Εξω ἀνθρωπος’ in 2 Corinthians 4._

In _2 Corinthians_ 4, Paul explicitly juxtaposes the ἔσω and the ἔξω as aspects of the self within the believer’s experience of life in the νῦν καιρὸς:

> Therefore we do not lose heart. Though outwardly [ἔξω ἄνθρωπος] we are wasting away, yet inwardly [ἔσω] we are being renewed day by day. For our light and momentary troubles are achieving for us an eternal glory that far outweighs them all. So we fix our eyes not on what is seen, but on what is unseen, since what is seen is temporary, but what is unseen is eternal (_2 Cor._ 4.16-18).

Here Paul reflects his own thoughts and attitudes about the challenges faced in the ministry of the gospel—challenges which he has outlined (4.7-12), and to which he will give eloquent expression later in the letter (6.4-10, 11.21-33, 12.1-10). Indeed, throughout the letter of _2 Corinthians_, Paul can be found attempting to subvert any confidence his readers or detractors may be investing in the outer, fleshly, corporeal aspect of the human experience. Thus, the ἔξω is manifestly in a state of deterioration and decay, while the ἔσω is undergoing a process of transformation that will continue through natural death (or the Parousia) into the resurrection.  

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47 _KSA_ 9:4[164], p.142 (emphasis original).
48 Or, a redaction of two or more letters, as many scholars believe of _2 Corinthians_. The unity of the letter has little bearing on my reading here.
49 Paul maintains his flow of thought into the next chapter, where the inward aspect is carried forward as surviving death (vv. 1-4), indwelt by God’s Spirit (v. 5), and new creation (v. 17), while the ἔξω aspect is likened to a ‘tent’ [σκήνους; cf. _Acts_ 18.3, where it is said that Paul was a ‘σκηνοποιοὶ τέχνῃ’—that is, a tent maker]. Here tent is a metaphor that emphasizes the outer aspect of the person as temporal, decaying, and subject to destruction.

It is worth noting that several items of Paul’s ‘litany of woes’ in 11.21-33 would have left visible or even disfiguring scars—not least the corporal punishment: ‘Five times I received from the Jews the forty lashes minus one. Three times I was beaten with rods, once I was pelted with stones’ (vv. 24-25). At the very least, Paul’s scaring illuminates the passage under consideration,
The nature of Paul’s usage has raised questions about his possible dependence upon Greek dualism. Plato had spoken of, ‘the human within τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὥς ἐντὸς’, as the best part of the person, which ought to rule the whole. This has led to attempts to locate Plato’s anthropological dualism in Paul. H. D. Betz takes the late appearance of the concept in 2 Corinthians and Romans to suggest that Paul’s articulation of the Gospel was raising questions among educated Hellenists about the applicability of dualistic frameworks for the early Christianity’s view of the human person—‘questions informed by the current philosophical debates about anthropological dualism’. The concept of an έσω/ἔξω ἄνθρωπος distinction, therefore, may be seen to originate from Platonic theories of mind-body dualism, but Paul, ‘reconfigured them conceptually, in order to preclude a split in the person between an immortal soul and a material body. This new configuration involved disconnecting the concept from the Middle-Platonic ontological dualism . . .’. Thus, for Paul, ‘the έσω ἄνθρωπος does not have a higher status than the έξω ἄνθρωπος, but both are two aspects of the same ἄνθρωπος’. These reconfigured concepts allow Paul to capture the human experience of life as a moral subject in the νῦν καιρὸς, with all its felt tensions and antitheses.

Harding takes issue with the reading provided by Betz at three points: first, his approach interprets the concepts of έσω and the έξω ἄνθρωπος ‘without directly identifying either term with any particular anthropological part or aspect’. Second, he ‘claims that the έσω ἄνθρωπος

and Paul’s claim to the Galatians, ‘From now on, let no one cause me trouble, for I bear on my body the marks [στίγματα] of Jesus’ (6.17).

50 ‘And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us complete domination over the entire man and make him take charge of the many-headed beast . . .’, The Republic, Book 9, §§ 589a-589b, trans. Paul Shorey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).


54 In the case of Rom. 7.7-25, Betz provisionally accepts the majority view that the passage captures the pre-Christian human experience viewed from a Christian perspective, but denies that the Christian is immune to such experiences: ‘This cannot, however, mean that during this life the Christian, including Paul himself, is spared such internal frustrations. On the contrary, the Christian life opens up not only a deeper insight into this human condition, but also an intensified realistic experience of it’, ‘The Concept of the “Inner Human Being”’, 338, n. 98.

55 Harding, Paul’s Eschatological Anthropology, 228.
describes “the divine κύριος present in the heart through the πνεῦμα”. And, third, while taking a non-metaphorical interpretation, he emphasizes the experiential dimension of the ἔσω and the ἔξω ἀνθρώπος. We will address these criticisms in reverse order. Harding’s third objection is insubstantial: while Betz does emphasize the experiential aspect, *these experiences logically proceed* from real-world developments as the subject undergoes transformation, and real-world developments *logically entail* changes at the level of experience. The second of these objections, likewise, may be quickly dispensed with, because it attributes to Betz a view he wishes to deny; in the passage cited, Betz explicitly states that ‘the ἔσω ἀνθρώπος *is not identical* with the indwelling Christ’. Finally, returning to the first point, Harding responds by first identifying the ἔξω ἀνθρώπος and the ἔσω ἀνθρώπος as the subjects of the verbs, ‘διαφθείρεται [wasting away]’, and, ‘ἀνακαινοῦται [renewed]’, respectively, and writes, ‘these terms denote the whole human of the old aeon and new aeon respectively. The negative correlation is implied by the recognition that it is *from* the ἔξω ἀνθρώπος that the ἔσω ἀνθρώπος is formed; it is *what* is transformed into the ἔσω ἀνθρώπος, whether partially or otherwise’. Harding’s reading emphasizes the unity of the person—indeed, it is maximally monistic, allowing that the person is *entirely* under the power of Sin/flesh, or *entirely* under the power of the Spirit: ‘For the apostle, the subject is always the *whole human*, albeit sometimes viewed from a particular aspect, whether under Sin or the Holy Spirit, and not any particular anthropological part or aspect’.

Within the broader context of the 2 Corinthians passage, however, there are strong suggestions that Paul is working with a composite picture of the human person in mind—perhaps a composite of natural and spiritual elements, or perhaps corporeal and incorporeal elements. Prior to the appearance of the ἔσω and ἔξω ἀνθρώπος in 4.16, Paul refers to the ministers of the

60 Harding, *Paul’s Eschatological Anthropology*, 231. Harding’s reading of the inner and outer person seems to very closely correspond to the new and old person; Käsemann, considered the father of the apocalyptic school in Pauline studies, took a more radical view of baptismal ‘death’: ‘[Paul] declares that the old man truly and radically dies; the new man is therefore not to be understood as something like a metamorphosis of the old’, ‘On Paul’s Anthropology’, 1-31, *Perspectives on Paul*, 10.
62 As in the *natural* [ψυχικόν] and *spiritual* [πνευματικόν] bodies of *1 Cor*. 15.44.
New Covenant with the metaphor, ‘ὀστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν [earthen vessels]’ (4.7)—the frail, mortal bodies that display participation in the death of Christ through their suffering (4.8-10)—and then again as the ‘θνητῇ σαρκὶ [mortal flesh]’ (4.11). Throughout the passage, Paul underscores the frailty and precariousness of corporeal existence in the νῦν καρός, which is understood as participation in Christ’s death. Thus, Paul turns to the hope of the resurrection in 4.12-16a, and captures the experience of outward decay and inward renewal in 4.16b. In light of this, Paul can scorn temporal suffering as ‘light and momentary affliction’ which produces within the believer ‘an eternal weight of glory’ (4.17), and so he says, ‘we fix our eyes not on what is seen, but on what is unseen, since what is seen is temporary, but what is unseen is eternal’ (4.18). The train of thought is then carried forward into 5.1-10, where corporeality is again characterized metaphorically, now as, ‘ἐπίγειος ἡ µῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους [our earthly dwelling]’, which is to be destroyed, and replaced by a permanent dwelling (5.1). The passage reveals a palpable frustration with the limitations of the temporary body: ‘For while we are in this tent, we groan and are burdened, because we do not wish to be unclothed but to be clothed instead with our heavenly dwelling, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life’ (5.4). Thus, the following chain of references to disembodiment—‘as long as we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord’ (5.6); ‘[we] would prefer to be away from the body and at home with the Lord’ (5.8); and, ‘whether we are at home in the body or away from it’ (5.9)—does not anticipate a final disembodied state, but more likely the shedding of the ‘σῶμα ψυχικόν [natural body]’, and reception of the, ‘σῶμα πνευματικόν [spiritual body]’, previously discussed at length in 1 Corinthians 15.35ff.

Paul’s confessions throughout this context suggest that the ἔσω ἄνθρωπον is the (invisible-eternal) subject who is undergoing spiritual transformation, while anticipating a resurrection body, and the ἔξω ἄνθρωπος is the (visible-temporal) fleshly and mortal body which will be exchanged for a spiritual and immortal body.64 Here we recall Nietzsche’s unique

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63 This passage is radically un-Nietzschean; cf. ‘The Greatest Weight’, GS § 341, pp. 273-274 [KS4 3, p. 570].
64 The ‘σῶμα πνευματικόν’ does not require that the eternal body is spiritual in the sense of immaterial. In addition to being a frequent traveller, and day labourer, Paul had dealt with sickness, physical hardships, and severe corporal punishment, and so he desired a body that was not subject to the frailties of fleshly existence. Paul seems to envision a state of embodiment that is of a radically different nature, though it is still a state of embodiment.
rendering of the resurrection hope: ‘Yet but a brief time within this decay!—that is the Christian’s lot, before, becoming one with Christ, he arises with Christ, participates with Christ in divine glory and becomes a ‘son of God’, like Christ’. Nietzsche was right to see Paul’s frustrations within the state of decay, and to associate this longing with a desire for power. However, Paul’s frustrations seem to be of an ordinary and relatable sort—not appreciably different from Nietzsche’s frequent kvetching about his failing eyesight, frequent (and severe) headaches, disrupted plans, cold apartments, strained relationships, gloomy weather, insomnia, and gastrointestinal ailments. On the other hand, while Nietzsche would say, ‘I took myself in hand, I made myself healthy again...’, while Paul’s hopes were other-worldly. He would downplay temporal suffering in his anticipation of the glories of the eschaton, when he expected to enter a permanent, immortal state of embodiment.

Apart from these two appearances, the ἐσω ἄνθρωπον is found only in Ephesians, but the corresponding concepts of the ἐσω and ἔξω ἄνθρωπος can be thought of as establishing ontic and semantic ‘domains’ that are carried forward in a matrix of related and contrasting terms. Paul uses clusters of related terms to address different facets and nuances of these domains. For example, terms such as ‘καρδία’, ‘νοῦς’, ‘ψυχή’, ‘συνείδησις’, and ‘πνεῦμα’, are not synonymous, but their meanings do overlap, and they are all encompassed within the broader semantic domain of the ἐσω ἄνθρωπος. Likewise, the terms ‘σάρξ’, ‘τὸ θνητὸν’, ‘σκήνους’, ‘σῶμα’, ‘σῶμα ψυχικόν’, and ‘σῶμα πνευματικόν’, are ways of referring to the domain of the ἔξω ἄνθρωπος. These terms also correspond to ontic domains, where the first set of terms

65 D § 68, p. 41 [KSA 3, p. 68].
66 Nietzsche has provided his biographers in with a wealth of material to work with in his frequent references his physical condition. Ronald Hayman’s, Nietzsche: A Critical Life, masterfully weaves these accounts of sickness and health into the developing story of Nietzsche’s life.
68 The passage is consonant with those above: ‘I pray that out of his glorious riches he may strengthen you with power through his Spirit in your inner being [ἐσω ἄνθρωπον], so that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith’ (3.16-17).
71 I use ‘ontic’, to differentiate between two kinds of being in the generic sense of ‘τὰ ὑπάρχοντα’—to use an example near to hand (1 Cor. 1.28). It is not my wish to appear needlessly technical—indeed, I think Paul’s use of anthropological terms is more elastic and imaginative than
refers to those aspects of personhood which may be thought of as the private, inward, cognitive, conscious, immaterial, and so-forth, while the second set broadly refers to the public, material, corporeal, and geographically-located aspect of the person. We will now turn to a further examination of how these terms elucidate Paul’s picture of the self within its world.

5.3.2 The Σῶµα and the Ψυχή—Body and Soul.

One of Paul’s most important anthropological terms for referring to the human person is ‘σῶµα’, including many interesting variations—positive and negative, literal and figurative. While ‘body’ is overwhelmingly the gloss used across English translations, J. Dunn writes, ‘In Paul’s own usage sôma, like so many of his terms, has a spectrum of meaning. The focus on physicality is only one end of the spectrum. . . . It is the embodied “me”, the means by which “I” and the world can act upon each other’, and this means that, ‘σῶµα gives Paul’s theology an unavoidably social and ecological dimension’. Human existence, for Paul, is almost necessarily somatic; apart from the briefly-considered possibility of out-of-body mystical experiences, or, perhaps, an interim period of disembodiment between natural death and the resurrection at the eschaton, Paul cannot imagine human existence as anything but existence in, or as, σῶµα. This centrality of the body, has invited widely-diverging treatments of the term, ranging from Bultmann’s controversial existential reading σῶµα, to R. Gundry’s straight-forward corporeal reading. For Bultmann, the human person is called σῶµα, ‘in respect to his being able technical—but I wish to refrain from suggesting that Paul is working out a systematic theory of being—i.e., an ontology. Paul’s uses of anthropological terms will naturally have ontological implications, but he is not primarily interested in bearing those implications out in a technical or systematic way. I will return to the question of how Paul specifically intends to use his lexicon of philosophical anthropology, below.

72 E.g. in Romans we find, ‘body of sin’ (6.6), ‘mortal body’ (6.12), ‘body of Christ’ (7.4), ‘body of death’ (7.24), and ‘dead body’ (8.10); furthermore, the body is to be redeemed (8.23), presented as a living sacrifice (12.1), and so-forth.

73 James Dunn, The Theology of the Paul the Apostle, 56.

74 James Dunn, The Theology of the Paul the Apostle, 61.

75 When Paul relates his mystical experience of being caught up into heaven in, 2 Cor. 12.1-10, he comments twice, ‘Whether it was in the body or out of the body I do not know—God knows. [ἐἴτε ἐν σώµατι οὐκ οἶδα, ἐἴτε ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώµατος οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν]’ (v. 2, and repeated in v. 3).

76 In 2 Cor. 5.4, Paul seems to express discomfort with the thought of an interim state of disembodiment: ‘we do not wish to be unclothed but to be clothed instead with our heavenly dwelling, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life’.
to control himself and be the object of his own action’, 77 and so, ‘The characterization of man as \textit{soma} implies, then, that man is a being who has a relationship to himself, and that this relationship can be either an appropriate or a perverted one; that he can be at one with himself or at odds; that he can be under his own control or lose his grip on himself’. 78 In Bultmann’s reading, the thrust of Paul’s gospel is resolving the self-estrangement of the \textit{sōma}-person that results from striving for justification under one’s own powers, rather than receiving it as a gift from God. Robert Gundry’s work on \textit{sōma} was a careful response to this influential reading. Gundry made a broad survey of both intra- and extra-Pauline usage, and concluded that Paul’s \textit{sōma} language was largely a convention for referring to the corporeal aspect of human being, akin to neutral references to the flesh. 79 This is far from being a settle issue.

By itself, \textit{sōma} is axiologically neutral, 80 but it is qualified in ways that highlight the diametric moral and ontic extremes in Paul’s anthropology. Negatively, Paul speaks of, ‘the body of sin [\textit{sōma} τῆς ἁμαρτίας]’ (Rom. 6.6), ‘the mortal body [\textit{θνητὰ σώματα}]’ (Rom. 8.11; cf. 6.12), ‘the dead body [\textit{sōma νεκρὸν}]’ (Rom. 8.10), and ‘the body of flesh [\textit{σώματος τῆς σαρκὸς}]’ (Col. 2.11). The most famous instance of the pejorative use of \textit{sōma} appears in the anguished cry of the ‘wretched man’ of Romans 7, where the \textit{sōma} appear to be no different than the most negative examples of \textit{sάρξ}: ‘Who will rescue me from this \textit{body of death}? [\textit{sώματος τοῦ θανάτου}]’ (7.24). The \textit{sōma} is also subject to defilement through illicit acts of sexual congress (Rom. 1.24; 1 Cor. 6.18). In general, the \textit{sōma}’s association with the \textit{flesh} [\textit{sάρξ}] makes it vulnerable to the enticements of Sin, the condemnation of the Law, and physical death. We may add, finally, that the \textit{sōma} is subject to ridicule; Paul quotes his detractors in Corinth as saying, ‘his bodily appearance is weak [\textit{παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενής}]’ (2 Cor. 10.10). 81

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80 E.g., \textit{sōma} can be used to refer to mundane, corporeal existence as when Paul warns the Corinthians that he is ‘absent in the body [ἀπό τῷ σώματι], but present in spirit’ (1 Cor. 5.3)
81 Cf. 2 Cor. 10.1, ‘By the humility and gentleness of Christ, I appeal to you—I, Paul, who am “timid” when face to face with you, but “bold” toward you when away!’ Nietzsche took notice of these references and recorded the following in his notebook: ‘Paul feels that outwardly he appears very timid to the Corinthians [Paulus fühlt, daß er bei den Korinthern äußerlich sehr schüchtern erschienen ist]’, \textit{KSA} 9:4[219], p. 154.
Paul sometimes refers to the human subject as ‘ψυχή’, which is glossed variously as ‘soul’, ‘self’, and ‘life’, in common English translations. Ψυχή can refer to something like the ensoulment of the body, as in Paul’s somewhat free quotation of the LXX of Genesis 2.7: ‘The first man Adam became a living being [ψυχήν ζώσαν] (1 Cor. 15.45). It can also refer to the moral aspect of the self as subject to divine judgement as in Romans 2.9, ‘There will be trouble and distress for the soul of every person [πᾶσαν ψυχήν ἀνθρώπου] who does evil: first for the Jew, then for the Gentile . . .’. Similarly, every soul [πᾶσα ψυχή] is the be subject to governing authorities, recognizing that these authorities derive their authority from God (Rom. 13.1). The term can refer to the value of human life with a deeply personal connotation, as when Paul praises Priscilla and Aquila for risking themselves for his own ψυχή (Rom. 16.4), or when Epaphroditus is praised for risking his life [ψυχή] for the work of the gospel (Phil. 2.30), or when Paul writes to encourage the Corinthians, ‘So I will very gladly spend for your souls [ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν] everything I have and expend myself as well’ (2 Cor. 12.15; cf. 1 Thess. 2.8).

Finally, the term can be used in reference to the corporate body of believers. When writing to the Philippians from prison, Paul prays that they ‘stand firm in the one Spirit [ἐνὶ πνεύματι] striving together as one soul [μιᾷ ψυχῇ] for the faith of the gospel’ (Phil. 1.27). In general, ψυχή may refer to an inward aspect of the human person, in the sense of ‘soul’ or ‘self’; or, it may have a broader use in the sense of ‘life’ as something of value which may be expended, preserved, or lost.

The Christ-event effects a transformation of the possibilities of the σῶμα, and a revaluation of the σῶμα itself. Indeed, the pre-existent Christ’s kēnotic adoption of bodily [σωματικῶς] existence, and his bodily resurrection, demonstrated the exalted possibilities for the body, and the language of ‘the body of Christ [σῶματος τοῦ χριστοῦ]’ appears frequently in the Hauptbriefe, deepening the positive association of the body with the spiritual life. Thus, the σῶμα, for all its negative associations (above), is not to be discarded, for the Christ-event promises the redemption of the σῶμα in the resurrection at the eschaton (Rom. 8.23). The believer is to experience the impact of the Christ-event on their σῶμα in the νῦν καιρὸς, 

82 Here NIV punts on the translation with ‘every human being’, which obscures Paul’s language.
83 Bultmann rightly sees Paul’s usage to be informed by the LXX use of ψυχή as ‘vitality’ or ‘life’: ‘Paul uses psyche altogether in the sense current in the Old Testament-Jewish tradition; viz. to designate human life, or rather to denote man as a living being’, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. 1, 204.
presenting the σώμα to God as a ‘holy and pleasing’ sacrifice (*Rom. 12.1*). Where the body under the Law is in distress (*Rom. 7*), the σώμα of the believer can be disciplined, and brought into submission to God’s will (*1 Cor. 9.27*). Believers are also to understand their bodies as ‘members of Christ’ (*1 Cor. 6.15*), and, ‘temples of the Holy Spirit’ (*1 Cor. 6.19*). The Christ’s resurrection life is manifest in the σώμα, and the believer lives in expectation of the full re-creation of the σώμα at the eschaton: ‘Jesus Christ, who, by the power that enables him to bring everything under his control, will transform our lowly bodies so that they will be like his glorious body’ (*Phil. 3.21*), and, ‘he who raised Christ from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies because of his Spirit who lives in you’ (*Rom. 8.11*). Somewhat counterintuitively, Paul can value the body *precisely because of its capacity for suffering*. Paul’s is loath to boast about anything apart from the Cross (*Gal. 6.14*), but this creates an exception for boasting in physical and emotional suffering (*2 Cor. 11-12*), and Paul can take pride in saying, ‘I bear on my body [σώματι] the marks [στίγματα] of Jesus’ (*Gal. 6.17*). A final passage, quoted here at length, illustrates the possibilities of transformation realized in the Christ-event:

> For in Christ all the fullness of the **Deity** lives in bodily form [θεότητος σωματικῶς], and in Christ you have been brought to fullness. He is the head over every power and authority. In him you were also circumcised with a circumcision not performed by human hands. Your whole self ruled by the flesh [σώματος τῆς σαρκός] was put off when you were circumcised by Christ, having been buried with him in baptism, in which you were also raised with him through your faith in the working of God, who raised him from the dead (*Col. 2.9-12*).

One clear implication of this brief survey, is that whatever may be said of the Christian tradition more broadly, Pauline anthropology does not favour the soul over the body, nor does it seek escape from somatic existence. The σώμα is an essential term—theologically and philosophically—with an expansive semantic field, allowing Paul to use the term negatively and positively, pessimistically and optimistically, in reference to the original sin, the Law, the power of the flesh, redemptive suffering, the resurrection, and so-forth. As J. A. T. Robinson writes in his classic study,

> One could say without exaggeration that the concept of the body forms the keystone of Paul’s theology. In its closely interconnected meanings, the word σώμα (soma) knits together all his great themes. It is from the body of sin and death that we are delivered; it is through the body of Christ on the Cross that we are saved; it is into His body the Church that we are incorporated; it is by His body in the Eucharist that this Community is sustained; it is in our body that its
new life has to be manifested; it is to a resurrection of this body to the likeness of His glorious body that we are destined.  

5.3.3 The Καρδία and Νοῦς—Heart and Mind.

The heart [καρδία] and mind [νοῦς] are two loci within the person (the ἔσω ἄνθρωπον) at which Paul envisions both immediate and ongoing transformation—or, loci at which Paul’s anthropological pessimism is transformed into hope-filled optimism in light of the Christ-event. A survey of Paul’s usage reveals that καρδία and νοῦς belong to overlapping semantic fields, with καρδία connoting a more affective aspect, and νοῦς a more cognitive aspect, but both have volitional shadings, and both exhibit the noetic effects of the Adam’s transgression. Paul treats the καρδία as an inward and private aspect of the self, a place of hidden secrets and motives (1 Cor. 4.5, 14.25). In Paul’s usage, it is from the καρδία that the self postures itself towards or against God, objects, or persons within its world, and so, for example, a true Israelite is correctly postured towards the Law in the obedience which discloses a hidden ‘circumcision of the καρδία’ (Rom. 2.29). Alternatively, the unredeemed heart is prone to disordered desires, as in Romans where, ‘their foolish hearts were darkened’, and, ‘God gave them over in the sinful desires of their hearts’ (1.21, 24; cf. 1 Cor. 10.6). The καρδία is also subject to stubbornness and unrepentance (Rom. 2.4), and apart from faith in Christ it is ‘veiled’ [καλύπτω] from understanding God’s purposes (2 Cor. 3.15-16; 4.3-4).

The νοῦς, for Paul, is not the locus of dispassionate reflection but an area of special vulnerability to forces external to the self.  

The νοῦς may be ‘fleshly [σαρκὸς]’ (Col. 2.18), and ‘depraved [ἀδόκιμον]’ (Rom. 1.28) through sin, and so it is associated in Paul’s writings with servitude or slavery (Rom. 7.23-25). Because Paul’s employment of νοῦς has an affective shading, the person’s valuations—including those with moral import—may be seated here as well as in the καρδία. Thus W. D. Stacey rightly emphasizes the ethical dimension of the mind

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85 Paul argues that even for believers the νοῦς may become inactive under the control of the Spirit, which may not benefit the gathered assembly of believers: ‘For if I pray in a tongue, my spirit prays, but my mind is unfruitful. So what shall I do? I will pray with my spirit, but I will also pray with my understanding; I will sing with my spirit, but I will also sing with my understanding’ (14.14-15).
in Paul: ‘the νοῦς is the faculty for testing, through reflection and moral discernment, various courses of action, with a view to choosing and pursuing that which is God’s will’. 86

The Christ-event marks a dramatic reversal of fortunes for both the νοῦς and the καρδία, and thus for the self who is in Christ. Paul warns his readership in Rome: ‘Do not conform to the pattern of this world, but be transformed [or, transfigured, μεταμορφοσθε] by the renewing of your mind [ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοοῦ]’, which brings the self into alignment with God’s perfect will (Rom. 12.2). Similarly, when Paul quotes from the LXX version of Isaiah 40.13, ‘who has known the mind of the Lord? [τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν κυρίου;]’, he replies, ‘But we have the mind [νοῦν] of Christ’ (1 Cor. 2.16). This possibility of knowing the mind of Christ provides an implicit justification for Paul’s plea that the believers in Corinth be ‘perfectly united in mind [νοῒ]’ (1 Cor. 1.10). The καρδία, too, becomes a locus of transformation in the Christ-event.

‘God’s love has been poured out into our hearts [καρδίαις]’ (Rom. 5.5; cf. Gal. 4.6). The καρδία is then reoriented from a posture of stubbornness to one of obedience (Rom. 6.17), becoming the locus of saving faith (Rom. 10.9-10), and the deep, mystical connection with God through the Spirit (Rom. 8.27), which secures a believer’s resurrection hope (2 Cor. 1.22). It is Paul’s conviction that God’s New Covenant is now written on the hearts [καρδίαις] of believers (2 Cor. 3.3). 88

Paul’s expressions of affection involve the καρδία: ‘I have you in my heart’ (Phil. 1.7; cf. 2 Cor. 3.2, 6.11, 7.3). Finally, the καρδία is held out as the locus of the authentic self—over against mere appearances (2 Cor. 5.12).

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87 The parallel quotation of the Isaiah passage appears at Rom. 11.34, where Paul’s doxology celebrates God’s revealed will for working out the salvation of Israel and the Nations.
88 Here Paul alludes to the text of Jer. 31.33: “This is the covenant I will make with the people of Israel after that time”, declares the LORD. “I will put my law in their minds and write it on their hearts. I will be their God, and they will be my people”. 
5.3.4 The Nature and ‘Proper Function’ of Paul’s Anthropological Terms.

Having explored much of Paul’s lexicon of anthropological terms throughout this study, I want to address the rather pertinent question of what is the nature of this language, and how is it intended to function? This brief survey has shown, among other things, that there is considerable variation in Paul’s usage of any single term that calls for an explanation. R. Jewett models an intriguing solution in his study where he aims to understand uses of each term within the precise contexts in which they appear.89 Jewett amasses evidence in support of his theory that Paul may have adjusted his use of terms to combat specific opponents, or to avoid misunderstandings, depending upon the issues he was addressing, and the cultural situation of his addressees.90 We have seen that Paul’s use of the terms is polysemic, with a wide range of applications for terms as fundamental to Paulinism as σὰρξ and πνεῦμα—each term extending over a broad semantic range. Given this polysemy, Wright’s cautions against hasty systematization seem well-founded:

Paul uses over a dozen terms to refer to what humans are and what they do, and since he nowhere either provides a neat summary of what he thinks about them or gives us clues as to whether he would subsume some or most of these under two or three heads, it is arbitrary and unwarranted to do so on his behalf or claim his authority for such a schema.91

An additional point of importance, which is rarely mentioned (perhaps because it is so obvious, perhaps because it is unsettling), is this: it was likely two or more centuries into the history of the church that any one ‘Paulinist’, in a single geographical location, might have had the luxury of flipping through a codex that contained half or more of Paul’s letters. The churches in Rome and Galatia may have had only one; the Corinthians were likely the rare case, having three or

89 See, e.g., Jewett’s summary of Paul’s various uses of σὰρξ, where the term is said to have been used in anti-Nomist, anti-Libertine, anti-Gnostic, and anti-θεῖος ἄνηρ arguments; Paul’s Anthropological Terms, 453-456.
90 Jewett’s study is weakened by its dependence upon uncertain hypotheses regarding the occasions of Paul’s letters, and the beliefs of his opponents. Profiles of Paul’s detractors are based upon mirror readings, which are manifestly prone to error. Harding seems right in her critique of Jewett’s study, arguing that it is ‘ultimately a tissue of assumptions’, Paul’s Eschatological Anthropology, 20.
more. While Paul no doubt hoped that some of his letters would receive a wide readership, he could not have expected that his readers would be familiar with the content of each of his major letters. Our sense of Paul’s anthropology morphs to some degree with every passage we include or miss out, or with each letter we exclude from consideration on questions of authenticity. It is likely, therefore, that were other authentic letters added to the corpus, our views would have to adjust to accommodate the added material. On the basis of 2 Corinthians 10.3 alone, we might reasonably assume that Paul uses the prepositional phrase ‘ἐν σαρκὶ’ in a positive sense, and the contrasting phrase ‘κατὰ σάρκα’ pejoratively. Turning to Romans, however, we would see ‘ἐν σαρκὶ’ used as a synonym of ‘κατὰ σάρκα’ in the most pejorative possible sense in Romans 8.9, and, ‘κατὰ σάρκα’ employed in a morally neutral manner in Romans 1.3, 9.5, and elsewhere. Indeed, how can Paul say so often that he lives ‘ἐν σαρκὶ’ (Gal. 2.20; 2 Cor. 10.3; Phil. 1.22-24; Col. 1.24, 2.1), if ‘Those who are [ἐν σαρκί] cannot please God’ (Rom. 8.3)? Should we not be surprised that these collisions occur—and on undisputed Pauline soil, no less? Should we not expect greater consistency in usage when 2 Corinthians and Romans were likely written only months apart?

My thesis here is that to press Paul’s anthropology for systematic precision, is to misunderstand him; Paul himself was not trying to achieve a systematically-precise account of the human person. Rather, Paul was giving his communities a language for speaking about how the Christ-event mapped onto the lived human experience. In Paul’s usage, as we witness it in the extant letters, these terms do not always have a one-to-one correspondence with discrete entities or capacities within the person, or within the world. They have, rather, a plasticity that

92 Though internal evidence (e.g., 1 Cor. 11.17) from the two extant letters suggests that they might not have considered access to this tiny theological library a privilege.
93 1 Cor., e.g., is addressed both to the church in Corinth, and to ‘all those everywhere who call on the name of our Lord Jesus Christ’ (1.2). Paul writes in Col. 4.16, ‘After this letter has been read to you, see that it is also read in the church of the Laodiceans and that you in turn read the letter from Laodicea’.
94 How, for example, might our sense of Pauline anthropology be enriched by embracing Ephesians, with its risky expression of Pauline universalism?: ‘For he himself is our peace, who has made the two groups one and has destroyed the barrier, the dividing wall of hostility, by setting aside in his flesh [ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ] the law [νόμον] with its commands and regulations. His purpose was to create in himself one new humanity [ἕνα καινὸν ἄνθρωπον] out of the two, thus making peace, and in one body [σῶματι] to reconcile both of them to God through the cross, by which he put to death their hostility’.
allows them to function—and requires us to understand them—in broader semantic domains. In Wittgensteinian terms, Paul’s anthropological language is less picture theory and more language game. By reading Paul’s anthropological terms as they appear in their various contexts, we learn to think with Paul about how the Christ-event intersects with the subjective, lived experience of the Christ-follower in the νῦν καιρὸς. The subject is crucified and resurrected in participation in the Christ-event, and the effects of this participation are experienced phenomenologically in the body, heart, mind, soul, and so-forth. Whatever else one thinks of St Paul, or the dogmatic content of the Pauline tradition, it is difficult to dispute the effectiveness of this lexicon. Paul took everyday Koiné terms and developed a rich, existential account of the religious life, that incorporated the heart, mind, spirit, conscience, body, and so-on. In some cases the usage is metaphorical: the καρδία is an effective metaphor for the affective and valuing aspect of human subjectivity. In other cases, the language is more theologically technical as in the case of πνεῦμα. One of Paul’s evident strengths was his vivid poetic imagination; his ‘wretched man’ in Romans 7.7-25 has proven so relatable—transculturally and across time—it has bewitched some of Paul’s best readers into thinking Paul was speaking about them. Paul’s personal experience of a profound religious conversion, and his experience in mission, contributed positively to his way of articulating the news about the Christ-event that extended beyond cultural particularism—Jewish or otherwise—and connected with what was common to the human experience. The Christ-event was good news for the entire cosmos, and this universalism needed an appropriately universal language. Without diminishing cultural differences, Paul believed that all humans—Israel and every Nation—were one in the First Adam, and could be one again in the Last Adam, Jesus Christ. Thus, Paul’s soteriology becomes an anthropology—not to reduce one into the terms of the other (Paul would be the last to demythologize the Christ-event), but to convey a universal message in the most universal terms. Paul shared a way of speaking about how the Christ-event intersects anthropologically with the whole, embodied human person, and how the Christ-event intersects with communities of these new-creation persons.

St Paul was among the most effective voices among the ancients in capturing human religious phenomena in plain language. The number of people who go to Paul’s letters for consolation and encouragement, or to learn about how the Christ-event can be experienced personally continues to grow. Nietzsche took note of this and used it as the point of departure in

Duff, 237
his first major reflection on Paul. People read Paul for consolation—‘als Mundstück Gottes’!\(^95\)

There is enormous complexity in much of Paul’s argumentation, as the voluminous literature devoted to the study of the Pauline corpus bears witness. Yet, a person needs very little catechesis before understanding the thrust of Paul’s language of the religious phenomenology of the ‘body of death [σώματος τοῦ θανάτου]’ (Rom. 7.24), or to imagine the existential security of the religious convert who can say, ‘God’s love has been poured out into our hearts [καρδίας] through the Holy Spirit [πνεύματος ἅγιου] who has been given to us’ (Rom. 5.5), or to understand his corporate anthropological metaphors: ‘we are one body [ἓν σῶμα] in Christ’ (Rom. 12.5).\(^96\) This is a language game that is easy to learn. This elasticity and relatability is no doubt why Bultmann found that Paul was an existentialist in many senses of that risky word. Paul’s gospel was a revolt against the predicament of the self. We also see in Paul’s anthropological terms, how anthropology unites with cosmology—flesh and Spirit are at once anthropological and cosmological terms. As Käsemann writes, ‘The ontological statement of Pauline anthropology is crystallized in its ontic conclusions: man is always himself in his particular world; his being is open towards all sides and is always set in a structure of solidarity’.\(^97\)

\(^95\) KSA 9:4[220], p. 156.

\(^96\) It is important to note that Paul’s use of anthropological language is not limited to the individual, but frequently refers to the corporate dimension of Christian experience. Two recent monographs bear out this point in greater detail: Sunny Chen, Paul’s Anthropological Terms in the Light of Discourse Analysis (Dallas, TX: SIL International, 2019); Sang-Won (Aaron) Son, Corporate Elements in Pauline Anthropology: A Study of Select, Terms, Idioms, and Concepts in the Light of Paul’s Usage and Background (Fort Worth, TX: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 2001).

