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Posthumanism in Literary Studies: The Nomad and Anthropocentrism

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Posthumanism in Literary Studies: The Nomad and Anthropocentrism

Joseph David Clark

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I develop my criticism of the modern philosophical and literary nomad by establishing its roots in the work of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and, most recently, Rosi Braidotti. I will show how a literary reshaping of the nomad can be used to challenge emerging anthropocentric paradigms which are often explored by dystopian and science fiction literature. As such, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: how can the nomad be used to challenge anthropocentrism?

Over three chapters, the dissertation will set out the characteristics of my literary nomad against the other modern nomads which came before it. The modern nomad has a rich heritage, developing from a figure that was comparable to the flâneur to a state-dismantling apparatus to finally a social commentator. This thesis contributes to this rich history, as in the second part it develops a practical set of tools that the nomad can employ for the literary investigation of spaces, places, and ontologies. Finally, it leads the discussions to the site of the body, which is a key concern of modern nomads, where it will employ the findings of theoretical investigations to literary criticism of the social, political, and cultural contexts in which a nomad may find its body. By the end of this thesis, I aim to show that by revitalising the nomad in the area of literary studies, we can discover new readings of science fiction and dystopian literature and create a theoretical platform through which other literary scholars may engage with the debates that I present through the course of three chapters.

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Declaration

'Yr wyf drwy hyn yn datgan mai canlyniad fy ymchwil fy hun yw'r thesis hwn, ac eithrio lle nodir yn wahanol. Caiff ffynonellau eraill eu cydnabod gan droednodiadau yn rhoi cyfeiriadau eglur. Nid yw sylwedd y gwaith hwn wedi cael ei dderbyn o'r blaen ar gyfer unrhyw radd, ac nid yw'n cael ei gyflwyno ar yr un pryd mewn ymgeisiaeth am unrhyw radd oni bai ei fod, fel y cytunwyd gan y Brifysgol, am gymwysterau deuol cymeradwy.'

Rwy'n cadarnhau fy mod yn cyflwyno'r gwaith gyda chytundeb fy Ngrichwylwr (Goruchwylwr)'

'I hereby declare that this thesis is the results of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. All other sources are acknowledged by bibliographic references. This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree unless, as agreed by the University, for approved dual awards.'

I confirm that I am submitting the work with the agreement of my Supervisor(s)'

Introduction

Posthumanism – A Divided Discipline

Posthumanism refers to the critical perspective that the age of humanism has come to an end. It is premised on the idea that humanism's twin assumptions that humans are both knowable and reasonable is false. It rejects the idea that humans can be known, largely on the grounds that the dividing line between human and non-human or animal is difficult to delineate in the first place and highly permeable too.¹

It has grown into a diverse and influential discipline within the humanities. As a mode of philosophical, critical, and political engagement with our contemporary condition in the twenty-first century, posthumanism analyses our understanding and engagement with other lifeforms and artefacts which are situated within a network of our ontologies.

Posthumanism is at times an epistemological investigation into what we call knowledge and how that knowledge is produced. At other times it is an ontological investigation into the practices and processes connected to our humanity, or posthumanity.

Over the last twenty years this diversity has been particularly noticeable. However, there has been a techno-centric focus in the field which has complicated the field again. This shift towards a techno-centric posthumanism in the aim of furthering human evolution has introduced a new type of anthropocentric thinking into the posthumanities. I call this schism posthuman anthropocentrism, the privileging of posthumans over humans. To begin analysing its effects in literary research, it is first necessary to provide an overview of the field of posthumanism, what these changes imply, what problems they may present for posthuman theorisation and finally how I intend to resolve these issues.

This introduction will pose the following five key questions to guide my investigation: what are the diverse ways in which posthumanism has been theorised? What are the problems caused by the techno-centric theorisation of posthumanism, and how does this introduce

¹ Oxford Reference, 'Posthumanism', 2021
<<https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100339501>> [accessed 6 December 2021].

anthropocentrism into posthumanist discourse? Is there a tool within posthumanism that can address the problems of anthropocentrism in posthumanist writing? Finally, how will explicitly articulating these key concepts make a difference to posthumanism? These questions establish the foundational knowledge required for each chapter to build upon towards the conclusion. Notably, the critical tool within posthumanism which addresses the problem of anthropocentrism will be my figure of the nomad. It will be a recurring theme which will be central to my three literary analyses, one taking place at the end of each of my three chapters.

In question one, I will show how posthumanism is traditionally divided into three main areas of interest. These areas are:

- a. Donna Haraway's relation of humanity to its earthly others such as animals, other humans, and bacteria.²
- b. Rosi Braidotti's exploration of the impact of ideologies on our epistemologies (capitalism, anthropocentrism, bio-politics, ethics, etc.).³
- c. Katherine Hayles' tracing of the developments concerning our mediation with technology such as cyborgism, application to medicine, and the problems that this emerging technology can pose.⁴

Their work exemplifies a healthy and coherent diversity of academic thinking, but it is my contention that it has become increasingly contradicted and marginalised by a growing misconception. This misconception is that posthumanism deals exclusively with the posthuman relation to technology to enhance our lives. The scholars Francis Fukuyama, Andy Miah and Steve Fuller have gained critical acclaim in arguing that posthumanism is solely a techno-centric discipline.⁵ This conception of posthumanism has caused problems for posthumanist scholars for over two decades.

² Donna J. Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press).

³ Rosi Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).

⁴ N. Katherine Hayles, *My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005); N. Katherine Hayles, 'Wrestling with Transhumanism', in *H± Transhumanism and Its Critics*, ed. by Gregory R Hansell and William Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus, 2011).

⁵ Francis Fukuyama, "'Our Posthuman Future" - The New York Times', 2002
<<https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/05/books/chapters/our-posthuman-future.html>> [accessed 12 October 2018]; Andy Miah, 'Posthumanism: A Critical History', in *Medical Enhancements and Posthumanity*, ed. by B.

The second question, with which this thesis engages, concerns the problems caused by the techno-centric theorisation of posthumanism and how it introduces anthropocentrism into posthumanist discourse. It explores how a shift from the traditional three branches of posthumanism to the techno-centric posthumanism causes problems of narrowing the apparent interest of posthumanist studies into a field which is less hospitable to social and literary criticisms. It also risks the re-introduction of anthropocentrism in the form of a posthuman anthropocentrism, which is something that posthumanist scholars originally tried to avoid.

These problems stem from a theorisation of posthumanism that resembles transhumanism (a branch of posthumanist studies that focuses on the benefits of technological enhancement in humans). As I will show later with my discussion of Fuller's article, the result of misrepresenting posthumanism is an inconsistency in the portrayal of interests in the field, followed by an undercutting of objectives of posthumanist studies. The most critically acclaimed cases of mistaken posthumanism that I will discuss here will show how authors are eclipsing the original purpose of posthumanist scholars. This is performed by creating a field which narrows its viewpoint to prioritise techno-centric criticism and dismisses wider concerns.

By returning to the familiar ground of Haraway, Braidotti and Hayles (among others), my aim firstly is to show how this techno-trend in posthumanist studies creates incoherence within the field. It will also reveal how techno-centric discourse hides the human from view, and how this methodology propagates the anthropocentrism that the posthumanities originally sought to challenge. The literary tool is only part of my solution. Literary analysis is an undervalued tool in posthumanist studies. The addition of this application of posthumanism will create a pragmatic referencing tool for posthumanists who aspire to create social critiques using literature as their catalyst. The second under-acknowledged aspect in this field is the nomad. The nomad of the post-war period tends to be a posthuman figure and less of an explorer as in earlier literary representations. Nomads have

Gordijn & R. Chadwick (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 71–94; Steve Fuller, 'The Posthuman and the Transhuman as Alternative Mappings of the Space of Political Possibility', *Journal of Posthuman Studies*, 1.2 (2018), 151 <<https://doi.org/10.5325/jpoststud.1.2.0151>>.

Note: While only Fuller makes this claim explicitly, Fukuyama presents posthumanism a dystopian setting inspired by Huxley's *Brave New World*, Miah, meanwhile centres his focus on the medical applications of technological enhancement, this focus falls clearly within the boundaries of transhuman research.

slowly fallen out of academic interest over the past decade, yet it is the most versatile representation of the sum of posthumanist scholarship. By updating this figure and applying it to literary studies, we can anticipate a way of considering questions of subjectivity, bodily and ideological agency, and deviation from the norm in ways that have previously been limited.

In question three, I will develop this discussion of the nomad, which was re-initiated in the post-war period with Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze likened it to a figure who walks among the Gods, as I will show in Chapter One. It developed with his collaborative work with Félix Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*, into 'the war machine', a violent State-dismantling tool.⁶ Many years later, Braidotti developed this figure further to fight for feminist rights less destructively, but focused on the values of new materialism, which seeks to take apart the human subject to the point where it cannot be put back together again.⁷ My discussion of the nomad will respond to the key contributions of these theorists which taught us to become more incisive and reflective in its approach to social critique. I will show over the course of this thesis how the discussion of nomads may complicate and nuance any theory in which they are implicated, how they combat ideological indoctrination, how they recognise that the human continues to exist and its nature of existence, and finally how essential embodiment is to understanding how to combat anthropocentrism. The nomad helps to challenge techno-centric posthumanism by revealing its anthropocentric disposition. The focus of a posthuman anthropocentrism is to position the post-human as a clean break from the human. At the same time, techno-centric posthumanism is a form of posthumanism which is solely interested in the spectacular aspects of technology. Nomads, as I will show, act as a key locus for critical re-evaluation. Their engagement with the environments around them reveals posthumanist concerns far wider in scope than human and technological enhancements.

In explicitly articulating the problems caused by a purely techno-centric representation of posthumanism, and by orienting the nomadic figure as a literary tool within posthumanism, I hope to promote a return to the original diverse aims that posthumanism once sought to

⁶ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), p. 586.

⁷ Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

address. I will outline these aims in my answer to question one. This move aims to remove the anthropocentrism that has emerged into the discourse and to create a new mode of literary analysis. It also allows me to update the figure of the nomad, which can be used to respond to a variety of different social concerns that traditional criticism cannot owing to its strict borders of theoretical interest, and what the new techno-centric posthumanism has little-to-no interest in addressing. I will answer the key question of how the figure of the nomad can be used to challenge anthropocentric thinking through the medium of literary investigation.

In response to my first question, there have been many texts published which attempt to define posthumanism. Some of the most recent and influential texts have been Haraway's *When Species Meet* (2008), Hayles's *How We Became Posthuman* (1999), and Braidotti's *The Posthuman* (2013).⁸

Haraway reluctantly evokes posthumanism to re-situate humans alongside non-human animals and microscopic non-animal organisms. Her use of posthumanism mainly targets the symbiotic relationship and histories that animals experience alongside humanity. Her book concerns:

Historically situated animals in companionate relations with equally situated humans are, of course, major players in *When Species Meet*. But the category "companion species" is less shapely and more rambunctious than that. Indeed, I find that notion, which is less a category than a pointer to an ongoing "becoming with," to be a much richer web to inhabit than any of the posthumanisms on display after (or in reference to) the ever-deferred demise of man.⁹

Her focus is strictly on the animal-human aspect of the posthuman assemblage of animal-human-technology. The key posthumanist themes running through her work are an historical re-situation of humans, animals, technology and language (as was the case with Karen Barad's 'Posthumanist Performativity').¹⁰ Her work on the companion species suggests that the human body and ideologies are porous, as they adapt to include animals

⁸ Donna J. Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); N. Katherine Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Braidotti, *The Posthuman*.

⁹ Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p. 16.

¹⁰ Karen Barad, 'Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter', *A Feminist Companion to the Posthumanities*, 28.3 (2018), 223–39 (pp. 223–39) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62140-1_19>.

through the sale of luxury animal products or through symbiotically adaptive bodily practices (such as horse riding).

Haraway's work can be divided into two concerns; firstly a feminist posthumanism, which is seen in *A Manifesto for Cyborgs*; and a focus on human situatedness in a network of other organisms, such as within *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, and *When Species Meet*.¹¹ Her work is primarily concerned with the treatment of parties who are on the receiving end of the index of power, or those whose voices are unheard by the majority, such as women who work in sweatshops and animals who are subjects of medical testing and food processing. Her work demonstrates a network of animal and human consumerism that is more complex than it appears on the surface. As such, her thinking touches many points that this thesis addresses both directly and tangentially.

Hayles sets critically a widely recognised standard for innovative posthuman relations with technology. Her definitions of posthumanism are lengthy and diverse, so I will summarise them as briefly as possible. She defines the posthuman subject as diverse in expression as it commonly articulates the union of the human with the intelligent machine.¹² She also argues posthumans have four defining features.

- [Privileging] informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life.
- Considers consciousness, [...] as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow.
- The body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born.
- Configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines.¹³

Hayles' definition focuses on the human-technology aspect of the posthuman assemblage. Not only does this assemblage articulate the posthuman relationship with technology, it

¹¹ Donna J. Haraway, 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs', in *The Routledge Critical and Cultural Theory Reader*, ed. by Neil Badmington and Julia Thomas (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 324–55; Donna J. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. (New York: Routledge, 1991); Haraway, *When Species Meet*.

¹² Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman*, p. 2.

¹³ *Ibid*, pp. 2–3.

translates the body as a technology capable of interfacing with other technologies. Hayles' work has developed over time to encompass two major concerns of posthumanism. Firstly, the relationship between the human and modern and ancient technologies and, thereafter, the importance of embodied subjectivities.

Hayles is a figurehead in the development of posthumanism and technology. Originally, she discussed the development of embodied subjectivity in relation to evolving hardware and software to assault the fantasies of writers such as Hans Moravec, who imagined it would soon be possible to download human consciousness into machines. Since then, her work has developed to encompass literary studies alongside these two fields through textual analyses, which yield unique readings of literary consumption. In Chapter Three, I will show how her work reveals why wider application of literary analysis can offer further understandings of our contemporary condition and track changing social trends through our relationship with different mediums of literature.

Hayles has argued a point that has been little explored in twenty-first century posthumanist criticism, and that is the continued existence of the human within posthumanism.

But the posthuman does not really mean the end of humanity. It signals instead the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice.¹⁴

It leads directly on to the final way posthumanism has been theorised. Posthumanism is not the end of the human. It is a reinvention of humanity which recognises its situatedness within a network of animals, other humans, and technology. The third way posthumanism can be reflected on is a theorised focus on the ideological aspect that Hayles suggests, but concerns itself with purely ideological implications and consequences of technological enhancement.

Braidotti's work surveys that of other writers, but her interest lies in two areas. Her first interest lies in finding the 'basic unit of common reference for our species, our polity and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this planet'.¹⁵ Her second interest is challenging

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 286.

¹⁵ Braidotti, *The Posthuman*, pp. 1–2.

anthropocentrism. Starting with the idea of the first interest, she aims to destabilise the humanist subject who is white, Eurocentric and male as depicted in Da Vinci's Vitruvian Man. It is a type of approach also known as new materialism. By challenging the myths which act as indexes of power, she aims to create a level field where minority groups, whose histories have been written for them, are able to use their own voices to tell their stories. It is an ideological approach aimed to combat humanist, capitalist and other limiting ideologies which have proven themselves to be violent through the twentieth century. Continuing to anthropocentrism, the preferential treatment of humans over other lifeforms, her second aim links directly to her first.

There is a necessary link between critical posthumanism and the move beyond anthropocentrism. I refer to this move as expanding the notion of Life towards the non-human or zoe. This results in radical posthumanism as a position that transposes hybridity, nomadism, diasporas and creolization processes into means of re-grounding claims to subjectivity, connections and community among subjects of the human and the non-humankind.¹⁶

Braidotti's interest in ideologies stems from Giorgio Agamben's theory of bios and zoe. The former referring to qualified or specific life, the latter being associated with Agamben's 'bare life', or undifferentiated life.¹⁷ I take these further to indicate that bios also refers to life which is negotiated, and therefore exists due to discourse, while zoe refers to life as a common and fundamental fact of all organisms. Braidotti's concerns are situated around challenging the narratives that humans have created to privilege certain groups over others, but in this way, the figure which has been deconstructed is left to collapse. In challenging the human as an index of power, which privileges a specific, idealised, gendered race of humankind, she dismantles what was assumed to be the basic unit of humanity since the Enlightenment. Braidotti's nomad allows for an exponential hybridisation, which creates new methods of criticising and understanding our contemporary condition. However, it does not overcome the same issue that its original creator, Gilles Deleuze, introduced at its inception.¹⁸ It does not stabilise; it does not ossify; but instead it tends towards entropy. Braidotti's nomad is so plastic in nature that it can change to become anything. While it

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 50.

¹⁷ Giorgio Agamben, *The Open : Man and Animal*, ed. by Werner Hamacher (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

¹⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference & Repetition* (London: Continuum, 2001).

opens up infinite opportunities for exploration, any binding force to create academic rigour falls away along with the human subject it criticised.

Each of these three writers have shown the diverse ways posthumanism is theorised, from analysing the situatedness of humans in a network of non-human animal others, to the human symbiotic relationship with technology and the issues that it raises in terms of porous embodiment. Finally, Braidotti raises questions concerning the ideological construction of humanity as a power index and how historical narrative excludes minority viewpoints. Haraway, Braidotti and Hayles each write in a different field within posthumanism, but ultimately their concerns all relate to the pragmatic problems of our contemporary lives. Due to their diverse interests, it is clear that they do not often appear in the same fields of discussion. Their works always aim to show wider implications beyond the simple benefits of technology to humanity.

A different and contradictory type of posthumanism has been growing in critical recognition since the mid-1990s. This type of posthumanism, which focuses on the post-human (or beyond human) aspect, excludes the human from analysis and privileges the post-human subject as 'beyond the human'. This paradigm privileges the investigation of how humanity can benefit from technology (transhumanism) and attempts to discredit the traditional branches of posthumanism by positing posthumanist interests as both reductive and seductive.

Transhumanism is often mistaken for posthumanism. Both disciplines often explore the human relationship with technology. The difference between them is that while transhumanism explores the benefits and availability of technology for human enhancement, posthumanism explores how society adapts to technological progress, and what ethical and practical problems may be created through these progressions. The problem that follows from the transhumanist concerns of being mistaken for posthumanism is the critical acknowledgement of an argument that is less nuanced than posthumanism, to the point where posthumanist concerns become eclipsed by transhumanism. While transhumanism is not in itself anthropocentric, its application can become so if scholars fail to consider the impact of technologies beyond the human subject. These attempts, are also diversely theorised. I will discuss three texts which show the developing trajectory of arguments within this transhumanist 'post-human' field: Fukuyama's 'Our Posthuman

Future' (2002), Miah's 'Posthumanism: A Critical History' (2007) and, Fuller's article, 'The Posthuman and the Transhuman as Alternative Mappings of the Space of Political Possibility' (2018).¹⁹

These three are examples of a genealogy that shifts from a focus on the foundational ideas expressed by Haraway, Hayles and Braidotti, to create an environment where literary contributions are less valued compared to politicised philosophy. I will now briefly analyse these articles to show how transhumanism is frequently mistaken for posthumanism, which will then lead into my second question of what problems this causes for the posthumanities.

Fukuyama's article is the most famous case of mistaken identity within academia. It argues that posthumanism is a dangerous and oppressive potential future which seeks to break from tradition and undermine the values of American citizens while controlling their bodies through the means of technology. It is a politically motivated attack on a developing field of theory. It posed an early threat to the development of posthumanist theory. Posthumanist writers then had to defend the study of the posthuman condition when they could have been mapping out the interests of the discipline. Miah's chapter summarises the work of several key figures including Badmington, Hayles and Haraway. His work does not explore the relation of humanity to its earthly others, nor the impact of ideologies, nor the potential issues of technological mediation in areas of cyborgism, medicine or literature. Instead, he focuses solely on the benefits of using medical enhancements on the human body, claiming that widespread availability of human enhancing is ethical because it will improve the quality of life for many people. This is a misrepresentation of posthumanism, as the availability of technology and a discussion surrounding only its benefits are a transhumanist interest. The concern with availability of technology is a transhumanist concern, and therefore not representative of the previous debates I have shown. Miah's work is the least intentionally subversive attack on posthumanist work, but a result of misunderstandings already having taken root in scholars since Fukuyama. Finally, and most problematically, is Fuller's article, which is one of the most recent additions of misrepresented posthumanism to scholarly debate. The most troubling issue surrounding it is its publication in *The Journal of Posthuman Studies*, which is the authority journal for posthumanist work. The article

¹⁹ Fukuyama; Miah, 'Posthumanism: A Critical History'; Fuller.

claims to explore the multiple constructed narratives that pervaded around humanity over the previous centuries to the present. However, it uses complex language to mask its attempt to undermine posthumanist studies and promote scholars into transhumanism (for a full definition see page eighteen).

I will now summarise the work from Fukuyama, Miah, and Fuller's influential works to show how their work attempts to undermine, undercut, and marginalise decades of research conducted by posthumanist scholars for a less nuanced, idealistic and potentially anthropocentric body of transhumanist work. Fukuyama's theory of posthumanism is based on his imagination of Aldous Huxley's transhumanist writings and his dystopian novel, *Brave New World*. Fukuyama claimed that:

Many of the technologies that Huxley envisioned, like in vitro fertilization, surrogate motherhood, psychotropic drugs, and genetic engineering for the manufacture of children, are already here or just over the horizon. But this revolution has only just begun; the daily avalanche of announcements of new breakthroughs in biomedical technology and achievements such as the completion of the Human Genome Project in the year 2000 portend much more serious changes to come.²⁰

These are all claims focused on a posthumanist, dystopian future as opposed to transhumanism. It fulfils none of the criteria I set out above to qualify as posthuman in its aim. Instead, through carefully chosen lexical and rhetorical choices to invite the fear that technology may soon rebel or that by gaining greater knowledge of our genetics, humanity will become extinct. Yet this narrow focus on technology prevails within posthumanist and wider circles. From the standpoint of most posthuman scholars, it is understood that Fukuyama's article was a politically motivated attack on posthumanism at a moment in his career when these ideas seemed threatening to public imagination. However, the obsession with genetic manipulation and human enhancement have not fallen away from their connotation of being posthuman. Fukuyama was prevalent among early twenty-first century debates. Posthumanists who should have been trying to establish posthumanism as a distinct field of study instead found themselves in a position where they needed to defend its existence where Fukuyama had challenged it on ethical grounds. While it is true that each mode of theory must develop its own ethical code, this rushed attempt has left critics such as Haraway and Braidotti continuing to articulate posthuman ethics to this time. Since

²⁰ Fukuyama.

this attack, ethics have become a main concern within the discipline, taking away attention from other areas such as developing critical posthumanist literary methodologies.

Miah's theory of posthumanism is double-sided. Firstly, it is based on his reading of contemporary posthuman writers. Secondly, it advocates for availability of technology in medical science. He begins by succinctly iterating some key posthumanist interests as:

[I]maginations about how humanity is transformed by technology are specific, historically contingent manifestations of posthuman ideas. Moreover, these ideas are more deeply rooted in claims about such concepts as becoming, alterity, transgressions of boundaries and the position of humanity in relation to these concepts.²¹

He uses the terminology of a posthuman writer, referring to 'alterity' and 'becoming' which evoke the works of Wolfe, Haraway, Deleuze and Guattari. However, he does not allude to these as being integral to his main argument.²² The idea that he mistakenly holds onto is that posthumanism prioritises 'transgressions of boundaries' when it concerns wider aspects of embodiment. In evoking respected posthumanist writers, Miah attempts to situate himself among them. However, his paradigm does not correspond to any of those I have discussed. Instead, he is situated within the field of transhumanism, but more positively than Fukuyama. Miah's work highlights two interests of the posthumanist field, these being the relation of the human to intelligent machines (prosthetics), and how the implementation of prosthetics is a way to challenge anthropocentrism by turning humans into cyborgs. He does this by discussing the benefits of using medical enhancements on the human body, advocating that widespread availability (liberal democratic transhumanism) is ethically sound insofar as it will improve the quality of life for many people. He explores some posthumanist concerns which are comparable to Braidotti, Wolfe and Haraway.²³ Notably, his concern is limited to the availability of these technologies and in this way based on his interest of Hayles' discussion of the human boundary with machines.

²¹ Miah, 'Posthumanism: A Critical History', p. 72.

²² Cary Wolfe, *What Is Posthumanism?* (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Haraway, 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs'; Deleuze and Guattari.

²³ Donna J. Haraway, 'A Cyborg Manifesto : Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism In The Late Twentieth Century', in *Simians, Cyborgs and Women : The Reinvention of Nature*, ed. by Neil Badmington & Julia Thomas (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 149–81.

Miah also shows his understanding of the work posthumanist writers have done when he states all posthumanists agree that:

[T]he starting point should be an attempt to understand what has been omitted from an anthropocentric worldview, which includes coming to terms with how the Enlightenment centring of humanity has been revealed as inadequate.²⁴

The recognition that anthropocentric worldviews need to be investigated situates him more in line with the views of the traditional posthumanists that I have cited. It is also a problem that I will identify in the next section from works such as Miah's. Ferrando and Welsch have also argued that posthumanism works through the postmodern tradition of criticism.²⁵ The Enlightenment is challenged by posthumanist writers, but his term 'inadequate' does not suggest that it is obsolete, or that it is 'mistaken', but that it does not extend far enough. As he discusses Haraway's work, he reveals his disagreement with her aims. However, simultaneously he makes a distinction between critical and philosophical posthumanism, which few had taken the time to articulate.

In sum, one must consider that Haraway's claims about cyborgs were *not* based on an interest to enhance humanity, but intended to disrupt uniform ideas about what it means to be human and the social and political entitlements this might imply. In this sense, cultural posthumanists are considerably different from philosophical posthumanists.²⁶

In arguing against Haraway's work, Miah's concern with the positive aspects of human enhancement and its availability is a viewpoint which is too narrow to be considered within posthumanist studies, as I will show in my literary analysis in Chapter Three. Miah is clearly a knowledgeable and recognised writer, but it is a mistake to call his work posthumanist when he does not explore the potential risks that these technologies pose. This leads me to my comparison between Miah and Fukuyama's works.

Fukuyama's posthumanism was clearly mistaken. It is a rhetorical representation of a dystopian transhumanist future based on fear and under-criticised fiction. Its aim was

²⁴ Miah, 'Posthumanism: A Critical History', p. 72.

²⁵ Wolfgang Welsch, 'Postmodernism – Posthumanism – Evolutionary Anthropology', VII (2014), 1–9 <http://www2.uni-jena.de/welsch/papers/W_Welsch_Postmodernism_Posthumanism_Evolutionary_Anthropolgy.pdf>; Francesca Ferrando, 'The Posthuman: Philosophical Posthumanism and Its Others', *Diss.*, 2013, 238 <http://dspace-roma3.caspur.it/bitstream/2307/4356/1/TESI_Ferrando_DEF.pdf>; Francesca Ferrando, *Philosophical Posthumanism* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019).

²⁶ Miah, 'Posthumanism: A Critical History', p. 78.

clearly to place posthumanist studies into disrepute, which it did successfully. However, its effects have lingered further in leading future scholars away from the challenge of building foundations for the development of posthumanist studies. It also misinforms scholars who are entering the posthumanities from other disciplines. It was focused on the uncertain ground of gene manipulation and human obsolescence in the face of more sophisticated technology. While there are some elements of this in the techno-centric exploration of the posthumanities, there is no deep insight into how these effect bio-politics, epistemology or ideological concerns. Miah adopts a diametrically opposed view to Fukuyama. He represents the opposite of the transhumanist spectrum in his engagement with posthumanist scholars and his optimistic approach to techno-centric debates. Therefore, it seems unfair to place Miah alongside Fukuyama. However, despite his utopian ideas of technology's benefit to humanity, it is still political in its divisive attack to discredit Fukuyama and its focus on only the benefits of employing technologies in a posthuman future. His allusion to challenging anthropocentrism is lost as his argument is dependent on the human relation to technology. His approach merits appreciation because it does not dismiss the category of the human as has become customary in anthropocentric posthumanist criticism, but it fails to escape this flaw in its singular focus on the human without discussing the network of organisms and artefacts of which humanity is a singular part.

Fuller's sceptical approach to the posthumanities is theoretical. His attack on postmodern scholars for their style of analysis which causes alienation and linguistic anxiety suggests that its methodology operates one way theoretically, and in another politically.

[F]or nearly a half century now, deconstruction has wrought havoc on self-styled "progressive" political movements—both liberal and socialist—which had been historically united in presuming that humanity is a potential waiting to be fully realized. However, if there is no humanity but only multiple self-serving "humanities," then it becomes difficult to arrive at agreement over which direction we/they should go in.²⁷

This is a sceptical approach to posthumanism as he attacks its foundations through his criticism of postmodernism. Because of the alienating factors of both postmodernism and posthumanism, and also the lack of unitary agreement, Fuller posits that these features invalidate the discipline. Fuller's main attack on posthumanism comes from his critique of

²⁷ Fuller, pp. 158–59.

the belief in posthumanism promoting a humanity 2.0. This is not representative of the field as a whole, but rather that of a few who are focused on using technology to transcend the human. This is reflected in his generalising definition of posthumanism to also indicate transhumanism:

Integral to both narratives is a story about our genetic makeup and whatever superorganic status “Humanity 2.0” might aspire to. Where posthumanists stress our massive genetic overlap with other species as a deep source of our interdependency with the rest of nature, transhumanists stress the variability and mutability of genes, which allows a future of genetic enhancement.²⁸

His paradigm attempts to undercut posthumanism by setting it against transhumanism, yet from the outside he claims to be representing the interests of both disciplines equally. Here it is clear that he favours the latter. This political struggle for power creates a negative and inaccurate tone for posthumanism while encouraging readers to move into transhumanism. Nowhere in Haraway, Hayles or Braidotti’s works that I have cited is it indicated that they advocate for a humanity 2.0. This is a trend that has appeared through another strain of acclaimed posthumanist discourse. Now I will show where these views sit within the field.

Fuller’s essay gaining acceptance in the *Journal of Posthumanist Studies* indicates that it contributes to the debate on posthumanist and transhumanist discourse. Fuller further argues that:

[W]hat makes both post- and trans-humanism so politically radical is their instinctive denial of this central premise, which in turn reflects their acceptance of the deconstructive turn in the human sciences. In other words, both movements presume that *Homo sapiens* is at best a way station from somewhere else to somewhere else.²⁹

Fuller sees posthumanism and transhumanism as using the human as a starting point to transcend its condition. While that is sometimes the case, from what I have shown it does not fall in line with my original definition of posthumanism based on Haraway, Hayles and Braidotti as starting points. It does, however, fall in line with this fourth interpretation of posthumanism, or transhumanism, only it is not focused on techno-centric augmentation of the human condition. Instead, it is theoretically attacking posthumanism while using posthumanist tools, while at the same time advocating that transhumanism is more worthwhile and less politicised. He positions posthumanism and transhumanism side-by-

²⁸ Fuller, p. 164.

²⁹ Fuller, p. 161.

side, as polarised opposites, and he defines what is meant by the shared “human” for both post- and trans-humanism.

But what meaning of the “human” do post- and trans-humanism share, on the basis of which they then part company? My proposal is that both are sensitive to a distinction in how we think about the human, between the anthropocentric and the anthropomorphic. The former is about where we start and the latter about where we end up.³⁰

Fuller’s suggestion that posthumanism is a precursor to transhumanism (anthropocentrism to anthropomorphism) indicates a linear progression from one to the other. This is the most distinct interpretation of the relationship between the two that currently exists. Fuller, instead of seeing these disciplines as distinct in some ways and similar in others, has chosen to relegate posthumanists to the past and favour transhumanism as the new posthumanism. While it does restore the human, which has somewhat disappeared from modern criticism, it also ceases to recognise the problems that the human element introduces to technologically enhanced posthumanism. Transhumanism was never intended for theoretical investigation as to the problems concerning technologically-enhanced societies. However, at the same time, there is no reason to argue that it cannot adapt.

Fuller’s interpretation of posthumanism is starkly different from Fukuyama and Miah’s interpretations to the point where their similarity is hard to notice. Fukuyama was scathing of posthumanism, which was clearly based on his concerns about transhumanism. Miah endorsed a posthuman future, but his vision was a humanity 2.0 which Fuller criticises. Fuller, himself, challenges the applicability of posthumanism academically. He appears to represent posthumanism and transhumanism distinctly and evenly from the outset but then undercuts posthumanism throughout his essay through attacks on posthumanist writers. These are all cases where posthumanism has been misrepresented by specialists, propagating further misconceptions of the posthumanities as a whole.

To conclude this section on the different ways posthumanism has been theorised, I started by establishing the diverse and stable ways that Haraway, Hayles and Braidotti have theorised posthumanism. Haraway seeks to destabilise the anthropocentric human who views humanity as the pinnacle of existence, thereby neglecting its animal origins. Hayles

³⁰ Fuller, p. 161.

describes the human relationship with intelligent machines, and also how the embodiment of subjectivity bears a lot of problems for investigating. Braidotti challenges anthropocentrism and ideological influence on using the human as an index for power using various theoretical devices, such as attempting to establish the basic unit of humanity, theoretical hybridisation, and a healthy diversity of critical interests. I then argued that posthumanism has been frequently misrepresented by prominent writers who view it as a techno-centric discourse relating to the creation of a post-human subject, or humanity 2.0. This theorisation attempts to be a conscientious investigation of the pragmatic implications that humanity faces in the twenty-first century in relation to the concerns of Haraway, Hayles and Braidotti. I showed how Fukuyama's direct attack created a situation where posthumanists had to politicise their work to respond to inaccurate attacks on the discipline. The result of Fukuyama's attack created the impression that posthumanism was techno-centric, eclipsing the concerns of Haraway and Braidotti to the point where Miah, who was sympathetic to the emerging posthumanities, also believed that it was a space to argue the benefits of adopting medical technologies. Fuller, the most recent of these writers, displayed little confidence in posthumanism, seeing it as a starting point from which transhumanism developed. He argues that posthumanism from its foundations is based on seeking to transcend the human. In reality, this is a strain of posthumanism that has become popularised through the reaction to Fukuyama's work and has subsequently seduced posthuman scholars with the impossible possibility of a clean break from humanity. In the next section of this introduction, I will explain what problems this has created for the posthumanities.

Techno-centrism and Humanity 2.0

My second question asks the following: what are the problems caused by the techno-centric theorisation of posthumanism, and how does this introduce anthropocentrism into posthumanist discourse? To answer this double-barrelled question, the section will suggest four problems that are caused by the over-simplified techno-centric discourse masquerading as posthumanism and suggest initial solutions to these problems that my later chapters will develop. In the previous section I showed how posthumanism and the

posthumanist subject have been theorised in diverse and contradictory ways. The critical uptake of misinterpretations of the original posthumanist aim has created four problems within the posthumanities. Firstly, the misinterpretation of transhumanism as posthumanism, as outlined in the answer to my first question, creates the mistaken impression that posthumanism is solely a techno-centric discipline. It links directly to the second problem, which is a limited interest of only analysing the human, or post-human relationship, with technology when there are much wider issues at stake. Thirdly, it tends towards a field in which many scholars are seduced by the notion of a humanity 2.0, which represents a clean break with humanism. Finally, these areas of interest also create a field in which literary studies are valued much less than techno-centric analysis or philosophical interpretations of authors who are seen as precursors to modern ethics.

The first problem of presenting posthumanism as solely a techno-centric mode of criticism is that it hides anthropocentrism behind a veil of theory which dismisses critique of the human. One such writer (to whom I will return to in Chapter Two) is Steve Beard. Beard's *Logic Bomb*, published in 1998, influenced many writers with his sociological and techno-centric argument that it was futile to theorise Man.³¹ This is predicated on the belief that it was pointless to analyse something that was 'staring us in the face'.³² However, in taking this attitude, writers avoid reflecting on the issues that technological progress raises beyond human necessities. The idea behind this is that techno-centric discourse reaps all the benefits of posthumanism without attempting to resolve its wider concerns.

My proposed solution to this first problem is to return to an original Deleuzian paradigm and adapt it. My adaptation will serve as a methodology which can be used to analyse contemporary society and literature in a way that recognises its focus on the human as part of a nexus of other entities. The methodology I am referring to will be explored in Chapter One as a type of nomadism, which relies on rhizomatic thinking. This is a mode of critical engagement that I have adapted based on Deleuze and Guattari's theoretical construct of the rhizome from *A Thousand Plateaus* (for a full description of rhizomes see below at p. 49-50).³³ In the context of this thesis, rhizomatic thinking is the critical application of these

³¹ Steve Beard, *Logic Bomb : Transmissions from the Edge of Style Culture* (New York: Serpent's Tail, 1998).

³² Neil Badmington, 'Theorizing Posthumanism', *Cultural Critique*, 53 (2003), 10–27 (p. 10) <<https://doi.org/10.1353/cul.2003.0017>> [accessed 10 March 2019].

³³ Deleuze and Guattari, pp. 7–12.

philosophical thoughts through the medium of a central, nomadic figure which anticipates a posthumanist critique.

Nomads, as I will explain in the next section, are figures which operate outside of normalised structures and they serve to mediate environments that they deem to be unjust or socially exclusive so as to challenge naturalised indexes of power and exclusion. The combination of nomads with rhizomatic thinking allows for a greater versatility of analysis than hybridisation. While hybridisation combines only two bodies of theory to produce a blended argument, which generally favours one mode over the other. Rhizomatic criticism can utilise several specialised fields of knowledge to capture a broader yet equally rigorous perspective. By deploying a rhizome structure of argumentation (explained in Chapter One), nomads may be seen to connect with many different clusters of ideas which blend seamlessly together. They emerge also resistant to sites of rupture, which responds to the threat of attacks on the discipline.

This solution applies most pertinently to answer problems that Fuller has introduced. By establishing a clear methodology on certain principles, the argument that posthumanism is only techno-centric is debunked. The methodology will allow for criticism of wider fields such as ideological, bio-political, and concerns over agency of bodies. While it is based on methodologies that exist, combining them in the way I will over the course of this thesis may open new avenues of theoretical exploration within the posthumanities. Further, by becoming nomadic, theorists can shed certain political attachments and focus on their analysis from outside a system, using a wide variety of debates without attempting to surreptitiously undercut what they are analysing. It becomes a-political outside of bio-political engagement, which as I will explain in Chapter Two, is the act of separating bare life from qualified life.

The second problem that is raised relates to a limited interest in engagement with wider issues at stake within the posthumanities. There has been an increasing narrowing of interest and polarised view of the posthumanities as a result. Jeff Wallace reacted to the critical acclaim gained by this narrowed image of posthumanism citing Bart Simon who

termed it 'popular posthumanism'.³⁴ Simon's own use of the term referred to the distinction between a critical posthumanism (what this thesis sets out to delineate) and popular posthumanism (the fascination and fear of humanity 2.0). With writers tending further and further towards techno-centric analyses, there has grown a divide between critical posthumanism and philosophical posthumanism, which is post-humanist, post-anthropocentric, and post-dualistic. Critical posthumanism has more to offer than techno-centric analysis. It should be considered the practical investigation and application of philosophical thought. By only focusing on this aspect of its assemblage, critical posthumanism ignores ideological and embodied forms of lived experiences that are crucial to understanding our contemporary condition.

My solution is to take the methodology that I develop in Chapter One and apply it over two chapters. The second chapter interrogates ideological and nomadic concerns, and their continued relevance in the twenty-first century. The third chapter investigates the concerns of embodiment, agency, and the human relationship with literary technologies. In this way I can show how posthumans are as susceptible to ideological thinking as humans. Therefore, there must be a link between the two. I will develop my iteration of nomadism to show how previous, violent versions are ultimately unsuccessful due to their lack of ability to stabilise after deconstruction. I also show how nomads are able to self-generate agency through taking control of their boundaries with technology to self-represent. Figures that are considered monstrous tend to be created, alien, and unrelatable. In doing this, posthumanism can engage effectively with problems that are beyond the scope of techno-centric research. This will preserve it from arbitrary relegation as being the precursor to the real techno-centric discipline of transhumanism.

Fukuyama, Miah, and Fuller do not account for any of these concerns in their understanding of posthumanism. The element of posthuman mediation with intelligent machines survives, but it does not focus on creating the humanity 2.0 that Miah and Fuller predict. It, likewise, does not fulfil the dystopian fantasy that Fukuyama foresaw.

³⁴ Jeff Wallace, 'Literature and Posthumanism', *Literature Compass*, 7.8 (2010), 692–701 <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-4113.2010.00723.x>> [accessed 11 March 2019]; Bart Simon, 'Toward a Critique of Posthuman Futures' *Cultural Critique* no. 53 (2003), 1-9 (p.2) <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1354621>.> [accessed June 1 2022].

The third problem that this creates is that Fukuyama, Miah, Fuller and Beard have presented posthumanism as a clean break from humanism. The focus on post-humans, which have transcended the human condition, introduces a new kind of anthropocentrism: a post-human anthropocentrism. This problem indicates an avenue of thought that makes no progress from previous attempts to gain power through academic deterritorialization. It is merely replacing one index of power for another. Comparatively, this problem has been introduced most recently by writers such as Miah and Fuller, to replace the human within its network of other organic and inorganic entities. However, uncovering and expounding on proof that there is a link between the human and the posthuman which has been ignored is a laborious endeavour.

To solve this problem, I will show how the human and posthuman are linked, and what this implies. At the same time, linking the human and posthuman does not attempt to resolve the anthropocentric subject, but instead reasserts it. To address the issue, I recall Neil Badmington's suggestion that 'perhaps a new approach is required.'³⁵ I argue that posthumanism is neither a clean break from humanism, nor does it represent a linear evolution from human to the posthuman. Instead, I argue that posthumans are a variety of different ontologies which at some times are normalised, or uniform with social and political expectations. Sometimes they are dissimilar, or as I term it, their ontologies are alternative to each other. What I argue is that the posthuman is the human re-iterated. It is an underexplored assertion in the posthumanities, originally written on at length by Badmington in 2004.³⁶ Failure 'to think carefully about what the prefix 'post-' might mean in this context'³⁷ has acted like a catalyst for the leaky boundaries of posthumanism. The diversity which allowed critics to delve incisively to the heart of contemporary concerns, also allows for the greatest misunderstanding of the term posthuman. Badmington suggests, as do I, that posthumanism 'needs to be imagined otherwise, and needs above all to reconsider the untimely celebration of the absolute end of 'Man''³⁸.

³⁵ Neil Badmington, *Alien Chic: Posthumanism and the Other Within* (London: Routledge, 2004).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 109.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 109.

Switching between anthropocentrism and posthuman anthropocentrism as a flickering light signal on a computer screen is insubstantial. Whether the human or the post-human (cyborg) are the index of power is meaningless. Instead, the solution is to escape this paradigm of polarised, preferential othering. As Braidotti argues:

This Eurocentric paradigm implies the dialectics of self and other, and the binary logic of identity and otherness as respectively the motor for and the cultural logic of universal Humanism. Central to this universalistic posture and its binary logic is the notion of 'difference' as pejoration. [...] Otherness is defined as its negative and specular counterpart. In so far as difference spells inferiority, it acquires both essentialist and lethal connotation for people who get branded as 'others'. These are the sexualized, racialized, and naturalized others, who are reduced to the less than human status of disposable bodies.³⁹

The ability to transverse these polarised boundaries requires a non-rootedness in either ideology. This is how my figure of the nomad will become a useful tool in uniting these sites of rupture in the aim of creating a spectrum of positivist associations. This is about dismantling the sexualizing, racializing, and naturalizing system of othering. At stake in resolving this issue is the ability to become post-dualistic in application, a theory which has yet to be tested outside philosophy.

In escaping this anthropocentric and post-human anthropocentric binary by firstly, re-establishing the link between the human and posthuman subject and secondly, by articulating it in a spectrum outside the binary indices of power, it shows the limitations of Fukuyama, Miah, and Fuller's expectations of the posthumanities. While Miah made a substantial effort in articulating that it is essential to understand what has been omitted from an anthropocentric worldview, he could not possibly have predicted that he left the field open for a post-humanist anthropocentric worldview in its place. It shows that a system must be ready to take the place of the one it challenges. This is a politicised problem that undercuts thinking, which is why rather than directly challenging the system of hidden anthropocentrism, it is less violent to lay out the methodology for this system, show its application and allow critics to make up their own minds as to its value. However, critics should be mindful that the debate should always be focused on the positive features of differences, never directed pejoratively.

³⁹ Braidotti, *The Posthuman*, p. 15.

The final problem that Fukuyama, Miah and Fuller introduce indirectly is the promotion of a discipline which is inhospitable to literary studies. This is in part due to the unwillingness of traditional humanities subjects to accept this mode of analysis as academically rigorous. The uncertainty surrounding what the term posthumanism means, followed by frequent attempts to undercut it, have led to the wide impression of posthumanism being little more than an attempt to leave behind the primitive and violent human of the twentieth century and replace it with a new, mysterious, intelligent, and even sexy post-human. However, technical and biological augmentation have little to do with literary analysis.

The solution to this lies in the structure of my thesis. At the end of each chapter, I will dedicate one third of the chapter length to apply my methodology and theories to a literary text to show not only the critical reasoning behind my research, but also the potential application that can be expected from it. The nomad is a vital part of my drawing together of all the different strands of thought into a coherent and conscientious analysis, which can have impacts within academia and beyond. In selecting nomadism as my catalyst for theoretical investigation, I have an already established tool for critical investigations, which needs only to be modified for literary analysis. Narratives involving nomads are highly adept at recognising fallacies, challenging anthropocentrism and at protecting their agency while negotiating with structures that are oppressive and potentially violent. What I hope to accomplish in this way is a revitalisation of a tool which is underappreciated within the posthumanities, and to draw attention to the lack of literary analyses that are being published in favour of philosophical or transhumanist discourse.

The Bare Bones – Fundamental Ideas for Moving Forward

In the previous two sections I have summarised the diverse ways in which posthumanism has been theorised by Haraway, Hayles and Braidotti, and misrepresented in the diverse positions taken by Miah, Fuller and Fukuyama. I have then identified the problems that have resulted from this diversity, namely the mistaken impression of posthumanism as solely a techno-centric discipline, the belief that posthumanism is not interested in issues beyond the beneficial applications of technology, the belief that posthumanism represents a

humanity 2.0. Finally, I have shown that these issues have made the discipline inhospitable to literary studies. In this section, I will begin to address question three: are there key concepts which can help us to re-create the paradigm that I set out in my solutions in the previous section? I will set out the concept of the nomad in a little more detail as a figure that will help solve the problems identified in the earlier section.

In the previous section, I showed some ways how I intend to employ the figure of the nomad to reveal and mediate anthropocentrism in posthuman literary studies based on the misrepresentations which proliferate the twenty-first century. I posit that the nomadic figure is a key tool in addressing the reductive interest that writers such as Beard, Fukuyama, Miah, and Fuller have put forward into the posthumanities. Without developing a methodology, theoretical case studies and application of literary analysis, my figure of the nomad cannot hope to redirect the techno-centric focus that these writers have promoted, in which a posthuman anthropocentrism has proliferated. The nomad set out by Deleuze, Guattari, and Braidotti has potential, but lacks the means of allowing critical posthumanism to challenge anthropocentrism within the discipline. Specifically, the Deleuzian figure of the nomad lacks the ability to address these concerns unless it teaches itself to, as well as transcend its self-destructive limitations. I will show in this section the origins of the nomadic figure and show how my own modernised nomad is suited to the task of effectuating a broad spectrum of critical interventions. Crucially, it does so without falling apart or promoting a posthumanist anthropocentrism, which is what happens with Deleuze and Braidotti's examples of the nomad.

The nomad must address the issues which emerge from the previous section. These issues are firstly, the misinterpretation of transhumanism as posthumanism. As outlined in my first question, this creates the mistaken impression that posthumanism is solely a techno-centric discipline. To address this problem, a solution involving the nomad is going to be deployed to showcase how they utilise posthumanist theory from the three diverse and stable sources that I mentioned at the beginning from Haraway, Braidotti and Hayles' works.

The second problem which nomadism can address is the limited interest of only analysing the human, or post-human relationship with technology when there are much wider issues at stake. To address this problem the figure of the nomad can be used as a way to shed certain political attachments and focus on analyses from outside a system (becoming a-

politicised), to reformulate itself into a mode of criticism which can deconstruct incisively and stabilise without falling into entropy, as Deleuzian nomads are noted for.

The third problem for the nomad to overcome is the trend towards a field in which many scholars are seduced by the notion of a humanity 2.0, which represents a clean break with humanism. Nomadic figures to address this problem will step outside of binary thinking in which the notion of humanity and humanity 2.0 are not indexes of power. In this way, there is no preferential bias towards the human or post-human subject. It depolarises this struggle for legitimacy and power, it rewrites itself as simultaneously outside and within social structures of humanity and posthumanity.

Finally, these areas of interest also create a field in which literary studies are valued much less than techno-centric analysis or philosophical interpretations of authors who are seen as precursors to modern ethics. The solution to this is to use the nomad as a basis of literary criticism, while having it showcase the range of its connection to the foundational posthumanist concerns. This cannot be done in the space of one literary analysis, which is why there will be three extended analyses over the course of this thesis. In doing this, I hope to use the nomad to overcome the lack of hospitality within the current posthumanities to recognise fallacies, challenge anthropocentrism and protect nomadic agency, while negotiating with structures that are oppressive and potentially violent.

The solutions themselves have difficulties to overcome, and the way I will begin to do this is by providing a succinct, but clear explanation of what a nomad is, its origin, and how my iteration derives itself from earlier versions of nomads. I will then show how it can engage with and overcome these early hurdles to being utilised in literary analyses.

My thesis focusing on humans, posthumans, active and normalised nomads evokes concepts parallel to Descartes' *Discourse on the Method*.⁴⁰ Examples of concepts include division of bodily and mental epistemologies, division of subjective realities between body and spirit and division between posthuman "higher" organisms versus humanist "lower or animal" organisms. While Descartes created a paradigm of the body and the mind being two separate entities, each with their own realms of heuristic ontology leading to their knowledge of themselves (epistemic knowledge of self), Descartes' method was to take

⁴⁰ René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Meditations* (New York: Dover, 1998).

nothing for granted except anything he could prove logically. My attempt will do something similar within the confines of a thesis. The aim will be to posit a figure that can connect many of the focal points within posthumanism and attempt to create a figure that can be used within literary analysis to further combat anthropocentric thinking, which pervades literary analysis through common misconceptions of posthumanism.

The idea of a nomadic figure began with Deleuze in his *Difference and Repetition*.⁴¹ They originated as divine figures:

Even among the gods, each has his domain, his category, his attributes, and all distribute limits and lots to mortals in accordance with destiny. Then there is a completely other distribution which must be called nomadic, a nomad nomos, without property, enclosure or measure.⁴²

Nomads have since developed more concrete characteristics. Deleuzian nomads are stateless, without hierarchy, and self-mediated. This enables them to move in any direction with no (or little) constraint. The freedom to move in any direction and the ability to self-mediate with other entities means they can form any assemblage at any time. The problematic aspects which follow are that their unlimited adaptability makes them difficult to define. Another disadvantage to Deleuzian nomadism is that its unlimited adaptability does not permit cohesion, and therefore it is nearly always encountered as destabilised or non-normalised individuals.

Deleuze and Guattari's nomad in *A Thousand Plateaus* is connected to the idea of 'the war machine'.⁴³ By this, they firstly mean something which 'seems to be irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law'.⁴⁴ Nomads lie beyond the powers that bind up the normalised citizen: they observe; they self-regulate their own agencies; and for Deleuze and Guattari, they as the war machine almost constitute another species. This makes nomads potentially threatening to signifying regimes (societies) with deterritorialization. It is the most problematic aspect of their work.⁴⁵ Societies are governed

⁴¹ Deleuze.

⁴² 'Difference and Repetition', *Choice Reviews Online*, 1994, 32-1461-32-1461 (p. 36) <<https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.32-1461>>.

⁴³ Deleuze and Guattari, p. 359.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 352

⁴⁵ N. Katherine Hayles, *Unthought: The Power of the Cognitive Nonconscious* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017), pp. 65-66. Note: Hayles, too, notes this shortcoming with its prevalence within the posthumanities school of new materialism.

by rules. Each part of society has its role, its position, is coded and institutionalised. The war machine, or nomad, lies outside these boundaries. Nomads need not wage direct war; they do not take up the hammer and smash against the walls of institutions. They conduct war without the battle lines, meaning by traversing spaces and by their very nature to resist coding. The nomadic war does not contain confrontation nor retreat; it is a battle consisting only of tactics which I will outline in Chapter Two. In short, a theme that I will return to in Chapter Three makes the same distinction that Deleuze and Guattari make between the relationship that nomads have with weapons and tools – the answer is purpose. My own distinction will be between the posthuman and monster, arguing that they are similar in many ways, but differentiated by several key aspects.

The nomad that I have outlined here is passive, yet its unyielding force is able to dismantle society by being unmovable except to itself. I find the tactics employed by Deleuzian nomads to be less peaceful than they appear, and I take a much more literal reading of the term war machine through reading Braidotti's adaptation of it. Before expanding on this, I will briefly note that Deleuze and Guattari develop six key tools that make nomads function as rhizomes. I will expand on these later. For reference, these six tools are: connection forming (it is always forming connections); heterogeneity (any point can connect with any other point); multiplicity (it is not composed of a prior unity); asignifying rupture (if you break it at any point, it can start growing again); cartography and decalomania (it is like a map being drawn, not a tracing which is already permanent).

Braidotti has done the most work on nomadology since Deleuze and Guattari's theorisation. Her feminist figurations, based on Deleuze and Guattari's 'war machine', are 'heterogeneous ways in which feminists today are exploring different forms of the subjectivity of women and of their struggle with language in order to produce affirmative representations'.⁴⁶ She argues that nomads are politically informed images that portray complex subjective interactions within a social setting. Braidotti is most concerned with Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic tool of heterogeneity. Braidotti argued for feminism to behave as a rhizome and in the years following this influential book, it did exactly that. Braidotti's nomadic subject is a 'myth', or a 'political fiction' as a nod to Donna Haraway's *A*

⁴⁶ Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*, p. 3.

Cyborg Manifesto. She uses it to blur boundaries without burning bridges.⁴⁷ Her work on theorising nomadic subjects opens the way for incisive challenges to hierarchical and exclusive systems, such as the human subject. Her definition of the nomad at the beginning of her book informs my work to shape a subject which still bears resemblance to its original creator's design. The effect of accepting the nomad in this way is it evokes a critical consciousness of what is being examined whether it be sociological or literary.

Braidotti's war machines target social movements, such as political movements 'from the "hippies" to the "new age gypsies," the peace camps, the music festivals, the feminist happenings all the way to the spiralling violence of terrorist units.'⁴⁸ The movements she describes across many of her works are usually related to social, political, and environmental activist movements. In this way, her nomadic war machines are more pragmatic than Deleuze's nomads, however, the focus on dismantling regimes pervades from Deleuze's iteration into Braidotti's.

There is a clear shift from Braidotti's more activist stance in 1994 to her explorative writing in 2006. In *Transpositions*, she becomes more interested in nomadic subjectivity as 'a contested space of mutations that follow no technological directives and no moral imperatives.'⁴⁹ Her social activist of 1994, much closer to resembling Deleuze and Guattari's immutable social dismantler, becomes something equally as destructive, chaotic, and ambiguous. The subjectivity of a philosophical nomadic subject transposed and applied to ethics leads Braidotti into beginning to establish a sense of posthuman ethics.

My nomad, based on my understanding of posthumanist materials, seeks to reveal what is already there but left unsaid. It shows that there are spaces that have been coveted through dogmatic beliefs in an outdated Human subject. It challenges hierarchies and accepted norms to create new norms on sites of deconstruction. My nomad acts as a site of activation for many aspects of my critical posthumanist paradigm. Nomads are singular entities, operating as individuals. It resists normalisation, and thereby homogenisation. It is a singular individual and therefore a minority. It does not distinguish itself against the society that it means to alter, as its purpose is to enact changes on the system that it has become

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 26.

⁴⁹ Rosi Braidotti, *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 4

disjointed from. It is always within and outside that system. It is the embodiment of alterity. This nomadic figure that cannot exist indefinitely and will either return to the society they wish to change, or they become fully disillusioned and are rejected from their native territory. My solution to this problem will be reached in Chapter Two. For now, I will state that nomads are able to stabilise. However, they must enter into a system which is stable. In the final part of this section, I will show how, over the course of this thesis, my figuration of the nomad will address the problems that I have identified over the course of this introduction.

My theory of the nomad progresses over three stages. Firstly, I will develop a methodology for posthumanist literary analysis in conjunction which uses the nomad to mediate theory with practical examples. The nomad needs further qualification as to its interests and capabilities so that it can be used by other literary scholars in similar ways to how I aim to construct it. I will show how nomads can respond to the problems outlined in this introduction due to their ability to self-mediate themselves in the milieu of modern society which is mirrored by the appearance of nomads in literature.

Next, the following chapter develops how the nomad encounters ideologies. This stage of my analysis requires my nomad to distinguish itself from Deleuzian and Braidotti's nomads. In this form it no longer behaves destructively, nor does it destroy itself while challenging human and posthuman subjects. I will show how the nomad is the site of active resistance to the over-coding process of humanist epistemologies.⁵⁰ The posthuman nomad, in order to resist becoming over-coded with the notion of humanity 2.0, must recognise that it is forever bound up in what it is post-ing. In this case, it can never form a clear break from the human. It is a debate where technology has no place, yet anthropocentrism can easily install itself. My argument situates the posthuman in what I believe to be the most honest presentation of posthumans, which may challenge social thinking with both critical and literary works with credibility.

The final stage of my arguments detailing how nomads can help challenge posthuman anthropocentrism is to develop their nomadic ontology. Ontology is the physical, embodied,

⁵⁰ Note: Over-coding transforms both imaginary and real spaces, persons, and non-human animals. Over-coding is a political act and involves breaking down subjects at a point of fracture and then reassembling them within a new context.

and practised manifestation of nomadic agency and ethics. It is the lived form of the theory that I develop over the course of the previous chapters when writing about the posthuman nomad. This ontological debate shows how addressing the four issues that I have outlined in this introduction (misinterpretation of transhumanism as posthumanism; a limited interest of only analysing the post-human relationship with technology; the notion of a humanity 2.0 representing a clean break with humanism; and literary studies valued less than techno-centric analysis), opens space for new modes of engaging with non-traditional literary forms such as e-books and graphic novels. The nomad in its versatility can account for all these issues, most of which have no links to technological debates, yet are increasingly receiving less interest within the posthumanist academic community. It is my intention to renew interest from literary scholars to employ this new, modernised nomadic figure to great effect and reverse the stagnation of thinking that this techno-trend has introduced into posthumanist research.

The Impact of This Project

I will now turn to the fifth and final question that I asked at the start of the introduction: how will these ideas make a difference to the field of posthumanism? In the first instance, I hope it will challenge the anthropocentrism that has emerged in techno-centric posthumanist writing, masquerading as a clean break from humanism. Techno-centric posthumanist writing is paradoxically anthropocentric, as it is interested in the benefits of technology for human consumption and absent of the human. It operates largely by hiding the human from view in literary and theoretical writing. With a renewed interest and new tools at their disposal, I hope critics will find my configuration of nomadic tools useful and my insights as to their application innovative.

Secondly, I intend to promote a re-emergence of interest in wider posthumanist debates such as animal studies and agency, bio-politics, and ideological debates. The importance of further understanding human links to non-human animals, both as mutual consumers and earthly dwellers, allows access into deeper parts of our psyche while allowing for the voice of our earthly others to tell their own histories. The importance of embodied agency is of

great concern when realising that our minds, the seat of all experienced life, are constantly in passive mediation with constructed environments. In using nomadic tools, the passivity transforms into an active mediation with the lived environment which controls the connections we form within it.

Thirdly, by developing the nomad into a more versatile tool which can more incisively critique our everyday lives of the twenty-first century and help to predict our near futures, I hope to use it to take a new spin on theorists such as Foucault and Derrida as I feel their work gains with new relevance when framed by my discussion of the nomad. By making these authors applicable in new pragmatic ways, we are encouraged to re-examine the progress we have made since their writing, concerning normalised systems such as the prison systems and ideologies (such as Marxism, Capitalism, etc.).

Finally, I hope that it will promote the importance of literary analysis within the posthumanities. Recognition for this topic is overdue as so few literary critics are recognised for their attempts to write on literature from a posthumanist perspective. I hope by designing these tools with literary analysis firmly in mind, that it creates a ready environment, willing to welcome new literary scholarship which can broach new insights into both ancient and modern lives.

Outline for following Chapters

In this section I will briefly outline my plan for progressing through the three chapters of this thesis. In Chapter One, I will develop my own figure of the nomad after discussing other writers of nomadology. This methodology of using the nomad as a central figure of analysis stems from my reading of Deleuze, Guattari and Braidotti. These three philosophers and scholars spent much time in developing the figure of the nomad, which began as a state-disassembling tool to a mode of challenging naturalisation in its later iterations. The tools used by post-war nomads are used in contextual notions of violence. Nomadic tools such as Deleuze's and Guattari's notion of rhizomatic thought, the theory of assemblages and Braidotti's adaptation of the war machine for social activism all seek to dismantle or destroy existing social and political structures which govern society. In my literary analysis of J.G

Ballard's *High Rise*⁵¹, I take the nomad which I have been developing in the first chapter and show how the other forms of nomadism are ultimately unstable and therefore are doomed to fail in social settings.

Chapter Two explores the political and social milieux which seek to normalise citizens within local and national settings. It focuses on the methods which governing bodies use to normalise citizens, and the methods nomads use to resist normalisation. It will also discuss how nomads, as posthumans, are as susceptible to the influence of ideology as humans who are normalised since they represent an alternative ontology of being human. What I reveal through scrutinising these scholars is that the nomad is a temporary state of being, which eventually re-submits to normalisation and thus solves the dilemma of its instability. It is exemplified in my literary analysis of Silverberg's *The World Inside* at the end of the chapter.⁵² My reading of Silverberg will show a literary example of nomadism which tests my paradigm against the theoretical body that I will construct.

Chapter Three explores the embodiment of posthumanist subjects, the production of embodied knowledge and the agency of posthuman, nomadic bodies. It also shows how the development of literature has followed humanity for thousands of years and continues this development in expression until today. I will also explore the ethics of representing bodies in non-traditional forms of literature such as graphic novels as new modes of literary expression have evolved allow for new ways of exploring and challenging contemporary social imaginations. This is shown in my analysis of Masamune Shirow's *Ghost in The Shell*.⁵³ In this Japanese graphic novel (manga) I show how he subverts cyborg ontologies to challenge normalised social-imaginary expectations by presenting using a strong female cyborg protagonist to challenge traditional body politics and by presenting cyborgs as ambiguous superheroes, leaving their agency, humanity, and allegiances in doubt.

⁵¹ J.G. Ballard, *High Rise* (London: Fourth Estate, 2014).

⁵² Robert Silverberg, *The World Inside* (New York: Orb, 2010).

⁵³ Masamune Shirow, *Ghost in the Shell* (Milwaukie: Dark Horse Comics, 1995).

