



Water sector resilience in the United Kingdom and Ireland: The COVID-19 challenge

Walker, Nathan; Styles, David ; Williams, Prysor

Utilities Policy

DOI:
[10.1016/j.jup.2023.101550](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2023.101550)

Published: 01/06/2023

Peer reviewed version

[Cyswllt i'r cyhoeddiad / Link to publication](#)

Dyfyniad o'r fersiwn a gyhoeddwyd / Citation for published version (APA):
Walker, N., Styles, D., & Williams, P. (2023). Water sector resilience in the United Kingdom and Ireland: The COVID-19 challenge. *Utilities Policy*, 82, Article 101550.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2023.101550>

Hawliau Cyffredinol / General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

1 Water Sector Resilience in the United Kingdom and Ireland: the COVID-19 Challenge

2

3 Nathan L Walker^a, David Styles^{b,c} A. Prysor Williams^a

4 ^a*School of Natural Sciences, College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, Bangor University,*
5 *Gwynedd, UK*

6 ^b*School of Engineering, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland*

7 ^c*Ryan Institute & School of Biological & Chemical Sciences, University of Galway, Ireland*

8 Author contributions

9 Nathan L. Walker: Conceptualization; Data curation; Formal analysis; Investigation; Methodology;
10 Software; Visualization; Writing - original draft.

11 A. Prysor Williams: Validation; Supervision; Writing - review & editing.

12 David Styles: Validation; Supervision; Writing - review & editing.

13

14 Abstract

15 The outbreak of COVID-19 led to restrictions on movements and activities, which presented a serious
16 challenge to the resilience of the water sector. It is essential to understand how successfully water
17 companies responded to this unprecedented event so effective plans can be built for future disruptive
18 events. This study aimed to evaluate how the water sectors in the UK and Ireland were affected from
19 a holistic sustainability and resilience-based perspective. Using pre-COVID data for 18 indicators of
20 company performance and comparing them to the first year of the pandemic, the direction and
21 magnitudes of change varied across companies. Financial indicators were significantly negatively
22 affected, with *interest cover ratio*, *post-tax return on regulated equity*, and *operating profit*, exhibiting
23 the greatest average declines of 21%, 21%, and 18%, respectively, a trend that would be dangerous to
24 provisions and company operations if continued. Despite this, service and environmental indicators
25 improved during the first year of the pandemic, exemplified by *unplanned outage*, *risk of sewer storm*
26 *flooding*, and *water quality compliance risk* decreasing by a mean average of 37%, 32%, and 27%,
27 respectively. Analysis using the Hicks-Moorsteen Productivity Index concluded that average
28 productivity increased by 35%. The results suggest that the water sector was relatively resilient to the
29 COVID-19 pandemic in terms of services, but adverse effects may have manifested in a deteriorated
30 financial position that could exacerbate future challenges arising from exogenous pressures such as
31 climate change. Specific advice for the UK water sector is to scrutinize non-critical spending, such as
32 shareholder payments, during periods of economic downturn to ensure essential capital projects can
33 be carried out. Although results are temporal and indicator selection sensitive, we recommend that
34 policy, regulation, and corporate culture embrace frameworks that support long-term resilience to

35 since the relative success in response to COVID-19 does not guarantee future success against differing
36 challenges. This study generates a timely yet tentative insight into the diverse performance of the
37 water sector during the pandemic, pertinent to the water industry, regulators, academia, and the
38 public.

39

40 **Keywords:** Water efficiency, sustainability, SARS-CoV-2, regulation, water industry

41

42 **1. Introduction**

43 The outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) led to global restrictions on intra- and international
44 movements to try and slow the spread of the virus (Ní Ghráinne, 2020). In the UK and Ireland, national
45 restrictions were imposed in March 2020 and continued to varying extents until all restrictions were
46 lifted in February and April 2022, respectively (Tumelty et al., 2022). The unprecedented scale of
47 change required organisations to adapt almost all aspects of their operations (Zhu et al., 2020), and
48 the water and wastewater services were no exception since there was a crucial requirement to ensure
49 reliable and safe water and wastewater services for safeguarding high levels of hygiene to help mollify
50 the spread of the virus (Howard et al., 2020).