5.4 (Re)Becoming Human in the Νῦν Καίρος

5.4.1 The Παλαιὸς Άνθρωπος, the Καινός Άνθρωπος, and the ‘Already, and Not-Yet’.

Readers of Paul have long recognized a paradox within the temporal aspect of his anthropology: future realities are spoken of as already present, and present realities are treated as already past. After surveying scholarly attempts at evasion, A. Schweitzer wrote, ‘Treating it in a way incomprehensible to us as a self-evident thing [Paul] speaks of living men as having already died and risen again with Christ’. In Romans 6.1-14, for example, Paul argues that ‘we can live a new life’ (v. 4), because ‘we know that our old self was crucified with him so that the body ruled by sin might be done away with’ (v. 6), and yet, there would be no reason for Paul to transition back and forth between didactic and paraenetic elements were the old self truly annihilated in its co-crucifixion with Christ. Similarly, in Galatians 3.28 Paul writes, ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’—this statement is made even more extraordinary by its appearance within a letter that is attempting articulate the unifying implications of the gospel for a community with palpable tensions arising from racial-ethnic diversity. There were indeed Jew and Greek, as Paul well knew. In some instances, Paul just explicitly embraced the paradox, so that both life and death, old self and new self, crucifixion and resurrection, are experienced simultaneously in the νῦν καιρὸς: ‘We always carry around in our body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be revealed in our body’ (2 Cor. 4.10). This paradox has made existential, and psychological readings attractive and fruitful. Luther at least gestured in this direction in his formula, ‘simul justus et peccator’, where the verdict of justification was rendered on the basis of Christ’s work, even as the life and conduct of the justified believer

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98 Or, future realities are treated as past events: ‘And having been buried with Him in baptism, you were raised with Him through your faith in the power of God, who raised Him from the dead’ (Col. 2.12).
99 Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, 18. See also, W. Wrede’s straight-forward treatment: ‘[I]n truth these expressions are intended actually and literally’, Paul, 103.
100 On the other hand, Lüdemann points out that Paul frequently transitions from speaking about the indwelling Spirit into paraenesis, which, on his view, would be unfitting were his readers caught in the dialectic of Rom. 7.23-25, thus, ‘in conversion and baptism the σῶμα has received its death-blow, though its twitching and convulsions will endure for some time’, Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 141.
continued to be marked by the presence sin and flesh. Bultmann, taking up the Lutheran mantle in the 20th century, worked out an explicitly existential model of Paul’s anthropology that would sound familiar to readers of Heidegger.\textsuperscript{101} He expressed Luther’s principle in this way:

\begin{quote}
[I]t is of basic importance to comprehend that by his thesis that \textit{righteousness is a present reality} Paul, nevertheless, does not rob it of its \textit{forensic-eschatological meaning}. The paradoxicality of his assertion is this: God already pronounces His eschatological verdict (over the man of faith) in the present; the eschatological event is already present reality, or, rather, is beginning in the present. Therefore, the righteousness which God adjudicates to man (the man of faith) is not ‘sinlessness’ in the sense of ethical perfection, but is ‘sinlessness’ in the sense that God does not ‘count’ man’s sin against him (2 Cor. 5.19).\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

However, this juridical, or forensic, justification by faith does not imply that any, ‘magical or mysterious transformation of man in regard to his substance, the basis of his nature, takes place’.\textsuperscript{103}

\subsection*{5.4.2 Identity and Ontology.}

We can see that by locating forensic justification at the centre of Pauline soteriology, the Lutheran tradition can resolve part of the temporal paradox: those in Christ receive a new creation \textit{identity} in the \textit{νῦν καιρὸς}, creating a new perspective on the self, even as the promised \textit{ontological} transformation tarries on the eschatological horizon, and a \textit{de facto} sinful condition remains (\textit{simul justus et peccator}).\textsuperscript{104} For Bultmann, once more, the real-world impact of the gospel was purely existential, but this does not diminish its importance: justification by faith provides \textit{the} path to a unified, authentic subjectivity. It is a long-standing criticism of forensic or juridical models, that they fall short of accounting for Paul’s language about holiness. Participatory models can better account for both identity statements about holiness, and Paul’s most optimistic paraenesis, wherein he calls his readers to live in holiness \textit{now}. For example, Paul frequently addresses his readership as ‘holy’ [\textit{ἁγίοις}, and cognates], as when he addresses

\textsuperscript{101} Bultmann was a professor at the University of Marburg, where Heidegger lectured from 1923-1928, publishing \textit{Being and Time} in 1927.

\textsuperscript{102} Bultmann, \textit{Theology of the New Testament}, vol. 1, 276 (emphasis original).


\textsuperscript{104} That is, believers will continue to experience their somatic existence \textit{‘in the flesh’}, with its mortality and vulnerabilities. I address this point in detail below.
the believers in Philippi: ‘To all God’s holy people in Christ Jesus at Philippi’ (1.1). On the basis of these designations, M. Gorman writes, ‘Holiness is, therefore, essential to the identity of the church as a whole and to each individual in it’. On the other hand, while Paul greets the Corinthians as, ‘κλητοῖς ἁγίοις’, he goes on to address issues, including incest, that indicate how *unholy* the Corinthian assembly really was—*de jure* saints, *de facto* sinners—*simul justus et peccator*. Other examples are more difficult to account for as forensic pronouncements, as when Paul warns the Thessalonians to control their bodies, ‘in a way that is holy and honourable’, because, ‘God did not call us to be impure, but to live a holy life’ (*1 Thess*. 4.4, 7), or in one of Paul’s statements of ‘robust conscience’, which appears in the same letter, ‘You are witnesses, and so is God, of how holy, righteous and blameless we were among you who believed’ (2.10). Indeed, without a participationist model, it is difficult to make sense of Paul’s paraenetic statements in *Romans* about righteous living: ‘offer yourselves as slaves to righteousness leading to holiness’ (*Rom*. 6.19), or the didactic undergirding: ‘But now that you have been set free from sin and have become slaves of God, the benefit you reap leads to holiness, and the result is eternal life’ (*Rom*. 6.22).

5.5 The Incident in Antioch: St Paul’s Cruciform Identity.

*Crux probat omnia*.

——Martin Luther,

In the remaining pages of this chapter, and as a fitting conclusion of this reading of Paul, I will examine Paul’s use of the death-of-God motif in his letter to the church in Galatia. Here, as nowhere else, we witness the logical outworking of Christ-event. In *Galatians* the Cross and the crucifixion and are the key symbols subverting opposition to gospel-shaped values, and the catalysing effect for the total restructuring of self, community, and world. Here we see Paul’s

105 Cf. *Rom*. 1.7, 15.25, 15.31; *1 Cor*. 1.2, 16.15; *2 Cor*. 1.1; *Phil*. 1.1; *Col*. 1.2, 1.12, 1.22, 3.12; *Philemon* 1.5; *Eph*. 1.1, 1.4, 1.18, 3.18, 5.3, 5.26, 5.27.

personal conversion story, expressions of his own identity, his universalism, his opponents, his revisionist view of the Law, and his tensions with the other apostles.\textsuperscript{107} Fully the first third of \textit{Galatians}, is given to Paul’s own testimony, which culminates in his account of the ‘incident at Antioch’, and some of his most important statements about Christian identity. Throughout the letter, Paul is engaged in combating the Judaizers,\textsuperscript{108} members of a counter-Pauline mission who were contending for the on-going necessity of circumcision\textsuperscript{109} among the believers in Galatia. The issues involved are complex, relating both to Paul’s gospel (1.6-10),\textsuperscript{110} and the implications of his gospel for how the diverse members of his communities would relate to one another. The fact that the rite of circumcision—which functions throughout the letter as a synecdoche for the Law—is such a central issue in the letter, indicates that there was uncertainty about the role of Israel’s identity markers within the Christian community, and questions about how Jewish and non-Jewish converts should relate to one another.\textsuperscript{111} Paul’s response is unrivalled in the Pauline corpus for its force.

\textsuperscript{107} This is no less true of \textit{Acts}, which tightens the link further still by structuring its larger account of the Northward expansion of Christianity around Paul’s conversion, and then the Westward expansion through his mission, and later, through his trial. It is in \textit{Acts} 9, the account of Paul’s conversion that we read, ‘But the Lord said to Ananias, “Go! This man is my chosen instrument to proclaim my name to the Gentiles and their kings and to the people of Israel. I will show him how much he must suffer for my name’ (vv. 15-16); what remains of \textit{Acts} demonstrates Luke’s commitment to, or interest in, the significance of this word.

\textsuperscript{108} The term is derived from the text of \textit{Gal.} itself, where Paul rebukes Peter: ‘You are a Jew, yet you live like a Gentile and not like a Jew. How is it, then, that you force Gentiles to follow Jewish customs?’ \textit{Ἰουδαϊζειν}.

\textsuperscript{109} That is, to enter into the Mosaic covenant through the rite of male circumcision, and to continue by keeping the Law. \textit{Acts} clarifies the controversy through the account of the Jerusalem Council, in which the views of the opponents of Paul and Barnabas are presented in \textit{précis} form as follows: ‘Unless you are circumcised, according to the custom taught by Moses, you cannot be saved’ (15:1b), and, ‘The Gentiles must be circumcised and required to keep the law of Moses’ (15:5b).

\textsuperscript{110} Parenthetical references throughout this section refer to the text of \textit{Galatians}, unless otherwise noted.

\textsuperscript{111} M. Bird notes that while circumcision was a sign of faithfulness to the covenant, it was also critical point of divergence between Judaism and the Graeco-Roman culture, because the rite was widely reviled by Greeks and Romans. Thus, Paul’s depreciation of circumcision could have been taken as a form of capitulation to Graeco-Roman preferences.
Paul begins his argument by carefully distancing himself from the any real or perceived authorities among the leaders of the church in Jerusalem, explicitly repudiating any notion that he was commissioned through human agency (1.1),\textsuperscript{112} that he cares about human approval (1.10), that his message had a human origin (1.11-12), that his message was shaped through consultations with other apostles (1.16-17; 2.6b), or that he was impressed by the reputations of Peter, James, and John (2.6).\textsuperscript{113} Throughout the argument, Paul is at pains to establish the pure and direct lineage of his apostolic kerygma, but what is sometimes taken as proof that there was an insoluble conflict between the Pauline and Petrine missions,\textsuperscript{114} may be better understood in the light of Paul’s mapping of the axiological implications entailed in Christ-event. Uniquely for Paul, the Christ-event had both a soteriological function, and a world-shaping revaluation of all values. The presence of social or ethnic factions within the Christian community could only indicate, for Paul, that the community was not standing in an authentic relationship to what had happened (and was happening) in the work of Christ. Paul’s compressed account of his conversion, and his dealings with the other apostles, climaxes in his account of a confrontation he had with Peter in Antioch:

When Cephas came to Antioch, I opposed him to his face, because he stood condemned. For before certain men came from James, he used to eat with the Gentiles. But when they arrived, he began to draw back and separate himself from the Gentiles because he was afraid of those who belonged to the circumcision group. The other Jews joined him in his hypocrisy, so that by their hypocrisy even Barnabas was led astray. When I saw that they were not acting in line with the truth of the gospel, I said to Cephas in front of them all, ‘You are a Jew, yet you live like a Gentile and not like a Jew. How is it, then, that you force Gentiles to follow Jewish customs’? (Gal. 2.11-14).

\textsuperscript{112} Even the leaders in Jerusalem merely ‘recognized [ἰδόντες] that [Paul] had been entrusted with the task of preaching the gospel to the Gentiles’ (2:7).

\textsuperscript{113} Here I differ slightly from William Campbell, who notes, ‘The fact that Paul, in the very passage in Galatians used by many to establish his own complete independence of all human agency, acknowledges that he visited Jerusalem and spoke to Peter and others, is proof that Paul himself realized the need for mutual recognition’, 35 (emphasis added). While Paul valued cooperation and mutual recognition, he still seemed determined to show that the other apostles, as human agents, added nothing to his message.

\textsuperscript{114} This supposition was axiomatic in Baur’s treatment, and continues to enjoy widespread support.
In Paul’s view, Peter stood condemned, not merely because his actions were hypocritical, or because he was using his influence to lead others into hypocrisy; Paul’s condemnation of Peter’s behaviour had deeper implications for his larger argument within Galatians. By shrinking back from openly socializing with the Gentile believers, he was giving an implicit nod to a system of valuation which had been abrogated in the Christ-event, and allowing those defunct valuations to re-stratify the community in Galatia. Even by implicitly denying the efficaciousness of the Christ-event to justify a person before God, he was allowing an obsolete metric to re-enter the symbolic world of early Christianity, compromising its cruciform character.

Throughout Galatians, Paul strenuously denies that any righteousness or justification is made available through the Law, but the good news is that the Christ-event marked the absolute end of the Law’s tenure. The central issue that Paul had with Peter’s separation from the non-Jewish Christians in Antioch, was that by acceding to the demands of ethnic particularism, he was rebuilding what had been destroyed in the Christ-event (2.18). In Paul’s analysis, Peter had chosen the hypocritical line of assenting to the efficaciousness of Christ’s work but reaffirming the necessity of (defunct) old covenant adherence in order to appease the Judaizers. Paul accuses Peter of not understanding the far-reaching implications of his own actions, and proposes his own radical solution to the identity problem:

For through the law I died to the law so that I might live for God. I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me. The life I now live in the body, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me. I do not set aside the grace of God, for if righteousness could be gained through the law, Christ died for nothing! (2.19-21).

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115 Internal evidence (Gal. 2.1-10) suggests that Gal. was composed subsequent to the Jerusalem Council (Acts 15), which has led some scholars (notably, Jürgen) to conclude that the mission centred in Jerusalem had begun to renege on the deliverance of their initial conclusions when implementing them became problematic. Michael F. Bird offers a more charitable proposal: the council had addressed the issue of Gentile circumcision, but never addressed the issues of Jew-Gentile interrelations within local church communities; see, ‘The Incident at Antioch (Gal. 2.11-14): The Beginnings of Paulinism’, 170-204, An Anomalous Jew: Paul Among Jews, Greeks, and Romans (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2016), 182-185.
Here Paul reveals the character of his radicalized post-Damascus identity as a kind of existential participation in the Christ-event—*co-crucifixion* [συνεσταυρώματι]. To encounter the crucified and risen Jesus—then as enemy, now as Lord—was, existentially speaking, such a violent disruption, Paul could only say it was the crucifixion and re-creation of his self. The existential aspect of the Damascus event was the sense of destitution that Paul felt when his zealous law-observance had not kept him from sinning and blaspheming against God. Paul’s self, once safely ensconced within its world, was now shown—as a matter of brute fact—to be campaigning against Israel’s Messiah: the self is destitute, the world collapses. The Christ-event functions as a *revaluation*, where former measures of worthiness (or boasting) are excluded, and Gentile converts stand on equal footing with the most zealous Israelite. This conviction of equality is deepened in Paul’s self-understanding, because, when God called Paul by grace, and revealed the Son in him (1.15-16), it could not have been on the basis of merit, because Paul was a violent threat to the early church. Within this remapped symbolic world, even the identity of Israel is reframed around the promises fulfilled in Christ:

So in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith, for all of you who were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus. If you belong to Christ, then you are Abraham’s seed, and heirs according to the promise *(Gal. 3.26-29)*.

This last passage has been load-bearing within a wide variety of readings: including Boyarin and Badiou’s universalist readings, Dunn and Wright’s New Perspective readings, and within the Augustinian-Lutheran tradition’s emphasis on the radical soteriological implications of the Christ-event. Whatever one’s perspective, Paul’s bald assertion about ‘those who were held in high esteem’, that ‘whatever they were makes no difference to me (2.6), reveals his distinctively

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116 The verb for co-crucifixion, συσταυρώματι, appears here and in a close parallel passage, *Rom*. 6.6. It appears three times outside of the Pauline corpus, each time in reference to the criminals who were crucified alongside Jesus of Nazareth (*Matt*. 27.44; *Mk*. 15.32; *Jn*. 19.32).


118 So Barclay, ‘Paul had lived enthusiastically in accordance with the well-established norms of “Judaism”, but God’s “calling in grace” had nothing to do with his success in those terms’, *Paul and the Gift*, 360.
‘revalued’ anthropology, which, in turn, is grounded axiologically in the radical nature of the Christ-event itself. Indeed, ‘God does not show favouritism’ (2.6).\(^{119}\)

5.5.2 Life Within the Cross-Pressures.

Living within this social geography that has been revalued and restructured by the Christ-event created friction when it came into contact with the glacial pace of culture. The social problems that Paul’s mission faced were acute. Deeply-entrenched customs that defined identities and shaped behaviour were not merely the superficial veneer of society, but constituted its structural integrity. Second-Temple Judaism was a thriving complex of identity markers, prescribed (and proscribed) behaviours, and a unique set of expectations, nested within all the thorny complexities of the First-Century Roman Empire.\(^{120}\) If, as in *Acts*, Paul typically began his missionary efforts within Jewish synagogues,\(^{121}\) those in attendance would include Israelites, proselytes, God-fearers, and a complex matrix of rules, mores, and practices for managing the interrelations between members. Naturally, Peter’s inconsistencies were situated within these complex and over-lapping social contexts, which made certain behaviours more socially permissible (or expedient) than others. By reaffirming ethnic boundary markers, Peter could present his allegiance to Christ as no threat to the established norms of Judaism. Paul viewed Peter’s compromise as anathema. This does not mean that Paulinism could not allow for difference; indeed, it presupposed a measure of difference. As Käsemann writes,

> [Paul] speaks about transformation of earthly life, but in his view this shows itself only in a new life lived to the praise of God and for the service of one’s neighbour. For Paul, unity in the body of Christ does not mean the sameness of all the members; it means the solidarity which can endure the strain of the differences—the different gifts and different weaknesses of the different members. Faith confers a sense of responsibility though it does so in a freedom which cannot be qualified by models and programmes of a systematic doctrine or by casuistry.\(^{122}\)

\(^{119}\) Cf. the similar assertion in *Rom*. 2.11, where Paul is denying any soteriological advantage to ethnic Israel.


Similarly, William Campbell rightly states, that ‘Pauline universalism is one that can coexist with particularities. The universal dimension of the gospel acknowledges its inclusive reference to both Jews and Gentiles’. Indeed, Paul’s *modus operandi* was to adapt and accommodate the customs of others, wherever possible. Paul’s adaptability, which he characterizes as a self-imposed slavery to others (*1 Cor. 9.19*), was the result of the dialectic between personal freedom and the burden for imitating the kenotic pattern of Christ he found in his re-created identity: ‘For I am not seeking my own good but the good of many, so that they may be saved. Follow my example, as I follow the example of Christ’ (*1 Cor. 10.33-11.1*).

Now Paul delivers a two-pronged accusation against those who are still promoting circumcision. First, they wanted to ‘impress people by means of the flesh’, or ‘boast about your circumcision in the flesh’ (*Gal. 6.12-13*). Secondly, they wanted to ‘avoid being persecuted for the Cross of Christ’ (*Gal. 6.12*). Thus, his fundamental point of conflict with the ‘hetero-gospel’ (*ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον*) of the Judaizers was their failure to recognize the revaluing logic of the Cross. Paul could boast in the Cross, ‘through which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world’ (*Gal. 6.14*; cf. *1.10*), meaning that he refused to dignify the symbolic capital of his opponents. We can make at least two significant distinctions between Paul’s practice of adaptability and what he saw as Peter’s compromise. The first is that Peter was tacitly lending support to ethnic chauvinism among the gathered body of ethnically-diverse believers—not an evangelistic context. And second, Peter’s actions implied that the status quo could be maintained in the wake of the Christ-event, while Paul’s world was characterized by a more radical revaluation of values:

> Not even those who are circumcised keep the law, yet they want you to be circumcised that they may boast about your circumcision in the flesh. May I never boast except in the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world’ (*6.13-14*).

The logic of Paul’s co-crucifixion was that the curse of the Law is concentrated on the death of the Son of God (*Gal. 3.13*), and so those who participate in his death might escape the (guilty) verdict which would be rendered were they judged under the Law. The incident in

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124 Paul details this practice and its underlying logic in *1 Cor. 9.19-23.*
Antioch stemmed from a wider failure to realize that resurrecting the Law set aside the gift of Christ’s life, and made Christ appear to be a minister of sin. Again, Paul believed that the break needed to be absolute. This did not mean that Israel’s distinctiveness was of no account, but it did mean that those patterns of religion which kept Israel separate from the Nations, were not to be allowed to divide what Christ had unified through the Cross.

For Paul, the incident in Antioch, and the parallel situations elsewhere, were fundamentally contests of the two irreconcilable sets values. All social transactions—not least those made within the cross-pressures of an ethnically-diverse Christian community—are implicitly or explicitly validated by complex matrices of symbols and values. Paul accuses his opponents of wanting to force the issue of circumcision in order to glory in the flesh, whereas his participation in the death of God radically depreciates the value of fleshly exploits. He can say the world has been crucified to him, and he to the world, and both are significant in that they denote fundamental axiological disjunctions. The ‘world [κόσμος]’ has no acceptable currency in social transactions, even as Paul knows that his ‘boast’ in the Cross of Christ is fundamentally absurd in relationship to the world. But for Paul, it is the radical nature of the Christ-event itself—the crucified Messiah, reanimated in the resurrection—that demands this radically reframed symbolic world. As Alexandra Brown writes, ‘[Paul’s] aim in preaching the cross is to alter his hearers’ perception of the world in such a way as to alter their experience in the world. In the preaching of the cross, something is unveiled that moves the one who perceives it from one world to another, from the divided mind to the “mind of Christ” (2.16)’.  

5.5.3 Summary: Towards the Crucified and Resurrected Self.

In Galatians, the crucifixion of the Son of God is the fulcrum point of Paul’s radicalized anthropological pessimism, and eschatological hope. Further, the crucified Son of God, reoccurs as a signal of the axiological disjunction between the community of Christ and the ‘present evil age’, and thus an indictment against the Judaizers’ anachronistic application of Jewish boundary markers. The Judaizers were attempting to re-stratify the community using a metric made obsolete by the Cross. The radical nature of Paul’s own conversion brought God glory (1.24),

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and Paul’s recreated identity was subject to God alone, making human valuations irrelevant (1.10); the two postures one may assume in relation to the Christ-event are starkly framed as freedom and slavery (2.4), and God’s grace to Paul established incontrovertibly that ‘God does not show favouritism’ (2.6).

5.6 Conclusion.

Over the course of this chapter, we have seen how the axiological aspects of Pauline anthropology are cast in and around the multiple facets of the Christ-event—most strikingly in Paul’s reflections on the crucifixion, and resurrection. Though the extant Pauline corpus may not afford a comprehensive picture of Paul’s theologizing, it amply demonstrates the relentlessness of Paul’s meditations on the Christ-event, and his fascination with the unanticipated kenotic shape of the Messiah’s path to exaltation. In Christ, the obscuring veil is removed, affording a view into the Torah which leads Paul to radically deepen his anthropological pessimism, even encompassing the covenant community of Israel. Christ crucified stands at the centre of Paul’s re-created symbolic world, and his anthropology, as in no other NT author, is contoured by this event.
Chapter 6

Nietzsche as Antichrist: Contextualizing Nietzsche’s Mature Anti-Paulinism

‘Man soll das Christenthum nicht schmücken und herausputzen: es hat einen Todkrieg gegen diesen höheren Typus Mensch gemacht . . .’

—Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist.¹

6.1 Introduction.

In the foregoing exploration of the early and middle periods, I sought to demonstrate the synergism between Nietzsche’s anthropology and his anti-Christianity. That is to say, Nietzsche’s emerging conflict with Christianity was fuelled by his exploration of human nature, even as his anthropology took shape in opposition to the Christian view of human being. I rejected as anachronistic Nietzsche’s claim in Eccé Homo that his first major publication evinced any appreciable hostility towards the Christian religion, arguing that the early-period writings demonstrated a marked ambivalence towards Christianity, and more importantly, that Nietzsche had not yet articulated any theoretical basis for anti-Christianity, as such. This began to change in the wake of a personal event—a sudden disruption in his mission with Wagner—a sense of self-estrangement at Bayreuth, which I juxtaposed with St Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus. Nietzsche overcame this period of existential vertigo by dramatically deconstructing and then reimagining his view of the self, and its world. In this schema, the unique ethos of

¹ ‘One should not embellish or dress up Christianity: it has waged a war to the death against this higher type of man. . .’, AC § 5, p. 127 [KSA 6, p. 171].
Human stems from Nietzsche’s orientation towards a non-creative period of demolition, where he sought to disabuse himself of the romanticism, idealism, and other defining characteristics of his early period, while somewhat uncritically embracing a kind of positivism. The two major publications which followed, Daybreak, and Gay Science, exhibit Nietzsche’s creative process of reconceptualising the ‘world as it concerns man’ (the world of human becoming), and they brought Nietzsche to the threshold of his mature period. Between these periods of demolition and re-creation, lies Nietzsche’s ‘return to Paul’—whose rival account of the self and its world became for Nietzsche an object of fascination and scorn.

We have now arrived at a critical juncture in Nietzsche’s writings, where the Nietzsche of fame emerges, and where cruciform Paulinism increasingly serves as a foil for Nietzsche’s own creative vision. I begin with Thus Spoke Zarathustra (hereafter, Zarathustra), as Nietzsche’s attempt to recreate a symbolic world that was structurally invulnerable to the weaknesses present in his earlier work—weaknesses pre-eminently exampled by Christianity. I focus on the death of God, and the eternal recurrence, as the two essential pillars of Zarathustra’s conceptualization of the world: cataclysmic historical event, and eschatological horizon. These pillars can be seen to correspond to the twin pillars of the world mapped by St Paul, and in this way, Zarathustra serves as an implicit critique of Paulinism, with some of its most prominent symbolic contours mapping directly (and agonistically) onto Paul’s world.

I then explore the roots of Nietzsche’s central task—the revaluation of all values—an irreducibly anti-Christian occupation that reached its apogee in The Antichrist. I begin with Beyond Good and Evil (hereafter, Beyond), where Nietzsche offers his explicit critique of the modern zeitgeist—including his indictment of philosophers, whom he styled as ‘crypto-priests’ in the service of residual Christian values. It is in Beyond that Nietzsche first published two major theses that would occupy him throughout his final productive years. First, he recognized Palestinian Judaism as the radix of the slave revolt in morals. Second, he saw in cruciform Paulinism a ‘revaluation of all values’, and his opposition to the symbology of the Cross emerged as a distinctive feature of his late period. These theses were explored more systematically in On the Genealogy of Morals (hereafter, Genealogy). In both Beyond and Genealogy—widely considered the most important philosophical works of Nietzsche’s whole corpus—Nietzsche began to cast a vision for a philosophy of the future, defining the task, and imaging the higher types who would carry the task to completion.
Finally, I examine Nietzsche’s most explicitly anti-Christian writings. I begin with a survey of Nietzsche’s plans for his Hauptwerk, which he developed under the working title, The Will to Power: An Attempt at the Revaluation of all Values. In Four Volumes. There I argue that, far from being abandoned, Nietzsche believed that this project was dramatically realised by his completion of The Antichrist, and its eccentric herald, Eccé Homo. In my examination of The Antichrist, I argue that Nietzsche’s overt hostility towards Paul is carefully ensconced within this larger revaluation of all values. I offer a fresh reading of The Antichrist, giving a detailed explication of what Paul accomplished, according to Nietzsche, and, offering a Nietzschean account of how Paulinism had culminated in the modern crisis that Nietzsche sought to resolve.

6.2 Zarathustra’s Symbolic World as Implicit Anti-Paulinism.

‘[M]einen Zarathustra . . . das erste Buch aller Jahrtausende, die Bibel der Zukunft, der höchste Ausbruch des menschlichen Genius, in dem das Schicksal der Menschheit einbegriffen ist’.

—Friedrich Nietzsche, Letter to Paul Deussen.2

Zarathustra begins where Gay Science had ended, and it represents a dramatic expansion of the implications of several of Nietzsche’s key images, which he had created late in the middle-period writings. Here the Death of God is the cosmic event that has dramatically reshaped the world into Zarathustra’s stark, apocalyptic landscape, and the eternal recurrence forms a new eschatological horizon. These two features of Zarathustra may be thought of as the twin pillars of Nietzsche’s reimagined symbolic world, and situated between them, are the last men, the higher men, and the Übermensch. My thesis here that this two-pillar structure of inaugurating event and existential-eschatological horizon, corresponds more-or-less exactly with the two-pillar structure at the heart of Pauline Christianity. For Paulinism, the Christ-event was a sudden and dramatic disruption—a revaluation of all values—in the world of Palestinian Judaism, and in

2 ‘My Zarathustra . . . the foremost book of all millennia, the Bible of the future, the greatest eruption of human genius, in which is contained the destiny of humankind’, eKGBW/BVN-1888,1159 — Letter to Paul Deussen: 26/11/1888.
the worlds of the Nations. It cast its dark shadow over the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος (the old human), declaring him dead, and under the condemnation of his progenitor, Adam; with the Resurrection dawns a new mode of being—the καινὸς ἄνθρωπος (the new human), made alive, and justified in Christ. The most sacrosanct of tribal identity markers—including Israel’s sign of covenantal membership—were depreciated to ‘nothing’; the most esteemed symbolic social capital was regarded as ‘garbage’ in comparison with the transformation made available in Christ.

This structure is identical in Nietzsche’s imagined world of Zarathustra, but here the Death of God event revalues the residuary values of a dying Christian world, casting its shadow over the village of the ‘last men’, provocatively calling for the resurrection of the ‘higher men’, and envisioning the mysterious figure of the Übermensch. Similarly, the eternal recurrence reshapes the eschatological horizon, confronting otherworldly hopes as nihilistic, and shifting the existential gravity back into earthly life. As in the proclamation of St Paul, so in the prophetic teaching of Zarathustra—the most important questions relate to how one is to live authentically within the axiological contours of these worlds. We turn now to a closer examination of these two ‘symbolic pillars’, and their implications for human becoming.

6.2.1 The First Symbolic Pillar: The Death of God.


—Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.3

In the prologue to Zarathustra, we find Zarathustra going down [untergehen] to the village, expressing his desire, ‘to become human again’ [wieder Mensch werden].4 Zarathustra is going down because he loves human beings, but he meets the saint along the way who says, ‘Now I love God: human beings I do not love. Human beings are too imperfect a thing for me.

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3 ‘Well then! Well now! You higher men! Only now is the mountain in labour with humanity’s future. God died: now we want—the overman to live’, Z ‘On the Higher Man’ § 2, p. 232 [KSA 4, p. 357].
4 Z ‘Prologue’ § 1, p. 3 [KSA 4, p. 12]; cf. Nietzsche’s letter to Salomé, dated 3 July, 1882: ‘I no longer want to be lonely, but learn again to become human’ [wieder lernen, Mensch zu werden], BVN-1882, 256.
Love for human beings would kill me’.\(^5\) Significantly, the saint’s misanthropy was rooted in an idealism made defunct by the great event—‘Could it be possible!’ Zarathustra asks, ‘This old saint in his woods has not yet heard the news that \textit{God is dead}!—’\(^6\) This brief exchange is a \textit{précis} of the larger revaluation project at the centre of \textit{Zarathustra}. The saint’s hierarchy of values, which is rooted axiologically in the ideal being of God, has been destabilized in the wake of the event; his mode of being is practicable only in a state of ignorance or denial. The saint’s misanthropy also contrasts with Zarathustra’s vision for the \textit{overcoming} of mankind, paradoxically motivated by a love for human beings.\(^7\)

The tight link which Nietzsche perceives between the death of God event, and his anthropology begins with his first speech. It is in light of the death of God that Zarathustra declares: ‘The \textit{Übermensch} is the meaning of the earth . . . \textit{remain faithful to the earth . . . }’, and warns them against those who speak of ‘extraterrestrial hopes’.\(^8\) The \textit{Übermensch} is envisioned as a sea that can absorb the polluted stream of human being,\(^9\) and the \textit{value} of the contemptible ‘last man’ lies in his capacity for self-overcoming—should he only will it.\(^10\) When the message is rejected with laughter, Zarathustra witnesses the tightrope walker’s fall, by which the man was mortally wounded. As death approaches, the man fears hell, but when Zarathustra assures him hell does not exist, and his soul will die before his body,\(^11\) the tightrope walker’s response—‘then I lose nothing when I lose my life’\(^12\)—betrays his precarious position between ascetic religion and nihilism. Zarathustra concludes: ‘Uncanny is human existence and still without

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5 Z ‘Prologue’ § 2, p. 4 [\textit{KSA} 4, p. 13]. The imagery of Zarathustra’s \textit{untergehen} clearly invites comparison with the \textit{kenotic} incarnation of Christ, who empties himself and goes down, becoming human, out of a love for humanity.


7 ‘I love human beings’ [Ich liebe die Menschen], Z-Prologue § 2, p. 4 [\textit{KSA} 4, p. 13]. This paradox anticipates an argument that Nietzsche will continue to refine throughout the mature period: namely, that Christian love is, at bottom, revalued hate that makes transactions at the expense of the future.

8 Z ‘Prologue’ § 3, p. 6 [\textit{KSA} 4, pp. 14-15].

9 Z ‘Prologue’ § 3, p. 6 [\textit{KSA} 4, p. 15].

10 Z ‘Prologue’ § 4, p. 7 [\textit{KSA} 4, pp. 16-17].

11 Nietzsche sees Paul’s bifurcation of the human person into the competing drives of flesh and Spirit (\textit{Gal.} 5.17; cf. Nietzsche’s quotation of the passage at \textit{KSA} 9:4[162] p. 141) as one of Christianity’s basic errors, which he confronts in \textit{Zarathustra} under the rubrics of, ‘On the Despisers of the Body’, and ‘On the Preachers of Death’.

12 Z ‘Prologue’ § 6, p. 11 [\textit{KSA} 4, p. 22].
meaning: a jester can spell its doom. I want to teach humans the meaning of their being, which is the overman, the lightning from the dark cloud “human being”.

We glimpse here Zarathustra’s therapeutic mission: ‘To lure many away from the herd—for that I came’. But, Zarathustra recognizes that luring people away from the herd will raise the ire of the last men: ‘Look at the good and the just! Whom do they hate most? The one who breaks their tablets of values, the breaker, the lawbreaker—but he is the creative one’. Here Nietzsche has Zarathustra embrace what I have called the dialectic of innovation by revaluation: the axiological untimeliness of those who transgress established boundaries in order to creatively re-envision the world. Indeed, ‘They shall be called annihilators and despisers of good and evil. But they are the harvesters and the celebrators’. Here Zarathustra’s task is akin to Paul’s as the ‘destroyer of the Law’, in Daybreak § 68.

The second appearance of the Death of God motif comes with Zarathustra’s meeting the retired pope, who sought the hermit-saint as the last pious person—who, in his seclusion, was still unaware of the Death of God. Here Nietzsche approaches the theme of revaluation from another tack, where the crisis provides a new opportunity for self-overcoming, or self-creation:

I teach mankind a new will: to want the path that human beings have travelled blindly, to pronounce it good and no longer sneak to the side of it like the sick and the dying-out.

It was the sick and the dying-out who despised the body and the earth and invented the heavenly and its redeeming drops of blood. But even these sweet and shadowy poisons they took from the body and the earth!

With this allusion to Christianity, Nietzsche takes aim at the priestly instinct he locates in Paulinism—with its anthropological pessimism, the hope of resurrection, and blood redemption. The connection to St Paul is made stronger in light of our study of Daybreak § 68, above. There Nietzsche diagnosed Paul as psychologically tormented and sick—and, as Paul

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13 Z ‘Prologue’ § 7, p. 12 [KSA 4, p. 23].
14 Z ‘Prologue’ § 9, p. 14 [KSA 4, p. 25].
15 Z ‘Prologue’ § 9, p. 14 [KSA 4, p. 26].
17 Z ‘On the Hinterworldly’ p. 21 [KSA 4, p. 37]. This passage bears an interesting resemblance to Col. 2.16ff., where Paulinism is opposed to the ‘shadows’ of cultic ritual and asceticism.
18 On blood redemption, see: Rom. 3.25, 5.9; 1 Cor. 10.16, 11.25; Col. 1.20. Eph. 1.7, 2.13.
was the architect of Christian thought, or ‘the first Christian’, that sickness lies at the heart of the Christian conception of (healthy) human being. The anthropological ideals of Christianity are revalued as sickness and dying-out in Zarathustra’s world.

The Death of Human Equality.

In *Gay Science*, the madman’s horror at the guilt of humanity—the murderers of God—was partly tempered by the hope that mankind could become worthy of the deed they had committed. The deliberately macabre imagery Nietzsche’s madman employed even gives way to a notion of theosis or deification: ‘How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? . . . Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? ’

Indeed, those who are born subsequent to the event, ‘belong to a higher history than all history hitherto’. In *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche brings the death of God to bear upon an aspect of Christian idealism, namely, the equality of every human before God. We have seen how Paul interprets the Christ-event as a foundation of human equality before God, both because Paul’s radicalized anthropological pessimism demands that ‘Jews and Gentiles alike are under the power of sin’ (*Rom*. 3.9), and, because the Christ-event was an inversion of the world’s values, according to each individual the status of one, ‘for whom Christ died’ (*1 Cor*. 8.11; *Rom*. 14.15). Nietzsche traced this doctrine of equality into the post-Christian democratic values of his contemporaries, who were content to abandon belief in God as outmoded, but who clung dogmatically to an adulterated form of equality: ‘Indeed, with the help of a religion which indulged and flattered the most sublime herd-animal desires, we have reached the point where we find even political and social institutions and ever more visible expression of this morality: the democratic movement is the heir of the Christian movement’. 

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19 *GS* § 125, p. 181 [*KSA* 3, p. 481]. And yet, Paul Tillich may go too far in arguing that Nietzsche allows no possibility of an authentic atheism. Tillich reads the account of the ‘Ugliest Man’ in *Z* as just such a concession: ‘The murderer of God finds God in man. He has not succeeded in killing God at all. God has returned in Zarathustra, and in the new period of history which Zarathustra announces. God is always revived in something or somebody; He cannot be murdered’, ‘The Escape from God’, in *Nietzsche and the Gods*, ed. Weaver Santaniello, 173-179 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 177.

