

**Bangor University**

## **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

### **The experiencing of personal transformations: A Heideggarian explication with reference to a counselling training programme**

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**THE EXPERIENCING OF PERSONAL TRANSFORMATIONS:  
A HEIDEGGARIAN EXPLICATION**

**WITH REFERENCE TO A COUNSELLING TRAINING PROGRAMME**

J K Randolph Ellis

2009

A thesis submitted in the fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy.

College of Arts, Education & Humanities  
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## **ABSTRACT**

An exploration and explication of how human-being becomes personally transformed, the various modes of that transformation, whether that transformation is authentic or inauthentic, what enables transformation, what limits and inhibits it and how human-being engages with the process of transformation. The purpose is to build up a picture of human-being and his/her social context and to account for personal change/transformation in human-being, (with reference to a counsellor-training programme as an exemplar in which self-transformation is a focused intention of the programme).

Primarily the mode of explication is philosophical and almost exclusively through the work of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). 'What' or 'who' human-being is, is not presupposed in this dissertation, instead a particular understanding of human-being is explored in detail, an understanding that is worked with and sustained throughout the project. It reveals that human-being is not an object, but a finite mortal and transcendent entity one who wholly and completely has its being in the world, an entity that is always 'we ourselves'. As transcendent, human-being is always open to its possibilities and it is this latter transcendent possibility, and no other, that is deemed foundational to its having a 'self'.

Human-being is mostly inauthentic. This inauthenticity arises through an average, everyday way of being, in which the world, discourse and selfhood come to be understood, interpreted and lived through mostly in a conventional and 'received' manner, one that does not (and cannot) take into account the unique authentic possibilities of individual human-being. A tension is revealed between this average way of being and the manner in which individual human-being becomes authentically transformed. The multifarious ways in which that tension arises, how it is 'dealt' with, what precipitates the transformational process, what the relational consequences are and how personal authenticity and inauthenticity is experienced are explored and explicated.

It shows how authenticity for human-being is exceptional and that its attainment is not simply a matter of 'choosing' nor following an epistemological pathway. In addition, it is revealed that a dominant and potent technological presence has the capacity to treat human-being as raw material, material that is revealed as always 'standing by' awaiting transformation. It is within this latter mode that human-being becomes limited to and confined within whatever that technological presence allows. It is revealed that the two potent 'forces' impinging upon human-beings' capacity to become authentically transformed (the average way of being and the technological presence) are mostly hidden. Burgeoning awareness of these 'forces', and to human-beings' authentic transformational possibilities is precipitated by an acknowledgement and understanding of human-beings' own mortal finitude and by the consequential temporal experiences of such acknowledgement. As a result of this burgeoning awareness, human-being is revealed as having the capacity to become resolute in its turning towards who it is and turning towards whom it may authentically become. It is further argued that the mortal and finite nature of human-being is mostly hidden from human-being by its becoming 'suppressed' both within the average way of being and within the technological presence.

An exploration is made of how human-being interrogates, interprets and comes to an understanding of itself and world. It is shown that this way of interpreting is consistent with the understanding of human-being as maintained within this project and is at odds with that which posits 'world' as an object over against human-being as subject. It is shown that human-being is immersed within the world in such a way that it is always that entity which **already** understands. It is argued that within this understanding, human-being requires neither an epistemological authority to act, nor a reflexive stance to accurately interpret.

Immersement is shown to be the ordinary way that human-being abides in the world, an immersement that must neither be 'taken for granted' nor 'edited out' in any reckoning of what it is to be human. As 'immersed' and only as such, has human-being the capacity to become transformed. The writer demonstrates and illustrates this latter principle by locating himself explicitly within the stream of personal transformation by exploring this immersement within a separate chapter and by

linking and locating the genesis and progression of this research project within that transformational stream.

This dissertation contributes to an understanding of the various pathways to personal human transformation, (whether those pathways be either authentic **or** inauthentic). In addition it contributes to an understanding of how authentic transformation is experienced, the obstacles to such transformation and how human-being may come to sustain itself resolutely within an orientation towards its own genuine transformational possibilities. It also contributes to an understanding of the extreme difficulties entailed in embracing the consequences of relating to Dasein as Dasein (especially to those relationships within the psychotherapeutic encounter) and raises questions of how such relationships may become possible.

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## ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT

AWP	Heidegger, Martin: The Age of the World Picture
BPP	Heidegger, Martin: Basic Problems of Phenomenology
BT	Heidegger Martin: Being and Time
COCP	Heidegger, Martin: Conversation on a Country Path
COT	Heidegger, Martin: Concept of Time
CTP	Heidegger, Martin: Contributions to Philosophy
EPTT	Heidegger, Martin: The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking
FCM	Heidegger, Martin: The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics
HCT	Heidegger, Martin: History of the Concept of Time
HHTI	Heidegger, Martin: Holderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'
HOF	Heidegger, Martin: Ontology – History of Facticity
ID	Heidegger, Martin: Identity and Difference
ITM	Heidegger, Martin: An Introduction to Metaphysics
LOH	Heidegger, Martin: Letter on Humanism
MA	Heidegger, Martin: Memorial Address
MFL	Heidegger, Martin: The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic
MIN	Heidegger, Martin: Mindfulness
OHF	Heidegger, Martin: Ontology — The Hermeneutics of Facticity
OWA	Heidegger, Martin: The Origin of the Work of Art
OWL	Heidegger, Martin: On the Way to Language
PAR	Heidegger, Martin: Parmenides
PLT	Heidegger, Martin; Poetry, Language, Thought
POW	Heidegger, Martin: Psychology of Worldviews
QCT	Heidegger, Martin: The Question Concerning Technology
SUPP	Heidegger, Martin: Supplements
SZ	Heidegger, Martin: Sein Und Zeit
TDP	Heidegger, Martin: Towards the Definition of Philosophy
TT	Heidegger, Martin: The Turning
TWTL	Heidegger, Martin: The Way to Language

WIM	Heidegger, Martin: What Is Metaphysics?
PTWIM	Heidegger, Martin: Postscript to 'What is Metaphysics?'
WON	Heidegger, Martin: The Word of Nietzsche
ZOLL	Heidegger, Martin: Zollikon Seminars

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
'Das Uneigentliche hat immer den Anschein des Eigenlichen. Darum meint der Manische, jetzt sei er eigentlich er oder sich selbst.'<sup>i</sup>

('The inauthentic always has the appearance of the authentic. Therefore, the manic human being believes that he is authentically himself or that he is [really] himself.')<sup>ii</sup>

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<sup>i</sup> Heidegger, Martin, (1994) (2006) *Zollikoner Seminare* Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, p.219

<sup>ii</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.174.



"This drawing should only illustrate that human existing in its essential ground is never just an object which is present-at-hand; it is certainly not a self-contained object. Instead, this way of existing consists of "pure", invisible, intangible capacities for receiving-perceiving what it encounters and what addresses it. In the perspective of the Analytic of Dasein, all conventional objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be abandoned in favour of an entirely different understanding. This new view of the basic constitution of human existence may be called Dasein, or being-in-the-world ... to exist as Dasein means to hold open a domain through its capacity to receive-perceive the significance of the things that are given to it and that address it by virtue of its own "clearing". Human Dasein as a domain with the capacity for receiving-perceiving is never merely an object present-at-hand. On the contrary, it is not something which can be objectified at all under any circumstances."

i

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<sup>i</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987) .pp.3-4.).

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to explore the nature of personal transformation, the way people change and how those changes might be interpreted and understood. The perspective is held that personal transformation is an important human experience, one that can occur at any moment and under any circumstance. It is also held that personal transformation can be inhibited in many different ways and that these ways are mostly hidden. The approach I will be taking differs from, for example, a Freudian analysis and seeks always to remain with a pivotal concept within this thesis, namely, that humans always have their being in the world and that 'world' can never be separated out from who humans are or from how they experience.

This thesis takes as its primary mode of analysis, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) explication of human being. In order to explore and to test the perspective that personal transformations are important human experiences, that much inhibits, prevents, distorts and extinguishes those transformations, and that world and human being are inseparable, I will use Martin Heidegger's understanding of human being and world, as explicated within *'Being and Time'* (1927) (1962)<sup>1</sup>, as the principal text. If there could be an epigram to this dissertation then it would have to be Heidegger's observation during one seminar in a course of seminars held (over a period of fifteen years in the Swiss town of Zollikon) in conjunction with his friend Medard Boss the noted psychotherapist:

*'Das Uneigentliche hat immer den Anschein des Eigenlichen. Darum meint der Manische, jetzt sei er eigentlich er oder sich selbst.'*<sup>2</sup>

*('The inauthentic always has the appearance of the authentic. Therefore, the manic human being believes that he is authentically himself or that he is [really] himself.')*<sup>3</sup>

This statement encapsulates many of the challenges I face in my attempt to unfold what it is to experience human transformation and the many ways personal transformation may be authentic or inauthentic, genuine or fake. A primary challenge is to tackle the deceitful manifestation of what is inauthentic in its guise as the authentic. Because ordinary everyday existence has to be rendered intelligible, not only to those who already have complex relationships and positions within the world, but also to those successive generations who will depend upon the world being rendered intelligible to them, this average everyday sort of intelligibility has to be one readily available, one with very little barrier between it and those co-opted within its ambit. Consequently, it possesses a very public persona, one that has very

little to do with the unique genuine possibilities of individual human beings and much more to do with a generalised understanding of what the world is (and how the individual is to fit within it). My position is that this way of being manages to render itself invisible through the comprehensive persistence of its presence and the public nature of its average intelligibility. As the principle mode of intelligibility it also disguises itself as a principal mode of inauthenticity. It is as if 'the inauthentic always has the appearance of the authentic' and that the mark of inauthenticity is the distinctive way in which it cloaks itself within an authentic appearance.

In addition, it is my argument that there is also a 'technological presence' which impinges itself upon human beings' capacity to experience authentic personal transformation, one that is equally invisible, equally present, equally potent and equally beyond any notion of personal control. I argue that within this presence human beings become treated as raw material, as standing by, waiting to be used as workers, researchers, consumers, travellers or in any of the ways they can be imagined as occupying. This 'technological presence' is a major Heideggerian explication of human life, of human way of being, within the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. This presence is deceptive and deceiving in that the instruments and the 'content' of the 'technological' always appear to be means to an end, the 'technical' answer to a 'technical' problem. Certainly, I and the rest of Western humanity are surrounded by handy equipment which we treat as readily available machine technology for our use, as and when we choose. But, the very technicity, the tangibility and concrete nature of this machine technology glosses over the (hidden) nature of that within which it (and ourselves) appear, in that, the phenomena of the technological presence become identified as the presence itself.

One of the most important and central challenges of this dissertation is to explore the smoke and mirrors that surround notions of human personal transformation. It is with this in mind that Heidegger's capacity to identify these mirages, to deconstruct them and to expose their deceitfulness has led me to follow his explications. If it is the case that things are not what they appear to be, that the inauthentic always has the appearance of the authentic and that which is most hidden is also that which is most present, then much attention must be paid to these and the ways they impinge upon human capacity for personal transformation. In addition to the above, Heidegger also identifies another major inhabitant to personal transformation, namely, the capacity of human being to pretend that it is immortal. By opting for this interpretation of existence (one that leaves out the radical mortal finitude of its own



life) human being disables itself from ever engaging with its own genuine possibility to become authentic. I will argue that this latter is a major inhibitant, possibly the most undermining of all, in that death becomes treated as simple demise, an event happening mostly to other people. In this avoidance of death, what becomes denied is that no one can ever die my death for me (only I can). By opting (as it were) for immortality, humans come to deny their own unique temporality in favour of one that allays anxiety through dynamic distraction. It is this latter notion that connects closely with Heidegger's observation 'the manic human being believes that he is authentically himself or that he is [really] himself.'<sup>4</sup> Part of my intention will be to peel back the various presentations of this manic dynamic distraction in order to look at how human transformation is possible and how it is experienced.

Fascination with personal transformation has stemmed from my earliest years and has been pivotal not only in the directions my own life has taken but also in my motivation to begin and to continue with this research. In order to keep this involvement with personal transformation to the fore and to acknowledge my own immersement within it, I will produce a schematic representation of the research process to outline the various ways in which threshold experiences of my own personal transformation have preceded and intersected with it. By bringing these two together, my intention will be to lessen the barrier between them and to show how they have influenced my choice of research and its primary mode of analysis. In addition to this there will be testimony by myself of various threshold experiences that have been personally formational. This testimony will focus on two 'big' dreams from my childhood and the way they have influenced my becoming a counsellor, counsellor trainer, counselling course director, course designer and researcher into counselling practice and theory. The purpose is to reveal the inherent connectedness that exists within human existence, between world and human life and the way that that connectedness enables understanding and interpretation. The preferred mode of interpretation within this dissertation is a Heideggarian hermeneutical one, and a full explication of this term is contained within Chapter Three. Briefly, it can be encapsulated in the following terms:

*'The major assertion by Heidegger about hermeneutics is that nothing is given outside the web of practical and conceptual references. Rather, everything is interpreted from within a specific position within a pre-existing order of referentiality.'*<sup>5</sup>

Inevitably, some tension must exist between what is revealed, at the level of personal transformation and the manner in which that transformation might come to be understood, consequently:

*'There is a major tension between hermeneutics as revelation and rationality ... both co-exist, as do poetry and philosophy, everyday psychological understanding and that of therapists. Beliefs, rules, rationality and precise definitions co-exist with the more immediate, tacit lived and situated forms of understanding.'*<sup>6</sup>

One of the central features of this dissertation will be its repudiation of the Cartesian subject/object perspective which is entirely at odds with the hermeneutical perspective namely, that 'everything is interpreted from within a specific position within a **pre-existing** order of referentiality.'<sup>7</sup> It is with this in mind that my personal immersion within the research process and its 'pre-existing order of referentiality' will be brought well to the fore both as exemplar of the method and as 'evidence' in response to the research question. This connectedness of human being to its own unseverable world, i.e., its 'pre-existing order of referentiality' will be a constant theme within this dissertation and a major concept in interpreting how human being experiences personal transformation.

A particular understanding of human being has been adopted and remained with throughout this dissertation as if in response to the question, 'who is it being transformed?'. The challenges thrown up by this understanding are in direct conflict with substantialist interpretations consequently, 'all conventional objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology [have been] abandoned in favour of an entirely different understanding.'<sup>8</sup> That this interpretation is in direct conflict with 'default' understandings occurring within psychology, psychiatry (and some branches of psychotherapy and counselling) has become apparent as this research has progressed. In order to explore this, a review of the history of counselling and psychotherapy was carried out which revealed that their roots have a deep anchorage not only in the soil of behaviourist objectivist approaches, but also in Freudian thinking about structural interpretations of the human psyche. The temptations to 'objectify' human being and to employ metaphors that reinforce such a perspective have been many and legion, nevertheless I have attempted to remain with the 'extreme' position explicated by Heidegger and to unfold the consequences of such. In that unfolding, attention has been paid to the preconditions expected of any psychotherapeutic practitioner who wishes to engage in a therapeutic encounter, as explicated by Heidegger. The term 'extreme-minimum' has been employed to

focus attention upon the difficulties of practising within this particular orientation and the necessity for any practitioner to undergo a substantial experience of personal transformation. As the research has evolved, it has become apparent that there exists a hard adamantine situation where to 'be' as human being within Heidegger's explication, is disclosed as having a hard uncompromising edge. I have attempted to remain with the hardness of that edge and have not attempted to ameliorate in any way anything that would render it more acceptable or more viable as a therapeutic approach.

Fascination with personal transformation has stemmed from my earliest years and has been a primary impetus in initiating and continuing with this research. Nevertheless, the precipitating event that actually brought this into being was face-to-face contact (as course director and lecturer) with adult students on a counselling training programme. Being with them as they underwent their difficult and often painful pathways to personal transformation, discoursing with them and tutoring them, encouraged me to use their testimony for researching their experiencing of personal transformations. Subsequently, tape recordings were made and full transcriptions created of our one-to-one interviews. I had already built the basis of a philosophical approach several years earlier, in the completion of a Masters degree which had examined existential presentations within a private counselling practice (using an entirely Heideggarian mode of explication). In this later project, as my engagement with the Heideggarian corpus intensified, so the orientation of my research changed. No longer were the written protocols (so painstakingly created) the primary basis of interest. Instead, the **general** notion of what constituted human personal transformation (and the possibility of its being unfolded within a Heideggarian approach) became the primary focus of attention and motivation. In other words there had been a fundamental shift from an 'empirical' type approach to an exclusively Heideggarian one. Once that shift had been made (and the **real** heart of my interest exposed) my enthusiasm increased and the focus of my research sharpened. This focus has continued and constitutes a most important element in the unfolding of this project. For me, this shift is entirely consistent with a Heideggarian notion of how human being comes to understanding; 'interpretation [is not] the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding.'<sup>9</sup> In that 'working-out' the subsidiary element in the title of this dissertation: '*with reference to a counselling training programme*', although enjoining the initiating impulse of that original student group, now more pertinently refers to the theme of

psychotherapeutic encounter as a relationship of personal transformation (and to the position of counsellors/psychotherapists/students/clients within it).

Chapter One is devoted to exploring a history of counselling from the perspective of three broad paradigms; The Psychodynamic Therapeutic Paradigm, The Cognitive-Behavioural Therapeutic Paradigm, and The Humanistic Psychotherapeutic Paradigm. A brief overview of the contemporary situation 'sets the scene' by giving special attention to integrationist developments within and between differing psychotherapeutic 'schools'. A rationale for paradigms as a methodological tool is developed (with characteristics of a possible counselling paradigm being outlined). The Psychodynamic Therapeutic Paradigm is posited as foundational to counselling and particular attention is paid to the contribution of Breuer (and of Freud in particular). The manner in which human being is viewed, therapeutic 'outcomes' as a result of that and the nature of the therapeutic relationship are discussed. Foundational ideas (such as the 'unconscious') are contextualised as major contributors (as is the paradigm itself) to the evolution of an 'alternate conscious paradigm'. It is noted that the complexity and bulk of Freud's theories provide psychodynamic practitioners with a profound source to draw on and focuses on the individual through innate drives and defence mechanisms (and the control thereof).

The Cognitive-Behavioural Psychotherapeutic Paradigm is identified as embracing Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) as the intervention most likely to be offered to Western clients in health-care systems. The formative beginnings of this orientation are examined in the work of the behavioural psychologist, J.B. Watson who claimed that 'consciousness is neither a definite nor usable concept.' The work of later behaviourists, Skinner and Wolpe are reviewed, as are the consequent emerging connections created between experimental psychology and psychotherapy. The work of Beck and of Ellis marks a rejection of the Freudian psychoanalytical approach (and its psychically historical approach) as well as a rejection of the behaviourist' failure to take into account their clients' own comments and reflections on their thoughts, life and emotions. Both cognitive-behavioural therapists and rational-emotive therapists seek to correct irrational thinking. Recent developments within CBT have found inspiration outside the cognitive-behavioural tradition through 'mindfulness' approaches and the adoption of Buddhist meditative practices, philosophy and attitudes.

The Humanistic Psychotherapeutic Paradigm focuses primarily on the work of Carl Rogers and his client-centred/person-centred approach. This approach is revealed as pivotal in the development of counselling and is one of the most widely used orientations whose ideas and methods have been integrated into other approaches. The publication of Rogers' six conditions (which he argues have to exist in order for 'constructive personality change to occur') has influenced the practice and development of counselling as a discrete 'lay' profession. A foundational concept for Rogers is the 'actualising tendency' an underlying 'mainspring of life' that promotes psychic growth. His humanistic approach is based on the notion of a human striving to meet inner needs and to accomplish self-actualisation.

Chapter Two builds up a picture of human being based entirely on a Heideggarian explication (with primary attention given to his major publication, *Being and Time*) and represents a sustained understanding of human existence worked with in this dissertation. Substantialist interpretations of human existence are rejected in favour of human being as a unitary entity whose existence cannot be severed from being-in-the-world. All notions of human being as a self-contained capsule-like psyche surrounded by an external world (within which it is contained) are challenged. Human existence is revealed as ever open to the claims of world, claims so overwhelming that human life becomes subsumed under their weighty blandishments. As a consequence, human being has a tendency to turn away from its own genuine possibilities in order to assuage the challenges inherent in its own finitude and to remain inauthentically orientated. The pathway to an authentic way of being is viewed as a modification of inauthenticity. The term 'Dasein' ('being-there') for human kind signifies a shift away from previous understandings of 'man' or 'mankind' or the 'rational animal' and is a term used in this special way throughout the dissertation. Dasein has the capacity to become resolutely oriented toward its own genuine possibilities by turning toward the angst of its own essential finitude and thereby modifying its tendency to becoming overpowered.

Chapter Three is in a dialogic relationship with Chapter Two and explores the ways in which human being interprets and understands. Attention is drawn to the manner in which human being already possesses understanding and the way it is always immersed in a process of interpretation. It is argued that personal transformation always takes place within a world already interpreted and understood. A review of phenomenological tradition and orientation is carried out with particular attention being paid to Edmund Husserl's pivotal contribution and the manner of its divergence from a Heideggarian one. An explication of Heidegger's



hermeneutics reveals that it is the ordinary mode in which Dasein interprets itself. Within this approach the view is taken that 'the fundamental structures of human existence are not on open display'<sup>10</sup> and that 'it is the task of philosophical hermeneutics to uncover what is not immediately apparent.'<sup>11</sup>

Chapter Four locates human being within a definite technological 'social' context and explores the lineaments its dominance (one implicit throughout Heidegger's work) but identified by him explicitly only in his later thought. It is within this, that human being is immersed and out of which it has the capacity to emerge and be transformed. This technological presence is not mere technicity (in the form of plain machinery and equipment) but represents a 'modern disclosure of being... revealed as a raw material for the aggressive transformation into resources.'<sup>12</sup> As a disclosure of being, and not mere technicity, this technology is beyond human control, one that hides itself through the prevailing immediacy of its presence. It is argued that this '...technology is not a human project at all... it is a meaning pattern in which we cease to be human... and are transformed into materials and numbers.'<sup>13</sup> It is suggested that this presence has a powerfully formative influence upon the possibility of personal transformation, an influence that must always be taken into account within any psychotherapeutic encounter.

Chapter Five is in two parts, the first includes autobiographical material in the form of two 'big' dreams in my life as they are indicative of Heideggarian immersement and are interpreted as having been formatively influential in the creation of this research project and in who I have become in order to do this. Figurative material is introduced in the form of a drawing by Heidegger (also present at the beginning of this dissertation) in which human existence is illustrated as an essentially open domain. This drawing provides a link with (and a thematic presence within) the second part of this chapter in which substantialist interpretations of human being and human existence are rejected. The consequences of rejecting these substantialist interpretations are examined and are discovered to be of the difficult and unfamiliar (particularly within counselling and psychotherapy). 'Stress' is seen as an unavoidably weighty characteristic of human being-in-the-world and not simply an occasional psychological 'mood' or 'condition'. The notion of an 'extreme-minimum' is introduced to highlight the challenge of having **first** to become transformed oneself in order to meet the other as Dasein (particularly in therapy). The overall purpose of this chapter is to draw together themes relevant to an understanding of human being as Dasein, the

consequences of accepting such, their significance to psychotherapeutic encounters/personal transformation and the demanding nature inherent in embracing this approach.

## END NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Heidegger, Martin, (1927) (1962) *Being And Time* [Macquarrie, J. & Robinson E. Trans.] Oxford: Blackwell.

<sup>2</sup> Heidegger, Martin, (1994) (2006) *Zollokiner Seminare* Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, p.219.

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger, Martin, (2001) *Zollikon Seminars* Evanston: Northwestern University Press, p.174.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger, Martin, (2001), p.174.

<sup>5</sup> Owen, Ian Rory, (2006), *Psychotherapy And Phenomenology* New York: iUniverse, Inc. p.250.

<sup>6</sup> Owen, Ian Rory, (2006), p.256.

<sup>7</sup> Owen, Ian Rory, (2006), p.250.

<sup>8</sup> Zoll, (2001), p.4.

<sup>9</sup> BT. pp.188-189.

<sup>10</sup> Polkinghorne, Donald, (2000), pp.120-121.

<sup>11</sup> Polkinghorne, Donald, (2000), pp.120-121.

<sup>12</sup> Borgman, Albert, (2000), p.69.

<sup>13</sup> Svenaeus, Frederik, (2006), p.422.



## CHAPTER ONE

### HISTORY OF COUNSELLING

#### **Preliminary considerations, contemporary developments, setting the scene:**

The intention of this section is sevenfold: first, to introduce the subject of separate schools of counselling and psychotherapy, second, to create a foil against which a 'history of counselling and psychotherapy' might be set, third, to discuss whether the concept of 'progress' in the development of counselling and psychotherapy is an appropriate one, fourth, to expose some of the dynamics within the present situation of counselling and psychotherapy, fifth, to raise the question of whether 'tension between integration and purity' is new or ongoing, sixth, to explore the nature of 'revolution' and its relationship to counselling and psychotherapy and seventh, to adopt a mode of analysis that might approach addressing many of the above.

In carrying out a summary and review of counselling and psychotherapy, its history and development and of the current situation as he sees it, Claringbull makes the observation that:

*'Historically, traditional therapists have associated themselves with the various individual models of therapy ... and so have tended to remain purist adherents of their various counselling and psychotherapy schools. However, these allegiances are breaking down, some say already broken, as the evidence mounts that client 'cure' rates are consistent across the schools and that it is unlikely that any particular therapy model is better than its rivals.'*<sup>1</sup>

He argues that for many years, writers within the field of counselling and psychotherapy have been uncovering similarities and parallel affinities that exist within the well-established psychotherapeutic 'schools' and have floated the idea that 'by isolating those commonalities and by focusing on providing them, therapists could maximise the help that they can give their clients.'<sup>2</sup> One of the important contributors to this integrationist approach, cited by McLeod, is Jerome Frank<sup>3</sup> who isolated five primary elements which he identifies as the effective means (across all psychotherapeutic endeavours) that leads to therapeutic effectiveness:

*'... the creation of a supportive relationship, the provision of a rationale by which the client can make sense of his or her problems, the installation of hope, the expression of emotion, and the participation by both client and therapist in healing rituals.'*<sup>4</sup>

And that the interventions and procedures within discrete psychotherapeutic orientations, such as 'free association, interpretation, systematic desensitisation, disowning irrational beliefs, reflection of feeling'<sup>5</sup> are of secondary significance.

Within the British context, Claringbull reveals that by 2008 the integrationist model of counselling and psychotherapy was present 'on over half of the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy's accredited training programmes'<sup>6</sup> and that integrationist models, emanating from within already established psychotherapeutic 'schools', have already been developed. Of these latter he cites, 'the Cognitive-analytic Theory (Ryle, 1990)<sup>7</sup>, the Five Relationships Model (Clarkson, 1995, 2003)<sup>8</sup> and the Relational- Developmental Model (Evans and Gilbert, 2005)<sup>9</sup>'.<sup>10</sup> Earlier American meta-analyses of the psychotherapeutic literature also point towards a commonality of effectiveness between the various competing single-focused schools:

*'Despite volumes devoted to the theoretical differences among different schools of psychotherapy, the results of research demonstrate negligible differences in the effects produced by different therapy types.'*<sup>11</sup>

Likewise, the meta-analysis of Wampole, et al., also came up with the finding:

*'That when treatments intended to be therapeutic are compared, the true differences between all such treatments is zero.'*<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, Harwood et al., whilst noting that '[psychotherapeutic] practitioners prefer naturalistic research over randomized clinical trials... or single-case studies over group designs and individualised over group measures of outcome'<sup>13</sup> conclude that:

*'Theoretical integration is widely practised but may be too abstract to provide clear and practical guidance to implement treatments ... [but] the theoretical and practical foundations of CT provide a framework and platform for the development of strategic eclectic interventions. CT has traditions, such as adherence to empirical guidelines, a foundation in sound measurement, and an absence of confounding theoretical constructs, that provide a suitable environment to extend the use of cognitive interventions and to apply them more discriminately than is typically done.'*<sup>14</sup>

Another American study, 'the most methodologically sophisticated study ever done',<sup>15</sup> compared two different approaches to psychotherapy over a fixed period of sixteen sessions. Their conclusion was:

*'Across a range of indicators, the study found no significant differences between the effectiveness of CBT and interpersonal therapy, with both psychological therapies somewhat superior to the placebo condition but marginally less effective than the anti-depressant.'*<sup>16</sup>

In addition (though pointing in a slightly different direction) the work of Orlinsky, Grawe and Parks in reviewing 'over 2,500 studies in process-outcome research have distilled a number of key relationship forces which have been considered by researchers:

- *The positive engagement in therapy by client and/or therapist*
- *The interactive coordination –the ability of both parties to work together on the therapeutic task*
- *Rapport or empathic communication*
- *Affective attitude, the communication of positive regard in the relationship*
- *Experiential congruence...the development of a common understanding of what is happening in the relationship.*<sup>17</sup>

For Claringbull, counselling is now within, to use Kuhn's<sup>18</sup> terminology, a revolutionary phase, one that points towards an ever increasing professionalisation of its practitioners through a movement to establish formal state accreditation coupled with an intensifying requirement that counsellors possess approved university degrees (with the added likelihood that those degrees be generic in nature):

*'inspection of the generic core competencies indicates ... counsellors ... need to study to at least Honours level ... need ... an understanding of a complex body of knowledge ... analytic techniques and problem-solving ... [need to be] able to evaluate evidence, argument and assumptions ... reach sound judgements.'*<sup>19</sup>

Any shift from the present situation (whereby practitioners choose their own disciplinary matrix, theoretical orientation and therapeutic practice) to one in which neophyte counsellors would be obliged to undergo the usual undergraduate preparation for a first degree, would also embrace the possibility of subverting the 'usual' (and current) age-profile of candidates to the profession. In summarising the present situation and speculating on possible future outcomes, Claringbull notes that:

*'Currently, counselling is almost exclusively entered by very committed mature students who want to train on a part-time basis. Indeed, many training courses set the minimum age of 30 years for their recruits. However the economics of higher education in the UK favours full-time undergraduates who usually come from sixth forms or further education colleges. This demand generates graduates who are mainly 18 to 21 years old and who may, or may not, be committed to their particular fields of study.'*<sup>20</sup>

He then goes on to draw a comparison between the 'typical' candidate for counsellor training, presently existent, and the possible future profile of future candidates:

*'Today's typical counsellor is probably female, 40 and fully committed. Tomorrow's counsellor might well be metro- sexual, maturity-light and multipurposed –another therapeutic revolution?'*<sup>21</sup>

This drift in the direction of therapeutic revolution appears to consist of three important elements; a desire to make counselling a discrete profession, one having a generic knowledge base and one with a core of proven therapeutic practices. In addition, existent single schools

of psychotherapy are perceiving themselves as ‘core’ orientations having the capacity to bring other orientations under the umbrella of their own disciplinary matrix. For example, within Cognitive Behavioural Psychotherapy, Leahy identifies the importance of the psychodynamic concept of ‘transference’ and its usefulness within his own practice. So, under the sub heading ‘Using the counter-transference’<sup>22</sup> he is able to claim that:

*‘The therapist is not a neutral object onto which internal dynamics are projected. Rather, the therapist is a dynamic part of the patient’s interpersonal world...’<sup>23</sup>*

In addition, Leahy asserts:

*‘cognitive models of psychotherapy can be enhanced by incorporating the roles of both emotional processing and social interaction in understanding the therapeutic relationship...[and that] the therapist and patient can use cognitive, experiential, emotion-focused, emotional schema, and compassionate mind techniques to modify the rulebook that the patient has been using...’<sup>24</sup>*

Perhaps the possibility also now exists for concepts, theories and practices from other schools to undergo modification and development **outside** the ambit of their own disciplinary matrix (through being utilised pragmatically by other core orientations). Certainly within Existential Therapy, for example, there appears recognition that a ‘purist’ position is no longer sustainable. This recognition (that other orientations have the capacity to endow it with a rich seam of practices) has been highlighted by one of its leading theorists when she expresses her desire to create:

*‘an on-going dialogue with other similar approaches, such as the person-centred one, Gestalt, personal construct theory, and some forms of cognitive therapy, also with psychodynamic therapy.’<sup>25</sup>*

The ‘added-value’ for existential therapists, in this desired on-going dialogue, is seen in their being able to ‘learn much from these different approaches’<sup>26</sup> for example:

*‘From Gestalt (Perls et al., 1951)<sup>27</sup> and experiential therapists (Mahrer, 1996)<sup>28</sup>, for instance, existential therapists could learn a range of strategies for helping clients reflect on their experiences more fully, and from personal construct therapists (such as Kelly, 1955<sup>29</sup>) they could develop their understanding of polarities and dilemmas.’<sup>30</sup>*

In addition, Existential Psychotherapy has benefited from integrationist contributions from a most unlikely source and has developed a sub-therapy as a consequence of that encounter:

*‘Behaviour therapy and, even more so, clinical behaviour analysis might be the last place one would look to find modern expressions of some of the core ideas of humanistic thought. Nevertheless, over the past 20 years a post-Skinnerian tradition has emerged within behaviour analysis that builds a bridge between humanism/existentialism and behaviourism... Rather, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) and the analysis of language and tradition which it is based ... in an exploration and extension of a certain type of functional behavioural thinking. What has resulted is an end product that overlaps in many ways with the core values and considerations of integrative experiential approaches.’<sup>31</sup>*

Likewise, from within a Person –centred orientation, Worsley argues that as integrationist practices are already existent within a wider understanding of human experience, they can, as such, be appropriated legitimately within the ‘idiosyncratic’, tradition that a person-centred approach enjoins. For him, ‘integration is about the stretching of my boundaries and presuppositions to allow into my experiencing as much as I can about the world as I see it.’<sup>32</sup> He argues that the rigid paradigm-constructs of well established schools of psychotherapy are highly excluding of concepts and terms that do not form part of their usual and ‘normal’ paradigm discourse, consequently it ‘make[s] them prone to a level of dysfunction’.<sup>33</sup> On the more practical level of how he actually relates as a counsellor to his own clients, Worsley reveals his indebtedness to other figures and orientations and acknowledges the contribution, for example, of Eric Berne (1910-1970), founder of Transactional Analysis:

*‘Eric Berne made an important phenomenological observation: some of his client’s introjects seem to be out of the client’s awareness, while others are inwardly audible by the client as if an alien voice were speaking to them...in seeking to understand my clients, Berne’s construct helps me to hear more clearly the differences in the ways clients contact the past...Berne’s phenomenological observation of clients is a valued insight, aiding attention and empathy, while I remain neutral as to the value of his derived concepts.’<sup>34</sup>*

It seems significant, that Worsley is not overly concerned with the actual provenance of concepts from other orientations but is more focused on whether they are able to fit in with the particular stage his client is ‘at’ and whether they are likely to be useful within the therapeutic alliance. Likewise, in paying tribute to the contribution of Gestalt Therapy within his practice, he says:

*‘One aspect of the Gestalt theory of awareness is the Cycle of Experience...To complete the cycle is to be functional. Dysfunction is in the interruption of this cycle... How might the cycle of experience be useful? I find that being aware that some clients interrupt their own experience helps my empathy. Yet, from time to time making this explicit is helpful... the concept from Gestalt acts as an item of language by which to understand experiencing.’<sup>35</sup>*

Within the psychodynamic sphere, integration has taken on a somewhat different configuration. Whereas other disciplinary matrices have utilised concepts and practices from **outside** their specific paradigm boundaries, the psychodynamic approach has tended to remain **inside** its own paradigm boundaries by drawing on divergences and convergences that have arisen (as for example) around such subjects as motivation and psychopathology. Nevertheless, there has been a hastening of this process, one that points toward an underlying trend from which no psychotherapeutic approach, apparently, seems immune:

*‘In spite of the commonalities present in the core sensibility and main points of view that define the psychodynamic approach, the field is faced for the time being with accepting a pluralist situation—the*



*existence of well-developed competing approaches, each with its own models and assumptions. Nevertheless, as the psychodynamic tradition enters its second century, there have also been signs of convergence and the beginnings of integration among these different approaches.*<sup>36</sup>

More generally, McLeod has identified four principal thematic strands in counselling integrationist trends: the Common factors approach, Theoretical integration, Assimilative integration and Collaborative pluralism. So, 'from a collaborative pluralist perspective, effective therapy makes use of change processes that are meaningful to the client',<sup>37</sup> the principal purpose being, 'to create opportunities for conversations between the client and therapist in which collaboration can take place around the construction of a set of therapy procedures that best fit the client's needs.'<sup>38</sup> In addition, the Common factors approach; 'emphasises a form of therapy practice based on client involvement, the therapeutic relationship and exploitation of extra-therapeutic events.'<sup>39</sup> Whilst, 'Theoretical integration suggests that existing approaches can be dismantled in terms of their component ideas and methods and reassembled into a new whole, which then constitutes a new form of therapy.'<sup>40</sup> Finally, 'Assimilative integration argues that therapy integration is driven by therapist development, as therapists introduce new elements into the theoretical approach in which they were initially trained.'<sup>41</sup>

At the beginning of this section it was claimed that allegiances are breaking down as the evidence mounts that client 'cure' rates are consistent across the schools and that it is unlikely that any particular therapy model is better than its rivals. Certainly there appear to be nodes of friction and points of tension at the interfaces between the various orientations as well as a bridging and a melding where they each symbiotically touch. Claringbull's apparently rhetorical question regarding the likelihood of 'another therapeutic revolution' seems to have some substance in that:

*'There is...a powerful trend towards finding ways of combining ideas and techniques developed within separate schools and approaches...there are also strong forces within the counselling and psychotherapy world acting in the direction of maintaining the purity of single-approach training institutes, professional associations and publications networks. The only prediction that would appear warranted would be that this tension between integration and purity is unlikely to disappear, and that it is to be welcomed as a sign of how creative and lively this field of study is at this time.'*<sup>42</sup>

### **How a history of counselling might be possible: the emergence of paradigms:**

I consider it to be of crucial importance to discuss 'how' a 'history of counselling and psychotherapy' might be made possible (and if such a history is possible, what the most

appropriate mode for its explication might be). In addition, an understanding of the history of counselling is considered important to provide a context for the main discussion of this dissertation namely: 'what are the modes of personal transformation for human beings and what constitutes their possibilities and what limits their fulfilment?' One of the striking features of this perspective will be a reliance on the Heideggarian explication of who human being is, an explication considered powerfully facilitative for interpreting, understanding and persistently foregrounding the unseverable human connection with world namely, the human 'pre-existing order of referentiality.'<sup>43</sup> This Heideggarian understanding of human being will connect and disconnect with various understandings of human being within past and present psychotherapeutic practice and theory. At times those understandings will be close and at other times at great distance. A history of counselling is therefore intended to expose those connections and disconnections and to assign a place to the Heideggarian position within it. Additionally, the Heideggarian position is intended to act as a foil to those other understandings and to be argued for as the preferred position.

It seems to me that the approach that best suits this purpose is a Kuhnian one<sup>44</sup> that interprets a history in terms of how paradigms and revolutions play a part. This approach, I believe, offers a mode of distinguishing between various 'schools' of counselling and psychotherapy whilst at the same time accounting for change. In addition, there is no obligation, within this mode, to account for change either in terms of 'progress' or simple 'cause-effect'. An additional aspect, of this approach, is that it allows a recognition that 'hermeneutic reinterpretation, the search for new and deeper interpretations, is the essence of many social scientific enterprises'<sup>45</sup> and that 'regular reinterpretation is part of the human sciences [because] social and political systems are themselves changing in ways that call for new interpretations.'<sup>46</sup> So what might a paradigm of counselling look like and what criteria might be established for such a paradigm?

Rocco (drawing on the work of Cottone<sup>47</sup>) and Kuhn establishes five criteria for a counselling paradigm. He indicates that:

*'First, a counselling paradigm must have a competitive paradigm against which it can be tested...*

*...Second, a paradigm must be philosophically distinct from its competitors, especially related to assumptions about the nature of problems and the focus of study...*

*...Third, a counselling paradigm must reframe the interpretation of cause and effect...*

*...Fourth, a paradigm must be practised by an identifiable professional group that, knowingly or unknowingly, adheres to its philosophy...*

*... [Fifth], a counselling paradigm must have or must have the potential to have a number of clearly identifiable counselling theories or therapeutic approaches incorporated under its framework...<sup>48</sup>*

With regard to the first criterion, Rocco indicates that 'there must be substantial anomalous, observational, or empirical evidence that is not supportive of the competitor paradigm'.<sup>49</sup> So for example if a particular problem within a specific paradigm cannot be adequately addressed within that paradigm 'in a way that holds true to its tenets'<sup>50</sup> then questions regarding the relevance of the paradigm to the presenting problem make an appearance. In other words, there is a "checking out" process that roams the existent paradigm for resolution and then only goes outside it if that resolution cannot be realised. This "checking out" process is inherently competitive, according to Rocco, in that there exists a perennial 'test of efficiency'<sup>51</sup> within any one paradigm. Out of this test lies the potential for the creation of new paradigms as well as the ongoing process of constant (competitive) comparison between one paradigm and another. With regard to the second criterion, 'paradigms ... must have distinguishable features at the level of philosophy.'<sup>52</sup> This distinctiveness refers almost exclusively to what is **assumed** to be the proper business of a particular paradigm. So, for example, within 'the systemic-relational paradigm, problems are designated in the **social** context, as inherent in relationships which are viewed as real and treatable processes.'<sup>53</sup> With regard to the third criterion, the notion of cause and effect undergoes a transformation with reference to the **framework** of the specific paradigm. Here, 'each paradigm... holds a precept'<sup>54</sup> about what is the case. So for example, within the medical paradigm, causes are usually seen as having a physical origin whereas, within a psychological paradigm, they are non-physical. Again, 'from the systemic-relational standpoint, cause is viewed as circular and embedded in relationships (i.e., people affect each other through their interactions).'<sup>55</sup> With regard to the fourth criterion, there must be a specific, recognisable and discernable body of professional practitioners who 'adhere to its philosophy'.<sup>56</sup> This adherence need not be of a consciously 'signed-up' nature (as in membership of a society) but may be more general in its nature. So for example, 'psychiatrists most typically adhere to the organic-medical paradigm.'<sup>57</sup> This adherence, therefore, may be characterised as being archetypal, distinctive and quintessential. With regard to the fifth and final criterion, a paradigm must combine specificity together with an openness to hold recognisable theories within its boundaries. So for example, a cognitive-behavioural paradigm might embrace Problem-Solving Therapy,



Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy, Cognitive Therapy, Schema Therapy and Mindfulness and Acceptance Intervention Therapy.

### **Paradigms: further considerations:**

At the opening of this section it was stated that:

*'Historically, traditional therapists have associated themselves with the various individual models of therapy ... and so have tended to remain purist adherents of their various counselling and psychotherapy schools. However, these allegiances are breaking down, some say already broken...'* <sup>58</sup>

A tone was therefore set for a history of counselling to be set against a background of change, transformation and revolution. In order to extend an understanding of paradigms and to supplement the five criteria already posited by Rocco, I shall make use of Kuhn's analysis of scientific paradigms and his explication of their nature and development. At the beginning of his analysis, Kuhn,<sup>59</sup> raises the question of whether a history (of science) is possible when interpreted in terms of incremental progress. As he sees the problem:

*'... historians of science have been finding it more and more difficult to fulfil the functions that the concept of development-by-accumulation of science to assigns to them.'* <sup>60</sup>

He then goes on to examine the 'steady state' any paradigm must possess (in order for it to remain distinctive) and observes that:

*'normal science, for example, often suppresses fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments.'* <sup>61</sup>

Nevertheless, from time to time something happens within the steady state of the paradigm that results in 'revealing an anomaly that cannot, despite repeated effort, be aligned with professional expectation.'<sup>62</sup> It is out of 'this tension between integration and purity'<sup>63</sup> that something approaching a revolution occurs. Notions of 'purity' and the steady state that apply to individual schools of counselling and psychotherapy, might well equate to Kuhn's understanding of 'the ability of scientists regularly to select problems that can be solved with conceptual and instrumental techniques close to those already in existence'<sup>64</sup> and might go some way to offer an explanation how that 'purity' is maintained and how change is resisted:

*'... an excessive concern with useful problems, regardless of their relation to existing knowledge and technique, can so easily inhibit scientific development.'* <sup>65</sup>

As has been indicated above, integrationist models, emanating from within already established psychotherapeutic 'schools', have already been developed and there appears a

hastening and expansion in this trend. It is at the interface between these 'schools' that Kuhn's understanding of a 'pre-paradigm' state has an approximately relevant value. For him, in order 'to be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.'<sup>66</sup> As this new paradigm begins to emerge, an amalgamation of practices and theories accrues around and within it, which in turn attracts other practitioners towards it. A new **community** is thereby created, one whose existence 'implies a new and more rigid definition of the field.'<sup>67</sup> This rigid defining not only hastens the development of the paradigm but also becomes characteristic of it. Those practitioners, who are unwilling or unable to accept these new defining rigidities, inevitably fall away or succumb to being ignored. The unyielding nature of the new explanations, classifications and interpretations, allows the individual 'practitioner' to embrace them as 'givens' and to work within them confidently without having to 're-invent the wheel' every time a problem arises and its solution is proposed. These rigidities, whether of old or of new or of an emerging pre-paradigm, are not underlying tenets or laws in the sense that they govern and direct the behaviour of the paradigm community. Characteristically, community members 'work from models acquired through education and through subsequent exposure to the literature often without quite knowing or needing to know what characteristics have given these models the status of community paradigms.'<sup>68</sup> If the community members remain satisfied that the solutions offered by standard and normative paradigm practices are beyond doubt, then the paradigm itself retains its integrity. No repeated reference to foundational canons needs to be invoked in order to legitimate the resolution of presented problems. However, 'the pre-paradigm period, in particular, is regularly marked by frequent and deep debates over legitimate methods, problems, and standards of solution.'<sup>69</sup> At this juncture, the matter of rules and preceptual conduct comes to the fore and gains an ascendancy, one that rapidly disappears again once the paradigm becomes consolidated. Nevertheless:

*'While paradigms remain secure, however, they can function without agreement over rationalization or without any attempted rationalization at all.'*<sup>70</sup>

### **Entering the paradigms: contextualisation: '**

*'The tale of personal or psychological therapy, which is also the tale of psychotherapy and the tale of counselling, is as old as the story of the human race... Humans have long tried to make sense of themselves and their worlds... That is why people have always used therapists, be they priests, gurus, wise ones, philosophers, doctors, good friends, or in fact just about anybody prepared to listen, as*

*sounding boards and as guides to help to try to bring some order into their inner and outer worlds. In other words, the role of the talking therapist goes back to the dawn of humanity*<sup>71</sup>

Perhaps it might be instructive, at this point, to recall the work of Frank<sup>72</sup> (at the beginning of this chapter) who isolated five primary elements which he identified as the effective means (across all psychotherapeutic endeavours) that leads to therapeutic effectiveness:

*'... the creation of a supportive relationship, the provision of a rationale by which the client can make sense of his or her problems, the installation of hope, the expression of emotion, and the participation by both client and therapist in healing rituals.'*<sup>73</sup>

My intention is to place a History of Counselling within an already ongoing endeavour, namely, the capacity of priests, gurus, wise ones, philosophers, doctors, good friends, or in fact just about anybody prepared to listen, to provide the five primary elements, identified by Frank and (perhaps) to do it very effectively. The intention, also, is to hold in mind the results of meta-analyses, which placed most of the major therapeutic approaches on a par (when it came to therapeutic effectiveness), a parity that existed irrespective of differing theoretical origins. In addition, I want to recognise those hidden precursors of counselling, psychotherapy and psychiatry, who, in a sense, must remain silent and mostly unacknowledged within such a history. Crabtree<sup>74</sup> reminds us that 'Psychological healing, as it is understood today, had its start with the discovery of magnetic sleep in 1789.'<sup>75</sup> and that the exploration of that phenomenon 'revealed a realm of activity not available to the conscious mind.'<sup>76</sup> Exploring that realm, in a methodical and organised manner through the induction of a hypnotic state, exposed a psychic sphere that was **other than** conscious. This sphere, which became manifest as magnet sleep '(artificially induced somnambulism)'<sup>77</sup> was in direct contrast to two previous paradigms that had been used for interpreting psychic states and psychic phenomena. The two paradigms which:

*'were most commonly called upon to explain mental aberrations: [were] the **intrusion paradigm**, which took them to be the result of the intervention from without of some spirit, demon, or sorcerer, and the **organic paradigm**, which ascribed them to physiological dysfunction.'*<sup>78</sup> [my emboldening].

It was the work of such pioneers in hypnotic induction<sup>79</sup> as Gassner (1727-1779), Mesmer (1734-1815), Puységur (1751-1825) and Charcot (1825-1893) that led to:

*'The **alternate-consciousness paradigm** [which] opened up the possibility of an intrapsychic cause of mental disturbance, pointing to the influence of unconscious mental activity as the source of unaccountable thoughts or impulses.'*<sup>80</sup> [my emboldening].

The emergence of this new paradigm 'made it possible to access and explore that realm systematically. **From that point a method of psychological healing based on a psychodynamic model was able to emerge.**'<sup>81</sup>

### **The Psychodynamic Therapeutic Paradigm:**

In this chapter I am going to discuss the three dominant paradigms in counselling and psychotherapy namely, the Psychodynamic, The Cognitive/Behavioural and The Humanistic. Very briefly and very crudely these can be outlined in the following manner:

*'Psychoanalytic theory focuses on the individual through innate drives and defence mechanisms related to anxiety and the control thereof, while humanistic theory is based on a striving to meet inner needs and to accomplish self-actualisation... cognitive- behavioural and rational-emotive therapists seek to correct irrational thinking.'*<sup>82</sup>

The paradigm to be discussed within this particular section will be The Psychodynamic. As suggested by the very term of the paradigm itself, the 'psycho' of 'psychodynamic' is connotative of 'psyche', that is of; 'spirit, soul, self....mind'<sup>83</sup> and the 'dynamic' of 'psychodynamic' of, 'power...to be able...energy...change...energetic movement or progression.'<sup>84</sup> Nevertheless, within the breadth of this general definition, whatever differences might persist between various branches and factions of the therapeutic paradigm itself, there does exist 'within the array of ideas and approaches that constitutes the psychodynamic tradition... a unity of outlook which holds the different strands together.'<sup>85</sup>

Within the unity of the psychodynamic approach there would probably be agreement that a principal point of interest would be 'psychological or emotional pain'<sup>86</sup> and that this pain would not only have many manifestations but be interpreted as 'anxiety and [be] conceptualised in terms of internal conflict.'<sup>87</sup> The presence of this pain would be premised upon recognition of human existence as inherently conflictual, arduous, burdensome, challenging and tough. In response, the 'psyche' would be seen as maturing under the formation of these energetic forces and reacting to their dynamic tumult. The intensity of these forces would be conceived as generating, within the individual, streams of mental commotion, and that the term 'dynamic' would be recognised as especially relating to this. The dynamism of this mental commotion would be regarded as giving rise to methods and stratagems, within the individual, for reducing (or avoiding) its hurtful or threatening presence and impact, consequently:

*'Means of avoiding pain are created: ways of seeing, thinking, feeling and behaving can all serve this purpose.'*<sup>88</sup>

By this means, the individual would protect him or herself from the impinging pressure through a wholesale response of sentience. These 'defence mechanisms' would not be seen as consciously adopted stratagems to particular threats (in fact, the individual would be seen as mostly unaware of either their purpose or existence). Nevertheless the existence of this alternative way of being, hidden from wakeful consciousness, would be recognised not only as having a powerful influence upon the individual but also as an 'internal world different from external reality.'<sup>89</sup> This internal reality, unconsciously and potently in existence (and premised largely on the avoidance of pain) would be regarded as being largely dysfunctional in its purported purpose. Its 'effect' upon the individual would be seen as blunting and restricting personal possibilities to safe and often inappropriate options. The mismatch between the defensive response mechanism of internal reality, its causative 'stimulus' in outer reality and the way in which it would be lived out within the individual, would be regarded as a 'psychopathological' condition. Therefore, from the psychodynamic therapeutic perspective:

*'Our failing defences are what give form to and maintain patterns of psychological disorder. They thus contribute to our difficulties in living, at least those that psychotherapy might properly help with.'*<sup>90</sup>

### **The basic foundations of psychotherapeutic counselling. The psychodynamic genesis:**

*'All counsellors and therapists, even those who espouse different theoretical models, have been influenced by psychodynamic thinking and have had to make up their minds whether to accept or reject the Freudian image of the person.'*<sup>91</sup> [my emboldening].

The purpose of this section is to outline the initial steps I consider foundational to the development and genesis of what is now understood as 'counselling' by placing it within a 'pre-existing order of referentiality'<sup>92</sup> (the aim being to connect it with modern and postmodern theory and praxis). The aim also, is to uncover foundational ideas that connect and disconnect with the research question, ones that will allow me to discuss them at a later stage. In addition many of these foundational ideas have either permeated or have been positively modified or positively rejected by the cognitive/behavioural and the humanistic paradigms. They also signify, within the modern era, the first systematic explorations of 'the talking cure.'

Earlier, it was said that 'the alternate-consciousness paradigm opened up the possibility of an intrapsychic cause of mental disturbance, pointing to the influence of unconscious mental activity as the source of unaccountable thoughts or impulses.'<sup>93</sup> This 'discovery' of unconscious mental disturbance and its influence upon the human psyche, cannot be underestimated. In some ways it may be regarded as a foundational moment in the development of psychotherapy as a discrete activity. Two pioneers in this field, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Josef Breuer (1842-1925), worked collaboratively on a ten year project in which they examined several patients 'suffering from symptoms attributable to hysteria.'<sup>94</sup> In his examination of one of these (Fraulein Anna O) Breuer reports that she suffered:

*'A psychosis of a peculiar kind, paraphasia, a convergent squint, severe disturbances of vision, paralyses (in the form of contractures) complete in the right upper and both lower extremities, partial in the left upper extremity, paresis of the neck muscles... a period of persistent somnambulism'*<sup>95</sup>

In addition, she manifested a plethora of other symptoms which were restricted to a particular state of being in which she experienced a series of hallucinations. For Breuer, this signified:

*'the existence of a second state of consciousness which first emerged as a temporary absence'*<sup>96</sup>

In addition:

*'her consciousness was constantly oscillating between her normal and her 'secondary' state.'*<sup>97</sup>

And,

*'Throughout the entire illness her two states of consciousness persisted side by side: the primary one in which she was quite normal psychically and the secondary one...'*<sup>98</sup>

It is during Breuer's analysis of Anna O, that two terms emerge for the first time, terms that were to become significant concepts within psychotherapy. First, Breuer in referring to his 'conversations' with Anna O, reports her as saying:

*'She aptly described this procedure, speaking seriously, as a 'talking cure', while she referred to it jokingly as 'chimney-sweeping'. '<sup>99</sup> [my emboldening].*

Up to then, the 'talking' in the 'cure' had mostly been done by the practitioners of hypnotic induction, in the form of instructions and suggestions to their subjects and patients, but:

*'Breuer and Freud's treatment essentially consisted of allowing the patient, rather than the doctor, to do most of the talking, an aspect of psychotherapy that has not changed to this day.'*<sup>100</sup>

Second, in recalling Anna O's second state of being, Breuer comments



*'...the patient was entirely clear and well-ordered in her mind and normal as regards her feeling and volition so long as none of the products of her secondary state was acting 'in the unconscious'.<sup>101</sup> [my emboldening].*

It should be noted that both Breuer and Freud were using hypnotic techniques at this time (late 1890s) to access their patients' alternate state of consciousness and that Breuer continued with this much longer than Freud. Even at the end of their ten year period of collaboration, Freud was still relying upon Breuer's perspective, namely:

*'...that hysteria is determined by traumatic experiences whose memory unconsciously reappears in a symbolic way in the symptoms of the illness and which can be cured by recalling the memory into consciousness.'<sup>102</sup>*

Unfortunately, Freud encountered a problem; 'I came upon the difficulty that a number of patients could not be hypnotised.'<sup>103</sup> His initial reaction was to abandon treatment, for in reliance upon Breuer's practice and theoretical position he still believed that 'I needed hypnosis to extend their memory in order to find the pathogenic recollections which were not present in their ordinary consciousness.'<sup>104</sup> But the stubborn resistance of some particular patients to any form of hypnotic induction challenged him to find a method that would 'bypass hypnosis and yet obtain pathogenic recollections.'<sup>105</sup> His new 'method' simply took the form of putting his patients into a relaxed position by asking them to lie down, close their eyes and, through his positively encouraging them, to focus on and then recall 'what had originally occasioned the symptom.'<sup>106</sup> This process proved successful in that his patients recalled distant memories and occurrences without resort to being hypnotically induced. This pathway to otherwise inaccessible memories led Freud to speculate that he, 'had to overcome a psychical force in the patients which was opposed to the pathogenic ideas becoming conscious (being remembered).'<sup>107</sup> It is from this position that he concluded that the memories, 'were all of a kind one would prefer not to have experienced, that one would rather forget.'<sup>108</sup> From then on he encouraged his patients to freely bring to mind and then discuss whatever they considered to be the source of their distress. Freud's conclusion was, 'that there had to be place where what was unacceptable to the conscious mind was repressed and held.'<sup>109</sup> It is from this that he deduced the existence of 'regions in the mental apparatus'<sup>110</sup> that came to be characterised as the 'unconscious'. From this he was able to construct what he believed to be its essential features:

*'...its processes pay little regard to reality; they are not bound by time; they are much more mobile than conscious processes, they can be displaced from one idea to another, or condensed into a form that is capable of expressing many different ideas, as is consciously expressed in the pun. Neither is the unconscious logical, so it can permit contradictions. When two wishful impulses whose aims must*

*appear to us as incompatible become simultaneously active, the two impulses do not diminish each other or cancel each other out, but combine to form an intermediate aim, a compromise. All these characteristics can be seen par excellence in dreams.*<sup>111</sup>

Freud's positing of the unconscious as belonging regionally to the 'mental apparatus' was perhaps more inferential than evidential, in that the existence of the unconscious could neither be directly accessed nor apprehended. Perhaps also its very positing, its very purported existence, served to answer a series of problems that could not otherwise be addressed without undermining the whole structure Freud had created around it:

*'It needs to be stressed that Freud's attempts to describe the unconscious were bold in the extreme, since by definition the unconscious in his psychology, like the deity in theology, is unseen and unknowable. To suggest that there is an unconscious is one thing; to attempt to outline its workings another. In practical terms the unconscious is best seen at work in its affects, or as Freud put it: 'the path led from symptoms to the unconscious to the life of the instincts, to sexuality'*<sup>112/113</sup>

Up to now, attention has been paid to the 'discovery' of an alternate consciousness paradigm, based upon the work of hypnotising practitioners, a discovery which allowed a systematic exploration of 'intra-psychic causes of mental disturbance.' The emergence of the 'talking cure' in its bypassing of hypnotic induction, opened up the possibility of accessing the source of a patient's hysterical symptomology, a source whose existence could only be inferred. In putting the patient at ease, inviting him/her to talk freely, encouraging him/her to review to reflect upon and to explore possible 'causes' of their distress, the foundations of a systematic counselling praxis and counselling therapeutic alliance were being laid down.

### **How the human being is viewed within the psychodynamic paradigm:**

More recent psychodynamic practitioners back away from Freud's notion of the unconscious as a 'region' or 'place' or structure, in favour of seeing it in a more metaphorical sense:

'...psychodynamic terms can be more fully understood and appreciated if they can be seen more as metaphors than as statements that are to be taken literally. The 'unconscious' is one of those metaphors.'<sup>114</sup> And again, but taking a broader interpretation, an assertion is made that; 'to describe 'personality' as having a 'structure'<sup>115</sup> is to use a metaphor that appears to give personality a definite form.'<sup>116</sup> Nevertheless, what does seem foundational from within a psychodynamic perspective (whether as metaphor or otherwise) is that:

*'We need some sort of working model of the mind as a framework within which to organise our experience, much as we need a map when embarking on a journey in unfamiliar territory.'*<sup>117</sup>



Hovering in the background is Freud's early 'intention... to construct an integrated model of the workings of the mind...',<sup>118</sup> a model that would continue to underpin later modifications and revisions of his theories. This model, being heavily influenced by his early interest in neurophysiology and his intention to 'translate in terms of energy... observed psychological data',<sup>119</sup> evinced a dynamic/energetic interpretation of psychic activity. For Freud, this energetic force, under pathological conditions would seek various forms of outlet:

*'...the quantities of physical energy circulating in the organism can choose different means of discharge, mental or somatic, in accordance with the degree of resistance or facilitation existing in the various networks.'*<sup>120</sup>

It was Freud's intention to institute some parallel affinity between the physical and the psychological, one that would still retain notions of a physical energy-based interpretation. In a way similar to pressurised 'quantities' of physical energy being enabled to find various outlets so also, within the psychic dimension, he postulated the possibility of corresponding psychic/somatic outlets. For him, the mind had to have a level of retained unrestricted and spontaneous psychic energetic forces to enable its proper functioning, a level that would not simply drain away through an automatic 'discharge'. It is out of this that:

*'Freud postulates the existence of a regulatory system in the mind which is able to resist discharge of excess psychic energy and has the property of transforming primary processes into secondary ones. The latter are characterised by their ability to bind energy and inhibit the primary processes. The whole regulatory system is based on the "principle of constancy", the function of which is to organise the "secondary processes"... Employed by Freud as early as 1895, the notions of primary and secondary processes would remain fundamental to his conceptions of the workings of the mind.'*<sup>121</sup> [my emboldening].

It should be emphasised that these notions, formulated in the 1890s, were still lively propositions for Freud forty years later, up until his death in the late 1930s and that he was still making connections between physical and psychical energetic states:

*'The future may teach us to exercise a direct influence, by means of particular chemical substances, on the amount of energy and their distribution in the mental apparatus.'*<sup>122</sup>

Perhaps, at this point, it would be appropriate to recall an important theme within this section, namely: 'all counsellors and therapists, even those who espouse different theoretical models, have been influenced by psychodynamic thinking and have had to make up their minds whether to accept or reject the Freudian image of the person.'<sup>123</sup> One of the outstanding features of psychodynamic theory is its sheer bulk and mass (coupled with complex inter and intra-textual referencing)<sup>124</sup>. Over the years, Freud wrote voluminously and 'The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud' now runs to some twenty

four volumes of densely packed pages. Unlike the cognitive/behavioural and the humanistic paradigms, the psychodynamic has a very detailed theoretical base from which psychodynamic practitioners may draw and it would be beyond the scope of this dissertation to paraphrase and to trace the complexity and detail of such. What will be attempted is to establish some connection between psychodynamic practice and its link with its Freudian origins:

*'...there are now many counsellors and psychotherapists who would see themselves as working within the broad tradition initiated by Freud, but who would call themselves psychodynamic in orientation rather than psychoanalytic. Counsellors working in a psychodynamic way with clients tend to make similar kinds of assumption about the nature of the client's problems, and the manner in which these problems can best be worked on. The main distinctive features of the psychodynamic approach are:*

1. *An assumption that the client's difficulties have their ultimate origins in childhood experiences.*
2. *An assumption that the client may not be consciously aware of the true motives or impulses behind his or her actions.*
3. *The use in counselling and therapy of interpretation of the transference relationship.*<sup>125</sup>

In the quotation immediately above there is more than a suggestion, particularly in items one and two that the client is always in a psychopathological state and that the origins and 'purposes' of that state mostly remained hidden. It is also suggested that the psychopathological state is inherently historical and refers to a period outside the current experience of the client. Although the client, of necessity, must speak out of his/her current temporality, that very temporality itself, on this view, is one formed and created by historical events, relationships, phenomena and interpretations. Freud, in one of his lectures, reminds his audience of two patients he had discussed within his previous lecture:

*'Both patients gave us an impression of being 'fixated' to a particular portion of their past, as though they could not manage to free themselves from it and were for that reason alienated from the present and the future. They then remained lodged in their illness in the sort of way in which in earlier days people retreated into a monastery in order to bear the burden of their ill-fated lives.'*<sup>126</sup>

On this view, there is a determining relationship between the present and the past, with the past being the overwhelmingly potent force. Referring to the ten-year project he embarked upon with Breuer, Freud concludes: 'in every one of our patients, analysis shows us that they have been carried back to some particular period of their past by the symptoms of their illness or their consequences.'<sup>127</sup> Although the former was written during 1917, Freud remained with this foundational concept right up until his death in the late 1930s and it formed a significant part of one of his last works:

*'We can speak with a fair degree of certainty about the part played by the period of life. It seems that neuroses are only acquired during early childhood (up to the age of six), even though their symptoms may not make their appearance until much later ... in every case the subsequent neurotic illness has this prelude in childhood as its point of departure ... neuroses are, as we know, disorders of the ego; and it is not to be wondered at that the ego, while it is weak, immature and incapable of resistance, should fail in dealing with problems which it could lead to manage with the utmost ease... the helpless ego fends off these problems by attempts at flight (by repressions), which turned out later to be ineffective and which involve permanent hindrances to further development.'*<sup>128</sup>

Within the psychoanalytic/psychodynamic therapeutic relationship, as understood by Freud, his patients had presented with a range of symptomology, a range that had become dysfunctional. The presence of a dysfunctional symptom within his patients signified for Freud: 'that every time we come upon a symptom we can infer that there are certain definite unconscious processes in the patient which contain a sense of the symptoms.'<sup>129</sup> It is within the unconscious therefore, that the origin and meaning of the presenting symptom has its provenance. Furthermore, whatever immediate contemporaneously significant interpretation patients may place upon their own symptomology, it is not upon their interpretation that interest will lie. For Freud:

*'Symptoms are never constructed from conscious processes; as soon as the unconscious processes concerned have become conscious, the symptoms must disappear.'*<sup>130</sup>

The significant movement therefore is in bringing what is unconscious into consciousness, a movement that is only 'made possible by the patient's cooperation'.<sup>131</sup> Freud enjoins his audience not to embark upon fruitless quests, ones they might embark upon in order to interrogate something that is already understood: 'nor should you torment yourselves with attempts at understanding by tracing it back to something already known.' For him, the symptom is inherently historical and, despite its distressing persistence as a life-inhibiting presence (and the very reason the patient is presenting to the psychotherapist), the symptom remains always an unconscious substitution:

*'The construction of a symptom is a substitute for something else that did not happen. Some particular mental processes should normally have developed to a point at which consciousness received information of them. This, however, did not take place, and instead -- out of the interrupted processes, which had been somehow disturbed and were obliged to remain unconscious -- the symptom emerged. Thus something in the nature of an exchange has taken place; if this can be reversed the therapy of the neurotic symptoms will have achieved its task.'*<sup>132</sup>

Although Freud is generally credited with developing, refining and modifying psychoanalytic/psychodynamic theory and the explicator *par excellence* of the 'talking cure', he himself attributes to his one-time colleague, Breuer, the status of being the discoverer of substitutional symptomology and the possibility of its reversal within psychotherapy; Freud acknowledges that; 'this discovery of Breuer's is still the foundation of psychoanalytic

therapy.<sup>'133</sup> Freud in his written works and in his lectures is refreshingly straightforward, unlike many interpretations and re-interpretations within the voluminous secondary literature. This straightforwardness is often surprisingly explicit and lays out in spare detail the workings of psychoanalytic/psychodynamic therapy:

*'The thesis that symptoms disappear when we have made their unconscious pre-determinants conscious has been confirmed by all subsequent research, although we meet with the strangest and most unexpected complications when we attempt to carry it through in practice. **Our therapy works by transforming what is unconscious into what is conscious, and it works only in so far as it is in the position to affect that transformation.**'<sup>134</sup> [my emboldening].*

In order to affect that transformation, Freud lays down a basic practice between therapist and client/patient in the one-to-one encounter. He insists that:

*'the patient put himself into a state of quiet, unreflecting self-observation, and to report to us whatever internal perceptions he is able to make -- feelings, thoughts, memories -- in the order in which they occur to him.'*<sup>135</sup>

Whilst within that 'state of quiet unreflecting self observation', Freud encourages the client/patient not to edit or censor any recollections on the grounds that it is 'too disagreeable, or too indiscreet to say, or that it is too unimportant or irrelevant, or that it is nonsensical and need not be said.'<sup>136</sup> This granting of full permission to disclose whatever enters consciousness (whilst on the one hand laying down a template of therapeutic interaction for succeeding generations of counsellors and psychotherapists from differing orientations) had a particular significance for Freud in that 'it becomes the target for the attacks of the resistance.'<sup>137</sup> He then goes on to illustrate the many various and ingenious forms that this resistance, this 'repression' makes itself manifest'. For him, this repression has significance in that '**it is the precondition for the construction of symptoms**'<sup>138</sup>, without this resistant force there would be no symptomology in the psychopathological sense. Earlier I said, 'Freud in his written works and in his lectures is refreshingly straightforward'. It is in that spirit that he is not averse to using plain metaphors and similes to illustrate his theoretical constructs. With that in mind, I will use one of Freud's own extended metaphors to illustrate his understandings of unconscious processes and the position of 'repression' within them:

*'Let us therefore compare the system of the unconscious to a large entrance hall, in which the mental impulses jostle one another like separate individuals. Adjoining this entrance hall there is a second, narrower, room -- a kind of drawing-room -- in which consciousness, too, resides. But on the threshold between these two rooms a watchman performs his function: he examines the different mental impulses, acts as a censor, and will not admit them into the drawing-room if they displease him. You will see at once that it does not make much difference if the watchman turns away a particular impulse at the threshold itself or if he pushes it back across the threshold after it has entered the drawing-room. This is merely a question of the degree of his watchfulness and of how early he carries out his act of recognition.'*<sup>139</sup>

One of the consequences of Freud's understanding of the unconscious is that it is seen as the origin of meaning. Any behaviour, any thought or impulse, any fantasy, any action can be causally traced back to a radical provenance within the unconscious. Therefore, whatever is manifestly existent (in what might be described as a 'conscious' way) is the outward expression of an inner determining force. This causal connectedness between what is unconscious and what is conscious, between what is inner and what is outer, is in a continual transformative mode. This transformative force, subject as it is to the diligent attention of the 'watchman', as detailed above, emerges in a fashion that will conform (after a fashion) to the constraints, strictures and conventions of external reality. Sometimes there is an awkward 'fit' between what is outer and what is inner. Nevertheless, from a psychodynamic point of view, it is the inner that constitutes the primary source of determination. It is the task of the psychodynamic therapist to trace a pathway back from the overtly expressed action, thought, behaviour or impulse to the meaning it possesses within the unconscious. It therefore follows that much in human life remains hidden and it is only through the skilled intervention of a trained practitioner that such a pathway to psychological understanding can be traced. It is the covert existence of this primary force that is seen as determinative of external reality. It is not the ordinary everyday average way of being, the ordinary mode within which normal life is rendered intelligible, that is dominantly formative but this other that is always:

*'...structuring our perception of reality. By selection and manipulation, all situations, especially people and relationships, can be made to conform to its assumptions and expectations.'*<sup>140</sup>

The awkwardness of the 'fit' between inner and outer reality is perceived as potentially giving rise to psychopathological instances of psychic distress. What might cause that distress? Under those circumstances the inner reality (as the dominant force) may forcefully be making an assertion, one that is unacceptable to circumstances existent within the outer reality. The situation therefore becomes conflictual:

*'As Freud's later theorising came to see it, there are broadly speaking two general types of conflict: the fear of losing control and being overwhelmed by one's impulses; and the fear of transgressing internalised social standards and of being punished for it.'*<sup>141</sup>

Arising from this conflictual situation, the client/patient may demonstrate great anxiety in his/her attempt to achieve a balanced reconciliation between these inner and outer forces. This conflict might result in the integrity of selfhood being perceived as compromised and its possible fragmentation being feared. In the face of this, further fear and further anxiety is created. The individual may respond defensively to this spiralling cycle in several ways.



From within the broad spectrum of psychodynamic activity three modes of psychic 'defence' to this conflictual situation have been identified as 'Repression', 'Disassociation' and 'Denial' (any three of which might be present within a psychodynamic therapeutic encounter).

'Repression' has already been alluded to in relation to the appearance of psychopathological symptomology and consists largely in the excluding of unacceptable material from entering consciousness. This excluding leads (inevitably) to a distorted way of being in that the 'symptoms' themselves become a source of distress by impinging upon the individuals' freedom to enjoy life, exercise choice and by their limiting him/her to a narrower range of possibilities. All the so-called mechanisms of defence are directed towards reducing the impact of anxiety upon the individual. Unfortunately, the price that has to be paid for this is a reduction in the integration of the self. When so much is excluded from the formation of selfhood then the self (on this view) gradually becomes attenuated through its being denied the material to complete its wholeness. In 'Disassociation' the purpose of the 'defence mechanism' is not simply to repress but rather to keep apart two discrete psychic processes so that they are denied the possibility of becoming integrated. This denial of integration is directed at reducing anxiety whenever it is apprehended that integration would result in an unacceptable collision of opposing realities. In 'Denial' there can be a thoroughgoing undermining of ordinary everyday reality, resulting in the prolongation of dysfunctional psychological states. For example, mourning, 'is a process which takes time, passes through different phases in a repetitive and cyclical fashion, [one that] gradually accomplishes certain tasks -- painfully and often with effort.'<sup>142</sup> This process cannot successfully be accomplished until a full experience of the loss has been realised, one that cannot be arrived at except 'painfully and often with effort.' This pain and effort and the accompanying feelings of despair, isolation and meaninglessness, can be short-circuited by the simple refusal to acknowledge that a death has actually occurred. In addition, it can be denied that the deceased was of any significance whatsoever. This latter has the logical consequence of removing any necessity to mourn at all. Denial can also take the form of ceaseless activity in which little time is left for contemplation but a great deal of time is devoted to asserting independence and in establishing social networks for further ceaseless activity.

Earlier, it was said that Freud, in one of his lectures, reminds his audience of two patients he had discussed within his previous lecture: 'Both patients gave us an impression of being 'fixated' to a particular portion of their past, as though they could not manage to free

themselves from it and were for that reason alienated from the present and the future'<sup>143</sup> It is from this perspective that psychodynamic therapists are able to claim that 'people have troubled relationships because they are repeating a destructive relationship pattern from the past.'<sup>144</sup> This orientation towards the past, in psychodynamic practice, has its foundations in two principal sources. The first is in the recognition of significance phases<sup>145</sup> in human development 'each needing to be negotiated at the appropriate and critical time to allow satisfactory progression to later phases.'<sup>146</sup> The second is a particular model of the mind which 'attempts to combine biological, experiential, and interpersonal dimensions ... [which includes] the basic biological aspect of the psyche, the inherited instinctual and constitutional aspects'<sup>147</sup> which we share to a large extent with other higher primates.'<sup>148</sup> It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine in detail the structural theory of mind, and its relationship to the developmental phases of human being, a theory that underpins psychodynamic/psychoanalytic practice, except in so far as to stress the importance of the psycho/biological and its connectedness to the interpersonal. In no other psychotherapeutic orientation does such a foundation have such a level of primary significance. Perhaps on this latter point, Freud should have the summative last word in bringing together all the elements of client/patient, the task of the therapist, the existence of the unconscious, its somatic language of expression, the latent and the manifest, the accessibility of what is hidden and the limitations of consciousness:

*'When I set myself the task of bringing to light what human beings keep hidden within them ... I thought the task was a harder one than it really is. He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore.'*<sup>149</sup>

## **Two examples of later developments:**

There is a certain 'Freudocentrism' around the figure of Freud and it is true that so pivotal is his position that no attempt at a history of counselling or a history of the psychodynamic tradition could ever overlook his contribution. This attempt at a history of counselling and psychotherapy has chosen to take a paradigmic approach and it is at this point that Kuhn's understanding of a 'pre-paradigm' state has an approximately relevant value. For him, in order 'to be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.'<sup>150</sup> As this new paradigm begins to emerge, an amalgamation of practices and theories accrues

around and within it, which in turn attracts other practitioners towards it. A new community is thereby created, one whose existence 'implies a new and more rigid definition of the field.'<sup>151</sup> And so it was with Freud and with his successors and followers. Even during his lifetime, Freud had to contend with his protégé, Carl Gustave Jung (1875-1961), disputing (and finally parting company) with him, particularly over the issue of the primacy of the client/patient's past or future. It was not that Jung dismissed the significance of the past, it was rather that:

*'The patients who interested him were those who had already freed themselves from the past sufficiently to become established in their own right; who were often successful in worldly terms; but who, in the mid-period of their lives, found that the world had become stale and unprofitable. Such people were seeking a meaning to their lives; and Jung's aim was to guide them along the path of individuation. Jungian analysis, therefore, was, and is, primarily oriented towards the patient's future.'*  
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All these pre-paradigmatic and paradigmatic movements came to be known by distinctive designations, reflecting not only their divergence but the centrality of their own orientations. With Jung it became 'Analytic Psychology' but with another, Melanie Klein (1882-1960) it became 'Object Relations Theory'. Her work with young children, in her observing them, playing games with them over extended periods, using toys and art materials, talking with them and recording the narrative<sup>153</sup> of their interactions, led to a questioning :

*'How do our significant early relationships with others become internalised and affect our subsequent view of the world and other people? What aspects of our early relationships determine those whom we choose as lover, spouse, or friend? What is the dynamic nature of our internal object world, how does it evolve and what are the implications for therapy? What is biologically innate in the psychology of the individual and what is modulated by direct environmental experience? What is the nature of motivation -- the pressure of instinctual wishes or the seeking of relationships with others?'*<sup>154</sup>

Briefly, for Klein the emphasis was on relational development and interactions between the young infant and the 'contents' of the outside world. It is the essence of these relationships, during this early period that becomes, for Klein, determinative of later patterns and interactions. Unlike Freud, whose stages of development represented biologically determinative phrases, Klein emphasised the nature and quality of these relationships:

*'These internal aspects (or again 'objects' as an object relations theory) of the psyche are formed over the long years of a child's development, as counterparts of external relationships which predominate in early childhood, principally those with mother and father. These aspects are more than pictures in the memory; they are as alive and as real within as once they were without, sometimes given extra force because the child's perception is coloured by lack of experience, so that internalised objects are 'worse' than they might have been in reality.'*<sup>155</sup>



## **Summary:**

Attention has been paid to the characteristics of psychodynamic counselling and psychotherapy, its emergence from the practice of hypnotic induction and the discovery that much of human life is hidden and yet determined by regions of the mind that are unconscious. The pathway to this region, pioneered by Freud, laid down a pattern of therapist/client interaction that exists to this day<sup>156</sup>. It was Freud's intention to institute some parallel affinity between the physical and the psychological, one that would retain notions of a physical energy-based interpretation. The complexity and bulk of Freud's theory provides psychodynamic practitioners with a profound source to draw on within their practice. Many developments have occurred within the psychodynamic paradigm that has led to pre-paradigmatic communities forming around (for example) the Analytic Psychology of Jung and the Object-Relations Theory of Melanie Klein.

## **The Cognitive-Behavioural psychotherapeutic Paradigm:**

This paradigm, the second of three to be discussed, embraces what is 'probably one of the most widely accepted treatments for a range of psychiatric disorders and psychological problems'<sup>157</sup> and is the therapy that 'has been widely adopted as the intervention model most likely to be offered to clients within health-care systems in North America and Europe.'<sup>158</sup> Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is essentially a North American development, very much in vogue within the UK (particularly within the NHS) and lays claim to an evidence-based practice, one that fits in with the culture and practice of the major healthcare agencies:

*'CBT interventions have been shown to have an enduring effect that extends beyond the end of treatment; they reduce risk for relapse in chronic disorders and risk for recurrence in episodic disorders. Whether CBT is truly curative remains to be seen, but there is more good evidence for CBT having an enduring effect than for any other intervention in the field today.'*<sup>159</sup>

CBT has had a varied past, one that first began to emerge in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century:

1. 'The first stage (1950-1970s), saw the emergence of behavioural therapy as a prominent treatment modality;
2. In the second stage, the 1960s, cognitive therapy mainly in the USA was developed;
3. The third stage saw the merging of behavioural therapy and cognitive therapy, a process which gathered momentum in the late 1980s, to form what is now known as CBT.'<sup>160</sup>

But what is CBT? Kazdin has noted that ‘cognitive –behaviour modification encompasses treatments that attempt to change overt behaviour by altering thoughts, interpretations, assumptions and strategies of responding.’<sup>161</sup> Whilst Dobson notes that,

*‘at their core CBTs share three fundamental propositions: 1. Cognitive activity affects behaviour. 2. Cognitive activity may be monitored and altered. 3. Desired behaviour change may be affected through cognitive change.’*<sup>162</sup>

So what underlies CBT? In what ways do its origins underpin its present phase of development? And what can be gained from examining these? One thing seems clear (even at this stage of the discussion) that the term ‘behaviour’ figures prominently. As McLeod comments,

*‘Ultimately, the cognitive-behavioural approach to therapy has its origins in behavioural psychology, which is widely seen as having been created by J.B.Watson.’*<sup>163</sup>

John Broadus Watson, (1878-1958) was an associate professor at John Hopkins University and later on president of the American Psychological Association who left academia (eventually) to work (for the remainder of his active life) as a senior executive within the American advertising industry. It was at John Hopkins that he developed his ideas about behaviour and on his understanding of the human being. Writing ten years after his major opus *‘Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology’*, Watson has the confidence to refer to the ‘behavioristic movement’ as ‘we’ and then to go on: ‘We believed then, as we do now, that man is an animal different from other animals only in the types of behavior he displays.’<sup>164</sup> He held the view that the introspective, or as he named it ‘subjective’ psychology, was of the ‘old’ whilst behaviourism was of the ‘new’ and an ‘objective’ psychology. For him, the old introspective psychology:

*‘...claimed that consciousness is the subject matter of psychology. Behaviorism on the contrary, holds that the subject matter of human psychology is the behaviour of the human being. Behaviorism claims that consciousness is neither a definite nor usable concept. The behaviourist, who has been trained always as an experimentalist, holds, further, that belief in the existence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and magic.’*<sup>165</sup>

It became very important for Watson to expunge from his conceptual system any term that found a pathway to the introspective in human being: ‘the behaviourist... dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined.’<sup>166</sup> It was no surprise therefore that following this declaration he developed what he termed ‘The

Behaviorist's Platform', whose foundational concepts and practices would underpin the behaviorist's understanding and interpretation of human being:

*'The behaviorist asks: why don't we make what we can observe the real field of psychology? Let us limit ourselves to things that can be observed, and formulate laws concerning only those things. Now what can we observe? We can observe behavior -- what the organism does or says. And let us point out at once: that saying is doing -- that is, behaving. Speaking overtly or to ourselves (thinking) is just as objective a type of behavior as baseball.'*<sup>167</sup>

This exclusion of 'internal process' and the treatment of language as a form of observable behaviour were themselves subject to another fundamental rule, a rule that limited the attention of the behavioural psychologist to two basic concepts/practices:

*'the rule, or measuring rod, which the behaviorist puts in front of him always is: can I describe this bit of behaviour I see in terms of "stimulus and response". By stimulus we mean any object in the general environment or any change in tissues themselves due to the physiological condition of the animal, such as change we get when we keep an animal from sex activity, when we keep it from feeding, when we keep it from building a nest. By response we mean anything the animal does -- such as turning toward or away from a light, jumping at a sound, and more highly organised activities such as building a skyscraper, drawing plans, having babies, writing books, and the like.'*<sup>168</sup>

For Watson, the notion of introspective examination or any reporting of such or any attempt at 'self-observation' was not only an enterprise that lacked rigour but was essentially: '...an impossible one'.<sup>169</sup> This impossibility (judged against the rule of stimulus and response) could never, for him, produce the consistency of results that external observation could nor could it accurately and consistently predict the likely result (response) of any such stimulus. In addition, for Watson the role of the behaviourist/ observer was not one to be limited to the disinterested study and examination of the observable only, but should embrace an equally important factor:

*'The interest of the behaviorist in man's doing is more than the interest of the spectator -- he wants to control man's reactions as physical scientists want to control and manipulate other natural phenomena. It is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and to control human activity. To do this it must gather scientific data by experimental methods.'*<sup>170</sup>

Watson's position within the cognitive-behavioural paradigm should not be minimised. For a considerable period, extending over three decades; 'mainstream academic psychology was dominated by the ideas of the behavioural school.'<sup>171</sup> And though his ideas were amended and modified by subsequent researchers and practitioners, they remained foundational. His ideas were taken up by B F Skinner (1904-1990) and later on by Joseph Wolpe (1915-1997). Although Skinner moderated Watson's views somewhat, Skinner still remained squarely within the behaviourist movement in his search to uncover the basic tenets underlying learning. In addition, in attempting to distance himself from Watson somewhat by re-naming

behaviourism ‘Radical Behaviourism’, he also reviewed the pre-radical behaviourist stance by contrasting it with the (then) current situation:

*‘Radical behaviourism...does not deny the possibility of self-observation or self-knowledge or its possible usefulness, but it questions the nature of what is felt or observed and hence known.’<sup>172</sup>*

But, like Watson, Skinner identifies that introspection as ‘mentalism kept attention away from the external antecedent events which might have explained behaviour, by seeming to supply an alternative explanation. Methodological behaviourism did just the reverse.’<sup>173</sup> He also echoes Watson’s view on the significance of introspective consciousness by stating explicitly that:

*‘...what is felt or introspectively observed is not some nonphysical world of consciousness, mind, or mental life but the observer’s own body.’<sup>174</sup>*

It is this body that, for Skinner is, ‘a small part of the universe’<sup>175</sup>, yet one not to be privileged in any way:

*‘There is no reason why it should have any special physical status because it lies within this boundary, and eventually we should have a complete account of it from anatomy and physiology.’<sup>176</sup>*

Introspection or ‘the world within the skin’<sup>177</sup> (as Skinner puts it) seems to raise problems as something emerging imperfectly through the medium of self-knowledge. Like Watson, he identifies language/speech as a form of behaviour, a behaviour that is rendered possible by the pre-existing human community. It is this human community that ‘in arranging conditions under which a person describes the public or private world in which he lives, a community generates that very special form of behaviour called knowing.’<sup>178</sup> Self knowledge is not, for Skinner, primarily a self generated enterprise that an individual may either embark on or experience. It can only come into existence when the pre-existing human community has created the possibility of its becoming significantly knowable as ‘knowing’. Therefore, it must follow that:

*‘Self-knowledge is of social origin. It is only when a person’s private world becomes important to others that it is made important to him. It then enters into the control of the behaviour called knowing.’<sup>179</sup>*

The problem Skinner faces is the one he labels ‘privacy’. The world within the skin is not simply ‘a small part of the universe’ but also the region given to imperfect and inaccurate reporting on its own introspective activity. It is this imperfection of self-reporting that taxes Skinner (as well as the inadequacy of what he terms ‘the verbal community’ to interpret effectively this self-reporting). For him, the imperfection of reporting and the community’s

inadequate interpretation has, over the aeons, generated a great variety of ‘speculation’ regarding this private region, this world within the skin. For him, the multiplicity of speculations is plain evidence, not only of the imperfections, but also of the **social** origins of knowing about oneself. In a tone of slight exasperation he concludes:

*‘...the verbal community...cannot fully solve the problem of privacy. There is an old principle that nothing is different until it makes a difference, and with respect to events in the world within the skin the verbal community has not been able to make things different enough.’<sup>180</sup> [my emboldening].*

He does not deny the unique distinctiveness of the individual, what he does deny is the individual as ‘an originating event’<sup>181</sup> The individual is rather ‘a locus, a point at which many genetic and environmental conditions come together in joint effect.’<sup>182</sup> For him, the speculative arena of ‘mentalist’ introspective explorations creates an unnecessary plethora of complex intra-referencing. The accusation that behaviourism oversimplifies the human being arises from the **habit** of **expecting** complexity when in fact:

*‘The complexity of mental organisation that behaviourism is said to underestimate is the complexity which arises from the effort to systemise formulations that might better be abandoned.’<sup>183</sup>*

Although Skinner makes sorties into recognising the distinctive status of ‘private events’<sup>184</sup> and pays due acknowledgement to the unique nature of certain experiences, for example; ‘Only one who has lived in a concentration camp can really know what “it feels like”, because there is nothing like it to generate comparable feelings in others’<sup>185</sup>. Four years later he still remains firmly with the view that:

*‘The major obstacles to progress in a science of behaviour are certain long-standing commitments to an inner world of the individual, either the metaphorical world of the mentalistic or cognitive psychologist or the real but not at the moment relevant world of the physiologist.’<sup>186</sup>*

For him, the wider application of behaviourist practices and principles has an ethical imperative, one that (if adopted as a social policy) would result in a greater individual freedom for the individual in his/her relationship with centralist institutional and economic powers. Additionally, he posits ‘behaviour modification’ as a systematic method to be employed as a control mechanism to promote this aim:

*‘Behavior modification is just the technology we need to promote the face-to-face control of people, by people, and for people and thus to reduce the scope of the centralized institutions of government and economics.’<sup>187</sup>*

Behaviour modification was, for Skinner, based upon the concept of ‘operant conditioning’ where the individual is posited as having a range of options (in reacting to any given prompt) and in consistently displaying behaviour (out of all the options of reaction available) as the



outcome of being advantageously rewarded. The more the behaviour becomes rewarded, the more the behaviour becomes repeated. Under laboratory conditions (a favourite site for Skinner) situations can be created in which behaviour can be observed, behaviour can be predicted, behaviour can be controlled. As his mentor Watson noted:

*'The interest of the behaviourist in man's doings is more than the interest of the spectator—he wants to control man's reactions as physical scientists want to control and manipulate other natural phenomena. It is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and to control human activity. To do this it must gather data by experimental methods.'*<sup>188</sup>

The repeated absence of any advantageous reward will, according to Skinner, lead to the deletion of specific behaviours from the range of options open to the individual. One of the key ideas present in 'operant conditioning' is the importance of **environmental** factors. Reward comes from the **outside**, not out of the self-generation of introspective self-regard. Outside the laboratory in the wider world, the individual will be forever responding to positive or negative environmental forces (and exhibiting consequential changes in behaviour) a process that will hold true, according to Skinner, for whatever social context the individual may inhabit. If environmental conditions/forces can be modified, then it follows (on a Skinnerian view) that not only can behaviour be predicted, it can also be controlled. It is thus a small step to promote control (through the mechanisms of behaviour modification) as an ethical *modus operandi* for the common or individual good. From this standpoint the environment is inherently stimulating and the individual inherently responsive. Consequently, within this configuration, it is always the **environment** that will modify and condition behaviour. As Skinner asserts:

*'It is a mistake to identify humanism with the self-centred individualism of the existentialists. By identifying the role of the environment, particularly the social environment, behaviorism makes it possible to achieve the goals of humanism more effectively.'*<sup>189</sup>

And again:

*'The effective management of human behaviour is jeopardized when we appeal to feelings and ideas in the explanation of behaviour. In doing so we neglect useful environmental contingencies.'*<sup>190</sup>

And finally and more emphatically:

*'...the changes in behaviour attributed to the supposed internal contingencies are due instead to the external contingencies **from which they were derived**.'*<sup>191</sup> [my emboldening].