Chapter One: Methodologies - A Nomad Walks Among Us

Nomads, both physically and conceptually have existed throughout written and pre-recorded history. From examples of nomadic migrations from the African continent thousands of years ago to nomadic peoples today, the nomad is widely related to peoples of uncertain and mobile origins. The term has become split between the postmodern act of travelling through spaces, such as in Richards and Wilson's critique of types of worldwide travellers in *The Global Nomad* in which the global nomad converging with a 'McDonaldised' system of conventional tourism.⁵⁴ The point their edited book makes is that the travel industry of the twenty-first century was seeing a re-emergence of nomadism supported by the increasing ease of international travel, a growing network of budget hostels and travel companies, and the increasing flexibility of life path and work patterns.⁵⁵

Meanwhile Braidotti's Deleuzian social dismantler in *Transpositions* attempts to decompile notions of Self, identity, and belongings into free-floating connections. This can be seen in her attempt to dismantle the us/them binary, as she argues it replaces a fixed notion of European citizenship with a functionally differentiated network of affiliations and loyalties.⁵⁶

The alternative to this investigation into the relation between capitalism and travelling is to define critical nomadism as the act of interdisciplinary criticism. When referring to nomadism, we are either referring to a traveller through spaces, or someone who travels through disciplines. As I will show in this chapter, the figures of nomad as traveller and nomad as critic are different. I will explore the latter in depth, through tracing its philosophical lineage through Deleuze, and later with Guattari, and finally through Braidotti.

Caren Kaplan offers an ideal introduction to defining nomads. She states that a nomad is:

[O]ne who can track a path through a seemingly illogical space without succumbing to nation-state and/or bourgeois organisation and mastery. [...] the nomad

⁵⁴ *The Global Nomad: Backpacker: Travel in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Greg Richards and Julie Wilson (Clevedon: Channel View Publications, 2004), p. 3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁵⁶ Rosi Braidotti, *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics*, p. 79.

Note: on page 269 of *Transpositions* Braidotti argues that an ethics of embodied differences is needed to respond to the principle of alterity for which an undifferentiated grammar of gender 'simply will not do'. I make a similar point later in this chapter, but framing the parallel at this point stipulates that my approach is not a complete rejection of Braidottian thought.

represents a subject position that offers an idealized model of movement based on perpetual displacement.⁵⁷

The notion of displacement was particularly interesting to French scholars during the nineteenth century. The *flâneur* was a figure who moved through spaces, observing the ebb and flow of citizens moving through the city. In this chapter, I begin with exemplifying Deleuze's original conception of the nomad as a figure who is linked to surpassing mortal limitations and walking with the gods.⁵⁸ However, before approaching the genealogy of the nomad, I will make a distinction between what I mean by becoming nomadic and practising nomadism.

Chapter Outline

My first aim in this chapter is to reforge this established concept of the nomad by tracing its lineage to show it is not a clean break from humanism. We can see this through its susceptibility to the same tools which Humanism (with the capital H to indicate the privileging certain groups within the *homo sapiens* genus) uses to marginalise both human and non-human animals. My second aim is to garner more interest, as has been growing since the beginning of this thesis, in investigating wider interest in researching animal studies, agency, bio-politics and ideologies. This is in response to a heavy techno-centric focus in research from the 1990s to the present. The third aim I hope to work towards is to adapt the nomad as an incisive tool of social criticism which is able to examine our current time and our near futures, using interdisciplinary methodologies. Finally, on the theme of reforging the nomad, I hope also to temper it into an effective tool of literary criticism. I will show later that Deleuze had originally intended to use the nomad as a literary critiquing vehicle. However, this purpose has received scarcely any notice in English criticism, so I will recast it to show the efficacy of nomadic criticism.

This chapter progresses over four discrete but holistic sections. Firstly, I will examine Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*. This is the starting point of Deleuzian philosophy and

⁵⁷ Caren Kaplan, *Questions of Travel: Postmodern Discourses of Displacement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), p. 1.

⁵⁸ Deleuze, p. 36.

the birthplace of nomadism within philosophy. There are fundamental traits that linger in our modern interpretation of the nomad which survive from this, and therefore the dated construction is still relevant to our modelling of a new nomad.

The second section discusses Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*. The combined work from these philosophers created the means of taking the nomad from a purely theoretical state and giving it tools with which to perform social and literary criticisms. While their tools are versatile, they are sledgehammers against ideologies. The limitations of their work are that this nomad is still early, unfocused and fails to be incisive. With these criticisms said, the tools they developed are malleable to whatever purpose, are sound in design and are as relevant to the nomad of today as much as their original conception of it.

Thirdly, I will show how Rosi Braidotti took the nomad in the early twenty-first century and modernised it as a tool of postmodern-feminist critique and then to a posthumanist-feminist critiquing tool. Her refinement of the original design of the nomad shows leaps and bounds of progress from Deleuze's original conception, and she stays true to the model of *A Thousand Plateaus*. This currently remains true for better and for worse as she is aware, and further, this model is also subject to the violent limitations of the war machine nomad.

In the final theoretical section of this chapter, I will develop my own paradigm of the nomad which progresses from Kaplan, Deleuze, Guattari or Braidotti's iterations of the nomad.

What I aim to show through re-tracing the lines of nomadism from Deleuze and Guattari to Braidotti is that their nomads have critical failings which need to be addressed to ensure the nomad functions as a viable tool for literary criticism. At present, the model is doomed to collapse on itself. I cannot address all the limitations of their nomads in a single chapter, so my model of the nomad will be stated in this chapter. As well as this, my method of escaping the largest flaw of Deleuzian nomadism, the spiral into entropy, will be explored in Chapter Two.

I use the scientific term entropy here to create the image of the nomad as a molecule which breaks down and scatters, much like the psyche of the Deleuzian nomads I will show in my literary analysis. As nomads are all concerned with dismantling binary thought, this suggests that they are all at risk of the entropic spiral, there is no denying this. The nomad that I hope to construct recognises this possibility and recognises that through exercising its agency, it

can self-regulate and normalise before it endangers its psychic network. I will extend this discussion further in Chapter Two when discussing the public and private Selves.

At the end of this chapter, I will take the paradigm that I have formed in this chapter and use it to perform an analysis of Ballard's *High Rise*, which will show how my paradigm yields a new reading of Ballard's dystopian psychological fictions and also provide tangible evidence of the limits of Deleuzian nomadism and paves the way for my own paradigm to take over in the following chapter.

Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* – Four Founding Assumptions of Nomadism

Difference and Repetition was Deleuze's first attempt at creating his own philosophy. This volume follows several works that he had completed critiquing Plato, Heidegger, and Nietzsche. Many of the ideas he explores are directed towards distinguished philosophers, however, there are four loci of thought which align into the constellation which critical posthumanism recognises as the nomad. The four concerns that Deleuze introduced into philosophy forming the foundation of nomadic criticism are encountering difference, positivist critique, interconnectivity of self through time, and the redundancy of binary paradigms.

The first issue Deleuze raises is the compounding of difference with falseness. Deleuze takes the problem into the realm of the abstract and determines that the problematic distinction between the ordinary and the singular, [...] are undoubtedly more important than the hypothetical or categorical duality of truth and falsehood along with the 'errors'.⁵⁹ The nature of this duality causes a schism in what would otherwise be a spectrum of subjectivities. By welding difference and falsehood together, it injects the notion of 'not truth' into its entity, while in turn the ordinary 'truth' is impregnated with a simulated falseness. This is the nature of posthumanist concerns with dualisms, and it is why philosophers are seeking a post-dualism which is not a monism nor a multiplicity, as one would become too simplistic and the other too entropic. My solution is rather than continue

⁵⁹ Deleuze, p. 163.

with these notions of truth and falseness, I will introduce a new term. This is a term which Deleuze uses, and one which remains true to his ideology of positivist analysis, alterity.⁶⁰ Alterity indicates a difference as an alternative to a singular truth, not as an opposition. In singularity, the truth becomes simplified, normal, and homogenous.

Deleuze's ontology of difference later informs the multiple subjectivities through lived experience which are holistic but distinct.

[D]ifference is made, or makes itself, as in the expression 'make the difference'. This difference or determination *as such* is also cruelty. [...] form distinguishes itself from matter or from the ground, but not the converse, since distinction itself is a form.⁶¹

Difference, by this meaning, is not different depending on the original, but different as a form in itself. In this way, it is a truth within itself and can be called alterity. Alterity cannot be false, nor does it carry an inherent negative connotation because it relies on its own self-contained system, which may interface with other systems at will. Posthumanist critics such as Ferrando and Braidotti, were seeking to unveil the ideological myths which aim to strip people of their human privileges by rendering them 'less' than human.⁶² These techniques come in the form of dogmatism, subjectivities, and pseudoscience with absolutist assumptions of truth, morality, and evil.⁶³

Binary systems are limited; that much is indicated in the name. The answer to any query must be yes or no. "Maybe" or "sometimes" fall outside the scope of the answer that this system seeks. It is for this reason that nomads, along with posthumanist scholars, seek a post dualistic system. The limitation of binary systems is that they rely on a system of negative validation. This means that within this true/false, truth is derived from the absence of marking features. Thus, anything deemed to be false is tainted with the idea that it lacks something, and that which is marked as true has been impregnated with the idea of what it is not.

⁶⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, p. 178.

⁶¹ Deleuze, p. 28.

⁶² Ferrando, *Philosophical Posthumanism*; Theodor Adorno, *Prisms* (Cambridge: First MIT Press, 1983); Braidotti, *The Posthuman*, pp. 85, 30 & 35.

⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 35.

The risk that we face when casting a negative bias over subjects, both real and abstract, is that they become disfigured or dehumanised. In his criticism of Plato, Deleuze states:

When the ground rises to the surface, the human face decomposes in this mirror in which both determinations and the indeterminate combine in a single determination which 'makes' the difference. It is a poor recipe for producing monsters to accumulate heteroclitite determinations or to overdetermine the animal.⁶⁴

Posthumanist critics apply his idea of decomposition to their analyses of social and literary 'others' regarded as deviant or monstrous, such as though within the genre of the Gothic in the nineteenth century, (such as Stoker's *Dracula*, Shelley's *Frankenstein* or Machen's *The Great God Pan*). Understanding normativity through a negation creates an understanding of the world by features which it lacks. There must always be a reciprocated lack within criticism within the humanities for this mode to be valid. The creative imagery he uses here of the 'human face' which 'decomposes in this mirror' suggests that the human aspects which we define ourselves are constructed and malleable. Strikingly, the organicity of the face decomposes rather than augments, suggesting its connection to the natural world; an inextinguishable humanity within the postmodern, posthuman faceless terrain. The forced creation of Otherness suggests how the human face is indicative of the human-animal, harming itself in the pursuit of biopolitical power.

Deleuze was concerned with the notion of multiple, interlinked selves in time, which he describes as the first, second and third syntheses of time. The first synthesis of time (the past, immutable self of experiences) is a figure that informs our decision making. Deleuze begins by questioning how we can detect our past selves from experience and apply it to present situations. He begins by stating that the entire past is conserved in itself, but how can we save it for ourselves, how can we penetrate that in-itself without reducing it to the former present that it was, or to the present in relation to which it is past?⁶⁵ While we may presume that the Self is singular and that their previous states of 'Self' cease to exist, I believe the Self is always in mediation with its previous iterations through memory and habit.

⁶⁴ Deleuze, p. 28.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 84.

The second synthesis of time is directly related to active memory. Deleuze looks to Proust when analysing instances of this site of rupture. He explains that in memory, particularly when reminiscing, there is a fractured 'I'. This 'I' fractures into an I (present) and Self (sum of past experiences and beliefs); this is what makes memory possible as a 'past-present' memory, then oscillates as a past-present which brings the past into the present. The difference between the first synthesis, and the second is that the former synthesis is passive. The second synthesis is a conscious act of the Self drawing upon experiences to re-experience the past in the present. It makes the perceived Self multiple and leads to internal conflict. Deleuze argues this designates a passive synthesis; an involuntary memory which differs in kind from any active synthesis associated with voluntary memory.⁶⁶ Nomads are subject to stabilising forces which encourage conformity within society. While nomads may have the plasticity of multiple selves (selves based on situations), they often succumb to conformity. Experiments such as Moscovici's "conformity bias" have indicated the same.⁶⁷

Deleuze's third synthesis of time, empty-time, is where the circle of habit and memory ruptures. Deleuze claims that empty-time takes apart old structures and uses them in new ways, without a form of repetition. For example, the French revolution modelled itself on the Roman republic. The issue that Deleuze highlights is that the 'new' destabilises the Self, and forces it to re-stabilise and redevelop itself in response to these changes. In his discussion of empty-time, he explains that time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured 'I' constitutes the discovery of the transcendental.⁶⁸ The link between fracturing and the transcendental is not coincidental. Recognising our situatedness within communities, organisations, beliefs, and our assemblage with technology was a founding notion within posthumanism. All processes and practices are therefore embedded and embodied. Their situatedness cannot be dismissed from the context in which they originate.⁶⁹ This fracturing also contributed to the notion of truth being changed.

⁶⁶ Deleuze, p. 85.

⁶⁷ S. Moscovici, E. Lage, and M. Naffrechoux, 'Influence of a Consistent Minority on the Responses of a Majority in a Color Perception Task.', *Sociometry*, 32.4 (1969), 365–80 <<https://doi.org/10.2307/2786541>>.

⁶⁸ Deleuze, p. 86.

⁶⁹ Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman*.

The nomad distinguishes itself from normalised conventions through its questioning of traditional binary systems, models of beliefs, and its engagement with social and theoretical problems from multiple perspectives, forming the foundation for rhizomatic criticism. Crucially, this is all done while resisting normalisation from the external powers with which it mediates itself. The nomad in this way dances across a tightrope where with each step, it may sway towards entropy or towards normalisation. The slightest misstep can send it flying from this balancing act, which requires constant active effort to maintain. Deleuze arrived near to this image of the nomad, his criticism of linguists shows an awareness of the power of language to corrupt this balance.

Now, despite all these aspects which define a fully positive multiplicity, linguists constantly speak in negative terms and assimilate the differential relations between phonemes to relations of opposition. Perhaps it might be said that this is only a matter of conventional terminology, and that 'opposition' here means simply correlation.⁷⁰

Normalisation dependent on negation is limited as it exists by way of exclusivity. The paradigm is too shallow for dealing with subjectivities. Instead, a paradigm of spectrums, which correspond to situational and subjective arguments for support, eliminate this true/false paradigm. They operate on a principle which is later explored in *A Thousand Plateaus* regarding the 'lines of flight', which I interpret as lines of logic whose trajectories are curved when mediated by human subjectivities. Their conclusions therefore are subject to the situational evidence (research) and subjectivity (interpretation).

My conclusion to this section is that Deleuze was walking a narrow tightrope which was always doomed to sway into entropy. On the one end of his balancing pole, he held a tool which could dismantle societies, resist coding, and operate in non-confirmative ways. On the other end of his balancing pole, he had an observer, a figure standing outside of society looking inwards. This character exists as a measure against which citizens could live, but do not. Somewhere in the middle is the point where his paradigm finds balance, but I think that critics have not yet arrived there as they tend between a dismantling, ethics or nihilist focus when using the nomad in posthumanist research. The middle of this pole, the point of

⁷⁰ Deleuze, p. 204.

balance is entropy, meaning one of many arranged ways a system can take form and be stable. Towards the edges of the pole, we see negative entropy in action, where the system becomes more disordered and as coherence breaks down, the system risks collapsing. This is not to say his paradigm of the nomad which emerges from it should be abandoned, but it indicates a need for the acrobat to be retrained in their balancing act. In the next section I will take the conclusions and show how they inform the more commonly recognised nomad of *A Thousand Plateaus*, and then adapt it as a critical literary tool.

In this section I illustrated four concerns that surround the inception of the nomad in Deleuze's philosophy. His first concern was how traditional philosophy encountered difference as problematic. His response to this was to promote a method of positivist critique, which would subvert the assumed connection between the ordinary and truth, and their power over defining difference and falseness. He may have recognised the potential for select empowered groups to abuse this absolutist paradigm. As such, the paradigm which he puts forward concerns the question of subjectivities. He recognised that the concept of Self is made up of many subjectivities, and this is particularly so for the nomad. Deleuze's three syntheses of time explain how multiple selves are connected through time. These multiple selves can be both sites of rupture in the stable present self, and they are also indicators of a linear self which changes from one moment to the next through experiences. Finally, he addressed redundancy of binary paradigms. He showed that individuals are constantly under the influence of normalisation processes. The counter-argument to this proposal is to tend towards a multiplicity. The danger of this is one side allows only for the answers yes and no, while the opposing element only offers the answer 'maybe'. The concern here is not resolved, and Deleuze's early nomad, so intent on breaking free of normalising forces, hurls itself into chaos. At this point in the modern development of the figure of the nomad, Deleuze's nomad resembles a cluster of concerns which loosely resemble the nineteenth century flâneur. As I will show in my following section concerning *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze had matured his concept of nomadism, and alongside Guattari, he was able to evolve it into what is widely known as "The War Machine".

During the second half of the twentieth century, European scholars were enamoured with the possibility of reconceptualising humanity in a way that offered a break from the atrocities of two world wars. Deleuze and Guattari responded to this need by drawing on the origin of posthumanist through postmodernism. It would not be until three years prior to *A Thousand Plateaus* that Ihab Hassan would deliver 'Prometheus as Performer' as the keynote address for the International Symposium on Postmodern Performance in November 1976 (published in *The Georgia Review* in the following winter of 1977).⁷¹ It is Hassan who is credited with the first use of the term 'posthuman'.

A Thousand Plateaus brings together many concerns and tools for addressing social and literary investigations regarding the influence of the state, and those within it together to form a nomadic state, destroying 'The War Machine'. Deleuze and Guattari's nomad here is a tool which imposes limits on itself by what it can destroy (as it is an anti-state mode of operation); it never seeks to create. In my reading of *A Thousand Plateaus*, I will discuss four key components that form the core of nomad ontology which remain unchanged through Braidotti's iterations and my own. They remain static features that can be used to identify nomadic processes and practices within a body of theory or text. The goal of nomadism is the questioning of and intervening in traditional hierarchical systems, and creating space for minority voices. The processes that I will address will be rhizomatic thought and assemblage-forming.

A Thousand Plateaus was published twelve years after Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*. It is the second in a series of books written jointly by Deleuze and Guattari, and represents the cornerstone of nomadic criticism, as the origin of nomadism as a literary and social analytical tool. This section will present four key aspects of nomadology that will carry through to the end of this thesis as they are the tools which govern nomadic ontology. Through this section I will introduce Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of rhizomes, machinic assemblages, abstract machines, and strata. These are all parts of their model known as the nomad.

⁷¹ Ihab Hassan, 'Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture?', *The Georgia Review*, 31.4 (1977), 830–50 (n. Footnotes) <<https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/41397536>>.

Rhizomes – The De-centralised Centre of A Thousand Plateaus

Rhizomes represent non-hierarchical structures, which means they have no beginning nor end. Rhizomes are assemblages of a-centred multiplicities. A multiplicity in their work is something which cannot be understood uniquely as a subject or object. In other words, they are magnitudes and dimensions, therefore cannot be changed without altering its nature. I infer the meaning of a rhizome is simply multiple multiplicities with no inherent structure.

Rhizomes work counter to the concept of so-called ‘arborescent’ models, hierarchical models of the centre-periphery type.⁷² This type of model is one we see across western societies, where old systems, cultures, political regimes, etc. are replaced or ‘over-coded’ with new signifying regimes. Rhizomes are over-coding mechanisms that subjugates other regimes into its own model. Therefore, there are no sites of rupture resulting from competition for authority. Arborescent thought is rooted in Western thinking and is observable in economic, educational, and other institutional facilities, as I will show through my analysis of Foucault in Chapter Two.

There are six components which define a rhizome. These features are: connection forming (it is always forming connections); heterogeneity (any point can connect with any other point); multiplicity (it is not composed of a prior unity); asignifying rupture (if you break it at any point it can start growing again); cartography and decalcomania (it is like a map being drawn, not a tracing which is already permanent).

Rhizomes are defined by their radical ability to connect at any number of points. They are heterogeneous, meaning that any point of a rhizome may connect to any other point through the ‘line of flight’ (metaphorically a line of reasoning). The line of flight is the means of connecting many points of thought in many different ways, to trace one arc which is unique in shape, yet can overlap other lines of flight without presenting a conflicting true/false paradigm.

Deleuze and Guattari’s summary of the rhizome is succinct and evocative.

[U]nlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play

⁷² Deleuze and Guattari, p. 506.

very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to the one nor the multiple. It is not the One that becomes Two or even directly three, four, five, etc. It is not a multiple derived from the One, or to which One is added ($n+1$). It is composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (*milieu*) from which it grows and which it overflows. It constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency, and from which the One is always subtracted ($n-1$).⁷³

They state that the asignifying rupture is a feature which enables any piece of the rhizome that may be broken off to start up again due to its having no centre, beginning or end.

Because of this, they describe rhizomes as maps, which are continually being re-drawn, as opposed to traced (which implies permanence). Maps, too, have no beginning or end point and are constantly changing. The nomad, likewise, constantly re-draws its boundaries in the context of its existence in milieu with other organisms and artefacts. Finally, 'decalcomania'; as with its overt definition of printing something onto another surface, the sixth quality of a rhizome does something similar. Decalcomania is attributed to the rhizome's continuous negotiation with its context, and its adaptive nature in response to and against rigid organisation and restriction. Rhizomes becomes a dismantling tool used to dismantle hierarchies and, depending on use, can lead to numerous political and creative outcomes.

Rhizomes are the most important tool for nomads, and Deleuze, likewise, uses it as a tool for exploring alternative ways of structuring spaces and tracing lines of logic. Nomads in Deleuze's work attempt to use the concept of Rhizomes to dismantle arborescent models of society, or as state-dismantling tools. This is why nomads in *A Thousand Plateaus* are referred to as war machines. This dismantling concept is bound up with the nomad all the way into the twenty-first century. The issue that remains behind is that because rhizomes are a-centred multiplicities. They tend infinitely towards entropy, as they break down what were once socially bound structures into increasingly divided tribes. This problem becomes clear in my analysis of *High Rise*, where social groups become divided based on the address of residents in the apartment block until these arbitrary groups also collapse.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 21.

Machinic Assemblages

As machines are defined as a system of interruptions or breaks, machinic assemblages are concerned with material and social flows, and collective assemblages of enunciation, which have to do with (semiotic and linguistic) sign regimes. One example of an assemblage is chivalry, the man-woman assemblage. These assemblages offer literary nomads to showcase how characters (or real persons) resist the flows of society, operating in ways that alienate readers from their efficiently operating linguistic and ideological systems. When we witness characters behaving in ways that do not conform with social expectations, or in ways which we may assume are harmful (or may genuinely be so, i.e., using hallucinogens) they are exercising autonomy, or agency over how they live, die, and seek pleasure. In short, these non-conforming characters may or may not be nomads, but they are always practising an alternative ontology to the normalised citizen.

In my three literary analyses, this assemblage-forming quality of nomadism comes across in different ways. Each of these different expressions of assemblage-forming nomads will be explained fully in the prelude to the analysis and during the analysis, and I will also state my reasons for selecting each text.

Machinic assemblages mediate the connection and relation of two strata. The warrior and the state apparatuses are both types of machine assemblages. The warrior could be defined as a male-hand-weapon, and the state has many more complex components. Deleuze and Guattari explain that there are misconceptions around the notion of these assemblages:

We think the material or machinic aspect of an assemblage relates not to the production of goods but rather to a precise state of intermingling of bodies in a society, including all the attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, alterations, amalgamations, penetration, and expansions that affect bodies of all kinds in their relations to one another. What regulates the obligatory, necessary, or permitted interminglings of bodies is above all an alimentary regime and a sexual regime. Even technology makes the mistake of considering tools in isolation: tools exist only in relation to the interminglings they make possible or that make them possible.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 90.

Machinic assemblages therefore encompass all physical assemblages and their purpose. For instance, we may envision an assemblage of hand and tool, however, depending on how the tool is used, it could be a weapon. Machinic assemblages are a type of glue that holds everything together, but it cannot do it alone. The other component which binds together the assemblage as a whole is the abstract machine. Abstract machines form the plane of consistency which operate as the forces which draw together the individual components, which will bind together at the body without organs (a site of activation) to provide the potentiality of the various flows to realise it. Nomads are not explicitly called the body without organs, but they are a site of activation for the organic and inorganic. Nomads resist normalisation, which I return to in Chapter Two, because they form machinic assemblages consciously with non-normalised processes, practices, and objects. Failure to control the assemblage-forming process results in entropic obliteration, and it stands as one of the largest shortcomings of Deleuzian nomads as I will show in *High Rise*.

Abstract Machines

Machinic assemblages effectuate the abstract machine across many strata. The abstract machine requires a body without organs to activate itself. Assemblages enable the body without organs to organise flows of ideas and energies where everything is captured and stratified. Deleuze and Guattari describe the abstract machine as:

[T]he state in which it remains enveloped in a corresponding stratum (ecumenon), and the state in which it develops in its own right on the destratified plane of consistency (planomenon). The abstract machine begins to unfold, to stand to full height, producing an illusion exceeding all strata, even though the machine itself still belongs to a determinate stratum. This is, obviously, the illusion constitutive of man (who does man think he is?). This illusion derives from the overcoding immanent to language itself.⁷⁵

While Deleuze and Guattari describe the abstract machine as a purely Matter-Function - a diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions and contents it will distribute - I take it to literally imply the forces which hold together the individual pieces of a

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 63.

strata.⁷⁶ Abstract machines are impetuses towards textual, or social production. They act as catalysts, using desire to perpetuate machinic assemblages in the body without organs. It describes the force which makes the machine, or part of the machinic assemblage which disrupts the flow of a continuum (money, air, knife, etc) with another machine (mouth, anus, thirst, etc) to form a new process or practice.

Assemblages help to understand the subjectivity of characters, and what forms of relationships they make with technology and animals. They create scenarios where we can question the politics of humanity, its relations with non-human animals, and technology.

Assemblages are already different from strata. They are produced in the strata, but operate in zones where milieus become decoded: they begin by extracting a *territory* from the milieus. Every assemblage is basically territorial. The first concrete rule for assemblages is to discover what territoriality they envelop, for there always is one: in their trash can or on their bench, Beckett's characters stake out a territory.⁷⁷

Deleuze, by critiquing Samuel Beckett's *Endgame*, reveals that he had already considered the marriage of his philosophy with literary studies in his theoretical writing. This benefits literary scholars who wish to use Deleuzian philosophy in their criticism in two ways. Firstly, the recognition that Deleuze and Guattari also contemplated the applicability of this model to literary studies suggests their text is not limited to philosophy as the book's aims are also interdisciplinary. Secondly, assemblages are an adaptation of already practised strategies (such as deconstruction) of literary analysis. Rather than entering into the argument of a formalist approach versus the school of new criticism, a rhizomatic analysis of assemblages allows for the greatest flexibility and availability of information to enter an analysis.

Assemblages allow critics to explore research from many disciplines while being a specialist in perhaps one or two areas of study. The disadvantage of this approach is that often the critic will stumble upon fields of broad and deep research that they are unaware of, but the benefit of the approach allows for new perspectives on subjects which have been limited by the parameters of their field. Critical posthumanism attempts to reposition the privileged Human subject within a paradigm that re-politicises it in relation to the organic and inorganic world that subjugated.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 141.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 503.

Critical posthumanist literary analysis can use the nomad to draw out the key political concerns of authors and address their potential impact their writing has on readers. Writing which pertains to an existence within a 'Real' world (it does not matter which world it pertains to); the ebb and flow of bodily and spatial politics play out regardless. Each of these is limited to the Human conception of what these other societies may resemble. They are a re-presentation of the world, and they are not allowed to speak for themselves.

Abstract machines are useful in developing the figure of the nomad as they enable new clusters of analysis. Nomads, as Deleuzian entities, are desire driven. Nomads use this force of desire to maintain their boundaries, to resist normalisation, or to challenge social injustices to form machinic assemblages. In this way, non-normalised assemblage forming becomes less alien. Simultaneously, the marriage of philosophy and literature in conjunction with the influence of abstract machines opens the way for a new form of criticism, which I call rhizomatic criticism. I expand fully on this concept when I elaborate on my paradigm in the final theoretical section of this chapter.

Strata

According to Deleuze and Guattari, there are three types of strata, each with a double enunciation of content and expression.⁷⁸ Each of these expressions are made of form and substance. I focus on how they are the result of a coming together of man and animal, or man and machine to form an ontology. Strata for me describe the intensity and essence of an ontology. These ontologies are not wholly distinct as they are all connected in some way, as is the nature of being alternative to something else. This is where Deleuze and Guattari's theory of rhizomes is relevant. Rhizomes are a means by which multiplicities combine together in certain ways at certain moments, while the plane of consistency is to do with the realm between multiplicities. The plane of consistency acts as the container for the milieu of multiplicities which exist inside it. The abstract machine operates from the 'plane

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 4.

of consistency' (the macro-structure of a paradigm) to organise matter, to bring form to the organs in the body without organs which until then was destratified.

Finally, Deleuze and Guattari define strata as:

Strata are Layers, Belts. They consist of giving form to matters, of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems of resonance and redundancy, of producing upon the body of the earth molecules large and small and organizing them into molar aggregates. Strata are acts of capture, they are like "black holes" or occlusions striving to seize whatever comes within their reach.⁷⁹

Deleuze and Guattari theorise how their subject of interest, the schizophrenic, forms assemblages with the inorganic so the body without organs finds new ways of expression. For example, with a car, hypochondriac, drug addict and S&M people all are trying to create bodies without organs for themselves. Strata, therefore, are the states of being that are attained through the combination of subject, desire, and object. They create new assemblages. The drug addict strata becomes a machinic assemblage of user, desire (such as escape or mental expansion) and the chosen drug. The drug addict risks becoming destratified in the case of having no drug, or overdosing, spiralling into entropy if s(he) is unable to pull together a new system of assemblages. The schizophrenic in Deleuze and Guattari's book shares one risk in common with the nomad that I develop in this chapter. This similarity is that if either experiences too rapid of a destratification it can result into a complete disintegration of the subject's system, whether that be on an individual or a societal scale.

Experiments in new expressions allow the trapped body without organs to create new assemblages where its energy can flow. A body without organs always tries to break out of its plane of consistency and create new assemblages between organic and inorganic assemblies. If the anarchic power is excessively greater than the imperial power which stratifies it, it will disintegrate, become destructive and/or die. Notably, the characters of my literary analyses at the end of each chapter are examples of the body without organs in literature.

Essentially, Deleuze and Guattari's deviants are nomads. Nomads, as assemblage-forming entities, are non-normalised and forever dance on the tightrope of entropic ruin. Older

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 4.

nomadic models, such as Deleuze and Guattari's nomad, rely on their destructive anarchic power to dismantle hierarchical structures. This is because they may fall back on their a-centred rhizomatic structure where if they take damage from these acts, they may break the damaged piece away and continue their actions. This is where my nomad will diverge later. It is aware that the strata it creates have an impact and while it can break these pieces away, it recognises that to be nomadic in this extreme has its limits. It becomes a deterrent for all out destructive practices and promotes a new kind of nomad, one which specialises in negotiation.

Conclusion to Deleuzian Nomadism

Beginning with Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, the original iteration of the nomad we see is the ungrounded figure of the nomad. The term floats in the aether, limited to interacting with deities, unconnected to humanity. It is important because it will be developed later in *A Thousand Plateaus*, with Guattari, and finally transformed into a socially active character within Braidotti's work.

Deleuze, early in *Difference and Repetition*, opposes the mode of nomad to the limitation of Godly realms.

Even among the gods, each has his domain, his category, his attributes, and all distribute limits and lots to mortals in accordance with destiny. Then there is a completely other distribution which must be called nomadic, a nomad *nomos*, without property, enclosure or measure. Here, there is no longer a division of that which is distributed but rather a division among those who distribute *themselves* in an open space - a space which is unlimited, or at least without precise limits.⁸⁰

This indicates that 'nomads' were originally made for transcending limitations. Nomads are portrayed as without abode and property; nomads lack fixed space where they claim sovereignty. They are the anti-state apparatus (state-dismantling tools). The notion of space, both virtual and real permeates Deleuze's work, revealing affect between subjects and the territory they inhabit. In this case, Deleuze's nomadic theory pertains to the

⁸⁰ Deleuze, p. 36.

proclivity of crossing boundaries. This has been seen as deviancy, monstrosity, and otherness, and are explored by posthumanist theorists.

Nomadism within Deleuze's work is bound with notions of anarchism and plasticity. He is not suggesting that nomadic thought is dangerous, however, he posits it as a State-changing tool, capable of affecting subjects (persons and entities) and organisations alike.

When we say that univocal being is related immediately and essentially to individuating factors, we certainly do not mean by the latter individuals constituted in experience, but that which acts in them as a transcendental principle: as a plastic, anarchic and nomadic principle, contemporaneous with the process of individuation, no less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of constituting them temporarily; intrinsic modalities of being, passing from one 'individual' to another, circulating and communicating underneath matters and forms.⁸¹

Nomadism is the factor which upsets sedimentary and hierarchical structures. It is the working-class man, the black rights movements, the suffragettes. Nomadism operates against state structures, fighting to secure its own space within that structure. The correlation that nomadism makes with plasticity is that it does not move to change the materials which compose society. It strives to create recognition within the structure it deterritorialises to make space for itself within it. For Deleuze and Guattari, deterritorialization was said to begin from a trait of expression. That trait is said to be "deterritorialising" in relation to the other precisely because it diagrams it, it carries it off, raises it to its own power. The most deterritorialized element causes the other element to cross a threshold enabling a conjunction of their respective deterritorializations, a shared acceleration.⁸² The interpretation of this process generally means a breaking down of semiotic connotations so that the subject in question may be examined in individual pieces. The original use of the term is worth remembering because the other element which is a part of the deterritorialization process is the critic, and therefore, it is an act of assemblage between critic and text where deterritorialization takes place.

Arguably, the methodology of posthumanism is nomadic. Therefore, in complementary manner, the character of most interest in critical posthumanist analyses is the nomad. Nomads must function as an everyday subject within society; they must be politically

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 38.

⁸² Deleuze and Guattari, pp. 141–42.

engaged in challenging notions of what we think humanity means, its relation to other humans and species; it must be a cyborg, or it must be an animal-human.

Distinguishing features of nomads include a refusal to conform to hierarchical structures, an existence on a plane of pure equality with other subjects of the same species, and a failure to adapt themselves without consent to the environment around them. In short, they are stateless, without hierarchy, and self-mediated. The advantages this posits is that they are able to move (movement being the key term) in any direction with no (or little) constraint. The freedom to move in any direction and the ability to self-mediate with other entities means they can form any assemblage at any time. The problematic aspects which follow are that the unlimited plasticity (or adaptability) makes them difficult to define, identify and prove. Another disadvantage to nomadism is that the flexibility they hold does not permit cohesion, and therefore they are nearly always encountered as individual. One issue this raises, addressed in Chapter Two, is how they exist and function on both macro and micro social scales.

This nomadic figure has developed from traversing the realms of the Gods since its original publication. However, the images assigned to this figure in Deleuze and Guattari's joined work are hardly soothing. The nomadic figure is an essential aspect of enacting the paradigm that I have constructed for the purposes of political action within a signifying and hierarchical regime. Deleuze and Guattari's nomad in *A Thousand Plateaus* is connected to the idea of 'the war machine'. By this, they mean to say that nomads not only challenge, but threaten signifying regimes (societies) with deterritorialization, its most problematic aspect I see in their work. Hayles, too, notes this shortcoming with its prevalence within the posthumanities school of new materialism.⁸³

Modern Nomads – Braidotti's Next Generation

Braidotti's work has extensively developed nomadism from 1994 to today.⁸⁴ While I will not provide an exhaustive analysis of her work, I will borrow definitions from three sources and

⁸³ Hayles, *Unthought*, pp. 65–66.

⁸⁴ Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*.

explain their developments from Deleuze and Guattari's nomad before moving on to their applicability in this thesis.⁸⁵

In Braidotti's book *Nomadic Subjects*, she begins her work which spans over two decades on nomadic theory. Her works began by exploring different facets which make up the notion of what we call a nomadic subject. Her intention was to develop it as 'as a suitable theoretical figuration for contemporary subjectivity'.⁸⁶ By figuration, she means a style of thought that evokes or expresses an alternative to phallogocentrism. The nomad in Braidotti's work is a politically informed account of an alternative subjectivity used to promote feminist goals. Since that time, it has expanded further in purpose.

Braidotti states that a question arises in response to the existence of her nomad:

[W]here can this new theoretical and political creativity be founded? Where does "the new" come from? What paradigms can assist us in the elaboration of new schemes? Is the model of scientific rationality totally discredited, or can it still provide some inspiration?⁸⁷

At the time of publication, it was not common practice to include the sciences in the humanities. A lot of distrust had been garnered due to many fallacies coming to light from gender and racial myths to falsified scientific research. The terrain since that time has changed and more and more sociological writers and particularly those within the posthumanities tend to support their research with scientific evidence.

Braidotti's feminist figurations are, she claims, 'heterogeneous ways in which feminists today are exploring different forms of the subjectivity of women and of their struggle with language in order to produce affirmative representations.'⁸⁸ They are, as she and I both understand it, politically informed images that portray complex subjective interactions within a social setting. I believe while being familiar with Deleuze and Guattari's work, she may have overlooked the influence they had on her own writing process. As explained earlier, rhizomatic thought bears six traits. The trait which Braidotti is most concerned with at this point is heterogeneity. Braidotti argued for feminism to behave as a rhizome, and in

⁸⁵ Braidotti, *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics*; Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

⁸⁶ Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*, p. 1.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 3.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p. 3.

the years following this influential book, it did exactly that. Feminism has become a staple contributor to the posthumanities and some, like Braidotti and Cary Wolfe, have argued that it is what has shaped the incarnation of posthumanism that we see today.⁸⁹ She adds that ‘The array of terms available to describe this new female feminist subjectivity is telling’⁹⁰. At this point she goes on to list many forms of feminism, which result in a confusing array of different themes and ideas being evoked. The effect is similar to the field of posthumanist studies over the last decade.

Following her laying the terrain for nomadism, Braidotti then moves on to tackle the concerns of the nomadic subject and defines them further. One concern she describes is in a feminist context, but is broadly applicable to posthumanist studies, and will make up the debate that I intend to evoke in the third chapter of this thesis. She states that:

Consequently, rethinking the bodily roots of subjectivity is the starting point for the epistemological project of nomadism [...]. The body, or the embodiment, of the subject is to be understood as neither a biological nor a sociological category but rather as a point of overlapping between the physical, the symbolic, and the sociological [...]. In other words, feminist emphasis on embodiment goes hand in hand with a radical rejection of essentialism.⁹¹

Questions of embodiment have changed since the publication of this book. While race and gender are still topics of debate today, there are posthumanist concerns of cyborgism such as does a body infused with technology count as human, or should there be a new category? Does technology help to eliminate violence and improve life, or does it enhance our capacity for violence? Braidotti’s point that posing such questions as a nomad (which seeks to tackle pre-existing beliefs and hierarchies) is necessary to challenge fallacies and conduct observable and provable investigations into the status of ‘Other’ humans.

Braidotti claims that the nomadic subject is a ‘myth’, or a ‘political fiction’ as a nod to Donna Haraway’s *A Cyborg Manifesto* (explored in Chapter Three). It allowed her to blur boundaries without burning bridges.⁹² Her work on theorising nomadic subjects opens the way for incisive challenges to hierarchical and exclusive systems, such as the human subject. Her definition of the nomad at the beginning of her book informs my work to shape a

⁸⁹ Wolfe, p. 127.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 3.

⁹¹ Ibid, pp. 3–4.

⁹² Ibid, p. 4.

subject which still bears resemblance to its original creator's design. However, my nomad will be altered to fit my own exploration of posthumanist terrain.

The nomad is my own figuration of a situated, postmodern, culturally differentiated understanding of the subject in general and of the feminist subject in particular. This subject can also be described as postmodern/industrial/colonial, depending on one's locations. In so far as axes of differentiation such as class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, and others intersect and interact with each other in the constitution of subjectivity, the notion of nomad refers to the simultaneous occurrence of many of these at once.⁹³

Her definition is widely used. Therefore, it is noticeable that her position has altered only slightly to fit more recent research. I also note from her work that she places her subject on axes of differentiation. These are points of contact with my proposed posthumanist methodology. The paradigm they all occupy is that of subjectivity, and the nomad can represent many of these axes meeting at one point as a type that I describe as a nexus. The effect of accepting the nomad in this way is it evokes a critical consciousness of what is being examined whether it be sociological or literary. The many fields that can be examined are integrated into many rhizomes. Unconnected, except tangentially by lines of enquiry which need not run as a straight line, but curve to fit the speciality and interests of the investigator. The investigator within rhizomatic thought is a nomad. The only ability this person has is to create new assemblages, creating alterities to existing strata. Not all of these changes will remain. Rhizomes can have sections damaged or broken away, and these sections of alterity make for interesting sites to explore, to examine the reasons why they failed, and why they could not be sustained, but these go beyond Braidotti's purview. Her aim is to create a subject whose critical consciousness resists 'settling into socially coded modes of thought and behaviour.'⁹⁴

Transpositions

Braidotti's vision of the nomadic subject in *Transpositions* (2006) is decidedly rooted in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Her subject is no longer concerned solely with female equality but has

⁹³ Ibid, p. 4.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 5.

become a feminist-inclined posthumanist nomad. This nomad, in seeking to establish a subjective nomadic ethics is more destructive in nature than her previous publication and has gained the ability to connect with more sites of activation. She opens her book by describing the state that her subject exists in:

In a totally schizophrenic double pull the consumerist and socially enhanced faith in the new is supposed not only to fit in with, but also actively to induce, the rejection of in-depth changes. The potentially innovative, de-territorializing impact of the new technologies is hampered and tuned down by the reassertion of the gravitational pull of old and established values.⁹⁵

The nomad, as seen above, is tied in with the idea of creating newness. It puts this figure in the position of suffering from a 'schizophrenic double pull', as she asserts. Her nomad is situated in between acceptance of familiar values and conditions that make up the fabric of their everyday lives and the desire to create new assemblages, whether they be productive or obscene. She makes another reference to Deleuze and Guattari's work in describing the 'gravitational pull' of old and established values. The black hole takes lines of flight, and submits them to a subjective pressure, warping their original form, de-territorialising them, and reassembling them laden with new meanings. The theoretical 'gravity', which is exercised on new modes of thinking, are the black holes of Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, which is further evidence of previous ontologies of thought lingering in how we formalise and normalise our processes and practices today.

Throughout her book, Braidotti seeks to make nomads accountable for their beliefs and actions. She argues to show that nomadic activity which takes place in the transitions between potentially contradictory positions does not make it a view from nowhere, that nomads act within the contexts of their histories and cultures.⁹⁶ Her investigation lays down a cartography by which the posthuman nomad can be charted as it moves through philosophical and political spaces. These politicised spaces can include financial, gender and racial (including cyborgs) inequities. Her mode of challenging inequity is, as she describes it, pragmatic amidst a complex sequence of lived events and conditions.

In continuing with this notion of de-territorialisation, Braidotti adds in this book that there is growing evidence of a post-human universe of ruthless power-relations mediated by

⁹⁵ Braidotti, *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics*, p. 2.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 29

technology.⁹⁷ Technology creates new expressions for older processes that exist, channelling desire and psychologically roots itself in our animal organism to be mediated with potentialities that these technologies offer. Technology creates new assemblages and new, heightened potentialities for desire to exist. An example from Ballard's *Crash* shows the main character frequently creating sexualised assemblages with motor vehicles. The effect is a type of auto-mania, the idea of an accident, of serious bodily injuries and of cars taking in some aspects of humanity, though imprints left on seats and detritus left behind by previous uses become a type of obscene assemblage.⁹⁸ The site of the car in *Crash* creates the potential for new assemblages in sex, presenting the potential for new assemblages in relation to it. Technology is an important concern for posthumanist critics for this very reason. A nomad can arise at any point and create new assemblages and explore an aspect of humanity that still remains unmapped.

My argument leads into Braidotti's own reflections on nomadic cartographies.

Transpositions is a book of ethics and of cartographies. She asks through the course of the book how cartographies raise ethical questions such as:

On the analytic front: what means do social and cultural critics have at their disposal in order to make sense of and account for the structural paradoxes of a historical era? On the more normative front, the question is: what are our hopes of finding adequate ways of expressing empowering alternatives and of having them socially enacted? How does this consumerist and socially enhanced emphasis on the new fit in with the rejection of in-depth changes? How do they join forces in reiterating old and established viewpoints? What are our hopes of finding adequate ways of handling them?⁹⁹

Braidotti does not conceptualise her nomad in the same way that I do in this book.

Transpositions indicates an overlay of ideas, a blurring of boundaries, while my own nomad relies on the older notions of being heterogeneous and highly connective. The effect is similar between these two archetypes that we have created. Her nomad deals with some of her concerns by relying on 'transposable notions that drift nomadically among different texts'¹⁰⁰. However, there is an aspect of her work which lends itself to my concerns of

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 4

⁹⁸ J.G. Ballard, *Crash* (London: Fourth Estate, 2011).

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 7.

creating a critical posthumanism, which is distinct from but complementary to philosophical posthumanism, which I argued at length in the introduction. She states:

Transposable concepts are 'nomadic notions' that weave a web connecting philosophy to social realities; theoretical speculations to concrete plans; concepts to imaginative figurations. Trans-disciplinary in structure, transposable concepts link bio-technology to ethics and connect them both with social and political philosophy.¹⁰¹

Nomads are vehicles for theorising and enacting social reforms as they are both counter-state and state forming, both anti-ideological and paradigm-forming. Their target is to challenge difference which spells inferiority. In essentialist paradigms, Other is reduced to facing lethal consequences. She picks up this line of thought in later works, but it is in this book she first mentions the notion of 'disposable bodies'. People branded as Other become 'less human' and consequently 'more mortal than those who fall under the category of "Sameness"'.¹⁰²

Nomads, cyborgs, and excess human bodies are all subject to the same dehumanising forces from Braidotti's viewpoint, they all become a generalised, abstract image of spectral commodification. They all become a part of a 'digital proletariat: mostly anonymous, underpaid exploited bodies of labourers, usually ethnic, natives or immigrant, which fuel the technological revolution.'¹⁰³ The power of anonymity coincides with excess, and it is in this combination where than excess of want does not correlate with a supply of resources, power, or equity. These subjects are then forced to fight for survival on the margins of existence, leaving no resources to waste on resistance, it is the ultimate normalisation through deprivation.

Faced with this problem, Braidotti incorporates a new paradigm in which to protect these figures. Though originally Agamben's creation, Braidotti has widely promoted the ethics of bios/zoe.¹⁰⁴ Her main emphasis is on the zoe aspect of this paradigm. While zoe refers to all life as biological, bios refers to much more complicated processes from discourse to assemblages from social structures. Taking just a fraction of this long definition she states:

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p. 7.

¹⁰² Ibid, p. 21.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 53

¹⁰⁴ Agamben, *The Open : Man and Animal*.

Zoe refers to the endless vitality of life as continuous becoming. Guattari and Simondon refer to this process as a transversal form of subjectivity or 'trans-individuality'. This mode of diffuse yet grounded subject-position achieves a double aim: firstly it critiques individualism and secondly it supports a notion of subjectivity in the sense of qualitative, transversal and group-oriented agency. [...] This nomadic eco-philosophy of belonging is complex and multi-layered.¹⁰⁵

This definition links in with her third axis of transposition which concerns a 'becoming-other' in relation to intra-species othering. Put simply, Othering of other humans. Braidotti shows how we need to 'rethink the embodied structure of contemporary subjectivity' to include criticism of biotechnologies and information technology.¹⁰⁶ Her later work brings these concerns to the forefront of debate. The effect of this is to understand the post-humanist, as she describes it as a hybrid, and hence impure. This idea will be carried through into Chapter Two when discussing Badmington's view and my own on who and what the posthumanist is through how it has been theorised in the twenty-first century.

My Paradigm of New Nomadism

I will now develop my own iteration of the nomad based on my reading of Deleuze, Guattari, and Braidotti. There are six aspects that I extrapolate from this chapter which inform my iteration of the nomad. These are: the distinction between becoming nomadic vs practising nomadism; normalisation vs deviance; multiple selves; the risks of extreme binary thinking; the methodology of rhizomatic criticism; and the nature of my gentler nomad.

There is an important difference between becoming nomadic and practising nomadism. Becoming nomadic is a process of extracting oneself from arborescent and dogmatic structures of political, social, and philosophical absolutism. It is a purely internal and intentional process of picking apart the separate agents within ourselves: our inner animal; the feeling; experiencing creature; the inner human; our narrative and political weaver; and our technology, the practices and processes with which and through which we create our collective consciousness. The final part can take place in isolation, through the act of interacting with a system, or literally through meeting with technology. It can also take part

¹⁰⁵ Braidotti, *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 96.

on a collective scale, through technologies of power, by making availability of certain key or luxury resources and exclusive information. With this virtual power, an outside influence may hold sway over our physical and virtual boundaries.

Practising nomadism should follow the process that I have described above of becoming nomadic. While becoming nomadic is to take the time to understand the assemblages a subject forms haphazardly with its environment, when understanding their cultural, political, and subjective assumptions, potential nomads who begin practising nomadism are no longer passive elements of their environment. It is the posthuman expression of nomadism, and it is the subject of my literary analyses. The difference between becoming nomadic and practising nomadism is evident. To become nomadic is the same as having reservations, doubts, or disagreements with your local milieu. Practising nomadism can only be done locally. It is specific to its environment as each village, city, and nation has its own customs, beliefs, and histories. A nomad cannot be simultaneously alien from them all, and it would be meaningless to do so. The meaning of practising nomadism comes from a rejection, or a subversion of the local environment from which a nomad has extracted themselves. This process can be concealed and emerges subtly. One may commit thought crimes, but outside of dystopian fiction, they are rarely punished for it. To practise nomadism is to manifest doubts and reject the social and political milieu publicly through processes of self-exile, non-conformance, or through negotiations with space. It cannot precede the act of becoming nomadic.

In Chapter Three I will show how these two ways of understanding nomads are not mutually exclusive, as we may perceive and critique the world using tools from many schools of thought, which concern travelling through places and times. The point is that our bodies experience our environment, our societies, and our philosophies in holistic ways. We cannot easily untangle these multivalent nexuses of experience. These modern expressions of becoming nomadic have emerged as a thirst for experiences. One of these has been interpreted by Greg Richards and Julie Wilson as tourism. They argue that:

[T]ourism has become an icon of the rootlessness and alienation of modern life. The search for meaning in modern societies encourages pilgrimage to the sites of

differentiation created by modernity and a search for the 'primitive' and pre-modern cultures it has displaced.¹⁰⁷

Alienation is an intrinsic factor of the nomad, as the philosophical nomad is estranged from their milieu. But we have seen alienation through centuries of literature, so why should we attribute this alienation to the nomad and reprise it again? The nomad that we have now, while indeed an effective tool for moving through spaces and for waging war on ideologies which bind and usurp the agency of individuals and are as violent as the systems they seek to undo. The issue this presents links back to *Difference and Repetition*, where Deleuze presents the idea of falseness and difference being bound up in notions of the ordinary/true. To the same extent, when Deleuzian nomads apply violence to create rupture in arborescent systems, they are using the same tools as over-coding societies, and are caught up in the system they have sought to undo.

Using the tools of a system, we seek to combat positions where nomads are deemed to fail. I will show the limitations of this violent methodology through my literary analyses in Chapters One and Two. In the first chapter, through analysing Ballard's *High Rise*, I reveal how the violent nomad is a glass cannon, capable of shattering original social structures at the cost of itself. In my second analysis, concerning Silverberg's *The World Inside*, I show the vulnerability of one nomad against a totalitarian system. I am not suggesting my nomad is a clean break from its lineage. This is a change in framework towards an introspective nomad, who is able to control their inner-subjectivity, and negotiate an existence in this world on its own terms.

Normalisation vs Deviance

Normalisation and the way posthumanist writers approach deviance is a core concern of my nomadic figure, who is posthumanist in origin. The evolution of my construct of the nomad began with Deleuze's nomad which resists over-coding processes, and thus never normalises, while deviance is linked to his earlier discussion on binary systems. The ability of

¹⁰⁷ Greg Richards and Julie Willson, 'Drifting Towards the Global Nomad', in *The Global Nomad: Backpacker: Travel in Theory and Practice*, ed. by Greg Richards and Julie Wilson (Clevedon: Channel View Publications, 2004), pp. 3-14 (p. 4).

a nomad to exist both within and outside a normalised milieu is a feature unique to my iteration of the nomad. It means that a nomad will be situationally outside a network of practices and processes, but also its experience is rooted within the structures it is critiquing or rejecting. The outside and the inside, as with any binary system, are connected.

Therefore, to claim a nomad exclusively in either point of existence would be to create a binary. Thus, nomads, as I will show in Chapter Two, are always partially normalised, and partially deviant depending on their preferences, and it is this ebb and flow of normalisation and deviant practices and processes that allow them to normalise sufficiently to resist total entropic collapse.

Deleuze argued the Platonic notion of different which relied on the notion of the same was inaccurate.¹⁰⁸ He thought of the two as separate ideas, and the idea of sameness as standard creates conventionality and privileges normality (in Chapter Two I develop this into normalisation). The consequence of normalisation is rigidity and a lack of creativity. The notions of *Difference and Repetition* are also slippery. The most practical way to understand them is to think of repetition or static replication, or a sameness. Deleuze assigns a further connotation of different repetitions of time. While he indicates there are complex repetitions which bear a notion of difference within repetition, these differences emerge from older structures and propagate newness.

The problem with repetition is it creates a homogeneous society or subject which becomes closed to change. Philosophical and Critical posthumanist critics challenge humanism, or Humanism with a capital 'H', assuming its privileged status is a 'closed' term, as an example of repetition, or sameness. Difference, for Deleuze, can be an internal idea or external conceptual mode of representation. It can be extrinsic or intrinsic. I understand difference as an intrinsic or represented heterogeneousness of a subject, which has differentiated itself or has been differentiated within a system. An example of this would be Adam in Shelley's *Frankenstein*, who is capable of understanding humans, but is considered monstrous and therefore rendering him the object of human hatred.¹⁰⁹ At the end of this chapter, I will

¹⁰⁸ Deleuze, pp. 265–66.

¹⁰⁹ Sean McQueen, 'Biocapitalism and Schizophrenia: Rethinking the Frankenstein Barrier', *Science Fiction Studies*, 41.1 (2014), 120–35 <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5621/sciefictstud.41.1.0120>> [accessed 2 January 2020].

demonstrate how the idea of self-imposed differentiation of a subject impacts a novel when I analyse Richard Wilder in Ballard's *High Rise*.¹¹⁰

Moving on to deviancy, or difference within society, Michel de Certeau seemingly retraces Deleuze's footsteps. Comparably, De Certeau's statement on how people gain knowledge is also applicable to societal development:

[T]he *acquisition* of knowledge; this is the sought-for mediation between the structures that organize it and the "dispositions" it produces. This "genesis" implies an interiorization of structures (through learning) and an exteriorization of achievements (what Bourdieu calls the *habitus*) in practices. A temporal dimension is thus introduced: practices (expressing the experience) correspond adequately to situations (manifesting the structure) if, and only if, the structure remains stable for the duration of the process of interiorization/exteriorization; if not, practices lag behind, thus resembling the structure at the preceding point, the point at which it was interiorized by the *habitus*.¹¹¹

De Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday life* appeared four years after Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, indicating Deleuze's profound impact in shaping a generation of critics and philosophers. The process of interiorization and exteriorisation that de Certeau describes here is similar to Deleuze's first and second syntheses of time.

Crystallised memory and desire to achieve a certain state of being are the processes of interiorization, while the exteriorisation of memory and desires is exhibited in practices, habits, or beliefs. This recalls Deleuze's argument against Platonian notions of one and many. The One, with capital O, distinguished against the uncapitalized version representing a single entity, recognises a subject of Othering within a social context. This concept of the differentiated One is taken much further in Chapter Three. It refers to the Dracula, Adam, Black, Woman, Cyborg which haunts literature and society. Ideas and beliefs are interiorized by a social entity, and it is the exteriorisation of these ideas and dogmatic beliefs in forms which give rise to ideas such as the Vitruvian Man; the white, Eurocentric Male who dominated not only Western culture, but the majority of the world until the twentieth century.

Nomads subvert these unquestioned ideas that the world operates in a certain way through their existence. We see throughout the three books I have selected that a central character

¹¹⁰ Ballard, *High Rise*.

¹¹¹ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 57.

continually challenges normalisation through their existence. In the first analysis of *High Rise*, Richard Wilder will challenge his position at the bottom of the apartment complex. In Chapter Two, several characters experience cognitive dissonance about the utopia of their environment, while revealing and reversing the arbitrariness of our own traditional notions of liberty and obligation, and thereby the novel subverts them. In the final chapter, I show how Kusanagi is shown to subvert the imagined ontology that the One, or non-normalised other, is always subject to pejection or deprived of their agency.

My analyses reaffirm de Certeau's assertion that societies contain testing grounds for radical changes, which may be written into bodies and codified. Ultimately, the body can be codified as acceptable or unacceptable through practices and processes which 'make a body conform to its definition in a social discourse'.¹¹² I argue that within literature, the concept of 'others' (sometimes including minority groups) manifests as science fiction, dystopian, or experimental writing.

What can be inferred is that a subject is a microcosm for society in some respects. Society creates the structures where achievements function to enable social mobility. It is society itself that determines which practices and beliefs are acceptable, and the value attached to them. In *High Rise*, the focus of my investigation will be on Richard Wilder, who is part of the emerging middle class, who is the subject of Othering due to his low social status as a first-floor resident and, less overtly, due to his physicality. The structures described, as de Certeau has stated, have been engraved into history, and we may refer to them unchallenged as culture.

The Social, Private and Multiple Selves

There are two parts to my paradigm when discussing multiple selves. Firstly, nomads recognise multiple agents within themselves. These take the form of the Self 'in time', meaning the influence of their past experiences and the drive of their desire to become a future Self. Secondly, a more widely addressed topic, particularly in Braidotti's work, the

¹¹² Certeau, p. 145.

concern of dogmatic belief and its influence on the social Self. Why this second point is a unique concern to me is not evident immediately, but simply put, the social Self is connected to the private Self. No matter how hard a person may try, they cannot separate their internal, or private Self from their social image. When participating in normalised or deviant practices, they introduce sites of rupture on what would otherwise be a homogeneous assemblage which is informed by cultural, political, and theological beliefs. Consequently, nomads recognise the interconnectivity between this network of belief systems through their connecting points in space through practices and processes, and they engage with these on a conscious level, as opposed to unconsciously or compulsively.

Theories of the fractured 'self' surfaced throughout the twentieth century, from Anna Freud's discussion of hysterical repression to Jacques Lacan's many works including the mirror phase and concepts of the Other. These works posit the human symbolic system, and a turning of the specular 'I' eventually becoming confused with the social 'I'.¹¹³ This is revisited in my Chapter Two literary analysis, where I analyse how a society which exists through purging threats to the social cohesion, where the mutual consent of the majority legalises murder. I turn again to de Certeau who echoes Deleuze's thoughts on memory. With Deleuze, we see memory acting as a mediator between past and present. De Certeau in a social setting reveals how memory has similar impacts within social spheres, supporting my belief that the private self and the social self are unavoidably linked.

Memory mediates spatial transformations. In the mode of the "right point in time" (*Kairos*), it produces a founding rupture or break. Its foreignness makes possible a transgression of the law of the place. Coming out of its bottomless and mobile secrets, a "coup" modifies the local order. The goal of the series is thus an operation that transforms the visible organization. But this change requires the invisible resources of a time which obeys other laws and which, taking it by surprise, steals something from the distribution owning the space.¹¹⁴

De Certeau's 'space' is particularly relevant to my discussion on subjectivities, which I later resume in Chapter Three as it can be interpreted as both real and virtual. The coup against local order is newness, which has the potential to be understood as chaos, and this newness symbolises the transition from closed Humans to open humanity. Chapter Two will develop this further, as I argue that the most accepted notion of posthuman as post-human is

¹¹³ Jacques Lacan, *Écrits* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2006).

¹¹⁴ Certeau, p. 85.

inaccurate. Instead, shifting the perspective of posthumanist reflexivity to focus on human subject within the posthumanities creates a grounded figures that supports literary investigation.

Donald Hall in *Subjectivity* traces the emergence of identity from the classical era through Descartes, Kant, and the modern period. His book ends with postmodernism and Haraway's cyborg subjectivity. He provides a convincing genealogical background to Western identity and the subjectivity which surrounds the qualification of Human. He claims that Haraway's answer to resolving the inadequacy of subjectivity is to '*do the best we can*' despite our limitations and approach life honestly.¹¹⁵

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze evokes the philosophical concept of multiple selves. He breaks down the psyche into three temporal entities: the past, which informs the present; the present, lived Self; and the Self which a person wants to become. Subjectivity has a profound impact on each of these three Selves, from how a subject interprets experiences, to ongoing events, and to how our desires inform the choices for what a subject aims to become. As each of these three Selves are bound together in the psyche, they are distinguishable from each other, but they are all part of a whole.

I argue their connections are tightly interwoven into the fabric of our lived experience. Therefore, the private self and the social self are unavoidably connected. Accordingly, there may be at any time multiple selves, a private 'deviant' self, and a conventionalised 'social self'. Deleuze argues that Platonic thought moved Western tradition to embrace 'orthodoxy' and 'conventionality' which can be measured and reasoned.

We may call this image of thought a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image. It certainly has variant forms: 'rationalists' and 'empiricists' do not presume its construction in the same fashion.¹¹⁶

Deleuze's warning of dogmatic thought is crucial to the posthumanist rejection of ideological belief systems. Braidotti in *The Posthuman* echoes Deleuze's criticism of dogmatic belief, but explicitly of ideological thought. She states 'The 'new' ideology of the free market economy has steamrolled all oppositions, in spite of massive protest from many

¹¹⁵ Donald E. Hall, *Subjectivity* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 122.

¹¹⁶ Deleuze, p. 131.

sectors of society, imposing anti-intellectualism as a salient feature of our times.¹¹⁷ In this way, she frames ideology as the antithesis of intellectualism. Her argument, like that of Deleuze, hinges on events which take place in the real world. Deleuze's method of escaping dogmatic thought, in his later work, is to exercise a type of open-mindedness that seems irresolvable and paradoxical, schizophrenia.

It is not a question of opposing to the dogmatic image of thought another image borrowed, for example, from schizophrenia, but rather of remembering that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a possibility for thought - one, moreover, which can only be revealed as such can through the abolition of that image. It is noteworthy that the dogmatic image, for its part, recognises only *error* as a possible misadventure of thought, and reduces everything to the form of error.¹¹⁸

Notably, dogmatic thought is predicated on people recognising what is true when they see it, and likewise what is wrong in the same manner. The issue this creates is a paradigm where there can only be two answers and two implications. Something may be absolutely true, and therefore accepted, or wrong and persecuted. There becomes no room for alternative selves, the private self inevitably becomes a site of rupture.

The Risks of Extreme Binary Thinking

I have already discussed my concerns in leaving binary thinking, where in extreme cases, but most commonly with Deleuzian nomads. The subject in question spirals into entropy because it resists all attempts at normalisation. This is a result of a binary rejection of normalisation. But now, I will discuss the reverse. My paradigm also accounts for extreme binary thinking, and in doing so leaves only the option for a spectrum of normalisation and deviance to be a nomadic option. The choice of where a nomad lies on the spectrum of normalised and deviant always remains a conscious decision of the nomad in question, and this location can change at a moment's notice. Claire Colebrook encountered a similar difficulty when conceptualising the posthuman humanities. She wrestles with a posthumanism that is not self-nihilistic in its recognition that there is no such thing as the human. Colebrook argues that the humanities of posthumanism has happily abandoned

¹¹⁷ Braidotti, *The Posthuman*, p. 4.