20 *GS* § 125, p. 181 [*KSA* 3, p. 481]. This line provides an illuminating commentary on Nietzsche’s self-conception as being the beginning of ‘great politics’, and ‘a destiny’.


Duff, 256
Nietzsche puts the dogma of human equality in the mouths of the blinking *hoi polloi*:

"You higher men"—thus blinks the rabble—"there are no higher men, we are all equal, human is human, before God—we are all equal". Zarathustra’s response is one of the most interesting and important applications of the divine death motif, focusing upon where axiology and anthropology intersect at the moment of the event:

> Before God!—But now this god has died! You higher men, this god was your greatest danger.
> It is only now, since he lies in his grave, that you are resurrected. Only now the great noon comes, only now the higher man becomes—ruler!

... Well then! Well now! You higher men! Only now is the mountain in labour with humanity’s future. God died: now we want—the overman to live.

Paralleling St Paul’s application of the Christ-event, Zarathustra traces the anthropological implications of the death of God, both negatively and positively. First, the event rescinds the Pauline basis of equality by which *décadent* types—the herd, the rabble, the last men—cast suspicion on the existence of higher men. Second, the death of God allows for a new axiological framework within which the status of the higher men *qua* higher men re-emerges as an extra-moral *good*. Here we have the case *par excellence* of the implicit counter-Paulinism in Nietzsche’s mature period. Within the symbolic world of *Zarathustra*, the death of God has the inverse effect to Paul’s logic of the Cross. The death of God deconstructs the axiological matrix within which the Christian tradition, following Paul, had justified a *theoretical* human equality. When Paul’s primary framework of *good and evil* collapses, this results in the axiological re-

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22 Z ‘On the Higher Man’ § 1, p. 232 [*KSA* 4, p. 356]; cf. *AC* § 62, p. 196 [*KSA* 6, 252]. This is one of Nietzsche’s most salient points of conflict with Christianity—to which we will return in connection with *AC*, below.


24 In the works following *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche will deconstruct the axiological framework of good and evil, and replace it with the less metaphysically-freighted framework of good and bad. It was of course on the basis of a *moral* evaluation that Paul’s negative universalism rested—people were equal as *unjust* (this was not inconsistent with believing that some people were of more exemplary character than others, and Paul routinely singled out individuals as worthy examples to follow, e.g., *Phil*. 2.19-24; *1 Cor*. 11.1, 16.15-18). By denying the ongoing significance of moral values, Nietzsche subverted this basis of equality.
stratification of human beings along the lines of good and bad, making it once again sensible to speak of ‘higher men’ in an amoral sense.25

The Identity of the Übermensch.

The Übermensch is introduced as a further consequence of this re-stratification of human beings. In the Madman’s requiem, the guilt incurred by murdering God is assuaged with the hope of one day becoming gods—and thus worthy of the act of deicide. In Zarathustra, ‘God died: now we want—the overman to live’. There has been a great deal of discussion, both scholarly and unscholarly, about the identity of the Übermensch, but there has been famously little in the way of consensus. More than a century ago, Figgis felt compelled to offer the counsel of despair: ‘Probably no two people to the end of time will be in precise agreement as to the significance of the Übermensch’.26 The issue is complicated, too, by its primary association with Zarathustra, where it appears only briefly, and in the work’s quasi-apocalyptic style.27 What is clear, is that Nietzsche sees the Übermensch as a possibility set in motion by the death of God, and so it is a break with the anthropological ideals of late European Christianity: ‘half

25 Pace Henry Bayman, who writes: ‘Nietzsche sets out to create a superior human being, yet succeeds only in producing a monster. . . . Barred from elevation in the vertical direction, his “self-overcoming” can take place in only one direction: the ego can only expand—or rather inflate—in the horizontal. Lacking this vertical direction, the only thing left for him is to claim superiority through his own will to power’ (‘Nietzsche, God, and Doomsday’, 196). But it is precisely the metaphor of vertical development and social stratification that Nietzsche continually employs. A related issue is signalled by Irving Zeitlin’s question, ‘Knowing the Hebrew Bible intimately, as he did, would Nietzsche have denied that Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, et al., were “higher types”?’, Nietzsche: A Re-Examination (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1994), 37. Using the vertical axis, Nietzsche would likely have answered that these were deep men—priestly types who contributed depth to subject qua homines religiosi (cf. BGE § 45), without achieving the heights Nietzsche sought.

26 Figgis, The Will To Freedom, 6 (emphasis original).

27 It is also complicated by Nietzsche’s scornful denial of a Darwinian interpretation (EH-Why I Write Such Good Books § 1, p. 261 [KSA 6, p. 300]), despite the fact that such an explanation seems to be invited, if not confirmed, by much of Zarathustra’s language:

All creatures so far created something beyond themselves; and you want to be the ebb of this great flood and would even rather go back to animals than overcome him?

What is the ape to a human? A laughing stock or a painful embarrassment. That that is precisely what the human shall be to the overman: a laughing stock or a painful embarrassment’ (Z-Prologue § 3, pp. 5-6 [KSA 4, p. 14]).

We will return to the question of Nietzsche’s relationship to Darwin, below.
“saint”, half “genius”.\textsuperscript{28} The exchange with the higher men provides the insight that the residual Paulinism present in Modernity is destabilized by the event, inaugurating the age of higher men. The Übermensch, therefore, can be interpreted as a further radicalisation of this inequality—the possibility of cultivating a type of being \textit{higher still}—building upon the superiority of the higher men. Zarathustra is ever awake to the new possibilities of his world: ‘I walk among human beings as among fragments of the future; that future that I see’.\textsuperscript{29}

This revaluation with respect to modes of human being was of first importance in Nietzsche’s view of his own task. If the proclamation of the death of God in \textit{Zarathustra} means that ‘Only now the great noon comes . . .’, Nietzsche similarly recognized his ‘task of preparing a moment of the highest self-examination for humanity, a \textit{great noon} when it looks back and far forward, when it emerges from the dominion of accidents and priests . . .’.\textsuperscript{30} The great event of modernity was a crisis because it had brought the foundations of Christian values to ruin, and yet no one, until Nietzsche, had recognized the need to confront the looming crisis of nihilism with a revaluation of all values.\textsuperscript{31} Nietzsche clarifies the nature of the crisis when he returns to the subject of the death of God in Book V of \textit{Gay Science}: ‘[Few] people today know as yet \textit{what} this event really means—and how much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined because it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it; for example, the whole of our European morality’.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{EH} ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’ § 1, p. 261 \textit{[KSA 6, p. 300]}. The very ideals the Nietzsche of the early period recognized as the ‘root of all culture . . . the longing of man to be \textit{reborn} as saint and genius’, \textit{SAE} § 3, p. 142 \textit{[KSA 1, p. 358]}, but explicitly \textit{denied} in connection with the Übermensch in \textit{EH}:

The word ‘overman’, as the designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed to ‘modern’ men, to ‘good’ men, to Christians and other nihilists—a word that in the mouth of a Zarathustra, the annihilator of morality, becomes a very pensive word—has been understood almost everywhere with the utmost innocence in the sense of those very values whose opposite Zarathustra was meant to represent—that is, as an ‘idealistic’ type of a higher kind of man, half ‘saint’, half ‘genius’ (‘Why I Write Such Good Books’, § 1, p. 261 \textit{[KSA, 300]}).

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Z} ‘On Redemption’ p. 110 \textit{[KSA 4, p. 179]}.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{EH} ‘Why I Write Such Good Books—D’ § 2, p. 291 \textit{[KSA 6, p. 330]} emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{31} Heidegger rightly avers that, for Nietzsche, ‘Nihilism is at work even—and especially—there where it is not advocated as a doctrine or demand, there where ostensibly its opposite prevails’, \textit{Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art}, 26.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{GS} § 343, p. 279 \textit{[KSA 3, 573]}.
Nietzsche’s application of the death of God motif, though clearly not everywhere explicit in his writings, undergirded the whole of his task. It was the heretofore unrealised possibility of overcoming the axiological restraints he recognized in Pauline anthropology (Christian ideals and Christian idealism). The Übermensch, therefore, is the Delphic symbol of the unexplored and unrealized potentiality which justifies human being. In Paul’s world, human becoming found its telos in the eternal ideal of the God-Man, and the hope of Pauline communities was ultimate conformation to this ideal in the eschaton. Zarathustra, invites his hearer to embrace the hope of a supreme achievement in human becoming, without succumbing to another form of idealism by fleshing out the Übermensch in detail. A passage in Eccé Homo clarifies his refusal to provide explicit detail:

The last thing I should promise would be to ‘improve’ mankind. No new idols are erected by me; let the old ones learn what feet of clay mean. Overthrowing idols (my word for ‘ideals’) — that comes closer to being part of my craft. One has deprived reality of its value, its meaning, its truthfulness, to precisely the extent to which one has mendaciously invented an ideal world.

It has been a commonplace to fault Nietzsche as being unable or unwilling to articulate a detailed profile for the Übermensch. While the evidence suggests that the Nietzsche’s anthropology was somewhat underdetermined, to accuse him of failure on this account is to misunderstand him. To concretize his image of the Übermensch as though the Übermensch were the platonic form of

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33 ‘And just as we have borne the likeness of the earthly man, so also shall we bear the likeness of the heavenly man’, 1 Cor. 15.49; cf. Rom. 8.29, 2 Cor. 3.18.
34 Similarly, K. Higgins, who writes, ‘I think Nietzsche intends this vagueness in his image of the overman. The overman is a kind of place-holder for the aim of human aspiration toward greatness’, ‘Reading Zarathustra’, 143.
35 Nietzsche’s reference to the ‘feet of clay’ alludes to Dan. 2.33ff, where the Daniel, the Hebrew prophet during the Babylonian captivity, interpreted Nebuchadnezzar’s dream of a statue. The statue represents the succession of empires beginning with the Babylonian and ending with the Roman—an empire represented by feet of iron mixed with clay. In the dream a rock is strikes the statue in its brittle feet and the statue crumbles. Some Christian traditions have interpreted the passage as a prophecy of the destruction of Rome by Christ, who is depicted in the NT as a rock (Rom. 9.33; 1 Cor. 10.4). The reference is apropos to this context, where Nietzsche is confessing his refusal to erect new ideals, which are subject to destruction.
36 EH ‘Preface’ § 2, pp. 217-221 [KSA 6, p. 258].
human perfection, would be to overcome idealism, only to allow it in through the back door.37 Constructed ideals are idols, and subject to deconstruction.

Towards an Anti-Humanism Without Misanthropy.

Nietzsche recognized that Zarathustra’s groans in connection with the human, all-too-human, and his rhapsodizing about the higher types who transcend mere humanity, made him vulnerable to accusations of misanthropy. Indeed, many of Zarathustra’s pronouncements seem to invite such accusations: ‘The overman is in my heart, that is my first and my only concern—and not human beings; not the neighbour, not the poorest, not the most suffering, not the best—’.38 This is qualified, however, by his love for human beings, which again, is rooted in their potential: ‘Oh my brothers, what I am able to love in human beings is that they are a going over and a going under. And in you, too, there is much that makes me love and hope’.39 Zarathustra’s greatest challenge is his need to overcome his nausea over the idea of eternal recurrence in connection with the smallest man,40 just as Nietzsche sometimes felt himself oppressed by ‘a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy—contempt of man’.41 In The Gay Science, he had already diagnosed misanthropy as a symptom of ‘an all too greedy love of man’,42 and would later add that it is hatred which ‘puts people on par [stellt gleich]’,43 and equality that required the ‘deepest levelling [tiefsten Vermittelmässigung]’.44 The kind of equality that is established in Christianity (and in modern democracy), is for Nietzsche a masked hatred against higher men because, in its quest for equality, it must reduce all human being to the

37 Michel Haar writes that while it is difficult to avoid treating the Overman as an ideal, the Overmann is rather the end of idolizing mankind: ‘Thus, the Overman does not fulfil humanity but rather that which, in humanity, is more originary than humanity—namely, the Will to Power: the Overman is the fulfilment not of the essence of man, but of the essence of life’, ‘Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language’, 24-28.
38 Z ‘On Higher Men’ § 3, p. 233 [KSA 4, p. 357].
39 Z ‘On the Higher Man’ § 3, p. 233 [KSA 4, p. 357].
40 Z ‘The Convalescent’ § 2, p. 177 [KSA 4, p. 274] cf., ‘[T]he two worst contagions that may be reserved just for us—against the great nausea at man! against great pity for man!’, GM-III § 14, p. 125 [KSA 5, pp. 371-372].
41 AC § 38, p. 159 [KSA 6, p. 209].
42 GS § 167, p. 200 [KSA 3, p. 499].
43 GS § 379, p. 342 [KSA 3, p. 632].
44 GS § 377, p. 338 [KSA 3, p. 629].
lowest common denominator. Whether or not the charge of misanthropy gets any traction with Nietzsche depends on the accuser’s perspective.\(^{45}\)

6.2.2 The Second Symbolic Pillar: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same.

The eternal recurrence—what Nietzsche saw as central to Zarathustra—forms the second pillar of Nietzsche’s reimagined symbolic world. In Gay Science, it was a demon who was imagined to teach the idea of eternal recurrence; here it is Zarathustra’s destiny to teach the idea:

> Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally and we ourselves along with them, and that we have already been here times eternal and all things along with us.

> You teach that there is a great year of becoming, a monster of a great year; like an hourglass it must turn itself over anew, again and again, so that it runs down and runs out anew—\(^{46}\)

The two major approaches to understanding the eternal recurrence, may be divided into the \textit{ethical} and the \textit{cosmological}, or \textit{metaphysical}. The ethical interpretation locates the main thrust of the eternal recurrence in the way it engenders different responses in different types of people, serving as an index of existential health.\(^{47}\) The cosmological interpretation adds to the ethical the thesis the eternal recurrence is Nietzsche’s hypothesis for how the cosmos actually works—as a rejection of teleology and unity.\(^{48}\) Salomé claimed, much to the consternation of Nietzsche scholars ever after, that Nietzsche himself embraced the metaphysical version, and had even related plans to devote several years to the study of physics, with the aim of providing a scientific defence of the idea.\(^{49}\)

\(^{45}\) Nietzsche brilliantly contrasts these two possible perspectives with his parable of the lambs and birds of prey, \textit{GM-I} § 13, p. 44ff [\textit{KSA} 5, pp. 278-279], cf. § 12.
\(^{46}\) Z ‘The Convalescent’ § 2, p. 178 [\textit{KSA} 4, p. 276].
\(^{48}\) Alphonso Lingis, for example, writes ‘The formation of the eternal return as a cosmological doctrine, in Book IV of \textit{The Will to Power}, is directed against the idea of the unity in things—against teleology in things, against essential unity in things’, thus replacing the ordered world with ‘a world without being, without unity, without identity’, ‘The Will to Power’, in \textit{The New Nietzsche}, ed. David B. Allison (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 43.
\(^{49}\) ‘He had the intention of heralding it when and if it could be founded scientifically. We exchanged a series of letters about this matter, and Nietzsche constantly expressed the mistaken opinion that it would be possible to win for it an indisputable basis through physics experiments.'
the eternal recurrence as a scientific hypothesis in the Nachlaß, though it seems none of them were intended for publication.50

What is most interesting from the perspective of this study, however, is that so few commentators have recognized the eternal recurrence as a type of post-Christian eschatology, broadly corresponding to the existential role that the belief in resurrection plays in Judaeo-Christian thought-world. It is interesting, for example, that Magnus’ generally very thorough study, only briefly mentions the resurrection, though he rightly recognizes that, ‘The gradual ascendancy of Jewish and Christian thought represents the triumph of an extreme antithesis to cyclical cosmologies and recurrence theories generally’.51 In this way, Magnus sees that Judeo-Christian doctrine of the resurrection represents a radical departure from ancient recurrence cosmologies, without making the related point that Nietzsche’s revitalization of the recurrence thesis represented a radical departure from the Christian doctrine which had come to prevail. The importance of seeing Christian eschatology as antithetical to recurrence should not be missed. It is not merely that the linear structure of the Christian worldview52 is fundamentally different to the circularity of eternal recurrence; on an existential level, recurrence and resurrection invoke very different postures with respect to suffering.53

The Judaeo-Christian eschatology, while not necessarily collapsing into a Platonic depreciation terrestrial life, views suffering through the lens of resurrection hope, on which basis, St Paul could write, ‘For our light and momentary afflictions are achieving for us an eternal

It was he who decided at that time to devote ten years of exclusive study to the natural sciences at the University of Vienna or Paris. Then, after ten years of silence . . . step among the people again as the teacher of the doctrine of eternal recurrence’, Salomé, Nietzsche, 131. Nietzsche corresponded frequently with Salomé during this period (circa, 1882), though none of the extant letters explicitly discuss the eternal recurrence.

50 See, e.g. KSA 13:14[188] pp. 374-376. Brian Leiter numbers this among Nietzsche’s most ‘silly’ claims, and suspects that Nietzsche realized the same, Nietzsche on Morality, xvii.


52 Often depicted linearly as a series of discrete events with a God-ordained telos: creation → catastrophe → Christ-event → redemption → final judgement → eternity.

53 Alistair Kee suggests that the ‘eternal recurrence is a fundamentally religious concept . . .’, and likens its implications to those of John’s Gospel, because, ‘In both eternal life begins now, in this world’ (Nietzsche Against the Crucified, 123). Pace, Kee, I take the eternal recurrence to be only quasi-religious; Nietzsche was not founding a new religion, but describing the world in a way that mapped onto religious concepts.
weight of glory that far outweighs them all’.\(^{54}\) In Paul’s thought, the hope of the resurrection is secured in the sudden and unanticipated Christ-event, where God the Father vindicated the mission of the Son by raising Christ from the dead.\(^{55}\) This meant that all human history was progressing towards eschatological judgement, and the ‘good news’ is that the Christ of kenotic self-sacrificial love, is Lord. Nietzsche’s strongest accusation—that Pauline resurrection denies life of any value\(^{56}\)—meets with the difficulty that Paul’s eschatological horizon clearly did not prevent him from embracing life with tenacity.\(^{57}\) There is a tendency in Paul, however, to stake the value of the νῦν καιρὸς \textit{entirely} on the hope of the resurrection. In the context of his most famous discussion of the resurrection, he writes:

And as for us, why do we endanger ourselves every hour? I face death every day—yes, just as surely as I boast about you in Christ Jesus our Lord. If I fought wild beasts in Ephesus with no more than human hopes, what have I gained? If the dead are not raised, ‘Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die’.\(^{58}\)

The resurrection was an anticipated, future event, which enabled Paul to face suffering with courage and purpose, but he allows that hedonism would be more sensible if there were no resurrection on the horizon. Because Paul’s embrace of the suffering life was predicated so entirely on the ‘otherworldly’ hopes of resurrection, any attempts to modernize or secularize authentic Paulinism is fated to collapse into nihilism—a weakness that Nietzsche was ready to exploit in his anti-Christian writings. The doctrine of recurrence, even in its most bounded form, is invulnerable to this challenge because it restores the existential centre of gravity to life in the

\(^{54}\) 2 Cor. 4.17; cf. Rom. 8.18.

\(^{55}\) Thus, the resurrection of Christ is frequently the pattern and guarantee of that for which Christians eagerly wait: I Cor. 6.14, 15.23; 2 Cor. 4.14; 1 Thess. 4.14; Rom. 6.4-8, 8.11; Phil. 3.20-21.

\(^{56}\) ‘Paul simply shifted the centre of gravity of that entire existence \textit{beyond} this existence—in the \textit{lie} of the “resurrected” Jesus. [. . .] If one shifts the centre of gravity of life \textit{out} of life into the “Beyond”—into \textit{nothingness}—one has deprived life as such of its centre of gravity. . . . So to live that there is no longer any \textit{meaning} in living’, \textit{AC} §§ 42-43, pp. 165-166 [\textit{KSA} 6, pp. 215-218]. We will return for a more detailed examination of these passages in the third section, below.

\(^{57}\) And, in Paul’s case, a life which included considerable physical and emotional suffering, 2 Cor. 11.16ff.

\(^{58}\) I Cor. 15.30-32; v. 32 is a quotation from Is. 22.13, where Jerusalem is rejoicing when they should be mourning for the coming judgement.
νῦν καιρὸς—and then radicalizes that gravity by proclaiming life itself as infinite, as ‘the greatest weight’.59

To read Zarathustra as Nietzsche’s reimagined symbolic world—or, his ‘neue Welt-Conception’60—is to see in it a substantive critique of Christian values conveyed in his relentless satirizing of the New Testament. I have argued here that Nietzsche is engaged in a kind of implicit anti-Paulinism, not least because the world of his alter-ego, Zarathustra, is structured so conspicuously alike to Paul’s. The death of God, and the eternal recurrence, form the two primary pillars of this world, bounding the present by the past event, and the newly dawning horizon. For St Paul, the business of life was related to conforming to a new kind of humanity—becoming who one is in Christ. How does one live authentically in light of the Christ-event? How do history and horizon come to bear on life in the νῦν καιρὸς? The Pauline corpus is an exploration of these questions. Nietzsche’s world is contoured by different symbolic pillars, but his questions are substantially the same, and we can now see the provocative challenge that these twin pillars of Zarathustra’s world level against the Pauline-Christian view of the world—especially in the anthropological dimension. As K. Löwith has it:

The death of God means the resurrection of the man who is abandoned to his own responsibility and command, the man who finally has his most extreme freedom in ‘freedom toward death’. At the peak of his freedom, however, the will to nothing inverts itself into the willing of the eternal recurrence of the same. The dead Christian God, the man before the nothing, and the will to the eternal recurrence characterize Nietzsche’s system as a whole as a movement first from ‘Thou shalt’ to the birth of the ‘I will’ and then to the rebirth of the ‘I am’ as the ‘first movement’ of an eternally recurring existence amidst the naturelike world of all that is.61

The death of God stages the confrontation between human being and the apocalypse of a stark new horizon, which shuns derivative values, and so refuses the sufferer the option of justifying life on the basis of otherworldly hopes. As Zarathustra instructs the higher men: ‘I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of

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59 As Nietzsche has it in GS § 341. Framed in Pauline terms, the existential weight of the νῦν καιρὸς is maximised by envisioning life as an endless succession of νῦν καιροῖς—now times.
60 As he titles a late-period note about the Eternal Recurrence, KSA 13:14[188] pp. 374-376.
61 K. Löwith, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, 37 (emphasis original).
extraterrestrial hopes! They are mixers of poisons whether they know it or not’. Nietzsche’s aim in Zarathustra was to secure the higher men in a world that was free from the life-effacing values and dogmas of Paulinism.

6.3 Nietzsche’s Task, and the Philosophy of the Future.

Nietzsche invested Zarathustra with an extraordinary significance, believing it to be a work that ‘stands altogether apart’, and describing it to Deussen as, ‘the foremost book of all millennia, the Bible of the future, the highest eruption of human genius, in which the fate of humanity is contained’. Most of Nietzsche’s interpreters have disagreed, preferring instead the two works which followed—in a way, preferring Nietzsche’s negative critique of the Christian world, to the alternative world that he offered in its place. Nietzsche himself considered Beyond and Genealogy to be bound up with Zarathustra as the other side of his task: ‘After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come from the No-saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great war—conjuring up a day of decision’.

Beyond was written as a negative critique of modernity, and Genealogy as a negative critique of the ‘highest values hitherto’. It is in the context of this negative critique that Nietzsche begins to

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62 Z-Prologue § 3, p. 6 [KSA 4, pp. 14-15].
63 ‘All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values’, GM-I § 17 n. 2, p. 56 [KSA 5, p. 289], emphasis original.
64 EH ‘Why I Write Such Good Books—Z’ § 6, p. 304 [KSA 6, p. 343].
66 So Alasdair MacIntyre, who wrote in After Virtue that ‘The Übermensch and the Sartrian Existentialist-cum-Marxist belong in the pages of a philosophical bestiary rather than in serious discussion. Both [Nietzsche and Sartre] by contrast are at their philosophically most powerful and cogent in the negative part of their critiques’ (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 22.
67 EH ‘Why I Write Such Good Books—BGE’ § 1, p. 310 [KSA 6, p. 350].
make explicit what was only implicit in Zarathustra—to articulate a rigorous philosophical
critique of Christian (and crypto-Christian) values. In this spirit, he takes aim at central pillar of
Paul’s symbolic world: the God on the Cross. In his middle-period writings, such as Human, he
made only occasional, passing references to Christian symbols.68 By the writing of The
Antichrist, however, he had developed a complex reading of the Cross as the symbol par
excellence of décadence, and an existential posture of hostility towards life,69 and so he ends his
writing in Eccé Homo with, as Stephen William’s so aptly puts it, ‘a declaration of fixed,
eschatological hostility between Dionysus and Christ’.70 In Beyond, Nietzsche awakens his
readers to the horror of the symbol—which is often lost in areas which have grown accustomed
to the Christian symbolism:

Modern men, obtuse to all Christian nomenclature, no longer feel the gruesome
superlative that struck a classic taste in the paradoxical formula ‘god on the
cross.’ Never yet and nowhere has there been an equal boldness in inversion,
anything as horrible, questioning, and questionable as this formula: it promised a
revaluation of all the values of antiquity.71

68 E.g., HH § 113 p. 66 [KSA 2, p. 117]; D § 84, pp. 49-50 [KSA 3, pp. 79-80].
69 Radically different was the tragic symbol of ‘Dionysus cut to pieces’, which Nietzsche
understood to be a rugged affirmation of life. See, Paul Valadier, ‘Dionysus Versus the
1992), 247-261. Valadier writes, ‘As the anti-type of the Crucified, Dionysus is opposed to the
Pauline invention of the Saviour on the cross, and thus to the obsession with a redeeming death,
a redeeming of self . . . In contrast to the Pauline crucified Jesus, who exalts death over life . . .
Dionysus confronts death, certain of the over-fullness of life and his own re-creative power’.
70 Stephen Williams, The Shadow of the Antichrist, 37. For an exploration of the ‘As the anti-
type of the Crucified, Dionysus is opposed to the Pauline invention of the Saviour on the cross,
and thus to the obsession with a redeeming death, a redeeming of self . . . In contrast to the
Pauline crucified Jesus, who exalts death over life . . . Dionysus confronts death, certain of the
over-fullness of life and his own re-creative power’.
71 BGE § 46, p. 60 [KSA 5, p. 67]. There is no exact parallel to Nietzsche’s arresting précis,
‘Gott am Kreuz’, in Paul’s writings, where either the messianic title, ‘Christ’, or the elevated
title, ‘Son of God’, are commonly used in connection with the sacrificial death on the Cross
(Rom. 1.10, 5.4, 8.3 1 Cor. 1.23, 2.2; Gal. 2.20, 3.1, 6.14). Nietzsche is, however, accurately
characterizing Paul’s understanding of the Christ-event. In Phil. 2.6-11, the important kenosis
passage, Christ Jesus, existing in the very form [ἐν µορφῇ] of God, humbled himself, subjecting
himself to death on the Cross. Cf. 2 Cor. 5.19, ‘God was in Christ [θεὸς ἐν ᾿Χριστῷ],
reconciling the world to himself’. The Latin Father Tertullian (155-240 AD)—for whom
Nietzsche had a special affection—developed closer parallels to Nietzsche expressions in his
Against Marcion: ‘dead God [mortuum deum]’ (Against Marcion II, ch. 16) and ‘God crucified
[deum crucifixum]’ (Against Marcion II, ch. 27). Meister Eckhart, the medieval German
theologian and mystic, wrote, ‘Darum ist Gott gestorben, damit ich der ganzen Welt und allen

Duff, 267
Here Nietzsche stages a confrontation with the heart of Paulinism—the climax of the Christ-event on the Cross. He draws attention to the shocking paradox at the heart of crucifixion event, and contrasts his contemporaries’ obtuseness to the horror of the Cross, which the classical taste would have found offensive. Nietzsche is working in truisms here, but they are puzzling truisms.

It is well-documented that crucifixion, invented by Rome, was the expression of the Empire’s contempt, *par excellence*. It has also been true throughout the history of the Church that the symbol of the Cross has evoked profound admiration—so far from contempt. This paradox is resolvable only in the revaluation of all values that so interests Nietzsche himself. How was it that the Cross was revalued from a symbol of shame, weakness, and contempt, to a symbol of the power of self-sacrificial love? In *Genealogy* Paul’s symbol for the death of God is interpreted into the larger context of values typified in Nietzsche’s writings by the juxtaposition of Roman (noble, life-affirming, natural) and Judeo-Christian (*décadent*, unnatural, slave) values. This leads to Nietzsche’s thesis that *décadence* values triumphed of over Rome precisely through the revaluation of noble values witnessed in Paul’s subversive interpretation of the Christ-event—I quote this remarkable passage at length:

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Did Israel not attain the ultimate goal of its sublime vengefulness precisely through the bypath of this ‘Redeemer’, this ostensible opponent and disintegrator of Israel? Was it not part of the secret black art of truly grand politics of revenge, of a farseeing, subterranean, slowly advancing, and premeditated revenge, that Israel must itself deny the real instrument of its revenge before all the world as a mortal enemy and nail it to the cross, so that ‘all the world’, namely all the opponents of Israel, could unhesitatingly swallow just this bait? And could spiritual subtlety imagine any more dangerous bait than this? Anything to equal the enticing, intoxicating, overwhelming, and undermining power of that symbol of the ‘holy cross’, that ghastly paradox of a ‘God on the cross’, that mystery of an unimaginable ultimate cruelty and self-crucifixion of God for the salvation of man?
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What is certain, at least, is that sub hoc signo Israel, with its vengefulness and revaluation of all values, has hitherto triumphed again and again over all other ideals, over all nobler ideals.— 73

Here, as in the passage from Beyond, St Paul is not mentioned by name, but the confrontation with Paulinism is unmistakable. Nietzsche has already made it clear that it was Paul who ‘invented Christianity’ as the transcultural phenomenon we recognize today, and that this required a masking of, or distancing from, its Judaic origins. According to Nietzsche, it was the genius of Paul to solve the paradox of the Cross, as the symbol of the abrogation of the Law, and thus the salvation for all sinful, Adamic humanity.

St Paul and the Paulinists.

Throughout his mature period, Nietzsche frequently traced the genealogy of St Paul’s influence by relating him to a small cast of characters who succeeded in extending Paul’s influence throughout history—St Augustine, Luther, and Pascal. I touch upon these characters at several other points throughout this project, here I wish only to demonstrate briefly that Nietzsche had come to broadly associate these figures with a certain approach to Christianity he found especially problematic in terms of its darkened view of human being—its anthropological pessimism—and its antipathy towards noble values. In an unpublished note dated to 1885 (the interval period between the completion of the third part of Zarathustra, and the publication of Beyond), Nietzsche demonstrates the points of continuity he perceived from Paul, through Augustine, to Luther—the triumvirate of theological architects, who shaped the German Christianity prominent in Nietzsche’s own experience:

—The absolute depravity of the human being, the inability to do good and therefore the exegesis of all our actions with the interpretation of the evil conscience: finally grace, miraculous act, sudden reversal. Paul, Augustine, Luther.

. . .

—Luther again gives the basic logic of Christianity, the impossibility of morality and therefore complacency, the necessity of grace, and therefore of miracles and also predestination. In essence, a confession of being overcome and an outbreak of self-contempt.

—‘It is impossible to pay one’s debts’ outbursts of the desire for healing, and of the cults and mysteries. ‘It is impossible to get rid of one’s sins’ outburst of the Christianity of Paul, Augustine, and Luther. Formerly outer misfortune was the

73 GM-I § 8, p. 35 [KSA 5, 269].
impetus to become religious; later it was the inner feeling of unhappiness, of being unredeemed, fear, uncertainty.\textsuperscript{74}

Nietzsche’s distillation of the Christianity of Paul, Augustine and Luther begins with its fundamental anthropological pessimism: absolute depravity; incapacity for morally good works; self-contempt; enslavement to sin, and so-forth. Secondly, Nietzsche takes aim is its sense of enchantment: the phenomenology (or ‘exegesis’) of the troubled conscience that is commonly associated with these three figures, always depends upon a miraculous reversal through grace. Thirdly, he highlights the \textit{inward turn}, where the Christian faith serves as a specific for psychological distress, or the kind of internal religious torment captured in the monologue of \textit{Romans 7}—frequently read through the experiences of Augustine and Luther, both of whom suffered from very active introspective consciences.\textsuperscript{75} What Nietzsche focuses on, might be thought of as the heart of the Pauline-Augustinian-Lutheran Gospel: human beings \textit{qua} God’s fallen image-bearers, are enslaved to sin through the flesh, but they may experience a sudden reversal of fortunes through the Christ-event. The concept of grace is central to Paul’s understanding of the Christian experience because of his convictions about the moral precariousness of life in the flesh and under the Law;\textsuperscript{76} Augustine maintained this aspect of Paulinism in his debate with Pelagius, who denied original sin; Luther marshalled Paul and Augustine’s writings against the Catholic church and succeeded in defining Christianity for Nietzsche’s Germany. Even after Nietzsche, this distillation of Paulinism broadly applied within the existential-dialectical theology of Bultmann, which dominated the Pauline guild in 20\textsuperscript{th}-Century Germany.

These figures also serve as incarnations of the very values that Nietzsche opposed in his ‘no-saying’ works—especially \textit{Beyond}, \textit{Genealogy}, \textit{Twilight}, and \textit{Antichrist}. Throughout the mature period, Nietzsche treated Paul, Augustine, and Luther with an assumed posture of noble

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{KSA} 12:1[5] pp. 11-12. This section was clearly not intended for publication. Rather, Nietzsche is trying to map the contributions of these figures and their inter-relatedness in the history of Pauline Christianity.

\textsuperscript{75} As we have seen, both Augustine and Luther read \textit{Romans 7} as Paul’s \textit{continuing} struggle with the sinfulness of the flesh in his own Christian experience. While this interpretation has fallen upon hard times in scholarly circles since the publication of Krister Stendahl’s famous article, ‘Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West’, it has retained its influence in the wider imagination of \textit{NT} readers.

\textsuperscript{76} ‘By the grace of God, I am what I am’ [\textit{χάριτι δὲ θεοῦ ἐμί ὑμῖν}, \textit{1 Cor}. 15.10.
contempt. If Paul was ‘Chandala’, Luther was a ‘northern barbarian of the spirit’, a ‘peasant type’, and ‘a lout’. Likewise Augustine was a ‘monstrosity of morality’, who ‘lacks in a truly offensive manner all nobility of gestures and desires’. None of these attributes make these figures unworthy opponents for Nietzsche, however. Indeed, he has regard for them as ‘deep men’, Luther is praised extravagantly for the quality of his prose, and to Paul, as we shall see, Nietzsche attributed an extraordinary (though not for that reason admirable) religious-psychological genius. Neither was Nietzsche’s relentless attention to the Chandala natures of these three architects of Western Christianity mere ad hominem—this was a marshalling of support for his major task in the revaluation of all values. Because Christian values focus on good and evil, Nietzsche’s readers may not have been accustomed to evaluating the saints and religious reformers from an amoral perspective. Nietzsche argued, therefore, that these Chandala priests were not the types of individuals you would want to influence the development of humankind—and yet they had controlled the narrative on what it means to be human for millennia, with tragic results:

Men, not high and hard enough to have any right to try to form man as artists; men, not strong and farsighted enough to let the foreground law of a thousandfold failure and ruin prevail, though it cost them sublime self-conquest; men, not noble enough to see the abysmally different order of rank, chasm of rank, between man and man—such men have so far held sway over the fate of Europe, with their ‘equal before God’, until finally a smaller, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal,

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77 *BGE* § 46, p. 60 [*KSA* 5, p. 66].
78 *BGE* § 50, p. 64 [*KSA* 5, p. 70].
80 *GS* § 359, pp. 314-315 [*KSA* 3, p. 606]. Nietzsche admitted in a letter to Overbeck that he read Augustine’s *Confessions* for amusement, ‘How I have laughed! (e.g., about the “theft” of his youth . . .)’, eKGWB/BVN-1885,589 — Letter to Franz Overbeck: 31/03/1885.
81 *BGE* § 50, p. 64 [*KSA* 5, pp. 70-71]; cf. *AC* § 59 p. 193 [*KSA* 6, p. 248], ‘One only has to read any of the Christian agitators, Saint Augustine for example, to realize, to smell, what dirty fellows had therewith come out on top’. 
83 See *BT* § 23, pp. 135-139 [*KSA* 1, pp. 145-149], and *BGE* § 247, pp. 183-184 [*KSA* 5, pp. 190-191], for two examples of many.
something eager to please, sickle, and mediocre has been bread, the European of
today—.84

Across the whole of Nietzsche’s relentless attacks upon Christianity, we see this central
argument that the axiological commitments, and the anthropological commitments of Pauline
Christianity, converged in such a way as to pose an existential threat to higher forms of
humanity. In Zarathustra, the God who died had been the greatest danger for the higher men; in
Beyond, ‘The sovereign religions we have had so far are among the chief causes that have kept
the type “man” on a lower rung—they have preserved too much of what ought to perish’.85
Beginning in Beyond, going through Genealogy, and into The Antichrist, Nietzsche articulates
the nature of the threat with increasing clarity and conviction. Religions have tended to side with
the weak, and those who suffer, but in a quintessentially Nietzschean reversal, it is actually the
higher types who are the most vulnerable—not only because degenerating types preponderate,
but because the inherent complexities of higher types increase their chances of failure:

There is among men as in every other animal species an excess of failures, of the
sick, degenerating, infirm, who suffer necessarily; the successful cases are, among
men too, always the exception—and in view of the fact that man is the as yet
undetermined animal, the rare exception. But still worse: the higher the type of
man that a man represents, the greater the improbability that he will turn out well.
The accidental, the law of absurdity in the whole economy of mankind, manifests
itself most horribly in its destructive effect on the higher men whose complicated
conditions of life can only be calculated with great subtlety and difficulty.86

Even in the wake of Christianity’s apparent decline in Modernity, the residual values of
Paulinism, continued to exercise a negative influence on the evolutionary development of the
human race—robbing it of its highest potential, and making transactions at the expense of the
future:

[O]ne has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing
‘the good man’ to be of greater value than ‘the evil man’, of greater value in the
sense of furthering the advancement and prosperity of man in general (the future
of man included). But what if the reverse were true? What if a symptom of
regression were inherent in the ‘good’, likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, a
narcotic, through which the present was possibly living at the expense of the
future? Perhaps more comfortably, less dangerously, but at the same time in a
meanner style, more basely?—So that precisely morality would be to blame if the

84 BGE § 62, p. 76 [KSA 5, p. 83].
85 BGE § 62, pp. 74-75 [KSA 5, p. 82].
86 BGE § 62, p. 74 [KSA 5, p. 81].
highest power and splendour actually possible to the type man was never in fact attained?