Earlier it was said that Watson's position within the cognitive-behavioural paradigm should not be minimised in that for a considerable period extending over three decades, 'mainstream academic psychology was dominated by the ideas of the behavioural school.'<sup>192</sup> Though

Watson's ideas were amended and modified by subsequent researchers and practitioners, they remained foundational. His ideas were taken up by B F Skinner (1904-1990) and later on by Joseph Wolpe (1915-1997). Wolpe was a South African, who in later life moved to California, but in his formative days 'as a medical officer he worked in a military hospital, and witnessed soldiers who were suffering from what would today be called post-traumatic stress syndrome. At the time it was known as "war neurosis".'<sup>193</sup> It was he, as McLeod illustrates, who 'saw a parallel between classical conditioning and the acquisition of anxiety or fear in human beings.'<sup>194</sup> At the beginning of the opening chapter in one of his major works, Wolpe briefly reviews the history of psychotherapy, beginning with Anton Mesmer and his practice of hypnotic induction and, passing through the psychiatric work of Pierre Janet (1859-1947), he finally arrives at Sigmund Freud and Psychoanalytic theory. Concluding his 'thumbnail sketch' of psychotherapy Wolpe claims:

*'Important as these contributions were during the first half of the twentieth century, the field of psychotherapy remained untouched by scientific study... No testable hypotheses were put forward... and no therapeutic principles emerged. In retrospect, we can see the reason for this lack of activity. Modern medicine is applied science. An applied science of psychotherapy could develop only when there was something to apply. There had to be a foundation in the form of data-based knowledge of behaviour change.'*<sup>195</sup>

Wolpe, in a sense, is a pivotal figure (within what Watson termed the 'behavioristic movement') in that he methodically applies behavioristic principles, practices and findings to the world of psychotherapy. Taking the position that in responding to a stimulating prompt from within the environment the individual can be predicted to repeat behaviours that are rewardingly reinforced, he also take the view that the individual can get into a fixed cycle of repeated behaviours that are not to his or her benefit. These latter cycles of repetitive responses are usually, for Wolpe the consequences of fear:

*'Recurring responses to particular stimulus conditions are called habits. Habits can be adaptive—that is, they subserve biological or acquired needs or prevent injury, pain or discomfort. Some habits are maladaptive; their effects are contrary to the welfare of the individual. A great many maladaptive habits are primarily emotional and the emotion is usually fear.'*<sup>196</sup>

Behaviour therapy (a term Wolpe acknowledges as a Skinnerian one, though one popularised mainly by Hans Jürgen Eysenck (1916-1997) <sup>197</sup> is primarily directed toward 'the use of behaviour to change habits.'<sup>198</sup> Unlike Freud, and his understanding of pathological symptomology, Wolpe claims that 'neuroses are persistent maladaptive habits that have been acquired in anxiety-generating situations.'<sup>199</sup> This acquisition of maladaptive habits is

predominantly a process of **learning** and one of the purposes of behaviour therapy is to promote a process of ‘unlearning’:

*‘Unlearning is the weakening of a previously learned habit of response. The usual context is experimental extinction, in which a habit is weakened when the response is repeatedly evoked without being followed by reward.’<sup>200</sup>*

The scope of behaviour therapy in unlearning maladaptive behaviours is, for Wolpe, wide-ranging in that it has the capacity to cover such conditions as, ‘nail-biting, trichotillomania, enuresis nocturna, extreme stinginess, chronic tardiness and some cases of tantrum behaviour.’<sup>201</sup> In addition it can also be directed towards ‘people who habitually perform asocial or antisocial behaviour regarding which they feel no guilt.’<sup>202</sup> Nevertheless, Wolpe remains firmly within a Watsonian and Skinnerian universe when it comes to matters of the private introspective world within the skin, for him:

*‘Our perception of things and situations in the world around us is a prime determinant of our actions. In this sense, thought has a central role in human behaviour. But thought obeys the same mechanistic laws as other behaviour.’<sup>203</sup>*

Whilst admitting that ‘a person’s knowledge of the world consists entirely of private events’<sup>204</sup> the privacy of these events is premised entirely upon their **immediacy** as perceptions and not as internal ‘knowing’. Even perceptions as ‘images evoked in the absence of objects’<sup>205</sup> are the products of prior conditioning beforehand and therefore the consequence of ‘conditioned seeing’.<sup>206</sup> For Wolpe, ‘immediate perceptions and conditioned perceptions make up cognitions.’<sup>207</sup> What Wolpe is contesting here is any notion of learning that ‘locates learning in the mind of the organism’<sup>208</sup> and he does this by emphasising that ‘conditioning is not governed by “the informational relation” but by the dynamics of the physiological events.’<sup>209</sup> Wolpe’s whole intention is to reach the conclusion that:

*‘...the general proposition that information must have a role in classical conditioning is untenable.’<sup>210</sup>*

Earlier it was said that, ‘cognitive –behaviour modification encompasses treatments that attempt to change overt behaviour by altering thoughts, interpretations, assumptions, and strategies of responding’<sup>211</sup> and that, ‘at their core CBTs share three fundamental propositions: 1. Cognitive activity affects behaviour. 2. Cognitive activity may be monitored and altered. 3. Desired behaviour change may be affected through cognitive change.’<sup>212</sup> It is not that Wolpe disagrees with any of the above *per se* it is rather that ‘...behaviour therapists use cognitive methods only in cases in which anxieties have evident misconceptual sources, cognitive therapists use them in all cases.’<sup>213</sup> In other words, behaviour therapists regard



cognitive therapeutic procedures as a **normal** part of their therapeutic practice but mostly under circumstances where a cognitive dysfunction at the level of conceptual formation has been positively identified. In addition, cognitive therapeutic procedures may also be employed (as a precursor to behavioural therapy *per se*) when it is clear that the ground must be laid beforehand by establishing a functional cognitive standpoint:

*'... in cases that call for classical reconditioning the stage for operations must often be set by establishing an appropriate cognitive perspective. For example, many timid people believe that it is right always to turn the other cheek. Before they can be taught assertiveness they must realise the futility of following that principle in most circumstances. **But the realisation by itself does not cure the timidity.**'<sup>214</sup> [my emboldening]*

Wolpe's insistence that cognitive therapeutic procedures form a **normal** part of behaviour therapy does not derogate from his opinion that cognitivism is 'a retrogressive theory of therapy.'<sup>215</sup> For him, the upsurge in cognitive psychotherapeutic theories and practices represents a return to 'mentalistic' understandings of the human being, a mentalism that behaviour therapy was itself formed under (and in opposition to). This return represents a 'retrogressive' refocusing on internal process at the expense of behavioural observation and a diminution of environmental factors as instruments for psychotherapeutic change. What he objects to is that:

*'For the cognitivists, emotional conditioning and, more specifically, learned automatic triggering of fear responses do not exist ... they suppose that between the perception of the situation of being the centre of attention and the fear that follows, some kind of thought-out rationale is necessarily interposed ... essentially, then an idea of danger is seen as the universal mediator of fear.'*<sup>216</sup>

As part of his criticism of cognitivism, he produces a list of cognitive therapeutic theorists whose number represent for him, 'a strong resurgence of mentalistic thinking.'<sup>217</sup> Two names that head the list<sup>218</sup>, Aaron Beck and Albert Ellis, are ones who will figure in the unfolding explication of the cognitive-behavioural paradigm.

### **The advent of the cognitive in the cognitive-behavioural paradigm (Aaron Beck):**

*'Both Albert Ellis, the founder of rational-emotive therapy, and Aaron Beck, the founder of cognitive therapy, began their therapeutic careers as psychoanalysts. Both became dissatisfied with psychoanalytic methods and found themselves becoming more aware of the importance of the ways in which their clients thought about themselves.'*<sup>219</sup>

Beck is still living (this being 2010) aged 89 but Ellis died (three years ago) aged 94. Aaron Temkin Beck currently holds many academic appointments within his native America and also abroad, his present principal position is as 'University Professor in the Department of

Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania and the Director of the Center for the Treatment and Prevention of Suicide and the Psychopathology Unit... he also holds a part-time appointment as a Consulting Professor... within the School of Psychological Sciences at the University of Manchester.<sup>220</sup> In a way similar to Freud's abandonment and later rejection of hypnotic induction as pathway to unconscious material, and Watson's, Skinner's and Wolpe's rejection of psychoanalytic mentalist introspection, Beck rejects the exclusivity of both the psychoanalytic and the behavioural in their separate approaches to psychotherapeutic endeavour. His criticism is somewhat excoriating when he reviews these and other schools of psychotherapy with such phrases as 'dearth of solid knowledge',<sup>221</sup> 'competing ideologies',<sup>222</sup> 'movements and fads',<sup>223</sup> 'myths or superstitions',<sup>224</sup> 'clusters of smaller sects',<sup>225</sup> that set the tone of his approach. For him:

*'Classical psychoanalysis regards conscious thoughts as a disguised representation of unconscious conflicts that are presumably causing the problem. The patient's own explanations are regarded as spurious rationalisations, his coping mechanisms as defences.'*<sup>226</sup>

He challenges the psychoanalytic rejection of the patient's own attempts to interpret his/her personal situation and the understandings the patient might already have in order to deal with, for example, recurring problems and symptoms:

*'...his conscious ideas, his reasoning and judgements, his practical solutions to problems are not taken at face value: they are treated as stepping-stones to deeper, concealed components of the mind.'*<sup>227</sup>

Likewise, in his critique of behaviour therapists, he challenges their failure to take into account the valuable information provided by the patient when he/she is commenting on his/her own life thought and emotions. The insistence that such material lies within the realm of unverifiable mentalist introspection (and therefore hopelessly subjective) is founded upon an insistence that all data be directly observable:

*'In their zeal to emulate the precision and theoretical elegance of the physical sciences, the original behaviourists rejected data and concepts derived from man's reflections on his conscious experiences. Only behaviour that could be directly observed by an independent outsider was used in forming explanations. Hence, thoughts, feelings, and ideas, which, by definition, are accessible only to the person experiencing them, were not considered valid data. **The patient's private world was not regarded as a useful area of enquiry.**'*<sup>228</sup> [my emboldening].

It is not simply that the psychoanalytic and behavioural orientations are in deficit by their various failings, for Beck they also positively undermine the patient's own capacity to activate his or her own resources. The patient is led to interpret him or herself as a psychopathological subject for treatment. This pathologising of the patient's own situation inclines him or her to look beyond for help and to derogate from the efficacious means

already available from within his or her own situation. The drawing of the patient into a psychotherapeutic relationship (one premised upon the inadequacy of the patient's own resources) has the added effect of disabling the patient at the heart of his own therapeutic possibilities:

*'The troubled person is led to believe that he can't help himself and must seek out a professional healer when confronted with distress related to everyday problems of living ... he can't hope to understand himself through his own efforts because his own notions are dismissed as shallow and insubstantial ... this subtle indoctrination inhibits him from using his own judgement in analysing and solving his problems.'*<sup>229</sup>

A phrase that has great provenance with Beck is 'common sense' and it is a foundational concept that occurs at the beginning of his major work. He is at pains to erect Freud as foil to his own approach and to distance himself from psychoanalytic/psychodynamic concepts and practice. For him, 'Freud assumed that peculiar behaviour has its roots in the unconscious.'<sup>230</sup> Beck rejects this by asserting that 'the presence of self-deception and distortions ... does not require the postulation of the unconscious ... irrationality can be understood in terms of inadequacies in organising and interpreting reality.'<sup>231</sup> There is no underlying dynamic world hidden from view that has a causal relationship with conscious every day sentience. For the psychoanalyst it is a world that can be accessed and interpreted only by a learned and skilful practitioner. But for Beck, 'psychological problems are not necessarily the product of mysterious, impenetrable forces.'<sup>232</sup> In a sense it could be claimed that the practice of cognitive therapy for him is an **extension** of the concept of everyday common sense:

*'the cognitive therapist induces the patient to apply the same problem-solving techniques he has used throughout his life to correct his fallacious thinking. His problems are derived from certain distortions of reality based on erroneous premises and misconceptions.'*<sup>233</sup>

He then goes on to succinctly summarise the position of the cognitive-therapist within the psychotherapeutic encounter:

*'The formula for treatment may be stated in simple terms: The therapist helps the patient to identify his warped thinking and to learn ways to formulate his experiences.'*<sup>234</sup>

In identifying warped thinking the cognitive therapist is not simply remaining on the plane of cognition *per se* but claims, 'we get to the person's emotions through his cognitions. By correcting erroneous beliefs, we can damp down or alter excessive, inappropriate emotional reactions.'<sup>235</sup> This damping down and 'helping the patient make more realistic appraisals of himself ... available'<sup>236</sup> is achieved through the use of three different methodological approaches. The first approach, which Beck terms 'intellectual', is directed towards

'identifying the misconceptions, testing their validity, and [by] substituting more appropriate concepts.'<sup>237</sup> This approach relies heavily upon the patients coming to a position where they recognise that their underlying patterns of previously unquestioned tenets have been those that have fundamentally undermined any prospect of their benefiting from a fruitful and fulfilling existence. This desired personal epiphany is achieved under the guidance of a cognitive therapist. The second approach, which he terms 'experiential', may rely upon the patient being in a social or personal setting where his or her prior underlying beliefs become challenged by the reality of, for example, actual interpersonal relationships within a personal development group, or in a counsellor's 'warmth and acceptance'.<sup>238</sup> In addition, the therapist may encourage the patient to experientially and experimentally embrace circumstances that are unfamiliar (and perhaps anxiety provoking) in order to amplify new learning and challenge maladaptive beliefs. This technique would be regarded as a useful complementary adjunct to any of the three approaches one that 'exposes the patient to experiences that are in themselves powerful enough to change misconceptions.'<sup>239</sup> The third approach, which he terms 'behavioural', relies upon 'the development of specific forms of behaviour that lead to more general changes in the way the patient views himself and the real world.'<sup>240</sup> The specific forms of behaviour that Beck wishes to develop are psychotherapeutic techniques ones that 'overlap considerably with the process of psychotherapy, so that it is difficult to draw a line between what the therapist does and the patient's responses.'<sup>241</sup> An outline of what the therapist might want to cultivate here is given by the illustration:

*'... in training the patient to recognise his automatic thoughts, the therapist directly or indirectly questions their validity. In turn, the process of extending the patient's awareness of this form of ideation is accompanied by greater objectivity (distancing). As the patient recognises that these self-signals are maladaptive or discordant with reality, he has a tendency to correct them automatically. Moreover, this kind of self-scrutiny leads to the recognition of the ... rules that are responsible for the faulty responses.'*

For Beck the first interview with the client/patient is of crucial importance, the primary purpose being 'to produce at least some relief of symptoms'<sup>242</sup> and to encourage the therapist in his desire 'to help another person in a meaningful way.'<sup>243</sup> Helping the other person would include 'cutting to the quick' by identifying 'a set of problems [and to] demonstrate to the patient some strategies for dealing with these problems.'<sup>244</sup> Certainly for patients suffering from depression, Beck advocated the application of **immediate** strategies during the first interview, strategies which could include 'homework assignments, listening to a tape-recoding of the previous therapy session, etc'<sup>245</sup> in order to perpetuate relief from problematic

symptoms. The primacy of promoting this immediate symptomatic<sup>246</sup> relief was to reinforce, *ab initio* the patient's capacity to motivate him/herself. For Beck:

*'the emotional and behavioural difficulties that people experience in their lives are not caused directly by events but by the way they interpret and make sense of these events. When clients can be helped to pay attention to the 'internal dialogue', the stream of automatic thoughts that accompany and guide their actions, they can make choices about the appropriateness of these self-statements, and if necessary introduce new thoughts and ideas, which lead to a happier or more satisfied life.'*<sup>247</sup>

### **The advent of rational-emotive behaviour therapy in the cognitive-behavioural paradigm (Albert Ellis):**

Unlike Beck, who was a qualified medical practitioner, Albert Ellis was a clinical-psychologist who obtained his Ph.D., from Columbia University. In the early days (1943)<sup>248</sup> before the innovation of formal registration/licensing, Ellis opened a private counselling practice and later trained (as did Beck) as a psychoanalyst and, in a manner similar to Beck, became excoriating of psychoanalysis, particularly regarding its claims to authority, claims that could not be founded on scientific premises:

*'although the art of psychoanalysis is now over a half century old, a comprehensive formulation of all its scientific principles is still far from being realised. Such a formulation, which will strip from analytic theory and practice all the trappings of dogmatism, unverified speculation, bias, and cultism, and which will leave standing only those principles and procedures which are, or seem well on the way to becoming, clinically validated, has been partially attempted, but by no means as yet systematically executed.'*<sup>249</sup>

Later in life Ellis made the startling admission that 'I was really an existential analyst'<sup>250</sup>, one who 'thought that Freud was exceptionally unscientific, knew very little about the origin of people's sex and love problems, and wrote brilliant fiction which he presented as scientific non-fiction.'<sup>251</sup> Ellis had an early interest in sex studies and was a significant commentator in this field over a period of three and a half decades, in fact 'Ellis's first Ph.D. dissertation proposal was on the love emotions of college coeds, but the faculty rejected his topic as too daring for the time.'<sup>252</sup> Ellis possessed a highly distinctive therapeutic style (as anyone can witness in the famous 'Gloria' filmed interviews, in which Ellis and two other therapists, Fritz Perls and Carl Rogers also took part) a style that at times could appear quite confrontational. It was within these 'confrontational' interchanges that the client was encouraged to face up to the irrationality of his/her thinking. It was his view that 'emotional problems are caused by 'crooked thinking' arising from viewing life in terms of 'shoulds' and 'musts'.<sup>253</sup> This distorted and 'unhealthy' cognition in the form of 'irrational beliefs', was



entirely at odds with Ellis's contention that 'sensible thinking... usually leads to healthy emoting.'<sup>254</sup> For him, irrational beliefs could be crippling whenever they remained unchallenged as the underlying rationales and motivations for dysfunctional behaviours. He developed a taxonomy, at the heart of which were ten Irrational Beliefs, ones that Ellis claimed covered the spectrum of dysfunctionality, as he saw it:

*'Irrational Belief No. 1, is the idea that you must -- yes, must -- have love or approval from all the significant people in your life.'*<sup>255</sup>

*'Irrational Belief No. 2: The idea that you absolutely must be thoroughly competent adequate and achieving. Or a saner but still foolish variation: The idea that you at least must be competent or talented in some important area.'*<sup>256</sup>

*'Irrational Belief No.3: The idea that people absolutely must not act obnoxiously and unfairly, and that when they do, you should blame and damn them, and see them as bad, wicked, or rotten individuals.'*<sup>257</sup>

*'Irrational Belief No. 4: The idea that you have to see things as being awful, terrible, horrible, and catastrophic when you are seriously frustrated or treated unfairly.'*<sup>258</sup>

*'Irrational Belief No.5: The idea you must be miserable when you have pressures and difficult experiences; and that you have little ability to control, and cannot change, your disturbed feelings.'*<sup>259</sup>

*'Irrational Belief No. 6: The idea that if something is dangerous or fearsome, you must obsess about it and frantically try to escape from it.'*<sup>260</sup>

*'Irrational Belief No. 7: The idea that you can easily avoid facing many difficulties and self-responsibilities and still lead a highly fulfilling existence.'*<sup>261</sup>

*'Irrational Belief No. 8: The idea that your past remains all-important and that because something once strongly influenced your life, it has to keep determining your feelings and behaviour today.'*<sup>262</sup>

*Irrational Belief No. 9: The idea that people and things absolutely must be better than they are and that it is awful and horrible if you cannot change life's grim facts to suit you.'*<sup>263</sup>

*'Irrational Belief No.10: The idea that you can achieve maximum human happiness by inertia or by passively and uncommittedly "enjoying yourself".'*<sup>264</sup>

The lengthy quote above is an attempt to cover, in a comprehensive manner, an important spectrum in Ellis's thinking, one that formed a core around which he developed his psychotherapeutic methods. For him there is an irrevocable link between how people behave, what they experience as emotions and how they choose to act as a result of what they believe. Each of these 'elements' of human life requires from the therapeutic practitioner a specific therapeutic response. At the heart lies the notion that clients are not simply 'disturbed' *per se* but primarily act to disturb themselves. In this **self-disturbance**, people often close themselves down and eschew their own genuine possibilities through dysfunctional repetitive behaviours (habits), automatic thinking and stereotyped emotional responses. It is 'when people seriously disturb themselves—that is, make themselves severely panicking,

depressing, or raging—and when they function poorly—that is, unduly inhibit themselves, withdraw, or act compulsively—they live less happily.<sup>265</sup> For Ellis, leading the happy life, and being free from self-disturbing dysfunctionality are the two foundational purposes of psychotherapeutic intervention. In the transitional pre-paradigmatic phase between his abandoning psychoanalysis and developing another orientation he states: 'I went back to philosophy, especially the philosophy of human happiness, which had been one of my main hobbies since the age of sixteen... I was particularly taken by Epicurus, who preached the philosophy of disciplined hedonism, and with Epictetus. It was Epictetus who wrote, "people are disturbed not by things, but by the views they make of them."<sup>266</sup>

*'Albert Ellis has acknowledged Epictetus as one of the chief inspirations behind the development of Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT).<sup>267</sup> ... Ellis was struck by Epictetus' insistence that "it is not the events that disturb people; it is their judgements concerning them" (Enchiridion 5). Ellis openly credits Epictetus for supplying his guiding principle that our emotional responses to upsetting actions—not the actions themselves—are what create anxiety and depression; and that (a basic point to Stoic psychology in general) our emotional responses are products of our judgements—tout court: "Much of what we call emotion is nothing more nor less than a certain kind—a biased, prejudiced, or strongly evaluative kind-of thought. What we call feelings almost always have a pronounced evaluating or appraisal element."<sup>268</sup> Ellis points out that irrational beliefs often appear in the way people talk to themselves.<sup>269</sup>*

It was this turning towards philosophy that became the impetus for re-orientating his therapeutic theory, one that would enable him to claim at a later time, 'I created and started practising REBT in January 1955.'<sup>270</sup>

### **The advent of the cognitive-behavioural within the cognitive-behavioural psychotherapeutic paradigm:**

*'Over the last 20 or 30 years, cognitive therapy has remained a distinctive approach, which has built on the early work of Beck and Ellis in devising cognitive strategies for working with an increasing range of client groups... Probably the most significant contribution of the cognitive therapy tradition has been in the combination of cognitive and behavioural ideas and methods, within what became known as cognitive behaviour therapy or cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT).<sup>271</sup>*

At the beginning of this chapter it was claimed that the drift in the direction of therapeutic revolution appears to consist of three important elements: a desire to make counselling a discrete profession, one having a generic knowledge base and one with a core of proven therapeutic practices. In addition, existent single schools of psychotherapy now perceive themselves as 'core' orientations having the capacity to bring other orientations under the umbrella of their own disciplinary matrix. Certainly from within the behavioural traditions of Watson, Skinner and Wolpe and the cognitive practices of Beck and Ellis there exist

many similarities (ones that had **already** been combined therapeutically (if Ellis is to be believed) when he claims, 'I created and started practising REBT in January 1955.'<sup>272</sup>). The attribution, by Ellis, of a stoical/hedonistic philosophical base for his emerging cognitive orientation and its later combination with behavioural therapeutic practices, traces a provenance that is not wholly of the empirical. Ellis's 'distinctively philosophical outlook is reflected in what he identified as the major goals of REBT: self-interest, social interest, self-direction, tolerance of self and others, flexibility, acceptance of uncertainty, self-acceptance, and a non-utopian perspective on life.'<sup>273</sup> Certainly, over the years intervening between the initiatives of Beck and Ellis there were many developments, ones reflected in the nomenclature of such CBT therapies as 'Problem-Solving Therapy', 'Schema Therapy', 'Mindfulness and Acceptance Interventions',<sup>274</sup> 'Dialectical Behaviour Therapy' 'Acceptance and Commitment Therapy', 'Constructivist Therapy'<sup>275</sup> (developments sometimes referred to as the 'Third Wave') as well as the more usual 'Cognitive Therapy' and 'Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy'. Ultimately though, 'CBTs represent the convergence of behavioural strategies and cognitive processes with the goal of achieving behavioural and cognitive change.'<sup>276</sup> Although, at the beginning of this chapter, the results of meta-analyses of therapeutic outcomes seemed to indicate that results across the various 'schools' are more or less the same, the peculiar status of CBT as a 'scientifically' based therapy has meant that: 'at a time when health care systems around the world are seeking to implement evidence-based practice policies (i.e. only funding the delivery of interventions that are backed by valid research evidence) ... has given CBT therapists a major competitive advantage in the therapy marketplace.'<sup>277</sup>

It could be argued that the main characteristics of CBT have already been put in place, through the histories given above of Watson, Skinner, Wolpe, Beck and Ellis and that CBT has been shown as a mix and match of the themes they initiated. As one practitioner admits in the preface to his publication, 'The cognitive-behavioural perspective taken in this book is a product of my early behavioural training and of the mentoring of Dr. Beck',<sup>278</sup> suggesting itself as an example of amelioration of one orientation by another. Certainly, many publications directed at very specific pathological dysfunctions bearing such titles as 'Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for PTSD' 'Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for OCD' 'The PTSD Workbook' etc have proliferated. And (in what seems a long way from early behaviourist observational practices) Zayfert and Becker make a claim for CTB that:



*'a unique challenge of doing CBT for PTSD relative to other anxiety disorders is that **it requires the therapist to be immersed**, along with the patient, in traumatic stimuli, memories and thoughts. Compared to other forms of therapy for PTSD, CBT also requires you to explore a level of trauma detail that is somewhat uncommon.'*<sup>279</sup> [my emboldening].

Likewise, within CBT a patient/client may be encouraged, on a self-help 'homework' basis, to assess his or her own level of suffering by, for example, completing a SUDS Scale (subjective units of distress) measured from zero to ten. '0' being 'I am very relaxed, with no distress'<sup>280</sup> (at one end) to '10' 'I am in extreme distress. I am totally filled with panic and I have extreme tension throughout my body. This is the worst possible fear and anxiety I could ever imagine. It is so great that I just can't think at all'<sup>281</sup> (at the other). The stated intention being 'to communicate to yourself or others how much distress you are experiencing'<sup>282</sup> and thereby to achieve an intended therapeutic outcome through a process of raising personal awareness.

Within this methodology the basic structure of a CBT therapeutic approach would appear to consist of four basic fundamentals, ones that the therapist uses to address the pathology:

1. *'Assessment to obtain a diagnosis and case formulation;*
2. *Treatment planning and obtaining the patient's informed consent to the treatment plan;*
3. *Treatment; and*
4. *Continuous monitoring and hypothesis testing.'*<sup>283</sup>

Nevertheless, one underlying theoretical assumption in the cognitive assessment of clients is that 'human cognitive functioning can be described in information-processing terms, and that this perspective can inform clinical assessment practices.'<sup>284</sup> The basis of this model is that the human mind gathers information from the world **outside** itself and then, together with intra-mental processes and activity, assembles a 'view of reality.'<sup>285</sup> As with Beck and Ellis, initial therapeutic sessions are of great significance within CBT (for it is within these that the therapist begins his or her task of formulating a case outline):

*'The case formulation is a hypothesis about the psychological mechanisms and other factors that cause and maintain a particular patient's disorders and problems.'*<sup>286</sup>

The creation of a hypothetical formulation of the patient's pathology becomes the basis for a strategic approach to addressing the presenting issues. This formulation serves as the 'base-line' to which therapist and client/patient return again and again:

*'At every step in the treatment process...the therapist returns repeatedly to the assessment phase; that is, the therapist collects data to monitor the process and progress of the therapy and uses those data to test the hypotheses (formulations) that underpin the intervention plan and to revise them as needed.'*<sup>287</sup>

Over the intervening years, between the initiatives of Beck and Ellis, there have been many developments within CBT, ones that now seem more akin to the philosophical bases that originally inspired Ellis to abandon psychoanalysis (and a dominant behaviourism) in favour of developing REBT. For example, the recent developments of therapeutic interventions that have turned toward the meditation practices of Buddhism (whilst at the same time attempting to 'strip out' their religious provenance) have emerged under the umbrella title of 'Mindfulness'. This 'stripping out', as one commentator has noted, has been based upon the notion that 'the goal of mindfulness training in CBT is not to teach Buddhism; mindfulness intervention must be free of cultural, religious and ideological factors.'<sup>288</sup> The attempt to 'strip out' has been resisted in some quarters, a resistance that has arisen out of the apprehension 'that something is lost when mindfulness is separated from its roots.'<sup>289</sup> Nevertheless, it seems that there are many tensions within this marrying of the religious and the cognitive/behavioural, ones that doubtless will continue:

*'There are challenges inherent in the incorporation of a historically spiritual or religious practice into a scientific practice, even after modification...because mindfulness and acceptance have spiritual and religious origins, they start out as "prescientific." However, as integrated parts of treatment, they must be specified and evaluated, and thereby become incorporated into the realm of science.'*<sup>290</sup>

Apart from their spiritual provenance, mindfulness interventions signal yet another divergence from the 'mainstream' of CBT (one that may yet pre-figure the emergence of a pre-paradigmatic progression). Whereas 'the founders of CBT, such as Beck [and] Ellis... developed a range of techniques to *change* the content of their thoughts, by contrast, the emphasis in mindfulness is not on forcing change to take place, but on promoting awareness and acceptance.'<sup>291</sup>

### **Summary:**

Attention has been paid to the emergence of CBT from within behavioural psychology through Watson's emphasis on laboratory experimentation, observational practices and rejection of 'internal process'. Likewise with Skinner, came a rejection of Freudian mentalist concepts but with an endorsement of the individual as primarily a social construct, one subject to environmental stimuli, a locus at which genetic and environmental conditions came together in joint effect rather than the individual being an 'originating event' in him or herself. With Wolpe a methodical application of behaviouristic principles to the world of

psychotherapy with particular attention being paid to the way maladaptive habits become adopted through a process of 'learning', focused on 'unlearning' these maladaptions through behaviour therapy. With Beck there is also a rejection of the psychoanalytic emphasis on unconscious process and its failure, as he saw it to take into account the client's comments on his/her thoughts and emotions. Beck's intention is to correct erroneous beliefs by gaining access to excessive and distorted emotional reactions. This is achieved by helping the client to identify warped thinking and in the learning of new ways to formulate his or her experiences. Likewise, Ellis also rejects the psychoanalytic emphasis on unconscious process. For Ellis, sensible thinking leads to a healthy emotional life (but with an emphasis being placed on identification and codification of irrational beliefs). Ellis also acknowledges the powerful influence of philosophy in the development and formulation of his approach. In addition, attention has been paid latterly, to the manner in which cognitivist and behaviourist traditions, theories, and practices have combined, over the last three decades, to create a cognitive-behavioural therapy whose evidence-based practice has resulted in its becoming the preferred approach for many health agencies and institutions. In a manner akin to Ellis's acknowledgement of a philosophical provenance to his work, recent developments in CBT, (such as 'Mindfulness') have also found inspiration outside the cognitive/behavioural tradition, especially through the adoption of Buddhist meditative practices, philosophy, and attitudes.

### **The Humanistic Psychotherapeutic Paradigm:**

Earlier in this chapter I introduced three dominant paradigms in counselling and psychotherapy namely, the Psychodynamic, The Cognitive/Behavioural and The Humanistic. Very briefly and very crudely I outlined them in the following manner:

*'Psychoanalytic theory focuses on the individual through innate drives and defence mechanisms related to anxiety and the control thereof, while humanistic theory is based on a striving to meet inner needs and to accomplish self-actualisation...cognitive- behavioural and rational-emotive therapists seek to correct irrational thinking.'*<sup>292</sup>

Ewan also identifies these three paradigms and uses them as a mode of analysis, but adds a fourth, 'The-Existential-Phenomenological Paradigm', with this caveat:

*'In many ways, strongly differentiating between this paradigm and humanistic psychology creates a false dichotomy. There is a great deal of conceptual overlap between them due to the significant influence of existential philosophy on both.'*<sup>293</sup>

He then illustrates the character of this overlap by identifying ten categories in which the concept of 'existence' figures prominently. These ten categories (again very briefly and very crudely) encompass many of the themes to be explored within this dissertation, and are named here with two main purposes: first, to succinctly register them as major concepts, and second, to place them within the humanistic paradigm:

*'1. Existence as unique...2. Existence as process not thing...3. Existence as freely choosing...4. Existence as future and meaning orientated...5. Existence as limited...6. Existence as-in-the-world...7. Existence as with others...8. Existence as embodied...9. The tragedy of existence...10. The choice between authenticity and inauthenticity.'*<sup>294</sup>

As within the Psychodynamic paradigm there is an inevitable 'Freudocentrism' around the figure of Sigmund Freud, so also within the Humanistic paradigm there is a certain 'Rogerocentrism' around the figure and pivotal position of Carl Rogers (1902-1987). Attention will be paid to his unique contribution in developing counselling both as a movement and as a profession. Additionally, consideration will be given to the special position of Existential Counselling in its encompassing many themes and arguments used in addressing the research question. In a manner similar to the position of Psychoanalysis within the Psychodynamic Paradigm, so Rogers Person-Centred Therapy has come to a similar position within the Humanistic one. Notwithstanding an earlier claim that CBT embraces what is 'probably one of the most widely accepted treatments for a range of psychiatric disorders and psychological problems'<sup>295</sup> and is the therapy that 'has been widely adopted as the intervention model most likely to be offered to clients within health-care systems in North America and Europe.'<sup>296</sup> It also remains the case that:

*'...the approach associated with Rogers...has not only been one of the most widely used orientations to counselling and therapy over the past 50 years, but has also supplied ideas and methods that have been integrated into other approaches. As with other mainstream approaches to counselling, such as psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioural, it encompasses a number of distinct yet overlapping groupings.'*<sup>297</sup>

One of these distinct yet overlapping groupings has now been recognised as a member of 'the tribes of the person-centred nation'<sup>298</sup> in the form of the Existential Therapy:

*'Carl Rogers was clearly influenced by existential writers. He included existential ideas into client-centred theory from the start. The two therapeutic traditions grew up in parallel and now we are beginning to understand the relationships between the two much better.'*<sup>299</sup>

This is despite Rogers' assertion, 'I am not a student of existential philosophy.'<sup>300</sup>

Nevertheless, there is evidence of contact with and influence by prominent existential figures such as Kierkegaard (1813-1855) by his taking 'one of Kierkegaard's phrases—to be that self

which one truly is—as the title of a lecture that became Chapter 8 of *On Becoming A Person*.<sup>301</sup> In addition he had face-to-face contact with Martin Buber (1878-1965) when they ‘met for over an hour of public debate on April 18 1957. Buber, the renowned Jewish philosopher of dialogue... on his second trip to the United States... at the University of Michigan.’<sup>302</sup> A similar debate also took place between Rogers and the ‘existential theologian, Paul Tillich (1886-1965).’<sup>303</sup> It was during the Rogers/Buber dialogue in Michigan that Rogers was profoundly challenged at the heart of his person-centred approach by Buber’s quiet insistent questionings and probing, in which the following elements were aired:

***Mutuality and therapy:** Is it possible for genuine dialogue or “moments of meeting” to occur between individuals who have different roles (such as patient and therapist), status, or power in the relationship?... **Human nature:** Is human nature positive (characterised by an “actualising tendency” according to Rogers) or polar, equally prone to moving in a positive or negative direction (Buber)?... **Inner meeting and dialogue:** Can one be that self “which one most deeply is” (Rogers) when not in dialogic relationship with others (Buber)?... **The nature of empathy:** Is it possible to truly enter the feelings and worldview of another person without giving up one’s sense of self (Rogers) or critical perspective (Buber)?*<sup>304</sup>

Contemporaneously, Existential Therapy (named by Sanders<sup>305</sup> as one of the five ‘tribes’ within the ‘person-centred nation’) now lives alongside four others: Classical Client-Centred Therapy, Focusing Oriented Therapy, Experiential Person-Centred and Integrative Person-Centred Therapy. Doubtless, the metaphor of ‘tribes’ and ‘nation’ is intended to register the distinct integrity of each tribal entity existent within a recognisable broader classification (much in the same way as the Apache, Crow, Navajo and Arapaho exist as distinct tribes within the Native American Nation of North America). Nonetheless, all of these tribes, residing as they do within the humanistic paradigm, harbour basic beliefs that signify a transition ‘from natural science to human science’<sup>306</sup> in that ‘the so-called humanistic orientation in psychotherapy is the only one which has so far explicitly taken the image of the human being as a starting point for practice and theory building.’<sup>307</sup> Bugental encapsulates the subjectivity of this starting point when he posits the fundamentally important questions that, for him, individual human being must address:

*‘Each person must in some way answer the basic questions life puts to us all: “Who and what am I? What is this world in which I live? **We answer these questions with our lives**, with how we identify ourselves, how we use our powers, how we relate to others, how we face all **the possibilities and limitations** of being human.’*<sup>308</sup> [my emboldening].

He then goes on to illustrate the multifarious ways in which he sees this being accomplished:

*‘We collect the materials from which to form our answers from our parents, our brothers and sisters, and other family members, our teachers and age fellows, from our reading, including fiction in all its forms, from our churches and our membership in various organisations. Throughout our lives we*



*collect these materials, form and revise our answers, and continually carry this process up to the final question, which we answer with our deaths.*<sup>309</sup>

For him, the psychotherapeutic encounter has an inherently **transformative** purpose, one that is contextualised by the client's immersion within his or her own existential questing. The therapist's role is essentially a collaborative one, the purpose being to be with the patient/client as a skilful assistant in which the therapist's 'normal sensitivity [is] carried to greater than normal acuity'<sup>310</sup>:

*'Life-changing psychotherapy is the effort of patient and therapist to help the former to examine the manner in which has answered life's existential questions and to attempt to revise some of those answers in ways which will make the patient's life more authentic and thus more fulfilling.'*<sup>311</sup>

Bugental's overview of relationships and intentions within the therapeutic encounter is very far removed from the context within which Carl Rogers began his therapeutic career. Rogers began as a psychotherapist during the 1930s, specialising in child guidance within the New York venue of the Rochester Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. At that time, Roger's approach, (especially during parents' meetings) could be encapsulated in the manner he described the purposes of his clinic as being:

*'rather similar to a garage—you brought in a problem, received an expert diagnosis, and were advised how the difficulty could be corrected.'*<sup>312</sup>

His whole approach was dominated by a diagnostic, behavioural-observationist, and psychological testing ethos in which it was quite usual to write 'lengthy case histories in which he interpreted the parent's behavior as being implicated in the behavioural problems of their children.'<sup>313</sup> He operated a testing regime based upon the administration of 'intelligence... reading and mathematical achievement tests, mechanical aptitude tests, interest inventories and, beginning in 1931...[his] own Personal Adjustment Inventory.'<sup>314</sup> His early frustrations at the fragmented nature of applying tests to discrete aspects of the subject, inclined him toward seeking one that not only transcended the ideologies of various 'schools' but also more comprehensively took into account all those factors that he believed influenced behaviour. He therefore produced a test that was designed to take into account a child-client/patient's 'heredity, physical factors, mentality, self-insight, family emotional tone, economic and cultural factors, social experience, education and supervision.'<sup>315</sup> Perhaps, even at that early stage, Rogers was seeking a unifying principle, one that would eventually emerge as the notion of the 'one motivational force that determined the development of the human being...the *actualising tendency*...which despite every kind of opposition or hindrance



[ensured] that an individual continued to strive to grow towards the best possible fulfilment of their potential.’<sup>316</sup>

Roger’s ‘epiphany’ toward a more client-centred approach occurred during a visit of Alfred Adler<sup>317</sup> (1870-1937) to the Rochester clinic. Adler, a former Viennese colleague of Freud (and rival), had already developed a theory that attempted to understand the human being in a more comprehensive manner, one that would later emerge as his ‘Individual Psychology’. It was Adler’s simple and straightforward advice to Rogers that ‘case histories were not necessary for successful treatment’<sup>318</sup> that brought about a radical change in Roger’s relationship with his clients in that he:

*‘began to **listen to what his patients were saying** about their lives and what **meaning** their feelings had for them, instead of what their ‘case histories’ said.’<sup>319</sup>[my emboldening].*

What needs to be recognised in this ‘epiphany’ is that its inception occurs at a very early stage in Roger’s career. Adler died in 1937 and Rogers left Rochester in 1939. The main influences that Rogers was working under at this time were ‘the two great streams of psychology after World War I... psychoanalysis and behaviourism’,<sup>320</sup> ones that he attempted to adapt to his own burgeoning understanding of the person. Of this burgeoning understanding Roger’s later noted:

*‘I was saying something that came from **me**, that I was not simply summarising a trend, and that I was developing a viewpoint which was my **own**.’<sup>321</sup>*

Earlier it was noted that it is at the interface between different ‘schools’ that Kuhn’s understanding of a ‘pre-paradigm’ state has an approximately relevant value. For Kuhn, in order ‘to be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.’<sup>322</sup> As this new paradigm begins to emerge, an amalgamation of practices and theories accrues around and within it, which in turn attracts other practitioners towards it. A new **community** is thereby created, one whose existence ‘implies a new and more rigid definition of the field.’<sup>323</sup> This rigid defining not only hastens the development of the paradigm but also becomes characteristic of it. The pre-paradigmatic state that Rogers found himself in did not attempt to ‘explain all the facts’, rather it was a neophyte movement in which non-directive approaches in psychotherapeutic relationships were beginning to coalesce. But it was with the publication of his cohering ‘*Counselling and Psychotherapy*’ in 1942 that Roger’s ideas found a wider audience:

*'Ironically, it was not a new method of therapy that this work introduced. Others had been advocating less directive, less interpretive approaches for the counselling field, and Rogers acknowledged their contribution. What he did do was...synthesize what a number of these practitioners were discovering and translate this synthesis into a clear description of the therapeutic process, which he called "A Newer Psychotherapy"'.<sup>324</sup>*

This publication had several novel features. First, it included extracts from a psychotherapeutic counselling session, one that had been recorded live, transcribed, and then **published** (the first time this had ever been done)<sup>325</sup>. Second, it used the term 'client' in preference to the term 'patient'. Third, by using the term 'client' Rogers effectively moved the psychotherapeutic relationship out of the **medical** consulting room and into another venue 'suggesting that counselling or the therapeutic process could be employed by helpers<sup>326</sup> in many professions, not only medically trained psychiatrists or psychoanalysts.'<sup>327</sup> Fourth, it gave a succinct schematic presentation of the therapeutic process, backed up by direct 'live' evidence from the process itself. Fifth, it laid out the process in terms of twelve 'steps'<sup>328</sup> or 'aspects' (with the caveat: 'although these different aspects of therapy are described separately and placed in specific order, it should be emphasized that they are not discrete events. The processes mingle and shade into one another.'<sup>329</sup>). Sixth, the whole enterprise was couched in response to four questions Rogers had posed regarding the therapeutic process; 'What happens? What goes on during a period of contacts? What does the counsellor do? The client?'<sup>330</sup>

Although Abraham Maslow is credited with being 'the single person most responsible for creating humanistic psychology [and that] his theory of the self and of self-actualisation served as a foundation for later humanistic psychologists [of which] Roger's client-centred or person centred...are partially elaborations'<sup>331</sup> it was Roger's practice of explicating his position in terms of clearly stated premises and of modifying and elaborating these over the decades, that earned him a pivotal location within counselling history and guaranteed attention on his evolving contributions. One of these significant contributions occurred within a short and succinct article in which he posited six conditions that **had** to exist (and **had to persist**) in order for 'constructive personality change to occur.'<sup>332</sup> These propositions Rogers enumerated as:

1. *'Two persons are in psychological contact.*
2. *The first, whom we shall term the client, is in a state of incongruence, being vulnerable or anxious.*
3. *The second person, whom we shall term the therapist, is congruent or integrated in the relationship.*
4. *The therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client.*

5. *The therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the client's internal frame of reference and endeavours to communicate this experience to the client.*
6. *The communication to the client of the therapist's empathic understanding and unconditional positive regard is to a minimal degree achieved.*<sup>333</sup>

His practice of summarising and schematising his psychotherapeutic approaches within relatively brief articles (expressed in plain language) had the effect of making his work accessible and (apparently) unambiguous. Also, his habit of subtly modifying his previous statements gave the impression of his being alert to fresh impressions from psychotherapeutic practice. For example, within two years following the article above, he modifies condition 6, so that the emphasis switches from the counsellor to the client:

*'6. That the client **perceives**, at least to a minimal degree, conditions 4 and 5, the **unconditional positive regard** of the therapist for him, and the **empathic** understanding of the therapist.*<sup>334</sup>

It may be seen that certain key-words in the above propositions such as, 'contact', 'congruence', 'integrated', 'experience', 'understanding', 'communicate', point towards an approach that emphasises the experience of both client and therapist (and the manner in which that experience may become available to the other). McLeod notes that 'the person-centred approach begins and ends with experiencing. Because of this, the set of ideas and practices that comprise the person-centred approach build on a *phenomenological* approach to knowledge.'<sup>335</sup> He then goes on to note that 'phenomenology is a method of philosophical enquiry...which is widely employed in existential philosophy, and which takes the view that valid knowledge and understanding can be gained by exploring and describing the way things are experienced by people...the aim of phenomenology is to depict the nature and quality of personal experience.'<sup>336</sup> Although my approach to phenomenology may be guided by a more Heideggarian interpretation (as elaborated in detail within Chapter Three) I do accept that Roger's interpretation and understanding of this is largely in line with the overview McLeod has given. The concept of human 'being-in-the-world', as explicated by Heidegger, is a major concept within this dissertation and one strictly adhered to (as being of the ontological) but, in a strictly metaphorical and analogous sense (or 'ontic' sense as Heidegger would say) it may also bear some resemblance to, and parallel affinity with the explication that:

*'...the concept of experiencing is absolutely central to the person-centred approach—the person is viewed as responding to the world on the basis of his or her flow of moment-by-moment experiencing. The concept of experience can be defined as a amalgam of bodily sensed thoughts, feelings and action tendencies, which is continually changing. The person-centred approach therefore positions itself differently from cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), which makes a firm distinction between cognition and emotion, and psychodynamic theory, which makes a firm distinction between conscious and unconscious. Within the person-centred approach, cognition and emotion, and*

*conscious/unconscious material, are always interwoven within the phenomenal field (i.e. the flow of experiencing of the person.).*<sup>337</sup>

Earlier it was said that for Rogers six conditions **had** to exist (and **had** to **persist**) in order for 'constructive personality change to occur.'<sup>338</sup> These six conditions also formed part of a larger (and later) theoretical schematisation<sup>339</sup> in which he explored not only the circumstances under which successful therapeutic process could take place but also the actual process of the therapy itself and the likely effects consequent upon fulfilling these conditions. Rogers was careful to enter a caveat *ab initio* whereby he stated, 'This theory is of the if-then variety. If certain conditions exist ... then a process ... will occur which includes certain characteristic elements. If this process ... occurs, then certain personality and behavioural changes ...will occur.'<sup>340</sup> In addition, Rogers hypothesised that fifteen likely outcomes for the client would occur when the six conditions of the therapeutic process had been successfully practised and adhered to, amongst which he noted that:

*'13. His behaviour changes in various ways.*

- *Since the proportion of experience assimilated into the self-structure is increased, the proportion of behaviours which can be "owned" as belonging to the self is increased.*
- *Conversely, the proportion of behaviours which are disowned as self-experiences, felt to be "not myself", is decreased.*
- *Hence his behaviour is perceived as being more within his control.*<sup>341</sup>

Heading Roger's list are three cardinal 'outcomes' on which the remaining twelve are more or less dependent. He identifies first, '[that] the client is more congruent, more open to his experience, less defensive',<sup>342</sup> that second, the client is 'consequently more realistic, objective, [and] extensional in his perceptions',<sup>343</sup> whilst third, he is 'more effective in problem solving'.<sup>344</sup> In a way similar to this research project (where a definite Heideggarian notion of human being is sustained and remained with) Rogers remains with a definite notion of the human being. First of all he postulates that human beings possess a 'basic drive to maintain, develop and enhance their functioning'<sup>345</sup> and it is this that 'constantly urges the person towards development. This actualising tendency drives a person to make the best they can of their circumstances.'<sup>346</sup> The notion of the actualising tendency is crucial to Roger's understanding of therapy and of the human within it. For him it is the 'one motivational force that determined the development of the human being'<sup>347</sup> and that 'despite every kind of opposition or hindrance would insure that an individual continued to strive to grow towards

the best possible fulfilment of their potential.'<sup>348</sup> One commentator draws attention to the centrally crucial position that the actualising tendency occupies in Roger's thought:

*'We cannot think about the organism without reference to this actualising tendency. One is not viable without the other and any theoretical separation of the two runs the risk of losing a coherent understanding of the person-centred approach.'*<sup>349</sup>

It could be argued that Roger's notion of the 'actualising tendency' occupies, within his theoretical framework, a position somewhat akin to the position of the unconscious in Freud's. For Rogers the actualising tendency is both a 'capacity' and a 'tendency' for human being to become transformed from an immature condition to a more mature one. This capacity, though often hidden and covered over, is a persistent capability, one that is ever in being and one that cannot be destroyed. Nevertheless, it remains for the most part a potentiality which, under certain specific conditions, becomes manifest in its operation. He claims that 'in a suitable psychological climate this tendency is released, and becomes actual rather than potential.'<sup>350</sup> This capacity is a motivational presence, one that underlies the human being's quest to uncover the causes of his/her psychic distress despite the pain and heartache involved in such a mission. This actualising tendency demonstrates its presence in the willingness of human being to restructure its own selfhood in such a way that it becomes positioned towards greater maturity not only in the ways life becomes lived but also in the nature of relationships entered into. For Rogers, 'whether one calls it a growth tendency, a drive toward self-actualisation, or a forward-moving directional tendency, it is the mainspring of life, and is, in the last analysis, the tendency upon which all of psychotherapy depends.'<sup>351</sup> This is a very large claim, one that Rogers relies upon, not only as the fundamental substratum for human psychic transformation, but also as the bedrock for his own psychotherapeutic approach. This 'capacity', 'tendency', 'drive', 'growth', 'mainspring', 'urge' (to use Roger's dynamic nomenclature) is not simply specific to human existence but is also present in anything that has life. Rogers therefore positively makes a connection between the characteristics of human existence and the characteristics of organic nature:

*'It is the urge which is evident in all organic and human life – to expand, extend, become autonomous, develop, mature – the tendency to express and activate all the capacities of the organism, to the extent that such activation enhances the organism or the self. This tendency may become deeply buried under layer after layer of encrusted psychological defences; it may be hidden behind elaborate facades deny its existence but ... it exists in every individual, and awaits only the proper conditions to be released and expressed.'*<sup>352</sup>

Nevertheless, there is a certain caveat to be entered into. Rogers does not conflate the terms 'actualising tendency' and 'self actualisation' with each other. For him a clear distinction must



be maintained between them. For him, 'self actualisation is 'the actualisation of that portion of the experience of the organism which is symbolised in the self.' <sup>353</sup> Earlier, Rogers stated that 'in a suitable psychological climate this tendency is released, and becomes actual rather than potential', <sup>354</sup> it the centrality of this notion that persists throughout his theoretical formulations. As late as 1986, Rogers is asking two fundamental questions:

*'What do I mean by a client-centred, or person-centred, approach? ... The central hypothesis of this approach can be briefly stated. It is that the individual has within himself or herself vast resources for self-understanding, for altering his or her self-concept, attitudes, and self-directed behaviour – and that these resources can be tapped if only a definable climate or facilitative psychological attitudes can be provided.'* <sup>355</sup>

Roger's notions of 'definable climate' and 'facilitative psychological attitudes' have passed into the pantheon of the counselling oeuvre. Here (again) Rogers emphasises the concept of 'growth' as being the underlying desirable outcome of a facilitative psychological attitude, one that would occur within a growth promoting ambience. He does not restrict this outcome to an exclusively psychotherapeutic situation. Instead, he widens the scope of its possibility to embrace **any circumstance** 'in which the development of the person is a goal.' <sup>356</sup> He postulates that there are three conditions under which such an outcome would occur. First, if the therapist or group facilitator abandons any pretence of being an expert, and abandons any pretence of other than who he or she genuinely is and embraces being genuinely present so that 'the therapist is openly being the feelings and attitudes that are flowing within at the moment.' <sup>357</sup> Second, if the therapist positively fosters an ambience within which the client recognises that he or she is accepted in a totally unconditional way and that this acceptance arises from the therapist's **own** experience so that 'when the therapist is experiencing a positive, non-judgemental, accepting attitude toward whatever the client **is** at that moment, therapeutic movement or change is more likely.' <sup>358</sup> Third, if the therapist is able to fluently inhabit the personal world of the client in such a way that the client has confidence in the therapist's presence within it. Having been invited and welcomed there, the therapist '...can [therefore] clarify not only the meanings of which the client is aware but even those just below the level of awareness.' <sup>359</sup> To these three conditions Roger's attaches the terms 'genuineness, realness, or congruence', 'unconditional positive regard' and 'empathic understanding'. These three conditions are envisaged as occurring within a more fundamental understanding of the client/therapist relationship, whereby the concept of 'non-directivity is a *foundational* stance, and the core conditions, as attitudes of values held by the therapist, are necessarily unique expressions of it.' <sup>360</sup> It is the foundational nature of non--directivity within



person centred counselling that encouraged Rogers to originally name it 'Non-Directive Therapy'<sup>361</sup> (only later to change it to the more familiar 'person-centred therapy'). It is this notion of non-directivity within person-centred therapy that sets it apart from many 'mainstream' counselling approaches and, in a sense, represents an **extremity** of orientation that is not always recognised:

*'Each core condition flows from a deeply held understanding of, and strongly held belief in, non--directivity ... Though this is not explicit in Rogers' writings, it is clearly implicit throughout ... Any notion that the therapist knows what is best for the client results in a return to the therapist taking ownership of power and diminishing client freedom, and of the values and attitudes that will flow from such a stance are necessarily and inexorably changed. Any use of the core conditions is no longer in keeping with the non--directive attitude; no longer in keeping with the radical notion of trusting the client to direct or guide therapy, their own processes and their own lives.'*<sup>362</sup>

### **Summary:**

It has been shown that a conceptual overlap exists between the humanistic psychotherapeutic paradigm and the existential-phenomenological and that ten categories have been identified in which the concept of 'existence' figures prominently. Attention has been drawn to the centrally pivotal position of Carl Rogers within the humanistic paradigm (somewhat akin to the position of Freud within the psychodynamic) and to the development of person centred therapy and the manner in which Rogers was influenced by existential philosophy and existential figures. The multifarious nature of present-day person-centred counselling (and its development into 'tribes') was discussed as was Bugental's notion of subjectivity and the manner in which he identified humans becoming personally transformed. Roger's early involvement with diagnostic, behavioural-observationist and psychological testing was noted as was his influence by Alfred Adler and the subsequent 'epiphany' into a nascent person-centred orientation. It was argued that Rogers found himself within a pre-paradigmatic situation in which his work synthesised many ideas and approaches that were already prevalent and already accruing around a less-interpretive non-directivity within psychotherapy. Rogers was pivotal in advocating the shifting of the psychotherapeutic relationship from the medical consulting room and into a relationship with 'lay' counselling practitioners. He posited that there were six conditions that had to exist (and had to persist) in order for significant personal transformation to occur within a psychotherapeutic setting. These conditions he listed in a characteristically accessible manner, a manner that became the

hallmark of his theoretical presentations and led to the widespread adoption of his ideas. It was argued that within the humanistic paradigm the primary focus is on personal experience (and the ways it can be explored and described) and that there is some 'ontic' connection between this and Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world. A foundational concept for Rogers was the 'actualising tendency' an underlying 'mainspring of life' that promoted psychic growth and was the fundamental substratum for human psychic transformation. This 'mainspring' was not simply a human inherence but existed within all organic nature. He postulated that there were three conditions under which psychic growth would occur when 'the development of the person is a goal': first, if a counsellor were genuine, second if the counsellor showed an unconditional positive regard towards his/her client and third, if a counsellor were skilfully and accurately empathic. Underlying all this, the notion of non-directivity within person-centred counselling remained foundational and was a classic feature of this orientation.

## **ENDNOTES:**

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<sup>1</sup> Claringbull, Norman, (2010), What is Counselling & Psychotherapy? Exeter: LearningMatters p.20.

<sup>2</sup> Claringbull, Norman, (2010),p.20.

<sup>3</sup> See Frank, Jerome, (1974), Persuasion and Healing: A Comparative Study Of Psychotherapy

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<sup>4</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.358.

<sup>5</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.358.

<sup>6</sup> Claringbull, Norman, (2010),p.21 .

<sup>7</sup> See Ryle, A, (1990), Cognitive-Analytic Therapy: Active participation in change—A new integration of brief psychotherapy. Chichester: Wiley.

<sup>8</sup> See Clarkson, P, (1995), The Therapeutic Relationship. London: Whurr.

And also:

See Clarkson, P, (2003) The Therapeutic Relationship, (2<sup>nd</sup> edition) London: Whurr.

<sup>9</sup> See Evans K & Gilbert M (2005) Introduction to Integrative Psychotherapy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>10</sup> Claringbull, Norman, (2010),p.21

<sup>11</sup> Smith, M. L, & Glass, G.V. (1977). Meta-analysis of comparative therapy outcome studies, American Psychologist 32, 752-760.

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<sup>13</sup> Harwood, T. Mark et al., (2010) Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy and Psychotherapy Integration

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<sup>14</sup> Harwood, T. Mark et al., (2010), p.120.

<sup>15</sup> According to Duncan, B.L., et al. (2004), 'The Heroic Client: A Revolutionary Way to Improve Effectiveness through Client-directed, Outcome-informed Therapy. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. P.26.

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<sup>16</sup> Data from, Elkin, J., et al., (1989) 'National Institute of Mental Health treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Program—general effectiveness of treatments', *Archives of General Psychiatry* 46 (11) 971-982.

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<sup>17</sup> Paul, Stephen & Haugh, Sheila (2008), *The Therapeutic Relationship* Ross-on Wye: PCCS BOOKS. p.15.

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<sup>18</sup> See, Kuhn, T.S. (1970), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (2<sup>nd</sup>.ed.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

<sup>19</sup> British Association for Counselling & Psychotherapy (BACP), (2007), draft report, Core Curriculum Consortium.

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Claringbull, Norman, (2010), p.22.

<sup>20</sup> Claringbull, Norman, (2010), p.24.

<sup>21</sup> Claringbull, Norman, (2010), p.24.

<sup>22</sup> Leahy, Robert, L., (2009), 'Schematic mis-match in the therapeutic relationship, a social-cognitive model,

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<sup>23</sup> Leahy, Robert, L., (2009),p.247.

<sup>24</sup> Leahy, Robert, L., (2009),pp.250-251.

<sup>25</sup> Van Deurzen, E, (2001) personal communication to Cooper, Mick, (2003)

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<sup>26</sup> Cooper, Mick (2003), 149.

<sup>27</sup> See Perls, F., Hefferline, R.F. and Goodman, p. (1951) Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality New York: Julian Press.

<sup>28</sup> See Mahrer, A. R. (1996), The Complete Guide to Experiential Psychotherapy New York: Wiley.

<sup>29</sup> See Kelly, G.A. (1955), The Psychology of Personal Constructs. New York: Norton.

<sup>30</sup> Cooper, Mick (2003), p.149.

<sup>31</sup> Bunting, Kara & Hayes, Steven C. (2008), 'Language and Meaning: Acceptance and Commitment therapy and the EI Model.

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<sup>33</sup> Worsley, Richard, (2004),p.126.

<sup>34</sup> Worsley, Richard, (2004),p.139.

<sup>35</sup> Worsley, Richard, (2004),pp.139-140.

<sup>36</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004), The Psychodynamic Approach, London: SAGE. p.32.

<sup>37</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.381.

<sup>38</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.381.

<sup>39</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.383.

<sup>40</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.383.

<sup>41</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.383.

<sup>42</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.385.

<sup>43</sup> Owen, Ian Rory, (2006), p.250.

<sup>44</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970).

<sup>45</sup> Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004), at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn>  
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<sup>47</sup> See Cottone, R.R. (1992), *Theories and paradigms of counselling and psychotherapy*. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

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<sup>50</sup> Rocco, R. (2007).

<sup>51</sup> Rocco, R. (2007).

<sup>52</sup> Rocco, R. (2007).

<sup>53</sup> Rocco, R. (2007).

<sup>54</sup> Rocco, R. (2007).

<sup>55</sup> Rocco, R. (2007).

<sup>56</sup> Rocco, R. (2007).

<sup>57</sup> Rocco, R. (2007).

<sup>58</sup> Claringbull, Norman, (2010), *What is Counselling & Psychotherapy?* Exeter: LearningMatters p.20.

<sup>59</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970).

<sup>60</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970), p.2.

<sup>61</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),p.5.

<sup>62</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),p.6.

<sup>63</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.385.

<sup>64</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),p.96.

<sup>65</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),p.96.

<sup>66</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),pp.17-18.

<sup>67</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),p.19.

<sup>68</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),p.46.

<sup>69</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),pp.47-48.

<sup>70</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),pp.48-49.

<sup>71</sup> Claringbull, Norman, (2010), p.3.

<sup>72</sup> See Frank, Jerome, (1974), *Persuasion and Healing: A Comparative Study Of Psychotherapy*



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<sup>73</sup> McLeod, John, (2009), p.358.

<sup>74</sup> Crabtree, Adam, (1993), *From Mesmer To Freud: Magnetic Sleep and the Roots of Psychological Healing*  
New Haven: Yale University Press.

<sup>75</sup> Crabtree, Adam, (1993),p. vii.

<sup>76</sup> Crabtree, Adam, (1993),p.vii.

<sup>77</sup> Crabtree, Adam, (1993),p.vii.

<sup>78</sup> Crabtree, Adam, (1993),p.vii.

<sup>79</sup> It is with a certain tone of exasperation that Crabtree notes, in reference to the tradition of magnetic sleep, that:

*'In modern textbooks of psychology and psychiatry, too often the tradition of magnetic sleep is written off as a combination of clever charlatanism and naive credulity ... it is one of those strange quirks of academic historiography, that a medico-psychological tradition that was investigated and used by practitioners in every country in the Western world for one hundred years before Freud came onto the scene, a tradition that found supporters among the most brilliant researchers and thinkers during that period and produced thousands of medical treatises describing tens of thousands of cures and ameliorations, a tradition that counted among its offshoots a practicable surgical anaesthesia and an effective system of psychotherapy, could be dismissed with a few cursory paragraphs.'*(p.viii).

<sup>80</sup> Crabtree, Adam, (1993),p.vii).

<sup>81</sup> Crabtree, Adam, (1993),p.vii).

<sup>82</sup> Russo, Mary Frances et. al., (2006), 'The Paradigm shift to post-modern theory in counselling and psychotherapy: are we throwing out the babies with the bathwater?' *Journal of Evolutionary Psychology*.  
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<sup>83</sup> Webster's Third New International Dictionary,(1961), Springfield Mass: Merriam-Webster. P.1832.

<sup>84</sup> Webster's Third New International Dictionary,(1961), Springfield Mass: Merriam-Webster. P.711.

<sup>85</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.12.

<sup>86</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.13.

<sup>87</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.13.

<sup>88</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.13.

<sup>89</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.13.

<sup>90</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.13.

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<sup>91</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.125.

<sup>92</sup> Owen, Ian Rory, (2006), p.250.

<sup>93</sup> Crabtree, Adam, (1993),(p.vii).

<sup>94</sup> Quinodoz, Jean-Michel (2005), *Reading Freud* London: Routledge. p.9.

<sup>95</sup> Breuer, Josef (1893-1895) 'Fraulein Anna O.' Studies on Hysteria, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume ii*. London: Vintage. The Hogarth Press And The Institute Of Psycho-Analysis. p.22.

<sup>96</sup> Breuer, Josef (1893-1895) 'Fraulein Anna O.' Studies on Hysteria, p.42.

<sup>97</sup> Breuer, Josef (1893-1895) 'Fraulein Anna O.' Studies on Hysteria p.44.

<sup>98</sup> Breuer, Josef (1893-1895) 'Fraulein Anna O.' Studies on Hysteria p.45.

<sup>99</sup> Breuer, Josef (1893-1895) 'Fraulein Anna O.' Studies on Hysteria p.30.

<sup>100</sup> Hall, Kirsty, et.al., (2010), *The Problem with Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy*. London: Karnac. p.3.

<sup>101</sup> Breuer, Josef (1893-1895) 'Fraulein Anna O.' Studies on Hysteria p.45.

<sup>102</sup> Ellenberger, Henri, F. (1970) *The Discovery of the Unconscious* New York: Basic Books Inc.

<sup>103</sup> Freud, Sigmund (1893-1895) 'Psychotherapy of Hysteria' *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume ii*. London: Vintage. The Hogarth Press And The Institute Of Psycho-Analysis.p.267.

<sup>104</sup> Freud, Sigmund (1893-1895) 'Psychotherapy of Hysteria', p.267.

<sup>105</sup> Freud, Sigmund (1893-1895) 'Psychotherapy of Hysteria' p.268.

<sup>106</sup> Freud, Sigmund (1893-1895) 'Psychotherapy of Hysteria' p.268.

<sup>107</sup> Freud, Sigmund (1893-1895) 'Psychotherapy of Hysteria' p.268.

<sup>108</sup> Freud, Sigmund (1893-1895) 'Psychotherapy of Hysteria' p.269.

<sup>109</sup> Jacobs, Michael, (2003), *Sigmund Freud* London: SAGE.p.34.

<sup>110</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1915) *The Unconscious* Penguin Freud Library Vol11 p.177.

In

Jacobs, Michael, (2003), *Sigmund Freud* London: SAGE.p.35.

<sup>111</sup> Jacobs, Michael, (2003), *Sigmund Freud* London: SAGE.p.35.

<sup>112</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1933), *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Penguin Freud Library, Vol. 2.

In

Jacobs, Michael, (2003),p.36.

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<sup>113</sup> Jacobs, Michael, (2003),pp.35-36.

<sup>114</sup> Jacobs, Michael, (2004), *Psychodynamic Counselling in Action* London: SAGE. p.13.

<sup>115</sup> See also Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.19:

*'The structural perspective focuses on the model of the mind, the overall framework within which psychological functioning is understood. In psychodynamic theory the principle feature of this psychological map is the presence of the unconscious. This is a core insight, Freud's greatest innovation. The notion of the mind as identical with conscious awareness is discarded. Freud believed this to be a revolutionary change of perspective: our relationship to our self is fundamentally altered; we are no longer 'masters in our own house'.'*

<sup>116</sup> Jacobs, Michael, (2006), *The Presenting Past* Berkshire: Open University Press. p.6.

<sup>117</sup> Bateman, Anthony et al., (2000), *Introduction to Psychotherapy: An outline of psychodynamic principles and practice*. London: Routledge. p.43.

<sup>118</sup> Quinodoz, Jean-Michel (2005),p.27.

<sup>119</sup> Quinodoz, Jean-Michel (2005),p.27.

<sup>120</sup> Quinodoz, Jean-Michel (2005),p.27.

<sup>121</sup> Quinodoz, Jean-Michel (2005),p.27.

<sup>122</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1938) (1940), *An Outline Of Psychoanalysis* The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. vol. 23. P.182.

<sup>123</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.125.

<sup>124</sup> It should be noted that not all commentators regard the English language translations from the German original to be accurate. One in particular regards many of them to be misleading and misrepresentative of Freud's thought:

*'Language is all important in Freud's work; it is the supreme instrument of his craft. His use of the German language was not only masterly but often poetic -- he nearly always expressed himself with true eloquence... Because Freud attached so much importance to finding the **mot juste**, his translators' clumsy substitutions and inexact use of language are all the more damaging to his ideas. Deprived of the right word or the appropriate phrasing, Freud's thoughts become not merely coarse or oversimplified but seriously distorted. Slipshod translations deprive his words of some or most of the subtle sensory tones and allusions that he deliberately evoked to permit the reader to understand what he had in mind, and to respond not only on an intellectual level but also on an emotional one -- not merely with the conscious mind but also with the unconscious mind.'*pp.8-9

Many examples are given by this commentator:

*'Almost invariably, the **Standard Edition** (like the earlier English Translations) either omits Freud's references to the soul or translates them as if he spoke only of man's mind. In the paper "The Uncanny" (1919), Freud's phrase "im seelischen Unbewussten" ("in the unconscious of the soul") has been translated as "in the unconscious mind". In the same sentence, "gewisse Seiten Seelenlebens" ("certain aspects of the life of the soul") has been rendered as "certain aspects of the mind."'p.73.*

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In

Bettelheim, Bruno, (1982), *Freud And Man's Soul* London: Penguin.

<sup>125</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.82.

<sup>126</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xviii 'Fixation To Traumas—The Unconscious' *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume xvi*. London: Vintage. The Hogarth Press And The Institute Of Psycho-Analysis.p.273.

<sup>127</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xviii 'Fixation To Traumas—The Unconscious' p.274.

<sup>128</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1938) (1940),p.51.

<sup>129</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xviii 'Fixation To Traumas—The Unconscious' p.279.

<sup>130</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xviii 'Fixation To Traumas—The Unconscious' p.279.

<sup>131</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xviii 'Fixation To Traumas—The Unconscious' pp.279-280.

<sup>132</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xviii 'Fixation To Traumas—The Unconscious' p.280.

<sup>133</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xviii 'Fixation To Traumas—The Unconscious' p.280.

<sup>134</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xviii 'Fixation To Traumas—The Unconscious' p.280.

<sup>135</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xix 'Resistance And Repression' *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume xvi*. London: Vintage. The Hogarth Press And The Institute Of Psycho-Analysis.p.287.

<sup>136</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xix 'Resistance And Repression' p.287.

<sup>137</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xix 'Resistance And Repression' p.288.

<sup>138</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xix 'Resistance And Repression' p.294.

<sup>139</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xix 'Resistance And Repression' p.295.

<sup>140</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.21.

<sup>141</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.17.

<sup>142</sup> Leiper, Rob & Maltby, Michael, (2004),p.111.

<sup>143</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (1917) Lecture xviii 'Fixation To Traumas—The Unconscious' p.273.

<sup>144</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.125.

<sup>146</sup> Bateman, Anthony et al., (2000),p.34.

<sup>147</sup> It should be noted that Freud, over the years, developed and amended his models of the mind:

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'In 1923 ... Freud introduced his structural theory with the now familiar concepts of Superego, Ego and Id...The structural theory is a hybrid that attempts to combine biological, experiential, and interpersonal dimensions... by Id is meant the basic biological aspect of the psyche, the inherited instinctual and constitutional aspects which we share to a large extent with other higher primates....The Ego (corresponding roughly to consciousness) is concerned with rational thinking, external perception, and voluntary movement...The Ego is the mediator between the needs and demands of the inside world and the realities and opportunities of the outside world. In performing this refereeing task it has to heed the Superego, which is roughly equivalent to conscience, both in its conscious and unconscious aspects. The Superego is built up from the internalised representations and standards of parental figures from infancy onwards, with contributions from later relationships with teachers and other admired or feared figures...Difficulty arises when the unconscious Superego (unnecessarily) represses feelings and impulses which may give rise to symptoms.'

In

Bateman, Anthony et al., (2000),p.44.

<sup>148</sup> Bateman, Anthony et al., (2000),44.

<sup>149</sup> Freud, Sigmund, (n.d.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume vii\_ pp.77-78.

In

Lear, Jonathan (2005), Freud London: Routledge.p.23.

<sup>150</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),pp.17-18.

<sup>151</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),p.19.

<sup>152</sup> Storr, Anthony, (1998), The Essential Jung London:FontanaPress. p.21.

<sup>153</sup> See, Klein, Melanie, (1961) (1989) Narrative Of A Child Analysis: The conduct of the psycho-analysis of children as seen in the treatment of a ten-year old boy. London: Virago.

This is a detailed analysis, together with clinical notes and reports of direct speech, over ninety three sessions. A flavour of her method can be had in the following extract:

'Richard chose a country on the map to speak about; this time Germany. He said he want to whack Hitler and to attack Germany. Then he decided to 'choose' France instead. He spoke about France, which betrayed Britain but might not have been able to help it, and he was sorry for France.

**Mrs K.** Pointed out that there were various kinds of Mummy in his mind: the bad Mummy, Germany, whom he wanted to attack in order to destroy Hitler inside her; the injured and not-so-good Mummy whom he still loved, represented by France; when they came together in his mind, he could not bear to attack Germany, and rather turned to France for whom he could allow himself to feel sorry.'p.49.

<sup>154</sup> Buckley, Peter [Ed], (1986), Essential Papers On Object Relations New York: New York University Press.

<sup>155</sup> Jacobs, Michael, (2004),p.9.

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<sup>156</sup> It should be noted that present-day psychodynamic therapeutic relationships between therapist and client, might be quite different from say parallel encounters within a cognitive-behavioural or humanistic counselling paradigm:

*'The First Session: The first thing a new client will notice is that a psychodynamic counsellor is likely to be quite formal in the way she relates to him, both when setting up the appointment and when greeting him; she may use surnames rather than first names, for example. She will also be unlikely to engage in social conversation on the way to and from the consulting room or during the session. The client will probably notice that the consulting room is not particularly personalised, even if it is in the counsellor's own home; there won't be family photos on display for example... During the session the counsellor is unlikely to undertake a formal predetermined assessment and ask a lot of questions, rather she is likely to listen to the client's story and prompt as necessary. The counsellor will listen very carefully to what the client says, and is unlikely to make notes during the session... At the end of the session she will not set him any tasks to be completed by the next session, which can be a surprise for those who have had previous counselling in other approaches where between-session assignments have been set.'*

In

Howard, Susan, (2006), *Psychodynamic Counselling in a nutshell*, London: SAGE. pp.54-55.

<sup>157</sup> Hall, Kirsty, & Iqbal, Furhan, ((2010) *The Problem With Cognitive Behavioural Therapy* London: Karnac. p.1.

<sup>158</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.128.

<sup>159</sup> Hollon, S.D. (2003) 'Does cognitive therapy have an enduring effect?' *Cognitive Therapy and Research* 27 (1), pp. 71-75.

In

Sanders, Diana, & Wills, Frank, (2005) *Cognitive Therapy* London: Sage.p.xi.

<sup>160</sup> Rachman, S. (1997). 'The evolution of cognitive behaviour therapy'

In

Clark, D. M. et al [Eds] *The Science and Practice of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy* Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.3-26.

In Hall, Kirsty, & Iqbal, Furhan, ((2010), p.7.

<sup>161</sup> Kazdin, A.E. (1978), *History of behaviour modification: Experimental foundations of contemporary research*. Baltimore: University Park Press.

In

Dobson, Keith & Dozois, David, (2010) 'Historical and Philosophical Bases of the Cognitive-Behavioural Therapies'

In

Dobson, Keith, [Ed] (2010), *Handbook Of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapies* New York: The Guilford Press. p.4.



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- <sup>162</sup> Dobson, Keith, [Ed] (2010),p.4.
- <sup>163</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.129.
- <sup>164</sup> Watson, J.B. (1924) (1970), *Behaviorism* USA: Norton Library. p.ix.
- <sup>165</sup> Watson, J.B. (1924) (1970),p.2.
- <sup>166</sup> Watson, J.B. (1924) (1970),pp.5-6.
- <sup>167</sup> Watson, J.B. (1924) (1970),p.6.
- <sup>168</sup> Watson, J.B. (1924) (1970),p.6.
- <sup>169</sup> Watson, J.B. (1924) (1970),p.10.
- <sup>170</sup> Watson, J.B. (1924) (1970),p.11.
- <sup>171</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.129.
- <sup>172</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), *About Behaviorism* London: Penguin. p.18.
- <sup>173</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993),p.18.
- <sup>174</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), pp.18-19.
- <sup>175</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993) p.24.
- <sup>176</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993) p.24.
- <sup>177</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), p.24.
- <sup>178</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), pp.34-35.
- <sup>179</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), p.35.
- <sup>180</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), p.35.
- <sup>181</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), p.185.
- <sup>182</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), p.185.
- <sup>183</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), p.254.
- <sup>184</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), p.192.
- <sup>185</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1974) (1993), p.192.
- <sup>186</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1978) *Reflections On Behaviorism And Society* Engle wood N.J: Prentice-Hall, p.x.
- <sup>187</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1978), p.ix.
- <sup>188</sup> Watson, J.B. (1924) (1970),p.11.
- <sup>189</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1978), pp.ix-x.

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<sup>190</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1978), p.x.

<sup>191</sup> Skinner, B.F. (1978), p. x.

<sup>192</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.129.

<sup>193</sup> Milite, George A. (2001) 'Wolpe, Joseph (1915-1997), *Gale Encyclopedia of Psychology* (2<sup>nd</sup>. Ed.) Gale Group. Internet document at: [findarticles.com/p/...ai\\_2699000655/](http://findarticles.com/p/...ai_2699000655/) [Document accessed: 11/08/2010.]

<sup>194</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.134.

<sup>195</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990) *The Practice Of Behavior Therapy* New York: Pergamon Press. pp. 5-6.

<sup>196</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.3.

<sup>197</sup> See: [The H.J. Eysenck Official Website:](http://www.hjeyenck.com/)

*'Hans Eysenck was born during the First World War in Berlin, opposing the rise of Hitler in his childhood. He left the country, seeking exile in France then England.*

*He studied under Sir Cyril Burt, obtained his Ph.D. during the Second World War, and soon thereafter founded the Psychological Department at the newly created Institute of Psychiatry. He was made Professor of Psychology in 1955.*

*He introduced clinical psychology as a profession into the country, and his research into topics ranging from personality and intelligence to behavioural genetics, from social attitudes to behaviour therapy, brought him renown throughout the world.*

*He also did work on such topics as the health hazards of smoking, the prophylactic effects of behaviour therapy on cancer and coronary heart disease, parapsychology, astrology and other matters.'*

Internet document: <http://freespace.virgin.net/darrin.evans/> [Document accessed 14/08/2010].

<sup>198</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990) p.4.

<sup>199</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.8.

<sup>200</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.17.

<sup>201</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.9.

<sup>202</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.9.

<sup>203</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.18.

<sup>204</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.19.

<sup>205</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.19.

<sup>206</sup> See: Skinner, B.F. (1953). *Science and Human Behavior*. New York: Macmillan.p.266

In

Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.19.

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<sup>207</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.19.

<sup>208</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.22.

<sup>209</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.17.

<sup>210</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.17.

<sup>211</sup> Kazdin, A.E. (1978), *History of behaviour modification: Experimental foundations of contemporary research*. Baltimore: University Park Press.

In

Dobson, Keith & Dozois, David, (2010) 'Historical and Philosophical Bases of the Cognitive-Behavioural Therapies'

In

Dobson, Keith, [Ed] (2010), *Handbook Of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapies* New York: The Guilford Press. p.4.

<sup>212</sup> Dobson, Keith, [Ed] (2010),p.4.

<sup>213</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.131.

<sup>214</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.131.

<sup>215</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.131.

<sup>216</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.131.

<sup>217</sup> Wolpe, Joseph, (1990), p.131.

<sup>218</sup> See page 131, Wolpe, Joseph, (1990). The whole list includes: Beck, Ellis, Goldfried & Goldfried, Mahoney, Meichenbaum and Raimy.

<sup>219</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),pp.137-138.

<sup>220</sup> Internet document: Manchester University, School of Psychological Sciences 'Professor Aaron T. Beck Consulting Professor of Cognitive Therapy.' [www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/beck](http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/beck) [Accessed 16/08/2010].

<sup>221</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976), *Cognitive Therapy And The Emotional Disorders* London: Penguin Books. p.6.

<sup>222</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.6.

<sup>223</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.6.

<sup>224</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.7.

<sup>225</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.7.

<sup>226</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),pp.7-8.

<sup>227</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.8.

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- <sup>228</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.8.
- <sup>229</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.9.
- <sup>230</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.19.
- <sup>231</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.19.
- <sup>232</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.19.
- <sup>233</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.20.
- <sup>234</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.20.
- <sup>235</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.214.
- <sup>236</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.214.
- <sup>237</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.214.
- <sup>238</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.215.
- <sup>239</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.214.
- <sup>240</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.215.
- <sup>241</sup> Beck, Aaron, (1976),p.258.
- <sup>242</sup> Beck, Aaron, Rush, John, et.al. (1979), Cognitive Therapy Of Depression New York: The Guilford Press. p.95.
- <sup>243</sup> Beck, Aaron, Rush, John, et.al. (1979),p.95.
- <sup>244</sup> Beck, Aaron, Rush, John, et.al. (1979),p.95.
- <sup>245</sup> Beck, Aaron, Rush, John, et.al. (1979),p.103.
- <sup>246</sup> See Beck, A.T. (1967, Depression: Clinical, experimental and theoretical aspects. New York: Hoeber

In

Beck, Aaron, Rush, John, et.al. (1979),pp.96-97:

‘ ... in the moderately to severely depressed patient, the focus of the therapeutic intervention should be at the target symptom level. The target symptom may be defined as any one of the components of the depressive disorder that involves suffering or functional disability. These target symptoms may be broken down into the following categories:

*Affective symptoms: sadness, loss of gratification, apathy, loss of feelings and affection toward others, loss of mirth response, anxiety.*

*Motivational: wish to escape from life (usually via suicide); wish to avoid "problems" or even usual everyday activities.*

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*Cognitive: difficulty in concentrating, problems in attention span, difficulties in memory. The cognitive distortions -- which are more on a conceptual or information-processing level.*

*Behavioural: often a reflection of the other previously mentioned symptoms; including passivity (for example, lying in bed or sitting in a chair for hours on end, with drawl from other people retardation, agitation.*

*Physiological: includes sleep disturbance (either increased or diminished sleeping); appetite disturbance (either increased or decreased eating).'*

<sup>247</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.138.

<sup>248</sup> See Abrams, Mike & Abrams, (2005), Lidia *A Brief Biography of Albert Ellis 1913-2007*. Internet Document: [www.rebt.ws/albertellisbiography.html](http://www.rebt.ws/albertellisbiography.html) [Document Accessed: 16/08/2010].

<sup>249</sup> Ellis, Albert, (1950) *Monograph no. 26898*.

in

Abrams, Mike & Abrams, (2005),p2.

<sup>250</sup> Ellis, Albert, (2001), *Overcoming Destructive Beliefs, Feelings, and Behaviors*. Amherst New York: Prometheus Books. p.246.

<sup>251</sup> Ellis, Albert, (2001), p.246.

<sup>252</sup> Ellis, Albert, & Blau, Shaun [Eds.] (1998), *The Albert Ellis Reader: A Guide To Well-Being Using Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy*. New York: Citadel Press.p.3.

<sup>253</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.140.

<sup>254</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] *A Guide To Rational Living*. Chatsworth, CA: Wilshire Book Company. p.45.

<sup>255</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.101.

<sup>256</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.115.

<sup>257</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.127.

<sup>258</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.139.

<sup>259</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.155.

<sup>260</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.163.

<sup>261</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.177.

<sup>262</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.187.

<sup>263</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.197.

<sup>264</sup> Ellis, Albert & Harper, Robert, A. (1961), (1975), (1997) [3<sup>rd</sup>., Edn.] p.207.

<sup>265</sup> Ellis, Albert, (2001), p.17.

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<sup>266</sup> Ellis, Albert, (2001), pp.248-249.

<sup>267</sup> See REBT Resources.Info *The World of REBT: "Preaching the gospel according to St. Albert"* Internet document at,

[www.rebresources.info/worldofrebt.php](http://www.rebresources.info/worldofrebt.php)

(Accessed 29/05/2010). P.5:

*'2000 years ago, Epictetus, a slave of the Romans, a Greek slave, showed how he could not be upset when terrible things happened to him. He was a slave, and he had chains on his legs, and the master who owned him started tightening the chain on his leg, and he said, "Master, if you keep tightening those chains you'll break my leg." The master did break his leg and ... (he was a cripple for the rest of his life).*

Ellis then spoke of one of the cornerstones of REBT, quoting (or paraphrasing) Epictetus:

*"It's not the bad things that happen that upset you, it's your view of them."*

<sup>268</sup> See Ellis, Albert, (2003), Early Theories and Practices of Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy and How They Have Been Augmented and Revised During the Last Three Decades, in *Journal of Rational Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy*, vol.21, nos.3-4 (December 2003) pp.219-43, at p.232

In Dobbin Robert, (2008) *Epictetus: Discourses and Selected Writings* London: Penguin Books, p.xviii.

<sup>269</sup> Dobbin, (2008) p.xviii.

<sup>270</sup> Ellis, Albert, (2001),p.249.

<sup>271</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.143.

<sup>272</sup> Ellis, Albert, (2001),p.249.

<sup>273</sup> Dobson, Keith, S. & Dozois, David, J. A. (2010), 'Historical and Philosophical Bases of the Cognitive-Behavioral Therapies'

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<sup>274</sup> See Dobson, Keith, S. & Dozois, David, J. A. (2010).p.11 ff.

<sup>275</sup> See McLeod, John, (2009),p.145.

<sup>276</sup> Dobson, Keith, S. & Dozois, David, J. A. (2010), p.11.

<sup>277</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.144.

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- <sup>289</sup> Fruzzetti, Alan, E, & Erikson, Karen ,R. (2010), p.349.
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- <sup>296</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.128.
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<sup>298</sup> See, Sanders, Pete [Ed.], (2004), *the tribes of the person-centred nation*. Ross-on Wye: PCCS Books. Title page.

<sup>299</sup> Sanders, Pete, [Ed.], (2004), p.x.

<sup>300</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1961) (1967) *A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy: On Becoming A Person*. London: Constable. p.199.

<sup>301</sup> Tudor, Louise Embleton et. al. (2004), *The Person-Centred Approach*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p.17.

<sup>302</sup> Anderson, Rob & Cissna, Kenneth, N, (1997) *The Martin Buber—Carl Rogers Dialogue*. Albany N.Y: State University Of New York Press. p.2.

<sup>303</sup> Tudor, Louise Embleton et. al. (2004),p.18.

<sup>304</sup> Kirschenbaum, Howard, (2007), *The Life And Work Of Carl Rogers*. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books. p.276.

<sup>305</sup> See, Sanders, Pete [Ed.], (2004).

<sup>306</sup> Schmid, Peter, F., (2007), 'The Anthropological and Ethical Foundations of Person-centred Therapy',

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<sup>313</sup> Wood, John, K., (2008), *Carl Rogers' Person-Centred Approach: Toward an understanding of its implications*. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books.p.24.

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<sup>316</sup> Mearns, Dave, & Thorne, Brian, (2007), *Person-Centred Counselling In Action* [3<sup>rd</sup>, Ed] London: SAGE. p.12.

<sup>317</sup> See, Moss, Donald, (2001) 'The Roots and Genealogy of Humanistic Psychology'

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Schneider, Kirk, J. Bugental, James F.T. & Pierson, Fraser, J. [Eds.] (2001) *The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology*. London:Sage Publications. p. 14:

*'Adler developed a psychology emphasising that each individual creates a style of life reflecting the central "fiction" or goal around which the person organises his or her life. Humans are socially embedded, and the development of a sense of social interest and community feeling is critical to human development. Human behavior is purposeful and future oriented, not merely driven by instinct and mechanism.'*

<sup>318</sup> Wood, John, K., (2008),p.24.

<sup>319</sup> Wood, John, K., (2008),p.24.

<sup>320</sup> Wood, John, K., (2008),p.24.

<sup>321</sup> Rogers, C.R., (1970), Foreword. In JT Hart & TM Solomon [Eds] *New Directions in Client-Centred Therapy*. (pp.3-22) Boston MA: Houghton & Mifflin

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<sup>322</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),pp.17-18.