51 The water sector should be sufficiently prepared for obstructive events such as COVID-19 because
52 operational, financial, and corporate resilience affects water and wastewater services for current and
53 future consumers. Resilience at the company level is a process where operational procedures and
54 responses are actively reviewed against the threat of potential risk and hazards (Linnenluecke, 2017),
55 the success of which depends on the capacity to mitigate, adapt, and learn from a crisis (Butler et al.,
56 2017). The UK water regulator has actively and explicitly documented its focus on resilience, making
57 it one of the four themes of the 2019 price review, which sets price regulation for 2020-2025 (Ofwat,
58 2019a). The sector has been attempting to build a resilient system, with the most significant known
59 threat being climate change, where changing and more unpredictable precipitation, temperature, and
60 extreme weather events are likely to affect demand, drought, flooding, distribution, and treatment
61 (Ofwat, 2022). Furthermore, preparations were made across the sector to be resilient upon the UK
62 leaving Europe Union to secure supply chains (Mukhtarov et al., 2022; Lawson et al., 2022). In addition
63 to the sector, broader disruptions to services affecting customers, communities, the economy, and
64 the environment can be significant (Sowby, 2020). Antwi et al. (2021) further emphasise the need for
65 sectoral resilience via water governance and management for post-COVID-19 recovery and climate
66 threats. They highlight a lack of governmental oversight evident in the preliminary responses to the
67 COVID-19 outbreak in European countries, where only 11 of 27 European countries (40%)
68 implemented at least one policy intervention, such as cost absorption or deferment of bills, that
69 considered the water sector, and these were typically short-term measures.

70 COVID-19 presented a significant challenge to the water sector's resilience. Understanding how
71 companies responded to this unexpected and unprecedented world event is integral so effective plans
72 can be built for future disruptive events, whether expected or unexpected. Studies have been
73 emerging on the impact of COVID-19 on the UK and Ireland water sectors, primarily based on water
74 quality and qualitative assessments. Some have shown the value the sector can have in understanding
75 and tracking the virus through wastewater (Bivins et al., 2020; Fitzgerald et al., 2021; Kevill et al., 2022;

76 Poch et al., 2020) and ensuring a safe drinking water supply (Giacobbo et al., 2021). Others have
77 viewed the influence of COVID-19 on water companies and the sector in differing ways. For example,
78 Renukappa et al. (2021) analysed the impact of the virus on UK water sector projects and practices via
79 twelve interviews with water professionals from six different organisations, highlighting how
80 companies adapted positively to alternative working conditions. Lawson et al. (2022) also found that
81 UK companies responded well to the pandemic through their eleven interviews, though they
82 emphasised the importance of not being complacent and embedding new knowledge into best
83 practices.

84 Additional interviews were conducted by Berglund et al. (2022) but included 27 water utilities within
85 a global scope to study the effects of the pandemic on operation and vulnerability, concluding that
86 staff flexibility, supply chain management, and finances were exposed. Atkins and Frontier Economics
87 (2020) produced the first and rare glimpse at quantifying the impact of COVID-19 on the UK water
88 sector, with early indications pointing towards an industry-wide reduction in return on regulated
89 equity between 0.35%-0.97% over the current five-year asset management plan period (AMP7). What
90 is clear is that the COVID-19 outbreak exerted additional pressure on the global water sector, which
91 was already facing challenges due to ageing infrastructure, ill-planned urbanisation, and climate
92 change (Mukhtarov et al., 2022). Neal (2020) notes that the pandemic acted as a “threat multiplier”
93 to the sector’s existing pressures, drivers, and threats to the path to sustainability.