Nietzsche is convinced that Christian theism, in the subversive form that emerges in Paulinism (and as it is mediated through Augustine and Luther), is actively hostile to the higher types—the rare, ‘lucky hit[s]’, of mankind. Once again, the danger that Christianity represents presents itself when the axiological commitments undergirding its anthropology motivate actions that thwart the process of evolution: ‘What is more harmful than any vice?—Active sympathy for the ill-constituted and weak—Christianity. . .’.

**Nietzsche and Darwinism: The Intersection of Values and Human Flourishing.**

The necessary connection that Nietzsche intuited between Christianity, anthropology, and denaturalized values calls out for explanation. Nietzsche’s task concerned the revaluation of all values towards the development of higher types, but it is not obvious by what mechanism values have any bearing on human becoming. The question may be formulated like this: how does Nietzsche’s inversion of Christianity’s denaturalized values, contribute to the ascendency of healthy *Daseinsformen*? If Christianity and broadly-evolutionary (though not necessarily Darwinian) processes conspired to preserve décadent types, how would the reestablishment of healthy, natural values make any difference?

Jaspers approached this question as an existentialist, seeing in Nietzsche a (highly-qualified) view of freedom by which he made man ‘responsible for his own transformation’:

> ‘[Nietzsche] requires each of us to follow the insecure and thus dangerous new path of the individual who is not yet sustained within a stratified society and who must find the source of his ties within himself’.

Jaspers marshalled a multitude of quotations in order to demonstrate the significance of self-creation in Nietzsche’s work, and connects this to his larger project of revaluation:

> Since man is a creative being, in that he appreciates, measures, and evaluates, there are no absolute values that simply subsist as realities needing only to be discovered. Rather values are the form in which man, in a unique moment of

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87 *GM*-Preface § 6, p. 20 [*KSA* 5, p. 253].
88 *AC* § 4, p. 126 [*KSA* 6, p. 171], emphasis original.
89 *AC* § 2, p. 126 [*KSA* 5, p. 170].
90 Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, 139.
historical actuality, lays hold not only upon the conditions of his existence but even those of his own self-being. Values are never final; at any given time they must be created. That is why Nietzsche, in the present moment of world history, assumes the task of a ‘transvaluation of all values’.\(^9^2\)

Human beings, as creative agents, are both situated within, and architects of, an inherently-malleable axiological matrix, and so one’s anthropological vision will necessarily impact how one turns out: ‘it is the image of man that becomes significant for propelling us upwards’, and the Übermensch is himself, ‘a guiding ideal which serves to prevent [us] from foundering and atrophying while embracing a determinate ideal’.\(^9^3\) On the other hand, Jaspers seems to admit that Nietzsche never succeeded in developing a coherent theory of how man could bridge the gap to the Übermensch.\(^9^4\)

Contrasting sharply with Jaspers’ view, is that of Leiter, who rejects the notion of active self-creation, and argues instead for a strong form of fatalism in the mature Nietzsche. As we have seen, Leiter’s argument rests, in part, on the irony of Eccé Homo’s ‘how one becomes what one is’, where Nietzsche writes that, ‘[O]ne day all my capacities, suddenly ripe, leaped forth in their ultimate perfection. . . . “Willing” something, “striving” for something, envisaging a “purpose”, a “wish”—I know none of this from experience’.\(^9^5\) Thus, for Leiter, Nietzsche’s fatalism is not inconsistent with the central task of the revaluation of all values. Nietzsche wants to restore natural values and therefore to, ‘translate man back into nature’, but he does this as someone who was born to this destiny by dint of his physiological superiority.\(^9^6\)

If this question of revaluation and becoming is to be settled, it is important to bear in mind that Nietzsche assumed a broadly evolutionary paradigm of descent with modification, while remaining critical of Darwinism as such—explicitly denying, for example, that

\(^9^3\) Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, 162, emphasis original.
\(^9^4\) Jaspers writes that Nietzsche’s theory is, ‘inadvertently transformed into the biological conception of a method of breeding and cultivation from which we could expect that a new being would arise at the boundary between the existing species of man and a higher one’, p. 168.
\(^9^5\) *EH* ‘Why I Am So Clever’ § 9, p. 255 [*KSA* 6, pp. 294-295], emphasis original. It would seem an impossible task to defend this passage in light of many biographical details from Nietzsche’s life, and so one wonders how seriously Nietzsche means what he says, or how suited it is to support Leiter’s argument.
\(^9^6\) Here quoting *BGE* § 230, p. 161 [*KSA* 5, p. 169]. See discussion on pp. 1-29, in Leiter’s, *Nietzsche and Morality*.  

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modifications through time necessarily represent an advance of the species. In the context of this study, it is especially important to recognize that Nietzsche tended to loosely map human types on both horizontal (historical), and a vertical (axiological), axes. Horizontally, he would contrast apes and ancient types with modern types, and then modern types with future possibilities. On the vertical, or axiological axis, he would contrast types he considered relatively higher or lower, more valuable or less valuable, ascendant or décadent. Nietzsche would plot types on these two axes in provocative, anti-Darwinian ways. Nietzsche took Darwinism to be committed to a notion of progress, which he dismissed as a modern myth. A second and possibly more serious disagreement with Darwinism, was its impoverished view of the world, which saw everything struggling for survival amid limited resources; Nietzsche asserts, to the contrary, that life is characterized not by scarcity but by abundance, making décadence an ever-present danger. Thus, ‘Species do not grow more perfect: the weaker dominate the strong again and again—the reason being they are the great majority, and they are also cleverer . . . the weak possess more mind [klüger . . . die Schwachen haben mehr Geist].’ The weak overcome the strong, both because they preponderate numerically, and because they

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97 As he will argue so clearly and strenuously in AC §§ 3-6.
98 We have already seen that this is a recurring motif in Z, where Zarathustra repeatedly refers to the ape, the last man, and the Übermensch.
99 ‘[T]he general aspect of life is not hunger and distress, but rather wealth, luxury, even absurd prodigality—where there is a struggle it is a struggle for power. . . .’ TI, ‘Expeditions’, § 14, p. 85 [KSA 6, p. 120]. For more on Nietzsche’s somewhat paradoxical engagement with Darwinism, see KSA 13:14[123]; 14[133].
100 TI, ‘Expeditions’, § 14, p. 86 [KSA 6, pp. 120-121]. Nietzsche was saying that physiological strength and mental strength often have a negative correlation. EH provides an illuminating illustration of this principle:

The perfect brightness and cheerfulness, even exuberance of the spirit, reflected in this work, is compatible in my case not only with the most profound physiological weakness, but even with an excess of pain. In the midst of the torments that go with an uninterrupted three-day migraine, accompanied by laborious vomiting of phlegm, I possessed a dialectician’s clarity par excellence and thought through with very cold blood matters for which under healthier circumstances I am not mountain-climber, not subtle, not cold enough. My readers know perhaps in what way I consider dialectic as a symptom of decadence; for example in the most famous case, the case of Socrates (EH ‘Why I Am So Wise’ § 1, pp. 222-223 [KSA 6, p. 265]).
develop cunning by necessity in their struggle for power.\textsuperscript{101} As he later writes in \textit{The Antichrist}: ‘One would be deceiving oneself utterly if one presupposed a lack of intelligence of any sort on the part of the leaders of the Christian movement—oh they are shrewd, shrewd \textit{[klug, klug]} to the point of holiness, these Church Fathers!’\textsuperscript{102}

Nietzschean anthropology considered human being \textit{primarily} (but by no means exclusively) within a value matrix, as his ubiquitous dichotomies—higher vs. lower, healthy vs. sick, strong vs. weak, noble vs. slave, good vs. bad, ascending vs. \textit{décadent}—demonstrate. This is not incompatible with Nietzsche’s preference for scientific, or naturalistic, explanations. Since at least \textit{Gay Science}, Nietzsche had recognized the necessity of understanding the sciences (even the hard sciences, like physics) as a pathway towards self-knowledge: ‘We, however, \textit{want to become those we are}—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves. To that end . . . we must become \textit{physicists} in order to be creative in this sense. . .’.\textsuperscript{103} This is why it was so natural for Nietzsche to engage with Darwinism, as the leading account for the emergence of the human species. In the \textit{Nachlaß}, Nietzsche advances three propositions against Darwinism under the rubric of ‘\textit{My general perspective}’:

— First Proposition: mankind as a species is not in a state of progress. Higher types are likely attained, but they do not endure. The level of the genus is not raised.

— Second Proposition: mankind as a species does not represent an overall improvement in comparison with any other animals. [. . .]

— Third Proposition: the domestication (the culture) of mankind is not deep. . . . Where it does go deep, it is immediately degenerated (type: the Christian) [. . .].\textsuperscript{104}

This passage clarifies Nietzsche’s rejection of the Darwinian assumption (at least as he understood Darwinism) that the mechanisms driving evolution are driving \textit{progress}. Again, as he says in \textit{The Antichrist}, ‘“progress” is merely a modern idea, that is to say a false idea’.\textsuperscript{105} The matter is more complicated, and more interesting than that. As we have seen, Nietzsche

\textsuperscript{101} For this reason, Nietzsche argued that Socrates’ employment of the ‘pitiless instrument’ of dialectics betrayed his own \textit{décadence}: ‘One chooses dialectics only when one has no other expedient. . . . Dialectics can only be a \textit{last-ditch weapon} in the hands of those who have no other weapon left’, \textit{TII}, ‘The Problem of Socrates’, § 6, pp. 41-42 [\textit{KSA} 6, p. 70].

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{AC} § 59, p. 193 [\textit{KSA} 6, pp. 248-249].

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{GS}, § 335, p. 266 [\textit{KSA} 3, p. 563].

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{KSA} 13:14[133], p. 317.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{AC} § 4, p. 126 [\textit{KSA} 6, p. 171].
everywhere affirms the axiological stratification of mankind, decrying the Christian dogma of human equality—of which democracy is heir. Nietzsche takes the doctrine to be *actively antagonistic* to the evolution of higher types: ‘the Gospel of the “lowly” makes low’;\(^\text{106}\) it is, ‘the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value’.\(^\text{107}\)

In Nietzsche’s first publication, he was already articulating the possibility of revitalizing the declining European type with the cultural resources available in Greek mythology—its ‘tragic wisdom’, or ‘Dionysian wisdom’. In his mature works, especially *Genealogy* and *The Antichrist*, he had developed the vivid and mutually-supporting narrative accounts of *décadence, ressentiment*, noble and slave values, and the slave revolt. Throughout his career, therefore, Nietzsche was concerned with the *implicit narratives* that undergird our values. His self-prophecy that he was a ‘destiny’ was no doubt founded upon his conviction that he alone saw the need for a new central narrative by which to live. Even Darwinism, as a naturalistic paradigm for origins that rivalled creational monotheism, had at its heart the problematic assumption of poverty within the natural order. His acceptance of, at minimum, an evolutionary process operating within the stream of life, meant that the values we embrace may have a lasting effect on our developmental potential as a species. This is pre-eminently true of Christian values, which are unnatural to the point of a direct confrontation with the basic processes fundamental to the development and survival of the species. As Frithjof Bergmann writes, ‘Nietzsche’s objection to the morality promulgated by slaves can be condensed into the assertion that it is “hostile to life”’.\(^\text{108}\) Nietzsche inverts the meta-motif Paulinism—the Christ-event and all its axiological implications for human being and becoming—with a meta-motif his own—that now-godless Modernity clings to hollowed-out Christian ideals to its ultimate peril: ‘Taking our human life as it is, all “truth”, all “goodness”, all “holiness”, all “divinity” in the Christian style has up to now shown itself to be highly dangerous—even now mankind is in danger of perishing through an idealism inimical of life’.\(^\text{109}\)

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\(^{106}\) AC § 43, p. 167 [KSA 6, p. 218].

\(^{107}\) BGE § 203, p. 117 [KSA 5, p. 126].


Nietzsche directly confronted this danger in, Beyond, which was written as a ‘prelude to a philosophy of the future’. The work reveals a more sustained focus on the task of philosophy, and philosophers, past and future. Nietzsche criticises the philosophers of modernity as humourless dogmatists, and unwitting champions of religious-priestly values. However, Beyond is also one of Nietzsche’s most hopeful works, and that hope rests upon a belief that, as Christian values begin to weaken, a new species of free-spirited philosophers—‘philosophers of the dangerous “maybe”’—may arise. The philosophy of the future, as Nietzsche conceptualizes it, begins where values and human being intersect—challenging the tendency of décadence (Christian-democratic) values to tilt towards the ‘over-all degeneration of man . . . this degeneration and diminution of man into the perfect herd animal . . . this animalization of man into the dwarf animal of equal rights . . .’. Nietzsche sees one hope for avoiding this dystopian future: ‘Where, then, must we reach with our hopes? Toward new philosophers . . .’. The task of the philosopher of the future is to redirect the course of humanity toward healthy goals, by creating new values that challenge décadence values:

*Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say, ‘thus it shall be!’* They first determine the Wither and For What of man, and in so doing have at their disposal the preliminary labour of all philosophical labourers, all who have overcome the past. With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that is and has been becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their ‘knowing’ is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to power.

Nietzsche further sharpens his vision of the philosophy of the future in Genealogy. In each of the three essays, Nietzsche focuses on a unique axiological problem related to human being, and he ends each essay by investing philosophy with the hope of the future. In the first essay, he deals with the origins of morality, where he credits the Jewish-priestly instinct with taking ‘the most spiritual revenge’, and working ‘the secrete black art of truly grand politics of revenge’, on their enemies by revaluing their enemies’ values:

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110 *BGE* § 2, p. 11 [*KSA* 5, p. 17].
111 *BGE* § 203, p. 118 [*KSA* 5, pp. 27-28].
112 *BGE* § 203, p. 117 [*KSA* 5, p. 126].
113 *BGE* § 211, p. 136 [*KSA* 5, p. 145].
114 *GM-I* § 7, pp. 33-34 [*KSA* 5, p. 267].
115 *GM-I* § 8, p. 35 [*KSA* 5, p. 269].
It was the Jews who, with awe-inspiring consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved by God) and to hang on to this inversion with their teeth, the teeth of the most abysmal hatred (the hatred of impotence), saying ‘the wretched along are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone . . .’.\textsuperscript{116}

It is important to note within the context of this study that the Jewish-priestly instinct reaches the apogee of its genius and power in the work of St Paul, in ‘that ghastly paradox of a “God on the cross”’, which triumphed over all nobler systems of value.\textsuperscript{117} He ends the first essay: ‘—All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values’.\textsuperscript{118}

The second essay deals with the origins of guilt and bad conscience—arguing famously that the emergence of bad conscience coincided with a period of rapid human evolution—an inward turn—in which ‘man first developed what was later called his “soul”’.\textsuperscript{119} With this inward turn came the capacity for a sense of responsibility, and with a sense of responsibility the capacity for a sense of legal indebtedness. This forensic notion of debt was radicalized by the Christian (Pauline) conception of God: ‘The advent of the Christian God, as the maximum god attained so far, was therefore accompanied by the maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness on earth’, which was why, ‘Atheism and a kind of second innocence belong together’.\textsuperscript{120}

It is important to recognize two things in connection with this passage. First, Nietzsche is not making a generous concession when he attributes to Christianity ‘the maximum god attained so far’. Within the scope of his argument in the second essay, the God of Christianity radicalizes

\textsuperscript{116} GM-I § 7, p. 34 [KS4 5, p. 267].
\textsuperscript{117} GM-I § 8, p. 35 [KS4 5, p. 269].
\textsuperscript{118} GM-I § 17, n. 2, p. 56 [KS4 5, p. 289].
\textsuperscript{119} GM-II § 16, p. 84 [KS4 5, p. 322].
\textsuperscript{120} GM-II § 20, pp. 90-91 [KS4 5, p. 330]. Within the framework of Paul’s creational monotheism, the whole Adamic race existed in a state of forensic indebtedness before God—for their failure to worship God rightly, reflect his image, and care for his creation. Justification—legal-subjective innocence—was made available through the Christ-event. Nietzsche found a new path to innocence—namely, embracing the death of God, and thus subverting the foundation upon which guilt was constructed. For an incisive exploration of this theme, see, Thomas J. J. Altizer’s classic essay, ‘Eternal Recurrence and Kingdom of God’, in The New Nietzsche, ed. David B. Allison (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 232-246; NB: pp. 236-237.
the problem of the creditor/debtor relationship, by radicalizing the moral-axiological alterity between the creditor (the holy God) and the debtors (sinful human beings). The forensic metaphor of legal guilt, incurred from transgressing the boundaries of the Law, was a loadbearing concept within Pauline soteriology.\textsuperscript{121} In Paul’s articulation of the Gospel, ‘[A]ll have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and are justified freely by his grace through the redemption that came by way of Christ Jesus’ (\textit{Rom.} 3.23-24). Christ was the Redeemer, through whom the individual passes into the security of justification—‘there is now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus’ (\textit{Rom.} 8.1), and enters into the innocence and security of God’s children: ‘For you did not receive a spirit that makes you a slave again to fear, but you received the Spirit of sonship. And by him we cry, “Abba, Father”. The Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are God’s children’ (\textit{Rom.} 8.15-16). Nietzsche draws remarkably close to these themes when he expresses hope for a ‘second innocence’, not grounded theoretically, but in the task of the philosopher of the future: ‘the redeeming man of great love and contempt’, who ‘liberates the will again and restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man; this antichrist and antinihilist; this victor over God and nothingness—\textit{he must come one day}.—’\textsuperscript{122}

In the third essay, Nietzsche traces the origins and power of the ascetic ideal, focusing more criticism on the philosophers of modernity than in the previous two essays. Historically, he argues, philosophers have \textit{by necessity} appropriated the ‘gloomy caterpillar form’ of the ascetic priest as a mask essential to their existence as philosophers, but he then asks why they have not now undergone their metamorphosis and broken free as winged creatures.\textsuperscript{123} Nietzsche then offers an extended explication of the service so far provided by the ascetic priest and the acetic ideal: ‘Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human \textit{animal}, had no meaning so far. His existence on earth contained no goal; “why man at all?”—was a question without an answer [. . .]—\textit{and the ascetic ideal offered man meaning!”}\textsuperscript{124} St Paul had been the most eloquent and

\textsuperscript{121} It is natural for Paul to have recourse to forensic language in light of the towering significance of the νόμος in Paul’s symbolic world, and the widespread expectation within Second-Temple Judaism of an eschatological judgement. Additionally, Paul’s mission to the Gentile nations, and even more so his advocacy for inclusion irrespective of ethnicity or covenant status, required a nuanced articulation of the new place (or lack of place) of the Law.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{GM-II} § 24, p. 96 [\textit{KSA} 5, p. 336].

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{GM-III} § 10, p. 116 [\textit{KSA} 5, p. 361].

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{GM-III} § 28, p. 162 [\textit{KSA} 5, p. 411].
influential advocate of this system of values. The meaning that the ascetic ideal offered was a means of salvation from nihilism, but the price it had to pay was ‘a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life . . .’. Nietzsche does not end the third essay with an explicit direction to the philosophers of the future, but the implication is as clear as it had been in the previous two essays: the philosophers of the future—as creators and legislators of values, as redeemers—they will confront the problem of meaning; they will offer mankind a new goal; they will offer a new answer to the question: ‘why man at all?’.

6.4 Nietzsche as Antichrist, Antinihilist, and Philosopher of the Future.

‘Ich bin kein Mensch, ich bin Dynamit’.

—Friedrich Nietzsche, Eccé Homo

6.4.1 The Will to Power: Nietzsche’s Plans for His Hauptwerk.

The portrait of the philosopher that emerges from the brief survey above, bears a striking resemblance to the prophetic figure Zarathustra, and indeed, to the Nietzsche we meet in Eccé Homo. This is due in part to the fact that Nietzsche had just finished the first three parts of Zarathustra, and throughout the period in which he wrote Beyond and Genealogy, Nietzsche was developing plans for his Hauptwerk—a series of mature studies that would constitute (along with Zarathustra) his philosophical legacy. The first experimental title page appears in a notebook entry, dated to the late summer of 1885:

Der Wille zu Macht.

125 For Nietzsche, this included misanthropy, hatred for material reality, and contempt for reason; GM-III § 28, p. 163 [KSA 5, p. 412].
126 Similarly, Jerry S. Clegg argues that the philosophers of the future are continuous with the priestly types of the Christian tradition in that it was Christianity that ‘began our training when it called Christ our teacher and made devotion to Him a turning to the path of knowledge’. Thus, for Nietzsche, ‘It is now time to become who we are: orthodox antichrists all, bred to believe that error is vice’, ‘Life in the Shadow of Christ: Nietzsche on Pistis versus Gnosis’, in Nietzsche and the Gods, ed. Weaver Santaniello, 159-171 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 171.
127 ‘I am no man, I am dynamite’, EH ‘Why I Am A Destiny’ § 1, p. 326 [KSA 6, p. 365].
A year later, after numerous iterations, Nietzsche settled on plans for a four-volume ‘Hauptwerk’ under the title, ‘The Will to Power. Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values. In Four Volumes’,\textsuperscript{129} and that September, he detailed his plans privately in a letter to Bernhard and Elisabeth Förster, saying he intended to devote the following four years to the project.\textsuperscript{130}

The subject of the Hauptwerk has been by beset by controversy throughout the history of Nietzsche scholarship, because Elisabeth capitalized on Nietzsche’s plans with her release of the somewhat careless anthology of Nietzsche’s notes under the planned title—The Will to Power.\textsuperscript{131} Complicating the matter further, the idea that Nietzsche’s most important work had gone unpublished, proved irresistible to a number of Nietzsche’s most influential commentators—Heidegger chief among them. Anglophone scholarship, following Kaufmann’s lead, has more frequently erred on the side of caution, treating as authoritative only those texts authorized for publication by Nietzsche himself. The textual-critical issues are not insignificant: there is good evidence that some of the notes had been culled by Nietzsche, and Elisabeth was not above making alterations to notes to avoid embarrassment, or when it served her political aims—scribbling over words and even crossing out whole lines of text.\textsuperscript{132} Undoubtedly, the greatest barrier to widespread reception of the idea of the Hauptwerk, is its ill-fated association with the

\textsuperscript{128} ‘The Will to Power. Attempt at a New Explanation of Everything’, \textit{KSA} 11:39[1], p. 619. This plan appears very soon after his most famous, and most controversial, expression of the doctrine of the will to power: ‘This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! You are this will to power—and nothing besides!’, \textit{KSA} 11:38[12] p. 611.

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{KSA} 12:2[100] p. 109.

\textsuperscript{130} eKGBW/BVN-1886,741 — Letter to Bernhard and Elisabeth Förster: 02/09/1886.

\textsuperscript{131} Obliging Nietzsche’s commentators ever after to state their own position on the work (as I have done at 1.3, above).

\textsuperscript{132} Kaufmann points out some of the more egregious offenses in his footnoted commentary in the popular Kaufmann-Hollingdale translation, and the facsimiles on pp. I-VIII show evidence of censorship.
title, *The Will to Power*. Montinari, a leading Nachlaß scholar, has argued convincingly that Nietzsche abandoned plans for a work under the title sometime in the late summer of 1888. Furthermore, Leiter points to Nietzsche’s relative silence on the titular doctrine in those key places where he provides commentaries on his own work, suggesting that Nietzsche did not, in the final analysis, give a place of importance to the doctrine. None of this requires that Nietzsche had abandoned plans for a multi-volume Hauptwerk, however. Indeed, in Montinari’s reconstruction, *Will to Power* is dropped from the plans, while the language of *Revaluation of all Values*, is retained as the primary focus. At this late point in Nietzsche’s plans—now only weeks before his collapse—*The Antichrist* existed as the first instalment in his reoriented vision for the Hauptwerk.

With the foregoing in mind, therefore, at least one aspect of Nietzsche’s Hauptwerk should be uncontroversial: the realized completion of his first volume of the project, under the title, *The Antichrist*. Not only was the work explicitly named in his latest plans for the four-volume project, it was personally completed and authorized for publication before Nietzsche’s collapse. What is more, Nietzsche’s notes and letters reveal that he personally invested *The Antichrist* with an unusual, even quasi-religious significance, calling it the ‘Gospel of the future’ [Zukunfts-Evangelium], and ‘the most independent book there is’.

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135 M. Montinari’s reconstruction includes the following:

1. Nietzsche abandons any and all plans for ‘Will to Power’.
2. For a brief period, he may have entertained the possibility of publishing the material already under fair copy as the ‘Revaluation of All Values’.

3. ...  
6. From then on, the magnum opus bore the title ‘Revaluation of All Values’ and was planned in four books (‘Nietzsche’s Unpublished Writings from 1885 to 1888’, in *Reading Nietzsche*, 98).

136 See, *KSA* 13:19[8], p. 545. The entry begins:

*Umwerthung aller Werthe.*  
Erstes Buch.

*Der Antichrist.* Versuch einer Kritik des Christenthums.

137 *KSA* 13:11[411], p. 190.

If *The Antichrist* represented a partial realization of Nietzsche plans, we might ask why its reception has not been stronger? While the literature on Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian tradition is growing, perhaps no scholars invest *The Antichrist* with the degree of importance that Nietzsche did. A more provocative suggestion might be that Nietzsche has not yet found a readership who are able to discern the dangers of post-Christian nihilism with the sufficient clarity—that no one has really been able to believe that Christian morality ‘corrupted humanity’ to the degree that Nietzsche feared. Nietzsche was acutely aware of his untimeliness, as he suggested in the forward to *The Antichrist*: ‘This book belongs to the few’. But, there are also strong indications that Nietzsche felt he was on the verge of something world-historical in scope; he seemed nervous, and convinced that he must proceed with extreme caution—only speaking of *The Antichrist* in personal correspondence, or referring to it as his ‘Revaluation of All Values’.

The plans for the publication of *The Antichrist*, expressed clearly throughout his letters, was to introduce himself through *Eccé Homo*—in German, French, and English, minimally—and then, after an interval of two years, to release *The Antichrist* in every major European language, with one million copies in each language planned for the first edition. Therefore, *Eccé Homo* was written to introduce the world to the thinker behind the great event of the revaluation of all values.

In light of these plans, securing the full rights to his literary estate was a growing concern as interest in his work would explode if *Eccé Homo* and *The Antichrist* met with the kind of reception Nietzsche hoped for them. Interest would be especially high for Zarathustra, which would be read as the ‘Bible of the future’. Although *Eccé Homo* is certainly an eccentric work, given the development of Nietzsche’s thinking, especially the realization of the first part of his major revaluation project, much of what cannot be accounted for by irony, can be understood as the hyperbolic—even apocalyptic—forerunner to the looming publication of *The Antichrist*. The

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139 ‘That they did not open their eyes earlier at this point, I regard as the greatest uncleanliness that humanity has on its conscience; as self-deception become instinctive; as a fundamental will not to see any event, any causality, any reality; as counterfeiting in psychologicis to the point of criminality. Blindness to Christianity is the crime par excellence—the crime against life’, *EH* ‘Why I Am A Destiny’ § 7, p. 332 [KSA 6, p. 371].
140 See, e.g., eKGB/BVN-1888,1159 — Letter to Paul Deussen: 26/11/1888. Nietzsche’s plans are surprising in light of his claim that *AC*, ‘belongs to the few’, but the numbers may have been insurance against censorship, as Nietzsche showed concerns that the book might be banned.
last chapter, ‘Why I Am A Destiny’, he singles out for specific mention, knowing it would be especially difficult to ignore—a fate his most important books had so far suffered:

By the way, I speak of myself with every possible psychological ‘cunning’ and cheerfulness.—I certainly do not want to appear before people as prophet, bogeyman, and moral monster. This book may also do good in this sense: perhaps it will prevent me from being confused with my opposite.—

He later remarked that it was composed with the ‘self-exaltation and good humour of antiquity. It seemed well-advised to have a little fun’.

I am a joyful ambassador like no one before me . . . I am necessarily also a man of calamity. For when truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded—all of them are based on lies: there will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on earth. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics.

The importance of this is that it demonstrates how closely Nietzsche had come to associate his philosophical legacy with his agôn against Christianity. The Antichrist, was the long-anticipated first book of his major project in revaluation, and the only book of the project

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141 As a ‘foretaste’ of the revaluation of values, in which he introduces himself as a man of destiny (eKGB/BVN-1888,1170 — Letter to Georg Brandes: Early December, 1888).
142 By late in the year of 1888, Nietzsche felt prepared to show the world the full extent of his heterodoxy, ‘which leaves no stone upon another’ (a tremendously apt reference to Jesus’ apocalyptic description of the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem; cf. Mark 13.2). He had confessed to Overbeck, ‘There is as yet absolutely no enmity against me: therefore, one simply has no ears for anything from me, neither for nor against’ (eKGB/BVN-1888,1132 — Letter to Franz Overbeck: 18/09/1888). At this point, Nietzsche’s books had sold only hundreds of copies, and he was planning on a multi-million printing of the first edition; cf. ‘[I] never speak to masses’, EH, ‘Why I Am A Destiny’ § 1, p. 326 [KSA 6, p. 365].
143 eKGB/BVN-1888,1137 — Letter to Heinrich Köselitz: 30/10/1888.
145 EH ‘Why I Am A Destiny’ § 1, p. 327 [KSA 6, 366]. NB: Nietzsche also referred to the Jewish-Pauline revaluation around the Cross a ‘grosen Politik der Rache’, GM-I § 8, p. 35 [KSA 5, 269]. Cf. Nietzsche’s vision for great politics in BGE: ‘The time for petty politics is over: the very next century will bring the fight for the dominion of the earthy—the compulsion to large-scale politics [grosen Politik]’, BGE § 208, p. 231 [KSA 5, p. 140]. Cf., ‘Should we triumph, we take the government of the earth in hand—including universal peace. We will have overcome the absurd boundaries of races, nations, and states, and there is nothing left but the hierarchy between man and man . . .’ (eKGB/BVN-1888,1170 — Letter to Georg Brandes: Early December, 1888).
that he realized. Even if Nietzsche had before his collapse abandoned his plans of the four-volume work,146 *The Antichrist* is only the more significant for that. Nietzsche is coy about *The Antichrist* in his autobiography, speaking only of the extraordinary feeling that was associated with its completion: ‘I attacked the tremendous task of the *Revaluation*, with a sovereign feeling of pride that was incomparable, certain at every moment of my immorality, engraving sign upon sign on bronze tablets with the sureness of a destiny’.147 In select company, however, Nietzsche intimated a sense of profound possibility for *The Antichrist*—telling his publisher that it would ‘open ears for him’, and not encounter the ‘absurd silence’ which characterized the reception of *Zarathustra*.148 He wrote to Overbeck that, ‘It has an energy and clarity, which perhaps no philosopher has yet achieved’.149 In another letter he claimed it was the greatest-ever philosophical event, which breaks human history in two.150 It is safe to say that Nietzsche attributed a significance to *The Antichrist*, that was rivalled only by *Zarathustra*. Finally, in a famous letter to Brandes, he wrote:

*I have now, with a cynicism which will become world-historical, spoken to myself the book, *Eccé Homo*, and it is an assassination without the slightest consideration for the Crucified. It ends in thunder and squall against everything that is Christian, or infected by Christianity . . . . I am, after all, the foremost psychologist of Christianity, and as an old artillerist, which I am, can bring those heavy guns, the existence of which no opponent of Christianity had even suspected. The whole work is a prelude to the Revaluation of all Values, the work that lies finished before me: I swear to you that in two years we will have the whole world in convulsions. I am a destiny.*—151

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146 Only days before his collapse, Nietzsche referred to *AC*, as ‘*Die Umwerthung aller Werthe*’, which Kaufmann takes the liberty to translate: ‘the first book of the *Revaluation of all Values* . . .’,*EH*, epigraph, p. 221 [*KSA* 6, p. 263].
147 *EH*, ‘Twilight of the Idols’ § 3, p. 315 [*KSA* 6, p. 355].
150 eKGWB/BVN-1888,1126 — Letter to Malwida von Meysenbug: 04/10/1888. The final paragraph of *The Antichrist* begins, ‘And one calculates *time* from the *dies nefastus* on which this fatality arose—from the *first* day of Christianity!*—*Why not rather from its last?—From today?’
6.4.2 *Nietzsche’s Introductory Argument: Christianity’s Lethal Antagonism Against Higher Types.*

I have argued that Nietzsche’s conflict with historical Christianity, and with its master architect, St Paul, is fundamentally an issue of philosophical anthropology—of understanding human nature within its ‘world’ context. The battles take place where anthropology and values intersect, because Nietzsche, like Paul, approached anthropology primarily from an axiological perspective—asking and answering the questions, ‘why man at all?’, and ‘what justifies human being?’ Nietzsche’s engagement with revaluation is an act of creation that will result in a new and higher types of human beings. This is the ultimate aim of Zarathustra’s apocalyptic message of the Death of God, and the eternal recurrence, which amounts to a reimagining of the world of human being, and a call to a new way of being human. This is no less true of Nietzsche’s more conventional philosophical works such as *Beyond*, *Genealogy*, and *Twilight*, where he diagnoses the pathologies of Modern man as the symptoms of residual Christian values. But, it is supremely true of *The Antichrist*, where Nietzsche’s ‘revaluation of all values’ manifests as a relentless attack upon the anthropological ideals of Paulinism, and the effect of those values on contemporary Human being. Nietzsche begins *The Antichrist* with a portrait of Modern man as pathetically lost within the labyrinth of Christianity—characterized by ‘lazy peace’, and ‘cowardly compromise’.152 Two of the introductory sections are especially critical for understanding both the impetus behind Nietzsche’s contest with Paulinism, and the technical nature of that contest. I quote them both here at length:

The problem I raise here is not what ought to succeed mankind in the sequence of species (—the human being is a conclusion): but what type of human being one ought to breed, ought to will, as more valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of the future.

This more valuable type has existed often enough already: but as a lucky accident, as an exception, never as willed. He has rather been the most feared, he has hitherto been virtually the thing to be feared—and out of fear they reverse type has been willed, bred, achieved: the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick man—the Christian . . . 153

In section 6.3, I briefly examined Nietzsche’s commitment to a broadly-evolutionary, but non-Darwinian account of origins. Nietzsche saw the common ancestry thesis, and descent with

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152 *AC* § 1, p. 125 [*KSA* 6, p. 169].
153 *AC* § 3, p. 126 [*KSA* 6, p. 170].