<sup>323</sup> Kuhn, T.S. (1970),p.19.

<sup>324</sup> Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990), *The Carl Rogers Reader*. London: Constable. p.61.

<sup>325</sup> According to Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),pp.61-62.

<sup>326</sup> This took place against a background in which psychoanalysts and psychiatrists had to possess a medical qualification in order to practice. The possibility of non-medically qualified psychotherapists had already been aired by Freud many years earlier, a possibility that was positively rejected in North America by the insistence that all psychoanalysts be medically qualified (a move that was opposed by Freud but eventually accepted (reluctantly) by him). See:

Freud, Sigmund, (1926) (1927) (1959) 'The Question Of Lay Analysis.' *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume 20*. London: Vintage. The Hogarth Press And The Institute Of Psycho-Anaysis.pp.179-250.

And also:

Freud, Sigmund, (1950) (1959) 'Postscript to a Discussion on Lay Analysis'. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume 20*. London: Vintage. The Hogarth Press And The Institute Of Psycho-Anaysis.pp.253-256:

'After 41 years of medical activity, my self-knowledge tells me that I have never really been a doctor in the proper sense. I became a doctor through being compelled to deviate from my original purpose; and the triumph of my life lies in my having, after a long and roundabout journey, found my way back to my earliest path... Some time ago I analysed a colleague who gave evidence of a particularly strong dislike of the idea of anyone being allowed to engage in a medical activity who was not himself a medical man... I was in a position to say to him: "We have now been working for more than three months. At what point in our analysis have I had occasion to make use of my medical knowledge?" He admitted that I had had no such occasion... a professional lay analyst will have no difficulty in winning as much respect as is due to a secular pastoral worker. Indeed **the words, "secular pastoral worker", might well serve as a general formula for describing the function which the analyst, whether he is a doctor or a layman has to perform in his relation to the public...** we who are analysts set before us as our aim the most complete and profoundest possible analysis of whoever may be our patient...We seek rather to enrich him from his own internal sources...such activity as this is pastoral work in the best sense of the words.'*[my emboldening]*.

<sup>327</sup> Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),p.62.

1. <sup>328</sup> 'The individual comes for help'.
2. 'The helping situation is usually defined. From the first the client is made aware of the fact that the counsellor does not have the answers'.<sup>328</sup>
3. 'The counsellor encourages free expression of feelings in regard to the problem'.<sup>328</sup>
4. 'The counsellor accepts, recognizes, and clarifies these negative feelings'.<sup>328</sup>
5. 'When the individual's negative feelings have been quite fully expressed, they are followed by the faint and tentative expressions of the positive impulses which make for growth'.<sup>328</sup>
6. 'The counsellor accepts and recognizes the positive feelings which are expressed in the same manner in which he has accepted and recognised the negative feelings'.<sup>328</sup>
7. 'This insight, this understanding of the self and acceptance of the self, is the next important aspect of the whole process. It provides the basis on which the individual can go ahead to new levels of integration'.<sup>328</sup>
8. 'Intermingled with this process of insight...is a process of clarification of possible decisions, possible courses of action'.<sup>328</sup>
9. 'Then comes one of the fascinating aspects of such therapy, the initiation of minute, but highly significant, positive actions'.<sup>328</sup>
10. 'Once the individual has achieved considerable insight and has fearfully and tentatively attempted some positive actions, the remaining aspects are elements of further growth. There is, first of all, a development of further insight—more complete and accurate self-understanding, as the individual gains courage to see more deeply into his own actions.'
11. 'There is increasingly integrated positive action on the part of the client'.
12. 'There is a feeling of decreasing need for help, and recognition on the part of the client that the relationship must end'.

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Rogers, Carl, (1942), *Counseling and Psychotherapy*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, pp.30-45.

In

Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),pp.64-76.

<sup>329</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1942), in, pp.30-45 .In Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),p.63.

<sup>330</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1942), In Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),p.63.

<sup>331</sup> See, Moss, Donald, (2001), p.15.

<sup>332</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1957), 'The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic Personality Change.' Vol.21. No.2. pp. 95-103.

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Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),p.219.

<sup>333</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1957), Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),p.221.

<sup>334</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1959), 'A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, As Developed in the Client-Centred Framework.'

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<sup>335</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.174.

<sup>336</sup> McLeod, John, (2009),p.174.

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<sup>338</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1957), 'The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic Personality Change.' Vol.21. No.2. pp. 95-103.

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Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),p.219.

<sup>339</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1959), 'A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, As Developed in the Client-Centred Framework.'

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<sup>343</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1959), in Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),p.241.

<sup>344</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1959), in Kirschenbaum, Howard & Henderson, Valerie Land (1990),p.241.

<sup>345</sup> Mearns, Dave, & Thorne, Brian, (2007), *Person-Centred Counselling In Action* [3<sup>rd</sup>. Ed], London: SAGE Publications. pp.19-20.

<sup>346</sup> Mearns, Dave, & Thorne, Brian, (2007),p.20.

<sup>347</sup> Mearns, Dave, & Thorne, Brian, (2007),p.12.

<sup>348</sup> Mearns, Dave, & Thorne, Brian, (2007),p.12.

<sup>349</sup> Embleton, Louise, Keemar, Keemar et.al.(2004), *The Person Centred-Approach: A Contemporary Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p.26.

<sup>350</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1954) (1967), *On Becoming A Person*. London:Constable. p.35.

<sup>351</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1954) (1967),p.35.

<sup>352</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1954) (1967),p.35.

<sup>353</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1959),p. 196 in Embleton, Louise, Keemar, Keemar et.al.(2004),p.31.

<sup>354</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1954) (1967), *On Becoming A Person*. London:Constable. p.35.

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<sup>356</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1986) (1990), p.135.

<sup>357</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1986) (1990), p.135.

<sup>358</sup> Rogers, Carl, (1986) (1990), p.136.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### DASEIN: (WHO IS IT BEING TRANSFORMED?)

#### INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to build up a picture of human-being and his/her social context and to explicate the experiencing of personal change/transformation. One of the novel features of this approach, it is suggested, is the presentation of a particular notion of who human-being is, what human-being does, how human-being lives and how human-being is inescapably connected to 'world' and to attempt to work out of this notion throughout the whole project. I am aware that this attempt is somewhat unusual, in that much is often 'assumed' about human-being, prior to many analytical processes and that these 'assumptions' often form the unspoken and unacknowledged background out of which the human 'subject' is deemed to emerge. My chosen notion of who human-being is, what human-being does and how human-being lives, is taken from the work of Martin Heidegger, with particular reference to the major work, *Being And Time* and other relevant works within that corpus.

I intend, for the purposes of this project, to make explicit that which is often 'assumed' about human-being and to unfold a picture of ordinary human-being in its everyday engagement with the world. I have chosen this particular philosophical analysis of human-being, rather than any other psychological, sociological or anthropological profile (or a profile from any other discipline) as I believe that it more capaciously embraces the breadth of phenomenal disclosure and more adequately addresses the themes permeating human-being on the way to experiencing self-transformation. I hope to retain that initial deep excitement I underwent when first opening the pages of *Being And Time* and on receiving a particular picture of what it is to be 'human-being', a picture that not only touched my own latent understandings at their very heart but which first gave me the visceral imperative to initiate this project.

The very term 'human-being' is often deemed to denote membership of a particular *genus* ('human') and of a *genus* that is existing ('being'). This term is often expanded by the addition of the definite and indefinite articles and by pluralising it. In all of these instances there is a background acceptance of human-being as; a hard 'thingly' entity, one extended in space and surrounded by and contained in a world, an entity capable of apprehending

objects it perceives as over and against it, and an entity that comes to understanding (as the one who is the consciously regarding 'subject'):

*'What happens if we deny that we exist as subjects isolated against the backdrop of an objective reality? What if we posit worldly reality as an intrinsic aspect of human beings? This is the solution made available by Heidegger. Human being, Heidegger maintains, is a being-in-the-world. To be human means to exist in relation to a world, to "dwell alongside." Traditional metaphysics abstractly defines the whole by way of dichotomized parts: subjects and objects, observers and observed, spirit and matter. Heidegger insists that the whole, human-being-in-the-world, concretely defines the parts as relations of interdependence and a mutual signification.'*<sup>1</sup>

In addition, it is suggested, the **compound** nature of the term 'human-being' is frequently overlooked and suppressed by being treated as one single expression, an expression that denotes something that can be ostensively defined by being pointed at. By this 'pointing at', both elements of the expression, it is posited, fuse into a compound noun, rather than the first element being treated as a separate noun and the second element being treated as a separate **verb**. It is my position that the treatment of the term 'human-being' as a compound term in which the final element is a verb, **more closely** resembles the notion of human-being I am arguing for and which I am attempting to employ within this project. Nevertheless, the matter of whether the final element of the term 'human-being' is a verb (or not) is not the crucial issue here, but rather it is being raised at this junction as an early illustration (and signal) of the directions I hope to take and the ways I hope to avoid.

In the sections below, there follows an explication of human-being, an 'analysis' mostly from Heidegger's *Being And Time* but also from his other works, together with the special terminology and concepts he employs, ones that have radical implications of how human-being is viewed and interpreted. The intention is to gradually unfold a unique picture, one at odds with visions of human-beings as, 'animated flesh', 'thinking things',<sup>2</sup> 'bodies extended in space', 'rational animals', 'minds in a body', 'physical containers of a soul', 'substantial egos', 'physical things', 'subjects as over and against objects', 'free-floating fully-individuated ahistorical entities', or any suggestion that human-beings are simply objects, alongside other objects, existing and being contained within the world:

Heidegger's view of human-being as thoroughly historical (but not as the product or 'object' of History), is one graphically at odds with his view of History as a discrete discipline. This latter view handily contains many of the themes that remain to be developed within the

chapters following (especially within Chapter Four, 'The existential context of individual personal transformations'). But here, the particular reference to History as:

*'The ascertaining explaining of the past from within the horizon of the calculative dealings of the present. Beings are thereby presupposed as what is orderable, producible, and ascertainable'*<sup>3</sup>,

also alludes to many themes both implicit and explicit within **this** chapter, particularly those that challenge the 'subject-object relationship', the all knowingness of *das Man* (see sections 2.3 and 2.4 for an explication of this term), and the unique temporality of human-being as 'Dasein' (see the sections immediately below for an explication of this term) that remain to be developed within this dissertation:

*'...we are barely able to free ourselves from history [as a discipline], especially since as yet we cannot at all survey how far, in manifold hidden forms, history [as a discipline] dominates human being... The manner in which man manages himself and calculates and enters into the scene and compares himself, the way in which he adjusts the past for himself as background of his presentness, the manner in which he stretches the present out into eternity — all of this shows the predominance of history [as a discipline]. But what is meant here by history [as a discipline]? The ascertaining explaining of the past from within the horizon of the calculative dealings of the present. Beings are thereby presupposed as what is orderable, producible, and ascertainable... As this ascertaining, history [as a discipline] is a constant comparing and bringing in the other, wherein one mirrors oneself as one who has come further — a comparing that thinks away from itself, because it does not come to terms with itself. History [as a discipline] disseminates the deception of the complete controllability of everything actual... The boundlessness of knowing that is inherent in history [as a discipline] — knowing everything in all respects and by all means of presentation, the mastery over everything factual — leads to a barring from history which, the more decisive this barring becomes, the more unrecognisable it continues to be to those who are barred... It belongs to the essence of history [as a discipline] that it is founded on the subject-object-relationship... All history [as a discipline] ends in anthropological-psychological-biographism.'*<sup>4</sup>

In addition, one of the foils to and protagonists of Heidegger's analysis and understanding of human-being is that of René Descartes (1596-1650). In Descartes, human-being is revealed as a self-contained entity extended in space as an independent thinking substance. This entity meets the world primarily through thought and through thought, is able to assign the world to that which is known. The world, as that which is known, is presented and re-presented as whatever thought allows, consequently, the world becomes secondary to thought and 'reduced' to, an object of regard. Heidegger's rebuttal of this is to claim that:

*'...a world does not get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world.'*<sup>5</sup>

The world, thus caught in thoughtful regard, can be posited and re-presented as inanimate and manipulable matter 'over and against' the subject that does the encountering. World and

human therefore become discrete spheres split apart from each other, as do human mind and human body. Descartes states his position as:

*'... I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search ... I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that "I", that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is.'* <sup>6</sup> [my underlining].

Descartes will be alluded to throughout this dissertation, in Chapters One to Five, in different cases and under differing circumstances.

When Heidegger is arguing that human-being is thoroughly historical and not somehow 'outside' time as a thinking thing, or 'inside' time as an object of historical attention, he is asserting that:

*'To say that Dasein's being is characterised by historicity is to say that it has two related characteristics. First of all, it means that Dasein is its past, where this past is given meaning and salience by Dasein's future-directed projects (the past, Heidegger says "happens out of its future on each occasion" (BT. p.41.). Secondly, it means that whatever way Dasein has of understanding itself at any time stems from the traditional or handed down way of interpreting itself into which it has grown up in the first place. "By this understanding, the possibilities of its being are disclosed and regulated" (BT. p.41.)... On Heidegger's account of history, therefore, we are always embedded in a historical context that defines our possibilities of understanding...Heidegger says that we "fall prey" to this tradition in such a way that it becomes master of us.'* <sup>7</sup>

The chapter will put forward the Heideggerian view that human-beings and the world are inseparably linked, so that the question 'what is a human-being?' cannot be posited without also asking the question, 'what is world?' In addition, reference will be made to Heidegger's reluctance, and at times refusal, to use the term 'human-being', 'mankind' or 'humankind', (or any of the traditional cognates to designate human-being), in favour of his own preferred term, 'Dasein'. It will be noted that Heidegger's term *Dasein*, is rarely pluralized or preceded by the definite or indefinite article, consequently it holds itself as a challenge to traditionalist notions of what it is to be human and is not therefore, ready to be conflated with such terms as, 'humans', '**the** human', '**a** human', 'human-being' or 'human-beings'. As an initial step, at the opening of this chapter, I intend to work towards an understanding of human-being, an understanding derived from, formed by and inspired by Heidegger's interpretation and to do that in a manner that explicates, by extensive use of personal pronouns, Heidegger's

terminology and analysis. I am aware that this is a hazardous affair that risks destroying the radical break with traditional metaphysics that Heidegger went to great pains to create and that it risks distorting the terms themselves to such an extent that they may collapse into, for example, psychologism, a position that I wish most profoundly, to avoid. I am also aware that this attempt may be in conflict with Heidegger's approach and also may be in conflict with the position that I am wishing to defend and expand. Nevertheless, I intend to circumvent these hazards by remaining faithful, in this initial step, to the Heideggarian text at all times and in remaining within the manner of an **explication** rather than an analytical interpretation.

In attempting this, the intention is to make explicit my **own** understandings and to render explicit the way that this understanding may be employed within this project (see section below immediately following). It is further **expected** that in 'practising what I preach' I will have embraced that hermeneutic process of understanding (to be outlined in detail within Chapter Three) and, as a consequence will have reached a **further** understanding that will modify my present understanding by the time this present chapter has come to an end.

I will then, it is suggested, be faced by particular challenges, namely:

- to make explicit what has been learned,
- to review the previous position in the light of the extant,
- and to carry this new learning forward into the project.

\*

### **What it is to be human-being and the particular understanding of human-being to be adopted here within this dissertation:**

#### **Preamble**

The personal pronouns used within this section are not intended to express the personal position of myself *per se*, nor to be personal statements by me, but are intended always to explicate Heidegger's view in a manner that renders Heidegger's argument accessible, to unfold the unique characteristics embedded in Heidegger's use of the term "mineness" and to clarify the ways in which I understand the concepts I am relying on.



It is also my intention to amplify and reinforce, by this extended example, Heidegger's persistent argument that human-being is always 'I', 'me', 'you', 'who' and never 'what'. In addition, the block of sections that follow on from this one (sections 2.1—2.13.6) are intended to underpin (by direct reference to Heidegger's corpus), the 'first person' explication of **this** preceding section and that these two blocks are intended to have a complementary relationship:

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The process does not denote analysis of that which is 'over there' as a discrete something to be objectively regarded, but is always myself. I am always engaged with this process since I cannot detach myself from my own being. One of the consequences is, I cannot say that I am a 'what' for it is always of the greatest significance to me that I am always 'who' and the other person 'you' and not 'that' or 'this'. I can never disown my own being, since that is always and forever 'mine'. This ownership is not that of simple possession, but is intrinsically 'who' I am, an 'ownership' I cannot detach myself from but which is inherently 'me'. It is this 'who-ness' this being 'who' and not 'what-ness' that is absolutely foundational for the burgeoning of all my projects and it is within this lived-out continuum of 'who-ness' that I have the opportunity to genuinely exercise choices that will lead to the opening out of my authentic possibilities.

No matter what choices I make, I have to live out whatever I have chosen, but in that choosing I am always directed at some future project, some job, some task (such as this dissertation), and in casting myself ahead of myself (in a manner of speaking), I am always open to my possibilities whether these are authentic or not. I am not a member of an alien species, stranded on an alien planet as a lonely and isolated individual, regarding the strange topography around me with a detached and regarding stance: I am he who is intrinsically of this world and no other. But this world is not simply an accompanying parallel 'thing', diverse though it might seem, but is always that with which I am intrinsically bound up and from which I cannot be detached. World and myself are to be thought of as so together that I can always confidently utter that I am he who is being-in-the-world (and for that utterance to be always expressed as a single compound expression).

I am he who has been thrown into the world, thrown into existence in such a way that it is 'never over and done with' for me as an established fact but is an inevitability that I live with all the time. As he who been thrown into existence I can never uncover its provenance or

trace it back to an event (such as my birth) that in any way ‘explains’ what my being thrown into the world is, or what its foundational characteristics might be. My being thrown has nothing to do with anything that I have ever had within my power (nor could I ever attempt to get that into my power, nor could I get that into my power). So long as I am, I will always be continuing in the ‘throw’ of who I am, since being thrown never was an event ‘out there’ outside myself, but always me myself

In the uttering of that single compound expression of myself as ‘being-in-the-world’, I am setting aside all notions of myself as a separate object contained ‘in’ anything or ‘on’ anything but claiming that as ‘being-in-the-world’ I am expressing myself as a unitary entity in that ‘in-the-world’ can never be separated from ‘who’ I am. I am he who is being in the world. As that unitary entity I am always ‘who’ and not a ‘what’ and as such I cannot be understood in the same manner that other entities may be understood, entities that do not possess the nature of being ‘who’ as I do. Being ‘who’ as myself is not the same as being a chair or a table, in that **as** ‘who’ I am always encountering others and I am always he who has the capacity to encounter as one who is involved. When you touch me and I touch you, ‘we’ encounter each other as being in the world and we accomplish this in a way that a chair placed adjacent to a table could never encounter, (no matter how close it got).

Who I am, what I do, what I desire, who I am to become and how I live my life are always and forever matters of continual and perennial significance to me. These matters are ‘who’ I am; consequently, when considering ‘who’ I am and in attempting to come to some understanding of that, I must always embrace notions that include care, relationships, language and the way I am actually being at this moment. How I am and who I am matters to me. I am **continually** in a stream of ‘caring’ for myself. This **caring** is not a self-reflexive mode of self-regard, which I can sometimes have and sometimes not (as a solipsistic attitude or stance), but is intrinsically who I am as he who is being in the world.

As stated earlier, I am setting aside all notions of myself as a separate object contained ‘in’ anything or ‘on’ anything and, as such, forgoing any notion of myself as staring out from behind my eyes at a world separated from myself. In asserting that I am always he who is being in the world, I am in fact stating that I am **already** ‘out there’ with everything else, and that I am out there as he who cares, who speaks, who encounters and who interprets myself as myself. Before I get out of bed in a morning, I do not have to be in possession of a recent, up to date, peer-reviewed research-paper, based on ‘hard’ evidence (and appearing in a journal

of substance) that might indicate the best way to first set my foot upon the floor (or not). I **already** have an understanding, and this understanding precedes any understanding I might subsequently come upon as a matter of 'knowledge' or a matter of 'theory'. As being in the world, I am not continually tripping over rocks or falling into craters of a world not yet discovered. I am **already** here 'outside' and here as that unitary entity.

I am not alone, as there are other people with me whom I recognise as having the same being as myself. I can see that they too are in the world and, as such, cannot be severed from that. If I attempt to do so then I am perpetrating the utmost violence upon them to such a degree that I can never come to an understanding of 'who' they are by that process. Other people are therefore always encountered (as I myself am) as being in the world as 'his/her', 'my' world. Other people are not simply there as something or someone alongside me. Although they are of the same being as myself (and I inevitably recognise them as such even when I reject them), when I am completely on my own I am never separated from them for they have the same being as myself and I am in relationship with them in some way. I cannot take myself out of that being 'outside' with them (even though I might want to), since being 'outside' is a feature of who I am as being in the world.

I am not able to 'control' this. Certainly, I can go out of my way to avoid speaking to them, socialising with them and thinking about them, but that in no way alters the fact that they are of the same being as myself and I am with them and they are with me whether I like it or not. I simply cannot avoid them even when alone.

The previous three paragraphs have been couched in a somewhat negative mood in that they might suggest that I and the other people are in opposition to each other in some way, as if our relationship is intrinsically oppositional but, for Heidegger, the situation is somewhat different. Because I can never sever myself from others, they are always (therefore) with me in some way. This lack of severance is not simply a negative capacity but rather an overwhelmingly positive presence. Their being with me and my being with them has radical consequences of how I am to live out my life in all its possibilities, whether this is in my genuine interests or not. Although I might know other people either casually or in great intimacy, the spectrum of intimacy ranging from positive acrimonious loathing, through indifference to the most overwhelming loving intimacy, is not the measure of what constitutes the essence of my being with them, and other people, in the world. My direct and

personal encounter with individuals is not the measure of what constitutes my 'being-with' them.

There is a more significant sense in which their being with me impinges upon my life and how I am to live it. This latter sense is one in which other people, as being with me in the world, vanish as discrete beings and become generalised as those who are with me who have no particular identity but who possess a great deal of force. These others are not simply those who are hidden from me, as those I have never known and those whom I will never know, but are those who have become abstracted as the holders and purveyors of common opinion. These holders and purveyors are not real individual people who happen to hold these views, but are the average and watered-down singularity that dictates what is and what is not, social, moral, personal, spiritual, political reality. This latter listing makes no claim to be comprehensive, but may actually be lengthened interminably to include every facet of my existence.

This inclusion of every facet of my existence does not take account of 'who' I am, what I need, who I hope to become or what my genuine possibilities are. How could it? What a refined instrument that would have to be in order to take account of that! Instead, 'they' as the generalised and abstracted others who are being with me in the world, dictate an average interpretation of what it is to be in the world. This average interpretation of 'how things are' is quite attractive in that it enables me to engage painlessly with others in a way that is non-combative and at the same time 'socially cohesive'. I can easily slip into this mode of being (and the innocuous way of speaking that goes with it), without in any way threatening the other or seriously challenging his or her sense of reality. It is something that we can all share, in the sure and certain knowledge that nothing extraordinary is ever going to pop up to surprise or alarm us as we stand about in a mode of non-contradiction.

The surprising, individual and perhaps, dark force of my own real authentic possibilities (and the choices that would enable them to come to fruition) have to be ignored and bypassed since they cannot be subsumed under that which has general and universal assent. Also, the inclusion of the surprising, individual and dark force of my own real authentic possibilities would be difficult, as it could form no part of that which has **already** been agreed upon. I am not simply the victim here, whose genuine possibilities are forever and for always being overlooked. I myself am an active participant, not only in overlooking other people's genuine possibilities but also my own.

Everything I engage in, within this commonality of agreement, has an unassailable air of being familiar and 'at home'. Here I can be confident that I will not be rejected as long as I keep the surprising, individual and perhaps, dark force of my own real authentic possibilities, quietly to one side. Above all, I must not disturb this being 'at home' by the sudden intrusion of material that would disturb the seamless quietude of its surface. Furthermore, it becomes really difficult to pin down the provenance of that upon which I am already in agreement as I am not really motivated to seek out a contention where I sense there is none. Because everything has the air of having been **already** agreed upon, (and I certainly approach it with this expectation) there appears to be no single emanating source that could be held responsible for the utterances themselves and for the style and manner in which they are given, received and exchanged.

Earlier, I said that I must not disturb this being 'at home' (for it certainly is home to me) for I do not have to constantly re-make it from scratch every morning that I wake up, it has **already** been prepared for me and I slip into it relieved of the burden of making, interpreting, acting as if it were entirely from the beginning and *ex nihilo*. If I **do** attempt to introduce a little 'dark material' into this discourse, I discover that it is absorbed with that speed of vanishing associated with a small pebble being tossed into a large pond. It becomes part of that which is **already** known and, if I had reflected upon my intention in introducing it, I would have realised that my 'dark material' had actually been there all the time as something we could eventually talk 'about' in a harmless and innocuous manner. If there is any element of the combative, within this agreeable context, then it is usually a mild and formal interchange with paper swords, in which we all know the outcome. You **already** know that I am taking a 'pretend' stance of being 'different' and you are 'going along with it'. At the conclusion, we realise that there is going to be no conclusion and that the matter is going to peter out into the next agreeable topic that itself will have no conclusion.

I understand quite well that if I take myself outside the ambit of this agreeable context, then I am on my own. If I stay within it, then I am not alone. But there is also so much that I have to 'set aside' of myself in order to 'be' in this agreeable context that occasionally I do not know 'who' is 'me' and 'who' is 'them'. On the whole, I opt for the agreeable context (it is after all my home), and this will remain the familiar and understandable world of my being. It was always there before I existed (and was always waiting for me). It is not lightly to be set aside. If it was left to 'me' this situation would continue indefinitely, but occasionally



something occurs, that each time it happens, takes me further and further away from the agreeable context which is my home.

Something comes upon me that shatters the familiarity of my home to such a degree that I end up living in an alien world stripped of the usual connections that join my world together. In fact, I am forced to witness its total deconstruction and to see it as something 'put together' by me and others and over which I and others have thrown a cloak of familiarity. Up to then I had believed that 'familiarity' was what constituted my world in an absolute way. I never questioned it for 'familiarity' and 'world' were fused together and appeared to be synonymous with each other. But now, in their being prised apart, things collapse back into what they had always been, (themselves as integral objects). It had always been 'me' and 'them' who had connected them together into a web of familiarity and had opted for the web as something that had always **already** been there.

So I stand in my kitchen as in an alien world and see things hanging on hooks, lying about and placed on things that are all now detached from me absolutely. They remain so resolute in their separate otherness that there is no bridge of connectivity that could join them and me together again. I am certainly not at home anymore and no amount of consolation and explanation is powerful enough to counteract the weight of this oppressive insight. I can no longer 'join in' with the usual arrangements of the agreeable context, as there is now nothing there that now speaks to me as it did before. In some way I have been 'pushed' into another realisation and have found myself there completely without any obvious escape hatch. It is not that I have struck up an attitude or adopted a mode of being. I am where I am without any 'part' of me being elsewhere.

It is as if I cannot be dissolved any more into the agreeable context of the other people who are always with me even when I am alone. I now am really alone as entirely myself, but that is uncomfortable, unfamiliar, terrifying and without any obvious purpose or outcome. But above all it is not ambiguous.

Even though I no longer know the purpose or outcome, the lack of ambiguity has no resemblance whatsoever to the vague inconclusiveness of that within the agreeable context. There is nothing I can challenge. Nothing I can cling onto that would give me a fingerhold to argue it out of existence. I know that it cannot be deconstructed into a simple fear or anxiety 'about' something. I could 'deal' with **that** quite adequately by seeking an explanation from others and I know that I would go away feeling restored again to my mundane domesticity.

But there is nothing here that I can talk 'about'.

The chatter of those around me has certainly ceased even though they go on talking with as much energy as before. Their lips move, their utterances multiply, their portents inflate and their publications and media continue without my participation, contribution or collusion. It is as if the volume has not only been turned down but that the whole transmitting source has been disconnected. If I am listening to anything then it is certainly not to 'them'. Two things seem to have happened at the same time. On the one hand the chatter has ceased and, on the other, I find myself in a world no longer 'mine'.

In some sense I feel that these are connected.

For me to be entirely alone is to experience who I am as an entirety. I am no longer distracted from experiencing this. I have been given another world in which I can register what it is to be really me as being in the world. This world, I sense, is still the same world (though it does not really feel like it) but it is now stripped of an overlay that I had opted for and one which I had accepted without much question. If, therefore, I am he who is being in the world, then I am now 'different' in some way, as world and myself can never be prised apart. I have been 'given' another world (for that is what it seems like), a gift that I did not actually ask for but one I sort of placed myself in the position of receiving, even though I did not know what I was to get.

One of the 'consequences' of being stripped of my usual consoling agreeable context is that I can no longer shield myself, or be shielded from the matter of my own death. Up to then I had put such a consideration to the back of my mind whilst, at the same time, engaging quite energetically in common gossip about who had died, when they had died, the manner of their dying, the degree of their suffering, the amount of their estate and the proposed time, date and venue of their funeral. In fact, the more I talked 'about' death the easier I became with the whole 'subject'. The fact that I was actually talking 'about' death indicated that (as usual) it had happened to someone else and not to me. Death was never 'mine'.

But standing in my kitchen as in an alien world and experiencing myself as an entirety, I am also experiencing the possibility that I will 'one day' no longer be an entirety. Death is now a possibility that will close off all my projects and plans, all my schemes and scheming, all my hopes and ambitions, all my loves and hatreds. In all the myriad ways I can envisage myself as being in the world, this is the one that has no picture. It is blank. I can never 'be' dead



since 'my' death is the death of 'me' in utter and completing extinguishment. It is the one thing I can never be. It is actually the one thing (paradoxically) that is utterly mine but which I can never 'experience' or have anyone else step in to have for me. This is not a comfortable realisation, particularly as it is coupled with a further realisation that 'my' death is embedded in me as being in the world. There was never a time when I could not die. There will never be a time when I cannot die. 'My' death can occur at any moment. It was never a polite event that out of consideration for my finer feelings postponed itself until some vague and future time never to be specified. 'My' death can occur at any moment as I am a necessarily finite creature and always will be.

I now live under the hand of death. That hand is always present as suspended. Its purpose is to grasp 'me' and not some vague 'other'. In 'grasping' me, death does not select a portion; death grasps the whole of me. This realisation is not now another idea I might ruminate on, (along with others) on the conveyor belt of reflective speculations, for what has been shown me is that I am absolutely 'here' as he who is being in the world, and I am 'here' as an entirety, and I am 'here' to die as an entirety, and it is **as** 'here' that I **will** die.

Standing in my kitchen, under the hand of death, I am more 'here' than I have ever been.

I can no longer escape the understanding that the agreeable context has constantly lured me away from the situation I now find myself in and that I have willingly embraced all that it had to offer. After all, it was my home. But I now live under the hand of death, not someone else's death. In the realisation of my utter extinguishment, is revealed a foundation that is simply not there.

I had assumed something foundational about my existence, an assumption that had to do with avoiding being finite. The constant stream of novel busyness within the agreeable context kept a flurry of 'important' activity constantly before me, a flurry that seemed to assume and to build a foundation under me. I had simply assumed it was there and could be relied upon. But now, I see that it is but a few weak twigs placed precariously across the mouth of a mine-shaft, a shaft I can fall down (and always could) at any moment and that this shaft is (and always was) the true foundation of my existence.

How can I live with such a realisation?

The mine-shaft that lies beneath me is not the only gaping emptiness I stand upon and my realisation of the first has somehow provoked realisation of this second.

I can only 'be' in terms of who I am to become, and not upon some prior foundation that somehow holds me up. I am not the sort of entity that has as its foundation the sort of foundation a house has. The kitchen in which I stand has more security in that respect than I could ever have. I simply do not have foundations (though I have been persuaded that I do have). In allowing myself to rely upon these absent foundations, I have foregone the only way I could ever be as a foundational entity namely, my potential to exercise my own possibilities for myself. If I could ever have foundations then they would never be 'under' me as something guaranteeing security in whatever I might choose to be or to do. They would, in a sense, be always 'ahead' of me, in which case, the metaphor of 'foundations' peters out into a quite clear nonsensical contradiction.

In going along with and being lassitudinously at home in the agreeable context, I have foregone myriad possibilities that were always mine (and always there): possibilities I turned away from as they 'needed' this realisation of my being radically finite. In that realisation I became 'gathered together' and not dissolved into the generality of received opinion that 'they' had perpetuated. As being genuinely 'gathered together', I was then freed to exercise this potential to become my possibilities.

But what is this second mine-shaft, referred to earlier?

It is the empty redundant opportunities at the heart of who I am, opportunities that I failed to exercise by being turned away by the comfortable distracting consolations of the agreeable context. I cannot now cancel out the realisation of that redundancy, that waste of my potential. I must carry that realisation forward into my life and with its emptiness lingering at my heart.

The strange alienation, as I stand in my kitchen surrounded by objects that are no longer the same, has revealed so much to me that it cannot be something I must temporarily endure with the hope that 'it will all be over soon'. If I do that I will again be attempting to build on foundations that are no longer there.

I am now in a position, in a sense, to choose my life or to lose it.

I realise that I cannot live out my life in the incandescent presence of this alienation, for I am always being with the others and they matter. But I can distance myself by being resolute in my new realisation and in being able to call upon that realisation when I have 'fallen' into the inveigling blandishments. By being able to 'call upon' this realisation, I will be able to repeat

the position of being open to my genuine possibilities and not deepening the second mine-shaft by creating yet more redundant opportunities at the heart of who I am. But will I be forever alone in my realisation (with the others always 'over there' lost within their agreeable context)? What would it be like if we were able to be with one another as those who were passionately finite? What would it be like if we were no longer lost within the inveigling blandishments of that context we find so agreeable? If such a position were possible, how would we achieve it?

It is certainly no project to be undertaken in an evangelising way with the missionary purpose of converting those as in a primitive state of being. Those others are not 'less' than I am. My new-found authentic possibility is not a superior mode of being; it is simply a different one in which my potential is more obvious and the choices clearer. Furthermore, I have the opportunity to be more determinedly resolute about who I will become and more aware of the 'traps' that lie ahead. In other words, I have not only become 'aware' I am also living out the consequences of that awareness. My 'awareness' is not a stance I have adopted but is actually lived out in my actual relationships with other people. In that 'living out' I am allowing others to become also open to their genuine possibilities by their being with me as I am. I do not proselytise my position, for that would open up the opportunity of its being talked 'about' in the general discourse of the agreeable context. I stay resolutely with who I am and attempt to meet others in that way. I can do no other.

When I say that I am 'in a mood' it is usually descriptive of my being 'angry' or 'pensive' or 'irritable' or 'bored'. I rarely say of myself that I am in a mood if I am being 'peaceful' or 'busy' or 'attentive' or 'meditative'. In either mode, there is an assumption that I am somehow the one who is creating the mood and that my mood has somehow been caused by something and that, as a consequence, I find myself affected by that. In other words, I tend to attribute to moods something positive, as if they have to dramatically stand out in order to be 'moods'. When there is no drama (and life seems to be just 'ticking over') I never say that I am in such and such a mood. Nevertheless, I am never nothing. There is no such condition for me as being 'blank' or non-consciously extinguished.

Every single day of my existence I am always the person who has the world revealed to him in a particular way. There is no such condition, for me, of the world's not being there in some way. It is always there **as** something. It too, like me, is never nothing, never blank. At every moment of my existence, even during those undramatic times when nothing particular

seems to be happening, something **is** happening for I am in the world (and always have been) and the world is constantly and unremittingly revealing itself to me, whether I like it or not. This constant revelation does not depend upon what I have learned about the world (as if the world were somehow 'over there' as an object to be viewed and regarded). I am attuned to the world (my world) by the manner of its continuous disclosure and I cannot 'turn it off' as if it were somehow an optional way of being.

If I were really being attentive, (and very often I am not), I would realise that my moods are accurate ways of letting me know how I really am. But I often cover them over with rationalisations that take me further and further away from the 'pure' nature of their revelation and disclosure. In addition, I have firm opinions and prejudices regarding particular circumstances and these often take priority over the accuracy of disclosure. More often than not, I find myself trammelled in the tangle of common opinion through what other people tell me, through the media of television, radio and newspapers and through what I have come to believe as a result of all that. Often, this latter way of being comes to dominate and I find myself in it as my 'default' way of being.

Whatever I do (even if I think, live and behave in a reckless and wanton manner), I am still doing all that as someone who cares and who is concerned as the person who **is** that. I am never 'non-concernful' even in my most extreme mode of inauthenticity, for I am always he who **is** inauthentic and I **am** that concernfully.

Even when I am inauthentic and appear to be engaging in matters that appear against my own best interests, I am always engaged in them as **possibilities**. These possibilities are ever before me and tell me that I am he who is always forward-focused, whether I like it or not. Although I make many mistakes regarding the direction I may take in my life, these directions, these possibilities, (although I may misinterpret them), are never themselves hidden or absent from me in the sense of being lost. If I were truly attentive, if I were truly open to my genuine possibilities, then I would not rely upon common opinion as the foundational mode of my being, as my lodestar in making choices.

The manner of how I come to understand who I am depends largely upon the degree to which I allow myself to become absorbed by the common currency of common opinion. Absorbed or not I am never 'half a being' simply because I take a wrong direction in the world (or a direction that is not in my own best interests). I am always he who is totally the person he is, whether authentic or not. In this totality, I never occupy a 'grey area' between authenticity

and inauthenticity, between being authentic and inauthentic; I am either one or the other and, as such, come to understanding in either of those two modes. Nevertheless, either as authentic or inauthentic, I am always focused forward, even when I am seeking distracting alternatives to facing up to my own radical finitude, my own final inevitable extinguishment and my own possible final extinguishment at any moment. In seeking to distract myself I have a tendency to follow whatever is nearest to hand (in the sense of its being familiar and not too complicated). I am drawn therefore, to a narrow range of possibilities, but one within which there are countless divisions and sub-divisions of activity and absorption. These are so detailed and interconnected that they always thoroughly engage me and keep me constantly occupied

In this constant engagement, I am always confident that whatever the degree or manner of activity or complication, I can never stray beyond the range of possibilities I have opted for. I therefore have a foundation for my being which affords me an apprehension of security. Because I opt for this narrow range, I exclude other possibilities, ones I scarcely even consider. These restricted possibilities cycle and re-cycle within my own personal demesne and I come to understand and interpret who I am in the light of what is disclosed to me therein.

This exclusion of other possibilities has the consequence of limiting who I am and who I may become. In some significant sense I am always aware of this deficiency, since it matters to me who I am and who I may become. But as I have already become diverted into a mode of understanding that has excluded from its apprehension possibilities outside the narrow range, I am no longer in a position to 'see' these (for although I am not 'blind' my ability to 'see' has become dimmed). Nevertheless I can still 'see' whatever possibilities are on hand within the narrow range and I am drawn towards them. They present and re-present themselves to me and I establish a relationship with them that is based more in wanting them for themselves than in understanding whether they are in my own best interests. Furthermore, I develop an habitual stance towards them in which I become fascinated by my own wanting and wishing, and exclude other modes of being in favour of this predominant one.

Yet even in my compulsive focusing upon that which is being readily disclosed within the narrow range, I am never 'inside myself' looking out: I am always 'outside' and alongside that over which I hanker. We are always together outside in the world. This being outside together also includes other people, and this condition of always being outside together is one



I can never extricate myself from (even if I were to occupy the most remote island hermitage).

When I talk, I reveal to other people how I am and how we are in being outside together. I cannot avoid, in quite an explicit sense, revealing my mood of how I am being in the world. This revelation covers the whole range of how I speak (and may be in contradiction to the actual 'content' of whatever I am saying). If other people are being truly attentive to what I am saying, then they may be attuned to this full spectrum of revelation, one that 'I myself' may not be fully aware of (yet one which is being accurately made explicit in the talking). This spectrum covers not only what I say but how I speak, the speed at which I talk, the degree of modulation in my voice, the tone I adopt and the particular idiosyncratic way of speaking that appertains to me specifically. If my speaking is being sensitively listened to and accurately discerned (especially that which 'I myself' may not be aware of) the possibility of genuine discourse then arises.

If 'I myself' am led to engage in that sensitive and discerning mode of listening I also become enabled to re-engage with those possibilities outside the narrow range.

I have come to realise that whatever I say is not completely under my control (even though I may struggle to make it as amenable to my intentions as possible). Nevertheless, what I say is always disclosive, particularly when sensitively and accurately discerned by another. But, even when **not** sensitively and accurately discerned, when I am engaged in the common mode of discourse in the world: gossip, chatter, banter, wordplay, drollery, nattering and rumour-spreading, I am engaged in that which forms the common currency of discourse between myself and others. A discourse (though impoverished and limiting), permits an easy and immediate access to the others' way of being.

When I listen to another and that other listens to me, we are both laying ourselves open to the others' possibilities as disclosed in what we say and how we utter. How we are is made explicit in that utterance, particularly how we are with each other. Listening is never the simple reception of articulated language noise, but always happens in a context within which whatever is said is already being understood. Listening and understanding go together, for I am always **already** in a mood and listening occurs within that. This context is one within which I **already** understand something and whatever is being said to me occurs within that and adds to it. Yet my understanding is never to be seen as an empty sack, one that is gradually being filled as a result of information acquired through the mode of listening (along



the lines of the 'more' that is said to me, the 'more' I will understand). In a profound sense, understanding enables me to listen in the first place. Yet nevertheless, my listening is capable of being 'conditioned' by the context of understanding I find myself in. Often I develop modes of listening that are thoroughly dysfunctional to my own best interests (in that I may earnestly and neglectfully disqualify what is being said to me by the other).

In being with the other, I never come to speaking or listening completely naked, so to speak. I always come as one already in the world and as one absorbed within it to a greater or lesser degree. In that sense I am already 'clothed' with an understanding that has the capacity to 'cloak' my listening and to change it in various ways. It is this being 'clothed' that enables me to listen either authentically or inauthentically. (In some sense, it could be said that there is a constant 'hermeneutical' relationship between my listening and my understanding in which the one 'guides' the other and the other 'guides' the one, in a cycle of transformation).

Often when I am talking, the other does not 'hear' what I am saying and fails to pick up the cues I am presenting. Occasionally these cues are actively resisted, not in a discursive way, but in a manner that makes further development difficult or impossible. There is implacability about such an encounter that contrasts with a stance that is actively rejecting, one that seems to deny all that I am intending to disclose. Sometimes, I am ignored, as if I **have** been heard, but that what I am disclosing is unacceptable in some way (a way I never really come to discover since the path to 'dialogue' is never opened up or encouraged). More often than not, my encounters consist of agreeing amicably with the general tenor of conversation in an innocuous way, and in following the popular and prevailing drift of opinion. Nevertheless, there have been occasions when another has understood something in my speaking that I myself have only been dimly aware of. This understanding has been transformative for it has served to clarify my vision and open up to me possibilities I had barely even thought of or considered.

In being able to talk with the other in a 'genuine' way and to be listened to in a 'genuine' way (and for the two of us to recognise that) I am relieved of any overarching obligation to simply 'follow along' or 'go along with' the usual conventional modes of exchange. It is as if the possibilities of talking and listening are being opened up for the first time. Because another has understood something in my speaking that I myself have only been dimly aware of, I have become much more attuned to the subtle nuances both of talking and of listening and the way that much is disclosed in the unsaid as in the said. Often, what has the potential to be the

most 'genuine' in discourse, does not arise as speech (in the sense of words spoken), but is somehow present as a potent silence, one that is not simply 'holding back' from utterance (as if it wants to speak but the opportunity is not arising), but is present as speech itself. This 'holding back' sets itself against the constant stream of chatter and opinion and, in its reserved reticence, discloses other possibilities of discourse, possibilities that have remained hidden from me but are now becoming restored.

\*

### **Dasein as Who (and where does Dasein live?):**

The preceding section, couched as it is in the first person, has served to prepare the way for Heidegger's discourse on human-being as always 'the entity which I myself am in each instance' and that the preceding section has attempted to do this by following, step by step, the arguments that are intended to 'underpin' and complement it in all the succeeding sections below.

With the opening words of *'Being And Time'*, Heidegger registers the whole tenor of his approach:

*'We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine.'*<sup>8</sup>

Within the theme of this analytic of Dasein, it is considered inappropriate to treat ourselves (as the entities to be analysed) as yet another substantial object present alongside other substantial objects, within the world:

*'Dasein is the entity which I myself am in each instance, in whose being I as an entity 'have an interest' or share, an entity which is in each instance to be it in my own way... This is the phenomenal motive for calling this entity which we ourselves are Dasein [literally "to be there"].'*<sup>9</sup>

Dasein is unique and its uniqueness does not abide in simply being present. Although the world of Dasein is full of solid objects (both living and inert), Dasein is never simply an extraordinary example of the same:

*'This designation 'Dasein' for the distinctive entity so named does not signify a what. This entity is not distinguished by its what, like a chair in contrast to a house. Rather, this designation in its own way expresses the way to be.'*<sup>10</sup>

Existence, so far as Dasein is concerned, should never be conflated with *quidditas*, or the 'whatness' of what a thing is, nor with the hard factual presence of being overtly 'there' or 'here':

*'Dasein is an entity which does not occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an **issue** for it.'*<sup>11</sup>

For Dasein, existence does not equate to simple presence:

*'The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand... When we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house or tree) but it's Being.'*<sup>12</sup>

### **Dasein: viewed etymologically:**

Yet the word 'Dasein', when viewed etymologically, signifies clearly a 'thereness' or 'hereness' in its very construction. Heidegger has taken a common German word (meaning 'existence') and split it into two, so that it can draw upon a radical relationship with the meaning of the 'Da' of Dasein. 'Da' can mean either 'there' or 'here'. The 'sein' of Dasein can have one of two meanings. As a verb it generally designates 'to be', but as a noun, 'Sein' means 'Being' (though with more abstract connotations). When put together in this way (and with this specific intention), this compound-word goes beyond signifying simple existence and comes to mean 'being there' or 'being here', or alternatively 'there being', or 'here being', and definitely signifies existent location.

Yet why is the term 'Dasein' so strangely neutral, bearing in mind the determinedly engaging tone of the opening sentence, '**we are ourselves** the entities to be analysed'? It is part of Heidegger's intention to free himself from historical analyses of what it is to be a human-being, and from historical analyses of Being itself. He wishes to assert the exclusive and peculiar 'nature' of human-being by stripping away previous cognates surrounding notions of 'humankind' or 'mankind' or 'human-being' in order to develop an analysis of the entity that is irredeemably, 'we... ourselves'. We ourselves are always 'who' and never 'what'. It is of issue to Dasein that it is always 'I' or 'you'. The very use of these terms underpins a fundamental engagement in and of relationship:

*'Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says "I am this entity", and in the long-run says this loudest when it is 'not' this entity. Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution.'*<sup>13</sup>

In order to forego the disengaging distance created by eschewing personal pronouns, the 'who' of Dasein, by being brought to the fore, connects with the notion of Dasein as 'mine'.

### **Dasein: and the notion of “mineness”:**

For Heidegger, Dasein is not simply 'over there' to be poked and prodded as a solid discrete entity, but is always inescapably 'mine'. If Dasein is 'mine' then it intrinsically possesses, as a defining condition, all the possibilities of who I am (and all those possibilities are 'mine'). It should be noted that the term 'mine' in no way connotes simple possession or 'owning' of a property, quality or condition, but points towards an intrinsic **engagement in** and an **openness towards**:

*'Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand... because Dasein has in each case mineness one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: "I am" "you are".'*<sup>14</sup>

'Mineness' has much to do with **who** Dasein is, in that, it connects futurally with who Dasein may become. 'Mineness', because it lies in Dasein's 'ability' to be, and therefore in who Dasein is, is never a static reified category but a condition of Dasein's 'exercising' it's own possibilities to become:<sup>15</sup>

*'Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine... in each case Dasein is its possibility, and it has this possibility but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. Because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very being, "choose" itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only "seem" to do so.'*<sup>16</sup>

The coming to fruition of Dasein's possibilities, being grounded not upon **what** I am, but upon **who** I am in my 'mineness', emerges out of the choices that Dasein makes:

*'Dasein has a peculiar selfsameness with itself in the sense of selfhood. It is in such a way that it is in a certain way its own, it has itself, and only on that account can it lose itself. Because selfhood belongs to existence, as in some manner "being-one's-own", the existent Dasein can choose itself on purpose and determine its existence primarily and chiefly starting from that choice; that is, it can exist authentically. However, it can also let itself be determined in its being by others and thus exist inauthentically by existing primarily in forgetfulness of its own self.'*<sup>17</sup>

In the exercise of those choices, Heidegger argues, Dasein takes account of all that it is, in relation to and in relation with the 'world'. Dasein can never be severed from world, not even in its most extreme fantasy of individuation. This active and continuous engagement is grounded upon the condition of 'mineness'. The choices that Dasein makes connect and direct Dasein's possibilities and, as such, these choices possess a definite futural aspect. Dasein's choices are often exercised 'about' this or that (signifying the ongoing engagement with world), and in so doing, often bypass whatever is most propitious for Dasein's own well-being:

*'Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not to be itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself.'*<sup>18</sup>

This bypassing, conditioned and influenced by gossip, common opinion, fear, anxiety, anger, peer pressure and a desire to socially conform at any cost, inveigles Dasein into entering a particular mode of being, which Heidegger describes as 'inauthentic'. Dasein therefore, 'can, in its very being, "choose" itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only "seem" to do so':

*'First and mostly, we take ourselves much as daily life prompts; we do not dissect and rack our brains about some soul-life. We understand ourselves in an everyday way or, as we can formulate it terminologically, not authentically.... "Not authentically" means: not as we at bottom are able to be ourselves. Being lost, however, does not have a negative, depreciative significance but means something positive belonging to the Dasein itself. The Dasein's average understanding of itself takes the self as in-authentic. This inauthentic self-understanding of the Dasein's by no means signifies an ungenue self-understanding. On the contrary, this everyday having of self within our factual, existent, passionate merging into things can surely be genuine, whereas all extravagant grubbing about in one's soul can be in the highest degree counterfeit or even pathologically eccentric... the genuine, actual, though inauthentic understanding of the self takes place in such a way that this self, the self of our thoughtlessly random, common, everyday existence, "reflects" itself to itself from out of that to which it has given itself over.'*<sup>19</sup>

This active and continuous engagement with world, being the ordinary currency of Dasein's existence, is not to be despised in its inauthentic mode. Nevertheless, Dasein as Dasein, being the entity that essentially chooses its own possibilities, can only enter into one mode or another, either as authentic or inauthentic:<sup>20</sup>

*'Authenticity and inauthenticity... are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterised by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterised by inauthenticity – when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment.'* (BT.p.68.)<sup>21</sup>

### **Dasein: facets of “being-in”:**

Heidegger constantly, and often disconcertingly, moves from the neutrality of the term 'Dasein' to the personal pronoun, usually within a single short sentence:

*'Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am.'*<sup>22</sup>

This dramatically reminds the reader that Dasein is not 'over there' as a discrete object to be regarded by some distanced and disengaged subject. Dasein is always oneself, and as such, is always engaged with its (my own) existence. But not all commentators agree with Heidegger (who sees Dasein as an individuated entity). One commentator, (Haugeland, John 2000 p.46) in particular, over the years has been a persistent and principal proponent of another view:

*'Dasein is Heidegger's word for what essentially distinguishes the human from the nonhuman ... This is not definitive of Dasein but only an indication of its evident scope ... As it happens, I disagree with most readers of Heidegger about the individuation of Dasein; in particular, I don't think there is a separate and unique Dasein for each person.'*<sup>23</sup>

In other words, on **this** view, human-being is not **itself** Dasein but is an example of it, an example of a general class that covers many instances, but which itself is not to be conflated **with** those individual instances:

*'People are to Dasein as baseball games are to baseball, as utterances are to language, as works are to literature. Dasein is the overall phenomenon, consisting entirely of its individual 'occurrences' ... a person is a case of Dasein.'*<sup>24</sup>

Ten years later, this commentator, whilst acknowledging that the 'Dasein' of human-being is that which is 'essentially distinctive' of that **genus**, is not that which is 'confined' to it nor restricted by it:

*"'Dasein' is not equivalent, not even extensionally, with 'person' or 'individual subject', both because it (somehow) comprises more than one person and because it comprises more than just people. Yet, unquestionably, 'Dasein' is Heidegger's technical term for whatever it is that is essentially distinctive of people; and, in each case, we are it.'*<sup>25</sup>

It my position that if 'we are it', as argued above, then 'we are it' in our 'mineness' and, as such 'are it' totally as the unitary entity asserted by Heidegger. The fact that "Dasein" is not



equivalent, not even extensionally with “person” or “individual subject” (but that still ‘we are it’), does not derogate from the Heideggarian position, as his term “Dasein”, **already** encompasses this:

*'In bending over backwards to avoid the Sartrean ... mistake of identifying Dasein with the conscious subject central to Husserlian phenomenology, interpreters such as John Haugeland have claimed that Dasein is not to be understood as an individual person at all. Dasein, according to Haugeland, is a mass term. People, General Motors, and Cincinnati are all cases of Dasein. While Haugeland has presented a well motivated and well argued corrective to the almost universal misunderstanding of Dasein as an autonomous, individual subject – a self-sufficient source of all meaning and intelligibility – Haugeland's interpretation runs up against many passages that make it clear that for Heidegger Dasein designates exclusively entities like each of us, that is, individual persons. For example, "Because Dasein has in each case mineness one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am,' you are".' BT. p.68.*<sup>26</sup>

But if Dasein is that entity whose very nature it is 'to be', and if (as its name suggests) it is that entity whose being is 'there' or 'here', then Dasein in its existence is always **located**. But the site of Dasein's 'location' is not the Earth *qua* Earth, for that would posit Earth as a discrete substantial object over and against Dasein. Rather, the home of Dasein's 'location' is 'world'. Heidegger seeks to avoid any picture that would equate Dasein with being a simple thinking thing extended in space, or as an entity resting upon, or inside some other solid object:

*'among the many abstractions of the philosophical tradition which hindered a proper access to the being of the human being stands the distinction, almost immediately fixed into a dualism, between man and a world... It establishes a crucial distinction between who we are, or the being of the human, understood as a 'thinking thing' (res cogitans), and the being of the world, understood as 'extended matter' (re extensa.). The human, this metaphysical construction stipulates, is a self-positing and autonomous thinking substance, which exists independently of the world it faces. The being of the human is ontologically distinct from that of the world. As a result, man can access the world through his own essence as a thinking substance only, or at least primarily and most significantly. Thought is itself understood as the ability to represent and formalise... This is the basis on which an encounter with the world takes place. In turn, the world is itself subordinated to its ability to be known, or represented whether physically or metaphysically. And it is for that very reason that it can only be envisaged as extended, inert matter.'*<sup>27</sup>

For Heidegger, 'world' is neither the base for, nor the container of Dasein, nor is 'Earth' to be conflated with 'world':

*'...we exist only and through our relation to the world, we, as human beings, are nothing independent from, and in addition to, our being-in-the-world. This means that we are not a substance, and not a thing, but precisely, an existence, always and irreducibly open to and onto the world, always moving ourselves within a certain pre-theoretical understanding of it. Openness to the world is what defines our being, not thought.'*<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless, in common parlance 'earth' and 'world' are terms often employed interchangeably, in that 'world' is often posited as a global phenomenon and 'earth' is posited as a planetary object and vice versa. In Heidegger's understanding, these two terms are **not** interchangeable and cannot be conflated with one another. For Heidegger, both these terms are significant in that they signify a relationship in which one (i.e., either 'earth' or 'world'), does not simply precede the other but that **between** them both there is often a powerful, 'antagonistic' and 'strifeful' relationship:

*'World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet cannot be separated...*

*"The temple work, in setting up a world, does not cause the material to disappear, but rather causes it to come forth for the very first time... the rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colours to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak. All this comes forth as the work sets itself back into the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and lustre of metal, into the darkening and lighting of colour, into the clang of tone and into the naming power of the world." (PLT p.46).*

*...The 'earth' is not 'matter' as opposed to 'form'. These traditions from 'aesthetics' do not work here... The work sets up the world: the world was not already there and is now founded. The work sets forth the earth: the earth was already there but was not manifest. The world is formed out of and set against the earth but is other to it and is not simply derived from it. Art needs both earth and world: it is the setting forth of their relation, which is one of antagonism or strife.' <sup>29</sup>*

Dasein, defined as a 'thinking thing' posits the world as an object of knowledge, and by so doing raises **itself** as the regarding subject. The world, thus caught undergoes successive splitting through categorisation, and is always, 'that which is over there', as an epistemological item. But being 'that which is over there' at least for Stenstad <sup>30</sup> has a cool neutrality about it that does not reflect the underlying and enduring potency contained in dualistic thinking, particularly in subject-objects relations. In such thinking and in such relations there abides a sinister and enduring purposiveness. Through monotheism and through Western philosophy, she traces the stubborn persistence of dualistic thinking and the manner in which it has become interwoven with notions of human superiority and power. She also acknowledges the position of Heidegger in shedding light on the persistent presence of such dualism:

*'When Heidegger said that the thought of ourselves as subjects is the refuge of all dualistic assumptions, he caught hold of an important insight, one that hints at the underlying reason why these dualisms are so hard to release from their position of dominance. Dualistic thinking has, from the very beginning, given human beings (or some sub-set of humans, determined in various times and places by things such as race and gender and class) very comforting sense of superiority. The divisions subject-object and mind-body have by no means been value-free notions that only pertain to the arcane*

*domains of metaphysics and epistemology. ... I bring them up here to remind us of the power that the dualism-based notion of human superiority has had and continues to have.'*<sup>31</sup>

Heidegger's opposition to this view is passionately rendered within a seminar situation in Zollikon, Switzerland, in which he pithily summarises and then dismisses the Cartesian worldview:

*'How could such a bright and intelligent man like Descartes come up with such a strange theory in which the human being, in the first instance, exists alone by himself in relationship to things? ... Descartes' position results from the essential need of a human being who has abandoned faith — the position that meaning of his existence is determined by the authority of the Bible and the church. Rather, he is someone entirely on his own, and therefore, someone who sought to hold on to some form of reliability and trust...Descartes gains his position from his will to provide something absolutely certain and secure, therefore something not from an immediate fundamental relationship to what is or from the question of being. On the contrary, that something is, and may be, is determined conversely by the rule of mathematical proof.'*<sup>32</sup>

World thus regarded, at an arm's length, is that which is known, that which is accessible to knowledge, as such. In its submission to Dasein as a 'thinking thing', world becomes reified into solid matter, as something presently available and infinitely malleable. Within such a regime, the phrase 'being-in-the-world' takes on the meaning of 'a thinking thing existent within an extended thing', much akin, therefore, to something's being **inside** something else. For Heidegger, (as has been alluded to above and in the Preamble) the great exemplar of this approach is René Descartes whom he uses as a foil to his own ontology:

*'...in criticising the Cartesian point of departure, we must ask what kind of Being that belongs to Dasein we should fix upon as giving us an appropriate way of access to those entities with whose Being as extensio Descartes equates the being of the 'world'. The only genuine access to them lies in knowing, intellectio, in the sense of the kind of knowledge we get in mathematics and physics. Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped. If anything measures up in its own kind of Being to the Being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it is in the authentic sense. Such entities are those which always are what they are. Accordingly, that which can be shown to have the character of something that constantly remains... makes up the real Being of those entities of the world which get experienced. **That which enduringly remains, really is.** This is the sort of thing which mathematics knows. That which is accessible in an entity through mathematics, makes up its Being. Thus the being of the 'world' is, as it were, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of Being which lies veiled in the concept of substantiality, and in terms of the idea of a knowledge by which such entities are cognized. The kind of Being which belongs to entities within-the-world is something which they themselves might have been permitted to present; but Descartes does not let them do so. Instead he prescribes for the world it's 'real' Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled.'*<sup>33</sup>

### **Dasein: Being-in as a unitary phenomenon:**

It has been asserted that Dasein can never be severed from world, not even in its most extreme fantasy of individuation. For Heidegger:

*'The world is something Dasein-ish, it is not extant like things but it is da, there-here, like the Dasein the being-da which we ourselves are: that is to say, it exists. We call the mode of being the being that we ourselves are, of the Dasein, by the name of existence. This implies as a matter of pure terminology that the world is not extant but rather it exists, it has the Dasein's mode of being.'*<sup>34</sup>

And Dasein is always that which 'has in each case mineness [*jemeinigkeit*], one must always use a *personal* pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are':<sup>35</sup>

*'The person is never to be thought of as a thing or a substance; the person is rather the unity of living-through which is immediately experienced in and with our experiences, not a thing merely thought of behind and outside what is immediately experienced.'*<sup>36</sup>

In asserting the unity of Dasein as entity and the unity of Being-in-the-world as a phenomenon, Heidegger claims that, 'the person is... the unity of living through which is immediately experienced', and, 'the compound expression "being-in-the-world" indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a *unitary* phenomenon'<sup>37</sup>:

*'The world is something which the 'subject' 'projects outward', as it were, from within itself. But are we permitted to speak here of an inner and an outer? What can this projection mean? Obviously not that the world is a piece of myself in the sense of some other thing present in me as in a thing and that I throw the world out of this subject-thing in order to catch hold of the other things with it. Instead, the Dasein itself is as such already projected. So far as the Dasein exists a world is cast-forth with the Dasein's being. To exist means, among other things, to cast-forth a world, and in fact in such a way that with the thrownness of this projection, with the factual existence of a Dasein, extant entities are always already uncovered.'*<sup>38</sup>

So elemental and irreducible is this unity for Heidegger that:

*'Being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having several constitutive items in its structure.'*<sup>39</sup>

And also:

*'World exists – that is, it is – only if Dasein exists, only if there is Dasein... Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world. Only because the 'subject' is determined by being-in-the-world can it become, as this self, a thou for another. Only because I am an existent self am I a possible thou for another as self. The basic condition for the possibility of the self's being a possible thou in being-with-others is based on the circumstance that the Dasein as the self that it is, is such that it exists as being-in-the-world. For 'thou' means 'you are with me in a world.'*<sup>40</sup>

Here again, Heidegger challenges notions of human-being, of Dasein, as a substantial entity that primarily interrogates the world through cognition, or as that entity that primarily interprets and reaches understanding through an epistemological process, or as that entity that comes to truth as *veritas* (that is, as that which is ascertainably 'correct'). He again argues that Dasein and world are not two separate entities whereby one lives 'on' or 'in' the other, whereby one, in irrefutable substantiality, treads the ground 'upon' which it exists. He is not starting from Descartes' position (of scepticism leading to a certainty), but is asserting that Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is that which must not be silently 'pre-supposed' and edited out of consideration. Perhaps, asking a question along the lines of, 'where does Dasein live?' would now seem misplaced and misconceived, in that it would invoke a discrete, solid and identifiable environment within which Dasein might take up residence:

*'Heidegger defines a world as the togetherness of (a) a "wherein" (das Worin) that focuses on human beings and (b) a "whereby" (das Woraufhin) that focuses on the things found within a world. (a) the "wherein" designates a world as a place-of-our-concerns wherein we live our lives for the sake of our purposes and ultimately for the sake of the survival of our own being. Thus human being is the ultimate "goal for the sake of which" we live... Putting the two together: the world as (a) the place wherein we are directed to our final goal is also (b) the set of relations that directs tools to tasks for the sake of that same final goal.'*<sup>41</sup>

Perhaps, a reformulation of the question just posited above of, '**How** does Dasein live as being in the world?' might now be more appropriate.

### **Dasein as Being in the World:**

Earlier, it was said, 'We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is *in each case mine*'. The 'mineness' alluded to in these opening shots of the analytic Dasein, points towards Heidegger's thesis, that for Dasein, its being is always an issue for it. This 'being an issue for it' is not limited to a self-conscious self-reflective cognitive inner process, but points towards the way in which Dasein always attempts to make sense of its own existence. In making sense of its existence Dasein, on Heidegger's understanding, does not need 'a self-reflective cognitive inner process' as the primary means of having a self:

*'The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things. This is not mysticism and does not presuppose the assigning of souls to things.'*<sup>42</sup>



This attempt to make sense is not a free-floating autonomous mechanism by an isolated subject (over and against an object of regard) but is intrinsic to Dasein itself. But because Dasein is that entity in which its very being is inescapably characterised by 'mineness', everyday and average relationships with the continuous 'whatever' of the world unremittingly bring before it, issues that require 'immediate' self-understanding. Nevertheless, Dasein, as being in the world, cannot escape being constrained and influenced, in its exercise of this self-understanding, by the conformations of ordinary conversation and the mundane confabulations of daily life:

*'Dasein's concrete particularity is... fundamentally different from that of any entity that is not essentially self-interpreting... What this means is that human existence exhibits an essential concrete reflexivity, for I must make sense not just of the being of entities at large, but of my own being. This irreducible dimension of particularity inherent in the structure of existence grounds all self interpretation, authentic and in authentic alike.'*<sup>43</sup>

This 'concrete particularity' by which Dasein is Being-in-the-world, is not the same as being continually present. The 'presence' of Dasein in the world, is not the **defining** mode of its being.

### **Dasein: commonsense challenged:**

Heidegger punctures commonsense notions of what it is 'to be', by asserting that 'things', even though they may be adjacent to each other and so close that they may have contact, never, in fact, ever touch each other:

*'There is no such thing as the "side-by-side-ness" of an entity called "Dasein" with another entity called "world"... "the table stands 'by' the door" or "the chair 'touches' the wall." Taken strictly, 'touching' is never what we are talking about in such cases, not because accurate re-examination will always eventually establish that there is a space between the chair and the wall, but because in principle the chair can never touch the wall, even if the space between them should be equal to zero. If the chair could touch the wall, this would presuppose that the wall is the sort of thing 'for' which the chair would be **encounterable**.'*<sup>44</sup>

This undermining of ordinary reality highlights the difference between Dasein's 'being in', on the one hand, and the enduring presence of things extended in space, on the other. The language and concepts that are appropriate to one, Heidegger claims, are not appropriate to the other and any crossover inevitably distorts a proper analysis of that entity known as Dasein, that entity which is ourselves. This crossover is often 'veiled' within ordinary discourse, with the result that a grounding of assumptions is established upon which



inappropriate analyses are constructed. These assumptions permit a view of Dasein, (one that may define its mode of being), by allowing it to be regarded as an animated thing.

As Heidegger claims:

*'Fundamental ontological distinctions are easily obliterated... 'being alongside' the world never means anything like the being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur. There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'.'*<sup>45</sup>

So, for example, the very ordinary word 'in', Heidegger argues, does not take its meaning from the assumption that something within something else is necessarily 'in' it. The notion of being 'in' is often unquestioningly taken to emanate from a notion of containment, a notion which (as a veiled assumption) is then applied to Dasein's mode of being:

*'we are inclined to understand this being-in as 'being in something'. This latter term designates the kind of being which an entity has when it is 'in' another one, as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard. By this 'in' we mean the relationship of Being which two entities extended 'in' space have to each other with regard to their location in that space.'*<sup>46</sup>

But Dasein's being-in does not emanate from notions of containment. Dasein is not 'in' the world as the garment is 'in' the cupboard. For Dasein, to be 'in' is essentially to 'dwell' in the world as the commonplace, everyday and habitual home of its being and its discourse. All those entities which do not possess the being of Dasein, or its discourse, in the sense indicated above are, according to Heidegger, merely present-at-hand. They do not dwell. They do not have habits. They can never be 'at home'. They lack language. They are enduringly and substantially present. The understanding that can be applied to them, in their being, cannot adequately or appropriately be applied to Dasein as an understanding of **its** being. So to say that two inert things that are in contact with each other 'touch' each another, is to apply an understanding that would more appropriately be applied to Dasein. The word 'touch' therefore, is not an understanding as such, but a metaphor:

*'When two entities are present-at-hand within the world, and furthermore are wordless in themselves, they can never 'touch' each other, nor can either of them 'be' 'alongside' the other.'*<sup>47</sup>

For Heidegger, two things can only touch if they are in an 'encounterable' relationship, and if one of them 'has' the sort of being that can encounter. Chairs, tables, jugs, garments and cupboards do not have the sort of being that can encounter anything and, to repeat, the understanding that can be applied to them, in their being, cannot appropriately be applied to Dasein as an understanding of its being. 'Categories' of understanding that can be applied to

inert objects can be identified by their oblivious lack of engagement. So the fact that one thing can be inside another thing (and categorised as being 'inside'), lacks any notion of care, concern, relationship and involvement. Notions of understanding that can be applied to Dasein's being-in-the-world, must always include care, concern, relationship, engagement and language. So for Heidegger, special notions of understanding around Dasein (which he calls *existentials*) must be applied; notions that must never be conflated with **categories** of understanding that apply to beings that are not Dasein.

My intention in labouring this point is to place the research question firmly within the unfolding ontology of Heidegger. So, for example, the notion of what it is to be 'in' (as an exemplar) must not be glided over or assumed to be such and such.

### **Dasein: and its passionate exteriority:**

The unity of Dasein as entity and the unity of Being-in-the-world as phenomenon, has been indicated as being of prominent importance within the ontology of Heidegger. Throughout "*Being And Time*" this unity is emphasised and unfolded in all its various and novel structures. But along the way, the text is peppered with 'signposts' that remind the reader that if he or she departs from this original understanding, Heidegger will not:

*'Being-in is not a 'property' which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and without which it could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that man 'is' and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-being towards the 'world' – a world with which he provides himself occasionally.'*<sup>48</sup>

In approaching the research question, it is my intention to ground the 'analysis' upon this central argument. Human-being, as Dasein, is never a corporeally bounded intellect, which looks out upon the world from its 'inside' to the world's 'outside'. Dasein does not first 'take in' an 'outside' and place it (by some filtering process) understandingly within an interpreting personal space 'inside'. Dasein comes to understand itself **primarily** through things, activities and engagement, rather than through self-reflective cognition:

*'We say that the Dasein does not first need to turn backward to itself as though keeping itself behind its own back, it were at first standing in front of things and staring rigidly at them, instead, it never finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves, and in fact in those things that daily surround it. It finds itself primarily and constantly in things because, tending them, distressed by them, it always in some*

*way or other rests in things. Each one of us is what he pursues and cares for. In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of. We understand ourselves by starting from them because the Dasein finds itself primarily in things.'*<sup>49</sup>

Dasein, is **already** out there in the world, and **already** has an understanding of world that does not need rendering intelligible, and as already out there, that understanding **precedes** any theory about it, and consequently is essentially pre-theoretical:

*'Because as existents we already understand world beforehand we are able to understand and encounter ourselves constantly in a specific way by way of the beings which we encounter as intrawordly... It is primarily things, in and from, which we encounter ourselves. That is why this self-understanding of the everyday Dasein depends not so much on the extent and penetration of our knowledge of things as such, as on the immediacy and originality of being-in-the-world.'*<sup>50</sup>

This immediacy and originality of being-in-the-world precedes anything we might think about it. Dasein does not first cast over its proposals a matrix of prior understandings, a web of cognitions as a necessary first step in a prelude to overt activity:

*'When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been approximately encapsulated, but its primary kind of being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity to be known, and determines its character... The perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows **remains outside**, and it does so **as Dasein**.'*<sup>51</sup>

This 'passionate exteriority' is never an homogenised, undifferentiated and uniformly present 'unity', but one that embraces all the multifarious ways Dasein can be; ways that manifest the variety of mundane engagements that Dasein relates to in its everyday existence:

*'a world it does not get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon being-in-the-world. Thus being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand.'*<sup>52</sup>

Clearly, endless lists could be compiled of Dasein's activities, activities that would reflect the multiplicity and diversity of Dasein's predilections and aversions, lists that might appear as mind-numbingly banal. But the very banality may be nothing more than a failure to recognise the passionate engagement that would infuse such listings. So, for example, when Heidegger 'lists' the various ways of Dasein's 'being in', his persistent use of the gerund points up the open-ended character of Dasein's engagement and the 'undetachability' of Dasein's concernfulness of itself in its 'being in':

- *'having to do with something,*
- *producing something,*
- *attending to something and looking after it,*
- *making use of something,*
- *giving something up and letting it go,*
- *undertaking,*
- *accomplishing,*
- *evinced comment,*
- *interrogating,*
- *considering,*
- *determining,*

*all these ways of Being-in have concern as their way of Being'.<sup>53</sup>*

Failure to recognise such passion would be to repeat the mistake (but in a slightly altered form) of treating Dasein's world as a separated thing extended in space. Why would this be? Heidegger argues that Dasein is an entity (unlike those chairs, tables and jugs, referred to earlier), an entity which has the 'ability' to be 'encounterable'. This encounterability is never the *faux* and indifferent touching of one inert object with another, but refers to an encountering (and a being encountered), which always has care, concern and involvement at its root. Care is a comprehensive term that for Heidegger has an extreme potency, a potency and scope that is not adequately rendered by the 'gentleness' of the English word 'care', yet it is a term central to his explication and analysis of Dasein. In order to portray the range and the **depth** of its coverage (to compensate for the 'weakness' of translation), the citation has been bullet-pointed in a graphic way:

*'Heidegger defines 'care' as the being of Dasein. It is a name for the structural whole of existence in all its modes and for the broadest and most basic possibilities of discovery and disclosure of self and world...*

*'Care' describes the sundry ways I get involved in the issue of my:*

- *birth,*
- *life,*
- *and death.*

*Whether by my*

- *projects,*
- *inclinations,*
- *insights,*
- *or illusions.*

*'Care' is the all inclusive name for my*

- *concern for other people,*
- *preoccupations with things,*
- *an awareness of my proper Being.*

*It expresses*

- *the movement of my life out of a past, and*
  - *into a future,*
- through the present'.<sup>54</sup>*

It has been outlined and suggested so far, that Dasein as being-in-the-world, is a united entity characterised by care<sup>55</sup> and concern, essentially 'encounterable' in its relationships, concernfully engaged in its everyday affairs, who **already** possesses understanding of its world, who has the choice of being either authentic or inauthentic, whose being is always 'mine' and always an issue for it, who possesses self understanding (and the capacity to self-interpret), and whose self and world belong together in the single entity that it is.

### **Dasein: and the Others:**

At the beginning of this chapter, the first quotation emphasised my approach to the research question:

*'To be human means to exist in relation to a world, to "dwell alongside." Traditional metaphysics abstractly defines the whole by way of dichotomized parts: subjects and objects, observers and observed, spirit and matter. Heidegger insists that the whole, human-being-in-the-world, concretely defines the parts as relations of interdependence and a mutual signification'.*

It would be easy to slip into a mode of explication whereby Dasein and world turn into bifurcated phenomena (with Dasein 'here' and world 'over there'). In order to forestall this, it may be appropriate to recall the import of an earlier quotation, 'Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein... The basic condition for the possibility of the self's being a possible thou in being-with-others is based on the circumstance that the Dasein as the self that it is, is such that it exists as being-in-the-world. For 'thou' means 'you are with me in a world'. The multifarious ways in which Dasein engages in encounters reflect, for Heidegger, the variety and richness of being-in-the-world. Dasein's products, creations, artefacts, constructions and equipment stand in a state of readiness to be used. These are intrinsically useful and occur within an environment of significance, a 'context' where they have meaning. Other objects, being merely present, lack any environmental significance (which would give them meaning), and remain, therefore, 'present-at-hand':

*'We understand ourselves by way of things, in the sense of the self-understanding of everyday Dasein. To understand ourselves from the things with which we are occupied means to project our own ability to be upon such features of the business of our everyday occupation as the feasible, urgent, indispensable, expedient. The Dasein understands itself from the ability to be that it is determined by the success and failure, the feasibility and unfeasibility, of its commerce with things.'*<sup>56</sup>

Thus the two main ways in which Dasein encounters things within the world, according to Heidegger, are of the 'ready-to-hand' and of the 'present-at-hand' and in that encountering, Dasein comes to understand itself through this mundane engaging. But in this 'mundane

engaging', is Dasein's 'encountering' always an encountering in the sense of a 'coming across' or a 'lighting upon' (as if the main element is always to be Dasein's 'meeting with' or 'facing up to' or 'handling of' things)? Certainly the possibility is raised that Dasein does not so much **employ** or use the tools of its world, but tacitly accepts them (in a dependent sort of way) and thereby comes quietly to **rely** on them:

*'Insofar as the vast majority of... tools remain unknown to us, and were certainly not **invented** by us (for example our brains and blood cells), it can hardly be said that we "use" them in the strict sense of the term. A more accurate statement would be that we silently **rely** upon them, taking them for granted as that naive landscape on which even our most jaded and cynical schemes unfold.'*<sup>57</sup>

According to Heidegger, Dasein, in its everyday engagement with the world of ordinary affairs, already has a 'pre-theoretical' understanding of world, an understanding that does not require it to have sceptically analysed and interpreted everything out beforehand (in order to be 'right' or 'correct'), as a necessary precursor to action, thus:

*'Dasein understands itself pre-theoretically in its being, and thereby not only discloses possibilities of its own being but also of the being of beings in general... It is out of this usually unquestioned pre-theoretical understanding of being that we first come to know ourselves as well as other beings. The understanding of being that belongs to Dasein discloses at the same time Dasein's own possibilities of being, world, and beings that become accessible within the world.'*<sup>58</sup>

It is this usually unquestioned and pre-theoretical understanding that Dasein is immersed in, in its fluent and competent engagement with its daily practices, its projects and plans, its environments and its contact with other Dasein. The world discloses itself to Dasein (and therefore Dasein is disclosed to itself) by this 'thrown' immersement:

*'When, for example, we walk along the edge of the field but 'outside it', the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a person, and decently kept up by him; the book we have used was bought at So-and-So's shop and given by such-and-such a person, and so forth. The boat anchored at the shore is assigned in its being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it; but even if it is a 'boat which is strange to us', it is still indicative of Others. The Others who are thus 'encountered' in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment, are not somehow added on in thought to some Thing which is approximately just present-at-hand.'*<sup>59</sup>

The Others, the other people, the other humans, appear in Dasein's world (where things are either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand). But, as these Others have the same essence of Dasein, they cannot therefore themselves be encountered, in their essence, as things either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. In encountering others Dasein encounters itself for, as Heidegger indicates, 'Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution':



*'By "Others" we do not mean everyone else but me, those over whom the "I" stands out. They are rather those from who, for the most part, one does **not** distinguish oneself, those among one is too. This being there too with them, does not have the ontological character of a being present-at-hand along "with" them within a world.'*<sup>60</sup>

At this point, it would be easy to slip into considering the 'site' of Dasein's encountering with others (along with its things and artefacts), as an extended space within which events occur. This again, would be to strip out the notions of 'mineness' and 'care' and 'concern' from the essence of Dasein. Even though Dasein 'finds itself in what it does, uses, expects, avoids'<sup>61</sup> it does not do so within an empty space, within a sort of spatial *tabula rasa*. To regard Dasein, in its essence, as an entity that can be defined by its specific locality, would be set it over and against the world. It would be to assert that Dasein 'speaks out from' a unique *locus* from which it receives and addresses 'whatever'. The 'site' of Dasein's being is not a simple physical location but is more a mode of absorption whereby Dasein, through the multifarious elements of its 'care' and 'concern', exists. The notions of 'mineness', 'care' and 'concern', cannot, for Heidegger, be stripped out of the essence of Dasein for they characterise Dasein's being-in-the-world. Neither 'mineness' nor 'care' nor 'concern', are essentially spatial, they are, it may be argued, otherwise:

*'The spatiality that is proper to Dasein, whether understood in terms of the particular spatiality proper to Dasein or in terms of the apparently spatial character of Dasein's being as such — a spatiality which, in either sense, is distinct from the spatiality associated with merely occurrent entities — is **actually to be understood as fundamentally temporal.**'* [My emboldening].<sup>62</sup>

### **Dasein: and the matter of "being-with":**

As indicated above, the Others, the other people, the other humans, appear in Dasein's world (where things are either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand). But, as these Others have the same essence of Dasein, they cannot therefore themselves be encountered, in their essence, as things either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. In encountering others Dasein encounters itself, for as indicated earlier, 'Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution'. On the basis of this, I am reminded of the subject group who provided the initial impetus for this research project. I am not, as a matter of fact, linked to them as a disinterested, disengaged and indifferent observer. But even if I were, there would be a powerful sense in which I as Dasein, could never 'get out of' 'being-with' them in the world.

Even the most distanced and 'objective' methodology, *apropos* the examination and analysis of Others, would not allow me an escape-hatch from the essential 'being-with' that I, as Dasein, has with Them. This latter 'being-with' is not a 'positive' matter of 'solicitude', nor any kindly attitude struck up by individual Dasein, in its comportment towards Others:

*'Even if Others become themes for study, as it were, in their own Dasein, they are not encountered as person - Things present-at-hand: we meet them 'at work', that is, primarily in their Being-in-the-world. Even if we see the Other 'just standing around', he is never apprehended as a human-Thing-present-at-hand, but his 'standing-around' is an existential mode of being... The Other is encountered in his Dasein-with in the world.'* [My emboldening] <sup>63</sup>

It is my argument, that the notion of 'being-with' is not to be conflated with the banality of such a *reductio* as, 'humans are social beings', but retains the potent sense of connectedness inherent in the statement 'even in our being 'among them ' they are *there with us*'.<sup>64</sup> 'Being-with' is therefore not a cool observation along the lines of, 'human beings are naturally gregarious', nor is it a positive act of solicitude struck by Dasein in its comportment towards Others, but it is something that Dasein 'has' even in the midst of being surrounded by many, and also when Dasein is completely alone:

*'Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factually no other is present-at-hand or perceived.'* <sup>65</sup>

So even when others are not present to Dasein, when they are in fact 'absent', Dasein is always 'with' them, (as 'being-with'), as an existential characteristic of its mode of being. One consequence of this 'being-with', Heidegger argues, is that Dasein (in its very essence), is inescapably connected with Others, which neither their presence adds to, nor their absence derogates from:

*'Being with Others belongs to the being of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein in its very being. Thus as being-with, Dasein "is" is essentially for the sake of others.'* [My emboldening] <sup>66</sup>

This essential "or the sake of others" is not dependent upon the 'content' or the 'quality' of any relationship positively struck up by Dasein. This, "for the sake of others" does not indicate what might constitute a 'good' relationship, rather that when a relationship is good, bad or indifferent it still 'is [inescapably] in the way of 'being-with'.<sup>67</sup>

### Dasein: another consequence of "being-with":

Another consequence of 'being-with' is the implication that Dasein already knows about the Other. This 'knowing' is not an epistemological phenomenon involving observation, intuition, research, personal acquaintanceship or the gathering of hard evidence, but arises from Dasein's **already** having an understanding of itself, **already** having an ability to self-interpret and **already** having these as being with others within the world. This already knowing of the other finds its foundation in the essential mode of what it is to be Dasein, and not simply in what one knows 'about'. Upon this knowing and upon this being-with the other, all other forms of social solicitude rest. Heidegger makes the point that vital personal relationships are founded upon self-knowledge, but that:

*'solicitude dwells proximally and for the most part in the deficient or at least in the indifferent modes (in the indifference of passing one another by), a kind of knowing oneself which is essential and closest, demands that one becomes acquainted with oneself. And when indeed, one's knowing oneself gets lost in such ways as*

- aloofness,
- hiding oneself away,
- or putting on a disguise,

*being-with one another must follow special routes of its own in order to come close to Others, or even to "see through them"'.<sup>68</sup>*

Not only must Dasein's ability to understand itself (and to self-interpret), come to the fore but the fruits of these must be manifest to the other and not hidden away:

*'It is indisputable that a lively mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of being-with, often depends upon how far one's own Dasein has understood itself at the time; but this means that it depends only upon how far one's essential Being with Others has made itself transparent and has not disguised itself.'<sup>69</sup>*

The 'being-with' is that out of which 'a lively mutual acquaintanceship' is possible. It is Heidegger's view that 'even the explicit disclosure of the Other in solicitude grows only out of one's primarily Being with him in each case.'<sup>70</sup> It is this 'primarily Being with' which is foundational for all solicitous engagement by Dasein. Nevertheless that solicitous engagement is not to be sought as the underpinning evidence of Dasein's 'being-with'. If therefore, this latter course **is** taken, and solicitous engagement as 'the phenomenon which proximally comes to view'<sup>71</sup> is taken as that which 'constitutes Being towards Others and makes it possible at all'<sup>72</sup> then:

*'This phenomenon, which is none too happily designated as 'empathy', is then supposed, as it were, to provide the first ontological bridge from one's own subject, which is given as proximally as alone, to the other subject, which is proximally quite closed off.'<sup>73</sup>*

Inevitably, the vitality of personal relationships is seen as foundering upon a paucity of this self-understanding, in that Dasein does not (in its run-of-the-mill way of being) disport itself in such a positively solicitous manner, that it brings itself habitually 'close' to Others.

Rogers,<sup>74</sup> in outlining the therapeutic relationship within the person-centred approach to counselling, alludes to one of the three necessary conditions that promote a 'growth promoting climate':

*"the third facilitative aspect of the relationship is empathic understanding. This means that the therapist senses accurately the feelings and personal meanings that the client is experiencing and communicates this acceptant understanding to the client. When functioning best, the therapist is so much inside the private world of the other that he or she can clarify not only the meanings of which the client is aware but even those just below the level of awareness. Listening, of this very special, active kind, is one of the most potent forces for change that I know."*<sup>75</sup>

What Rogers does not make explicit here, is the asymmetrical relationship between the client and therapist and the purposes inherent in the client's being present in that relationship.

Although empathic understanding, as outlined by Rogers, connects with Heidegger's conditions for a "lively mutual acquaintanceship" namely the necessity to be 'transparent', and the necessity to eschew 'disguise', it does not emphasise that "'empathy"... gets its motivation from the unsociability of the dominant modes of being-with"<sup>76</sup> **nor does it recognise that 'empathic understanding' is not itself foundational of solicitous being with the other.**

### **Dasein as the One**

#### **Dasein: and the highly-generalised Others:**

Dasein "is" is essentially **for the sake of Others'**. Who are these 'Others'? Where do they live? What effect do they have? Should I take any notice of them? What connection, if at all, do I have with them? Are they that important? It is Heidegger's position that the Others are not necessarily individual personages who might possess personal signification within Dasein's life-world. For him, these Others might more closely resemble those to whom the designation falls as, 'one' or 'one's'. So the comments, 'one does not do that sort of thing' or 'one is not in a position to help at the moment' encapsulate, to a degree, the essence of Heidegger's 'Others'. There is something highly generalised about these 'Others', so generalised, in fact, that the category of 'one' or 'ones' could be expanded to also include those

of the first person plural, the second person plural and the third person plural. In each instance, the definiteness by which I make a statement, using these terms, (instead of 'I'), recedes into a foggy and homogenised otherness. But this omission of 'I' is not, in itself, a merely technical matter. Even when this is not excluded, even when I say 'I do not do that sort of thing' or 'I am not in a position to help at the moment', my statement can **still** be of the nature of, 'one says', 'we believe', 'they assert'. In each of these cases, individual Dasein as sole asserter wanes, with the consequence that the statement's origin shifts to another source. This other source (not easily identifiable), emanates from so large a background that it can never be precisely 'pinned down'.

Out of this background, individual Dasein draws down an authority that underpins whatever is asserted. As this authority is of 'no one in particular' and of 'everyone', and of 'all' and of 'they', no one can ever become exactly accountable. Heidegger uses the term *das Man* to designate these Others, this 'no one in particular', this 'everyone', this 'all' and this 'they' as they occur in this particular mode. In German, *Man* stands for 'one' and *das* for the definite article, so the expression comes to have the myriad meanings of, 'The One', 'The They', 'The Everyone' or 'The No one', (although *das Man* literally translates as 'The One').

So, 'everyone believes', 'we understand', 'one would always...', 'they have said', 'no one would ever ...', 'you are not going to believe this', are all statements attributable to and 'symptomatic' of, *das Man*.

But, it should be made clear that the use of these statements, within this section, has been a preliminary means of explication in unfolding the nature of *das Man* and that *das Man's* nature is **not** confined to the simple uttering of these statements, as such. The centrality and significance of these Others for Dasein, is captured by Heidegger in the statement:

*'Dasein's everyday possibilities of being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them. [My emboldening].'*<sup>77</sup>

The manner and the degree to which the Others achieve centrality and indefiniteness is of an almost entirely covert nature *apropos* Dasein's awareness. Because Dasein is essentially always in the mode of being-with (the Others) and, in one way or another identifies these mostly as 'other', this habitual action of separating itself from them, conceals Dasein's

essential connectedness with them (by that designation alone). The Others are never 'not here', for Dasein. They do not disappear, and Dasein's connectedness with them (mostly below the level of awareness), remains of issue. But this process of separation, by which Dasein distances itself from other Dasein:

*'Cover[s] up the fact of ones belonging to them essentially oneself.'*<sup>78</sup>

and is intended to smooth over this essentiality. This process of covering up does not have within it any sense of singularity, nor any sense of individuated Dasein being contained within the designation 'The Others'. The consequence is that:

*'The 'who' is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the 'they' [das Man].'*<sup>79</sup>

#### **Section 2.4: Dasein as Absorbed:**

In the explication of what it is to be human-being, so far, it has been argued that human-being is never an object but always I myself as 'who' and never a 'what' who is able to make choices as I face my possibilities. In addition, there has been reluctance (one that will continue) to talk about 'a human being' or 'the human being' but always '**human-being**' in acknowledgement of my essential openness to existence, but never as 'a' thing or 'the' thing to be pointed at as the '**that**' or the '**what**'.