¹¹⁸ Deleuze, p. 148.

species-ism and exceptionalism—man is no longer adjudicator or hermeneutic arbiter outside the web of life—for there is one de-centered, mutually imbricated, constantly creative mesh, system or network of life.¹¹⁹ While there is a lot of truth to this, it seems that Colebrook has given up on the idea of the human continuing to have input into the posthumanities. I would argue in response that despite the human being little more than a construct, it is still a worthy vehicle of analysing our human, and posthuman conditions. It offers insight into emerging ontologies which are alternative to normalised, traditional humanism.

Brian Massumi's *What Animals Teach Us About Politics*, discusses normalising processes that are part of a system, and how they seek to expunge deviance in the pursuit of becoming more efficient. The risks of taking binary systems to an extreme can result in fascism. This is a system of belief which places limits on what an acceptable 'self' may resemble and has re-emerged in recent works. Following Colebrook's ephemeral effaced human model, there is no foundation on which to base ethics, thus no gravitational centre for a spectrum to take room. It could, in certain circumstances lead to the naissance of new posthuman fascist regimes. Consider, for example, a posthuman society emerging, which defines social class based on a credit system of academic achievement. Citizens deemed better integrated into capitalist, intellectual or other meritorious systems are given privilege, while bodies and minds who are in excess of demand, or who do not merit the same preferential treatment are pushed to the margins. Massumi asserts that fascist regimes place normativity and conformability as their highest priorities.

Call sociopathic any mechanism that works to refound the structure of human politics in such a way as to reimpart more normopathy and psychosis, in their infernally complementary antibecoming. The sociopathy of sovereignty is closely related to fascism, without being reducible to it. Sociopathy, like schizophrenia in Deleuze and Guattari's sense, is an impersonal tendency.¹²⁰

The theory of recognition lends itself to a fascist mode of thought. It prohibits newness from entering a system. It is highly-conventionalised and prioritises a confirmation bias, seeking only to confirm what 'one already knows' without question. My literary analysis at the end of this chapter shows desire within potential nomads offers a means of analysing

¹¹⁹ Claire Colebrook, *Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction*, Vol. 1 (Michigan: Open Humanities Press, 2014), p. 162.

¹²⁰ Brian Massumi, *What Animals Teach Us About Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), p. 71.

supernormal confirmative behaviours, which descend into a type of psychosis. The desire to belong through tribalistic conformation allowed to emerge unrestrained in Ballard's novels, and within closed societies. I consider Ballard's novels as a kind of petri dish for potential near-future posthuman societies. Further, he explores human-human interactions, and human-machine interactions (which we can now refer to as assemblages as we approach an analysis of *A Thousand Plateaus*), or even in the case of *Super Cannes* Human-machine-machine-Human assemblages.¹²¹ By this last statement I refer to a scene in the book where Ballard (the character) purposely initiates a low-speed collision with the car belonging to the psychologist Penrose Wilder¹²².

I raised my foot from the brake pedal. I felt the Jaguar's heavy chrome bumper bite deep into soft fibreglass, almost buckling the passenger door of the sports saloon. It rocked under the impact, its hydraulics letting out a chorus of neurotic cries.¹²³

The cars symbolically become prosthetics psyches for both men. They reveal the tensions are primarily between their ability to affect one-another. Violence in this novel brings about pleasure. However, it is Wilder who has realised these tensions of the inhabitants of Eden Olympia were not fulfilled when he first arrived, so uses violence as one of his 'psychological mechanisms that rein them in'.¹²⁴ Ultimately, as I will show in my analysis of *High Rise*, if nomads lean too far in either direction, then both destratification and neurosis are inevitable.

Rhizomatic Criticism

In this section I will introduce a concept unique to my methodology of literary critique involving the nomad. Countless attempts have been made to incorporate Deleuzian thought into the humanities, including the now dated collection of essays *Deleuze and Politics*.¹²⁵

¹²¹ J.G. Ballard, *Super Cannes* (London: Fourth Estate, 2014).

¹²² Ibid, p. 82.

¹²³ Ibid, p. 82.

¹²⁴ J. Carter Wood, "'Going Mad Is Their Only Way of Staying Sane": Norbert Elias and the Civilized Violence of J. G. Ballard', in *J. G. Ballard: Visions and Revisions*, ed. by Jeannette Baxter; Rowland Wymer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 198–214 (p. 200).

¹²⁵ *Deleuze and Politics*, ed. by Ian Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

While the volume builds upon Deleuzian writing by several leaps and bounds, it never truly breaks free from Deleuze's limitations, these being the forever open-ended arguments that never find resolution. Chapters such as 'Deleuze and Political Ontology of 'The Friend' and Schizoanalysis, Nomadology, Fascism' are all topics which have informed my thinking in this early phase of the thesis.¹²⁶ Holland discusses *A Thousand Plateaus* in depth, and situates himself alongside the opinions of other critics.¹²⁷ While the analysis delves into the schizophrenic aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's volume, it does not resolve the ambiguity they leave behind between the war-machine (nomad) and the state. I, however, intend to seek out the traces of thought which can 'connect' with other knowledge and form a scaffold for my own ideas.

Deleuze has also been placed under scrutiny in Mary Bryden's book concerning cinematic representation of travel writing. Her book, *Gilles Deleuze: Travels in Literature*, is one of the first alternatives to using Deleuze's work with philosophy and film studies. Her book uses examples of travel writing to demonstrate the productivity of a Deleuzian frame of reference when applied to travel writing. Bryden and I differ on opinion regarding her assumption that a Deleuzian literary investigation is always an open-ended one, and one which seeks out the exilic rather than the domiciliary space.¹²⁸ I do not entirely disagree with Bryden's assessment. I prefer to think of Deleuze's work as providing a means of creating new ground within existing space, which is the purpose of a nomadic investigation. In doing so we can interpret the same medium from viewpoints of more than only majority groups by way of understanding the numerous processes that are involved in codifying space, society, and art.

I have taken a different route employing Deleuze as a resource for analysing social and literary texts. But rather than reinvent a new tool which employs his work, I have an already existing starting point of interdisciplinary criticism which I can develop further into rhizomatic criticism. Rhizomatic criticism is inspired by *A Thousand Plateaus*, which opens with the notion of the rhizome, a system of roots or plateaus which spread outwards with

¹²⁶ Gregg Lambert, 'Deleuze and the Political Ontology of "the Friend"', in *Deleuze and Politics*, ed. by Ian Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), pp. 35–53.

¹²⁷ Eugene W. Holland, 'Schizoanalysis, Nomadology, Fascism', in *Deleuze and Politics*, ed. by Ian Buchanan and Nicholas Thoburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

¹²⁸ Mary Bryden, *Gilles Deleuze: Travels in Literature* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 155.

no beginning, no end, and neither superior nor inferior parts. Based on this concept, my flexible way of engaging with literary and social criticisms takes its name from the rhizome. I call it Rhizomatic criticism, and I attribute it solely to the nomad, who claims no origin and no finite destination. The fluidity of my interdisciplinary methodology goes beyond the original meaning of the term interdisciplinary, which would refer to combining multiple fields of specialisation (generally two) to create a hybrid analysis of an issue. Rhizomatic criticism refers to the extreme range of materials and the fluidity of methodologies, which can be applied to an analysis. The term rhizome acknowledges one feature of the nomad, which arises from my reading of *A Thousand Plateaus*, and I use it because it denotes the opposition of a hierarchy. The Rhizome is a flat surface through which lines of thought can be traced, leading to an unbiased and broad view of issues that were once compartmentalised. It offers more varied ways of approaching literary studies than previously available.

Rhizomatic criticism is both an interdisciplinary methodology, and is based not on binary thinking, but on a thinking in terms of spectrums. My selection of this paradigm aims to limit the sites of rupture that occur when different posthumanisms compete for supremacy, particularly at the expense of politicising themselves as dualistic, while positing a false post-dualism (where they claim to transcend the binary system, but in reality they are propagating it) as in my example of Fuller in the introduction. The ability to activate a post-dualist paradigm, for me, relies on Deleuze's notion of difference (found in *Difference and Repetition*). This notion returns in the final chapter of this thesis, where I will show how posthuman nomads can adapt his philosophy into ontology.

Conceptualising the potential for rhizomatic criticism has two major impacts on literary criticism that is practised today. Firstly, it means that any theory may be used at any time (as long as it is coherent) by a critic, as any discipline can contribute knowledge to an argument. Secondly, it means that a major paradigm shift is necessary. We can no longer see a solution as right or wrong. There can no longer be a right or wrong argument within the posthumanities in this way. Instead, we must shift to a system of alterities. A system of alterities is where minority viewpoints are less relegated to the categorisation of 'other' or 'outside' mainstream criticism which is currently in place. This methodology provides only the initial investigation into such multivalent matters.

An example of rhizomatic thinking is to trace a line through concepts which are seemingly disparate, such as city housing, vertical spaces, technology, and politics. In an essay I have delivered in the past, I drew these lines together to show how Ballard's *High Rise* can be read as a revealing of technological democracy. In this sense, the vertical spaces of apartment buildings are arbitrary symbols of status depending on which floor someone happens to inhabit. The cost of living and facilities may be equal on each floor, but the separation of body from ground, and the facilities such as elevators and air conditioning, and the right to inhabit higher spaces, even in passing will exist for the sole use of those upper-floor residents. In the same analysis, I show how those privileged residents may damage the facilities of the lower floors with no drawbacks for themselves, thus denying others the availability of a commonly used resource. While they gain nothing physically from acts of vandalism, they gain a level of prestige as they widen the gap of living standards with those they victimise. In this moment, we see architecture, applications of technology, psychology, sociology, and literary studies all inhabiting the same analysis, each subtly offering their specialist knowledge to assist critics in better understanding multi-faceted problems.

Posthumanism is primarily concerned with our ways of living in the twenty-first century. Therefore, it stands to reason that the work it produces should have an impact on people now, rather than people in decades to come. There is much emphasis on work being peer reviewed by specialists within posthumanism, but also, they must have specialist knowledge of other relevant fields. This mode of analysis calls for specialists themselves to operate in the same way as a rhizome. My next and final section before *High Rise* articulates my nomad in a succinct way.

Gentler nomads

Braidotti theorises that advanced capitalism allows for a free movement of goods, but does not facilitate a free movement of people and ideas. Much of her work in the last decade has concerned the 'mercantileisation' of higher education, leading to a politicisation of

universities, arguably manipulating them into idea engines which fuel economical and militaristic growth. She directs her thoughts directly to nomadism where she states:

Nomadic theory's central figuration expresses a process ontology that privileges change and motion over stability. This is also rendered in terms of a general becoming-minority or becoming-nomad or becoming-molecular/woman/animal, etc. The minority is the dynamic or intensive principle of change in nomadic theory, whereas the heart of the (phallogocentric) Majority is dead.¹²⁹

I agree that nomadic theory configures itself in this chaotic way to privilege change over stability. However, I feel her analysis of it becoming a becoming-minority is contentious. The minority is a group with limited influence over the social ebb and flow, and this group cannot gain any space in which to claim power without the permission of the majority. I see the nomad as a figuration; a schizophrenic subject who is rooted *both* in the majority with a proclivity for making assemblages with *multiple* minorities. These assemblages are motivated by desire and are sites of intensities and becomings. All characters I will introduce in my literary analyses will also fit this notion of the nomad that I have argued in conjunction with, but not identical to the works shown from Braidotti, Deleuze and Guattari.

While there is cause to expand on Braidotti's nomads as having figurative and abstract qualities, such as in *Transpositions*, where she argues that 'a nomadic and post-humanistic vision of the subject can provide an alternative foundation for ethical and political subjectivity¹³⁰.' Her use of Deleuzian nomads and the war machine has been to employ tactics to target marginalisation, social and political inequity, and to explore the biopolitics involved in the excess of bodies and resources. It is arguably a literal interpretation, much like my own, of Deleuze and Guattari's multi-faceted figure. It is a figure that can be used in literary, social, political, and philosophical criticism, and at the same time it is both designed to take part and designed to sit outside these constructed dominions of debate. Braidotti, like myself, has adapted the nomad across her different and developing works into a purposeful tool in analysing inequities and ethics, just as I have done. We differ in one respect, that is Braidotti has focused on specific aspects of the rhizome as her main feature of her nomadic criticism, whereas I have captured all of its qualities as proposed by Deleuze. With her shift into exploring the nomadic and posthumanist subjectivities, she creates space

¹²⁹ Braidotti, *Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti*, p. 29.

¹³⁰ Braidotti *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics*, p. 11

in which lived experience can be examined through alternative ontologies as I will do in my literary analyses.

Deleuze and Guattari state that there is no pure signifying regime. This means that no system of signification exists in isolation of any other, and therefore they draw on previously collapsed signifying regimes. They are intensely critical of hierarchies and sign regimes in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari employ the concept of the nomad to act as a counter-state tool to dismantle these regimes. I disagree with their application of nomadism. As I will show through Ballard's *High Rise* and Silverberg's *The World Inside*, hierarchical societies form part of the animal aspect that makes up the theoretically neglected human-animal within the posthuman. Thus, their vision of a purely rhizomatic society is untenable.

Because there is no pure signifying regime, they state that all sign regimes are mixed. The four regimes they outline are as follows: the pre-signifying sign regime, or the tribal world; the signifying regime, or the rise of the State during the bronze age; the counter-signifying sign regime, which is nomads, the nomadic war machine which operates in opposition to the State; and the post-signifying sign regime which comes in with the Hebrews, the regime of subjectification.

There is always a process of coding or blocking coding going on. In *A Thousand Plateaus* it is assemblage, while in *Difference and Repetition* it was described as social formations. The abstract machine draws the diagram on the plane of consistency for matter in terms of intensities, which are translated by machinic assemblages into substances which build the material world, and functions of signs which the human uses to make sense of the world. All primary sources that I will analyse in this thesis will perform this operation of coding or blocking of coding. They are always in dialogue with the regimes around them, whether it be the State or social formation or if it is their own internal struggle.

In brief, my paradigm adapts the figure of the nomad for literary analysis, to show how nomadic practices can challenge hierarchies and normalisations which are arbitrary, personally limiting, unjust or discriminative. This figure is based on Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, *A Thousand Plateaus* and through Braidotti's texts above. My nomad aims to overcome the limitation of open-endedness that Bryden attributed to Deleuzian nomadism.

As the nomad is situated in the school of new materialism, which destabilises the human subject, I must adapt a constantly connection-forming nomad, who is not normalised as a figure who has no stereotype, but is not destructive, and is self-stabilising. Nomads are subjects which travel (or move through spaces). They do not conform to hierarchical structures and exist on planes where there is no hierarchy. As such they are unburdened with layers of complex thinking, as their thoughts are contingent on the direction in which they are travelling. I posited earlier that they are self-mediated. By this, I mean they are in control of their presentation and they must be able to stabilise themselves while deterritorialising spaces.

My nomad, based on my understanding of posthumanist materials, must be a character who seeks to reveal what is already there but left unsaid. It must show that there are spaces that have been coveted through dogmatic beliefs in an outdated Human subject. It challenged hierarchies and accepted norms to create new norms on sites of deconstruction.

The nomad is the site of activation for many aspects of my critical posthumanist paradigm. Nomads are singular entities, operating as individuals. It resists normalisation, and thereby homogenisation. It is a singular individual and therefore a minority. It does not distinguish itself against the society that it means to alter as its purpose is to enact changes on the system that it has become disjointed from. It is always within and outside that system. It is the embodiment of alterity. What may already be evident is that this nomadic figure that I have constructed cannot exist indefinitely and is always destined to either return to the society they wish to change, or they become fully disillusioned and are rejected from their native territory. My solution to this problem will be reached in Chapter Two. For now, I will state that nomads are able to stabilise. However, they must enter into a system which is stable.

Applying My Paradigm to J.G. Ballard's *High Rise*

Introduction

In this chapter I have traced a line from Deleuze's first conception of the nomad in *Difference and Repetition* as a cluster of concerns regarding how we can encounter difference in a positive way, the theory of multiple selves in temporal spaces, and the problems with binary paradigms. Following this, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, I illustrated the nomad's evolution into the war machine, showing the links in Deleuze's thinking by outlining the rhizomatic properties nomads possess. Additionally, I noted several concepts attributed to nomads which allow them to resist normalisation, which are machinic assemblages, abstract machines, and strata.

Braidotti's nomads are based on Deleuzian nomadism; they possess the same obsession with dismantling hierarchical structures, and employ the same language in doing so. The difference between Deleuze and Braidotti's nomads is that the latter is heavily laden with feminist concerns. Braidotti's nomad takes the terms posthuman and feminist to create a post-feminism; a tool which breaks into phallogocentric paradigms to reveal the fallacies which govern patriarchal societies. But, in her dubbing the nomadic subject a 'myth', it is as though she has placed limits on its existence by shifting it from a lived reality into a conceptualised space. In response to that, I will take the nomadic paradigm that I developed in the previous section and through literary critique and show how nomads in literature can escape the grasp of the Deleuzian war machine, in favour of mediation with their native environments. The results of which create an opportunity for more dystopian and science fiction authors to be considered as social commentators.

This analysis will link the six elements of my paradigm to the critical question of how my paradigm of nomads reveals a new reading of Ballard's *High Rise* that could not be realised through a Deleuzian or Braidottian vision of nomadism. This literary analysis reveals how Braidotti and Deleuze's previous iterations of nomads collapse. To this point I have stated openly that Deleuzian nomads spiral into entropy, and this will be displayed in the following analysis, and refers to the Ballardian critics Groes, O'Hara and Matthews to support this assertion.¹³¹ This is a hybrid of Ballardian criticism, critical posthumanism, and

¹³¹ Sebastian Groes, 'The Texture of Modernity in J. G. Ballard's *Crash*, *Concrete Island* and *High-Rise*', in *J. G. Ballard: Visions and Revisions*, ed. by Jeannette Baxter; Rowland Wymer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 123–41; Graham Matthews, 'Consumerism's Endgame: Violence and Community in J.G. Ballard's Late Fiction', *Journal of Modern Literature*, 36.2 (2013), 122–39
<<https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/jmodelite.36.2.122>> [accessed 22 January 2019].

psychoanalysis as an example of rhizomatic criticism. Because rhizomatic criticism is a nomadic tool, it is sufficient to call this a nomadic critique in Ballardian studies. In this way, the essay will follow three questions with four directed concerns. These are normalisation and deviance, multiple and fractured selves, the distinction between becoming nomadic and practising nomadism, and how the different kinds of nomads in Ballard's text never transcend the limitations that I have discussed in relation to Deleuzian nomads.

The other two sections of my paradigm (the risks of extreme binary thinking and my gentler nomad) will be explored in Chapters two and three respectively. Not all aspects of my paradigm can be explored explicitly through this novel. I will take up the risks of extreme binary thinking at length in Chapter Two, while examples of my gentler nomad are also taken up in later chapters. Rhizomatic criticism does not have a distinct section in any analysis because it is a methodology concerned with a subject interacting with arborescent spaces, using the paradigm I have outlined earlier, as examples of rhizomatic and nomadic critiques. I will apply my paradigm to yield a new reading of Ballard's *High Rise*. It will break down into four sections: normalisation and deviance; fractured selves; my unique take on how Ballard's characters undergo the transformation into Deleuzian nomads through the processes of becoming and practising nomadism; and finally, how they never transcend the limitations of Deleuze's 'war machine' paradigm.

In the first section of my analysis of Ballard's *High Rise*, I will consider normalisation and deviance. I will then discuss the process of social othering that Ballard's characters undergo which create boundaries and hierarchies. In analysing the process of the decline in social cohesion, it is as though we were studying the anatomy of a social body, which is in the process of terminal failure. This process comes about when those who are subject to pejection or discrimination resist against the overlap of signification and attempt to claim their own agency of presentation (and in this book, protect their living standards). At each instance of Othering, there is a rupture in the social cohesion of the building. This begins with a divide into three sections of the building. Nomads spring into existence by traversing the floors, protesting their place on the lower side of a border, and through creating more ruptures in dividing into tribal micro-societies. Normalisation in this way is created by the forced construction of deviance, which is attributed to those who have equal use of the

building's facilities, but are believed to be of lower social standing based arbitrarily on their address within the apartment building.

My second section aims to show how technology poses equal risks as it does conveniences to the psychology of urban residents. It is the catalyst that reveals the nature of a fractured assemblage that makes up both normalised human and nomadic subjects alike. Humans, I will explain, are made up of a three-part assemblage, the animal-human-technology machinic assemblage, and that through psychosis brought about by destructive nomadism in an isolated place that resists normalisation, this leads to the fracturing of selves and dissociative disorders. This issue can only come about within a postmodern environment and has been analysed by many postmodern critics. As posthumanism is a progression of the postmodern movement, the concerns merit visiting from a posthumanist perspective as new readings become available through techniques such as rhizomatic criticism.

I believe that in the course of their descent into psychopathy, certain types of nomads go through processes where they uncontrollably form assemblages with animals and technology in such a way that they destabilise their psyche. At this time, they enter a Deleuzian nomadic state, but fail to stabilise. We can see one way in which the fundamental assemblage of animal-human-technology becomes skewed. Thus, we can see the limits of practices which take place under extreme states of social isolation. In this petri dish we can examine certain traits (violent, deviant, neurotic) of our (post)human psyche which are difficult for many to accept.

My third section aims to distinguish the process of becoming nomadic from practising nomadism. I believe I can illustrate the difference through literary analysis in this novel while providing insight as to the formation of Deleuzian nomads in Ballard's novel. Becoming nomadic is the process of extracting oneself from arborescent and dogmatic structures. It begins with a feeling of alienation which prompts the desire to recognise the different elements of our machinic assemblages. Practising nomadism follows the act of becoming nomadic. It manifests as actions responding to reservations, doubts, and disagreements with the social milieu. In this novel, I will show how at several points characters teeter on the edge of practising nomadism, but the entropic forces involved in their becoming nomadic sheer them from stability and throw them into entropy before they can act.

Throughout this novel, there is frequent vandalism committed against technology and examples of its abuse to create an inequity of living standards for other tenants of the building. This vandalism is a form of dismantling process that is akin to Deleuzian nomadic over-coding processes. In this way, the violence of practising Deleuzian nomadism leads to the entropy I addressed in my paradigm. Unfortunately, it is not an aspect that Deleuze resolves at any point, but returning to this in my later chapters, I will show how nomadism can be evolved away from violent dismantling and over-coding processes. Ballard's works have in recent years begun receiving recognition as contributing to the posthumanist canon, particularly in postgraduate research. Researchers still argue about the politics of space which emerge in his work, the conflicting boundaries between man, animal, and machine in his work, and his obsession with investigating the effect of desire on inner space.¹³²

The fourth and final aspect from my paradigm concerns the types of nomads that Ballard presents in *High Rise*, and how none of them truly transcend Deleuzian limitations. To mediate this concern in a directed manner I will attribute the emergence of different Deleuzian nomads with the different social classes within the apartment building. Of these nomads I outline three specifically; the first is radical, and most resembling the war machine of *A Thousand Plateaus*; the second is the gynocentric nomad, which responds to Braidotti's iteration of nomads; and finally one which comes closest to my own formulation, but never takes initiative to make the leap from its Deleuzian roots, is what I refer to in this novel as the 'cartographical nomad'. The trait all three nomads share in this novel is that they are all trying to create space within and outside themselves so that they may stabilise.

I will briefly introduce the three types of nomad in this novel. Firstly, Richard Wilder. He fits the criteria that Deleuze calls 'the war machine' as he challenges the hierarchy and creates a more suitable space for himself within it. He is motivated by his low status within the system and his biological 'Otherness'. Secondly, an unnamed character that travels around the building. I call her a 'cartographical nomad'. This type of nomad is not destructive. They are merely twenty-first century observers, or a castrated flâneur.¹³³ She is in the truest

¹³² Mark Hausmann, 'Concrete Reality: The Posthuman Landscapes of J.G. Ballard', *English (MA) Theses* (Chapman University, 2016) <<https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000022>>; Erica Brown Moore, 'Practising the Posthumanities: Evolutionary Animals, Machines and the Posthuman in the Fiction of J.G. Ballard and Kurt Vonnegut' (Cardiff University, 2011) <<http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/23442>> [accessed 21 January 2019].

¹³³ Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 87.

sense nomadic, however, she neither creates nor destroys and is rootless, moving through spaces that she can never possess. Finally, the women who group together are in a sense nomadic in their allegiance. They are purely creative in nature. The women follow Royal and defect to Pangbourne before finally creating their own majority and matriarchal society. They are nomadic in the literal sense, as they move between floors, lovers, and allegiances. Their limitation is that they serve only as the majority, their power is only exercised in selecting leadership, and their leadership choices reflect a rootedness in previous violent regimes.

J.G Ballard in Context

James Ballard was an English novelist, prolific short story writer and essayist. His works were mostly encompassing science fiction writing, post-apocalyptic stories, and literary critiques. He was born in the Shanghai International Settlement in 1930. His provenance is of great importance for understanding his work in general as during the Second World War, he found himself interred in a Japanese concentration camp. During these formative years, he witnessed daily atrocities and disregard for human dignity and wellbeing. When the camp was liberated, he was repatriated to the UK. He noted that he was not unused to seeing human suffering before the camps. In interviews he would candidly explain that he would often see people beaten within feet of where he stood at the back of his American limousine, and that on the way to school there 'were always fresh bodies lying in the street'.¹³⁴ It is no coincidence that he developed a fascination with writing about the misuse of power among the middle-class. Ballard was known in the 1960s from the publications of his short stories in science fiction magazines throughout the decade, which were eventually compiled into two substantial volumes. The title of his most famous short story collecting the volumes were *The complete Short Stories*.¹³⁵ *High Rise* was originally published in 1975

¹³⁴ Martin Amis, 'JG Ballard: From Outer Space to Inner Space', *The Guardian*, 25 April 2009 <<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/apr/25/jg-ballard-martin-amis>> [accessed 21 January 2019].

¹³⁵ J.G. Ballard, *The Complete Short Stories* (London: Fourth Estate, 2014).

and was the third novel in his 'concrete trilogy', which encompassed *Crash* (1973) and *Concrete Island* (1974).¹³⁶

Each of these novels sought to explore a different aspect of modern society's bleaker elements. While *Crash* was a novel of atrocities and sexual excitement at the idea of destruction and technology, *Concrete Island* bore hallmarks of being influenced by a Robinson Crusoe type of tale. It investigated the abandoned spaces in between highways outside of the city and revealed that not only spaces became abandoned in the process of modernisation, but people also. Chris Hall, who has spent many years reviewing Ballard's work and has conducted several interviews with him from the mid-nineteen nineties, explains that these novels are 'under-imagined or liminal spaces, such as multi-storey car parks and motorway flyovers, act as metaphors for the parts of ourselves that we ignore or are unaware of.'¹³⁷ Ballardian space, as opposed to the inner space explored in science fiction, is a much more robust exploration of subjectivity which connects the inner psyche of a character's mind with their external conditions. In some ways the two become intertwined, but in unexpected ways. His characters in this trilogy are often forced to assess the physical surroundings and, by extension, themselves rather than to take them for granted. What they find in all three novels is an aspect of their humanity which was not evident to them beforehand. This is what I refer to (through Deleuzian thinking) as assemblages.

High Rise (1975) takes place in a newly constructed tower block two miles outside of central London which contains two thousand middle-class residents. The novel is set over the short period of time after the high rise reaches full capacity for occupants and they undergo a collective psychosis leading to acts of extreme violence. Through the physical and psychic decline of the building and those who occupy it, the novel follows three of its inhabitants: Anthony Royal, the architect and occupant of the penthouse; Dr. Robert Laing, who resides on the twenty-fifth floor, who moved into the building to live a reclusive life after a recent divorce; and Richard Wilder, a documentary film-maker who has recently entered into middle-class life through his recent successes. A power-struggle of lethal proportions

¹³⁶ J.G. Ballard, *Concrete Island* (London: Fourth Estate, 2014).

¹³⁷ Chris Hall, 'Why JG Ballard's High-Rise Takes Dystopian Science Fiction to a New Level', *The Guardian*, 3 October 2015 <<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/oct/03/jg-ballards-high-rise-takes-dystopian-science-fiction-to-a-new-level>> [accessed 22 January 2019].

ensures within the high rise, with the infrastructure failing as quickly as the residents' minds. Anthony Royal strives to maintain his authority over the tenants on the floors below by his patriarchal right as architect and chief of the upper floor tenants. Meanwhile, Laing is content with maintaining his semi-comfortable status among the detritus that litters his apartment. The book begins with the scene of Laing roasting the hindquarters of a dog on the balcony for his drugged sister and concubine. Wilder, however, has some childhood neurosis awoken within this environment, with a constant reminder that he is more physically imposing than any other male resident. He strives to reach the penthouse to prove his equality to the father of the high rise. Thus, an interplay of failing social structures, closed societies and social injustices see the collapse of modern society as we know it, to be replaced with a matriarchal tribalistic cult.

Normalisation and Deviance

As I explained above, normalisation is the process of coding processes and practices as acceptable by the majority of persons inhabiting a space. It is a system of control which creates homogeneous spaces whose milieu has significant social, liturgical, or ecclesiastic significance. To have thoughts, beliefs or to commit actions that are contrary to the agreed norm of a milieu is to create a fracture in the continuum. This fracture is embedded with the notion of what it is not. We call this deviance. Persons who suffer from deviance have conflicted views of themselves as what they are, and what they are not. Deviance is an attempt to resist normalisation through practices and processes, but inevitably without a positivist paradigm it is bound to the binary system.

O'Hara criticises Ballard's characters as resembling dead wood or as mere spokespeople for Ballard's own views.¹³⁸ While to an extent this is true, they can be seen as being reducible to a matter of 'roles' and his situations to 'context'. Reading against the grain of this criticism, I would argue that Ballard's characters exceed the sum of their perceived parts by their complex interactions with each other and evolving subjectivities which provide an often monstrously organic perspective on deviant subjectivities. The sites of rupture within the

¹³⁸ Dan O'Hara, 'Reading Posture and Gesture in Ballard's Novels', in *J. G. Ballard: Visions and Revisions*, ed. by Jeannette Baxter; Rowland Wymer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 105.

apartment building are one such case where normalising forces are the cause of their own destruction.

Through the scope of a postmodernist reading, Ballard's characters are analysed alongside their surroundings, the plot, the literariness of the text and the themes which influence the ebb and flow of the narrative. The characters therefore are reduced in scope to a fraction of the 'context'. Postmodernist literary analysis has a vibrant literary pool from which to draw that can analyse the characters of *High Rise*. However, when discussing the real-world applicability of these characters, nomadism is better suited to criticising human conditions.

Colin Greenland argues that Ballard's characters are flat and functional, their humanity subordinated to their values as roles or signs.¹³⁹ As I will show in the section on multiple selves, the transformation from normalised to deviant residence as the acceptable state of being results in multiple ruptures which eventually shatter beyond recognition. Initially, characters who form a homogenised, middle-class social group congregate in an apartment building, which serves as a gated community. Among these inhabitants are Dr Robert Laing, in his second appearance in Ballard's creative work (his first being in *My Dream of Flying to Wake Island* (1974)), who Dan O'Hara argues forms a trio of Freudian characters in this book. These other two characters are the architect Anthony Royal and the television producer Richard Wilder, who respectively play the roles of the Freudian superego, ego, and id of the high-rise itself.¹⁴⁰

Ballard was a well-known social commentator, and his literary work reflects such interests. Gregory Stephenson connects Laing's radical anti-psychiatric theories and Ballard's views on the relation of the individual to society. He states they are:

[P]rofoundly ambivalent with regard to our individual identities and our collective social identity, that we are clinging determinedly, apprehensively, to an illusion while at the same time forces within our psyches are working to overturn that illusion. Both writers also share the belief that 'breakdown' and 'break-through' are inextricably intertwined.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Colin Greenland, *The Entropy Exhibition : Michael Moorcock and the British 'New Wave' in Science Fiction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 99.

¹⁴⁰ O'Hara, p. 106.

¹⁴¹ Gregory Stephenson, *Out of the Night and into the Dream: A Thematic Study of the Fiction of J.G. Ballard* (New York: Greenwood, 1991), p. 7.

O'Hara suggests that Ballard's characters must experience what Gregory Bateson theorised as a 'double bind'. This occurs when someone finds themselves in an unresolvable position. In any situation where the subject is psychologically trapped or prevented from escape by the power of any relationship, the instigator of the double bind communicates simultaneously two mutually contradictory messages to the subject. The situation comes about when one message (which is verbal) usually contains an injunction *not* to do something, with an implied or explicit threat. The other message is more abstract, contextual, perhaps an intimation of love and is non-verbal. This message can be transmitted through any number of meta-linguistic signals, including body language or tone of voice.¹⁴² Examples of the double bind appear throughout Ballard's later work, but it makes a notable appearance in this novel.

With that ground cleared, I can now enter my first concern of the effect of deviance in *High Rise*. Wilder, who lives on the first floor, and thereby being stuck at the bottom of the social hierarchy, does not associate himself with the feebleness that his social standing connotes. He is physically strong and believes this strength can allow him to overthrow Royal as the patriarch of the tower. With the increasing sites of rupture, eventually leading from initially from two breaks (the upper floors, middle section, and the bottom floors). It eventually results in the warring factions within the building breaking down further into a floor-by-floor tribal system. Wilder, in his ambition to climb to the top of the building, must break through each site of rupture before he is able to impose his own laws of normalisation.

Richard Wilder, resident of the first floor, suffers from Bateson's double bind. He decides to leave behind his wife and children in favour of embracing his own neurosis and unrestrained ambition to climb to the top floor of the apartment block. He shows that his affection towards his family is genuine. While his wife sleeps, his description of her does not match the stereotyped 'id' that Freudian analyses attribute to him. While his ambition ultimately outweighs his affection, we see a moment of tenderness towards his wife:

Wilder looked down at his wife, lying on the bed surrounded by the children's books she was reviewing. Aware that he was to be leaving her in a few hours, he regretted

¹⁴² Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution and Epistemology* (Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc, 1987), p. 156.

that she was too weak to come with him. They might have climbed the high-rise together.¹⁴³

His attention to detail does not suggest selfishness, but anticipates an imminent loss. In this moment he creates the final divide between him and his family unit, and succumbs to the normalisation of the building. Where this system rewards the physically strong, and punishes those who adhere to the exterior social normalisations. Ballard does not leave the reader to doubt that Wilder's feelings contain regret. Although he states this regret relates to her not being able to follow him on his journey, more can be inferred than what we read on the surface level. In clinging to his family unit until the building had fallen so far into entropy shows a resilience to the normalisation that is being exerted through physical tortures from the top of the building to the bottom by way of tampering with the air conditioning, electrical systems, excessive littering, and vandalism of their floors. In his struggle to remain in one state of normalisation that does not conform to the apartment block's new norm, Wilder has become a deviant.

Wilder has Œdipal feelings towards his wife. There are references that their marriage suffers due to his frequent affairs and his immaturity. He states much later that he wanted nothing more than to be free of her so he can 'break away from the whole system of juvenile restraints he had been trying to shake off since his adolescence'.¹⁴⁴ Supporting this confused, deviant emotional and mental image he has of the people around him in the high-rise, he also later reveals his mixed mental image of Royal as his father. At this moment he is consciously dismantling the assemblages that he has created which provided him with mental and financial stability, investing himself into climbing the apartment block rather than working and providing for his family. He has chosen to become the object of his disgust, the absent father.

When his wife asks him:

'Richard...? Are you going...?'

As she spoke she emerged briefly from the deep well inside herself, aware for these few seconds that she and her sons were about to be left on their own.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 80.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 166.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 82.

The double bind completes itself in this moment. It is a last, unspoken plea for Wilder to prioritise their family relationship over his ambition. The threat of violence and potential death lies above, and the threat of his family either renouncing him or dying in the future is implicitly understood between them. Wilder, under the mental strain of his dissatisfaction with the unfairness of the living conditions, and the assault to his ego, becomes nomadic and sheers himself from his remaining anchors of sanity, his wife, and children. Wilder's nomadic persona occasionally reflects back to wonder if his wife (Helen) has managed to survive with their children in his absence. Wilder as family man and Wilder as nomad are not separate people. They are interconnected, but broken by two regimes of normalisation in which they are both deviant. Wilder exhibits unique plasticity in transitioning into his new persona as he had entered into the apartment block on the lowest floors. This may be in part due to his role as a deviant to his physical difference from the other residents, his cultural difference (a Welshman in London), and his psychological deviancy related to his Oedipal complex and his infidelity.

Multiple Selves

My second section deals with how technology poses equal risks and conveniences to the psychology of urban residents in *High Rise*. I will additionally explore this by showing how the Self becomes fractured in this environment. There are two stages to how multiple selves emerge in *High Rise*. Firstly, normalised residents perform actions of violence against other residents who they deem to be deviant. As no psychologically sound person considers themselves evil, there becomes a rupture at the site of violence between the aggressor and the victim of having their equal standard of living usurped. Secondly, the skewed animal-human-technology assemblage tends towards a self-identification among residents as animals. In the example I use, I show how animals are used by their owners to vandalise communal elevators, resulting in the human marking their territory through the urine of their dog. This becomes the marking of the master through the animal. The machinic assemblage therefore has deep connotations of interspecies confusion.

Technology enables a developed urban environment, and in relation to both Ballard's work and many other examples of urban literature captures a certain aesthetic of absence. Groes states that the distinct changes to the structure of feeling and aesthetic whereby language as a tool for meaningful communication becomes exhausted. Therefore the dominating technology of concrete reshapes social structures and relationships in monstrous, dehumanized and Americanized ways.¹⁴⁶ Both the fading structures of language and humanity within the urban environment perform a spectral ontology of absence, in seeking their lost humanity in a postmodern and posthuman world. In response to this posthuman condition, writers who have become disenfranchised with humanity look for new ontologies, which may liberate posthuman subjects from liberal humanism whose doctrines had been unquestioned since the Enlightenment.

High Rise makes frequent reference to barrenness, to an unarticulated desire for power which overpowers logic, during the insatiable violence which haunts each page of the book. The human component of my three-way assemblage (animal-human-technology) is a narrative creator. Each of these three parts of the assemblage contain their own aspect of self, all of which are connected at certain points. In the narrative of *High Rise*, the human narrative disappears with a more primal animal dominance, in an environment technologically designed to corral the occupants much like a zoo or a petri-dish experiment. One scene in particular makes this clear.

The spectacular view always made Laing aware of his ambivalent feelings for this concrete landscape. Part of its appeal lay all too clearly in the fact that this was an environment built, not for man, but for man's absence.¹⁴⁷

As Laing waits on the terrace of the 40th floor for the architect Anthony Royal who has led him to a trap, Laing's ponderings leave space for the reader to wonder whether it is the animal or technological subject which will inherit the terrain. In this sense there are only the ghosts of humanity left as the post-absence inherits the terrain, along with the animals in a technologically-mediated, urban landscape. Foucault also sees the individual as a fictitious in his analysis of the development of crime and punishment within societies. The shifting notion of what counts as a free and criminal body and the appropriate ways to mediate and

¹⁴⁶ Groes, p. 124.

¹⁴⁷ J.G. Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 28.

transform them run through the entirety of his book. He states that 'the individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an 'ideological' representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called 'discipline''.¹⁴⁸ The illusion of human superiority disappears in the artificially crafted landscape and is replaced with something else which Laing interprets as barren.

Laing presents a rare moment of self-awareness in the novel, examining himself as part of a network with his concrete environment. He recognises that they, as humans, have already architecturally and physically removed themselves from the high-rise landscape. While my analysis contemplates the characters of Ballard's book as becoming nomads, this is the most poignant and fleeting moment in which one person stops to consider their assemblages and attempt to become nomadic. The lack of awareness, shown by the other participants regarding the social milieu they are creating, resists my assertion that they are nomadic in my sense. Rather, they are using nomadic tools such as deterritorialization to break down the existing social structure of the building to return to a pseudo-nineteenth-century social class structure. Their lack of awareness of the tools they employ ultimately dissolves the cohesion of the social milieu across the building.

Ballard refers to the barrenness of the people and landscape several times throughout the novel. The high-rise in Laing's mind is a place which exists for the absence of men, so then those who inhabit it must be made of an assemblage which no longer encompasses the human aspect. But as O'Hara suggests, this absence of humanity opens up a new form of communication in an environment where traditional human communication has been exhausted. He argues that this absence of characters in fact permits Ballard to focus purely upon the metacommunicative elements of posture, environment and technology.¹⁴⁹ As shown by the increasing incoherency of the sophisticated vandalism, communication begins to fail when a space is constantly coded without any time to stabilise.

Fittingly enough, these graffiti reflected the intelligence and education of the tenants. Despite their wit and imagination, these complex acrostics, palindromes and civilized obscenities aerosolled across the walls soon turned into a colourful but

¹⁴⁸ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 193.

¹⁴⁹ Dan O'Hara, 'Reading Posture and Gesture in Ballard's Novels', in *J. G. Ballard: Visions and Revisions*, ed. by Jeannette Baxter; Rowland Wymer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 105–20 (p. 109).

indecipherable mess, not unlike the cheap wallpapers found in laundrettes and travel-agencies which the residents of the high-rise most affected to despise.¹⁵⁰

Vandalism here is clearly directed at the façade of the homogenised residents who live in the building, as someone who were not educated or successful enough would not be expected to comprehend the derogatory meaning of the 'complex acrostics, palindromes, and civilized obscenities'.

Graffiti can serve a purpose beyond artistic expression in two contexts. The first, most common application is among gang and tribal cultures to mark territory. Markings have been used to designate the boundaries of territory for thousands of years, and this ancient form of boundary marking is still employed by animals today. The second is used as a political statement in social movements. This is most commonly a European form of political statement, but at various times it has crossed borders into British and American forms of educated awareness raising protests. There are many problems associated with boundaries in *High Rise*, and graffiti offers an insight into these splintering and dissolving lines.

Beginning with the first of three points I wish to make, graffiti is used by middle-class, educated men and women to impose the connotation of disadvantaged 'street thug' on members of their own social class whom they perceive to be of lower importance than themselves. The type of graffiti is indicative of an educated mind, acrostics, palindromes, and civilised obscenities are used rather than one-word names to designate more complex messages than boundary marking. Instead, it serves the purpose of forcefully overlaying the identity of a cultural group who are deemed undesirable over a group they perceive as inferior, thus compounding the two ideas. While neither group necessarily has a connotative connection to the other, this link, and therefore a split notion of self, is branded on to them and they themselves become deviants in the face of the majority who were the first to break away from wider social norms and were the original deviants themselves.

The second point follows directly on from the first, the process in which the upper floor residents have gone about usurping power is unlike traditional bourgeoisie methodologies. Typically, as I will explain in Chapter Two, those of the ruling class control the means of production and labour in order to take control from those who are less educated or who are

¹⁵⁰ J.G. Ballard, *High Rise*, pp. 55–56.

unable to raise the capital to enter into the social class. Instead, here they are maintaining the façade of being bourgeois but simultaneously. They are performing the manual labour involved in the power-usurping process. The factory owner therefore becomes his own worker in this context. At the same time, it is typically the working class who have had to scramble over their fellow workers to rise to the ranks of either a privileged worker, or to enter into the middle-class. That same scramble is taking place within the apartment block through abuses to the systems of the building, and through the graffiti on an ideological level. While technology facilitates this inequity of access, due to the vertical nature of the building, this socially homogeneous group should never have been fighting for the plentiful resources of the building.

This brings me to the third and final point relating to graffiti at this time. As I have said before, in certain situations it is a nomadic tool, where nomads can attempt to raise awareness of injustices by changing the nature of public spaces. It is a delicate process however, as all spaces are laden with messages. In this case, however, it is a hierarchical mode of over-coding, which is not nomadic in design. While not nomadic, it does indicate the result of the continuous failed mastery of nomadic tools, which is to spiral into entropy. Nomadism is an attempt to control one's own boundaries, or an attempt to engage selectively with the spaces that they inhabit. In this case, the constant over-coding of spaces causes a linguistic breakdown of the graffiti. Eventually, the intelligent messages on the wall lose their context and fade to become a 'colourful but indecipherable mess'. It reflects the abstract machine in overdrive, forming too many machinic assemblages to the point where the body that tries to bind them all together fails. It is a linguistic manifestation of entropy that foreshadows the events of the novel. This is indicative of what will happen towards the end of the novel, by foreshadowing the complete breakdown in mental and verbal communications among residents of the apartment block.

This absence that concerns urban literature enters a posthuman realm, and most specifically the nomadic concern of understanding our assemblages. As mentioned before, this is the essential step in becoming nomadic. Looking closely, we can see that the residents begin to resemble the assemblage of animal-absence-technology, where the absence fills the gap left behind by the narrative-weaving human. Humans and now animals exist in networks, not only with humans, but also with non-sentient organisms and technologies which permeate

many different strata of their lives. This takes place on many strata. From pacemakers, prosthetics and medicines, there are multiple assemblages taking place in our lives not only on a daily basis, but on a minute-by-minute basis.

Laing had heard Helen Wilder complain that, rather than use their five high-speed elevators which carried them from a separate entrance lobby directly to the top floors, the dog-owners habitually transferred to the lower-level elevators, encouraging their pets to use them as lavatories.¹⁵¹

The animal-machine assemblage is at its most obvious in an early scene in the book where the acts of vandalism begin. The characters of Ballard's novel seem partially aware of this, but only insofar as they can over-code these places. Technologies are a way of framing the world. To think of technology in terms of the inorganic reveals its limited scope here. Animal domestication is an ancient technology, and in this scene we see the ancient technology over-coding the modern technology with some encouragement. Their over-coding process through animal urine in the lift, graffiti on the walls and vandalism of various systems in the building recreate technological equality into a divide of technological detritus and technological supremacy, depending on who has need to access certain disrupted systems.

Further, in earlier sections of the book, residents used animals and technology as tools of torture rather than submission. In lieu of these acts being calculated and deliberate, I can infer that the residents were previously in more control of their mental faculties. Laing earlier reveals:

Laing had heard Helen Wilder complain that, rather than use their five high-speed elevators which carried them from a separate entrance lobby directly to the top floors, the dog-owners habitually transferred to the lower-level elevators, encouraging their pets to use them as lavatories.¹⁵²

This rivalry between dog-owners and the parents of small children polarized the building. Wealthy pet owners on the upper floors used their animals in a two-fold manner. Firstly, to lower the standard of living of those below them. To re-establish the order that they believe they should enjoy on the upper floors. This comes from the humanist notion that there should exist a class-system where some sections of society are naturally 'more human' than others, leading to those being less human being more vulnerable. Groes argues that

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p. 25.

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 25.

'Paradoxically, Ballard's novel points out the dangerous fissure between traditional humanist paradigms and postmodern psychopathologies as well as endeavouring to close the gap between them'.¹⁵³ Upper floor residents exercise discrimination through reducing the quality of life and dignity of the lower floor occupants. This deindividualizing process ruptures the sense of Self for both aggressor and aggressed.

I have established that these acts of mediated violence are sites of rupture which split the sense of identity for both the aggressor and victim of the action, while forming new assemblages through constructed connoted links with arbitrary ideological groups. The result is that technology has a part to play, as it is the site of rupture and formation for these issues. In committing to these deindividualizing acts, the residents attack their own assemblages by eventually over-coding to such an extreme that they are rendered incapable of further communication, thereby creating not only multiple selves, but also absences. I will now move on to my third concern, which is the difference between becoming nomadic and practising nomadism. The following section will complete my analysis of how technology poses equal risks as it does convenience to the psychology of residents.

Becoming Nomadic and Practising nomadism

Becoming nomadic and practising nomadism are two distinct parts of a nomadic subject, and they do not occur simultaneously. Becoming nomadic is the reflective act of extracting the psychic elements of the Self from the milieu of social, political, and philosophical ideologies and understanding the mental processes that are influenced by external factors. To become nomadic is to be aware that the Self is not bound by the skin which holds together the human form, but it mutually influences technologies, peoples and non-human animals that surround it. The nomad understands its place in the wider network of its existence. Practising nomadism is to act on the holistic knowledge gained from becoming nomadic. It never precedes the act of becoming nomadic. This is an ontology based on the reservations, doubts, or disillusionment a nomad has in relation to its local milieu. It expresses itself through deviant acts, in binary system societies, these acts are seen as

¹⁵³ Groes, p. 125.

criminal or distasteful. In the context of *High Rise*, characters do not sufficiently become nomadic to the point where they may stabilise in this state of non-conformity, it results in the act of practising nomadism to emerge as a derivative of the 'war machine'. In this section I will show how the nomadic practice of decoding spaces has been mastered by Ballard's characters, but the ability to network, which must always come first, was not mastered, resulting in an entropic death spiral.

High Rise consistently, demonstrates how residents use technology (i.e., the lift, the pool, the parking spots closest to the building) not only to make their lives more convenient, but to make life less convenient for other inhabitants in order to create social inequity within a homogeneous enclosed system. These focal points become progressively decoded and over-coded as the building descends into anarchy. Eventually the over-coding process wipes away any narrative response and reaches the bedrock of meaning where symbolism is reduced to nothing more complex than the scents of refuse and bodily fluids.

The sweat on Laing's body, like the plaque that coated his teeth, surrounded him in an envelope of dirt and body odour, but the stench gave him confidence, the feeling that he had dominated the terrain with the products of his own body. Even the prospect that the lavatory would soon be permanently blocked, something that had once filled him with polite dread, was now almost inviting.¹⁵⁴

There is a parallel between Baudrillard's research on the madness of waste to Ballard's description of Laing's room in that Baudrillard argued that 'waste is always considered a kind of madness, of insanity, of instinctual dysfunction, which causes man to burn his reserves and compromise his survival conditions by irrational practice.'¹⁵⁵ Waste is a by-product of having surplus production, and those who own the most surplus will waste the most. Therefore, we can tie together the three components of waste, insanity, and surplus production. Waste, like insanity, replaces the exterior human part of their assemblages and becomes a part of their nomadic assemblage. It represents their absent status as human. Waste takes over the human aspect of the assemblage. Instead of becoming nomadic, the Deleuzian nomads of *High Rise* become waste. We can see how Laing, in a haze of dehydration and dreamlike consciousness, sees the physical manifestation of waste as part of his mind.

¹⁵⁴Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 150.

¹⁵⁵ Baudrillard, p. 43.

By recognising waste as ‘almost an extension of his own mind’ he accepts it as a part of his assemblage.¹⁵⁶ Laing has taken a step away from protecting his boundaries, but instead he has associated himself with the decadence and insanity of modern living. He has become a part of the throwaway society which has thrown away society. These educated and successful residents of the high-rise represent living the postmodernist’s posthuman fantasy of luxury and efficiency. Groes also indicates the parallel between urban living and altered states of collective consciousness when he suggests the emergence of new spatial configurations have the ability to reshape communities.¹⁵⁷ The vertical landscape that Ballard discusses plays on the worries that people had concerning the utopian, but misconceived and under-funded tower block projects in the 1950s and, in particular, 1960s, which had come to an abrupt halt with the partial collapse of Ronan Point on 16 May, 1968.¹⁵⁸

These spatial configurations reveal a milieu of ontologies which are far from utopian. The characters of *High Rise* are each practising a type of Deleuzian nomadism which resembles the war machine. They are trying to overthrow a system that they believe to be unfair through destructive means, while living increasingly strained daily lives. Many residents begin to recognise and fear their illegal conduct in the building as they believe it can be sensed by those outside, thus their private Self risks leaking through to the public Self. The situation is Reminiscent of Georges Perec *A Life User’s Manual*, where characters within the same building reveal their stories in episodic manner as the plot unfolds.¹⁵⁹ Unlike Perec’s novel, however, only a few aspects of characters’ assemblages are revealed; an absence remains. The absence is overtly posited as the absence of both their sanity and humanity. There are many subtle indications that social inequality pervades throughout this novel despite socio-economic homogenisation. Following the introductory dog roasting scene of the book, Ballard takes us back to the admittance of the final resident of the high-rise. Here it seems to be the pinnacle of sophistication and its residents content:

The high-rise was a huge machine designed to serve, not the collective body of tenants, but the individual resident in isolation. Its staff of air-conditioning conduits,

¹⁵⁶ Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 205.

¹⁵⁷ Groes, p. 125.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 107; Andrzej Gasiorek, *J.G. Ballard* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 107.

¹⁵⁹ Georges Perec, *Life: A User’s Manual*, Vintage (London, 2003).

elevators, garbage-disposal chutes and electrical switching systems provided a never-failing supply of care and attention that a century earlier would have needed an army of tireless servants.¹⁶⁰

High Rise depicts people living lives of middle-class luxury, where they are able to completely isolate themselves from the outside world as their apartment building contains shops, leisure facilities, a bank and restaurant. The building is almost fully automated, except for the maintenance crew who repair minor faults. But this is the surface dream of how people imagined posthumanity. Ballard was ahead of the curve in his equally impersonal demonstration of technology's ability to provide equal luxury to all, but equally its ability to intensify social inequities.

Technology has no desires of its own, so it does not affect any system which it is a part of directly, but rather it is the means by which techno and bio-politics takes place. Technology can be used to enhance the will of those who use, or misuse it. The notion that those who live on higher floors gain no benefits over lower floor residents is fallacious, as it grants them unequal access to systems which flow down the building. This affords them the ability to subjugate those who live on floors below them through acts of vandalism, or violence against the technology which maintains the infrastructure of the building for those who live beneath them.

The tampering with the electricity system had affected the air-conditioning. Dust was spurting from the vents in the walls. Exasperated, Wilder drove his fists together. Like a huge and aggressive malefactor, the high-rise was determined to inflict every conceivable hostility upon them. Wilder tried to close the grilles, but within minutes they were forced to take refuge on the balcony. Their neighbours were crowded against their railings, craning up at the roof as if hoping to catch sight of those responsible.¹⁶¹

Critics such as Groes argue that the health of the building symbolises the failing mental health of the residents.¹⁶² He goes further to argue that London's physical structure embodies and induces an unhealthy state of mind; the city's spaces form a dense compression of Victorian architecture that leaves no room for the imagination, resulting in psychopathologies and violence.¹⁶³ In this system, the physically imposing Wilder is

¹⁶⁰ J.G. Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 6.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 76.

¹⁶² Groes, p. 137.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 134.

rendered powerless in the face of a different law of nature; the law of technological democracy. His physicality in a wider social system would have been a source of strength, but his social standing here is determined by something other than his physical and mental attributes. It is determined by his address, something which is unrelated to his existence and in many ways could be seen as both arbitrary, and as existing in the background of our everyday social relations. Wilder is the most advanced nomad of Ballard's novel in that he recognises these defective aspects which make up his normalised Self within the original apartment complex, before the sites of rupture destratify the unified building into violent turmoil. In the new violent landscape, Wilder no longer needs to exercise abstract and subtle forms of nomadism as he is able to become a living embodiment of the war machine, empowered by his prolonged exposure to heavy camera equipment. His organic body, having been empowered in a different way by technology, makes him an organic cyborg empowered by his ability to move metal as opposed to being moved by it.

Recalling a previous affair with Jane Sheridan on the 37th floor, Wilder recalls his discomfort at integrating with upper-class/floor society. Ballard overtly likens the high-rise as a metaphor of the social unrest experienced in London during the nineteenth century.

He found it difficult to be himself in her apartment. All the time he was conscious of the distance to the ground, and of his wife and children far below him, deep in the lowest seams of the building like the exploited women and child labourers of the nineteenth century.¹⁶⁴

The sterile impersonality which developed through technological progress creates this atmosphere that unsettles Wilder. The wealthy learned to adapt to this environment, as the environment allows for efficiency and instant gratification. The residents become apathetic towards other people, engaging only when they have a vested interest in the outcome of an engagement. Wilder, who we learn is 'pugnacious' and was a rugby player, is portrayed as a Welshman. Wilder is rootless, as he belongs neither to the working-class nor the middle-class groups. He is clear on the reasons for this perceived deviance being due to his physical aspects and his not having been traditionally initiated into the middle-class group through traditional means, i.e., via a professional degree, business, or through inheritance. Instead, Wilder, who likely holds a degree relating to a vocational subject, who comes from a

¹⁶⁴ Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 82.

working-class Welsh background, is forever a deviant who consistently makes the mistake of altering himself rather than mediating himself with his surroundings. The result is an awareness of his radically deviant body which has been developed through sport and through prolonged contact with heavy camera equipment, which he carries around everywhere.

Ballard's characters frequently explore their psyches and assemblages to understand where their boundaries are in relation to exterior forces. In many cases they also practice nomadism to distinguish themselves against the insanity that forms their milieu. Examples of this desire to portray nomadism can be found in his short story *The Subliminal Man* and the novel *Super Cannes* where the protagonist is sent into turmoil while attempting to resist extreme normalising forces.¹⁶⁵ Stephenson similarly argues that:

The catalyst of the psychic devolution of the residents of the high-rise is the building itself [...] its luxury, privacy, and efficiency pander to the weakest and most frivolous aspects of their characters. Outwardly successful, satisfied and optimistic specimens of a new affluent social type, [...] the residents of the high-rise are inwardly destitute and desperate, consumed with loathing for themselves, for each other, and for the building.¹⁶⁶

Contrarily, I argue that the building provides a surrogate body which the inhabitants commit the acts of self-harming upon as a subconscious cry for help amidst the looming psychosis. The environment that these successful occupants of the high-rise inhabit is so clinical and anti-human, that their psyches shatter under the mental anguish of trying to reconcile existing in such spaces. This can serve as an investigation of human plasticity in that we observe how Ballard believes inhabitants adapt to inorganic environments. I deem them inorganic, rather than inhuman, as they were created by humans and are therefore impregnated with the very notion of 'humanity' as they exist only to serve Humans, not human-animals.

Next, I will move on to the final section of this analysis by outlining the different nomads which inhabit this novel, and why each of them never transcends Deleuzian nomadism to practice nomadic ontologies in the ways that I advocate for this posthuman figure.

¹⁶⁵ Ballard, *The Complete Short Stories*; Ballard, *Super Cannes*.

¹⁶⁶ Stephenson, p. 81.

A Spectrum of Nomads

This final section is the final link in severing my nomadic paradigm from that of Deleuze, Guattari and Braidotti. The most vocal concern that I have expressed throughout this chapter is that previous nomads based on the Deleuzian model are open-ended and operate on a system of violence in the form of 'the war machine'. This analysis has shown the limitations of the Deleuzian nomad as it functions through the scope of my own paradigm. An unanticipated result of reading Deleuzian nomads in this way is the emergence of different kinds of nomads. These nomads yield a new reading of *High Rise* which brings the novel into a new focus within critical posthumanist studies, which allow for further development of nomadism within the field. These nomads provide concrete examples of the limitation of Deleuze's paradigm, and open the way for me to construct a nomad that does not spiral into entropy in Chapter Two. In this sub-section I will explore three different types of Deleuzian nomads within *High Rise* through the scope of my paradigm to chart the entropic spiral suffered by Deleuzian nomads. This will allow me to enter Chapter Two with the premise of using my paradigm to create a stable nomad which can resist entropy.

It is important to recognise that when Ballard wrote *High Rise*, he was not writing to portray Deleuzian or any other type of nomad. Nomads are a reading that I have created in response to my reading of his novel and is thus a unique take on Ballardian studies. First, I will discuss Richard Wilder. He is what can be referred to as a counter-signing regime nomad and is a concrete manifestation of Deleuze and Guattari's 'war machine', whose aim is to deterritorialise the arborescent hierarchy from within. He begins his nomadic life benignly, seeking only to deterritorialise a section of this hierarchy so that he can make space for himself within it. However, characterised by the Freudian 'id', he enters into a psychosis that leaves him in this destructive state of nomadism, with no opportunity to stabilise. After destroying the last remnant of the regime which he opposed, he is exterminated by the new state which emerged as a matriarchal society. The matriarchal society goes from a nomadic state into a nomadic-resistant society founded on the war machine which they used as their vehicle for forming their society.

As Wilder cleans his apartment before leaving his family behind for the last time he considers the difficulties of his upcoming ascent of the building.¹⁶⁷ He realises that the ability to push a button and expect an elevator to carry him to the floors above has become nothing but a myth due to the barred lobbies and murderous tribes of people on each floor. According to Groes, 'one way in which Ballard's trilogy can be read is as an attempt to translate postmodern spatiality into classical, human structures by inducing specific sensory reading experiences'.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, Wilder can be re-thought of as a counter-regime nomadic subject. Wilder's frustration develops through the narrative as his wife and children are progressively denied access to facilities, to the point where he drowns a dog in the communal swimming pool on the tenth floor. Wilder's ascent through the building like a contested line of flight symbolises his attack of the structure until he succumbs to the same psychosis of the other, more wealthy residents.

Groes also notes that 'Ballard's oppressive tower block is appropriated by its inhabitants and turned into a counter-space'.¹⁶⁹ I argue most specifically that Wilder is merely one aspect of the transformation of the space within the high-rise becoming a counter space, however, he is the most destructive. We can see this when Wilder is contemplating on 'this same surrender to a logic more powerful than reason was evident in the behaviour of his [Wilder's] neighbours'.¹⁷⁰

Wilder's neighbours do not feature among my nomads as they either leave the high-rise or remain on their own floors to resist occupation. Wilder is different as he traverses the floors. Diplomatically, he manoeuvres his way into securing lodgings on progressively higher floors. His advances are met with suspicion as others around him recognise him as transitioning from one signing-regime to another. He becomes an impure sign among both parties and eventually threatens them both. We can see evidence of this in his choice of language as he returns to the apartment one day as he has managed to secure lodgings on a higher floor.

¹⁶⁷ Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 80.

¹⁶⁸ Groes, p. 124.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 126.

¹⁷⁰ Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 80.

In the entrance lobby a group of down-at-heel 1st -floor residents watched Wilder stride past the elevators to the stairway. They were suspicious of his movements around the building, his changing allegiances.¹⁷¹

Wilder accepts his stigmatised position as a sign of his superiority. However, the mental anguish that comes with it is something that he is never ultimately able to mediate. As Wilder's mental health deteriorates, he begins re-experiencing his past neuroses. Earlier I made a case for him feeling Œdipal connections to his wife as though she represented his mother. For his father, who we find was absent during his childhood, he relates this figure to the architect, Royal, facilitated by his assault using the other residents.

Without any doubt, he was deliberately exposing himself to Wilder, tempting him upwards. At times Royal seemed to be uncannily aware of the confused image of his natural father that hovered in the attics of Wilder's mind, glimpsed always in the high windows of his nursery. Had Royal set out to play this role, knowing that Wilder's confusions about his father would deflect his resolve to climb the building?¹⁷²

Wilder becomes unable to mediate his present self with his past selves and this is where his failing as a nomad lies. Without the ability to stabilise a sense of Self, the act of change, such as in rising up the high-rise, leads to destruction without the ability to re-territorialise.

The second type of nomad appears only once in the novel. As Wilder enters the elevator on his way to the thirty-seventh floor he meets a resident from the fifth floor, of the same social class as him. She is what I call a 'cartographical nomad'. This type of nomad is not destructive. They are twenty-first century observers who have the ability to negotiate spaces non-destructively. She is also the closest type of nomad to the one I have developed at this point.

'How far do you want to go?' she asked him. 'We can travel anywhere. I'll ride with you.'

Wilder recognized her as a masseuse from the 5th floor, one of the vagrants who spent their time wandering around the high-rise, the denizens of an interior world who formed a second invisible population. 'All right – what about the 35th floor?' 'The people on the 30th floor are nicer.' Expertly she pressed the control buttons, activating the heavy doors. [...] 'If you want to go higher, I'll show you. There are a lot of air-shafts, you know. The trouble is, dogs have got into them – they're getting hungry ...'¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p. 164.

¹⁷² Ibid, p. 163.

¹⁷³ Ballard, *High Rise*, p. 87.