Duff, 287
modification, as axiomatic—while decisively repudiating the notion that the evolutionary process was directed towards higher types. Rather, both natural and artificial forces of selection seemed to conspire against exceptional human beings, who are rare by definition, and whose inherent complexity proportionally increased their chances of failure. If this seems to contradict Nietzsche’s language of ‘more certain of the future’, that is because reigning values are short-sighted—making short-term transactions ‘at the expense of the future’.  When he raises the question in § 3, about what types of human beings should be accorded higher value, he is provocatively challenging the axiological commitments that he has traced genealogically back to Paulinism, by the suggestion that human beings have differential value, but he is also pressing the reader to consider the responsibility we bear as agents working within a mutable value matrix. A second step in Nietzsche’s argument is to explicitly state what he has argued elsewhere—that Mankind’s ongoing evolution is neither necessarily, nor in fact, directed towards ‘the better or the stronger or the higher. . .’. Higher types are manifested throughout the world, but they are not the product of a will towards health, but rather of mere chance; a higher type is a ‘stroke of luck’ [Glücksfall]. This leads to Nietzsche’s essential indictment of Christianity: its lethal antagonism against higher types: ‘One should not embellish or dress up Christianity: it has waged a war to the death against this higher type of man. . . . Christianity has taken the side of everything weak, base, ill-constituted, it has made an ideal out of opposition to the preservative instincts of strong life. . .’. The logic of the introductory argument is straightforward. The first premise is quasi-moral: that human beings ought to be axiologically-differentiated—that some types ought to be willed as more valuable, and more worthy of life than others—that we bear responsibility as axiological agents to will the ascendancy of the good. The second premise is quasi-Darwinian: that the evolutionary odds of the Glücksfall turning out

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154 As he suggests in the preface to GM-Preface § 5, p. 20 [KSA 5, p. 253].
155 AC § 4, p. 126 [KSA 6, p. 171].
156 The term also appears at two important junctures in GM—both times designating unusually high types. The first appearance connects the concept of a higher type with the crisis of nihilism: ‘[G]rant me the sight, but one glance . . . Of a man who justifies man, of a complementary and redeeming stroke of luck [Glücksfall] on the part of man for the sake of which one may still believe in man! . . . The sight of man now makes us weary—what is nihilism today if it is not that?—We are weary of man’, GM-I § 12, p. 44 [KSA 5, p. 278]. The second appearance of the term sheds much light on Nietzsche’s requirement for solitude, GM-III § 14, p. 121 [KSA 5, p. 367].
157 AC § 5, p. 127 [KSA 6, p. 171].
depend partly on human values and human will. Nietzsche wants to argue that, if his reader should concede the truth of these two premises, it naturally follows that Christianity is not a religion of love, but a war—a war to the death [Todkrieg] against the higher, or more valuable types. This is the fundamental argument behind Nietzsche’s campaign for the revaluation of all values, but the third part is far from obvious. It is not clear, to be specific, that the Christianity is inherently antagonistic to higher types, and Nietzsche will require the rest of the book to make that case. In fact, Nietzsche is eager to affirm that it is far from obvious: ‘Nobody yet as felt Christian morality to be beneath him: that requires a height, a view of distances, a hitherto altogether unheard-of psychological depth and profundity’.158 Were it obvious, the revaluation of all values would be unworthy of Nietzsche’s genius, but in fact, he saw it as his greatest triumph: ‘Have I been understood?—What defines me, what sets me apart from the whole rest of humanity is that I uncovered Christian morality’.159

6.4.3 Signposts of Décadence—The Adverse Effects of Residual Christianity.

Before Nietzsche examines the origins of Christianity, he makes a series of cases for Christianity as a force for decline, beginning with the ‘depraving of Pascal’, as the example par excellence of the subversive effects of Christianity on a higher type, who is depraved into seeing himself as depraved.160 Satirizing the anthropological pessimism he had come to associate with Pauline anthropology, Nietzsche writes: ‘I have drawn back the curtain on the depravity of man. . . . I understand depravity, as will already have been guessed, in the sense of décadence: my assertion is that all the values in which mankind at present summarizes its highest desideratum are décadence values’.161 Nietzsche is ready to affirm with Christianity that mankind is depraved, but it is natural depravity, caused by unnatural values: mankind as a species is so sick it ‘prefers what is harmful to it’.162 Pity, thought to be a virtue, is revalued as an example of a harmful force in Christianity, resulting in the artificial selection of low-value, ill-constituted types:

158 EH ‘Why I Am A Destiny’ § 6, p. 331 [KSA 6, p. 370-371].
159 EH ‘Why I Am A Destiny’ § 7, p. 332 [KSA 6, p. 371].
160 AC § 5, p. 127 [KSA 6, p. 171]. Pascal is an especially interesting case study, because Nietzsche sees Pascal’s embrace of Paulinism’s anthropological commitments as his undoing.
161 AC § 6, p. 127 [KSA 6, p. 172].
162 AC § 6, p. 127 [KSA 6, p. 172].
Pity on the whole thwarts the law of evolution, which is the law of selection. It preserves what is ripe for destruction; it defends life’s disinherited and condemned; through the abundance of the ill-constituted of all kinds which it retains in life it gives life itself a gloomy and questionable aspect.\footnote{AC § 7, p. 128 [KSA 6, p. 173], cf. § 2, ‘What is more harmful than any vice?—Active sympathy for the ill-constituted and weak—Christianity . . .’.}

The theologians and philosophers among Nietzsche’s contemporaries are then revalued—as the antitheses of Nietzsche and his free spirits, and as heirs of the priestly instinct: ‘That poison extends much further than one thinks’.\footnote{AC § 8, p. 129 [KSA 6, p. 174].} The theologian instinct is a ‘subterranean form of falsity’, by which German philosophy has been corrupted. The German philosopher—not least, Kant—is animated by the theologian’s instinct: ‘The erring instinct in all and everything, anti-naturalness as instinct, German décadence as philosophy—that is Kant!—’.\footnote{AC § 11, p. 132 [KSA 6, p. 178].} Nietzsche follows this discussion of Kant’s lack of intellectual conscience with the contrasting type: ‘we ourselves, we free spirits, are already a “revaluation of all values”, an incarnate declaration of war and victory over all ancient conceptions of “true” and “untrue”’.\footnote{AC § 13, p. 133 [KSA 6, p. 179].} The free spirits, with their natural, scientific values are the Chandala from the (warped) perspective of the décadent: ‘We have had the whole pathos of mankind against us—its conception of what truth ought to be, what the service of truth ought to be; every “thou shalt” has hitherto been directed against us . . .’.\footnote{AC § 13, p. 133 [KSA 6, p. 179].}

Nietzsche offends because he is more modest than the Christian; he desacralizes human being—‘we have placed him back among the animals’\footnote{AC § 14, p. 134 [KSA 6, p. 180].}—guarding against the notion that human beings are the telos of animal evolution: ‘Man is absolutely not the crown of creation: every creature stands beside him at the same stage of perfection’.\footnote{AC § 14, p. 134 [KSA 6, p. 180].} In fact, ‘man is, relatively speaking, the most unsuccessful animal, the sickliest, the one more dangerously strayed from its instincts—with all that, to be sure the most interesting!’\footnote{AC § 14, p. 134 [KSA 6, p. 180].} One of Nietzsche’s most direct
indictments of Christianity in the early part of the book is its falsification of mankind, which he attacks under a small catalogue of the Christian-imaginary—false causes and effects, false beings and false science, false psychology and false teleology—resulting in a wholesale falsification of the ‘actual world’.\footnote{AC § 15, p. 135 [KSA 6, p. 181].} This decoupling from reality stems from an inability to experience reality without suffering from it—in Nietzsche’s language, a ‘formula for décadence . . .’.\footnote{AC § 15, p. 136 [KSA 6, p. 182], emphasis original.} This thesis opens Nietzsche’s way to critique Christianity at the level of theology proper, where he juxtaposes two conceptions of God as two reflections of the worshippers’ will to power.

Nietzsche’s most positive conceptions of divine beings are related to tribal gods: ‘A people which still believes in itself still also has its own God. In him it venerates the conditions through which it has prospered . . .’.\footnote{AC § 16, p. 136 [KSA 6, p. 182].} The God of Christianity, on the other hand—the ‘good God’—is a dark mirror reflecting back the decaying will to power of the people who created him—proof of their ‘physiological regression’.\footnote{AC § 17, p. 137 [KSA 6, p. 183].}

Here Nietzsche’s reading of theology as anthropology is not far from that of Feuerbach, but Nietzsche is directly contradicting the theological zeitgeist of Germany, which held that the God of the New Testament represented a remarkable theological advance over the God of the Hebrew Bible.\footnote{As I showed in the study of Paul, above, the Tübingen school, under the leadership of F. C. Baur, held that the triumph of Christian universalism over Jewish particularism represented a major theological advance. This aspect of Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity fell upon very stony ground. Still today, very few people prefer the tribal gods to the ‘good God’.
\footnote{Cf. AC § 38, where the priest is ‘the actual poison-spider of life’.
\footnote{AC § 18, p. 138 [KSA 6, 185].} With Nietzsche’s aim at the revaluation of all values, his brief focus upon the God depicted in the New Testament serves the double purpose of depreciating the Christian ideal, and collapsing the value structure within which the Christian disciple orients their becoming:

The Christian conception of God—God as God of the sick, God as spider, God as spirit—is one of the most corrupt conceptions of God arrived at on earth: perhaps it even represents the low-water mark in the descending development of the God type. God degenerated to the contradiction of life, instead of being its transfiguration and eternal Yes! In God a declaration of hostility towards life, nature, the will to Life!\footnote{AC § 18, p. 138 [KSA 6, 185].}
Nietzsche’s surprising juxtaposition of Christianity and Buddhism, prepares the ground for his contrasting of two types of primitive Christianity—authentic Jesuan Christianity and Paulinism. Christianity and Buddhism are ‘kindred’ religions as religions of décadence, but Buddhism struggles against suffering without falsifying reality by adding the complex metaphysical elements of Christian soteriology—‘it stands, in my language, beyond good and evil’. Nietzsche is clearly impressed by the physiological intuitions of the Buddha, which look unmistakably like some of Nietzsche own practices. Buddhism is distinguished from Christianity in how it keeps the body in the foreground and seeks (and attains) the modest goal of cheerfulness, while Christianity seeks the immaterial and savages the conscience with thoughts of sin. Throughout the remainder of The Antichrist, Buddhism reappears as a criterion of a species of décadence values, which compare favourably to Christian values.

6.4.4 The Origins of the Two Christian Religions.

With § 24, Nietzsche began his first foray into the origins of Christianity, but unlike his contemporaries, he works to root Christianity deeply within the value-soil of Judaism. In my study of the middle period writings, I argued that much of Nietzsche’s development in that period centred around creating new knowledge of human nature and the world of human experience—the world ‘as it concerns man’. Similarly, Paul’s development from pre-Damascus Antichrist, to post-Damascus Apostle, involved a reappraisal of human nature and the symbolic world of Palestinian Judaism. Paul viewed himself as the master architect [ἀρχιτέκτων] of the kerygmatic foundations of that new world through his proclamation of the universal Gospel (1 Cor. 3.10-11). This is precisely what Nietzsche recognizes when he roots Christianity in the world-falsification of décadent Judaism: ‘the instinct of ressentiment here become genius had to invent another world from which that life-affirmation would appear evil, reprehensible as such’.

What makes the Judeo-Christian falsification of the world so insidious, for Nietzsche, is that it also used décadence as a means for attaining power—for taking revenge. The success of

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178 AC § 20, p. 139 [KSA 6, p. 186], emphasis original.
179 It was a basic assumption of the influential Tübingen School that Christianity was the antithesis of Judaism. Nietzsche relentlessly attacks this view throughout AC, strategically leveraging German antisemitism against German Christian piety.
180 AC § 24, pp. 144-145 [KSA 6, p. 192], emphasis original.
this falsification is proved by the universal assumption of a ‘moral world-order’ among philosophers who have come under the pernicious influence of the priestly instinct of the Judeo-Christian tradition. And thus, the value of the individual is determined within a moral framework.\(^1\) Essential to this is Nietzsche’s revisionist history of the priests, whose will to power exercises itself in the creation of the categories of obedience and disobedience—measured against the will of God, and mediated through the priests as divine revelation: ‘In plain words: a great literary forgery becomes necessary, a “sacred book” is discovered—it is made public with all hieratic pomp, with days of repentance and with lamentation over the long years of “sinfulness”’.\(^2\) Anthropological pessimism is essential to the maintenance of priestly power: ‘From a psychological point of view, “sins” are indispensable in any society organized by priests: they are the actual levers of power, the priest lives on sins, he needs “the commission of sins”. . . . Supreme law: “God forgives him who repents”—in plain language: who subjects himself to the priest.’\(^3\)

\textit{An Excursus: Nietzsche’s Quest for the Historical Jesus.}

The enigmatic portrait of Jesus of Nazareth that Nietzsche’s outlines in \textit{The Antichrist} is one of the most widely-appreciated aspects of his critique of Christianity. Overall, Nietzsche’s comments on the historical Jesus lack the invective character of his comments on Paul.\(^4\) In

\(^1\) AC § 26, p. 147 [KSA 6, p. 195].

\(^2\) AC § 26, p. 148 [KSA 6, p. 196]. Nietzsche here refers to a series of events during the life of King Josiah (2 Kings 22-23), who reigned in the southern kingdom of Judah after the northern kingdom had been conquered by Assyria. During a renovation of the Solomonic temple, Hilkiah the priest is said to have found the \textit{Book of the Law}, which Shaphan the secretary read in Josiah’s presence. Josiah’s zealous religious reforms were unparalleled in the monarchical period of Judaism. The account is especially well suited to Nietzsche’s aims, because Josiah’s orthodoxy apparently hung upon the chance discovery—by a priest—of the long-lost \textit{Book of the Law}.\(^3\) AC § 26, pp. 148-149 [KSA 6, p. 197], emphasis original.

\(^3\) Some commentators have overstated just how positive Nietzsche’s portrait of Jesus might be, as M. Tanner certainly does in his introduction to the Hollingdale translation of \textit{TI}: As [Nietzsche’s] eight-page account continues—he does a good deal more than merely ‘touching on’ the psychology of the redeemer—the tone becomes ever warmer and even ecstatic. The portrayal of Nietzsche’s (or Dionysus’) antipode becomes, bizarrely, one of the most moving passages in the whole of his writings. With the occasional omission, it could be used as a magnificent sermon addressed to a devout congregation (p. 21).
Human, Jesus was honoured as ‘the most noble human’. In Daybreak, Nietzsche excused Jesus from the largely negative critique he levelled at Paul, to whom he had begun to credit the phenomenon of Christianity itself. In The Antichrist, where Nietzsche develops his full-scale psycho-historical theory of Christianity, the differences between Jesus of Nazareth and Paul are vividly portrayed.

Nietzsche’s own quest for the historical Jesus begins with a sketch of Israel’s history in five stages, allowing Nietzsche to bring his genius for tracing genealogies of values to bear on the troubled ancestry of Christianity. In his analysis, the Israel of the early monarchical period stood in a ‘correct, that is to say natural relationship to all things’, where their worship of Yahweh evinced both consciousness of their power as a nation, and their good conscience; consequently, early Israelite religion was an expression of gratitude and self-affirmation. Israel’s political decline, ‘anarchy within, the Assyrian from without’, prompted them to reconceive their relationship to Yahweh, the God of justice, believing their decline to be the just punishment for their lack of obedience. This development transferred power into the hands of the priests, who leverage the Law and the concept of sin (violation of Law) to consolidate their power, and subject the people through guilty conscience.

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185 HH § 475, p. 175 [KSA 2, p. 310].

186 As several commentators have recognized, Nietzsche’s reconstruction of Israel’s history was largely shaped by his reading of Julius Wellhausen’s, Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels, though AC is very far from a slavish repetition of Wellhausen. Rather, AC is Nietzsche’s opportunity to advance, among other things, an axiological reading of Wellhausen’s historical revision. See, Gary Shapiro, ‘The Writing on the Wall: The Antichrist and the Semiotics of History’, in Reading Nietzsche, 197-198.

187 AC § 25, p. 145 [KSA 6, p. 193]. Nietzsche does not adorn this stage of his analysis with specific examples, but the festival dedication of Solomon’s temple at the apogee of Israel’s wealth and political security would serve his purposes well. The account in 1 Kings 8.62-66 reports fellowship offerings of twenty-two thousand cattle, and one hundred and twenty thousand sheep and goats. Fellowship offerings were consumed by the worshippers.

188 Nietzsche is pointing to a cluster of major events in Israel’s monarchical period. King David’s reign was troubled by insurrections, and the nation divided after the death of his son Solomon, when the ten northern tribes rebelled against Solomon’s successor, Rehoboam, stoning his emissary, and attempting an assassination (1 Kings 12.1-19); the northern tribes were conquered by Sargon II, of Assyria in approximately 722 BCE (2 Kings 17.6).

A God who demands—in place of a God who helps, who devises means, who is fundamentally a word for every happy inspiration of courage and self-reliance. . . . Morality no longer the expression of the conditions under which a nation lives and grows, no longer a nation’s deepest instinct of life, but become abstract, become they antithesis of life—morality as a fundamental degradation of the imagination. . . .  

It was only, ‘On a soil falsified in this way’, that Christianity could arise. The problem of unnatural values was dealt with in two different ways, represented by Jesus and Paul. Contra Paul and later Christian orthodoxy, Jesus was not the Christ; contra Renan, Jesus was neither genius nor hero. Here we have Nietzsche’s precis of the Jesuan gospel:

[I]ncapacity for resistance here becomes morality (‘resist not evil!’: the profoundest saying of the Gospel, its key in a certain sense), blessedness in peace, in gentleness, in the inability for enmity. What are the ‘glad tidings’? True life, eternal life is found—it is not promised, it is here, it is within you: as life lived in love, in love without deduction or exclusion, without distance. Everyone is a child of God—Jesus definitely claims nothing for himself alone—as a child of God everyone is equal to everyone else. . . .

Nietzsche’s Christology is a load-bearing aspect of his anti-Christianity, but not because the Christ will bear the brunt of his animus. Rather, by reconceptualising the mind and mission of the historical Jesus, Nietzsche positions himself as a rival to Paul, subverting Paulinism where it begins—that is, where Jesus’ mission ends. It is more precise, therefore, to think of Nietzsche’s ‘psychology of the redeemer’ as an ingenious and subversive critique of Paulinism.

Nietzsche’s confession that the Gospels present him with so many difficulties, is not the confession of a philologist, as such. He disavows any interest in the textual issues which ‘the learned curiosity of the German mind celebrated one of its most unforgettable triumphs in pointing out’. Rather, Nietzsche’s interest lies in the possibility of reconstructing from the

190 AC § 25, p. 146 [KSA 6, p. 194].
191 AC § 29, p. 151 [KSA 6, p. 200].
192 AC § 29, p. 151 [KSA 6, pp. 199-200], emphasis original. Here Nietzsche paraphrases Matt. 5.39 (from the Sermon on the Mount), and provides a literal reading of Luke 17.21: ‘ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐντὸς ὑµῶν ἐστιν’.
193 Just as Paul recognized that his conflicts with rival traditions were fundamentally conflicts over the meaning of the Christ-event. The one who controls the interpretation of the Christ-event, controls the (theo)logical implications.
194 Nietzsche refers here to David Strauss’ classic, Das Leben Jesu, which had made an impression on him as a young university student. The work was a shocking transgression against Protestant German piety; from Nietzsche’s post-Christian perspective, however, it failed to even
Gospels—their problematic nature notwithstanding—a psychological typology that can account for the life and teachings of Jesus.\(^{195}\) Under the inspiration of Dostoevsky, he (provocatively) proposes the type of the ‘idiot’, with the ‘condition of morbid susceptibility of the sense of touch which makes it shrink back in horror from every contact, every grasping of a firm object’.\(^{196}\)

In the previous chapter, we examined Nietzsche’s transition from his early to his middle period, where his emancipation from Romanticism and Idealism influenced his approach to anthropology: physiological factors such as health, instincts, and drives, superseded the anthropological ideals hero, saint, genius, which characterized his early period. Here, Nietzsche hypothesizes two ‘physiological realities’, which give rise to the doctrine of redemption in the life and teaching of the historical Jesus: ‘Instinctive hatred of reality’, and ‘Instinctive exclusion of all aversion, all enmity, all feeling for limitation and distancing’.\(^{197}\) In the mature Nietzsche’s analysis, both of these instincts are born of an ‘extreme capacity for suffering and irritation’; taken together they result in a withdrawal, or disengagement from life.\(^{198}\)

Jesus’ doctrine of redemption, therefore, is the natural consequence of Israel’s history of decline—of the ‘denaturalizing of natural values’, and it can be seen as the further evolution [Weiter-Entwicklung] of hedonism—not unrelated to Epicurean hedonism.\(^{199}\) He concludes, ‘The fear of pain, even of the infinitely small pain—cannot end otherwise than in the religion of love . . .’.\(^{200}\)

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\(^{195}\) ‘For it could be contained in the Gospels in spite of the Gospels, however much mutilated and overloaded . . .’, \(AC\) § 29, p. 150 [\(KSA\) 6, p. 199], emphasis original.

\(^{196}\) \(AC\) § 29, p. 151 [\(KSA\) 6, p. 200]. Kauffmann and others have made mention of the sudden appearance of the term ‘idiot’ in Nietzsche’s writings, beginning shortly after his chance discovery of Dostoevsky in a bookshop in 1887, which suggests at least his familiarity with Dostoevsky’s novel by that name. There now seems to be little doubt that Nietzsche had read enough of the novel to be conversant on the character of Prince Myshkin; Meta von Salis-Marschlins recalled a discussion with Nietzsche about, ‘Dostojewsky’s Idiot und die Gestalt Jesu nach den vier Evangelien!’, in \emph{Philosoph und Edelmensch: ein Beitrag zur Charakteristik Friedrich Nietzsche’s} (Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1897), 64. I am indebted for this reference to Paolo Stellino’s excellent, \emph{Nietzsche and Dostoevsky: On the Verge of Nihilism} (Bern: Peter Lang, 2015), 113.

\(^{197}\) \(AC\) § 30, p. 152 [\(KSA\) 6, pp. 200-201], emphasis original.

\(^{198}\) \(AC\) § 30, p. 152 [\(KSA\) 6, p. 201].

\(^{199}\) Here Nietzsche refers to Epicurus as a \emph{décadent}, as he does with respect to the historical Jesus in the following section (§ 31), \(AC\) § 30, p. 152 [\(KSA\) 6, p. 201].

\(^{200}\) \(AC\) § 30, p. 152 [\(KSA\) 6, p. 201], emphasis original.
In the *décadence* of Jesus, love is the fear of pain and suffering; in Paul’s gospel, love is sublimated *ressentiment* and revenge. Thus, Nietzsche finds Jesus to be a fascinating and paradoxical figure, as both a *décadent* and a type of free spirit. In *The Antichrist*, Epicurus was named a ‘typical *décadent*’, along with the ideal human of the church, and the God of the *New Testament*. Jesus stands apart as a ‘most interesting *décadent*’ because his manner of life represents a mutation of *décadence* to which Nietzsche can show a certain regard. In the soil that produced the most virulent incarnations of priestly *ressentiment*, the Evangel appears as one who enjoins everyone to seek blessedness in *this* life, refusing to take revenge against his enemies—or even to *resist* his enemies. Jesus represented a *Daseinsform* that embraced its powerlessness and *loved*.

What is too seldom recognized by commentators, is that Nietzsche is quick to acknowledge that his revisionist history cannot be founded upon a coherent reading of Gospels themselves; the redeemer-type that Nietzsche reconstructs exists in the Gospels ‘only in a very distorted form’, and indeed *could not* ‘remain pure, whole, free of accretions’. This distortion is then accounted for by the hypothesis that the primitive church appropriated aspects of the historical Jesus’ life and teaching for their own very different aims. Failing to understand the rich symbolism of Jesus’ teaching, the primitive Christians falsified the type by translating

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201 *AC* §§, 30, 51, and 17, respectively. Cf. *EH* ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ § 1, p. 271 [*KSA* 6, p. 310], where Socrates is also referred to as a ‘typical décadent’.

202 There is an intriguing similarity between Nietzsche and his Evangel at the level of this ‘most interesting’ type of *décadence*, suggesting that Nietzsche may have personally related to the portrait he paints in *The Antichrist*. Early in *Eccé Homo*, under the rubric of, ‘Why I Am So Wise’, Nietzsche’s rhapsodizing is briefly interrupted by a candid discussion of his suffering and overcoming of *ressentiment*—even allowing that he is a *décadent* of a type: ‘Apart from the fact that I am a *décadent*, I am also the opposite’ (*EH*—Wise § 2). It was his experience of an upbringing in Christian *décadence*, and his later adoptions of Dionysian atheism, that allowed him to say, ‘I know both, I am both’ (*EH*—Wise § 1). Nietzsche and the Evangel’s *décadence*, was *décadence without ressentiment*.

203 *AC* § 31, p. 152 [*KSA* 6, p. 201], emphasis original.

204 On this point, Nietzsche and a small handful of other scholars (notably, Bruno Bauer) may be distinguished from the larger company of critical biblical scholarship only on the basis of the radical nature of their readings. Critical scholarship need take nothing for granted, but the veracity or originality of questioned texts must be rooted in a larger theory of primitive Christianity, or within a larger theological paradigm. For Nietzsche, the theory laid out in *GM* provides just such a framework.

205 Failure to understand Jesus’ symbolism is a recurring motif in the Gospels. In a clearly comical instance (*Matt*. 16.5-12; cf. *Mk*. 8.14-21), Jesus warns his disciples to ‘beware the yeast
him into the established categories of first-century Palestine Judaism: prophet, miracle-worker, Messiah, and so-forth. Indeed: ‘When the first community had need of a censuring theologian to oppose the theologians they created their ‘God’ according to their requirements...’

The foremost sin of ‘Christianity’ was the wholesale falsification of what was actually Christian in treating Jesus’ symbolism as pointers to concrete realities. Nietzsche’s Jesus ‘took for realities, for “truths”, only inner realities... he understood the rest, everything pertaining to nature, time, space, history, only as signs, as occasion for metaphor.’ The gospel of the historical Jesus is the abrogation of opposites. Jesus was an antirealist whose language must be taken as a ‘sign-language, a semiotic, an occasion for metaphors’. Jesus, ‘cares nothing for what is fixed: the word killeth, everything fixed killeth’. Further still, Nietzsche argues that the historical Jesus had no concept of sin, guilt, or separation between God and man, ‘precisely this is the “glad tidings”’. By now Nietzsche’s wedge strategy is clearly evident, for he has reimagined the historical Jesus in a way that is fundamentally different from that of Paul and the Gospels. Unlike Paul, ‘It is not “penance”, not “prayer for forgiveness” which leads to God: eva"gelic practice alone leads to God, it is God! —What was abolished with the Evangel was the Judaism of the concepts of “sin”, “forgiveness of sin”, “faith”, “redemption by faith”...’

of the Pharisees and Sadducees’; the disciples were clearly at a loss, wondering amongst themselves, whether this was a rebuke for forgetting to bring bread on their journey. Jesus asked, ‘You of little faith, why are you talking among yourselves about having no bread...? How is it you don’t understand that I was not talking to you about bread?’ Another misunderstanding of Jesus’ symbolism serves as an accusation in his trial (Matt. 26.21ff; Mk. 14.58).

207 AC § 31, p. 153 [KSA 6, pp. 202-203], emphasis original.
208 AC § 34, p. 156 [KSA 6, p. 206].
209 AC § 32, p. 154 [KSA 6, p. 203].
210 AC § 32, p. 154 [KSA 6, p. 204], emphasis original. Here Nietzsche, apparently quoting from memory, makes a strange gaffe. He is alluding to a quintessentially Pauline notion that has no clear parallel in Jesus’ extant teachings: ‘the letter kills [γράµµα ἀποκτέννει], but the Spirit gives life’ (2 Cor. 3.6; cf. Rom. 7.6). Paul’s point, taken in context, is more or less exactly the point Nietzsche is crediting to Jesus. Cf. Käsemann’s classic article, which credits Paul with developing the first theological hermeneutic around these two concepts: ‘The Spirit and the Letter’, in Perspectives, 138-166, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971).
211 AC § 33, p. 155 [KSA 6, p. 205].
212 AC § 33, p. 156 [KSA 6, pp. 205-206]. Cf. Matt. 5.17, ‘Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfil them’.
Nietzsche avers that these glad tidings resulted in a different way of living, rather than a new dogma: ‘It is not a “belief” which distinguishes the Christian: the Christian acts, he is distinguished by a different mode of acting’. The historical Jesus fascinates Nietzsche as a radically-abstracted mode of being [Daseinsform], sharing an ancestry with the prevailing zeitgeist of Palestinian Judaism, but diverging from it—even growing hostile to it—‘the priestly instinct which can no longer endure the priest as a reality’. The movement Jesus led was, therefore, ‘a revolt against “the good and the just”, against “the saints of Israel”, against the social hierarchy—not against a corruption of these but against caste, privilege, the order, the social form; it was a disbelief in “higher men”, a No uttered towards everything that was priest and theologian’, and so, ‘The entire prophet and miracle-worker attitude, the anger, the calling down of judgement is a dreadful corruption’. The Jesus of history threatened to destabilize Israel’s already-precarious sense of national identity, and so, ‘he died for his guilt’. In light of this, it becomes evident how Paul was able to make use of the life of Jesus. Jesus, like Paul, was a further development of the Jewish instinct; Jesus, like Paul, relativized the values and symbols of Judaism; and Jesus, like Paul, arrived at a notion of human equality—leading the ‘Chandala’, and denying the existence of ‘higher men’ [höheren Menschen].

Nietzsche’s revisionist portrait of Jesus of Nazareth allows him to bring his unique genius to bear upon the search for the Historical Jesus—one of the epoch-making projects of the

\[213\] AC § 33, p. 155 [KSA 6, p. 205]. The privileging of a way of being over dogma—the central motif in Nietzsche’s Christology—is a key point of agreement with Renan’s Jesus. Renan’s best-selling, Life of Jesus, upon which Nietzsche heaped scorn in AC, portrayed Jesus as the founder of a universal spirituality—antithetical to the dogmatics of patristic and scholastic theology: ‘Jesus was not a founder of dogmas, or a maker of creeds; he infused into the world a new spirit’, trans. Charles Edwin Wilbour (London: Trübner and Co., 1864), 302.

\[214\] AC § 27, p. 149 [KSA 6, p. 197].

\[215\] AC § 27, p. 149 [KSA 6, p. 198].

\[216\] WP § 164, p. 99 [KSA 11[360], pp. 158-159].

\[217\] AC § 27, p. 150 [KSA 6, p. 198]. An earlier draft of this section was prefaced by, ‘There is no reason to maintain with Paul that Jesus has died, “for the sins of others” . . .’, KSA 13:11[280], p. 107.
nineteenth century. This ‘most interesting décadent’ had a place in Nietzsche’s reimagined world, just as he had in Zarathustra’s. Here Nietzsche stages a confrontation with contemporary antipodes like Strauss and Renan, who led the way in demythologizing Christianity, and reforming it for the zeitgeist of nineteenth-century Europe. He publicly displayed his contempt for the holy fictions embedded in these projects, which clung dogmatically to the very values made vacuous by the death of God and the demythologizing of New Testament history. Importantly for this study, Nietzsche’s genealogical theory positioned him to interpret the life of Jesus in a way that there was a superficial concurrence, but deep conflict with the positions of these contemporary writers.

Nietzsche’s image of Jesus is not without merit—especially his portrait of the historical Jesus as a ‘symbolist par excellence’. Furthermore, his psycho-historical profile has a kind of intrasystematic coherence when considered alongside Genealogy and other works; Nietzsche, as he had it, was ‘the foremost [erste] psychologist of Christianity’. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s Jesus is everywhere at odds with the Gospel materials themselves, making some of his readings appear ad hoc. For example, Nietzsche derives his key to the Gospels from the famed Sermon on the Mount—but even there Jesus speaks at length about justice, sin, hell, judgement, righteousness, and eternal reward. By what principle does he winnow out the ahistorical accretions and arrive at the true redeemer-type? As in his first major publication, Birth, Nietzsche’s reimagining of Jesus derives its persuasiveness from the plausibility of Nietzsche’s genealogy of décadence, which is why Nietzsche charts the history of unnatural values immediately prior to his portrait of Jesus. And so Nietzsche is prepared to answer the objections of scholars who are more inclined to follow the text: ‘I give a few examples of what

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218 Michael Grant writes, ‘People have been attempting to write lives of Jesus for a very long time. There have been more of them than of any other man or woman in history; 60,000 were written in the nineteenth century alone’, in Jesus: An Historian’s Review of the Gospels (New York: Scribner, 1977), 197.
219 If Nietzsche had briefly regretted the timing of his attack on Strauss (as he noted in a letter to Carl von Gersdorff, upon hearing of Strauss’ death, BVN-1874, 345), he remained steadfast in his opposition to Strauss’ project. Renan, he came to prize as his antipode, BGE, § 48, p. 63 [KSA 5, p. 70].
221 Namely, ‘resist not evil’, from Matt. 5.39 (cf. 1 Cor. 6.7); AC § 29, p. 151 [KSA 6, 200].
these petty people [i.e., the primitive church] have taken into their heads, what they have put into the mouth of their Master: confessions of “beautiful souls” one and all’. In this context, Nietzsche provides several quotations from the synoptic Gospels with the aim of contrasting the portrait of Jesus he has provided with what he sees as the corrupted Jesus of the Gospel tradition. Here he will quote Jesus, and then blame the primitive church for false attributions. To the final quotation, Luke 6.23, Nietzsche adds the commentary: ‘Impudent rabble!’.

In terms of the canonical gospels’ portrait of Jesus of Nazareth, Nietzsche’s Christology is a non-starter, but he was not trying to do the text of the gospels justice. Nietzsche knew that the plausibility of his reading came from its coherence within his larger revaluation project (Nietzsche’s perspective). Dylan Jaggard raises the issue of the relationship between Genealogy and The Antichrist, arguing that scholars have not sufficiently appreciated the importance of The Antichrist in Nietzsche’s critique of moral values: ‘In many ways one can see The Antichrist as an attempt to give historical flesh to the psychological skeleton he first creates in the Genealogy’. However, the relationship between Genealogy and The Antichrist may also be viewed from the opposite perspective: it is the psychological theory of Genealogy that gives Nietzsche’s revisionist history its purchase. At minimum, the works are mutually-supporting, with Genealogy providing ‘Three decisive preliminary studies by a psychologist for a revaluation

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222 AC § 45, p. 169 [KSA 6, p. 221].
223 Nietzsche provides five quotations from Mark, four from Matt., and one from Luke, in that order, corresponding to the long-held consensus of Mark was written first, followed by Matthew, and finally Luke. That Nietzsche followed this chronology may be his subtle suggestion that the historical Jesus was progressively corrupted by the successive Gospels—especially considering the invective with which he treats the quotation from Luke.
224 AC § 45, p. 170 [KSA 6, p. 222].
226 Nietzsche certainly could not have intended the polemical AC to be taken as an exacting work of historical scholarship—a standard by which it would fare rather poorly relative to the impressive works being produced by the German scholars of this period. Nietzsche’s health—especially his failing eyesight—precluded the possibility of competing on this front; his taste precludes his willingness to engage in such learned idling.
of all values’, and a commentary on the Chandala morality of Paulinism—all of which demonstrate how central Nietzsche’s critique of Paulinism is to his basic task within modernity.

6.4.5 The Falsification of the Evangel and the Birth of Paulinism

Nietzsche’s account of the origins of primitive Christianity, began with the death of the Evangel on the Cross, and unfolds as a morbid, tragicomedy: ‘[T]he history of Christianity—and that from the very death on the Cross—is the history of a progressively cruder misunderstanding of an *original* symbolism’. From the time of his early engagements with St Paul in the summer of 1880, Nietzsche remained convinced that Paul was the primary architect of the Christian religion: without Paul, ‘there would be no Christianity’. But Paul’s conversion *en route* to Damascus retains its importance for Nietzsche, and so there remains a paradox in Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul’s role in Christian origins, namely, that Paul is at once *founder* and *convert*. The paradox begins to resolve when we understand how Nietzsche seems to delight in equivocating over the word ‘Christian’. Nietzsche subtly contrasts two kinds of *Christianity*, which are nearly antithetical to each other—an authentic Jesuan form associated with the Evangel, and a bastardized ‘Dysangelic’ form which he traced primarily to Paul. Authentic, Jesuan Christianity came and passed with the Evangel: ‘The word “Christianity” is

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227 *EH* ‘Genealogy of Morals’ p. 313 [*KSA* 6, p. 353].
228 Nietzsche recommends reading the first essay of *GM* as a commentary on *I Cor.* 1.20ff (*AC* § 45, p. 171 [*KSA* 6, p. 223].
229 *AC* § 37, p. 159 [*KSA* 6, p. 209]. Nietzsche’s characterization of Paulinism as a falsification, or rejection of Jesus’ message, finds a worthy opponent in Bultmann, whose position seems designed to confront Nietzsche:

> However, just as little as one may say that Paul’s theology represents a development in the history of ideas of Jesus’ preaching, so little, of course, may one say that, from the standpoint of the history of ideas, it stands in opposition to Jesus’ message—as though the latter’s piety, say, was a joyous faith in God the Father, whereas Paul’s religion is to be characterized as an austere faith in redemption. Looked at in terms of the history of ideas, the proclamation of Jesus and that of Paul are essentially the same. Thus their idea of God is the same: God is the Judge and also the God of grace; and similar also is their view of man, who is obligated to obey the will of God and as a sinner is dependent on God’s grace—who can exhibit no merit before God and also make not claims on him. . . . Paul does not teach other new ideas from those Jesus teaches, but rather teaches us to understand an *event* in a new way (‘Paul’, 124-125).