In facing my possibilities I am always facing towards the future. Ways of understanding that can be applied to objects within the world cannot be applied to human-being, for it is always 'I' who is being understood. Within that understanding must always be included the multifarious ways in which I care about and for myself, how I communicate with others, how they communicate with me, how I am conformed to the world, and the manner of my engagements. In all that, I am never simply an ego already established and looking out from behind my eyes onto a strange and alien world but I am already outside with other human-being and I'm there as I myself.

When I meet with others and speak with them and they speak to me, they are never simply animated flesh or simply other versions of 'things' that I encounter in the world. The others are like myself and, being like myself, have an enormous influence upon me and upon whom



I may become. In the ordinary course of events, I allow myself to be influenced to a greater extent by the others' influence upon me (and I contribute likewise to that others' conformation by my influence also) and I find this very easy and very satisfying.

The questions now arise: What exactly is the nature of this conformation? What is its structure? How does it work? What are the consequences? What are the alternatives to that conformation (if any)? The purpose is to further explicate what it is to be human-being with reference to the **public** manner in which **that** human-being is lived out and also in the light of whether **that** human 'living out' is to be either authentic or inauthentic. In addition, it is intended to unfold a mode of personal transformation that human-being finds itself habitually immersed in and to unfold the manner in which human-being interprets itself, based upon that mode. By extension, it is also intended to indicate the various ways in which human-being becomes limited in its mode of personal transformation, particularly by the manner in which it allows itself to become habitually immersed within its 'preferred' mode of transformation.

Additionally, a further purpose will be to continue and extend the use of Heidegger's own terms, in German, not with the intention of creating obfuscation and mystification, but rather to pin down and to make manifest, the uniqueness and specificity of the terminology and concepts being relied upon within this argument. Attention will now be directed in attempting to address many of the questions posited above, with particular and focused reference to Heidegger's notion of 'das Man'.

\*

Remembering that Heidegger wrote "*Being And Time*" in 1927, when mass society as a phenomenon had not developed to such a contemporary degree, either in its size or in its structures, his following comments now have added import:

*'In utilising public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the rest. This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. **In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded.** [My emboldening].<sup>80</sup>*

The two examples that Heidegger uses, the public means of transport and the newspaper, (which in its very purpose is an entirely **public document**), point towards a communal exposure within which Dasein vanishes by absorption into the 'publicness' of *das Man*. But

this condition of disappearing is not experienced as a personal dissolution nor as a diminishment by individual Dasein. The very manner in which *das Man* maintains its inconspicuousness and unascertainability arises by Dasein's speaking, acting, understanding and interpreting itself out of this communal averageness, with the result that Dasein is actually pushed to the foreground through its citation of *das Man*'s authority. While Dasein is being pushed to the fore in this manner, *das Man* recedes into the background, and by this recession, *das Man* gains its true potency and influence:

*'We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as **they** take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as **they** see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the "great mass" as **they** shrink back; we find "shocking" what **they** find shocking.'*<sup>81</sup>

Heidegger argues that Dasein takes pleasure, enjoys, reads, sees, judges, shrinks back and finds shocking, all that *das Man* finds so, because of the sense of **difference**, the sense of asymmetry that Dasein experiences between itself and *das Man*. Dasein cares about this difference. It is a matter of concern:

*'there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that difference is merely one that is to be evened out, whether one's own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and wants to catch up in relationship to them, or whether one's own Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed. The care about this distance between them is disturbing to Being-with-one-another. **The more inconspicuous this kind of being is to every day Dasein itself, the more stubbornly and primordially does it work itself out.**'*<sup>82</sup> [My emboldening].

The care about this difference is not simply a matter of Dasein's undertaking to make adjustments, to 'even out' or to 'catch up'. It may also include amplifying and exaggerating a current and familiar difference in order to maintain a *status quo*. In either situation, Dasein subsumes itself within the suzerainty of *das Man* out of the care it has of this difference. This care about difference is not simply a personal anxiety that individual Dasein might have, as in the nature of an ongoing personal worry or concern, but is a care conditioned by and conformed to the everydayness of *das Man*:

*'In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well-known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. **This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the "levelling down" of all possibilities of being.**'*<sup>83</sup> [My emboldening].

### **Dasein: as conformed by “The One”:**

Earlier, it was said that, 'the multifarious ways in which Dasein engages in encounters, reflect the variety and richness of being-in-the-world. Dasein's products, creations, artefacts, constructions and equipment stand in a state of readiness to be used. These are intrinsically useful and occur within an environment of significance, a 'context' where they have meaning'. But this context of meaning is **also** the ordinary world of Dasein's being-with- [the] Others. The world is that which is 'given' and into which Dasein is 'thrown'. It is never free-floating or neutral but always highly specific in its historicity. Within this historical 'location', Dasein develops its understanding, an understanding not predicated upon self-conscious reflective practice, but by a birthright commonality, mostly hidden and nearly always assumed. The Dasein is, and lives out of this Being-in-the-world, not as an isolated discrete ego, (detached and for ever sceptically alienated), but as embodied in, inseparable from and constantly co-creating of its universe of commonality. Dasein never opts to be in its world, it is there, in a sense, by *force majeure* and not by choice. As such, the 'givenness' of the world unfolds as a conformation which Dasein itself constantly amends as co-creator.

The world of *das man* is that of brutish intelligibility, an intelligibility to which Dasein is conformed. Brutish through its insensitivity to individual differences. Brutish in its resistance to anything profound. Brutish in its guarantee of being 'always right'. Brutish in its attachment to the familiar. Brutish in its possession of all fore-knowledge. Brutish in its judgments of true and false. Brutish in its undermining of individual effort. Brutish in its denial of the private. Brutish in its exercise of control. Brutish in its refusal of accountability:

*'Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein gets interpreted, and it is always right...it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets to the 'heart of the matter'. By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone.'*<sup>84</sup>

### **Dasein: authentic and inauthentic:**

At the beginning of this chapter it was argued that 'mineness' has much to do with **who** Dasein is, in that, it connects futurally with who Dasein may become. 'Mineness', because it lies in Dasein's 'ability' to be, and therefore in who Dasein is, is never a static reified category

but a condition of Dasein's 'exercising' its own possibilities to become. For Heidegger, the coming to fruition of Dasein's possibilities, being grounded not upon **what** I am, but upon **who** I am in my 'mineness', emerges out of the choices that Dasein makes. In the exercise of those choices Dasein takes account of all that it is, in relation to and in relation with the 'world'. In taking account of all that it is, Dasein through its inescapable immersion in and with the world, 'allows' its openness to its own possibilities, its openness to self-interpret, to be formed by *das Man*. By this ordinary process, Dasein becomes either more or less open to its own possibilities and it is **in** this 'more' or 'less' that Dasein is **either** authentic or inauthentic. But this 'in' of the 'more' or 'less' is not a special kind of being in, but is the 'ordinary' being in, of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. The obscure and oblivious characteristics of *das Man* always allow it to veil itself so that it is never 'there' as an accountable entity. If put to the challenge it has already absconded, leaving behind what has already been decided and what is readily 'familiar and accessible to everyone', so for Heidegger:

*'It can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. It 'was' always the 'they' who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been 'no one'. In Dasein's everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that 'it was no one'... **Everyone is the other, and no one is himself.**'<sup>85</sup> [My emboldening.].*

In this condition of 'everyone is the other and no one is himself', Dasein is sustained and supported in inauthenticity. Everywhere that Dasein turns, there is validation and acceptance of this. Whatever is exceptional, innovative, congruent, guileless and sincere, becomes offered up to *das Man* to have the challenging and the fearful, stripped out of it. Is the ordinary condition of Dasein therefore, to be inauthentic? From a Heideggarian perspective the answer must be, 'yes'.

*'Authenticity and inauthenticity are both modifications of the "indifference" of mundane life... Understanding authenticity as a genuine possibility requires that we conceive it in negative rather than positive terms. Resoluteness is not a stable, self-sufficient mode of existence, but a perpetual struggle against the reifying and banalizing forces inherent in discursive practice. Authentic existence is thus constituted by the very forces against which it has to push in its effort to grasp itself in facticity. Being resolute is like swimming against the current: there would be no such thing absent the forces resisting it. At the same time, there is only so far you can swim upstream before you run out of river. Similarly, authenticity is nothing over and beyond our ongoing resistance to the banalizing, leveling pressures that pull us away from any explicit recognition of the "mineness" at the centre of our existence.'*<sup>86</sup>

But, inauthenticity, from Heidegger's viewpoint, is the 'default' condition that Dasein has by its being with the Others in the world. But this being with Others is not akin to being with Others like oneself, or simply being with other people, other humans. Being with others in the world of *das Man* is, from a Heideggarian perspective, **already** weighted on the side of

inauthenticity and is not a 'neutral' fulcrum of indifference. Earlier, it was said that, notions of understanding that can be applied to Dasein's being-in-the-world, must always include care, concern, relationship, engagement and language. So special notions of understanding around Dasein (which Heidegger calls *existentiales*) must be applied, notions that must never be conflated with **categories** of understanding that apply to beings that are not Dasein. *Das Man* is not a category of Dasein's being, a 'something' that Dasein may or may not possess, may or may not choose to have. Neither is it a something 'out there' as simply alongside Dasein as an exceptional or optional accompaniment:

*'The 'they' is an existentielle and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution... The self of everyday Dasein is the 'they self' which we distinguish from the authentic self... As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the 'they', and must first find itself.'*<sup>87</sup>

Through this dispersal of Dasein into *das Man*, Dasein conflates itself with the 'averageness', 'levelling down' and 'publicness' of *das Man*. This conflation, which is ever present and unremitting, becomes the accustomed and habitual way of being. So, as Heidegger argues, Dasein, having submitted to *das Man* understands itself and interprets itself 'through the eyes of' (so to speak) *das Man* and:

*'The 'they' itself articulates the referential context of significance.'*<sup>88</sup>

This context of significance is Dasein's Being-in-the-world and being in the world with Others. Earlier it was asserted that, 'the more inconspicuous this kind of being is to every day Dasein itself, the more stubbornly and primordially does it work itself out'. It must be emphasised that this inauthentic mode of being is **mostly hidden** from Dasein and is so close and 'familiar' that it passes for the mundane and real. Dasein accepts this reality as the 'given' of its existence, and any step away from this is always an exceptional (and possibly 'unnecessary'), adventure into unknown territory:

*'Dasein is... determined in its possibilities by the beings to which it relates as to intraworldly beings. The Dasein understands itself first by way of these beings: it is at first unveiled to itself in its inauthentic selfhood... What is more, inauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of factual Dasein. Authenticity is only a modification but not a total of obliteration of inauthenticity... Dasein's everyday self understanding maintains itself in inauthenticity and in fact in such a way that the Dasein thereby knows about itself without explicit reflection in the sense of an inner perception bent back on itself but in the manner of finding itself in things.'*<sup>89</sup>



But is this exceptional and possibly 'unnecessary' adventure into unknown territory, a step into authenticity, a step into an authentic way of being in the world? The answer from a Heideggarian perspective must be, 'yes'. *Das Man*, as 'the referential context of significance', by already prescribing what may or may not arise, prevents the world from disclosing itself as it 'really' is. Everything has already been decided on beforehand and nothing is exceptional. Even that which is brought forward as extraordinary or remarkable is considered as already having been (and therefore as already having been understood), through an allocation to a 'previous', a 'prior-to' and an 'earlier-than'. The world, as already decided upon, is therefore presented (or re-presented) to Dasein in such a manner that Dasein is relieved of seeing things as they are. In this turning towards a world already prepared as painless and anodyne, *das Man* becomes Dasein's 'usual' mode of being in the world. There is a need to understand this in the light of Heidegger's position on Dasein's everyday and ordinary way of Being-in-the-world:

*'the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less'. Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterised by inauthenticity – when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment.'*<sup>90</sup>

Likewise, when he moves to discuss the language, the ordinary discourse of Dasein in its everyday way of being, Heidegger prefaces his comments by stating:

*'The expression 'idle talk ["Gerede"]'<sup>91</sup> is not to be used here in a 'disparaging' signification.'*<sup>92</sup>

'Discourse... constitutes the bridge between the anonymous social normativity of *das Man* and the concrete interpretive practices of individual human agents.'<sup>93</sup> Every time that Dasein opens its mouth to speak, and every time it opens its ears to hear, Dasein crosses that bridge. It is an unavoidable journey.

### **Dasein: and the groundless discourse:**

As has been argued up to now, Dasein finds itself in a world 'already interpreted'. Dasein does not have to remake its own Being-in-the-world *ab initio*, but as an entity thrown into a particular place, a particular time, a particular language and born to a particular woman in a particular group, it 'finds its own interpretations conditioned by and permanently indebted to the anonymous social normativity governing intelligibility at large, a normativity that



Heidegger calls *das Man*'.<sup>94</sup> If discourse is the bridge between Dasein and *das Man*, then that discourse will possess many features of *das Man* itself, features already outlined in the previous two sections. As Heidegger makes clear, 'discourse is expressed by being spoken out, and has always been so expressed; it is language.'<sup>95</sup> It is through language that Dasein comes to an understanding of world and to an understanding of self. It is through language that Dasein self-interprets. Heidegger indicates that *das Man*, through its anonymous, average, familiar, ever present, everyday hidden mode of being, is an essentially groundless basis for discourse to rest upon.

So, what are the characteristics of *das Man*'s groundless discourse, its 'Idle Talk', its 'Gerede'? Idle talk (*Gerede*) has its own distinctive hermeneutic in that it cycles and recycles, not in the sense of refreshing its interpretive basis, but in **dissipating** itself within a generality that resembles 'gossiping and passing the word along'.<sup>96</sup> It would be virtually impossible to trace this 'idle talk' back to an authoritative and original source as there is no singularity in its origin. It is what it is essentially, 'a passing the word along, in an accumulative manner by many. Although its groundlessness is hidden, it itself is not. 'Idle Talk' is a discourse that does not take accountability for its own authoritative basis. By its very nature it always turns away, always evades being held to justify the basis of its assertions. For Heidegger, it is a discourse that is always 'out there' in the public realm of the world:

*'The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its becoming public; instead it encourages this. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own. If this were done, idle talk would founder; and it already guards against such a danger. Idle talk is something which anyone can rake up; it not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer.'*<sup>97</sup>

This release from genuine understanding cuts Dasein off from the radical origins of discourse, in that everything becomes undifferentiatedly intelligible. This is the discourse of, 'The They', 'The One', 'The Anyone'. Nevertheless, this discourse is the ordinary mode by which and through which Dasein finds expression and in which it communicates. Discourse, as language, is essentially formative. Dasein **already** finds itself 'thrown' onto it as a bridge it cannot avoid crossing:

*'In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all rediscovering and appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted'.<sup>98</sup>*

Is Dasein therefore a passive, unregarding dupe, totally subsumed within the discourse of *das Man*? There is a definite strained relationship between Dasein's actual specific and unique singularity, on the one hand, and its usual mode of utterance as discourse, on the other. It speaks in the language of *das Man* and as such surrenders its own singularity. Such surrendering is inherently disturbing in that it undermines Dasein's ability to be. It is from this strained relationship that Dasein steps in and out of inauthenticity:

*'Interpretation has no choice but to accommodate and exploit the prevailing criteria of intelligibility, which means at least to some extent trading the irreducible particularity of one's own factual situation for generally adequate, but always more or less loosely fitting means of expressing and communicating it. The effort to make oneself intelligible in discourse therefore tends to drift into ever shallower waters, eventually bottoming out in sheer banality and cliché'.<sup>99</sup>*

Nevertheless, this mode of utterance as 'the prevailing criteri[on] of intelligibility', is not only entirely dominant but also inherently **ambiguous** (as the difference between what is genuine and what is not, is neither clear nor settled). 'Idle Talk', Heidegger argues, thrives on this ambiguity, in that 'no one' in particular has said this or that (but 'everyone' agrees that it is such-and-such). This general commonality of agreement therefore becomes the authoritative basis of utterance, and by this ambiguity, Dasein's own ability to exercise choice is hidden from it. This 'trading the irreducible particularity of one's own factual situation' is enacted within a temporal relationship, whereby *das Man* is always ahead of individual Dasein (in that everything has **already** been decided by *das Man* and everyone is in agreement). It is this '**already**' that guarantees that *das Man* will always be 'speeded up' *apropos* Dasein and that Dasein will always appear as a 'slowed down' Johnny-come-lately.

### **Dasein: as 'Johnny-come-lately':**

In abandoning its own possible tempo, Dasein in its attempt to catch up 'seeks what is far away simply in order to bring it close to itself in the way it looks'.<sup>100</sup> This predominance of 'the way it looks' precludes a meditative regard for the thing itself, in favour of a bringing close in the shortest possible time. It's as if the wholeness of anything can now be understood within the grasping purview of a single glance in that 'just casting an eye over it', guarantees a quick turnover of things to be regarded. In letting itself adopt *das Man*'s tempo (and in

having its own ability to exercise choice hidden from it) Dasein, according to Heidegger, 'does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters'.<sup>101</sup> In the face of novelty, change and excitement, this 'tarrying observantly' is disregarded as an inefficient and time-wasting way to understanding, as all is now accomplished by a brisk, 'just looking at it'. Nevertheless, the continual presentation and re-presentation of things in quick succession keeps Dasein in a state of what Heidegger describes, as 'distraction'. The achieving of distraction by 'the way it looks' eventually becomes not only an end in itself, but the 'usual' way to interpretation.

Earlier it was said that, 'the effort to make oneself intelligible in discourse... tends to drift into ever shallower waters, eventually bottoming out in sheer banality and cliché.' It is within banality and cliché that general agreement can be asserted about what should be the case regarding such-and-such:

*'Ambiguity has already taken care that interest in what has been realised will promptly die away. Indeed this interest persists, in a kind of curiosity and idle talk, only so long as there is a possibility of a non-committal just-surmising with-someone-else... When confronted with a carrying through of what 'they' have surmised together, idle talk readily establishes that 'they' 'could have done that too' – for 'they' have indeed surmised together. In the end, idle talk is even indignant that what it has summarised and constantly demanded now **actually** happens. In that case, indeed, the opportunity to keep on surmising has been snatched away.'*<sup>102</sup>

The subject matter of *das Man's* discourse is premised upon the non-fulfilment of its 'projects', for if ever an **actual** project turns into a concrete action, then the **generality** of agreement (which is the source of *das Man's* potency) becomes fundamentally undermined. Any concretion into final action is deemed as 'of little contemporary interest', and thoroughly *passé*. Why is this? Simply, that whatever has come into being, as a novel and vital event, had **already** been 'predicted' well beforehand and is now **already** well back into the past as settled 'common knowledge'. *Das Man* has long ago moved on, leaving the poor isolated concretion as a foolish monument to individual enterprise. The actual fulfilment of its 'projects' has the potential to expose and to close off the open-ended nature of its discourse. Nevertheless, *das Man* always and forever talks about potentialities, projects, possibilities and actions with the full understanding that it will rarely allow itself to be anchored by such. Anchoring has the potential to make it accountable and is to be avoided at all costs.

The very public nature of its discourse allows it to conflate its 'publicness' with notions of being 'open', 'available', 'current' and 'in the know'. By this means it covers over its intense interest in the possibilities of individual Dasein. These possibilities, because they are primordial, individual and always 'mine', cannot be generalised into common agreement and cannot therefore be rendered down to ambiguous speculation.

#### **2.4.8: Dasein: and its tendency to "fallenness":**

Perhaps at this point it is important to emphasise that for Heidegger the idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity of *das Man* are not something 'independent from', in 'addition to' or 'outside of' Dasein but are actually embedded in Dasein's being-in-the-world namely, '...we exist only and through our relation to the world, we, as human-beings, are nothing independent from, and in addition to, our being-in-the-world'.<sup>103</sup> All that Dasein is, within the totality of its existence, according to Heidegger, is embedded in world. There is no other possibility, within its horizon of existence, except to be in the world as being-in-the-world as 'thrown' into existence:

*'Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity characterise the way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its "there"'.<sup>104</sup>*

Significant and identifying words in the literature that refer to Dasein's 'submission' to *das Man* are, 'lostness':

*'Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue. Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from the "they". This means that in anticipation any Dasein can have wrenched itself away from the "they" already. But when one understands that this is something which Dasein "can" have done, this only reveals its factual lostness in the everydayness of the they-self.'<sup>105</sup>*

'abandoned':

*'...to the extent that..Being towards its potentiality-for-Being is itself characterised by freedom, Dasein can comport itself towards it possibilities, even unwillingly; it can be inauthentically; and factually it is inauthentically, proximally and for the most part. The authentic "for-the-sake-of-which" has not been taken hold of; the projection of one's own potentiality-for-Being has been abandoned to the disposal of the "they".<sup>106</sup>*

'falling' and 'absorption':

*'Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity, characterise the way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its 'there'... in these, and in the way they are interconnected in their Being, there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the 'falling' of Dasein... This "absorption in" has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the "they".'*<sup>107</sup>

denoting a basic tendency of Dasein to develop amnesia about its own vital freedom and being. By thus surrendering itself, Dasein mirrors the very entropy of life itself viz: to decline and come to an end. This mirroring indicates that Dasein's basic tendency to 'submit' is not to be regarded as a consciously adopted posture, nor an optional choice nor a fleeting attitude, but as something much more fundamental:

*'... life tends to understand and interpret itself on the basis of its own fallen state, that is, on the basis of its own practical, concerned absorption in the world. This is a natural tendency, and an alienating one, in so far as it drives life to avoid itself, that is, to pass by its other, more genuine possibilities. At the same time, however, this tendency is reassuring and tranquilising: it allows Dasein to carry on with its life without further questioning or complication.'*<sup>108</sup>

Heidegger's term for Dasein's absorption into the public world of *das Man* is 'fallenness' and 'falling'. In one sense these terms chime very readily with (and appear synonymous with), notions of Original Sin and the necessity for Redemption. But Heidegger makes very clear, at the beginning of his analysis that:

*'This term does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the 'world' of its concern.'*<sup>109</sup>

Nevertheless, through idle talk and all its cognates, through an ambiguous understanding based on a 'just glancing', and through Dasein's conflation of its own possibilities with that of the generality of *das Man*, Dasein finds itself on the way to inauthenticity.

### **Dasein: and the potential of its possibilities:**

Dasein's being inauthentic in no way takes Dasein out of the world. In fact, the everyday world of being inauthentic is, on Heidegger's argument, Dasein's commonsense average and entirely pragmatic way of being. By this undramatic and mundane means, the immediacy of inauthenticity is thereby covered up. But the context within which Dasein 'allows' itself to become absorbed, is the inalienable presence of its own potentiality to be authentically itself. This potentiality never vanishes, as it is a primordial existentials of Dasein's very being. The irreducible continuance of this potentiality 'guarantees' that Dasein is never totally subsumed within the blandishments of *das Man*. Dasein is therefore always open to authentic change

and transformation through the potentiality of a dynamic *metanoia* inherent in its very being-in-the-world.

**It is this potentiality that approaches the heart of the research question. Authentic Personal Transformation is not conceived as a superior way of being but rather as a potentiality and a modification of inauthenticity.**

In order to understand those Others who are struggling with the ravages of inauthenticity (who are 'lost' in the 'they'), who are trammelled by the dominance of the technological paradigm, (see Chapter Four for a fuller explication of this term) the Dasein who wishes to concernfully engage with these Others in their 'deficient' mode of being, must itself know the **difference** between authenticity and inauthenticity. This 'knowing the difference' is never purely an epistemological item of theoretical concern but is itself an **experience** of responding to its own authentic potentiality. The way to this authentic potentiality is strewn with cul-de-sacs, temptations, anxieties, morbid fears and the ever present and ready to hand alternative of *das Man's* comforting and tranquilising presence.

The contribution of the ten women and one man who formed the impetus for this research is one that outlines their often difficult personal journeys to this experience of difference. The purpose, therefore, of personal development exercises and personal development structures, within the training programme of becoming a counsellor, is premised upon creating a state of readiness for authentic transformation within individual Dasein, but not through a crude voluntarism, wilfulness or targeted outcomes. This developing a state of readiness for authentic transformation is not reliant upon the mere presence of 'structured' activity, but is based more upon 'the "climate" of any course'.<sup>110</sup> As Hazel Johns (1996) says it is in that "climate" that:

*'the success or failure of training, the promotion of trust, the opportunities for communicating and extending empathy, acceptance and genuineness and the possibility of a mutuality of involvement of all members of the course community.'*<sup>111</sup>

It is only within such a "climate" that the possibility arises of genuinely:

*'Engaging in direct interaction and intimate exchange with peers, even if the eventual outcomes are trust, awareness and growth, may—indeed must—involve challenge, possibly conflict, uncomfortable feedback, at times distorted projects and, at worst, undermining negative attack.'*<sup>112</sup>



### Dasein: as tranquilised and consoled:

As the blandishments of *das Man* are always teasingly proffering themselves, Heidegger recognises that 'being in the world is itself *tempting*'<sup>113</sup> :

*'Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen everything, having understood everything, develop the supposition that Dasein's disclosedness, which is so available and so prevalent, can guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its being will be secure, genuine, and full. **Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the 'they', it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or the state-of-mind that goes with it.**'*<sup>114</sup> [my emboldening.]

The discourse of *das Man* is in its very nature, according to Heidegger, unaccountable. It never takes final responsibility for anything it says. Analogously, it is similar to the captain of a ship who sits permanently on its prow (as his vessel for ever and always crests a perpetually ongoing wave). He can never pull into port, for that would be to lose his place in the vanguard of whatever is still ongoing. To tarry alongside, in some little harbour, would not only create **distance** between himself (as the always ongoing one), but would also disclose him as an **anachronism**, as the one now **stopped** and removed in time from the cutting edge of the perpetually ongoing wave. The unaccountable certainty of the eternally 'modish', 'recent', 'up-to-date', 'contemporary', 'modern', 'fashionable' and 'of the moment' *das Man*, emanates from a groundless source in which there is no foil to hold it against. By the time that were to happen, things would have already 'moved on' to such a degree that the attempted contrast would be exposed as a now irrelevant anachronism.

Dasein in its day-to-day activity often mirrors the frenetic inauthentic transformations of *das Man*. Tranquillised, as it is, by the general consolations of *das Man*, Dasein eschews lying down and sleeping awhile, in favour of a 'must keep up with', in which a constant hurrying and bustle becomes equated with living the best kind of life. In the same way that the discourse of *das Man* is groundlessly open-ended and unending, so Dasein's hurrying and bustle is characterised by an ongoing curiosity which cannot be satisfied and which is never at rest. The more that Dasein engages in this freneticism, the more it is drawn into a state of 'fallenness'. The more frenetic this engagement becomes, the more convinced it is that it is leading a 'genuine' sort of life. As Heidegger says:

*'Versatile curiosity and restlessly 'knowing it all' masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. But at bottom it remains indefinite what is really to be understood, and the question has not even been asked. When Dasein, tranquillised and 'understanding' everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-being is hidden from it. Falling being-in-the-world is not only **tempting** and **tranquillising**; it is at the same time **alienating**.'*<sup>115</sup> [my emboldening.].

### **Dasein: re-emphasised as a unitary phenomenon:**

Earlier it was said that, 'in asserting the unity of Dasein as entity and the unity of Being-in-the-world as a phenomenon, Heidegger claims that, 'the person is... the unity of living through which is immediately experienced', and, 'the compound expression "being-in-the-world" indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a *unitary* phenomenon'. Why is it deemed important to emphasise this unity? The ordinary average way of, being-in-the-world precludes the world's disclosing itself as it 'really' is, by overlaying it with:

*'Anonymous public practice... Decided on the rules, standards, norms, etc., for the sake of which Dasein engages in its everyday activities.'*<sup>116</sup>

Within the anonymity of 'public' practice, Dasein finds a home in the ready availability of an interpretation of 'world'. This interpretation is always pre-given for Dasein, since it is the everyday anonymous 'background' occurrence within which Dasein discourses and within which it understands, consequently, 'A particular Dasein can get its "role" and even its moods only by being socialised into the "stock" available in its society'<sup>117</sup>:

*'The Self of everyday Dasein is the **they-self**, which we distinguish from the **authentic** self... As they-self, the particular Dasein has been **dispersed** into the "they", and must first find itself... Dasein is for the sake of the "they" in an everyday manner, and the "they" itself articulates the referential context of significance.'*<sup>118</sup>

It is within this pre-given 'referential context of significance' that Dasein finds its guiding articulation but:

*'This does not mean, however, that the roles, norms, etc., available to Dasein are fixed once and for all. New technological and social developments are constantly changing specific ways for Dasein to be. Nor does it mean that there is no room for an individual or political group to develop new possibilities, which could then become available in our society.'*<sup>119</sup>

Nevertheless, for Dasein:

*'...it does mean that such "creativity" always takes place on a background of what **one** does — of accepted-for-the-sake-of-which that cannot all be called into question at once because they are not*

*presuppositions and in any case must remain in the background to lend intelligibility to criticism and change.*'<sup>120</sup>

Therefore, Dasein is prevented from encountering the world (as world), in its complete entirety. Nevertheless, Dasein's being-in-the-world is not a composite, not a conglomerate of many elements that can be separated out into simpler parts. Neither is Dasein's engagement with the world a partial or optional 'response'. Dasein is always, as Heidegger asserts, the 'unity of living through which is immediately experienced' and its Being-in-the-world is always a 'unitary phenomenon'. In its turning away from its own possibilities, Dasein does not simply turn away from **some possibilities** (as if on the basis of preference and choice), but turns itself away in the **entirety** of itself. This total turning away is not a blind deflection into blank otherness, but is a positive turning towards an everyday 'absorption' and 'lostness' in *das Man*. For Heidegger, Dasein is always in a state of turning away from its own possibilities to be itself. As this turning is always characterised by a totality of 'response' by Dasein, that which it turns away from is also, in **itself** a complete totality.

#### **Dasein: and its everyday fascination with detail:**

If it is true that Dasein's being in the world is a unitary phenomenon then there must be no division, qua division, between the Dasein as absorbed in *das Man* and the Dasein in the fullness of its possibilities. If Dasein were to turn towards its own possibilities, then it would come face-to-face with who it is. It is this very 'who' that Dasein flees from, or as Heidegger puts it 'falls' away from:

*'Dasein's absorption in the 'they' and its absorption in the 'world' of its concern, make manifest something like a **fleeing** of Dasein in the face of itself — of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its Self ... But to bring itself face to face with itself, is precisely what Dasein does **not** do when it thus flees. It turns **away from** itself in accordance with its ownmost inertia of falling.'*<sup>121</sup>

If Dasein were therefore to be 'addressed' by 'who' it is, then whatever form that addressing took would be of such a nature that it could not 'grasp' the entire wholeness of that 'who', Dasein could not present its 'who' as a simple object of regard.<sup>122</sup> As indicated earlier, the context within which Dasein 'allows' itself to become absorbed in *das Man* is the inalienable presence of its own potentiality to be authentically itself. This potentiality never vanishes, as it is a primordial existentiale of Dasein's very being. The everyday facticity of *das Man*, the 'anonymous public practice', always splits up into clusters of 'content' and forms the very

stuff of Dasein's commonsense, practical and ongoing engagement with the world. As such this 'content' can always be dealt with on an 'item by item' basis and can absorb Dasein into the frenetic minutiae of its detail. Concerned with this detail, Dasein, in a mundane fashion may turn from one thing to another in the **certainty** that whatever it brings beneath its regard always has the potential to be grasped in an everyday fashion and therefore understood and dealt with in that way.

### **Dasein as Anxious:**

In the explication of what it is to be human-being, so far, it has been argued that Dasein, in its ordinary day-to-day existence, allows itself to be subsumed within a public way of being. This public way of being is formative for Dasein in that it levels down that which may be exceptional and is the primary mode of interpretation for Dasein and its ordinary way of being. The consequence is that Dasein develops a self that is mostly of this public way and in this public selfhood is mostly inauthentic. This public way of being is not an alternative mode for Dasein; it is unavoidable in that it actually belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. In this public way of being, Dasein comes to see things in an average sort of way and interprets its world mostly in the manner set down by this public way of being. As such, Dasein adopts not only the tempo of this way but also the mode of speaking, listening, choosing, thinking and understanding and in that adoption is mostly not itself and is therefore mostly inauthentic. This public way of being constantly undermines Dasein's ability to be genuinely itself in that Dasein comes to conflate its own possibilities with this public way with the consequence that Dasein's whole being consistently turns away from its own genuine possibility to be itself.

The questions now arise: Is it possible for Dasein to be extricated from this public way of being? If so, what occurs to make that happen? What happens to Dasein in the process of extrication? Is this extrication beneficial for Dasein? What is the structure of this extrication? What does Dasein learn as a result of this extrication? Is Dasein transformed? If so, can Dasein maintain itself in this state of transformation? Can Dasein ever be fully extricated? Is this public way of being a permanent factor for Dasein? The purpose is to further explicate the possibility of personal transformation for Dasein and the structures that might make that possible.

It is intended to explore the ways in which Dasein becomes addressed in its turning towards its genuine possibilities and the 'experiences' it undergoes in that turning towards being addressed. In addition, it is intended to unfold Dasein's relationship with its own death and the consequences that relationship might have upon Dasein's ability to become genuinely itself. By extension, it is also intended to explore the manner in which Dasein has the possibility to authentically become itself, the obstacles that Dasein finds standing in its way and the consequences for itself in its remaining untransformed and the consequences for itself in becoming personally transformed.

Attention will now be directed in attempting to address many of the questions posited above, with particular and focused reference to Heidegger's notions of 'das Man', 'Angst', 'death', 'being guilty', 'Dasein's transcendence', 'Entschlossenheit', 'einspringende Fursorge', 'vorspringende Fursorge', 'anticipation', 'uncanniness', 'Gerede', and 'conscience'.

\*

In Heidegger's analysis, there is an 'attunement', a 'mood' that can come upon Dasein, which lacks any 'content', any itemisation or any concretion that can be grasped and understood in this everyday fashion. This 'mood' can appear without warning and is characterised by a fearful apprehension that has no object. Dasein is fearful but knows not what it is fearful of:

*'Anxiety is indeed anxiety in the face of..., but not in the face of this or that thing. Anxiety in the face of... is always anxiety for..., but not for this or that. The indeterminateness of that in the face of which and for which we become anxious is no mere lack of determination but rather the essential impossibility of determining it. In a familiar phrase this indeterminateness comes to the fore.'*<sup>123</sup>

In the familiar world of *das Man*, Dasein is always fearful of something. This kind of anxiety has a precipitating object and a rationale to accompany it. Surrounded by familiar equipment and its accompanying contexts of significance, Dasein is always able to trace the lineage of this kind of anxiety back to its logical 'cause' and thereby to consistently disarm its sting. But Heidegger is speaking here of a unique anxiety, an *angst*:

*'That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite. Not only does this indefiniteness leave factually undecided which entity within the world is threatening us, but it also tells us that entities within the world are not 'relevant' at all. Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious.'*<sup>124</sup>

Within this *angst*, all the usual contexts of significance that Dasein has become absorbed in (and which Dasein has unreflectingly accepted as the world as it is), simply 'collapse' in upon

themselves. The world, stripped of its usual familiarity (by which it has been comfortably covered over), is now restored to it itself and appears as something strange and unfamiliar. Equipment, objects, useful tools, gadgets and all the common bric-a-brac that form the boundary to and the body of Dasein's commonplace existence, reappear as they themselves, in discrete, isolated, contextless existence. They stand out starkly without the blurring camouflage of a dominant background<sup>125</sup>:

*'Original anxiety can awaken in existence at any moment. It needs no unusual events to rouse it. Its sway is as a thoroughgoing as its possible occasioning are trivial. It is always ready, though it only seldom springs, and we are snatched away and left hanging.'*<sup>126</sup>

This reappearance of the world reveals to Dasein that the context of significance has always been an overlay and that the world has **already** been there in ways not confined to nor defined by the familiar. According to Heidegger, Dasein's absorption in *das Man* guarantees that the world will always be overlaid by a familiarity that can be explained and talked about. The world will always be that which is ready to hand, controllable, calculable, manipulable, dismissible, attainable and available. What will **not** be disclosed by *das Man* (and which will be avoided at all costs), is that the familiar emerges out of an entire alien otherness:

*'In anxiety one feels 'uncanny'. Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: "nothing and nowhere". But here "uncanniness" also means "not-being-at-home".'*<sup>127</sup>

Within *angst* the world neither disappears nor diminishes, neither does Dasein withdraw into a closeted fearful apprehension. There is no lineage to this anxiety. No pathway to disarming its sting. The world is startlingly present:

*'Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping. Its breath quivers perpetually through Dasein, only slightly in those who are jittery, imperceptibly in the "oh yes" and the "oh no" of men of affairs; but most readily in the reserved, and most assuredly in those who are basically daring... The anxiety of those who are daring cannot be opposed to joy or even to the comfortable enjoyment of tranquillised bustle.'*<sup>128</sup>

There is no ground on which Dasein can comfortably stand in order to regain its usual comfortable place within the world; 'uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the "they".'<sup>129</sup> This *angst* is totally at odds with *das Man*, and totally undermines *das Man's* ability to restore Dasein to the world as formerly apprehended. Dasein's being-in-the-world, is thereby revealed as not bounded by, nor **confined** to the 'rules, standards, norms, etc for the sake of which Dasein engages in its everyday activities'.



This lack of confinement is deliberately veiled by *das Man* as it forever and always holds itself forward as Dasein's sole source of understanding and interpretation. Heidegger claims that:

*'As Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualised, but individualised as the Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential 'mode' of the "not-at-home".'*<sup>130</sup>

It should be noted that what is **not** being talked about here is any state of privation. Dasein is not in any way **less** of being in the world. What is also **not** being talked about is any psychological condition or 'frame of mind, emotional state, humour, temper or disposition'.<sup>131</sup>

One of the fundamental challenges confronting me in attempting to explicate Heidegger's understanding of human-being (and to draw from that understanding) is to avoid falling into the trap of treating Dasein as a something present-at-hand, as a something simply extant that can be examined. A further challenge is to avoid reifying Dasein's world by sectioning into, for example, *Umwelt*, *Mitwelt*, *Eigenwelt* and *Überwelt*. There is no doubt that Dasein and its world **can** be so treated and has been so treated, for example, in the disciplines of psychology and sociology. But the challenge here is to avoid drifting into that particular approach and to walk a thin line in which the 'learning to be gained' from Heidegger always remains open, but not in way that turns that learning into something else. Heidegger engages with this challenge when he argues that:

*'The question of Dasein's basic existential character is essentially different from that of the Being of something present-at-hand. Our everyday environmental experiencing which remains directed both ontically and ontologically towards entities within-the-world, is not the sort of thing which can present Dasein in an ontically primordial manner for ontological analysis. Similarly our immanent perception of experiences fails to provide a clue which is ontologically adequate.'*<sup>132</sup>

The thinness of that line gets thinner when it becomes plain that Heidegger is not talking about a generalised class but is always referring to Dasein as individuated. In the opening sentence of Part One of '*Being And Time*' he insists that:

*'We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is **in each case mine**.'*<sup>133</sup>

For Heidegger, Dasein is always in each case 'mine' in which my being is always an issue for it (me). In addition, 'I' can live authentically and be open towards my genuine possibilities or 'I' can live as one absorbed within *das Man*. In a having a genuine apprehension of 'my'

death, 'I' have the possibility of embracing 'my' radical finitude in such a way that 'I' can live as a 'whole' as one fully individuated. In addition, 'I' am surrounded by tools and equipment that 'I' fluently employ, and 'I' can fluently employ and apprehend them only as individual Dasein. Also, 'I' live in a world where there are others who directly impinge upon 'who' 'I' am and 'who' 'I' may become (and this impinging is always an issue for 'me'). And, as in the world, 'I' am never an isolated monad (as with Descartes) but always 'with' others, even when 'I' am alone (and these 'others' are always Dasein, like 'myself'). The challenge is to travel the thinning line by retaining always Heidegger's sense of Dasein as **individuated**, but not treating Dasein as an individual object of research. So, when it is asserted above that 'what is also **not** being talked about is any psychological condition or 'frame of mind, emotional state, humour, temper or disposition', I am pointing to a path Heidegger is not travelling down. So, with regard to whether *Angst*, for example, is a psychological condition (or not), the reply can be made:

*'...anxiety is always, fundamentally, keyed to one or another aspect of Dasein's mortality...it is as misleading to call anxiety a state-of-mind as it is to call death an existential possibility. Angst is no more a specific mode of Dasein's thrownness than death is a specific possibility of its projectiveness... One might say: whatever Dasein's particular state-of-mind and project, it is always already anxiously relating to its mortality, whether in resolute anticipation of it or an irresolute, self-alienating flight from it.'*<sup>134</sup>

### **Dasein: anxiety and the possibility of authentic engagement:**

The manner in which the worldliness of the world is disclosed to Dasein, through the mood of *angst*, focuses the world as **other** than that constructed by *das Man*. This 'otherness' is not simply an alternative version, a re-presentation (or an optional interpretation to be taken up and dropped willy-nilly), but one more 'primordial':

*'When the mood of angst arises, it offers Dasein the opportunity to experience its mortal openness in a way unimpeded by the seductive attitudes of "the they". Surrendering to angst involves undergoing a virtual death experience, involving the annihilation of one's possibilities as well as the ordinary egoic self to whom such possibilities seem to belong. Temporarily obliterating egoic subjectivity, angst reveals that Dasein cannot be reduced to the status of a thing, or person ... Dasein can choose the possibilities that matter most, rather than allowing itself to be ensnared by distractions.'*<sup>135</sup>

Dasein's exposure to this primordial condition of the world (minus the blandishments of *das Man*), raises the possibility of an authentic engagement with the world and therefore with Dasein's authentically being-in-the-world:

*'In anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualises. This individualisation brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its being. These basic possibilities of Dasein (and Dasein is in each case of mine) show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves – undisguised by entities within-the-world, to which, proximally and for the most part, Dasein clings.'*<sup>136</sup> [my emboldening].

This laying bare of the world and the laying bare of Dasein's authentic possibilities within it, inclines Dasein to return to the homely familiarity it formerly possessed (i.e., when it had 'fallen' away from its own authentic possibilities into the consoling inauthenticity of *das Man*):

*'...in falling we flee into the "at-home" of publicness, we flee in the face of the "not-at-home"'*<sup>137</sup>

The predisposition of Dasein to become anxious in *angst*, is an inclination arising from Dasein's being 'thrown into the world'<sup>138</sup>, and not from any individual Dasein's propensity to become 'anxious' or 'nervous'. Again, to re-affirm Heidegger's position, it needs to be emphasised that the 'unitary phenomenon' of being in the world that Dasein is, precludes any analysis that would set Dasein as **subject** against world as **object**, or as Dasein as 'cause' and progenitor of its own *angst*. Heidegger argues that *angst* is that which exposes Dasein to itself for what Dasein actually is, 'a lieutenant of the nothing'. But, in that lieutenancy Dasein fails to reveal itself to itself (even as its own rank and disposition) and it fails to do that especially as an act arising out of its own volition. For Heidegger, the extremity of Dasein's finitude is of such depth and range that its radical finitude persistently undermines Dasein's own ability to freely confront the consequences of its own intrinsic mortality:

*'Being held out into the nothing – as Dasein is – on the ground of concealed anxiety makes man a lieutenant of the nothing. We are so finite that we cannot even bring ourselves originally before the nothing through our own decision and will. So profoundly does finitude entrench itself in existence that our most proper and deepest limitation refuses to yield to our freedom'*<sup>139</sup>

## Dasein as Being-toward-[its]-death:

### Dasein: death as the ever-postponable event:

In this unfolding of what it is to be Dasein, much emphasis has been laid upon the everyday manner in which Dasein conducts its affairs. Mostly, this explication has revealed that Dasein's ordinary way of being is characterised by circumvention, sidestepping, evasion and bypassing of its own authentic possibilities to be itself. Sometimes this circumvention and sidestepping takes the form of speculations within which a particular future is posited in which Dasein is always still existent and always unready. Everywhere it turns, Dasein finds reinforcement for this, in idle talk, gossip, febrile curiosity and a certain ambiguity about what is the case and what is not. But in *angst*, Heidegger argues, a rare opportunity arises for Dasein to turn towards its authentic possibilities by refusing to let itself fall back into the familiar 'homeliness' of *das Man*:

*'Dasein's ontological structure, care, cares for Dasein lost in the routine practices and tempting distractions of everyday life by generating the mood of angst. This ontologically self-corrective intervention reveals in a dramatic, transformational manner that Dasein is not a thing, but rather finite/mortal openness for Being.'*<sup>140</sup>

To recall what has been indicated earlier, 'care' as the ontologically self-corrective intervention, 'is a name for the structural whole of existence in all its modes and for the broadest and most basic possibilities of discovery and disclosure of self and world.' As such, 'care' opens for Dasein the possibilities that have become occluded for it by the blandishments of *das Man*. Dasein in its propensity to 'fall' into inauthenticity has 'available' this 'ontologically self-corrective intervention'. But, as Heidegger has noted above, Dasein as 'a lieutenant of the nothing' is denied the freedom to **voluntarily** exercise this as a positive intervention. Nowhere is Dasein's propensity to fall more patent than in Dasein's being towards death, and nowhere will Dasein find greater endorsement for this than in the arms of *das Man*:

*'Someone or other "dies", be he neighbour or stranger. People who are no acquaintances of ours are "dying" daily and hourly. "Death" is encountered as a well-known event occurring within the world. As such it remains in the inconspicuousness characteristic of what is encountered in an everyday fashion. The "they" has already stowed away an interpretation of this event... "one of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us."'*<sup>141</sup>

By this "it has nothing to do with us", Dasein is enabled to regard death as something not actually present but always indefinitely elsewhere. It is never Dasein who dies but always a vague 'other'. Even the fact of death itself hardens into just another event that can be treated as simply occurring:

*'... after my death, the sun will still shine and the business of the world will go on pretty much as before. Other human beings will still be alive, and the world will still be whatever it is for each and all of them. All of this may well lead me to imagine my death as well as an event in the world of these people who will go on living when I am dead. When I think about it in this way, my death becomes an event in the one public world in which everything happens – a world that belongs to everyone but for precisely that reason does not really belong to anyone.'*<sup>142</sup>

This event is always 'out there', but not quite anywhere, and has nothing to do with any individual Dasein actually dying itself:

*'Indeed the dying of Others is seen often enough as a social inconvenience, if not even a downright tactlessness, against which the public is to be guarded.'*<sup>143</sup>

By being maintained within the public plane of *das Man*, Dasein's attitude towards death remains generalised. Death is something that occurs to other people:

*'It is pretty hard, after all, to get around the fact that in the case of my own death, there is a point beyond which I can neither observe nor imagine observing whatever processes may be involved in the termination of my life. If at that point I shift to the perspective of someone who survives me and in whose life my death is just another event, I have to recognise, as I previously did not, that this is what I am doing and that the view I thus precariously adopt bypasses my death altogether.'*<sup>144</sup>

Death, because it is a well-known phenomenon and a common occurrence, does not therefore have to be dwelt upon with much focus or energy. This generalising of death prevents Dasein from looking upon its own death as the 'possibility of the impossibility'. Within this possibility, Dasein confronts its own essential nullity in the reality of its own finitude. By turning towards that 'which is not to be outstripped',<sup>145</sup> Heidegger argues that Dasein faces its own death as being always specifically 'mine', a possibility not grounded upon the evasive generalisations of *das Man*. But within the world of *das Man*, death, as the ever-postponable event, is never anything to do with Dasein 'now'. It is always the death of others (being a consistent pattern and an everyday affair), that proves to Dasein that it itself still exists.

### **Dasein: and its failed relationship with death:**

By authentically turning towards its own death, Dasein faces extreme anxiety at its own 'impossibility'. This 'impossibility' has no content and is utterly abyssal in nature. There is

nothing within it that Dasein can cling to, nothing that could give it a sense of being 'at home'<sup>146</sup>.

*'The "they" concerns itself with transforming this anxiety into fear in the face of an oncoming event. In addition, the anxiety which has been made ambiguous as fear, is passed off as a weakness with which no self-assured Dasein may have any acquaintance. What is "fitting" according to the unuttered decree of the "they", is indifferent tranquillity as to the "fact" that one dies.'*<sup>147</sup>

By this conversion of anxiety into fear, the abyssal characteristic of *angst* is thereby stripped out, leaving what remains, as a fear "about" something. This fear "about" something focuses upon the specifics of death as a simple demise. By this focusing, Dasein believes it is actually confronting death by focusing upon the hard concretion of death as a specific something. Dasein attempts to establish a relationship with death in a manner similar to its relationships with things present at hand within the world. By this means, Dasein hopes to render death into something familiar and to handle it as a common object of regard. When death is posited as a future event that will never quite arrive, the vagueness surrounding its appearing renders it impossible to ever calculate when it may occur. But what is disguised in this positing is '*that it is possible at any moment*'<sup>148</sup>. Nevertheless, regard for this kind of awareness of death as being a general characteristic of Dasein is denied in the argument that it is culturally specific:

*'In the Middle Ages many churches had a figure of St Christopher at the entrance. By touching it as one entered one guaranteed that one would not die suddenly (i.e. without being able to confess one's sins) today. Up until quite late in the 19th-century statistics were such that for all the years between the ages of about 20 and 71 one was as likely to die in any one year as any other. Unlike us, in other words, pre-modern-man had no statistical warrant for supposing that death would first concern him in his 70s or 80s. Facts such as these suggest that Being and Time was wrong to suggest that evasion of the at-any-momentness of death is, to a constant degree, a universal human disposition and that later Heidegger is right to regard evasion of death as a phenomenon especially characteristic of the modern West.'*<sup>149</sup>

This ever-ongoing possibility, by being rendered as something solidly definite, has its own essential indefiniteness covered over. Death as that which is possible at any moment precludes the establishment of any **familiar** relationship with it. As Heidegger says:

*'Everyday concern makes definite for itself the indefiniteness of certain death by interposing before it those urgencies and possibilities which can be taken in at a glance, and which belong to the everyday matters that are closest to us.'*<sup>150</sup>

Nevertheless, the possibility has been raised of establishing a relationship with death, one that allows Dasein to substitute the certainty of death for the certainty of the Cartesian *cogito*



whilst at the same time undermining that Cartesian position. On this view, the grounding certainty for Dasein is death, its own death, and in that certainty it is always 'I' who will die and when that 'happens' it will be the utter extinguishment of all that 'I' am and 'who' 'I' may become. Against the backdrop of this utter certainty, all that occurs 'before' it (including the purported certainty of the *cogito*) occurs within the temporality of a finite existence and within a radical exteriority with others as being in the world. The certainty of 'my' death is not the certainty of anything else that resides within this radical finitude (the certainty of which may be provisional and contingent) but it is a certainty that is 'outside' of it and defining of it. My death is that which is entirely uncommon. It has no correspondence with anything within the radical finitude of my existence and, as such, it is a singularity that cannot be generalised in any way into that which is commonplace, prevailing, regular, universal, familiar, generic or prevalent:

*'Death is a certain possibility, of a greater and more primordial certainty than the I am. The certainty of my death is older than "me"! This certainty: that it is I myself in my going towards death, is the fundamental certainty of Dasein itself and is a genuine proposition concerning Dasein, whereas the cogito is merely the semblance of such a proposition. What does this imply? That it is in the time of mortal finitude that being appears; that the being of the sum, which is given to me only in the narrow horizon of having-to-die, manifests itself as mine only in this way. The Heideggerian position is here close to Kierkegaardian existentialism. It is opposed to abstract universality: "There is no death in general." It is in favour of a singularity that can find itself only in effecting itself.'*<sup>151</sup>

### **Dasein: and death as always mine and no-one else's:**

Heidegger indicates that in all the various ways that Dasein can be substituted for, as parent, lover, worker, no one can substitute for Dasein at its death. Death is always 'mine'. Certainly, others may heroically die for Dasein (on Dasein's behalf), but it is always their own deaths that they die when they make it possible for Dasein to yet wait awhile to die its death:

*'The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more surely does the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all.'*<sup>152</sup>

Dasein's death is not a property that it can ever have, it can never have mastery over death. Death has no content that can be grasped. This contentlessness of death discloses to Dasein the possibility of its own nullity, its own negation of it itself as specifically existent. The ultimate cancellation of itself (and all its possibilities) is always 'an issue' for Dasein, an

issue never completely subsumed within the blandishments of *das Man*. But so long as Dasein is lost within the 'they', it remains blind to its own finitude and therefore blind not only to its own death but also to the nature of its existence:

*'Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be 'actualised', nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be... the possibility reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all, no more or less, but signifies the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence.'*<sup>153</sup>

In the face 'of the measureless impossibility of existence', Dasein is released to confront its own extinguishment, not as a mundane event happening to others, but as absolutely embedded in its own existence and possible at any moment. Ironically, death can only ever be utterly 'mine' and never anyone else's, yet it can never become actualised in Dasein. If death can only ever be utterly 'mine' then it is 'my' being itself, my existence that is of issue. In the face of 'my' measureless impossibility of existence, the generalisations and blandishments of *das Man*, evaporate like the morning mist beneath the rising Sun. 'Anticipation' is the word Heidegger uses to describe Dasein's authentic turning towards its own death. In this anticipatory turning, Dasein is graphically confronted, on the one hand, with its own death as being immediately of issue, and on the other hand, with the empty consolations of *das Man*.

### **Dasein: and the authentic anticipation of death:**

In this authentic anticipation, Dasein comes to understand that death forever and for always 'lays claim to it'<sup>154</sup> and in its being claimed, Dasein is presented with an ultimate 'foil' against which all things and all Others may be held:

*'When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one's own death, one is liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factual possibilities lying ahead of a possibility which is not to be outstripped. Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached.'*<sup>155</sup>

This shattering of tenaciousness, this lessening of *das Man's* hold over individual Dasein arises, analogously, through a surrendering of Dasein to the instruction, '*momento mori*', i.e., '**remember you must die**'. It is Heidegger's position that by entering into its own death, Dasein comes to realise the absolute finitude of its existence. No longer is Dasein that immortal entity who witnesses the death of others. No longer is death an actual thing. Death

is always my death, and as such cannot be extracted from my existence. My death is always total. There is no such thing as death, but not quite. In my death all possibilities end. All the openness of who I am becomes 'closed off' and in that closing, I am disclosed as complete. In apprehending death as total, (as that 'which is not to be outstripped'),<sup>156</sup> Dasein cannot avoid placing itself 'there' as a totality. **In fact, its very 'being there', its 'Da-Sein' may for the first time become disclosed to itself as that which it really is.** This 'personal' transformation from the 'they-self' to its-self, lays bare Dasein's previous existence under the suzerainty of *das Man*. Stripped of all consolations and rationalisations, Dasein is liberated to a discernment of itself, one that does not float upon a commonality of understanding. Nevertheless, this transformation is neither final nor consoling; it remains what it essentially is, an inescapable anxiousness and anxiety of that 'which is not to be outstripped'. But what is transformed? Who is transformed? Heidegger's approach in answering this is to assert:

*'For the most part I myself am not the "who" of Dasein; the they-self is its "who". Authentic being-one's-self takes a definite form of an existential modification of the "they".'*<sup>157</sup>

This dispossessing of its essential possibility to become authentic forms the very fabric of Dasein's ordinary everyday selfhood. It is Heidegger's position that being authentically oneself is an **exceptional** condition that Dasein constantly turns away from. This turning away is not a simple opting for a preferred mode of existence, but is more akin to a solid immersion in worldly affairs that dominates Dasein's available time through the immediately pressing nature of its exigencies.

### **Dasein as hearing the Call:**

Dasein never loses its capacity to choose the "who" it is or the who it may become, but this capacity is 'tranquillised' by the anodyne discourse of *das Man*. Dasein's awareness of its more profound and authentic possibilities always remains extant, but lies buried beneath the persistently ambiguous stream of *das Man's* idle chatter and curiosity. Dasein, in being inauthentic, does not know that it is inauthentic. Analogously, Dasein is a sleepwalker (albeit an extremely busy one on a hectic schedule), in its consistently "unconscious" disregard of its own authentic possibilities. How therefore is Dasein (now lost, absorbed and "unconscious" within *das Man*), ever going to transform? Within the terms of this analysis, the simple exercise of choice, of **choosing** to become authentic, is not, for Heidegger, an exercisable

option for Dasein; (preceding that choice; Dasein would first have to be in a position not only to exercise it, but also to understand that it **needed** exercising). How therefore is Dasein ever going to get itself into such a position?

*'Dasein is to be brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself, and if this is to be done through its self, it must first be able to find itself, to find itself as something that it failed to hear in itself and continues to do so in listening to the they. This listening must be stopped, that is, the possibility of another kind of hearing that interrupts that listening must be given by Dasein itself. The possibility of such a breach lies in being summoned immediately... If this lost hearing is numbed by the "noise" of the manifold ambiguity of everyday "new" idle talk, the call must call silently, unambiguously, with no foothold for curiosity. What this gives us to understand in calling is conscience.'*<sup>158</sup>

The content of this other message differs entirely from the endless chatter within 'idle talk'. But change can never be made if the immersion is of such a nature that Dasein's capacity to hear another message is blocked off. This 'call of conscience' precedes Dasein's choosing and lacks the detailed 'content' of 'idle-chatter'. In fact, this message lacks any content at all it is contentless. It possesses no concretion that could allow it to be argued out of existence. It emanates from a source that appears unknown. It contains no information with which Dasein could cavil. But it finds the one who wants to be found, and unsettles him at its arrival. Its call is disturbing by its sudden shocking manifestation. As Heidegger notes, 'In the tendency to disclosure which belongs to the call, lies the momentum of a push — of an abrupt arousal. The call is from afar unto afar. It reaches him who wants to be brought back.'<sup>159</sup> In wanting to become authentic (but lacking the awareness to articulate this 'want'), Dasein has already placed itself in the way of being addressed. This 'placing itself in the way of' opens Dasein to the possibility of thereby being addressed. Whereas *das Man*'s discourse is characterised by detailed and clamorous obfuscation (one that endlessly proliferates itself), the call of conscience is singular and 'silent' in its direct appeal to Dasein. It bypasses the intervening 'reality filter' of *das Man*. The absence of this cushioning buffer increases the call's impact when it arrives. To whom is the call addressed? Not to authentic Dasein, but to the self conformed to *das Man*. The call defies all expectations, renounces all conclusions, inverts all logic and evades all definiteness. Dasein is ignored in its normal and everyday way of being. As Heidegger argues:

*'The caller maintains itself in inconspicuous indefiniteness. If the caller is asked about its name, status, origin, or repute, it not only refuses to answer, but does not even leave the slightest possibility of ones making it into something with which one can be familiar when one's understanding of Dasein has a 'worldly' orientation. On the other hand, it by no means disguises itself in the call. That which calls the call, simply holds itself aloof from any way of becoming well-known, and this belongs to its phenomenal character.'*<sup>160</sup>

*Das Man* always has a reason for everything and can trace every effect back to its cause. It has already decided what will happen before it has even begun and will pass conclusive judgment on that which has not yet finished. It is confident in all its certainties and will not tolerate subversive contraries. It is forever available in the marketplace of common opinion and never hides itself away. But the call has no opinions, no certainties no discourse. It has nothing about it that can be discussed. In being available to the call of conscience, Dasein has opened itself to that which is totally at odds with *das Man*. Before it, *das Man* is disarmed. There is nothing for it to draw into the agora of debate. Faced with this indefinite silence, what can Dasein do?

### **Dasein: and the inexorable orientation:**

Heidegger indicates that the commonplace reputation by which Dasein relates itself to the world is simply ignored 'while the content of the call is seemingly indefinite, the *direction* is a sure one and is not to be overlooked'<sup>161</sup>. It is the inexorable orientation of the call and its consequent impactful appeal that will not allow it to be argued out of existence. But who has sent this appeal? Who has sent this message? If the call emanates from Dasein itself then its provenance can be undermined as being predominantly solipsistic. Such a conclusion would fit into all the usual ways of Being-in-the-world and could be neutralised in all the usual ways. But if Dasein has not sent the message who has?

*'In conscience Dasein calls itself... the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. 'It' calls against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from me and yet from beyond me.'*<sup>162</sup>

The call, as that which cannot be argued out of existence, nor subsumed under ordinary methods of treatment, is consistently 'alien' and inescapably present. Its sudden epiphany, its sudden appearance provides a powerful contrary pull to all 'the usual arrangements' by its discomfiting and targeted persistence. This subversion pulls Dasein out of its confident 'being at home' by pushing it into the more primordial condition of 'uncanniness'. If 'In conscience Dasein calls itself... [and] the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned for nor voluntarily performed', then its sudden appearance can have a startling effect upon well-established relationships and on the conventions that have built up around them. Earlier, it was said that the call's sudden epiphany, its sudden appearance



provides a powerful contrary pull to all 'the usual arrangements' by its discomfiting and targeted persistence.

This upsetting of all the 'usual arrangements' can produce a 'hall of mirrors' effect in which multi-faceted understandings of self and others collide and intertwine. For Heidegger, the self appealed to in conscience, is the self conformed to *das Man*. But in that appeal the self is not only 'bypassed' but also 'overcome'. In that overcoming, Dasein, bereft of all its usual norms, roles, rules, clichés and consolations, confronts a world of stark otherness, an otherness essentially 'uncanny'. Although Dasein's Being-in-the-world is conformed to the 'they', this uncanniness betrays that the world is **always** and will **always** be other than Dasein's constructs and representations. But 'uncanniness' is Heidegger's word for a certain Being-in-the-world that is **prior to *das Man***. It 'pre-dates' *das Man's* appearance and signifies an underlying condition into which Dasein has been 'thrown'. In this condition of being 'thrown' into existence, Dasein does not first establish a base for itself by pointing to its thrownness ostensibly as that which securely underpins its existence and as that which thereby grounds who Dasein is. Dasein's 'thrownness' is not an underlying phenomenon that can detach itself (or be detached) from Dasein. It cannot be regarded or manipulated or drawn within the ambit of Dasein's projects (or its possibilities) nor can it form part of Dasein's personal 'history':

*'As existent, it never comes back behind its thrownness in such a way that it might first release this 'that-it-is-and-has-to-be' from its being-its-Self and lead it into the "there". Thrownness, however, does not lie behind it as some event which has happened to Dasein, which has factually befallen and fallen loose from Dasein again, on the contrary, as long as Dasein is, Dasein, as care, is constantly its 'that-it-is' ... The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power ... in being a basis – that is, existing as thrown – Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as this.'* <sup>163</sup>

On this view, the search for a secure basis for Self is an elusive (and possibly a fruitless) one, in that the very basis of Dasein's existence (its being 'thrown' into existence), can never **itself** be absorbed within Dasein's ongoing project of seeking foundational security. But it is from and out of this primordial 'thrownness' that 'uncanniness' emerges.

### **Dasein and the uncanniness that pursues:**

In hearing the call, Dasein is denuded of all its usual succour. Abandoned in a world now returning to itself, Dasein has nowhere to turn for consolation. That which had been covered



up by the blandishments of *das Man*, is now fully exposed as it itself. Within that exposure Dasein comes to an understanding of that which cannot now be argued away:

*'The call of conscience, existentially understood, makes known for the first time... that uncanniness pursues Dasein and is a threat to the lostness in which it has forgotten itself.'*<sup>164</sup>

Dasein is never **simply** the construct of *das Man* but is always open towards its own authentic possibilities. Out of this (usually hidden) alien and more primordial way of being the call derives. Its source therefore (in reply to the earlier questions: Who has sent this appeal? Who has sent this message?) is not a self-regarding and narcissistic solipsism but Dasein as itself concerned in its own care, namely:

*'The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-being...'*<sup>165</sup>

For Heidegger, Dasein's authentic possibilities are always extant (even if concealed by the blandishments of *das Man*). But Dasein's possibilities being essentially futural in nature, point towards what Dasein may actually become. This pointing towards is not directed to anything extraneous to Dasein (in the sense of an exemplary possibility that Dasein might or should model itself on) but always remains rooted within individual Dasein's unique and singular potentiality:

*'Heidegger describes human being as a nullity in the sense that there is no way for us to escape the fact that the sense we make depends upon the cultural practices into which we are, as he says, "thrown" ... A radically self-determining human being is not a human being at all: there is no self and no determination of it without a sense of what's worth doing. It is the tendency to think that there is something to bemoan in this fact that Heidegger ... finds at the root of the inauthentic ways of life he deplotes.'*<sup>166</sup>

Dasein is open to its own possibilities but not to all of them (being finite these must come to an end in death), but in exercising any one possibility over any other possibility, Dasein inevitably excludes a whole universe of "what might have been" in favour of "what is" and "what is to become". Therefore a universe of "what might have been", lingers to haunt Dasein as an unexercised option.

## Dasein as guilty:

## Dasein: and the nullity at its heart:

Dasein is essentially futural. It constantly exercises its singular possibilities in such a way that they draw it forward in a projective manner. Only the Dasein as 'no-longer-able-to-be' can ever be the Dasein bereft of possibilities. There is no firm basis on which Dasein could confidently stand as a 'radically self-determining human-being' (other than its potential to exercise its own possibilities **for** itself.). Yet many of these possibilities, in their potential of being exercised, lie unused. These latencies, these absences, these discards, being redundantly dormant futures of Dasein, expose a basic nullity at the heart of Dasein. Dasein as the "they" self in *das Man*, exercises its possibilities (and therefore the possible basis of being itself) according to whatever "they" have commanded. By so falling, by so turning away, by so discarding its own authentic possibilities, Dasein exposes yet another nullity at the heart of itself:

*'Hearing the appeal correctly is thus tantamount to having an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-being. When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes its **becoming free** for the call—its readiness for the potentiality of getting appealed to. In understanding the call, Dasein is **in thrall to its ownmost possibility of existence**. It has chosen itself.'*<sup>167</sup>

As asserted earlier, Dasein is essentially futural and is not conforming to a sequential sense of time in which its basis is a static present 'fed' by a receding past and from which it launches itself forward into a future which is calculable:

*'... the future does not happen "later than" or "after" the past, and the past does not occur "earlier" than the future ... primordial time does not have any sequentiality at all, instead, past, present, and future are structures of Dasein's being that are prior to the time of everyday practical existence. In Heidegger's words, "time characterises the wholeness of Dasein. Any instance of Dasein is not only in a moment but rather is itself within the entire span of its possibilities and its past...to be human is to be the stretching or stretch that embraces both "coming toward" what one is and carrying forward the possibilities defining one's "beenness".'*<sup>168</sup>

Nevertheless, Dasein as thrown into existence is always specifically located in ways that can be identified by such classifications as cultural, social, communal, religious, geographical, racial and regional and as such Dasein's temporal futurity 'is always experienced in a historically specific and variant form.'<sup>169</sup> The time that is experienced by Dasein, according to

Heidegger (though being ‘historically specific’), is not itself generated or created by that historical specificity nor does it originate from therein. Nevertheless, Dasein’s experience of time is always that of singular Dasein in its being with others and inhabiting its own significant contextuality, a contextuality that makes sense of time to Dasein. This time, though ‘historically specific’ is, for Heidegger an ‘ontologically invariant structure’. <sup>170</sup> This invariance is characterised by its being incapable of division and subdivision into reified temporal sections or clusters. It is Heidegger’s position that Dasein in its very existence ‘contains’ (or is) all its temporality, all its temporal dimensions of ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’, but not as any one ‘moment’ nor as a streaming ‘succession of ‘nows’. In being essentially futural, Dasein is not turned towards a specific funnelled future, one that is ‘out there’ as a goal or target to be aimed at. It is **already** within that projectiveness that casts itself over what Dasein is, in such a way that it is ‘constantly’ definitive of what Dasein may become and what Dasein already has been:

*‘The...experience of time actually takes place within historical contexts, and only makes sense within them. It happens to particular people at particular times. It is artificial and incomplete when detached from that attributability; and renders delusory all attempts to articulate either a metaphysical view from nowhere or a general relativism.’* <sup>171</sup>

### **Dasein: and its persistent creditor:**

Earlier it was said that ‘a radically self-determining human-being is not a human-being at all’, but in ‘choosing itself’, as indicated above, has Dasein not radically chosen to self-determine? If so, what is the context within which such a choosing might occur? The world of *das Man* is a world of endless plasticity in which the ‘typical’ the ‘average’ the ‘to be expected’ stand forward to be judged on the shifting sands of public opinion. Within the ambit of this appraisal, Dasein is always found wanting. It is never quick enough to keep pace, it is always out of touch, it is always the perennial laggard. In its dithering attempts to match *das Man*’s preferred tempo, Dasein becomes a constant ‘debtor’ to *das Man* and *das Man* its willing ‘creditor’. In this asymmetrical relationship Dasein falls into a state of ‘guilty indebtedness’. To compensate for this ‘guilt’ and to offset the sting of judgment, Dasein engages in an obedient compliance in which all infringing behaviour is reduced to a minimum. By this accommodating acquiescence Dasein not only lightens the burden of its liability, lessens the amount of its debt, but also spirals further into the world of *das Man*.

The fulcrum of Dasein's indebtedness is *das Man*. Always and forever Dasein's struggles to 'balance out' this relationship so that asymmetry approaches symmetry. Constantly in debt as a straggling slowcoach, Dasein 'chooses' to reduce its 'guilt' by becoming blind to its own authentic possibilities:

*'The commonsense of the "they" knows only the satisfying of the manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them. It reckons up infractions of them and tries to balance them off. It has slunk away from its own most being-guilty so as to be able to talk more loudly about making "mistakes".'*<sup>172</sup>

For Heidegger, Dasein is guilty in two specific ways. First, it is guilty of allowing itself to be subsumed under the blandishments of *das Man*. Second, it is guilty of abandoning its own authentic possibilities. The self conformed to *das Man* is most guilty and it is to this self that the call of conscience is directed:

*'Dasein's structural indebtedness to the culture for an understanding of itself that it can never clearly choose, yet out of which it must act and for which it is fully responsible, is existential guilt. The existential meaning of conscience is the call, not to do this or that, but to stop fleeing into the everyday world of moral righteousness or of moral relativism and to face up to Dasein's basic guilt.'*<sup>173</sup>

That which Dasein is guilty of and indebted to is nothing that Dasein itself has created (but it is one to which it has become a contributor). Dasein's guilty indebtedness arises out of its unavoidable and essential thrownness, a condition that is always historically 'given' for Dasein and highly specific. This historical specificity is formative for Dasein, particularly in the ways that Dasein comes to understand itself and out of which it 'chooses' to live its life. In embracing the blandishments of *das Man*, Dasein turns aside from acknowledging and recognising its own unavoidable historical 'thrownness' (and from all the formative conditionality that flows from that). The call of conscience is one from outside the ambit of *das Man*'s discourse and, as such, cannot be absorbed into its generality. The call cannot arise through the use of will alone but neither can it come unbidden. In becoming open, Dasein already acknowledges that the call must be 'answered'. Being open is never an overt invitation, but is more akin to 'being in the way of' or 'being available to' or 'ready to receive' or, as Heidegger puts it, 'wanting to have a conscience' [*Gewissenhabenwollen*]:<sup>174</sup>

*'Though the call gives no information, it is not merely critical; it is positive, in that it discloses Dasein's most primordial potentiality-for-being as being-guilty. Thus conscience manifests itself as an **attestation** which belongs to Dasein's being – an attestation in which conscience calls Dasein itself face-to-face with its ownmost potentiality-for-being.'*<sup>175</sup>

### Dasein: as inherently transcendent:

It is Heidegger's contention that Dasein is already 'ahead of itself' as an innately futural entity. It is forever reaching out towards its own possibilities and constantly missing the mark. Authentically passionate engagements are repeatedly turned aside in favour of *das Man's* normative offerings. As futural, it is always that 'which-it-can-yet-become', but as 'not-yet-that' Dasein is in deficit to itself as unfinished. At the heart of Dasein, therefore, is a nagging slippage, a paucity and a deprivation that will not go away:

*'If we are in this sense essentially incomplete or lacking (Heidegger goes on to call this our being-guilty), then we are also essentially irreducible to what we have hitherto and presently achieved or attained. We are, in other words, inherently self-transcending or transitional, always capable of becoming more or other than we presently are.'*<sup>176</sup> [my emboldening].

Dasein as transcendent, is always a midway entity and, as such, essentially evolutionary and transformative. It is perpetually challenged by futural possibility and cannot 'stop' to justify or satisfy itself. This transcendence of Dasein is, in Heidegger's view, not to be equated with 'otherworldly' notions of that which is beyond World, beyond Dasein, beyond as a deity or beyond in any sense as a sphere of perfection:

*'The birthplace of all the different notions of transcendence is, he [Heidegger] contends, Plato's construal of entities in terms of the constant look that they present over many different and changing circumstances. From this vantage point, the beingness of a being is the **idea** or **eidos** that is common (**koinon**) or generic (**gene**). With the positing of this idea common to and yet beyond any particular beings, its separateness from beings is also instituted and this, Heidegger insists is "the origin of 'transcendence' in all its forms".'*<sup>177</sup>

The transcendence of Dasein is none of these but refers to that which is foundational to Dasein. In this assertion Heidegger traces the etymology of 'transcendence' to its roots in 'to step over, pass over, go through and occasionally to surpass'.<sup>178</sup> In all of these, it is Dasein who is engaged in the stepping, the passing over, the going through and the surpassing, and all of this is occurring in the world of Dasein as that unitary phenomenon. The use of the gerund points up the 'doing' and 'engaging' nature of transcendence in its application to Dasein and to Dasein's 'location' in a sphere that is radically different from an 'otherworldly' one. In its stepping over, passing over, going through and surpassing, Dasein is not first adopting an attitude in which it (as something else) then carries out its projects as a matter of choice. Dasein has no choice in this matter. According to Heidegger, Dasein is ontologically constituted as **already** transcendent and that this 'is precisely what essentially constitutes its

being'.<sup>179</sup> This 'already transcendent' characterisation of Dasein's being (in its always being that entity that is forever 'reaching out') is, for Heidegger, absolutely foundational to the notion of ever having a self:

*'Only a being to whose ontological constitution transcendence belongs has the possibility of being anything like a self. Transcendence is even the presupposition for the Dasein's having the character of a self. The selfhood of the Dasein is founded on its transcendence, and the Dasein is not first an ego-self which then oversteps something or other. The "toward-itself" and the "out-from-itself" are implicit in the concept of selfhood. What exists as a self can do so only as a transcendent being. This selfhood, founded on transcendence, the possible toward-itself and out-from-itself, is the presupposition for the way the Dasein factually has various possibilities of being its own and of losing itself. But it is also the presupposition for the Dasein's being-with others in the sense of the I-self with the thou-self.'*<sup>180</sup>

This ongoing and ontologically constituted 'reaching out' of Dasein (now recognised as constitutive of Dasein's transcendence), raises questions about the nature of Dasein's temporality within which Dasein's transcendence 'occurs'. Earlier it was asserted that in being essentially futural, Dasein is not turned towards a specific funnelled future, one that is 'out there' as a goal or target to be aimed at. It is **already** within that projectiveness that casts itself over what Dasein is, in such a way that it is 'constantly' definitive of what Dasein may become and what Dasein already has been. And that Dasein in its very existence 'contains' (or is) all its temporality, all its temporal dimensions of 'past', 'present' and 'future', but not as any one 'moment' nor as a streaming 'succession of 'nows'. There is in the above argument, a denial of time as being serially successive for Dasein. In this denial 'death and anxiety reveal important structures of Dasein's being':

*'Heidegger is concerned with death and anxiety for two reasons. First, the distinction between an existentially authentic or owned life and an inauthentic or unowned life is located in one's response to death and anxiety. Second, death and anxiety reveal important structures of Dasein's being. That Dasein can find itself unable to understand itself and project forth into a way of life, that it can find itself equally indifferent to all human possibilities, shows that it is capable of living as nothing, as a question without even a provisional answer. This, in turn, forces us to recognise that the possible ways to be Dasein are not possible as potentially actualisable, that Dasein presses ahead into a future that never can become present. The latter implies... that originary temporality is not successive.'*<sup>181</sup>

On this argument, as Dasein has the propensity to exist inauthentically (yet as frenetically engaged within the world of *das Man*), by turning away from its own radical finitude by denying the 'impossibility of the possible' in death and by also seeking myriad ways to assuage the nagging persistence of its anxiety, Dasein can 'lose itself' and not 'find itself' in such a way that it reveals a capacity to 'live as nothing':



*'The "they" never dies because it **cannot** die; for death is in each case mine, and only in anticipatory resoluteness does it get authentically understood in an existential manner. Nevertheless, the "they", which never dies and which misunderstands Being-towards-the-end, gives a characteristic interpretation to fleeing in the face of death. To the very end "it always has more time"... The only time one knows is the public time which has been levelled off and which belongs to everyone — and that means, to nobody.'*<sup>182</sup>

In this living as 'nothing', Dasein is denied a basis of understanding that would enable it to project itself authentically onto those genuine possibilities that are always open to it. These genuine possibilities are never cancelled-out or obliterated, but remain occluded within the realm of Dasein's ongoing openness to **all** its possibilities. As these genuine possibilities are occluded but not cancelled, they remain as latent existents for Dasein, existents that remain unactualised and unrealised in such a way that they are bypassed by Dasein as it projects itself into other and alternative futures. In its bypassing these, Dasein leaves aside that which always has the capacity to become other futures. These futures remain 'on the table', as it were, in such a way that though 'available', they are so covered over to be 'not possible as potentially actualisable'. This lack of becoming potentially actualisable indicates an incapacity to form whatever is to become present to Dasein. Yet these futures remain. In their remaining, they undermine any notion of time as serially successive **by their very availability** and by Dasein's always pressing ahead into a future, a future that for the most part, does not include them. For the Dasein (as the perennially 'not-yet'), there is never to be a still point in its ever turning world:

*'If Dasein's being is inherently being-ahead-of-itself, no meeting of any particular demand in action can eliminate or silence the need to re-encounter that demand (or to choose not to do so) in the next moment of our existence.'*<sup>183</sup>

### **Dasein as resolute:**

### **Dasein: and resoluteness as an extension of being-towards-death:**

In authentically re-encountering that demand (of being-ahead-of-itself as essentially transcendent), Dasein becomes resolute. 'Resoluteness' [*Entschlossenheit*] for Heidegger, is a pivotal 'concept' (and a significant one in exploring the transformative element within **this** research question. *Entschlossenheit* is a notoriously difficult term to explicate and many commentators have sharpened their mettle in attempting to do so. These explications are not

helped by the fact that Heidegger, in his later philosophy attempted to "read later developments back into the earlier texts, as if he were *simply* clarifying what had been originally intended there." [in *Being And Time*] <sup>184</sup> The fundamental questioning revolves around whether 'resoluteness' [*Entschlossenheit*] is fundamentally a matter of willed intention or more a matter of 'letting-be' (as in Heidegger's later notion of 'releasement' or *Gelassenheit*):

"1. The notion of *Entschlossenheit* in *Being and Time* is – despite later developments in Heidegger's thinking and despite his later self-interpretations – a matter of wilful resolve.

2. Despite certain misleading expressions in *Being and Time*, which can be attributed to "the metaphysical residues" inappropriate to the "original experience" behind the text, the term *Entschlossenheit* already exclusively refers to the later Heidegger's "non-willing" explanations of *Entschlossenheit*.

3. The inconstancies between the various connotations of *Entschlossenheit* in *Being And Time* are irresolvable. It contains undeniable elements of will, while in other respects foreshadowing his later thought of *Gelassenheit*

4. The ambiguity of *Entschlossenheit* is rather that of a dynamic ambivalence, where authentic Dasein not only wills to resolutely choose its possibility of being, but also resolves to repeat an interruption of this willing." <sup>185</sup>

An etymological history of *Entschlossenheit* is also given:

"Etymologically, *Entschlossenheit* derives from the word *schließen* (to close, shut, fasten) and the prefix *ent-* indicating opposition or separation; hence *entschließen* is said to have originally meant "to open, unlock". The term *Entschlossenheit* would therefore "literally" mean "to be un-closed or opened up" (*aufgeschlossen*). That Heidegger reads the term in this manner in his later writings... where *Entschlossenheit* finds its place (gets reinterpreted?) in a philosophy of *Gelassenheit*.

But is this "being opened-up" *unequivocally* the sense of *Entschlossenheit* already intended in *Being and Time*? Let us consider for a moment the other common modern, every day, if etymologically non-original, sense of the term. While originally meaning to open or unlock, from around the 16th century, *entschließen* came to be used (with the reflexive *sich*) in the sense of "to decide, reach a decision". The perfect participle *entschlossen* then came to mean "resolute", and the noun *Entschluss* to mean "decision or resolution", a matter of a "decision of a will" (*Willensentscheidung*) to carry out a certain intention ... if read in [the] modern sense, *Entschlossenheit* would mean "the establishing of a closing off", that is, a rejection of other possibilities in a firm grasping of a particular one. In the context of *Being and Time*, Dasein would, in freeing itself from its every day deference to the they, resolutely choose its own possibility of being. This will clearly seem to imply a comportment of willing." [my underlining]. <sup>186</sup>

Up to now, 'angst', 'das Man', 'death', 'the call of conscience', 'wanting to have a conscience', 'authenticity', 'inauthenticity', 'possibilities', 'world', 'being-with', 'being-guilty', 'Dasein', 'being-in', 'mineness', 'falling', 'idle-talk', 'curiosity', 'ambiguity', 'thrownness', 'care', 'anticipatory', have all been terms necessary to the unfolding of Dasein's being-in-the-world.

None of them can be extracted from Dasein's existence without rendering it impossible, nor can any of them be put out of mind when considering the nature of *Entschlossenheit*. Nevertheless (with that caveat in mind) certain terms do come to the fore in this particular consideration. Earlier, it was said that 'anticipation' is the word Heidegger uses to describe Dasein's authentic turning towards its own death. In this anticipatory turning, Dasein is graphically confronted, on the one hand, with its own death as being immediately of issue, and on the other hand, with the empty consolations of *das Man*. In this authentic anticipation, Dasein comes to understand that death forever and for always 'lays claim to it' and in its being claimed, Dasein is presented with an ultimate 'foil' against which all things and all Others may be held. (Yet as that foil, death is never simply a discrete phenomenon that can be specifically located in time as an 'event'):

*'...by death Heidegger does not understand a particular moment in one's life considered from an impersonal perspective. Instead, death here signifies **mortality as the very basic condition of individual existence**, that is, as that aspect of human life that gives it its very sense of human life.'*<sup>187</sup>

The authentically anxious anticipation (or, as Heidegger calls it, 'being-towards-death') together with Dasein's 'being-guilty' and 'wanting-to-have-a-conscience' are terms that assume a certain prominence when considering the characteristics of *Entschlossenheit*:

*"Resoluteness" (**Entschlossenheit**) is defined as an extension of being-towards-death and the call of conscience, in so far as it presupposes running ahead [i.e. transcendence] and the capacity of **Dasein** to take on its ownmost being indebted [i.e. being-guilty], and to do so with a view to a possible action. Resoluteness is to lead to **decision** ... that is, to the projection of a factual possibility.'*<sup>188</sup> [my square bracketing.].

### **Dasein: and the revelation of its essential nullity:**

Within the world of *das Man*, Dasein is that immortal entity whom death does not touch. All things are possible, and all options are open within a temporality that has no limit. Dasein, as constantly emerging from nowhere exactly specific (and progressing to nowhere exactly particular), obscures its own essential transcendence by cloaking itself with *das Man*'s "constructed" temporality. Within this temporality, Dasein's essential finitude is denied and in this denial, Dasein grounds itself upon its own eternal continuance by attempting to treat this as a constant presupposition. As Heidegger argues:

*'When Dasein is resolute, it takes over authentically in its existence the fact that it is the null basis of its own nullity. We have conceived death existentially as what we have characterised as the possibility of*

*the impossibility of existence – that is to say, as the utter nullity of Dasein. Death is not "added on" to Dasein at its "end" ... The nullity by which Dasein's being is dominated primordially through and through, is revealed to Dasein in authentic being-towards-death.'*<sup>189</sup>

*Entschlossenheit*, as resoluteness, manifests itself as an understanding of Dasein's essential finitude, an understanding of the possibility that its own impossibility can be 'actualised' at any moment. Through this realisation Dasein, having nothing to ground itself on, can no longer treat death as an infinitely deferrable option. Recognition of this groundlessness (in which Dasein 'takes over'<sup>190</sup> its existence as authentically revealed), dissolves the constructed temporality of *das Man* and Dasein is returned to its own temporality. In this 'deconstructing', Dasein anticipates itself as no longer existent. Compared to the vague, partial, and ever-receding certainties of *das Man*, **this** certainty is utterly grounded in an authentic understanding that is total:

When I die **all** that I am becomes impossible. Death doesn't happen to just a little part of me. **All** that I am is no longer able to be. **All** that I would be is completed. **All** that I will be is closed off. **All** that I was vanishes. My death is always my own and no one else's.

*Entschlossenheit*, premised upon what Heidegger refers to as, 'anticipation', comes into existence through Dasein's readiness to turn towards *angst*, to its openness to receive the call of conscience, to its understanding of itself as essentially transcendent, to its 'ability' to bear its own guiltiness and to its turning towards its own essential finitude:

*'Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death ... Nor does wanting-to-have-a-conscience ... signify a kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather, it brings one without Illusions into the resoluteness of 'taking action'.'*<sup>191</sup>

So Dasein, stripped of *das Man*'s glamorous fancies, is freed to take 'action'.

It should be understood that *Entschlossenheit*, for Heidegger, is neither prescriptive nor directive. It neither determines what action should be taken, nor when, nor how. Akin to the call of conscience, *Entschlossenheit* is contentless. There is nothing within it that Dasein could turn to for surety that would ever guarantee compliance with a binding dictat. As indicated above, *Entschlossenheit* 'is not a way of escape, fabricated for the overcoming of death', but is actually Dasein's concerned care of itself. In this care, Dasein, as the unitary phenomenon it is (and now freed from its partiality within *das Man*) is enabled to be oriented towards the world as Dasein that whole entity. In its 'wholeness', as restored, Dasein's social

relationships now have the capacity to be fundamentally transformed. Why should this be? As noted above, in its 'wholeness', as restored, Dasein's social relationships now have the capacity to be fundamentally transformed.