She has developed a cognitive cartography of the building schematics and the political structures of the remaining resident tribes that the average resident would not care to recall. She is a neutral observer, operating *outside* the interests of both sides of the fighting. Notably, she claims the residents of the thirtieth floor are nicer than the thirty-fifth floor, suggesting that she maintains a social relationship with them both. It would explain her knowledge of current events being in detail greater than Wilder's. This scenario could come about that she is recognised as a neutral observer in the conflict. However, it may also be in relation to her profession as a masseuse, the upper floor residents may use her services.

The third category of nomads which I consider is the wives and mothers previously quoted, living on the roof. These women until the final scene drifted between who they perceived to be the strongest leader, from the architect Royal, to Pangbourne, who was second-in-command. This type of nomadism is not of the same type as Wilder's. It is on the other end of the spectrum, called state-forming. They serve as the majority by selecting the head of the hierarchy. They ultimately break away from this regime again to form an egalitarian society (as originally intended) on the roof, feeding the remaining dogs (and possibly men) to their children. These nomads make up the missing piece of Wilder's nomadism. While he was active in de-territorialising, they were desperate for the process of re-territorialising. This desperation led them to (we assume) kill Wilder as he reached the roof to avoid him damaging the newly forming rhizomatic state.

Each type of nomad described here falls short of re-territorializing the structure they wish to challenge, internalising the system and becoming re-territorialised themselves. However, each of these three nomads enacts specific parts of the process. Ballard's characters are, in this light, vibrant and certainly not 'dead logs' as previously described, but act out radically developing roles through posthumanism, becoming indications of many sites of debate in eradicating humanist dogmatic thought in the twenty-first century.

My reading of characters within Ballard's *High Rise* yields a new reading of *High Rise* which acts testament to the need to create non-war machine nomads, while providing the opportunity to review and refresh the nomadic and posthumanist methodology of encountering literary studies. My reading of *High Rise* has taken the potential of its literary significance in a new direction by analysing it through my four concerns (normalisation and deviance, multiple and fractured selves, the distinction between becoming nomadic and

practising nomadism, and the different kinds of nomads in Ballard's novel). While some of these concerns have been expressed by other critics, I have been unable to find any who are interested in this combination of concerns. For critical posthumanist studies, this offers a long-overdue revisit into its Ballardian and nomadic studies fields. My hope is that there will be further critical interest in response to my paradigm.

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, I retraced the genealogy of the Deleuzian nomad through its initial conception as a cluster of concerns, to its practical development as a nomadic war machine, destined to resist marginalisation and dismantle hierarchical societies. Finally, Braidotti's work on post-feminist criticism using the nomad I showed how the nomad was adapted to challenge phallogocentrism, among other social and political inequities, by engaging with posthumanist ethics. My own iteration of the nomad took the concerns of the distinction of becoming nomadic and practising nomadism into account and realised that a nomad must first understand all the links in its chain before attempting to mediate with spaces, otherwise it risks becoming the subverted subject, or it may be thrown into an entropic spiral.

In *High Rise*, I applied my paradigm through three sections, examining how the process and effects of social Othering among Ballard's characters is influenced by binary notions of normalisation and deviance. In the second section I asserted that technology poses equal risks as it does conveniences to the psychology of urban residents. This was supported by my examples of how technology became a battle ground in which violence was used to usurp power among residents, using connotations to arbitrarily render certain residents inferior to others. As a result, the oppressor and oppressed had their notions of Self shattered into multiple selves. Technology's biggest inconvenience emerged through the revelation that the usage of technology emerges through desire, technology exists to enhance any aspect of the user within the mechanical function of the machine in question. However, because machines lack any desire of their own, they can be used to enhance the ability a human has to cause suffering to other organisms if that is the user's wish. Further, I

explored the notion of how waste societies are thought of by some postmodern scholars as societies of insanity. More and more efficient technology permits the generation of greater amounts of surplus, and therefore waste. Because residents such as Laing begin to associate themselves with their waste, technology has potential drawbacks to the already disturbed mind. In the final section I showed how my paradigm of the nomad yielded new understanding of Ballard's characters in the novel while simultaneously showing how the Deleuzian model of the nomad falls short.

In the following chapter I will take the nomad that I have contrasted in this chapter, which has so far been in isolation, and insert it into a milieu to encounter systems of normalisation. In this way I will be able to discuss why it is impossible to create a clean break from prior social, political, and ideological systems, and then finally explain how these reveal the fallacy of a clean break between the human and the post-human subject. In the accompanying literary analysis of Chapter Two, I will show how nomads undergo the process of becoming nomadic in a totalitarian society, and how practising nomadism can have its drawbacks if the society in question is unable or unwilling to accept deviation.

Chapter Two: Power, Ideologies, and Posthuman Mythology

Introduction

To reach this crucial point in my literary investigation of nomads, we have had to revisit and revise our understanding of the original Deleuzian nomads, and its developments, so that I can now integrate the next stage of my paradigm. Now as I enter the point of integrating my nomad in response to social, political, and literary contexts, I will review the stages from which this paradigm and figure have emerged.

In the introduction, I prefaced my investigation into nomadic posthumanism by posing five key questions. These questions were: what are the diverse ways in which posthumanism has been theorised? what are the problems caused by the techno-centric theorisation of posthumanism? How does this introduce anthropocentrism into posthumanist discourse? Is there a tool within posthumanism that can address the problems of anthropocentrism in posthumanist writing? Finally, how will explicitly articulating these key concepts make a difference to posthumanism? Through these questions, I determined that the main concerns of posthumanism are socially and philosophically motivated critiques concerning capitalism, anthropocentrism, biopolitics, ethics, and the implications of advancing technologies to name the broadest concerns. The problem that I asserted was an increasing disproportionate weight centred around the applications and benefits of technology, as opposed to its potential risks within the posthumanities. While this is more commonly known as transhumanism, it is often claimed to be a form of techno-centric posthumanism, and this form of posthumanism is the most widely recognised, and oversimplified face of posthumanism.

The aim of my reinvigorating nomadic criticism is to present a platform on which further posthumanist readings of literature can become available, particularly in response to social, technological, and political concerns within science fiction, dystopian and new gothic genres of literature. I will return to its significance in Chapter Three when clarifying how the nomadic body differs from that of monstrous bodies. The six-point paradigm I outlined in Chapter One acts as a focal point, which allows new readings of these three genres because

they are associated with the umbrella genre of speculative fictions, or fictions which attempt to portray near future situations. They are viewed as texts which present, or represent concerns a writer, or readers may have regarding their local milieu through the experience of a socially ostracised figure. With the considerations I outline in this and the following chapter, I hope to present a robust methodology for investigating non-conforming characters in literary criticism.

Chapter One constructed the foundation of my three-part, three-chaptered paradigm. The chapter aimed to investigate the origins and developments of the nomad through Deleuze, Guattari, and Braidotti, so that it could be understood through their terms in its entirety. After this was completed, I was then in a position to highlight what I believe are the shortcomings of their concepts of the nomad, and developed the foundations of my own six-point paradigm. This paradigm altered the original concerns of, or expanded on, my original take on the distinction between becoming nomadic vs practising nomadism, normalisation vs deviance, multiple selves, the risks of extreme binary thinking, the methodology of rhizomatic criticism, and the nature of my gentler nomad.

The result of my literary paradigm was that it could be applied to yield a new reading of J.G. Ballard's *High Rise*, in which I could highlight the limitations of unstable, violence-prone nomadic figures originating from a Deleuzian paradigm. It also offered new insights into the nomad forming processes and practises that literary characters undergo through sights of rupture in the form of arbitrary social normalisations. These normalisations can be based on anything as trivial as someone's address, which can lead to unequal expectations of living conditions even within a homogenous social class. Ballard's characters exemplify nomads who cannot escape the system of violence that they are using to re-territorialise their living spaces, resulting in infinite sites of rupture where nomads are no longer able to use their ability of connection to construct any meaningful assemblages. As such, a nomad who cannot form and control their assemblages has given way to normalisation or entropy, and thus ceases to operate nomadically.

My paradigm reveals a new reading of Ballard's *High Rise* that could not be realised through a Deleuzian or Braidottian vision of nomadism. I have yielded a new reading of a well-trodden Ballardian novel. The advantages of this new reading are that it engages with Ballard's writing from a new perspective; from the angle of social and critical posthumanist

critiques. What was once assumed to be a critically exhausted novel gains new life through the rhizomatic critical methodology that I have applied through my research. It complements my theoretical section of Chapter One by showing nomads working in isolation, whereas in this chapter, I will show nomads who continue to work both individually and in groups. The context that was absent in Chapter One is now introduced here in limited fashion.

Nomads are investigators of spaces which have been coveted and converted through dogmatic beliefs of an outdated humanist subject. It therefore negotiates with, rather than challenges, practised and imagined hierarchical notions through systematised subversive non-conformance. The ultimate aim of a nomad is not to destroy the system which comes before it, but to mediate these spaces in such a way that certain arbitrary inequalities are surgically purged without destroying an entire system for the purpose of minor alterations.

The nomad is the site of activation for my critical posthumanist paradigm. Nomads are singular entities, operating as individuals. They resist normalisation, and thereby homogenisation. This is done through the process of becoming nomadic, in which an individual assesses their connection forming habits and recognises elements of their entire assemblage that they wish to take control over, thereby creating an internalised state of nomadism. The individual then becomes a minority as it begins to practice nomadism, in forming assemblages in non-normalised or deviant ways. Nomads recognise they are always networked to the system they critique. Therefore, they are within and outside that system. They are the embodiment of alterity.

In Chapter One I developed my paradigm of the nomad in isolation to serve as a foundation for my whole paradigm. In this chapter, I will further nuance this paradigm by developing it in relation to social and political contexts. These contexts will subject my nomad to the pushes and pulls which attempt to normalise it in literary settings. To do this, I will develop critical tools related to three areas of my six-point paradigm from Chapter One. These are normalisation and deviance, the relationship of normalisation to binary thinking through the scope of ideological forces, and the process of becoming nomadic through exposing the much-denied linkages between humanism, posthumanism and nomads.

Section one - Normalisation - Technologies of The Body - begins by explaining what I mean by normalisation, technologies of the body and how these concepts relate to nomads. I will then outline the macro-societal structures, which restrict the connections that bodies make in societies by placing boundaries on how citizens live, die, and seek pleasure. I refer to these normalising processes through societal and liturgical developments as technologies of the body as these techniques of control are almost exclusively focused on controlling citizen's movements and practices within society. This first section concludes by shifting from technologies of the body to introducing technologies of the Self. These are bio-political tactics which nomads employ to resist arbitrary normalisation through usurpation of their agency.

Section two - Binary Thinking and Ideology - moves from the oppressive milieu of governmental control to the milieu on a cultural and ideological scale. Here, I re-adjust my focus to the Self by exploring the vulnerability nomadic subjects have to ideologies. The vulnerability itself indicates a link between the human and the posthuman which was heavily resisted in the early 2000s. However, nomads, as posthuman subjects, are raised in networks of social, historical, and philosophical traditions that are specific to their local milieu.

Section three - Becoming Nomadic – Humanism, Posthumanism, Nomads – with the milieu of governmental and social networks outlined in the previous two sections of this chapter, I will move on to reconnect nomads with their human counterparts, and reveal posthumans and nomads as alternative modes of experiencing humanity. Finally, I will summarise my paradigm before offering a close reading of Badmington's *Alien Chic*, to demonstrate the three areas of the paradigm that I have developed in this chapter. Badmington's *Alien Chic* offers profound insights into the posthuman condition and allows for the starting point of a discussion of posthuman ontologies. These ontologies and the agencies associated with them will be the focus of Chapter Three.

Developing My Paradigm: Normalisation - Technologies of The Body

This part of my paradigm addresses technologies, both physical and ideological, employed by state bodies to outline how citizens in a localised milieu can live, die, and seek pleasure. I will use Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, and *Technologies of the Self* to guide my investigation.¹⁷⁴ This section will present the nomad as a state of being as the subject of epistemological and ontological investigations. This first section, utilising *Discipline and Punish*, establishes a context for society, which is in the grasp of state mandated technological and social mechanisation. This book highlights both the increasing control that Western governments exert over its systems and its citizens, and the arbitrary means by which it goes about punishing who it deems to be criminals.

This work has two implications for nomadic and posthumanist critics. Firstly, in showing how governments can transform citizens into criminals, they are creating a tool for the purpose of rendering someone 'less' than human, thereby creating a vulnerable group. The posthumans response to this process is bio-politics, or the politics surrounding the body and constructed discourses (such as race, gender, class, and provenance), which aims to defend the agency of lifeforms against exploitation. Secondly, it raises the concern of the ideological Self within a normalised system. The capital 'S' in 'Self' refers exclusively to the individuated ego, separating one person from the normalised social body. Foucault's work reaches a metaphorical wall as he charts State-mandated normalisations and transformations of the body. *Technologies of the Self* can only point readers towards the prospect of becoming nomadic. It is the first indication that nomadism is a powerful tool in social and literary criticism.

Before I begin my discussion of technologies of the body, I must first clarify my paradigm of normalisation in a milieu, which is nuanced from Foucault's work concerning 'normalisation'. Foucault was concerned with governmental technologies of the body, resulting in normalisation which he referred to as both normalisation and

¹⁷⁴ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977); Michel Foucault, *Technologies of the Self*, ed. by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: The University of Massachusettes Press).

standardisation.¹⁷⁵ Normalisation is the processes and practices that are approved of by a governing body, be it political, liturgical, social, or religious. Normalisation occurs when governing bodies use tactics of control and coercion. Foucault referred to these as technologies of behaviour.¹⁷⁶ As my terminology encompasses ideologies and broader social translations, I will employ the term technologies of the body. Standardisation has the same meaning, though it indicates a codification where these practices and processes are not only approved, but also codified so that others may be trained in replicating them. Note that in Chapter Three I will explore the changeability of a codex, so standardisation should not be considered a permanent state of being.

Normalisation is the result of formal, social, cultural, and educational training.¹⁷⁷ In Foucault's work, he describes discipline as isomorphic; a synchronisation of body and will to the technologies which are applied to it. His specific example refers to the prison system.

Disciplinary punishment is, in the main, isomorphic with obligation itself; it is not so much the vengeance of an outraged law as its repetition, its reduplicated insistence. So much so that the corrective effect expected of it involves only incidentally expiation and repentance; it is obtained directly through the mechanics of a training. To punish is to exercise.¹⁷⁸

The isomorphism in this case applies to the bending of the criminal's will, and thereby body, to the training through labour that the prison system inflicts on it. It is a technology of the body which represents a mutual adaption of the prison system to sustain and transform the lives of offenders, and the adaption of the criminal's body to serve the community through forced labour as a symbolic gesture of making amends. This technology of the body is designed to restrict the way a criminal can live until they are released as a reformed citizen. Foucault explains 'corrective training'; his theory of hierarchies and the introduction of the 'norm'.¹⁷⁹ The penal system exists perpetually. It traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it *normalizes*.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 184.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 293.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 231.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 180.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 301.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 183.

Nomads threaten normalisation processes because of their rhizomatic, assemblage-forming ability. They are therefore often seen as outcasts or social minorities. Occasionally they are not permitted to re-join the society without publicly renouncing their defection.

Normalisation, however, often indicates the flexibility of a society to accept non-acceptable practices while maintaining order. Nomads cannot remain socially deviant indefinitely, therefore their existence must be temporary. The same can be said for posthumans. The posthuman is an engagement of human with technology, animals and philosophy in ways that explore the complex networks that they inhabit. Therefore, the posthuman condition is as borderless and impermanent as a nomadic existence.

This section is a reading of Foucault which highlights the processes through which governments normalise bodies in a milieu. As such, these mechanisms usurp the agency of a subject, and replace it with a normalised citizen who is at risk of becoming a minority, or less-than-human subject. Colin Koopman has also within the last decade emphasised the pertinence of revisiting Foucault's excavation of the prison system in *Active Intolerance*, which contains a collection of essays about Foucault's time with the Prisons Information Group. Koopman argues that an investigation of how Foucault's engagement with this group on the prison system would achieve the 'urgent' task of putting 'Foucault into contact with the politics of today'.¹⁸¹ I think revisiting Foucault's work still has valuable insight to offer scholars of today. While posthumanism is constantly engaged with politics (bio-politics, gender-politics, etc), Koopman emphasises that engaging political realities must always work in reflexive engagement with both its subject matter, and its own conditions of critique.¹⁸² I will begin by how ruling bodies have exercised power over bodily and psychic will. I believe the bodily and psychic subjugation that I am concerned with here relates to Foucault's political 'transformations' of the body. In judicial contexts, this relates to what Foucault describes as 'the condemned man'.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Colin Koopman, 'Conduct and Power: Foucault's Methodological Expansions in 1971', in *Active Intolerance: Michel Foucault, the Prisons Information Group, and the Future of Abolition*, ed. by Perry Zurn and Andrew Dilts (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 59–74 (p. 59).

¹⁸² Ibid, p. 59.

¹⁸³ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 9.

Technologies of the body – State-Mandated Transformations

Technologies of the body both take away the agency of a person to decide how they live, die, and seek pleasure. They have the power to transform an acceptable citizen into a deviant or criminal overnight.¹⁸⁴ At the same time, they also have the power, through political and mechanical progress, to enact more nuanced transformations on bodies, not only to criminalise certain beliefs or acts, but to also create social cohesion, which is essential in maintaining diverse populations in large, industrialised urban settings.

This first section responds to Foucault's excavation of the developing legal system in France to reveal the diverse transformative mechanisms that governments employed, as they uncovered the technologies necessary for state-mandated normalisation. As these technologies did not occur overnight, it is important to understand their origins to reveal all the hidden links which encircle the nomadic figure in a milieu of agency generating and usurping practices. I will then be able to apply this milieu in the context of normalisation, which makes up an important aspect of my six-point paradigm.

Discipline and Punish excavates the penal system from the end of the medieval period to the twentieth century. This book shows how capital punishments created a divide in the State's power. Execution and public torture acted as a deterrent for crime, effecting a form of fear control over its citizens. It also associated the criminal as a hero who defied the State and who suffered the penalty.¹⁸⁵ The aim of capital punishment was to create a spectacle of the body, which demonstrated the State's power to transform individuals from citizens into condemned others. The State in this way established its control and benevolence over individuals. Foucault argues how:

One would be concerned with the 'body politic', as a set of material elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays, communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Note: Deviancy is created by and operates within binary systems, to promote the concept of non-conformity. Deviancy, especially those represented in Foucault's work are man-made. Deviancy is therefore a man-made ongoing, political transformative process contrasting the non-politicised existence of alternative human ontologies.

¹⁸⁵ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 61.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 28.

The body of the citizen becomes transformed (or over-coded) as a condemned body. Stripped of any other connotations, it is reduced to a symbol of political and social revenge, a site of power and is othered publicly from society. The body is stripped of its humanity in the most fatal way. The State completes the transformation from the privileged Human (with a capital H to show its privilege over other forms of life), to condemned sub-human by using technology. In some cases the State used, gallows, in other cases it employed the guillotine among other devices which were created for the purpose of shortening life or inducing pain.

This system makes use of liturgical processes to ensure a standardised code of conduct for citizens. In some cases, this means to protect the governing body, or in other cases the social body. One reason nomads are considered deviant is due to their questioning of these arbitrary processes and practices. The potential of a non-conforming criminal body is implicitly linked to nomadic practices, which in Deleuzian contexts was not an impossibility. My gentler nomad resists the normalising processes of State control, but it does not seek to destroy the processes in place. In the broadest sense, my nomad observes, records, and then seeks to improve on what exists in a way that benefits not only the survival of the majority, but those groups who are already rendered sub-human. It essentially recognises that its own ideals are of less importance than the course of action that will benefit the most people.

Once the spectacle of the body became commonplace, governments needed a new way to mystify the process of bodily transformation. Public execution, which exercised power over the body alone, evolved so that the victim's face was concealed.¹⁸⁷ Privation of death followed and finally, only knowledge of the crime, sentence and execution being publicly known became the standard procedure.¹⁸⁸ Moving away from overt violence and spectacle of punishment, to a more abstract and cerebral form of punishment, indicates a new form of power at work. With the consequences of crime no longer on display, governments could exercise a fear of the imagination in addition to physical punishment. The spectacle

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 15.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 9.

becomes redundant compared to the knowledge of what the State can do to the body of those it renders less than Human.

[T]here may be a 'knowledge' of the body that is not exactly the science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more than the ability to conquer them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be called the political technology of the body [...] it implements a disparate set of tools or methods.¹⁸⁹

This type of knowledge grants governing bodies justified means of stripping a person of their humanity. Ideological subjugation of the human body in order to over-code it with certain political 'truths' is the result of abuses of these practices. This becomes one mode of humanist bio-politics. Eventually this knowledge became more nuanced and transitioned from a punishment of the body, paid in blood, to a punishment of the soul.¹⁹⁰

Incarceration represented a new technology of the body, which created a section of society bound in forced labour providing a productive means of control while permitting legitimised usurpation of agency.¹⁹¹ This allowed governmental bodies to over-code the citizen into the condemned body and then act on that site of fracture, creating a reformed body by way of servitude as penance. While incarceration of violent criminals for the protection of a society can be justified, this one-punishment-fits all approach of the prison system sees non-violent criminals punished in the same way as dangerous criminals. This suggests the ideology at play here is a containment of physical body in order to exercise violence over the psychic elements of offenders. Foucault summarises that the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body.¹⁹² This form of over-coding required manpower and resources, as convicts needed to be maintained and transformed simultaneously.

The drawback of this process is that the prison system became the government's most productive social re-training and cost-effective labour choice. This introduced new issues surrounding the habitual and arbitrary nature of transformations. What were once reserved for preserving social cohesion, now served as a means by which the government recruited affordable labour. This means of over-coding, or reformation, also became entirely

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 26.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 101.

¹⁹¹ Note: Agency is the ability of a subject to control its boundaries, its internal processes, and external practices freely along with the ability to self-represent.

¹⁹² Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 26.

dependent on the technologies of the body and mechanical technological developments. The literary analysis of Silverberg's *The World Inside* at the end of this chapter provides concrete examples of the transformations of non-conforming bodies into condemned bodies by making them a spectacle, and by using hidden processes to 'correct' undesirable behaviours. They are essentially anti-nomadic mechanisms formed by ruling bodies to maintain absolutist cohesion. The effect of these processes leads to extreme regimes, which prioritise normalised patterns of behaviour at the cost of rendering alternative ontologies deviant and thus illegal.

Nomads are under constant threat of normalisation. The very milieu in which their bodies are situated are subject to these disassociated processes that are invisible to the eye. They are constantly being deindividuated while undergoing the process of becoming nomadic. It is also for this reason why nomads operate both within and outside social hierarchical structures. In having the option of existing as a rhizome, they may break off parts of their assemblage which are within the social sphere without damaging themselves irreparably. They are able to escape total collapse because they recognise that these pieces of their behaviours and psychologies are also necessary for their continued existence. It secures their agency in a setting where agency has become an illusion. To see through the illusion is to render yourself free of its grasp.

In this section, I recounted how the technologies of the body became more nuanced, leading to the creation of normalised citizens and deviant criminal bodies which become subject to a uniform prison system. This system charts a change in techniques of punishment, and the uses of various technologies in inscribing meaning on to bodies. The practice of inscribing political and social truths on to certain bodies are ubiquitous in literature, and it is for this reason that we need a more nuanced tool designed to address the concern. Nomadic engagement with bio-politics is my answer to this anthropocentric threat. The relevance of nomadic resistance to arbitrary normalising forces will become clear when I analyse different systems of taboos and punishments in my literary analysis at the end of this chapter.

Through bio-political engagement, nomads protect their ability to control their processes and practises. Bio-political engagement shows already that laws do not protect minority groups who needlessly suffer, starve, and die in place of privileged citizens. In Braidottian

fashion, conscientious nomads evaluate the processes involved in creating or overlooking the suffering of minority groups to ask who profits from the unethical inequity. It also aims to negotiate scenarios to minimise the suffering of marginalised groups while holding those in power accountable. Now I have outlined the mechanisms that are used to transform bodies through punishment. In the next section, I can move on to introduce bio-politics as technologies of the Self, to resist abuses in normalisation.

Introduction to Bio-politics – Technologies of the Self

This section introduces bio-politics for readers who are unfamiliar with the term, and in preparation for its employment in my literary analysis at the end of this chapter and in Chapter Three. While in Braidotti's work, bio-politics refer to a complex political economy that connects bodies to machines more intimately, through simulation and mutual modification.¹⁹³ Bio-politics describes the political tactics of protecting the agency of embodied groups within a milieu. All technologies of the body and technologies of the Self operate in a milieu. This is because, as with bio-politics, they are always at play when two bodies meet. In my paradigm, bio-politics are employed as a measure to protect the nomadic subject or scholar who is being subjected to the normalising forces outlined in this chapter. It exists in this paradigm to enable nomads to protect their rhizomatic assemblage-forming ability from the limitations of oppressive, agency-usurping, dehumanising tactics.

Bio-politics have been a growing concern for posthumanist writers since the 1990s and were developed in response to the abuse of economic, social, and political power. According to Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, bio-politics implies disciplinary practices of controlling and regulating human lives as a precondition for aggregating a population into a single collective body.¹⁹⁴

Bio-politics is always at play when bodies come together and relate to each other in spaces, changing the way we think and write about bodies in space. It is a political tracing of beliefs

¹⁹³ Braidotti, *The Posthuman*, pp. 89–90.

¹⁹⁴ Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, 'Biopolitics and National Identities: Between Liberalism and Totalization', *Nationalities Papers*, 45.1 (2017), 1–7 (p. 1) <<https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1225705>>.

and semiotic allegiances. The application of bio-politics to technologies of the Self allows me to engage with bio-politics, and protect posthuman subjects and their literary counterparts from state-mandated normalisation by analysing the nodal points beyond traditional ideological divides.¹⁹⁵ This concern of bodies coming into contact is highlighted in my literary analysis as it portrays a society where the notion of privacy is alien, creating its own reference point of deviancy which would lead readers to imagine themselves as minority characters.

Makarychev and Yatsyk make an important point when they wrote that the shift to greater state control implies a transfer from disciplining the individual body, to disciplining the population through managing health, hygiene, nutrition, birth, and sexuality.¹⁹⁶ This trajectory of thought has further implications than Foucault's critique of the prison system as these everyday points of biopower informs the social conceptualisation of national Self-Other paradigms. For myself, this highlights three common topics of investigation being debated in the field of bio-politics. These are excess and deprivation, birth and death, and codes for the acceptability of sexuality, all of which are targeted in my literary analysis of Silverberg's novel at the end of this chapter.

Technologies of the Self are the tactics employed by my nomads to explore and protect their assemblages from arbitrary over-coding from external bodies. It is like bio-politics as it concerns retaining agency over the body in a milieu. However, technologies of the Self refer to the tactics employed by nomads in their relationship with processes and practices within a milieu, which help them to resist normalisation. This is where I will conclude my contextualisation of the nomad in the sphere of normalisation processes and practices, before moving on to contextualising it within the scope of the relationship of normalisation to binary thinking through the scope of ideological forces. It is for this reason I will complete my discussion of bio-politics as a series of tools and tactics designed for nomads to resist normalisation, and mediate social and political elements that they deem to be anthropocentric.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 1.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 2.

It would be impossible to contextualise nomads, in relation to ideologies before developing the tools they need, to withstand the normalising forces that ideological systems employ when regulating, representing, and re-presenting bodies. Specifically, regulation refers to what was discussed in the previous section. 'Representation' is the presenting of a body (singular and plural) on behalf of a party, and 're-presenting' refers to the act of employing technologies of the body to alter the nature of a body being presented. This can refer to criminal, ill, foreign, or naturalised bodies depending on the desire of the presenting body.

This emphasises the need for an active engagement with bio-politics, without which any ruling body may dictate the most imminent grounds of our lives, including our existence. Governing bodies, or bodies with the power to re-present social groups, may limit how people live, the laws they must obey to protect their citizenship, and also set codes for death. This is one reason why nomads are so threatening to the concept of State-control, as they use their rhizomatic connective properties to connect with different processes and practices concerning methods of living, dying and pleasures which are not prescribed as acceptable. Science fiction writers often show how our modern concepts of morality and normality are meaningless in the face of a more technologically advanced society, which has a different set of values which bind it together.

What makes my selection of Silverberg's novel at the end of this chapter so poignant is that in this text, we have a character who I would argue is a nomad who undergoes the process of becoming nomadic. Moreover, his way of practising nomadism is not subtle. His mode of being nomadic is to leave his native society and expose himself to an alien, but human milieu. The point of this is that the society from which he originates is a neo-modern human society, and the society he enters, which repulses him, is a dystopian representation of a twentieth century human society. Two different value systems operating at the same time. In the case of this novel, on his return, the government's response to this threat is to impose the death penalty on him.

Bio-power is not limited to the system of governing bodies, but also it constructs identities and produces actors' roles as objects of control and regulation through a variety of

institutions, including the church, prisons, schools, and various cultural practices.¹⁹⁷ Bio-politics was traditionally accessible to authorities to grant or deny parole, which included or excluded bodies. However, this exclusion itself has always been a myth. The exclusion of a body creates a belonging of that body to the paradigm.

Bio-politics responds to the abuse of economic, social, and political power by becoming self-reflective. It begins to do this through its use of language. Foucault's *Technologies of the Self* frames language as a prosthetic for ideas, but never as an adequate representation of thoughts which must always be in translation. It is a translation from idea into language. Posthuman writing to cease being a translation of humanism, must develop its own mode of thinking and writing whose language and notions do not hinge on its rejection of humanism.

To summarise, this section concerning technologies of the Self has outlined and drawn together already existing tactics employed by posthuman critics to resist normalisation. These resistances are not generalised. I have discussed the bio-politics of representation, a topic that I will discuss at length in Chapter Three. At this stage, I have introduced bio-politics to show how nomads resist normalising processes on many everyday fronts including health, hygiene, nutrition, birth, and sexuality. Having spent time outlining this multivalent arena in which nomads must act strategically to preserve their status as Human (the capitalised H indicating the dialectic power associated with humanity), I have invested the last few pages constructing this terrain because next I will shift my focus on to the tactics employed by nomads, which fall under technologies of the self. These tactics will include investigating everyday interactions with spaces through psychogeography, investigating the translation of agency, and the creation of monstrosity through technologies of the body. Likewise, nomads can engage with my six-point paradigm, which has already outlined the issues surrounding binary thinking and, as I will show in section two, the employment of multiple selves in resisting normalisation processes employed by State and ideological forces. In brief, I have made provision for a prolonged investigation of bio-politics, binary thinking, multiple selves, and agency, as sites of discourse for technologies of the Self. This discussion of tactics relating to technologies of the Self, in

¹⁹⁷ Philip G. Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (New York: Random House, 2007); Makarychev and Yatsyk, p. 4.

particular the areas I have just mentioned, are in preparation for practical applications of my paradigm in the literary analysis at the end of this chapter.

I will now briefly outline the necessity for nomads to understand their degrees of separation not from ideologies, cultures, or education, but from a network of reflective, embodied experiences which can produce knowledge derived from human experience. This will allow them to understand the systems they inhabit in more nuanced ways, and allow for more lateral assemblage forming within it. Finally, I will close the first section of my chapter with a summary of what I have done and explain how I will proceed on to my second concern regarding milieu, binary thinking, and ideologies.

Haraway, Braidotti, Foucault and I have all chosen marginalised characters who are social outliers, and therefore fit in everywhere, but are never integrated as the focus of their investigations. In *Technologies of the Self*, Foucault explains his reasons for choosing obscure and marginal figures as his point of departure:

The political and social processes by which the Western European societies were put in order are not very apparent, have been forgotten, or have become habitual. They are a part of our most familiar landscape, and we don't perceive them anymore. But most of them once scandalized people. It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are a part of their landscape-that people think are universal-are the result of some very precise historical changes. [...] They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made.¹⁹⁸

The subtleness of political powers and social order mean that the transformation from obscene to ordinary can reveal a political bio-appropriation, or a re-appropriation of bodies that were once marginalised. Foucault succeeded in establishing the seeds of understanding that the process of marginalisation and Othering are arbitrary. One way to counter this is to challenge the fallacies of arbitrary ideologies, and by rooting suppositions on the embodied experiences of many different people. An example of such tactics can be seen by the situationist movement led by Guy Debord, who practiced aimless walking (or *randonnées*) around cities to discover its psychogeography. Practitioners would explore cities on foot, pretending to not understand how humanly constructed systems work to garner an awareness of their constructedness.¹⁹⁹ The persona the situationists at this time took on

¹⁹⁸ Foucault, *Technologies of the Self*, p. 11.

¹⁹⁹ Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* (Canberra: Hobgoblin Press, 2002).

was a twentieth-century iteration of the flâneur, who drifted across cities to absorb aspects of the urban landscape. Nomads, as mutual drifters, and my twenty-first century iteration of the flâneur, have moved beyond passively drifting to actively engaging with the threats of processes which entangle them.

Foucault's work on the production of knowledge is important for a posthuman understanding of the parameters that we use to judge something as factual. He explains how knowledge of the Self developed in Western culture.

[A] hermeneutics of the self has been diffused across Western culture through numerous channels and integrated with various types of attitudes and experience so that it is difficult to isolate and separate it from our own spontaneous experiences.²⁰⁰

The act of reflection is integral to the investigation of individuality and the Self and are thus core components of Western thought processes. Humans are inclined to constantly ask how events relate to themselves, and how their actions represent their desires and social standings. The notions of body and Self have always been politically weighted. To ask questions related to one's identity is to ask what desires one holds and to where one may place their allegiances. Foucault's main area of interest was in the classical period.

Throughout this text, he presented examples of how the ancient Greek philosophers constructed their theories of the self and of the duty to care for oneself physically, mentally, and spiritually.

Nomads act as individuated Selves which draw attention in a novel for subverting the *status quo*. They are not passive, but instead active sites for engaging with the ideologies, practices and processes which propagate and deprive power from humans and non-human animals in the society around them. Like all characters that I will analyse in this thesis, nomads resist normalisation, and deviate from social and moral expectations for the type of character they are supposed to portray. By analysing characters as practising technologies of the Self, we gain the tools to analyse character that deviate from the 'norm' not as deviants, but as nomads. They indicate more than threat, mystery, or monstrosity, as they allow writers to explore their concerns which stem from their real lives. Nomads are the tools writers use to participate in larger debates and influence the social imaginary in a direction that they hope

²⁰⁰ Foucault, *Technologies of the Self*, p. 17.

benefits future societies. I will take this line of thinking into my discussion of posthuman agency verses monstrosity in Chapter Three.

Nomadism has the unique advantage of rhizomatic thought and that is its ability to move in any way within a system of ideas as opposed to only linearly. Because it can move over spaces, drawing together ideas that were confined within traditional disciplines, it is able to analyse ideas in new combinations that were once incomparable. It is therefore not bound by a single dogmatic ideology. Nomadism also reveals the difficulty of resisting normalisation as any thought must be translated into language. Language is a globalised process of normalisation, and therefore all ideas must become subject to a system before expression.

This chapter is a crucial step in establishing the nomad as a vehicle for challenging anthropocentric thinking within the posthumanities through literary investigations, thereby achieving this goal. To reach this point, I have developed an isolated, theoretical nomadic figure and provided it with tools with which it may perform new readings of science fiction, dystopian and new gothic texts. In this chapter I have introduced the crucial element of milieu in which the nomad must resist normalising processes. This first of three steps has established the presence, processes and need for resistance against the misuse of technologies of the body, which create both normalisation and deviance. In the following section, I will take this current discussion a step further and focus on another aspect of my six-point paradigm. In providing further context for nomadic resistance to normalisation through ideological forces, my nomads will be exposed to extreme dogmatic thinking. This will contextualise my paradigm within the scope of the relationship of normalisation to binary thinking through the scope of ideological forces which rely on naturalised binary thinking.

Developing My Paradigm: Binary Thinking and Ideology

Resistance to binary thinking is another aspect of my paradigm that implicates the existence of arbitrary normalisation. I claim that posthuman psyches are resistant to over-coding as they do not fracture (paradoxically viewing over-coded bodies as legitimised and

simultaneously deviant), because posthuman psyches are made up of many networked parts, or agents. In each part being networked, nomads and posthumans enjoy the reflexivity of a virtual milieu, which resists ideological fallacies. In Chapter One, I discussed the idea that hierarchies cannot be deconstructed without dismantling the whole system. The human psyche is the same in that if one element has been challenged, the whole belief system and cognitive process of that person must reassemble itself to accommodate the new data. In this chapter, I will isolate two agents of the posthuman and nomadic network to show how together they resist binary thinking imposed by ideological infiltration, and why the denial of their relationship with the human agent is the cause of their continued susceptibility to ideologies.

To illustrate this concern, I will situate the nomad in an extreme binary system in which ideological forces are attempting to embed themselves within a nomadic subject. The subject has three options at this point: they may either accept the over-coding, and become normalised in the binary system; they may resist the effects of the process, thereby remaining in a state of imminent becoming; or they may pursue my third option, which is unique to my paradigm of multiple selves. They may divide their psyche into multiple selves pertaining to the public body and the private body. These two states are constantly informing each other and will allow nomads to continue to function in social settings while being considered alien from the group.

Multiple selves are both the problem of, and the solution to, binary thinking. Therefore, this section pertains to modes of ideological normalisation, and how nomads may protect their individualities. To outline the tactics of multiple selves within my paradigm as a response to ideological milieus, I will respond to Derrida's *Ends of Man* while exploring the significance of minority subjects, such as foreigners, who are not considered fully equal citizens within a society. The term foreigner itself is employed to distinguish one who knows the expected social customs, language, history, from one who doesn't (the foreigner, the child) is what constitutes the culture of a people.²⁰¹

²⁰¹ Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 19.

This section maps the common ground nomads share with foreigners. I will show how both may be clearly distinct from a social group. However, nomads may be cognitively deviant from normalised citizens and their assemblage forming may be in the virtual sense, leaving no evidence of their alternative ontologies while foreigners are always considered potentially deviant. While nomads may choose non-conformity, they are still members of their social and cultural milieus. In this way, there is a distinct space between the perceived public self and the private self.

I will then show how ideologies haunt the systems that replace them. This will serve my paradigm in three ways. Firstly, it recognises that most citizens are fractured by internal opposing beliefs, and as such, they compulsively operate using trained reflexes as opposed considering their beliefs and choices reflexively. It also indicates the hidden links between the public and private self. Finally, it bridges my discussion on to the third part of this chapter, which argues that posthumanism is not a clean break from humanism, as is widely claimed. Nomadology is adapted to retrace these hidden or denied links as it explores spaces and questions the assemblages that make up our normalised human networks, and our intense, unstable networks that make up the posthuman. In Chapter Three, with all my links outlined, I will be able to show how nomads take control of these ubiquitous assemblage potentials in relation to literary practices, technology, and spaces.

Public and Private Bodies – Tactics to Resist Ideologies

This section will make two points regarding the relationship between multiple selves and binary thinking through a parallel analysis of nomads and foreigners. Firstly, nomads and posthumans are susceptible to extreme binary thinking through the influence of ideology on social, cultural, and historical influences. Referring to the nomadic subject, I will show how the private body and the public body are inescapably connected, which both shows that nomads are temporary states of being, and it also provides grounds for my literary investigation at the end of this chapter.

Secondly, the relevance of the split but connected public and private bodies is a tactic nomad and posthumans use in literary and real settings. This can be seen when characters

conceal their true thoughts while complying openly with their social milieu while simultaneously seeking to subvert it. The sudden emergence of a nomad further implies that nomads and posthumans are susceptible to ideologies, as the emergence of a nomad represents a break from their prior normalised state. This scenario suggests their existence is temporary. My reading of Derrida's *Ends of Man*, and *Specters of Marx* will guide my investigation of binary thinking and multiple selves, to show how the end of ideologies that Braidotti ironically proclaimed is still beyond the grasp of posthumanism.²⁰²

These discussions anticipate my analysis of Silverberg's *The World Inside*, as the plot tracks a growing mistrust among certain residents who commit increasingly deviant acts. Within the context of my first chapter's paradigm, we were unprepared to analyse these issues, despite using the same tools that are available now. In providing the rich array of contexts that I will explore here, dystopian and science fiction literary investigations are more widely applicable to posthuman discourse and literary investigations, which explore concerns about how literature explores social inequalities.

Before entering my analysis, I will define the concepts of public and private bodies which run through the remainder of this chapter and continue into Chapter Three. Beginning with the public body, the most succinct way of illustrating this concept is by referencing performativity. Performativity refers to practices performed in a public setting and infers allegiances, beliefs or preferences connoting to the actions that others may witness. It should be noted that the act of consuming media and purchasing goods also fall under this term. The public body is the observable citizen who may be either normalised, deviant, or alternative (non-politicised, non-conformed public bodies). The public body is the persona which connects to all other bodies, artefacts, and ideas in a communal context. Generally, the public body is the conforming buffer for the private body against the expectations of the milieu.

The private body, therefore, is the Self which does not network completely with society and retains elements that may or may not be acceptable by the milieu. All human-animals have private bodies, as many non-human animals do. However, the alignment of each private

²⁰² Jacques Derrida, 'The Ends of Man', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 30.1 (1969), 31–57 <www.jstor.org/stable/2105919>; Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Braidotti, *The Posthuman*, p. 4.

body to the social body differs from person to person. The private body often manifests in literature through the first-person persona of characters who doubt the milieu in which they live. This private body may, with enough conviction, manifest in the public body by ways of resistance, subversion, or displacement. The posthuman and nomad who are aware of their ability to process multiple agents, constantly maintain dialogue between the public body and the private body. In this way they can resist technologies of the body while practising technologies of the Self. They are, however, not immune to the ideologies which try to synchronise the two bodies as all sentient organisms, containing a psychic frame of reference for their private bodies. It is essential to remember that these two bodies are not antagonistic, but mutually informative. In this way, they present a solution to ideological binary thinking.

Derrida's *Ends of Man* recounts the discussion of French philosophers concerning the unique position humans occupied during the 1960s. It criticises the marginalisation of foreign opinions within a society, for the arbitrary reason that they are not informed by the same cultural heritage as a native citizen. Derrida was particularly concerned that technologies of the body would constrain the philosophical development of a nation. He determined that foreigners must be selective in what they say; that a statement opposing some official policy is authorized by the authorities indicates that it does not upset the social order, or that it does not disturb.²⁰³ The importance of this position is clear to me that foreigners may have the right to free speech, and the right of agency over their actions, so long as it conforms and does not perturb the social body. In short, it is a submission to ideology.

This suggests an ideological link between culture and the citizen as it rejects the foreigner who is considered deviant from the normalised public body. What it does not account for, however, is the private non-conforming bodies that native citizens conceal through suppressing their performativity because private bodies mediate with the public bodies in ways that can slowly garner changes to the social milieu. The relationship between the two can be antagonistic, in the case of violent protests, or when vocalising ideologies which are harmful to certain minority groups. Posthuman and nomadic usage of this network is within

²⁰³ Derrida, 'The Ends of Man', p. 33.

the remit of bio-politics, and therefore governed by a sense of ethics promoting the wellbeing of human-animals and non-human animals.

Derrida was focused on the free exchange of ideas within a society, so that oppositions can be expressed in the country itself, not only through the voices of the citizens, but also through those of foreigners, and that from then on diversity or even oppositions can come together freely in discursive relations.²⁰⁴ Foreigners occupy a unique position in society, operating within social structures, but remain inherently 'Other' bearing mixed connotations of exotic, desirable, and mistrust. While obligated to obey the law, foreigners are not required to follow all social codes, and are therefore constantly considered suspect within the social milieu as being uninitiated in local customs, and therefore their trustworthiness is yet unproven. Foreigners may choose to be normalised and adopt local customs, thereby linking their private bodies and their public bodies to normalisation. They may also opt to accept ostracization, remaining in limbo between their respective cultures. The final action they may take is to leave the milieu in search of a place that is more sympathetic to their dogma.

When citizens speak, they voice partly, or unconsciously, the State mandate or the will of the majority, unless they are themselves a minority. Scholars are not exempt as they are educated within the structures of a country and so cannot claim sole ownership of their thoughts and opinions, as they are based on methodologies of previous scholars. Therefore, they will flavour their contributions to academia, with the cadence of their native country.

[I]n a given historical, political and economic context, these national groups have deemed it necessary to organize international meetings, and to be represented by their national identities, and there to determine or relate their respective differences. [...] national philosophical identities are presupposed that are defined by their doctrinal content or by a certain philosophical "style."²⁰⁵

My interpretation of his opening statement is liberal. I take it to indicate that in thought and speech, we are torn between our private beliefs, which we now know conform or are informed by a public body. Our public body is instructed from birth about the public expectation of what to believe, say, and do. The multiple sites of fracture this may cause are uncountable. It is these constant struggles between conformity and agency that eventually

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 33.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 31.

render the foreigner normalised, and which destabilise Deleuzian nomads, who tear themselves apart to be free of normalising processes. My nomad recognises the potential dangers of remaining a part of the public body, but it is also cognisant that its time as a nomad is temporary.

The process of recognising the fallacies within a local environment, practising techniques such as bio-politics, or escaping that environment are always followed with stabilisation and then normalisation. This kind of normalisation is still reflective, as those who undergo the process of becoming nomadic maintain a certain degree of agency. If they leave their milieu, they become foreigners who eventually submit to the forces of another culture. Those who return to their milieu accept the changes they have made as sufficient, and accept that another nomad will continue the efforts that they have contributed towards.

For me, Derrida's point indicates that codes of conduct are embedded in the educational systems is logical. These codes which inform us at a young age of our cultural philosophies and histories, to a point where any member of society can instruct an outside of acceptable behaviour within their national borders. As Derrida points out the question of "man" was being raised in France along highly significant lines and in an original historico-philosophical structure.²⁰⁶ This structure was attempting to reorient the position of man with philosophy, in an early attempt to challenge the anthropocentrism which originated from the Enlightenment.

To broach a topic that Derrida refrained from discussing, the term 'Human', when tied up with philosophy, can be conceived of as a struggle for or an index for power. It is clear from his essay that Derrida, too, was also attempting to find a place for the humanity that was no longer naive to the destruction it could cause. However, he did not account for the necessity of foreigners, nomads, and marginalised groups to provide societies with the vitality of diversity that would break the chain of supernormal dogmas.²⁰⁷ Nomads, who contain both local and foreign agents, always teeter on the edge of acceptability. Anthropocentrism actively ensures that should nomads balance excessively one way or the other, their foreign agents see them fall from their tightrope, which represents the narrow spaces they have in

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 34.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 33; Massumi, p.20.

which to work and fall into a category of sub-human. This category is still widely subject to pejoration and is threatened with extinction. Derrida also notes that:

Defined in this way, humanism or anthropologism was at this time a sort of common ground of existentialisms whether Christian or atheist, of the philosophy of values, whether spiritualistic or not, of personalisms, whether rightist or leftist, and of Marxism in the classical style. And if one's references is on the ground of political ideologies, anthropologism was the unnoticed and uncontested common ground of Marxism, of social-democratic or democratic-Christian discourse.²⁰⁸

Political inclusion is open to all who fit within either society's vision, or the State's vision of 'acceptable'. The acceptability of a Christian body, or an atheist body, creates links between the private body and daily life. These aspects of the private body manifest in public through performative actions, such as attending church on Sunday or staying at home. While Marxism, Christianity and atheism have been commonplace for over half a century, we are accustomed to these notions being discussed in determining what will have an effect on our current and future mode of living. Literature is a valuable asset when assessing the potential outcomes of future social factors.

In Silverberg's *The World Inside*, which I will analyse later in this chapter, I intend to show how this novel uses its experience of contemporary concerns to speculate on the state of humanity in the future. In Silverberg's novel, his speculations concern the year 2381. His novel is like Ballard's *High Rise*. In Silverberg's novel humanity has, thanks to religious ideology, abolished birth control. At the same time, technological developments have eliminated war, crime, and famine. Humanity lives in twenty-five self-contained 'cities', each built over forty floors. The residents, like in *High Rise*, are segregated by social class, each floor corresponding to one's social position in hierarchical fashion.

Immortal Ideologies – How Humanism Haunts Posthumanism

While Derrida's focus was on how to create a diversity of debate, my concern lies with how to protect the agency of nomads from being over-coded by these discourses. In constructing the narrative of what it means to be human, we identify certain attributes to what we

²⁰⁸ Derrida, 'The Ends of Man', p. 36.

perceive as uniquely human, (bios) and what is leftover or not codified is known as bare life (zoe).²⁰⁹ My solution to maintaining an open exchange of ideas between the nomad and public body is to establish that nomads have multiple selves: the public self, which seems to conform while experimenting with deviant ideologies; and the private self, which is free to form assemblages and create alternative ontologies in any way it chooses.

Now that I have shown how nomadic assemblages of the public and private bodies are a tactic which can resist ideological normalisation, I must return to the issue from my discussion which concerned the vulnerability of nomads and posthumans to ideologies. In this section, I will explain how any ideology deposed through a system of negation falls victim of binary thinking and is therefore subject to ideology. The clean break of posthumanism from humanism that scholars lauded in the early 2000s is one such example of this system of negation which has allowed the anthropocentric ideologies of humanism to survive in posthumanist writing.

The posthuman is not a concept completely liberated from humanist ideas. To claim this invites hubris into posthumanist writing and complacency in methodology. Posthumanist studies have been criticised for their apparent lack of rigour.²¹⁰ This adverse criticism in this area has over the recent years lessened through more frequent journal publications.²¹¹ However, it remains an area of concern for some posthumanist scholars. In response, I aim to reconnect posthuman and human as networked entities. The nomad is my vehicle for reconnecting the posthuman subject through the assemblage of animal-human-technology, using the paradigm that I have employed throughout these two chapters.

By drawing parallels between Derrida's argument concerning Marxism and my argument concerning Humanism, I argue that posthumanism is not a clean break from the traditions which preceded it. While many writers have considered humanism to act like a spectre haunting posthumanism (as Derrida does with Marxism), I do not agree with this

²⁰⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 8.

²¹⁰ Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter, 'Theory Reloaded', in *Post-Theory, Culture, Criticism*, ed. by Ivan Callus and Stefan Herbrechter (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004), pp. 283–91.

²¹¹ Jeffery Scott, *Posthuman Body in Superhero Comics : Human, Superhuman, Transhuman, Post/Human* (Perth: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 21.

assessment as I disagree with the assertion that humanism has 'died'. When Derrida considers the end of Marxism, he states that:

One must, magically, chase away a specter, exorcise the possible return of a power held to be baleful in itself and whose demonic threat continues to haunt the century.²¹²

This cautionary statement warns that any ideology that has been overcome by a nation can easily return if its roots are not expunged by another ideology. The deposed ideology lurks in the recesses of select minority groups, who seek to gain (social or political) power by propagating these ideas among members of the ruling ideology. This fear of being haunted by the ghost of the previous century indicates that Foucault's governmental methodology concerning technologies of the body are not as bulletproof as we are led to believe. There are examples of hate movements within western countries, which are as obscene as though committed in literary settings.²¹³ In this way, it shows that posthumanist writers who cling only to extolling the benefits of technology have missed a crucial area of criticism which exists to protect people from the systematic abuses that come from ideological dogmatism.

These incidents reveal that ideologies do not simply disappear. They breed in the recesses of society until they re-emerge. Nomads are always at risk of encountering such or being represented as being a part of hate movements for their choice to not become a part of certain movements. Derrida's caution of vigilance, therefore: the cadaver is perhaps not as dead, as simply dead as the conjuration tries to delude us into believing remains in the forefront of any nomads consciousness when an ideology is declared dead.²¹⁴ Ideology is the milieu around us and continues the fight to gain new bodies to promulgate itself.

Nomads create space for themselves or others on the grounds that they have identified that they have no place for themselves within a society; they have examined their desires and motivations for acting, and they intend to create enough space to satisfy their desires without de-stratifying the existing hierarchy. Nomadism can consequently be thought of as

²¹² Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 120.

²¹³ Simone Veil, "L'antisémitisme d'aujourd'hui Amalgame Des Traditions Différentes", *France 24*, 12 February 2019 <<https://www.france24.com/fr/20190212-france-hausse-actes-antisemitisme-analyse-potier-wieviorka-matard-bonucci>> [accessed 12 February 2019].

²¹⁴ Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 120.

radical, as investigating the origins of lines of flight using rhizomatic thought is crucial in their not being possessed with ideas that do not belong to them.

Drawing on an example from *The World Inside*, the self-exiled character Michael Statler finds himself appalled at the seemingly brutalist culture of the outside world. At many times he attempts to convert his love interest, Artha, to the ways of urban monad life.²¹⁵ He realises later that he cannot exist in both worlds; his fantasy of living outside and his social values do not match. In that moment he transmits his ideology to an external body and is tainted by his experiences beyond being accepted back into his local milieu. To analyse nomads who have become trapped in the midst of two ideologies and chart their escape, or their failure to escape, is a valuable tool in rhizomatic criticism of nomads in context.

It can be argued that State-accepted norms cannot exist without the acceptance of the social body. The social body, in turn, is made up of countless private bodies who hold the same opinion. When thinking of this in terms of dictatorship regimes, Derrida argues:

Nazi, fascist, or Soviet totalitarianisms. Not one of these regimes was possible without what could be called the axiomatics of the party. Now, as one can see foreshadowed, it seems, everywhere in the world today, the structure of the party is becoming not only more and more suspect [...] but also radically unadapted to the new tele- techno-media--conditions of public space, of political life.²¹⁶

The axiomatics of the party that Derrida describes is a collection of private bodies which formulate a social body. Nomads generally act alone, or independently alongside other nomads. They do not share the same modes of operations as individuals who form groups. Nomads may cooperate within a community, but they do so only to further their individual desires. Should other nomads share their desire, they may cooperate, but the idea attached to this cooperation is that they do not enter into a nomadic hierarchy.

The influence of the media during the twentieth century was becoming increasingly suspect of postmodern writers and theorists. Notable writers include Ballard and his short Science Fiction story, *The Subliminal Man*, as one example indicating potential concerns raised

²¹⁵ Silverberg, p. 201.

²¹⁶ Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 127.

about the influence techno-media bodies had over social bodies through the mediation of technology.²¹⁷

Baudrillard also details how the media and consumerism have cooperated to create the capitalist and apathetic state we know today. He states in this work that ‘one could argue that nothing more is involved than an infantile disorder of the technological society, and attribute such growing pains entirely to the dysfunctionality of our present social structures - i.e. to the capitalist order of production’.²¹⁸ What Baudrillard encourages is a reflection, or in my words, an entering into a nomadic investigation of assemblages, and a theorisation about what it will become and what will be produced after it has run its course.

Having now seen that nomads are constantly facing threats to their agency of living, dying, and seeking pleasure, we can also see how their connection to the public body, and all its ideologies, means that the process of becoming and practising nomadism is cyclical with normalisation. Next, in the final theoretical section of Chapter Two, I will examine several texts published by Badmington in the early 2000s as he explored what was meant by posthumanism, what it entailed for contemporary theorists, and his exploration of Otherness through the medium of the alien.

Developing My Paradigm: Becoming Nomadic – Humanism, Posthumanism, Nomads

This final section attempts to reunite humanity with its posthuman and nomadic counterparts. Reclaiming this network not only reopens the potential for investigations relating to other networks (such as my animal-human-technological network), but also it frees nomadic subjects from influence binary systems exerted over their agencies. To achieve these aims, I shall refer back to the becoming nomadic aspect of my six-point paradigm, as earlier I outlined the necessity for nomads to explore their assemblages before practising nomadism. The results of failing to become nomadic before attempting nomadic ontologies was evident in my literary analysis of Ballard’s *High Rise* in Chapter One.

²¹⁷ Ballard, *The Complete Short Stories*.

²¹⁸ Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society*, p. 132

In this chapter I introduced contexts in which nomads have their assemblages threatened by normalisation. In the first section, this risk originated from governments who exercise technologies of the body to regulate the ways citizens within a localised milieu may live, die, and seek pleasure. My response to this pressure was to exercise technologies of the Self in the form of bio-politics. In this way, nomads may recognise abuses in power and mediate their assemblages in relation to these issues. My second section discussed the potential risks that ideologies pose within milieus. Nomads must become rhizomatic in order to withstand the ideological forces that may lead them to re-enter binary systems of thinking. By becoming rhizomatic, nomads take advantage of their multiple agents within a network, two of which position themselves as their public body and another as the private body. While both bodies are linked, and therefore intra-informative, it provides a buffer against assimilating unregulated ideas within the nomadic subject's psyche.

This third section discusses further how undergoing the process of becoming nomadic reveals the assemblages which allow nomadic subjects, and posthumans to realise the fallacies of anthropocentric thinking. The conclusions of this section, and chapter are twofold. Firstly, by becoming nomadic, the nomadic critic and the posthuman critic must accept that the human, posthuman, and nomadic subject are all interlinked. There is no clean break at any point in the network. Secondly, in accepting this network, there can no longer be binary systems, thus eliminating the risk of anthropocentric thought. The system then takes the shape of alternative ontologies of practising humanity, which then becomes the norm for posthumanity. I will frame the posthuman and nomadic subject as alternative modes of practising humanity overcoming the binary divide of human, moral, and correct as indexes of power. The conclusions drawn from this chapter inform my final chapter, in which I outline the ontology of these alternative humanities by showing how nomads maintain control over their agency when forming assemblages with artefacts and places.

I will achieve these goals in two stages, the first part utilises Neil Badmington's essay *Theorising Posthumanism*, to contextualise the origin of the human/posthuman divide in the early 2000s. Afterwards, I will perform a close reading of Neil Badmington's *Alien Chic*, which uses an intuitive methodology of positioning humans as alien to themselves, while charting how social attitudes have changed towards aliens and groups of humanity since the 1950s. This reading will reveal how posthumanity and nomadism are not alien concepts

which represent a clean break from humanity, rather humans have become alien to themselves and therefore cannot recognise alternative human ontologies.

Reconnecting Humanity – Abolishing the Human/Posthuman Divide

Badmington's essay, *Theorizing Posthumanism*, investigates the claim that man need not waste time investigating its condition. In the early 2000s, many theorists claimed that only the most foolish or self-absorbed cultural critic would spend time speculating about something (posthumanism) that was actually staring him or her in the face.²¹⁹ He identified Beard as a leading advocate for an anti-humanist posthumanism with his belief that 'consumerism and techno-culture had already erased 'Man.'²²⁰ The aversion of social, philosophical, and even literary critics to explore the human or posthuman condition in the twenty-first century has been the catalyst for the imbalance of techno-centric and anthropocentric investigations, which fall under the umbrella of posthumanism. Like myself, Badmington also argued that posthumanism needs theory, needs theorizing, needs above all to reconsider the untimely celebration of the absolute end of "Man".²²¹ While I agree with much of Badmington's work, and find it is still relevant today, its meaning is different in the context of my work because I have the benefit of an additional two decades of research from which to draw knowledge. While Badmington's aim was to establish posthumanism as an alternative form of social criticism, I establish that posthumanism in combination with the nomads I have developed in these two chapters reveals that minority groups of people are not deviant, but they are practicing alternative human ontologies. As Chapter Three addresses alternative human ontologies in much greater detail, I will work with Badmington's terminology here of the posthuman being the human reiterated.

My nomadic paradigm can now assert that posthumanism represents a shift in humanity's perceived centre to analyse the notion of humanity using rhizomatic criticism; to see all its points on a flat plane. These points are uncountable, representing consumer choices,

²¹⁹ Badmington, 'Theorizing Posthumanism', p. 10.

²²⁰ Beard, p. 114.

²²¹ Ibid, p. 10.

beliefs, friend networks, technological habits, etc. These networks span outwards like a global network. Real life posthumans and humans form comparable consumerist and lifestyle networks. In literature, the focus of my nomadic paradigm can be used to overlay these same trends on to characters, and this offers exact loci for where a character begins to become nomadic. It considers its local belief systems, becomes disillusioned with its habits, and refuses to engage in accepted practices. At the same time, characters who enter nomadic states still conform to many accepted practices and beliefs, showing their rootedness in their original cultural system. Therefore, even if a nomad or any onto-epistemic system presents itself as a clean break from what preceded it, the claim is impossible to fulfil through negation.

In shifting humanity's perceived centre, the locus of power is dislocated. In this temporary vacuum of power, hierarchical structures must reorganise themselves, while rhizomatic entities may simply cut off the damaged aspect and replace it with something new. This new perspective is a strong topic on which literary analysis can take place as it can indicate much about a fictional world's belief, governmental, and social system in its response to adversity. It also provides a tool for analysing nomadic characters which are considered deviant in response to a society. The inter-party mediation between the nomad's agents, and the society it criticises can offer literary and social critics a wealth of insight into the interests of authors and readers from both contemporary and previous time periods.

Badmington foresaw the haunting of humanism within the posthumanities, and through my concern of ideological influences on the nomadic subject, I have begun to show that humanism does indeed haunt the posthumanities. This haunting is not due entirely to the robust nature of humanism. While humanism is a highly adaptive ideology, the haunting occurs because critics have been reluctant to map the connection between humanism and posthumanism, opting instead to state that there is a clean break between the two. In Chapter One, through enacting a positivist linguistic method of engaging critically with literary criticism, I have argued that because linguistic and semiotic system define the existence of an object through traits that it lacks, simply stating that posthumanism is based on the rejection of humanism does not liberate it from Humanist ideology. If anything, the negation of Humanism as a founding principle binds humanism and posthumanism together.

Badmington's analysis of Moravec's *Mind Children* offers a hint of the consequences of not rigorously resolving the position of the paradigm that a scholar wishes to move on from. Jonathon Murdoch also adds that there were areas of Badmington's work that had not been fully addressed.²²² The human/posthuman divide in language taken up by this section also addresses the potential for humanism to taint the posthuman through a lack of critical interest in developing the rigorous methodology needed for a discipline to stand up to scrutiny.

What remains to haunt the book, however, is the *possibility* that humanism will haunt or taint posthumanism, and it is precisely this problem that will concern me here—a problem of what remains, a problem of remains.²²³

Posthumanism is a semi-porous discipline which allows ideas and theories to pass through its borders. However, posthumanism remains vulnerable to the influence of Enlightenment humanism due to the lack of interest in analysing a methodology for engaging with literature in ways that do not rely on negations of humanism, or which focus on the benefit of humans without regard for minority groups, or other organisms which may be negatively impacted through technological advancements. To address this problem, I posit posthumanist language as not separate from, but associated with humanism. This approach will incite criticism from posthumanist scholars. However, this view is predicated on the idea that in directly opposing humanism, we must first oppose its concepts. If posthumanist theory or the posthuman subject are developed on the premise that they are a negation of or a defence against humanism, then they must also concede that humanism informs the posthumanist mindset as a core contributor to the discipline. Anthropocentrism continues to survive because it has impregnated posthumanist paradigms.

The claim that many are too quick to affirm an absolute break with humanism, and too reluctant to attend to what remains of humanism in the posthumanist landscape provided impetus for limited attempts into theorising the posthuman.²²⁴ It must be conceded that engaging with humanism and acknowledging its persistence is not necessarily to support humanism.²²⁵ This version of posthumanism repeats humanism; it does so *in a certain way*

²²² Jonathan Murdoch, 'Humanising Posthumanism', *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 36.8 (2004), 1341–63 <<https://doi.org/10.1068/a37127>> [accessed 11 March 2019].

²²³ Badmington, 'Theorizing Posthumanism', p. 12.

²²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 15.

²²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 15.

and with a view to the deconstruction of anthropocentric thought.²²⁶ Posthumanist writers have successfully de-territorialised much anthropocentric thinking and have begun to impact social changes.