230 *D* § 68, p. 39 [*KSA* 3, p. 65].

Duff, 302
already a misunderstanding—in reality there has been only one Christian, and he died on the Cross. The “Evangel” died on the Cross’. Paulinism begins where authentic Christianity ends.

Because Nietzsche’s Evangel did not represent a new faith, but another kind of being [Nicht ein Glauben . . . ein andres Sein], Paul’s emphasis on exercising faith in the Christ-event—and so the dogmatic content of the gospel—was a departure from the Evangel’s Sein, and into a world-falsifying spiritual causality. ‘The Christian’s world of ideas contains nothing which so much as touches upon actuality: on the other hand, we have recognized in instinctive hatred for actuality the driving element, the only driving element in the roots of Christianity’. Underlying the shrewd, obscuring screen of faith, a ‘Christian’ is motivated by instincts for what harms. The pathway from type to antitype passes through a brief, but unique period of Christian origins, wherein the crucifixion event precipitates an intra-Jewish class conflict:

It was only the death, this unexpected shameful death, only the Cross, which was in general reserved for the canaille alone—it was only this terrible paradox which brought the disciples face to face with the real enigma: ‘Who was that? What was that?’—The feeling of being shaken and disappointed to their depths, the suspicion that such a death might be the refutation of their cause, the frightful question-mark ‘why has this happened?’ [. . .] Only now did the chasm open up: ‘Who killed him? who was his natural enemy?’—this question came like a flash of lightening. Answer: ruling Judaism, its upper class.

This initial falsification of Jesuan Christianity—of the Evangel, himself—happened wholly apart from the mind or work of St Paul. Indeed, at the birth of this movement, Paul [Saul] was safely ensconced within Jerusalem’s privileged class—receiving an elite education under Gamaliel, and having close ties with the ruling class of Judaism. When traveling to Damascus,

231 AC § 39, p. 161 [KSA 6, p. 211]. Paul’s Evangel—his εὐαγγέλιον—begins with the crucifixion of Christ: ‘Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day . . . ’ (1 Cor. 15.3-4); Nietzsche’s Evangel ends at the Cross.

232 AC § 39, p. 161 [KSA 6, p. 211]. ‘Faith’ [πίστις], appears frequently in sayings attributed to Jesus in the synoptic gospels, and verbal form ‘to believe [πιστεύω]’ is used throughout the synoptic gospels, and is a key term in John. Both terms occur frequently throughout the Pauline corpus, making the language of faith an area of agreement between the Pauline, Petrine, and Johannine missions. Nietzsche sees this as a wide-spread falsification of the Evangel.

233 AC § 39, p. 161 [KSA 6, p. 212].

234 AC § 40, p. 162 [KSA 6, p. 213].

235 Most scholars think Paul converted to Christianity in about AD 34-35, approximately three or four years after the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth.
Paul was serving as an emissary of the high priest, fully supported in his anti-Christian missions. The primitive community of Jesus-followers, like the later Paulinism, was animated by revengefulness, failing to understand that the Evangel demonstrated a life of ‘freedom from, [and] superiority over every kind of ressentiment: —a sign of how little they understood of him at all!’ The primitive Christian community had begun to reinterpret the life of Jesus towards their own ends when he was crucified and ‘thereby made of him a Pharisee and theologian!’

The second step in the falsification of Jesuan Christianity, took the form of the primitive community’s answer to how God could have permitted the death of the Evangel: ‘the little community found a downright terrifyingly absurd answer: God gave his Son for the forgiveness of sins, as a sacrifice’. If, therefore, no less central a doctrine than that of substitutionary atonement antedated Paul’s conversion, in what sense does Paul remain the primary architect of Christianity? In other words, how is Nietzsche’s paradoxical treatment of Paul as founder and convert to be resolved in a meaningful way? Nietzsche’s answer is that he sees Paul as a convert because, in the Damascus event, he suddenly became a member of the community he had been trying to destroy. However, in Nietzsche’s view, Paul was not really joining the primitive community—he was arrogating it to himself, and reforming it around his own needs and his own vision. The developing ideals of the primitive community never approached the strong and subversive phenomenon that Nietzsche regards as his worthy opponent; he sees these first few years as mere Jewish sectarianism—an intra-Jewish conflict arising along class lines. Here the lower strata of Palestine were attempting to free themselves from the tyranny of the priestly class by turning the Evangel’s death into a bypath to atonement, resulting in another sect within Palestinian Judaism. The conversion of Paul was an event of a higher order of importance—even a destiny as Nietzsche employs the term. Here Nietzsche axiologically inverts Paulinism: On the heels of the ‘glad tidings’ came the worst of all: those of Paul. In Paul was embodied the antithetical type to the ‘bringer of glad tidings’, the genius of

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236. AC § 40, p. 163 [KSA 6, p. 213].
237. AC § 40, p. 163 [KSA 6, p. 214]. By, ‘Pharisee and theologian’, Nietzsche was referring to the way the Gospels present Jesus as a skilled dialectician, arguing with the religious leaders, and refuting their traditions—an aspect of the Gospel portrait that Nietzsche attributes to early redaction.
238. AC § 41, p. 164 [KSA 6, p. 215]. Nietzsche’s compressed account corresponds to the history of the primitive church recorded in the first eight chapters of Acts—all prior to Paul’s conversion. Of course, in the case of Acts, it is the ruling class that seems to harbour the ressentiment, trying to consolidate their power by opposing the apostles.
hatred, of the vision of hatred, of the inexorable logic of hatred. *What* did this
dysangelist not sacrifice to his hatred! The redeemer above all: he nailed him to
his Cross. The life, the example, the teaching, the death, the meaning and the
right of the entire Gospel—nothing was left once this hate-obsessed false-coiner
had grasped what alone he could make use of. *Not* the reality, *not* the historical
truth! . . . And once more the priestly instinct of the Jew perpetrated the same
great crime against history—it simply erased the yesterday and the day before
yesterday of Christianity, *it devised for itself a history of primitive Christianity.*
More: it falsified the history of Israel over again so as to make this history seem
the pre-history of *its* act: all the prophets had spoken of *its* ‘redeemer’. . . . The
Church subsequently falsified even the history of mankind into the pre-history of
Christianity.\(^239\)

What Nietzsche sees as the fully-fledged antitype of Jesuan Christianity emerges in earnest with
the conversion of Paul. The developments come most clearly to light when we allow material
from *Daybreak* § 68 to bridge some of the gaps left in *The Antichrist*’s account. During the first
few years after the Evangel’s death, Paul [Saul] the persecutor was the fanatical defender of
orthodox Judaism, *even as* he was seeking a way out from under the Law, and his tormented
conscience. In *Daybreak* the Law was ‘the cross to which he felt himself nailed’\(^240\); here in *The
Antichrist*, Paul nails Jesus to *his own* Cross on account of his hatred. Paulinism claims that
Jesus *gave* his life to save the people from their sins; Nietzsche’s reversal claims that the people
place Jesus on the Cross to save themselves from their own tormented consciences, from their
moral impotence, from their incapacity for nobility. Thus, Nietzsche attributes Paul’s conversion
to an epiphany on the road to Damascus—the realization that the Cross could be an instrument of
freedom and power.\(^241\) As a later convert, Paul did not share the primitive community’s history
of life together with the Evangel, and he could make no use of it. The lower strata had shaped
the Evangel into the ideal leader of their sectarian revolt—the prophet, theologian, and master

\(^{239}\) *AC* § 42, pp. 164-165 [*KSA* 6, pp. 215-216], emphasis original.

\(^{240}\) “‘It is all in vain! The torture of the unfulfilled law cannot be overcome’. . . . The law was
the cross to which he felt himself nailed: how he hated it!’, *D* § 68, p. 40 [*KSA* 3, p. 66]; cf. *Gal.*
1.13ff; *Acts* 22.1ff, 26.1ff.

\(^{241}\) It is on this point that the Girardians contest Nietzsche’s anti-Paulinism most forcefully. On
Girard’s account, Paul’s understanding of the Cross is not only profoundly true, it is ultimately
the only mechanism for breaking the cycle of mimetic violence. Giuseppe Fornari writes, ‘St
Paul was bound to be Nietzsche’s chosen target. . . . The anger felt by Nietzsche and his
imitators is not unmotivated, since it was Paul who gave highly penetrating expression to the
anthropological and historical significance of the Crucifixion, a formidable doctrine that Girard
can help us understand more fully’, *A God Torn to Pieces*, 92.
dialectician of the Gospels. Paul did not need a master dialectician—*he was one*—but in order to establish his messianic interpretation of Jesus as the Christ, he had to ‘erase’ the recent history of Jesus’ life, and the history of the primitive community.²⁴²

Nietzsche sees Paul’s messianic interpretation of the Evangel as a quintessentially *priestly* falsification. Just as the priests of Israel’s late monarchical period had reinterpreted their national history in terms of the false causality of good and evil in order to establish their own power, Paul reinterpreted the story of Christian origins in a way that served his own requirement for power. Further, in order to communicate this message in Jewish synagogues, Paulinism ‘falsified the history of Israel over again so as to make this history seem the pre-history of its act: all the prophets had spoken of its ‘redeemer’ . . .’.²⁴³ The priestly instinct in Paul then falsified the whole of human history as though it were leading up to and culminating in the Christ-event. In my own reconstruction of Paulinism, I argued that one of the most powerful steps that Christianity took was the radicalization and universalization of the anthropological pessimism that Israel had tended to reserve for those existing outside the covenant community.²⁴⁴ Paul made this argument by beginning his soteriology with the prototypical man, Adam, thus refocusing attention on the transcultural and transtemporal *human* problems, and how they were resolved on the Cross. As an opponent of the primitive community, who then converted, Paul could only continue a process of falsification that was already underway,²⁴⁵ but Nietzsche wants to consistently attribute to Paul the authoritative interpretation of the Christ-event—especially what I have called the two symbolic pillars of Paulinism: the crucifixion and the resurrection.²⁴⁶

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²⁴² Erase through silence. It has long been recognized that Paul’s letters focus more on the death and resurrection of Christ, than on Jesus’ life and teachings (though the latter are far from absent).

²⁴³ *AC* § 42, p. 165 [*KSA* 6, p. 216].

²⁴⁴ See section 2.3, above.

²⁴⁵ ‘What Paul later carried to its conclusion with the cynical logic of a rabbi was nonetheless merely the process of decay which commenced with the death of the redeemer’, *AC* § 44, p. 167 [*KSA* 6, p. 218].

²⁴⁶ So, S. Williams: ‘Paul is credited with developing the theology of atonement and immortality to its canonically extreme point of antithesis to the natural and the vital’, *The Shadow of the Antichrist: Nietzsche’s Critique of Christianity* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 131. To the point: ‘Fashioned by Paul: a) death for our sins, b) the meaning of the resurrection’, *KSA* 12:10[180], p. 563. Even though Nietzsche allows that the primitive community held to some form of substitutionary atonement, here Paul gets the credit, perhaps because he gave the doctrine its clearest and most forceful expression.
The Cross itself served as a devastating symbol in Paul’s revaluation of noble values, and the hope of resurrection to eternal life created a new horizon within which to interpret the meaning of life within the νῦν καιρὸς: ‘Paul simply shifted the centre of gravity of that entire existence beyond this existence—in the lie of the ‘resurrected’ Jesus. In fact he could make no use at all of the redeemer’s life—he needed the death on the Cross and something in addition...’.  

The additional element is, the doctrine of resurrection:

[T]he whole and sole reality of the Evangel, is juggled away—for the benefit of a state after death! . . . Paul, with that rabbinical insolence which characterizes him in every respect, rationalized this interpretation, this indecency of an interpretation, thus: ‘If Christ is not resurrected from the dead our faith is in vain’. —All at once the Evangel become the most contemptible of unfulfillable promises, the impudent doctrine of personal immortality. . . . Paul himself even taught it as a reward! . . .

With Paul’s interpretation of these two aspects of the Christ-event, Christianity exploded the categories of Jewish sectarianism, and Nietzsche sees something darkly sinister at work: ‘His requirement was power; with Paul the priest again sought power—he could employ only those concepts, teachings, symbols with which one tyrannizes over masses, forms herds’.

With this assertion, Nietzsche makes explicit what he has so far implied—that St Paul is another incarnation of the (anti)décadent, priestly instinct. This forms a significant bridge between his developed anti-Christianity and his middle-period understanding of Paul. In the middle period, Paul’s experience en route to Damascus was recast as an epiphany wherein he realized that the very Christ he was fighting against, could be wielded against his own sense of powerlessness under the strictures of the Law. During the same period that Nietzsche was reflecting on Paulinism, he continued to develop his thinking about the relationship between the Judeo-Christian tradition and the Roman Empire, seeing that Christianity employed its notion of sin, the symbology of the Cross, and its eschatological vision of final judgement—Welt, Sünde,

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247 AC § 42, p. 165 [KSA 6, p. 216].
248 AC § 41, p. 164 [KSA 6, p. 215].
249 AC § 42, p. 165 [KSA 6, p. 216].
250 Paul, as a member of the tribe of Benjamin, could not legally serve as a priest of Israel within the Mosaic covenant, but the Christ-event inaugurated a new covenant. Thus, Paul refers to his ministry as a priestly service: ‘He gave me the priestly duty of proclaiming the gospel of God, so that the nations might become an offering acceptable to God, sanctified by the Holy Spirit’, Rom. 15.16; cf. 2 Cor. 3.1ff. Other canonical Christian writings (1 Peter 2.9; Revelation 1.6, 5.10) develop the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, which Luther rediscovered.
The Paul we meet in *The Antichrist* is the Paul of *Daybreak* grown darker and more sinister as Nietzsche’s own project of revaluation matures. Here Paul realizes on the road to Damascus that ‘to disvalue “the world” he needed belief in immortality, that the concept of “Hell” will master even Rome—that with the “Beyond” one *kills life*. In *Daybreak* § 68, Paul’s religious consciousness is primarily in view; he is tormented by his incapacity for righteousness; in *The Antichrist*, Paul—possessed of an axiological genius, deep *ressentiment*, and a developed will to power—is actively taking revenge on the noble values of Rome through a universalism of psychological tyranny. We can see the development of Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul in connection with the theses he expounded on in *Beyond and Genealogy*. He is no longer musing about the ironies of Christian history—he is making a frontal attack on Christianity that is less concerned about its *truth*, in the sense of facticity, and more concerned about the destructive implications of ‘Christianity’ *qua* Paulinism. *St Paul*: founder and convert, ascetic priest and religious genius, and finally the apogee of Palestinian Judaism’s slave revolt against Rome:

> [T]hen Paul appeared. . . . Paul, Chandala hatred against Rome, against ‘the world’, become flesh and genius, the Jew, the *eternal Jew par excellence*. . . . What he divined was that with the aid of the little sectarian movement on the edge of Judaism one could ignite a ‘world conflagration’, that with the symbol ‘God on the Cross’ one could sum up everything down-trodden, everything in secret revolt, the entire heritage of anarchist agitation in the Empire into a tremendous power. ‘Salvation is of the Jews’. —Christianity as the formula for outbidding all the subterranean cults, those of Osiris, of the Great Mother, of Mithras for example—and for summing them up: it is in this insight that the genius of Paul consists.

6.4.6 The Genius of St Paul.

With Paul’s conversion, Christianity was reinvented as a universal religion. Nietzsche seeks to account for this development, while maintaining the genealogical relationship between Christianity and Judaism—‘The Christian is only a Jew of a “freer” confession’. In order for

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251 D § 71, pp. 42-43 [KSA 3, p. 69-70].
252 AC § 58, pp. 191-192 [KSA 6, p. 247].
253 AC § 58, p. 191 [KSA 6, pp. 246-247].
254 AC § 44, p. 169 [KSA 6, p. 221]; cf. D § 68, ‘That the ship of Christianity threw overboard a good part of the Jewish ballast, that it went and was able to go among the heathen—that is a consequence of the history of this one man, of a very tormented, very pitiable, very unpleasant man who also found himself unpleasant’.

Duff, 308
Pauline Christianity to spread into cultures which lacked the soil-type of Judaism, it had to adapt itself to the pagan religious landscape of the ancient world. This, too, was the work of Paul. In Book V of The Gay Science, Nietzsche attributes to Paul a kind of psychological genius that made him uniquely suited to this expansion of Christianity: ‘To become a founder of a religion one must be psychologically infallible in one’s knowledge of a certain average type of souls who have not yet recognized that they belong together. It is he that brings them together’. Nietzsche credits Paul with an instinctual understanding of the felt needs of those outside of Judaism [Bedürfnisse der Nicht-Juden], which he met by translating some of the symbols of Jesus’ teaching into concrete, or tangible [Handgreifliche] (non)realities, and borrowing from ‘complete paganism [volle Heidenthum]’, the philosophical doctrine of personal immortality.

6.5 Conclusion.

6.5.1 Décadence and Ressentiment in Jesus and St Paul.

For Nietzsche, part of the tragedy of Christian origins lies in the radical disparity between the Evangel’s instincts and those of Paul. They were both incarnations of Judaism’s unnatural values, but they were radically different incarnations. Nietzsche’s Evangel was a gentle décadent, more Buddhistic than Judaic. He displayed ‘the freedom from, the superiority over every feeling of ressentiment’. His sensitivity required a falsification of world, but it was not a world-falsification that revenged itself against life. Paul was the example par excellence of this latter, darker form of Judaism, who invented ‘another world from which that life-affirmation would appear evil, reprehensible as such’, one who created and employed a décadence movement in order to weaken others. They are both iterations of Judaism’s unnatural values, but they are very different in effect. Jesuan Christianity was ‘a naïve beginning to a Buddhistic

255 GS § 353, pp. 296-297 [KSA 3, pp. 589-590]. Nietzsche refers in this section to, ‘Jesus (or Paul)’, likely because he sees both the Jesuan and Pauline missions to be proselytizing among the same class of ‘small’ people.

256 KSA 13:11[281], pp. 107-108. Plato is not mentioned in the note, though it seems likely that Nietzsche has Plato in mind when he speaks of Paul’s antithesis [Gegensatz] between the earthly and the heavenly-otherworldly, and the notion of death as a bridge.

257 AC § 40, p. 163 [KSA 6, p. 213].

258 AC § 24, p. 145 [KSA 6, pp. 192-193].
peace movement in the very seat of *ressentiment*—but reversed by Paul into a pagan mystery doctrine . . .‘. 259 Were Jesus’ instincts present in his successors, the ‘Jewish assembly’, would have been further destabilized and eventually dissolved. 260 Paul, however, as a separate strain the of priestly instinct, took revenge on life and on the world with his pessimistic view of mankind, his revaluation of noble values, and his vision for the afterlife.

6.5.2 *The Subversive Anthropology of the Christ-Event.*

In the two broad forays into Paulinism contained in this project, I sought to demonstrate St Paul’s consistent pattern of reflection on the Christ-event, followed by his mapping this event onto human experience. For Paul, to see Christ on the Cross was to witness *God crucified in the weakness of human flesh*—‘Gott am Kreuze’, in Nietzsche’s striking paraphrase. The radical nature of the Christ-event resulted in Paul’s sense that both world and human being—κόσμος and ἄνθρωπος—were being reborn. From Nietzsche’s earliest portrait of Paul, until his closing remarks in *Antichrist*, he consistently understood Paul’s ‘word of the Cross’ to be the product of eisegesis rather than exegesis; that is, Nietzsche saw Paul *reading himself into the Christ-event*—just as the subsequent Christian tradition had done with Paul’s writings. Nietzsche intuited the centrality of the Christ-event for the whole structure of Paulinism, in his early reflections on Paul—as his many allusions to co-crucifixion and participation with Christ reveal. But Nietzsche’s hermeneutics of suspicion also led him to trace the broader implications of Paul’s thinking, and it was in these broader implications that Nietzsche saw the emergence of Paulinism as a cultural, religious, and political catastrophe. Paul’s universalism—his boundary-transgressing mission to the Nations; his depreciation of cultural identities and symbolic social capital; his robust theoretical basis for the oneness of the human race; his eschatological vision of resurrection and final judgement—the whole topography of Paul’s symbolic world revealed the genius of his poetic imagination, and Nietzsche came to locate the whole of the Western tradition under his spell.

259 *WP* § 167, p. 100 [*KSA* 13:11[282], p. 108].

260 Once again, we see how Nietzsche strategically leverages the antisemitism of his readers to subvert Christianity: ‘Nietzsche could not resist trumping the Christian anti-Semites by asserting the Jewishness of Christianity, the ingrained subversive and anti-imperial character of Christianity. . .’, Bergmann, *Nietzsche: ‘The Last Antipolitical German’*, 176.
Chapter 7

**Conclusion: The Death of God, and New Horizons in Nietzsche and St Paul**

‘— Hat man mich verstanden? — Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigten…’

— Friedrich Nietzsche, *Eccé Homo*.

‘οὐ γὰρ ἐκρίνα τι εἰδέναι ἐν ὑμῖν εἰ μή Ἰησοῦν Ἰησοῦν καὶ τοῦτον ἐσταυρωμένον.’

— St Paul, *1st Epistle to the Corinthians*

### 7.1 Introduction.

St Paul wrote to the community he founded in Corinth: ‘For I resolved to know nothing while I was with you except Jesus Christ and him crucified’. Nietzsche concluded his autobiography, just days before his collapse: ‘Have I been understood?—Dionysus versus the Crucified.—’ Here Paul and Nietzsche provided their followers with précis of their prophetic philosophies, distilling their messages down to a single formula by pointing to the radical theological motifs that run through their work. When we examine these motifs in context, we find them associated with revaluations of old values, and the dawning of new worlds within which new possibilities for human beings might be realized.

Throughout this study, I have sought to demonstrate that these shared strategies are neither superficial, nor coincidental, but that Nietzsche’s mature philosophical programme came to be critically shaped through a deep and sustained *agōn* with St Paul’s distinctive articulation of the Christian hope. The main burden of this argument has rested on an original study of the resemblance, or shared patterns, in Paul and Nietzsche’s approaches to philosophical anthropology. I began by showing how Paul’s subversive logic of the Cross [λόγος τοῦ
σταυροῦ] undergirded his vision a new creation [καινὴ κτίσις] humanity. To know the Crucified God, was to participate existentially in his death, and to rise a new self or new human [καινὸς ἄνθρωπος], restored in the image of God which had been fractured by Adam’s sin. The Cross, therefore, is proclaimed as a euchatastrophe—a sudden reversal of fortunes, a new dawn for the weary and hopeless Nations of the world. I then proceeded with a diachronic study of Nietzsche’s evolving task, sustained over the course of two chapters, which highlighted the development of his anthropology in concert with his anti-Christianity. For Nietzsche, too, the Death of God was the dawning of a new world—a Morgenröte, in the broadest sense. It signalled a revaluation that brought the hegemony of Christian values to an end, including the stark anthropological pessimism that Nietzsche came to closely associate with St Paul, the denial of self that pervaded moral philosophy, and the doctrine of the equality of human persons that undergirded decadent, democratic cultures. The Death of God meant the resurrection of higher forms of humanity, and the restratification of society. In the quasi-scriptural, apocalyptic landscape of Zarathustra, the Death of God made possible the more radical goal of a trans-humanity—glimpsed in the Zarathustra’s enigmatic proclamation of the Übermensch.

Ultimately, I argued, in the final years of his productive period, Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity was broadly coextensive with his whole cultural and philosophical project—his ‘revaluation of all values’. St Paul—as an incarnation of the priestly instinct; as a religious genius; as an improver of mankind; as the Apostle of revenge; as the founder of Christianity; as the central villain in The Antichrist’s retelling of the origins of Christianity; and, most importantly, as the architect of an unrivalled revaluation of all values in hoc signo the Crucified God. Paulinism begins to appear everywhere as the perfect foil for Nietzsche’s unique vision for who we must become in a post-Death-of-God world.

7.2 Chapter Summaries.

I will turn now to a summary of the constituent parts of this study, which was carried out over the course of six chapters. Taken together, these summaries will clarify the sequential development of my argument, and provide a basis for a discussion of its most significant inferences.
7.2.1 Chapter 1: The Death of God, and Becoming Who You Are.

The burden of the first chapter was to frame the rational of this study, to clarify its horizon, to articulate its central thesis, and to summarize anticipated findings. The rational of the study was rooted in exploring and elucidating the relationship between Paul and Nietzsche as heralds of the beginning and end of Occidental Christianity—Paul, Antichrist-turned-Christian, and Nietzsche, Christian-turned-Antichrist. I outlined my thesis that the Paul-Nietzsche relationship is best studied within the context of their respective approaches to philosophical anthropology in light of the Death of God event. Thus, Paul’s cruciform anthropology provides the pattern and foil for Nietzsche’s post-Death-of-God anthropology.

An implication of this thesis is that the mature Nietzsche cannot be understood apart from his own ‘return to Paul’, beginning with his study of Lüdemann’s, Die Anthropologie des Apostles Paulus, in the summer of 1880. Lüdemann’s careful analysis of Pauline anthropology reintroduced Nietzsche to Paul’s Hauptbriefe, his lexicon of anthropological terms, and the importance of the quasi-dualistic flesh-Spirit dichotomy. This study was an event which corresponded to a period of extraordinarily rapid development in Nietzsche’s understanding of, and interest in, Paulinism, but also his sense of his own task as a philosopher. Nietzsche would come to see Paul’s identity as ‘crucified with Christ’ as ‘selfless’ in a perverse sense; with the succeeding work, Daybreak, Nietzsche would begin his campaign against Christian morality and its aim to ‘un-self man’ [Entselbstungs-Moral]. Daybreak § 68 marked Nietzsche’s first published reflection on Paul and Paulinism, and where he recognized for the first time the world-historical significance of Paul’s vision of the crucified and risen Christ. Fragments of what would become Nietzsche’s most famous image, ‘The Madman’, began to appear in Nietzsche’s journals only a few months later. The importance of this ‘return to Paul’ is that it marks the point, dated with precision, that Nietzsche began to define himself in opposition to Christianity, and to see his own task (later, destiny) with world-historical significance: the overcoming of the Christian theory of human nature.

1 EH ‘Dawn’ § 2, p. 292 [KSA 6, p. 332], emphasis original.
In Chapter 2, I focused on the dual task of surveying the literature dealing explicitly with the Nietzsche-Paul relationship, and contextualizing the Paul-Nietzsche relationship within three relevant spheres of academic inquiry—Pauline studies, recent philosophical appropriations of Paul, and especially within the broader purview of Nietzsche studies. The last of these I accomplished by dividing the history of Nietzsche scholarship into three broad ‘quests’. In the first quest, I demonstrated that the early commentaries of Salomé, Figgis, and Bertram, each make Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity central, even highlighting some interesting parallels between Nietzsche and St Paul, while allowing the relationship to remain an enigma. Figgis’ reading was an insightful juxtaposition of Nietzsche and the Christian gospel, but he remained unable to provide any rationale for Nietzsche’s hostility towards the well-known life-affirming statements in St Paul’s letters.

In the second quest, Nietzsche scholarship came of age with major luminaries like Kaufmann, Jaspers, and Heidegger. Historically, this quest was shaped by its post-Holocaust context, wherein Nietzsche’s legacy had become entangled with German fascism, and his most influential apologists—Kaufmann for Anglophones, and Jaspers for Germanophones—adopted the task of depoliticising Nietzsche by making him the misunderstood humanist and dialectical thinker (Kaufmann), or the inspired forerunner of existentialism (Jaspers). A by-product of this depoliticising effort, however, was the obscuring of Nietzsche’s anti-Christianity. Heidegger’s study of Nietzsche obscured the problem further by drawing Nietzsche primarily into the orbit of the Greek metaphysical tradition (and into the concerns of Heidegger himself), to the neglect of his agōn with Christianity.

The third quest (in which the present study takes part) is the diverse contemporary renaissance of Nietzsche scholarship that is both conscious of the influence of these luminaries, and returning ad fontes for fresh insight. Here the questions surrounding the Nietzsche-Paul relationship are asked once again from new perspectives, and the concurrent renaissance in Pauline studies—including the ‘return to Paul’ in Continental Philosophy—has made the question at once more interesting and more urgent. Here, I briefly examined important studies by Badiou, Taubes, and Žižek, and then turned to studies directly bearing on the Nietzsche-Paul relationship, by Salaquarda, Havemann, Franck, and Azzam. I concluded this chapter by pointing to several lacunae within the current literature on the Paul-Nietzsche relationship,
including the paucity of references to Paul’s own writings, the insufficient attention given to how their thought-worlds were shaped symbolically by Death-of-God events, and the virtually unexplored parallels in their respective approaches to anthropology.

7.2.3 Chapter 3: St Paul and the Anthropology of Event.

In Chapter 3, I began with the canonical account of Paul’s vision on the road to Damascus, agreeing with Segal and others (against Stendahl), that Paul was a convert. Paul’s commissioning for Christian mission entailed a radical conversion, though Paul did not for that reason leave Judaism. Rather, Paul’s reimagined world was the world of Judaism marvellously reshaped by the Christ-event. Paul’s conversion from persecutor to Apostle (Gal. 1.11ff, 1 Cor. 15.9), was the catalyst for his radicalized anthropological pessimism because, in his zeal for Judaism, he had only known Christ, ‘κατὰ σάρκα’ (2 Cor. 5.16), and had violently resisted God’s anointed Messiah. This is a recurring theme in Pauline studies that requires careful attention—the question of the formation of the early Christian identity in Paul’s communities in contradistinction to Jewish contemporaries who did not assent to the messianic claims of Jesus of Nazareth. This has been a vexed issue in post-Holocaust New Testament studies, but I argued that Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul’s mission as a ‘revaluation of all values’ around the Crucified God, can provide an illuminating path forward that does justice to Paul’s radicalism, without collapsing into anti-Semitism.

The multiple facets of the Christ-event—kenosis, incarnation, earthly ministry, crucifixion, and resurrection—constitute the engine of Paul’s revaluation of all values. In Paul’s discourse, the Christ-event is of infinite moment—a singularity that unfolds into new κόσμος. Thus, I argued here that Paul’s genius can be located in his capacity for thinking through the axiological implications of the event; inarguably, Paul perceived the ways in which the Cross subverts competing value matrices with greater clarity than any other known writer from the earliest Christian period. Out of this, arises Paul’s unique discourse, wherein his proclamation of the death of God serves as an elastic motif in the service of his radicalized anthropological pessimism: sin in the flesh is death and hostility towards God (Rom. 7.5, 8.13; Gal. 6.8); the righteous and good commandments of the Law are weaponized by sin because of fleshly

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3 Which is neither emphasized, nor ignored, in Paul’s writings.
weakness. In the euchatastrophe of the Christ-event, however, these resolve into Paul’s optimistic portrayals of the freedom of life in the spirit (Gal. 5.16-18; 1 Cor. Rom. 8.1ff, 12:1ff), and his belief in the power of an ethic of ἀγάπη love (1 Cor. 13.1ff; Rom. 8.35ff, 13.8ff; Gal. 5.6, 14; 1 Thess. 4.9).

As a preliminary statement, I argued that Paul’s genius is—to put it anachronistically—Nietzschean. He demonstrated the ability perceive the implications of values, satirize the arguments of his interlocutors, and deftly shift perspectives to powerful effect—just as Nietzsche did. Ultimately, what invites hostility against the Pauline mission is the fundamental incommensurability of Paul’s logic of the Cross with the values of his contemporaries.

7.2.4 Chapter 4: Nietzsche’s ‘Return to Paul’.

Chapter 4 began a diachronic survey of Nietzsche’s anthropology and anti-Christianity throughout his early, middle, and late periods, which carried through Chapter 5. Beginning with The Birth of Tragedy, and proceeding through The Untimely Meditations, I highlighted Nietzsche’s early quest for healthful, and authentic human becoming, and his marked ambivalence towards Christianity (§ 4.2). I showed that in Birth, Nietzsche was already situating contrasting types of human existence [Daseinsformen] within their symbolic worlds [Welt der Symbole]. We see this especially in the juxtaposition of the tragic (Dionysian-Apollonian) and the theoretical (Socratic-Scientific) types. Importantly, however, we search in vain for any evidence that Christianity was a serious concern for the author of Birth. I argued therefore, that we witness some continuity between Nietzsche’s nascent anthropological concerns, and his late-period writings, but a discontinuity with respect to his critique of Christianity. Here I questioned the veracity of Nietzsche’s claim in Eccé Homo that Birth evinced a ‘hostile silence’ towards Christianity. These basic concerns, outlined in Birth, are sustained throughout the Untimely Meditations, and others are raised: Strauss served as a bridge between the ‘theoretical man’ of Birth, and the ‘last man’ of Zarathustra; his study of history highlighted the fundamental plasticity of human being, and the necessity of a temporal horizon; his essay on Schopenhauer

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4 This is made explicit in 1 Cor. 15.56, and is the central argument of Rom. 7.7-25.
5 That is not to say, conclusions.
6 EH ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ § 1, p. 271 [KSA 6, p. 310].
crystalized the challenge to pursue a higher self, and the importance of values in shaping identity; and his essay on Wagner articulated the significance of event qua event.

I then turned to a study of Human. It is universally acknowledged that Nietzsche’s transition from Wagner in Bayreuth to Human is so jarring it cries out for an explanation. I suggested there that Nietzsche’s experience at Bayreuth, which was the focus of his retrospective on Human in Eccé Homo, could be likened to Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus. Nietzsche describes Human as a ‘monument to a crisis’, which I read as an event that catalysed a rethinking of his whole symbolic world, just as Paul had done following his vision. I then traced the impact of Nietzsche’s return to Paul through Daybreak, and Gay Science, and then concluded with a careful exegesis of Nietzsche’s explicit comments on St Paul, contextualizing those comments in both the Pauline studies of Nietzsche’s contemporaries, and within the symbols that emerge at the end of the middle period—the Death of God, and the Eternal Recurrence.

7.2.5 Chapter 5: The Anastasis Self.

In Chapter 5, I returned to my study of Paul, beginning with an examination of the transvaluing logic of the Cross in Paul’s two extant letters to Corinth. In 1 Corinthians, the Cross of Christ serves as an index for human failures. Neither the Greek mind or the Judaic religious consciousness could countenance the crucified God. Thus Paul invites his interlocutors to assume an inverse perspective where human wisdom and power become folly and weakness, and the (apparent) folly and weakness of the Cross are transformed into divine wisdom and power. In 2 Corinthians, Paul explores the paradoxical way in which this divine power supervenes upon human weakness. In both letters, the Cross is a symbol of revaluation, and the inauguration of a new economy of power, which is reflected in Paul’s cruciform ethical vision.

I then examined some key words from Paul’s lexicon of anthropological terms: ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, ἔξω ἄνθρωπος, καρδία, νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα. While many studies of Pauline anthropology labour to systematize Paul’s understanding of the human person, I emphasized the evental and axiological aspects of Paul’s thinking. From this perspective, Paul’s anthropological terms give the Christ-follower a vital language for mapping the Christ-event onto lived, human experience.

I concluded this chapter with a reading of the Incident in Antioch, and its function within the argument of Galatians. This study served as a test-case for the evental, and transvaluative
approach to Pauline anthropology, which I have explored and defended throughout this study. This cruciform self was radically incommensurable with the competing symbolic worlds of Paul’s contemporaries; in Paul’s words: ‘May I never boast except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world’ (Gal. 6.14).

7.2.6 Chapter 6: Contextualizing Nietzsche’s Mature Anti-Christianity.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I examined evidence for Nietzsche’s agōn with Paulinism during his final productive years. Here the various themes explicated throughout Chapters 3 and 4 converged in the mature anti-Christianity witnessed from Zarathustra to Eccē Homo. I read Zarathustra as an implicit critique of Paulinism through the creation of an antipodal symbolic world. Zarathustra’s themes, its apocalyptic landscape, quasi-Scriptural language, and its symbology, are used to playfully (and subversively) satirize the world of Paulinism. This is especially evident in its two symbolic pillars: The Death of God, which sets Zarathustra on his quest for higher men and the Übermensch, and the Eternal Recurrence, which provides a new eschatological horizon—antipodal to the Pauline-Christian doctrine of the bodily Resurrection, and calling for a radically different existential posture.⁷

I then surveyed the important ‘no-saying’ works that followed Zarathustra: Beyond, and Genealogy. In these works, Nietzsche’s central argument against Paulinism becomes clear: the Cross, as the central symbolic pillar of Paul’s Christianity, undergirded axiological commitments, and a subversive anthropology, that posed an existential threat to higher forms of human being. St Paul, St Augustine, and Luther—key architects of this noxious species of Western Christianity—were deep men, characterized by anthropological pessimism, belief in the necessity of grace, and radical interiority; on the other hand, they not higher men, and their cruciform values and doctrines conspired with evolutionary forces in a way that was actively antagonistic to higher men. Nietzsche envisioned, therefore, a new kind of philosophers who were creators and legislators of healthful, natural values: ‘With a creative hand they reach for the future...’ ⁸

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⁷ This in addition to the fact that even Zarathustra, himself, is a kind of parody of Jesus of Nazareth. See, Kathleen Higgens, ‘Reading Zarathustra’, in Reading Nietzsche, 132-151 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); see pp. 135-136.
⁸ BGE § 211, p. 136 [KSA 5, p. 145].
I then examined Nietzsche’s conception of himself as just such a philosopher, which was especially evident in his plans for a *Hauptwerk* on the ‘revaluation of all values’. *The Antichrist*, planned as the first of four volumes, and the only part of this project that Nietzsche authorized for publication before his collapse. Nietzsche invested this short work with extraordinary significance, calling it, ‘the Gospel of the future’ [Zukunfts-Evangelium], with hopes of a first printing in every major European language numbering in the millions. *The Antichrist* was a declaration of war on Pauline Christianity, which, he argues, had been at war with higher forms of human being. Nietzsche carefully, if irreverently, absolves Jesus (the Evangel) of any guilt as a founder of Christianity, and lays out his mature arguments against St Paul’s mendacious arrogation of the death of the crucifixion event. The Cross, once again, is Outed as the subversive symbol of the Chandala classes in their war against noble values.