### **Dasein: and the possibility of repeated authenticity:**

It is argued that *Entschlossenheit*, having neither the potency to prescribe nor direct, is inherently a 'modifier' of how Dasein understands itself. As Haar writes:

*'In itself, resoluteness indeed has no content. It modifies our **understanding** of world, others, and ourselves, but this modification is merely formal. In view of it the world does not become other in its 'content'... Resolute Dasein does not withdraw from the world to float above it. On the contrary it is "nothing other than **authentically being-in-the-world**."*<sup>192</sup>

In this modification, Dasein 'concernfully' engages with other people and world. The world is not changed, neither are other people, but Dasein has the capacity to be authentically itself in its social and mundane presentations. More importantly, as self-transformative, *Entschlossenheit* places Dasein in the way of 'repeating' itself as authentically disclosed:

*'Dasein for the first time, because it is resolved to itself, no longer encroaches on the possibilities of others; it becomes capable of authentic relations with others, capable of that "solicitude which runs ahead" and liberates the other from himself or herself.'*<sup>193</sup>

Inevitably, Dasein must fall back into the arms of *das Man*, but not so completely. The power to repeat is retained, by Dasein, as an inalienable characteristic of *Entschlossenheit*:

*'Resolved to the silence of itself, Dasein can authentically approach the other and truly talk to him or her, because it has gathered itself into itself and is no longer half-melted into the other.'*<sup>194</sup>

This inalienable characteristic is based upon the firm foundation of Dasein's death's being certain. This death is not the widespread common and prevailing demise within *das Man*, nor is it the presupposed deaths of other people. Always and forever death is specific and uniquely 'singular':

*'[Dasein] turns round and round in his own circle. He can ward off whatever threatens this limited sphere. He can employ every skill in its place ... All violence shatters against one thing. That is death. It is an end beyond all consummation, a limit beyond all limits. Here there is no breaking-out or breaking-up-, no capture or subjugation. But this strange and alien thing that banishes us once and for all from everything in which we are at home is no particular event that must be named among others because it, too, ultimately happens. It is not only when he comes to die, but always and essentially that man is without issue in the face of death.'*<sup>195</sup>

Death is unfailingly my death as unrepeatable. So what does this point to? Death as certain is premised upon my being mortal. This mortality is not the unfortunate curtailing of what ought to be eternal, but is the essence of what Dasein is. All that I am. All that I would be. All that I will be. All that I was. All this is only possible within Dasein's being finite:

*'... we need to think of human existence not as a series of occurrences moving toward a finished state, but as a movement or happening shaped by specific structures, with death being one of these structures. Regarded as a structural dimension of life, the concept of death captures the idea of life as a finite, forward-moving, directional project, one that points toward fulfilment even though a final and complete fulfilment is never possible for it as long as it exists. As being-towards-death, human existence is an unfolding movement toward the realisation of one's identity or being as a person.'*<sup>196</sup>

Dasein, as that 'unfolding movement' is also that which is scattered, diffused and dissolved within the world of *das Man*. In that dispersion, Dasein is lost and has no hold on the 'wholeness' of who it is. If it is the case that Dasein is that unitary entity as being-in-the-world, in what sense is Dasein's understanding of itself as that unity, that 'whole', ever to be made possible? If Dasein is that 'unfolding movement' then it is always in an ongoing state of being incomplete. There is no handy boundary that can be drawn between the 'this' and the 'that' of Dasein's temporality. In addition, the nature of Dasein's immersement in *das Man* is yet another feature that serves to consistently undermine Dasein's sense of itself as a 'whole'. Dasein's existence is such that its sense of 'wholeness' is perennially elusive, which leads Heidegger to ask the critical questions:

*'Can one, by following [the] path of description, arrive at any concepts that will help define human Dasein as a whole, as a unified reality?... How can human Dasein be given as a whole? For only in this way can one form a concept of life... How can we grasp human Dasein, which is always one's own, as a whole?'*<sup>197</sup>

A whole is always that which is complete by becoming completed. In its completeness it is extant and available but, as Heidegger argues:

*'...life doesn't fit this case; when all of its possibilities have been exhausted it "is" no longer.'*<sup>198</sup>

The danger for Heidegger, in this argument, is falling into the trap of regarding Dasein's existence as an experiential proceeding, an unfolding progression that has its ready terminus in an event called 'death'. His reply, in avoiding this, is to locate death in the **very being** of Dasein itself:



*'...death is not something that comes to me from somewhere; it is rather what I myself am. I myself am the possibility of my own death. Death is the utmost end of what is possible in my Dasein; it is the most extreme possibility of my Dasein. There lies in Dasein a possibility which is imminent for it and in which human Dasein itself stands imminently before itself in its most extreme possibility'*<sup>199</sup>

This location of death in the very being of Dasein leads Heidegger to assert that; 'I myself am my death precisely when I live. Here it is less important to describe types of death than to understand death as a possibility of life.'<sup>200</sup> If death is located in Dasein and is not an extraneous happening (a 'something' that can be alluded to anecdotally), then it is always that before which Dasein is perennially confronted. In this confrontation therefore, Dasein 'must have different possible ways of standing before its death.'<sup>201</sup> It is argued that the myriad different possible ways of standing before its death that Dasein invokes in evading both its own death and also its own genuine and authentic possibilities (in the world of *das Man*), have already been extensively rehearsed within this chapter and, in an important sense, have now come to some sort of fruition in serving as replies to and examples of the 'different possible ways [that Dasein has] of standing before its death' But to summarise this particular position, Heidegger goes on to assert that:

*'When death will come is wholly indefinite for Dasein. But at the same time this possibility stands imminently before us as a certainty that surpasses all other certainties we might think of. It is for Dasein a certainty that it will die its death. This certainty neither does away with the indefiniteness nor diminishes it. On the contrary, it increases it. Everydayness attempts to thrust aside this indefinite certainty... It pushes away the indefiniteness of death into the realm of postponement and suppresses its certainty in an attitude of "not thinking about it"'*<sup>202</sup>

But to return to the main question: 'How can we grasp human Dasein (which is always one's own), as a whole' and what relationship might this grasping have to *Entschlossenheit*? For Heidegger, the possibility of Dasein's coming to understand itself as a unity, as a complete 'whole', lies in the possible ways that Dasein has in standing before its own death:

*'A whole is defined by its limits. Death is such a limit that is there for Dasein itself. Standing before this limit as an indefinite yet certain possibility is what characterises the kind of being that is characteristic of human life.'*<sup>203</sup>

It has already been indicated that Dasein has many ways to inauthentically engage with this issue, which prompts Heidegger to ask the question:

*'Is there an authentic way of approaching death that is not defined by publicness but rather is a way in which Dasein always stands before itself as in each case something individual, ownmost, and "my own"?''*<sup>204</sup>

His reply is to direct attention towards Dasein's capacity to authentically engage with its possibilities by its **grasping** them as possibilities (and not as hankered-after would-be actualities), in such a way that they become Dasein's 'own' and not the generalised produce of *das Man*:

*'To endure the possibility of death means to have it there for oneself in such a way that it stands before one purely as what it is — indefinite regarding its "when" and certain regarding its "that". To let this possibility exist as a possibility and to not turn it into an actuality, as is done in suicide, for example, means to **run forward toward it** in an anticipatory manner.'*<sup>205</sup>

The nature of enduring this possibility of death as death lies, for Heidegger, in Dasein's capacity to fully embrace whatever addresses it in this possibility and not to turn aside or attempt to modify it in any way. The special quality of the term 'to endure', lies in Dasein's prevailing encounter with whatever has to be sustained, lived through, suffered and faced up to in such a way that it does not falter fatally in its enterprise (or if it does falter is able to **regain** its position and **repeat** its attempt.). Dasein, on this argument, has a choice, it can 'comport itself in such a way that it chooses between itself and the world, it can make each decision on the basis of what it encounters in the world, or it can rely on itself.'<sup>206</sup> Therefore, in each instance of embracing its death as death, Dasein retreats from the arms and blandishments of *das Man* and moves into the openness of its own genuine possibilities:

*'When Dasein has chosen itself, it has thereby chosen both itself and choice. To have chosen to choose means, however to be **resolved**. This running forward anticipatorily means choosing; to have chosen means to be resolved — not to die but to live. This choosing and this being resolved is the **choice of responsibility** for itself that Dasein takes on and that consists in the fact that in each instance of my acting I make myself responsible through my action. Choosing responsibility for oneself means to choose one's **conscience** as a possibility that the human being authentically is.'*<sup>207</sup>

In its resolution, in its choosing responsibility for itself, Dasein is therefore able to stand before itself in such a way that it becomes disclosed to itself as a 'whole'.

Earlier it was said that 'As being-towards-death, human existence is an unfolding movement toward the realisation of one's identity or being as a person.' In this sense and on this argument, *Entschlossenheit*, is an essential in the fostering of selfhood, identity and personhood within Dasein. This fostering, it is argued, connects with *Entschlossenheit* as 'authentic Being-one's Self'<sup>208</sup> in that it 'brings the Self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.'<sup>209</sup>

Consequently, as indicated earlier; *Entschlossenheit*, premised upon what Heidegger refers to as, 'anticipation', comes into existence through Dasein's readiness to turn towards *angst*, to its openness to receive the call of conscience, to its understanding of itself as essentially transcendent, to its 'ability' to bear its own guiltiness and to its turning towards its own essential finitude:

*'Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the "overcoming" of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein's existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self concealments. Nor does wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has been made determinate as Being-towards-death, signify a kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather, it brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of "taking action". Neither does anticipatory resoluteness stem from "idealistic" exactions soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of what are factually the basic possibilities for Dasein. Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualised potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility.'*<sup>210</sup>

Within the world of *das Man* I am denied this sobriety, this power and this joy. I can never return to *das Man* as the bedrock of my resoluteness. If I were resolute I could act and in my acting modify not only my own existence but also that of those around me. Because I now possess this certainty, because I am empowered to understand it, I can now return to it 'without Illusions into the resoluteness of "taking action":

*'Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others. Only by authentically being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another – not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternising in the "they" and in what "they" want to undertake.'*<sup>211</sup>

Heidegger argues that a first step in allowing other people, other human Dasein, to become authentic in what they may become, is the embracing of *Entschlossenheit* in **oneself**. In this embracing, the blandishments of *das Man* vanish when I am genuinely present to you and you are given an openness (by me) to be genuinely present with me. Only when we are able to 'co-disclose' within what is now **our** *Entschlossenheit*, are we able to 'see' and identify the *faux* enterprises that still arise before us in *das Man*. This co-disclosure does not have to be enshrined within verbal discourse, it can be characterised by a silent and reticent presence.

In order to 'point up' variations in the way Dasein can disclose in its 'solicitude' for the other, Heidegger creates a spectrum in which he places at one end what he identifies as '*einspringende Fursorge*' and at the other end what he identifies as '*vorspringende*

*Fursorge*'. Both words have clear connotations of 'leaping', 'jumping' and 'springing' (in the former of 'leaping in' and in the latter of 'leaping ahead'). In the former case, of '*einspringende Fursorge*', Heidegger indicates that Dasein in its solicitous attempts to care for the other 'leaps in' and takes the burden and responsibility upon itself in such a way that the other is disobliged to have its own burden and responsibility for him or herself. In this case, the other is deprived of its own position in such a way, that when some resolution has been obtained (as a result of Dasein's solicitude), the other can then regard the matter either as closed as 'done and dusted' or as something he can confidently pass over to whoever is willing to solicitously bear it. At this end of the spectrum, the other may so sink into dependence upon Dasein and upon Dasein's manner of caring that the other falls under the power of Dasein and that this asymmetrical relationship may go largely unheeded and unacknowledged. In this expression of solicitude, Dasein plays an active substitutional role for *das Man*.

In the latter case of '*vorspringende Fursorge*' Dasein, in its care for the other, 'leaps ahead' and does not take the burden and responsibility for the other upon itself. In turning away, Dasein does not shed its care for the other, but refuses to play an active substitutional role for *das Man*. The other remains at liberty to be either the Dasein of its genuine possibilities or to seek the readily available consolations and rationalisations of *das Man*. At all times, the freedom of the other is not derogated from by a 'heavy' solicitous presence of Dasein bent on 'leaping in' (perhaps in an overly 'empathic' way), on **behalf** of the other. At all times, the focus is **not** on the 'matter' of concern (as in a diagnosis that identifies the pathology of a condition), but rather on the possibility the other might have in seeing for him or herself who he or she is and who they may become. In this expression of solicitude, Dasein is 'there' for the other in such a way that the 'matter' of concern is not reified as a 'something' that both can look at as 'over there' as an object of attention for regarding subjects. The 'matter' of concern is not separated from the other's existence, is not removed from its existential contextuality in order to render it more readily examinable, is not removed from the other's temporality (as if time were being 'drawn to a standstill'). In this solicitude there is a steady 'selflessness' by Dasein that courageously refuses to be drawn into the multifarious expressions of 'leaping in' that may press upon it. This pressure may be very great and very persistent (for it is the pressure of *das Man*). At all times, in this solicitude, Dasein does not waver from the 'who' of the other by being distracted into the 'what':

*'... solicitude has two extreme possibilities. It can, as it were take-away 'care' from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can leap in for him. This kind of solicitude takes over for the Other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is first thrown out of his position; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. In such solicitude of the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. This kind of solicitude, which leads in and takes away 'care' is to a large extent determinative for Being. '...in contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead in his existential potentiality-for-being, not in order to take away his 'care' but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a 'what' with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.'*<sup>212</sup>

Another commentator, Boss, who later went on to develop Heidegger's ideas into a psychotherapeutic *praxis* (and held a series of seminars on that theme in Switzerland with Heidegger present) also comments on these two distinct modes of solicitude that Heidegger identifies:

***'vorspringende Fursorge'***

*'...describes that selfless caring for the other in which one goes before him in an existential sense, thereby opening to him the possibility of his perceiving more of his own innate potentiality for existing, but leaving him free in the face of this potentiality to fulfil it, or not to fulfil it.'*

***'einspringende Fursorge'***

*'one does not go before the other... existentially, opening the world to him, but rather steps into his place...and thinks and acts for him, thereby hindering him in attaining a self-reliant, independent selfhood.'*<sup>213</sup>

## **Dasein: and its resoluteness deconstructed:**

In this section, the intention is to lay out the characteristics of *Entschlossenheit* with particular reference to its 'social' ambit and to the manner in which *Entschlossenheit* as Resoluteness enables Dasein to effectively become 'the "conscience" of others', and to do this graphically by splitting the characteristics of *Entschlossenheit* into clusters of meaning:

*'Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others. Only by authentically being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another – not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternising in the "they" and in what "they" want to undertake.'*<sup>214</sup>

## **'Resoluteness towards itself':**



In becoming resolute, Dasein is not simply purposive or fixed upon a target outside itself (as a goal to be achieved), but is resolute **in itself** as Dasein transformed towards its own potentiality. This is the first movement, **itself disclosed to itself** in its authentic potentiality.

‘First makes possible’:

Before any change can take place in other people (in terms of their contact with Dasein), resoluteness towards itself must **first** have been disclosed to Dasein. Freed from the dominant inauthenticity of *das Man*, Dasein (as now transformed), is enabled to authentically engage with Others. But, being that entity who is always Being-with, Dasein **also** remains in itself as authentically being-with others, **even when no one else is present and Dasein is completely alone.**

*‘As Heidegger states, moreover, coexistence ... is not the same as interaction, or bodily co-presence. Two Daseins can coexist even if they are not interacting or perceptually present to one another. Being alone, for example, far from being an asocial condition, is a way of someone who coexists can be, a particular relationship with others.’<sup>215</sup>*

These constitute the second and third movements.

‘To let others be in their utmost potentiality-for-being’:

Dasein as resolute has no prescriptive agenda to impose on Others. In echoing the contentlessness of *Entschlossenheit*, Dasein engages with Others **in terms of their own unique individuated potentiality**. Others are thereby ‘released’ to be who they are primordially and potentially (or not to be, as the case may be.). This is the fourth movement.

‘To co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude that leaps forward and liberates’:

Through this careful mindfulness, this solicitude in being alongside the Others, **Dasein allows the Others to become transparent to themselves** so that they grasp who they are authentically in all potential fullness, and does this **without in any way standing in for the Others** or restricting their freedom to become open. Within this solicitude, Dasein and the Others are enabled together to ‘co-disclose’ their own potentiality to be. This is the fifth movement.



‘When Dasein is resolute, can become the conscience of Others’:

The presence of resolute Dasein has the characteristic of **bringing back Others from their lostness to hear themselves**. Dasein, as now authentically disclosed, 'interrupts' the discourse of *das Man* by being concernfully the one who is no longer dominated by it. This is the sixth movement.

‘Only by being-their-selves in resoluteness can people be with one another’:

By being resolute, people are not trapped within the blandishments of *das Man* but are enabled to 'repeat' their authenticity by being open to their own finitude. In this manner, **social intercourse is not dominated by the covering over of individual Dasein's own possibilities**, but is released to an acceptance of mortality and a more authentic practice in co-relating. This is the seventh movement.

‘Not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations. Not by talkative fraternising in the 'they' and in what 'they' wants to undertake’:

The 'they' set out to create straw-men, straw-people and then to relate to them as if that were really the case. This creating is done loudly and publicly under the veiled threat that rejection follows failure to accept. Constant movement and chatter encourage a busy co-association, which keeps its agenda self-importantly to the fore. Resoluteness, on the other hand, is characterised by silence and 'reticence'. As a result, Dasein now has the capacity to be authentically itself in its social and mundane presentations. More importantly, as self-transformative, resoluteness places Dasein in the way of ‘repeating’ itself as authentically disclosed.

**Dasein as state-of-mind/attunement/mood:**

In the explication of what it is to be human-being, so far, it has been argued that Dasein can lose its capacity to be 'at home' in the world when it becomes addressed by a unique anxiety, one that has no content in itself but one, in appearing to address Dasein in its wholeness, undermines all of Dasein's usual arrangements. In this undermining, Dasein's position within

its public way of being is also undermined. In losing this public and generalised identity, Dasein is able to embrace itself as individualised as being in the world. The diminishing of this public identity also takes away from Dasein the consolations that have been 'enjoyed' thereof, in particular its attitude towards its own utter extinguishment at death.

In being called to turn towards facing its own utter extinguishment (which had hitherto been 'covered over'), Dasein is enabled to recover an understanding of itself as that entity who is radically finite. In anticipating this, Dasein is able to interpret death as that which claims the whole of itself and is further enabled to understand that this claim can be exercised at any moment of Dasein's existence. In being called back from being lost in its public identity (and in conflating itself with that identity) Dasein rejects the vacuous and generalised mode of discourse associated with this identity. In this being called back there are no blurring of the boundaries between Dasein's public identity and its emerging understanding of its own individuation, and therefore no remaining remnants of consolation that Dasein can cling on to from the world of its public identity.

In allowing itself to embrace the consolations offered in its public way of being, Dasein fails to exercise its own capacity to become itself as an authentic entity. It opts for a mode of transformation that is directed not towards 'reaching out' but more towards 'recycling' of the familiar, safe, respectable, acceptable and appropriate. In being called back from being lost in its public identity, Dasein is enabled to reconnect with its capacity to 'reach out' and in that 'reaching out' to begin to resolutely turn towards its own authentic possibilities. This resolute turning towards its own authentic possibilities also creates a 'climate' of caring in which Dasein is enabled to be present to others in such a way that they are enabled to become personally transformed by also turning towards their own possible authenticity. In being present for others in this resolute manner, Dasein does not proselytise its own position or attempt to take the burden of the other upon itself, but is 'there' for the other in such a way that the other becomes free to become authentically transformed itself (and for itself).

The questions now arise: Is Dasein disposed to coming to an understanding of itself? Does it have the capacity? Can Dasein become transparent to itself? If so, can that transparency become muddled and obscured? If Dasein can come to an understanding of itself, can that understanding be misdirected? If so, in what ways? In caring for itself, can Dasein become diverted into simply hankering, wishing and wanting? Can the world be accurately disclosed to Dasein? How is the world disclosed to Dasein? In what ways can Dasein fail to accurately

to discern its own being in the world? In what ways can Dasein authentically engage with others? What would be the features of such an authentic engagement?

The purpose is to further explicate the way in which the world is disclosed to Dasein and how Dasein comes to understand and interpret. It is intended to explore the ways in which Dasein comes to such understanding and the obstacles that lie in accurately interpreting this. In addition, it is intended to unfold the ways in which Dasein becomes restricted in accessing its own genuine possibilities and the way in which discourse plays a significant role in this. By extension, it is intended to explore various ways in which Dasein is able to speak and listen (and to be) for the other, either genuinely or inauthentically.

Attention will now be directed in attempting to address many of the questions posited above, with particular and focused reference to Heidegger's notions of: '*Stimmung*', '*Verstehen*', '*Durchsichtigkeit*', '*Undurchsichtigkeit*', '*das Man*', '*Befindlichkeit*', '*Gerede*', '*Verschwiegenheit*', '*des Folgens*', '*Mitgehens*', '*des Nicht Hörens*', '*des Widersetzens*', '*des Trotzens*', '*der Abkehr*'.

A persistent theme throughout this work is Heidegger's assertion that Dasein as being-in-the-world is a unitary entity and that Dasein, as that unitary entity, cannot be separated from world. The question now arises; in what way therefore, is 'world' disclosed to Dasein and how does Dasein come to any understanding, interpretation and communication of that disclosure? In addition, some attention will be paid to the manner in which Dasein engages with others in discourse and to the special status that Heidegger gives to 'listening'.

It is Heidegger's position that Dasein is always in some sort of mood, some basic mode of disposition that may be interpreted as 'the state in which one may be found'<sup>216</sup> for which the phrase 'state-of-mind', even by its translators, is regarded as an inadequate translation of the German term *Befindlichkeit*.<sup>217</sup>

Within that basic mode of disposition, that 'state of mind', that, 'state in which one may be found', being in a mood is that common mode of being in the world that Dasein is and which it 'experiences'. This 'state-of-mind', for Heidegger, is not simply a passing phenomenon that can be interpreted psychologically as something expressive of this or of that, nor does it refer to, nor does it rely upon its being an intense 'experience' (for being in a mood can refer to even the most anaemic and lacklustre of conditions that Dasein may find itself in). He chooses the word *Stimmung* to signify this basic mode of disposition, a word that has at its

root strong connotations of 'tuning a musical instrument'<sup>218</sup> and therefore by extension of how Dasein finds itself as attuned as being in the world.

This attunement may suggest a harmony, that might allow itself to be interpreted as 'peaceful relationship' but nothing could be further from the way in which Heidegger wants this term to be used. This attunement, it is argued, has rather a closer proximity to the notion of harmonic relationship in which **accuracy** of relationship is the major underpinning premise. In being in a mood, the world is accurately disclosed to Dasein. (At this point it needs to be recalled that for Heidegger, Dasein is a unitary phenomenon and that disclosure of the world to Dasein, must also be disclosure of itself):

*'This accuracy of disclosure shows to Dasein how it is being in the world. In a state of mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has.'*<sup>219</sup>

This 'finding itself in the mood that it has' has little in common with any notion that would suggest an amalgam of what Dasein might know, what Dasein might believe, what Dasein might wish for or what Dasein might think about. In its becoming attuned (and in always **finding** itself attuned) Dasein is confronted by its being in the world in such a way that its position as an entity 'thrown' into existence is accurately disclosed. This mode of disclosure is not an optional and fleeting phenomenon Dasein can choose to have or not. It belongs to Dasein's very constitution and being in a mood is Dasein's daily and everyday condition of being itself:

*'...mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself **prior** to all cognition and volition, and **beyond** their range of disclosure. And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of counter-mood; we are never free of moods.'*<sup>220</sup>

There is no such condition, for Dasein, as not being in a mood. Dasein, by not having the option to dispense either with 'mood' or its mastering 'counter-mood', finds itself set upon and besieged by that which is beyond its control or influence. It cannot change the mood, as disclosed, into that which it not. It is therefore, on this argument, not something that Dasein casts over its experience in order to render its world more intelligible, more likeable or more amenable.

### **Dasein as understanding:**

For Heidegger, understanding (*Verstehen*) is not the result of cognitive activity, nor is it the product of epistemology. It is not something ‘achieved’ after a career, nor as a matter of ‘experience’. Rather, any of the fore-mentioned, although they may be derived from the ‘understanding’ as proposed by Heidegger, may neither substitute for it nor precede it. Understanding (*Verstehen*) is not ‘bolted-onto’ Dasein as something optional, something it can either have or do without:

*‘this phenomenon is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein’s **Being**.’*<sup>221</sup>

For Heidegger, ‘state-of-mind always has its understanding’<sup>222</sup> and ‘understanding always has its mood’<sup>223</sup>. Therefore, arising from the constancy of Dasein’s always being cast in a mood or counter-mood, it has already got before itself its own possibilities (whether it ignores them, deliberately turns away from them or engagingly embraces them.). On this argument, Dasein’s foundational mode of understanding lies upon its potentiality, its own ‘possibility to be’, and not upon what Dasein ‘knows’ as acquired ‘knowledge’ or ‘theory’. This understanding cannot be divorced from Dasein’s concernfulness, its own care for itself as being in the world and its concern for others (with whom it is always ‘being-with’ even when completely alone). In all this, Dasein has the capacity to blunder about, misinterpreting and finding itself in error regarding these possibilities whilst also remaining free to continue to be such or to allow itself to more accurately become ‘attuned’. Nevertheless, within this capacity, Dasein is always ‘transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees’<sup>224</sup> and in this transparency constantly has before it its own possibilities, ones that are specific and can actually be ‘followed’ or lived out.

### **Dasein as essentially futural:**

This transparency discloses to Dasein the myriad ways in which Dasein may live, ways that embrace the subtle and specific detail that pertain to its personal existence alone, a transparency which lays bare that which can always be open to being misinterpreted. The constant refrain of ‘potentiality’ and ‘possibility’ points continually to that which is essentially futural. For Heidegger, Dasein has no foundational underpinning to its radical finitude **other than** the possibilities it remains open to.

Mood is able constantly to disclose to Dasein, for Dasein is that entity open to the world and ceaselessly confronting that which is of **concern** to it. This stream of constant disclosure is of Dasein's concernful disposition in which Dasein has the capacity to allow itself to become so absorbed in this stream that the everyday 'matters' of the world, the persistent 'averageness' of the 'they' comes to dominate. In its embracing the blandishments of das Man, and in being 'lost' in them, Dasein comes to assume for itself a substantial unpinning it can never possess and, in resting upon these absent footings closes itself off from whatever is being disclosed within its own transparency.

The phrase 'that which is essentially futural', is not intended to indicate a stance of proposed action that Dasein may strategically strike in order to carry out some sort of blue-print for action. What it is intended to indicate is that Dasein is constitutively orientated toward the projective and in being projective always casts itself ahead of itself in such a way that whatever position it finds itself in is always the result of some former projective throwing forward. In this sense Dasein's capacity to project always entails a contemporary and a 'historical' dimension, since it can never be free of its projection:

*'Only because the Being of the 'there' receives its Constitution through understanding and through the character of understanding as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or alternatively does not become), can it say to itself 'Become what you are', and say this with understanding.'*<sup>225</sup>

In a sense, Heidegger's challenging notion regarding the nullity, the null heart of Dasein, that abyss of nothingness that opens up under Dasein when the persistent grasping gesture of death is recognised, is fundamentally related to 'Entwurf', Heidegger's term for Dasein's projectiveness. In relying upon the mythical foundations of das Man, Dasein is unable to 'see' the full potentiality of its possibilities. It disables itself to such an extent that its 'Durchsichtigkeit', its transparency, becomes occluded:

*'Understanding can devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of its world. Or else understanding throws itself primarily 'for-the-sake-of-which'; that is, Dasein exists as itself. Understanding is either authentic, arising out of one's own Self as such, or inauthentic.'*<sup>226</sup>

Authenticity and inauthenticity are, on this analysis, to be regarded as 'basic possibilities of understanding', and not as ephemeral and 'historical' psychological conditions that can be readily amended, for example, by brief therapeutic intervention. On this argument, authentic or inauthentic possibilities of understanding, do not lay aside the whole of 'what' Dasein is



nor what Dasein may become. Inauthenticity is not to be regarded merely as the ‘shadow side’ of authenticity (as if this latter were somehow the ‘real’ Dasein and inauthenticity a mere fragment of its ‘true’ possibilities). **In either sense**, Dasein has the full capacity to be always fully disclosed to itself. Nevertheless, either one way or the other Dasein has **already** become *Sichverlegen in*, that is ‘diverted’ into authenticity or inauthenticity and diverted into these as **possibilities of understanding**. It should be emphasised that Dasein as diverted into an inauthentic possibility of understanding always remains within the projective mode of its being in the world. Inauthenticity is never to be thought of as an abandonment of this:

*‘Thus when we speak of ‘Being-ahead-of-itself’, the ‘itself’ which we have in mind is in each case the Self in the sense of the they-self. Even in inauthenticity Dasein remains essentially ahead of itself, just as Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself as it falls, still shows that it has the state-of-being of an entity for which its Being is an issue.’*<sup>227</sup>

At this point in his argument, Heidegger employs notions that emphasise the ‘sight’ of what is disclosed and the ‘opaqueness’ with which this understanding as ‘sight’ is obscured; his special terms for these are *Sicht* and *Undurchsichtigkeit* respectively.

For him, *Sicht* and *Undurchsichtigkeit* are related to the way that phenomena may be disclosed to Dasein and he employs here the term ‘sight’, for, in his interpretation of the philosophical tradition, this special term has always had the sense of letting things be apprehended ‘unconcealedly in themselves’.<sup>228</sup> This seeing is not to be interpreted as a bare visual exposure after the manner of a picture or as an optical process, but is rooted in the way that Dasein has already been diverted into its possibilities of understanding. These terms, *Sicht* and *Undurchsichtigkeit*, it is argued, must also avoid being interpreted as mere metaphors for theoretical or notional procedures. They must, on this argument, always retain that sense in which phenomena have the capacity to immediately become accessible to ‘sight’ (and also the capacity to be obscured within it). On this argument, it is through ‘sight’, rooted always in understanding that, Dasein is enabled to gain access to *Selbsterkenntnis*, or ‘knowledge of the self’.<sup>229</sup>

It is at this juncture that I am able to refer to Chapter Three of this dissertation in which Dasein’s structures of understanding, in terms of this argument, are more further developed.

### **Dasein as modified:**

As has been noted earlier, Dasein in its day-to-day activity often mirrors the frenetic inauthentic transformations of *das Man*. Tranquillised, as it is, by the general consolations of *das Man*, Dasein eschews lying down and sleeping awhile, in favour of a 'must keep up with', in which a constant hurrying and bustle becomes equated with living the best kind of life. It is 'from this world it takes its possibilities'.<sup>230</sup> But instead of a full exposure to these possibilities, Dasein allows itself to become confined within 'the range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable — that which is fitting and proper'.<sup>231</sup> The freneticism of activity that characterises this mode of tranquillised absorption in *das Man* is never Dasein earnestly and understandingly opening itself to the 'full range' of its possibilities, but is Dasein frenetically moving around in that which is already known:

*'This tranquillising does not rule out a high degree of diligence in one's concern, but arouses it. In this case no positive new opportunities are willed, but that which is at one's disposal becomes 'tactically' altered in such a way that there is a semblance of something happening.'*<sup>232</sup>

The presence of 'a high degree of diligence' and the persistence of its arousal signifies, on this argument, Dasein's persistent and inextinguishable openness to its own possibilities within the structure of care. Having at its 'disposal' the world as interpreted and fostered by *das Man*, Dasein, as always essentially projective, throws itself upon possibilities 'whose fulfilment has not even been pondered over and expected'.<sup>233</sup> It is this lack of expectation, this lack of pondering, that characterises a deficient mode of understanding, a mode of understanding that expresses itself in the form of 'wishing'. It is in 'wishing' that Dasein as *Sichverlegen in* (that is 'diverted'), is not in a mode of understanding that can disclose to it the 'factual possibilities'<sup>234</sup> of its own genuine possibilities of being in the world. Instead, this deficient mode of understanding is only able to reveal to Dasein a world that can only ever be 'never enough'.<sup>235</sup> The world that is 'never enough' is one in which Dasein has at its disposal that which can never adequately fulfil that over which it has projected its wishes. The meeting of the 'actual' and the 'wished-for' always results in the 'actual' being disclosed as deficient. In addition, whatever is 'wished for, also has the capacity to collapse into the 'actual', through its having about it a unfulfillable concreteness, a concreteness related more the deficiency of understanding than to genuine 'factual possibilities'. Within this mode of understanding, possibilities possess the characteristics of having 'hard outlines' much after

the manner of ‘castles in the air’ but castles that still always remain castles. Despite this, Dasein’s appetite for wishing remains undiminished for:

*‘Wishing is an existential modification of projecting oneself understandingly, when such self-projection has fallen forfeit to thrownness and just keeps **hankering** after possibilities.’*<sup>236</sup>

‘Wishing’ as an existential modification restricts Dasein’s accessibility to its own genuine possibilities, but it does not restrict, on this argument, Dasein’s **capacity** to be always open to these. That which is wished for has the air of being immediately available, of being concretely and actually ‘attainable’ at any moment. This attainability is always ‘just there’ and, as such, can always be desired in its own occurring concreteness.

*‘...the irresoluteness of inauthentic existence temporalises itself in the mode of making-present which does not await but forgets. He who is irresolute understands himself in terms of those very closest events and be-fallings which he encounters in such making-present and which thrust themselves upon him in varying ways. Busily losing **himself** in the object of his concern, he **loses his time** in it too. Hence his characteristic of talking — ‘I have no time’.’*<sup>237</sup>

Although Dasein’s ‘focus’ remains on that which is desired and ‘hankered’ over (and which when gained must always be deficient), what is of issue here, on this argument, is not the deficiency of that which is ‘wished for’ per se, but that:

*‘Dasein, as it were, sinks into addiction... there is not merely an addiction present-at-hand, but the entire structure of care has been modified.’*<sup>238</sup>

In this modification of the structure of care, Dasein loses its *Sicht* and enters the mode of *Undurchsichtigkeit*. In its opaqueness, Dasein no longer ‘looks’ at that which belongs to the projective, but attends to that ‘just always already alongside’. In this modified attentiveness Dasein gains, in a seemingly paradoxical manner, both a heightened focus on that which has to be attained, together with a craving compulsion towards that which is ‘wished for’:

*‘...the **urge** ‘to live’ is something ‘towards’ which one is impelled, and it brings the impulsion along with it of its own accord. It is ‘towards this at any price’. The urge seeks to crowd out other possibilities’.*<sup>239</sup>

This absorbing fascination for something that is wished-for is entirely open-ended and has no ready terminus.

### **Dasein as discourse/language:**

In Heidegger's analysis, language is inextricably bound up with *Befindlichkeit* and with understanding. For him, language is that phenomenon which is radically connected to 'talking', to discourse, **even when** there has been no utterance. This foundational and radical connectedness lies in Dasein's **already** being-with others, even when Dasein is completely alone. This 'being-with' is always within the context of care, even when Dasein is being indifferent or neglectful and is akin somewhat, to mood and counter-mood as indicated above in that, as with 'being-with', there is no such option for Dasein for **not** being in a mood. Language, for Heidegger is not a 'bolt-on' facility that Dasein can have or do without, for:

*'As an existential state in which Dasein is disclosed, discourse is constitutive for Dasein's existence. **Hearing and keeping silent** are possibilities belonging to discursive speech... Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world.'*<sup>240</sup>

As such, discourse is 'modelled upon this basic state of Dasein' and therefore resembles Dasein within its own analysable modes. It must never, on this argument, be collapsed into a narrow interpretation of language where language/discourse comes to signify a positive mode of communication in which the transmission of information from one to another is deemed to be the primarily significant element. Although discourse is always 'about' something, (and in that sense appears to have 'content'), the 'content' is really the disclosure of that which has **already** been disclosed in the very uttering.

### **Dasein as radically exterior:**

As has been noted above, 'hearing and keeping silent are possibilities belonging to discursive speech', in which phonic articulation of words is simply part of that which is being rendered articulable. Whatever is being articulated, arises out of the fact that 'Dasein-with' is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding'<sup>241</sup> Discourse therefore, does not create the means, the mode or the occasion of 'being-with' but it does, within this argument, render it 'explicit'. This explicitness is not simply the imparting of novel and interesting experiences and facts from one to another, in which these experiences and facts are always hidden from one isolated monad to be revealed by another isolated monad through the 'medium' of speech, but rather:

*'[Dasein] as Being-in-the-world... is already 'outside' when it understands'.<sup>242</sup>*

In being outside, in its radical exteriority, Dasein is **already** in a mood and, as has been argued earlier, in being in a mood, the world becomes accurately disclosed to Dasein (as unitary phenomenon), in which disclosure of the world to Dasein, also becomes disclosure of itself:

*'Being-in and its state-of-mind are made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk, 'the way of speaking'.<sup>243</sup>*

On this analysis, intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk and the idiosyncratic way of speaking are not mere 'features' of Dasein's discourse (in which the important 'content' of any discourse could be adequately rendered in a robotic monotone), but are **integral** to the disclosure of what it is to 'be with', 'be-in' and 'the state in which one may be found'. Within this argument any attunement to intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk and the idiosyncratic way of speaking would provide a more accurate discernment of Dasein's being in the world. Any reluctance or incapacity to attune would consequently render an impoverishment of 'being-with' and 'being-in'. A determined focusing on the 'content' of any discourse (as speech), where the primary element of interest would be on its informational value as data, in which intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk and the idiosyncratic way of speaking would become side-lined or in any way reduced in significance would, within the terms of this argument, exclude to a large extent the rich possibilities of Dasein's constitutive openness. The Dasein who speaks and the Dasein who listens becomes, in the condition outlined above, co-terminus with each other in a discursive impoverishment. The Dasein who speaks is not listened to and the Dasein who listens does not hear for:

*'Hearing is constitutive for discourse.'<sup>244</sup>*

### **Dasein and hearing as primary and authentic:**

In the same way that speech is not simply phonic articulation, hearing is not simply acoustic response. Hearing is not simply a something that 'happens' as a consequence of something else's stimulatingly causal activity. Dasein's capacity to hear arises within an ambit of significance that **already** exists for it. That ambit is that of understanding. As has been noted earlier, Dasein's foundational mode of understanding lies upon its potentiality, its own 'possibility to be', and not upon what Dasein 'knows' as acquired 'knowledge' or 'theory'.

This understanding cannot be divorced from Dasein's concernfulness, its own care for itself as being in the world and its concern for others (with whom it is always 'being-with' even when completely alone):

*'Listening to... is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-being — as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it.'*<sup>245</sup>

Heidegger, in turning commonsensical notions on their head, argues, 'Dasein hears, because it understands'<sup>246</sup>, rather than 'Dasein understands, because it hears'. In this hearing, Dasein is **already** immersed in the world of *das Man* and, as such, **already** subsumed within an ambit of meaning and significance within which Dasein's hearing becomes attuned. In addition, Dasein's always 'being-with' others, even when completely alone, advances and transforms in this engagement:

*'Being-with develops in listening to one another which can be done in several possible ways: following, going along with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away.'*<sup>247</sup>

Presumably, what Heidegger intends to convey by the notion of 'privative' is that even when Dasein is unheedingly oblivious in an inattentive way to the intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk and the idiosyncratic way of speaking (that is, when that particular quality of listening is **absent**), even then Dasein is in a transformative mode of engagement with the other, though perhaps 'negatively'. Listening, on this view, 'constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-being'.<sup>248</sup> As primary and authentic (even in its privative mode), listening is not prior to understanding as, for example, being a simple receptive conduit that **leads** to understanding. Heidegger underlines the significance of this argument by paraphrasing his own earlier statement, 'only he who already understands can listen'.<sup>249</sup>

### **Dasein, language, noise and chatter:**

Earlier, it was posited that language, on this argument, must never be collapsed into a narrow interpretation in which it comes to signify a positive mode of communication where the transmission of information from one to another is deemed to be the primarily significant element. Discourse, for Heidegger is broad and deep, having about it elements that range beyond the usefully communicative. On this argument, discourse renders 'being-with' explicit and has the capacity (as primary and authentic) to engender in others the possibility



to transform (but not on the basis of bare informative data along the lines of ‘this is how you do it’ or ‘this is how you should be’). The breadth and the depth of discourse entails also the **absence** (though not in a privative way), of words, sentences and phonic activity. Discourse cannot be collapsed into ‘language-noise’, nor be identified with constant streams of ‘talking speech. Although silence of interlude makes word-discourse possible and allows differences and nuances to become disclosed, yet it is not the necessary hiatus between words that Heidegger is intending when he says:

*‘Keeping silent is another essential possibility of discourse.’*<sup>250</sup>

This ‘keeping silent’, in which no words are uttered, is not only a possibility of discourse (as perhaps one among many), but serves to expose Heidegger’s foundational argument. To recapitulate: Dasein’s foundational mode of understanding lies upon its potentiality, its own ‘possibility to be’, and not upon what Dasein ‘knows’ as acquired ‘knowledge’ or ‘theory’. This understanding cannot be divorced from Dasein’s concernfulness, its own care for itself as being in the world and its concern for others (with whom it is always ‘being-with’ even when completely alone). ‘Talking at length’, as Heidegger puts it, is not the royal road to understanding, as if a simple quantitative calculation could be made that correlated greater understanding with a corresponding quantity of information, but rather:

*‘Both talking and hearing are based upon understanding. And understanding arises neither through talking at length nor through busily hearing something ‘all around’. Only he who already understands can listen.’*<sup>251</sup>

This ‘busily hearing something “all around”’, is the corresponding feature to the ‘talking at length’ and entails an indiscriminate acquisitiveness of whatever is being talked about with the intention of ‘passing it along’ in the mode of *Gerede*, (chatter). This ‘passing it along’, within the agreeable context of *das Man*, has the effect of concealing whatever is being talked about beneath a surface of that which has **already** been agreed. Because it has **already** been agreed, it has the limpid appearance of that which is unassailably transparent. The more it is talked ‘about’ the clearer it becomes, with the result that it ‘brings what is understood to a sham clarity — the unintelligibility of the trivial’.<sup>252</sup>

### **Dasein and reticence:**

Silence, on this interpretation, can serve as a countervailing mode of discourse, one that does not conjoin itself with the stream of chatter, but absents itself, not because it is bored or indifferent nor dumbly waiting to ‘pass it along’ but because it is passionately engaged. Its

absent presence, rather than being an unnoticed and sidelined phenomenon, has the possibility of pointing towards a more authentic discourse. As silent, in this countervailing mode, Dasein has already disclosed itself as that entity that has something to say ‘outside’ the mode of *das Man*, and, as such, demonstrated another possibility of being in the world that does not accede to that immersement within *Gerede*. This countervailing mode (that Heidegger terms *Verschwiegenheit* and which is translated as ‘reticence’) already discloses authentic Dasein as ‘holding back’ in reserved restraint that which has already the capacity to be disclosed within talking speech. **Nevertheless**, *Verschwiegenheit* itself, on this view, is not simply a latent or potential contributor to authentic discourse, a contributor that would always and only find its true home in ‘talking speech’, but is itself **already** part of that discourse in its very reticence.

### **Dasein and the six modes:**

Earlier, it was posited that, on this argument, there were six basic modes in which Dasein engages in listening and that these were indicated as:

1. following (*des Folgens*)
2. going along with (*Mitgehens*)
3. not-hearing (*des Nicht Hörens*)
4. resisting (*des Widersetzens*)
5. defying (*des Trotzens*)
6. turning away (*der Abkehr*).

It is now intended to split these terms into clusters of meaning, following Heidegger’s argument in *Being And Time* (pp.206-207) with a view to expanding upon each cluster so that they may become more readily accessible and explicable as modes in which Dasein engages in listening.

### **Dasein as *des Folgens*:**

In this mode, Dasein is always trailing in the wake of that which it treats as larger and more significant. It allows itself to be the disciple of that which it deems to be leader. Essentially,

Dasein opts for an orientation that is always set by the other and surrenders its own capacity to follow its own genuine possibilities by always looking ahead to the others' direction and compass bearing.

### **Dasein as *Mitgehens*:**

In this mode, Dasein does not simply follow in the wake of that which it treats as leader, but more indifferently (and in a more companionable way) allows itself to be conjoined with the prevailing topic/opinion/mood/issue/fashion. In this mode Dasein may appear as undergoing a dynamic, personal and volatile adaptation and transformation, but in effect nothing may be happening other than a brief adoption of that which is novel, nearest and easiest to hand. In this mode, Dasein may delude itself that it is in control of whatever it is choosing to adopt, but actually its persistent adoption of this particular mode may point toward an underlying lack of engagement with its own genuine possibilities.

### **Dasein as *des Nicht Hörens*:**

In this mode, Dasein is so deeply immersed in the idle chatter of *das Man* that it maintains itself in a persistent state of privation. In this privation attentiveness to intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk and 'the way of speaking' is excluded. By this means Dasein fails to hear what is being disclosed in the discourse and opts to hear only the 'language noise' generated by the 'they'. It is as if it were wearing close-fitting ear-defenders that systematically filter out anything not directly attributable to *rede*.

### **Dasein as *des Widersetzens*:**

In this mode, Dasein does have an understanding of what is being genuinely disclosed in the discourse and has a recognition of its occurrence and re-occurrence yet, at each occasion of its appearance Dasein positively and stubbornly refuses to accept this disclosure and holds out against it. *Des Widersetzens* is to be distinguished from *des Trotzens*, in that metaphorically it resembles more an implacable fortress than a positive attacking mode.

### **Dasein as *des Trotzens*:**

In this mode, Dasein openly refuses to accept genuine discourse and positively disregards what that discourse discloses. In a pugnacious and combative manner it sets itself on an opposite course and, in a dissenting way, opts for that which is simply contrary. In a sense, it persistently allows itself to be **negatively** defined by genuine discourse.

### **Dasein as *der Abkehr*:**

In this mode, Dasein rejects that which is being genuinely disclosed, not through positive contentiousness, but through deliberately looking in another direction and in taking a different path. In this mode, Dasein may quietly and modestly hide its rejection and may go unspotted in its orientation. In a sense, like *des Trotzens* it persistently allows itself to be **negatively** defined by genuine discourse.

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### **Resumé:**

In the unfolding of what it is to be human-being, explicated within this chapter, human-being is never an object but always I myself as 'who' and never a 'what' who is able to make choices as I face my possibilities. In addition, there has been little talk about 'a human-being' or 'the human-being' but always '**human-being**' in acknowledgement of my essential openness to existence, but never as 'a' thing or '**the**' thing to be pointed at as the '**that**' or the '**what**'. In facing my possibilities I am always facing towards the future. Ways of understanding that can be applied to objects within the world cannot be applied to human-being, for it is always 'I' who is being understood. Within that understanding must always be included the multifarious ways in which I care about and for myself, how I communicate with others, how they communicate with me, how I am conformed to the world, and the manner of my engagements. In all that, I am never simply an ego already established and looking out from behind my eyes onto a strange and alien world but I am already outside with other human-being and I'm there as I myself.

When I meet with others and speak with them and they speak to me, they are never simply animated flesh or simply other versions of 'things' that I encounter in the world. The others are like myself and, being like myself, have an enormous influence upon me and upon whom I may become. In the ordinary course of events, I allow myself to be influenced to a greater extent by the others' influence upon me (and I contribute likewise to that others' conformation by my influence also) and I find this very easy and very satisfying. In addition, it has been argued that human-being, as Dasein, in its ordinary day-to-day existence, allows

itself to be subsumed within a public way of being. This public way of being is formative for Dasein in that it levels down that which may be exceptional and is the primary mode of interpretation for Dasein and its ordinary way of being. The consequence is that Dasein develops a self that is mostly of this public way and in this public selfhood is mostly inauthentic.

This public way of being is not an alternative mode for Dasein; it is unavoidable in that it actually belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. In this public way of being, Dasein comes to see things in an average sort of way and interprets its world mostly in the manner set down by this public way of being. As such, Dasein adopts not only the tempo of this way but also the mode of speaking, listening, choosing, thinking and understanding and in that adoption is mostly not itself and is therefore mostly inauthentic.

This public way of being constantly undermines Dasein's ability to be genuinely itself in that Dasein comes to conflate its own possibilities with this public way with the consequence that Dasein's whole being consistently turns away from its own genuine possibility to be itself.

It has been argued that Dasein can lose its capacity to be 'at home' in the world when it becomes addressed by a unique anxiety, an *angst*, one that has no content in itself but one, in appearing to address Dasein in its wholeness, undermines all of Dasein's usual arrangements. In this undermining, Dasein's position within its public way of being is also undermined. In losing this public and generalised identity, Dasein is enabled to embrace itself as individualised as being in the world. The diminishing of this generalised and public identity also takes away from Dasein the consolations that have hitherto been 'enjoyed', in particular its attitude towards its own utter extinguishment at death.

In being called to turn towards facing its own utter extinguishment, (which had hitherto been consolingly 'covered over') Dasein, it has been argued, is enabled to recover an understanding of itself as that entity who is radically finite. In being free to anticipate its own death, Dasein is able to interpret death as that which claims the whole of itself and is further enabled to understand that this claim can be exercised at any moment of Dasein's existence. In being called back from being lost in its generalised and public way of being (and in conflating itself with that) Dasein rejects the vacuous and generalised mode of discourse associated with this. In this being called back, Dasein discovers that there are no blurring of the boundaries between its public way of being and its emerging understanding of its own

individuation. In this new clarity there are no remaining remnants of consolation that Dasein can cling on to from the world of its public identity.

In allowing itself to embrace the consolations offered in its public way of being, Dasein fails to exercise its own capacity to become itself as an authentic entity. It opts for a mode of transformation that is directed not towards 'reaching out' but more towards 'recycling' of the familiar, safe, respectable, acceptable and appropriate. In being called back from being lost in its public way of being, Dasein is enabled to reconnect with its intrinsic capacity to 'reach out' and in that 'reaching out' to begin to resolutely turn towards its own authentic possibilities.

This resolute turning towards its own authentic possibilities creates a 'climate' of caring in which Dasein is enabled to be present to others in such a way that they too are enabled to become personally transformed by also turning towards their own possible authenticity.

In being present for others in this resolute manner, Dasein does not proselytise its own position or attempt to take the burden of the other upon itself, but is 'there' for the other in such a way that the other becomes free to become authentically transformed itself (and for itself).

Dasein is always in some sort of mood (not in the sense of being 'moody' or emotionally heightened), but in the sense of always being in a state in which the world is accurately disclosed to Dasein. There's no such thing for Dasein as being 'blank'. This being in a mood is not an option for Dasein. Dasein is always in a mood and accompanying that mood is also an understanding of what that mood discloses to Dasein in its possibilities to be itself.

Dasein's understanding is not simply something that comes after the mood or after the disclosure (as a cognitive interpretive afterthought), but is itself embedded in Dasein's constitution as being in the world. Dasein, in a sense, **already is** understanding. In being in a mood, and coming to some understanding of what that mood discloses, Dasein may become transparent to itself in the sense of how it may live its life and how it may live it in the light of its possibilities.

Within this chapter it has been argued that Dasein's being in a mood and Dasein's way of understanding point always towards Dasein's possibilities to be itself and indicate always to Dasein that it is always open to **all** its possibilities. Nevertheless, Dasein may become less transparent to itself than is good for it, in that its transparency may become occluded and even opaque. This occlusion may arise by Dasein's persistent immersion in its public way of



being, in that its ability to **see** itself and **how** it may become, becomes covered over by a generalised way of being (a way that is at odds with the individuation that belongs to Dasein in its intrinsic openness to **all** its genuine possibilities).

In being diverted, through its lack of transparency, the argument has gone, Dasein settles for what is immediately within its range, it settles for the familiar, the attainable, the respectable and the fitting and proper. In also settling for what is immediately within its range, Dasein becomes fascinated by what it 'wants'. In this 'wanting' and 'wishing' it 'hankers' (in an addictive sort of way), over what it perceives as imminently attainable. In a sense, the actual objects of Dasein's hankering, become persistently **substitutional** for its genuine possibilities.

As has been argued, Dasein is always with others, even when it is completely alone (and even when completely alone is always greatly influenced by those other's presence).

This being with others is not an option for Dasein; it is part of Dasein's basic constitution one that it can never exclude (even when it adopts an extreme position along the lines of 'I want to be alone.'). In always being with others, Dasein speaks and Dasein listens, and is involved in discourse even when completely alone.

When Dasein listens and the other speaks, Dasein may be attuned to how the other speaks, the speed, the intonation, the modulation, the special personal manner in which the other discourses, in such a way that each may become authentically disclosed to one other through sensitive and nuanced listening.

Strong indications have been given of the various structures within Dasein's public way of being that perpetuate Dasein's 'inauthentic' condition, not least the phenomenon of 'idle talk'. On this argument, a plethora of information 'about' something is not necessarily regarded as a help-mate on the road to understanding. Silent and reticent presence of the other may powerfully serve to countervail the persistent intrusiveness of the dominant public way of being that Dasein is immersed in (and so readily runs toward), and may be a **definite** option for Dasein in its attempts to genuinely discourse with the other. It is through this kind of listening (in which silence and reticence are a part) that the possibility arises of Dasein's becoming transformed and of being a transforming presence to others. This kind of listening is also part of Dasein's understanding of how it is with others in the world.

It has also been argued that there are other kinds of listening, ones in which Dasein positively opts for an orientation that is always set by the other, ones in which it simply goes along with whatever is being suggested, ones in which it fails to hear what is being genuinely disclosed, ones in which it resists what is being spoken of, ones in which it openly defies by setting itself positively at odds with whatever is being articulated and ones in which it deliberately turns away and goes off in other directions.

### **Forward Focus: Further Questioning:**

One of the challenges within this dissertation is to consistently remain within Heidegger's understanding of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. In that understanding, Heidegger has made it clear that world for Dasein is not something "with which he provides himself occasionally". Heidegger's understanding precludes any notion of Dasein as an isolated "knowing subject" confronting a world of objects in which the main and most significant relationship with the world is epistemological.

Dasein as being in the world is already one who understands. Dasein as the one who exists, exists with the possibility of being authentic or inauthentic. For Heidegger, Dasein is not grounded first on a firm substantial base from which it may then confidently interrogate and access that which presents itself. Dasein **already** possesses an essential relationship with world (and with other Dasein) and it is out of this latter relationship that Dasein mostly comes to be conformed and out of which it arrives at an understanding of itself as "Self".

On Heidegger's understanding, there is no such possibility of an isolated Dasein. For Heidegger, Dasein is always given as that entity that is always "being-with" other Dasein. The consequence of this understanding is that Dasein's existence is grounded upon being in the world with others and that this understanding must precede any account whatsoever of Dasein as an isolated monad and must not be excluded in the giving of any such an account.

Another consequence of Heidegger's understanding of Dasein's being with others as Being-in-the-world (as summarised above) is, that no elaborate mechanism has to be clanked into place in order to establish a connective link between Dasein and others. Nor does a connective link have to be severed in order for "being-with" to be understood.

For Dasein: "the identity of an "I" is grounded in self understanding, however diffuse it might remain. In the "I", self-consciousness expresses itself, not as the self-relationship of a knowing subject, but rather as the ethical self assurance of a person capable of being responsible. And this person who is capable of being responsible indeed always stands in an intersubjectively share life world."<sup>253</sup>

Much space has been given, within this dissertation, to the notion of an intersubjectively shared life world, to the position of *das Man* as the ordinary world of Dasein. I wish to make it clear that I am aware of conflictual tensions that exist around this notion between (for example), the notion of "idle talk" as the ordinary given discourse of Dasein within *das Man* and the asking of the questions: "Can there ever be an authentic discourse for Dasein?" and if not: "Is silence therefore the only authentic discourse available to Dasein?". I am also aware that 'lying on the table' is the question: "If the ordinary discourse of Dasein is "idle talk" and if that discourse constitutes that which is ordinarily intelligible, how could anything approaching an authentic discourse be ever rendered intelligible for Dasein?"

Two further questions are also possible arising from this conflictual tension: "If personal transformation is based upon discourse and if personal transformation is premised upon becoming authentic, how can transformation ever come about in the absence of authentic discourse?" and also: "If silence is the only mode of authentic discourse available, how is Dasein able to engage with that?"

I do not intend to engage with these issues 'head-on' (as they constitute substantial issues outside the scope of this dissertation.). Nevertheless, I do wish to take them forward as a continuing and unavoidably persistent tone, one that will resonate recurrently with an accompanying understanding that the clear weight of argument presented so far, points towards an inauthenticity, one that is primordial for Dasein and against which Dasein is able to contend.

Up to now, discussion about 'a human-being' or 'the human-being' has been eschewed in favour of '**human-being**' in acknowledgement of Dasein's essential openness to existence, never as '**a**' thing (or '**the**' thing to be pointed at as the '**that**' or the '**what**'). In addition, it has been argued that human-being is never an object but always I myself as 'who' and never a 'what' who is able to make choices as I face 'my' possibilities. This interpretation of what it is to be human-being has been central, within this dissertation, in developing a basis for asking the question 'who is it being transformed?' In attempting to address that question, I have had

to confront my own position in that I too am never 'a' thing or 'the' thing to be pointed at as the 'that' or the 'what' and in attempting to address the question 'who is it being transformed?' I must somehow set myself the task of avoiding turning myself into a 'that' or the 'what' and to demonstrate somehow that I am attempting to be otherwise. In furtherance of that intention, I have located myself within the research process as a 'who', as one who has undergone personal transformation and as one whose life direction has been diverted as a result of that change. In addition, I am registering that this research project itself is identified as being consequent upon that transformation. I am also arguing that in making explicit my immersion (as to be presented within Chapter Three and Chapter Five), I am engaging with an interpretation of Heideggerian hermeneutics as explicated with Chapter Five of this dissertation, but briefly summarised here as:

- Heideggerian hermeneutics must always include notions of understanding that embrace care, concern, relationship, engagement and language that can be applied to Dasein's Being-in-the-world.
- Heideggerian hermeneutics in its interrogation must not be covered over by received or conventional notions of what it is to be a human-being.
- Heideggerian hermeneutics eschews any analysis of Dasein that would resemble a subject/object, body/soul, mental/physical, objective/subjective mode of interpretation.

Consequently, the intention of Chapter Five is to unfold my immersion as 'who' and not 'what', with the subject of this dissertation and to delineate that immersion at the developmental thresholds of my personal transformations. I have identified two dreams within my personal biography that significantly engage with the material of this dissertation and which locate me not only within the stream of personal transformation but which have led me to undertake this specific research project. In explicating these dreams, the intention has been to preserve the integrity of the narrative, so that the fluency of the dream action may be kept intact. In furthering that intention, the first part of Chapter Five will resemble a story, one that is embedded in my personal biography.

## CHAPTER TWO END NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Thiele, Leslie Paul (1995) p.44.

<sup>2</sup> But see also Schurmann, Reiner (1990) p.318n:

‘Greek classic antiquity agreed that the highest form of human life was spent in a *polis* and that the supreme human capacity was speech...Rome and medieval philosophy defined man as the *animal rationale*; in the initial stages of the modern age, man was thought of primarily as *homo faber*, until in the nineteenth century, man was interpreted as an *animal laborans*.’

<sup>3</sup> CTP. pp.347-348.

<sup>4</sup> CTP. pp.347-348.

<sup>5</sup> BT. p. 90.

<sup>6</sup> Descartes, René (1965) (1637).p.27.

<sup>7</sup> Guignon, Charles (2006), p. 552.

<sup>8</sup> BT. p.67.

<sup>9</sup> HCT. pp.152-153.

<sup>10</sup> HCT. p.153.

<sup>11</sup> BT. p. 32.

<sup>12</sup> BT p.67.

<sup>13</sup> BT. p.151.

<sup>14</sup> BT. p.68.

<sup>15</sup> See HCT. p.153:

‘The relationship of being to the entity which I myself am characterises this ‘to-be’ as the ‘in each case mine’. This mode of being—to be it—is essentially to be it in each instance mine, whether I expressly know about it or not, whether I have lost myself in my being (cf. the Anyone) [*das Man*, The They] or not.’ [my square bracketing].

<sup>16</sup> BT. p. 68.

<sup>17</sup> BPP. p. 170.

<sup>18</sup> BT.p.33.

<sup>19</sup> BPP. pp. 160-162.

<sup>20</sup> See BPP. pp. 170-171, for an explication of Heidegger’s understanding of the connection between *das Man* and Dasein’s mode of existence as either authentic or inauthentic:

‘Dasein is... determined in its possibilities by the beings to which it relates as to intraworldly beings. The Dasein understands itself first by way of these beings: it is at first unveiled to itself in its inauthentic selfhood... What is more, inauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of factual Dasein. Authenticity is only a

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modification but not a total of obliteration of inauthenticity... Dasein's everyday self understanding maintains itself in inauthenticity and in fact in such a way that the Dasein thereby knows about itself without explicit reflection in the sense of an inner perception bent back on itself but in the manner of finding itself in things. [My underlining.]

<sup>21</sup> BT. p. 68.

<sup>22</sup> BT. p.78.

<sup>23</sup> Haugeland, John (2000), p.46.

<sup>24</sup> Haugeland, John (1982), p 20

<sup>25</sup> Haugeland, John. (1992) p.35.

<sup>26</sup> Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1991) p.14.

<sup>27</sup> de Beistegui, (2005) p.12.

<sup>28</sup> de Beistegui, (2005), p. 12.

<sup>29</sup> See Clark, Timothy (2002), pp.52-53.

<sup>30</sup> Stenstad, Gail (2006).

<sup>31</sup> Stenstad, Gail (2006), pp.182-183

<sup>32</sup> See ZOLL. p. 109-110.

<sup>33</sup> BT. pp. 128-129.

<sup>34</sup> BPP. p. 166

<sup>35</sup> BT p.68.

<sup>36</sup> BT. p.73.

<sup>37</sup> BT. p.78.

<sup>38</sup> BPP. p.168.

<sup>39</sup> BT.p.78.

<sup>40</sup> BPP. pp.297-298.

<sup>41</sup> Sheehan, Thomas (2005). pp.209-210n.

<sup>42</sup> BPP. p. 158.

<sup>43</sup> Carman, Taylor (2000), p.18.

<sup>44</sup> BT. p.81.

<sup>45</sup> BT. p. 81.

<sup>46</sup> BT. p.79.

<sup>47</sup> BT.pp.81-82.



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<sup>48</sup> BT. p. 84.

<sup>49</sup> BPP. p. 159.

<sup>50</sup> BPP. p. 171.

<sup>51</sup> BT. p. 89.

<sup>52</sup> BT. p. 90.

<sup>53</sup> See BT. p. 83.

<sup>54</sup> See LOH. p.223n:

<sup>55</sup> See OHF. p.66:

‘This world is something being encountered as *what we are concerned about and attend to*, and the latter, as having the character of initial givens now and soon to come which are closest to us, gives to the world of everydayness the character of an *envirning world, a world round-about...It is on the basis of factual spatiality that we can define the ontological meaning of being “in” the environs of the world.* This “being” itself is what is encountering the world and indeed in such a that it is in the world as what it is concerned about and attends to, as a worldly being-there. It is characterised by *caring, a fundamental mode of being which is distinctive in that it “is” its world, the very world it has encountered.* This being—*being a worldly being-there which it is concerned about and attends to*— is a mode of the being-there of factual life.’ [my underlining].

<sup>56</sup> BPP. p. 288.

<sup>57</sup> Harman, Graham (2002), p.20.

<sup>58</sup> 'neu Vallega, Daniela (2003), p.11.

<sup>59</sup> BT. pp. 153-154.

<sup>60</sup> BT. p. 154.

<sup>61</sup> BT. p. 155.

<sup>62</sup> Malpas, Jeff (2000), p.212.

<sup>63</sup> BT. p. 156.

<sup>64</sup> BT. p. 157.

<sup>65</sup> BT. p. 157.

<sup>66</sup> BT. p.160.

<sup>67</sup> BT. p.160.

<sup>68</sup> BT. p.161

<sup>69</sup> BT.162.

<sup>70</sup> (BT.p.161.).

<sup>71</sup> BT.p.161.

<sup>72</sup> BT. p.161.

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<sup>73</sup> BT.p.162

<sup>74</sup> Rogers, Carl (1986).

<sup>75</sup> Rogers, Carl (1986).

<sup>76</sup> BT. p 162.

<sup>77</sup> BT. p.164.

<sup>78</sup> BT. p.164.

<sup>79</sup> BT. p.164.

<sup>80</sup> BT. p.164.

<sup>81</sup> BT. p.164.

<sup>82</sup> BT. pp.163-164.

<sup>83</sup> BT. p.165.

<sup>84</sup> BT. p.165.

<sup>85</sup> BT.p.165.

<sup>86</sup> Carman, Taylor (2000), pp.24.-25.

<sup>87</sup> BT. p.167.

<sup>88</sup> BT. p.167.

<sup>89</sup> BPP. pp. 170-171.

<sup>90</sup> BT. p.68.

<sup>91</sup> Though the translators do make the comment that “It is not easy to translate ‘*Gerede*’ in a way which does not carry disparaging connotations. Fortunately Heidegger makes his meaning quite clear.” BT. p.211n.

<sup>92</sup> BT. p.211.

<sup>93</sup> Carman, Taylor (2000), p.20.

<sup>94</sup> Carman, Taylor (2000), p.20.

<sup>95</sup> BT. p.211.

<sup>96</sup> BT. p.212.

<sup>97</sup> BT. p.213.

<sup>98</sup> BT. p.213.

<sup>99</sup> Carman, Taylor (2000), p.21.

<sup>100</sup> BT. p.216.

<sup>101</sup> BT. p.216.

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<sup>102</sup> BT. p.218.

<sup>103</sup> de Beistegui, (2005), p. 12.

<sup>104</sup> BT. p.219.

<sup>105</sup> BT. p.307.

<sup>106</sup> BT.pp.237-238.

<sup>107</sup> BT.pp.219-220.

<sup>108</sup> de Beistegui, (2005), p. 18.

<sup>109</sup> BT. p.220.

<sup>110</sup> Johns, Hazel (1996), p.101.

<sup>111</sup> Johns, Hazel (1996), p.101.

<sup>112</sup> Johns, Hazel (1996), p.101.

<sup>113</sup> BT. p.221.

<sup>114</sup> BT. p.222.

<sup>115</sup> BT. p.222.

<sup>116</sup> Dreyfus, Hubert L (1991), p.160.

<sup>117</sup> Dreyfus, Hubert L (1991), p.161.

<sup>118</sup> BT.p.167.

<sup>119</sup> Dreyfus, Hubert L (1991), p.161.

<sup>120</sup> Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1991), p.161.

<sup>121</sup> BT. p.229.

<sup>122</sup> See M. pp.116,117:

‘The “pure” “objectivism” of being wholly absorbed into the ‘all-life’ is the most hidden completion of “subjectivism” in the sense of the unconditional domination of man’s power as the “subject”. The objective and the subjective are now equally self-evident. The total lack of questioning as the disguise of powerlessness.

and also,

‘Selfhood is *not* retro-relatedness to oneself— or to ‘I-hood’ or ‘we-hood’...Every talk of a relation to be-ing is erroneous ( M. p.118.). as soon as and insofar as something like an *object*, something that is set aside, is implied.’ [my underlining].

<sup>123</sup> WIM. pp.100-101.

<sup>124</sup> BT. p.231.

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<sup>125</sup> See BT. p.23:

'the utter insignificance which makes itself known in the "nothing and nowhere", does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within the world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this *insignificance* of what is within the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself... When anxiety has subsided, then in our everyday way of talking we are accustomed to say that "it was really nothing".

<sup>126</sup> WIM. P.106.

<sup>127</sup> BT. p.233.

<sup>128</sup> WIM. p.106.

<sup>129</sup> BT. p.234.

<sup>130</sup> BT. p.233.

<sup>131</sup> Oxford Thesaurus of English (2004), p.643.

<sup>132</sup> BT.p.226.

<sup>133</sup> BT.p.67.

<sup>134</sup> Mulhall, Stephen (2005). p.308.

<sup>135</sup> See Zimmerman, Michael (2000), p. 138

<sup>136</sup> BT. p.235.

<sup>137</sup> BT. p.234.

<sup>138</sup> See BT. p.239, for a succinct summation of this position:

'Dasein's projection of itself understandingly is in each case already alongside a world that has been discovered. From this world it takes its possibilities, and it does so first in accordance with the way things have been interpreted by the 'they'. This interpretation has already restricted the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable –that which is fitting and proper. This levelling off of Dasein's possibilities to what is proximally at its everyday disposal also results in a dimming down of the possible as such. The average everydayness of concern becomes blind to its possibilities, and tranquillises itself with that which is merely 'actual'. [My underlining].

<sup>139</sup> WIM. P.106.

<sup>140</sup> Zimmerman, Michael E. (2000), p. 135.

<sup>141</sup> BT. pp.296-297.

<sup>142</sup> Olafson, Frederick A. (1995), p.144.

<sup>143</sup> BT. p.298.

<sup>144</sup> Olafson, Frederick A. (1995), p.144.

<sup>145</sup> BT. p.298.

<sup>147</sup> BT. p.298.

<sup>149</sup> Young, Julian (2002) p.66n.

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- <sup>150</sup> BT. p.302.
- <sup>151</sup> Haar, Michel (1993).
- <sup>152</sup> BT. p.307.
- <sup>153</sup> BT. p.307.
- <sup>154</sup> BT. p.308.
- <sup>155</sup> BT. p.308.
- <sup>156</sup> BT. p.308.
- <sup>157</sup> BT. p.312.
- <sup>158</sup> BT. Stambaugh, pp.250-251.
- <sup>159</sup> BT. p.316.
- <sup>160</sup> BT. p.319.
- <sup>161</sup> BT p 318.
- <sup>162</sup> BT. p.320.
- <sup>163</sup> BT p.330.
- <sup>164</sup> BT. 322.
- <sup>165</sup> BT p.322.
- <sup>166</sup> Havas, Randall (2000), p.39.
- <sup>167</sup> BT. pp.333-334.
- <sup>168</sup> Guignon, Charles (2005), p.396.
- <sup>169</sup> Hodge, Joanna (1993). p.21.
- <sup>170</sup> Hodge, Joanna (1993), p.21.
- <sup>171</sup> Hodge, Joanna (1993), p.22.
- <sup>172</sup> BT. p.334.
- <sup>173</sup> Dreyfus. (1991), p.308.
- <sup>174</sup> BT. p.334.
- <sup>175</sup> BT. p.334.
- <sup>176</sup> Mulhall, Stephen (2005), p.309.
- <sup>177</sup> Dahlstrom, Daniel O. (2007) p.66.
- <sup>178</sup> BPP. p.298.

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- <sup>179</sup> BPP.p.299.
- <sup>180</sup> BPP.p.300.
- <sup>181</sup> Blattner, William (2005), p.322.
- <sup>182</sup> BT.p.477.
- <sup>183</sup> Mulhall, Stephen (2005), p.309.
- <sup>184</sup> Davis, Bret W (2007), p.45.
- <sup>185</sup> Davis, Bret. W (2007), pp.41-42.
- <sup>186</sup> Davis, Bret. W (2007), pp.41-42.
- <sup>187</sup> Elliot, Brian (2005), p.99.
- <sup>188</sup> Haar, Michel (1993), p.27.
- <sup>189</sup> BT. p.354.
- <sup>190</sup> BT. p.354.
- <sup>191</sup> BT. pp.357-358.
- <sup>192</sup> Haar, Michel (1993) p. 28.
- <sup>193</sup> Haar, Michel (1993) p. 28.
- <sup>194</sup> Haar, Michel (1993) p. 28.
- <sup>195</sup> ITM., (1935), (1987), p.158.
- <sup>196</sup> Guignon, Charles (2005), p.395.
- <sup>197</sup> SUPP. p.165.
- <sup>198</sup> SUPP. p.166.
- <sup>199</sup> SUPP. p.166.
- <sup>200</sup> SUPP. p.166.
- <sup>201</sup> SUPP. p.167.
- <sup>202</sup> SUPP. p.167.
- <sup>203</sup> SUPP. p.168.
- <sup>204</sup> SUPP. p.168.
- <sup>205</sup> SUPP. p.168.
- <sup>206</sup> SUPP. p 168.
- <sup>207</sup> SUPP. p.168.



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<sup>208</sup> BT. p. 344.

<sup>209</sup> BT. p. 344.

<sup>210</sup> BT. pp.357-358.

<sup>211</sup> BT. 344-345.

<sup>212</sup> BT. pp.158-159.

<sup>213</sup> Boss, Medard (1998) p.20.

<sup>214</sup> BT. 344-345.

<sup>215</sup> Schatzki, Theodore R. (2005) p.234.

<sup>216</sup> BT. p. 172n.

<sup>217</sup> BT. p. 173n.

<sup>218</sup> BT. p.172n.

<sup>219</sup> BT. p.174.

<sup>220</sup> BT. p. 175.

<sup>221</sup> BT. p.182.

<sup>222</sup> BT.p.182.

<sup>223</sup> BT.p.182.

<sup>224</sup> BT.p.183.

<sup>225</sup> BT. p. 186.

<sup>226</sup> BT. p.186.

<sup>227</sup> BT.p.238.

<sup>228</sup> BT. p.187.

<sup>229</sup> BT. p.186.

<sup>230</sup> BT.p.239.

<sup>231</sup> BT.p.239.

<sup>232</sup> BT. p.239.

<sup>233</sup> BT.p.239.

<sup>234</sup> BT. p.239.

<sup>235</sup> BT.p.239.

<sup>236</sup> BT.pp.239-210.

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<sup>237</sup> BT.p.463.

<sup>238</sup> BT.p.240.

<sup>239</sup> BT.p.240.

<sup>240</sup> BT.p.204.

<sup>241</sup> BT.p.205.

<sup>242</sup> BT.p.205.

<sup>243</sup> BT.p.205.

<sup>244</sup> BT.206.

<sup>245</sup> BT. p.206.

<sup>246</sup> BT.p.206.

<sup>247</sup> BT.pp.206-207.

<sup>248</sup> BT.p.206.

<sup>249</sup> BT.p.208.

<sup>250</sup> BT.p.208.

<sup>251</sup> BT.p.208.

<sup>252</sup> BT.p.208.

<sup>253</sup> Tietz, Udo (2006) p.173.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING**

#### **Introduction**

In this chapter, the preferred methodology of Heideggarian phenomenological hermeneutics is laid out in detail. Broad definitions of ‘phenomenology’ are included, as are references to Edmund Husserl (as the ‘founder’ of modern phenomenology). Explications of Husserl’s notion of phenomenological reduction and its relationship to his understanding of consciousness are unfolded at the beginning of this chapter. The differences between a Husserlian and a Heideggarian phenomenology are noted, as is the difficulty of using Husserlian phenomenology as a tool of research.

The relationship between (a) Heideggarian phenomenological hermeneutics, as methodology and (b) the understanding of what it is to be a human-being is intended to be consistent with the focus of this research. I attempt to cement this linkage through example, explication and argument. Toward the end of this chapter, an attempt is made to disclose my personal immersion within the research process, and to explicate its link to the preferred methodology of this thesis, through an exemplar of hermeneutic circling.

Within this chapter I attempt to create a dialogic relationship between two pivotal chapters within this dissertation namely Chapter Two and Chapter Three. Whereas Chapter Two has attempted to lay out what it is to be human-being (and to form the specific understanding of human-being that has been adhered to here) Chapter Three explores the ways in which human-being interprets and understands. In that interpretation and understanding, it is argued that human-being often lays claim to a foundational authority it does not possess. Within that claim, attempts are frequently made to edit out that which must always be presupposed in making an interpretation (and in arriving at an understanding).

Within this chapter, attention is drawn to the manner in which human-being **already** possesses an understanding and that understanding arises from human-being always being the entity that is **already** being-in-the-world. The dialogic relationship between these two chapters is now here brought to some fruition in that Chapter Two has laid out ‘who’ human-being is, whilst Chapter Three shows that human-being is always immersed in a process of interpretation and that personal transformation always takes place within a world **already** interpreted and understood. A crucial linkage between these two chapters has been forged in the explication of interpretation and understanding as that which occurs within a world immediately, ordinarily and averagely intelligible, a world that, as such, is both crucially **formative** and also radically **limiting** of personal transformation.

A consequence of arguing that human-being is **already** that unitary entity as being-in-the-world (and who already possesses an understanding) has been the acknowledgement of radical immersements in the world (ones from which human-being cannot be severed). In order to highlight these characteristics, I have drawn attention to my own immersement with this research project and have laid out, both schematically and within Chapter Three, the features of that immersement (and its significance in relation to the genesis and conduct of the project). In particular, I attempt to incorporate elements of that immersement within an example of the hermeneutic process of interpretation and understanding towards the end of this chapter.

The intention in placing this example within Chapter Three is fourfold: To **use** biographical material as the very medium of explication in order to cohere ‘content’ with ‘form’. To explicate the argument that hermeneutic process is the ordinary and everyday mode of human-beings’ interpretation and understanding. To maintain a resonant relationship between the understandings of human-being (as laid out in Chapter Two) with an explication of **how** that entity ordinarily interprets and finally, to employ that hermeneutic as the methodology with this project.

A further intention has been to bond together all these elements in such a way that the notion of human-being as that unitary entity finds its way into the very fabric of this dissertation’s construction.

## **Phenomenology: The Background:**

### **Preliminary considerations:**

The definitions of the terms 'phenomenology' and 'phenomenon' are discussed extensively, likewise, the terms 'hermeneutics' and 'phenomenological hermeneutics'. Attention has primarily been focused on Heidegger's use of 'phenomenology' and 'phenomenon' and the etymological pathway he traces to their original usage and their subsequent developments. Notice has been taken of the connectedness between Heideggarian phenomenological hermeneutics, its relationship to Dasein (and Dasein's structures of understanding as laid out in Chapter Two) and the manner in which phenomenological hermeneutics engages with the personal locatedness of myself within the research process.

Some heed has been taken of the uniqueness of Heideggarian phenomenological hermeneutics, in its radical connectedness with the nature of what it is to be a human-being and that human-being's capacity to self-interpret. The difference between Heidegger's interpretations of 'phenomenology' and selected other traditions, is compared and contrasted within the earlier sections of this chapter and a schematic representation of the research process is included towards the end in an attempt to 'bind together, in a preliminary manner, methodology, personal locatedness and their connectedness with 'method' in the chapter following. This methodological exemplar of the 'operation' of the hermeneutic circle is an attempt to connect formative personal phenomena, Heideggarian phenomenology and Heideggarian hermeneutics (and also by implication the nature of Dasein in Chapter Two), to the interpretive process.

### **Phenomenology broadly defined. Preliminary approaches:**

As noted above, considerable space is to be given to Heideggerian interpretations of the term 'phenomenology' its cognates and related concepts in later sections. The intention of this section (5.1) is to place Heidegger, both explicitly and implicitly, within a broader context, using contrasting definitions of the term 'phenomenology'

and relating his contribution to that of the 'father' of modern phenomenology, his mentor, sponsor and one-time friend, Edmund Husserl.

I have brought together some broad definitions of 'phenomenology' in order to tease out the various strands that this term possesses:

*'Phenomenology may be characterised initially in a broad sense as the unprejudiced, descriptive study of whatever appears to consciousness, precisely in the manner in which it so appears. Phenomenology as thus understood emerged as an original philosophical approach at the end of the 19th-century in the school of Franz Brentano, and was developed by Edmund Husserl and his successors to become a major tradition of philosophising throughout the world during the 20th century.'*<sup>1</sup>

And again,

*'Though there are a number of themes which characterise phenomenology, in general it never developed a set of dogmas or sedimented into a system. It claims, first and foremost, to be a **radical** way of doing philosophy, a **practice** rather than a system. Phenomenology is best understood as a radical, anti-traditional style of philosophising, which emphasises the attempt to get to the truth of matters, to describe **phenomena**, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experienter. As such, phenomenology's first step is to seek to avoid all misconstructions and impositions placed on experience in advance, whether these are drawn from religious or cultural conditions, from everyday commonsense, or indeed, from science itself. Explanations are not to be imposed before the phenomena have been understood from within.'*<sup>2</sup>

And again,

*'Phenomenology began as a discernible movement with Edmund Husserl's (1859-1938) demand that philosophy take as its primary task the description of the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness. This description was meant to be carried out on the basis of what the "things themselves" demanded, without assuming or adopting the theoretical frameworks, assumptions, or vocabularies developed in the study of other domains (such as nature). ... For Husserl, phenomenology is a study of the structures of consciousness ... which proceeds by "bracketing" the objects outside of consciousness itself, so that one can proceed to reflect on and systematically describe the contents of the conscious mind in terms of their essential structures. This was a method, Husserl believed, which would ground our knowledge of the world in our lived experience, without in the process reducing the content of our knowledge to the contingent and subjective features of that experience.'*<sup>3</sup>

And again,

*'The most fundamental phenomenological presupposition of a philosophy of interpretation is that every question concerning any sort of 'being' is a question about the meaning of that 'being'.'*<sup>4</sup>

And again,



*'Phenomenology is neither a school nor a trend in contemporary philosophy. It is rather a movement whose proponents, for various reasons, have propelled it in many distinct directions, with the result that today it means different things to different people ... Though these currents have a common point of departure, they do not project toward the same destination ... It has been said that phenomenology consists in an analysis and description of consciousness; it has been claimed also that phenomenology simply blends with existentialism ... it also considers the world to be already there before reflection begins... Some use phenomenology as a search for a philosophy that accounts for space, time, and the world, just as we experience and "live" them... it has been said that phenomenology is an attempt to give a direct description of our experience as it is in itself without taking into account its psychological origin and its causal explanation.'*<sup>5</sup>

And again,

*'Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: as a disciplinary field of philosophy, or as a movement in the history of philosophy.*

*The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is the study of "phenomena": appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, all the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study of right and wrong action), etc.'*<sup>6</sup>

And again,

*'... pure phenomenology is the science of **pure** consciousness. This means that pure phenomenology draws upon pure reflection exclusively, and pure reflection excludes, as such, every type of external experience and therefore precludes any copositing of objects alien to consciousness.'*<sup>7</sup>

And finally,

*'There is no such thing as **the one** phenomenology, and if there could be such a thing it would never become anything like a philosophical technique. For implicit in the essential nature of all genuine method as a path toward the disclosure of objects is the tendency to order itself always toward that which it itself discloses. When a method is genuine and provides access to the objects, it is precisely then that the progress made by following it and the growing originality of the disclosure will cause the very method that was used to become necessarily obsolete.'*<sup>8</sup>

### **Entering the world of experience and consciousness:**

From the above selected quotations, certain key phrases and keywords come to the fore namely, 'radical', 'a practice rather than a system', 'anti-traditional', 'the

description of the structures of experience', 'an analysis and description of consciousness', 'a search for a philosophy that accounts for space, time, and the world, just as we experience and live them', 'phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view' and 'there is no such thing as **the one** phenomenology'.

*'Lived experience is the starting point and end point of phenomenological research. The aim of phenomenology is to transform lived experience into a textual expression of its essence – in such a way that the effect of the text is at once a reflexive re-living and a reflective appropriation of something meaningful: a notion by which a reader is powerfully animated in his or her own lived experience.'*<sup>9</sup>

It would be very difficult to undertake any explication of phenomenology and phenomenological inquiry without taking into account the contribution of Edmund Husserl. Although phenomenological inquiry has always been implicit in all philosophical research, even from the earliest times, it was not until the nineteenth century and into the early years of the twentieth, that phenomenology 'as a discernible movement'<sup>10</sup> emerged as a significant and influential force. The 'radical' and 'anti-traditional' features of this emerging movement, which so engaged the minds of Husserl's contemporaries and pupils (such as Heidegger), lay partly in its insistence on turning to 'the things themselves', the things as they actually are and the things as they actually appear, in the consciousness of the individual human-being. This action of turning 'to the things themselves' entailed a describing of those things, of those phenomena, as they actually appear in the human consciousness. 'The things themselves', on this view, are the pro-genitive source of interpretation, but they are not simply 'over there' as discrete objects which can be subjected to analysis by the traditional means of, for example, psychology, anthropology and ontology. Husserl's 'method' in turning to 'the things themselves' involved putting to one side the inherited ideas, concepts, special terms and systematic structures of other disciplines and spheres of interest, so that the things themselves would not be 'contaminated' by a pre-existing (and therefore inappropriate) mode of interpretation.

It was Husserl's intention that, 'philosophy should attempt to account for various types of evidence by tracing them to their characteristic sources in experience -- and to do so in a rigorous, critical and systematic manner'.<sup>11</sup> It is that phrase 'sources in experience' which locates Husserl's preoccupation with the question of human

consciousness. If experience occurs as consciousness, and if 'the things themselves' occur within and as that experience, then whatever constitutes consciousness is of crucial significance to him. For Husserl, the primary and most significant mode of consciousness 'is whatever is part of someone's occurrent experience – what belongs to someone's "stream of consciousness"<sup>12</sup> and it is this mode of consciousness that is of interest at this moment. He begins by focusing attention on a naturally occurring object (such as a cube or dice) and draws attention to the fact that we cannot take it in as a whole. When we see it we do not see it completely in all its dimensions simultaneously. So if we look at it from above we cannot see it from the side furthest away from us, nor can we see the underside of the object (as the upper side nearest to us (and in full view) blocks it out). Nor can we see the whole of the side that is slightly away from us: we see only part of that.

Yet, even though a great deal of 'information' is not available to us, we do not thereby fall into a complete state of confusion about what we are seeing. We do not need to see everything simultaneously in order for us to recognise what it is and for us to understand what it means. Nor are we placed in a further state of confusion when we move our position and view the object from a fresh perspective. We are not led into believing that something else now occupies the location of the object previously viewed. Wherever we are and whatever we do, things present themselves to us in a 'profiled' manner in which the height, depth and breadth, (in other words the three dimensionality of the objects) though present, are never completed as a comprehensive and whole apprehension. The fluidity of experience arising from the differing perspectives we adopt, does not in any way derogate from the stable and steady nature of the thing itself. It always maintains a sustained integrity for we recognise that, even though we see only part of it, there are invariants in its appearance that are continuous and abiding throughout the changing episodes of our regard. Neither do the objects occur as isolated phenomena occupying nowhere in particular, but always appear within specific environments. In our apprehension of the object we do not exclude its environmental context (even though the primary focus of our attention might be on the object itself).

This apprehension of the environmental context places the object within a sphere of significance, a significance that moves us towards our understanding it in a more

pointed manner. This sphere of significance is not limited to that which is immediately apprehended but points towards other spheres in which (were we to give them our full attention) would reveal more completely that which we are apprehending as now occurrent and only partially. There is then, for Husserl in every occurrent apprehension an element of what he terms 'anticipation'. This 'anticipation' is essentially revelatory in that it brings to disclosure that which is hidden, obscured or absent from that which is being occurrently apprehended. This anticipation enables us to 'view' the whole object as if it were actually present in all its facets and dimensions as a complete and whole presentation:

*'The cube looks to one — as it does — cubicle from a given angle, only in so far as one "anticipates" other appearances: how it would look from other angles, were one to do what is needed to see its hidden aspects.'*<sup>13</sup>

For Husserl, this anticipation forms an irreducible element in the way we come to understand (through recognition) what a thing is. For him, we are constantly being presented, in a sense, with fragmentary aspects, partial views, inadequate information and hidden or absent data. But it is this 'anticipation' that rescues us from constant confusion and obfuscation:

*'Only in virtue of a relation between current actual spatial experience and potential experience that would fulfil (in some sense confirm or corroborate) it, can one identify an object to which the experience refers or is directed.'*<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless, on this view, we are always and forever in a position of occupying a world in which objects present themselves as incomplete and partial. There is always a deficiency, a paucity, in the way we come to perceive them. This deficiency is, from Husserl's position always an indicator of something other and further. If we remained simply with whatever is occurrent and if, in that remaining, there was no element of anticipation, then the world would be unintelligible and fragmentary. Furthermore, the inadequate presentation of phenomena indicates that there is always an insubstantial basis for the existence of anything that comes within our experience. The phenomena gain 'fulfilment' only through anticipation and not within their fragmentary presentation. Nevertheless, that which is presented, though partially and fragmentarily, is the only evidential base of that which exists as a concrete physical thing:

*'Opposed to the epistemological method derived from Cartesian dualism, with its strict separation of subject from object, and to more traditional methods of introspective self reflection, Husserl sought to explore consciousness itself for "evidence" – and that was a critical word in his vocabulary, implying the unmediated and unqualified force of what is given to us – of the ideal world. Describing the contents of that consciousness in a "rigorous" way, looking for the logos in the phenomena rather than proving it deductively, could yield up essential knowledge that was superior to the objectivist belief in a correspondence between what was "out there" in the world and "in here" in our minds.'*<sup>15</sup>

Husserl's project, therefore, was to describe 'the contents of that consciousness in a "rigorous" way'. A significant motive was to clear away all that might obstruct, obscure, distort or skew that description. It should be remembered that Husserl is remaining always within the ambit of consciousness, and that the descriptions being referred to are always that which arises as the 'content' of consciousness. He held that there was much, within the common life of a human-being, to obstruct, obscure, distort or skew that description. Such skewing was unavoidable since common life, with all its exigencies and prejudices, often dictated a pragmatic pathway that necessarily coloured human experience and human interpretation. Nor, for him, was it simply a matter of practical pragmatics. Purely 'respectable' and 'traditional' and 'rigorous' theoretical approaches might also be applied to skew the descriptive and interpretive process. His intention was to devise a disciplined practice of systematic exclusion, an exclusion of the so-called 'natural attitude', so that a clear access 'to the things themselves' might be obtained.

Embedded in this 'natural attitude', according to Husserl, was the unacknowledged assumption that everything constituting the world 'out there', actually existed as an unchallengeable reality. In this attitude the starting point of any contemplation was from this assumption.

But for Husserl:

*'Against all odds, a passage was possible between the level of impure psychological events, temporal and relative to the knowing subject, to atemporal, ideal truths and meanings purified of any contingent, contextual dross.'*<sup>16</sup>

By excluding 'impure psychological events' and all the messy contingency that goes with a finite and temporal entity (such as a human-being), Husserl attempted to establish a timeless, non-contingent, non-relativised perspective of 'the things themselves'.

Husserl himself is rarely quoted directly at length in phenomenological research, but it is this writer's intention to include Husserl's most succinct expression of his method, and to present it in such a way that it is broken down into its constituent steps. By this means it is hoped that a clearer understanding of his 'bracketing' of the 'natural attitude' might ensue. Husserl declares that:

1. ' For the sole purposes of attaining to the domain of pure consciousness and keeping it pure,
2. we therefore undertake to accept no beliefs involving Objective experience
3. and therefore, also undertake to make not the slightest use of any conclusion derived from Objective experience.
4. The actuality of all material Nature
5. is therefore kept out of action
6. and that of all corporeality with it, the body of the cognizing subject.
7. This makes it clear that, as a consequence, all psychological experience is also put out of action.
8. If we have absolutely forbidden ourselves to treat Nature and the corporeal at all as given entities,
9. then the possibility of positing any conscious process whatsoever
10. as having a corporeal link or as being an event occurring in Nature
11. lapses of itself.
12. What is left over, once this radical methodological exclusion of all Objective actualities has been effected?
13. The answer is clear. If we put every experienced actuality out of action,
14. We still have indubitably given every phenomenon of experience.
15. This is true for the whole Objective world as well.
16. We are forbidden to make use of the *actuality* of the Objective world:
17. For us the Objective world is as it were placed in brackets.
18. What it remains to us is the totality of the phenomena of the world,
19. Phenomena which are grasped by reflection
20. As they are absolutely in themselves.'<sup>17</sup>



It should be stressed that Husserl is not advocating a secure base from which to objectively derive a fundamental truth about phenomena. His 'bracketing' in step 17 is not akin to the Cartesian *cogito*, though at first sight, it does seem to resemble such. What flows from this? In this process, reality as objectively regarded (and now 'bracketed'), leaves behind a residue of phenomena (outside the brackets) uncluttered by the 'natural attitude' (in that the phenomena now become purely disclosed as 'the things themselves'). If a step is made that leads to the phenomena being objectively regarded, then the whole phenomenological reduction collapses into the very thing that ought to be within its own 'brackets'.