94 Although the research published thus far regarding the effect of COVID-19 on the UK water sector has
95 provided value in a multitude of ways, as highlighted in these studies, there is a need to fully
96 understand how the water sector responded to the pandemic, particularly in a sustainability-focused
97 manner, representing a more holistic view of companies and the sector. The anticipated results are
98 that the sector will have declined fiscally, and subsequently, some services may have declined too;
99 however, to capture a complete picture and possible unexpected results, many indicators crossing
100 economic, service, and environmental considerations are required, where data availability allows. By
101 interpreting the appropriate data and grasping how well companies were prepared, it is possible to
102 identify which processes will help improve resilience to future disruptive events. This study thus had
103 several objectives: 1) to explore how water companies within the UK and Ireland were affected by the
104 COVID-19 outbreak using metrics encompassing a holistic sustainability perspective; 2) to use the
105 Hicks-Moorsteen Productivity Index (HMPI) to investigate the extent of change inflicted by the
106 pandemic and the optimal values of selected inputs and outputs at the scale of companies and the
107 sector; and 3) to evaluate the resilience of the water sector and lay the foundations for informing
108 future resilience, using the results and outcomes illuminated from objectives 1 and 2. These objectives
109 provide novel insight for the water industry, regulators, and benchmarking academic literature by

110 generating rare quantitative results regarding the water sector and COVID-19, using seldom applied
111 sustainability metrics within a customised emerging methodology.

112 The paper unfolds from here with the data selection and justification, followed by the breakdown of
113 the HMPI in the Methodology. Then in the Results and Discussion section, the whole water sector
114 sample is evaluated together using the selected indicators to highlight the best and worst performers
115 before moving on to the indicators by economic, environmental, and service groupings. The Results
116 and Discussion then move on to the productivity analysis, starting on the sector as a whole, before
117 analysing company-level productivity. Conclusions then round off the study, drawing from the key
118 findings.

119 **2. Methodology**

120 2.1. Data description

121 The sample included 19 companies from the UK and Ireland water sectors: six water-only companies
122 and 13 water and sewage companies. The data collected were annual financial year entries (April-
123 April) from 2018 to 2021, covering four years. Data for 18 indicators were collected and spanned
124 economic, environmental, and service-based metrics. Indicators were chosen to represent water
125 companies and the sector as well as possible based on the availability of quality data (Walker et al.,
126 2021a). Some audited and independent data (e.g., credit rating) are included, but most of the data are
127 self-reported by companies, which should be considered when making inferences, as discussed further
128 in the Results section. Indicators were analysed with all companies where possible; however, where
129 data were limited, fewer indicators were used for years or companies (see Supplementary
130 Information). A limited selection of indicators from this total pool was used for productivity analysis,
131 which is discussed and justified further in Sections 2.2 and 3.2. All the data were acquired from publicly
132 available company annual reports and regulatory reports, summarised in Table 1; the complete
133 dataset is available in Supplementary Information.

134 For clarification on the lesser-known indicators, they are elaborated on further here and supplied by
135 Ofwat (2019b). Return on regulatory equity is a measure of profitability in terms of returns after tax
136 and interest that companies have earned by reference to the notional regulated equity, calculated
137 from the regulatory capital value (RCV) and notional net debt. Adjusted gearing is the percentage of
138 the net debt to the RCV. Interest cover ratios are a measure of a company's profitability compared
139 with its annual interest expense, in the adjusted metric, the numerator is adjusted to subtract
140 depreciation. Operating profit refers to total earnings from core business functions, excluding the
141 deduction of interest and taxes.

142 The GHG emissions include all scopes, which are defined thus: Scope 1 regards all emissions from
 143 processes which are the organisation’s direct responsibility, Scope 2 is emissions associated with grid
 144 electricity use, and Scope 3 regards all other (upstream) emissions from relevant supply chains, which
 145 may come from sources that the company does not own or control but are strongly influenced by
 146 company activities. Unplanned outage refers to the inability of companies to supply water due to
 147 unforeseen deterioration or failure of assets. Lastly, customer satisfaction was devised from company
 148 surveys, namely C-mex and D-mex surveys. The C-mex scores are comprised of data from a customer
 149 service survey to residential customers who recently contacted their company and a customer
 150 experience survey of random members of the public about their experience of their water company.
 151 D-mex scores are from a survey of developer services customers who have recently completed a
 152 transaction with their water company, which measures performance against a set of Water UK service
 153 metrics.