Throughout the three distinctive periods of Nietzsche’s career, we see a persistent interest in philosophical anthropology running parallel to his evolving anti-Christianity. We can chart a progression from the ambivalence evident in his earliest writings, to the open hostility of *The Antichrist*, and *Eccé Homo*, and, along with this progression, the creation and evolution of a post-Christian, and anti-Christian, anthropological vision, with Pauline anthropology serving as the perfect foil.

### 7.3 The Distinctive Shape of Pauline and Nietzschean Anthropology.

Throughout this study, I have approached Nietzsche and St Paul with a focus on their respective philosophical anthropologies. This approach was beset with challenges from the outset, because neither theorist set out to provide formal explications of human nature, and neither formalizes a vocabulary. However, their tasks required original insights into what it

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9 This is far from suggesting they lack an adequate lexicon for communicating their approaches. Much attention has been given to Paul’s broad vocabulary of anthropological terms—soma, nous, flesh, spirit, inner human, outer human, old human, new human, first human, last human, new creation, and so-forth—which is nearly coextensive with the material of Biblical anthropology as a whole. Nietzsche develops a similar vocabulary—human, all too human, super human, subhuman, higher human, deeper human, last human, soil, spirit, flesh, mind,
means to be human, and I organized my approach around terms common in Pauline studies—*plight* and *solution*. Paul’s universal mission, through which the Gospel first took root in Europe, began with his articulation of a universal *plight*—seeing human being as *universally* problematic in its oppressed condition under the hegemony of the flesh, sin, and death. Paul traced this condition genealogically back through the story of Israel, to Adam—the prototypical *old human* through whom sin and death entered the human family. Paul’s radicalized anthropological pessimism led him to jettison any hope in the salvific power of the orthodox Palestinian Judaism he had zealously studied and defended prior to his conversion *en route* to Damascus. For the post-Damascus Paul, it was only in the Christ-event that one could glimpse the key to salvation: the problematic self was to be crucified and raised with Christ—the prototype of the *new human*—and so become a free spiritual child of God.

Nietzsche declared himself ‘a bringer of glad tidings like no one before . . .’, and came to conceive of his task as ‘a moment of the highest self-examination for humanity, a *great noon* when it looks back and far forward, when it emerges from the dominion of accidents and priests . . .’. This task required fresh insights into the human condition, and in a surprising turn, Nietzsche articulated the *plight* in the terms of Paul’s *solution*, which he saw as actively antagonistic to healthful and authentic human being. The *solution* began with Modernity’s greatest event—the Death of God—the decisive end of Pauline Christianity’s metaphysically-enchanted world. In light of this event, Nietzsche assumed the critical task of creating new

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10 *EH* ‘Why I am a Destiny’ § 1, p. 327 [*KSA* 6, p. 366]. This language may invite Giles Fraser’s provocative thesis that, ‘Nietzsche is obsessed with the question of salvation’, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 2. There is much to commend Fraser’s study, but I take ‘salvation’ and ‘soteriology’ to be too metaphysically-freighted to capture the character of Nietzsche’s task of ‘translating man back into nature’. It is more helpful to speak of Nietzsche’s *therapeutic* aims, as Arthur C. Danto does in, ‘Some Remarks on *The Genealogy of Morals*’, in *Reading Nietzsche*, 13-28, eds. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (New York: Oxford University Press: 1988): ‘I want to claim that the *Genealogy* is . . . a medical book: etiological, diagnostic, therapeutic, prognostic. I want to underscore *therapeutic* here, for the book is not so much for other practitioners of the caring art . . . so much as it is for those who suffer from the diseases it addresses’, 19 (emphasis original).

11 *EH* ‘Dawn’ § 2, p. 291 [*KSA* 6, p. 330], emphasis original.

12 Nietzsche leaves us with a fine line here. On the one hand, Nietzsche speaks contemptuously of the ways in which Christianity, and those under the spell of Christianity, falsify the world. On
values, that could provide fresh new possibilities for ascending human being. The no-saying aspect of this task was critically revaluing the values of Christianity. Thus, for Paul and Nietzsche, human being is at the centre of their respective tasks. As Bultmann famously said of Paulinism, ‘every assertion about Christ is also an assertion about man and vice versa. . . .’ Thus, Paul’s theology can best be treated as his doctrine of man. . .’. Likewise, Schacht wrote of Nietzsche, ‘On the map of Nietzsche’s philosophical interests and concerns, the domain of inquiry which lies at its centre is what might be called philosophical anthropology . . .’. We can see, therefore, that Nietzsche and St Paul approach the root questions of their philosophical anthropologies in transparently-similar ways, which I will summarize here under three key rubrics: the axiological, the evental, and the subversive.

7.3.1 The Axiological Aspect.

Both anthropologies approach the self on the most fundamental existential stratum—that of values. We have seen this in how they contrast the relative value of different ‘types’ of human selves, in their views on the good or worthy life, and in their careful articulations of what may be broadly construed as plight and solution. As Nietzsche recognized, St Paul’s anthropology emphasized the moral (and, therefore, an irreducibly-metaphysical) dimension of selfhood—as did Judaism before him, and the whole Christian tradition after him. Paul’s εὐαγγέλιον—his ‘good news’—was predicated upon his thoroughgoing anthropological pessimism: both Israel and the Nations trace their genealogies to the prototypical human being, Adam. Due to this universal paternity, to be a human self is to be ‘in Adam’—to be located under the hegemony of the flesh, Sin, and Death. The Christ-event discloses a new type of human: one participates existentially in the crucifixion of Christ, crucifying the flesh, dying to the world, and then reflecting God’s glory by bearing suffering joyfully, and by living freely and

the other hand, Nietzsche is happy to call himself ‘spiritual’, and he is clearly not content with an existentially disenchanted world. We go too far when we treat Nietzsche like a positivist, though I confess that I find Benson’s claim that Nietzsche, ‘remains a kind of theist throughout his life’, bordering on scandalous (see, Pious Nietzsche, 6-7).

14 Schacht, Nietzsche, 267.
15 Paul even makes the picture more vivid by personifying Sin and Death, making them co-conspirators, working to exploit the vulnerabilities of human selves. Rom. 7 and 1 Cor. 15 provide striking examples of this kind of personification.
virtuously in the Spirit. In Paul’s estimation, the old human and the new human are as disparate as flesh and spirit, as light and darkness, as virtue and vice, as death and life.\(^\text{16}\) Given this radical revaluation, the boundary markers of ethnic identities, socio-economic status, and gender differences now have no bearing on the value accorded to an individual who is in Christ: ‘There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Gal. 3.28). The ground is level at the foot of the Cross. Indeed, ‘God chose the lowly things of this world and the despised things—and the things that are not—to nullify the things that are, so that no one may boast before him’ (1 Cor. 1.28-29).

Nietzsche conceived of his own confrontation with Pauline Christianity as a confrontation with, and inversion of, the system of values associated with the Christ-event. As Nietzsche wrote of the priestly Christian: ‘[A]ll his values, all his aims are harmful, but whomever he hates, has value. . . . The Christian, the priestly Christian especially, is a criterion of values’.\(^\text{17}\) Nietzsche partly conceived of his task—as a theorist studying human nature—as translating man back into nature, and creating natural values that would point the way to ‘second innocence’ that would be available in light of the Death of God.\(^\text{18}\) Nietzsche’s frequent recourse to axiological dichotomies—higher vs. lower, healthy vs. sick, strong vs. weak, noble vs. slave, good vs. bad, ascending vs. décadent—reveal his consistency in situating the self within an extra-moral (and, therefore, non-metaphysical) value matrix. The creational paradigm, in which Paul traces all humanity to a single human progenitor, is superseded by a broadly-evolutionary paradigm. The antithetical drives, flesh and Spirit, so basic to Paul’s anthropology are superseded by a myriad of natural drives in competition. Interestingly, however, Nietzsche’s ‘gospel of the future’ is no less founded upon anthropological pessimism than is Paul’s. Nietzsche everywhere sees the human, all-too-human. Nietzsche (and his Zarathustra), struggle to combat the temptation towards misanthropy.\(^\text{19}\) Looking towards the future, and envisioning

\(^\text{16}\) A point Paul makes in his ‘holiness code’, 2 Cor. 6.14-18.
\(^\text{17}\) AC § 46, p. 172 [KSA 6, pp. 224-225], emphasis original.
\(^\text{18}\) ‘Atheism and a kind of second innocence belong together’, GM—II § 20, p. 91 [KSA 5, p. 330], emphasis original.
\(^\text{19}\) See, e.g., Z—III ‘The Convalescent’, where Zarathustra is nauseated by thought of the smallest man recurring eternally. See also, AC § 38, ‘There are days when I am haunted by a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy—contempt of man.’
the possibility of healthy, higher types of humanity, or trans-humanity, is Nietzsche’s most important means of tolerating his *decadent* contemporaries.

7.3.2 *The Evental Aspect.*

Secondly, both Nietzsche and Paul situate the self within a symbolic world that has been shaped by a Death-of-God event. Before his vision on the road to Damascus, Paul’s world had been determined by the symbolic pillars of Second-Temple Judaism: the land, the people, the Mosaic covenant sealed by circumcision, the temple, and the Torah. When Paul’s messianic hopes were realized in Christ, these Judaic symbols were revalued in the light of the Christ-event, and a new world took shape around the creation and fall of Adam, the Abrahamic covenant, and most importantly, the incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and kingdom of Jesus Christ. *1 Cor.* 2.2 states explicitly what Paul’s letters confirm—that his preaching was often focused on the crucifixion of Christ. For Paul, the Christ-event was a radical disruption in the course of human being that never lost its potency, and his chief pastoral concern was that his spiritual children live authentically in light of the event. Existential participation with Christ’s death on the Cross—that symbol *par excellence* of the world’s contempt—was the point of entry into the new creation selfhood which did not recognize the values of the world (*Gal.* 6.14-15). The individual self who is co-crucified with Christ is reconstituted as a new creation, free from the tyranny of the flesh and free to walk by the spirit.

Throughout Paul’s epistles, we see his exploitation of other key facets of the Christ-event, understanding the Christ’s *kenotic* servanthood as ‘power in weakness’—now the controlling paradigm for how God’s power is channelled. Essential, too, is the new existential-eschatological horizon formed by the resurrection of Christ, in light of which one overcomes the fear of death—‘Where, O death, is your sting? (*1 Cor.* 15.55)—even as it infuses life in the now-time [νῦν καιρὸς] with eternal significance: ‘For our light and momentary troubles are achieving for us an eternal glory that far outweighs them all’ (*2 Cor.* 4.17). At the heart of this reimagined world is the good news [*εὐαγγέλιον*] of the new humanity revealed in Jesus Christ, who is, ‘the last Adam’ (*1 Cor.* 15.45; cf. *Rom.* 5.14). Once bearing the image of their mortal progenitor Adam, now Paul anticipates re-creation of his converts into the image and likeness of the eternal

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20 See, especially, *Phil.* 2.5ff; cf. *2 Cor.* 12.9-10, 13.4.
Son of God: ‘just as we have borne the image of the earthly man, so shall we bear the image of the heavenly man’ (1 Cor. 15.49). In every case, the Christ-event is the radix from which a more complex symbolic world emerges as the context within which human being must be understood.

Nietzsche’s visionary anthropology has a conspicuously-similar evental aspect. The death of God is foundational to Zarathustra, and the few explicit applications of the motif in Gay Science indicate that the event reshapes the ‘world that concerns man’. The death of God is symbolized by the figure of ‘Dionysus cut to pieces’, and assumed in Nietzsche’s discussions of atheism. Beyond this, Nietzsche staged a confrontation with Paul, offering a competing analysis of the axiological significance of the Cross of Christ—not as an ironic symbol of God’s wisdom and power, but as a symbol of ressentiment, pity, décadence, and revenge. From the late-middle, through the mature period, Nietzsche was going about the task of eliminating the shadows of God, to create space for a new theory of human being. Indeed, in both cases, the very legacies of Nietzsche and Paul are inseparable from the radical theological, or (a)theological, motifs that run through their work. And, for this study, it is important to see how the death of God motif, as radical theology in Paul, and radical (a)theology in Nietzsche, is a signpost pointing towards a more authentic selfhood—a new way of being human.

7.3.3 The Subversive Aspect.

As a consequence of the two foregoing aspects, the Pauline and the Nietzschean anthropological visions are inherently subversive. Paul subverts the potential efficacy of the Mosaic law through his interpretation of the genealogical Adam, and, with his training in the Mosaic law, he understood that his proclamation of the new identity revealed in Israel’s Messiah would relativize the stabilizing features of the pre-Christian, Jewish identity. By depreciating circumcision, by shrugging off Sabbath observance and feast days, and by denying the necessity

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21 Cf. Nietzsche’s summary in D § 68, ‘Yet a brief time within this decay!—that is the Christian’s lot, before, become one with Christ, he arises with Christ, participates with Christ in divine glory and becomes “a son of God”, like Christ.—With that the intoxication of Paul is at its height . . .’.
22 GS § 301, p. 242 [KSA 3, p. 540].
23 WP § 1,052, pp. 542-543 [KSA 13:14[89], pp. 265-267].
24 Contra I Cor. 1.17-2.5.
25 E.g., BGE § 46; GM—I § 8; AC § 37, 51, 58.
of kosher laws wholesale, Paul revealed how willing he was to confront the very ethnic chauvinism that had characterized his pre-Christian experience. The famous incident at Antioch demonstrated Paul’s impatience with those who allowed Jewish particularism to be smuggled into multi-ethnic Christian communities. Paul is less patient still with any residues of Paganism among Christians. Unbelievers would have been warned of God’s wrath against idolatry and immorality, and called to abandon their ties to anything that stood in opposition to Christ; believers were expected to exhibit grateful but sober allegiance to Jesus the Messiah.

Once again, Nietzsche’s corpus provides illuminating parallels. He destabilizes the Christian identity by relating it genealogically to the problematic identity of diaspora Judaism. Throughout The Antichrist, Nietzsche repeatedly leverages the anti-Semitism of his readership to his own advantage, entangling Pauline Christianity with Judaism: ‘The Christian is only a Jew’ (§ 17); Christianity is the logical consequence of Judaism (§ 24); one must be alert when reading the Bible, for, ‘One is among Jews’ (§ 44); the early Christians are likened to Polish Jews: ‘Neither of them smell very pleasant’ (§ 46); Pilate is singled out as the one figure in the New Testament who commands respect: ‘To take a Jewish affair seriously—he cannot persuade himself to do that. One Jew more or less—what does it matter?’ (§ 46); Paul is the ‘eternal Jew par excellence’ (§ 58).

Though a thorough treatment of Nietzsche’s relationship to anti-Semitism lies beyond the scope of this project, a close study of his understanding of Paul, and of Pauline Christianity’s roots in the soil of diaspora Judaism, suggests that Nietzsche’s contempt for anti-Semitism was largely directed towards the crass anti-Semitism of his Christian contemporaries. Nietzsche’s overall innocence of any charges of anti-Semitism has been the orthodox position in Anglophone scholarship since the publication of Kaufmann’s, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. W. Santaniello’s 1994 publication, Nietzsche, God, and the Jews, remains a forceful defence of Nietzsche as an anti-anti-Semite. Santaniello develops a portrait of a Nietzsche who is so favourably-disposed to his Jewish contemporaries, she ultimately has difficulty accounting for it: ‘The question as to why Nietzsche strongly aligned himself with the Jewish people is almost impossible to discern . . .’ (143), and she argues that the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche’s work was not based upon misunderstanding, but upon a sense of Nietzsche’s betrayal of Aryan values. The Nazi myth, Santaniello suggests, was a calculated act of revenge (145ff).

Recently, Robert C. Holub has delivered an impressive rejoinder in, Nietzsche’s Jewish Problem: Between Anti-Semitism and Anti-Judaism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). Holub takes studies at the intersection of Nietzsche and Judaism to task for viewing the problem (anachronistically) through ‘the distorting lens of the Holocaust’ (xi), presenting ‘one-sided apologies for him’ (xi), and for unwarranted excesses in making Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche a scapegoat (xv; cf. 17, where Holub deals briefly with Santaniello’s treatment of Elisabeth). Holub’s thesis was that Nietzsche rejected the anti-Semitism of his time, while maintaining a complex and often-negative view of the Jewish people, and especially Jewish values: ‘[Nietzsche] was more anti-Jewish in his early adulthood than has commonly been
of a “freer” confession”. The Christianity of Paul, is ‘the instinct of ressentiment . . . become
genius . . . ’—one more illustration of the Judaic priestly instinct turning the tables in its favour,
inventing a world, and creating values that weaken and sicken its more noble opponents. As
Paul uses the Law against itself, so Nietzsche attributes the demise of Christianity to its own
valuing of truth. As the Law died with Christ, so the ‘glad tidings’ died with God. We also see
Nietzsche’s subversive intent in Zarathustra’s contempt for the pathetic ‘last man’, who appeals
to the doctrine of equality before God. The Nietzsche self-disclosed in *Eccé Homo* recognized—
indeed, he was happy to recognize—his world-historical importance in his exegesis and
subversion of the value matrix articulated in St Paul’s cruciform revaluation of all values:

*Revaluation of all values:* that is my formula for an act of supreme self-
examination on the part of humanity, become flesh and genius in me. It is my fate
that I have to be the first *decent* human being; that I know myself to stand in
opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia.—

7.3.4 Towards a Broadly-Integrated Anthropology.

These three aspects, taken together, reveal both the distinctiveness, and the antipodal
correspondence of Paul and Nietzsche’s approaches to philosophical anthropology. The point of

understood, and . . . he never completely relinquished anti-Jewish attitudes even when he
opposed anti-Semitism’ (209).

My own view is that the cogency of these very different theses reveals just how complex
Nietzsche’s relationship to Judaism was. *GM* and *AC* show that Nietzsche had developed his
own reasons for suspicion of the Jews, but they were reasons that, by their very nature, could not
have been shared by adherents to Christianity. The uncivil statements about Jews in *AC*,
however, make sense within Nietzsche’s strategic attempt to subvert Christianity. Again, he
leverages the cruder forms of anti-Jewish sentiments to his own advantage. It seems reasonable,
however, to hold that Nietzsche rejected the anti-Semitism of 19th-Century Europe as petty and
resentful, while developing a view of the Jewish people that was frequently critical. As I
suggested above, Nietzsche seemed to have had no qualms with using anti-Semitic attitudes to
his own advantage—especially in *AC*, where Nietzsche’s negative uses of the word ‘Jew’ and its
cognates preponderate. If Nietzsche was determined not to be misunderstood as an anti-Semite,
he would not have praised Pilate as the, ‘one solitary figure one is obliged to respect’ from the
*NT*—to whom Nietzsche attributes the ‘noble’ attitude, ‘One Jew more or less—what does it
matter?’, *AC* § 46.

27 *AC* § 44, p. 169 [*KSA* 6, p. 221], emphasis original.
28 *AC* § 24, pp. 144-145 [*KSA* 6, p. 192], emphasis original.
29 *EH* ‘Why I Am A Destiny’ § 1, p. 326 [*KSA* 6, pp. 365-366], emphasis original.
departure for this study was the intuition, shared with many other scholars, that there exists a kind of kinship between Nietzsche and Paul. I have joined other commentators in seeking to discover the precise nature of this relationship. Uniquely among the studies of the Nietzsche-Paul relationship, however, I have focused specifically on their respective explorations of human nature. Beginning with a focus on anthropology was natural in light of Nietzsche’s reading of Lüdemann’s, *Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus* seemed to catalyse the sudden development in Nietzsche’s interest in Christianity, and the subsequent emergence of some of his most important ideas. No prior study has seriously explored the possibility that Pauline anthropology might have been the catalyst and foil for Nietzsche’s visionary anthropological doctrines.

A second question that guided this research followed from the first: *how might Pauline anthropology illuminate Nietzsche’s mature philosophical programme?* Similarly, *what light does Nietzsche shed on the Pauline corpus?* Pursuing this line of enquiry, I found significant inter-textual resonance between St Paul’s proclamation of the logic of the Cross, in which the old self/human \( \text{ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος} \) participates existentially with Christ’s crucifixion, and the new self/human \( \text{τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον} \) lives in anticipation of the resurrection, with Nietzsche’s death of God as the end of the hegemony of Christian values, and with those values the contemptible, blinking last man [der letzte Mensch], and the resurrection [auferstanden] of the higher men [der höhere Mensch]. Previous studies have, rather remarkably, stopped short of exploring some of the most suggestive points of opposition between Nietzsche and Paul’s legacy-making symbols and ideas. Few studies have done more than gesture towards the possible comparisons between their respective uses of the death of God motif, or the relationship between resurrection and recurrence as eschatological-existential horizons, and so have failed to convincingly contextualize Nietzsche’s anti-Paulinism within his larger philosophical project.

One advantage of this approach, therefore, is that it contextualizes Nietzsche’s anti-Christian (a)moral philosophy—arguably his most important contribution to the canons of Western Philosophy—within the larger scope of his anthropology. By reducing his *agôn* with Christianity to the purview of Christian morality, we are left without an explanation for Nietzsche’s sustained engagement with the principle figures, texts, and events that give rise to

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30 Salaquarda, Azzam, Figgis, Bertram, Jaspers, Hayman, Žižek, Taubes, Badiou, Salomé, Havemann, Franck, Girard, and Bernoulli—by no means an exhaustive list.
Christianity as a subversive cultural force.\textsuperscript{31} For Nietzsche, Christian values contribute to the larger anthropological problem: Christianity is responsible for ‘un-selfing man’, for diminishing the health and vitality of human beings, making the cultural problems Nietzsche focused on early in his career more interesting and more intractable. For Nietzsche, “‘Selflessness’ has no value either in heaven or on earth”.\textsuperscript{32} In ‘Christian Europe . . . what is characteristic of moral actions is selflessness, self-sacrifice, or sympathy and pity’, but, “[N]obody up to now has examined the value of that most famous of all medicines which is called morality. . .”.\textsuperscript{33} In other words, there is another axiological perspective from which the value of morality as such may be valued. Nietzsche’s contemporaries were not the stuff of a strong culture. ‘Even if morality has grown out of an error, the realization of this fact would not as much as touch the problem of its value’.\textsuperscript{34} The psycho-historical examination of Paul as an incarnation of the priestly instinct, and as an apostle of revenge, provides a critical step in his moral argument.

7.4 Original Contributions.

Having laid out the rational for this study, and having summarised the development of its central thesis, we are now positioned to examine a few of its most significant contributions. I will develop a few of these findings, beginning with a closer examination of the nature of Paul and Nietzsche as subversive thinkers.

\textsuperscript{31} Pace, Brian Leiter, who writes in his peerless commentary on GM: ‘[Nietzsche] is not really interested at all in the origin of the religious cosmology, institutions, and rituals distinctive of Christianity; indeed, he is not even interested in Christianity, per se . . .’, Nietzsche on Morality, 195. This seems unnecessarily reductive, and difficult to square with AC, where Nietzsche is not only at pains to describe the origins and significance of the ‘cosmology, institutions, and rituals distinctive of Christianity’, but there he even characterizes the Gospels as ‘a pleasure of the first rank to a psychologist . . . as artistry in psychological depravity’, AC § 44, p. 167 [KSA 6, pp. 218-219].

\textsuperscript{32} GS § 345, p. 283 [KSA 3, p. 577].

\textsuperscript{33} GS § 345, pp. 284-285 [KSA 3, pp. 578-579].

\textsuperscript{34} GS § 345, p. 285 [KSA 3, p. 579].
7.4.1 *St Paul’s Subversive Aspect Revisited.*

St Paul has been recognized as a subversive thinker from our earliest sources onward. In *Acts*, Paul’s pagan detractors accused him of discrediting idol worship (19.23ff), and his Jewish detractors accused him of teaching against the Jewish people, the Law, and the temple (21.20ff).³⁵ Paul, himself, seemed to welcome the reputation when he wrote, ‘The weapons we fight with are not the weapons of the world. On the contrary, they have divine power to demolish strongholds. We demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the knowledge of God, and we take captive every thought to make it obedient to Christ’ (2 Cor. 10.4-5).

Commentators in the Lutheran tradition have understood Paulinism as a subversive critique of the ‘bad religion’ of works-righteousness—a critique often levelled against strains of 2nd-Temple Judaism, neo-Pelagianism, and decadent Catholicism—which, from this perspective, try to bootstrap their own justification [δικαιοσύνη], rather than receive it as a gift [χάρις], in Christ. This has been the dominant thesis in the history of Occidental Pauline scholarship, undergirding the epoch-defining treatments of Paul by Augustine, Luther, Bultmann, Käsemann, and important recent work by John Barclay.³⁶ This approach has tended to prioritize the experience of salvation at the level of the individual, developing a strong sense of the introspective conscience, radical reflexivity, and the existential dimensions of religious experience. The *subversive aspect*, in this case, focuses on the power of the Gospel to overcome the multifaceted plight of the individual human being, characterized by self-alienation, burdened conscience, concupiscence, incapacity for self-knowledge, and a whole panoply of vices—all of which find abundant support in Paul’s letters. This has been the traditional perspective’s strength and weakness: it has so easily accommodated various strands of modern Western individualism that it is ever at risk of reading Paul anachronistically. A key challenge to this view, coming to light with the work of E. P. Sanders, is the accusation that the Augustinian-Lutheran tradition has often traded on a jaundiced view of Palestinian Judaism, and, in a post-

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³⁵ In the case of the pagans, the issue is framed as a concern about the economy that related to the worship of Artemis; in the case of the Israelites, the issue had to do with their unique identity, and the symbols of that identity.

³⁶ Barclay’s *Paul and the Gift* is distinguished from the other commentators on this list by his temporal location. Writing post-Sanders, and indeed *critiquing* Sanders, he is immune to the kinds of criticism frequently levelled at the traditional Lutheran perspective.
Sanders world, New Testament scholars are rightly seeking to better understand Judaism on its own terms.

A second stream of interpretation, found in New Perspective advocates such as Wright, and Dunn, and among leaders of the ‘return to Paul’ such as Taubes, Agamben, and Žižek, has a more sociological, or theopolitical orientation. These interpreters find Paul’s subversive aspect in possible anti-imperial subtexts, and draw resources from Paul’s universalism for overcoming social fragmentation, or the inherent social stratification of imperialism. This is a broad and elastic thesis, able to bridge the chasm between the traditional orthodoxy of Wright and Dunn on the one hand, and the political radicalism of Žižek on the other. What all these perspectives share in common, however, is the view that realities of the Roman Imperium, and the Caesar Cult are reflected through Paul’s letters. They can be distinguished from the traditional view in the way they prioritize community experience—and the kingdom of God, which Jesus of Nazareth proclaimed—over the religious-existential experience of the individual. Not surprisingly, this corrective has resonated with the communitarian aspect of Postmodernism, and came into favour as Existentialism was in decline.

The foregoing comments are only sketches, glossing over some complex issues, but they serve to illustrate two major trajectories in Pauline scholarship, neither of which encompasses Nietzsche’s own critique of Paulinism. Some who have approached the question of Nietzsche’s relationship to Paul have been surprised by just how Lutheran Nietzsche’s Paul appears to be. While Nietzsche’s genealogy allows a strong stream of continuity running from Paul, through Augustine, to Luther, his fusillade against Paulinism bursts those boundaries in a way that anticipates contemporary trends. Nietzsche’s own return to Paul via Lüdemann set him on the path of thinking through Paul’s anthropology, and his axiological acumen unlocked to him the ways in which the symbology of the Christ-event transvalues various facets of human being. Nietzsche recognized that something extraordinarily-subversive happened when Jesus of

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37 Here I am referring again to the 1977 publication of Paul and Palestinian Judaism, widely considered the watershed event in contemporary Pauline studies, demonstrating that shallow treatments of Second-Temple Judaism as a religion of works righteousness were just that—shallow treatments. Barclay’s, Paul and the Gift, is important for this very reason, as it shows that the Augustinian-Lutheran tradition cannot only survive, but can experience exciting renewal through a sustained and nuanced exploration of Judaism.
Nazareth became *the Crucified God*—when the Cross became ‘an argument’. Nietzsche’s sense of Paul’s subversive aspect developed over time, but was radicalized by the time he entered his mature period. When Nietzsche first began to think through the issues of Christianity in *Human, All-Too-Human*, his lingering ambivalence towards early Christianity was clear—Christianity could be both ‘*Balm and poison*’:

If one thinks of the Rome of Juvenal, that poison-toad with the eyes of Venus, one learns what it means to confront the ‘world’ with a Cross, one comes to respect the quiet Christian community and is grateful that it overran the Graeco-Roman world.\(^3^9\)

The reader is struck by Nietzsche’s uncharacteristic generosity here, but this quotation is also marked by its generality, treating Christianity in a vague, monolithic way—absent of the dark contours characteristic of Nietzsche’s mature anti-Paulinism. When he returns to this same theme in *Daybreak*, after his own return to Paul, he is far less generous:

This centuries-long speechless hatred for Rome on the part of its wearied spectators, which extended as far as Rome ruled, at last discharged itself in *Christianity*, in as much as Christianity welded together Rome, the ‘world’ and ‘sin’ into one sensation: it avenged itself on Rome by imagining the sudden destruction of the world to be near at hand . . . it avenged itself on Rome by dreaming of a last judgment—and the crucified Jew as the symbol of salvation was the profoundest mockery of the splendidly arrayed provincial Roman governors, for they now appeared as symbols of ill-fortune and of ‘world’ ripe for destruction.\(^4^0\)

Here, the world has grown weary of Roman occupation, and the hatred and *ressentiment* central to Nietzsche’s portrait of Paul in *Daybreak* § 68, now colour the contest between cruciform Christian values and the noble majesty of Rome. Nietzsche was on the cusp of one of his most important counter-Pauline ideas: the transvaluing power of Paul’s central symbol, the Cross. It is finally present when he returns to this theme in *Beyond*:

Modern men, obtuse to all Christian nomenclature, no longer feel the gruesome superlative that struck a classical taste in the paradoxical formula ‘god on the cross’. Never yet and nowhere has there been an equal boldness in inversion, anything as horrible, questioning, and questionable as this formula: it promised a revaluation of all the values of antiquity.

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\(^{38}\) *AC* § 53, p. 181 [*KSA* 6, p. 235.].

\(^{39}\) *HH*, ‘Assorted Opinions and Maxims’ § 224, p. 269 [*KSA* 2, p. 478].

\(^{40}\) *D* § 71, pp. 42-43 [*KSA* 3, pp. 69-70], emphasis original.
It is the Orient, *deep* Orient, it is the Oriental slave who revenged himself in his way on Rome and its noble and frivolous tolerance, on the Roman ‘catholicity’ of faith.\(^4\)

Here, Nietzsche is finally engaging directly with the cruciform heart of Paulinism, and he recognizes that the character of its subversive aspect is located in its radical revaluation of values. Paulinism is fundamentally incommensurable with the values of Rome—Roman ‘catholicity’ and ‘tolerance’ notwithstanding. Nietzsche is still less patient, and his critique grows darker still in his *Genealogy*:

[C]ould spiritual subtlety imagine any *more dangerous* bait than this? Anything to equal the enticing, intoxicating, overwhelming, and undermining power of that symbol of the ‘holy cross’, that ghastly paradox of a ‘God on the cross’, that mystery of an unimaginable ultimate cruelty and self-crucifixion of God for the *salvation of man*?

What is certain, at least, is that *sub hoc signo* Israel, with its vengefulness and revaluation of all values, has hitherto triumphed again and again over all other ideals, over all *nobler* ideals.—\(^4\)

Finally, Nietzsche’s critique reaches its fever-pitch in *The Antichrist*:

The Christian and the anarchist: both *decadents*, both incapable of producing anything but dissolution, poisoning, degeneration, both *blood-suckers*, both with the instinct of *deadly* hatred towards everything that stands erect, that towers grandly up, that possesses duration, that promises life a future. . . . Christianity was the vampire of the *Imperium Romanum* . . . Paul, Chandala hatred against Rome, against ‘the world’, become flesh and genius, the Jew, the *eternal Jew par excellence*. . . . What he divined was that with the aid of the little sectarian movement on the edge of Judaism one could ignite a ‘world conflagration’, that with the symbol ‘God on the Cross’ one could sum up everything down-trodden, everything in secret revolt, the entire heritage of anarchist agitation in the Empire into a tremendous power.\(^4\)

These five quotes, here in chronological order, span five major publications and the last full decade before Nietzsche’s collapse. Each of them has in view Christianity’s supersession of Rome. In each case, the Cross, or the Crucified God, plays a load-bearing role. But they also bear out a clear pattern: Nietzsche’s depiction of cruciform Christianity, of Paulinism, becomes darker, the adjectives become more potent, italics, ellipses, and ‘sneer-quotes’ multiply; he

\(^4\) *BGE* § 46, pp. 60-61 [*KSA* 5, p. 67], emphasis original.
\(^4\) *GM*—I § 8, p. 35 [*KSA* 5, p. 269], emphasis original.
\(^4\) *AC* § 58, pp. 190-191 [*KSA* 6, pp. 246-247], emphasis original.
seems to strain to capture the gravity of the situation. Rome is finally vindicated and Christianity bears the full weight of guilt in the matter. At last Nietzsche seems to admire noble Rome as he despises slavish Christianity—without nuance.\(^{44}\) I have argued that herein lies the importance of treating Nietzsche’s agōn against Christianity with diachronic sensitivity. It is a phenomenon that darkens with his evolving understanding of human being through his genealogy of morals, his understanding of the subversive genius of the priest, and of the power of the revaluation of all values in light of the Christ-event. Where Nietzsche differs dramatically from most of Paul’s contemporary interpreters, is that he sees the rise of Paulinism—the success of the subversive aspect of Paul’s ‘glad tidings’—as a kind of crisis in the history of human being: ‘It is a painful, a dreadful spectacle which has opened up before me: I have drawn back the curtain on the depravity of man’.\(^{45}\) What was purported to be the antidote to human depravity, was itself a noxious, militant depravity, antagonistic to stronger types of human being: ‘Christianity desires to dominate beasts of prey; its means for doing so is to make them sick—weakening is the Christian recipe for taming, for “civilization”’.\(^{46}\) Paulinism was a war to death against the higher types of human being.\(^{47}\)

7.4.2 A War of Symbolic Worlds.

This study offers another original approach in its juxtaposition of Nietzsche and St Paul’s respective symbolic worlds—both of which radiate from Death-of-God events. The radical theological motifs of the Crucified God and the Death of God, give rise to new ways of understanding the world that the self existentially inhabits. Paul frequently employs ‘κόσμος’ as a synecdoche for these inhabited geographies of human existence, including the whole complex matrix of responsibilities, symbols, practices, values, and judgments which shape the character of human existence. The semantic range within Paul’s use requires attention to context. On one end of the range, world can be neutral, referring to the rhythms of ordinary life;\(^{48}\) at the other

\(^{44}\) Showing that Nietzsche’s noble perspective is no more compromising than the slave’s: ‘[The slave] loves as he hates, without nuance, to the depths, to the point of pain, of sickness . . .’, \textit{BGE} § 46, p. 61 [\textit{KSA} 5, p. 67].

\(^{45}\) \textit{AC} § 6, p. 127 [\textit{KSA} 6, p. 172], emphasis original.

\(^{46}\) \textit{AC} § 22, p. 142 [\textit{KSA} 6, p. 189], emphasis original.

\(^{47}\) \textit{AC} § 5, p. 127 [\textit{KSA} 6, p. 171], emphasis original.

\(^{48}\) E.g., the concerns of the ordinary life in marriage and family, \textit{1 Cor.} 7.33-34.
extreme, it can refer to the fordoomed sphere of unredeemed flesh [σὰρξ], and death [θάνατος], where Adamic humanity exists prior to an infusion of grace—what St Augustine called, ‘the city of man’, in contrast to ‘the city of God’. Especially important for this study, is how Paul’s use of world can have an axiological character to which Paul wants his communities to be wisely aligned. The crucifixion of Christ towers symbolically in Paul’s world as the unforeseen apotheosis of nomos-centric Judaism—the object of Paul’s pre-Christian zeal: ‘Christ is the culmination [τέλος] of the law so that there may be righteousness [δικαιοσύνην] for everyone who believes’ (Rom. 10.4). The Christ-event abrogates the symbols of Paul’s own Jewish identity: circumcision becomes nothing (1 Cor. 7.19; cf. Gal. 6.15), kosher laws are depreciated to near-irrelevance (Rom. 14.1ff), and, rather astonishingly, Paul’s advantages in Judaism are demeaned as ‘garbage’ [σκύβαλα] in comparison with knowing Christ (Phil. 3.8), as Paul strains forward towards his participation in Christ’s resurrection (Phil. 3.12-14). The symbolic pillars of Palestinian Judaism are not condemned but revalued by the Christ-event, allowing the universal-but-peculiar people of God to receive a new creation identity.