It needs to be emphasised that in this Husserlian reduction, **falsehood is not that necessarily included in the brackets**. Whatever is of incontestable veracity is **also** contained within them. The foundational issue being that 'we are forbidden to make use of the *actuality* of the Objective world' (step 16). The Husserlian method is necessarily purgative in that it pushes out all the 'ordinary' experience of human-being. In addition, it pushes out all the 'extraordinary' experience as well, in that the rigorous analyses of other disciplines are also included within this action. The extremity of this reductive process should not be under emphasised. It **is** extreme in that it includes within its purgation, objective experience, all material Nature and everything that refers to the body of the human-being.

But what is the purpose of all this? It is Husserl's intention that his:

*'... investigation will take these Objectivities simply as correlates of consciousness and will inquire solely into the What and the How of the phenomena that can be drawn from the conscious processes and coherences in question. Things in nature, persons and personal communities, social forms and formations, poetic and plastic formations, every kind of cultural work—all become in this way headings for phenomenological investigations, not as actualities, the way they are treated in the corresponding Objective sciences, but rather with regard to the consciousness that constitutes—through the intermediary of an initially bewildering wealth of structures of consciousness—these objectivities for the conscious subject in question.'*<sup>18</sup>

He goes on to note:

*'Consciousness and what it is conscious of is therefore what is left over as a field for pure reflection once phenomenological reduction has been effected.'*<sup>19</sup>

In a sense, Husserl is asserting, (by implication) that Objectivities being themselves of consciousness can **also** be subject to his phenomenological reductive process of 'bracketing'. His whole objective is to arrive at an ideal state whereby contingency is completely eradicated. It is eradicated in order to disclose the pure essential of phenomena. This disclosing occurs within the ambit of pure consciousness. This pure consciousness guarantees that 'the things themselves' are disclosed as themselves and in themselves. This consciousness, not relying upon sensation in order to regard 'the things themselves', has the capacity to bypass traditional modes of apprehension and not be limited by them:

*'...where Husserl's phenomenology differed from other anti-empiricist alternatives such as hermeneutics and pragmatism was in its far more ambitious goal of finding eternal, essential, ideal truths amid the flux of passing encounters between self and world or self and other, a goal that seemed to many ultimately comparable to Platonic idealism in its search for a priori truths.'*<sup>20</sup>

It may be my position that the Husserlian method of reduction, as a research tool, is extremely difficult to use and that its purported application within other phenomenological projects has, to his mind, not yet been demonstrated. Its occasional linkage with a Heideggerian mode of explication (with the intention of rendering that mode more 'rigorous') is, to his mind, an impossible combination in that a Husserlian first step is to eradicate Dasein's Being-in-the-world from the mode of its regard.<sup>21</sup>

### **Heideggerian Phenomenology**

#### **Heideggerian phenomenology and being-in-the-world:**

Heidegger departs radically from traditional philosophical interpretations of what it is to be a human-being and of what it is to be a human-being in a world full of 'things'. It is this radical departure from the tradition that fuels his phenomenological approach. For him, Dasein is not simply another entity alongside other entities in the world, nor is the world simply over and against Dasein as an object of sceptical regard. Dasein can never simply 'opt out' of Being-in-the-world, either through sceptical positing or a 'bracketing' of its experience. Existence is not something that Dasein possesses as a personal effect, a resource or an existential asset.<sup>22</sup> Existence for Dasein is essentially

Being-in-the-world, neither as super-added to something already ongoing nor as an optional extra to be exercised later as an alternative recourse. Dasein's being in the world is not a variable condition that can be amended by choice (or wilfulness) but rather Dasein's choice and wilfulness can only be exercised because Dasein is primordially, essentially, inescapably and always and for ever, Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, Dasein cannot be an associate of the world, in which links might sometimes be strong and sometimes weak:

*"Being-in is not a "property" which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and **without** which it could **be** just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that man "is" and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-being towards the "world" -- a world with which he provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never "proximally" an entity which is, so to speak free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a "relationship" towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only **because** Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is."<sup>23</sup>*

For Heidegger a certain amnesia has befallen previous endeavours which sought to 'determine the essence of "man"'<sup>24</sup> in that they 'edit out' the underlying question of Dasein's being (and consequently Being-in-the-world), by merely assuming it to be present, by merely assuming it to be the case and by embarking on an analysis which is then considered to be presuppositionless. This failure to take into account Dasein's Being-in-the-world arises out of Dasein's being regarded as yet another item, yet another body and yet another object, alongside other items, bodies and objects within the world. Once that shift has taken place, then the tradition is free to regard Dasein in a way similar to other entities alongside Dasein:

*'Over and above the attempt to determine the essence of "man" as an entity, the question of his Being has remained forgotten, and that this Being is rather conceived as something obvious or "self-evident" in the sense of the **Being-present-at-hand** of other created Things.'*<sup>25</sup>

Dasein can never distance itself from its own existence in the way that it distances itself from objects within the world. It can never posit itself as an unusual and exceptional occurrence alongside other entities (similarly unusual and exceptional in their own way) within the world. Whenever Dasein opens its mouth to speak it is, in each instance making an utterance that presupposes its Being-in-the-world and which presupposes its own existence as essentially 'mine'. The whole of Dasein's existence cannot be taken out of the world by any epistemological sleight of hand, nor can it be

validated or denied by *post facto* reflections on what is or is not the case. Our existence is and as such we always possess 'a certain pre-theoretical understanding of it.'<sup>26</sup>

*'... an interpretation of human existence cannot be neutral, dispassionate, theoretical contemplation, but must take into account the involvement of the inquirer him or herself in the understanding. Human beings are involved with their existence in such a way that hermeneutics must be able to accomplish this movement backwards and forwards between the existence to be examined and the nature of the examining inquirer.'*<sup>27</sup>

### **Heideggerian phenomenology, substantiality and theory:**

Heidegger's view of human existence as being essentially dynamic, always mine, rooted and existent only in time, 'irreducibly inseparable' from the world, thrown into being and specifically historical, is in stark contrast to the 'metaphysical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle [whereby] being has been understood as *presence* ...[ as] some kind of static occurrence.'<sup>28</sup> For Aristotle, 'the question of being is simply a question of what substance is'<sup>29</sup>:

*'... that which 'is' primarily (i.e. not in any qualified sense, but absolutely) must be substance ... The ancient and everlasting question 'What is being?' really amounts to 'What is substance?' It was substance that many of the earlier philosophers described as one or many, as numerically finite or infinite; so that it must be our first and principal if not our **only** subject.'*<sup>30</sup>

That which is existent, as substance, is, in the Aristotelian and Platonic view non-historical, not bound by time and utterly immutable. The stasis of this substantial presence ensures a stability which underlies variation and change but which itself is not affected by these. In this view, that which is fleeting, relative, variable, amendable and temporal is **derived** from that which is primary. That which is primary is an ever enduring sub-stratum, underlying all that is worldly and mortal and which is foundational to the existence of beings. Without this eternal bedrock nothing could exist. The Greek word *ousia*,<sup>31</sup> as used by Aristotle, translates variously as 'presence', 'essence', 'substance'<sup>32</sup> and is a notoriously difficult concept to grapple with (not least for Aristotle himself, who spent a great deal of time tying himself up in knots attempting to unravel it!). But, in one commentator's view (McCumber, John 1999) the endurance of *ousia* is not limited to the concept itself, but has spread out through time as a potent historical phenomenon.<sup>33</sup> In this view '*ousia* in modernity

continues its ancient work of structuring the human world.<sup>34</sup> It thus functions, politically, socially, existentially and economically as a hidden form of organisation that always displays certain fixed characteristics.

An ousidic entity always has a fixed and sealed boundary that does not allow of intrusive permeability and which securely separates and defines itself from all else. Within this fixed and sealed boundary there is 'one unitary component' which is the exclusive source of command and which determines whatever is to occur. Nothing else within the boundary is empowered to influence whatever might happen beyond the boundary. Only the 'one unitary component' is able to influence that which lies on the other side. In this view, colonialism, imperialism and monopoly-capitalism are all ousidic structures, so, for example in monopoly capitalism:

*'The first step is to give the market fixed boundaries, which individual consumers cannot transgress: to prohibit or impede them, by a variety of means, from going and buying the goods they need elsewhere. The second step is to make sure that within these boundaries, there is just one supplier, who "orders" consumers in that he makes them into his customers.'*<sup>35</sup>

As was said earlier, Heidegger departs radically from traditional philosophical interpretations of what it is to be a human and it is this radical departure that fuels his phenomenological approach. He rejects the 'substantialist' approaches of Plato and Aristotle in which their interpretation of being fails to take into account the finitude, the mundane, the contingent, the everyday nature of human existence. He considers their approach to be wholly inadequate for this special purpose and it is his intention to develop a phenomenology and a hermeneutic that for him will be 'fit for purpose'.

Within a purely theoretical mode of reflection upon human existence, Heidegger asserts that time has to be drawn to a standstill in order for human existence to be viewed and grasped as a whole. Theory<sup>36</sup> emerges out of this artificial stasis, but it emerges stripped of the facticity<sup>37</sup> of human existence. The purely theoretical approach is not able to take into account the 'mineness' of human existence and has a tendency to conflate Dasein's Being-in-the-world with other entities within the world both animate and inanimate. In addition, for Heidegger, there is a temporal distortion whenever the purely reflective mode of interpretation is employed (in that a temporal concentration around that which is within the **present moment** occurs). The past and the future swivel fixedly upon that axis, **without** the spiralling and dynamic ebb and

flow, backwards and forwards inherent within the human hermeneutic. So, for Heidegger:

*'... if we are to understand the philosophical sense of the tendencies of phenomenology in a radical manner, and appropriate them genuinely, we must not merely carry out research in an "analogical" fashion on the "other" "domains of experience" (the aesthetic, ethical, and religious domains) ... Rather, we need to see that experiencing in its fullest sense is to be found in its authentically factual content of enactment in the historically existing self ... the concrete self should be taken up into the starting point of our approach to philosophical problems, and brought to "givenness" at the genuinely fundamental level of phenomenological interpretation that is related to the factual experience of life as such.... we come to have the phenomenon of existence only within a certain "how" of experiencing it, and this "how" is something that has to be achieved in a specific manner.'*<sup>38</sup>

The presuppositionlessness stance whereby ordinary human experience is 'bracketed' in order to have a pure and unadulterated view of 'the things themselves', the drawing of time to a standstill in the theoretical mode of interpretation and the epistemological certainties generated through the Cartesian *cogito*<sup>39</sup>, for him, eschew the factual conditions of human existence.<sup>40</sup>

### **Heideggarian phenomenology, cognitive reflexive process, the snail and naïveté:**

It is almost impossible to understand Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutical method without reference to his analysis of Dasein. There is a direct correlation between method and analysis, (probably more so than in any other philosopher). His analysis of Dasein, as explicated within Chapter Two of this thesis, and within "Being and Time" is his phenomenology laid bare. So the **very headings** of Chapter Two in encapsulating the factual elements of Dasein's existence demonstrate the 'contents' of his phenomenology, namely:

- 2.1: Dasein as who.
- 2.2: Dasein as being-in-the-world.
- 2.3: Dasein as the One.
- 2.4: Dasein as absorbed.
- 2.5: Dasein as anxious.
- 2.6: Dasein as being-toward-[its]-death.
- 2.7: Dasein as hearing the Call.
- 2.8: Dasein as guilty.



2.9: Dasein as care.

2.10: Dasein as attuned.

2.11: Dasein as discourse.

2.12: Dasein as understanding.

2.13: Dasein as resolute.

So, for Heidegger the reflective process long held by the philosophical tradition as the only mode of truthful disclosure, is held against his phenomenological approach in that when:

*'... we say that the Dasein does not first need to turn backward to itself as though, keeping itself behind its own back, it were at first standing in front of things and staring rigidly at them. Instead, it never finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves, and in fact in those things that daily surround it. It finds **itself** primarily and constantly **in things** because tending them, distressed by them, it always in some way or other rests in things. Each one of us is what he pursues and cares for. In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our experience by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of. We understand ourselves by starting from them because the Dasein finds itself primarily in things. The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things.'*<sup>41</sup>

Cognitive reflexive processes as modes of analysis for human existence, (and the creation of an epistemological foundation of certainty as in *cogito ergo sum*) are, for Heidegger, 'derived' modes of Dasein's Being-in-the-world (and, as such, cannot be presuppositionless). Dasein's Being-in-the-world is the very context out of which the derived modes emerge. They themselves are not primary. They themselves are not the substantial substratum. Rather, it is out of the factual elements of Dasein's existence that these secondary modes derive their power. There is an existential immediacy to Being-in-the-world that is not reliant upon cognitive reflexive processes in order for actions to become enacted. Dasein does not first have to think and then act. Dasein actions do not have to have the additional requirement of an intentional provenance in order to be or to be valid. Dasein does not have to first place itself outside its own experience in order to come to understanding. In a colourful analogy, Heidegger explicates his position:

*'We can say that the snail at times crawls out of its shell and at the same time keeps it on hand; it stretches itself out to something, to food, to some things that it finds on the ground. Does the snail thereby first enter into a relationship of being with the world? Not at all! Its act of crawling out is but a local modification of its already Being-in-the-world... the snail is not at the outset only in its shell and not yet in the world, a world described as standing over*

*against it, an opposition which it broaches by first crawling out. It crawls out only in so far as its being is already to be in a world. It does not first add a world to itself by touching. Rather, it touches because its being means nothing other than to be in a world.*<sup>42</sup>

Heidegger does not want his phenomenology to become trammelled with hypotheses, theories, arguments or premises of an exclusively philosophical nature. Nor does he want his phenomenology to become stuck in questioning of whether this or that is real or whether this or that is a mere appearance or semblance. Nor does he wish his phenomenology to engage with notions of whether this or that is a mental content or whether this or that has independent existence. He considers that this ground has been well fought over, and one that will continue to be fought over so long as philosophers do not look 'to the things themselves'. It is this 'looking' which is the essence of his phenomenology:

*'the term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim which can be formulated as "To the things themselves!" It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as 'problems', often for generations at a time.*<sup>43</sup>

### **Heideggerian phenomenology, 'to the things themselves' and the chair:**

The phrase 'to the things themselves', is a variation of Heidegger's old mentor's (Edmund Husserl) maxim, 'back to the things themselves'<sup>44</sup> (*zurück zu den Sachen selbst*), a maxim that Heidegger endorsed and which was foundational to his own phenomenology. In this going 'back to the things themselves' there is for Heidegger a certain guilelessness and a trusting in that which is 'given'. In one of his lectures, given during the summer semester in 1925 at Marburg, he traces his 'perception' of a chair as an exemplar of the phenomenological way of 'seeing' and of what is involved in going 'back to the things themselves'.

He begins by claiming that in seeing the chair he is actually seeing the chair itself and not anything else. This 'anything else' would not simply exclude things that were not chairs, but would also exclude notions that the chair was merely a re-presentation to himself of something 'over there' and that whatever he was seeing was not actually the thing itself. On this view, in seeing the chair, he is neither apprehending a facsimile nor a reproduction (as in the form of an optical representation), nor is he engaged in a secondary process whereby his sensory faculties 'process' systematically

an input of 'information'. As he asserts, 'I simply see it – it itself.'<sup>45</sup> He calls this particular way of seeing, 'natural perception'. This particular phenomenological way of seeing, for Heidegger, is always located in a specific environment and it is the specificity of that environment which enables the phenomenologist to say something 'about' the thing itself.

This chair is located in a specific environment (room 24 in the University of Marburg) and its presence in that particular spot indicates that it is there for those lecturers who have a preference for sitting down, rather than standing up when delivering their lectures. Its purpose is indicated by its being adjacent to the lecturing desk. In addition, because of prolonged use it looks well used and 'somewhat worse for wear'. Doubtless, its being worse for wear would be hastened by the fact that it was not the most expensive chair in the world and was 'somewhat...poorly painted in the factory from which it evidently came.'<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, in this phenomenological 'natural perception' Heidegger is enabled to say whether the chair is heavy or light, what particular colour or staining it has, what its particular dimensions are and that it is also completely portable and can be chopped into pieces with a hatchet; [and] if ignited, it burns.<sup>47</sup> In this phenomenological way of seeing, Heidegger is implicitly claiming that he is not reporting on a string of secondary phenomena in the form of mental objects nor of seeing, touching, smelling, tasting, hearing, as separate sensations that have to be cohered by another process. He is in fact, seeing the chair itself.

In addition, if he were to make the observation that the chair was hard, he would not be embarking upon a technical description referring to the particular density of the wood used in constructing the chair, nor would he be commenting on the particular surface resistance of this material in comparison to other materials. His plain and simple observation regarding the hardness of the chair would be to convey the message, 'the chair is uncomfortable.'<sup>48</sup> And it is within this message that the chair's density, surface resistance and weight would come to light (as revealed by Heidegger's discomfiture on sitting upon that particular chair).

The materiality of the chair would come to light, not as a result of inferences, not as a result of speculations brought from outside, nor as a consequence of opinions or systematic enquiry, but as a result of the discomfiture itself as revealed by the chair. The chair itself would 'give' itself in this phenomenological way of 'natural

perception'. His claim that the chair originated from a factory would, from this point of view, not be based on his possession, for example, of an official receipt, or an institutional order form 'proving' that his statement had genuine provenance. Nor would it be based on some brand mark indicating that the chair originated from so-and-so's factory in such-and-such a town. The fact that it came from a factory would arise because 'we simply see this in it, even though we have no sensation of a factory or anything like it.'<sup>49</sup>

The cultivation of this way of seeing was, for Heidegger, essential in order to cut through, what he perceived as a tradition barnacled and burdened by the weight of 'pseudo-questions' and fascinated by purely epistemological issues:

*'... what we want is precisely naïveté, pure naïveté, which in the first instance and in actuality sees the chair. When we say 'we see', 'seeing' here is not understood in the narrow sense of optical sensing. Here it means nothing other than 'simple cognizance of what is found.'... We thus say that one sees in the chair itself that it came from a factory. We draw no conclusions, make no investigations, but we simply see this in it ... The field of what is found in simple cognizance is in principle much broader than what any particular epistemology or psychology could establish on the basis of a theory of perception.'*<sup>50</sup>

### **Heideggarian phenomenology and intersubjective relationships:**

For Heidegger's mentor, Husserl, 'all consciousness is consciousness of something as something, thanks to which all entities present themselves with a certain "content" or meaning'.<sup>51</sup> But for Heidegger, this consciousness, so crucial to Husserl, is not foundational in that it itself 'rests upon an ontological basis that has the character of "Being-in-the-world"'.<sup>52</sup> This Being-in-the-world eschews any notion of individual Dasein's being an isolated and encapsulated ego staring out from a monadic solitude (alongside other encapsulated egos similarly staring back). Dasein, as explicated in Chapter Two of this thesis, is always 'with-world' and therefore is always 'being-with' even when completely alone:

*'The analysis of the world is therefore reconstructed first of all from the point of view of an intersubjective relationship of Dasein to Dasein in being-with, with which being-with is shown to be a constitutive feature of Being-in-the-world ... The entire modern epistemology since Descartes has to accept the blame for proceeding from a subject in the figure of the "I think", a subject which has neither a world nor yet a with-world.'*<sup>53</sup>

Earlier in this section, it was emphasised that it is almost impossible to understand Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutical method without reference to his

analysis of Dasein. There is a direct correlation between method and analysis, (probably more so than in any other philosopher). This cannot be stressed enough, particularly in the analysis of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and Dasein as always being with others in the world (and therefore always 'being-with' in the world even when Dasein is completely alone). The repetition of the phrase 'in the world' serves to turn attention to Heidegger's great gift to 20th-century thought, namely that the persistent and inescapable worldliness of Dasein, must precede any attempt by Dasein in seeking to establish a secure ground for itself. Being in the world cannot be edited out as something that is merely assumed nor is it to be something placed 'on top of' something else, which is brought in, as more foundational. Any attempt to interpret the world, on this view, cannot therefore proceed on the basis that the individual making the interpretation is an isolated consciousness to whom the only certainty is its **own** cognizance.

For Heidegger, all attempts at interpretation must be grounded in the acknowledgement that Dasein (as interpreter) always conducts such interpretation out of a world in which it is **already** with others.

*'The analysis of the world is therefore reconstructed first of all from the point of view of an intersubjective relationship of Dasein to Dasein in being-with, with which being-with is shown to be a constitutive feature of Being-in-the-world. Through this, Heidegger brings those processes of the understanding into view which hold present the intersubjectively shared, lived-worldly background – the background which supports hermeneutic understanding. Heidegger enters with a stroke the level of intersubjectivity, without having to construct it from the transcendental performances of individual subjects, using a theory of constitution. He thereby deepens that phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity in which he explains the analysis of the world from the point of view of an intersubjective relationship which I enter into with others'.<sup>64</sup> [my emphasis].*

Although 'Being-in-the-world' has been listed earlier as a separate section within Chapter Two 2.2 of this thesis, all the section titles now recorded in this present later section 5.4, constitute, in fact, Dasein's Being-in-the-world. It is this 'list' and its contents that must be 'held' in mind as that out of which phenomenological hermeneutical interpretation emerges.

### **Heideggarian phenomenology and the term 'phenomenology':**

Heidegger himself disclaimed creating a phenomenology that was novel, but claimed rather that he was returning to a more original understanding of the term, an

understanding that was already embedded within the tradition. In 1959 he published, as part of a larger work, a purported dialogue between two people, a Japanese and an Inquirer in which the Inquirer, in replying to prompting from the Japanese states, 'I was concerned neither with a new direction in phenomenology nor, indeed, with anything new. Quite the reverse, I was trying to think the nature of phenomenology in a more originary manner, so as to fit it in this way back into the place that is properly its own within Western philosophy.'<sup>55</sup> What Heidegger's phrase, 'more originary manner' refers to is contained within the early pages of "Being and Time", in which he deconstructs the term 'phenomenology' and links that interpretation to a much earlier understanding.

### **Heideggarian phenomenology and the term 'phenomenology' divided:**

For Heidegger, the term 'phenomenology' has its primary origins in Greek and it is to Greek that he must turn in order to lay out what is now being understood in this 'more originary' term. By associating his interpretation with this more 'originary' understanding, Heidegger now places himself within a tradition that precedes most of his antecedents and therefore connects him, on this view, more primordially with the term. He begins by dividing the term 'phenomenology' into two discrete parts (rendered in English rather awkwardly as 'phenomeno' and 'logy'. For him this first term *φαινόμενον* (*phainomenon*) finds its origins in the Greek verb *φαίνεσθαι* (*phainesthai*), which he interprets as 'to show itself'<sup>56</sup>.

So for him, *φαινόμενον* (*phainomenon*), indicates that which makes itself plain, 'the manifest'. He notes that this first term *φαινόμενον* (*phainomenon*) 'is based on the Greek *φαίνεσθαι* (*phainesthai*), the middle voice of *φαίνω* (*phaino*) an occurrence that was neither active nor passive nor even necessarily reflexive'.<sup>57</sup> The term, *φαίνεσθαι* (*phainesthai*) (to show itself), is, as noted above, based upon the term *φαίνω* (*phaino*) which is interpreted as, 'to bring to the light of day, to put to the light'.<sup>58</sup>

This latter term, *φαίνω* (*phaino*), itself emanates from a stem *φα—* (*pha—*) similar to *φώς* (*phos*) meaning 'the light, that which is bright — in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself'.<sup>59</sup>

- The word 'phenomenology' has two parts, 'phenomeno' and 'logy', 'phenomeno-logy'.



- 'Phenomenon' has its origins in another word, 'phainesthai' which means 'to show itself'.
- 'Phenomenon' therefore indicates a meaning of, 'that which shows itself', in other words, 'the manifest'.
- 'Phainesthai' ('to show itself') is itself based upon a further term 'phaino'.
- 'Phaino' means 'to bring to the light of day, to put to the light'.
- 'Phaino', has its origins in a stem meaning 'the light, that which is bright — in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself'.
- 'Phenomenon' therefore means *ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα (apophainesthaita phainomena)* 'to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself'.<sup>60</sup>

### **Heideggerian phenomenology and notions of 'truth':**

In order to emphasise a pivotal moment in this argument, Heidegger brings out the underlying sense of 'phenomenon' as that which is brought out from concealment, as that which stands out as explicitly unconcealed and as that which resides in the light as completely visible itself, as it itself, without semblance or derogation. So for Heidegger *φαινόμενα (phenomena)* 'are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light.'<sup>61</sup> In this lying within the light and being brought to the light, the phenomenon, whilst always remaining itself in itself, can be displayed in 'many ways'. These 'many ways', these multiplicities of manifestation, are not themselves **primarily** phenomenal.<sup>62</sup> It must always be remembered that, as noted above, the phenomenon always remains 'as that which resides in the light as completely visible itself, as it itself, without semblance or derogation.'

But if such is the case, (that the phenomenon shows itself as itself), what exactly are these other 'many ways' of manifestation?

*'Phenomenology has to do with self-manifestation. Things show themselves in many ways, depending on the modes of access we have to them; indeed sometimes things show themselves as what they are not, in cases of dissembling, seeming, illusion and other such phenomena.'*

*Heidegger gives a careful analysis of these different senses of appearing and strongly emphasises that dissemblance, mere appearance, semblance and illusion are all secondary senses dependent on the primary meaning of 'phenomenon' as that which shows itself in itself.<sup>63</sup>*

But the very notion of 'unconcealedness', as that which now resides within the light of day, **already** has buried within it a sense of 'concealedness', i.e., of that which is hidden. The 'phenomenon' therefore (as that which is unconcealed and which is brought into unconcealment), stands out, not only as that which manifests itself within the light of day, but also as that which emerges from and retreats into a certain hiddenness. Heidegger designates the term *ἀλήθεια* (*aletheia*) to this bringing to the light, to this process of unconcealment<sup>64</sup>, (a term which for him is interpreted, perhaps rather controversially, as 'truth') in opposition to 'truth', more conventionally interpreted as '*veritas*' as correctness.

He traces the transformation of *ἀλήθεια*, as being the more originary term for 'truth' (and which for him is linked irreducibly to phenomenological 'method'), through the centuries from Greece to Rome and through the period of European mediaeval scholasticism, to the present time. During these transitions and translations 'truth', as *ἀλήθεια*, Heidegger argues, metamorphoses into:

*'... the Roman Veritas, to the mediaeval adaequatio, rectitudo, and iustitia, and from there to the modern certitudo, to truth as certainty, validity, and assurance, the essence and the character of the opposition between truth and untruth [being therefore] also altered.'<sup>65</sup>*

As noted above, phenomena also come into the light of day as mere appearances, semblances and illusions and also appear as if they are the things themselves and in so doing, deceitfully present themselves as that which they are not. In fact the very word *φαινόμενον* (*phainomenon*),<sup>66</sup> in Greek also has the meaning of something 'which looks like something, that which is 'semblant', 'semblance'.<sup>67</sup> But it is Heidegger's view that semblances, illusions, representations and seemings would themselves never be enabled to come into the light of day, if it were not for the phenomenon itself. The phenomenon is neither obliterated nor amended but is 'included as that upon which the second signification is founded'<sup>68</sup> in other words, the phenomenon is already enduringly present within the semblance:

*'...the concepts of semblance and appearance can be defined only by using the concept of phenomenon, whereas the converse is not the case. The concepts of semblance and appearance thus 'presuppose' and are thus 'in different ways founded in' the 'originary' concept of phenomenon.'<sup>69</sup>*

A further question remains, are phenomena merely the totality of whatever comes into appearance?

Up to now the argument might seem to provoke the answer 'yes!', in that the emphasis so far has been heavily emphatic on phenomena as 'that which shows itself'. But phenomena are never **bare** appearances (in fact never appearances at all) for what is being left out of this explication is the manner in which phenomena are **encountered**. Phenomena are always encountered, but in order to **be** as phenomena there has to be encountering in a particular manner:

*'... "the showing itself in itself", is not just any given thing which appears, but rather "signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered"'.<sup>70</sup>*

And that phenomena,

*'must show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them'.<sup>71</sup>*

### **Heideggarian phenomenology and Dasein's encountering of phenomena:**

As has been argued earlier, (Chapter Two 2.2) 'the multifarious ways in which Dasein engages in encounters, reflect the variety and richness of being-in-the-world. Dasein's products, creations, artefacts, constructions and equipment stand in a state of readiness to be used. These are intrinsically useful and occur within an environment of significance, a 'context' where they have meaning. Other objects, being merely present, lack any environmental significance, (which would give them meaning), and remain, therefore, 'present-at-hand'. Thus the two main ways in which Dasein encounters things within the world, it is argued, are of the 'ready-to-hand' and of the 'present-at-hand'.<sup>72</sup> It should be emphasised that the 'ready-to-hand' and the 'present at hand' are not properties of the phenomena themselves but are descriptions of the manner in which Dasein **encounters** them.

That which is extant in itself can be encountered in many ways and is not 'constrained' by the facticity of its existence. Dasein can approach the same phenomenon for different purposes, under different circumstances, with a variety of motives and under the influence of differing moods. This difference of approach therefore signifies the difference between **how** Dasein encounters phenomena and **what** Dasein encounters it

as. In any encountering of phenomena, Dasein has to make an interpretation, in fact it is almost impossible for Dasein to encounter any phenomenon without its being an interpretive engagement. In that encountering, and therefore in that interpreting, Dasein takes the phenomenon as such and such. But this such and such can also be the this, that and the other of endless multiplicity. Dasein engages with the meaning of the phenomenon based upon what it takes it to be i.e. through the process of interpretation, but in that encounter Dasein can make misinterpretations and mistakes:

*'Whereas an encountered entity is generally actual, meanings are possibilities –namely, possible ways of encountering that entity, whether correctly or falsely (in the case of the present-to-hand) or appropriately or inappropriately (in the case of the ready at hand).'*<sup>73</sup>

### **Heideggarian phenomenology and the term 'logos':**

Earlier in this section, it was said that Heidegger divides the term 'phenomenology' into two discrete parts (rendered in English rather awkwardly as 'phenomeno' and 'logy') and that for him this first term *φαινόμενον* (*phainomenon*) finds its origins in the Greek verb *φαίνεσθαι* (*phainesthai*), which he interprets as 'to show itself'. It is now time for the second part of the term 'phenomenology' namely, the 'logy', to be considered.

Heidegger begins, as he often does, by challenging the received understandings of a term by tracing its etymology to a purported more originary meaning. He traces the 'logy' of phenomenology to *λόγος* (*logos*), which he interprets as 'discourse'<sup>74</sup>, (or as some commentators translate it, 'speech' or 'word'<sup>75</sup>)<sup>76</sup>. It is his position that over the years and through the generations, the tradition of philosophical discourse has encrusted the term *λόγος* with 'significations' that have served to mask its original meaning. During its encrusting, *λόγος* has come to bear the meanings of 'reason', 'judgment', 'concept', 'definition', 'ground', or 'relationship'<sup>77</sup>. This encrusting has distorted its originary meaning into these later received understandings and has led to a misinterpretation of the 'logy' of phenomenology. For him, *λόγος* (*logos*) has the more originary meaning of 'discourse/speech' and, as such intrinsically bears the meaning of that which 'lets something be seen'<sup>78</sup>, lets something be revealed, lets something become manifest; for Heidegger then, *λόγος* is essentially **disclosive**.

λόγος (*logos*), in its originary meaning as discourse/speech has, according to Heidegger, an almost identical meaning with the term *δηλοῦν* (*deloun*), to make manifest namely, “what is being talked about” in speech.<sup>79</sup> At an earlier time, Heidegger indicates, Aristotle had drawn attention to this particular characteristic of speech, namely its disclosiveness, its capacity to make manifest whatever the speaker intends, nevertheless, on this particular reading, the speaker is never **simply** the originator and creator of speech but is more a 'medium'<sup>80</sup> of what is being enacted. In this, Heidegger is associating his argument with Aristotle's term *ἀποφαίνεσθαι* (*apophainesthai*)<sup>81</sup> in that, '[when] encountering an entity, ...we allow it to show itself, show up, or be seen (in a broad sense, not restricted to vision), as something.'<sup>82</sup>

λόγος therefore, through the medium of the speaker, lets something come into appearance within speech/discourse in whatever might be being talked about. This coming into appearance, this revelation is not simply a possession of whoever happens to be speaking, nor is it a simple projection of intention or a projection of 'content' by one speaker to another, rather λόγος is that which brings into appearance, (for those involved in dialogic discourse), that which is being said:

*'Aristotle's word for 'statement', 'predication', apophansis, comes from apophainen, 'to show forth, display'. The prefix apo, 'from, etc.', indicates that talk lets what it is about be seen 'from' itself.'*<sup>83</sup>

There is something about the λόγος of 'phenomeno-logy' that is neither completely active nor completely passive. λόγος, lets things be, lets things come into appearance, lets that 'which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself'. It is never simply raw data actively transmitted from one source to a passively receiving entity, nor is it simply the medium of such. λόγος, lends to the 'phenomeno' of phenomenology a specific quality in that:

*'Phenomenology involves an effacing of one's prejudices, 'stand points', or 'any special direction' one might be inclined toward, in order to let the things themselves present themselves as they are in themselves. In other words, phenomenology involves not imposing ones will on the phenomena to be thought; it involves, to begin with, a restraining from willing.'*<sup>84</sup>

Nevertheless, as has been indicated earlier (in Chapter Two 2.3) a great deal of Dasein's discourse has the characteristic of inauthentic speech. This inauthentic

speech as 'Idle talk' has its own distinctive hermeneutic in that it cycles and recycles, not in the sense of refreshing its interpretive basis, but in dissipating itself within a generality that resembles 'gossiping and passing the word along'.<sup>85</sup> It would be virtually impossible to track this 'idle talk' back to an authoritative and original source as there is no singularity in its origin. It is what it is essentially, a passing the word along in an accumulative manner by many. Although its groundlessness is hidden, it itself is not. 'Idle Talk' is a discourse that does not take accountability for its own authoritative basis. By its very nature it always turns away, always evades being held to justify the basis of its assertions. It is a discourse that is always 'out there' in the public realm of the world:

*'The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its becoming public; instead it encourages this. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own. If this were done, idle talk would founder; and it already guards against such a danger. Idle talk is something which anyone can rake up; it not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer.'*<sup>86</sup>

This release from genuine understanding cuts Dasein off from the radical origins of discourse, in that everything becomes undifferentiatedly intelligible. This is the discourse of 'The They', 'The One', 'The Anyone'. Nevertheless, this discourse is the ordinary mode by which and through which Dasein finds expression and in which it communicates.<sup>87</sup> Discourse therefore, by residing within a public realm, develops a commonality of understanding that has the capacity to become reified. This reification arises when consensual agreement about what such and such is, occupies the space where authentic/genuine speech might be. Everyone in agreeing that such and such is the case, and in agreeing that this means that, relegates speech/discourse to a sort of habit rather than a passionate encountering where λόγος, through the medium of the speaker might let something authentic come into appearance:

*'It is simply not the case that one can live in the truth all the time, that one can bask in the light of disclosure. Our ordinary life constantly draws us back down into forms of complacency and everydayness. This is a structural feature of Dasein; its everydayness is characterised by 'falling', which Heidegger stresses is not meant to have any negative connotation but simply expresses the manner in which human beings live.'*<sup>88</sup>

Perhaps it would be timely to 'point up', yet again, the connectedness between the structural features of Dasein and phenomenological methodology and to be reminded



that Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, as explicated within Chapter Two of this thesis, and within "Being and Time" is his phenomenology laid bare. So the **very headings** of Chapter Two in encapsulating the factual elements of Dasein's existence demonstrate the 'contents' and capacity of his phenomenology. It is thus argued, that there is a powerful confluence between the *φαινόμενον* (phenomenon) and *λόγος* (logos) of 'phenomenology' and that the two terms come together to have the meaning *ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα*, 'to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch of research which calls itself "phenomenology". But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim: ' "To the things themselves!" ' <sup>89</sup>

### **Heideggarian Hermeneutics:**

#### **Heideggarian hermeneutics and the term 'Hermeneutics:**

Four years before the publication of his *magnum opus* "Being And Time" (1927) Heidegger, during the summer semester of 1923 in the University of Marburg, gave a lecture course in which he began to develop his understanding of hermeneutics. At the beginning of the first lecture, in the series, 'Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity' he first defines what he means by 'hermeneutics' and then embarks on a practice he was to continue on many occasions thereafter namely, to trace the etymology of the word and to find ancient examples of its usage. So in his definition hermeneutics is:

*'The unified manner of the engaging, approaching, accessing, interrogating, and explicating of facticity'.<sup>90</sup>*

He begins by suggesting that *ἐρμηνευτική* (hermeneutics) comes from *ἐρμηνεύειν*, which means 'interpreting' and *ἐρμηνεία*, which means 'interpretation'. He makes a further connection between *ἐρμηνευτική* (hermeneutics) and the term *ἐρμηνεύς* (interpreter) and also associates the terms for 'science' and 'art' with the same basic source as hermeneutics namely, *ἐρμηνεύειν*, which means interpreting. In addition, he associates *ἐρμηνευτική* with *Ερμής* (Hermes)<sup>91</sup> who was a god himself but who was primarily a messenger of the gods.<sup>92</sup> So the major resonances associated with the term 'hermeneutics', in this view, are 'interpreting', 'interpretation' and 'interpreter' together

with the terms 'engaging', 'approaching', 'accessing', 'interrogating' and 'explicating' (and by extension, as in the Hermes' function, 'communicating' and 'listening'). As ever, Heidegger's return to a more originary meaning is intended to bypass the various crustaceous accumulations that have grown upon traditional practices and interpretations of hermeneutics. There is also a further intention to limit and to focus the meaning so that:

*'Hermeneutics has the task of making the Dasein which is in each case our own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its being, communicating Dasein to itself in this regard, hunting down the alienation from itself with which it is smitten. In hermeneutics what is developed for Dasein is a possibility of its becoming and being for itself in the manner of an **understanding** of itself.'*<sup>83</sup>

### **Heideggarian hermeneutics and the term 'Hermeneutics' deconstructed:**

So, at this early stage it might be important to 'deconstruct' the above quotation through paraphrase and summary, in order to explore the range and the boundary of the term 'hermeneutics' as understood within this Heideggarian explication.

'Hermeneutics has the task of making the Dasein which is in each case our own...':

As has been noted earlier in Chapter Two 2.2, 'notions of understanding that can be applied to Dasein's being-in-the-world, must always include care, concern, relationship, engagement and language.

So for Heidegger, special notions of understanding around Dasein, (which he calls *existentiales*), must be applied, notions that must never be conflated with **categories** of understanding that apply to beings that are not Dasein'. So in its interpretation of facticity, Dasein can never exclude itself nor extricate itself from Being-in-the-world. For Dasein, its being is always an issue for it and, as has been noted earlier, is always and inextricably 'mine'.

'accessible to this Dasein itself...':

The means by which Dasein arrives at an interpretation and understanding of its own facticity, must not be covered over by received or conventional notions of what it is to be a human-being. Neither must the discourse, by which such an interpretation and understanding might arrive, be dominated by the inauthentic modes of discourse that belong to *das Man*.

'with regard to the character of its being ...:'

Dasein, is 'immersed' in its facticity. This facticity is not simply the factual contents of a daily life that can be listed, examined, regarded, objectified or reified as something 'other' and 'over there'; but designates the very character of Dasein itself, as Being-in-the-world. Any understanding of this 'location' of Dasein within the world, **always already includes its own being-there** as utterly specific, unique, engaged and temporarily bounded in its finitude.

'communicating Dasein to itself in this regard ...:'

Dasein, as already being-with, does not need a special language nor a cognitive reflexive stance, as pre-requisites for understanding. Dasein already possesses a pre-theoretical understanding of itself in its ordinary ways of going about and in its daily passionate engagement with others and world.

'hunting down the alienation from itself with which it is smitten ...:'

Nevertheless, as has been noted earlier, the coming to fruition of Dasein's possibilities, being grounded not upon **what** I am, but upon **who** I am in my 'mineness', emerges out of the choices that Dasein makes. In the exercise of those choices Dasein takes account of all that it is, in relation to and in relation with the 'world'. In taking account of all that it is, Dasein through its inescapable immersement in and with the world, 'allows' its openness to its own possibilities, its openness to self-interpret, to be formed by *das Man*. By this ordinary process, Dasein becomes either more or less open to its own possibilities and it is **in** this 'more' or 'less' that Dasein is **either** authentic or inauthentic. Therefore, within the hermeneutical circle of interpretation and understanding, Dasein, as noted in Chapter Two, 'is not simply

purposive or fixed upon a target outside itself (as a goal to be achieved), but is resolute **in itself** as Dasein transformed towards its own potentiality [i.e.]...**itself disclosed to itself** in its authentic potentiality'.

'In hermeneutics what is developed for Dasein is a possibility of its becoming and being for itself in the manner of an **understanding** of itself'

Hermeneutics develops for Dasein an authentic language that is concerned not with **what** Dasein is but rather **how** Dasein is. This authentic language arises out of Dasein's facticity and is not a special terminological mode of interpretation that comes from an extraneous epistemological source. The authenticity of its discourse is not 'checked' against anything other than the authenticity of Dasein itself in its resoluteness. But, Dasein is **essentially** an interpreting entity and the nature of Dasein's factual life as Being-in-the-world, (whether authentic or inauthentic), **requires** it always and forever to be interpreting. This hermeneutical mode of interpreting more closely resembles *ἀλήθεια (aletheia)* than it does *veritas* as 'correctness', in that 'the chance that hermeneutics will go wrong belongs in principle to its ownmost being. The kind of evidence found in its explications is fundamentally labile. To hold up before it such an extreme ideal of evidence as "intuition of essences" would be a misunderstanding of what it can and should do.'<sup>94</sup>

### **Heideggerian hermeneutics and traditional modes of interpretation:**

As has been oft repeated within this section, there is a connectedness between the structural features of Dasein itself and phenomenological methodology. This arises 'because human-beings are nothing but interpretation all the way down that the activity of interpreting a meaningful text offers the most appropriate model for understanding any human experience whatsoever.'<sup>95</sup>

As has already been indicated above, hermeneutical interpreting is necessarily 'labile' and resembles Dasein in being dynamic, engaged, immersed in the world and is not to be held against extraneous 'objective' standards of 'correctness' (as in *veritas*). Heidegger's departure from traditional modes of interpreting human experience was

based upon his rejection of what he considered to be inappropriate methods of interpretation, namely the persistent attempt 'to model all human experience on the basis of our perception of physical objects.'<sup>96</sup>In his view, this perception objectified Dasein and claimed for itself a special and secure stasis from which it was able to posit itself as a subject empowered to view itself **as if** it were **other** than the Dasein as thrown into the world, alongside and with others in the world and as mostly inauthentic and bounded by time. This perception of itself as simply another substantial entity alongside other substantial entities, involved, in this view, an editing out of its own innate capacity to self-interpret through a process of 'bracketing' this innate capacity and suspending it in favour of something else which produced 'an entirely distorted account of human identity.'<sup>97</sup>

*'If Dasein is ontically constituted by Being-in-the-world, and if an understanding of the Being of its Self belongs just as essentially to its Being, no matter how indefinite that understanding may be, then does not Dasein have an understanding of the world ... which indeed can and does get along without explicit ontological insights?'*<sup>98</sup>

Heidegger's intention was to eschew any 'analysis' of Dasein and Dasein as Being-in-the-world that would in any way resemble a cause/effect, subject/object, body/soul, mental/physical or objective/subjective mode of interpretation. In all these modes, there was for Heidegger, a disengagement of Dasein from Being-in-the-world, a disengagement that had once been deemed necessary as a preliminary step in the interpretive process. His intention was not to occupy a more secure stance (one that would be both foundational and irrefutable), but rather to acknowledge an inescapable immersement of Dasein, as interpreter, in its world.

As has been indicated in Chapter Two of this thesis, the 'in' of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, is not that of water as in a glass. Dasein is not simply 'contained in' or simply 'present upon', but is actively engaged in structuring its world and is formed by that world in an ever ongoing relationship. In other words, Dasein is never simply a subject regarding an object, (nor an object being regarded by a subject<sup>99</sup>). Heidegger's approach, therefore, becomes nothing short of revolutionary, in that it puts aside centuries of assumptions, presuppositions and practices:

*'The central feature of Heidegger's hermeneutic turn lies in his replacement of the subject – object model, that is, the model of an **observing** subject posed over against the world as the*

*totality of entities, by the hermeneutic model of an **understanding** Dasein which finds itself always **in** a symbolically structured **world**... the world is no longer the totality of entities, but a totality of significance, a web of meanings that structures Dasein's understanding of itself and of everything that can show up within the world.*<sup>100</sup>

As has been noted earlier, 'notions of understanding that can be applied to Dasein's being-in-the-world must always include care<sup>101</sup>, concern, relationship, engagement and language'. In the light of this, I wish to assert that there exists a relationship between the pivotal chapter, Chapter Two of this thesis, and this present Chapter Three, a relationship similar to that between Heidegger's analysis of Dasein and of his methodology in "Being and Time" for, as has been oft repeated, there is a connectedness between the structural features of Dasein itself and phenomenological hermeneutical methodology, hence the existence of that pivotal chapter.

### **Heideggarian hermeneutics and discourse:**

Two of the structural features treated within this pivotal chapter namely, 'Dasein As the One', 2.3, and 'Dasein As Absorbed', 2.4, point towards a world that not only pre-exists Dasein and one that forms Dasein but also one that is always culturally and linguistically specific. Dasein as thrown into this world, is not merely a passive recipient but an ongoing co-creator of world and, while submitting to those conventions and prescriptions Dasein also chooses to embrace resolutely its own personal authentic possibilities and to experience these as its own personal transformations.

The attempt to draw time to a standstill and to turn that which is dynamic and labile into a static picture (in order to secure a singular view and contemplate it analytically at leisure) may be regarded with some sympathy, in light of the above vision of 'world'. The very dynamic of world, in this Heideggarian-hermeneutical interpretation is (as one commentator has noted) 'a phenomenon that is hard to situate'.<sup>102</sup> But, this 'situation' of Dasein as absorbed within *das Man*, is the world of Dasein in its Being-in-the-world. Within this world there is a commonality of understanding, one that is 'mediated' in language. This language carries-along, amends, amplifies, (and diminishes) all that Dasein is and wishes to be. Through this language, this discourse, this *λόγος*, the world always and forever becomes 'linguistically articulated'.<sup>103</sup>



Within this articulation, Dasein does not communicate as if it were an isolated monad reaching out to other monads (as if reporting on something that is either merely ongoing or has just past), but always engages with a world already shared and being shared.<sup>104</sup>

If Dasein is not an isolated monad and the world is not a singular entity, then Dasein's Being-in-the-world cannot be interpreted as if it were simply 'one thing inside another one thing'. This being-in is premised upon Dasein's being 'open' and although the word 'open' has a 'passive' feel, it actually denotes an active engagement with a world already shared with others. Within this engagement, within this sharing, Dasein, though absorbed as *das Man*, always shows up as the 'who' intrinsically unique and individual. Speech, discourse, language, *λόγος*, emerge out of that sameness and out of that difference, but in so emerging, Dasein not only interprets the world to others, but also actively interprets itself to others and to itself. What does this admit of?

It admits of diversity, multiplicity, abundance and a profusion of worlds. That which can be talked about, can be changed. That which can be talked about, can be shared. That which can be talked about, can be interpreted. That which can be talked about, can be recognised. That which can be talked about, can be explained. That which can be talked about, can be understood. Within this diversity there is always difference. In a sense, recognition of difference is at the heart of a hermeneutical interpretation of world. When Dasein talks to others there is an assumption of a common intelligibility arising out of difference. It is not simply that the 'content' determines the discourse, it is discourse **itself** that is intelligible, even if that which is borne within it, is difficult or arcane. **Discourse, on this view, is always intelligible because it is the discourse of *das Man*.** As has been indicated earlier:

*'The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its becoming public; instead it encourages this. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own. If this were done, idle talk would founder; and it already guards against such a danger. Idle talk is something which anyone can rake up; it not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer.'*<sup>105</sup>

Because 'idle talk is something which anyone can rake up', it possesses therefore, the utmost in **accessibility**. It is this accessibility that guarantees a commonality in sharing.

But what is being shared?

### **Heideggarian hermeneutics and the priority of understanding:**

Dasein is not a *tabula rasa* with a guaranteed purity of perception as if it were standing on the established ground of a certain cognitive reflexivity. Dasein **already** comes with an understanding of what such-and-such is and how such-and-such fits into this or that. For Dasein, there is no such thing as the pure perception or apprehension of a thing or a world. Heidegger regards such positing as a former fantasy belonging to those who had edited out their own worlds in favour of one that could be accessed from the point of absolute certainty. This point of absolute certainty, he argues, was intended to guarantee a neutrality whereby the world could always be seen 'just as it is'. Because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has already assimilated a comprehension of (and an insight into) how things are, it comes primed and prepared to interpret its perceptions as already being such-and-such. This being 'primed and prepared' precedes any notion of 'pure perception' and always underlies that which Dasein perceives. A neutral stance of pure perception is therefore impossible.

### **Heideggarian hermeneutics, Dasein, its world and texts:**

It is important to grasp the notion that Heideggarian hermeneutics is not simply a method of interrogating linguistic scripts, nor simply a convenient tool for researchers. Neither is it something that conveniently tags along as an adjunct to phenomenology. Heideggarian hermeneutics embraces an understanding of what it is to be a human-being, and an understanding of that human-being in its world, and an understanding of that world itself. In many senses, this hermeneutical view of how things are (of how the world is and how Dasein exists within it), challenges received notions of interpretation. For example, the commonsense notion that, 'in order to understand you must listen' is subverted in favour of the formula 'in order to listen you must understand.' In this sense, understanding precedes listening. Hearing something, listening to something is not simply a collecting point that passes data along for

interpretation and a final understanding. Within the Heideggarian hermeneutical view, listening and understanding **do not** have this kind of simplistic seriality.

Dasein already approaches entities within its world with a vague or average everyday sort of understanding of how things are and what they might be (even if it has never encountered them before). Dasein would simply be unable to pilot itself through the complexities of existence if everything had to be interpreted beforehand as a novel entity. In other words, Dasein exists in a world already given but not in a world unknown. Dasein always moves from a position of understanding, not from a position of complete ignorance, this applies particularly when Dasein moves into an environment where the cultural, social, topographical, personal and linguistic variables are not known and have never been known by that individual Dasein.

On a Heideggarian hermeneutical view, it is impossible to approach entities by having edited out one's own understanding. So, for example, in approaching a text for the first time, the reader, although he or she has never encountered it before, **already** approaches it full of presuppositions that may have led them to it in the first instance. In addition, the reading of a text already presupposes that it leads somewhere and in that presupposition the reader already has an understanding of what the text is. So, as the reader progresses with a text, that presupposition is amended so that his or her understanding of what the whole text is, changes in favour of the ongoing understanding. The reader's understanding is never confined to that which has just been read, it is always essentially projective in that the reader's understanding goes backwards and forwards, in a spiralling motion between

the whole text as being always understood,

the part text as read and understood

and the text not yet read, as understood.

It is never possible, on this Heideggarian hermeneutical view, to claim that the reader is 'objectively' not in a position to understand any pages of a text that he or she has not yet read, for 'interpretation [is not] the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding.'<sup>106</sup> In this working out of possibilities there is no longer any room for a

bare understanding of the things themselves, as they are in themselves and as they are encountered in a presuppositionless way. Such a neutral mode of understanding and interpretation, on this Heideggarian hermeneutical model, is not possible:

*'In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a "signification" over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it, but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation.'*<sup>107</sup>

Dasein does not first approach the world with ready-made attributes and 'significations' that are then projected onto it (in order to make it meaningful), but finds within the world the realisation that 'meaning is an essential part of all experience ... meaning is not added on or constructed.'<sup>108</sup>

### **Heideggarian hermeneutics and Dasein's encountering:**

In encountering entities within the world, Dasein is **already** engaged (even with that which is entirely novel). On this model, Dasein never find anything within the world that is completely unknown. Dasein, as ourself therefore, 'already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world.' This involvement is never simply a partial interest in whatever might be ongoing at any moment but underlies all encountering that Dasein has within the world. In other words, all encountering involves a whole environment of significance, much of which may remain concealed.

As was asserted earlier in Chapter Two of this thesis: 'for Heidegger, two things can only touch if they are in an 'encounterable' relationship, and if one of them 'has' the sort of being that can encounter. Chairs, tables, jugs, garments and cupboards do not have the sort of being that can encounter anything and the understanding that can be applied to them, in their being, cannot appropriately be applied to Dasein as an understanding of its being.' Dasein, as the being who encounters, can never be edited out of that encountering. But in that encountering, 'the fundamental structures of human existence are not on open display but are hidden, owing to the very familiarity and to the tendency of humans to misinterpret and obscure their own nature and features [such as their mortality]. It is the task of philosophical hermeneutics to uncover what is not immediately apparent.'<sup>109</sup>

Dasein, in its encountering, never approaches the world in a presuppositionless manner but always possesses an understanding of whatever it encounters. But in that understanding, 'the prejudices, assumptions, and projects in which humans dwell provide the pre-understanding within which subsequent understandings occur.'<sup>110</sup> To say that the environment of significance is always present and that understanding is never presuppositionless, is to assert that Dasein is always immersed in a process of interpretation and that the interpretive understanding is a fundamental characteristic of Dasein's being:

*'Can the knower ever leave his own present situation, transcend his prejudices, in order to access another situation and to transpose himself into an horizon of understanding altogether different from his own? If our own historicity is not entirely accidental, but is constitutive of our very being (as Heidegger suggests) then our access to the past will always and irreducibly be informed by our present situation. Our prejudices will themselves orient and free our relation to the past, open it up as such. Our hermeneutic situation is a structural feature of our being an ontological trait that cannot be reduced ... as soon as the past, or history, is involved in an operation of understanding, that understanding will always be irreducibly informed by the present situation (the ramifications and roots of which can never fully be classified)... hermeneutics is more akin to a dialogue between persons, or a game between players through which both parties evolve and are transformed. Understanding is this movement to and fro between text (or situation) and interpreter, between an 'I' and a 'Thou'.'*<sup>111</sup>

### **Heideggarian hermeneutics and the structures of understanding:**

So the question now arises: what are the characteristics of that hermeneutic situation, as a structural feature of our being that cannot be reduced?

As was asserted earlier in Chapter Two of this thesis, Dasein is an entity that is always open to its possibilities and, as such is always incomplete. At death, the horizon of possibility becomes closed off and in that closing off Dasein becomes complete.

For Heidegger, Dasein is essentially transcendent, in that Dasein's essential openness to its possibilities disqualifies it from ever being simply another 'thing' within the world. 'Things' are not open to their possibilities as they do not possess selfhood, for 'what exists as a self can do so only as a transcendent being. This selfhood, founded on transcendence ... is the presupposition for the way that Dasein factically has various possibilities of being its own and of losing itself. But it is also the presupposition for Dasein's being-with others in the sense of the I-self with the thou-self.'<sup>112</sup> If it is true that the environment of significance is always present, and that

Dasein is always immersed in a process of interpretation and if it is also true that Dasein as transcendent is always open to its possibilities, then understanding and interpretation must be radically intertwined with those possibilities:

*'... interpretation [is not] the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding.'*<sup>113</sup>

So, in light of the above, what are the characteristics of that hermeneutic situation, as a structural feature of our being that cannot be reduced? Heidegger employs three significant terms, which underpin his explications of that hermeneutic situation (the situation as understanding and interpretation). These terms appear as '*Vorhabe*', '*Vorsicht*' and '*Vorgriff*'.

For him, the first term '*Vorhabe*' signifies a mode of hermeneutic interpretation (translated as *fore-having*), which assumes that Dasein is **already** immersed in a 'totality of involvements'.<sup>114</sup> This totality of involvements always pre-exists any subsequent interpretations that Dasein might deliberately make. These involvements are interpretations that are not cancelled out by any ensuing interpretations, but open up the field of that which is to be interpreted. Anything that is deliberately interpreted does not come into existence thereby as something specially disclosed as if now existing for the first time, but always was so existing, (even without the subsequent action of 'thematic interpretation.'). *Fore-having* therefore, 'refers to the prior intelligibility with which we have understood in advance what we want to interpret, the particular way it is presented to us prior to our explicit interpretation.'<sup>115</sup>

The second term '*Vorsicht*' signifies a mode of hermeneutic interpretation (translated as *fore-sight*), which validates the position that, 'interpretation cannot begin from any view from nowhere'.<sup>116</sup> This completely eschews the Cartesian position that seeks to establish a point of certainty from which all prior involvements have been erased. In *Vorsicht*, that which is to be interpreted is often concealed.

In order for that concealment to be brought into unconcealedness, it has to be viewed from the actual 'position' that Dasein actually 'occupies' (a position that can **never** be a 'view from nowhere'). So, 'in every case interpretation is grounded in something we see in advance—in a fore-sight'.<sup>117</sup> The 'specific perspective' of Dasein as *Vorsicht*, is rooted in 'care' which, 'Heidegger defines as the being of Dasein. It is a name for the structural whole of existence in all its modes and for the broadest and



most basic possibilities of discovery and disclosure of self and world... 'Care' describes the sundry ways [Dasein gets] involved in the issue of birth, life, and death whether by [its] projects, inclinations, insights, or illusions. 'Care' is the all inclusive name for [Dasein's] concern for other people, preoccupations with things, and awareness of [its] proper Being. [Care] expresses the movement of [Dasein's] life out of a past, and into a future, through the present'.<sup>118</sup> It should be noted that *Vorsicht* presumes the prior operation of *Vorhabe* in that 'fore-sight "takes the first cut" out of what has been taken into our fore-having.'<sup>119</sup>

The third term '*Vorgriff*' signifies a mode of hermeneutic interpretation (translated as *fore-conception*), which presumes the prior operation of *Vorhabe* and *Vorsicht*.

Dasein as always immersed within a totality of involvements ( *Vorhabe*), grounds whatever is to be interpreted from a particular point of view (*Vorsicht*), with the result that understanding arises through conceptualisation (*Vorgriff*). This conceptualisation is essentially a 'grasping' by which Dasein interprets the whole of whatever comes to appearance through fore-having and fore-seeing. But this *Vorgriff* can also be violent, mistaken and misdirected in that 'the way in which the entity we are interpreting is to be conceived can be drawn from the entity itself, or the interpretation can force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its manner of Being.'<sup>120</sup> Nevertheless, this hermeneutical position, though being potentially violent, mistaken and misdirected, is one that Dasein 'cannot transcend at will.'<sup>121</sup> In this inability to transcend that which is already transcendent (i.e., itself), Dasein eschews any claim to a final and secure objectivity in that it can never escape its own vital dynamism of Being-in-the world.

What are the consequences then, of '*Vorhabe*', '*Vorsicht*' and '*Vorgriff*'?

*'Precisely by discovering that interpretation entails a moment of application to our own hermeneutic situation, we finally realise what we wanted to know all along: the point of interpreting a text is to find out not so much what its author literally said at the time, but first and foremost what he may have to say to us now, that is, in our current situation.'*<sup>122</sup>

### **Heideggarian hermeneutics and the hermeneutic circle:**

*'Meaning is an existentials of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'. Dasein only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be 'filled in' by the entities discoverable in that*

*disclosedness... as the disclosedness of the 'there', understanding always pertains to the whole of Being-in-the-world.*<sup>123</sup>

Heidegger lays down quite clearly that there is no ground for proof which lacks a presuppositionlessness understanding. All attempts at grounding such a proof, for him, are doomed to failure in that they elide what essentially belongs to Dasein as an existential characteristic, (hence his declaration above: 'meaning is an existentials of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities lying 'behind' them'.).

As has already been argued above, 'Vorhabe', 'Vorsicht' and 'Vorgriff' being the structures of understanding, always and for ever 'operate' in all circumstances of interpretation for Dasein. This, for Heidegger, is inescapable. The pre-suppositionless 'location' of Dasein as Being-in-the-world is the herald of all interpretation, but this 'location' is not static but dynamic in that by being constantly amended through fore-having, fore-seeing, and fore-conceptualising, that which Dasein comes to know emerges through a circling process 'within' these structures. For Heidegger, this circling process is not a *circulus vitiosus*<sup>124</sup> a 'vicious circle', in which there is an eternal return of the same (along the lines of 'rubbish in rubbish out'), but refers explicitly to the 'structure of meaning'<sup>125</sup> which, for him, 'is rooted in the existentials constitution of Dasein.'<sup>126</sup> On this view, scientific investigation is always attempting to place itself outside the hermeneutic circle of understanding and interpretation. It is attempting to do this in order to expunge prejudice and in order 'not [to] presuppose what it is our task to provide grounds for.'<sup>127</sup>

For him, the hermeneutic circle is unavoidable and:

*'What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existentials fore-structure of Dasein itself. It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.'*<sup>128</sup>

In one sense, the word 'circle' in the term 'hermeneutic circle' is misleading in that it directs attention towards something static (as in the representation of a circle alongside that of a square or a triangle). Perhaps, the term 'hermeneutic circling' would be more appropriate in that it focuses attention on a dynamic process constantly ongoing. But again, it gives the picture of something that begins in one location and returns to the same location after having gone on a little journey. What would be less misleading, in this writer's opinion, would be the term 'hermeneutic spiralling' in that

it implies movement in a circling manner but one that never returns to the same location. In a sense, interpretation is that which travels along the spiral and is always in a relationship with that which 'already lies beneath' and that which 'already lies ahead' as well as to its own location as that which 'already turns about'.

As noted above, for Heidegger, 'what is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way'. So, for example, in approaching his analytic of Dasein, Heidegger does not begin from a point of scepticism in which Dasein is posited as an object regarded by a subject, but enters the hermeneutic circle of understanding by locating Dasein in its everydayness as already Being-in-the-world. This point of entry is absolutely crucial to his unfolding explication of Dasein; any other point of entry would have fundamentally undermined his analysis, (an analysis as outlined in Chapter Two of this thesis.).

Chapter Two of this thesis, is the hermeneutic circle laid bare. In Heidegger's analysis of Dasein (in "Being And Time"), the theme is indicated at its point of entry into the circle by Heidegger's opening words:

*'We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine.'*<sup>129</sup>

### **Heideggarian hermeneutics, Gadamer and the relation of 'Vorhabe', 'Vorsicht' and 'Vorgriff to prejudice:**

For Heidegger, Dasein is always historically located and in that historical locatedness always has a point of view. Such a perspective becomes modified, transformed and shaped according to the specific setting into which Dasein is 'thrown', whether linguistic, ethnic, national, historical or religious and whether of degree, lineage or culture. This list is not exhaustive but itemises the multifarious ways in which Dasein is both historically and perspectively located. This 'givenness', being inescapable, is that out of which Dasein interprets and comes to understanding, a position that Gadamer (1900-2002) endorses:

*'Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in the self evident way in the family, society, and the state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.'*<sup>130</sup>

But this givenness must never simply be assented to or tokenly taken into account as, 'that which cannot be avoided', or as 'that, which is already understood'. In both cases, it presumes that Dasein is subjectively regarding the world from a perspective where its own historicity has been treated as an item of knowledge. Such a perspective pushes Dasein into the Cartesian position by which its own historicity is set over and against whatever is to be laid out in interpretation, thereby becoming just another object of epistemological interest:

*'Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated. This is what must be validated by hermeneutic theory, which is far too dominated by the idea of a procedure, a method.'*<sup>131</sup>

As an item of epistemological interest, Dasein's historicity<sup>132</sup> can be argued out of existence, amplified, ignored or distorted. But the 'trick' in an 'hermeneutically trained consciousness'<sup>133</sup> is to remain sensitive to the otherness and separateness of, for example, a text whilst realising that 'this kind of sensitivity involves neither "neutrality" with respect to content nor the extinction of oneself, but the foregrounding and appropriation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices'.<sup>134</sup> The 'trick' is not to eradicate or deny any of Dasein's previous understandings (nor to identify and label such understandings) but rather to place them prominently in the front of any process of interpretation, so that 'the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to what speaks to us in tradition'<sup>135</sup> may be avoided.

Thus, the hermeneutically trained consciousness is one in which awareness has been raised to a prominent level, one that recognises Dasein's own prejudices and one that does not censor what would have tainted an otherwise pure and unadulterated interpretation. It is this consciousness that acknowledges that 'prejudgment [serves] a positive function in that its anticipations enable understanding to develop'.<sup>136</sup> For Gadamer, this positive function completely opposes any Cartesian-like stance of 'a view from anywhere'. For him 'a view from anywhere' equates to a stance of false neutrality, one that refuses to acknowledge its own pre-existing locatedness<sup>137</sup> and one that renders itself unable to activate what it already possesses, namely its power to inform understanding:

*'all understanding arises only in and through our prejudices. Following Heidegger's account of **Vorhabe**, **Vorsicht** and **Vorgriff**, Gadamer claims we always approach a topic with a certain initial understanding or misunderstanding and it is this set of initial beliefs that allow*

*us to interrogate the topic under consideration. All understanding is on the basis of such prejudice and Gadamer believes we must overcome the Enlightenment "prejudice against prejudice".<sup>138</sup>*

Earlier on it was asserted that 'understanding is...movement to and fro between text (or situation) and interpreter, between an 'I' and a 'Thou'<sup>139</sup> and it is this 'conversational' model of the hermeneutic situation that Gadamer wishes to promulgate. For him, understanding arises through an interactive process in which the Dasein who wishes to listen (either to the other, or to the text) must first be in an understanding that enables this to happen:

*'Heidegger describes the [hermeneutic] Circle in such a way that the understanding of the text remains permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of fore-understanding. The circle of whole and part is not dissolved in perfect understanding but, on the contrary is most fully realised. The circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of the text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. But this commonality is constantly being formed in our relation to tradition. Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves in as much as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves.'<sup>140</sup>*

Earlier on it was said that λόγος (logos) has the more originary meaning of 'discourse/speech' and, as such intrinsically bears the meaning of that which 'lets something be seen'<sup>141</sup>, lets something be revealed, lets something become manifest; so.... λόγος is essentially **disclosive**. If a dialogue or a conversation has any claim to genuineness then it can never resemble pure declaratory statements by one party to the other, in which one party hogs the encounter with the aim of tyrannically forcing the other to agree. In such a case, neither party is interested in what lies between them, because neither is engaged in a 'commonality of understanding':

*'Every conversation presupposes a common language, or better still creates a common language. Something is placed in the centre, as the Greeks say, which the partners in dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with one another.'<sup>142</sup>*

And again:

*'The fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language.'<sup>143</sup>*

And again,

*'To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were.'<sup>144</sup>*

The hermeneutic situation then, is essentially transformational in that it allows that which lies between us to emerge out of our unwillingness to dominate<sup>145</sup>. By ‘stepping back’ within the dialogic situation, we gain an immersement that both of us co-create and out of which something other emerges. The newness of that emerging is the ‘process of [our] coming to an understanding’.<sup>146</sup> This new understanding forms the substance of your horizon and the substance of my horizon<sup>147</sup> both now fusing together into a novel understanding. A fusion of our horizons. But this fusion is never a static coalescence (as of molten glass cooling into a pristine rigidity), but rather a dynamic merging and intermingling that allows the possibility of change and being changed.

It should be emphasised that this fusion arises through language, through discourse, through λόγος. It is not simply the conflation of one horizon with another, nor the absorption of one by the other, but is the creation of something other. This ‘third thing’ (that which ‘is placed in the centre’) is a new liminality shared by both, which has the effect of bringing into play a new understanding. Horizons have the appearance of rigidity. They appeared fixed because they always seem steadily present. Their mirage-like nature gives an illusion of their always pre-existing the unique locatedness of individual Dasein. But horizons forever move, they have an essential liquidity not easily revealed in the constancy of their persistence. Horizons are limits, yet their liminality is disguised. Horizons cannot be avoided. They are the passionate thresholds of Dasein’s own finitude and their fusion is always the emergence of another liminality.

In this emergence, Dasein’s understanding rearranges itself in a transformational recasting of what had previously been held:

*‘Through this fusion one’s own initial prejudgements are transformed in a manner that clearly resembles the educational process.’<sup>148</sup>*



## Heideggerian Phenomenological Hermeneutics

### Method and methodology:

Most of what constitutes Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutics has already been treated in section 5.4 and section 5.5 above; nevertheless a few additional comments need to be made in order to clarify and to bring together the unique features of this methodology. The term 'method' implies a procedural orthodoxy, a strict rigour of meticulous adherence in the practising of systematic procedure within which the personal locatedness of the researcher has mostly been bracketed out of the analytic process, in order to achieve a certain neutrality of perspective. 'Methodology', on the other hand, implies a more open and creative process in which the prejudices, fore-knowledge, assumptions, personal locatedness and historicity of the researcher are essential elements in interpreting and understanding. Within a hermeneutic interpretation of understanding (as has been argued above), bracketing is an illusion that fails to take into account the already existent pre-understanding of Dasein, a pre-understanding that obtains under all circumstances.

Hermeneutic understanding and hermeneutic interpretation constitute the manner in which Dasein understands itself and its own Being-in-the-world. This process is not based upon understanding as 'correctness' but emerges averagely through common discourse, reflective practice, lived experience, awareness of finitude and transformational coming to understanding through non-egotistical sharing:

*'Hermeneutic phenomenology tries to be attentive to both terms of its methodology: it is a **descriptive** (phenomenological) methodology because it wants to be attentive to how things appear, it wants to let things speak for themselves; it is an **interpretive** (hermeneutic) methodology because it claims that there are no such things as uninterpreted phenomena. The implied contradiction may be resolved if one acknowledges that the (phenomenological) "facts" of lived experience are always already meaningfully (hermeneutically) experienced. Moreover, even the "facts" of lived experience need to be captured in language ... and this is inevitably an interpretive process.'*<sup>149</sup>

It is difficult to explicate the nature of the hermeneutic circle or of hermeneutic circling, as other than a linear process. Flow-charts, text boxes, figures, diagrams and inventive typography (in an attempt to liberate) serve to solidify it into a static and puzzling picture. Nevertheless, the term 'hermeneutic spiralling' (as in section 5.5.1.1 above), is intended to unlock the dynamic nature of this lived process and point attention toward its ever-ongoing nature.

One of the central motivations in writing this chapter has been to avoid claiming a philosophical basis of method for this thesis whilst at the same time ignoring the implications that that basis creates. It is not the intention of this writer to enhance the 'rigour' of interpretive process by attempting to 'bracket' his lived-experience, personal locatedness, historicity and professional involvements, out of existence. Rather, I will attempt to explicitly locate myself within the hermeneutic process (as, for example, within Chapter Three) :

*'A hermeneutical approach asks the researcher to engage in the process of self-reflection to quite a different end than that of phenomenology. Specifically, the biases and assumptions of the researcher are not bracketed or set aside, but rather are embedded and essential to interpretive process. The researcher is called, on an ongoing basis, to give considerable thought to their own experience and to explicitly claim the ways in which their position or experience relates to the issues being researched. The final document may include the personal assumptions of the researcher and the philosophical bases from which interpretation has occurred... The overt naming of assumptions and influences as key contributors to the research process in hermeneutic phenomenology is one of the striking differences from the naming and then bracketing of bias or assumptions in phenomenology.'*<sup>150</sup>

### **A methodological exemplar:**

The schematic representation of steps in the research process is now featured below in this section. Its appearance here is intended as an exemplar of the hermeneutic circle, of hermeneutic 'spiralling' and its reference to my lived experience in my engagement with the research question.

**SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS:**

**STEP MINUS TWELVE**

PRE-REFLECTIVE LOCATION WITHIN THE TRANSFORMATIVE PROCESS.

\*

EARLY CHILDHOOD OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCES AND  
APPREHENSIONS OF:  
ALIENATION, OBLIVION, FINITUDE,  
VULNERABILITY AND PERSONAL EXTINGUISHMENT.

\*

‘THE DREAMS’ [CHAPTER THREE]

|

**STEP MINUS ELEVEN**

EARLY EXISTENTIAL QUESTIONING ARISING FROM POWERFUL  
EXPERIENCES OF GROUNDLESSNESS:

‘HOW AM I TO BE?’

‘HOW AM I TO LIVE?’

‘WHO ARE WE?’

GENESIS OF PERSONAL REFLEXIVE PRACTICE.

|

**STEP MINUS TEN**

DEVELOPING SENSE OF WANTING TO ENGAGE AND BE ASSOCIATED  
WITH, AUTHENTIC PROCESSES OF PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION.

\*

SEEKING TO ADDRESS EXISTENTIAL QUESTIONINGS.

|

**STEP MINUS NINE**

IMMATURE FLOUNDERINGS AND CONFUSIONS.  
SEEKING ESCAPE FROM EARLY POWERFUL EXPERIENCES.

\*

BURGEONING AWARENESS OF AUTHENTIC/INAUTHENTIC MODES OF  
BEING.

|

**STEP MINUS EIGHT**

STERILITY STAGNATION AND STASIS:  
ARISING FROM 'FIGHT AND FLIGHT' RESPONSES TO EXISTENTIAL  
EXPERIENCES.

|

**STEP MINUS SEVEN**

ENGAGEMENT WITH THE LITERATURE OF TRANSFORMATION:  
SARTRE, CAMUS, LAING, DE BEAUVOIR, FREUD, JUNG, FROMM.

\*

AND WITH THE POETRY OF TRANSFORMATION:  
RILKE, RIMBAUD, BAUDELAIRE, JUVENAL, DICKENSON, YEATS, CARLOS  
WILLIAMS, DYLAN THOMAS.

↓

**STEP MINUS SIX**

A DEVELOPING SOCIAL COMMITMENT TOWARDS THOSE UNDERGOING  
POWERFULLY TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCES.

\*

TELEPHONE-VOLUNTEER 'SAMARITANS'.

|

**STEP MINUS FIVE**

A DEVELOPING SOCIAL AWARENESS:  
TAPE-RECORDED/TRANSCRIBED/PUBLISHED 'HIDDEN' LIFE-STORIES OF  
'HIDDEN' PEOPLE/COMMUNITIES/OCCUPATIONS.

\*

3YRS., FULL-TIME ORAL HISTORIAN.

|

**STEP MINUS FOUR**

ENROLMENT ON POST-GRADUATE CERTIFICATE IN COUNSELLING  
COURSE.

\*

ENROLMENT ON POST-GRADUATE DIPLOMA IN COUNSELLING COURSE.

\*

ENGAGEMENT WITH HEIDEGGARIAN PHILOSOPHY AND ETHOS AND  
WITH THE POETRY OF HÖLDERLIN.

|

**STEP MINUS THREE**

FOUNDING OF PRIVATE COUNSELLING PRACTICE.

\*

COMPLETION OF MASTER'S DEGREE ENTITLED:  
*'DASEIN: DEATH, FINITUDE AND INAUTHENTICITY; EXISTENTIAL  
PRESENTATIONS WITHIN A PRIVATE COUNSELLING PRACTICE.'*

|

**STEP MINUS TWO**

APPOINTMENT AS TUTOR IN COUNSELLING WITHIN A NORTH OF  
ENGLAND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE.

\*

APPOINTMENT AS

COURSE-DIRECTOR/LECTURER/COURSE DESIGNER AND HEAD OF UNIT  
WITHIN A NORTH OF ENGLAND COLLEGE OF FURTHER EDUCATION.

|

**STEP MINUS ONE**

(1) EMERGENCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION:  
ARISING FROM STUDY AND REFLEXIVE PRACTICE FOR MASTER'S  
DEGREE.

\*

(2) EMERGENCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION:  
ARISING FROM BROADENING OF HORIZONS:  
IN DESIGNING:  
HIGHER-LEVEL CERTIFICATE COURSE  
AND  
HIGHER-LEVEL DIPLOMA COUNSELLING COURSE  
AND  
PRESENTING THEM FOR ACCREDITATION.

\*

(3) EMERGENCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION:  
ARISING FROM:  
INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL TRANSFORMATIONS  
WITHIN MY CLIENTS  
WITHIN MY STUDENTS  
AND WITHIN MYSELF.

+

|

**STEP ONE**

INFORMAL AND GENERAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESEARCH PROJECT BY  
RESEARCHER TO POTENTIAL PARTICIPANT GROUPS.

\*

RESEARCH OUTLINED.

\*



The steps in the research process from 'step minus twelve' to 'step minus one' represent all that part of my life prior to the formal enactment of the research process itself. Its inclusion within this schema is intended to bring to the fore all that I identify as significantly formative in bringing me to the place represented within this schema as 'step one'.

The caveat entered previously in reference to the hermeneutic circle namely, that flow-charts, text boxes, figures, diagrams and inventive typography (in an attempt to liberate) serve to solidify it into a static and puzzling picture, needs to be recalled at this point as it is my intention to attempt to 'liberate' the stasis of the above schematic representation by a series of explications.

Earlier, it was asserted that, 'if it is true that the environment of significance is always present, and that Dasein is always immersed in a process of interpretation and if it is also true that Dasein as transcendent is always open to its possibilities, then understanding and interpretation must be radically intertwined with those possibilities.'

The steps in the research process from 'step minus twelve' to 'step minus one' can be considered as '*Vorhabe*', as the 'totality of involvements [which] always pre-exists any subsequent interpretations that Dasein might deliberately make.' This '*Vorhabe*' constitutes my web of significance, where all turnings, twistings, points of juncture, spaces, tensions, hiatuses and distortions are already my whole world within which I have always been immersed.

At 'step one' I am already at a specific standpoint that enables me to be positioned so that I can now begin the research process. This '*Vorsicht*' is not a detached view from anywhere but emerges out of what I already am, and what I have already been immersed in. I am able to 'see' that which is to come and I am able to have an understanding of it because I 'care' as one already involved and as one whose very being is an issue for it. Because I am already immersed in my world and because I already have a specific standpoint, I am now enabled through '*Vorgriff*' to grasp this whole, and grasp it in an interpretive manner that enables me to begin an interpretive conceptualising process.

This '*Vorgriff*' now enters the totality of involvements which always pre-exists any subsequent interpretations, in that it is now already that which I already have as '*Vorhabe*' and I am therefore enabled, from my new standpoint as '*Vorsicht*' to 'see' that which is to come and I am able to have an understanding of it because I 'care' as one already involved and as one whose very being is an issue for it and as one now enabled to grasp this whole, and to grasp it in an interpretive manner that enables me to begin an interpretive conceptualising process.

The deliberately breathless nature of the preceding paragraph is intended to point up the interconnectedness of '*Vorhabe*', '*Vorsicht*' and '*Vorgriff*' and to lead into the question: Isn't this a *circulus vitiosus*?

Perhaps all that has gone before in the previous four paragraphs is somewhat of a fiction in that 'step minus twelve' to 'step minus one' has been deemed to be a complete block 'consisting' of '*Vorhabe*'.

In those four paragraphs, the hermeneutic circle has been demonstrated, (to a degree), in relationship to my own approach to the research question, but what has not been demonstrated is the **multiplicities** of hermeneutical spiralling that constitute this dynamic process. The hermeneutic circle is not one thing. The hermeneutic circle as a singularity does not exist. What does exist is a complex referential process that connects and interconnects at multiple junctures and which amends those connective interfaces so they are transformed into something other than what they were.

These hermeneutic circlings and these hermeneutic spirallings are persistently parallel, alongside, inside, outside, separate from and contiguous with one another. The hermeneutic circle *qua* hermeneutic circle is merely the isolation of this process into a singularity in order to render it visible and to enable it to be looked at.

(The danger in reifying it into one thing so that it becomes a simple mode of interpretation lies in its seeming to need the addition of something other in order to render it more substantially rigorous.).

So, for example,

**STEP MINUS TWELVE**

PRE-REFLECTIVE LOCATION WITHIN THE TRANSFORMATIVE PROCESS.

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EARLY CHILDHOOD OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCES AND  
APPREHENSIONS OF:

ALIENATION, OBLIVION, FINITUDE,  
VULNERABILITY AND PERSONAL EXTINGUISHMENT.

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‘THE DREAMS’ [CHAPTER THREE]

my total immersement within the horror of my early dreams and the sense of my own personal extinguishment lay outside my ability to make an interpretation, nevertheless my total immersement, my total involvement served to open up the field so that,

**STEP MINUS ELEVEN**

EARLY EXISTENTIAL QUESTIONING ARISING FROM POWERFUL  
EXPERIENCES OF GROUNDLESSNESS:

‘HOW AM I TO BE?’

‘HOW AM I TO LIVE?’

‘WHO ARE WE?’

GENESIS OF PERSONAL REFLEXIVE PRACTICE.

I was able to find myself in such a position that I could now ask questions, questions that enabled me to enter the transcendence of my own possibilities: How am I to be? How am I to live? Who are we? From this position I found that I was

**STEP MINUS TWELVE**

PRE-REFLECTIVE LOCATION WITHIN THE TRANSFORMATIVE PROCESS.

\*

EARLY OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCES AND APPREHENSIONS OF:  
ALIENATION, OBLIVION, FINITUDE,  
VULNERABILITY AND PERSONAL EXTINGUISHMENT.

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‘THE DREAMS’ [CHAPTER THREE]

no longer totally floundering and overwhelmed but was able to interpret 'step minus twelve' in the light of 'step minus eleven'. My new understanding of 'step minus twelve' being now transformed, spiralled into 'step minus eleven' thereby enriching my already extant existential questioning.

There is a certain inexhaustible plenitude in the lived experience not easily accounted for by the above boxes! For each time a return is made, it is to a new destination. The newness of this destination impels a direction to yet another destination, one already changed by a fresh trajectory. And so the re-vivification of ‘step minus twelve’ from the vantage of ‘step minus eleven’ and the enrichment of ‘step minus eleven’ by the potency of ‘step minus twelve’ actually proceeded in multiple and contemporaneous phases and not as rigid singular seriality.

It should be remembered that although, for example, ‘*Vorgriff*’ presumes the prior operation of ‘*Vorhabe*’ and ‘*Vorsicht*’ it does not in any way curtail or determine these processes. Multiplicity entails complexity and variety. It entails circlings and re-circlings and not simply the operation of a preferred method of research. So, in being able to draw upon my early dreams I was enabled to ask the right sort of questions, ones that not only pointed forwards but also pointed backwards. In returning to the point of questioning I was then more greatly empowered to ask further questions that took me to a position of

### STEP MINUS TEN

DEVELOPING SENSE OF WANTING TO ENGAGE AND BE ASSOCIATED  
WITH, AUTHENTIC PROCESSES OF PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION.

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SEEKING TO ADDRESS EXISTENTIAL QUESTIONINGS.

wanting to engage and be engaged with processes of personal transformation. In this engagement I had the capacity to grasp what had gone before (and which was already with me as the totality of my involvement), in such a way that I could now come to an understanding through conceptualisation.

Although the concepts arising from this process might have been inappropriate and misapplied, the potential existed within the hermeneutic circling process itself for there always to have been a perpetual re-engagement with 'the things themselves' and therefore to the exercise of a more 'hermeneutically trained consciousness'.

## **Summary:**

Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate my enthusiasm, either explicitly or implicitly, for Heidegger's philosophy and hermeneutics. For me the suitability of Heideggerian methodology, particularly in its approaching and opening up of the research question and in its potential in coming to an understanding of what it is to be a human-being, lies in its capacity to richly disclose the variety of human experience.

Efforts have been made to persistently establish links between (a) Heidegger's understanding of what it is to be human and (b) the preferred mode of methodology chosen for this thesis, in order to create a rigorously consistent background out of which the method is intended to emerge.

Overt connections between my personal biography, personal transformation, professional immersement and research commitment have been prominently and deliberately highlighted, in order to (a) draw a clear distinction between an Husserlian 'bracketed' approach in which the researcher is always detached and (b) a Heideggerian hermeneutically involved approach in which the researcher participates in making the data.

In attempting to do 'something different', I have attempted to maintain a consistently 'philosophical' and direct orientation towards Heidegger's work, relying mostly on Heidegger's "Being and Time" (and other of his publications), and have consciously chosen to avoid 'secondary' explications of Heideggerian methodology that refer to the 'doing' of 'lived experience' and the 'doing' of other social science research.



### CHAPTER THREE END NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See Moran, Dermot, & Mooney, Timothy, (2002), p.1.
- <sup>2</sup> See Moran, Dermot, (2000), p.4.
- <sup>3</sup> See Wrathall, Mark A., and Dreyfus, Hubert L.,(2006) p.2:
- <sup>4</sup> See Ricoeur, Paul, (1981), p.114.
- <sup>5</sup> See Audi, Robert, (1995), p.578.
- <sup>6</sup> See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2003), (phenomenology section first page). Internet document.
- <sup>7</sup> See Husserl, Edmund, (1981) in Moran, Dermot, & Mooney, Timothy, (2002), p.124.
- <sup>8</sup> See BPP, p.328.
- <sup>9</sup> See van Manen, Max, (1997), p.36.
- <sup>10</sup> See Wrathall, Mark A, &Dreyfus, Hubert, L, (2006), p.2.
- <sup>11</sup> See Stewart, Charles, (2006), p.81.
- <sup>12</sup> See Husserl, Edmund (2001), (1966) *Analyses Concerning Passive and active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic* in Stewart, Charles, (2006), p.81.
- <sup>13</sup> See Stewart, Charles, (2006), p.82.
- <sup>14</sup> See Stewart, Charles, (2006), p.82.
- <sup>15</sup> See Jay, Martin, (2006), p.93.
- <sup>16</sup> See Jay, Martin, (2006), p.93.
- <sup>17</sup> See Husserl, Edmund, (1981), in Moran, Dermot & Mooney, Timothy, (2002), p.130.
- <sup>18</sup> See Husserl, Edmund, (1981), in Moran, Dermot & Mooney, Timothy, (2002), p.131.
- <sup>19</sup> See Husserl, Edmund, (1981), in Moran, Dermot & Mooney, Timothy, (2002), p.131.
- <sup>20</sup> See Jay, Martin, (2006), p.95.
- <sup>21</sup> For a schematic representation of the differences between a Husserlian and a Heideggarian phenomenology, see Koch, Tina, (1995), p.832:

#### **HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY**

Transcendental phenomenology

Epistemological

Epistemological questions of knowing

How do we know what we know?

#### **HEIDEGGARIAN PHENOMENOLOGY**

Philosophical hermeneutics.  
Hermeneutic phenomenology.

Existential-ontological.

Questions of experiencing and understanding.

What does it mean to be a person?

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Cartesian duality: mind-body split.	<i>Dasein</i> .
A mechanistic view of the person	Person as self-interpreting being.
Mind-body lives in a world of objects.	Person exists as a 'being' in the world.
Ahistorical.	Historicity.
Unit of analysis is the meaning giving subject.	Unit of analysis is the transaction between the situation and the person.
What is shared is the essence of the conscious mind.	What is shared is culture, history, practice, language.
Starts with a reflection of mental states.	We are already in the world in our pre-reflective selves.
Meaning is unsullied by the interpreter's own normative goals or view of the world.	Interpreters participate in making data.
Participants' meanings can be reconstituted in interpretive work by insisting that data speak for themselves.	Within the fore-structure of understanding interpretation can only make explicit what is already understood.
Claim that adequate techniques and procedures guarantee validity of interpretation.	Establish own criteria for trustworthiness of research.
Bracketing defends the validity or objectivity of the interpretation against self-interest.	The hermeneutic circle (background, co-constitution, pre-understanding.).

<sup>22</sup> See COT, p. for a succinct (and earlier than BT) summary of Dasein's existentials:

'Dasein is that entity which is characterised as *Being-in-the-world*. Human life is not some subject that has to perform some trick in order to enter the world. Dasein as Being-in-the-world means: being in the world in such a way that this being means: dealing with the world; tarrying alongside it in the manner of performing, effecting and completing, but also contemplating, interrogating, and determining by way of contemplation and comparison. Being-in-the-world is characterised as *concern*.' [Care].

<sup>23</sup> See BT. p.84.

<sup>24</sup> See BT. p.75.

<sup>25</sup> See BT. p.75.

<sup>26</sup> See le Beistegui, (2005), p.12.

<sup>27</sup> See Moran, Dermot, (2000), p.197.

<sup>28</sup> See Moran, Dermot, (2000), p.198.

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<sup>29</sup> See Akpen, Thomas Targuma, (2006), p.46.

<sup>30</sup> See Aristotle, 'Metaphysics' Substance: Static Consideration (Book Z). Chapter One , 'Being As Substance '.pp. 167-168.

<sup>31</sup> McCumber, (1999), argues that *ousia* is very enduring and that it 'functions at once like a concept and like a set of instructions' (p 14). He talks of social "engines" which he defines as 'a discourse, institution, or mechanism which gets people to live and act in accordance with an ontological structure, ousioic or not. When an engine is ousiodic, it aims at getting people to live within fixed boundaries, in accordance with dispositive factors which generate or order what happens within these boundaries, and to forego affecting the world outside these boundaries.' (p, 14).

<sup>32</sup> See also Sudduth, Michael, (1995):

'Substances, in general, are the permanent furniture of the world, invariants of existence.'  
Internet document, <http://philofreligion.hoemstead.com/files/Aristotle.html>

<sup>33</sup> See McCumber, (1999), p. 15:

'First "codified" (defined and legitimated) by Aristotle, ousia was entitled to structure our lives parametrically because—as Aristotle's metaphysics had it—ousia structured the natural order, to which we in turn belonged. Ousia then received an exemplary "consolidation" in Thomas Aquinas: it was underwritten not merely by nature but by an omnipotent God. But the consolidation did not last. With the rise of modern science, ousia was "evicted" from nature, and that left its role in structuring the human world increasingly suspect until, with the Empiricists, it became altogether indefensible. At that point ousia went wholly underground; it continued to function, but in an entirely invisible way.'