Nomads reconceptualise and retrace its assemblages without succumbing or introducing arbitrary beliefs on what posthumans and nomads have become, or what form they should aspire towards. Badmington further clarifies that the task of posthumanism is:

[T]o uncover those uncanny moments at which things start to drift, of reading humanism *in a certain way*, against itself and the grain. This clearly involves a rethinking of the meaning of the “post-,” and while Derrida’s philosophy implicitly demands a cautious approach to the prefix in question, Lyotard’s writings on the postmodern might be more immediately relevant to the work of theorizing posthumanism along these lines.²²⁷

Thinking of the prefix ‘post’ as meaning ‘after’ implies that the previous mode of thinking becomes implicit in the new mode of thought by means of active negations. His link to Lyotard refers to the analysis the of knowledge in postmodern society as the end of 'grand narratives' or metanarratives. Lyotard considered the production of knowledge a quintessential feature of modernity.²²⁸ Rethinking the ‘post’ of posthumanism is an essential task of nomadic investigators. The many early posthumanist scholars once mistakenly used the post-human, believing the discipline was about positing an entity which comes after humanity. However, the notions of becoming the next stage of humanity begs the question of what has been left behind, and what is new. The same questions were asked when analysing the relationship between modernity and postmodernity. In returning to Lyotard’s critique, Badmington notes that modernity and postmodernity should not be thought of as entirely distinct entities as postmodernity is the rewriting of modernity, which is itself constitutionally and ceaselessly pregnant with its postmodernity.²²⁹

Posthumanism, Nomadism, and Humanism are all difficult terms to pin down. The suffix ‘ism’ relates to a boundary against which paradigms define themselves. In the early 2000s posthumanism enjoyed considerable success, and its growth seems to have little respect for

²²⁶ Ibid, p. 15.

²²⁷ Ibid, p. 19.

²²⁸ Lyotard, pp. 21–23.

²²⁹ Badmington, ‘Theorizing Posthumanism’, p. 20.

traditional disciplinary boundaries.²³⁰ There was little critical interest in defining a framework of processes through, which posthumanism defined itself against other schools. Instead, it became a porous discipline, which allowed for immense hybridisation, utilising a methodology reminiscent Deleuzian rhizomes. The drawback was literary investigations which use the book-rhizome have been criticised as leaving many open-ended arguments.²³¹ Despite a decade of renewed effort to create a posthumanist methodology that transcends the binary system that posthuman philosophers through post-dualism, binary systems have remained in place.²³² Any school of thought will bear the same problems as an 'ism', is knowable to itself and defines itself dualistically against something else. In the case of posthumanism and humanism, scholars immediately jumped to this conclusion rather than exploring it as two interrelated processes.

It leaves the question of how Humanism could be a part of posthumanism, when the prefix - post is clearly intended to create a break from what it is post-ing. I argue that humanism, as the entity it describes, is a versatile and vital body of theory which makes it more robust than any ideology conceived of by humanity. My theory of using gentle nomads to mediate humanism is not the first to be considered. Badmington, who also contemplated this course of action, hesitated at the attempt due to the complexity of negotiating with the binary systems and traditions, which must be resolved in the process of deconstructing humanism and networking it with the posthuman.

Humanism cannot possibly survive such transformations, can it? Yes and no. The uncertainty of the human, as Whatmore recognises, exists along-side continued claims of certainty. The binary oppositions of the past tremble but continue to inform everyday decisions, assumptions, and activities. Tradition does not necessarily fall into silence with its deconstruction; its sounds still ground, even if they at once find themselves in discordance with other voices that flow from the fractures of humanism.²³³

My nomadic paradigm can make use of the vital traits of humanism, incorporating it in controlled ways into the posthuman processes as opposed to focusing on attempting to eradicate it. In this way I disagree with Badmington's assessment that posthumanist

²³⁰ Ibid, p. 1344.

²³¹ Bryden, p. 155.

²³² Ferrando, *Philosophical Posthumanism*.

²³³ Badmington, 'Mapping Posthumanism: An Exchange', p. 1349.

discourse only occurs at sites of humanist rupture. If this were the case there would be an exponential shattering of humanist sites of belief until, having been completely de-territorialised, we would be left with entropic posthumanism. This means of contradicting humanism leads to a posthumanism that is solely interested in the same sites as humanism and rejecting them. This is still an anthropocentric discipline as it focuses on the human alone. Clearly, this does not represent the posthumanism of today. Recognition of this fallacy is growing and with it, new approaches to posthumanism - through the means of literary, animal, and theories of humanity's place within vast networks - are gaining increasing recognition. Nomadism is my contribution towards a transformation of the human to resemble their non-human animal others, and the non-organic technological others which are all parts of interconnected networks.

These ideas have since been taken up in this thesis through the notions of multiple selves, and becoming nomadic to represent fundamental and interlinked aspects of my six-point paradigm. In the next section, I will perform a close reading of Badmington's *Alien Chic* which explores the possibility of alternative humanities. It also completes the context in which I will place my nomadic subject in preparation to expose nomadic ontologies in Chapter Three to show how nomads form assemblages with places, artefacts, and ideas.

Alien Chic – Alternative Human Ontologies

I will now show how ideological binary thinking and the early reluctance to explore the relationship between posthumans and humans has led to humans becoming alien to themselves. The result of this alienation is intolerance towards alternative human ontologies. The process of becoming nomadic is a potential solution to the self-alienating process of losing our human networks. In doing this, I open up many new avenues of investigation concerning deviant characters in science fiction, dystopian and new gothic genres of literary fiction.

How we read humanity and literature are not two separate tasks; the same can be said for how we read posthumanity. My nomad through this chapter has been tracing the boundaries that attempt to limit its ability to form assemblages freely, and thus restrain

nomadic ontologies. The solution to this problem is to form another assemblage with the materialist school of thought, which deconstructs these gendered, political, and social boundaries in a process which can be compared with diffractive reading.²³⁴ Kirby's reading of Barad's technique is telling of the increasing desire for both literature and humanity to fall under scrutiny in increasingly innovative ways:

Importantly, to allow anthropomorphism its non-local ubiquity is not to refuse its specificity, but rather to acknowledge that anthropomorphism's infinite differentiations/specificities are expression of one phenomenon. How we approach this phenomenon (which includes us), a phenomenon whose identifications entail constant morphogenesis, is to open the question of the human, and writing, as if for the first time.²³⁵

My nomadic intervention is not dissimilar to diffractive reading, whose purpose it is to break down the boundaries which restrict assemblages such as gender through their performance, and it falls within the remit of new materialist deconstructions of boundaries. My nomad, however, uniquely focuses on allowing the free assemblage forming of entities, artefacts, and ideas, which allow for further specific readings by critics using literary theory. Finally, nomads are not necessarily limited to *homo sapiens*, as many other species are capable of social cognition in ways similar to humans.²³⁶

My reading of *Alien Chic* proceeds over two stages, the first relating to the cultural dysphoria experienced by the younger generation when exposed to cultural tropes of the 1950s. The significance of this disconnect indicates that notions of acceptability have radically changed during the span of two generations. With this change in what is considered normal, I question the creation of the binary system pertaining to "us" and "them" lingers in modern society. I then show how humanity's alienation from itself necessitates the re-examination of the assumption that posthumanism is a clean break from humanism and how my six-point paradigm has contributed to the reconnection of these concepts in a way that does not perpetuate anthropocentrism.

²³⁴ Vicki Kirby, *Quantum Anthropologies: Life at Large* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).; Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway, Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 2nd edn (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

²³⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 20–21.

²³⁶ Brian Hare and Vanessa Woods, *The Genius of Dogs: How Dogs Are Smarter Than You Think* (New York: Penguin Group, USA, 2013).

My Grandparents – The Aliens Next Door

Badmington coined the term *Alien Chic* in response to Tom Wolfe's 1970 phrase 'radical chic', which represents double-track mindedness and fuses it with the alien. An example of radical chic refers to incidents such as in the New York neighbourhoods, where the rich affirmed their difference from impoverished persons by giving charity to the poor. It was both '*excessively public*' as a display of support, which sent a message of the legitimacy of the wealthy retaining their status, and it was also exclusive in that the act did not make any long-term meaningful impact to the social situation in which it intervened.²³⁷

Alternative ontologies of humanity are frequently a source of fear in social and literary settings, but in the case of *Alien Chic*, Badmington notes that he was so arrested by a student's Alien love themed backpack, he began an internet shopping search with the intention of finding more examples of 'Alien love'. Badmington recalled that Marx once pointed out that even tragedy can all too easily become farce, 'And the more I thought about my students' amusement, the more I began to wonder if difference *itself* was at stake in their response'.²³⁸ This difference becomes central to his analysis of changing social attitudes throughout the book. He questions whether posthumanism is posterior to humanism, concluding initially that aliens are not what they once were: enemies, others, monsters.²³⁹

Changes in attitudes results in a cultural and ideological dysphoria. Humans and posthumans are porous to the cultural, social, and belief systems of their local milieu. No matter how well one maps their assemblages, I have shown through Derrida that each person is informed by the socio-historico forces of their local milieu. These forces, however, change over time, and it is this change in *zeitgeist* which leads to a cultural disconnect from previous generations. It is also this distance which reveals the failings of previous assumptions which lead to mass normalisations. This insight can also be applied to the normalisations which take place in a contemporary or fictional setting. The unease characters may feel about their fictional environment may resonate with audiences on

²³⁷ Badmington, *Alien Chic*, p. 5.

²³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 2.

²³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 2.

many levels. As such, these characters who begin to undergo the process of examining their assemblages, beliefs and actions serve as an example for potential futures for those who are interested in experiencing alternative human ontologies without certain prejudices of their local milieu.

Reading posthumanism as a clean break from humanism inspires this generational 'us' and 'them' paradigm that Badmington sees in relation to alien invader films. By claiming that we have entered an era where ideologies of the twentieth century are extinct, and by disregarding the biopolitical control that governments exercise over our daily lives has made us aliens to ourselves. Badmington suggests in response to this alien on our doorstep, that the simple formula of 'Us versus Them' is no longer entirely credible; perhaps a new approach is required.²⁴⁰ He suggests that while we enjoy hating and then loving our non-Terran aliens, we are still in a phase of transitioning from hatred to love of our own alien 'Others' on earth. These aliens include both our human and non-human others. In reference to Antony Hoffman's film *Red Planet* (2000), he reveals that it suggests 'the threat lies elsewhere, *within the human itself*. Mars is no longer to be feared, for other humans are now far more terrifying. Earth and the human race are endangered not by invaders from Mars or an 'It' from beyond space, but by the activities of the human race itself'.²⁴¹ It is a warning for the twenty-first century; there is no threat of invaders from another world, but humanity is threatened by itself.

The line that in the 1950s separated the human from alien has in cinematography, literature and reality become blurred. The human is at the same time recognisable and unrecognisable to itself. When we become our own enemies, it is time to rethink our paradigm. There was never a human, and by that definition, there was never a posthuman. Humanism forgot that it began from animal life, and to that life it would always belong.

Re-reading Humanity – Re-tracing the Borders

²⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 25.

²⁴¹ Ibid, p. 27.

The idea that we can become alienated from ourselves suggests a loss of some kind; a loss of situatedness, a loss of history, or perhaps a loss of identity as a species. The feeling of self-alienation has become more prevalent during the last century than at any other point in time. These ideas carry into the next chapter where I will argue that when assemblages are unwillingly formed with other entities to create monstrosity, there is a loss of agency. However, nomadic assemblage-forming processes protects agency in subjects. It remains an expression of the shifting animal-human-machine paradigm which I posit challenges anthropocentric thinking.

Richard Dawkins, also commenting on self-alienation, this time in relation to awareness of evolution (just because it is hidden does not mean it does not exist). At the beginning of his book *The Selfish Gene*, he states:

If superior creatures from space ever visit earth, the first question they will ask, in order to assess the level of our civilization, is: 'Have they discovered evolution yet?' Living organisms had existed on earth, without ever knowing why, for over three thousand million years before the truth finally dawned on one of them.²⁴²

It is a mark of our cognitive evolution to recognise our origins and use them to the benefit of all organisms on Earth. This is a frame of mind that indicates we are progressing towards posthumanist networks of thought. Dawkins' opening thematically and semantically complements Badmington's interests. However, Dawkins focuses on the psycho-genetic aspect of humanity, while Badminton takes a macro-scale approach to shifting social attitudes towards alien life being mirrored within the society that produces those attitudes.

The term posthumanism is not alien to contemporary Western culture. However, this has come at a price, for there is often a remarkable reluctance to theorize posthumanism to think carefully about what the prefix 'post-' might mean in this context.²⁴³ Many of his contemporary thinkers scorn the idea of theorising posthumanism as it is believed it was the contemporary citizen. It is conceivable why people could see posthumanism staring them in the face, and why they found the exercise pointless. However, Badmington suggests that posthumanism 'needs to be imagined otherwise and needs above all to reconsider the untimely celebration of the absolute end of 'Man''.²⁴⁴ Here, Badmington reaches his most

²⁴² Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 1.

²⁴³ Badmington, *Alien Chic*, p. 109.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 109.

ground-breaking thought, that posthumanism is not an end of Man, but a reiteration of humanism. In his words, it is an act 'of rereading humanism *in a certain way*, against itself and the grain'.²⁴⁵

This rereading can only be done by 'rethinking of the meaning of the 'post-''.²⁴⁶ The term 'post-' can indicate a barrier between what came before and what comes after. There is at least a moment of interruption, of change, and becoming. What follows after this point of augmentation must be clearly defined. Badmington's assessment of the situation fits the tone of what I am attempting to argue convincingly as he states that 'The 'post-' is forever tied up with what it is 'post-ing''.²⁴⁷

Post-'s speak (to) ghosts, and cultural criticism must not forget that it cannot simply forget the past. The writing of the posthumanist condition should not seek to fashion 'scriptural tombs' for humanism, to write tradition into silence; it must, rather, take the form of a critical practice that occurs inside humanism, and should consist not of the wake but the working-through of anthropocentric discourse.²⁴⁸

He reminds us with this compilation of quote and analysis that the cultural 'post-' is intrinsically bound up with the history, and therefore the future of what it posts. Humanism is the starting point of posthumanism and denial of histories and influences limits our ability to progress into the beyond; the re-iteration of ourselves in which we resemble what we were, but operate in different ways.

The thesis question which I have been attempting to answer since the beginning was how nomadism can challenge anthropocentric thinking in literary studies. The connection between my methodology and Badmington becomes explicit when I frame the posthuman as a figure who nomadically recognises its humanity. The nomad functions as an altered state of humanity where the connection forming ability of the nomad has the human recognise its connections to the point where they may control the praxis (the manifestation or embodiment of ideas) of their assemblages. The alien of the posthuman, I argue, comes from the denied human underneath the theoretical development. Badmington does not go so far as to argue this point. Instead, his argument is based on two points. The first being

²⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 117.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 117.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 118.

²⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 119.

that alien chic is the fake love of aliens, which affirms the otherness (or not sameness) of the aliens to 'us'.

The second point he argues is that the posthuman is the human reiterated. In response, I argue the posthuman who does not enter a nomadic frame of mind is forever alienated from themselves, because they do not recognise themselves. My theory of this inevitable realisation of the humanity of posthumanism is further supported with the recognition of altered and multiple histories, which are written from the perspective of certain cultural, economic, and ethnic groups.²⁴⁹ History and science become narratives, and the nomad emerges to walk through the heady haze into a new form of knowledge. The knowledge is that it is a molecule of animal-human-technological assemblages. The animal represents the desires that we have. It is the vital force that ensures we adapt and grow. The human represents a narrative building capacity into this animal system. The technological aspect is the companion species (to borrow the term from Haraway). Technology has existed alongside humanity since its earliest iterations. It is not unique to humanity. Not only was it incorporated into daily life by protohumans, but animals too have formed assemblages with it for centuries.

Summarising the Developments to My Paradigm Made in This Chapter

This chapter has taken the nomadic subject I developed in Chapter One and thrust it into social, historical, and political contexts. This is because my six-point paradigm is designed to enable nomadic subjects to resist normalisation when engaged in social and literary criticism. I have referred to at several points in this chapter the literary applications of this paradigm concerning: the distinction between becoming nomadic vs practising nomadism, normalisation vs deviance, multiple selves, the risks of extreme binary thinking, the methodology of rhizomatic criticism, and the nature of my gentler nomad. In this concluding section I will summarise the development of my paradigm throughout this chapter. Then I

²⁴⁹ Ferrando, *Philosophical Posthumanism*.

will perform a literary analysis of Silverberg's *The World Inside*, which portrays several deviant characters who highlight many of the concerns I have raised in this chapter.

I covered five important points in the preceding sections to contextualise my interpretation of nomadism and develop its tools which resist normalising processes which aim to usurp citizens' agencies surrounding how to live, die and seek pleasure. I began by outlining how governing bodies developed technologies of the body to the point where they were able to create normalised and deviant or criminal bodies. I then discussed technologies of the Self, through which a nomad uses bio-politics to protect its ability to form assemblages freely. I outlined how ideologies work in similar ways to technologies of the body, operating on cultural, familiar, and social levels which are ingrained in localised cultural and philosophical histories. I then retraced the networks between humans, posthumans and nomads which allowed for a new perspective of deviant bodies as alternative ontologies of humanity. These alternative realities highlight the changing attitudes towards foreign bodies and how despite the shift from hate to love, both processes remain rooted in the binary system of affirming otherness.

In this chapter I argued that technologies of the body concern how bodies are regulated within a milieu and are the largest driving force of over-coding bodies within a local milieu. They operate by re-presenting persons, groups, species, and artefacts with added connotations in which they are transformed through positive or pejorative connotations. I drew examples from the development of the prison system, in which citizens have their rights removed and are transformed into condemned bodies, who are reduced to cheap labour for the purpose of reformation. This transformation strips individuals of agency on the basis of a person being deemed as deviant against what the governing body determines is normal. In incarcerating these bodies, they may be regulated on the pretence of reformation, but what it does is normalise the binary split between citizens who have certain degrees of agency, and those who have none.

Technologies of the Self refer to the process of becoming nomadic in order to resist arbitrary over-coding. It responds to the abuse of power that influential organisations and ruling bodies have over the re-presentation of groups at risk of becoming minorities. This is as much a process of self-defence as it is a defence of others. Nomads are intimately familiar with bio-political strategies to resist the threats associated with becoming deviant. Mastery

of bio-politics allows a nomad to recognise arbitrary normalisations which proliferate in societies which seek to influence their opinion or limit their freedoms through the use of social or liturgical processes.

The continued existence of ideologies suggests that posthumans are not as different from humans as was claimed. I discussed how nomads, like foreigners, hold a unique position in society, being able to operate alternatively from the local milieu but at the same time being regarded with distrust. All humans are raised within a local culture, posthumans when practising nomadism are in direct mediation with the ideologies that govern the *zeitgeist* of public opinion, political stances, and philosophies of that milieu. In brief, nomads need tactics besides bio-politics to resist the normalising influence of ideological forces which proliferate on a societal, rather than governing level. My solution to resisting socio-ideological forces is to re-trace the human-posthuman links and recognise their interconnectivity. In this way anthropocentric tropes are more easily identified, and a nomad may distinguish their private body from their public body, thus lessening the porousness of social influence on their assemblages.

It is important to remember this when encountering nomads within literature. These are characters who are aware that their thoughts are deviant, and punishable within their milieu but are unwilling to normalise. In these instances, we can analyse the character as two, the public body who practises, perhaps with mistakes, the proper social codes of that milieu, and the private body which attempts to resolve the misgivings it has while attempting to mediate with others around it to effect small changes on the milieu. What is impossible, however, is to remove all ideological traces from a society, as in combatting ideology we provide it sanctuary of existence through negation. A philosophy based on the negation of ideology must always contain that ideology at its heart, thus it is always caught within its own binary snare.

Humans, posthumans and nomads are rooted in their socio-historical and philosophical traditions due to having been raised in that milieu. This reveals two fallacies, firstly, the posthuman is not a clean break from humanism, and that with nomadism recognising this fallacy, it has opened the option to explore non-binary alternative human ontologies. Not only does this provide a means by which anthropocentric mechanisms of usurping agency can be discovered in relation to these persecuted characters, but also it provides spaces in

which potential near futures or contemporary social concerns may be explored in the hopes of gaining insight into what it means to be a posthuman in the twenty-first century. In the next section I will introduce my literary analysis of Silverberg's *The World Inside*, which addresses the concerns that I have traced through this chapter. In the analysis I will use my investigation of normalising forces in milieu to investigate how speculative fiction depicts abuses of advanced technologies of the body. This is a thesis related to nomads, and therefore the appearance of nomads is essential to all my literary analyses. In this analysis, rather than looking at entropic nomads, as in the previous analysis, I will this time target the way they are eradicated by technologies of the body. The analysis I will perform will provide many examples of both lethal and non-lethal normalising techniques on subjects who attempt to practise nomadism to gain control over their embodiments.

Applying My Paradigm to Robert Silverberg's *The World Inside*

In this literary analysis, I will analyse Robert Silverberg's *The World Inside*, a dystopian science fiction novel which originally appeared as a series of shorter works in 1970 and 1971, all but one published in *Nova* and *Galaxy Science Fiction*.²⁵⁰ The premise of this story was that humanity ceased to control its population growth, but instead saw the ability to maintain an exponentially increasing population as a proof of human existence. My analysis will take place over three sections. Each section will focus on one aspect of my paradigm in the context of the milieu I have constructed in this chapter, showing how Silverberg applied his contemporary concerns in a fictional setting to explore potential distant futures. The differences and taboos depicted in this novel are based on historical attempts at totalitarian control. They also try to subvert some arbitrary normalised behaviours in Silverberg's contemporary setting. Notably, this novel is a piece of speculative fiction containing elements of social commentary, which evoke a level of realism and depth that would be unexpected in fiction concerning distant futures.

Each novel that I have chosen for literary analysis belongs to the umbrella genre of speculative literature. This genre of literary fiction is derived from a writer's real life

²⁵⁰ Silverberg, p. 11.

experiences to speculate what the future may resemble. This interaction can be employed either to support certain values or ideas that are hegemonic at the extratextual level, or rather to subvert it.²⁵¹ Its reliance on the writer's experience of their real life and the reader's resonance to the almost-reality that is being portrayed creates a political space, lending credence to the exploration that the writer undertakes.

The final aspect, which has become the binding point to the collection of literature and media that I have chosen to use for my analysis, comes from my exploration of potential posthuman assemblages. In each novel we see the assemblage skewed in different directions. From *High Rise*, we saw an assemblage heavily favouring the animal aspect of the animal-human-technology assemblage. In Ballard's novel, the human was almost entirely effaced. *The World Inside* almost effaces the animal element of the assemblage for a heightened human-technology exploration, later emphasised by the contrast of those living in the Urban Monads to those living outside. This will contrast later with a much more complex assemblage that Masamune Shirow presents in *Ghost in The Shell*.

The first of my three sections concerns the normalising forces and their relation to governmental totalitarian control. These forces change what is usually considered as normal and deviant, leading to extreme binary systems of acceptability. This section re-engages with one of my six concerns regarding the socio-ideological barriers created by implementation of extreme binary systems. The second section follows this line of thought as it moves on to the creation of desires and taboos, which are enabled through a different ideology and created using advanced technology and technologies of the body. Finally, nomadism in such a society will already be established as illegal, but when subjects begin to practice nomadism. We see the different forms of control society can exercise over them, and how in this dystopian setting, biopolitics would have offered citizens more control over what can be done to their bodies and minds. The three sections together try to yield a new reading of *The World Inside* by presenting some ways nomads can resist and challenge anthropocentric powers in the context of literary investigation, by showing how Silverberg shows the limits of ideological and governmental control in this novel.

²⁵¹ R. B. Gill, 'The Uses of Genre and the Classification of Speculative Fiction', *Mosaic*, 46.2 (2013), 71–85 (p. 73) <<https://doi.org/10.1353/mos.2013.0021>> [accessed 5 August 2019].

The first section discusses the bio-politics at play in Silverberg's novel. Firstly, the society is governed by radically dissimilar technologies of the body than those which operate in our society. For example, conflict is forbidden, and any display of violence is met with social execution. These measures are to ensure social cohesion and total obedience to the ideologies that maintain the status quo. The society is also distinct from our contemporary expectations as Silverberg reverses social obligation and expectations with freedoms. For example, Silverberg's fictional society sees reproduction as a social obligation while considering drug use as an acceptable privilege of the wealthy. Silverberg's fictional society has a range of different desires, practices, and normalisations from our own which makes them alien, both temporally and traditionally from humanity today. The second section analyses the availability and acceptability of desires the society has which are different from our own. Looking at the influence within this society, I also note how the social, cultural, and historical influences on the psyche of characters evoke emotions that are dissimilar from our perspectives. While some aspects such as drug use have moved towards resembling the acceptability of the novel, there are still illicit categories of drugs, which reveal the eutopia that is initially portrayed as being potentially dystopian. On this realisation, the reader may decide that they, too, fell into the ideological dogma of the novel because of its novelty. The third section shows how the dystopian society uses posthuman means to not only exercise technologies of the body, but erase nomads through use of technology to remove the ability of deviant citizens to practise technologies of the Self. In removing this key bio-political tactic, nomads in such a society infrequently undergo the process of becoming nomadic. Finally, I will show how the building administrators who form the oligarchy propose insight that endless leisure is not what makes humans happy, and so while everything in the buildings could be automated. They remove the agency of the citizens in another way, transforming them into manual labour which creates the illusion of purpose.

Robert Silverberg's *The World Inside* is set in a skyscraper called Urban Monad 116. In the year 2381, the world we explore is almost entirely situated within this skyscraper which holds at the beginning 881,115 people and increases at the rate of approximately ten thousand births per day.²⁵² Humanity no longer lives in sprawling cities which span the

²⁵² Silverberg, p. 17.

globe, but instead have moved entirely to living in skyscrapers which have become vertical cities. These vertical cities are built with the purpose of maximising occupancy within the cities and outside, maximising the amount of available space for growing produce to sustain the seventy-five billion people that make up the human race in this novel. The novel follows several of Urban Monad 116's residents, much in the style of George Perec's *Life a User's Manual*. What we discover is that this posthuman eutopia is not as serene as it appears. The inhabitants that we follow through the course of the novel are free to sleep with whomever they like so that they do not become frustrated. They also have free access to narcotics and also unconditional access to healthcare and entertainment. However, there are still people who are unhappy with their lives there. There are only two rules which must be obeyed at all costs. The first is to procreate and the second is to not oppose the system. Failure to comply will see people thrown 'down the chute', a public execution.

Technologies of the Body – Creating Total Obedience

I will now examine the relationship between normalising forces and totalitarian systems of government. This section progresses over three stages. Firstly, I will show how technologies of the body are used by the government of the urban monads to ensure social cohesion and total obedience to their regime thus maintaining the status quo. Then, I will show how Silverberg reverses our notions of social obligation and freedoms in ways that reveal the workings of ideology in the milieu. Finally, I will explore how the differences of normalised desires and practices alienate the reader from fully connecting with that novel, the way the futuristic society deals with waste management, and its post-privacy culture provoke readers to consider their own normalised concepts of society. Each of these three stages reconnects and allows for practical application of my six-point paradigm concerning ideologies, binary systems, and representations of normalisation in literature.

The government of urban monad society is an oligarchy, made up of an exclusive minority who use their position to administrate the laws and maintenance of the building. They employ technologies of the body to maintain absolute authority over citizens by granting them the appearance of living in a democracy. In one scene we are introduced to the function of naming the cities which make up a group of floors in the building.

“What determines the names?”

“Citizen vote. Shanghai used to be Calcutta, which I personally prefer, but a little bunch of malcontents on the 778th floor rammed through a referendum in '75.”

“I thought you had no malcontents in the urban monads,” Gortman says.

Mattern smiles. “Not in the usual sense. But we allow certain conflicts to exist. Man wouldn't be man without conflicts, eh? Even here. Eh?”²⁵³

The cities are named through referendum, indicating that citizens have some autonomy to decide seemingly important aspects of their daily lives. However, Charles Mattern's addition that 'certain conflicts' are permitted to exist within the building suggests that there are laws in place which set boundaries on how people live and disagree with each other. All decisions of minor importance are enforced by rule of the majority, although the changes they affect have no bearing on the overall power structure of the building itself. As Makarychev and Yatsyk stated, these bodies who have resisted are marginalised, but at the same time it creates a sense of loyalty and solidarity within the national community.²⁵⁴ The technology of the body employed by the government here is a disassociation of themselves with power. By allowing the citizens to disagree with each other while enforcing boundaries via laws of conduct, they can continue to keep their tactics mysterious while remaining omnipresent. Disagreements are only permitted on an ideological basis between groups of inhabitants where the minority group must submit short of disrupting the everyday function of the building due to the necessity of social cohesion.

Residents recognise that no matter their personal feelings, their continued survival depends on accepting the will of the majority group. What they fail to recognise is that their clinging to the ideology of maximum procreation is what has driven this necessity for compliance. Governments in real life have adopted policies and gone to great lengths to educate citizens about birth control, yet it is clear that governments have for many generations used this natural desire as a means of securing their place in a hierarchy. This is how biopolitics becomes a mechanism for governance and a nation-building tool based on standards and norms of inclusion and exclusion. These norms, for example, may negatively mark certain sexual practices and lifestyles as culturally “inappropriate” and thus marginalize them.²⁵⁵ The public body engulfs minority groups so that everyone overtly agrees, while inwardly

²⁵³ Ibid, p. 19.

²⁵⁴ Makarychev and Yatsyk, p. 4.

²⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 4.

minority groups suppress their private bodies as though they represented a form of mental illness. Deviancy is not thought of in the conventional sense in this book. Rather than a system where language is monitored and mediated, here, conflict which mediated and subject to governance.

Silverberg takes the impact of ideology further to subvert notions of social obligations and freedoms to reveal ideologies operating in the fictional and real milieus. The majority group in this society is ideologically normalised to believe that procreation is being the highest calling a human can have in life. We see this from the outset of the novel when Mattern is showing the visiting sociocomputator from Venus, Nicanor Gortman, around the urban monad and they discuss their cultural differences.

“Not at all.” Mattern feels an uptake of tension. “We like children. We approve of breeding. Surely you realized that before you set out on this tour of-“

[...]

“Ran counter to norm? Just because I have a scholar’s detachment, you shouldn’t assume that I disapprove in any way of my cultural matrix.”²⁵⁶

The difference between this fictional world and the real world is mirrored by the difference between the cultures of the two men and resembles the concerns of overpopulation that were being raised as this novel was written. Silverberg’s aim was to project how the human relationship to technology might change if humanity decided not to control the birth rate, but instead tried to reproduce as exponentially. It is clear that while in reality procreation is a freedom, in *Urban Monad 116* it is a civic duty. What makes this theme particularly convincing is that Silverberg has gone to the lengths of creating a psychosomatic symbolic system, which reacts emotively and physically to challenges to the norm.

“*Control fertility?*” Mattern clutches his genitals in shock at the unexpected obscenity. Several copulating couples look up, amazed. Someone giggles. Mattern says, “Please don’t use that phrase again. Particularly if you’re near children. We don’t-ah-think in terms of control.”

“But-“

“We hold that life is sacred. Making new life is blessed. One does one’s duty to god by reproducing.” Mattern smiles, feeling that he sounds too earnest.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ Silverberg, p. 20.

²⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 30.

The parallel between religion and this system emerges as, 'life is sacred' and 'one's duty to god'. The function of 'god' as a binding social mechanism is similar to how Marxism works according to Derrida, as he states it [Marxism] remains at once indispensable and structurally insufficient: it is still necessary but provided it be transformed and adapted to new conditions and to a new thinking of the ideological, provided it be made to analyse the new articulation of techno-economic causalities and of religious ghosts.²⁵⁸ This indicates that this 'god' centred system of procreation and 'blessedness', which includes both thought and deed, shows the plasticity of this humanist system to maintain its existence by adapting its expression to a new environment to evade obsolescence. Gortman is not acting as a nomad due to his originating outside this system, and due to his having no interest in challenging the system that he questions. His function is that of an observer, tasked with understanding the system without producing any effect.

Mattern reacts by clutching his genitals due to the emotional distress that the 'obscenity' causes him. He behaves as though someone had inadvertently uttered a cultural obscenity, but he mediates his reaction to caution the outsider not to repeat the offence. The system is capable of tolerating outsiders in the private scope. However, in the public sphere, it is clear that someone who is naturalised today would warrant death in this new ideological order. What we see is elements of our contemporary ideologies, which we are mostly unaware of, acting in altered forms, which are mutated into ways we would clearly identify as unnatural. This unnaturalness is felt most clearly both within the novel and within contemporary societies, most poignantly by minority groups. This can encompass many groups who are unwelcome in the majority ideology who act as nomads in academic and creative means. Ideology for the outsider operates as a cage. It stems from the creation of a binary system of US/Them, appropriate/taboo, and a confusion of natural/unnatural.

Notably, all these binaries could not act as a cage without them being cognisant of the other against which they define themselves. I define this ideological cage through three points of reference. Firstly, the cage must restrict speech, movement, or expression. Gortman clearly feels the cage of cultural ideology by Mattern's reaction and utterance. Secondly, a cage must be unnatural. Unnaturalness can be related to the contemporary *bios/zoe* discourse,

²⁵⁸ Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, p. 73.

of which Agamben is most known for within posthumanist studies.²⁵⁹ Zoe is undifferentiated life, or life without distinguishing rights, while *bios* describes the details of its existence. Therefore, the urge to reproduce exponentially is unnatural and the questioning of that system is feeling the effects of that cage. Further, as a cage is unnatural, it exists because of *bios*; the constructed argument. Finally, it must be possible to deconstruct the cage. There must be a means of leaving that cage. In this cage, Gortman may simply leave Urban Monad 116 and return to his own cultural matrix. There are many other alternatives to exiting an ideological system.

As Haraway states 'the emergent ontologies of biodiversity naturecultures are laced with new ethical demands.'²⁶⁰ While Haraway's debate concerns the forced breeding of animal species, I think there is a grain of similarity between the two ecosystems that we are discussing. A new ethics is needed for environments such as the Urban Monad as the survival of the residents relies on continual harmony and obedience. The culture is built up from the nature that is available to them, though the only shred of nature that remains is the human body. Though it is not ethics which operates in this society, as ethics is secular; the duty of reproduction is blessed, and therefore carries religious connotations. Like the atrocities of Haraway's example of the meat-industrial complex which comes about when humans separate themselves from nature, humans who become deviant face identical dehumanisation in the novel.²⁶¹ Humans who become violence or who break the rules beyond the tolerated limits of the Oligarchy are tossed 'down the chute' and their bodies become combustible fuel to power the Urban Monad. It shows the constructed and malleable nature of what constitutes as protected and privileged.

While the Urban Monad is a natureculture of human and machine (as non-human animals are not present in the novel), there are two non-explicit references to animals in the novel. The first reference is via the food that people consume or recycle, the second is through the transformations of bodies from citizen into condemned body. The link between animal and human-animal here is they are both tossed down the chute like waste, their flesh become equally an excess of society, thrown away, recycled into energy and equally forgotten by the society that exiles them.

²⁵⁹ Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, p. 15.

²⁶⁰ *When Species Meet*, p. 150

²⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 206

To bring this section related to how the government employs technologies of the body to normalise its citizens to a close, I will discuss the differences between the practices of Silverberg's futuristic society and those of today. The important point to remember is that both the concepts of waste as wealth, and privacy, are normalised, ideological concepts. In being confronted by an affluent society which produces zero waste and rejects the notion of privacy, readers are led to question the values of their own society. Beginning with Urban Monad 116 as a zero-waste society, we follow Mattern as he gives the visiting sociocomputator Gortman a tour around his home:

"This is where we sleep," he explains. "There's ample room for three. We wash at the cleanser, here. Do you like privacy when voiding waste matter?"

"Please, yes."

"You press this button for the privacy shield. We excrete in this. Urine here, feces there. Everything is reprocessed, you understand. We're a thrifty folk in the Urbmons."²⁶²

The waste this society produces sustains the energy requirements of the entire building and creates a surplus. Baudrillard's *The Consumer Society* suggests that knowledge concerning the affluence of societies is linked to waste, especially in terms of the quality of waste, quantity of waste it produces and what it does with that waste.²⁶³ In this novel, the waste that is produced via heat and excretion are both converted to the building's energy source. Due to the vast energy needs of the citizens, a zero-waste ideology became normalised, so rather than an excess going to waste, the excess heat, energy and materials are reinvested to create an exponential product which facilitates the proliferation of ideology. Baudrillard's criticism that only in destruction are objects there *in excess* and only then, in their disappearance, do they attest to wealth is reversed by this society. Rather, only in the efficiency of the recycling of objects, the continued existence of the society is ensured.²⁶⁴ This society emphasises individuals and society as a whole collectively taking responsibility for waste production and energy use. Posthumanist studies also targets eco-criticism in recognising that human-animals are also networked with nature, and in this society built on and sustained on its own waste. As speculative fiction, this ecological frame questions the

²⁶² Silverberg, p. 22.

²⁶³ Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society*, p. 42.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 48.

system of governance. It asks the same questions that Baudrillard posed much later, such as do human beings organise themselves for purposes of survival, or in terms of the individual or collective meaning they give to their lives, and does not affluence ultimately only have meaning in wastage?²⁶⁵

The normalisation of post privacy culture develops similarly to a zero waste culture. The notion that nudity and waste avoidance is stripped of significance of vulnerability, and social class reduced back to its animal function shows the society has moved away from the current symbolic system we operate within, and it is this which alienates the fictitious society to us.

Smiling, Mattern says, “We’re a post-privacy culture, naturally. But it wouldn’t be any trouble for us to press the button”.²⁶⁶

The significance of this system is not to be understated. It presents itself as liberation from the socially stratified system in which we live today. It also binds the occupants to a new system of forced equality based on reproduction and into a newly stratified system. Equality becomes relative to the city which one becomes assigned to. Residents have no apprehension about being naked in front of others from their own social matrix. The discomfort they feel is only related to how it renders an outsider uncomfortable.

That being said, the existence of the privacy screen is an illusion. Residents are expected to not use the button, and therefore the use of the button would signal a social deviant who might face repercussions. It is a psychological trap laid by the government to monitor the normalisation of its residents without needing to take any action.

The idea that all citizens are equal does not hold, no matter which strata it is argued on. Within the urban monad, residents are ingrained in a hierarchy by city. Outsiders share the same privileges, but they are recognised as foreigners and therefore as having unequal adaptability if they are recognised as foreign. It indicates neither happiness, nor equality originate naturally within an individual to realise their own happiness or equality. Instead, it derives socio-historically from the myth of happiness and equality embodying the same idea. In fact, these two ideas are based on the further myth, the *myth of Equality*.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 44.

²⁶⁶ Silverberg, p. 22.

²⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 49.

The society portrayed in the novel is a *democracy of social standing*, where possessions are used to create the semblance of an equally formal democracy, which is beyond contradictions and social inequalities. However, the televisions which provide serene scenes from the outside world, the morning announcements of the population growth, and bodiless commands which can be issued at any time, combine in a general democratic ideology which conceals the *absence* of democracy and the non-existence of equality.²⁶⁸

The Ideologies of Desires and Taboos

This second section exploring the acceptability, normalisation and creation of desires and taboos in this novel will reveal how readers have also been sucked into this eutopia that the world of *The World Inside* initially portrays. I will show how desire and taboos are social constructs by examining how the attitudes to sex and drugs differ in this novel to our contemporary standards. For this, I will also note how the acceptable and unacceptable availability of narcotics indicates that this culture is not as utopian as first believed. Ultimately, the novelty of this narrative likely stops the reader from questioning the ideologies at play within the society until they, along with the characters they follow, are subject to the harmful aspects of it. All this is in the aim of showing that ideology is present within nomads in the setting of this novel where it is most evident, as the culture and ideologies of the inhabitants of Urban Monad 116 are already alien to our own normalised standards. Therefore, we must begin with the premise that while desires and taboos have some basis in evolutionary biology, they are largely created through technologies of the body.

Desire and taboo are ideological constructs which are deeply rooted in the cultural, historical, and philosophical contexts. They may be manipulated through technological availability or through political over-coding, though people within a localised milieu will share many desires and concepts of taboo through their social training and personal preferences. As seen in this novel, the free access to sex is considered a civic responsibility by citizens to make oneself unavailable for copulation is seen as selfish and potentially

²⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 50.

aggressive. This is a society where swinging is public knowledge, though spouses generally do not discuss these acts with each other (even if the husband is present while the wife is engaging in intercourse with their neighbour). This ideology is rationalised by stating that it avoids tensions, the slightest of which could threaten the stability of the community as a whole. During Gortman's visit Mattern, unsure whether Gortman can be accepted within the cultural matrix asks:

Mattern says, "Forgive me for being overobvious, but I must bring up the matter of your sexual prerogatives. We three will share a single platform. My wife is available to you, as am I. Within the urbmon it is improper to refuse any reasonable request, so long as no injury is involved. Avoidance of frustration, you see, is the primary rule of a society such as ours, where even minor frictions could lead to uncontrollable oscillations of disharmony. And do you know our custom of nightwalking?"²⁶⁹

Nightwalking is the act of wandering the corridors of one's local city in an urban monad in the aim of finding an available sexual partner in an apartment. It is an ingrained social and cultural process founded on the political and collective decision to exponentially increase the human population. With each generation focused solely on the tasks of sustaining and growing a population, little thought is given as to what will happen once a maximum population is achieved, nor what the consequences are for those who supply the resources needed to sustain the billions of human lives that are arbitrarily being created. Because of this, desire and taboo have a basis in this cultural context determining that nightwalking is an act of desire and is a socially becoming act, while refusal to accept the sexual advances of a resident or the inability to procreate are seen as potentially illegal.

Free access to any person they desire allows men to inhabit spaces in such close proximity to one another that they should not have competitive urges. However, at the same time, the notion of fidelity becomes abstract. Baudrillard argues that few ideas 'are offered *alone*, without a context of objects which 'speak' them. This changes the consumer's relation to the object: he no longer relates to a particular object in its specific utility, but to a set of objects in its total signification'.²⁷⁰ This is similar to the relationship the citizens have to each other's bodies. In the context of nightwalking, the female body is transformed into an object

²⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 23.

²⁷⁰ Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society*, p. 27.

which satiates desire for sex, which is intensified as children are taught to embrace these urges from their most formative years.

Badmington offers advice on analysing this social shift from our own familiar paradigms. He states that a cultural critic looking only for quick and easy answers might conclude that:

[T]he shift from 'alien hatred' to 'alien love' outlined in the previous chapter marks the absolute end of humanism. [...] Such reports would be exaggerations. They would also be nothing new, for the end of humanism has been reported at various moments in the past. And yet, that end never quite seems to come.²⁷¹

The characters in this novel spend very little time in self-reflection, and often act on impulse, guided by a complex cultural dynamic facilitated and sustained by technological progress. 'Love' in this novel comes in many forms, all of which are ingrained in social and historical ideological processes which manifest through the act of sex. Examples of the types of love in this novel are the love between a couple, unconditional in a sense, whereas the Eros that a spouse feels for their partner seems to have been effaced almost entirely and placed with a city-wide Eros. Importantly, all types of love in this novel are a form of bonding, but in the sense of taking possession of another person's body, and likewise being physically possessed by others. It is a state-mandated ideological over-coding through the process of desire. The hate or disdain that humanity feels for its alien bed-mates never quite eclipses in this posthuman world. Rather, the loathing it feels towards others is necessarily transformed into love. I believe the walls here exist to limit the number of people that residents must see all the time. Humanism serves as a driving force in the ideology, in that they have conquered the world and have taken the fullest advantage of technologically driven ideologies. 'Nature' within this culture renders otherness unnatural, impossible, and unthinkable. 'Man' rests upon a bland, complacent, unjust sameness.²⁷² Badmington's critique links with Massumi's criticism of fascist societies in that the obsession with normopathy leads to societal frenzy of achieving normalisation greater than organically possible, without an institution intervening to breed normalcy into a society.

The free access to narcotics is the second desire generated by this society which differs in attitude from the time when this novel was published, but it is becoming more aligned with

²⁷¹ Badmington, *Alien Chic*, p. 35.

²⁷² *Ibid*, p. 38.

societies in the twenty-first century. Two decades ago, there was a zero-tolerance culture of recreational drugs, informed by previous widespread abuse of opiates and many failed social experiments conducted in the 1960s. So, when we see the musician Dillon Chrimes experiment with the 'multiplexer', it is hinted that he has profound insights to offer readers.

In the hall he finds a groover dispenser and requisitions his pill, tapping his metabolic coefficient out on the console. The machine performs the necessary calculations and delivers a five-hour dose, timed to go off in twelve minutes. He swallows it and steps into the dropshaft.²⁷³

Pragmatically, governmental mediation of access to narcotics suggests that processes such as drug trafficking and addiction could be eliminated in large by allowing the use of drugs recreationally. We are shown no evidence of drug addiction within the urban monad, yet drugs are widely available at any time. But this acceptability of drugs would not come about overnight, nor by governmental approval alone. The society of *The World Inside* is a speculative future which is based on the real world, therefore this change in the usage of drugs would be in response to growing demand for the legalisation of drugs as they are seen as arbitrarily restricted. Since the time of this novel's publication, the use of some substances once highly regulated by governments are becoming legalised, showing a shift which could potentially open an avenue for the world Silverberg depicts to become a reality.

Baudrillard argues that consumption, like the education system, is a class institution: not only is there inequality before objects in the economic sense (the purchase, choice and use of objects are governed by purchasing power and by educational level, which is itself dependent upon class background, etc).²⁷⁴ This is evident when it is clear that not everyone has equal access to drugs. It appears that the more access one has to drugs, the higher their social status. There is less evidence on the lower floors of the urban monad that drugs are widely present than on the upper floors, where there is almost an overconsumption of drugs for the sake of showing status.

Narcotics serve many purposes in this society; on a surface level they enhance pleasure. Examples of this are 'groovers' and 'tingle' which are used as mood enhancers in social settings. 'Harder' drugs, such as the hallucinogenic 'multiplexer' are less used and in the

²⁷³ Silverberg, p. 86.

²⁷⁴ Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society*, p. 59.

case of Chrimes, it seems to have the purpose of extreme recreation and ritualistic use. It seems to be a riskier choice as the after-effects of the drug are similar to depression. There is also a class of drugs known as 'filters' which result in memory loss and lasting hangover-like symptoms. These drugs are not sanctioned by the government. However, it seems the problem is either unknown to the government, or the problem is so minor that the system decides to react with plasticity. The existence of non-regulated drugs indicates that this society, which seems utopian on the surface, is not as harmonious as it seems despite the extensive administration of the ruling bodies through technological advancements and advanced technologies of the body.

Drugs are readily available, and people are generally trusting of others if they are offered drugs because the society is programmed to be entirely communal. However, the deeper reasons for this availability are two-fold. The first reason is to keep the population docile, without the same side effects as alcohol, including addiction, weight gain, health side-effects, etc. In keeping people's bodies in a constantly serene state, they are less likely to break laws, commit violent acts or feel any discontent towards their environment or neighbours. The second reason for making drugs readily available to the population is much darker. The government makes use of specific mind-altering drugs in their re-programming process. In making drugs available, the governing body cannot be accused of hypocrisy, nor will it risk addiction to drugs as people have moderated access to drugs using their income, rather than placing a high demand on the government or by obtaining them through means that would need to be legislated. Instead, the government may regulate an individual's intake of drugs based on their income and monitor their 'metabolic coefficient', which keeps their medical records up to date. They become the more efficient mental and physical meditation and monitoring mechanism that the government has outside of the judicial system.

Now I have explored normalised access to pleasure, the alternative to this is non-sanctioned nomadic experiences with taboo elements of society. Taboo is a challenging topic because it depends on understanding acceptability in the terms of the man-made social system which creates it. This system is balanced at one point by what processes keep the ruling party in control over the population, and on the other end by the traditions and rights of the citizens whose agency to live, die and seek pleasure are being administrated.

The taboo I will examine which contradicts our morality of promiscuity is the desire created by this society of nightwalking. The existence of taboos in society is the first indication that this is in fact a dystopia. However, until these boundaries are encountered and tested, the inhabitant and the reader may remain blissfully ignorant of the potential dangers of becoming deviant in this novel. Nightwalking is an example of a polyamorous technology of the body designed to satiate any unfulfilled desire in residents of the building. By modern standards, the taboo stems from the ecclesiastic morality of monogamy. In Silverberg's fictional society, monogamy would be considered a privatisation of the body, and therefore a risk to the idea that everyone belongs to each other. The technology is effective in creating a communal loyalty that promotes a communal emotional and physical presence to maintain continued normalisation. The refusal to make one's body available to someone else acts as an early indication of the subject's becoming nomadic, and they are pressured to discontinue that course of action through the assault to their public reputation.

The first chapter begins with Mattern and Gortman discussing the cultural matrix of urban monad 116. In one instance the conversation turns to the sexual activities of the residents.

“So you can go into any room in this whole gigantic building and sleep with-“

“Not the whole building,” Mattern says, interrupting. “Only Shanghai. We frown on nightwalking beyond one's own city.” He chuckles. “We do impose a few little restrictions on ourselves, you see, so that our freedoms don't pall.”²⁷⁵

Instead of seeing this as a society which may enjoy more freedoms than contemporary societies have, it is more accurate to state that they are societies based on restrictions. The love citizens claim to feel for each other is a complex lie developed through advanced technologies of the body, masquerading as technologies of the Self. Love manifests as a coping mechanism for the intimate living spaces, and the technology of the body that allows this love to manifest is sex. Peace is on the surface maintained by the pursuit of pleasure and reproduction, but actually it is maintained through fear of the consequences which may arise in the event of conflict. This speculative fiction highlights that the more freedoms become available to us through technology and societal changes, the more they will be based on restrictions. Further, if we read Badmington's *Alien Chic* closely, we uncover another clue as to a dual purpose of this unlimited Eros, which they think of as love.

²⁷⁵ Silverberg, p. 24.

The love that citizens experience is no different from the alien chic which Badmington writes about insofar as —like Radical Chic— it quietly reaffirms a traditional border between ‘them’ and ‘us’.²⁷⁶ It means that the original longing humans have for space and to feel significant is converted to a new expression. I argue that with societal change and technological developments, the psychic (or more accurately neurological) functions we experience do not change. Our fundamental desires, fears, and reactions so long as they are based on biology or intra-species relations have not changed for thousands of years. Instead, what changes is their expression. When I state that this is a society built on restrictions and not privileges, I am indicating that the society of Silverberg’s novel has not become posthuman in the way it operates. The paradigm has not shifted. Humanity is not free to have its own agency.

The theme of being trapped pervades the novel in the figure of characters who are secret outliers within the system. These characters, such as Jason Quevedo and his wife Micaela, are both subject to feeling the limits of their freedom within the oppressive structure of the society they inhabit.

The truth is that if he didn’t escape Micaela and their five littles every day, he’d go flippo. That is, accumulated frustration and humiliation would cause him to commit nonsocial acts, perhaps violent ones. He is aware that there is no room for the nonsocial person in an urban monad. He knows that if he loses his temper and behaves in a seriously unblessworthy way they will simply throw him down the chute and turn his mass into energy. So he is careful.²⁷⁷

Divorce seems to be an impossibility; another restriction which exists in contemporary societies. Jason’s desire to escape, his worry of committing ‘nonsocial acts’ which could lead him to going ‘down the chute’ all lead to one conclusion; he is a prisoner of the system. Jason is a unique character as he actively transgresses certain taboos. He does so both lucidly and in a calculated manner. He bears the mental stresses of frustration and humiliation to a degree where he reflects on the consequence of committing violent acts, which would instantly result in his public death sentence. There are, however, transgressions which are not punished due to the taboo of talking about extra-marital sexual practices that Jason may break certain taboos. As no one may openly challenge his

²⁷⁶ Badmington, *Alien Chic*, p. 5.

²⁷⁷ Silverberg, p. 96.

nightwalking because it does not threaten the social cohesion, Jason has found the point where the system must exhibit plasticity to accommodate his desire for fear of collapse. The only negative impact is that those who force the system to enter this state are laden with an inescapable social stigma, which does not impede their open social interactions. However, they know that all their acquaintances will be talking about it privately.

No one will punish him for his unconventional behavior, since it is merely a violation of accepted custom, not of urban law. No one will even criticize him to his face for doing it. Yet his wanderings give him the mild thrill of doing the forbidden.²⁷⁸

All residents potentially secretly wish to transgress the rules. While these humanist structures mediated by technology propagate new expressions of desire, it also creates new desires based on transgression. The 'thrill' which Jason experiences comes from imagining he is 'doing the forbidden', which bears consequences if caught. The issue with this traditional definition is that everyone knows what he is doing, and he is aware of this. Therefore, the thrill he feels derives from somewhere other than the threat of discovery. But the urge to do the forbidden is in itself the final proof that citizens are unhappy with their futuristic sexual paradise. Despite all the conveniences of their posthuman living, they remain unfulfilled for reasons none of them can explain, instead they bury these feelings through pleasure and ideological indoctrination. The world becomes a blissful lie, and it is designed to prevent nomads from coming into existence.

The source of this thrill is the sense that he has gained a semblance of agency. This is an embodied agency over whom he can have sexual encounters with. While today there is an expectation to have monogamous encounters, the number of people one could have those encounters with is limited by many criteria including location, number of potential partners, ability to travel, etc. Jason's situation is no different, except that he would be confined to having an open relationship with the same number of people for his entire life. Nomadically, he takes control of his self-governance in relation to his sexual assembly and opens himself up to the rest of the building. However, these are not actions meant to assert control of his agency. If they were, he would be a posthuman nomad. Instead, it is for other base reasons.

²⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 98.

By law they must embrace him willingly. "I'm from Shanghai," he tells them, and they go "Ooooh!" in awe, and he mounts them tigerishly, contemptuously, swollen with status.²⁷⁹

He is proof that social hierarchy exists and that he has implicit power as both a male, and a resident of one of the higher tier cities within the building. Within the society, there is an understanding that men and women have the same sexual freedom to sleep with whom they wish, but this is not the case pragmatically. Women wait in their homes for men to court them. They do not have a choice of whom they must embrace as they must accept any man willingly. Jason takes advantage of his status as a man, as is customary in that society, but also his status as a citizen of Shanghai, to take advantage of any woman in the building beneath Shanghai. It is certain that if a man from the lowest floors of the building dared to nightwalk on the higher floors, they would be sentenced to death for breaking the taboos. The truth becomes hidden as ideological facades masquerade as reality. The humanist hierarchy endures and the system of taboos allowing for pleasures to be satiated maintains social cohesion. But this leads to the next question: how does this society help us to better understand posthuman agency?

Automated Ideology – How Agency Can Become an Illusion

To have agency over oneself is to take responsibility for our actions, a conundrum raised by other writers including famously the author of *A Clockwork Orange*. *The World Inside* is another clear example of the moral, philosophical, and theological issues involving the removal of our capacity for self-governance. In this section I will examine three aspects related to technologies of the Self, specifically the idea of agency in this novel. Firstly, I will explore how the dystopian society uses posthuman means to not only exercise technologies of the body, but erase nomads through use of technology and drugs to remove the ability of deviant citizens to practise technologies of the Self. In removing this key bio-political tactic, nomads in such a society infrequently undergo the process of becoming nomadic. Finally, I will show how the building administrators who form the oligarchy propose insight that endless leisure is not what makes humans happy. So while everything in the buildings could

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 98.

be automated, they remove the agency of the citizens in another way, transforming them into manual labour which creates the illusion of purpose.

The government of *The World Inside* tolerates only ideological disputes between groups of persons because the law of the majority is unquestionably upheld. However, when someone questions that system in non-violent ways, we see that unlike most social milieus this system does not enter into mediation with its potential nomads. Instead, it decides on the appropriate level of over-coding. In the case of nomads that we see emerge in the novel, technology and drugs are used in the case of minor infractions while potentially inflammatory nomadism results in execution. These are the posthuman technologies of the body employed by the government in the aim of erasing nomads.

In the first example I will provide, the deviant we see is not fully nomadic. Instead, Aurea Holston recognises a need to protect her assemblage, that is to remain normalised within her milieu. She and her husband are chosen by the automated selection process for residents moving from one urban monad to another. Aurea and her husband, Memnon Holston, are selected at random for resettlement. Aurea breaks a clearly dangerous taboo in refusing to leave.

“I won’t go!” Memnon, I’ve always lived here! I-“

“You’re talking like a flippo,” he says, keeping his voice low. He pulls her back inside the dormitory. Staring up, she sees only cavernous dark nostrils. “Pop a pill, Aurea. Talk to the floor consoler, why don’t you? Stay calm and let’s adjust.”

“I want you to file an appeal.”

“There is no appeal.”²⁸⁰

As one of her relatives is a member of the building’s elite administrators, while not having the autonomy to reject the decision imposed upon her, she avoids the death penalty for attempting to retain her ability to choose where she lives. In this, the building shows that it has enough flexibility to force compliance of its citizens in ways other than public executions. There being no option but to adjust or perish strikes a comparison between this society and prison. In this system there is no appeal, and to rebel against it suggests the person is mentally unwell. Furthermore, Memnon tells Aurea to ‘pop a pill’, to drown her

²⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 55.

individual inclination within narcotics to make her more amenable to the processes that are happening to her.

It is a stark reminder that they are all incarcerated in the building and their autonomy is based on their complicity. Foucault similarly shows that like this society, a prison must be the microcosm of a perfect society in which individuals are isolated in their moral existence, but in which they come together in a strict hierarchical framework, with no lateral relation, communication being possible only in a vertical direction.²⁸¹ Examples of this are seen throughout the book, but none more so negatively than in Aurea's desperate attempts to prevent her expulsion from her social matrix. Aurea has no opportunity to rise vertically except in the event of leaving the urban monad. Her husband has, however, adapted due to his instant promotion in the new building.

Aurea is eventually referred to the 'moral engineers' where she is assessed as needing treatment. It is here where we see that as a woman, she is subordinate to her husband's appeal to the system to 'fix' his wife. At the end he tells her:

"Conflict sterilizes. You must learn to comply with the demands of society, for society will not nurture you unless you play the game." He recommends treatment.

"I don't want treatment," she says thickly, but Memnon authorizes it, and they take her away. "Where am I going?" she asks. "For how long?"

"To the 780th floor, for about a week."

"To the moral engineers?"

"Yes," they tell her

"Not there. Please, not there."

"They are gentle. They heal the troubled."

"They'll change me."

"They'll improve you. Come. Come. Come"²⁸²

The moral engineers are the public process of exercising technologies of the body through the guise of medicine. They claim that they are gentle, but the process of over-coding, as I have shown over these two chapters, is a violent, ideological, and political process. The

²⁸¹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison*.

²⁸² Silverberg, p. 61.

(female) reproductive system is subject to ideology here. Aurea has been unable to bear children, which is why she and Memnon were selected for resettlement. The idea that she will be changed is seen as positive by everyone. The notion that she will be more compliant and less critical of the system is seen as improvement. She is left with two choices, to comply or to die. She chooses the latter. It could be suggested that this choice is lenient when we consider that Aurea is frequently reminded that she must adjust or go down the chute. Thomsen highlights the issue succinctly that the novel proposes in terms of posthuman agency. He states that like the fascination with the posthuman, the idea of being part of a collective mind is also a paradoxical situation. It creates new ways of interacting with the world and other humans, and it overcomes what is a staple of the description of modern identity: the distance to other humans and the feeling of being lonely and strange.²⁸³ However, the idea of being an autonomous individual, responsible for our own agency is difficult to surrender, no matter whether we are human or posthuman. For these reasons, privacy and free will are two important problems to consider within posthumanist discourses of agency, and it is why this novel is particularly interesting to use as a literary investigation of these concerns.

Agency is limited in this novel through technologies of the body through the use of several dogmatic ideologies. First in relation to gender, and by social hierarchy. A man decides for his wife whether she be labelled as a “flippo” or whether she must undergo “treatment”. A wife has no option of resistance. The processes that enable these technologies are automated and are available to husbands at the push of a button. Residents of the lowest floors, likewise, have more limited agencies. As for men, there are several scenes where their thoughts betray them and they must go through a ‘ritual’ to rationalise their thoughts, otherwise they are subject to public opinion and the almost omnipresent system. Technologies of the Self have been so profoundly infiltrated that they are used by citizens on the brink of deviance to normalise themselves. It is the most efficient form of educational, cultural, and social normalisation that could possibly exist. This introduces the problematic question of whether these citizens have the choice of non-compliance. I argue they do not have the choice between doing what is right and wrong, instead the choice

²⁸³ Mads Rosendahl Thomsen, ‘Posthuman Scale’, *CounterText*, 2.1 (2016), 31–43 (p. 39) <<https://doi.org/10.3366/count.2016.0037>> [accessed 24 March 2019].

becomes conform, self-normalise, submit to treatment, or die. Death in this case is either a physical or an individualistic ending. Victims are either effaced from life or their individuality is smoothed to fit the normalised masses.

The ideology recognises itself as a necessity. It perpetuates itself and is limited by the human ability to reproduce. It has taken steps to become plastic enough to contain those who deviate from the normalised accepted model in non-violent ways, through social stigmatisation and through 'moral engineers'. It therefore recognises that it is always battling disillusionment. No matter whether it is faith, pleasure, or threat, it constantly needs to remind its subjects that the system is necessary.

Necessity is best exemplified in the scene where Siegmund, a highly gifted academic, is speaking with Shawke, the head of the building, and asks why all jobs cannot be automated so people may have unlimited leisure time. Siegmund is referring to the twentieth century postmodern dream of technology creating more leisure time, whereas we have subsequently found that more work is needed in response to this more efficient system.

Shawke gave him a patronizing smile. "But if they had no work, what would all those poor people do with their lives?" he asked. "Do you think we can turn them into poets, Siegmund? Professors of urban history? We deliberately devise labor for them, don't you see?" And Siegmund embarrassed by his naïveté. A rare failure, for him, of insight into the methodology of government.²⁸⁴

This shows how a hierarchy manipulates its lowest tier citizens to become labourers.

Foucault describes such systems as having a 'policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour', which is true for both labour and the running of society. All bodies are subject to a 'political anatomy' also known as 'mechanics of power', which defines how one may have power over the bodies of others. This is now renamed as biopolitics. In agreement with Foucault, I argue that this society has been optimised in its efficiency through its production of subjugated, disciplined, and practised bodies, also known as 'docile' bodies.²⁸⁵

This is not the only way in which humanity feels itself threatened in the age of posthumans. Dilan Chrimes' scene while preparing for a concert sees him contemplating his relevance as

²⁸⁴ Silverberg, p. 229.

²⁸⁵ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison*.

an artist, he sees the musicians, possibly an allegory for humanity in this ideological system, as vulnerable in the face of technology.

A lifting machine stands by, waiting to help him put it in its proper place. The machine brought the vibrastar to the auditorium; it would also tune it in for him, if he asked it to, but of course he will not do that. Musicians have a mystique about tuning in their own instruments. Even though it will take him at least two hours to do it, and the machine could do it in ten minutes. Maintenance workers and other humbles of the grubbo class have the same mystique. Not strange: one must battle constantly against one's own obsolescence if one is going to go on thinking of oneself as having a purpose in life.²⁸⁶

The only semblance left of humanity is restricted to having a purpose in life. For the lowest levels it is to progress within their manufacturing work; for artists, it is to not require the aid of machines to operate their music; for those higher it is pleasure. The further down the building a person finds themselves, the greater the desire to find their purpose, for having the social status of someone in Shanghai is to already have reached the highest point of those outside the Oligarchical ruling class. It indicates that humanity always wants to control the technology it creates, even if it can make the machines fully autonomous. In Silverberg's fictional world, if the musician does not prove he can tune his instrument, he has already become halfway obsolete. As Chrimes contemplates this further, he imagines that the machines are almost sentient but kept under human control. As humans are kept under the control of other humans, he can be forgiven for believing that machines feel that way.