Nietzsche, had an evil eye for Paul’s use of world as a pejorative, frequently calling attention to it with sneer-quotes.49 Nietzsche located the origins of Paul’s world in Judaism’s original falsification of the actual world: ‘To be able to reject all that represents the ascending movement of life, well-constitutedness, power, beauty, self-affirmation on earth, the instinct of ressentiment here become genius had to invent another world from which that life-affirmation would appear evil, reprehensible as such’.50 He went on to articulate a philosophical sense of world with greater detail. The world, for Nietzsche, is the lived matrix we both discover and create. His discovery, drawn from Greek tragedy, Schopenhauer, and Christianity itself, was that human beings both inhabit and create their worlds, and that ‘We can destroy only as creators’.51 Diachronically surveying Nietzsche’s engagement with Pauline Christianity, we trace the emergence of a conspicuously-antipodal, symbolic world. Nietzsche’s early-period mission sought to revitalize German culture, beginning with an exegesis of the symbology of Attic Greek tragedy wherein the emergence of new forms of art required, ‘eine neue Welt der Symbole’. When Nietzsche’s early hopes that Wagner’s Zukunftsmusik might be the catalyst for cultural

49 E.g., AC §§ 24, 27, 29, 32, 38, 44, 46, 47, and 58.
50 AC § 24, pp. 144-145 [KSA 6, p. 192], emphasis original.
51 GS § 58, p. 122 [KSA 3, p. 422].
renewal in the spirit of Greek tragedy reached their desolation at Bayreuth, he soon emerged with a greater sense of the importance of his own contributions to cultural renewal, launching his middle-period trilogy of major works marked by their careful analyses of the Allzumenschliches, their sober focus on the problem of morality and its relationship to Christianity, and finally to the emergence of some of the enduring symbols of Nietzsche’s oeuvre—the Death of God, and the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. I have argued that Zarathustra, which marks the inception of Nietzsche’s mature period, can be fruitfully read as a wholly-reimagined symbolic world that is antipodal to the Christian conception of the world. By beginning with the proclamation of the Death-of-God event, proclaiming emergent possibilities for human or transhuman becoming (rather than the redemption of mankind as God’s image-bearers), and articulating the basic doctrine of the Eternal Return as a newly-conceived eschatological horizon (rather than Paul’s hope of eschatological resurrection), Zarathustra satirizes and inverts the world of Paulinism.

The significance of this comparison of symbolic worlds is especially evident in three areas: first, it demonstrates both the breadth and the character of Nietzsche’s engagement with the Pauline-Christian worldview. It is a relentless, frontal attack that uses the patterns of Pauline Christianity against it. Secondly, it demonstrates a similar instinct in both thinkers to orient human being through the use of load-bearing symbols. It has not been sufficiently appreciated in Nietzsche studies how many of Nietzsche’s mature ideas have a largely symbolic character. This symbolic character is not incompatible with other interpretive approaches. Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence could be existential and therapeutic in orientation, or it could be an embarrassingly-Quixotic attempt at physics, without depreciating its symbolic value, just as Paul could tirelessly mine the symbolism of a Cross he believed to be—as a matter of brute,

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52 ‘Richard Wagner, seemingly the all-conquering, actually a decaying, despairing romantic, suddenly sank down helpless and shattered before the Christian cross . . .’, AOM—1886 preface § 3, pp. 210-211 [KSA 2, p. 372].
53 Pace, Fornari, who writes: ‘Without the revelation of the killing of God by men, the phrase “God is dead” would not have the resonance and meaning that it has. Nietzsche knew this, but at the same time it was the last thing that he would have wanted to hear, or admit’, A God Torn to Pieces, 60. This seems to be a wholly unnecessary conclusion; Nietzsche made no secret of the fact that he is attacking Christianity with some of its own language and images.
54 As Salomé insisted: ‘Nietzsche constantly expressed the mistaken opinion that it would be possible to win for it an indisputable basis for [the theory of the eternal return] through physics experiments’, Nietzsche, 131.
historical fact—a wooden object used by the Romans to execute Jesus of Nazareth. Indeed, Nietzsche’s strong reservations regarding Paul’s veracity notwithstanding, Paul seems adamant that the Christian kerygma cannot cohere without its key historical touchpoints—‘And if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is useless and so is your faith’ (1 Cor. 15.14). Nietzsche’s apparent ambivalence about the truth as such, marks an important epistemological departure from the larger tradition emerging out of early Paulinism; Paulinism was animated by the grand metaphysical vision of reconciliation between Creator and creation; Nietzsche was content with the more modest goal of preparing the seedbed of a free-spirited, ascending humanity.

Thirdly, in my reading of Gay Science, I suggested a breakthrough in Nietzsche’s development, where he realized the necessary link between creation and destruction: ‘We can destroy only as creators’. Here Nietzsche styles himself as a kind of anti-realist, who recognizes that ‘Only we have created the world that concerns man’. This insight underlies the intimate link between Nietzsche’s anthropology and his broader thought-world. Understanding the complex relationship between philosophical anthropology and the world of the self, sheds light on Nietzsche’s incessant accusations of mendacity on the one hand, and his apparent ambivalence about ‘truth’ on the other. Nietzsche is ever wary of the tendency to falsify the world in an effort to accommodate human ideals. I have argued that one reason for this is that the human self must exist within a sphere that provides its existential resources; the self does not simply take up residence in the world an sich. Nietzsche wants to move beyond the metaphysical dualism that underlies the ‘real world’ and ‘apparent world’ distinction:

*We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? . . . But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world! (Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)*

55 GS § 58, p. 122 [KSA 3, p. 422].

56 I applied this term to Nietzsche on the basis of his own discoveries—not his explicit self-designation. ‘Anti-Realist’ [Anti-Realisten], is a term Nietzsche uses only in reference to the ‘Evangel’, in AC § 32, p. 154 [KSA 6, p. 203].

57 GS § 301, p. 242 [KSA 3, p. 540].

58 *TI* ‘How the “Real World” at last Became a Myth’, p. 51 [KSA 6, p. 81], emphasis original. Heidegger rightly saw that the six stages of world-falsification corresponded to six types of human beings: the portrayal of all six divisions of the history of Platonism is so arranged that the “true world,” the existence and legitimacy of which is under consideration, is in each division brought into connection with the type of man who comports himself to that world.
7.4.3 The Mendacity of Priests and Philosophers: Was St Paul an Unbeliever?

‘Was er selbst nicht glaubte, die Idioten, unter die er seine Lehre warf, glaubten es’.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Antichrist.

‘τέλος γάρ νόμου Χριστός εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι’.
—St Paul, Letter to the Romans

In Chapter 5, I examined Nietzsche’s account of Christian origins, arguing that in The Antichrist, Nietzsche’s Paul had grown darker and more subversive, while remaining broadly congruous with the image of Paul found in Daybreak § 68. We discover this broad coherence to Nietzsche’s perspective on Paul when we recognize in Paul the complex of founder and convert. According to Nietzsche, Paul’s epiphany en route to Damascus was the recognition that the Christ he had been contending against could be the solution to his own burdened conscience—his own Cross. Paul’s bad conscience with respect to the Law he fiercely defended, was the essential psychological insight of Nietzsche’s early understanding of Paul, and he never explicitly renounces it. Morgan Rempel, whose work I surveyed in Chapter 2, proffers the most radical reading of Paul’s priestly mendacity. Rempel draws from several passages in The Antichrist which seem, prima facie, to aver that Paul was himself an unbeliever, reducing his entire Christian mission to a mere power-play. I quote Rempel here at length:

It is highly doubtful that Nietzsche’s Paul believes in the resurrection and immortality-securing ‘sacrificial’ death of Jesus for the sins and guilt of others. Indeed, given the Antichrist’s ongoing portrayal of a shrewd and tireless Apostle whose ‘Christianity’ emerges not from religious conviction but an extraordinary thirst for power, it seems reasonable to conclude that Nietzsche’s Paul does not even believe in the existence of the ‘other world’ which to this day remains so bound up with Christianity. Speaking—once again as ‘a psychologist’—of Paul’s famed vision on the road to Damascus, for example, Antichrist 42 says explicitly what was simply implied in Daybreak seven years earlier. The Apostle has not fooled himself, nor like the ‘first Christians’ actually embraced a convenient version of ‘Christianity’, but deliberately trades in lies.\(^{59}\)

Consequently, the overturning of Platonism and the ultimate twist out of it imply a metamorphosis of man’, Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art, 208.\(^{59}\) Rempel, Nietzsche, Psychohistory, and the Birth of Christianity, 126-127.
It is true that Nietzsche refers to Paul as a ‘frightful imposter’ [Fürchterliche Betrüger], but, on closer analysis, Nietzsche’s Paul cannot be an unbeliever in an unqualified sense. To begin with, it is basic to Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul that his own psychology requires the solution he engineers. Beliefs reflect needs and desires. As Nietzsche says in another connection, ‘It is his [that is, the theologian’s] deepest instinct of self-preservation which forbids any part of reality whatever to be held in esteem or even spoken of’, and ‘so far nobody has been more mendacious than holy men . . . so far one has called lies truth’. To argue that Paul carried out his apostleship as a mere power play with no belief in its message, is to attribute to Paul a cold rationality that cannot inhere within Nietzsche’s broader understanding of Paulinism.

This is not to suggest, however, that Nietzsche’s accusations of priestly mendacity amount to nothing; Nietzsche sees Paul’s mission as an example of priestly mendacity par excellence, but one aspect of this mendacity is wilful self-deception. This is precisely what Nietzsche speaks of when he writes that ‘the heirloom of the priest [is] self-deceptive fraudulence’. Indeed, even though Nietzsche accuses Paul of lying, his understanding of lying is idiosyncratic: ‘I call a lie: wanting not to see something one does see, wanting not to see something as one sees it’.

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60 AC § 45, p. 170 [KSA 6, p. 222], emphasis original.
61 AC § 9, p. 130 [KSA 6, pp. 175-176]. Added to this is both the ‘nihilistic will’ and the desire for power.
62 EH ‘Why I am a Destiny’ § 1, p. 326 [KSA 6, p. 365], emphasis original.
63 What seems most damning with Rempel’s reading is that it would mark a brand new development in Nietzsche’s understanding of Paul, which would render a host of earlier theories obsolete. If Paul is a power-hungry unbeliever, he is not the tortured forbear of Augustine, Luther, and Pascal, as Nietzsche elsewhere insists.
64 This paradox is no insurmountable difficulty when we recognize that Nietzsche recognizes no unified will, but a cluster of competing drives.
65 AC § 12, p. 133 [KSA 6, p. 178], emphasis original.
66 AC § 55, p. 183 [KSA 6, p. 238], emphasis original.
67 Both points are firmly established in Rempel, Nietzsche, Psychohistory, and the Birth of Christianity, 114-115.
have made this move with a clean intellectual conscience.\textsuperscript{68} He had to deceive himself, and deceiving the intellectually inferior—the idiots among whom he planted churches—was an outworking of his self-deception. Furthermore, this is a significant point within Nietzsche’s larger argument in \textit{The Antichrist}, which has a strong emphasis on intellectual conscience, and anti-idealism:\textsuperscript{69} ‘Whoever has theologian blood in his veins has a wrong and dishonest attitude towards all things from the very first. The pathos that develops out of this is called \textit{faith}: closing one’s eyes with respect to oneself for good and all so as not to suffer from the sight of incurable falsity’.\textsuperscript{70} To see that Paul’s genius permitted him only a strained, self-deceptive ‘faith’, makes him the logical forebear of the jaundiced Christianity of Nietzsche’s contemporaries, which Nietzsche sees as the same species of wilful self-deception, epistemic cowardice, and bad intellectual conscience.

This reading also allows a more coherent psychology of religion to emerge from Nietzsche’s genealogies. The psychohistorical survey of Israel’s history introduces the world-denying priestly instinct that undergirds the whole of Nietzsche’s project. Paul himself was another incarnation of the Judaic-priestly instinct, which chooses ‘being at any price’—even at the cost of ‘the radical falsification of all nature, all naturalness, all reality, the entire inner world as well as the outer’.\textsuperscript{71} This pernicious, world-denying instinct is the psychohistorical thread running from the decline of Israel, through the rise of Paulinism, up to the Christianity of Nietzsche’s contemporaries. To take Paul as an unbeliever, and his missionary activity as a power game \textit{simpliciter}, leaves us—historically, psychologically, and philosophically speaking—with a less interesting Nietzsche articulating a much less interesting Paul. In the cases of both figures, this nearly amounts to a refutation in itself. At the very least, it leaves us with a less satisfying reading of Nietzsche’s complex psychology of religion. Nietzsche’s assertion was that the Judeo-priestly instinct was not animated by \textit{décadence} itself, but used \textit{décadence} as the instrument by which it sought a power ‘by means of which one can prevail against “the world”’,\textsuperscript{72} painting Paul as an enormously complex figure.

\textsuperscript{68} One of Nietzsche’s firmly-held values.
\textsuperscript{69} ‘Pure spirit is pure lie’, \textit{AC} § 8, p. 130 \textit{[KSA] 6, p. 175}.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{AC} § 9, p. 130 \textit{[KSA] 6, p. 175}, emphasis original.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{AC} § 24, p. 144 \textit{[KSA] 6, p. 191}, emphasis original.
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{AC} § 24, p. 145 \textit{[KSA] 6, p. 192}, emphasis original.
Finally, somewhat counterintuitively, this more nuanced reading of Nietzsche anti-Paulinism becomes a more powerful argument. What makes Nietzsche’s interpretation of Christianity so subversive, is that it allows for the kind of psychological complexity which can account both for Christianity’s historic resilience,\(^{73}\) and its surprising capacity to draw higher types under its spell. Nietzsche’s Paul is of world-historical importance because he was the religious genius in whom we glimpse a cluster of the pernicious drives that give rise to the ‘spider’s web’ ensnaring Nietzsche’s contemporaries. Paul is the forebear of the Augustines and the Luthers, the theologians and the ‘crypto-priest’ philosophers—all of whom are driven by the same malignant instinct—it falsifies existence, and engages in self-deception as self-preservation. This instinct engages the will to power, but this need not imply that the will to power is a conscious drive.\(^{74}\) When Nietzsche adds, ‘And the philosophers have seconded the Church: the lie of a “moral world-order” permeates the whole evolution even of the most recent philosophy’,\(^{75}\) he is drawing parallels between contemporary philosophy and early Christianity in order to condemn philosophy as decadent.\(^{76}\) Thus, Nietzsche’s thoughts on mendacity constitute a genealogy forming a bridge between the origins of Christianity in 1st Century, and certain cultural problems of Nietzsche’s 19th Century.

7.4.4 The Return to Paul: Belief without Content?

Some of the most surprising and interesting developments in the study of St Paul have occurred well beyond the fringes of the New Testament guild—even as Pauline studies proper has undergone a kind of renaissance of its own. Fresh readings of Paul by Badiou, Žižek, Taubes, and Agamben—to name only a few of the leading lights—have returned to Paul’s work for insights that might be applied in our increasingly post-Christian, Western context. These new trajectories are raising interesting and important questions about Paul’s potential contributions to contemporary issues—Badiou’s sometimes wistful reflections on how Paul’s universalist declaration, ‘There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and

\(^{73}\) Nietzsche’s writings evince interest in the historic resilience of Pauline Christianity from its foundations, to the church fathers (especially St Augustine), to the Protestant Reformation under Luther and Calvin, through the Enlightenment, and up to Nietzsche’s contemporaries.

\(^{74}\) If it were, Nietzsche would not have needed to defend the view.

\(^{75}\) AC § 26, p. 147 [KSA 6, p. 195], emphasis original.

\(^{76}\) Cf. AC § 49 [KSA 6, pp. 228-229].
female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Gal. 3.28), might help to overcome the contemporary impasse between the endlessly-fracturing self of identity politics, and the self-as-consumer that is tailored to the market economy; or, Taube’s admiring exploration of possible anti-imperial subtexts in Romans. On the other hand, the ‘return to Paul’ is not entirely new; it occurred with Augustine, and again with Luther, and I have highlighted Nietzsche’s own return to Paul late in the 19th Century. The mature Nietzsche’s agōn with Paul has made the Apostle more interesting, while his animus towards Paul has left contemporary philosophers in the position of having to contend with Nietzsche in every approach to Paul’s letters. Part of the tentativeness of contemporary philosophers’ appropriations of Paul is no doubt due to the decidedly post-Nietzschean context within which we approach the New Testament. We can now only re-read Paul after Nietzsche.

In light of this, I would now like to outline a few comments about the broader phenomenon of the return to Paul—the first drawn primarily from Badiou, who suggests that Paulinism is a kind of ‘belief without content’. For Badiou’s Paul, ‘since truth is evental . . . it is singular’, and since it is subjective, ‘nothing communitarian or historically established can lend its substance to the process of truth’. To translate this into the rival frameworks of contemporary Pauline studies (without implying full commensurability), this seems to be akin to a radical apocalyptic reading. Martin provides a brief but fascinating defence of this reading, arguing three basic theses: first, that ‘Paul is not really a theologian’, in the systematic, or even creedal sense; second, that ‘he has an ambiguous relationship to knowledge itself’; and third, that he is ‘constrained by his eschatology from announcing the establishment of the kingdom of God in the Church’. Expanding this last point, Martin writes, ‘[Paul] is also prohibited from proclaiming a new people or a new religion because of his faithfulness to Israel and the God of

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77 Badiou, Saint Paul, 14.
79 This amounts to a kind of epistemological caution or reserve. Martin, ‘Teleology, Epistemology, and Universal Vision in Paul’, 95.
80 Here Martin holds that while justification has already been provided, salvation still looms on the distant horizon. The already/not-yet character of Paul’s writings is uncontroversial—less so the bifurcation of justification and salvation. Martin, ‘Teleology, Epistemology, and Universal Vision in Paul’, 98.
This clearly pulls the rug out from under Badiou and Žižek’s Paul—who is first and foremost the architect of the universal subject. While each of Martin’s points does find support in the Pauline corpus, they also find nuance and qualification. We may grant his first point, as it would be anachronistic to apply the label, ‘systematic theologian’, to a First-Century Apostle. On the other hand, however, systematic theology very often involves a sustained engagement with Paul’s letters, which is remarkable considering their epistolary genre. To the second point, regarding Paul’s epistemological conservatism, we would need to add that Paul betrays no uncertainty when it comes to the revelational content of the Gospel. And, to the third point, Paul does not found a new religion ex nihilo, but he does proclaim a new covenant through the blood of Christ—under the sign of the Cross—between the God of Israel, and Abraham’s spiritual offspring.

Badiou’s approach to Paul is partly right: Paul’s gospel erupts from the Christ-event and is thus fixed in its singularity: ‘I resolved to know nothing . . . except Jesus Christ and him crucified’ (1 Cor. 2.2). But, Nietzsche might warn that the evental character of Paulinism is anything but incompatible with belief content, as such. According to Nietzsche, Paulinism is an extraordinarily ambitious falsification of reality, the creation of a new world, the reinterpretation of Israel’s history, the appropriation and synthesis of many facets from competing cults, the popularization of resurrection eschatology, and the advancement of a subversive moral account of the self. We should not be surprised, therefore, that contemporary Pauline studies is rediscovering a Paul who is as thoroughly rooted in Palestinian Judaism, as he is radically Christocentric. Nor should we be surprised to find that early Paulinism envisioned itself as the formation of a new humanity by placing Christ, rather than Abraham or Moses, at the centre of

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82 An especially salient example of this was the renaissance in Germanophone theology that issued from the publication of Barth’s commentary, Der Römerbrief.
83 E.g., Gal. 1.11-12; 1 Cor. 2.6ff; 2 Cor. 12.1ff; cf. Eph. 3.3.
84 2 Cor. 3.6ff; 1 Cor. 11.25; Gal. 3.26ff.
85 Though it bears mentioning that this passage locates the singularity of the Christ-event in the Cross, and not in the resurrection, which Badiou holds to be central.
86 What Martin outlines regarding Paul, could just as easily be applied to Nietzsche—who was not systematic, who had an ambiguous relationship to the truth, and for whom the Death-of-God event had an already/not-yet character—but his corpus remains rich in content.
Israel’s identity, thereby welcoming the Nations into the reconstituted people of God. This is precisely the balanced point the author of Ephesians\(^87\) labours to make:

Therefore, remember that formerly you who are Gentiles by birth \(\tau\alpha\ \varepsilon\theta\nu\eta\ \epsilon\nu\ \sigma\alpha\rho\iota\kappa\eta\) and called ‘uncircumcised’ by those who call themselves ‘the circumcision’ (which is done in the body by human hands)—remember that at that time you were separate from Christ, excluded from citizenship in Israel and foreigners to the covenants of the promise, without hope and without God in the world. But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far away have been brought near by the blood of Christ.

For he himself is our peace, who has made the two groups one and has destroyed the barrier, the dividing wall of hostility, by setting aside in his flesh the law with its commands and regulations. His purpose was to create in himself one new humanity \(\text{ένα καινὸν ἄνθρωπον}\) out of the two, thus making peace, and in one body to reconcile both of them to God through the cross, by which he put to death their hostility. He came and preached peace to you who were far away and peace to those who were near. For through him we both have access to the Father by one Spirit. Consequently, you are no longer foreigners and strangers, but fellow citizens with God’s people and also members of his household, built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus himself as the chief cornerstone (2.11-20).

One strength of Nietzsche’s reading of Paul is that he recognized the evental character of Paulinism and yet continued to contextualize Paul in ‘the soil’ of 2nd-Temple Judaism. A second strength of Nietzsche’s reading relates to the axiological aspect. Nietzsche sees Paulinism as a revaluation of all values, which allows Paul’s universalism to emerge from Jewish particularism without collapsing into the anti-Semitism that plagued the Pauline scholarship of Nietzsche’s contemporaries. Those who have made Palestinian Judaism a foil for Paulinism misunderstand the nature of Paul’s subversive aspect—Jewish identity markers are relativized to unimportance within the overlapping social, and soteriological economies of Paul’s gospel, but they remain morally neutral insofar as their observers do not invest them with symbolic social capital within the multi-ethnic assembly of believers.\(^88\) Prior to the Christ-event, a humbly-postured Jewish

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\(^87\) Whether Eph. was authored by Paul or an astute, early reader of Paul, makes little difference here. In either case, it demonstrates the content of early Paulinism.

\(^88\) Rom. 14.1ff defends the freedom and necessity for individuals to operate according to conscience, while somewhat condescendingly referring to those observing dietary laws and holy days as those whose ‘faith is weak’ (vv. 1, 2). While convinced that ‘nothing is unclean in itself”—which seems nothing less than a wholesale rejection kosher laws—Paul says, ‘let us stop

Duff, 343
particularism—of the kind that we might associate with Paul’s Hebrew-Bible counterpart, Jeremiah\(^{89}\)—would have been the only appropriate response in a world that knew no other salvation, but particularism of any kind was inconsonant with the universalism of a world transvalued by the Cross. Paul clearly feels himself free to observe or ignore the identity markers of his Jewish ethnicity as the cause of the gospel warrants (\textit{1 Cor.} 9.19ff), but he is notoriously impatient with those who try to compel ethnic proselytizing.\(^{90}\) On the level of national identity, the Nations (\(τὰ ἔθνη\)) could no longer serve as a negative foil for Israel as they began to be incorporated into the true Israel, for ‘in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith. . . . There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (\textit{Gal.} 3.26, 28).

7.5 The Nature of the Paul-Nietzsche Kinship Revisited.

There are two areas where Nietzsche and Paul seem to compare rather favourably, as thinkers. The first is their remarkable \textit{axiological acuity}. Their minds seem to perceive values, and the implications of those values, more clearly than do their contemporaries. In the famous incident at Antioch, Paul’s searing public indictment of Peter’s hypocrisy was based on Paul’s belief that the universalism of the Gospel could not, and need not, inhere within the particularism that had been the norm. The church was a spiritual \([κατὰ πνεῦμα]\), not a fleshly \([κατὰ σάρκα\)], fraternity.\(^{91}\) Paul’s most astute readers—from Augustine to Badiou—have recognized his universalism, which looked for the truly human self behind the outward trappings of ethnic identities. Peter’s error stemmed from implicitly lending credence to such an ethnic particularism, one that had been abrogated by the Christ-event. Nietzsche’s savaging of the passing judgment on one another’ (v. 13), and ‘whatever you believe about these things keep between yourself and God’ (v. 22).

\(^{89}\) Jeremiah relates to both Paul and Nietzsche in his sense that his mission is both destructive and (re)constructive: ‘See, today I appoint you over nations and kingdoms to uproot and tear down, to destroy and overthrow, to build and to plant’ (\textit{Jer.} 1.10). This passage echoes through \textit{2 Cor.} 10, and Kaufmann relates it to Nietzsche’s claim that ‘negating and destroying are conditions of saying Yes’ (\textit{EH} ‘Why I am a Destiny’ § 4, cf. n. 1).

\(^{90}\) Paul even suggests that circumcision had come to be symbol that signified nothing but an empty boast: ‘Not even those who are circumcised keep the law, yet they want you to be circumcised that they may boast about your circumcision in the flesh’ \textit{Gal.} 6.12.

\(^{91}\) \textit{Rom.} 9.8; \textit{Gal.} 4.28.
‘English consistency’ of George Elliot is a very close parallel: ‘They have got rid of the Christian God, and now feel obliged to cling all the more firmly to Christian morality . . .’. Paul and Nietzsche both seem to recognize that values do not emerge mysteriously from the ether; they exist within complex matrices, and they are characterized by logical interrelationships. You cannot change one value-related belief at a time. Nietzsche took pains to map the values of Christianity and point to incoherence wherever he found it. Nietzsche and Paul are sometimes faulted for inconsistencies, or even contradictions, but if we allow values to stand at the centre of their respective worldviews, inconsistencies begin to disappear, and we see a greater intra-systematic (or intra-perspectival) coherence.

A second, and related, point of comparison is their perspectival dexterity. Both of their minds have the capacity to quickly shift from one perspective to another. Paul knew that Hellenism and Judaism contained rival perspectives on the Christ-event. He was able to understand the perspectives of his rivals, and even to sympathize with them up to a point: yes, the Cross was a scandal from the perspective of Judaism, and folly to the Greek mind, but there was a new way of seeing the world—seeing it through the Cross—that made a new kind of sense of the human condition. Paul’s ‘ὁ λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ’ invited interlocutors and seekers to adopt this radical new perspective. Perspectival shifts surface repeatedly in the Pauline corpus, and recognizing them can help to resolve difficult issues. Stendahl, for example, made much of Paul’s claim in Philippians 3, that he was ‘faultless’ under the Law. Paul was making a dual point, however, by deftly shifting perspectives momentarily—indeed, in the space of a brief parenthetical digression. The first point (3.3) reflects Paul’s actual perspective. It serves as a reminder of some of the basic values of Paulinism: true circumcision (that of the heart), spiritual service, boasting in the Lord, and pessimism with respect to the flesh. This leaves him open to the charge by his opponents that he has abandoned the practice of Judaism because it was unable to fulfil its requirements. In his second point (3.4), Paul attempts to pull the rug out from under his detractors by briefly assuming their perspective, and declaring his pre-Damascus self to be innocent by their standards: ‘as for zeal, persecuting the church; as for righteousness based on the law [δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ], faultless’. By this, Paul indicates that he had believed himself innocent as a practitioner of Judaism. However, in this (perspectival) innocence, Paul

92 Til ‘Expeditions’ § 5, p. 79 [KSA 6, p. 113].
93 Interestingly, this was Nietzsche’s basic thesis in D § 68.
had violently resisted and persecuted Israel’s Messiah; for this reason, his guilt was serious but
his perspective blinded him to this guilt. Paul’s strong warning about the opposition from non-
messianic Israelites raises a comparison between the church’s opponents and his own regrettable
violence against the fledgling messianic movement before Damascus. Thus, what appears to
be a declaration of innocence, is on closer inspection, a *reductio ad absurdum* applied against the
perspective that would have acquitted him.

Again, Nietzsche’s corpus provides an illuminating parallel. The notion that Nietzsche
deply lamented the Death of God has been a widespread fiction in the wider reception of
Nietzsche. This (mis)interpretation likely stems from reading the Madman’s lament about the
Death of God—the most famous passage in all of Nietzsche’s literature—as *Nietzsche’s own*
perspective. But, as we saw earlier, Nietzsche does not identify himself with the Madman, nor
with the atheistic οἱ πολλοί of the marketplace for whom the nonexistence of God was thought to
be a matter of indifference. Nietzsche’s atheism could not merely shrug at the absence of God,
because so much had been predicated on God’s existence. However, Nietzsche numbers himself
among the ‘fearless ones’ for whom the Death of God is a cataclysmic event, but who face it as
adventurers exploring uncharted seas: ‘Indeed, we philosophers and “free spirits” feel, when we
hear the news that “the old god is dead”, as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with
gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation’. This was Nietzsche’s perspective.

Furthermore, Nietzsche could gladly affirm with Zarathustra that the Death of God meant the
resurrection of the higher men. In this sense, the Death of God meant the end of the falsified
world, and the falsified anthropology of Paul, where everyone is equal because ‘God is no
respecer of persons’ (*Gal. 2.6; Rom. 2.11*). Nietzsche would agree with The Madman’s
perspective insofar as it underscores the dramatic shifts that have begun to take place with
Modernity’s greatest event, but he does not present himself as one who shares his anxieties.
Again, the Death of God sets Nietzsche on the quest for higher types than what he saw among
his contemporaries:

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94 *Acts* 22.3-5, where Paul is arrested in Jerusalem, and then defends himself before a crowd of
fellow Israelites, is a very close parallel. In that case, however, his audience was hostile and he
used his testimony to map common ground before explaining why he had shifted perspectives.
95 ‘Wir Furchtlosen’, the title Nietzsche gave to the fifth book of *GS*.
96 *GS* § 343, p. 280 [KSA 3, p. 574].
Being new, nameless, hard to understand, we premature births of an as yet unproven future need for a new goal also a new means—namely, a new health, stronger, more seasoned, tougher, more audacious, and gayer than any previous health. . . . After such vistas and with such a burning hunger in our conscience and science, how could we still be satisfied with *present-day man*? 97

CONCLUSION.

It is now time to bring this study to a close. I am grateful to see that broad trends towards work across disciplinary boundaries 98 have breathed fresh life into the quests for St Paul’s relationship to philosophy, and Nietzsche’s contributions to the fundamental questions of religion. 99 The so-called ‘return to Paul’ in Continental Philosophy has long come of age. 100 The Nietzsche-Paul relationship is now the subject of a number of articles, and a handful of monographs across several languages, and from both sides of the Atlantic. There are promising signs showing that common laments over the scholarly neglect of Nietzsche’s anti-Christian dimension are standing on receding ground. These are welcome developments for all who wish to better understand the religious and philosophical geographies we now inhabit.

This study has been interdisciplinary by design, and this is one dimension of its unique value. There is always a risk that interdisciplinary studies rise no higher than *mere appropriation*, making brief forays across disciplinary boundaries, plundering useful ideas and

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97 GS § 382, pp. 346-347 [KSA 3, pp. 635-636], emphasis original.
98 Bangor University’s Philosophy and Religion programme stands as an especially salient example of this exciting renaissance.
99 While my focus here on Paul and Nietzsche has given this study a broad horizon, it certainly makes no claim to encompass the whole Paul’s relationship to philosophy, or Nietzsche’s contributions to religion. Only time will tell how burgeoning areas of enquiry relating Paul to Stoicism, or Platonism, or to the more immediate concerns of contemporary political philosophy will develop. The same is true of Nietzsche’s relationship to religion, which might shine light on ancient and contemporary expressions of Pantheism, Buddhism and Islam—by no means an exhaustive list.
100 This is especially the case if one traces the roots of this movement (as I have) back to Nietzsche’s own *agōn* with Paul late in the 19 th-Century.
methods, before returning to more familiar (or preferred) ground. This study has made every effort to respect the integrity of the disciplines it engages, attempting the often-difficult task of exploring new ground while having its feet firmly planted in the larger interpretive traditions of ‘Pauline studies’, and ‘Nietzsche studies’. This is always a challenging enterprise, not least due to the breadth and depth of the literature devoted to each thinker—vast in the case of Nietzsche, and immeasurable in the case of Paul—an embarrassment of riches on both accounts. On one hand, this is cause to celebrate and not despair; on the other, the task is daunting, and remains unfinished. Nevertheless, this study has, I hope, succeeded in finding deep points of resonance, between Christianity’s first and greatest theologian, and his greatest modern detractor, and I would like to conclude by revisiting the question of Nietzsche’s aim in contending with St Paul.

In my study of Salaquarda’s seminal article, ‘Dionysus Against the Crucified’, and Azzam’s recent monograph, Nietzsche Versus Paul, I noted that these works framed the Nietzsche-Paul relationship in the terms of Hegelian dialectics—the Nietzschean antithesis challenging the Pauline thesis. Ultimately, however, Salaquarda and Azzam arrived at conflicting theses over the nature of the ‘dialectical kinship’ between Nietzsche and Paul. Salaquarda argued that Nietzsche advocated an overcoming with preservation, and Azzam an overcoming without preservation. The differences between their conclusions are not trivial, but I think that when we see the degree of incommensurability between Paul’s world, and Nietzsche’s world—how averse they are to compromise, or synthesis—the apparent usefulness of the Hegelian model begins to pale. I have preferred throughout this study to refer to the relationship between Paul and Nietzsche as antipodal rather than dialectical, in order to avoid the limitations of the model. The mature Nietzsche consistently treats St Paul as his antipode, radicalizing differences, using Paulinism as foil in the creation of his own legacy. Paul’s good news of the Crucified God was contingent upon a resurrected and living Christ: ‘And if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is useless and so is your faith’ (1 Cor. 15.14). Paul’s world was a world infused by divine grace, with the hope of resurrection on the eschatological horizon helping he and his communities to joyfully endure temporal suffering. Nietzsche rejected outright the very

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101 See, e.g., Peter Frick’s critique that the return to Paul has been characterized by, ‘the death of the author’, because, ‘Continental philosophy uses the voice of Paul, but does not always give him his own voice. Continental philosophy changes the voice of Paul to say things that Paul may not have been willing to say’; Paul in the Grip of the Philosophers: The Apostle and Contemporary Continental Philosophy, 8ff.
possibility of such metaphysical inputs, and declared Paul’s hope of resurrection to be nihilistic. There can be no mediating between Nietzsche’s natural values, and Paul’s enchanted world. This incommensurability stems from their fundamentally different points of departure—whether Christ crucified, or the Death of God. To what end, then, did Nietzsche contend with Paulinism? One answer is suggested by an entry in the Nachlaß, dated to 1887:

I have declared war on the anaemic ‘Christian-ideal’ (along with, what is closely-related to him), not with the aim of destroying it, but only to put an end to its tyranny, and to gain some free space for new ideals, for more robust ideals. . . The continuation of the Christian ideal belongs among the most desirable things there are: for the ideals we want to place alongside him, or perhaps above him—you must have strong opponents to become strong. —So we Immoralists require the power of morality our instincts for self-preservation desire that our opponents remain strong—it only wants to become master over them.¹⁰²

This note was never published, and it might appear to clash with the general tenor of The Antichrist, where Nietzsche renders his judgements against Paulinism with such a palpable sense of disgust. There is, however, no contradiction between the jarring verdict of The Antichrist, and Nietzsche’s professed desire for strong opponents—there is rather deep concord. Even Kaufmann’s kinder, gentler Nietzsche—the good humanist—revels in the military school. For Nietzsche, it is precisely in the thick of the fray that one becomes the strongest version of oneself. St Paul’s reflections on, ‘ὁ λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ’, might never have achieved their sparkling brilliance had his mission not faced such intense opposition in Jerusalem, Antioch, Cyprus, Galatia, Ephesus, Philippi, Thessalonica, Athens, Corinth, and, finally, Rome. Likewise, we would never know the fascination of Nietzsche’s mature writings had he not contended so relentlessly with the tradition that he traced back to a ‘rug-weaving’ religious genius from Tarsus—St Paul.

¹⁰² KSA 12:10[117], p. 523 (emphasis original). Cf. the following quotation from a discarded draft of EH: ‘I want nothing differently, not backward either—I was not permitted to want anything differently.—Amor fati.—Even Christianity becomes necessary: only the highest form, the most dangerous, the one that was most seductive in its No to life, provokes its highest affirmation—me’ (EH, Appendix, p. 343).
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