<sup>34</sup> See McCumber, (1999), p.180.

<sup>35</sup> See McCumber, (1999), p.182.

<sup>36</sup> See TDP, pp.67-68 for a Heideggarian sidelight on the 'action' of theory, in his critique of critical realism:

'In the course of a hike through the woods I come for the first time to Freiburg and ask, upon entering the city "Which is the shortest way to the Cathedral?" This spatial orientation has nothing to do with geometrical orientation as such. The distance to the Cathedral is not a quantitative interval; proximity and distance are not a "how much"; the most convenient and shortest way is also not something quantitative, not merely extension as such ... In other words: these meaningful phenomena of environmental experience cannot be explained by destroying the essential character, by denying their real meaning in order to advance a theory. Explanation through dismemberment i.e. destruction: one wants to explain something which one no longer has as such, which one cannot and will not recognise as such in its validity. And what kind of remarkable reality is this, which must first of all be explained through such a bold theories?

When I attempt to explain the environing theoretically, it collapses upon itself. It does not signify an intensification of experience, or any superior knowledge of the environment, when I attempt its dissolution and subjected to totally unclarified theories and explanations.

The incoherence of critical realism consists not just in its cancellation of the meaningful dimension of the environing world, in the fact that it does not and cannot see this dimension. Instead, it already comes armed with a theory and attempts to explain one being by another. The more critical it becomes, the more incoherent it is.'

<sup>37</sup> See HOF, p.5 for a 'definition' of facticity:

'"*facticity*" is the designation ... for the character of the being of "our" " own" *Dasein*. More precisely this expression means: *in each case* "this" *Dasein* in its being-there *for a while at the particular time* (...

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tarrying for a while, not running away, being-*there*-at-home-in ..., being-*there*-involved-in ..., the being-there of Dasein).'

See also BT, p 82 for a 'definition' of facticity :

'The concept of 'facticity' implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.'

<sup>38</sup> See POW, p.30.

<sup>39</sup> See McDonald, Hugh P.(2004) p.39:

'Descartes begins with radical doubt...Doubt, as Arendt has noted, lies in the background of modern thought, not just Descartes' *Meditations*...Descartes connected existence to thought, firstly, and not to being: "I think, therefore I am". Inner consciousness grounds knowledge, not outer reality. we know "clear and distinct ideas" in the mind, not dubious sense representations of other beings. The subject of consciousness is logically prior to being: outer reality is "proven" only later in the *Meditations* after thought. [My underlining].

See also:

'The rationalism of Descartes contains a transcendent philosophy of the subject, in which the subject is prior to being. The senses are misleading, and need the guidance of reason. The mathematical method is certain, and the basis of outer reality. But mathematics is true [sic] independent of any content, that is, it transcends its instances. The one mathematical model forms an intellectual hierarchy from above, whose subordinate layers reflect decreasing degrees of certainty, that is, distance from the ideal mathematical model. At the bottom is misleading sense-data, unformed by rational principles.'[p.41].

See also Delancey, Craig, (2006), p.362 below.

See also BPP p. 300 and also Chapter Two this thesis, for Heidegger's interpretation (*contra* Descartes) of the transcendence of Dasein.

<sup>40</sup> See Delancey, Craig, (2006), p.362:

' The notion of the world, and of being in the world, provides a bold way to avoid the technical problems of the subject/object division. The most obvious such problems are epistemic: if world is out there, external to me, and communicated to me by way of some kind of representations or other sensory data, then there is always a remove of myself from the world. As a result, I can always doubt that my knowledge of the world is accurate. I can even rightly doubt that there is any external world. But Heidegger asserts that a world in this case of extant, present objects external to me is derivative from world in the sense of Being-in-the-world. World in the sense of Being-in-the-world is not external, but includes essentially the interaction of myself with things, and I am essentially defined by these interactions, as are the things with which I interact. There is no gulf to cross, no wall between two worlds that requires a window.'

<sup>41</sup> See BPP, p.159.

<sup>42</sup> See HCT, p.166.

<sup>43</sup> See BT, p.50.

<sup>44</sup> See Wrathall, Mark A ., and Dreyfus, Hubert L.,(2006) p.2:

'Phenomenology began as a discernible movement with Edmund Husserl's (1859 -- 1938) demand that philosophy take as its primary task the description of the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness. This description was meant to be carried out on the basis of what the

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"things themselves" demanded, without assuming or adopting the theoretical frameworks, assumptions, or vocabularies developed in the study of other domains (such as nature)'.

<sup>45</sup> See HCT, p.37.

<sup>46</sup> See HCT, pp.37-38.

<sup>47</sup> See HCT, p.38.

<sup>48</sup> See HCT, p.38.

<sup>49</sup> See HCT, p.39.

<sup>50</sup> See HCT, p.39.

<sup>51</sup> See Crowell, Steven Galt (2005), p.54.

<sup>52</sup> See Crowell, Steven Galt (2005), p.55.

<sup>53</sup> See Tietz, Udo (2006), p.171.

<sup>54</sup> See Tietz, Udo (2006), p.171.

<sup>55</sup> See OWL, p.9.

<sup>56</sup> See BT, p.51.

<sup>57</sup> See Scott, Charles "The Middle Voice in *Being And Time*", in *The Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years*. ed. John Sallis et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), p. 161. In Davis, Bret W., (2007), p.28.

<sup>58</sup> See BT, p.51.

<sup>59</sup> See BT, p.51.

<sup>60</sup> See BT, p.58.

<sup>61</sup> See BT, p.51.

<sup>62</sup> See Inwood, Michael, (1999), for a straightforward explication of a 'phenomenon' and its 'many ways' of semblance, symptom, announcement and appearance:

- 'Tom's spots show themselves, are manifest, are a phenomenon.
  - The spots may be a semblance, a trick of the light or painted.
  - Such semblance is a 'modification' of a prior phenomenon.
  - Only what purports to show itself can be a semblance:
  - they seem to be manifest, self-showing spots, but are really not.
  - The spots, if genuine, are a symptom of measles.
  - Measles 'announces' itself in the spots.
  - The spots 'refer' to measles.
  - Measles appear in the spots, which are an appearance of measles.
  - Measles is an appearance, but not a phenomenon:
  - measles does not show itself in the way that spots do.
  - If anything, such as measles, appears, something else, such as spots, must show itself.
  - Conversely, something may show itself without being the appearance of anything that does not show itself.
- [my bullet-pointing].

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<sup>63</sup> See Moran, Dermot, (2000), p.229.

<sup>64</sup> See PAR, pp13-14:

'In some way or other we surely do know the likes of concealing and concealedness. We know it as veiling, as masking, and as covering, but also in the forms of conserving, preserving, holding back, and trusting, and appropriating. From these modes of concealedness and concealing, "unconcealedness" immediately gains clearer features. The realm of the "concealed-unconcealed" is, if we do not deceive ourselves, more immediately familiar and accessible than what is expressed in the banal titles *Veritas* and "truth". Strictly speaking, the word "truth" does not give us anything to think and still less to represent "intuitively". We must immediately call for help from a borrowed "definition" of truth in order to give significance to the word...

... "Un-concealedness" can mean concealedness is taken away, cancelled, evicted, or banned, where taking away, cancelling, evicting, and banning are essentially distinct. "Un-concealedness" can also mean concealedness is not allowed at all, that, although possible and a constant menace, it does not exist and may not arise.'

<sup>65</sup> See PAR, p.57.

<sup>66</sup> In the sense of 'likelihood' and in the sense of to have the outward appearance of something that [one] actually is but may not always seem to be. To appear to be so.

<sup>67</sup> See BT, p.51.

<sup>68</sup> See BT, p.51.

<sup>69</sup> See Boedeker, Edgar, C. (2005), p.162.

<sup>70</sup> See Davis, Bret W., (2007), p.29.

<sup>71</sup> See Davis, Bret W., (2007), p.29.

<sup>72</sup> See Chapter Two, 2.2, this thesis.

<sup>73</sup> See Boedeker, Edgar, C. (2005), p.159.

<sup>74</sup> See FCM, pp.305-306, In which Heidegger traces Aristotle's explication of the term *λόγος*:

'*λόγος* means discourse, everything that is spoken and sayable. The Greeks really have no word corresponding to our word 'language'. *λόγος* As discourse means what we understand by language, yet it also means more than our vocabulary taken as a whole. It means the fundamental faculty of being able to talk discursively, and accordingly, to speak. The Greeks thus characterise man as ... that living being that essentially possesses the possibility of discourse ... if in antiquity *λόγος* represents that phenomenon with respect to which man is understood in terms of what is proper to him, and if we ourselves are saying that the essence of man is *world-forming*, then this expresses the fact that if these two theses are at all collected, then *λόγος*, *language*, and *world* stand in an intrinsic connectedness.'

And also, (p 303):

'... it is in the *λόγος* That man expresses what is most essential to him, so as in this very expression to place himself into the clarity, depth, and need pertaining to the essential possibilities of his action, of his existence. It is only from this perspective that all the apparently technical aspects of philology acquire their inner justification and their genuine, albeit relative, necessity.'

<sup>75</sup> See *Novum Testamentum Graece*, 21<sup>st</sup>., Edition, Eberhard Nestle in 'The Interlinear NRSV-NIV Parallel New Testament In Greek And English (1993), p.260, for successive examples of *λόγος* (*logos*) as 'word':



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‘*Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.*’ [my emboldening].

“In [the] beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word.”  
(The Gospel According To John Chapter One verse one.)

<sup>76</sup> See Stambaugh, Joan, (1996), p.28.

<sup>77</sup> See BT, p.55.

<sup>78</sup> See BT, p.56.

<sup>79</sup> See Stambaugh, Joan, (1996), p.28.

<sup>80</sup> See BT, p.56.

<sup>81</sup> The term *ἀπό* (*apo*) is a preposition that has the meaning of ‘from’. This prefix to a compound verb has the effect of *intensifying* the meaning. So, consequently, ‘in speech [*ἀπόφανσις*] (*apophanis*), insofar as it is genuine, *what* is said should be derived *from* what is being talked about.’ (Stambaugh, Joan, (1996), p.28.

So speech that might be described as ‘apophantic’, is essentially assertional, or put more strongly, ‘declaratory’.

So a phenomenon declares itself disclosively, but it should be remembered that, ‘one goal of *apophansis* is to make *correct* interpretations of the entities in question.’ (Boedeker, Edgar, C. (2005), p.159.).

So, ‘For Heidegger, the primordial meaning of *logos* [*λόγος*] is assertion, in the Greek sense of *apophansis*, [*ἀπόφανσις*] “letting an entity be seen from itself”. Moran, Dermot, (2000), p.230.

<sup>82</sup> See Boedeker, Edgar, C. (2005), p.159.

<sup>83</sup> See Inwood, Michael, (1999), p.159.

<sup>84</sup> See Davis, Bret W., (2007), p.30.

<sup>85</sup> BT. p.212.

<sup>86</sup> BT. p.213.

<sup>87</sup> Chapter Two, 2.2, this thesis.

<sup>88</sup> See Moran, Dermot, (2000), p.230.

<sup>89</sup> See BT, p.58.

<sup>90</sup> See HOF, p.6.

See also HOF, p.5 and BT, p.82, above, for definitions of ‘facticity’.

<sup>91</sup> See also OWL, p.29 in which Heidegger elicits the necessity of an ability to listen with care before communication is possible. A possible further meaning is the capacity to apprehend that which is implicit in order to enrich and to make a proper communication:

‘The expression “hermeneutic” derives from the Greek verb *hermeneuein*. That verb is related to the noun *hermeneus*, which is referable to the name of the god Hermes by a playful thinking that is more compelling than the rigour of science. Hermes is the divine messenger. He brings the message of destiny; *hermeneuein* is that exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a message.’

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<sup>92</sup> See HOF, p.6.

<sup>93</sup> See HOF, p.11.

<sup>94</sup> See HOF, p.12.

<sup>95</sup> See Lafont, Cristina, (2005), p.265.

<sup>96</sup> See Lafont, Cristina, (2005), p.265.

<sup>97</sup> See Lafont, Cristina, (2005), p.266

<sup>98</sup> See BT, p.102..

<sup>99</sup> See MIN, p.138, for a succinct 'definition' of the subject in subjectivism:

'Subjectivism in the positioning, in the sense of the sub-ject, of man (be it the "I", the "we", the "individual", the "community", the "spirit", the "body", the mere living being, or the "people"), that is, *of that* being from, and in view of which, all beings are "explained" in their beingness.

<sup>100</sup> See Lafont, Cristina, (2005), p.270.

<sup>101</sup> See Ricoeur, Paul, (1981), p.56:

'In ... making understanding worldly, Heidegger de-psychologises it. This shift has been completely misunderstood in the so-called existential interpretations of Heidegger. The analyses of care, anguish and being-towards-death were taken in the sense of a refined existential psychology, applied to uncommon states of mind. It was not sufficiently recognised that these analyses are part of a meditation on the worldliness of the world, and that they seek essentially to shatter the pretension of the knowing subject to set itself up as the measure of objectivity. What must be reaffirmed in place of this pretension is the condition of inhabiting the world, a condition which renders situation, understanding and interpretation possible.'

And also:

'If *Being and Time* thoroughly exploits a certain feeling like fear and anguish, it is not in order to 'do existentialism', but rather to disclose, by means of these revelatory experiences, a link to a reality more fundamental than the subject-object relation. In knowledge, we posit objects in front of us; but our feelings of the situation precedes this *vis-a-vis* by placing us in a world'.

<sup>102</sup> See Lafont, Cristina, (2005), p.272.

<sup>103</sup> See Lafont, Cristina, (2005), p.273.

<sup>104</sup> See COT, p.8E:

'Being with one another in the world, having this world as being with one another, has a distinctive ontological determination. The fundamental way of the Dasein of world, namely having world there was one another, is *speaking*. Fully considered, speaking is: oneself speaking *out* in speaking *with* another *about* something. It is predominantly in speaking that man's Being-in-the-world takes place. This was already known to Aristotle. In the manner in which Dasein in its world speaks about its way of dealing with its world, a *self interpretation of Dasein* is already given. It states how Dasein specifically understands itself, what it takes itself to be. In speaking with one another, in what one thus spreads around in speaking, there lies the specific self interpretation of the present, which maintains itself in this dialogue.'

<sup>105</sup> BT. p.213.

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- <sup>106</sup> See BT, pp.188-189.
- <sup>107</sup> See BT, pp.190-191.
- <sup>108</sup> See Still, A,(1999) p.194.
- <sup>109</sup> Polkinghorne, Donald, (2000) pp.120-121.
- <sup>110</sup> Polkinghorne, Donald, (2000) pp.120-121.
- <sup>111</sup> See le Beistegui, (2005), p.194.
- <sup>112</sup> See BT, p.300.
- <sup>113</sup> See BT, pp.188-189.
- <sup>114</sup> See BT, p.191.
- <sup>115</sup> See Lafont, Cristina, (2005), p.277..
- <sup>116</sup> See Davis, Bret W., (2007), p.30.
- <sup>117</sup> See BT, p.191.
- <sup>118</sup> See LOH p.223n:
- <sup>119</sup> See BT, p.191.
- <sup>120</sup> See BT, p.191.
- <sup>121</sup> See Lafont, Cristina, (2005), p.277.
- <sup>122</sup> See Lafont, Cristina, (2005), p.278.
- <sup>123</sup> See BT, pp193 & 194.
- <sup>124</sup> See BT, p.194.
- <sup>125</sup> See BT, p.195.
- <sup>126</sup> See BT, p.195.
- <sup>127</sup> See BT, p.194.
- <sup>128</sup> See BT, p.195.
- <sup>129</sup> See BT, p.68.
- <sup>130</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), pp.276-277.
- <sup>131</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), pp.276-277.
- <sup>132</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.304:

"The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past out of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always

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in motion. The surrounding horizon is not set in motion by historical consciousness. But in this motion becomes aware of itself.'

And also,

'Our own past and that other past towards which our historical consciousness is directed help to shape this moving horizon out of which ought human life always lives and which determines it as heritage and tradition.'

<sup>133</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.269.

<sup>134</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.269.

<sup>135</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), pp.270.

<sup>136</sup> See Polkinghorne, Donald, (2000) p.121.

<sup>137</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.302:

'Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of "situation" by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the concept of situation is the concept of "*horizon*". The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point... A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence over values what is nearest to him. On the other hand, "to have a horizon" means not being limited to what is nearby, but being able to see beyond it ... working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition.'

<sup>138</sup> See Moran, Dermot, (2000), p.278.

<sup>139</sup> See le Beistegui, (2005), p.194.

<sup>140</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.293.

<sup>141</sup> See BT, p.56.

<sup>142</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.278.

<sup>143</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.278.

<sup>144</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.279.

<sup>145</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.305:

'If we put ourselves in someone else's shoes, for example, then we will understand him -- i.e., become aware of the otherness, the indissoluble individuality of the other person -- by putting *ourselves* in his position.

Transposing ourselves consists neither in the empathy of one individual for another nor in subordinating another person to our own standards; rather, it always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other. The concept of "*horizon*" suggests itself because it expresses of the superior breadth of vision that the person who was trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand -- not in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion.'

<sup>146</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.385.

<sup>147</sup> See Gadamer, Hans-Georg, (1989), p.303:

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'In a conversation, when we have discovered the other person's standpoint and horizon, his ideas become intelligible without our necessarily having to agree with him.'

<sup>148</sup> See Polkinghorne, Donald, (2000) p.121.

<sup>149</sup> See van Manen, Max (1997), pp.180-181.

<sup>150</sup> See Lavery, Susann M, (2003), p.5.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE TRANSFORMATIVE LOCATION

#### **The existential context of individual personal transformations:**

##### **Preliminary considerations:**

In keeping with the understanding of what it is to be a human being (as outlined in Chapter Two), this section of Chapter Four intends to locate Dasein within an existential context.

Up to now, Dasein has been seen as being-in-the-world, absorbed within the blandishments of *das Man*, inauthentic for the most part, open transcendently towards its possibilities, having the capacity to be resolute, reaching understanding through discourse, an entity whose being is always an issue for it and who is historically situated as the one who can know death as death. This research project, in attempting a Heideggarian explication of the experiencing of individual personal transformations within counselling training, hopes to identify and unfold a Heideggarian understanding of a dominant social paradigm that I and the other contributors to this research have been immersed in and conformed to.

In keeping with the Heideggarian notion that people are 'thrown' into existence and that it is only as being-in-the-world that they are existent, this research will take as implicit that individual personal transformations exist and continue before, after, and outside the counselling training programme. In all these locations, there is an assumption that I and the other contributors within this research project have all been formed by and 'within' the historical streams and impulses of the Western world and have contributed themselves toward the creation of those impulses. Arising from this, the historical situation of Dasein is understood as the formative location into which Dasein is 'thrown' as a participating co-creator.



The main purpose of this section (4.1) is to explore the lineaments of a specifically dominant 'social' paradigm, one implicit throughout Heidegger's work but one identified by Heidegger in his later thought, within which Dasein is immersed and out of which, it is argued, Dasein emerges and is transformed.

### **The question concerning technology:**

The heading of this subsection is taken from the title "*The Question Concerning Technology*", a major essay published by Heidegger in 1953 and which cohered and condensed a principal trend in his thinking. For Heidegger, technology was never 'an ensemble of artefacts and procedures that for better or worse is subject to human control'<sup>1</sup>, neither was it 'the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry'<sup>2</sup> nor was it 'certain types of things (tools and machines), [nor] certain ways things are produced or manufactured...that helps us use things faster, produce them faster, more efficiently and on a larger scale'<sup>3</sup>. Nor was it something that 'allows us to get to places we couldn't reach before, or reach greater results in data and information gathering.'<sup>4</sup> Heidegger himself rehearses the above conception of technology at the beginning of his essay:

*'We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is... One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of technology belong together. For to posit ends and procure and utilise the means to them is a human activity. The manufacture and utilisation of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves, and the needs and ends that they serve, all belong to what technology is... the current conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity, can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology.'*<sup>5</sup>

And it cannot be denied also that:

*'All those things that are so familiar to us and are standard parts of assembly, such as rods, pistons, and chassis, belong to the technological.'*<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, Heidegger rejects this instrumentalist and anthropological interpretation of technology, in favour of one which sees 'technology as the modern disclosure of being – reality... revealed as a raw material for the aggressive transformation into resources.'<sup>7</sup>

A short time ago it was stated that the main purpose of this section was to explore the lineaments of a specifically dominant 'social' paradigm, one identified by Heidegger in his later thought, in which Dasein is immersed and out of which, it is argued, Dasein emerges and is transformed. I am aware that the inherent claims behind such an attempt appear to be beyond the scope of any single work, certainly beyond the scope of any section within the chapter of a thesis, nevertheless I intend to follow Heidegger in that:

*'Heidegger's search for the essence of technology is not what these days is called and criticised as essentialism. Critics take exception to essentialism because they think of it as the oppressive imposition and timeless mold [sic] on what is in fact historically changing and multiple in its appearance. Heidegger.... does not disagree with the claim that reality changes fundamentally over time... He does... oppose the other claim i.e. that cultural phenomena are too many-sided to exhibit a definite character, and he denies a third claim, often associated with anti-essentialism, to the effect that what discernible shape a cultural phenomenon has is a social construction.'*<sup>8</sup>

It is these latter elements, namely Heidegger's rejection of 'what discernible shape a cultural phenomenon has', has always to be a social construction, together with his rejection of technology as a human activity, that makes his response to the question concerning technology not only contentious, elusive and difficult but also, it is implied here, challengingly counter-intuitive and counter-cultural. My motive in pursuing this matter lies within a statement quoted earlier, in which technology from a Heideggarian perspective is asserted as 'the modern disclosure of being'. If technology is such a disclosure, then it has major implications not only for the understanding of Dasein but also in the understanding of personal transformations and, as such it is argued, merits some consideration within this project.

### **The question concerning technology, value and the point-of-view:**

Heidegger's arrival at the point of arguing that technology is neither a human activity nor a social construction had its origins in a course of lectures delivered between 1936 and 1940 at the University of Freiburg which later found its way into a series of publications culminating in "The Question concerning Technology" (1953). The aim in stating the above is not a diversion into writing a mini-monograph upon an

interesting feature within the *corpus* of a favourite philosopher but rather to attempt to unfold the antecedents of the question concerning technology, to relate them directly to the research question and to elucidate further the purposes of Chapter Two:

*'How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun?'*<sup>9</sup>

By these words, which he attributes to Nietzsche, Heidegger metaphorically engages with an appetite and a potency that enabled seas to be consumed, the limits of human sight to be obliterated and the very earth to be disengaged from its source of life and light. The tenses employed in this attribution already indicate that the questions are now rhetorical, as these cosmic events have irreversibly taken place. There is even a *frisson* of wistfulness in their tone. But what has happened to give rise to these three questions and what relevance do they have to the research question itself? Heidegger, in his use and explication of Nietzsche's thought traces the subject-matter of the questions back to the 'establishing of values, the devaluing of values, the revaluing of values'.<sup>10</sup> For him:

*'We speak of the values of life, of cultural values, of eternal values, of the hierarchy of values, of spiritual values... We build systems of values and pursue in ethics classification of values... We define God, the **summum ens qua summum bonum**, as the highest value... We hold science to be value-free and relegate the making of value judgments to the sphere of world views. Value and the valuable become the positivistic substitute for the metaphysical'.<sup>11</sup>*

The apparent comprehensiveness of values and of value-systems, their very pervasiveness and their lack of provenance ('the frequency of talk about values is matched by a corresponding vagueness of the concept'<sup>12</sup>), serves to obscure a central feature of value namely, that value always embodies focus. This focus creates a centre of interest around which attention becomes fixed, this centre of interest implies also another position namely, that position from which the focus can be both regarded and observed. It is this latter observation post that is of interest to Heidegger. In looking at the object of focus from the vantage of this point-of-view, the *quidditas*, the very 'whatness' of whatever is being regarded becomes set aside in favour of something **already** being posited as something else:

*'The essence of value lies in its being a point-of-view. Value means that upon which the eye is fixed. Value means that which is in view for a seeing that aims at something or that, as we say, reckons upon something and therewith must reckon with something else. Value stands in intimate relation to a such-much, to quantity and number. Hence values are related to a numerical and mensural scale.'*<sup>13</sup>

This setting aside is not simply a *post factum* incident, an optional process that may or may not occur, but inherent in the very act of looking, seeing and staring at, one that alters 'that upon which the eye is fixed'. These changes, these transformations occur within an ambit where such expressions as 'reckon', 'quantity', 'number', 'numerical', 'counts', are a foundational currency. This essentially calculative ethos is already embedded within 'that upon which the eye is fixed' so that:

*'Value is value in as much as it counts. It counts in as much as it is posited as that which matters. It is so posited through an aiming at and a looking toward that which has to be reckoned upon. Aim, view, field of vision, mean here both the sight beheld and seeing.'*<sup>14</sup>

The insistent visual vocabulary of 'aim', 'view', 'seeing', 'field of vision', 'sight', 'eye', 'point-of-view', keeps the focus always on that which is posited as sight and **not** on any subsequent procedure or operation viz: 'the essence of value lies in its being a point-of-view. Value means that upon which the eye is fixed'. 'Seeing', and all its related cognates is not simply an ocular phenomenon to do with eye-activity but is embedded fundamentally with an 'impetus...that enjoins anything to arise (to appear) and thus determines its coming forth.'<sup>15</sup> This determining, this 'impetus, is seen by Heidegger as wilful and grasping in that the *quidditas* of that which is regarded is replaced by something else:<sup>16</sup>

*'Seeing is that representing which... has been grasped more explicitly in terms of its fundamental characteristic of striving (appetitus)... The essence of everything that is... lays hold of itself in this way and posits for itself an aim in view. That aim provides the perspective that is to be conformed to. The aim in view is value.'*<sup>17</sup>

### **The question concerning technology and the highest value:**

Earlier on it was stated that 'we define God, the *summum ens qua summum bonum*, as the highest value'. For Heidegger, this attribution of value to God, albeit the highest value, signified humankind's upsurge into a position, a point of view,

from which even the *summum ens qua summum bonum* could be viewed and calculatedly weighed in the scales of calculative seeing. It mattered not that God became the ‘highest value’; rather it was the **very fact** of the transformation of God into that which could have value, which manifested the true position that humankind now occupied. If God could now be weighed in the scales (where before no calculative measurement existed), from whence came the scales? Who now held them? Heidegger via Nietzsche forwards the argument that this ‘death of God’ is not the consequence of indifference or neglect, nor of deliberate Deicide but signifies a transformation whereby everything that is (either potentially or actually) falls quite naturally within the gaze and sight of Dasein and that within that gaze whatever has existence, either potentially or actually, now comes into being:

*‘The whole field of vision has been wiped away. The whole of that which is as such, the sea, has been drunk up by man. For man has risen up into the I-ness of the ego cogito. Through this uprising, all that is, is transformed into object. That which is, as the objective, is swallowed up into the immanence of subjectivity. The horizon no longer emits light of itself. It is now nothing but the point-of-view posited in the value-positing of the will to power.’<sup>18</sup>*

As has been noted in the previous chapter, this picture in which Dasein ‘has risen up into the I-ness of the ego cogito’, is essentially a Cartesian one where Dasein is revealed as a self-contained entity extended in space as an independent thinking substance. This entity meets the world primarily through thought and through thought, is able to assign the world to that which is known. The world, as that which is known, is presented and re-presented as whatever thought allows, consequently, the world becomes secondary to thought and ‘reduced’ to, an object of regard.<sup>19</sup> Thus caught in thoughtful regard, it can be posited and re-presented as inanimate and manipulable matter ‘over and against’ the subject that does the encountering. World and human therefore become discrete spheres split apart from each other, as do human mind and human body:

*‘... the three key images (sun, horizon, and sea) ... speaks of the event wherein that which is as such does not simply come to nothing, but does indeed become different in its Being. But above all, in this event man also becomes different. He becomes the one who does away with that which is, in the sense of that which is in itself. The uprising of man into subjectivity transforms that which is into object. But that which is objective is that which is brought to a stand through representing.’<sup>20</sup>*

As has been noted earlier, this 'impetus, is seen by Heidegger as wilful and grasping in that the *quidditas* of whatever is, is replaced by a re-presenting of itself as something else because, 'the uprising of man into subjectivity transforms that which is into object [and] that which is objective is that which is brought to a stand through representing.'

### **The question concerning technology, the subject, the object and the world:**

In circling the question concerning technology, Heidegger refuses to acknowledge that the essence of technology is contained in the 'standard parts of assembly, such as rods, pistons, and chassis', or even that these 'belong to the technological' in any essential way. He refuses to be fascinated by the weight, speed and dynamism posited by the world of mechanised machine activity, even though these positively impinge upon Dasein in every actual and imaginable mode of its existence. For him, the essence of technology does not lie in the extant and intrusive visibility of machines and machine activity. Neither does technology appear as that which is within human control. Nor does technology operate simply at human behest. Rather it is neither a human activity nor within human control:

*'At bottom, the essence of life is supposed to yield itself to technical production. ... the utilisation of machinery and the manufacture of machines is not yet technology itself -- it is only an instrument concordant with technology, whereby the nature of technology is established in the objective character of its raw materials. Even this, that man becomes the subject and the world the object, is a consequence of technology's nature establishing itself and not the other way round.'*<sup>21</sup>

The highly conspicuous and unmistakable presence of technology (with its patent display of itself as artefact) conceals, for Heidegger, its true essence and provenance. These for him lie somewhere outside the hypnotic presence of a glamorous technicity and somewhere in the uprising of Dasein into subjectivity, an uprising that leads to the twilight of *quidditas*:

*'He becomes the one who does away with that which is, in the sense of that which is in itself. The uprising of man into subjectivity transforms that which is into object.'*<sup>22</sup>



The world (and all that is) becomes transformed into something other than its essential 'whatness'. It becomes an object regarded by a subject. It becomes transformed into the knowable. But what happens in this transformation?:

*'The horizon no longer emits light of itself. It is now nothing but the point-of-view posited on the value-positing of the will to power.'*<sup>23</sup>

It is as if the horizon cannot illuminate of its own but has first to be framed within the focus of a point of view, only then can it illuminate. During the interim, it remains as something waiting, standing by, 'on hold'. When the horizon offers itself up as the object of a point of view (a point of view held by Dasein), its own essential *quidditas* is diminished. The world thus leached of its own essential potency is enabled to manifest only as the object of a subject:

*'The world changes into object. In this revolutionary objectifying of everything that is, the earth, that which first of all must be put at the disposal of representing and setting forth, moves into the midst of human positing and analysing. The earth itself can show itself only as the object of assault, an assault that, in human willing, establishes itself as unconditional objectification. Nature appears everywhere as the object of technology.'*<sup>24</sup>

### **The question concerning technology and life-experience:**

It is Heidegger's argument that a shift has occurred whereby Dasein has come to occupy a premier centrality that overrides all other positions and all other modes of revealing. There is no other more crucial or determining location than that to which Dasein has gravitated and it is in that location that Dasein 'allows' the earth to appear only in direct reference to Dasein. No other mode of revealing or disclosure may arise except within that overriding paradigm.

Some suggestion has already been made of 'the particular manner in which the world is provoked so as to be at the service of the human'<sup>25</sup> and that 'this victory of method originated in Europe and is exemplified in Descartes'<sup>26</sup>. As referred to earlier, there is an assumption that I and the other contributors within this research project have all been formed by and 'within' the historical streams and impulses of the Western world and have contributed themselves toward the creation of those

impulses. It is the purpose of this section to trace those streams and impulses particularly in reference to a major 'social' and 'cultural' context within which Dasein emerges. One of the streams and impulses is the unchallenged assumption of Dasein's life as the final point of reference from which all is viewed and to which all is turned for ultimate citation:

*'The world became picture as soon as man brought his life as **subjectum** into precedence over other centres of relationship. This means: whatever is, is considered to be in being only to the degree and to the extent that it is taken into and referred back to this life i.e., is lived out and becomes a life-experience.'*<sup>27</sup>

So deeply embedded and so dominant is this assumption, that its provenance as an historical phenomenon is rarely put into question. It is the **dominance** of this historical paradigm that interests Heidegger and which is of interest as the subject of this section:

*'The content and the reality of everything objective has whatever validity it has as the inexhaustible occasion for objectivisation in the sense of the certification of the content of world and "life".'*<sup>28</sup>

The world thus transformed into an object of Dasein's regard and the transformation of Dasein into the subject that regards the object, not only places Dasein and Dasein's life, according to Heidegger, into a dominant position but subordinates the world into that which can be controlled and modified. The *quidditas* of worldly variety submits itself to the dominant controlling gaze that regards it as a resource for its own wilful purposes. The dominant controlling gaze is essentially technological. There is no corner of the world, nor of the imagination, that cannot be subjected to its method of examination and interpretation:

*'... inherent in the nature of the gaze, there is an inveterate tendency to develop only one aspect of its primordial ontological potential, viz ., its detached, dispassionate, theoretically disinterested power to survey, encompass, and calculate or categorise with one's sweep of a glance. The development of this aspect of our vision is reflected in the history of Western metaphysics, for the predominant tendency in our vision, theoretical and instrumental, unquestionably privileges a metaphysics of permanence, constancy, fixity, simultaneous co-presence, substance and totalisation.'*<sup>29</sup>

Anything outside this technological paradigm is regarded as provisional, conditional, speculative, anecdotal, notional, conjectural, unsubstantiated and insubstantial. Anything existent outside the technological paradigm has no

intrinsic authority of itself, no essential *quidditas* that could dignify it with the status of its actually being real:

*'This method...reveals a decision regarding the real: only that which is scientifically verifiable, that is, calculable and measurable, is considered to be truly and genuinely real.'*<sup>30</sup>

Unless it forms part of the dominant organisational structure it is merely a latency that derives its existence as a precursor to its becoming knowable:

*'Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve. The word expresses here something more, and something more essential, than mere "stock", the word "standing-reserve" assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the revealing that challenges. Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object.'*<sup>31</sup>

It is part of Heidegger's argument, at this stage, that the dominance of the technological paradigm has robbed the world even of its status as an object (for even an object retains something of its *quidditas*). For that which has to stand by as a mere potential for future usage has no other reality within itself, apart from its potentiality to become disclosed for calculable purposes.

### **The question concerning technology and the calculative stance:**

The argument seems to be, according to Heidegger, that if everywhere everything is ordered to stand by to be immediately on hand, to be 'standing-reserve', then it no longer has the dignity and distinctiveness of being itself but finds itself 'set upon' by a requirement that its value lies almost exclusively in its availability. It becomes nothing more than raw material awaiting some transforming process, a transforming process that calls forth the raw material that now suddenly appears and becomes revealed:

*'Technology is a way — according to Heidegger, it is now the fundamental way — in which the world of human beings is revealed, constituted, and populated; it is an over-arching set of linguistic and behavioural practices that allow our entities to appear around us in a particular way, that give to the entities that appear in our world a particular being, a particular significance, a particular sense. The machines and tools we think of as distinctively "technological", such as power plants and particle accelerators, are just the most obvious*

*instances of the being of all — or at least almost all — our entities as they are constituted by our most basic social practices.'*<sup>32</sup>

Everywhere, everything and **everyone** being available to be called forth, stand there waiting, almost invisibly, until seen or primed to be processed. No longer emerging out of their own inimitable contexts, they are brought forth and achieve illumination and visibility only within a context that is pre-given, a context that has been rendered secure through the certainties of calculation. This rendering secure through calculation 'refuses to let anything appear except what is countable'.<sup>33</sup> This very process of calculation is essentially transformative in that, 'the calculative process of resolving beings thus into what has been counted counts as the explanation of their being'.<sup>34</sup> The finality of this explanation 'as the explanation of their being' has already decided that that which cannot be counted (i.e., that which cannot be calculated) cannot appear. This rendering secure through the certainties of calculation is essentially projective in that it always precedes the transformative process and guarantees veracity through 'the consequential correctness of its procedure'.<sup>35</sup>

The consequence is, on Heidegger's argument, that 'certitude in the sense of unconditional certitude counts as what is most valuable, and therefore ascertaining becomes the basic character of all comportment. Ascertaining is not merely subsequent corroboration but is rather the aggressive making secure in advance for the sake of certitude'.<sup>36</sup> There thus emerges a calculative stance, resembling a *circulus vitiosus*, a circle of calculation in which all is set upon in advance to guarantee that all can only come to appearance as controlled, subjugated and mastered and 'only in the form of what can be set at our disposal and consumed'.<sup>37</sup>

### **The question concerning technology and the question of technicity revisited:**

It is a matter of common apprehension that humankind cannot move an inch or a mile without bumping into technological hardware: multitudinous models of cars, computers, bridges and motorways, plus every variety of clothes and food from all over the world. All the hardware of technology is presented and re-presented through the persistent presence of advertising and Dasein cannot easily withdraw

itself from all this, nor perhaps would it be able to do so. The overwhelming presence of technical devices, their sheer instrumentality and Dasein's embedded interaction with them leads to a spellbinding through the irrefutable hardness of their existence. It is easy to conflate the 'technical' with the 'technological', but this 'technical' hardware (as has been hinted earlier), though captivating and enthralling in itself is not the proper focus of attention.

No longer is an 'archaeological' perspective sufficient to explain Dasein's artefacts nor can these artefacts continue to be regarded as substantive evidence for Dasein as *homo faber*. Dasein is no longer **simply** the maker and user of tools and tool technology but is possessed and directed to the extent that 'modern technology, as a revealing that orders, is no mere human doing'.<sup>38</sup> As Heidegger says:

*'we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely represent and pursue the technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to pay homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.'*<sup>39</sup>

The picture of contemporary Dasein, surrounded by sophisticated machine technicity, as a mere 21<sup>st</sup> century upgrade of primitive forebears, is as deceiving as it is inaccurate. No longer is Dasein master/mistress of the hammer that is grasped, the spear that is thrown, the chisel that incises, the car that is driven and the keyboard that is pressed. Dasein finds itself subsumed within the generality of calculation and the calculative stance in much the same way as the machine technicity and raw material that is supposedly at Dasein's disposal and for its usage. It is Heidegger's argument that:

*'Technology, conceived in the broadest sense and in its manifold manifestations, is taken for the plan which man projects, the plan which finally compels man to decide whether he will become the servant of his plan or will remain its master... Our whole human existence everywhere sees itself challenged... to devote itself to the planning and calculating of everything... Man, too, is challenged, that is, forced to secure all beings that are his concern for his planning and calculating... the name for the gathering of this challenge which places man and Being face-to-face in such a way that they challenge each other by turns is "the framework"... the framework concerns us everywhere immediately. The frame... is more real than all atomic energy and the whole world of machinery, more real than the driving power of organisation, communications, and automation.'*<sup>40</sup>

The startling element in Heidegger's argument is that Dasein is no longer in control of the technological, but is mastered by it. Furthermore, the method of the

calculative stance, premised as it is as the guarantee of predicted outcome, includes Dasein itself as raw material for its accounting. The all-pervasive dominance of the technological paradigm conceals itself through the certainty of its procedures and the myriad variety and volume of its products. This concealment is further intensified by the diminishment of the object itself to something that is no longer simply instrumentally useful, but as that which stands by as available. So for Heidegger:

*'The essence of modern technology has for a long time been concealed, even where power machinery has been invented, where electrical technology is in full swing, and where atomic technology is well underway. All coming to presence, not only modern technology, keeps itself everywhere concealed to the last'.<sup>41</sup>*

An example of this latter given by Heidegger, is of an aeroplane at the airport, which on one level is clearly an object and certainly a very large one, but primarily, he argues, it has become that which merely stands by 'to insure the possibility of transportation'<sup>42</sup> and its available readiness is merely a calculated means to secure that. The available readiness of that which stands by, blunts the hard outlines of itself as a simple artefact by achieving a certain objectlessness in its appearing only as an element within 'the possibility of transportation'.

If by misfortune the aeroplane were to break down and refuse to fly, it would then emerge out its invisibility to regain itself as a weighty complex object worthy of regard in its own right and no longer standing by as an abstraction within a svelte availability. In an apparent paradox, its resolution into and its exposition as a machine, occurs when it cannot emerge into the light of revelation; but recedes, as it were, into the shadow land of its own *quidditas*.

### **The question concerning technology, *Bestand*, and raw material:**

Earlier on it was said, 'our whole human existence everywhere sees itself challenged... to devote itself to the planning and calculating of everything.' And again, 'the frame... is more real than all atomic energy and the whole world of machinery, more real than the driving power of organisation, communications, and automation', and again, 'everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be



immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering'. Heidegger's term for that which stands by as 'standing reserve' or 'resource' or 'stock', is *Bestand*. The catena of quotations above, it is argued, is challenging not only in its use of such extreme terms as 'everywhere', 'everything', 'whole human existence', etc., but also in its flying in the face of the received notion that humankind uses, possesses and controls technology and is not itself used, possessed and controlled by it. As one commentator, in a tone of despair has noted:

*'that which is not yet at our disposal to use efficiently (e.g. the wilderness, friendship, and stars) — will finally be brought under our control, and turned into a resource...ours is the only culture that tries to make the social and natural order total by transforming or destroying all exceptions.'*<sup>43</sup>

The potential of everyone and everything to be dormant raw material for transformation, pushes the world into a permanently undeveloped state. It itself abides as an embryonic entity waiting completion. Built into this notion of transformation is the sense that completion can never be brought to a quietus, (for completion itself is but an unrealised latency lying in abeyance). That which has been recast, reshaped, remoulded and rearranged into a renewal, is (and always was in itself) yet another raw material awaiting further transformation:

*'Calculability, predictability, standardization, generalizability, and all such notions ultimately contribute to the effective and efficient exploitation of the world as a vast system of resources. Human beings thereby find themselves "in the midst of objectlessness", and so as "nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve". The first attestation to the "supreme danger" of enframing precipitates the second: since technology relegates to human beings the sole task of being the "orderer of the standing-reserve", this brings them to "the very brink of a precipitous fall". The "fall" in question involves human beings ultimately being subjected to enframing, that is, coming to view themselves as just more standing-reserve. The supreme danger is thus one of human beings becoming just more resources to be effectively and efficiently ordered.'*<sup>44</sup>

It is in this sense and within this context that a former quotation; 'everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering', achieves its proper significance. The essence of technology, it is argued, lies in its being instrumentally utile and neutral and, as such, demonstrably within human control. Yet Heidegger's argument is that such is not the case. What therefore is the case?

As has been suggested earlier, the aeroplane at the airport is not simply a machine for flying, but is embedded in and emerges out of whatever imposes an homogeneity upon space and range, an imposition that collapses measurement as miles, measurement as kilometres and distance over the ground, into notional 'distance' and 'distancelessness'. This extinguishment of distance in favour of a destination arising within 'the possibility of transportation', occurs where 'space and time comprise the framework of our calculative domination'.<sup>45</sup> Within this dominant calculative framework, Heidegger argues, space and time are themselves treated as raw materials to be transformed into handy equations for transportation purposes.

The extinguishment of distance becomes an actual *reductio* of whatever is far off (in favour of itself as close by). The intention is to create a notional within which irksome and intrusive elements such as suffering, impatience, extremes of temperature, expense, energy, boredom and time are elided in favour of that which will always be conveniently and expeditiously just at hand. It is into this that the aeroplane disappears (and out of which suddenly appears when its engines cut out over the Sahara). For Heidegger, the extinguishment of time and distance to 'insure the possibility of transportation' has shrunk the world, but failed to create 'nearness' or a sense of proximity:

*'All distances in time and space are shrinking ... Man puts the longest distances behind him in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortest range. Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings in no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance. ... What is nearness if it fails to come about despite the reduction of the longest distances to the shortest intervals? What is nearness if it is even repelled by the restless abolition of distances? What is happening here when, as a result of the abolition of great distances, everything is equally far and equally near? What is this uniformity in which everything is neither far nor near -- is, as it were, without distance? Everything gets lumped together into uniform distancelessness.'*<sup>46</sup>

Perhaps some further questions now merit mention here?

1. If 'space and time comprise the framework of our calculative domination' and if within that framework a notional dimension has emerged, what now is our relationship to specific places, features and things?
2. How can the *quidditas* of anything survive within such a notionality?
3. How can the integrity of anything survive the attention of Dasein, except as an instance of raw material?
4. What happens to objects and things when their free sovereignty is stripped away in favour of an imposed homogeneity?
5. What happens to us when we are restricted to a singular relationship with them?
6. What happens to Dasein itself and its relation to others, when Dasein itself is regarded as raw material ready for use?
7. What happens to Dasein when it regards **itself** as raw material?
8. How can Dasein ever step outside so dominant and intrusive a paradigm?

It my hope that by asking these questions, the challenges set out at the beginning of this section (4.1.1) will become clearer in that this research project in attempting a Heideggarian explication of the experiencing of individual personal transformations within counselling training, hopes to identify and unfold a Heideggarian understanding of a dominant social paradigm that I and the other contributors to this research have been immersed in and conformed to:

*'... the false familiarity of the television image, which suppresses the close or distant, tragic or ordinary nature of events. Who can watch the daily tides of misery, ruin, despair, famine, war and catastrophe, tranquilly curled up on the sofa, without shutting off his heart, without arming himself with indifference? The world becomes a spectacle for which we feel nothing more than neutral, conventional emotions; and about which we think nothing but the clichés dictated by the "media": the contemporary form of They.'*<sup>47</sup>

In keeping with the Heideggarian notion that people are 'thrown' into existence and that it is only as being-in-the-world that they are existent, this research will take as implicit that individual personal transformations exist and continue before, after, and outside, for example, the counselling training programme referred to in the title of this dissertation.

### **The question concerning technology and *das Gestell*:**

*'das Gestell [translated as] "enframing" is not an action but rather a mode of disclosure which determines the character of action [and] is a proper name...designating not something that can happen in any age or culture, but, uniquely the "essence" of Western modernity.'*<sup>48</sup>

The word *Gestell* preceded by the definite article *das* achieves an uncanny eeriness that even Heidegger was chilled at<sup>49</sup>. Literally, as *das Gestell* it has the meaning and connotations of 'the rack', 'the frame', 'the chassis', 'the scarecrow' 'the skeleton'. On one level these words denote seemingly utile objects that have a basic practical applicability. They suggest fundamentally foundational structures upon which further constructions can rest or be attached. They suggest that which must be in position before all other and which must underlie all other as an absolute prerequisite. They also suggest that which remains as residue after all has been lost or stripped away.

There is also something determinative in their being the central core around which all other must accrue in assuming a final shape. In another sense, they foreshadow that which is come, and memorialise that which once was. Essentially, *das Gestell* is that which not only **is** concealed but which **ought** to be concealed. Its blatant exposure of itself, as itself, has that spare forbidding menace of unknown threat. Perhaps all these resonances must inevitably be present in Heidegger's choice of the word and must have been known by him in that choice:

*'Gestell is...the name for a skeleton. And the employment of the word Gestell that is now required...seems equally eerie.'*<sup>50</sup>

For Heidegger, *das Gestell* signifies the underlying, overarching dominance of that which:

*'means the way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of modern technology and that is in itself nothing technological.'*<sup>51</sup>

The phrase, 'holds sway' seems to betoken a pre-eminent ascendancy that possesses the mastery to press out all other options from the world constrained within its frame, a mastery that strips the original flesh off its own skeleton and allows only a cybernetic substitute to thrive and ensue. This metaphorical stripping off signifies a mode of disclosure whereby Dasein presents its own flesh to itself as an object of regard to be disposed of according to its availability as raw material standing in reserve:

*'...the enframing of modern technology is not a human project at all, but rather a meaning pattern whereby we understand things in the world as merely economic and physical resources. The goal of modern technology is not determined by humans; rather it is a meaning pattern in which we cease to be human, in the sense of beings dwelling in the world, and are transformed into materials and numbers ourselves...the Gestell...will ultimately enframe, not only plants and animals, but human beings as well.'*<sup>52</sup>

This stripping can only occur when Dasein itself has 'set up a world' within which it itself is pivotally paramount as the crucial focus, a setting up where it itself has become subsumed as 'pure resource' alongside a world already likewise subsumed:

*'Human willing... can be in the mode of self-assertion only by forcing everything under its dominion from the start, even before it can survey it...everything, beforehand and thus subsequently, turns irresistibly into material for self-assertive production. The earth and its atmosphere become raw material. Man becomes human material, which is disposed of with a view to proposed goals.'*<sup>53</sup>

The above seems to underline the argument that humankind is forcibly coerced into a mode of becoming, whereby it not only resembles but is treated as crude element (but cannot even appear as such) but must be conformed 'beforehand and thus subsequently' into standing-reserve:

*'A woman is violated when she finds herself forced to live not as a person but as mere sex object — a mere sexual "resource" — a forest, an intricately and finely balanced ecological system, is violated when its exploitation as timber no longer allows it to be the ecological system it is... if one cannot see the forest as anything more than a supply of cellulose...or the person as anything more than a sexual resource or productive unit, then*

*the beings in question show up as available for... the technological will's unconditional self-assertion.*<sup>54</sup>

The allocation of terms such as 'raw material', 'resource', 'object', 'standing-reserve' in relation to human Dasein, seems to undermine the previous explication of Dasein (as being-in-the-world) laid out in Chapter Two. Yet even the term 'standing-reserve' does not seem to adequately convey the starkly indifferent nature of its essence. In the manner that water is contained within a jug, so human Dasein is deemed to be framed 'within' the *Gestell*. This deeming elides the reality of Dasein's being 'within' the world. This 'being-in' is never simply determined by notions of inclusion or containment (or being present 'inside' or 'within' something 'outside' or 'over there'). It is **always** characterised, existentially, by the recognition of humankind's essential 'being-in' as 'concern' and 'care'. It is Heidegger's argument that:

*"Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always disbursed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining ... all these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being."*<sup>55</sup>

To strip out 'concern' and 'care' from human Dasein, allows the cognates of 'standing-reserve' to roll out in grim display. So, 'standing-reserve' becomes 'resources', 'capital', 'supplies', 'materials', 'stores', 'stocks', 'stockpile', 'accumulation', 'hoard', and 'holdings'. None of these is animate. None of these is human. Most are abstract. Not a blush rises in the cheek of modern corporations and institutions when they designate their major personnel departments as 'Human Resources'. Nor do radio and television journalists even hesitate when they casually refer to, 'human assets'. Nor does the sweated labour of humankind retain the real rankness of its effort, when it becomes quantified within the costed value of 'man-hours':

*'Man ... exalts himself and postures as lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only in so far as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself.'*<sup>56</sup>



### The question concerning technology and a new concept of subjectivity:

Reference is scattered within this thesis, within this chapter and also within Chapters Two and Three, to the Cartesian *cogito* and to the rise of Dasein as *subjectum* and the emergence of the world as object. A summary of this argument and subject matter is also contained within sub-section 4.1.8 of this section, as well as in the Endnotes of the relevant chapters.

The argument now posited is that within the post-modern epoch, these concepts have become so radically modified, that the distinctiveness of 'subject' and 'object' can no longer be realistically recognised as conceptually separate. What therefore has happened? The argument goes that within the modern epoch, the terms 'subject' and 'object' indicated a relationship held by Dasein towards the world. The 'objectness' of things remained 'thingly' (within their *quidditas*) they retained (even residually) characteristics individual and peculiar to themselves. Within that subject/object relation the distinctive character of 'object' and 'subject', allowed them to appear within a process that recognised and relied upon that distinctiveness.<sup>57</sup> Whole industries, systems of bureaucracy, commerce and political structures rose upon that assumption. What was not recognised was that the 'subject'/'object' distinction was merely a step in the development of *das Gestell* and in the development and extension of the technological paradigm:

*'The subject-object dualism was a necessary stage on the way to the progressive technologisation of the world. It amounted to a first moment of reunification of man and of nature. But this dualism, and the world view it projected, underwent its own dissolution...nowadays the world is increasingly seen in terms of flow, whether of energy or information...the flows in question are entirely derived from the mathematical, and often cybernetic representation...of the world, through which differences between beings are annulled.'*<sup>58</sup>

Earlier, it was stated that, for Heidegger, calculation 'refuses to let anything appear except what is countable'.<sup>59</sup> This very process of calculation is essentially transformative in that, 'the calculative process of resolving beings thus into what has been counted counts as the explanation of their being'.<sup>60</sup> The finality of this explanation 'as the explanation of their being' has already decided that that which cannot be counted (i.e., that which cannot be calculated) cannot appear.

The cybernetic representation of the world, it is argued, posits an **extremity** of the calculative process summarised above. It reveals, discloses and emphasises what was always latently present within the technological calculative stance, namely its capacity to ‘command and control’.<sup>61</sup> The difference in the cybernetic stance, is that it appears to possess a limitless capacity to ‘command and control,’ a capacity that lacks any clear liminality and which rests on this lack as a feature of its process:

*"Beings lose their own being to the productivity of subjectivity which finds no limits in what is given because what is given is given by itself in a motion of endless empowerment."*<sup>62</sup>

Thus ‘command and control’ are no longer enacted within a world where Dasein employs or utilises objects or things (or even orchestrates their transformation), but within a world where Dasein merely occupies a position within a stream of that which orders and is orderable. This stream is essentially informational in that ‘the process that receives the order has the ability to return information to the process that commands it, the process as a whole has the character of *feedback*...

Circularity — and self-regulation — are the defining characteristics of the world that cybernetics projects.’<sup>63</sup> Whether it is named ‘process’, ‘flow’, ‘feedback’, or ‘circularity’, Dasein finds itself within it, not as commander, controller or facilitator, but as one immersed and bounded. This immersement, it is argued, has washed away even the former defining outline of Dasein as subject and dissolved it within a never ending informational loop:

*‘The human is no longer an autonomous, self grounding substance...but an “effect” of a broader system or network of information that defines it. The only reality is the system, it self characterised, in its activity, by the differences it generates...instead of the old Cartesian ontological dualism of substance, we now have an informational (cybernetic) monism of the flow’.*<sup>64</sup>

This ‘monism of the flow’ does not pass within well-defined banks or chasms, but creates its own defining containment, (and these only provisionally) according to whatever information is fed back to that which commands. Consequently, this flow breaches all boundaries that are arbitrarily set up (and this arbitrariness may be **nothing more** than traditionally defined limits within, for example, established disciplines). As Heidegger indicates:

*'lack of distress is the greatest where self-certainty has become unsurpassable, where everything is held to be calculable and, above all, where it is decided, without a preceding question who we are and what we are to do ...'*<sup>65</sup>.

Within this cybernetic representation of the world all is subjected to a provisional status, one that finds its confirmation within whatever is ongoing. Computer games never come to maturity. They are arranged as a series of crescendos — mini-maturations that complete nothing. The serial nature of repeated heightened activity creates a flow that has no final terminus. This flow can be stepped into at any point without disrupting the narrative process:

*'Cybernetics has done away with the modern subject, and invented a new conception of subjectivity. This is a conception according to which the human is no longer the origin or the term of a process signification and communication, but is entirely contained within it and defined by it.'*<sup>66</sup>

### **The question concerning technology, *das Man* and *das Gestell* and the position of *das Gerede*, *die Neugier*, and *die Zweideutigkeit*:**

In the interests of bringing together elements of Heidegger's thought with reference to the research question, and in integrating arguments from other chapters within this thesis, some attention will now be paid to the possible relationship between two major Heideggarian concepts, *das Man* as explicated within Chapter Two and *das Gestell* as introduced within this chapter.

Earlier it was stated that in German, *Man* stands for 'one' and *das* for the definite article, so the expression comes to have the myriad meanings of, 'The One', 'The They', 'The Everyone' or 'The No one' (although *das Man* literally translates as 'The One'). So, 'everyone believes', 'we understand', 'one would always...', 'they have said', 'no one would ever ...', 'you are not going to believe this', are all statements attributable to and 'symptomatic' of, *das Man*. The centrality and significance of these for Dasein, is captured by Heidegger in the statement:

*'Dasein's everyday possibilities of being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them.'*<sup>67</sup>

Even as early as 1927, Heidegger in *Being And Time* it is suggested, was laying out the deleterious consequences for Dasein, in its being absorbed within a particular cultural paradigm. In particular, he was drawing attention to the manner in which the definiteness of individual human Dasein became dissolved into the vague, indefiniteness of *das Man*. The vagaries of *das Man* belied its actual pervasive and persistent puissance, in that it publicly set itself up as the benchmark of reality, whilst at the same moment hiding itself as unaccountable for anything:

*'This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded.'*<sup>68</sup>

As has been argued within Chapter Two, Dasein finds itself in a world 'already interpreted'. Dasein does not have to remake its own Being-in-the-world *ab initio*, but as an entity thrown into a particular place, a particular time, a particular language and born to a particular woman in a particular group, it 'finds its own interpretations conditioned by and permanently indebted to the anonymous social normativity governing intelligibility at large, a normativity that Heidegger calls *das Man*'.<sup>69</sup> This anonymous social normativity, it is suggested, is 'less a timeless condition of humans than the debilities of life in the culture of technology'.<sup>70</sup> These debilities find a concretion in the arguments already rehearsed and laid out within Chapter Two, namely as *das Gerede*, *die Neugier*, and *die Zweideutigkeit*.

For Heidegger, *Das Gerede* ('idle-talk') refers to that anonymous public opinion expressed in the idle unaccountable discourse of that which is already known and understood.

*Die Neugier* ('curiosity') refers to that fretful disquiet expressed in curiosity that fails to engage Dasein's authentic attentiveness, 'news no longer engages us and does not have to engage us because as soon as we tire of one news story two others clamour for our attention'.<sup>71</sup>

*'Versatile curiosity and restlessly 'knowing it all' masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. But at bottom it remains indefinite what is really to be understood, and the question has not even been asked. When Dasein, tranquillised and*

*'understanding' everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-being is hidden from it. Falling being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilising; it is at the same time alienating.'*<sup>72</sup>

*Die Zweideutigkeit* ('ambiguity') refers to that ambiguous mode of being, in which Dasein becomes stripped of a basis, and thereby disempowered, for making authentic decisions:

*'When, in our everyday Being-with-one-another, we encounter the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not. This ambiguity extends not only to the world, but just as much to Being-with-one-another as such, and even to Dasein's Being towards itself.'*<sup>73</sup>

While Chapter Two attempts to address the question of Dasein as the one being transformed, Chapter Four attempts to explicate the contexts within which such a transformation might be possible.

Chapter Three attempts to lay out a methodology (underpinning a possible method) consistent with Dasein as explicated within Chapter Two, while Chapter Five attempts to positively locate myself existentially in his approach to the research question.

### **The question concerning technology, a final question, a conclusion:**

The question now remains 'is there a resonance and relatedness between the early concept of *das Man* and the later one of *das Gestell*?

It appears to me that they have certain resemblances in common:

- Both are all-embracing and pervasive cultural conditions.
- Both are self-concealing and difficult to locate.
- Both are deleterious to Dasein's achievement of authenticity.
- Both are beyond the application of Dasein's wilfulness.

- Both deny and undermine the notion of individual Dasein's uniqueness.
- Both are self-maintaining.
- Both block Dasein's capacity to transform.
- Both are dominant conditions in which Dasein lives, moves and has its being.
- Both treat Dasein as raw material.
- Both lead to the deconstruction of Dasein as a bounded subject.
- Both lead to the deconstruction of the world as a definite object.
- Both appear as value-neutral but are powerfully value-positive.

### **A Conclusion:**

In this section an attempt has been made to explicate and argue:

- that 'technology [is] the modern disclosure of being – reality... revealed as a raw material for the aggressive transformation into resources' <sup>74</sup>
- that technology was never 'an ensemble of artefacts and procedures that for better or worse is subject to human control' <sup>75</sup>
- and that the main purpose of this section (4.1) has been to explicate the lineaments of a specifically dominant 'social' and 'cultural' paradigm, one implicit throughout Heidegger's work but one identified by Heidegger in his later thought



- within which Dasein is immersed and
- out of which, it is argued, Dasein emerges and is transformed.

## **CHAPTER FOUR END NOTES**

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<sup>1</sup> See Borgman, Albert (2005), p.420.

<sup>2</sup> See *The New Oxford Dictionary Of English*. (1998), p.1903.

<sup>3</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel, (2005), p.97.

<sup>4</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel, (2005), p.97.

<sup>5</sup> See QCT, p.312.

<sup>6</sup> See QCT, p.325.

<sup>7</sup> See Borgman, Albert (2000), p.69.

<sup>8</sup> See Borgman, Albert (2005), p.421

<sup>9</sup> Attributed to Nietzsche, as quoted by Heidegger in WON p. 106.

<sup>10</sup> See WON. p.70.

<sup>11</sup> See WON. pp.70-71.

<sup>12</sup> See WON. p.71.

<sup>13</sup> See WON.p.71.

<sup>14</sup> See WON. p.72.

<sup>15</sup> See WON. p.72

<sup>16</sup> See Rouse, Joseph (2005), p.185:

'The relentlessly conjoined objectification of entities and subjectification of our accountability to them inevitably transformed that accountability itself into a further object (a "value") for a subject. Values then need clarification and objective assessment in turn, but their objectification as values to be chosen undermines their authority over the choice. "Value appears to express that one is positioned toward it so as to pursue what is most valuable, and yet that very value is the impotent and threadbare disguise of the objectivity of entities having become flat and backgroundless. No one dies for mere values." This lack of accountability beyond ourselves, and hence of the possibility that what we do could make a significant difference, supposedly conjoined science and technology with this subjectivisation of art and the holy as "essential phenomena of modernity" '.

<sup>17</sup> See WON. p.72.

<sup>18</sup> WON page 107.

<sup>19</sup> But see Heidegger's argument in BT p. 90:

'a world does not get *created* for the first time by knowing, nor does it *arise* from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world.'

<sup>20</sup> See WON. p.107.

<sup>21</sup> See PLT p. 112:

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- <sup>22</sup> See WON. p.107.
- <sup>23</sup> See WON. p.107.
- <sup>24</sup> See WON. p.100.
- <sup>25</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel (2005), p.103.
- <sup>26</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel (2005), p.103.
- <sup>27</sup> See AWP. p.134.
- <sup>28</sup> See HHTI p. 128:
- <sup>29</sup> Levin, (1988) p.98:
- <sup>30</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel (2005), p.102.
- <sup>31</sup> See QCT p 322.
- <sup>32</sup> See Edwards, James C. p.458:
- <sup>33</sup> See PTWIM. p.235.
- <sup>34</sup> See PTWIM. p.235.
- <sup>35</sup> See PTWIM. p.235.
- <sup>36</sup> See HHTI. p.128.
- <sup>37</sup> See PTWIM. p.235.
- <sup>38</sup> See QCT. p.324.
- <sup>39</sup> See QCT. pp. 311-312.
- <sup>40</sup> See ID. pp.34-35.
- <sup>41</sup> See QCT. P. 327:
- <sup>42</sup> See QCT. p.322.
- <sup>43</sup> See Dreyfus (1993), p.302.
- <sup>44</sup> See Cerbone, David R. (2008) p.148:
- <sup>45</sup> See HHTI. p.48.
- <sup>46</sup> See PLT pp.165-166.
- <sup>47</sup> See also Risser, James (1999)
- <sup>48</sup> See Young (2002), p.44.
- <sup>49</sup> See QCT p.325.
- <sup>50</sup> See QCT p.325.

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<sup>51</sup> See QCT p.325.

<sup>52</sup> See Svenaeus, Fredrik (2006) p.422:

<sup>53</sup> See PLT. pp.110-111.

<sup>54</sup> See Young (2002), pp.52-53.

<sup>55</sup> See BT p 83:

<sup>56</sup> QCT p. 332.

<sup>57</sup> See Spinoza, Charles p. 501 for an explication of how tools and equipment were revealed during this phase:

'... the richest way to understand technological equipment like data processors of various kinds would be in terms of the technological mode of revealing, where everything shows up as available for flexible use. To try to appreciate a computer printout the way one might appreciate a handwritten letter, noticing the care with which the letters were shaped and the boldness or elaborateness of the shaping of letters, would surely be mistaken. A fountain pen, however, would best be understood according to the subject/object kind of revealing (prominent when it was invented) where people show up as complicated subjects trying to understand themselves and objects. In this mode of revealing, the fountain pen could be appreciated for the kinds of stroke one could make with it, the intricate ways that it would allow one to express his or her subjectivity. Likewise, a handwritten letter would obviously be best suited to being appreciated through this mode of revealing.'

<sup>58</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel (2005), p.110.

<sup>59</sup> See PTWIM. p.235.

<sup>60</sup> See PTWIM. p.235.

<sup>61</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel (2005), p.104.

<sup>62</sup> neu Vallega, Daniela ,(2003) p 62:

<sup>63</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel (2005), p.104-105.

<sup>64</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel (2005), p.104-105.

<sup>65</sup> See CTP 87 p. 87:

<sup>66</sup> See de Beistegui, Miguel (2005), p.104-105.

<sup>67</sup> See BT. p.164.

<sup>68</sup> See BT. p.164.

<sup>69</sup> Carman, Taylor (2000), p.20.

<sup>70</sup> See Borgman, Albert (2005), p.422.

<sup>71</sup> See Borgman, Albert (2005), p.422.

<sup>72</sup> See BT. p.222.

<sup>73</sup> See BT. p.217.

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<sup>74</sup> See Borgman, Albert, (2000), p.69.

<sup>75</sup> See Borgman, Albert (2005), p.420.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### EXPERIENCING PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION

#### **Introduction:**

This first section is intended to have a special connection with Chapter Two in explicating my personal immersement with the research question and in showing that its roots have been significantly formative at the heart of my existence. Likewise, an affinity with Chapter Three in making present my hermeneutic of understanding within my own biographical pathways, connects also with the ‘formal’ subject matter of this dissertation. In the first part of this chapter, ‘*The Two Dreams*’, an experientially based reflection on the research question is attempted by exposing the roots of my motivation and by connecting the biographical detail (via end-notes), to the method of interpretation and analysis. In the first part of this chapter, ‘*The Two Dreams*’, I have attempted an experientially based reflection on the research question by exposing the roots of my motivation and by connecting the biographical detail (via end-notes), to the method of interpretation and analysis. I have been prompted to introduce the nature of ‘Dasein’ in an oblique fashion, through explication at the personal biographical level (within the body of the text) and by a related philosophical underpinning referenced in ‘Endnotes’. I have deliberately withheld direct quotations within this first part, working on the principle that an engaged dialogue between the main text and its end-notes will already have happened and that a preliminary understanding, regarding the nature of ‘Dasein’, will already be in place. Within this section, I have wished to demonstrate the possibility of a philosophical, rather than a psychologically based approach to the research question, whilst at the same time, not interrupting (but maintaining) the integrity of the biographical narrative line. I have wanted elements in my biographical detail (and its accompanying explications and underpinning) to be proximally linked to the notion of Dasein as Dasein (as explicated by Heidegger) and not as descriptions of psychological data or phenomena.

In the later part of this chapter, ‘*Experiencing Personal Transformations: The Relating To Dasein As Dasein*’, I have attempted to continue using Heidegger’s Burghölzi drawing both as a graphically recurring theme illustrative of Dasein and as a foil to substantialist interpretations. The consequences of accepting the ‘reality’ of



Dasein (particularly in counselling and psychotherapy) is paradoxically revealed as an 'extremity' and a 'minimum'. Yet this 'extreme-minimum' is the therapeutic stance consequent upon accepting Dasein as Dasein. The existential situation of Dasein is explicated in the light of therapeutic encounters (and various Heideggarian concepts, for example, *Seinlassen*, *Mitsein* and *Offenständigkeit* relevant to these are explored). The phrase 'Dasein as Dasein', in conjunction with reference to the Burghölzi drawing, focuses attention on 'who' it is being personally transformed. The dangers of metaphorical thinking are reviewed as are the consequences of acting upon such. Repeated reference is made to foregoing chapters (particularly Chapter Two) in order to draw upon the theoretical base already argued for and explicated. The primordially disclosive nature of Dasein's moods is explored as are challenges to counsellors and psychotherapists in therapeutically engaging with them. The notion of 'stress', as a Heideggarian notion, is revealed as an unavoidable characteristic of being 'claimed' as being-in-the-world, one that can never be gainsaid. A pre-requisite for counsellors and psychotherapists to become personally transformed is disclosed as a 'minimum' necessity. The purpose of the latter section is to draw together themes relevant to an understanding of human being, the consequences of 'accepting' such, their significance to psychotherapeutic encounters and the demanding nature inherent in embracing this approach.

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### **The Two Dreams: (An experientially-based reflection on the research question):**

When I was a small boy and up to about the age of seven, I had a recurring dream of great intensity and power. It was a scene, in which boulders emerged from nowhere, high up, and tumbled into nowhere, low-down. Always and forever, as they descended, they rotated endlessly at a fixed rate, drawn by gravity yet seeming at the same time to be independent of it. As they fell, they appeared to be joined together, as if of the same nature and substance, yet at the same time separate but melded.

Below them, always in their path, stood matchsticks, brimstone-headed and bright-bodied. Incapable of movement, they withstood everything as the boulders came

upon them. They were never destroyed. They were not even touched, yet at the same time, paradoxically, they were not bypassed. All this continued, in utter silence. There was a complete givenness to this scene. This was it. Nothing else would ever go on here. Forever and for always. Unremitting. My early screams usually brought my parents running. Later on, I would wake alone (and remain alone) without screaming, but in a complete sweat of terror. Waking up was never a simple relief, but more a turning away from what was actually still continuing. This was my secret as a child: "Matchsticks and Boulders" lay behind all arrangements. It seemed to me, that between it and the world was set a great chasm, which hid one from the other (the world of usual arrangements continued as if this other reality didn't exist).<sup>1</sup> But in my own self, in my own being, these two had come together and I had come to know something. What I knew could not be spoken of.

"Matchsticks and Boulders" had no narrative structure. Its reality was completely untranslatable, especially for a small boy struggling to convey his terror. A plain description evoked no response, for there was nothing to hang onto. No 'handle'. The dream would never allow it.<sup>2</sup> It completely defeated language and undermined all its intentions. It engendered in me a kind of mutism whereby I experienced an intense and paralysing liminality that forced me to embrace silence.<sup>3</sup> It was not something that I could never unknow, nor ever pretend wasn't there, yet in my childlike and childish way I attempted to assuage its power through devising and performing little rituals and magic ceremonies. They didn't stop the dream and they didn't undo the knowledge. Like my rituals and ceremonies, the world became exposed as one in which things had been arranged and imbued with significance. In fact, the world as given (especially by adults), became, for me, undermined fundamentally whenever its meaning was deemed to be founded, solely on their intentions.<sup>4</sup>

I experienced an erosion in belief at accepting the givenness of arrangements and an increase in insight that arrangements stood always as passive foils to "Matchsticks and Boulders". The provenance of objects and utensils, both in terms of their manufacture, purchase and relationship to other mundane furnishings, constantly pointed themselves back to themselves, as ostensibly defined discrete entities, bleakly isolated in space.<sup>5</sup> Whatever had been put together could be scrambled up and

put away. No arrangement could ever be final or accepted as given, especially against the ultimate given finality of “Matchsticks and Boulders”.

Something never to be articulated, but understood by me, was the inescapable sense of suspended extinguishment. Here it was: latent, potential, possible. Here in blatant silent unfolding, was enacted the "possibility of the impossibility", not as a strung-out story, with a beginning, a middle and an end, but as a total rude block.<sup>6</sup> There would never be a time. There would never be a place. There would never be an anywhere, where the matchsticks could be anything other than themselves. That the matchsticks were never destroyed was itself a source of terror. In fact, if the truth were told, this was the true wellspring of my dread. Even now, at a distance of 56 years, I feel again a familiar sickening heaviness accruing around this recollection. It was not simply that the matchsticks withstood the boulders' onslaught: rather it was their very fate to be exactly in that place, matchsticks and boulders together, fated in an inescapable bond. And the boulders, in that inexorable plane of rotation, drew their terror from the total brutality of their being, contrasted with the delicate vulnerability of the matchsticks. The matchsticks were open to whatever had to come on. They could not turn away. They were fixed and confounded by their location. There was no other place they had ever been. There was no other place they would ever be. This was it. This was their world. But it was a world filled up. It contained just two entities within its claustrophobic exclusiveness. There was no room left for anything except itself.<sup>7</sup> The overwhelming givenness of its presence pressed its authority upon my little soul. I **had** to be there, for there was no other allowance. I was in it by *force majeure*.

Though I did not know what “Matchsticks and Boulders” was, I knew it was central. Therein lay its significance and terror. Its soundless vacuum was always something near to me, always something I could never turn from. One thing was certain, it was never ‘relatively’ important, it was always and for ever, pivotal and paramount and it had everything to do with me.<sup>8</sup> In terms of personal formation, this dream was of cardinal importance, but my awareness of it, through the tumult and turbulence of adolescence (and the later compelling exigencies of parenthood and marriage) became veiled.

During the early 1990s, in preparation for a residential weekend for the Diploma in Counselling, I, and my fellow students were given the task of painting, drawing or sculpting an "event" that we recognised as being crucial in changing who we were. As I had never painted or drawn since my schooldays this task seemed somewhat formidable and I was deeply unhappy at approaching it. Nevertheless, I decided to do it honour and bought the finest beeswax crayon blocks for the artwork. It was not until the drawing paper was under my hand and the crayons in my fingers, that I had any knowledge of what I had to do. Then suddenly out of the occluded blanket of my past, came "Matchsticks and Boulders". For the first time, in over three decades, the full impact of its guiding and determinative power came upon me. When I had finished my crayoning, the tutor came over and having spent some time staring at it, uttered one word, "bleak", and went away. In a sense, I had lived the consequences of the dream but had lost awareness of it.<sup>9</sup>

For me, things had always emerged out of a set of arrangements; arrangements which themselves, though significant to those making them, had no final ground or substance. From the time of "Matchsticks and Boulders", I had awoken to the fact that there was an implicit latent appeal to permanence and substantiality in the busyness of those about me. For me, neither arrangements nor things were durable or immutable. They had always emerged out of somewhere and went to elsewhere and within them was a threnody of arbitrariness.<sup>10</sup> The tumbling boulders pressed any hope of permanence out of me and unveiled it as spectacular and as enduring as a piece of stage scenery. The appeal to permanence evoked sensations of claustrophobia, and in this I was ineluctably linked to my dream.

The busyness of 'usual arrangements' was firmly a front-of-house-experience, an experience in which human faces turned and set themselves toward a brilliantly lit action, an action caught and enframed within its own proscenium. But my face was ever turned sideways and backwards, turned to those looking forward. Sometimes I sneaked backstage, to remind myself that there was another aspect to this action, another perspective. Always I brought this realisation and memory back into the front-of-house.<sup>11</sup> The airless theatre of my dream and the panicky depletion of its atmospheres, were generated by the notion of permanence. The endlessly

transformative dynamism of the one and the static breathless vacuum of the other, set them as extreme foils, and out of that extremity, arose terror and dread.<sup>12</sup>

It should be stressed that I was not terrorised by the matchsticks and boulders as subjects, *per se*, after all, little was being narrated in the endless loop of their drama. Nevertheless, permanence was present as something to be taunted; permanence and all its glamorous cognates underlying the reason for "Matchsticks and Boulders".<sup>13</sup> This world, my world, whereby consensual notions of permanence elided the reality of finitude (in an endless loop of 'usual arrangements') found, in me, a terrifying mimesis as "Matchsticks and Boulders". By underlying what was overlaying and lampooning it in a fearsome burlesque, I could not escape being fundamentally addressed, for it was the overlay and the underlay, the totality of my existence, my world, that was seized in this drama. Within its hermetically sealed universe, there was no room for anything except itself. It contained no haven where I might find peace. At the very moment of seeking consolation I realised the cutting despair of denial. But I knew where to look, I knew where to turn to, I knew where to track it down and I knew I need not look further than my own front door.<sup>14</sup> In active discourse with those around me, in the serene and restful consolations of everyday speech, I wanted to lie down and go to sleep. In my own immature observings I had come to understand that others had found a comfort there, as well.<sup>15</sup>

I had undergone a weighty transformation, a re-making of myself, a grounded understanding, but I possessed little worldly skill to render it articulable. It had never seemed a matter of being changed and then world itself becoming transfigured; it seemed more a matter of world disclosing itself first *per se*, somehow preceding my understanding.<sup>16</sup> In opposition to this revelation, lay the world of usual arrangements. At first, it felt that there were two worlds, one overlaying the other. As if they were laminated and inseparable. But the silent message of "matchsticks and boulders" showed me, that these worlds were forever one and forever mine.<sup>17</sup>

In later life, when I had undergone the sorrow of losing people I loved, and had stared out through the windows of many funeral cars at the ordinary world going about its ordinary business and had asked myself, out of the depths of my grief, the questions: "How can they carry on like this? How can they be so unaffected when ... is dead?",

I became reminded of that earlier self, the one who had withstood the stark alienation of what had once been settled and familiar, the one who had come to realisation that both these worlds were mine and in me they had found their nexus.<sup>18</sup>

Some forty years later,

*In the mid-time of my life I found myself  
Within a dusky wood; my way was lost.*<sup>19</sup>

And out of that confusing period, I experienced the second "big" dream of my life.

Unlike "Matchsticks and Boulders", which was the name I had given to my first dream, this latter instructed me into its true and proper designation. Ahead of me stood two columns, Grecian in appearance but without any entablature. Along the whole of their length were smoothly fluted parallel incisions, but no other decorative detail. Between them was a wide gap, filled with the sort of opaque greyness created by a soft pencil blocking in a space. The greyness swirled extremely slowly, as if it had no energy.

Standing slightly below the left-hand column, and facing me, was a figure gesturing towards the gap with her left hand. In keeping with the whole scene, this figure seemed one-dimensional and provisional, as if sketched in and of a species of grey. There was an impelling sense of being invited to pass between the two upright columns. It felt more like an injunction, an instruction, (as if not to step forward and follow the direction of the figure's gesture, would be tantamount to denying a paramount threshold experience). As I approached, and passed by her, the figure gave me to understand that this was "The Portal of Oblivion".

When I entered, I experienced a complete denial of everything I had ever been and everything I had come to know. But most of all, I knew that within that Portal, was a complete and total absence of care. To say it was absent would be to weaken the experience of its not being there. Care was simply not necessary, nor ever had been, nor ever would be; and in that, there was no tragedy.<sup>20</sup> Within its oblivion there were no claims, no arguments, no justifications, no accumulations nor any histories. In this 'place', one could never think a beginning, nor envisage an end. Here,



extinguishment was no longer suspended. Here, extinguishment was casually present, and it didn't matter. In this 'place' nothing was ever cancelled. To be cancelled would give it a status of life, of living, of having lived. Here, nothing could ever be cancelled, because nothing had ever begun, and it didn't matter. It lacked the energy of erasure, for there was nothing, nor ever had been, nor ever would be, anything to erase. Beyond that Portal, the claim "*there had once been something and then it came to an end*" could never be uttered, because oblivion made "*something*" forever impossible. It never existed. There could never be "*and then*" because there could never be "*there had once*".

Unlike "Matchsticks and Boulders", which had filled me with terror and dread, "The Portal of Oblivion" left me in empty stagnated resignation. I could not mourn, nor regret, nor fear, for there had never been anything, which could ever evoke these. These were impossible and always had been. I had wanted to turn my head, to see what lay about me, but even this was denied. I knew that action here was futile, there was no direction whatsoever, nor any dimension. Possibilities here were risible, and at their heart, essentially null and void. In this place there was no difference, nor identity. Any claim to uniqueness could never exist. It was a heart of stone, everything the same substance, undifferentiated and homogenised, and it didn't matter.

In both "Matchsticks and Boulders" and "The Portal of Oblivion" nothing entered to derogate from their power. There was no way out, and there was no way in, they were simply given. They never allowed themselves to breach their own defining boundaries. The second dream did not simply end, it faded, and in that fading lay an extinguishment of extinguishments. Within that double negative there was nothing of a positive. The merest residue of **anything**, the merest residue of **nothing** could never be allowed. Even the dream, within its own bleak and consistent logic, had been denied.

Although in "Matchsticks and Boulders" there was an experience of unremitting excess, and in "The Portal of Oblivion" one of oblivious diminution; phenomenologically each was identical, in that both forced me to see myself in the light of what it is to be human. From the earliest times this became embedded in me

as a quest, and later on as an inescapable odyssey, I tried to render both these articulable by living out of the life of the odyssey, and doing so consciously within the circle of language.<sup>21</sup> Both dreams manifested my fate to be **here**, my fate to be **open** to receive whatever had to come on. And in that 'whatever' lay the world, my world, inescapably bonded with me, and I with it. No longer a super-added addition to an autonomously ring-fenced individual. No longer an 'over there' to my 'over here'. Here was my home. There had never been anywhere, an otherwise, an elsewhere except this, here. Through the medium of excess, when all had been too much, and through the medium of diminution, when all had been taken away, a pre-eminent kinship, an imperative affinity with world had been unveiled, an essential it was my destiny to affirm. I had not only survived the dreams, I had experienced that surviving as a rooted element in the dreams themselves.

But set against the necessity for transformation was the eternal fixity of permanence. It was permeated with desire and trailing an elaborate cortège of seductions. I had been guided into a temple and found there a horror that provoked resignation and acceptance, yet within it, I had come to understand that oblivion alone is permanent and that obeisance to other deities, was gross idolatry. Yet still it beckoned. Permanence had been given as a graphic opposition to transformation. It seemed, at times a preferred option (the life of enduring statues to the patent fragility of flesh). All about me I felt encouraged in this view. Me as a thing. You as a thing. Me extended in space. You extended in space. Me, like you, an elaborate and autonomous automaton but strangely deficient, lacking the enduring permanence of bronze. And also the puzzled little boy, born during the last year of the war and alert to an adult culture in which people seemed sacrificially expendable, and were fated to be. Me as thing. You as thing.

As child and as an older man, I lacked any enduring symbol that could incorporate the revelations of my two dreams. Although what had come to me, in them, had been foundational in how I had become, I had no pennant under which I might advance, no flag to follow. This absence proved uncannily formative, in that it prevented collapse into rigid representational modes of understanding and kept me open to the transformative dynamic of myself and world, consequently, I lived a life of direction but not of clarity.

During my years of immaturity I grew mystified by that alien disagreement between how I understood myself to be and how I was informed things were, and even more confounded by a general verdict that I live my life in the light of these assumptions. Having a preferred and persistent orientation but no concrete destination, I could not easily reverse into a state of withdrawn introverted contemplation, but had to encounter the sustained oncoming exposure of being in the world.<sup>22</sup>

As a young and as an older man I found myself flipped against solid pillars labelled: Permanence, Transformation, Thing-ness, Tittle-tattle, Finitude, Desire. Like a pin-ball, I could not evade the trajectory of my direction, nor its repeated collisions. Often, within the gravity of two or three pillars, I turned and circled; sometimes driven, sometimes drawn. In later life, having been denied a flag and pennant, I came across a drawing that would cohere for me the topography of my quest and odyssey. In September 1959, Martin Heidegger, in the Burgholzi Auditorium of the University of Zurich Psychiatric Clinic (in the first of many seminars later to be known as the 'Zollikon Seminars') drew on the blackboard a series of identical shapes. Two lines of semi-circles, side-by-side, three semi-circles below, two immediately above, with their open ends tilted downwards to the right. Entering each shape, and at the same orientation, he drew a single arrow, whose 'tail' emerged from the blankness of the board and whose 'head' penetrated slightly beyond the point where the centre would have been, had each been a complete circle (See Fig 1.) I had become aware that such terms as "Man", "Mankind", "Humanity", "Persons", "People", "Human Beings", had about them a generalised abstractedness that only seemed to resolve into some form of concretion, within the singularity of multiple individual disciplines such as History, Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, Biology et al; and within which "Man", "Mankind", "Humanity", "Persons", "People", "Human Beings", were treated as objects of regard. The very specificity of disciplined regard, rather than opening up what I was seeking, served to close it down. In each instance the focusing of regard seemed, to me, a dispersal of attentiveness, a dispersal of attention. At first, I had problems in recognising and dealing with this apparent paradox. How could the central subject and object, vanish into invisibility, especially when these disciplined attentions gave it such a hard outline? It seemed that the more solid and discrete the subject, the wispier it eventually became.

The very neutrality of Heidegger's drawing in the Burgholzi Auditorium of the University of Zurich Psychiatric Clinic, and with it the abandonment of any conventional figurative representation of human existing, spoke to me profoundly as did his insistence on using the word "Dasein" for what would otherwise conventionally have been interpreted as "human-being":

*"The peculiar neutrality of the term "Dasein" is essential, because the interpretation of this being must be carried out prior to every factual concretion. This neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two sexes. But here sexlessness is not the indifference of an empty void, the weak negativity of an indifferent ontic nothing. In its neutrality Dasein is not the indifferent nobody and everybody, but the primordial positivity and potency of the essence. Neutrality is not the voidness of an abstraction, but precisely the potency of the origin, which bears in itself the intrinsic possibility of every concrete factual humanity." <sup>23</sup>*

My dreams had somehow deposited me into some originary dimension outside the curtilage of the individual disciplines. Somehow these disciplines seemed to elide a "something" more primary, a "something" more elemental, but this "something" never seemed to be mentioned. In fact the very "hardness" of disciplined attentiveness drew attention to its lack of presence. There were foundational assumptions here that I knew were related to my dreams and related to the direction of my life:

*"Over and above the attempt to determine the essence of "man" as an entity, the question of his Being has remained forgotten, and that this Being is rather conceived as something obvious or "self-evident" in the sense of the Being-present-at-hand of other created Things. These two clues become intertwined in the anthropology of modern times, where the res cogitans, consciousness, and the interconnectedness of Experience serve as the point of departure for methodical study ... Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life ... In suggesting that anthropology, psychology, and biology all fail to give an unequivocal and ontologically adequate answer to the question about the kind of Being which belongs to those entities which we ourselves are, we are not passing judgment on the positive work of these disciplines. We must always bear in mind, however, that these ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material, but that they are always "there" already, even when that empirical material simply gets **collected**." <sup>24</sup>*

Certainly, I wanted an approach to human-being that seemed unavailable in both the religious and secular spheres, an approach that would neither reduce nor magnify, nor hold human utterance merely 'subjective, or 'anecdotal', if it failed to arise within a controlling archetype:

*"in the claim of modern science ..., a dictatorship of the mind expresses itself, reducing the mind to that of a technician of calculations. Therefore, thinking gets passed off as nothing more than a manipulation of operational concepts, representational models, and models of*

*thinking ... the method of modern science, first thought out by Descartes himself, demolishes, that is, destroys, the world of everyday familiar things (not to mention works of art) approaching us in its immediacy."*<sup>25</sup>

Over the years, human-being had come to be envisioned, by me, as a 'unitary phenomenon'<sup>26</sup> indissolubly connected and radically contiguous with the world, yet persistently emerging as a self-objectifying observer 'cabined, cribbed, confined'<sup>27</sup>, within a dominant paradigm. The Cartesian certainties, which I had met in their original form at an earlier time, had with the passing of time, hardened under my eyes. Everywhere I looked there were basic assumptions regarding the veracity of whatever might appear on the horizon of articulation, assumptions that seemed to possess a Cartesian provenance:

*"... I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search ... I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that "I", that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is."*<sup>28</sup>  
[my underlining].

In this Cartesian picture, human-being is revealed as a self-contained entity extended in space as an independent thinking substance. This entity meets the world primarily through thought and through thought, is able to assign the world to that which is known. The world, as that which is known, is presented and re-presented as whatever thought allows, consequently, the world becomes secondary to thought and 'reduced' to an object of regard.<sup>29</sup> Thus caught in thoughtful regard, it can be posited and re-presented as inanimate and manipulable matter 'over and against' the subject that does the encountering. World and human therefore become discrete spheres split apart from each other, as do human mind and human body:

30

*"the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body"*<sup>31</sup>

This vision is wholly in opposition to the Zollikon drawing of Heidegger. Here, the world is not a solid objectified otherness 'over and against' a regarding gaze. Here, human existing is essentially the openness within which world comes to presence.

Human-being is not a super-added addition to a pre-existing world of reified entities (in which human-being itself may be encountered as an object also)<sup>32</sup> but rather:

*'...Dasein means to hold open a domain through its capacity to receive-perceive the significance of the things that are given to it and that address it by virtue of its own "clearing".'*<sup>33</sup>

Hence,

*"Openness to the world is what defines our being, not thought."*<sup>34</sup>

The Zollikon semi-circles are not sealed hermetic universes, but are semi-circles, because the nature of such is to be open. They are not merely incomplete wholes on the way to final juncture; they are what they are in their own 'selves'. They are open to give and receive, not as mediating transmitters and receivers, but as essentially in and inseparable from world.<sup>35</sup> The arrows poised within the open region of the arcs, are not caught as objects 'over and against' a consciously regarding gaze, but come to presence, because Dasein is there being as the clearing in which they are appearing. The multiple semi-circles elide any possibility of a single substantial ego standing as human existence. Although they are five they could be five hundred in number and in no way be illustrating a 'crowd' or 'group'. The multiplicity is not intended to dissolve human existing into 'neutral abstractedness', but rather to undermine centrist visions of a single regarding consciousness, and to assert that Dasein is not to be equated with 'Mankind' and all its historical cognates.