154 **Table 1.** Summary statistics of eighteen variables from nineteen UK and Irish water and sewage
 155 companies (2018-2021)

	Average	St. dev	Minimum	Maximum
Post-tax return on regulated equity (%)	5.79	5.63	-9.21	15.56
Adjusted Gearing (%)	68.47	8.26	47.90	83.17
Interest Cover Ratio	1.93	0.66	0.22	3.31
Credit rating*	8.37	0.77	6.00	10.00
Operational expenditure (£m)	401.33	325.93	26.11	1667.70
Capital expenditure (£m)	354.68	298.70	7.97	1223.00
Operating profit (£m)	187.18	180.73	0.60	610.58
Leakage (Ml/day)	203.04	176.06	23.55	695.00
Consumption per capita (Ml/d)	144.96	9.85	126.55	163.30
Volume delivered (ml/d)	926.08	581.61	146.97	2170.98
Water quality compliance**	3.17	2.95	0.01	16.71
Treatment works compliance (%)	98.98	0.76	97.06	99.85
GHG emissions*** (kgCO ₂ e/Ml)	310.80	170.30	40.00	787.00
Pollution incidents (per 10,000 km)	40.03	31.09	12.00	130.87
Supply interruptions (mins/properties)	13.23	12.24	0.07	73.70
Risk of sewer storm flooding (%)	15.55	9.83	0.37	41.81
Unplanned outage (%)	2.87	3.78	0.02	18.59
Customer satisfaction****	80.51	5.18	69.59	87.78

156 * Credit rating based on Fitch and Moody’s rating scales and converted to numbers for ease of comparison
 157 ** Based on compliance risk index figures (lower values = less risk and more compliance)
 158 *** Location-based carbon calculations for water production and wastewater treatment (scopes 1, 2 and 3)
 159 **** From C-mex (customer surveys) and D-mex (company metrics) scores by OFWAT
 160

161 2.2. Hicks-Moorsteen Productivity Index

162 2.2.1. Method description and justification

163 Many non-parametric frontier methods are used to compute Total-Factor Productivity (TFP) in the
 164 water sector, such as the Fare-Primont productivity index (Molinos-Senante et al., 2017a), Malmquist

165 Productivity Index (MPI) (Molinos-Sennante et al., 2017b), Luenberger Productivity Index (Sala-
 166 Garrido et al., 2018), Malmquist-Luenberger productivity indicator (Sala-Garrido et al., 2019), and the
 167 Hicks-Moorsteen Productivity Index (HMPI) (Molinos-Senante et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2021b). The
 168 essential advantage of these non-parametric frontier methods over parametric methods is that they
 169 do not require *a priori* assumptions about the functional relationship between the variables, which
 170 can cause specification and estimation problems (Silva et al., 2017; Moutinho et al., 2020). The MPI is
 171 the method most applied to analyse changes in TFP (Chen et al., 2022). Its popularity is because it can
 172 be computed without price data and can be broken down into measures of technical and efficiency
 173 changes (Shao and Lin, 2016). Despite the numerous positives of MPI, it does have some decisive
 174 limitations. O'Donnell (2014) comments that some distance functions within the index may be
 175 undefined, and infeasibility problems might ensue, meaning results may not accurately express TFP
 176 change from scale effects. Furthermore, MPI requires a choice of input or output orientation and is
 177 deemed inappropriate when the sample operates under variable returns to scale (VRS), O'Donnell
 178 (2012) demonstrated.