Now and then one of the idling instruments flares past its threshold and emits a blob of light or a squeak of sound. They'd play themselves if we'd only let them, Dillon thinks. It might just be a wild soar to everything on and sit back, doing nothing, while the instruments themselves give the concert, self-programmed. You'd get some strange percepts then. The mind of the machine. On the other hand it might be a hell of a dropper to find out you were superfluous.²⁸⁷

Chrimes imagines that there is a threat that the instruments will learn to play themselves. It opens the possibility that the only entities in this novel which are free within the building is the technology which enables both survival and oppression. Technology permeates every facet of life, from the necessity of meals, transport to and from work, entertainment, dispensing of narcotics, surveillance, and security, etc. Most notably, and I will return to this point in my third literary analysis, humans serve these systems, maintain them, upgrade

²⁸⁶ Silverberg, p. 74.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 78.

them, and devote much of their time to ensuring they are fully serviced. This may be the closest sense of equality that humans and machines have experienced without introducing the complexity of embodiment and cyborgs.

Finally, traditional Enlightenment humanism itself is threatened by the emerging relationship and potential equality of humanity with technology in a transhumanist and posthumanist relationship. Technology has permeated all strata of life, for better and for worse. The relationship humans have with technology is the strongest posthuman element that pervades through the novel due to its unique assemblage. Ferrando reminds us of the historical and ontological dangers of technology's active participation in posthumanist discourse. Posthumanism does not turn to technology as its main focus. This is because such a focus would reduce its own theoretical attempt to a form of essentialism and techno-reductionism.²⁸⁸ Technology both facilitates the ideology which maintains humanist hierarchies and at the same time threatens the necessity of humanity's sole reason to exist; to find a purpose.

I began by outlining how governing bodies developed technologies of the body to the point where they were able to create normalised and deviant or criminal bodies. I then discussed technologies of the Self through which a nomad uses bio-politics to protect its ability to form assemblages freely. Following bio-politics I revealed that ideologies work in similar ways to technologies of the body, operating on cultural, familiar, and social levels which are ingrained in localised cultural and philosophical histories. I then retraced the networks between humans, posthumans and nomads which allowed for a new perspective of deviant bodies as alternative ontologies of humanity. These alternative realities highlight the changing attitudes towards foreign bodies and how despite the shift from hate to love, both processes remain rooted in the binary system of affirming otherness.

In this chapter I argued that technologies of the body concern how bodies are regulated within a milieu and are the largest driving force of over-coding bodies within a local milieu. They operate by re-presenting persons, groups, species, and artefacts with added connotations in which they are transformed through positive or pejorative connotations. I drew examples from the development of the prison system, in which citizens have their

²⁸⁸ Ferrando, 'Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms', p. 28.

rights removed and are transformed into condemned bodies, who are reduced to cheap labour for the purpose of reformation. This transformation strips individuals of agency on the basis of a person being deemed as deviant against what the governing body determines as being normal. In incarcerating these bodies, they may be regulated on the pretence of reformation, but what it does is normalise the binary split between citizens who have certain degrees of agency, and those who have none.

Technologies of the Self refer to the process of becoming nomadic in order to resist arbitrary over-coding. It responds to the abuse of power that influential organisations and ruling bodies have over the re-presentation of groups at risk of becoming minorities. This is as much a process of self-defence as it is a defence of others. Nomads are intimately familiar with bio-political strategies to resist the threats associated with becoming deviant. Mastery of bio-politics allows a nomad to recognise arbitrary normalisations which proliferate in society which seek to influence their opinion or limit their freedoms through the use of social or liturgical processes.

The continued existence of ideologies suggests that posthumans are not as different from humans as was claimed. I discussed how nomads, like foreigners, hold a unique position in society, being able to operate alternatively from the local milieu but at the same time being regarded with distrust. All humans are raised within a local culture, posthumans when practising nomadism are in direct mediation with the ideologies that govern the *zeitgeist* of public opinion, political stances, and philosophies of that milieu. In brief, nomads need tactics besides bio-politics to resist the normalising influence of ideological forces which proliferate on a societal, rather than governing level. My solution to resisting socio-ideological forces is to re-trace the human-posthuman links and recognise their interconnectivity. In this way anthropocentric tropes are more easily identified, and a nomad may distinguish their private body from their public body, thus lessening the porousness of social influence on their assemblages.

Chapter Conclusion

I have developed three areas of my paradigm, the first of which was technologies of the body which are employed by governments to normalise its citizens. Then I discussed technologies of the Self, which are employed by citizens through bio-politics to resist ideological over-coding. The final area that I developed concerned the connection between the human, and the posthuman in relation to the nomad and socio-political contexts.

In my first section, I analysed the creation of processes which enabled and implicated State-mandated normalisation. I concluded that governments utilise certain tactics called technologies of the body, which set boundaries on how people live, die, and seek pleasure. The purpose of these boundaries is two-fold. Firstly, they serve to create social cohesion, and secondly, they protect the people who are in power by taking power from those they suspect will oppose them. I charted the rise of the prison system as a facility which over-codes its inmates who have been transformed through technologies of the body into criminalised bodies. These bodies must produce on behalf of the government to shed the sub-human connotations that have been written onto them so they may re-join society. While this system works well in theory, it is easily exploited so that any citizen who deviates from that which the government deems acceptable will be thrust on to the wrong side of the binary system. The consequences of this can range from imprisonment, ostracizations or execution.

Technologies of the Self are tactics which include bio-politics to encourage posthumans and nomads to exercise awareness over their boundaries, assemblages, and what is trying to be coded into them. In this section I discussed how foreigners and nomads are both viewed with mistrust. While being on the disadvantaged side of the binary system, naturalised citizens experience a double perception of themselves which will have them view themselves as normalised yet deviant. When facing the threat of being rendered deviant, the tactic related to multiple selves becomes pertinent. In recognising that the psyche is part of a network, nomads may isolate two agents, the public body, and the private body, to act as mutually informative agents so that a nomad may protect its assemblages while being able to interface with normalised society. The problem I encountered was that nomads, posthumans, and humans are all equally vulnerable to ideologies because they are all raised in a culturally contextual environment and are educated in the social and historical context

of their local milieus. This means that each of these three personas I have mentioned are in fact a network of agents within the psyche of any given individual.

In the third section I discussed how the process of becoming nomadic allows nomads to recognise fallacies of anthropocentric thinking. In recognising the link between humans, posthumans and nomads in the previous section, I could then work on my hypothesis stating that humans have become alienated from themselves due to technologies of the body changing through the generations, so that younger people have different ideas of normality, and acceptability than previous generations. With this in mind, the idea of deviancy becomes questionable to the degree where it is suspected of being a politicised term which is used to remove agency from citizens. Therefore, the idea of alternative human ontologies, which practises humanity in a different way mirrors Badmington's posthuman being a reiteration of the human.

These three sections which developed my paradigm, particularly the concept of technologies of the body, were crucial to developing my new reading of Silverberg's *The World Inside*. My unique reading over this novel traced the various lethal and non-lethal technologies of the bodies which ideologize, suppress, and normalise citizens into conformity. I also showed how these technologies created a self-perpetuating system of desire and taboo which evidence that there is no inherent desire or taboo without a system in which it functions. Further, I am confident that my claim in which the novel invites readers into the ideology of its utopian system before revealing its dystopian mechanisms is unique. I also highlighted the process of becoming nomadic which takes place, and the response of an automated totalitarian system in addressing this problem as sections two and three discussed. I also discussed how the novel acts as an ideology itself by luring in the reader with the promise of eutopia but in fact indoctrinated the reader into its ideology through its novelty.

I concluded that potential advanced technologies of the body can be used to erase technologies of the Self by creating a system where deviance would mean the extinction of many citizens. Additionally, technologies of the Self can be manipulated, as in the novel, as a self-normalising tactic, used by the citizen becoming nomad to protect themselves from potential consequences of dissent. Instead, the network in which residents are programmed to participate within is carried around as semiotic systems, which seek both connection via

sympathetic agents and to over-code foreign terrain. While the relationship Silverberg's characters have with technology is posthuman, with the level of advancement resembling a transhumanist's dream and a society created which contains no war or famine, it is far from eutopia. The hidden idea is that there is still a humanist biopolitics at play, where bodies are as much currency for labour as they are idea-carrying machines. The limit we find is in the animal-human-technology assemblage, which I discussed in Chapter One. In this case, the assemblage has been heavily distorted, removing in this case much of the animal from the equation, leading humanity with a system which prioritises human survival via reproduction within the capability for technology to support that growth. The consequence of this system is that fascist ideology is no longer one of many different regimes which may work, but it becomes the only system which maximises efficiency of the regime and minimises waste.

This literary analysis has taken the points made in Chapter Two of governmental limitations on agency; enforced normalisation; ideology which has taken root over the development of society and how the relationship people have with technology does not mean they have broken 'free' of humanity but have enhanced their ability to indulge the belief system that a minority have imposed on to the majority so as to create a favourable circumstance for a society built on consumption. I have been able to target several focal points of my thesis question, by showing how nomadic figures target anthropocentric systems of government and ideologically extreme societies.

The next chapter takes my conclusions from this chapter further. Now that I have discussed production and processes of ideologies, I will next look at the production of knowledge and how it is embodied. By concerning itself with posthuman and nomadic embodiment, the next chapter will add a physical dimension to the figure of the nomad. It will target the becoming nomadic and practising nomadism aspect of my paradigm to show how nomads are highly aware of the artefacts that they form assemblages with and how that might affect their agency. I will also complete my discussion of agency, which again focuses on the normalisation and deviance aspect of my six-point paradigm. In this case, my rhizomatic methodology will pull together many different scholars, each of whom have different interests, to show exactly how a nomadic critique can look. My nomad has been forged; its milieu is now populated. In the next chapter, which completes this thesis, it will respond to

situations involving literature and semiotics to offer my fullest critical reading of nomadism, according to the paradigm that has been constructed over the last two chapters.

Chapter Three: Practising Nomadism in Literature and Society

Introduction

This chapter deals with characters who are firstly, cyborgs, and secondly, of grey morality. My choice of subject is not incidental as my choice of the cyborg represents a non-human lifeform who does not have all the rights and privileges as a human, but in exchange they possess superhuman cognitive and physical abilities. The depiction of cyborgs offers a unique opportunity to analyse the ontology of a minority group, which is both human and non-human. The issue of grey morality gains new critical significance when analysed in the context of cyborg ontology. The efficiency and pragmatism of machinic thinking is critical of morality. For example, to a cyborg the right to privacy of thought represents nothing more than trivial inefficiency. In crossing such lines, the cyborgs I will analyse are nomadic in their ability to form connections between two people in a pseudo-interspecies manner. Such abilities are beyond human capability without technological enhancement, and therefore offer a new ontology to consider within speculative science fiction writing.

The epistemological investigations of Chapters One and Two discussed nomadism using theoretical discussions aimed to develop a paradigm within which I tested my assumptions. Chapter One was dedicated to outlining my figure of the nomad without the contextualisation of social and political milieux. Chapter Two outlined milieux pertaining to social, political, and ideological systems of control. 'Systems of control' describes each distinct area where bio-politics are applied to dictate how humans may live, die, and seek pleasure. However, I often refer to them collectively as normalising systems. At that point, I dedicated time to discussing how nomads often subvert these normalising systems, but I did not go beyond discussing bio-political tactics. Now, arriving at Chapter Three, I will shift to an ontological study of nomadic and literary embodiments.

This chapter applies my paradigm of the nomad to the topic of technologically mediated societies, meaning societies whose social and political milieux are inundated with ideological and mechanical technologies. It also discussed how our idea of embodiment - and in particular literary embodiments - evolve in tandem with society and technology. The

nomads presented in the literary example of Chapter One became entropic; their cognitive processes degenerated into chaos as they progressively deconstructed and over-coded the contested living spaces, as described by the Deleuzian nomadic war machine. The nomads analysed in the literary analysis in Chapter Two were erased before they could fully manifest themselves. The nomads that I encounter in Chapter Three are the fullest expression of the figure of the nomad that I have outlined over these three chapters.

This chapter builds from the theoretical work I have produced in previous chapters to explore concerns of nomadic embodiment. This is done by first delineating what is meant by embodiment, and distinguishing between different kinds of embodiments. The exploration of alternative ontologies and embodiments is the fulcrum of the thesis, which draws on all the critical tools discussed in previous chapters, to investigate representations of minority groups through literary analysis. Representations of normalised, and minority bodies in literature are often conventional, and therefore conform to the social imagination of their time. As I will show using the theory of body horror, nomads and monsters share many traits of difference, but diverge on the topic of agency.²⁸⁹ In the second section of this chapter, I shift my focus to the importance of recognising the value of literature beyond the traditional printed tome, which will lead me to my final discussion – in section three - of the difficulties and ethics surrounding the analysis of manga texts in preparation for my literary analysis, which forms the final section of this chapter.

I will now outline how this chapter will develop. My theoretical section proceeds in three sections: Nomadic embodiment and (O)ther Bodies; Nomadic embodiment and Monstrous Bodies; and Graphic Novels: Difficulties and Ethics of Literary Criticism. I will now outline the aims of my following three sections.

In my first section, 'Nomadic Embodiment and (O)ther Bodies', I will investigate the impact of embodiment on nomads, particularly the negative transformation that bodies undergo when they are represented as other. This first section specifies what is meant by embodiment before discussing embodied consciousnesses, the agency associated with embodiment, and how the embodiment associated with types of literature is an important

²⁸⁹ Kelly Hurley, 'Reading Like an Alien: Posthuman Identity in Ridley Scott's *Alien* and David Cronenberg's *Rabid*', in *Posthuman Bodies*, ed. by Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 203–24.

concern for literary scholars. My second section, 'Nomadic Embodiment and Monstrous Bodies', discusses the difference between monstrosity and nomadism, as each of the two terms denotes a configuration of the way bodies are understood. I will differentiate nomadism as the body presented with agency intact, while monstrosity denotes re-presented bodies whose agencies have been appropriated. These two terms reveal a dualist milieu within which all bodies are trapped. By discussing Kelly Hurley's theory of 'body horror', I will be able to show how expectations in entertainment are evoked through conventionalised representations. Conventionalism is, therefore, a technology of the body which threatens the integrity of unconventional bodies.

In the third section, 'Graphic Novels: Difficulties and Ethics of Literary Criticism', I will outline the pragmatic and ethical difficulties of analysing graphic novels. I include this section specifically in anticipation of my final literary analysis of a Japanese manga text, whose complexity resembles that of a graphic novel. I will finish by discussing the bioethics of portraying bodies generally in literature, the ethics of portraying alternative human bodies (alternative as in psychically, physically, or ontologically), and explain how graphic novels, such as speculative fiction, can be read as a new technology of the Self, which presents ways in which various milieux interact with the public and private Selves. The final section of the chapter is an application of these ideas onto the animated film and manga (Japanese graphic novel) *Ghost in the Shell*, by Masamune Shirow. I will interrogate how Shirow subverts traditional expectations of cyborgs for science fiction readers by presenting readers with alternative cyborg ontologies. My literary analysis will depend on several key points in this theoretical section including my definition of embodiment, as much of my analysis will target the non-human bodies of cyborgs.

Nomadic Embodiment and (O)other Bodies

This section investigates the significance of embodiment for nomads. I will proceed through two related points to answer this question of embodiment's relevance. Firstly, I will specify what is meant by nomadic embodiment in the physical and conceptual sense of the term. Secondly, I will link the developed, embodied, conscious private body to agency in

preparation for an extensive investigation of nomadic agency in the following sub-section of this chapter.

Nomadic bodies have been theorised and presented as war machines, drifters, and monsters (see note below).²⁹⁰ In the fifty years where the term nomad has been in common use to critically describe a subject who moves through, and engages with spaces, there have been few attempts to discuss the relevance of a nomadic embodiment. Cooper, O'Mahony, and Erfurt in Richards and Wilson's *The Global Nomad* posits the nomad as a type of traveller by referencing Cohen (1972) who first classified nomads as a type of traveller.²⁹¹

[T]he nomad (or drifter); with the latter two characterised as noninstitutionalised tourists as they were conceptualised as being only loosely attached to the tourist 'establishment' during their travels.²⁹²

My iteration of the nomad is not dissimilar to Cohen's. However, as Cohen's nomad drifts through spaces, every action undertaken by my nomads is done purposefully. Nomad embodiment means that nomads are a site of activation for ideas and ontologies. Nomadic bodies form assemblages within spaces that the non-nomadic body may not. For example, Haraway's point in her cyborg manifesto makes an important observation which Hayles later reiterates, namely that theorising bodies is undeniably a political act because bodies are always connected to the political milieu.²⁹³ Embodiment warrants the further distinction that each individual embodiment is unique, and therefore the experiences of one subject may never be identical to that of another. As such, when theorising alternative human bodies, such as cyborgs, we must recognise before discussing about the nature of their embodiment, that the discussion itself is a political act. If we are to categorise them as

²⁹⁰ Deleuze and Guattari; Cooper, O'Mahony, and Erfurt; Kelly Hurley, *The Gothic Body Sexuality; Materialism, and Degeneration at the Fin de Siecle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).; Note: Nomads are solitary figures who subvert social customs, as described by D&G in *A Thousand Plateaus*. The term drifter is borrowed from Erik Cohen (see below), which references the mobility of nomads while suggesting a lack of direction for movement. There are many examples of these qualities found in literature through characters such as Helen Vaughan in Arthur Machen's *The Great God Pan*, and *Frankenstein's* Adam. Both characters are considered monsters, and both share key qualities of nomadism, such as solitariness, non-rootedness in geographical locations, and the cognitive ability to operate within accepted social spheres, but being unable or unwilling to be normalised.

²⁹¹ Erik Cohen, 'Toward a Sociology of International Tourism', *Social Research*, 39.1 (1972), 164–82 <<https://doi.org/10.2307/40970087>> [accessed 9 January 2020].

²⁹² Cooper, O'Mahony, and Erfurt, p. 181.

²⁹³ Haraway, 'A Cyborg Manifesto : Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism In The Late Twentieth Century'; Hayles, 'Wrestling with Transhumanism', p. 225.

anything but alien, we must change our own position within the network that gives the term 'human' its power.

There are several consequences to taking seriously the imagery of cyborgs as other than our enemies. Our bodies, ourselves; bodies are maps of power and identity. Cyborgs are no exceptions. A cyborg body is not innocent; it was not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity and so generate antagonistic dualisms without end (or until the world ends); it takes irony for granted.²⁹⁴

Haraway posits her own dualism of the cyborg as being the ideological, as well as anatomical opposite of the human by playing on the rhetorical garden of Eden image to theologially situate the cyborg as a figure to be feared, followed by the irony that it will not bring unity as predicted but endless dualisms. As I will show in my literary analysis, using the cyborg to directly oppose the human is one way of approaching this embodied alternative human ontology, but it is not the only one available to critics. Another way to think of these alienated states of humanity is to consider them as another embodied reality in relation to our human-animal-technological network of embodiment. In shifting the emphasis towards the direction of technology, the cyborg, as its name suggests, is a non-normalised human ontology, practising hybrid human and machine ontologies. Nomadic embodiment, likewise, is another alternative embodied human ontology, but rather than its existence being intimately bound up in machinic technology. Its aim is to control its boundaries. If embodiment alone refers to the form or shape of human, non-human and non-living organisms and artefacts, any adjectives placed before the term embodiment will modify the nature of the subject which does the embodying. In this case I am discussing nomadic embodiment. The term nomadic immediately suggests a bias towards non-normalised ontologies, and a resistance to systems which normalise. Therefore, to define a nomadic embodiment: it is a cognitive shape or form, typically human, which has a penchant for forming unconventional assemblages so they may experience alternative human and non-human ontologies.²⁹⁵ Nomadic embodiments are political in that they resist normalisation, but are vulnerable to subjugation within social and political milieux.

²⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 180.

²⁹⁵ Note: by unconventional assemblages I mean to refer to Brian Massumi's notion of -esqueness, where one subject may partially capture the practices or processes of another different entity to produce a hybrid ontology. These ontologies have been described by Massumi as human and animal hybrid ontologies.

The *status quo* of assemblage forming has been directly criticised in literature for over a century already. There is a scene in Edwin A. Abbott's *Flatlands: A Romance of Dimensions* for example, where the dreaming square enters the one-dimensional world.²⁹⁶ He finds himself talking to the monarch of the world whose body he cannot define as either a man or woman (as in the square's world women are straight lines while men have clear two-dimensional shapes).

“Nature herself having ordained that every Man should wed two wives-“ “Why two?” asked I. “You carry your affected simplicity too far,” he cried. [...] “But supposing,” said I, “that a man should prefer one wife or three?”²⁹⁷

This passage shows how the square, who originates from a two-dimensional world, questions the norms and customs of entities in a one-dimensional world. As he engages with this other mode of being, originally from a perspective of otherness, he begins to consider making assemblages within that framework which are not normalised. Thus, once he understands the system in place, he begins practising nomadism to test the ways that the system can function in non-normalised states. The square appears outwardly alien in his ideas when speaking to the line, who presides as monarch. Initially, the otherness is due to his holding the place of foreigner in that system, therefore stipulating his ignorance of a one-dimensional cultural system. The alien qualities develop in complexity on understanding the naturalised and normalised system that the one-dimensional society endorses, and he begins to probe its ability to accommodate to non-normalised assemblages. Nomadic bodies can be physically different, either through disability or non-normalised changes to the body. They may also be conceptually different (technologically altered in representation). They can be ideologically different from the standpoint of having their origins or current belief system outside the milieu in which they are situated. This conceptual difference is an idea I will return to in my discussion of monstrous bodies. Nomadic embodiment is the ceaseless questioning and assemblage-forming it undergoes in its environment, affecting its embodied experience in unique ways from those who travel through spaces and places passively.

²⁹⁶ The experimental novel depicts characters as two-dimensional and a three-dimensional entity in a way to provide social commentary. Two dimensional. equilateral shapes such as squares and hexagons are posited as male, while triangles are represented as female.

²⁹⁷ Edwin A. Abbott, *Flatland: A Romance of Dimensions* (London: Seeley and Co., 1884), p. 56.

Nomads conceptualise themselves in a different way to normalised humans. Firstly, they see themselves as outside the normalised paradigm. This internally alienates the nomad. They are also aware of their situatedness within a network of animals, people, and technology. Therefore, their interactions with all three are more mediated and carefully selected than normalised, passive consumers. The world around nomads is also alienated as they deterritorialise their environments in the aim of negotiating the biopolitics that creates the practices and processes, which are attempting to code their bodies.

My second point in the first section of this chapter targets agency as a concern at the forefront of embodiment. Now that I have defined nomadic embodiment as being biased towards forming non-normalised assemblages to practice alternative ontologies I can add that their resistance to normalisation makes them vulnerable to subjugation within social and political milieux. This section therefore explores how nomadic embodiment negotiates its agency when encountering technology, media, and literature. As I will show, embodiment has significant implications on the agency of a subject to mediate its assemblages with its environment, and with other subjects which co-inhabit spaces alongside it. Agency, thus, is not restricted to a singular dimension of limitless assemblages, but rather it is an intermediation between the form of embodiment, desire, and environment.

Nomadic embodiment is one of the most liberated forms of embodiment which we can scrutinise, and I argue it is also one of the most intuitive forms to analyse with the aim of gaining insight into agency. But how much control do nomads have over their processes and practices? The question of embodiment is important because it corresponds to their lived experience and the agency they have over our autonomy and representation. The way they consume, exist, and learn are all tied to the question of embodiment.

When analysing characters, there is always the question of how much agency does the author give each character? There are many examples of marginalised (e.g., black, female, homosexual, servant, disabled or foreign) characters having no agency over their representation. It is important to remember that anyone and anything which can be embodied can be represented, therefore an agency exists between the entity and the representer of a subject. Representation of bodies and information and the availability of private information are growing concerns in the twenty-first century. Adriana de Souza e

Silva, who wrote about the *Nano* exhibition (December 14, 2003 to September 2004)²⁹⁸ states that accepting that information is never independent of the material interfaces that transmit it.²⁹⁹ It is impossible to reduce any information into a pure abstract form without agency. It is an *intermediation* of two agencies, one of which uses its medium (book, screen, audio) to transmit an intended message, and the other (human senses or machine coding language) to process and interpret the information.

Assemblages are a collection of ideas, or more simply, abstract information which is translated into processes and practices. Nomadic embodiments make use of this information to augment their embodiments and as such must mediate between the agency of the ideas they use and their own unstable embodiments. This process is not spontaneous nor is it unconscious, but it does pose risks for the subject whose 'esqueness' the nomad is attempting to capture and for the nomad who undertakes the cognitive transformation.³⁰⁰ This assumption stems from the work of Roland Barthes, who famously also indicated that once a message is transmitted into the world, the author's intention becomes irrelevant due to readers interpreting the messages on a page, resulting in the destruction of the author. When considering our constant exposure to messages, nomadic bodies who are not passive to this process often have their assemblage-forming traits assaulted with capitalist advertising.³⁰¹ Characters analysed in novels are subject to the same processes. For example, Aurea Holston from Silverberg's *The World Inside* was subject to daily broadcasts from the television proclaiming that procreation was a blessed act. She was available at any time of the day to be contacted because technology was built into every part of the residential building, and when she resisted leaving, she was over-coded through the use of drugs. Nomads must therefore always be aware that their milieu will continually challenge

²⁹⁸ N. Katherine Hayles, 'Connecting the Quantum Dots: Nanotechnology and Culture', in *Nanoculture: Implications of the New Technoscience*, ed. by N. Katherine Hayles (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2004), pp. 11–23 (p. 15).

²⁹⁹ Adriana de Souza e Silva, 'The Invisible Imaginary: Museum Spaces, Hybrid Reality and Nanotechnology', in *Nanoculture: Implications of the New Technoscience*, ed. by N. Katherine Hayles (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2004), pp. 27–82 (p. 36).

³⁰⁰ I use this term in a similar way to Brian Massumi, who in *What Animals Teach Us About Politics*, uses the term to describe how play contains elements of social training. In the same way, I use esqueness to describe how nomads incorporate many subtle elements of different organic and inorganic entities. These assemblages not only change the nature of their embodiments but also transform their ontologies. The resulting changes incorporates a hybridity of the original nomad and the thing it has tried to add to its assemblages. The innate resemblance (both physically or ontologically) to the new entity is how I describe the esqueness.

³⁰¹ Roland Barthes, *The Rustle of Language* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), p. 51.

their agency regarding their participation or refusal to conform with preferred processes and practices and coerce them towards normalisation.

The way I have indicated intermediation is a practical application of Barthes' original theory. It resembles Hayles' version of intermediation, which she insightfully describes as complex transactions between bodies and texts as well as between different forms of media.³⁰² Readers form assemblages with texts in different ways depending on the embodiment of the device. For example, a text may be interacted with anywhere on a phone, at the cost of the reader's attention being diverted from their surroundings, likewise a hefty novel cannot be easily carried from place to place, so the reader will have to create an environment to hold the text and in which it can be appreciated.

My approach accounts for one additional aspect, to the above-mentioned consideration of textual embodiment. This consideration includes emphasising the transformative function of the text on a reader's psyche. It responds to Hayles' question of how technology creates assemblages with readers to alter habits and beliefs. It evokes the idea that these assemblages threaten consumers who operate as symbol processing machines. In Chapter two I foregrounded the risk that ideas possess people, rather than vice versa. In creating assemblages with creative, theoretical, or political works in non-traditional ways, without a greater sense of awareness of the assemblage with which we connect, we may surrender our agency to processes and artefacts.

De Souza e Silva takes a more optimistic stance. She indicates that the merging of virtual and physical spaces is hastened by nomadic interfaces, and pervasive computing made possible by the increasing miniaturization of intelligent hardware.³⁰³ This develops into spaces that de Souza e Silva refers to as hybrid spaces. She comments that they have three main characteristics which are:

Hybrid spaces have three main characteristics: (1) the merging of borders between physical and virtual spaces, (2) the use of nomadic and pervasive technologies as interfaces, and (3) mobility and communication in public spaces. Hybrid spaces fold the virtual as potential into the nearby physical space, blurring the borderlands

³⁰² Hayles, *My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts*, p. 7.

³⁰³ de Souza e Silva, p. 36.

where the virtual transforms into the actual, and the actual fades back into the virtual.³⁰⁴

Embodiment impacts greatly on interactions between subjects and spaces. From prostheses, pacemakers, smartphones, GPS and augmented reality, the way we can or intend to interact with spaces and texts can take many different forms. The image of organic bodies merging with virtual spaces represents how nomads are sites of activation for ideas. This body of research lacks exploration of implications concerning animals merging with the virtual reality. In this scenario, we could posit the virtual human and the virtual animal on a new space of equality which steps outside the anthropocentric portrayal as virtual reality being a human privilege. What this shows is while Hayles et al. focus on the pragmatics and possibilities of human mediation with technology, little is still being said about animal-mediated relations with technology.

The merging of bodies and cybernetics was a worrying idea for many scientists such as Norbert Wiener in the twentieth century, as it implied that the body's boundaries could become more porous, thus no longer purely human. Furthermore, the idea of a distinct body of knowledge is also threatened by the hybridity between the sciences and other disciplines which becomes more likely in this framework. Wiener was rigidly against this. Theorists such as Moravec exacerbated these concerns, as Hayles reports:

The Moravec test, in may call it that, is the logical successor to the Turing test. Whereas the Turing test was designed to show that machines can perform the thinking previously considered to be an exclusive capacity of the human mind, the Moravec test was designed to show that machines can become the repository of human consciousness-that machines can, for all practical purposes, become human beings. You are the cyborg, and the cyborg is you.³⁰⁵

I argue that much of Hayles' book challenges Moravec's claims. The first ground on which she refutes the claim that machines can become a repository of human consciousness is that bodily practices have this power because they sediment into habitual actions and movements, sinking below conscious awareness.³⁰⁶ Her argument assumes that the mind is able to react dynamically to attempts to influence, modify, and change them. Additionally, the idea of habitual actions, as opposed to programmed actions, is claimed to be a unique

³⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 38.

³⁰⁵ Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman*, p. xii.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 204.

indication of organic life as opposed to cybernetic life. In her later work *Unthought*, this idea has traced a line of flight through Deleuzian philosophy and has drawn on two decades of technical, scientific, and theoretical development. Her stance has now shifted to the notion that humans contain a type of consciousness which has come into recent debate among psychologists. Originally the ideas of consciousness (our ability to perceive and process information) and unconsciousness (repressed or inaccessible mind) were fully mapped in the twentieth century, traced from Freudian and Lacanian theories.³⁰⁷ Hayles posits that the nonconscious has not been addressed adequately in contemporary critique and while its existence does not render everything we know as false, she comments that is incomplete or partial without it.³⁰⁸

Hayles' nonconscious mind could be the key to understanding nomadic thought. It is a mode of thinking which is automatic, beneath the surface, but is accessible to the conscious mind. This operation occurs in nomads who move through spaces, actively forming assemblages with organisms and artifacts which share or operate in common spaces. This process can require much psychic energy if it were constantly deliberate. Therefore, nomads have a heuristic ability which automatically operates on the nonconscious level, which saves both time and energy. Additionally, nomads have memorised criteria relating to many different preferences based on their past experiences which enable efficient and dynamic assemblage-forming. These mnemonic triggers are more than likely stimulated by visual-aural stimuli, but also activated when presented with certain concepts. For example, a nomad may have an interest in poetry, but ignore an open book. However, a concrete poem may capture their attention. They stop and read the poem. This would be an example of a salient visual trigger. Someone could additionally comment that the poem (perhaps a romantic poem) was written from a man to a woman. In nomadic fashion, we might question the expectation of a heterosexual romantic interest. This is an example of an ideological trigger for nomadic questioning. In both cases, the embodiment (of form) and the embodiment (of gender) have been targeted for investigation. These sites of nomadic interest are not sought, they are activated non-consciously.

³⁰⁷ Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar Of Jacques Lacan: Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955*, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller (London: WW Norton, 1991).

³⁰⁸ Hayles, *Unthought*, p. 66.

The mnemonic triggers are a link in the chain that I have extrapolated from my reading of Hayles' *How We Became Posthuman*, where she identifies four distinguishing characters of knowledge gained through heuristic practices. Firstly, that it is contextual, rather than abstract. Secondly, that it is sedimented or embedded into the body and resistant to change. Thirdly, that not all knowledge is readily conscious as it is habitual. Finally, because it is contextual, resistant to change, and obscure from the cogitating mind, it has the power to define the boundaries within which conscious thought takes place. In *Unthought*, Hayles adds a fifth characteristic, that is 'when changes in incorporating practices take place, they are often linked with new technologies that affect how people use their bodies and experience space and time'.³⁰⁹ She argues that technology is formed by the bodies which it is influencing. Therefore, creator and created are locked into a feedback loop, or an assemblage, where the body is no longer purely an organism in practice, but a body of knowledge.

In evoking the human into an assemblage of human, non-human, and non-organic assemblages, it is possible to posit a planetary cognitive ecology, much in the same way that Hayles does in *Unthought*. However, my method and purpose are distinct from Hayles' while still borrowing from her, evocation of a Deleuzian methodology. My own method investigates the epistemologies and then ontologies of nomads in places. While I could evoke further studies of spaces and places, the difference being an investment of time, emotion and activity which transforms a space into a place, there is not the time to explore these connotations in depth.³¹⁰ In examining the transformations of bodies in places through the assemblage forming process, I can see how nomads resist and succumb to different social and political pressures in literature.

Hayles, alternatively evokes a Deleuzian tenor in her research, basing her investigations on scientific models. She is also highly critical of certain new materialist critics who do not posit specialist knowledge outside of philosophy and yet who use Deleuzian thought in their critiques. I cannot help but agree with Hayles on this point, but it is a risk of entering the

³⁰⁹ Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman*, p. 205.

³¹⁰ Michel de Certeau, Henri Lefebvre, Jonathan Raban and Steve Pile are all theorists who have greatly informed my knowledge in the past on these subjects. While I am not adding to their discussions in any way, my previous reading my inform some of my thoughts when describing the body in social milieux or in relation to urban settings.

posthumanities that the discipline is so porous, and its connections far reaching (not unlike a rhizome) that a researcher cannot be a specialist in every area that their work takes them. Nevertheless, her concerns about the lack of specialists among new materialist critics leads to their research making assumptions and conclusions that lead either to contradictions, very partial accounts, or significant distortions of scientific practices, especially evolutionary biology are worryingly commonplace.³¹¹ Her other criticism of new materialist methodology is a destabilisation of the subject (most notably the human subject) without an attempt at reintegration. I faced similar issues in Chapter One, where the need to reformulate Deleuze and Guattari's ideas became evident as their discourse on *the body without organs* simply destabilises the human figure without any attempt at reconstruction.

This section has addressed the question of the effect embodiment has on nomads. The question involved several steps to reach this stage. Firstly, I summarised what nomadic embodiment is and how nomads conceptualise themselves. I used the literary example of Abbott's *Flatland* to show how nomads interact with unfamiliar spaces to question normalised practices and beliefs of that system. I stipulated that embodiment concerns not only physical entities, but also psychic elements which are bound up in socio-cultural processes, which indicates how bodies behave and what processes they are passively subject to. This raised the question of agency in terms of bodily representation in literature and the way bodies can interact with both knowledge and narratives. Notably, even within the discourse of creating bodily equality through subject interactions with virtual reality, bodies are still not equal (for instance the animal is left to guard their human companion's body while their mind sublimates to the virtual). The next section talks about how nomadic bodies and monstrous bodies are alternative states of agency within deviance. While both bodies deviate from normalised bodies, there is a difference between them which evokes the further question of their agency.

³¹¹ Hayles, *Unthought*, p. 71.

Nomadic Embodiment and Monstrous Bodies

My previous section posited that nomadic embodiment must be situated within assemblages of embodied knowledge, embodied practices, processes, and embodied agency. My argument proceeded over four steps to establish that embodied experiences are unique for every individual, therefore we cannot expect for anyone's personal experiences ever to be wholly identical or replicable. I showed how individuals who martial their agency may begin in new terrain as foreigners and transition into nomads. I then connected the idea of the human, physical embodiment with that of literary embodiment. Both the human body, and literary body are bound up in the social and historical practices of their milieu. I will qualify this connection further in my third section of this chapter. Until now, I had only presented evidence of human nomads, but this connection includes alternative human ontologies encapsulating non-human networks. This connection of human and literary bodies has opened one further question, and that is what other embodiments we need to consider as posthuman nomads? So, in this section, I will explore the difference between a nomadic body, which represents alternative human (and non-human) ontologies and monstrous bodies (which are re-presented bodies).

I will bridge the gap between our social and literary experiences of monstrosity to pave the way for my analysis of a human-cyborg at the end of this chapter. The reason I need to bridge this gap is because cyborgs distort our traditional human expectations of what bodies *should* be, and as I will show, when these expectations are challenged, the nomad, posthuman or character finds themselves in a precarious situation where their existence becomes threatened by these expectations. At this point, I recall Deleuze's statement, which I alluded to in Chapter One, that difference is an object of affirmation; that affirmation itself is multiple; that it is creation but also that it must be created, as affirming difference, as being difference in itself.³¹²

This section explores the notion of difference in the Deleuzian sense, which connotes more than monstrousness within a nomadic framework of posthumanism. The Deleuzian concept of 'difference' and the construction of difference connoting monstrosity form an adversarial

³¹² Deleuze, p. 55.

debate surrounding agency which result in two different embodiments – the nomad and the monster. For the posthuman or nomadic subject to surrender to re-presentation is to ensure its monstrosity, and in this way, it will surrender to a gaze which objectifies it. This section explores whether “difference” in the Deleuzian sense (meaning creation in relation to *Difference and Repetition*) connotes more than the term monstrous. To arrive at an answer my investigation will proceed in two stages. I will first establish how the notion of monstrosity creates the agency-usurping mechanism that sublimates bodies within a binary dualist paradigm. Much like the binary systems I have outlined in the previous chapters, this system creates monstrosity by setting naturalised and normalised expectations of the bodies which are re-presented within a milieu. Toffoletti’s work will enable me to discuss this technology of the body through the medium of gendered expectations. This allows me to introduce my final critical tool for combating anthropocentrism using the nomadic paradigm I have developed in this thesis. Another critical tool I will develop is called open assemblages. This concept is adapted from the Deleuzian rhizome which I outlined in Chapter One, but it emphasises in new contexts how assemblages are in constant change; they operate as imminent becomings which do not fully stabilise. They enhance the rhizomatic criticism that I outlined at the end of Chapter One. Finally, I will investigate the origins of literary monstrosity through the Gothic and new gothic genres. In responding to Kelly Hurley’s essay discussing the ‘body horror’, I will show how non-normalised embodiments, such as nomads, rather than monstrous identities threaten the integrity of the human body. I will do this by scrutinising the production of monstrous bodies through the conventionalised mediatisation of politicised language, and technology as key contributors of conventionalisation of public imaginary concepts of monsters and aliens.

Nomadic criticism challenges naturalised and normalised conceptions of “types” of acceptable bodies. The aesthetic surrounding altered humans, warped into barely recognisable shapes through hybrid assemblages with machines and animals, presents a new way of interpreting alternative embodied humanities. It is a newness which is also in the traditional sense monstrous, and therefore it raises questions concerning othering, agency, and mediated assemblage-formation.

Toffoletti’s analysis of Marilyn Manson in her book *Cyborgs and Barbie Dolls*, examines the ambiguities related to his photoshopped body on the album art of his *Mechanical*

Animals.³¹³ It evokes the disrupting notion of humanity that Giorgio Agamben outlines in his book *The Open: Man and Animal* (2002). Agamben's book aims to destabilise the assumptions that Enlightenment scholars, philosophers and theologians held about the distinction between *homo sapiens* and non-human animals. He argues that *homo sapiens* is neither a clearly defined species nor a substance; it is, rather, a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human.³¹⁴ Agamben, by exploring separate genealogies of reasoning such as evolution, philosophy of the human ability to use language and the divine gift of human reason, shows how people have defined humanity against animals for centuries. However, he prefaces these arguments with an allusion to Aristotle's claim that everything happens as if life were *what cannot be defined, yet, precisely for this reason, must be ceaselessly articulated and divided*.³¹⁵ This same division in Agamben's work deterritorialises the metaphorical and literal face of humanity, peeling its life and ego back to the point where it could possibly re-resemble its primate cousins. Agamben, using the same example of disfiguration notes that humanity as a species is approaching a state of politicisation where it will no longer recognise itself. Despite Agamben's assertion that humanity is the most anthropocentric machine ever to be produced by nature, he makes frequent reference to literature and research which destabilise the faces of humanity. In Agamben's words, the characters in such novels and research forcibly to try to 'humanise' themselves in order to be recognised.³¹⁶

The face is the initial point of reference for human-to-human interface, it is where language is primarily produced, and it also transmits many important extralinguistic intentions. As such for human characters to feel the need to humanise themselves, it indicates a political deterritorialization of their faces, as opposed to a physical attack on their status as human. The changeability of the semiotics surrounding human faces offer up more than a singular feature for dispute, destabilising the face, and the body as a whole. In short, the features of

³¹³ Kim Toffoletti, *Cyborgs and Barbie Dolls: Feminism, Popular Culture and the Posthuman Body* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 81–105.

³¹⁴ Agamben, *The Open : Man and Animal*, p. 26.

³¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 13.

³¹⁶ Note: Agamben here is referring to Pico's Oration on the Dignity of Man (1496), which denotes many types of *enfants sauvages*, or wolf children, who have varying dissimilarities from other children such as additional hair, muteness etc. In his literary example Agamben refers to Lord Monboddo's *Histoire d'une jeune fille sauvage, trouvée dans les bois à l'âge de dix ans*, as a literary example of the blurring of lines between human and animal.

the human face are here so unsure and aleatory that they are always in the process of being undone and erased like those of a transitory being.³¹⁷

The efficiency of this anthropological machine to efface its animal qualities makes the human alien to itself, as it holds Man suspended between a celestial and a terrestrial nature, between animal and human—and, thus, his being always less and more than himself.³¹⁸ So when we return to Toffoletti's digital distortion of Marilyn Manson's body we see a similar suspension of humanity, but this time it is not the boundary of animal and human melting away, but the borders of human and technology beginning to blur.

Toffoletti's fourth chapter in her book, titled 'Posthuman Monsters: The Erasure of Marilyn Manson' indicates she has given some thought to the same line of enquiry that this chapter has taken. However, while she investigates the invention of posthuman monsters, my investigation intends to distinguish monstrosity from nomadism. I will begin by showing how Toffoletti construes posthuman monstrosity and for the critical purpose of this monstrosity before reintegrating it back into my argument of embodied nomadic agency. The invention of CD art is one of many emblems of the technologically mediated society, it is proof that representation of any number of bodies can be warped and re-presented in any way that the editor desires, so long as they speak the language of machines. Toffoletti's branding of posthuman sexuality as monstrous is not entirely surprising. In her example of Manson's album cover, she outlines that he lacks certain characteristics that she is familiar with:

Despite clearly suggesting sex organs, these body parts show no trace of the inversions and extensions that typify the human body. The characteristics of the abject self are absent—protruding nipples, coarse hair, the vaginal cut, the eye of the penis, or the umbilical remnant of birth. No such markers rupture the seamlessness of the skin's surface.³¹⁹

Manson's androgenous body is not only borderline inhuman, but also asignifying as it does not confirm or reassure outsiders of its humanity in conventionalised ways that we are trained to accept. It operates in a rhizomatic way as per Deleuze and Guattari's definition

³¹⁷ Agamben, *The Open : Man and Animal*, p. 31.

³¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 29.

³¹⁹ Toffoletti, p. 82.

outlined in Chapter One.³²⁰ The point of Toffoletti creating this inhuman, almost corpse like, image of the posthuman body is so she can propose her own site where gender identities can be contested. The posthuman body, whose embodiment was still immature at the time could be the site of activation for digital technologies to inform scholars of how images were made and understood.³²¹ Toffoletti's scope of investigation is limited to analysing the physical features of sexuality in Manson's picture. Manson's picture acts as a site for important critical investigation, but also as frustration as he lacks distinctive male or female sexual qualities which would confirm Manson's masculinity and by proxy humanity. Toffoletti's critical stance in response becomes limited when trying to define alternative embodied humanities as anything but monstrous. Manson's technologically simulated embodiment is forever haunted by the humanity that it has edited from our gaze.

The choice of Manson's inhuman, but all too human, picture is not coincidental. Toffoletti selected this image as it fits within the paradigm of borderline figures which fascinate the late postmodern, postindustrial society on which the postfeminist and posthumanist critic Braidotti commented extensively.³²² Monstrosity via technological augmentation became iconographic of the technophilic cultural climate of the early-twenty-first century as human bodies increasingly mingled with and mutated in response to contemporary techno-cultural (technological objects which inspired cultural movements) artefacts. There are great advancements made towards transcending the dualist paradigm concerning sexuality and the human body in this small section of Toffoletti's book. However, the way forward from this is not to present the posthuman body as monstrous.

While Toffoletti is clearly alienated by the sexually muted, corpse-esque image of Manson, I believe her assessment that it, and the posthuman body are monstrous is premature. Toffoletti defines monsters as embodiments which simultaneously threaten and uphold the integrity of the human, serving as a deviant category, or marginal extreme through which the limits of normal, natural, human identity are defined and secured.³²³ Her definition is

³²⁰ See p. 34 & 53 for more details on asignifying rupture

³²¹ Toffoletti, p. 82.; Note: Toffoletti is using the same process as D&G to create a Body without Organs to act as a site of activation for her exploration of how technology can be used to alienate the representation of gender constructs (for further details on the BwO see p. 55-6).

³²² Rosi Braidotti, 'Teratologies', in *Deleuze and Feminist Theory*, ed. by Ian Buchanan and Claire Cole- Brook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 157.

³²³ Toffoletti, p. 84.

limited to a state where the agencies of non-conventionalised bodies are monstrous does not consider subjects that choose alternative embodiments. I argue that monsters reaffirm the integrity of the human by their inability to normalise; nomads, on the other hand threaten the integrity of humans by not needing to normalise while having the potential to do so.

The posthuman body symbolises a complex relationship between body, culture, and politics. By recognising that some deviants choose alternative ontologies while others do not mean that there are differing degrees of agency involved with the choice to deviate from naturalised expectation of the human body. Frankenstein's Adam is an example of an alternative human embodiment that Adam had no agency over, but he had the choice over his behaviours. In other texts, such as *Ghost in the Shell*, cybernetic human enhancements, or cyborgification are optional. However, are expected with certain career choices. So, while I agree that Manson leads us to not only question these categories [of how deviant bodies manifest sexuality], but the very status of the body and embodied reality as the sites where identity resides, I also think that the emphasis of its human qualities anthropocentrically limits the scope of who has agency.³²⁴

Ferrando goes much further than Agamben and Toffoletti in her discourse concerning Othering. She challenges what she claims is the speciesist monologue in which the (human) subject has co-created their own image through the absence of what has been posed as the radical difference (of the nonhuman animal).³²⁵ While there is a clear framework for resistance to anthropocentric thinking across the three books that I have referred to, they remain entrenched in dualistic thinking despite offering their firmest resistances to it.

Posthumanism, as anything with the prefix -post, is ambiguous, as I outlined in the previous chapter. It represents a dialectic and roots itself in a system of taxonomical difference. My own paradigm cannot claim to be post-dualistic, as I am not escaping binary systems in positing alternative thinking as opposed to difference. In this case I am exploring monstrous bodies as without agency, and nomadic bodies which retain their agency. Toffoletti makes a similar case in her negotiation of differences within the domain of sexuality.³²⁶ As an

³²⁴ Ibid, p. 88.

³²⁵ Ferrando, *Philosophical Posthumanism*, p. 73.

³²⁶ Toffoletti, p. 82.

important part of the ego-forming Self, an individual spends much time and energy in exploring and nuancing this aspect of their assemblages. In her essay she poses many questions to probe these assemblages.

Can posthuman, post-gender images, like queer, bisexual and transgender bodies, encourage us to move beyond a dialectical way of thinking about, not only gender, but other social categories of difference? What can novel depictions of gender identity reveal about the circulation of categories of sexual difference? How might we speak about differences when the markers that once distinguished categories of gender and race are no longer distinct or definable? On what level can individuals identify with such images?³²⁷

Here, Toffoletti is suggesting that these differences are threatening, and as a sign of fallibility and weakness. They seek to dehumanise the posthuman subject. Toffoletti concludes that the posthuman is a monster for the digital age; a boundary form that calls into question ontological configurations of difference.³²⁸ I find her description of the posthuman as a monster is contestable. The posthuman represents a porous discipline whose boundaries are designed to be permeable for the purpose of finding a philosophy that escapes dualisms. It is in this way that her notion also does not account for epistemological configurations of difference. The continued existence and proliferation of these differences reveals an acceptable non-acceptability in social settings. If deviations from what is considered normalised were detrimental to personal or group survival, there would be little to no deviation from or questions surrounding the validity of normalisation. Furthermore, their ability to evoke deep seated emotions that allow us to experience elements of ourselves, which are suppressed indicate that the human as socially seen is not a true representation of the individual in society. Individuals are constantly evolving; their psyche changes with each new experience, so the idea that they can have static labels such as monstrous is unrealistic. It is for these reasons that I have recommended that we think of these differences as positively generative. While not escaping dualist systems, they do not require indexes of power to maintain the *status quo*.

Our rootedness in dualist systems which revolve around discourses of us/them stems from the question of embodiment. The lack of omnipotence requires humans to have embodied, and therefore limited experiences. Our inability to resolve our situatedness leads to hurdles

³²⁷ Ibid, p. 82.

³²⁸ Ibid, p. 82.

in translating otherness between the us/them divide. In this equation, we find the middle ground that my discussion has arrived at through rhizomatic criticism. It is the point between the beginning and end, representing the grey area of ambiguity. Ambiguity can be regarded as an imminent becoming, and it comes at the cost of stabilised assemblages.

Toffoletti's approach to ambiguity is more negative than mine. She states:

Ambiguity typifies these figures, eliciting anxieties concerning the boundaries and borders of the body, subjectivity and the human. Monsters simultaneously threaten and uphold the integrity of the human, serving as a deviant category, or marginal extreme through which the limits of normal, natural, human identity are defined and secured.³²⁹

It is not a new argument to use the traditional monsters of the Gothic and new gothic to state that monsters threaten and support the integrity of the human body. My answer takes a unique approach to investigating monstrosity based on the work I did in Chapter two, showing how the posthuman is the human reiterated. I apply a similar methodology here while examining what is present in these 'monstrous' assemblages. Rather than asking what is absent, another way is to address the speciesist discourse that concerns Ferrando and Agamben. I propose that we do not see these differences as threatening, or as evidence of absence. Subjects can be analysed either heuristically or situationally. The methodologies used to examine difference as opposed to the norm are either pre-prescribed methodologies or developing context for analysing subjects. This means either they are analysed with an agenda in mind to prove, or scientifically disprove the existence of something, or difference is monitored in the context of its native environment so the subject can express its ontologies in its own terms. One mode of proposed analysis sees the subject void of agency to present itself. It is re-presented, translated, and mutated by the assumptions of another person who is outside of its network of assemblages, thus rendering it monstrous. The second mode of analysis offers subjects some agency over their self-presentation. In literature where characters break the fourth wall and address audiences directly is a moment where they deviate from literary norms to express with their own voice their experience of the plot. In the moment where character and consumer share the innermost thoughts of the character, reader or viewer gain a moment of insight into the non-normalised assemblages of (often simulated) alternative embodied human realities.

³²⁹ Ibid, p. 84.

Depending on the medium of interaction with literature/narrative, the reader will have an individualised embodied experience of the content they interact with. What is essential to note is that by consume, I am also indicating a taking into the psyche attributes from the narrative of a simulated, lived experience that undoubtedly changes the reader.

Pertinently, this very process can be seen in the Lois Lowry's *The Giver*.³³⁰ In this text, at the age of twelve, Jonas is selected to become the receiver of memories. In Jonas' world, everyone does not perceive colour, music, or even the feel of sunshine. Once he begins to take in the memories of his instructor 'the Giver' his perception of the world changes. Whether it be from seeing real warfare in children's games or appreciating the feeling of sunshine on his skin. These are embodied realities that would have been alien to him before having gained the memories imparted to him by the Giver. Likewise, when a reader interprets narratives, there is a dynamic shift in subjects to which they become sensitive, whether it be to traumatic events or to the appreciation of how language can become particularly nuanced in its descriptive ability. The reader is forever changed by the simulated experience of the novel.

Alternative human ontologies are more responsive to their environments than normalised ontologies, this is because the latter forms assemblages in pre-mediated ways. As such nomads and monsters, who practice these alternative embodied realities are constantly in flux, wavering between the lines of chaos and normalisation. There are subtle, and important epistemological differences between nomads and monsters. Nomads must know what they are and be both self-creating and self-perpetuating. Monsters do not create, they are created.³³¹ The assemblage forming quality that defines nomads is central to their existence. By assemblage forming, I am indicating the ability to not only make up normalised assemblages like hand-tool, or horse-cart, but non-normalised assemblages such as human-wheelchair, eye-augmented reality spectacles-wireless internet connection, and bat-man. The point of all these non-normalised assemblages is they open the way for new ontologies to germinate within environments which otherwise would be highly regulated.

³³⁰ Lois Lowry, *The Giver* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002).

³³¹ Note: Frankenstein's Adam is in the closest sense a true monster as he was created and could not create other monsters.

As I claimed that the nomadic assemblage forming trait is the key difference between nomads and monsters, I will go further to arguing that to understand why there are nomadic and monstrous forms, we need to develop a term for understanding the difference between them. In the context of this thesis, which deals with assemblage-forming nomads, I will adopt the term *open assemblages*. This term describes, as in Chapter One, how we are made up of numerous assemblages which are constantly changing. Open assemblages describe how assemblages are in constant change; they do not 'ossify' or stabilise fully. The term recognises that assemblages of identity and self-presentation are open to mediation and intermediation with the way they are embodied. In applying open assemblages in this way, agency becomes not a question of being able to choose our identity (like vampiric consumerism) or our gender (through performance). Agency becomes the realisation and acceptance that aspects of our assemblages are static and other parts are dynamic, thereby being open to mediation through experience and preferences. Nomadic subjects are the site of activation, and therefore change. They are aware of parts of their assemblages which present themselves for negotiation, and thereby mediation with something external. This allows for a clearer agency over the boundaries for those who practice posthumanist ontologies.

Toffoletti's argument links directly with this discourse as her awareness over the theoretical developments, particularly feminist discourse in the nineties and first years of the twenty-first century comes across in her discussion of how the posthuman subject's boundaries challenges what it means to be human. She states that:

The posthuman shares with the monster a confusion of boundaries that challenges what it means to be human. Both act as boundary figures, and it is this ambiguity that has been strategically used by feminists who analyse monster discourse, to disrupt a humanist version of being. But digital images of the posthuman monster can't be interpreted in the same way as the hybrid creatures of old.³³²

The posthuman possesses an agency which the monster never had, and that is an agency of its purposeful challenging of boundaries at certain sites of contestation with anthropocentric thinking. By contrast, the monster has always been subject to artistic creation, therefore it is constructed for the purpose of emphasising its status as non-human by evoking curiosity and horror. It is denied empathy with the humans from whom it elicits a

³³² Toffoletti, p. 84.

gaze which both confirms its existence and denies its agency. It is a question of articulation which distinguishes the posthuman from the monster. The monster is what is not human. The posthuman is the human which has been augmented, enhanced, or transformed. It shows the power of nomadic agency in being able to mediate your own presentation within a social setting. The ambiguity that Toffoletti speaks of no longer applies to postmodernism, as in the original context of feminist usage of the device. Ambiguity has been appropriated as a core concept of posthumanism, done through extensive feminist writing within the discipline. The result is a theoretical landscape which originally lacked stability but had a highly developed body of writing in how to create epistemological and ontological agency. Toffoletti's final remark states that posthumanism is a way to escape the issue of whether technology is threatening to humans in terms of prosthesis, invasion, or unification with organic bodies. However, she stops short of my theory with her concluding sentences where she states:

No longer is the technological/human interaction configured in terms of a prosthetic extension or invasion of the unified and organic self by technology. Instead, posthuman configurations play with the boundaries separating the organic and machinic, the human and non-human, interiorities and exteriorities, self and Other.³³³

Taking my concept of open assemblages into account, her final statement fails to break away from anthropocentric thinking as it is still based in traditional dualism. Instead, positing that humans, non-humans, and artefacts form complex and changing assemblages which alter our processes and perceptions within social and private spheres, two things are simultaneously true; we are chimera, and we are cyborgs. In everyday circumstances, these assemblages are negotiated in a standardised manner, therefore not nomadically. One example of this is the consumption of branded products. The desire to consume is sometimes predicated on desire. Desire can be linked to the idea of the brand, rather than pragmatic needs. At other times we may become aware of biases or prejudices that we act upon in the form of discrimination. This reflects certain types of ideology operating on our psyches without our explicit consideration but implicit permission (for lack of mediation). In these cases, Toffoletti's conclusions suffice to account for most human and posthuman interaction in her debate. However, nomadic thinking, and therefore embodiment cannot

³³³ Ibid, p. 87.

operate in the way this describes. By using the concept of open assemblages, nomads can act consciously as the site of activation to mediate themselves with organic, inorganic, epistemological and ontological mediations.

This first section has made several complex points that need summarising before moving forward. In the introduction to this section, I stated that I would explore how the notion of monstrosity creates the agency-usurping mechanism that sublimates bodies within a binary dualist paradigm. I also aimed to perform a close reading of Toffoletti's work to show how the dualist system of human/inhuman creates monstrosity by setting naturalised and normalised expectations of the bodies which are re-presented within a milieu. Finally, I aimed to develop my key idea that nomads benefit from my own formulation of open assemblages, which allow them to continually alter their assemblages, which is a feature of the rhizome that I developed in conjunction with Deleuze and Guattari in Chapter One. In response to my first aim, I began by outlining how philosophers have not been able to define life, therefore philosophers, scholars and theologians have been continually articulating and dividing aspects of life for hundreds of years. There is an inability to define the human, yet a ubiquity of division has resulted in a rootedness of divisional thought which became the binary system. The largest fallacy which has resulted from this is the animal/human divide, which continually blurs with our greater understanding of humanity's position within the natural network of life on Earth. The second fallacious binary system which emerges in response to the posthuman body is the human/inhuman divide. The inhumanity of an entity can be seen through its non-normalised and non-naturalised assemblage-forming ontologies with technology and animals, thus creating alternative embodied in/human realities. My reading of Toffoletti allowed me to explore the notion of technologically simulated androgyny, as being considered a form of monstrosity. I disagreed with Toffoletti's notion that the posthuman body is inherently monstrous, but her point that its fusion with non-human components meant there was a need to articulate this new simulated bodily reality. My response is that there are two non-normalised embodied realities that the posthuman body can take when it comes to the agency of self-presentation. This is the posthuman body that creates itself and is self-perpetuating through its choices to refuse normalisation (nomadic posthumanism) and the body, which is created, naturalised and unable to negotiate its assemblages (monstrous posthumanism). The final

issue this raised was what was the key difference between the monstrous body and the nomadic body? Returning to the rhizomatic assemblage-forming properties that I attributed to nomads in Chapter One, the solution was to transform Deleuze's principle into the notion of open assemblages. These open assemblages allow nomads to remain in a state of flux, being open to forming new assemblages while never ossifying into a normalised pattern. The openness of this assemblage refers to its ability to act as a site of activation for its intermediation with the environment it inhabits, as a lack of mediation infers a lack of agency to mediate on behalf of itself. To lack the ability of mediation means the state of being attributed to the non-normalised body has been prescribed, and the body is transformed into monstrosity.

Now I move on to my second step of outlining how non-normalised identities threaten the integrity of the human body. To do this I will refer to Hurley's essay 'Reading Like an Alien' which discusses the notion of body horror as it promotes the assumption that monstrous identities threaten the integrity of the human body. In the previous section I began arguing my reasons for rejecting Toffoletti's claim, which happens to agree with that of Hurley's, that monstrous bodies threaten the integrity of the human body, and why I believe instead that nomads that hold this position. Likewise, I argue that monstrous identities reaffirm anthropocentric humanism by providing a dualist object against which the human may maintain its borders. While I differ from Hurley and Toffoletti on the matter of embodied integrity, I find Hurley's theories concerning the processes of conventionalised production of monstrous bodies without agency insightful to understanding how the re-presentation of monsters results in their loss of agency. To this end, I will show how technology and mediatisation have been key contributors of conventionalisation of public imaginary concepts of monsters and aliens.

Hurley's essay 'Reading like an Alien' complements my aim of developing the concept of nomadism within literary studies to combat anthropocentrism. Hurley's analysis of body horror opens with the direct and informative statement:

Body horror seeks to inspire revulsion- and in its own way, pleasure-through representations of quasi-human figures whose effect/affect is produced by their abjection, their ambiguation, their impossible embodiment of multiple, incompatible

forms. Such posthuman embodiments are liminal entities, occupying both terms (or rather, existing in the slash between them) of the opposition human/not-human.³³⁴

This suggests that there are two examples of body horror, the emotive reaction to difference, and the existential horror of ceasing to be human while possessing a human form.³³⁵ I think there is a degree of truth to Hurley's assertion. There is no basis to reject the idea that posthumans, especially nomads, embody alternative human ontologies due to their non-normalised assemblages, thereby embodying both human and not-human qualities. Rather than these qualities being in opposition, however, I see them as synergising. Alternative human bodies are not often represented as healthy, they are designed to be not-quite-human, or even appear mutilated thus inspiring a deep-seated empathic horror responding to the imagination of possessing the portrayed body. They offer audiences the pleasure of experiencing disgust or fear directed at inhuman figures who embody both human and inhuman qualities. However, the term posthuman does not necessarily constitute a liminal subject. Likewise, posthumans are hardly so extreme as Hurley describes. Such figures she is making example of are monsters, violent cyborgs, and posthuman philosophers who openly challenge human morality and anthropocentrism by subverting the belief of the unique value of human life. This last suggestion on my part is common among cultural posthumanist critics, so to an extent I can agree with Hurley's standpoint, but I believe she is referring to only the first of my three suggestions. So, while her arguments are valid in certain context, she means only to discuss posthuman figures whose embodiments have little-to-no agency of their own and whose human/not-human qualities are in dialectic opposition.

Colin Milburn's reaction to this is limited to considering Hurley from the standpoint of 'a subversive technoscientific gaze'.³³⁶ His interest in Hurley's work extends to how using the theory of nanologic is an innovative way to take Hurley's concept and utilise it within

³³⁴ Hurley, p. 203.

³³⁵ Note: The concept of body horror relates poignantly to the literary analysis which will conclude the chapter. *Ghost in the Shell* is replete with examples of body enhancement. Many of the enhancement features are grotesque on different levels, from obvious ocular enhancements, where eyes are replaced with goggles, to full body replacement, leaving only the brain inside a cybernetic body.