Heidegger uses the compound 'receiving-perceiving' to illustrate the 'nature' of Dasein and world. For him, the semi-circles are not empty spaces, passively inclined to contain whatever might come on, but domains in which a dynamic connected relationship is there inseparably, *ab initio*. But the shaped illustrations are not representations of some-thing substantial, a weighty 'it' that presses into the wood of the blackboard. The openness between the arcs engages with the arrows as they appear in their familiar directionality. Whenever they stream on, they do so as 'mine' and not as alien darts from another star. They emerge from my inescapably commonplace world, a world that through its everyday mundane habits, allows me to dwell domestically. If they emerge as startlingly alien, then I live exceptionally, in constant novelty and without coherence. When that happens all ordinary and



customary routines are stripped away. So what is left in 'my' denuded world, when what is closest becomes a foreign residue of a collapsed matrix? A world. The world. My world stripped of coherence turns into 'Matchsticks and Boulders' and 'The Portal of Oblivion', and becomes an unmanoeuvrable ocean lacking all landmarks. I had been forced to have these dreams. They had appeared with their 'wordless message' 'In the twinkling of an eye'.

When all is stripped away, something remains, and, as my dreams foretold, that which remains is not more of the same, or more of anything. Sometimes, under pressure of grief, or great suffering, or 'big dreams', the world loses familiarity. The usual connections remove themselves and things stand out in incoherent starkness. Nothing remains that could bind them together into a comfortably recognisable world: <sup>36</sup>

*"What's left, then, when all things have vanished, when my usual grip on the world has failed me, when I can no longer hold on to it and rely on it, it is the fact of the world itself, that is, the fact that I am nothing outside this worldliness, or this being-in-the-world. What's left, then, is myself as this pure openness and exposedness, my worldly, vulnerable and abyssal self, and, with it, the awareness of something within me I cannot master."*<sup>37</sup>

This unbidden exposure at a tender and at a mid-life time had turned me on the spit of questing. All my life, under its unavoidable suzerainty, I had asked, 'How am I to be?' 'How am I to live?' Though, as Heidegger observed, an "extravagant grubbing about in one's soul can be in the highest degree counterfeit or even pathologically eccentric." Was I doing this? Was I being this? I had tasted the upward blast of finitude and had come to know that if a life is to be lived crucially, then a life must be lived truthfully. The world of my unavoidably persistent everyday self, the 'normal' 'default' context for my acting, was not the whole story. Something had been unveiled in me that could never be entirely veiled. Perhaps, it was simply this: against the foil of suspended extinguishment, and against the foil of permanent oblivion, the 'usual arrangements' of 'normal' and 'default' were insufficient conditions for that 'truthful' life.<sup>38</sup> The dreams had been 'given' to me. They had not been worked for nor worked towards. They had simply appeared. But there was still a sense of being 'placed in the way of', and somehow 'placing' myself in their way.

I had an embedded sense that living a 'truthful' life could not rely on intentionality alone. Such reliance often resulted in sudden brief flights ending with the eternal

return of the same. Likewise, my dreams also had their fugal quality, but when I returned, things had changed:

*'Dasein, leaving the world behind in authenticity, cannot go anywhere else and is simply restored—though now 'authentically' committed — to its previous world.'*<sup>39</sup>

Perhaps the drip, drip, drip, of ongoing mundane exposure to the usual arrangements of common familiar life, could never be sufficient to bring about personal transformation. Perhaps the inescapable gravitational force of always being-in-the-world meant that any sudden departure into another sphere, always guaranteed a landing place back in the world:

*'It is unsurprising that the nature of the "modification" by which inauthenticity is converted into authenticity should remain in some ways highly mysterious. The transformation of Dasein from inauthentic to authentic and back is not, for example, the intelligible result of the process of growth or education; nor is it the result of a moral resolution. It is portrayed as a sudden and unpredictable transformation at the heart of Dasein itself, in which Dasein passes from one to the other in the "blink of an eye"'*<sup>40, 41</sup>

My own embedded engagement with the mystery of personal transformation and the strange 'givenness' which made it possible, had led me to eschew sermonising, exhortation, pedagogy and the merely instructional, as adequate means to bring it about. There was a powerful sense in which I wanted to engage with the authentic structures of personal transformation, to embrace them within a developmental and experiential context and to be used by them in the shared company of others. More importantly, I wanted a life-focus in the form of professional formation, which would immerse me within the world of liminality, the world of the dynamic threshold and margin. And I wanted all this to be necessarily connected with the aims and objectives of something both structured and forward-looking, something experientially focused within the realm of personal formation.

In a sense, as a fulfilling of my 'destiny', I entered first, the voluntary sector, (SAMARITANS and CRUSE) as a Trainer and Supervisor, and later on, the Further and Higher Education sectors, as Tutor, Lecturer and finally, Course Director, training mostly women, between the ages of 28 and 45, to become counsellors, as well as becoming a counsellor in private practice myself. <sup>42</sup>Nearly all the courses on which I taught, had been planned and designed by myself, and were pitched at various levels:

The Foundation Level, an introductory course lasting over one term (12 weeks),  
The Certificate in Counselling over one year,  
The Diploma in Counselling over two years.

The Foundation Level course was intended as a 'taster' for those unfamiliar with counselling terms and practice, but who had a sense that they would like to explore this world further. Entry to the Certificate in Counselling was conditional upon the candidate having completed the Foundation level 12 week course, and was intended for professionals already working in the spheres of teaching, social work, welfare, nursing, social care and the voluntary sector and who wanted to use counselling skills within their existing areas of practice and competence. Entry to the Diploma in Counselling was conditional upon the candidate having completed both the one-year Certificate in Counselling and also the Foundation Level one-term course. In effect, The Diploma in Counselling, being over three years, was intended for the aspiring independent professional practitioner.

What struck me about these courses was that nearly all the participants became changed in some fundamentally significant way. For many students it became a threshold experience involving the excitement of a new adventure, coupled with an anxiety of the unfamiliar and unknown. Typically, on whatever course they took, they began asking themselves questions and making statements such as in these 'reconstructed'<sup>43</sup> statements:


- *"I can't believe how much I've let myself be used. I can feel myself going red with shame when I realise how much I've been conned and how willing I've been to go along with all that."*
- *"Things have become a lot more difficult with my friends ... they just expect me to be the same old person I was. When I began this course I was still pretending ... but now it's a lot more difficult."*

- *"I wonder what will happen to all these people when they finish here... and find...that out there... nothing's changed."*
- *"When I walk down the street and see someone with a long face ... I don't assume that they're a miserable old git who needs to get out more ... What if they've lost someone? ... What if something's happened and they can't get over it? ... I make less assumptions now and things have become much more complicated."*
- *"You'd think, wouldn't you, doing a counselling course would sort of broaden your mind and make you more trusting? ... but I think I've gone the opposite way ... I don't trust people any more ... I sort of stand back and look at them more carefully ... I just don't unzip myself, as I used to, and say, "Here I am, take what you want" ... I think where I am, might come under the heading of "taking care of yourself" ... I've never done that before and I'm still feeling a bit uneasy and self-conscious about it."*

### **Eperiencing personal transformation: The relating to Dasein as Dasein:**

The drawing that appears at the head of this dissertation (Heidegger's blackboard drawing in the Burghölzli Auditorium, University of Zurich Psychiatric Clinic on September 8<sup>th</sup>, 1959) also appears within this chapter [see fig.1]. If anything could be more graphically epigrammatic of human being, as argued for within this dissertation, then it is **this** drawing and it is of human being and of human existing, as illustrated within **this** drawing, of whom I speak when discussing the matter of personal transformations. It is also this human being, as argued for in Chapter Two, who is the one being personally transformed and the one present (either as client or counsellor) within a psychotherapeutic relationship. It is this same human being, as argued for within Chapter Three who interprets and understands and it is this same one, as argued for within Chapter Four, who is immersed within an impersonal, covert and transformationally oppressing presence. The challenges of staying with this interpretation are many and great, not least because this interpretation flies in the face of a scientism in which most things are not only deemed present-at-hand but also as

FIG. 1



"This drawing should only illustrate that human existing in its essential ground is never just an object which is present-at-hand; it is certainly not a self-contained object. Instead, this way of existing consists of "pure", invisible, intangible capacities for receiving-perceiving what it encounters and what addresses it. In the perspective of the Analytic of Dasein, all conventional objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be abandoned in favour of an entirely different understanding. This new view of the basic constitution of human existence may be called Dasein, or being-in-the-world ... to exist as Dasein means to hold open a domain through its capacity to receive-perceive the significance of the things that are given to it and that address it by virtue of its own "clearing". Human Dasein as a domain with the capacity for receiving-perceiving is never merely an object present-at-hand. On the contrary, it is not something which can be objectified at all under any circumstances."

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<sup>i</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987) .pp.3-4.).

observable, analysable, subject to calculation and ready to be codified as data. Human existence, as illustrated in this drawing (and argued for within this project) not only falls outside such considerations but is positively antithetical to them. The strength of such challenges can be detected within the following probing questions: How is it possible to discuss human being without taking into consideration something akin to an "ego"? How can you talk of personal transformations (and particularly what limits or prevents such) without foregrounding psychopathology as a main issue? How can you offer an 'analysis' of human being without mentioning either men or women *per se*? How can you examine human 'being-in-the-world' when the word 'in' doesn't mean 'in' at all? How can you approach explicating human being when a clear distinction between 'human' and 'world' has been eradicated beforehand? Why do you ignore the matter of conscious human experience when it is clear that humans are consciously experiencing all the time? How is it possible to deny that human beings **are** objects when they are manifestly physical bodies of flesh, subject to physical laws? Why are psychological states not taken into account as significant indicators of human personal transformation? How is it possible to discuss human beings without explicating their stages of development? Why is the impersonal term 'Dasein' used in describing humankind when it is supposed to be 'we ourselves' being discussed? Why are humans never allowed to be 'subjects' (as over against 'objects') when humans as 'subjects' are encountering 'objects' all the time? If the 'technological presence' is socially constructed (and not simply a force of nature) where are the social-constructionist arguments that might offer interpretations/solutions.

The questions above represent challenges that do not go away but, more importantly, they represent fields of enquiry that have been eschewed within this dissertation. The avenues that open up through their querying, negatively define what this enquiry is about and, as a result, push to the fore a particular notion of human being. It is this human who is being personally transformed and it is this human being who will be discussed. Earlier, it was said that the challenges of staying with this interpretation are many and great not least because such an interpretation may well represent an extremity (one graphically illustrated in Heidegger's drawing). This drawing is not simply a silent visual aid. It is accompanied by a well captioned explication. It is this explication that represents the extremity and the consequences for personal transformation that flow from it (not least those occurring within a psychotherapeutic



context). This caption summarises the explications unfolded already within earlier chapters of this dissertation. Its tenor is quite explicit:

*‘...all conventional objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be abandoned in favour of an entirely different understanding.’<sup>44</sup>*

This drawing represents what is **not** being talked about and is (as Heidegger indicates) an abandonment ‘in favour of an entirely different understanding.’ This different understanding challenges the very notion of Dasein’s embodiment as a simple physical entity in that, ‘Dasein is not spatial because it is embodied. But its bodiliness is possible only because Dasein is spatial in the sense of making room.’<sup>45</sup> Heidegger then proceeds to explicate the pithiness of this statement by turning to the notion of sadness. He begins by denying that sadness can be calculated. He further rejects any notion that tears of sadness are simply fluid droplets. In this rejection he turns away from collapsing physicality into physicalist explanations and concepts. In this rejection he points towards tears as those that are not **limited** to or **limited** by such conceptuality and that tears are not simply ‘things’ nor are physicalist explanations necessarily the ‘default’ position for interpreting such ‘phenomena’. Nevertheless, notions of measurement and calculability are not easily rejected (nor the assumptions that accompany them). Having explored the question of whether sadness is capable of being measured and whether a notion such as ‘depth’ of sorrow can be measured, he moves to challenge the very notion of measurability itself in its relation to Dasein. In this move an ‘extremity’ previously referred to is exposed. He asserts that:

*‘Not even the “depth” of this room as experienced in my being-in-the-world is measurable. That is, when I attend to depth in order to measure it by approaching the window over there, then the depth experience moves with me as I move toward the window and it goes right through it. I can objectify and measure this depth as little as I can traverse my relationship to this depth. Yet I am able, more or less, to estimate the distance precisely from **me** to the window. Certainly. Yet, in this case, **I measure the distance between two bodies, not the depth opened up in each case by my being-in-the-world.**’<sup>46</sup> [my emboldening].*

This again connects with notions already unfolded within Chapter Four regarding the technological presence, namely, ‘that which can be calculated in advance and that which is measurable—only that is real.’<sup>47</sup> This ‘reality’ within which Dasein is posited to exist is one where space has been both reified and homogenised in order to ‘satisfy the condition of measurability’<sup>48</sup> a measurability that exists primarily ‘to

predetermine how the process of nature occurs so that I can relate to it safely.’<sup>49</sup> The pressure to occupy a ‘default’ position in which Dasein is treated as an objectively observable thing-like entity who in turn observes other thing-like entities out of a definite ‘internal’ psychic self, is not only very great, but one Heidegger had to resist throughout his life. It is still persistent. It still underlies many assumptions regarding the nature of human being. It underlies the ways those assumptions might determine, for example, how therapy might be offered. Regarding this latter, six important questions arise: Who is it being related to? What might the consequences of a relationship **not** premised upon reification, calculability and physicalist and mentalist interpretations be like? Is such a relationship possible? What challenges does it pose for therapy? Who is being transformed? What is the therapist’s ‘role’ in this transformation?

Recognising Dasein as Dasein. Relating to Dasein as Dasein. Recognising oneself as Dasein (and **then** relating to Dasein as Dasein out of that self-recognition). These are steps inherent in not only occupying a therapeutic relationship within this ambit, but in meeting Dasein as Dasein. Crucial to such relationship is the notion of *Seinlassen*, or ‘letting be’. The difficulties arising from *Seinlassen* should not be underestimated. They lie at the heart of any therapeutic attempt. They provide, as far as I am concerned, an ultimate challenge to any therapist who ‘accompanies’ another in the experiencing of personal transformation (a challenge not usually accounted for within professional therapeutic formation). Heidegger expresses the difficulty involved:

*‘The letting-be of this being (the human being) in light of Dasein is extremely difficult [and] unfamiliar...the “letting be”, that is, accepting a being as it shows itself, becomes an appropriate letting-be only when this being, the Da-sein, stands constantly in view beforehand.’<sup>50</sup>*

What might constitute Dasein’s standing ‘constantly in view beforehand’? Within Chapter Two an attempt was made to examine the delineaments of Dasein. It is this same Dasein, in all its complexity that now stands ‘constantly in view beforehand.’ It is this same Dasein that in standing ‘constantly in view beforehand’ is (as a result of *Seinlassen*) allowed to be ‘let be’ as Dasein (and as nothing else). Nevertheless, such ‘letting be’ is not simply an empathic attitude or technique adopted for the nonce. Nor is it something arising out of a skill learned for particular therapeutic purposes. Its

foundations lie within the ‘extremely difficult [and] unfamiliar’. It seems clear that *Seinlassen* can only occur to an entity in which ‘being-with’ is constitutive of its own being. This ‘being-with’ is the ‘dimension’ indicative of the ‘beforehand’ in ‘letting be’:

*‘Any adjustment [by the patient] is only possible and meaningful on the ground of existential being-with [Mitsein]. As to the physician’s will-to-help [the patient]: One must pay attention to the fact that it always involves a way of existing and not the functioning of something. If one only aims at the latter, then one does not add to [the understanding] of Dasein. But this is the goal.’<sup>51</sup>*

The therapist, as Dasein is unavoidably of this *Mitsein*, this ‘being-with’. This *Mitsein* is not simply something present-at-hand as a ‘default’ position of human sociability, which someone can have (and sometimes not) and which can be ignored as ‘always being there anyway’. Nevertheless, as has been seen in the explication of *das Man* within Chapter Two, it can be covered over by the average everydayness of inauthentic relating and, as such, can be submerged in the Lethe of concealment. The therapist is not ‘called’ to this Lethe. Instead, there is a calling to something extremely difficult and unfamiliar (an authentic relating) which:

*‘...can only happen when the investigator has experienced himself as Dasein, as ek-sisting, and when all human reality is determined **from there**. The elimination and avoidance of inappropriate representations about this being, the human being, is only possible when the practice of experiencing being human as Dasein has been successful and when it is illuminating any investigation of the healthy or sick human being in advance.’<sup>52</sup>*

It seems that letting the other ‘be’ (as Dasein) is extremely difficult in that one **first** has to let **oneself** ‘be’ beforehand **in order to** let the other ‘be’. Earlier, I used the term ‘extremity’ in explicating the consequences of accepting Dasein as Dasein. Paradoxically, this so called ‘extremity’ in relation to *Seinlassen* and *Mitsein* is the very ‘minimum’. To be Dasein as Dasein is to be that which one is **already**. Nothing is to be ‘added’. The extremity of this relating in which ‘all human reality is determined from there’ is the minimum requirement. Perhaps there is something precious in the term ‘requirement’ nevertheless; this ‘requirement’ is more a necessity. The position of the therapist within this extreme-minimum begins with him/herself. There is no avoiding being Dasein as Dasein **first** in any investigation of Dasein as Dasein. To be otherwise is to occupy a position from which no investigation can be successful. This is why *Seinlassen*, ‘letting-be’ is so difficult. It is not something that one **does** to the other using a ‘set’ of skills ‘appropriate’ to the

diagnosis. Rather it ‘involves a way of existing and not the functioning of something’. Within Chapter Two and Chapter Four, attention was drawn to the many and various ways in which Dasein can be limited or prevented in experiencing itself as Dasein. These ways are of the customary and habitual (which mostly remain unseen in their familiar recurring). To step into what is ‘difficult and unfamiliar’ is to step out of the oppressive authority of the technological presence and also to step out of the everyday blandishments of *das Man*. Neither of these vanish from the scene, for neither are present-at-hand as simple entities. What **is** transformed in this ‘stepping out’ is the transforming relationship, the transformational relating **from the position of being Dasein as Dasein**.

The recurring phrase ‘Dasein as Dasein’, cumbersome though it may be, serves to nail down the **unavoidability** of an authentic relating (in all its difficulty and unfamiliarity) if one is ever to let the other ‘be’. The challenge in letting the other ‘be’ is in eschewing any notion of human existence as simply another occurrence of something present-at-hand. This **really is** difficult. To ‘be’ is often regarded as what is existentially present, something that doesn’t have to be taken into account. It simply ‘is’ no matter what one does. For the therapist or for the investigator of Dasein (as Dasein) this position is untenable. It **does** matter that he/she is **not** subsumed under the crustaceous coverings of *das Man* and **is** hermeneutically attuned ‘to the things themselves’. This is not simply an acquired skilfulness. To step out of the familiar is to become personally transformed. This transformation is not a psychological state or condition that can be accounted for by reference to causal claims in which a lineage of origins, sources and effects can be traced and detected. Neither is it a state or condition to be investigated *per se* as if it were an instance of an objectively regarded substantial occurrence (one among many). To become Dasein as Dasein **is not** to be in a discrete state or condition that can be catalogued as one among many (in which one may be this rather than that) it is itself the **precondition** of all authentic relating. If this precondition is not present, if the therapist is not Dasein as Dasein then ‘the elimination and avoidance of inappropriate representations about this being’, can never come into play. The terms ‘elimination’ and ‘avoidance’ suggest a stubborn intractability around ‘inappropriate representations’, as if they are expected to be present **already** as familiar occurrences. Their stubborn intractability suggests they are of the everydayness within which Dasein hides itself to avoid the consequences of

its own essential finitude. The representations are classically characterised by their repetitious presentation, their inherent ambiguousness and their value as eye-catching novelties for investigation/research. It is at this point that Heidegger's phrase (and the epigram to this dissertation) gains pertinence:

*'Das Uneigentliche hat immer den Anschein des Eigenlichen. Darum meint der Manische, jetzt sei er eigentlich er oder sich selbst.'*<sup>53</sup>

*('The inauthentic always has the appearance of the authentic. Therefore, the manic human being believes that he is authentically himself or that he is [really] himself.')*<sup>54</sup>

Within the meaning of 'the manic human being' would be included any energetic and committed therapist, professionally qualified, conforming to codes of practice, licensed as a member of a recognised psychotherapeutic corporate body (and thoroughly up to date with the latest developments) **if** he or she were **not** practising as Dasein as Dasein. Such a practitioner could not rely on the professional appurtenances listed above as evidence that he or she were. This points toward the 'extreme-minimum' enjoined in this approach. Not only is the therapist impelled to **be** Dasein as Dasein, but he/she must have 'experienced and continue to experience himself as Dasein'. This is not to erect 'experience' as a heightened way of being, (in which the therapist might sometimes be and sometimes not) but to point towards the necessity of **continuance**. Any discontinuance of this authentic being-with leads to **the re-appearance** of 'inappropriate representations' and the forestalling of a successful outcome.

Heidegger's drawing and its accompanying caption, point towards an openness in Dasein, one that is inherent. Dasein is not 'a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness' but, akin to the openness of the drawn semicircles in their reception of the oncoming arrows. But this inherent openness:

*'...must not be misunderstood as something present-at-hand, as a kind of empty, mental sack into which something could fall on occasion...Without standing-open, nothing could appear by itself, not even the table here. The openness, as which the human being exists, is always openness for being claimed, by the presence of something.'*<sup>55</sup>

This standing-open, this *Offenständigkeit*, rests in opposition to any determinisms that would fix Dasein into 'inappropriate representations' (or into any **pre-determinations** of its inherence). Authentic relating to Dasein **as** Dasein is to relate in an



**unthematized** manner, one not determined by causal considerations nor impelled to trace such to a foundational substantiality. Such provenance- hunting denies the freedom of Dasein's inherent *Offenständigkeit* by an insistence upon a **thematized** relationship, one that seeks its origins in the setting up pre-conditional 'claims':

*'Being open for a claim lies outside the dimension of causality. Thus, determinism does not even come close to the realm of freedom in the first place. It cannot say anything about freedom at all. Therefore, as far as freedom is concerned, it does not matter at all whether we know all the causes, or none of the causes, or how many causes a thing has.'*<sup>56</sup>

A question now arises regarding the nature of psychotherapeutic encounters. Do such encounters have embodied within them notions of Dasein 'as a kind of empty, mental sack into which something could fall on occasion', that is, as one **already** thematized as a psychopathological entity? In any attempt to respond to this, the 'extremity' previously referred to would (once again) become uncovered. And, once again, the extremity- theme becomes heightened by the recurring necessity to acknowledge it as a 'minimum' 'requirement'. Are we therefore left with an untenably 'hard' situation of adamant proportions along the lines of?

*'...psychotherapy can be done only if one objectifies the human being beforehand, then what is decisive thereby is psychotherapy and not the existence of the human being. Since one can [supposedly] only do therapy, which is a concerned handling of objects, and thus something purely technical, then the outcome of such psychotherapy cannot result in a healthier human being. In such a therapy, the human being is finally eliminated. At best, such a therapy could [only] result in a more polished object.'*<sup>57</sup>

A great deal of this dissertation has been devoted to explicating the nature of human being, the manner in which Dasein avoids its own genuine possibilities, the responses open to Dasein to embrace these, and the limitations that are present to inhibit their burgeoning. Throughout this, personal transformation has been the main theme. The questions now arise, 'Are psychotherapists and counsellors more involved in the polishing trade than they are in the therapeutic?' 'Is the purpose of counselling to buff up the client, through a process of therapeutic rubbing in order to create a satisfactorily sparkling item?' 'Has the therapist first to dust him/herself down in order to model what a shiny finished article should look like? These questions arise out of the 'hard' adamant situation. As indicated at the beginning of this work, one of the challenges of this dissertation has been to explore the smoke and mirrors that surround notions of human personal transformation. Heidegger's capacity to identify



these mirages, to deconstruct them and to expose their deceitfulness has led me to follow his explications to the 'hard' adamantine situation where to 'be' with Dasein as Dasein is disclosed as having a hard uncompromising edge:

*'The human being is essentially in need of help because he is always in danger of losing himself and of not coming to grips with himself. This danger is connected with the human being's freedom. The entire question of the human being's capacity for being ill is connected with the imperfection of his unfolding essence. Each illness is a loss of freedom, a constriction of the possibility for living.'*<sup>58</sup>

Nevertheless (in a return to the 'extreme-minimum') it must be remembered that:

*'Any adjustment [by the patient] is only possible and meaningful on the ground of existential being-with [Mitsein].'*<sup>59</sup>

As has been noted within Chapter Two; I can only 'be' in terms of who I am to become, and not upon some prior foundation that somehow holds me up. I am not the sort of entity that has as its foundation the sort of foundation a house has. The kitchen in which I stand has more security in that respect than I could ever have. I simply do not have foundations (though I have been persuaded that I do have). In allowing myself to rely upon these absent foundations, I have foregone the only way I could ever be as a foundational entity namely, my potential to exercise my own possibilities for myself. If I could ever have foundations then they would never be 'under' me as something guaranteeing security in whatever I might choose to be or to do. They would, in a sense, be always 'ahead' of me, in which case, the metaphor of 'foundations' peters out into a quite clear nonsensical contradiction. For Dasein, these possibilities 'are not a subject's tendencies or capacities. They always result, so to say, from "outside", that is, from the particular historical situation of being-able-to-comport-oneself and of choosing, from the comportment what is encountered.'<sup>60</sup> This approach blocks any tendency on the therapist's part, to interpret his or her role as 'bringing out' what is 'potentially' 'in' the client as a 'resource' to be 'drawn' on. What is eschewed within this 'extreme-minimum' is a resort to metaphorical thinking that places itself outside the 'extremity'. Metaphors are often resorted to in order to clarify and 'normalise' what would otherwise resemble an extremity so, for example, countervailing interpretations have been employed within this dissertation around the little word 'in' in order to dispel any notion (metaphorical or otherwise) of its being used as meaning 'inside', 'being contained' or 'containing'. Metaphorical thinking

(for the therapist) though masquerading as a useful tool of explication, places in danger the possibility of ever relating to Dasein as Dasein. Such thinking has the capacity to reinforce notions of Dasein as substance, Dasein as object, Dasein as container and to introduce inappropriate terms and concepts into the relationship. Often:

*'The most useful is the useless. But to experience the useless is the most difficult undertaking for contemporary man. Thereby, what is "useful" is understood as what can be applied practically, as what serves an immediate technical purpose, as what produces some effect, and as that with which I can operate economically and productively.'*<sup>61</sup>

The question that must be turned to again and again is, 'Who is it being related to?' and the answer must always be, 'The Dasein as explicated within Chapter Two and Chapter Three.' This Dasein is one where 'all conventional objectifying representations'<sup>62</sup> have been set aside in favour of an openness in which it can never be 'something which can be objectified at all under any circumstances.'<sup>63</sup> In the light of this, the plaintive cry may rise, 'How can we ever relate to an entity which is not already 'a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness'?'<sup>64</sup> If there exists any expectation **at all** that anything **other** than a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness is to be related to, then a light has been thrown on a 'default' expectation of human-relating.

Perhaps, at this point, the dangers of metaphorical thinking begin to emerge. Anything that reinforces a **solid substantiality** of Dasein already possesses the capacity to 'set up' a matrix of relationships that flow from it. Even a 'friendly' figurative device, employed to clarify and explicate, has the capacity to underpin and strengthen 'conventional objectifying representations.' It is not a question of 'Be careful what you say' but rather 'What you say reveals **who** you are relating to.' In this relating, such phrases as 'acting-out' (often employed by therapists) indicate a specific interpretation of human activity in which Dasein's possibilities have **already** been objectified in advance as 'something' that may or may not be actualised. In other words, within its utterance a particular understanding of Dasein has already been exposed. The very word 'out' of 'acting out' presupposes an 'in' from which an 'out' can be counter-posed. And the word 'acting' already presupposes an arena in which whatever is already scripted may be performed.

The matter of Dasein's personal transformation lies within its openness to its potentiality-to-be. Heidegger's drawing in the Burghölzi Auditorium is illustrative of this. The potentiality-to-be (*das Sein-können*) always 'belongs to my Dasein in a wholly original way'.<sup>65</sup> 'Original' here does not point towards something 'novel' but rather to what is constitutive of my very existence. My potentiality-to-be is not **something** awaiting an enlivening impulse, nor is it a 'tendency' or 'capacity'. It is constitutive of my very existence *ab initio* and is always already of me (without break or juncture). What flows from this? If it is constitutive of my very existence *ab initio* then any personal transformations are never **alterations** of who I am. I remain Dasein, always. All the cognates of 'alteration' namely 'modification', 'variation', 'revision', 'shift' and 'adaptation' (and perhaps the very title 'personal transformation' embedded in this dissertation) rather dubiously apply. There is never a moment when I am abandoned by *das Sein-können*. It is always of me. But in what ways can this explicate the matter of personal transformations?

My potentiality-to-be is of my possibilities (as was argued for within Chapter Two) and it never vanishes; it is the inalienable presence of Dasein's own potentiality to be authentically itself. This potentiality is an existiale of Dasein's very being; the irreducible continuance which 'guarantees' that Dasein is never totally subsumed within the blandishments of *das Man*. Dasein is therefore always open to authentic transformation through the potentiality of a dynamic *metanoia* **inherent** in its very being-in-the-world. It is this potentiality that approaches the heart of the research question. Authentic Personal Transformation is not conceived as a superior way of being but rather as a potentiality and a modification of inauthenticity. Here, the term 'modification' has an uncomfortable 'fit' with non-substantialist notions, ones that would reject 'all conventional objectifying representations', illustrating (yet again) the difficulty of approaching Dasein as Dasein:

*'This potentiality-to-be is precisely the **unfolding essence** of Dasein. I am always my potentiality-to-be as potentiality. My potentiality-to-be is not a possibility in the sense of something present-at-hand which could then be transformed into something else, for instance, into action.'*<sup>66</sup>

The temptation to render transformation into metaphorical terminology is immense. Everywhere transformation and change impinges upon our existence insistently. The

green grass becomes brown, dies and vanishes. The wheat is taken away, turned into flour and reappears as bread and cakes. Autumn turns to winter. Winter to spring. Spring to summer. Everywhere, we are impinged upon by earthly transformation. It is small wonder that we convert these ready-to-hand figures of speech into metaphors of our own being. Nevertheless, their use invites ways of understanding that emasculate the unique specificity of Dasein's existence. Dasein's uniqueness (and therefore Dasein's unique personal transformation) is **not** akin to metaphorical transformations (no matter how close they might appear to be):

*'For instance, in the domain of the present-at-hand, the corresponding feature is the "possibility" that the trunk of a tree becomes a beam [for a ceiling]. As something present-at-hand, this possibility for being a beam belongs essentially to the trunk of the tree. Yet when I have made the trunk of the tree into a beam, then it is no longer a tree trunk. Thereby, it has been used up as a tree trunk.'*<sup>67</sup>

Such a metaphor for human transformation may easily be resorted to within a psychotherapeutic situation as an encouraging and harmless device to promote change within a client. It could even be categorised as a creatively therapeutic figure of speech, part of a 'box of tools' the therapist might use to foster transformation. Nevertheless, its use would set both counsellor and client upon a route that would divert the meeting of Dasein with Dasein, as it already contains within itself the notion that **Dasein as Dasein is destroyed in the process of transformation**:

*'In contrast to the actualisation of the possibility present-at-hand for being a beam from the tree trunk, the enactment of Dasein's potentiality-to-be is totally different.'*<sup>68</sup>

The use of metaphorical language endangers Dasein's status as that entity **not** of the present-at-hand. The fact that Dasein is **not** 'used up' within the process of personal transformation is one not lightly to be set aside. Metaphorical language sets aside the understanding that Dasein is not of the present-at-hand, by delivering it immediately **into** the present-at-hand, and by 'thinking' from that base (as if it were truly foundational). By so doing it 'uses Dasein up' as that unitary entity, being-in-the-world. To repeat; it is never simply a matter of 'Be careful what you say' but rather 'What you say reveals **who** you are relating to'. Metaphorical thinking (particularly when employed within therapy) imposes closure upon Dasein in such a way that Dasein appears as 'complete'. This closure is a kind of death (perhaps within therapy it could be called 'murder') much after the fashion of Dasein's 'no-longer-being-

able-to-be-there', as explicated within Chapter Two. This linking of 'no- longer-being-able-to-be-there' (*Nicht-mehr-dasein-können*) with any denial of Dasein's potentiality-to-be, indicates that in a powerful 'existential' sense such a denial of Dasein's potentiality-to-be results in *nicht-mehr-dasein-können*:

*'Ecstatic being-in-the-world always has the character of the potentiality-to-be. When I sit here now, I can get up at any time and go out through the door. I myself am this potentiality for going out through the door, even though I do not enact it. But when I enact it and actually go through the door, then, nevertheless, this potentiality-to-be this way is still present, exerting its presence, and co-constituting my Dasein.'*<sup>69</sup>

In offering an explication of Dasein, it has been shown that Dasein is **inherently** transformative in its openness. That is the cardinal word 'open'. The very openness of Dasein is the realm of its own transformation. Heidegger's Burghölzli drawing is a denial of encapsulation, of anything fortress-like that overlooks an alien world below. There are no permeable or semi-permeable membranes across the mouths of the semi-circles to filter an incoming 'outside' to a receiving 'inside'. The open semi-circles, by their very openness, are already of the 'outside'. They neither occupy that 'outside' nor are contained within it. Heidegger's drawings are metaphors showing **Dasein's incapacity to become closed off**. This feature of Dasein's inherence is of 'its essential ground' and is irremovable. Heidegger enjoyed using metaphors of Dasein that elicited a sense of illumination, of light falling upon darkened places, of being free in order for light to appear:

*'With the rising of the sun, it gets light and everything becomes visible. Things shine...A clearing in the forest is still there, even when it's dark. Light presupposes clearing. There can only be brightness where something has been cleared or where something is free for the light. Darkening, taking away the light, does not encroach upon the clearing. The clearing is the presupposition for getting light and dark. It is the free, the open.'*<sup>70</sup>

The openness of the clearing is the very definition of itself. The clearing is neither subsumed within nor is it apart from the forest. Even when it is occupied, it is as a consequence of its being free. Even when there is no light, the clearing is the 'space' where darkness not only appears but is allowed to appear. This 'allowed' is not permissive. There is no 'choosing' whether this or that should be admitted as a pre-condition of encountering. There are no guardians along the threshold of the clearing, nor above it nor below it. My repeated attempts to draw attention to the openness and non-substantiality of Dasein resemble a pointing-out akin to saying 'coal is black' (the

point being that coal's being black is mostly **overlooked** by the very familiarity of the notion). Likewise:

*'The human being's being-open to being is so fundamental and decisive in being human that, due to its inconspicuousness and plainness, one can continuously overlook it in favour of contrived psychological theories.'*<sup>71</sup>

So, for example, would the following statements made by student counsellors on a counsellor training course be **expected** to be more suitable as raw material for psychological interpretation?

*"I don't really know what I'm going to do, everything's changed and nothing's ever going to be the same again, I know that, and it's a bit frightening."*

*"I can't believe how much I've let myself be used. I can feel myself going red with shame when I realise how much I've been conned and how willing I've been to go along with all that."*

*"Things have become a lot more difficult with my friends ... they just expect me to be the same old person I was. When I began this course I was still pretending ... but now it's a lot more difficult."*

Do these statements gather force from being exemplars of **themetised** alterations from one psychological state to another? Are personal transformations only identifiable when they appear as themetised? How is it possible to talk about human personal transformation without referring to themetised, identifiable concrete instances of personal transformation? The approach suggested by these questions has not been the pathway of this research project. I have chosen to remain with the transformational consequences of being human (as Dasein) without resorting to substantiate such, by building an empirical base. Even my personal testimony, in the form of two 'big' dreams, is not really of the psychological or of the empirical. It is more an example of the structural hermeneutic of Dasein in its encountering and the manner in which Dasein has the capacity to become changed as a result of that hermeneutic. It is not simply an 'experience' I 'had' that I now 'reflect' upon as a 'discrete occurrence' within my personal 'history' in order to 'report' back on as 'data' illustrating 'change'. Many of the terms in the foregoing sentence represent a road not taken. As stated earlier, my attempts to draw attention to the openness and non-substantiality of Dasein may resemble a pointing-out that 'coal is black' but my



position is that ‘conventional objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology’ are firmly embedded within common parlance and in many assumptions regarding personal transformation. Part of my intention is to do ‘something different’, not least in remaining with the consequences of Heidegger’s explications of human being as Dasein and avoiding ameliorating those consequences in order to render them more therapeutically viable and available.

Many of the references, in this part of the dissertation, have been to seminars and conversations held in the Swiss town of Zollikon between 1959 and 1969, with Heidegger and the psychotherapist, Medard Boss. These seminars consisted mostly of students, scientists, doctors, psychotherapists and psychiatrists and represent, in many instances, a sustained meeting of minds in which there was very little meeting. For ten years, Heidegger constantly explicated Dasein to seminar members as if reporting from an alien star to species on another planet. And therein lies its significance. It represents an interface between the consequences thrown up by being-in-the-world as Dasein, and the expectations of those who come from the Cartesian-like world of subjects and objects. In a sense, the research project of this dissertation has a continuing affinity and correspondence with that interface.

Earlier, in relation to measurement and calculability, it was said that, ‘not even the “depth” of this room as experienced in my being-in-the-world is measurable.’<sup>72</sup> The assumptions residing within substantialist notions of human being obtrude everywhere. They slip into conversation to become the common-sense of sociability (the ‘default’ position from which reality is coordinated). This ‘default’ can be found in the conflation of ‘self’ with the notion of ‘Dasein’ and the identification of one with the other. Do therapists assume a relation to a selfhood, to a client’s self, as ‘something’ primarily related to? Is there a temptation to assume (for convenience) ‘a capsule-like psyche, subject, person, ego, or consciousness’<sup>73</sup> in order to make counselling ‘do-able’? ‘Do therapists engender within clients, notions of their own selfhood as a ‘something’ awaiting transformation? Do therapists engender such notions within themselves? The path of the ‘extreme-minimum’ diverges from the destinations indicated by these excursions. If Dasein’s selfhood becomes substantiated as a solid ‘something’ then Dasein’s inherent *Offenständigkeit* is occluded.

Substantialist thinking (and its accompanying panoply of metaphors) equates the continuance of selfhood with the endurance of a ‘something’ through time. The fact that we know who or what somebody is becomes equated with things that have identity and endure through time. We apply the concepts that rightly apply to one to the other. The claim that Dasein is unique is embedded within the argument offered by Heidegger’s explications (and which formed the basis of irritation within the Zollikon seminars). This claim underlies the analysis of Dasein offered within Chapters Two and Three and underlies my opting for a Heideggarian explication. The continuance of Dasein’s selfhood is not primarily determined as something identifiably enduring through time:

*‘The self is never present-at-hand as a substance. The constancy of the self is proper to itself in the sense that the self is always able to come back to itself and always finds itself still the same in its sojourn.’<sup>74</sup>*

The irritation of substantialist thinking can be detected in the riposte, ‘But **what** does the self come back to, you haven’t said **what** that self is? Any attempt to answer this on its own terms would deliver one over to the present-at-hand:

*‘The constancy of a substance consists only in the fact that it is always present-at-hand within the course of time, but it has nothing to do with time itself.’<sup>75</sup>*

What seems fundamental here is the conflation of constancy apprehended in the temporal consistency of things with the assumption that the constancy of Dasein’s selfhood is like that. But, unlike things:

*‘The constancy of the self is temporal in itself, that is, it temporalises itself.’<sup>76</sup>*

Dasein’s self is not temporalised from outside by a chronology into which it fits. This is the ‘error’ of substantialism and which leads to distorted understandings of personal transformation. So long as Dasein’s self is understood as subject to the chronology of things, then it can only be related to as a ‘thing’ and can only change as a ‘thing’:

*‘This selfhood of Dasein is only in the manner of temporalising.’<sup>77</sup>*

In other words, Dasein’s self **is** its own time. A substantialist approach would veer towards saying, ‘Dasein’s self **makes** its own time’ in an attempt to make the claim clearer (and thereby occlude the claim being made.). In interpreting itself, Dasein refers to itself as ‘I’ but in saying ‘I’ its selfhood does not first come into existence.

More importantly, the uttering of 'I' is not **inclusive** of all that Dasein's selfhood is. Dasein can never get the **whole** of its own selfhood into that utterance nor should any therapist expect a client to be doing so (even when being inveigled into 'owning' statements beginning with 'I'). Because Dasein temporalises **itself**, the whole of that process cannot be drawn to a standstill in order to 'fit into' the single utterance of 'I'. The utterance of 'I' is Dasein's provisional method of interpreting itself to others and itself:

*'In saying 'I' Dasein expresses itself about 'itself'. It is not necessary that in doing so Dasein should make any utterance. With the 'I', this entity has itself in view. The content of this expression is regarded as something utterly simple. In each case, it just stands for me and nothing further. Also, this 'I', as something simple, is not an attribute of other Things; it is not **itself** a predicate, but the absolute 'subject'.*<sup>78</sup>

And again:

*'I' is always the calling of the self as mine, that is, of my own self's being in the moment of calling. **For the whole self can never be realised in one moment.** In calling myself 'I', I need not represent my possibilities expressly. If I were to do this, that is, to represent to myself expressly all my ways of the potentiality-to-be, I could not exist at all.*<sup>79</sup> [my emboldening].

For a therapist to expect clients to be expressing the whole of who they are, in the utterance of 'I' is to push them into non-existence (even though 'the 'I' seems to 'hold together' the totality of the structural whole').<sup>80</sup> The assumptions behind 'who' it is being transformed are many and legion and the intention of this research project has been to clarify this. It is difficult to speak of 'the experiencing of personal transformations' without explicating 'who' it is experiencing. Within Chapter Two, Dasein is **mostly not** the self of its authentic possibilities. It is the self of *das Man* and therefore **modified** from the selfhood of authenticity. As has been seen, *das Man* does not take account of Dasein's uniqueness (a uniqueness argued for within this dissertation). The world can never be excluded in this matter of personal transformation it is always 'there' as Dasein's inherent 'being-there'. Dasein and world are a unitary phenomenon and the experiencing of personal transformation is not some private achievement of individual endeavour enacted within the curtilage of a 'capsule-like psyche'. Any counsellor or psychotherapist who excludes 'world' (and therefore *das Man*) in favour of intra-psychic explications fatally disarms themselves.

An impetus has been to draw the dyadic face-to-face encounter (as within psychotherapy) onto the plane of the world (as explicated as Dasein's being-in-the-world). By doing so, a whole universe of metaphysical/technological thinking becomes

unavailable. My intention has been to foster this unavailability in favour of one that treats Dasein as Dasein. Any temptation to treat 'plane of the world' as a substitutional expression for 'community', 'social factors' or 'social-construction' would signify a submission to the gravitational pull of metaphysical/technological thinking. Likewise, the technological presence, as explicated within Chapter Four, is not a manageable and convenient technicity, both present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. It represents a way of being, a powerful transformational mode that is **not** under human control and any therapist who excludes this 'disclosure of being'<sup>81</sup> will fail to account for a mode of transformation that impinges **unavoidably** upon Dasein. What **does** impinge upon those who present for counselling (and those who present for counsellor training) is the weight of the situation they find themselves in. The term 'stress' has entered common parlance and has become a ready-to-hand device to account for many difficult circumstances. Sometimes it is regarded as the portal through which one must pass in order to 'qualify' for psychotherapeutic attention. Often it is regarded as a heightened way of experiencing (even when expressed negatively as in 'rock bottom'). Psychopharmacology approaches this 'pressure' palliatively in the form of chemical alleviation, in which the recipient receives 'something' that disencumbers him or her. The weight of the situation is regarded as exceptional and unique (for which, typically, the individual is not equipped). That clients should be 'under stress' as they enter psychotherapy becomes the very *raison d'être* for that encounter. Certainly, there is an understanding that something is 'causing' the stressful circumstance and that this 'something' is susceptible to being described. The client, typically, is able to do just this and the therapist's ability to demonstrate his or her plasticity in entering this description, is regarded as a benchmark of therapeutic competence. Nevertheless, from a Heideggerian perspective:

*'Stress is always oriented toward a particular situation, that is, toward the particular, factual being-in-the-world where the human being, as existing, does not step into occasionally from time to time but, on the contrary, where he essentially and constantly **always is**.'*<sup>82</sup>

From this perspective, 'stress' is the continuous unbroken situation inherent upon Dasein's being-in-the-world. It is not exceptional. Heidegger's Burghölzli drawing of Dasein's 'invisible, intangible capacities for receiving-perceiving what it encounters and what addresses it'<sup>83</sup> draws attention to Dasein's *Offenständigkeit*, its standing-

open to whatever is to 'come on'. Because Dasein is never closed off and unable to set up pre-conditions for its own openness; it can never be otherwise that that entity upon which unremitting demands are made. It is also that entity that cannot choose its own existence. Dasein has been 'thrown' into existence an existence that has definite existential 'features':

*'Stress means to have a claim made on oneself and to be burdened.'*<sup>84</sup>

To be burdened is to be Dasein. Dasein cannot be otherwise than burdened. 'Stress' is the term for Dasein's unavoidably being burdened. When a client reports being 'stressed' they are reporting an existential feature of Dasein itself and **not** upon an exceptional circumstance. A question arises, 'If Dasein were not burdened by its encountering would there be an homogenised and undifferentiated reception of whatever is to 'come on'?' Dasein's *Offenständigkeit* points towards a capacity of being-in-the-world in which it accurately becomes burdened by the differentiated nature of encountering:

*'The human being could not live without this being addressed. "Stress" is something that preserves "life" in the sense of being addressed. As long as we think of the human being as a world-less Ego, the necessity of stress for life cannot be made intelligible. Thus understood, this being burdened—the stress—belongs to the essential constitution of the existing human being.'*<sup>85</sup>

Dasein is not 'a world-less Ego' but is immersed as being-in-the-world in such a way that it becomes burdened by being absorbed 'an absorption in being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity.'<sup>86</sup> Already, in Chapter Two, Dasein positively lives out its inauthenticity within *das Man* and its 'falling' from possible authenticity is an alienating condition pointing towards a burdening which manifests as 'a tranquillity for which everything is 'in the best of order' and all doors are open.'<sup>87</sup>

*'However, this tranquillity in inauthentic being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one into uninhibited 'hustle'. Being-fallen into the 'world' does not now somehow come to rest. The tempting tranquillisation **aggravates** the falling.'*<sup>88</sup>

Absorption for Dasein is an unavoidable existential spiralling which intensifies its own impact. The more Dasein turns toward the tranquilising blandishments of *das Man* (for relief from its existential burdening) the more the weightiness increases and forms the bulk of the presenting 'stress'. The challenge for the counsellor is to

recognise the paradoxical presentations thrown up by these existentials. Tranquilised Dasein is burdened Dasein. Tranquilised Dasein is alienated Dasein. Tranquilised Dasein is manic Dasein. The challenge is to recognise paradox as a pathway to uncovering Dasein's unique being-in-the-world:

*'...alienation cannot mean that Dasein gets factually torn away from itself. On the contrary, this alienation drives it into a kind of Being which borders on the most exaggerated 'self-dissection', tempting itself with all possibilities of explanation...This alienation **closes off** Dasein from its authenticity and possibility...The alienation of falling—at once tempting and tranquilising—leads by its own movement to Dasein's getting **entangled** in itself.'*<sup>89</sup>

If some of the key notions are prefixed by the word 'being' a more existential-phenomenological perspective is allowed to emerge. Being stressed. Being burdened. Being tranquilised. Being self-dissecting. Being alienated. Being entangled. Being closed-off. Three questions now arise; 'Are counselling and psychotherapy distinctive modes of Dasein's receiving relief?' 'Can counselling and psychotherapy mimic the tempting tranquilising of *das Man*?' 'Do counselling and psychotherapy have the capacity to exacerbate Dasein's inauthenticity?' Perhaps, at this point, an earlier argument needs bringing to mind. For the counsellor there is a calling to something extremely difficult and unfamiliar (an authentic relating) which:

*'...can only happen when the investigator has experienced himself as Dasein,[my emboldening] as ek-sisting, and when all human reality is determined **from there**. The elimination and avoidance of inappropriate representations about this being, the human being, is only possible when the practice of experiencing being human as Dasein has been successful and when it is illuminating any investigation of the healthy or sick human being in advance.'*<sup>90</sup>

Although counselling can be regarded as a classical form of 'unburdening' (one within which professionally trained 'Unburdeners' practise) nonetheless, such 'unburdening' **does not** equate to 'being unburdened' when viewed from a Heideggarian perspective. What then would such a therapist be expecting as an 'outcome'? How would he or she interpret their 'purpose' as a practitioner Again, this exposes a danger of metaphorical thinking. Psycho-therapy, or 'soul-healing', suggests a remedially curative outcome as a consequence of unburdening oneself from an oppressive weight. Any personal transformation (consequent upon psycho-therapeutic practice) is rarely viewed as the replacing of one burden with another. Conventionally, it is viewed as an **absence** which is replaced with beneficially integrated psychic material allowing the client to 'let go' and 'move on' into a



different way of living. But, within the difficult and unfamiliar ‘extreme-minimum’ of Dasein as Dasein:

*‘Relief is not merely a negation of the way of being-claimed **in the sense that any claim is dropped**. Rather, it is another (and even distinctive) way of being addressed.’<sup>91</sup> [my emboldening].*

From a Heideggarian perspective, the notion that ‘any claim is dropped’ is crucial to understanding that ‘unburdening’ is **the replacing of one burden with another**:

*‘Unburdening is possible within and on the ground of always being-claimed.’<sup>92</sup>*

The stressful claim that Dasein’s being-in-the-world makes, never goes away. The possibility of a stress-free dimension is simply non-existent and consequently the psycho-therapeutic encounter never serves to move a client into where he or she remains unclaimed. To repeat, from a Heideggarian perspective, the notion that ‘any claim is dropped’ is crucial to understanding that ‘unburdening’ is always the replacing of one burden with another. The sources of ‘stress’ objectified as ‘causes’ takes away Dasein’s inherent capacity to be claimed as other than a simple receiver of stimuli. The tracking of ‘causes’ in psychotherapeutic encounters encourage both therapist and client to set off upon historical quests to discover where the treasure is **already** lying. When it is found, the client receives an array of appropriate therapeutic options to ‘cope’ (in one way or another) with the new found reason. Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is never a passive receiver of worldly stimuli. The semi-circles in Heidegger’s Burghölzli drawing are not satellite dishes pointed, from a fixed position, at some distant star. The world does not transmit on fixed wavelengths to which Dasein tunes in. The matter of whether an individual is open to his or her genuine possibilities (or closed off from them) exposes the nature of the claim made upon him or her. Dasein as ‘being-there’ always responds from that ‘there’. Who we are **changes** the claim. The claim changes in relation to who we are as being-in-the-world. Earlier, it was said that ‘the whole self can never be realised in one moment’.<sup>93</sup> The attempt to ‘get to the root of the matter’ (by finding the ‘cause’) ‘draws time to a standstill’ by manoeuvring Dasein’s selfhood into a fixed position so that the whole self **can** be realised in one moment. Once the position is fixed a safe and secure point is established from which to navigate. Heidegger gives a clear example of Dasein’s inherent lack of fixity:

*'Plügge hears the noisy children, but they do not disturb him because he lets them be **his** children, because he is with them as his own children in his domestic world. On the contrary, the neighbour's "girls" disturb him because he does not put up with their noisy playing. If he would let the girls play like children as well, it would be impossible for them to disturb and annoy him. **Because he does not respond to their being children, they make a claim on him.**'*<sup>94</sup> [my emboldening]

Earlier, it was said that the recurring phrase 'Dasein as Dasein', cumbersome though it may be, serves to nail down the **unavoidability** of an authentic relating (in all its difficulty and unfamiliarity) if one is ever to let the other 'be'. The challenge in letting the other 'be' is in eschewing any notion of human existence as simply another occurrence of something present-at-hand. Plügge lets his own children 'be' but he does not let his neighbour's children 'be'. The neighbour's children stop being children at all and collapse into being present-at-hand as mere annoying noisy stimuli:

*'It becomes clear from this that the claim (as appropriately understood "stress") must be measured by entirely different standards, that is, by the way and manner in which we respond (and in which we are able to respond) to a claim in advance—the way in which our existing relationship to the world, to other human beings, and to ourselves is determined.'*<sup>95</sup>

For Heidegger, the inherent weightiness of human existence and its unavoidable pressure is revealed when temporarily lifted. For him it is that way round, 'a mood of elation can alleviate the manifest burden of Being; that such a mood is possible also discloses the burdensome character of Dasein, even while it alleviates the burden.'

<sup>96</sup>Thinking 'about' being burdened is less disclosive to Dasein than the mood that discloses. For him, there are significant restrictions on Dasein in 'thinking about' itself as a pathway to self disclosure:

*'The possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods, in which Dasein is brought before its Being as "there".'*<sup>97</sup>

In other words, Dasein does not have to first 'report' on itself in order to interpret itself. This limitation is a major factor in the matter of personal transformation and the way therapy is approached within psychotherapeutic encounters. The disclosive power of 'mood' may be overlooked by the counsellor in favour of a cognition that 'looks backwards' (whilst failing to notice that this latter process is a secondary one). The client, the counsellor, the student-counsellor may give priority to conceptual understandings of themselves whilst forgetting that 'the human being's being-open to

being is so fundamental and decisive in being human that, due to its inconspicuousness and plainness, one can continuously overlook it in favour of contrived psychological theories.’<sup>98</sup> The inconspicuousness of Dasein’s moods arises from their plain existence (in being there all the time). For Dasein, there is no such thing as not being in a mood. Is it the therapist’s task therefore, to track down the ‘cause’ of moods in order to uncover their hidden origins and thereby discover the ‘reason’ for mood’s purpose and existence?

As indicated within Chapter Two and Chapter Four, the calculative stance ‘that which can be calculated in advance and that which is measurable—only that is real’<sup>99</sup> becomes the ‘default’ standpoint of cognitively based therapeutic approaches. This stance underpins many assumptions regarding the nature of human being. It underlies the ways those assumptions determine, for example, how therapy might be offered. Anyone turning the pages of an influential publication such as DSM 1V<sup>100</sup>, will be offered ample examples of psychopathology in which criteria set up clinical disorders into types and subtypes together with diagnostic features and symptomology. This publication, widely regarded as the ‘bible’ of psychiatric practice, embodies a definition of ‘mental disorder’, one that is widely assented to and which enjoins how psychiatrists relate to their patients. It is quoted here, first because of its significant status and second as foil to the position argued for within this dissertation:

*‘...each of the mental disorders is conceptualised as a clinically significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. In addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved one. Whatever its cause, it must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the individual.’<sup>101</sup>*

And, lest any accusation that its system of classification might be construed as referring to people as such, it goes on:

*‘A common misconception is that a classification of mental disorders classifies people, when actually what are being classified are disorders that people have.’<sup>102</sup>*

There are many challenges offered to the psychotherapist through the primordially disclosive nature of moods (not least through mood’s resistance to classification).

That they **ARE** primordially disclosive, indicates their significance in the experiencing of personal transformations and ‘how one is’ within psychotherapy. Unfortunately, their evasion to taxonomy makes it difficult for them to be written ‘about’ as something useful. Earlier it was stated that:

*‘The most useful is the useless...to experience the useless is the most difficult undertaking for contemporary man. Thereby, what is “useful” is understood as what can be applied practically, as what serves an immediate technical purpose, as what produces some effect, and as that with which I can operate economically and productively.’<sup>103</sup>*

To embrace the primordial disclosiveness of Dasein’s moods is to accept that they disclose without any filtering intervention. Their immediacy **disallows** any pre-cognition of what might or might not be the case. The plainness of their existence (though never capable of being overridden *per se*) commonly results in their being set aside in preference to ensuing cognitive conclusions. Nor is it simply their plainness. When something is ‘the thing itself’ (without reference to anything else) it can resemble ‘tangling with a ghost’ and evade the concreteness that reification employs. Although Dasein is primordially disclosed by its moods, it does not signify that Dasein is ‘lost’ in them:

*‘Factically, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of volition and cognition.’<sup>104</sup>*

This ‘priority of volition and cognition’ is not Heidegger’s opt-out clause (though doubtless it would find favour within CBT), for it is tagged with a strict caveat:

*‘...we must not be misled by this into denying that ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself **prior to** all cognition and volition, and **beyond** their range of disclosure.’<sup>105</sup>*

This disclosure (prior to all cognition and volition) is not lightly to be set aside within the therapeutic encounter. Its importance lies in the comprehensive inclusiveness whereby Dasein becomes disclosed to itself. Nor must it be forgotten that Dasein, as that unitary phenomenon as being-in-the-world, becomes **world-disclosive** in its moods. Perhaps it is challenging to counsellors and psychotherapists to have the ‘psyche’ in ‘psychotherapy’ underplayed by this mundane inclusion. Nevertheless, the orientation of this approach stabilises around the difficult and unfamiliar conditions entailed in relating to Dasein as Dasein and in the rejection of the ‘useful’ (as outlined above):

*'Having a mood is not related to the psychical in the first instance, and is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts its mark on things and persons.'*<sup>106</sup>

Is psychotherapy fascinated by the glamour of psyche? Does the term 'being-in-the-world' still suggest 'a human being within an environment'? Is the psychotherapist essentially in relation to 'an inner condition which then reaches forth'? It has been an intention of this research project to expose some consequences of Dasein as a unitary phenomenon. In reviewing the literature for Chapter One I found little evidence of that unity being recognised. Personal transformation still appeared as a private inner matter that might or might not lead to 'growth' or 'development'. World and human being seemed separated. Even the notion of a client's 'world' appeared as a conditionable state susceptible to modification or, alternatively, as a personal psychically historical sphere. Much space has been given, within this dissertation, to the notion of *das Man*. If it is the case that Dasein's everyday selfhood 'is itself the existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the 'world' and lets the 'world' "matter" to it in such a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self'<sup>107</sup> and if *das Man* is primarily constitutive of that 'surrender', is it the task of the psychotherapist to assuage Dasein's submission? If the answer is 'yes' then an embracing of consequences seems unavoidable. To be in relation with Dasein as Dasein, the counsellor/psychotherapist must first be Dasein as Dasein. This is not a technical requirement fulfilled along the lines of, 'I'm human already so I'm already well qualified'. To be Dasein as Dasein one must **not** be in total surrender to *das Man* **but also** be he or she **not separated** as a consequence. As has been seen in Chapter Two, this is not a matter of willed volition. To be Dasein as Dasein the therapist must be resolute, but this:

*'...resoluteness indeed has no content. It modifies our **understanding** of world, others, and ourselves, but this modification is merely formal. In view of it the world does not become other in its 'content'... Resolute Dasein does not withdraw from the world to float above it. On the contrary it is "nothing other than **authentically being-in-the-world**."*<sup>108</sup>

The therapist does not model 'authentically-being-in-the-world', he or she **is** it. This is the blunt consequence of an 'extreme-minimum'.



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> See BT p 223 "Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein by the way things have been publicly interpreted, so much so, indeed, that it gets interpreted as a way of "ascending" and "living concretely."<sup>1</sup> [my underlining].

<sup>2</sup> See WIM P101 "The receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety oppresses us . We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this "no hold on things" comes over us and remains. Anxiety reveals the nothing." [my underlining].

<sup>3</sup> See WIM P101 "Anxiety robs us of speech. Because beings as a whole slip away, so that just the nothing crowds around, in the face of anxiety all utterance of the "is" falls silent." [my underlining].

<sup>4</sup> See BT p 222 "the supposition ... that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine "life", brings Dasein a tranquillity, for which everything is "in the best of order" and all doors are open. ... however this tranquillity in inauthentic being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one into an inhibited "hustle". ... versatile curiosity and restlessly "knowing it all" masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. [my underlining].

<sup>5</sup> See BT p.233 "In anxiety one feels "uncanny". Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the "nothing and nowhere" ... here "uncanniness" also means "not-being-at-home." [my underlining].

<sup>6</sup> See BT p 294 "Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is ones ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped. As such, death is something distinctively impending .[my underlining].

<sup>7</sup> See BT p 231. "...when something threatening brings itself close, anxiety does not "see" any definite "here" or "yonder" from which it comes. That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterised by the fact that what threatens is nowhere. Anxiety "does not know" what that in the face of which it is anxious is. ... it is already "there", and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet it is nowhere." [my underlining].

<sup>8</sup> See BT p 320 "... the call is precisely something which *we ourselves* have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. "It" calls against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from me and it yet from beyond me." [my underlining].

<sup>9</sup> See WIM p 106 "Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping. Its breath quivers perpetually through Dasein, only slightly in those who are jittery, imperceptibly in the "oh yes" and of the "oh no" of men of affairs; but most readily in the reserved, and most assuredly in those who are basically daring. ... the anxiety of those who are daring cannot be opposed to joy or even to the comfortable enjoyment of tranquillised bustle. It stands -- outside all such opposition -- in secret and alliance with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing." [my underlining].

<sup>10</sup> See de Beistegui, M. (2005) p11 " Paradoxically, by suspending my relation to anything concrete in the world, by neutralising the world as the task at hand, or as the local situation in which I usually find myself, and with which I must deal, my dream had brought me face to face with myself as this being that is irreducibly in and of the world, as the being to which worldliness belongs essentially. ... what traumatised me was in fact the opposite of what I had initially taken it to be, namely, a loss: it was the experience of an excess, an irreducible residue, and the uncanny sense of coming face-to-face with my own being. What my dream had uncovered was that phenomenon of world itself, as the extent to which I do not exist independently of it." [my underlining].

<sup>11</sup> See WIM p104 "... we usually lose ourselves altogether among beings in a certain way. The more we turn towards beings in our preoccupations the less we let beings as a whole slip away as such and



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the more we turn away from the nothing. Just as surely do we hasten into the public superficialities of existence, and yet this constant if ambiguous turning away from the nothing accords, within certain limits, with the most proper significance of the nothing." [my underlining].

<sup>12</sup> See BT pp 286, 288. "In Dasein there is undeniably a constant "lack of totality" which finds an ending with death. This "not-yet" belongs to Dasein as long as it is ... The ripening fruit, however, not only is not indifferent to its own ripeness as something other than itself, but it is that unripeness as it ripens. The "not-yet" has already been included in the very being of the fruit, not as some random characteristic, but as something constitutive. Correspondingly, as long as any Dasein is, it is too is already its "not-yet"." [my underlining].

<sup>13</sup> See Oxford Thesaurus of English, second edition, 2004 page 714. "durability, persistence, permanency, fixity, changelessness, endurance, constancy, continuance, continuity, immortality, indestructibility, perpetuity, endlessness, everlastingness, imperishability, unchangeability."

<sup>14</sup> See BT pp 213, 214. and also 4 above. "Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own. If this were done, idle talk would founder; and it already guards against such a danger ... idle talk discourages any new inquiry and any disputation, and in a curious way suppresses them and hold them back ... when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk it is ... cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-being towards the world." [my underlining].

<sup>15</sup> See Thiele, Leslie Paul (1995) pp55,56. "social life is indeed anchored in convention, and Heidegger readily acknowledges its ubiquity and indispensable utility. But social convention is simply an unavoidable game soliciting participation, not a jealous God demanding unthinking fidelity ... being authentic means thinking and acting with awareness that human being, as thrown being-in-the-world, is both a contingent being without stable foundations and a being-with-others whose meanings are always co-discoveries. Far from requiring that one close oneself off from the shared world, authenticity solicits one to inhabit this world self-consciously, to acknowledge the social constitution of human being while at the same time refusing to become lost in the dominant modes of coping that inhibit its ontological reflection." [my underlining].

<sup>16</sup> See BPP. P 165. "World is not something subsequent that we calculate as a result from the sum of all beings. The world comes not afterward but beforehand, in the strict sense of the word. Beforehand: that which is unveiled and understood already in advance in every existent Dasein before any apprehending of this or that being, beforehand as that which stands forth as always already unveiled to us. The world as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact specifically occupy ourselves with it, or apprehended it, but instead it is so self-evident, so much a matter of course, that we are completely oblivious of it. World is that which is already previously unveiled and from which we return to the beings with which we have to do and are among which we dwell. We are able to come up against intraworldly beings solely because, as existing beings, we are always already in a world." [my underlining].

<sup>17</sup> See de Beistegui, M. (2005) p 11 "... the absence of familiar objects and beings, or the dissolution into nothingness of the things I had learned to rely on over the years as an extension of myself and had invested with my emotions, my hopes and desires, my habits, how, in other words, the lack of anything -- no matter how fantastical -- to relate to, had the mysterious power of revealing myself to myself, of bringing to the fore the very worldliness that is normally covered over in my everyday dealings. By depriving me of anything familiar, and so by revealing myself as a stranger to myself, my dream had uncovered an essential trait of my being, if not its basic truth, namely, the fact that this being that I am cannot be disassociated from the world that surrounds it." [my underlining].

<sup>18</sup> See BT p 322 "the call does not report events; it calls without uttering anything. The call discourses in the uncanny mode of *keeping silent* ... it does not call him into the public idle talk of the "they", but *calls him back* from this into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-being. When the caller reaches him to whom the appeal is made, it does so with a cold assurance which is uncanny but by no means obvious ... what is it that so radically deprives Dasein of the possibility of misunderstanding itself by any sort of alibi and failing to recognise itself, if not the forsakenness with which it has been abandoned to itself. Uncanniness is the basic kind of being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday

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way it has been covered up. ... the call of conscience, existentially understood, makes known for the first time ... that uncanniness pursues Dasein and is a threat to the lostness in which it has forgotten itself." [my underlining].

<sup>19</sup>(Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, The Inferno, Canto 1, [Trans.] E.M.Shaw, (1914).

<sup>20</sup> See BT p.231 "The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the "nothing and nowhere", does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this insignificance of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself." [my underlining].

<sup>21</sup> See PLT p.208 "Poetry proper is never merely a higher mode of everyday language. It is rather the reverse: everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any longer....If attention is fastened exclusively on human speech, if human speech is taken simply to be the voicing of the inner man, if speech so conceived is regarded as language itself, then the nature of language can never appear as anything but an expression and an activity of man." [my underlining].  
See also BT p.208. "Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say -- that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. In that case one's reticence makes as something manifest and does away with "idle-talk". As a mode of discoursing, reticence articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial and manner that it gives rise to a potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a being-with-one-another which is transparent." [my underlining].

<sup>22</sup> See BPP. P 160. ". When we say the factual Dasein understands itself, its own self, from the things with which it is daily concerned, we should not rest this on some fabricated concept of soul, person, and ego but must see in what self understanding the factual Dasein moves in its everyday existence ... First and mostly, we take ourselves much as daily life prompts; we do not dissect and rack our brains about some soul-life ... On the contrary, this everyday having of self within our factual, existent, passionate merging into things can surely be genuine, whereas all extravagant grubbing about in one's soul can be in the highest degree counterfeit or even pathologically eccentric." [my underlining].

<sup>23</sup> MFL, 1992 (1978) pp. 136,137.

<sup>24</sup> BT. 1995 (1927). P. 75.

<sup>25</sup> (ZOLL 2001, (1987) p.107.)

<sup>26</sup> See BT p.78. [A] "Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as a condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible ... but these are both ways in which Dasein's Being takes on a definite character, and they must be seen and understood *a priori* as grounded upon that state of Being which we have called "*Being-in-the-world*". "Being-in-the-world" indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a *unitary phenomenon*." [my underlining].

[B] Heidegger makes a clear distinction between "being in" as in the case of water being in a glass, or a garment being in a cupboard, which refers to objects specifically located in space, and the particular "being-in" of Dasein. This latter being-in, is not a category which expresses notions of containing or being contained, but is a "state of Dasein's Being". That which can be categorised as being contained or containing, Heidegger identifies as being present-at-hand, in a manner similar to that of objects, equipment and things. The former he describes as categorial and the latter existential. Dreyfus (1991) p 43 identifies the categorial sense of "in" as spatial inclusion, characterised by "indifference" ("she is in the house." "the university is in the city") and the existential sense of personal involvement, characterised by "concern" ("he is in love." "She is in a good mood". "He is in business").  
Hence, "being-in-the-world" is always characterised by care and concern, never by indifference, and is not a category.

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<sup>27</sup> Shakespeare. *Macbeth*. Macbeth to First Murderer, Act iii scene iv.

<sup>28</sup> (Descartes, René (1965) (1637).p.27)

<sup>29</sup> See BT p. 90. "...a world does not get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world." [my underlining].

<sup>30</sup> (ZOLL 2001, (1987) .p3.).

<sup>31</sup> (Descartes, René (1637) (1965) p.27).

<sup>32</sup> See BT p.84. "Being-in is not a "property" which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and *without* which it could *be* just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that man "is" and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-being towards the "world" -- a world with which he provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never "proximally" an entity which is, so to speak free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a "relationship" towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of Being does not arise just because some entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can "meet up with" Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show it self within a world." [my underlining].

<sup>33</sup> ZOLL (2001) p.3.

<sup>34</sup> (de Beistegui, M. (2005) p12.).

<sup>36</sup> "The world is thus known, for Heidegger not through the plenitude of forms it presents but through the breaks and emptinesses which occasionally intervene in its smooth functioning...but these breaks and emptinesses...are not gathering forces which themselves shape world but simply checks, privations of function which occasion the wider awareness of involvement. The involvement they reveal is not gathered and shaped by them but is already there. [my underlining].  
McCumber, John. (1999). pp. 221-222.

<sup>37</sup> de Beistegui, M. (2005) p21.

<sup>38</sup> See BT. pp. 303-304 "our everyday falling evasion *in the face of* death is an *inauthentic* being-towards-death. But inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity. Inauthenticity characterises a kind of being into which Dasein can divert itself and has for the most part always diverted itself; but Dasein does not necessarily and constantly have to divert itself into this kind of being. Because Dasein exists, it determines its own character as the kind of entity it is, and it does so in every case in terms of a possibility which it itself *is*, and which it understands." [my underlining. my emboldening].

<sup>39</sup> McCumber, John. (1999). pp. 221-222.

<sup>40</sup> McCumber, John. (1999). pp. 221-222

<sup>41</sup> See BT. pp. 387-388. "In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one's closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That *Present* which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is *authentic* itself, we call the "moment of vision" ... the moment of vision is a phenomenon which *in principle* can *not* be clarified in terms of the "*now*" ... "In the moment of vision" nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-towards, the moment of vision permits us *to encounter for the first time* what can be "in a time" as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand." [my underlining].

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<sup>42</sup> For an exploration and interpretation of a private counselling practice, from an Heideggarian perspective, (using an exclusively philosophical approach), see Ellis, Randolph J.K. (1996) *Dasein: Death, Finitude and Inauthenticity: Existential Presentations Within A Private Counselling Practice* M.Ed. Thesis, School of Education, University of Wales, Bangor.  
No. b1344843.

<sup>43</sup> These statements have been reconstructed from actual comments and 'feedback', over a number of years, from cohorts of counsellor-students. The intention in including them here is to retain the reality of the comments both in their typicality and in the unique tone each student makes.

<sup>44</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.4.

<sup>45</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.81.

<sup>46</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.82.

<sup>47</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.19.

<sup>48</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.20.

<sup>49</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.19.

<sup>50</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.223.

<sup>51</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.157.

<sup>52</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.223.

<sup>53</sup> Heidegger, Martin, (1994) (2006) *Zollokiner Seminare* Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, p.219

<sup>54</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.174.

<sup>55</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), pp.216-217.

<sup>56</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.217.

<sup>57</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.215.

<sup>58</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.157.

<sup>59</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.157.

<sup>60</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.158.

<sup>61</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), pp.159-160.

<sup>62</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.4.

<sup>63</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.4.

<sup>64</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.4.

<sup>65</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.164.

<sup>66</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.164.

<sup>67</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.164.

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- <sup>68</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.164.
- <sup>69</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.164.
- <sup>70</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.13.
- <sup>71</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.74.
- <sup>72</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.82.
- <sup>73</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.4.
- <sup>74</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.175.
- <sup>75</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.175.
- <sup>76</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.175.
- <sup>77</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.175.
- <sup>78</sup> BT. p.366.
- <sup>79</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.175.
- <sup>80</sup> BT. p.365.
- <sup>81</sup> Borgman, Albert, (2000), p.69.
- <sup>82</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.138.
- <sup>83</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.4.
- <sup>84</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.137.
- <sup>85</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.137.
- <sup>86</sup> BT. p.220.
- <sup>87</sup> BT. p.222.
- <sup>88</sup> BT. p.222.
- <sup>89</sup> BT. p.222-223.
- <sup>90</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.223.
- <sup>91</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.143.
- <sup>92</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.143.
- <sup>93</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.175.
- <sup>94</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), pp.142-143.
- <sup>95</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.143.
- <sup>96</sup> BT. p.173.

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<sup>97</sup> BT. p.173.

<sup>98</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.74.

<sup>99</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), p.19.

<sup>100</sup> *Diagnostic And Statistical Manual Of Mental Disorders* [4<sup>th</sup>, Edition] (2000), Washington, DC: The American Psychiatric Association.

<sup>101</sup> DSM IV, p.xxxi.

<sup>102</sup> DSM IV, p.xxxi.

<sup>103</sup> ZOLL 2001, (1987), pp.159-160.

<sup>104</sup> BT. p.175.

<sup>105</sup> BT. p.175.

<sup>106</sup> BT. p.176.

<sup>107</sup> BT. p.178.

<sup>108</sup> Haar, Michel (1993) p. 28.



## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION

The aim of this research project has been to explore how human-being becomes personally transformed and to view that exploration primarily through a particular philosophical lens, namely that of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Throughout this dissertation a specific understanding of human-being has been adhered to, one that I have used to explicate the multifarious ways in which transformation is experienced and the powerful formative influences that render that experience as either authentic or inauthentic. It has been demonstrated that human-being is mostly inauthentic in its comportment towards itself, toward the world and toward others, particularly in its engagement with everyday discourse, a discourse which, on the one hand has been explicated as that which enables life to become averagely intelligible and on the other, as that which perpetuates in human-beings their modes of inauthenticity. In addition, attention has been paid to a predominant 'social'/'technological' paradigm within which human-being finds itself subsumed and to which personal transformations are conformed. It has been shown that this latter paradigm is unavoidable for human-being and that its ubiquitous totalising influence also possesses the capacity to conceal itself.

Notions of 'concealment' have been present within this dissertation, as elements more implicit than explicit but not, it is argued, less significant for that. The average everyday way of comportment in which human-being deals with existence predisposes a mode of transformation which is predominantly inauthentic and which diverts human-being away from its genuine possibilities. This comportment has been shown to be mostly hidden from human-being (by the very generality of its prevailing presence) and by the way in which it works as the common mode within which ordinary existence is rendered meaningful.

Again, an element more implicit than explicit within this dissertation, has been the way in which human-being may experience personal transformation as a mere re-cycling of inauthentic modes of being, a re-cycling within which human-being may come to assume that a mere alteration from one novel state to another, signifies a shift into and towards its own genuine transformational possibilities. In addition, it has been shown that human-being may experience its own personal transformation in terms of 'lack', in that the world is interpreted

as deficient in addressing genuine possibilities and that within that deficiency, human-being experiences its own personal transformations as 'hankering' and 'wishing' over whatever comes to hand as possible and attainable. Importantly, the inauthenticity of that transformation, it has been argued, is mostly concealed to human-being.

A matter that has been brought to the fore consistently, within this project, is the demonstration that human-being and world are a unitary entity and that the two cannot be rendered asunder without the utmost violence. I have attempted, at several points, to compare and contrast this view with the more generally prevailing one, in which world is posited as that which is over and against human-being (as subject) with world as examinable object that can be treated as an available raw resource.

An attempt has been made, within this work, to make explicit the powerful 'forces' that limit and constrain genuine personal transformation within human-being, 'forces' that must always be taken into account whenever matters of personal transformation are to be considered. I have been at pains to keep this latter issue to the fore, in part to avoid allocating a 'psychologising' explication to what might appear as differing 'psychic' states of consciousness.

A major aim has been to demonstrate the difficulties human-being undergoes in attempting to turn towards its genuine possibilities and in attempting to experience its own personal transformations. Many obstacles lie in its way and many divergent pathways take it not only back into a prior condition, but into numerous cul-de-sacs that lead nowhere. In addition, I have sought to emphasise that the ways to genuine transformation are not primarily epistemological but lie in the human-being's readiness to respond to the implications of its own finitude and to allow itself to be addressed by these.

A recurring theme, both implicit and explicit, has been the rejection of human-being as a foundationally secure entity, an entity that can rely upon this 'foundation' to further its prospects as one genuinely to be transformed. Attention has been repeatedly drawn to the 'nullity' at the heart of human-being, a nullity that is registered not only in human-being's abiding mortality and finitude but in its repeated forsaking of the myriad routes to its own personal authenticity (its own 'would-be' lives). A prominent feature in this latter abandonment has been the manner in which human-being allows its possibilities to be

subsumed under and within a particular generality of being, a generality that human-being then adopts as its **own** possibility.

This project has consistently undermined, not only explicitly but also implicitly, the notion (and the metaphor) of human-being as having foundations. It has rejected the picture of human life as being akin to a building, substantially present, enduring and (possibly) permanent, in favour of one in which the picture of such foundationality has been abandoned in favour of human-beings openness to its own futural genuine possibilities. In this latter sense, human-being has been revealed as inherently transcendent and not at all 'foundational' in that it is **already** ahead of itself (and that this being ahead of itself and constantly reaching out is what is constitutive of its having a 'self'). In other words, 'selfhood', as explicated within this dissertation, is not that which lies upon any previously laid foundations but upon this insubstantially unique orientation of itself outwards.

From the beginning, it has been a major intention to follow Heidegger in asserting that whenever human-being is being considered it is always 'we ourselves' who are under consideration. This pathway has been followed in order, not only to remain within the notion of human-being as a unitary entity, but also to emphasise that human-being is always 'who' and not 'what' and that as 'who' it is always 'my' possibilities I am open to.

Another intention has been to undermine notions of intentional sociability and empathic capacity as being the primary pathways to being with other human-beings. I have followed Heidegger in asserting that human-being is always 'being-with' (other human-being) even when completely alone and that this 'being-with' has nothing to do with any stance that might be struck up by any individual. An intention here has been to emphasise that in 'being-with', a recognition is being assumed namely, that others are **as** oneself and that therefore in encountering the others 'we' are encountering a 'who' and not a 'what'. In that encountering, it has been argued, we are precluded from considering the others either as just other objects occurring within the world or as handy and manipulable tools for our use.

An attempt has been made, within this dissertation, to demonstrate that human-being has the capacity to turn towards its own genuine possibilities and the capacity to **experience** those possibilities as genuinely transformational. Mostly this transformation is arrived at by human-being taking over its own radical finitude and by living out that 'taking over' within everyday existence. In that 'taking over', it has been shown that human-being becomes resolute in

remaining oriented toward those possibilities and that within that resoluteness becomes empowered to recover itself whenever it loses that resolute orientation.

It has been my intention to show that human-being, by becoming resolutely transformed in taking over its genuine possibilities, not only becomes disclosed to itself as that finite entity which is 'whole' (maybe for the first time) but also becomes that entity which **experiences** itself as such. My personal testimony, within Chapter Five has, it is argued, serves to illustrate the multifarious ways in which radical 'experience' is lived out and the multifarious ways in which radical personal transformation occurs.

In a manner that might be contributive to interpreting the empathic stance/condition a counselling practitioner might take within counselling and psychotherapy, I have followed Heidegger in emphasising the necessity of becoming resolutely transformed oneself as a pre-condition to allowing others to arrive authentically at what they may become. In that resoluteness, I have drawn attention to the way in which a dysfunctional empathic mode may hinder the transformational process by a 'leaping-in' in such a way that the other is deprived of turning towards his/her own finitude, experiencing it as such and being blocked in his/her capacity to become authentically transformed.

By contrast, I have attempted to explicate another empathic mode in which there is a reticent withholding of 'leaping-in' in favour of one that 'leaps-ahead'. In this leaping-ahead, the other is not deprived of his/her responsibility, but remains at liberty to be the one of its genuine possibilities (or the one that remains within the blandishments of its average everydayness). In addition, it has been identified that the silent presence of the one who is resolutely transformed has, through his/her reticent and authentic silence, the capacity to circumvent the blandishments of everyday discourse and allow the other to genuinely discourse.

I have attempted to create a dialogic relationship between two pivotal chapters within this dissertation namely between Chapter Two and Chapter Three. Whereas Chapter Two has attempted to lay out what it is to be human-being (and to form the specific understanding of human-being that has been adhered to here) Chapter Three has explored the ways in which human-being interprets and understands. In that interpretation and understanding, it has been shown that human-being often lays claim to a foundational authority it does not possess.

Within that claim, I have argued, attempts are frequently made to edit out that which must always be presupposed in making an interpretation (and in arriving at an understanding).

Attention has been drawn to the manner in which human-being **already** possesses an understanding, an understanding arising from human-being always being the entity that is **already** being-in-the-world. The dialogic relationship between these two chapters has been brought to the fore in that Chapter Two has laid out ‘who’ human-being is, whilst Chapter Three has shown that human-being is always immersed in a process of interpretation and that personal transformation always takes place within a world **already** interpreted and understood.

A crucial linkage between these two chapters has been forged in the explication of interpretation and understanding as that which occurs within a world immediately, ordinarily and averagely intelligible, a world that, as such, is both crucially **formative** and also radically **limiting** of personal transformation.

A consequence of arguing that human-being is **already** that unitary entity as being-in-the-world (and who already possesses an understanding) has been the acknowledgement of radical immersements in the world (ones from which human-being cannot be severed). In order to highlight these characteristics, I have drawn attention to my own immersion with this research project and have laid out within Chapter Three and Chapter Five, the features of that immersion (and its significance in relation to the genesis and conduct of the project). In particular, I have attempted to incorporate elements of that immersion within an example of the hermeneutic process of interpretation and understanding.

The intention in placing this example within Chapter Three has been fourfold: to **use** biographical material as the very medium of explication in order to cohere ‘content’ with ‘form’; to explicate the argument that hermeneutic process is the ordinary and everyday mode of human-beings’ interpretation and understanding; to maintain a resonant relationship between the understandings of human-being (as laid out in Chapter Two) with an explication of **how** that entity ordinarily interprets and finally, to employ that hermeneutic as the methodology with this project. A further intention has been to bond together all these elements in such a way that the notion of human-being as that unitary entity finds its way into the very fabric of this dissertation’s construction.



### **What therefore may also be concluded from all the foregoing?:**

It seems to me that authentic personal transformations are not easy for human-being, that they are, in fact, exceptional. Yet, even within its general inauthenticity, human-being is not neglectful of itself, it is always predisposed to care for itself in such a way that this 'caring' is not a specific attitude or stance struck up occasionally, but is of human-being itself.

'Authentic being oneself' is not evidence of human-being's 'care', but it does point towards an ongoing possibility towards which human-being may turn.

It must not be denied that there is much that overlies human-being's attempts to turn towards its authentic possibilities, much that possesses great power to persistently and consistently divert human-being from an orientation towards its own authentic being. Not least is the refusal to accept the consequences of its own radical and mortal finitude, a refusal that goes to the heart of not turning towards itself as **who** it is. In this refusal, it is enabled to engage with a generality that supports and sustains it in its authenticity. This generality cannot take into account the unique individuality of human-being as it actually is (in its being-in-the-world), but must always 'side-step' this in favour of a consensual discourse which not only perpetuates inauthenticity but **relies** upon inauthenticity for its very existence.

As this way of being (and its accompanying discourse) is not only ever-present but also forms the very means by which ordinary everyday life is rendered intelligible and meaningful, it manages to slide into the background by the very prevalence of its existence. Human-being fails to notice this prevalence and in its very striving to become more genuinely itself, may become absorbed more comprehensively within its language, concepts, ways of being, culture, tradition and philosophy. At each point within this absorption, human-being may claim that each novel step marks a radical personal transformation (on the basis that it 'has never been here before'). Yet if this step does not involve an engagement with itself as it is (that is, as radically finite), then no authentic movement has been made.

What has been concluded here is that a genuine turning towards its authentic possibilities is never a slight thing for human-being and rarely a matter of 'choosing' to be this or 'choosing' to be that. In allowing itself to be addressed by its finitude it is empowered to recognise what it is **not**, in favour of **who** it is (and who it may become). But this allowing itself to be so addressed seems to suggest not only a revolutionary overthrowing of an 'embedded',



prevailing, ordinary and everyday way of being, but a turning towards a futurity that has no pre-determined pattern of familiarity.

The passing of the familiar (in which everything has been agreed beforehand), into that which is dynamically transformational, is experienced as alienating, challenging, frightening and usurping of personal relationships. At the 'interface' between the authentic and inauthentic, human-being is enabled to embrace a resoluteness, for it is now empowered to 'see' the difference between the two. Its ability to 'see' is no longer occluded by the familiar and everyday way of interpreting and understanding. In its resoluteness, human-being is not simply in a mode of being determinedly stubborn in a gritty sort of way (as simply an act of volition) but is that entity **who** has already recognised its finitude and is no longer afforded the perennial amnesia offered within the familiar. It may therefore be enabled to 'draw upon' this transformational way of being on those occasions when it will (inevitably) fall back.

It should be stressed that as 'that entity **who** has already recognised its finitude', human-being has not turned towards this as an epistemological item of information, as a something that handily presents itself as labelled 'finitude' or as a subject to be talked 'about'.

Recognition of finitude may present itself under many forms and guises, not least in human-being recognising that it has reached a limit in personal inauthenticity, a limit which may present itself through bereavement, relational abuse or any other 'threshold' moment. The essential move, it would appear, is in human-being's responding to the promptings that finitude proffers (in whatever guise) and not turning back into the blandishments of the conventionally familiar.

But the ambit of the familiar is not alone as that which possesses great power to persistently and consistently divert human-being from an orientation towards its own authentic being, there is another, equally pervasive, and one equally enabled to conceal itself. In its immersion with technology, human-being has retained the notion that technology is a force under its control and available as an optional and handy mode of **technicity**. The sheer prevalence of equipment in its 'hard' and 'weighty' forms of cars, aeroplanes, ships, refrigerators, cutlery, washing-machines and televisions, and in its 'light' forms of computer-software, emails and media-programming, has led human-being to treating all these as discrete phenomena available for use.

It is certainly the case that the weight of technicity is patently present and embraces the ordinary and everyday mode of engagement between human-being and its way of being in the world. Life without equipment would not be recognisable as human life at all in that (for example) the mere covering of the genitals with a fig-leaf, marks an initial step into equipmental existence. It is my conclusion that a general interpretation of technology's presence remains at the level of fig-leaf understanding and that therefore this presence remains in a mode of concealment from human-being.

In a way similar to its immersement within the familiar, human-being finds itself immersed within that which it is unable to control. Technology is already that which elides the concreteness of its products. Technology is, in fact, somewhat transcendent in that it 'steps over' these very artefacts of its creation and points towards its ongoing possibility as that which is utterly transformational. This transcendent transformational possibility is embedded not only within the very 'weighty' objects of production, but directs and conditions the very processes of that production. These artefacts already possess the possibility of their own transformational possibility and already point towards another product, another artefact not yet realised.

The totality of this technological presence, in its transcendence, embraces all as utterly transformational. It is within this totality that human-being finds itself immersed as 'raw-material' 'standing by' as available for use. Two further questions arise. Does the transcendence of the technological presence so closely resemble that of human-being that human-being is unable to 'step back' in order to regard it as something over and against itself? Does this transcendence indicate that the technological presence has a direction and a possibility redolent of human-being itself? Nevertheless, within this immersement only that which is calculable is permitted to have any reality. Only the calculable is allowable, in that the calculable has the capacity to safely predict any outcome and to achieve that outcome in a consistently transformational mode.

Meeting Dasein as Dasein is extremely difficult and unfamiliar (especially within the psychotherapeutic encounter) as it entails throwing off substantialist ways of relating, substantialist ways of thinking and substantialist metaphorical language. The counsellor must prepare for this encounter by becoming Dasein as Dasein (that is personally transformed) to avoid reinforcing their consequences. This is the very minimum required and forms the

‘basal’ line of psychotherapeutic relating. This minimum requirement is also extreme in that it cannot be substituted for by professional training alone nor in assent to a code of practice. That the counsellor/psychotherapist has first to be Dasein as Dasein necessitates that he or she wants no less for his or her client. This imposes a fundamental obligation upon the psychotherapeutic practitioner to remain personally transformed in such a sustained way that the client/counsellor relationship offers a powerful alternative to the blandishments of *das Man*, the controlling dominance of the technological presence and the presuppositions assumed in substantialism.

Human-being has much to contend with in its path towards transformational authenticity. Some never embrace it as a possibility, some never recognise it as such, some remain immersed within the familiar and some fail to identify the manner in which they have become technologically absorbed. Nevertheless, it must be concluded that human-being, in **whatever** mode of being it finds itself within, is always that entity who ‘cares’ and, as such, retains always the possibility of becoming authentically itself.

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