³³⁶ Colin Milburn, 'Nanotechnology in the Age of Posthuman Engineering: Science Fiction as Science', in *Nanoculture: Implications of the New Technoscience*, ed. by N. Katherine Hayles (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2004), pp. 109–30 (p. 124).

posthumanist discourse.³³⁷ While Milburn's attention would be directed towards the use of technology to sculpt and make available the body horror, someone such as Haraway may look at it from the standpoint of confusing the boundaries of human and animal/other. In her *When Species Meet*, her chapter on companion species puts forward such usages of technology and ideology which confound both the history of humans and animals:

How would we sort things out? Canid, hominid; pet, professor; bitch, woman; animal, human; athlete, handler. One of us has a microchip injected under her neck skin for identification; the other has a photo ID California driver's license. One of us has a written record of her ancestors for twenty generations; one of us does not know her great grandparents' names. One of us, product of a vast genetic mixture, is called "purebred." One of us, equally a product of a vast mixture, is called "white." Each of these names designates a different racial discourse, and we both inherit their consequences in our flesh.³³⁸

Haraway's question is seemingly pragmatic. She begins by juxtaposing two uniform but different systems of identification between non-human animals and humans to then contrast and fracture these aspects of uniformity of both animal and human alike. However, if read politically it becomes a question of sociological import. By this, I mean to say it is tied up in power structures that exist only in social formats. For example, the terms 'bitch' and 'woman' were not arbitrarily juxtaposed in this passage. It is a statement to show how power structures which separate humanity from non-human animals is bound up and exercised on the strata of language. Haraway's statement in the second sense shows how the parallel histories of humanity and non-human animals have been bound up in culture, technology, biology, and - I will add - literature, respectively.

This politicised language has the power to simulate, in Hurley and Toffoletti's terms, a posthuman. The assemblage 'bitch' conflates woman-dog, when used pejoratively, while its practical meaning is female-dog. The term 'bitch' creates a monster without agency, whether the term posthuman applies to this kind of creation is difficult to say. While there is an argument to suggest that if a woman were to make the concept of becoming a bitch her reality, that would create a simulated embodied reality where her ontologies would reflect the epistemic naissance of her becoming dog. The difference between the woman being

³³⁷ Note: nanologica a concept developed by Millburn. It resembles my open assemblages but it's scope is limited to radical techno-scientific narratives.

³³⁸ Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p. 15.

labelled a bitch, and a woman embodying the bitch are very different. The former is a meaning which has been thrust upon an individual to attack its humanity, the latter is a nomadic construct which rejects its humanity.

The significance of conflating human and non-human characteristics cannot be understated. I have shown how Hurley presents the body horror as a site where agency is threatened through the ideas of human and non-human bodies and ontologies being incompatible when juxtaposed. Hurley's body horror makes a strong case for the emergence of nomadism, as it argues that the body horror helps us to imagine otherwise, outside of the parameters of "the human" in its generation of posthuman embodiments both horrific and sublime.³³⁹ While she still ties together the posthuman with elements of horror and the sublime, these are aspects of her assemblage that can be stripped away allowing for the emergence of alternative human ontologies that do not suffer the stigmas which monsters must endure. The escape from the dualist dichotomy of affirmative and absence of humanity is why nomadism is a novel posthuman practice which opens itself to the possibility of not being trapped within a dualist paradigm. This escape is still far from being achieved here, but I am promoting a concept of self-realisation which operates outside the domain of those who dictate which identities have agency and allows assemblages to form in self-mediated ways. This practice is not entropic. Rather it offers a wider variety of ways humans may form assemblages with other organisms and artefacts.

I have established thus far that the body horror, in Hurley and Toffoletti's imagination, is a liminal posthuman who conflates ideas of the human and non-human and who inspires horror in those who view it. I have responded to this concept by arguing that there are contexts in which the views of Haraway and Toffoletti can be supported. However, in the examples that I have outlined, there are many situations where the kind of posthuman bodies that they describe have been created by outside sources for the purposes of attacking the humanity of a subject. This is a bio-political argument, an argument where the politics of life are at play. Posthumans, in their terms, and in my own monsters, are constructed through dialectics, they are argued into being through representative (or rather re-presentative) language. The reason for evoking Hurley's body horror was not because it

³³⁹ Hurley, p. 205.

synergised so well with Toffoletti's understanding of the posthuman, nor was it so I could attack this collective idea to validate my paradigm of nomadism. The reason to evoke Hurley at this time is because it allows for considerable insight into how monsters are created in both cinema and literary representations of the 'Other'. I will now examine the process of othering through using technology and mediatisation to write meaning on to re-presented bodies to establish a conventionalised production of monstrous bodies. This is a tactic employed by technologies of the body (referring tactics which normalise or write meaning on to bodies which do not comply to the ideologies or policies of the ruling body) to routinely usurp agency from nomadic and monstrous bodies to inform the public imagination of monsters and aliens.

My approach resembles Massumi's idea of play where the two subjects involved in this process enter a reciprocal metaphysical situation, not unlike Hayles' feedback loop. Massumi describes how animals initiate and distinguish play from actual combat so that they avoid injuring each other. The animals he describes here can be replaced with humans and artefacts (capable of networking).

They are taken up in a *transformation in place* that does not affect one without affecting the other. The ludic gesture releases a force of *transindividual* transformation. The immediacy of the transformation that the gesture's execution induces qualifies the ludic gesture as a performative act.³⁴⁰

The point he makes is two-fold. Firstly, the assemblage which is formed between two entities is mutually transformative, thereby being a transindividual transformation. Both individuals in the moment of mediation have equal agency as they have the force to accept and receive transformative information from the other. Likewise, the transformative process enacted on one, in playfulness or otherwise forces a chain of reactions, entangling the two bodies in a system of negotiations until resolution is reached. Secondly, the interactions between two bodies are always part of an embodied reality. When in play, the two bodies interface their realities to create a shared simulated reality of play, where serious situations may be played out with muted consequences. These exchanges are mutually instructional, as they educate the two participants on their social status, the limitations of what they can adapt to, and what is forbidden in their milieu.

³⁴⁰ Massumi, p. 5.

Similarly in literature, character and cultural context are therefore in negotiation with the public imagination with the character's re-presented agency stake. Nomads are also situated within milieux and are therefore embodied. It is through the mediation of their embodiment with the situation and the external mediator that the assemblage and transformation may be formed or denied. Depending on context, characters may engage in practices acceptably or be considered subversive (to the point where publication may be restricted). Whether acceptable or otherwise, characters are a product of their cultural ideals, made up of conventionalised and non-normalised assemblages which were a part of the public imagination at the time of publication. As such they communicate with readers, forming virtual, mutually transformative, transindividual assemblages. While characters remain static on the page (e-lit excluded as I will show in the next section), the interpretation of characters, and the impact of their experiences form a two-way informative exchange between reader and novel.³⁴¹

The concept of body horror allows critics to track the damaging effects it has on agency through the process of monstrosity as opposed to nomadism. There is a striking moment where Hurley's analysis summarises the dehumanising process of the body horror, which resembles the process I have described above.

The narrative told by body horror again and again is of a human subject dismantled and demolished: a human body whose integrity is violated, a human identity whose boundaries are breached from all sides. One needs to place this narrative, and the images from which it is generated, within the discourse (and culture) of postmodernity, particularly as that discourse theorizes the breakdown of human specificity and the erosion of human identity, embodied and otherwise.³⁴²

The myth of a stable human with impenetrable boundaries is a source of fear surrounding the body horror. It is the reason why in horror films the trope of bodily ambiguation has become a filmic convention. It is conventional distortion which robs the subject of its agency as it solidifies itself as Other. Convention, normalisation, and standardised subjectivity are the causes of this negative reaction to the erosion of human identity. What replaces this

³⁴¹ Note: This statement broaches heavily on hermeneutics and reader response theory, however as posthumanism inevitably broaches on such large topics it is impossible to elaborate on these links at such a length which would do justice to the fields. For clarity, in this case I aim to introduce the reader to the concept of narration transforming bodies through representation and creating monsters through the process of conventionalised portrayals, which are in turn informed by localised social imaginations.

³⁴² Hurley, p. 205.

eroded humanity is the myth of a “fully human” identity, a technology of the body which attempts to naturalise the acceptance of viewing marginalised groups as deviant. This fully human identity leads readers, critics, and authors to disavow certain actions in pejorative terms, for example as “filthy” and promote the values of their time / group.³⁴³

Faced with the threat of erosion, society exercises its power of the majority in two ways: either to subsume and deny what it thinks of as monstrous, or to exercise plasticity, the ability it theoretically reserves to incorporate factors which are deemed beneficial to the population or its majority group. Plasticity is the ability for an organism, structure, or society to reshape itself to a limited degree to include something which before may have been deemed a maverick. Ideological normativism is disrupted by the incursion of monstrosity and all that it represents, but the disruption is only temporary, with the horror text being at some pains to expel monstrosity and effect closure, reconfiguring the boundaries of the normative.³⁴⁴

It can be assured from this discourse that difference in the Deleuzian sense can connote more than monstrousness if stipulated within a nomadic framework of posthumanism. It has also been revealed that the posthuman difference and monstrous notion of difference have oppositional grasps of agency, with the posthuman choosing to create new assemblages, like monstrosity (but lacking convention) to gain agency over its ability to exercise plasticity on itself. Monstrosity, likewise, is an example of conventionalised assemblage formation for the purpose of being gazed upon, it is a surrendering of the subject, of its boundaries within a humanist framework and thus its agency to operate within it.

To this point I have outlined embodiment as being connected to our lived experience of reality and therefore being linked to our agency and self-presentation. Embodiment is bound with our ontologies, therefore signalling how we live, die, and seek pleasure. I also stated that nomadic embodiments are political, in that they resist normalisation but are vulnerable to subjugation within social and political milieux. Non-normalised ontologies such as nomadism have their agency constantly challenged through technologies of the

³⁴³ Kelly Hurley, *The Gothic Body Sexuality; Materialism, and Degeneration at the Fin de Siecle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 78.

³⁴⁴ Hurley, p. 207.

body employed within their social and political milieux. Nomads cannot avoid these pressures because they are situated and embodied within milieux. Furthermore, I challenged the notion that all posthumans are linked with the concept of body horror, which puts forward the idea that all posthuman bodies are associated with the horrific and sublime. Rather, I argued that monsters are re-presentations of humans, non-humans, hybrids, nomads or posthumans as monstrous. Monstrosity is not the inherent quality of being monstrous, it is the invention of the monster through politicised alienation. Agency is based on the ability to self-create, self-present and self-proliferate, all qualities which nomads develop through the processes of becoming nomadic and practising nomadism. Finally, as all humans are situated and therefore embodied, they must form assemblages exterior to their own bodies to survive, thus eliminating the pure human myth. Humans must form assemblages with animals, technology, and other humans in order to survive. Faced with this revelation nomads are able to freely practice nomadism as nomads are always aware of the extent society allows for plasticity so that it may continue to function.

In the final section before my literary analysis, I will move from discussing the politics of embodiment to the difficulties of analysing not only nomadic but other alternative embodiments in graphic novels. While, up to this point, I have discussed the freedom of nomads to form assemblages freely, there are limitations to this freedom. A nomad, for the price of shedding humanist morality must adopt a code of ethics which governs its actions. Ethics is a guiding principle for nomads, particularly in the domain of representation. As I will show, the portrayal of bodies in graphic literature has more profound implications than their representations within literature as physical representations of bodies expose alternative physicality, psychologies, and ontologies, which leave them vulnerable to subjugation.

Graphic Novels: Difficulties and Ethics of Literary Criticism

This final section serves as a caution against grandiose expectations revolving around literary investigations using the nomadic tools I have outlined in this thesis. Throughout these three chapters I have constructed a nomadic subject, by showing how the nomad

functions as a site of activation for ideas and potential ontologies. It functions much in the same way as Deleuze and Guattari's body without organs. The nuances of my nomad are key to its link to my critical paradigm. The nomad must be considered in social and political contexts, as nomads are always embodied and therefore are always rooted within various milieux. Nomads do not only act as a body without organs, as sites where assemblages with human, non-human animals and artefacts are formed through forces of desire. They also resist normalising forces through their processes of becoming nomadic by understanding the interconnectivity of their assemblages and the assemblage forming process. My construction of the nomad allows me to perform a critical reading of literature (specifically dystopian, gothic and science fiction literature) to examine how non-normalised characters resist normalisation and explore alternative ontologies both successfully and unsuccessfully.

In this chapter, I have linked human, technological and literary embodiments in both epistemological and ontological networks. The warning I will add to this section is that while nomads are free to transgress, deviate and disregard some social codes, they must abide by the limitations of a different kind of morality – ethics. It is important to note that when analysing nomadic ontologies, the representation of bodies, and the subsequent conclusions drawn from an investigation pose a risk to the subject being criticised. The risks uniquely occur in the context of analysing graphic novels. This is due to the private bodies of nomads or other marginalised characters becoming available to criticism from the public body in the visual context of a graphic novel. I will finish delineating the significance of embodiment by discussing the bioethics of portraying bodies generally in literature, the ethics of portraying alternative human bodies (alternative as in psychically, physically, or ontologically). Finally, I will explore how graphic novels, within the genre of speculative fiction is instructive when depicting how the public self, which interacts with other processes, practices and bodies, and private selves which are the non-normalised, unregulated psyches experience their simulated realities in social and political milieux.

This final section will proceed sequentially first discussing the meaning of bios/zoe in relation to ethics, then the problem of using graphic novels to represent normalised bodies in society. This is a problem due to their only representing the public body, while the private body can only be portrayed as deviant. This dualism is misleading because all humans have public and private bodies, and the degree of their difference is different for each individual.

My second concern targets the bioethics of representing certain groups such as the disabled, the oppressed, or mentally ill people in graphic novels. Portraying more vulnerable groups of people in graphic novels can be problematic in graphic novels due to the primarily visual aspect of the narrative. There are many difficulties around representing the experiences of vulnerable or minority groups of alternative humanities which can manifest in the visual portrayal of their experiences. Some narratives, such as those depicting psychological illness or politically marginal figures risk alienating members of that group. Such narratives could, depending on the style of presentation, portray a disorientated, almost a-linear narrative based on the visual progression of a narrative in snapshots, the purely fictional, or non-fiction narrative can be difficult to follow, analyse or be challenged on its credibility. Finally, I will relate my tactics concerning technologies of the Self and ethics to the study of graphic novels. This point serves as a final caution regarding the responsibility of critics who approach graphic novels to be vigilant in their ethical awareness of the representation of human and non-human subjects within a text. I will discuss how cyborgification can free a female of the gender stereotypes that are commonplace in societies today. For example, the presentation of a subject that is both female and cyborg does not simply liberate the female from the subjugating gaze which enforces gender prejudice. Cyborgification creates an alternative humanity with its own problems. I will therefore end this theoretical section with a discussion of how graphic novels allow for an investigation into the embodied experience of alternative (non-)humanities and how revealing alternative ontologies in a visual medium can run the risk of compromising the privacy of these hidden bodies who are concealed because they believe it ensures their continued survival.

I will begin by reviewing what I mean by bios, zoe, and bioethics. These three terms, according to Agamben, offer an alternative to regarding life politically. His notion of bios/zoe is to see them as approaching politics through the scope of bare life.

The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoe/ bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life.³⁴⁵

³⁴⁵ Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, p. 8.

These are important codifications for nomads to monitor as zoe denotes the bare life or existence of an organic subject while bios, or qualified life, indicates the discourse surrounding a species, race, or gender of subjects. Racial groups have, in the past, had their rights to life removed by the label 'animal' or 'less than human' depending on the regime in place at any given time. Ethics surrounding bios/zoe are essential so that assemblages are not formed on the part of a third-party group to remove their rights for biopolitical gains. There are many examples of this taking place in literary history. Examples include Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, as suggested before where arbitrary prejudices proliferate into literature in this case in the treatment and representation of Friday.³⁴⁶

Braidotti has revived the discussion of bios and zoe because she has identified, as this chapter has made clear, that humanity has still not overcome the politicisation of representing bodies. Thus:

we are forced to confront the inbuilt anthropocentrism which prevents us from relinquishing the categorical divide between bios and zoe and thus makes us cling to the superiority of consciousness in spite of our poststructuralist scepticism towards this very notion.³⁴⁷

The inability to cross the political divide from constructed narratives of life to the bare life that Agamben imagined lends credence to the belief that anthropocentrism is still prominent in the debate surrounding embodiment. Bioethics encompasses bios and zoe, indicating a system of fair operation when discussing all lifeforms in respect to their agency, however the term bioethics is seldom used nowadays and has been replaced with biopolitics, a term I used frequently in Chapter two. Cary Wolfe is an adamant critic of the institutionalised politicisation of ethics surrounding embodiment, as it moved the line between what counts as life (human) and what exists on the margins of death (non-human). She argues that:

One of the central ironies of bioethics in its dominant institutionalized form is that it is subtended by a certain notion of the human that remains—despite wave after wave of changes in our understanding of the “bio-” of bioethics—not only uninterrogated but indeed retrenched, and nowhere more clearly (or more predictably) than in the confidence with which the boundary between human and nonhuman animals is taken for granted as an ethical (non)issue—the very difference, ironically enough, that would seem thrown completely open to question by the very

³⁴⁶ Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe* (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1993).

³⁴⁷ Braidotti, *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics*, p. 40.

biotechnical and scientific developments with which contemporary bioethics is so concerned.³⁴⁸

The debate is poignant when considering that the subject of my later analysis will be a non-human cyborg, which would be considered a non-living organism, despite holding an active human brain. But it leads me into my discussion of the problems graphic novels face when portraying normalised human bodies. My assumption, based on the research I have put forward in Chapters two and three, is that portraying characters who have any significance to the plot of a narrative in graphic novels immediately destabilises them to the point where they must reveal their private body, or the aspects of themselves which do not conform to social codes of morality. Therefore, on the surface, any escape from dualistically portraying a main character from the general public is futile. In traditional print, there is a larger gap between embodied experience and the reader due to the reader's imagination filling in more of the gaps of the narrative. However, characters have their own bodies and therefore the reader does not fill them in with their own private bodies. This immediately creates a suspicion against the agenda of portrayed characters. Jeffrey Scott comments in his investigation of readers of posthuman literature and comic books that on the one hand the idea of enhanced human beings (or superhumans) troubled readers who were aware of the Transhumanist movement. At the same time, the divide between fiction and reality is often more porous for readers, who preferred reading narratives which portrayed realistic or only cognitively-enhanced characters.³⁴⁹ As assemblages are essentially bits of things attached to other bits of things (in Scott's words) a comic book or graphic novel is likewise an assemblage, capable of bringing about any number of effects, and of containing assemblages within itself and forming new assemblages with readers. The superhero is also an assemblage, as is the reader, the corporation and creators.³⁵⁰

So, after spending three chapters discussing what an assemblage is, what then is not an assemblage? Assemblages are formed through desire and the dynamic act of creating the assemblage. To be succinct, assemblages need a desiring, acting site of activation. Without this site, the machinic assemblages, which make up each segment, there can be no assemblage. Therefore, two artefacts, which could become an assemblage at some point,

³⁴⁸ Wolfe, p. 49.

³⁴⁹ Scott, pp. 201–2.

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 206.

cannot do so spontaneously, because artefacts do not desire. Animals can become part of assemblages, they have desires and needs, though their assemblage-forming abilities are highly limited without the intervention of human-animals. Finally, it must be conceded that non-nomads can form assemblages, it is obvious, but it must be stated. Normalised bodies routinely create assemblages according to their desire, but these assemblages generally operate within a social, historical, or political milieu and is among one of many recommended choices available to them. Reading posthuman literature and graphic novels in this way allows critics to consider the synergy of reader and characters in a new way, potentially in ways that offer protagonists more agency.

Dualism between reality and fiction threatens the already precarious relationship between narrative and reader with believability and attention potentially being a page away from collapse, there is the need to continuously believe in the illusion of sharing a private body with the protagonist. Instead, a graphic novel emphasises the non-normalised aspects of a person about whom a narrative describes. Therefore, while in traditional novels, we may see an openly claimed deviant character prove themselves as equally normalised as the rest of society, graphic novels have a unique potential to take normalised characters and highlight the ways they are deviant and are therefore worthy of chronicling through images.

My second point targets the ethics and difficulties of portraying alternative bodies or the embodied experiences of certain groups of people, such as the disabled, the oppressed, or mentally ill people in graphic novels. Bioethics concerns the portrayal of marginalised characters in graphic novels, as I claim they have less porous boundaries than in traditional literature. These characters concern mentally ill, disabled, nomadic, ethnic and cyborg realities which are not entirely accepted within globalised mainstream societies. The different viewpoints readers gain from the point of view depicted in panes create multiple ways for them to empathise with characters which may not be present in print literature. This leads to the question of how to represent people who appear in the pages of a graphic novel. At first this may not seem like an issue, but if we depict subtle exchanges which when depicted in writing would break the pace of a novel, such as nonverbal relational aggression, there is more scope for a graphic novel or manga to incorporate the lingering stares, the looks of discomfort or the timid body language of someone who feels oppressed. This is a topic which has been addressed in relation to manga in the last decade. Sarah Coyne has

made a case at length to show the risk factors of presenting violence through comic books and manga. She claims that readers of Shonen (manga targeting boys) features the most violence and encourages readers to become more violent if they see similarities between themselves and the characters on the page who commit violent actions. Such similarities can include the gender, age, personality of the character, the justification of their actions and the acceptability of the consequences.³⁵¹ Scott McCloud, writing much earlier also indicated that in comic books (which I can extend to other forms of graphical literature) readers are often required to fill in the missing action of the plot depicted in snapshot panels through their own imagination. He calls this process closure.³⁵² In this sense Coyne's argument, which bases itself on readers paying attention to and participating imaginatively with aggression portrayed in this genre of text, can be seen as a valid concern to younger readerships.

The difficulties are not limited to the depiction of aggression, as this pervades through all entertainment genres to some extent. When considering comic book tradition, there is a double necessity and problem of depicting actions and attitudes of characters portrayed while remaining entertaining for consumers. It is important to recognise that reading graphic novels, manga and graphic memoir, and even comic books have their own set of reading tools, as with traditional literary fiction. The reason I have chosen nomadism and rhizomatic criticism to tackle this genre is because of its focus on milieu, agency and understanding alternative human (and non-human) ontologies. Gretchen Schwarz, a researcher into graphic novels and the classroom, indicates the value of graphic novels as a part of secondary education's literary education.

So far, graphic novels have often been able to express voices not necessarily mainstream and to tackle uncomfortable, even little-known social issues. Good graphic novels, like all art, do so in ways that move the reader and capture the imagination.³⁵³

³⁵¹ Sarah Coyne and others, "Just How Graphic Are Graphic Novels?" An Examination of Aggression Portrayals in Manga and Associations With Aggressive Behavior in Adolescents', *Violence and Victims*, 30.2 (2015), p. 213 <<https://doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.VV-D-13-00012>> [Accessed 26 February 2021].

³⁵² Scott McCloud, *Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994), pp. 63–69.

³⁵³ Gretchen Schwarz, 'Media Literacy, Graphic Novels and Social Issues', *SIMILE: Studies In Media & Information Literacy Education*, 7.4 (2007), 1–11 (p. 8) <<https://doi.org/10.3138/sim.7.4.002>> [Accessed 26 February 2021].

Graphic novels have relatively recently been accepted as a serious subject of academic criticism. Because of their novelty, graphical narratives can target niches in social commentary. However, the drawback to this novelty is that the comic book format continues to be perceived as an unintellectual consumption of literature; therefore, there remains a stigma attached to literary analyses of this genre as having a lack of rigour.³⁵⁴ As with posthumanism, this can be reflected in the tone and type of analyses that critics might expect relating to research into graphic novels. The problem of representing these vulnerable or minority groups can come across in the visual portrayal of their experiences. The format of comic books, graphical novels and manga are liberated from the obligation of presenting a realistic image on paper. As McCloud states, when we abstract an image through cartooning, we are not eliminating the details as we are focusing on specific details.³⁵⁵ Therefore, the removal of complexity has the effect of amplifying certain aspects of characters that may not be intended by an artist. Its effects can reach as far as alienating other members of that group to presenting a disorientated, almost a-linear narrative based on the visual progression of a narrative in snapshots. The effects of presenting a first-person perspective from an alternative perspective, no matter whether it be purely fictional, or non-fiction narrative can be difficult to follow, analyse or be challenged on its credibility. For example, in his book, *Graphic Subjects*, Michael Chaney explains how autobiographical writing in the form of graphic novels (i.e., graphic memoir), often faces claims of inaccuracy due to the exaggerated style of the comic book genre and due to the experiences being portrayed are idiosyncratic or belonging to only one person's embodied experience and therefore being impossible to verify.

[A]utobiographies told in the typically exaggerated visual style of the comics, by contrast, complicate those claims, juxtaposing them against autobiography's other set of authorial promises—to portray experience in a manner that is emotionally and psychologically true to the unique, often idiosyncratic perspective of the author-artist.³⁵⁶

While all biographical work, including autobiographies are a translation of lived experience into language, comics, and any graphical medium have the added difficulty of faithfully

³⁵⁴ Scott, p. 21.; McCloud, p. 3,18-9.

³⁵⁵ McCloud, p. 30.

³⁵⁶ *Graphic Subjects: Critical Essays on Autobiography and Graphic Novels*, ed. by Michael A. Chaney (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), p. 4.

representing these experiences while being aesthetically pleasing to its intended readership. Added difficulties include portraying altered mind states, expressing visually, and the potential for presenting the experiences of a singular individual as the experiences of a group of associated individuals. The characters of graphic memoir who reflect on their societies have undergone the process of becoming nomadic, able to separate their assemblages from that of their social and political milieux. In this sense, to look through the eyes of a nomad allows readers to trace the developmental milestones in their disillusionment from their milieu, and the informative experiences which lead to the creation of the graphical text.

Graphic novels are an excellent context in which to practise literary nomadism, as this setting provides nomads with the agency of their own embodiment. The feature of rhizomatic criticism that I developed in Chapter One deals with a-linear, psychological narratives. Visual portrayal of protagonists allows for explorations of their embodiments in various milieux, and invites literary criticism on the portrayal surrounding nomadic interactions with practices and processes emphasised through visual representation of embodied experiences. The difficulty associated with a-linear storytelling in relation to psychological narratives, the grey morality of fiction surrounding cyborgs or the memoir of a disabled person each have expectations to fulfil, and expectations to transgress. The depiction of altered mental states may come across as nonlinear on the page, so when characters respond to these internalised realities with expressions or actions, it may set a tone for readers to recognise or misrecognise these experiences elsewhere. With each ontology that readers can witness, tactics for approaching other speculative milieux, or appreciating milieux in before unanticipated ways. Essentially, the graphic novel is an attempt to capture a milieu in a single frame of a page using a combination of imagery and language.

My final point concerns technologies of the Self; a term describing tactics designed to resist normalisation, and the ethics surrounding the study of graphic novels. The representation of individuals practising tactics of technologies of the Self allows for a greater awareness of these tactics among wider communities. Therefore, this point serves as a final caution regarding the responsibility of critics who approach graphic novels to be vigilant in their ethical awareness of the representation of human and non-human subjects within a text.

This is a subject which concerns many feminist, postfeminist, and new materialist scholars. I will draw on one example in this section to serve as an allegory for many wider debates as it is also a point that I expand upon in my literary analysis at the end of this chapter.

Haraway's *A Manifesto for Cyborgs* provoked a powerful feminist movement in the late-1990s to remove the glass ceiling which prevented women from obtaining equal status in the workplace with men. This is a movement which has seen much success through the twentieth century, seeing women gain many rights that were once only in the hands of wealthy men. Haraway posited a mythological world where gender was re-evaluated and the notion of woman was not only alienated from its connotations, but in a deep sense does not exist as a subject, or even potential subject, since she owes her existence as a woman to sexual appropriation.³⁵⁷ This leaves a gap which returns to Toffoletti's posthuman alienation, this time we are able to answer this uneasiness she experienced. The gap left behind by transcending the constructedness of feminisation does not immediately fall away into equality of genders. Rather, it leaves a void where territory is ready for over-coding. The suggested solution from her title of her manifesto indicates that gender gives way further to philosophical, as opposed to literal, cyborgification. While this would eliminate the female stereotypes that are associated with female biology, I argue here, and in the following literary analysis, that replacing the power index of woman for cyborg introduces new problems that reveal the continued existence of the dualist power paradigm. Therefore, Haraway's replacement of gender with the asexuality and inhumanity of cyborgs is not the solution to this agency usurping problem.

Indeed, Margret Grebowicz and Helen Merrick also identified this issue having summarised four decades of Haraway's research. The problem lies in the dualist paradigm functioning as a technology of the body.

Her [Haraway's] resistance to the construct/ reality binary helps us conceive of possibilities for new characterizations of feminist engagement with what might be called the material/ figural. The diffractive work implied by naturecultures has implications for a whole series of similarly divided and productive dualisms in

³⁵⁷ Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature.*, p. 28.

Western thought: sex/gender, human/nonhuman, self/other, and material/semiotic.³⁵⁸

Grebowicz and Merrick's answer, along with that of many postfeminist scholars, is to use diffractive reading, a method of reading literature which seeks to deconstruct boundaries. I agree it is an effective tool in removing the problematic divide which renders one group powerless in relation to another. However, my nomadic paradigm has established from my literary analysis in Chapter One that a deconstructive approach to reconstructing the structure of two oppositional paradigms leads in mutual destruction and an entropic spiral. This means the system has become too disorganised to retain coherence and continues to break down rather than stabilise. The two paradigms of genre and humanity will be the subject of my literary analysis of a graphic novel where I will discuss cyborgification of a female character in a speculative futuristic society.

The private body and public body are both uniquely available for the critic to study, but additionally they form a network with other bodies within the graphic novel in ways that traditional novels cannot. The context of my literary investigation at the end of this chapter relates to speculative, science-fiction writing in the form of a graphic novel. One of the main subjects of my analysis will be a female character who has undergone full cyborgification. In my analysis I will identify one passage of the narrative where two full-cyborg women (people who have only their brain and spinal column in a metallic body) are subject to both prejudices of being non-human and discrimination through verbal slurs and segregation in places such as restaurants. There are many examples where in the workplace cyborgs are treated with respect simply due to their superhuman abilities, likewise, outside of work, their existence as humans is always in question. It indicates that the concealment of private bodies which practice alternative humanities ensures their continued survival within milieus made up of social bodies. Graphic novels, in exploring little known social issues, will also encounter these minority or oppressed groups. In revealing these alternative ontologies with the new layer of visual experiences tied up in the literary rendition of potential memoirs, fictional or otherwise, there is a risk of threatening the agency of people who fall into these non-normalised machinic assemblages. The ethics around invading these all-too-

³⁵⁸ Margret Grebowicz and Helen Merrick, *Beyond the Cyborg - Adventures with Donna Haraway*, 2013, p. 23 <<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.expneurol.2009.06.007>>.

human yet alien ontologies is worth considering because it comes with rules attached: to theorise about these embodied experiences, which have only begun coming to light in the last thirty years, could lead to the development of further technologies which aim to subdue them.

In this final theoretical section, I discussed the problems and ethics surrounding the nomadic investigation of graphic novels. I began by first talking about the meaning of bios/zoe in relation to ethics, then the problem of using graphic novels to represent normalised bodies in society relating to the bio-political dualism of the public body, and the private body which I outlined in Chapter two. This dualism is misleading because all humans have public and private bodies. I then outlined the bioethical concerns of portraying certain vulnerable groups such as disabled, oppressed, or mentally ill people in graphic novels. I also discussed the many difficulties in depicting the experiences of vulnerable or minority groups of alternative humanities which can manifest in the visual portrayal of their experiences. I also noted that along with these difficulties, graphic novels position themselves as productive sites for nomadic analysis due to their flexibility to portray visual information in non-linear and to express highly subjective, or idiosyncratic experiences that are central to an alternative human ontology. In the final step of this sub-section, I related the criticism of graphic novels to post-feminist methods of reading such as diffractive reading, highlighting the difference between nomadic reading and deconstructive reading of the social boundaries depicted by texts. My example showed how Haraway's removal of gender did not remove the power-usurping dualism created by a human/ non-human paradigm. What it did highlight, however, was the risk of engaging in investigations of alternative human ontologies for the subjects that are being investigated by this growing discipline. The hidden embodiments which once sought refuge in anonymity threaten to emerge and be targeted by technologies which are continually aimed at normalising citizens.

Applying My Paradigm to Masamune Shirow's *Ghost in the Shell*

Introduction

To reach this point I constructed a theoretical framework which are supported by three literary analyses. In Chapter One, I constructed the foundation of my three-part, three-chaptered paradigm. The chapter aimed to investigate the origins and developments of the nomad through Deleuze, Guattari, and Braidotti, so that it could be understood in their terms. I then argued what I believe are the shortcomings of their concepts of the nomad and developed the foundations of my own six-point paradigm. This paradigm altered the original concerns of, or expanded on, my original take on the distinction between becoming nomadic vs practising nomadism, normalisation vs deviance, multiple selves, the risks of extreme binary thinking, the methodology of rhizomatic criticism, and the nature of my gentler nomad.

The limitations of Deleuzian, and subsequently Braidottian configurations of the nomad were highlighted in positing the subjects of J.G. Ballard's *High Rise* as nomads. In the analysis I demonstrated how humans exist as part of an animal-human-technology assemblage which is in its entirety multi-valent and complex. Nomads who have undergone the process of becoming nomadic are able to form and reject potential assemblages dynamically. For the nomads of Ballard's novel, they are passive and simple assemblage builders, using assemblages to over-code areas, much like Deleuze and Guattari's War Machine. It results in the psychic collapse of the potential nomad. In Ballard's *High Rise*, the characters had an enhanced animal and technological assemblage. In Deleuzian language, the strata of animal and technology connected as in a rhizome, bypassing the human stratum in this assemblage. The result of Ballard's novel was the destruction of the closed-gate society of the high rise building into warring tribes and finally into singular individuals competing for resources. The nomad, Richard Wilder, characterised by his constant, purposeful movement though the building found his sanity and assemblages unravelled as climbed the apartment building. As he reached the end of his journey, the newly formed matriarchal society ended his existence as a nomad, and it is suggested, his life.

In Chapter Two I developed my initial critical methodology to identify how nomads resist normalisation within social and political milieus. The chapter focused on the epistemology of nomads in social and political contexts, and the methodologies which nomads use to protect their assemblages. The first section concerned technologies of the body, which describes tactics used by authoritarian groups to maintain control over society through normalisation. Technologies of the body aim to usurp the agency of a person by deciding the proper etiquette for how they live, die, and seek pleasure. It can transform an acceptable citizen into a criminal overnight. It can also, through political and mechanical mechanisms, enact more nuanced transformations on bodies, influencing the shape of 'acceptability' within social, and political milieus through legal and meritorious systems. My second section referred to technologies of the Self, which describes many tactics employed by nomadic individuals to assert agency over their practices and processes against normalisation within social and political milieus. While technologies of the Self are tactics employed by individuals to protect their physical and cognitive agencies from arbitrary over-coding, technologies of the body are a collectivising group of tactics employed by a small group of people on a society. Technologies of the Self are a core subject of this chapter as I will discuss the mechanisms of normalising forces that ideological systems employ when regulating, representing, and re-presenting bodies.

Chapter Two's literary analysis followed on from my discussion of the production of power from governmental and ideological practices and processes, which the posthuman nomad resists in order to act as an active site of mediation with ideas which form the milieu of biopolitics around them. In choosing Silverberg's *The World Inside*, I revealed the power structures that I discussed in my theoretical section through an ontological investigation of nomadic activity within a dystopian distant future society which was almost entirely mediated by technology and human desire. In this society, the political milieu of the building is absolute, the people of the uppermost floor operate in an oligarchy, whose policies and actions cannot be questioned or resisted. The continued survival of the people in the urban monads had become dependent on the smooth running of the building. Whereas in other literary forms difference has been presented as intolerable from a politically ideological standpoint, in *The World Inside* nomadism threatens all social milieus with societal collapse. The result is seen clearly when a nomadic subject finally began to practice nomadism, he

became exposed to both the external environment outside his home, and to alternative ontologies which he could not reconcile in his mind. He became alienated from nomadism, as he was alienated from his Terran others. On failing to adapt he attempted to cease his existence as a nomad, only to find himself incompatible with the structure that he once forsook.

My central question of this literary analysis asks how does the manga *Ghost in the Shell* use the cyborg as a radical example of nomadic ontology? This question responds to the lack of writing concerning posthuman ontology in literary studies. My solution is to develop the nomadic figure in discourse with current critical work.³⁵⁹

This is a literary investigation to establish the nomadic nature of the female cyborg Makoto Kusanagi. In examining science fiction of this calibre, I am working in the grey area between critical posthumanism, and transhumanism and I recognise that can introduce problems in accepting the credibility of my subject material. However, I intend to highlight the problems that cyborgs of this technology-driven world introduce and explore the agency, and holistic experiences of their cyborg subjectivities. It is the focus of this analysis to explore the grey morality of cyborgs as superheroes as opposed to the break between cyborgs and humanity.

As with Haraway's *A Manifesto for Cyborgs*, this literary analysis can be read literally to discuss the cyborg embodiment, or it can be more abstract, as discussing a means of thinking. Most pertinently, her comment that such sociobiological stories depend on a high-tech view of the body as biotic component of cybernetic communications system lends itself to analysing *Ghost* from the lived experience of a cyborg.³⁶⁰ I will show why this point is particularly impactful when discussing the social treatment of cyborgs in the analysis.

Ultimately, the cyborg is allegorical for any minority human group as it inhabits that liminal space between human and Other. The human has always been synonymous with technology, and in this respect human, cyborg and nomad all triangulate much larger issues.

Cyborgs are traditionally depicted as a hybrid of humanity and technology resulting in an artificially enhanced human. This is in part accurate, though limiting if we consider that our

³⁵⁹ See Appendix A for my clarifications of the differences and impacts of Oshii's animated film adaptations on criticism concerning Shirow's manga.

³⁶⁰ *A Manifesto for Cyborgs*, p. 340

non-human animal companions can also fall under the same definition as I will now explain. Cyborgs are not limited to literary fiction, as they already exist. We can see some cyborgs in the street, other cyborgs are invisible as they walk among us. They exist predominantly due to the breakthroughs in medical technology, developed over the last century; the cyborgs I have cited above, including animal cyborgs are those who may incorporate medical technology such as prosthetics or pacemakers into their bodies so they may lead normal functioning lives. To go one step further any assemblage between organism and technology could result in some type of cyborgification, but I would argue they would be limited to conceptual cyborgification. These assemblages could be as simple as wrist-smartwatch or hand-smartphone-eye. Such technologies are not incorporated into the body, and do not enhance the body's capabilities. Maybe, then, these would be better called soft cyborgs, to omit the mechanical impact on the body, and to limit their cyborgification to conception only. We should remember that technology is increasingly approaching the boundaries of the human body, with the aims of streamlining the connectivity between the two. In this literary analysis, we will see a near future society in which the term soft cyborg (or conversely hard cyborg) is insufficient to describe the levels of cyborgification which take place in that society. In *Ghost in the Shell*, the definition of cyborg falls on a sliding scale; from unenhanced human, to partially enhanced, whether it be a chip added to the brain allowing for communication and cognitive enhancement to enhanced eyes or full cyborgification like Major Motoko Kusanagi who only retains her brain and spinal column.

With all these types of cyborgs available to criticise, what then makes Shirow's portrayal of cyborgs so radical that I am devoting the valuable space of my thesis to answer the question in a literary analysis of his work? Nomadic ontology is composed of two terms; nomad, describing both someone who continually displaces in space, and someone who is a marginal character through the choice not to conform to social expectations. The term ontology means the study of concepts such as existence, being, becoming, and reality. When these terms are juxtaposed, their meaning compounds to denote the study of how those who are marginalised, and moving in spaces exist, be, become and their conceptual realities.

To conclude the explanation of my critical question of how the manga *Ghost in the Shell* uses the cyborg as a radical example of nomadic ontology, I argue that Kusanagi presents

herself as a cyborg whose presentation and ontology are both radical by the standards of the early twenty-first century. This is because she subverts the expectations of what a cyborg, nomad and female are simultaneously in a realistic setting which Shirow supports with research in a republished issue of his manga. My intention by presenting Shirow's Kusanagi as a radical nomad is to subvert anthropocentric expectations of science fiction readers.

I will now outline the progression of the upcoming analysis in brief. In my explanation of my critical question, I outlined three key points that need to be explored: these were, the alternative ontologies of cyborgs, the subversion of assumptions around cybernetic bodies having only pragmatic ontologies but in fact they can experience pleasure without consequences alongside how Kusanagi as a female cyborg also subverts traditional body politics, and the grey morality of cyborgs. Each of these three points leads to my conclusion which aims to show how Kusanagi, who is a radical nomad, is able to maintain her nomadic status while subverting anthropocentric expectations of cyborgs for science fiction readers.

In my first section I draw a parallel between the cyborg body and superheroes in comic books. This is because superheroes, like cyborgs, are often indistinguishable from normalised humans, and the ontology of superheroes is as radical to normalised humans as are the cyborgs of *Ghost*. Additionally, the agency which accompanies cyborg ontology is questionable, as I will show cyborgs are free to leave their employment, but they lose the privileges of their superhuman bodies. In my second section I discuss how Kusanagi subverts anthropocentric assumptions of cybernetic bodies as only having pragmatic ontologies, though showing how Kusanagi indulges in addictive behaviours while abusing her enhanced body to negate negative side effects of her consumption. This section also explores how Kusanagi problematises gender politics as she is a female cyborg. I will show how at several points she jokes about her gender and is able to enjoy life as a female, yet she commands the respect of her ultra-masculine colleagues. The third point discusses her grey morality, and it is the most important of the five points to discuss as it involves her abusing her technological enhancements to usurp the agency of her lesser enhanced colleagues. This is an act of violence as in controlling the body of her colleague she renders him incapable of choosing what his body does. Her moral stance on her attitudes and actions is that it is the most effective way to get her job done. Finally, the last part concludes how the previous

three sections subvert anthropocentric expectations of science fiction literature, relating back to the overarching theme of this thesis.

Cyborgs and Superheroes— A Parallel Analysis of Alternative Ontologies

This first section begins with an investigation arguing that the cyborg bodies of *Ghost* and the superhero bodies of traditional comic books as similar but alternative and posthuman bodies. To be clear, I posit both the cyborg and the superhero as alternative nomadic embodiments which share sufficient similarities to allow for a literary analysis of them in similar contexts.

The ‘super heroic’ body is one of many types of monstrous bodies that is not designed to repel readers, but rather to highlight the inhuman characteristics of the superhero.

Traditionally, cyborgs have also been portrayed as inhuman, as possessing superior physical and cognitive skills, yet relying on humans for their continued survival. Shirow’s cyborgs do not entirely cross this boundary, though they do demonstrate that the ability to change bodies is not reliant on having a human perform the operation. Full-body cyborgs such as Kusanagi emulate superhero disguises such as Clark Kent, Bruce Wayne, and Peter Parker in that her normalised persona is that of a human. As an avenue of discussing the superhero cyborgs of Shirow’s near future reality, I will begin by introducing their closest cousins, and figures that are on well-researched ground, the superhero.

Scott Jeffery’s *The Posthuman Body in Superhero Comics* provides an essential articulation of critical and philosophical posthumanism, applying it to an historical investigation of the development of superheroes in comic books across the twentieth century. While I would argue that Jeffery’s argument is clear, it is selective in its choice of authors and texts supporting his analyses. Nevertheless, it draws together many strands of posthuman thought and applies them critically to a corpus of comic book texts which explore the portrayal of superhero embodiments in literature.

Jeffery opens his analysis of the superhuman body by clarifying that the concept of superhumanity ‘encompasses fictional representations of posthuman bodies, with particular

emphasis placed on its manifestation in comic books'.³⁶¹ The simplicity of representation in comic book art does not necessarily mean that the characters portrayed are simplistic. Rather, the art style allows for an emphasis on certain details of characters that the artist wishes to emphasise. In the case of *Ghost*, Shirow is depicting a posthuman body which has formed an assemblage which is predominantly mediated by technology. He uses this radically alternative ontology to subvert anthropocentric expectations of readers by portraying an all-too-human machine. The subversion occurs not on the site of the assemblage, but in the implications of its unrecognizability. Where does the human end and the machine begin? Is having a brain and a 'Ghost' enough to be considered human? Do cyborgs have the same rights as humans despite their not having exclusive ownership over their own bodies? In very few representations of cyborgs have these questions come across so clearly (except perhaps in *Bladerunner*).

Jeffery's focus on the representation of posthuman bodies through a graphic medium is pragmatic as this literary analysis analyses super non-human bodies and superhuman bodies in the Japanese equivalent of comic books (manga). The superhuman body and the cyborg body are both regulated and normalised constructs. Having said that, the superhuman body is more complex than normalised human bodies, therefore situating superhumans becomes a question of questioning in what ways they are super, and in questioning their agency and morality. It is also difficult to situate superhuman, or super heroic bodies within a certain branch of posthumanism. Jeffery stated that an attempt to define superheroes within posthumanism 'would be misleading to suggest that posthumanism is a neatly bounded category'.³⁶² The importance of selecting dystopian, science fiction, and speculative genres for posthumanist and nomadic investigations in literature is also noted by C. M. Klugman who suggests that cyborg fictions 'motivate the reader to consider the social and ethical implications of new technologies'.³⁶³

Ghost situates readers within a world where technologically-driven capitalism has been developed unimpeded. With the enhanced threat of terrorists, drug barons and corrupt officials, cybernetically-enhanced human beings have become essential corrupters and

³⁶¹ Scott, p. 2.

³⁶² Ibid, p. 11.

³⁶³ C. M. Klugman, 'From Cyborg Fiction to Medical Reality.', *Literature and Medicine*, 20.1 (2001), 39–54 (p. 40) <<https://doi.org/10.1353/lm.2001.0007>> [accessed 14 December 2019].

protectors of society. Enhanced humans exhibit various degrees of cybernetic alteration from replacement eyes, cybernetic implants in the brain, or bionic hands, to full-body cyborgification. While the first few examples have differing levels of noticeability, the full-body cyborg is indistinguishable in appearance from the average human. The effect of scaling from obvious to unrecognisable cyborgification aims to alienate readers. The alternative embodied experience of full-bodied cyborgs becomes apparent to the reader through internal monologue, along with discussions which take place in the novel. In an establishing scene towards the end of the book, Kusanagi (the Major) comments 'I hate it when it rains... It's such an empty sound, piercing my prosthetic body and shrouding my ghost'.³⁶⁴ It is a stark reminder to readers that while humans are composed of water, cyborgs feel the vibrations of the rain through their bodies, and fear its corrosive power.

Cyborg assemblages, as with superheroes, create new, alternative ontologies which are both normalised (they serve a purpose for existing) and nomadic (the cyborg/hero has desires of their own and act on them). While Jeffery relates this debate directly to the superhero, it requires no leap of imagination to relate this to the cyborgs of *Ghost*. He states the superhero did not emerge as the result of necessary telos of the Superhuman but:

[A]s an emergent property resulting from these parts being plugged together in new ways—the dual identity crime-fighting of the Scarlet Pimpernel AND the outlandish costume of the circus strongman AND the genius level detective skills of Sherlock Holmes AND the alien races and amazing technologies of early science fiction AND so on.³⁶⁵

The cyborg and superhero are made up from normalised and nomadic assemblages. They are not ontologies which spontaneously appear, but they are created purposefully. While nomads are self-creating, cyborgs, in *Ghost* are created. This exception is due to the original human who becomes a cyborg deciding to be transformed from one state to another, thus making the decision to form an assemblage with technology. The act is nomadic, despite being regulated within the narrative. In *Ghost*, cyborgification is extended to different degrees of mechanical enhancements to the human body, fulfilling a human dream of becoming more than human without an investment of time to perfect any skills or train muscles to increase strength. The cyborgs in this graphic novel are mostly innocuous. Other

³⁶⁴ Shirow, p. 238.

³⁶⁵ Scott, p. 138.

than being recognised by experts as belonging to certain models of cyborgs or through certain evident enhancements, the ‘circus’ Jeffery describes only comes to the forefront when the cyborg protagonists are required to be superhuman.

Some aspects of cyborg ontology, as with superhero ontology, are normalised. These aspects lie in the expectations for them to be altruistic, patriotic and possess superpowers. *Ghost* subverts the expectations of the cyborg superhero and detective. The detectives of Shirow’s novel are not altruistic, but fight for justice to maintain their lifestyles and for monetary compensation. We see this in Kusanagi’s admission that ‘If everyone had all their rights the world’d be at peace and we’d be out of a job’.³⁶⁶ It indicates that while she would like to see a utopian future, if it ever arrived, she would become obsolete, therefore the utopia she wishes for finds itself in direct conflict with her survival instinct. Off duty, partially enhanced cyborgs are welcome as equals with human customers, no matter their disfigurement. However, full-bodied cyborgs are met with discrimination as they do not consume products as readily as human customers. This theme is clearest in the manga when Kusanagi meets with a friend for a meal. They are both full-body cybernetically enhanced humans. After concluding an incident involving a man whose memories were ‘ghost hacked’, Kusanagi expresses her fears that her memories, identity and ghost are not her own, and that perhaps they were manufactured.³⁶⁷

Sometimes I wonder if I’ve really already died, and what I think of as “me” isn’t really just an artificial personality comprised of a prosthetic body and a cyberbrain.

Hey, we’ve got grey matter, and people treat us like humans.³⁶⁸

The cyborg expressing concerns over its ontological crisis is poignant, but by no means radically different from other cyborg narratives. Although, with Kusanagi exploring her potential inhumanity, she instigates the process of becoming nomadic by not taking for granted that she remains a human being because of her birth. She asks if her ‘ghost’ and memories also belong to her, or whether she has transitioned into a servant whose will is emulated. Receiving an artificial body with superpowers can be a source of deep concern.

³⁶⁶ Shirow, p. 140.

³⁶⁷ Note: Ghost hacking involves someone illicitly accessing the memories of another individual to replace them with information of the hacker’s choosing. This can lead to them being compelled to obey the hacker or believe in a reality that never existed.

³⁶⁸ Shirow, p. 106.

More disturbingly, when the brain becomes the subject of enhancement, the authenticity of identity and therefore agency falls into doubt. Jeffery, who also considers the status of cyborg humanity, addresses this concern.

Of all the posthuman bodies to be found in the multiverse of superhero comics it is those characters who express themselves through Artificial Bodies that are most often concerned with the question of what it means to be human.³⁶⁹

It leaves Kusanagi's status as a nomad with agency in doubt, and at this point she seems to resist my attempts to frame her as nomadic and radical. However, I argue that it was her initial choice to become a cyborg that laid the foundation for her to re-emerge as a nomad while in a cyborg state. The term nomad (like cyborg), as I have already stated, is not exclusive to humans, and therefore may still apply to non-humans provided they follow the processes of becoming nomadic and practising nomadism. In response to this assertion, the question of whether to call Kusanagi human becomes less important in considering her state as a nomad. As for her radical traits, I have already begun to indicate areas where she does not fit into the purely pragmatic and purely good/evil categories that readers expect of cyborgs. But to fully expand on what I mean by her radical ontologies I must continue this discussion in the next section.

Before moving on to the second section of this literary analysis, I will make one final point regarding the ownership over superhero or cyborg bodies. Humans, aliens, and superheroes have agency over their bodies provided they serve the country an appropriate, expected capacity. They may, however, betray the expectations of their wards and enemies by abandoning that duty at any moment, thus expressing agency over when and how to act. Cyborgs do not have the same flexibility to make choices as the technology and materials which sustain their bodies need regular maintenance, which they inexplicably cannot perform on themselves. This does not mean they are entirely without agency.

Cyborgs demonstrate radical ontologies as superhumans because they operate as rhizomes, connecting one system of imagination, one reality, and many scientific and pseudo-sciences together into one entity in a literary setting. The powerful, superheroic body is imagined to be free of social constraints, but it is the opposite. Superheroes are more constrained compared to average citizens by the country's liturgical and moral codes, hence they are

³⁶⁹ Scott, p. 143.

often criticised as being hypocritical or fascist. The protagonists of *Ghost* are subject to the same expectations, but fall under less scrutiny, therefore their autonomy is far greater than the traditional superhero. Cyborgs of *Ghost* are unafraid of being branded as rogue or unacceptable. Rather, Kusanagi frequently shows distastes for the weakness of humans in the face of capitalism, while being equally as devoted to the pursuit of money as her colleagues. Her boss, Aramaki laments ironically, 'How fragile the human heart is... People get caught up in worldly events and seek nothing but pleasure, becoming machines pursuing profit and efficiency, or mere consumption units'.³⁷⁰ In essence she becomes nomadic in her movement from her organic form, but simultaneously normalised as her desire for money instigated the migration, and physically as her body represents a standardised unit. The largest difference between Kusanagi's cyborg and a superhero is the matter of subjectivity. Full bodied cyborgs in *Ghost* are always regarded as the property of an organic master. In many ways this may impact the opinion of a cyborg charged with protecting the humanity which denies its equality. In one scene where Kusanagi and her boss Mr. Aramaki are called to investigate the theft of a cyborg, Kusanagi is mistaken for the (cyborg) product. Rather than speaking for herself, Mr. Aramaki answers for her.

Aah, Mr. Aramaki... Thank you so much for retrieving our robot!

Hands off! She's one of mine...government property!³⁷¹

The cultural attitude of *Ghost* shows all who resemble and have cognitive abilities similar or superior to humans may enjoy the privilege of relative equality. Changes made to full-body cyborgs are both cosmetic and corporeal in the sense that embodiment changes, thus subjectivity changes with it. If cyborgs do not experience the world in a relatable human way, their original humanity falls into doubt. As there is no singular, or measurable, way to set parameters on subjective experience, qualifying subjects as human is relegated to the discretion of the individual and how "human" they appear to themselves and others around them. When discussing perceived humanity, it may be more prudent to discuss the identity of artificial bodies, as they themselves occupy a spectrum which ranges from cybernetic implants to full-body cyborgs. The spectrum of perceived humanity could also include

³⁷⁰ Shirow, p. 148.

³⁷¹ Ibid, p. 239.

artefacts that began as completely robotic and have developed sentience. Scott, discussing the embodiment of non-organic sentient bodies, adds:

[T]he Artificial Body does not simply seek cosmetic change. This search for an authentic “identity” is really a search to be accepted as “human”. The adoption of the Perfect Superhuman Body as their form is not enough to make them “authentic”.³⁷²

Kusanagi’s intelligence began as human, and although her body has become completely inorganic, and her brain enhanced, she claims to possess her human “ghost”, relating to an intangible essence of humanity. She shows none of the shortcomings described by Scott, and it is because she does not possess them that the Puppet Master proposes their union as he/it fits the description of the ‘chief shortcomings’ attributed to computers. This means she is not bound by the same limitations as other cybernetic identities, such as robots or androids who do not possess a ‘ghost’. To fully understand Kusanagi’s radical attributes, we must look beyond the super heroic aspects of the cyborg body and delve into the choices which she has made governing her sexuality, profession, and recreation to better understand how she, as a cyborg, is a radical example of nomadic ontology.

Before she became a nomad, Kusanagi sought the cyborgification because of her desire for power and money. She chose to form the assemblage realising that the cost would throw her humanity into doubt. Her desire for money and her physical body are problematic for analysis as I indicated that her body was confused for that of another model. This means she chose not to or did not have the means of choosing a customised, individual appearance for her body. On the other hand, it can be argued that her ‘ghost’ creates enough identity so that such aesthetic customisations become unnecessary. I have indicated the potential for her to exemplify radical ontologies as a cyborg, but for the moment I have laid out only the normalised assemblages in detail.

In my second section I will explore the radical aspect of cyborg ontologies in *Ghost in the Shell* by discussing how Kusanagi subverts anthropocentric assumptions of cybernetic bodies as only having pragmatic ontologies, her indulgence in addictive behaviours, and through the assemblage of being a female-cyborg-soldier.

³⁷² Scott, p. 144.

Radical Cyborg Ontologies – Subversion of Pleasure and Gendered Expectations

In this section, I will examine the ways in which a cyborg body allows Kusanagi to pursue radical ontologies that do not correspond to embodied or gendered expectations of cyborgs. My use of the term radical here means to subvert through non-conformity, and Kusanagi's non-conformity is motivated from her all-too-human, cybernetically enhanced desires. The first expectation she subverts will relate to her use of mind-altering drugs, including narcotics and alcohol. The second expectation she subverts relates to the expectations of female-gendered cyborgs, and their position of dominance in relation to male primarily organic humans.

Ghost posits a radically different cyborg ontology from traditional expectations of helpless, dependent or resistant automatons who seek to either serve humanity or destroy it (and fail). The tradition of these typical utopian and dystopian tropes of cyborgification are prevalent across comics, manga, and cinematography. Kusanagi does not conform to stereotypical codes of behaviour for full-body cybernetic lifeforms seen in any other science fiction writing around the time *Ghost* was written. My analysis of this feature of the manga is prompted in response to Bolton's essay 'The Mecha's Blind Spot', in which he discusses *Ghost* briefly alongside other classics such as *Patlabor 2*. His argument is that:

The trope of a body that is both enhanced and invaded by technology is a staple in anime. It is also an idea that has attracted the interest of literary critics, a number of whom have seen human-machine hybrids in a range of texts as figures that embody or solve the dilemmas we face in our increasingly electronic and virtual culture.³⁷³

While he sees the marriage of human and machine as a way to solve certain concerns of embodiment in increasingly technology-centric societies, he falls into the same trap as Moravec, neglecting the importance of subjectivity and its embodiment. Kusanagi, from near the beginning of the narrative shows that she enjoys consuming alcohol as she is seen sitting outside a traditional Japanese-style house, accompanied by Batou and her other

³⁷³ Christopher Bolton, 'The Mecha's Blind Spot: "Patlabor 2" and the Phenomenology of Anime', *Science Fiction Studies*, 29.3 (2017), 453–74 (p. 454) <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/424111>> [Accessed 21 November 2019].

colleagues. They are participating in a tradition in Japan known as flower viewing, indicated by the cherry blossoms around them. Kusanagi is drinking from a traditional Japanese saké (rice wine) drinking cup.³⁷⁴ Alcohol has no pragmatic function for the running of her inorganic body, but she can enjoy the intoxicating effects, and continue to function without the inebriating side effects. The assemblage she forms between alcohol-technology-brain form an unusual combination, which I would argue go beyond the expectations of cyborgs in fiction, as I would argue her drunkenness is not feigned.

The organic and inorganic parts of her assemblage synergise in ways that are unusual for cyborgs who often wrestle to reconcile their inhumanity with what they once had. Wong Kin Yuen, in comparing the cultural imagination employed in generating the cities of *Blade Runner* and *Ghost*, raises the question of the fractured body of the humanoid in cyborg films. He argues:

It is not just on this large scale of global cultural flows (particularly of technoscape, mediascape, and ideoscape) that fractal aesthetics are relevant to *Ghost in the Shell*. On a smaller level—namely, that of the body—the idea of the fractured body of the humanoid hybrid has been popular in cyborg films; and it receives rather interesting if not controversial treatment in this Japanese anime. Corporeality, as we remember, is one of the four Cs listed by Frances Bonner to delineate a general pattern of plotting in cyberpunk films, which emphasize the wetware of mutable bodies.³⁷⁵

Unlike Yuen's fractured humanoid hybrid body, Kusanagi presents little evidence of wrestling with her inhumanity. For the most part, she uses the cyborg embodiment to enhance her leisurely indulgences in ways that her human body would have been incapable of supporting. Kusanagi seems to thrive on obtaining altered mental states, as her taste for them does not end with alcohol consumption. Far from the singularly pragmatic mindedness readers might expect (or might have expected at the time), Kusanagi is a selfish character as she pursues her desires to enjoy life outside of work. Her ontology of seeking pleasures through mind altering experiences lends itself to discussing the corporeality of embodiment as a large concern of cyborg ontology. It is because corporeality is both entwined with lived experience (including subjectivity) and consciousness (the way we mediate ourselves within a given environment). In this scene, Kusanagi is interrupted during her recreation time with

³⁷⁴ Shirow, p. 14.

³⁷⁵ Wong Kin Yuen, 'On the Edge of Spaces: "Blade Runner", "Ghost in the Shell", and Hong Kong's Cityscape', *Science Fiction Studies*, 27.1 (2016), 1–21 (p. 15) <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/4240846>> [Accessed 21 November 2019].

her friend where they have been indulging in the use of drugs. On being summoned, she states that she will report for duty.

Motoko, how could you!? This always happens, but still—you promised to spend your leave with us!

Well, the drug's locked out now, and my leave's been cancelled...

Hey, don't take the equalizer...!

When you leave make sure you lock the door. I'll call you later... Ta ta!³⁷⁶

This scene shows that cyborgs ontologically and linguistically can become indistinguishable from humans. The informality and unproductive use of Motoko (Kusanagi)'s time shows she can be as idle and hedonistic as any example humanity has to offer. The contrast between her enjoying illicit and hedonistic activities, which would leave a regular human unable to work productively as opposed to the constant productivity expected of her enhanced abilities, allows readers to question the merit of cyborgification for pragmatic functions. Readers watch Kusanagi paradoxically forming assemblages in ways that are contemporarily viewed upon as negative, but also managing to be a highly-functioning professional. The two images that readers must hold are paradoxical, yet the paradox extends itself further into her language. Kusanagi's language is a mixture of pragmatism and familiarity when she is still 'off duty'. Terms such as 'ta ta' indicating her farewell, and collocations such as 'locked out' indicating her ability to neutralise narcotics within her system create a mixture of function and playfulness which leaves readers wondering where the human ends and the cyborg begins.

Next, I will discuss how humour and violence towards female cyborg subjects create radical ontologies due to their drawing the reader's attention to the fact that Kusanagi is both female and cyborg simultaneously, whereas otherwise this fact could be forgotten. I argue that *Ghost* problematises traditional body politics related to gender. By traditional body politics, I mean the expectations of bodies in relation to masculinity and femininity. Earlier, I discussed Toffoletti's critique of Marilyn Manson's androgenous body when fused with technology could not be interpreted in the same way as the monsters of old.³⁷⁷ It is pertinent to revive this debate here because I made the distinction that posthuman bodies

³⁷⁶ Shirow, p. 57.

³⁷⁷ Toffoletti, p. 84.

were not monstrous, because monstrosity connotes a normalised and powerless representation of a subject. The posthuman body, however, can be nomadic, indicating the conscious control it has over its assemblage-forming ability and the agency of self-presentation. This brings me to my query of Kusanagi as an example of performing radical nomadic ontologies as a female cyborg. To resolve my stance on whether Kusanagi has her own agency, I believe that she has agency to a certain point while Kusanagi continues to fulfil her duties to her employer. She can act and present herself however she chooses.

Her radical nomadic embodiment begins with her choice to present as a woman. Full-body cyborgs can choose the gender of their body. Thus, they have the agency to self-present their sex. The choice of the gender for their exterior can be based on their perception of their identity, sexual preferences, or they may choose to remain the same sex that they were as a human. Kusanagi, while overtly female, embodies many stereotypically male attributes such as strength, intelligence, and power, leading to an ambiguity on how to read her. If she is to be read as a cyborg, the non-physical traits are easily read as conventional cyborg ontology; as a female, her attractive physique and sexual interests are read conventionally, as I will show later. As a cyborg and a female, her conventionalised literary ontologies are juxtaposed as such a figure embodies the powerlessness of a female while demonstrating the practicality of a machine.³⁷⁸

The binary dichotomy of male/female no longer functions within the power dynamics of *Ghost*, but not all tropes associated with male and female treatment of the opposite gender are negated by the appearance of full-cyborg bodies. In this section I will discuss the relationship Kusanagi has with her colleagues. Specifically, I will focus on how humour and violence are received by Kusanagi. I will also show how violence is enacted against female cyborg bodies, both towards Kusanagi and to cyborgs built for pleasure.

Kusanagi subverts gender expectations of female cyborgs through her use and acceptance of humour towards her choice to self-present as a female. During a mission near the beginning of the narrative, Kusanagi suggests despite not possessing a reproductive system, that she continues to menstruate. In a telepathic conversation between Batou and Kusanagi, Batou comments:

³⁷⁸ Note: See *Blade Runner* for clear examples of these tropes.

Damn, there's a lot of noise in your brain, Major.

Hey, I'm on my period!³⁷⁹

Kusanagi and Batou are not only colleagues but also friends, so this is not the only moment in which humour concerning her gender appears. The direct attention to her being female clashes with her function as a cyborg in the tense scene. The inconvenience caused by there being 'noise' in Kusanagi's brain is excused by her being female. This suggests that the traits female and cyborg are at odds with one another, yet she is considered superior to her co-workers as being the only member titled with a military rank. The ironic linking of female with suboptimal shows how Kusanagi through humour subverts gender stereotypes. While she could simply state she needs maintenance, she instead implies that her inorganic body is somehow at fault for the discomfort she causes, and that Batou is being insensitive to her needs. It is a radical assemblage which mocks both her outward gender and humanity simultaneously. By ironically evoking the social expectation that Batou is insensitive and should treat her more sensitively, the two cyborgs enjoy a joke about their emulated humanity without compromising the efficiency of their performance. I can conclude from this one scene that as the terms male and female are interchangeable through a simple procedure for full-body cyborgs, attributing a gender to distinguish Kusanagi as female almost becomes superfluous, yet humorously, her retorts make it clear which gender she has assigned herself.

In a second instance of humour at the expense of Kusanagi's female cyborg form, one scene in particular plays on Kusanagi's role as woman as she jokes with Batou before entering a situation which could compromise either her essence (or fundamental identity) or her life. In this case she is forming an assemblage which is radical in the sense that it carries lethal consequences. However, despite the imminent threat to Kusanagi's life, the moment before she enters the psyche of the dying antagonist, the Puppet Master, to gain information which would be lost upon 'her/its' death, Batou reassures Kusanagi:

Don't worry, Major, I'll make sure you don't get "pregnant"

With that crude concept-remark, his system just quivered³⁸⁰

³⁷⁹ Shirow, p. 18.

³⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 268.

Batou is subtly reassuring Kusanagi that he will not allow the Puppet Master to usurp her body, effectively ending her life. As Kusanagi connects to the Puppet Master, she comments that the Puppet Master reacts to the comment, whether humorously or with disgust is subjective. She forms an assemblage between their two psyches, making her own existence no longer singular but multiple. While Kusanagi and the Puppet Master both inhabit female bodies, there is a connotation of penetration as they become linked through data ports. The joke refers to this penetration, yet it is Kusanagi who is considered female in this exchange.

In this scene the irony of the connection between Kusanagi and the Puppet Master is two-fold. Firstly, due to the same-sex encounter of the physical bodies, and secondly due to the Puppet Master having no gender. William O. Gardner explores the implications of the Puppet Master's dubious embodiment. He claims that the incorporeal Puppet Master must borrow the body of a cyborg to enter the realm of the physical (or, in terms of the film's aesthetics, to enter the realm of the representable).

However, this attempt at bridging the gap between the Net and the physical human realm is prone to the same awkwardness and violence described above. The female cyborg body borrowed by the Puppet Master is mismatched with the Puppet Master's male voice, while the cyborg body itself is immediately exposed to violence: wandering naked onto a city street, it is struck by a car, recovered by Section 9, and subjected to various painful-looking tests and procedures by the Section 9 technicians, before being snatched away by a rival agency.³⁸¹

When discussing how violence is related to the radical nomadic ontologies of *Ghost* there are two ways to examine its existence. The first method concerns analysing violence directed at helpless female cyborgs. This is partially helpful as violence and the female body are a trope throughout this manga. The second most productive way it can be viewed is how the empowered, female cyborg body exerts violence on other (male, unenhanced) bodies and has violence acted on it. I will explore the ways Kusanagi contravenes expectations of exerting power on others in the next section of this analysis. For the moment, I will examine how violence is directed at the body which has been commandeered by the Puppet Master, and how gender stereotypes pervade when partially enhanced cyborgs use Kusanagi's enhanced brain as a tool.

³⁸¹ William O Gardner, 'The Cyber Sublime and The Virtual Mirror: Information and Media in The Worlds of Oshii Mamoru and Kon Satoshi', *Canadian Journal of Film Studies*, 18.1 (2009), 44–70 (p. 47) <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/24411782>> [accessed 21 November 2019].

Gardiner's assertion clearly shows the difficulty of representing simulated genders when trying to reconcile gender, technology, and violence in the same assemblage. The Puppet Master represents an existence 'born' on the internet. In acquiring a body, it potentially gained the right to continue living. The futuristic society in *Ghost* is no more ready to accommodate new lifeforms than we are today. Oshii depicts the Puppet Master as forcing Kusanagi to procreate with it/him. The manga conversely proposes a synthesis between the infinite knowledge of the Net (internet) and the vitality of humanity.

Carl Silvio comments that *Ghost* appears at first sight to subvert radically the power dynamics inherent in dominant structures of gender and sexual difference, while covertly re-inscribing them.³⁸² I disagree with this statement, preferring to argue that Shirow's manga does not compromise the new autonomy that cyborg females have gained through their augmentation. Kusanagi shows more compassion than her male colleagues in certain situations, however, she acts with the stereotypically male professional callousness as any within the world of *Ghost*. While she is not liberated from being used as a tool, she is re-inscribed as a female from more uncertain ground. Silvio, showing his awareness of the cinematic adaption adds that in reading Kusanagi in this way, we veer towards an elimination of conventional gender attributes, with regards to her relationship with Batou, (Silvio's unfamiliarity with the textual versions of *Ghost* becomes apparent when noticing that he fails to spell 'Batou' correctly throughout the article). Most notably, the Major and Batou are textually represented as hyperbolic extremes of femininity and masculinity respectively, a female body that corresponds to a contemporary, Western ideal of feminine beauty in its physical proportions alongside a gigantically muscled masculine frame.³⁸³

Most problematically is Silvio's concept of the cyborg body's position as a narrative signifier which enables bodies to become free of conventionalised associations. He asserts that:

Ghost in the Shell, however, visually deploys these bodies as narrative signifiers that have been stripped of the qualities they conventionally signify: passivity and aggressiveness. [...] they exemplify something akin to free variation-that is, the

³⁸² Carl Silvio, 'Refiguring the Radical Cyborg in Mamoru Oshii's "Ghost in the Shell"', *Science Fiction and Queer Theory*, 26.1 (1999), 54–72 (p. 56) <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/4240752>>. [Accessed 21 November 2019]

³⁸³ *Ibid*, p. 63.

material differences between these bodily signifiers do not similarly correspond to differing signifieds.³⁸⁴

Silvio's paradigm of stripping the abstract signifying qualities from both cybernetically enhanced genders leaves them as free-floating signified, which can attract whichever ideas that they chose is untenable. There can be no free element surrounding the cyborgs of *Ghost* as they are purpose-built. Kusanagi and Batou's affinity for combining danger with cyborg humour offer an insight into how cyborgs of Shirow's fictional near future can subvert some expectations around them concerning their humour, gender, and choice on whether to conform to these expectations. Silvio's claim has merit in that Kusanagi's body is designed to wield a lot of power while retaining its feminine charm and this pragmatic, yet playful design has become aspects of her assemblages.

This section demonstrated how Kusanagi and Batou exhibit ontologies that show some of the radical nomadic ontologies that cyborgs can demonstrate. I discussed the ways they use humour in the face of violence to showcase the irony of associating genders with cyborgs, and that their uncertain humanity becomes something of a farce. At the same time, violence acted against Kusanagi creates a complex assemblage of an almost feminist annoyance towards men using her technology in a way that risks her life. Whether or not a cyborg can still be a feminist is not in question at this point, but the recognition that it is not only the efficiency of her colleague's actions which impact on Kusanagi's mind is relevant to observe as it shows that she is more than a mere automaton with a human brain.

I will move from Kusanagi to discuss Batou, her partially upgraded colleague and friend. Already in this section I portrayed him as playful but as I will show, his psychology and therefore ontology is as affected by his upgrades as Kusanagi.

Grey Morality – Radical Cyborg Ontology

This section examines how Kusanagi subverts expectations of cyborgs to usurp the agency of a human colleague, Togusa. This not only presents itself as an opportunity to revisit the subversion of expectations surrounding females, cyborgs, and violence alongside my

³⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 63.

discussion of radical nomadic ontologies of forming assemblages with non-consenting colleagues. In exercising violence over her human colleague, Kusanagi presents herself as having a grey morality which is uncharacteristic of nomads.

Togusa the human junior colleague, finds himself in a situation where the human body is a minority embodiment, and as such, human agency falls under threat in a reverse anthropocentric environment. As Kusanagi contemplates the extent of her own agency as a cyborg, she devalues the agency of other human characters around her, thus the precious element of agency becomes secondary to the mission at hand. This brings to light aspects of cyborg ontology which can be problematic. The implications of cyborg lifeforms being able to take control of humans with minimal cybernetic enhancements creates a speculative body politics which could become an issue with emerging technologies. The body that was designed to better serve its human masters demonstrates the ability with ease to become the master reversing the role of machine and human.

In this assemblage that Kusanagi thrusts upon Togusa, he becomes subject to a reverse anthropocentrism. I call this phenomenon 'technopocentrism'. It describes situations where technological based lifeforms have taken the preferential, powerful slot and left conventional and traditional humans to suffer prejudice as a minority group. Silvio's claim is:

Major's enhanced cyborg body, however, enables her to perform athletic and martial feats that consistently outstrip anything of which Togusa is capable. This increased ability in combat effectively positions her as his superior, though there is never any direct indication that she in any way officially outranks him. Thus, even the most cursory first reading of the film suggests that cyborg technology has endowed a female character with a marked degree of power and positioned Togusa in the more "feminized" role of inferiority. Major makes the decisions in their partnership while Togusa finds himself relegated to the role of "sidekick."³⁸⁵

I argue that Kusanagi takes on a more parental stance to her interaction with Togusa (whether being the mother or the father is ambiguous). I do not mean parental in a protective way, but instead in a pedagogical way, chiding him to think and behave more pragmatically, and in the sense that she has the right to impose her wisdom and decisions on him because he does not know better. In a scene directly before Kusanagi and Togusa

³⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 58.

pursue someone for questioning, Kusanagi chides Togusa on his choice of weaponry and his extensive time practising long range shooting in his free time.

What we **really** need, Togusa, is not sharpshooting skills, so much as the ability to get close enough to make **sure** the enemy can be killed. If you want to play at long-range sniping, you can always go shoot an elephant at 500 miles with a miniature cruise missile.³⁸⁶

Kusanagi's enhanced mental and physical prowess enables her to accurately shoot distant targets without the need for practice that Togusa requires. As such, she views his investment of time as wasted when he could obtain the same skills as her at the cost of some of his humanity. This is clearly a trade they each value differently. As Ursula K. Heise indicates, aliens and Cyborgs are traditionally reaffirming the humanness which Darwinian theory once blurred. However, Kusanagi actively shapes her interactions to berate human inefficiencies, subtly praising the efficiency of her cyborg ontology in ways that contradict traditional cyborg functions in literature.³⁸⁷ With her stance clear on her apathy or disapproval for human inefficiency clear, it foreshadows her moral stance of usurping that inefficient agency as pragmatic when required.

The difference between Togusa and his cybernetically enhanced colleagues is exemplified in two scenes, the first of which between Kusanagi and himself reads like a joke:

Your sentiments are touching, Togusa, but keep'em on hold for now, okay?

Hey, I'm not a robot, Major.

Ha! That's why you're still a rookie...³⁸⁸

While this seems like an innocent exchange, Togusa is reminded that his place is unofficially beneath his technologically blended superiors. The violence in this scene against Togusa is subtle, but in other instances it is tangible. It is one of many themes of technology having conquered humanity due to humanity's need to maintain the machines for survival. The cyborg-human relationship here resembles the present human-animal companion species paradigm. By reaffirming Togusa's position as rookie, Kusanagi implicitly reinforces her own

³⁸⁶ Shirow, p. 62.

³⁸⁷ Ursula K Heise, 'The Android and the Animal', *Modern Language Association*, 124.2 (2009), 503–10 (p. 505) <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/25614291>> [Accessed 21 November 2019].

³⁸⁸ Shirow, p. 65.

place as the leader. This is a position that cyborgs do not often occupy due to their dependence of humans for maintenance and their perceived disposability. Humans in *Ghost* have become secondary players to the cyborgs they employ. In interpersonal relations between colleagues, cyborgs are considered superior, and seniority is based firstly on experience, secondly on ability and thirdly the degree of cybernetic enhancement they have undergone. This subordination of human to cyborg is subtle in its violence, but nevertheless, the human succumbs to the superiority of his cyborg superior. The scene conforms with the social imaginary of the apathy of cyborgs. It is not the case within *Ghost* as the characters clearly understand the comment as comical.

As I have already indicated, cyborgs as super heroic bodies traditionally adhere to a wholly good or evil role within literature. However, the cyborgs of *Ghost*, in particular the full-bodied cyborg Kusanagi, breaks away from tradition. Silvio suggests that our interaction with technology cannot resolve the social justice it aims to create. Instead, it further entangles humanity in webs of domination that cannot be reversed. Kusanagi's ability to take control over her mostly human colleagues (and likely any other human with a cyber brain if she had that desire), along with her position as leader, granted to her because of the extent of her cyborgification, represents these ontologies of dominance that Silvio has indicated. I have similarly considered the issue of cyborg and nomadic presentation throughout this thesis through showing how science fiction and dystopian writing are representations of the social imaginary. The genres are useful tools in exploring the potential implications of near-future technological and moral developments.

It is not, however, always the case that the image of the cyborg appeals to a hope for social justice while our actual material interactions with technology, our "real conditions of existence," further entangle us within networks of domination. [...] the radical cyborg is both validated and made to serve the interests of the dominant within a single fictional text.³⁸⁹

Once violence enters a system, it permeates the structures of both micro and macro scales. The violence of domination within the social imaginary emerges as attacks on agency within *Ghost*. In a situation where Kusanagi and Togusa are in the middle of a gun fight with someone they need to capture. Togusa aims to kill the suspect however, before he can pull the trigger, Kusanagi performs an operation remotely called a "ghost hack". It is the

³⁸⁹ Silvio, p. 55.

equivalent of taking remote control of his brain and remotely operating his body as though he were a robot. As Kusanagi is a full-body cyborg, she has abilities which un-augmented and less-enhanced cyborgs do not possess. This is an example of Silvio's radical cyborg exercising direct control over its human inferiors to serve the interests of those who they serve better than her biological colleague. Togusa's protest to the hijacking is clear:

How would you feel if a stranger had your ghost infiltration key even someone like **you**, Major...? I bet you wouldn't like it.

I just did it because you were aiming at his head. Dead men tell no tales—and we need info about the forces behind this.³⁹⁰

Naturally, the only reason she can impose her will on him is the fact that he has minor enhancements to his brain and therefore she is able to form a link between them. Technology, here, creates conditions which favour the most technologically enhanced entity. Kusanagi justifies her choice to remove Togusa's agency of killing the assailant, despite the risk of her intervention resulting in her colleague's death by placing the value of information above his life. Togusa is little more than a tool for Kusanagi, who is, herself, a governmental tool. To have equal value to and have the same agency as the gun he fires suppresses Togusa's humanity, invalidating the liberal humanist notion of having untouchable agency within a system.

Marking the end of this section, Silvio's words still resonate with what I have argued.

Kusanagi's sense of self thus does not derive from a supposedly interior source, from a "real self" that animates a body that physically establishes its identity, but rather from her relation to the organization to which she belongs. Because Section Nine actually owns the material underpinnings of her subjectivity, her sense of personhood cannot be thought of apart from its bureaucratic organizational structure. Major's body thus does not exist as an ontologically stable presence that guarantees her identity, but as an ensemble of parts that circulate within a larger system.³⁹¹

The "real self" that Silvio mentions is problematic as nothing about Kusanagi's body is organic and, therefore, original. The question of originality fades only as we question whether Kusanagi counts as human. Kusanagi's state of cyborgism allows for a unique and radical ontology which is not only different from human ontologies, and morality but also

³⁹⁰ Shirow, p. 88.

³⁹¹ Silvio, pp. 59–60.

breaks with traditional representations of cyborgs. I demonstrated in this section how Kusanagi's cyborg ontology is radical in its assemblage containing grey morality. By this, I mean to show that she represents neither an entirely good, nor an entirely bad character. Her belief in the superiority as a cyborg, which affords her the uncommon position (for a cyborg) as a leader, fuels her belief in the limited value of human agency over the pragmatism of the mission. The issue of morality is not that she believes herself superior to humanity, as in many ways she is, but that she freely exercises unethical violence to control her subordinates when she perceives they are acting sub-optimally due to their humanity. Using her cyborg enhancements not only to enhance pleasure, but the precision of violence she can leverage over her co-workers is a radical ontology that is unique to a cyborg.

The final section of my analysis ties together my discussions from the previous three sections to subvert anthropocentric expectations of science fiction literature, relating back to the overarching theme of this thesis.

Radical Ontologies of Cyborgs and how Kusanagi Subverts Anthropocentrism

This final section will explore how Kusanagi is constantly under threat of anthropocentric over-coding, and how as a nomad she highlights the necessity to continue to expand the rights of humanity to other alternative ontologies through literary analysis.

Ghost is set in the not-too-distant future, juxtaposing cyborgs with their human cousins. Shirow appears to be making a subtle statement on the need to consider the rights and ontologies of cyborgs, who are different from their soulless android and robot predecessors, as he becomes much more informative than is convention in manga using the gutters (margins) as metatext. At approximately the midpoint of the text we are arrested by a facility which creates cyborg shells for human brain implantation, or for programming without the need of human components. As we are introduced to the process of creating full-body cyborgs, Shirow adds in the gutter exactly what is understood by the term cyborg. He clarifies that 'A "cyborg" refers to a human whose body has been partially or almost

completely altered by the use of substitute organs and parts'.³⁹² This explanation appears late in the narrative, having followed Kusanagi for much of the narrative and having already come to conclusions about her ontologies. Shirow continues by referencing published research conducted much later than the original publication of this manga (and therefore signifying that he is concerned with keeping the reader informed of global progression towards making this possible future a reality). He explains:

It is also difficult to imagine how artificial versions of some parts of the body- [...] For those who read Japanese and are interested in knowing more, allow me to suggest the now slightly dated book, *Biomaterials – An Approach to Artificial Organs*, published by Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun. The author is Dr. Yoshito Ikada.³⁹³

These revisions in later editions of the book, and the knowledge that Shirow demonstrates of the subject area to reference texts, lends the fictional world of *Ghost* credibility. *Ghost* dates Ikada's 2005 publication which is referenced by Shirow. While full-body cyborgs are an extreme example of where technology cannot keep pace with Shirow's imagination, he shows incredible sensitivity to the corporeality of the re-embodied experience as I showed above with Kusanagi's dislike of rain. This is an example of cyborg-esque subjectivity which is enhanced through considering how to portray a cyborg to readers. As the pane which holds this scene commands the top right section of the page, the reader recognises the information concerning what it means to live inside a cyborg shell.

I believe that re-addressing the radical aspects of the previous three sections can also demonstrate how Kusanagi has operated nomadically throughout the narrative. I will begin with the criticism of gender presentation in *Ghost*. While Yuen criticises the representation of Kusanagi as being a symbol of the perfect female body, I find these criticisms to be based within contemporary attitudes of gender and body presentation. For completeness, Yuen argues that:

[B]ecause Major Kusanagi is presented in a "perfect" female body (often sans clothes), she can be criticized, especially by feminist critics who interpret her as a commercial object for the male gaze. Indeed, if one looks through the original comic strip by Masamune Shirow, one will find more occasions for such an objection. Moreover, by simply noting the bifurcation of the title, we may assume that the so-

³⁹² Shirow, p. 101.

³⁹³ Ibid, p. 101. Note: See Appendix B for full quotation.

called "theme" of the film remains confined to a Cartesian duality-of-body-and-mind paradigm, and by extension, the binarisms surrounding gender issues.³⁹⁴

Yuen is not mistaken in criticising the potential sexualisation of Kusanagi, however, he overlooks that her value as a tool which is more coveted than her body. However, the retention of an aesthetically appealing and sexualised body serves to act as a point of vanity and pleasure for the human who selects to become a full-bodied cyborg. It allows them to retain aspects of their humanity and retain the options to engage in sexual activities if they have that desire. Yuen argues that Kusanagi's metal body is female, but as I argue that the connection between body and sexuality becomes problematic when discussing cyborgs. Yuen's argument falls short of the mark, as rather than requiring Kusanagi to become an asexualised, or neutered female, she retains the full functionality of her body without the denial of her sexuality. At the same time, Kusanagi at no point becomes an object of desire, repulsion, or curiosity from those around her unless on her own terms. On the radical assemblage of gender, Kusanagi controls her identity through not only selecting her gender but also selecting the terms on which she presents herself as sexualised.

Returning to my discussion of Kusanagi's grey morality, as a hero with ambiguous morality, I questioned whether her morality limited her from being a nomad due to the over-coding she performed on Togusa. However, nomads, as posthumans, are not bound by morality. This is not to say that nomads or posthumans view all ontologies as viable or acceptable, hence their selectivity about which ontologies to perform. In this case, Kusanagi is 'super' when accounting for her physical and mental abilities, which exceed normalised citizens. Her boss, Mr. Aramaki, is a righteous character. To an extent, she operates as an agent of his will. Kusanagi therefore acts 'heroically' and can be called a superhero. However, Kusanagi does not attempt to aid those who commit injustices towards citizens. Rather, she remains neutral and is often callous in her response to the suffering of less fortunate people. For example, when she and Batou are in the middle of a sting operation, they observe young orphans working in sweatshop conditions so that they may have accommodation and the minimal amount of nutrition to survive. Batou is unsettled by these conditions, but Kusanagi is objective in her response.

Wonder why the human rights agency doesn't raise a fuss about this.

³⁹⁴ Yuen, p. 15.

Because the water filters the kids are making are more important than human rights, that's why. Hey, people are cruel.³⁹⁵

The fictional world thrives on a capitalist ideology, prioritising the acquisition of money and power. Life, in the age of roboticization have a reduced value, both monetarily and intrinsically within the system. Kusanagi is as much a consumer as any other citizen, as is seen on many occasions with her consumption of alcohol, drugs, and her plethora of clothing. She is seen even willingly humbling herself to the human Aramaki, someone she could easily overpower. 'Shit! You old fart!! Made us look like idiots **again!** Just make sure you pay us top dollar hon...'³⁹⁶ Yet, the reality is that she wants to please Aramaki because he controls how much money she receives, supervises the maintenance of her body and the training she undergoes. Kusanagi obeys the orders of normalised systems to pursue her desires. Her complicity risks compromising her state as a nomad difficult, but I conclude that it does not compromise her status as a true nomad. A true nomad is a figure which is in full control over their assemblage-forming ability, and which can intervene in a system with the least amount of disruption. Most importantly, they may stabilise into normalised ontology at any point before resuming nomadic practices again. By this definition, she can start and cease nomadic activity of her own volition.

In a final example between Kusanagi and Batou, we see how Kusanagi took advantage of the world situation and the availability of technology to empower herself as a cyborg. 'If everyone had all their rights the world'd be at peace and we'd be out of a job'.³⁹⁷ Her existence relies on her ability to defend national interests and assumes that she, or her State, has an enemy. She does not desire to eradicate all threats to peace, otherwise it would be the same as desiring her own obsolescence. Therefore, her moral code was always in question when she chooses not to kill villains, but instead capture them (as she knows that many will be "allowed" to escape or be traded back to their countries).

Ghost is an indication of the rapidly closing gap between humans and cyborgs. Kusanagi's body is an extension and an enhancement of her agency so that she may obtain what she desires. She has a powerful and robust connection to her body and the opportunities it

³⁹⁵ Shirow, p. 24.

³⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 52.

³⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 140.

presents to her. It is subtly hinted in the narrative that she may have opted for cyborgification to escape a life of poverty. In a scene where she encounters orphans who are being worked as slaves, one stops her and asks:

Thank God, ma'am! You've come to finally free us, haven't you?

What?! What do you want? Do you just want to eat and contribute nothing, to be brainwashed by media trash? To sacrifice the nation's future for your own selfishness?

But...but that's not what...

Listen, kid—you've got a ghost, and a brain... and you can access a cyber brain. Create your own future.³⁹⁸

The relationship that Kusanagi has with her body is like our own relationship with technology as it liberates her from a life of isolation, and allows her to network with experiences and resources that would otherwise be impossible to obtain. These assemblages are formed voluntarily, and they form crucial parts of Kusanagi's and our own everyday lives. Kusanagi's desires come across clearly through the narrative, from her love of drinking and drugs to her sexual desires. Kusanagi is suggesting that the orphan, who has nothing but his brain and a ghost, has everything he needs to become independent. Kusanagi's statement suggests he could trade his privileged human body for cyborgification, which invites the question of whether she views the trade as having lost anything. Kusanagi is bound to other humans, namely her employer for bodily maintenance. The orphan is tied to the people who work him on the edge of starvation to earn enough money to keep him sheltered. Kusanagi makes a poignant and valid point; there are limits to freedom no matter which situation they are in.

Orbaugh rightly argues that cyborgs already walk among us due to our ability to utilise technology to control certain medical conditions. However, Orbaugh raises concerns that cyborgs will be less easily placated compared to their robotic predecessors:

Control of the body and body boundaries is clearly an important node of anxiety being played out through many cyborg narratives. [...] The classic robotic bodies that appear in traditional science fiction are perfect, completely controllable. They represent an ideal version of the modernist conception of the body/self. But the

³⁹⁸ Shirow, p. 45.

conceptual price that must be paid for our increasing attempts to control the body is the recognition that the repressed always returns.³⁹⁹

The pinnacle of increased control is what we see from Kusanagi, able to not only consume whatever she desires, but also liberate herself from inconvenient side effects. Her body represents a transhumanist dream of efficiency and liberation while at the same time a profound problem for posthumans. She represents a new alternative race of humanity that exercises its ability to consume, not out of necessity but for pleasure. The enhanced pleasure experienced by cyborg bodies and the ability to network at faster speeds in more versatile ways also blurs the boundaries of the cyborg. Her body, contrary to Orbaugh's claim, is not muted; it is irrelevant due to the possibility of exchanging it at any time. However, there remains a corporeality to Kusanagi's body. Her brain and spinal column remain human. Damaging either of the two results in the loss of her freedom as a cyborg, and at worst, her loss of life. The recognition of her continued mortality, maintains her link to humanity and draws her back from walking among the gods, as with Deleuze's first vision of nomads, back to negotiating their place within the world of *Ghost*.

Orbaugh is potentially considering that the control exercised over the body relates to a state-mandated physical control over bodies as opposed to liturgical, or sociological control. As Kusanagi has control over her self-presentation, as she is able to hide the fact that she is a cyborg from civilians. She has the agency of choosing to blend in or reveal herself to those around her. Kusanagi also has the agency of forming assemblages, or networks with artefacts and people around her, depending on the circumstances she finds herself in. In this way, she has relative control over what crosses the boundaries of her body in the same way nourishment and information constantly cross and are repelled from human bodies. Because of this control Kusanagi, like humans, is responsible for her actions and is therefore accountable as a nomad for her sense of ethics, speech, and ontology.

I have argued that Kusanagi has her own agency to decide when to act and is therefore accountable for her grey morality. In the scene I will discuss, Kusanagi in the middle of a mission encounters a runaway cyborg child and must decide whether to announce herself to the boy and help him or to remain hidden and prioritise her mission. I will show how she not

³⁹⁹ Sharalyn Orbaugh, 'Sex and the Single Cyborg: Japanese Popular Culture Experiments in Subjectivity', *Science Fiction Studies*, 436–52 (p. 443) <<https://doi.org/10.2307/4241109>>.

only chooses the latter but is also apathetic to the consequences that the boy faces. I argue that memories are essential to an individual, as experiences shape future desires and actions. Therefore, I must also state that cyborgs, too, have rights to retain their memories as they have human brains. In *Ghost*, there are several times where the threat of losing one's memories takes place, and such processes are strictly government controlled or entirely banned. But still we encounter a situation for example, when a young orphan who has tried to escape from his workhouse institution is captured.

Three escape attempts and they brainwash him...

Poor kid

He knows the rules. This is a suicide attempt.

Give into the pressure and there're only two choices... Ghost-Back or Ghost-out— Cyberbrainwash or death.⁴⁰⁰

While the brain is the property of the human to whom it is born, memories in *Ghost* may be transplanted inside them. Information today also has monetary value, hence the enormous amount of capital which changes hands to advertise and access confidential information on the internet. At stake is deciding what rights we should anticipate humans having as the relational proximity we have with bodies of data declines. The data about us may not belong to us if we leave such practices (even in fictional worlds) unquestioned. The existence of these fictional problems pre-empts consideration of anthropocentrism in wider contexts.

The potential to forcefully remove memories and to state it as a punishment alternative to death is discomfoting. Memories are a record of life and to have them removed is a symbolic death for a part of the Self. The notion of control over what goes in and out of the body, including memory, food, faeces, etc. is a clear demonstration of ontological control over our bodies. When we 'lose control' over what we put in or out, these are known as excessive behaviours, or disorders which need curing. Orbaugh makes a similar argument which I link to Kusanagi's alcohol and drug habits:

The body ingests or incorporates materials from "the outside"-food, oxygen, semen- changes them, and expels a different kind of material back to "the outside"-feces, carbon dioxide, baby. This conceptualizing of our bodies is basic to the construction of the unitary, bounded subject, permeable only within controlled limits. Having

⁴⁰⁰ Shirow, p. 33.

control over what we take in and when and how we expel wastes/products is part of the training and prerogative of the autonomous adult modern subject.⁴⁰¹

While Kusanagi demonstrates some autonomy over what she ingests and how it is metabolised, her time is restricted and on the authority of Aramaki. This restricted level of autonomy is also not unheard of, particularly among military personnel. Cyborgs are simultaneously unitary bounded subjects, in that their organic and inorganic components work while synthesised together. The ability to replace the inorganic components creates a multiplicity of selves through the various prosthetic appendages that can function as a part of the 'Self'. The subject is permeable within controlled limits, but those limits become more and more microscopic, until they fade into the sublime. Should then Kusanagi be held accountable for her inaction in helping the young cyborg? Having argued that despite being a cyborg with radical nomadic ontologies she does have agency, and therefore is an autonomous nomad. Therefore, I think she should be held accountable for her apathetic grey morality. This, too, is a feature of the nomad; the ability to control when to act and when to ignore the plight of others. Perhaps, though it lies beyond the scope of this analysis to make the claim, Kusanagi is no superhero, but she is the perfect nomad.

At the beginning of this literary analysis, I asked the question how the manga *Ghost in the Shell* uses the cyborg as a radical example of nomadic ontology? I made two assertions to help me infer an answer to this question. The first assertion I made was that the way in which *Ghost in the Shell* presents cyborgs problematises traditional humanist body politics. The manga shows this by positing a cyborg ontology, which is radically different from traditional depictions of cyborg subjects in science fiction writing. I then analysed three characters from the manga, Kusanagi, Batou, and Togusa; each of these three had a different element to offer my assertion. The first analysis talked about Kusanagi's superhuman body and the difficulties that it presented in discussing agency and the cyborg as superhero. Batou was presented alongside Kusanagi to demonstrate how these radical nomads use humour in the face of danger, and Togusa was analysed through his relationship as a sidekick with Kusanagi. The two types of violence (of control) she exercises over him show the dominance of the cyborg in social and professional settings. Finally, I addressed criticisms other scholars have had of *Ghost in the Shell*, mostly directed at Oshii's

⁴⁰¹ Orbaugh, p. 442.

cinematic interpretation of the manga.⁴⁰² I concluded that cyborgs force us to reconceptualise binary gender politics to include a spectrum of different entities, which connect together at any point as with rhizomes that I discussed in the first chapter.

My conclusion is that *Ghost in the Shell* presents a fusion of traditional human ontology and overlays it on to cyborg bodies. The overlay, while awkward, opens the floor for further discussion concerning cyborg subjectivity and agency. Should cyborgs feel desire, it promotes the idea that they can and will exercise their abilities to achieve certain goals. It also suggests that the moral code of a cyborg does not necessarily follow our own social moralistic codes, which has been ingrained and localised in different societies for centuries. Cyborgs are and will continue to be our image, our mirror; they are a reflection and the product of our social imagination which already walk the streets.

Chapter Conclusion

In this third and final chapter, I targeted the importance of embodiment, to both nomads and literary bodies, and its relation to nomadic ontologies and agency. I began by outlining nomadic embodiment as a site of activation for ideas and ontologies. This indicates that nomadic embodiment is a form of self-realisation, meaning nomads may choose to perform certain practices in spaces of which normalised bodies would not consider or approve. This causes nomadic bodies to be labelled as deviant or monstrous in an attempt by social or political milieux to remove agency from the non-conformative body through representation. I concluded that embodiment concerns not only physical entities, but also psychic elements which are bound up in socio-cultural processes, which indicates how bodies behave and what processes they are passively subject to. This raised the question of agency of bodily representation in literature and the way bodies can interact with both knowledge and narratives. These points were crucial to establish at the beginning of this

⁴⁰² Mamoru Oshii, *Ghost in the Shell* (Japan: Manga Entertainment, 1995), p. 106.

chapter as my literary analysis was heavily informed by the research I presented from the beginning.

The research of my first section was important to informing my literary analysis for two reasons. Firstly, because my literary analysis devoted much time to discussing non-human ontologies, and secondly, because of the medium of its narrative being a graphic novel. The risk of representing bodies in a politicised way was of great concern to me when reading other critics who were more familiar with the cinematic adaptation than the manga. This was problematic as Oshii's adaptation sexualised female bodies where the manga did not.

In my second section, I explored the difference between a nomadic body, which represents alternative human (and non-human) ontologies and monstrous bodies (which are re-presented bodies). It aimed to bridge the gap between our social and literary experiences of monstrosity in preparation for my analysis of non-human cyborgs at the end of the chapter. I concluded that because embodiment is connected to our lived experience of reality, it also impacts our agency and ability to self-present. Embodiment is bound with our ontologies, therefore signalling how we live, die, and seek pleasure. I also stated that nomadic embodiments are political, as they resist normalisation but are vulnerable to subjugation within social and political milieux. Non-normalised ontologies such as nomadism have their agency constantly challenged through technologies of the body employed within their social and political milieux. Nomads cannot avoid these pressures because they are situated and embodied within milieux. Furthermore, I challenged the notion that all posthumans are linked with the concept of body horror, which puts forward the idea that all posthuman bodies are associated with the horrific and sublime. Rather, I argued that monsters are representation of humans, non-humans, hybrids, nomads or posthumans as monstrous. Monstrosity is not the inherent quality of being monstrous; it is the invention of the monster through politicised alienation. Agency is based on the ability to self-create, self-present and self-proliferate; all qualities which nomads develop through the processes of becoming nomadic and practising nomadism. Finally, as all humans are situated and therefore embodied, they must form assemblages exterior to their own bodies to survive, thus eliminating the pure human myth. Humans must form assemblages with animals, technology, and other humans in order to survive. Faced with this revelation, nomads are

able to freely practice nomadism as nomads are always aware of the extent society allows for plasticity so that it may continue to function.

This multi-layered section of my chapter contributed to the understanding of cyborgs, not as alien or monstrous, but as having their own agencies and ontologies which are alternative to normalised human ontologies. In my discussion of cyborg gender and the disconnect between their physicality and their identities, I determined that the emergence of full-body cyborgs enables humans to change their sex as they choose. However, with partially enhanced humans, there is conflict of their purpose-built self and their organic bodies. Examples of this include Batou, who exemplifies his human prankster persona, and his serious hardened cop identity when he is on missions. Kusanagi continually subverts gender expectations with her female cyborg body, as she uses her hardened exterior to perform superhuman feats of athleticism, while at the same time denying the agency of her all-too-human colleague and junior Togusa through the use of her cybernetically enhanced brain. As for Kusanagi's identity, I explored moments where her pragmatic, machinic personality juxtaposes her human hedonistic character. It leads me to conclude that for full-body cyborgs who have reconciled their non-human lives, the connection between what they are (male, female, robot) and who they are (as in their assemblages formed through their desires) have little to do with one another.

In my final section I discussed my concerns surrounding the ethics of analysing graphic novels. I began by first talking about the meaning of bios/zoe in relation to ethics, then the problem of using graphic novels to represent normalised bodies in society relating to the bio-political dualism of the public body. I also argued that portraying or representing speculative, or minority bodies, could expose private bodies (those assemblages which do not conform to social expectations) to public scrutiny. The further danger is that spectacularising narrative points may damage the credibility of the narrative for the sake of entertainment. For *Ghost in the Shell* as a speculative piece of fiction, the plot was already spectacular. However, as I showed, many aspects of the world have been based on growing researching into these fields of cybernetics, and Shirow seems to have given careful thought to the aspects of his near-future society that he intended to satirise. I concluded that graphic novels allow for an investigation into the embodied experience of alternative (non-) humanities, and how revealing alternative ontologies in a visual medium can run the risk of

compromising the privacy of these hidden bodies who are concealed because they believe it ensures their continued survival. I also noted that along with these difficulties, graphic novels position themselves as productive sites for nomadic analysis due to their flexibility to portray visual information in non-linear, and to express highly subjective, or idiosyncratic experiences that are central to an alternative human ontology.

These conclusions became evident in my literary analysis as I discussed how cyborgification can free a female of the gender stereotypes that are commonplace in societies today, but simultaneously it creates an alternative humanity with its own problems. One instance of this is where Kusanagi and her friend discuss how cyborgs in general are discriminated against if they do not seem human enough. The links between physicality and sexuality may be cut free, but desire is still the driving force for cyborgs. The anthropocentrism which I have sought to challenge in this thesis meets a direct subversion through the exploration and acceptance of non-human ontologies, which do not spiral into entropy as with Ballard's nomads in Chapter One.

At the beginning of this literary analysis, I asked the following question: how does the manga *Ghost in the Shell* use the cyborg as a radical example of nomadic ontology? I made two assertions to help me infer an answer, which I will do at the end of my conclusion. The first assertion I made was that the way in which *Ghost in the Shell* presents cyborgs problematises traditional humanist body politics. I showed this by showing how the manga posits a cyborg ontology, which is radically different from traditional depictions of cyborg subjects in science fiction writing. I also presented three significant characters from the manga to help with my analysis: Motoko Kusanagi, Batou, and Togusa; each of these three had a different element to offer my assertion. The first analysis talked about how Kusanagi has a superhuman body and the difficulties that it presented in discussing agency and the cyborg as a superhero. Togusa was analysed through his relationship as a sidekick with Kusanagi. The two types of violence (of control) she exercises over him shows the dominance of the cyborg in social and professional settings. Finally, I spent some time discussing some of the criticisms other scholars have had of *Ghost in the Shell*, most of them directed at Oshii's cinematic interpretation of the manga. I concluded that cyborgs force us to reconceptualise binary gender politics to include a spectrum of different entities which connect at any point, as with rhizomes that I discussed in the first chapter.

My conclusion is that *Ghost in the Shell* presents a fusion of traditional human ontology and overlays it on to cyborg bodies. The overlay, while (as Gardner also states) is awkward, it opens the floor for discussing, most importantly, cyborg subjectivity and agency. Should cyborgs feel desire, it promotes the idea that they can and will exercise their abilities to achieve certain goals. What it suggests most of all is that the moral code of a cyborg does not necessarily follow our own social moralistic codes, which has been ingrained and localised in different societies for centuries. Cyborgs are and will continue to be our image, our mirror; they are a reflection and the product of our social imagination, and they now walk our streets.

Conclusion

This thesis proposed to answer the question of how the figure of the nomad can be used to challenge anthropocentric thinking through the medium of literary investigation. I have offered some methods of answering this question over three chapters, each concerning a different aspect of the methodology that nomads use to renegotiate anthropocentrism when performing literary analyses. I will now summarise my findings briefly and discuss what future avenues of research that may develop based on this research in the future. In this conclusion, I will bring my work together in two steps. Firstly, I will reflect on the progress made by my work on posthumanism and nomadic studies in terms of the ideas that each chapter has contributed to their discussions, while taking the conclusions from each chapter further to answer the thesis question; partially by using material that did not make it into the final manuscript, and partially through my own reflection on how my work can be used to challenge anthropocentric thinking in literary studies. Finally, I will end this thesis by postulating on where this research may develop in future, and how I have already adapted it in other projects.

Chapter One developed my own nomadic figure, which traces its lineage back through Braidottian and Deleuzian post-war nomads. My nomad is to be taken on the large part as a marginalised figure who moves through spaces and places in the hopes of questioning the social, political, and historical truths that impact on human-animals, non-human animals, and artefacts. While there was not time to recognise nearly two centuries of literary production research that laid the ground for Deleuze in order to reimagine his posthuman nomad, his work has lent itself as a starting point to consider the discrete components of his nomadic war machine. I set out to create clear criteria by which subjects can be considered nomadic, which fell in line with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the rhizome and with my own concern to move the nomad beyond only dismantling milieux, but to be an investigator and negotiator of milieux. With clear definitions of the traits that nomads can have, we set out from the beginning an affirmative existence of what a nomad is. By stating that we can confirm what a nomad is, we invite the binary system into existence; if it lacks a quality that I mentioned, then it must not be a nomad. This is where my own system faced its first hurdle. However, through relying on the Deleuzian positivist paradigm, I do not invite the

question of what a subject lacks; it matters only what the subject possesses, and how much it can adapt itself to conform with the shape of a necessary paradigm. If it does not fit perfectly, then the subject will take on new parts as a rhizome, so it can provide rigorous and robust investigations.

A relevant point that was not mentioned in the thesis is the similarity between nomads, Nietzsche's Übermensch and the flâneur.⁴⁰³ I would like to suggest that Deleuze's original concept of the nomad, the lofty figure that walked among the Gods, is akin to Nietzsche's superhuman figure that distinguishes its individuality from that of those who are integrated into socially accepted norms. It draws an uncanny parallel to my discussion in Chapter Two in terms of the nomadic resistance to normalisation and the technologies of the body. Figures such as the Übermensch and flâneur continually resurface throughout literary history. However, I have focused on the reappearance of the nomad in the post-war period, because it coincides with the development of posthumanism and new wave science fiction literature.

We see such concepts as the Übermensch and the process of becoming nomadic operating simultaneously within Daniel Keyes' *Flowers for Algernon*, in which the mentally retarded Charlie Gordon undergoes surgery. After Charlie begins to explore and understand his place within society and through understanding his all-too-human condition, he becomes a superhuman genius.⁴⁰⁴ However, like his counterpart, Algernon the lab mouse, which he escapes with towards the end of the narrative, Charlie learns that there are some hurdles that his enhanced mind cannot overcome, and eventually he reverts to his unaware, non-nomadic state, losing all the mental prowess that he gained from his surgery. The novel has profound implications worthy of exploring through this paradigm, notions of the split Self, the infantile Charlie watching the surgically enhanced Charlie having sexual intercourse with women, but only stepping in to prevent him from having those encounters with the woman he truly loves. The theme of rediscovering his lost family ties is another aspect of the novel which would be worthy of exploration. The mentally retarded Charlie was taken to many scam artists who posed as doctors claiming to be able to raise his intelligence. Charlie recalls

⁴⁰³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁴⁰⁴ Daniel Keyes, *Flowers for Algernon* (London: Millennium, 2000).

many traumatic episodes where he was mistreated by his parents and the struggle they endured because they could not accept his impeded cognitive development until he was eventually left with a distant relative as opposed to being institutionalised. It is interesting to see how as a final act, much like deciding on funeral arrangements, the cognitively awakened Charlie decides to leave instructions to have him institutionalised as opposed to return to the bakery where those around him once thought him to be better off. These are only two lines of questioning I anticipate being worthy of pursuit in this multi-valent novel, which until this point did not have a paradigm compatible with nomadic investigations.

Chapter Two moved from outlining a reformulated nomadic figure to exploring the processes which States use to control, regulate, or administrate the ways citizens live, die, and seek pleasure. These transformations which make use of liturgical, ideological, and historico-cultural mechanisms are called technologies of the body. I posited tactics known as technologies of the Self which include biopolitics as means of resisting the normalisation imposed by the State and social forces. These tactics also include a segregation of the social Self and the private Self, a concept which could be taken much further than I took it in this thesis due to it being developed purposefully for nomads to conceal themselves, while undergoing the process of becoming nomadic. Taking this concept further, I showed how both the public and private Selves are intra-connected in the psychic network of an individual, and therefore nomads must be always mindful whether they are conforming to the will of the public Self, which exists to maintain links to their milieu, or to their private Self, which exists to fulfil their individual desires, operating as a Body without Organs.

In this chapter, I also explored the idea that posthumans and posthuman nomads are equally susceptible to ideologies as their human and non-nomadic counterparts. I made it clear that the mutual susceptibility to ideological paradigms served as evidence of the human-posthuman link remaining, despite the claimed posthuman break. What I did not go on to say was that from Enlightenment humanism, we have seen the human posited as an index of power. In anthropocentric posthumanism the posthuman, or maybe cyborg, takes the place of Da Vinci's Vitruvian Man. However, in this mutual vulnerability to the ideological transformative machine, it shows that posthuman, cyborg, and superhero are all equally as constructed as the human as a power index. Perhaps then it is the notion of finite power that continues to bind anthropocentric ideologies to binary, mutually exclusive

paradigms. These ideas concerning the relationship between human-posthuman, and power are debates which are taking place already (see Braidotti (2013) for her account of the Vitruvian Woman and the Vitruvian Cat) but are a long way from being resolved. In recognising that nomads and posthumans differ from monsters through the conventionality of their representation, and through their agency to present themselves, it could lead into further avenues of research that I will address at the end of this conclusion.

Chapter Three explored the embodiment of posthumanist subjects, the production of embodied knowledge, and the agency of posthuman, nomadic bodies. It also shows how the development of literature has followed humanity for thousands of years and continues this development in expression to today. To do this, I analysed several texts by Hayles, Hurley, Wolfe and Massumi, to show how the importance of the assemblage-forming ontology of nomads is essential to their agency. Then, I created a parallel of the posthuman and non-traditional forms of literature, including e-lit and graphic novels, whose new modes of expression which have evolved with changing embodiment allow for new ways of exploring and challenging contemporary social imaginations.

This chapter investigated the changes the posthuman effectuates on nomadic bodies and how they conceptualise themselves. The two aims of this final chapter were to employ the ideas that I have developed throughout this thesis, and to show how new materialism creates many problems for nomadism. While new materialism and nomadism are overtly similar, they are different in their operations. I also addressed the pragmatic concerns of analysing human, posthuman and monstrous bodies in literary studies. I began by outlining what I meant by a 'body', then proceeded to delineate what is meant by a nomadic body. This allowed a progression to distinguish nomadic bodies from that of explicitly monstrous and cyborg bodies. While cyborg bodies can be nomadic, their status as cyborg does not entitle their recognition as fundamentally posthuman or nomadic. The key difference lies in whether they recognise their network of human-animal-technology, and whether they have undergone the process of becoming nomadic as I outlined in Chapter One. The importance of discussing embodiment as part of the holistic network that makes up posthumans and posthuman nomads cannot be understated, as it is the site where all these ideas and processes come together and enter mediation. I argued that the posthuman nomad has a self-created agency that subjects described as 'monstrous' by showing how the posthuman

deliberately uses technology and social structures to destabilise normalised expectations. Also, in this chapter, I illustrated the importance of literature in posthumanist studies, and why the variety of medium and expression of non-traditional forms of literature (e-lit, graphic novels) are the epitome of posthumanist self-realisation.

In my analysis of Kusanagi in *Ghost in the Shell*, I resolved her nomadic state because her agency was in constant doubt due to her continued existence being reliant on her obedience to a lesser-upgraded human master. Braidotti has already done much work on using nomads to challenge the concept of heroic posthuman masculinity. Kusanagi sits uncomfortably in this field as being a female hero, though due to her also being a cyborg she is subservient to a male owner. It becomes problematic to see her as a genuine, empowered, female hero due to her reliance on a male, no matter how righteous he is portrayed in the narrative. Indeed, in this way she conformed to many stereotypical expectations of female cyborgs; she was subject to the orders of a human man, and as a woman, non-human cyborg, she was obedient. However, through discussion, I showed how her choice to be female, cyborg, her interests and her morality are all examples of her individuated will, alongside her own reflections on what it means to be an individual and cyborg. Kusanagi, I concluded, is both a cyborg and a nomad.

While a large component of posthumanist research is particularly into literature and seeks to destroy the egocentric, anthropocentric figure in literature, I have taken a stance which does not conform with this. Rather than use posthumanism as a tool to attack the human index of power, which is not a cause without merit, I believe part of this process requires humanity, and posthumanity, equally to look introspectively at its place within multi-species networks. While I have not argued that the posthuman nomads that I have written about are superior to humans or non-nomadic posthumans, I have highlighted two integral aspects which may be universal to posthuman nomads. Firstly, that the posthuman remains bound up with the human meaning that the argument of a break from humanism is a matter of perspective, but I have taken a stance in line with Badmington that the connection remains unbroken, and that posthumans are a reconfiguration of the human network. Secondly, because the posthuman remains human, the literary subject is an examination of lived subjective experiences. It is therefore impossible to eradicate the egocentric 'I' of characters

in a novel because this thesis has been an investigation of retaining the individuality of nomadic subjects inside and outside of social, political, and cultural power structures.

I will end this thesis by postulating on where this research may develop in future, and how I have already adapted it in other projects. While this thesis only looks at the mid-Twentieth century and the beginning of the Twenty-First century, other writers such as Lisa Yaszek and Jason W. Ellis in *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and The Posthuman* (2017) discuss concerns which are akin to my own across this thesis.⁴⁰⁵ Like Yaszek and Ellis, I believe there is much potential for applying posthumanism and nomadism into literary investigations of the Nineteenth century in an exploration of the human and posthuman bodies, beliefs and spaces. Referring to the early Nineteenth Century, they highlight how early science fiction writers have depicted the posthuman in one of two ways:

[E]ither through stories about the posthuman dramatized Enlightenment ideas about unlimited perfectibility extrapolating from developments in surgery and theories of evolution to explore what might happen if the human body was the base upon which to create new species.⁴⁰⁶

This bears a strong resemblance to the debates taking place in the latter half of the Twentieth century and start of the Twenty-First century concerning the posthuman break from the human and Enlightenment humanism. Although the Nineteenth century human bodies were considered as raw materials for creating posthuman bodies, as Yaszek and Ellis show in their allusions to Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818) and Poe's *The Man That Was Used Up* (1839) writing, from my perspective, I consider these figures to be proto-posthuman figures due to the grotesque nature of the figures not consisting of a purposeful reorientation of the human network.⁴⁰⁷ As discussed in the previous sections, the monstrous transformations of Frankenstein et al. are not synonymous with the posthuman as I have outlined it, and this is why they will remain proto-posthuman; the first stirring of an imaginary world where humanity's index of power is challenged. However, each experiment of this period is all doomed to see the human triumph over their monstrous others. The reason why these monsters are relevant for scholars who wish to look further is

⁴⁰⁵ Lisa Yaszek, and Jason W. Ellis, "Science Fiction," in *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Posthuman*, ed. by Bruce Clarke and Manuela Rossini, Cambridge Companions to Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 71–83 <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781316091227.009>>.

⁴⁰⁶ Yaszek and Ellis, p. 71

⁴⁰⁷ Yaszek and Ellis, p. 71;

unlike spectres and phantoms, as one may find in the stories of Willkie Collins for example, these monsters are corporeal; they are visible to protagonist and reader alike. They dare to appear on the page and take the first step towards materialisation. It is for me to conclude this line of thought here to suggest that it was not Victorian readers who killed the early posthuman monsters, but perhaps, the monsters died much later through the routinisation of depicting monsters, when what had agency, and that which did not, became matters of familiarity and convention.

Finally, among other avenues of literary and social research that I foresee this thesis contributing towards, I will outline two scenarios in which I have already begun to adapt this paradigm towards. While I would like to take time to discuss its applications in Edwin A. Abbott's *Flatlands A Romance of Dimensions*, due to the highly nomadic sense of movement through spaces of different complexities, it is better to limit myself, as I have done through this thesis, to more contemporary concerns. I will state that this is not the first mention of Abbott's work in this thesis, and in the future, it will have due diligence done in terms of being subject to a rhizomatic analysis.

The first of two investigations that this thesis makes possible is a renewed look at the spaces and places that nomads move through and inhabit. One of which I have explored in my own research on technological democracy, which describes the equity of the value of an address based on the technology required to construct high rise buildings. As a rule, the taller a building is, the more money is needed to sustain the building, via cooling, heating, and ventilation systems to name but a few. Therefore, the cost of living is raised for all tenants alike, despite the premium being placed on living on the upper floors. My analysis focused specifically on *High Rise*, which in posthumanist discourse still has many avenues left to explore. However, in this sense, we can see how not only the building represents the degenerative psychic health of its inhabitants (an already explored postmodernist analysis), but also how the technology of the high rise, its seclusion and its premium on the upper floors drives the whole narrative. The downward spiral of ambition and hubris, much like MacBeth's hubris to become king, sees Richard Wilder desperately spiral his way up the building with the maddened lust to usurp the throne which is the penthouse. With the upper floor tenants deliberately vandalising the building's facilities, it increases the inequity

people experience on lower floors. Travelling through these spaces, but never integrating to become a part of them, is an apt description of Richard Wilder in this book, and thus new ways of analysing this character avail themselves to future studies.

My second suggestion as to further ways this thesis can anticipate later works is by drawing on the briefly mentioned work of Braidotti and Haraway throughout this thesis. Their individual negotiations with cyborgs and gender norms could provide further ways of conceptualising the cyborg as a perceived gender, rather than an alternative state to male or female. There are already many differing genders beyond the binary male/female split, the first push to progressing from this point was Haraway's *Manifesto for Cyborg*. However, in the following years, gender has fractured like the postmodern looking glass, each shard revealing one potential among many. The coherence of each gender-shard becomes incoherent without a pane full of other shards each creating their own situational, relational contexts. The cyborg nomad may be a way of encroaching into this terrain. The cyborg is a Body without Organs; it is constructed, like gender, and it is pulled together by desire. This desire stretches from the want to express a certain identity, to the want to express many different identities across a period of time. It is not so much as walking into the closet and choosing a new coat as it is performing certain actions consciously over time, and these experiences becoming a part of the potential perceived to the actual Self. This is a more ambitious and ambiguous line of exploration that would require a lot more research into feminist and post-feminist writers alongside my own paradigm. However, I have no doubts that this paradigm will operate as a rhizome to accommodate all those scholars who choose to include these lines of investigation in their endeavours.

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Appendix A:

Ghost in the Shell has also fallen out of current discussion, the most recent notable work being dated by a decade. Further, nearly all discussion of this work relates to the film, which is different from the manga. I find the manga more intellectually insightful than in Mamoru Oshii's film adaptation. There are two clarifications regarding the critical response to the cinematic adaptation of *Ghost in the Shell* which has damaged the academic credibility of the graphic novel. So, in advance of my analysis I intend to expose these misconceptions, so that I may proceed with my analysis without unwarranted prejudices that may affect the tone of my arguments. Oshii's adaptation of *Ghost in the Shell* introduces several highly sexualised scenes featuring the protagonist Major Motoko Kusanagi, which do not appear in the graphic novel, and which have been the subject of intense feminist criticism.⁴⁰⁸ This has consequently damaged the credibility of the original work. The adaptation of some of the language has also had a detrimental impact to interpretations of the work (see Orbaugh, 2002).⁴⁰⁹ Further complication stems from Oshii's manga adaptation of his film of *Ghost in the Shell*, as it shares the title with Masamune's manga (hereafter referred to as *Ghost*), and both concern the same characters in the same universe.⁴¹⁰ My second clarification refers to the brilliance of Oshii's work in the sequel to this film (which lies outside this analysis). In *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* (2004), Batou, sidekick to the Major in *Ghost*, takes over the role as protagonist.⁴¹¹ We learn more about Batou, a cybernetically enhanced stereotypically hyper-masculine male who works in the anti-terrorist unit under the prime minister. In the manga, we learn about Batou from the beginning, alongside the Major. However, in Oshii's work, he receives little character development until the second film. My clarification relates to his relationship to his Basset hound, the typical sidekick for a detective. Also noted by Heise (2009),⁴¹² Batou lies outside of the social norm of owning a cybernetically

⁴⁰⁸ *Ghost in the Shell*, dir. by Mamoru Oshii (Japan: Manga Entertainment, 1995).

⁴⁰⁹ Sharalyn Orbaugh, 'Sex and the Single Cyborg: Japanese Popular Culture Experiments in Subjectivity', *Science Fiction Studies*, 436–52 <<https://doi.org/10.2307/4241109>> [accessed 21 November 2019].

⁴¹⁰ Mamoru Oshii, *Ghost in the Shell -Archives-* (Tokyo: Mag Garden, 2004).

⁴¹¹ *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, dir. by Mamoru Oshii (Japan: Go Fish Pictures, 2004).

⁴¹² Ursula K Heise, 'The Android and the Animal', *Modern Language Association*, 124.2 (2009), 503–10 <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/25614291>> [accessed 20 January 2020].

enhanced or genetically created companion. Instead, his Basset hound was born naturally. When questioned about why he does not feed the dog nutritional supplements which are the “best” for its health, he responds that his companion likes traditional dog food best. The viewers are rewarded by a scene in which cyborg and animal enjoy a moment of piece together amid the brutal action of this film.


Appendix B:



breep beep

TIME TO GET TO WORK, MAJOR.

I WANT YOU TO JOIN *SUISEN* IN SOUTH SHINHAMA, WARD 4, AND STAND BY.



"WORK." ?! WHAT'S THAT?

THE BUDGET YOU IDIOTS ASKED FOR PASSED, SO GET YOUR BUTTS IN GEAR!



HEY, FUCHIKOMA! GOT THE CONFIRMATION?

N-NO, MA'AM!


WELL THEN, GET ON WITH IT!







JEEZ, DON MAKE THO HORRIBL SOUNDS GIVES ME THE CREEPS...
UNG!





WELL, TO FORMALLY APPLY TO THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR A SPECIAL FORCES UNIT, WE DID NEED THE, ah, "CO-OPERATION" OF PUBLIC SECURITY.




















YOU MEAN THAT SHE'S REALLY SIXTY-TWO YEARS OLD?

WHAT? NO SHIT!



HEY, TOGUSA, EVERYONE CAN DO THAT... EXCEPT YOU AND SAITO.









05

MEGATECH MACHINE 2


.....

THE MAKING OF A CYBORG

A "cyborg" refers to a human whose body has been partially or almost completely altered by the use of substitute artificial organs and parts.


The female cyborg suspended to the left is over ninety percent machine. The only part of her original flesh-and-blood body that remains is her brain and spinal cord, and that, as the illustration shows, is inside a special shell. As she demonstrates, at first glance it is very difficult to tell the difference between a cyborg and a robot.

It is also difficult to imagine how artificial versions of some parts of the body—such as the endocrine system, the lymphatic system, the spleen, the liver, and the marrow—can ever be manufactured, so it is extremely doubtful that we will ever see a cyborg as mechanized as the one here, but there are indeed many other manmade body parts that are already available (and it's a growing field). For those who read Japanese and are interested in knowing more, allow me to suggest the now slightly dated book, *Biomaterials—An Approach to Artificial Organs*, published by Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun. The author is Dr. Yoshito Ikada.



SOMETIMES I WONDER IF I'VE REALLY ALREADY DIED, AND WHAT I THINK OF AS "ME" ISN'T REALLY JUST AN ARTIFICIAL PERSONALITY COMPRISED OF A PROSTHETIC BODY AND A CYBERBRAIN.

EEEK! MOTOKO! DON'T EVEN SAY SCARY STUFF LIKE THAT!!




HEY, WE'VE GOT GREY MATTER, AND PEOPLE TREAT US LIKE HUMANS...




HOW DO YOU KNOW? YOU'VE NEVER SEEN YOUR ALLEGED GREY MATTER.

MAYBE YOU'RE JUST ASSUMING YOU'VE GOT IT BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION YOU'RE IN.




MAYBE SOMEDAY YOUR "MAKER" WILL COME...

... HAUL YOU AWAY, TAKE YOU APART, AND ANNOUNCE THE RECALL OF A DEFECTIVE PRODUCT. WHAT IF ALL THAT'S LEFT OF THE "REAL YOU" IS A COUPLE OF LONELY BRAIN CELLS, HUH?



WELL, I *AMA* HUMAN, AND I'M SURE THE NUMBER OF PARTS NEEDED TO *BE* HUMAN IS MORE THAN TWO OR THREE CELLS! 'COURSE I *DO* KNOW THAT CHEMICALS AND MECHA CAN SUBSTITUTE FOR A FAIR NUMBER OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CEREBRUM TODAY...

Hmph!





Heh-heh-heh...



LISTEN. IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO CREATE ROBOTS THAT CLOSE TO HUMANS, THEY WOULDN'T BE ROBOTS, THEY'D BE HUMANS! THE ONLY THING DIFFERENT WOULD BE THEIR EXTERNAL APPEARANCE!

DON'T DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ROBOTS!



WHAT THE HELL DO YOU THINK YOU'RE DOING, TOGUSA?



YOU DIDN'T RESPOND TO MY CALLS, SO I RAN OVER HERE, EXPECTING TO FIND A STIFF...




THIS ROOM'S A FARADAY CAGE.

BLOCKS ALL EM INTERFERENCE.




VERY FASCINATING, BUT THE COMPANY PRESIDENT JUST SKIPPED IN A CAR!



FUCHIKOMA! GIVE EVERYONE C42 ANESTHESIA, MOVE 'EM INTO AN ARMORED TRANSPORT, AND STAND BY!



HEY, THEY'VE GOT SOME RIGHTS, TOO, YOU KNOW.







IF EVERYONE HAD ALL THEIR RIGHTS, THE WORLD'D BE AT PEACE AND WE'D BE OUT OF A JOB!




WHY DIDN'T YOU TELL ME? LET'S GO!










MEGA-TECH DEVELOPS A VARIETY OF CYBORG PARTS...


...BUT TWO HOURS AGO, ONE OF THE MANUFACTURING CELLS BEGAN AUTONOMOUSLY ASSEMBLING INDIVIDUAL PARTS INTO A FULL ROBOT.

IT'S A MILITARY MODEL, WITH THE SAME TOP-SECRET CLASSIFICATION AS YOU FOLKS.



FIVE MINUTES AGO--JUST TWO MINUTES BEFORE WE GOT HERE--THE ROBOT WAS COMPLETED AND IMMEDIATELY FLED.

BATOU'S SET UP A DRAGNET IN THE AREA AND IS SEARCHING FOR IT RIGHT NOW.




IF IT'S THE WORK OF A HACKER, HE OR SHE HAS GOT TO BE PRETTY GOOD TO GET THROUGH THEIR ATTACK BARRIER.


THAT'S A 3D IMAGE OF THE FUGITIVE ROBOT.

AAH, MR. ARAMAKI... THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR RETRIEVING OUR ROBOT!

HANDS OFF! SHE'S ONE OF MINE... GOVERNMENT PROPERTY!




WHAT THE HELL?!




THE GATE'S OPEN, AND I'M BEING INVITED TO ENTER...


WHAT MODE IS THE SUBSTITUTE BARRIER?



DON'T WORRY, MAJOR, I'LL MAKE SURE YOU DON'T GET "PREGNANT"...



WITH THAT CRUDE CONCEPT-REMARK, HIS SYSTEM JUST QUIVERED...



PUPPETEER! I CAN'T UNDERSTAND YOUR VISUAL PATTERNS...

BATOU! LET HIM INTO MY LINGUISTIC FIELD...

WHAT?! AREN'T YOU GOING TO LEVEL C TOO QUICK?!