179 The HMPI largely overcomes the limitations that MPI encompasses. Defined as a ratio of the
 180 Malmquist input and output indices while using the Shephard input and output distance functions,
 181 respectively (Simões and Marques, 2012), the HMPI does not require price data and satisfies all other
 182 index conditions, including multiplicative completeness and transitivity tests (O'Donnell, 2012). The
 183 HMPI thus functions within a simultaneous input and output orientation and can be computed under
 184 both constant returns to scale and VRS technologies, giving it a distinct advantage over similar TFP
 185 methods like MPI. Furthermore, HMPI makes no assumptions about behavioural aims such as
 186 maximising profit or market settings like regulation and competition (Ondrej & Jiri, 2012). Bricc and
 187 Kersten (2011) highlighted further advantages of HMPI, commenting that under substantial input and
 188 output disposability, the determinateness axiom is satisfied so that infeasibility problems are avoided,
 189 meaning that the index is well defined even when one or more of its arguments becomes zero or
 190 infinity.

191 The HMPI specifies optimal input and output levels for individual operating units (Mohammadian &
 192 Rezaee, 2020) as a ratio of aggregate output quantity over aggregate input quantity index (Bjurek et
 193 al., 1998). Under the assumption of each water company using a vector of M inputs $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_M)$
 194 to produce a vector of S outputs $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_S)$, the output and input distance functions are defined
 195 thus (Shephard, 1953):

$$196 \quad D_t^o(x, y) = \min_{\delta} \{ \delta > 0 : (x, y/\delta) \in T^t \} \quad (1)$$

197
$$D_t^i(x, y) = \min_{\rho > 0} \{ (x/\rho, y) \in T^t \} \quad (2)$$

198 Where T^t denotes production possibilities set at period- t . $D_t^o(x, y)$ symbolises the output distance
 199 function and evaluates the inverse of the largest radial expansion of the output vector, which is
 200 achievable, given the input vector. Conversely, $D_t^i(x, y)$ denotes the input distance function and
 201 evaluates the largest radial contraction of the input vector attainable while fixing the output vector
 202 (Epure et al., 2011).

203 For a base period t , Bjurek et al. (1998) defined HMPI as:

204
$$HMPI_{T(t)}(x^{t+1}, y^{t+1}, x^t, y^t) = \frac{[D_{T(t)}^o(x^t, y^t)/D_{T(t)}^o(x^t, y^{t+1})]}{[D_{T(t)}^i(x^t, y^t)/D_{T(t)}^i(x^{t+1}, y^t)]} \quad (3)$$

205 For a base period $t + 1$, HMPI is defined as:

206
$$HMPI_{T(t+1)}(x^{t+1}, y^{t+1}, x^t, y^t) = \frac{[D_{T(t+1)}^o(x^{t+1}, y^t)/D_{T(t+1)}^o(x^{t+1}, y^{t+1})]}{[D_{T(t+1)}^i(x^t, y^{t+1})/D_{T(t+1)}^i(x^{t+1}, y^{t+1})]} \quad (4)$$

207 A geometric mean of the HMPI for base period t and $t + 1$ yields:

208
$$HMPI_{T(t), T(t+1)}(x^{t+1}, y^{t+1}, x^t, y^t) =$$

 209
$$[HMPI_{T(t)}(x^{t+1}, y^{t+1}, x^t, y^t) \times [HMPI_{T(t+1)}(x^{t+1}, y^{t+1}, x^t, y^t)]^{1/2}] \quad (5)$$

210 A HMPI >1 indicates an increase in TFP, <1 illustrates a decline in TFP, and a result of 1 demonstrates
 211 no change in TFP. An asset of HMPI is its classification into technical potential and relative efficiency
 212 change, along with a breakdown of efficiency change into sub-indices; however, within the scope of
 213 this study and the nature of the assortment of indicators, this was deemed unnecessary and
 214 inappropriate.

215 **2.2.2. Sample selection**

216 Productivity analysis was conducted on 16 water companies across the UK, omitting three companies
 217 from the total sample within Sections 2.1 and 3.1 due to a lack of data completeness in the panel data
 218 for all four years. A limited core of six indicators was chosen to measure the productivity of the water
 219 sector, namely *total expenditure (TOTEX)* (calculated by summing *operating expenditure* and *capital*
 220 *expenditure*), *volume of water delivered*, *customer satisfaction*, *water supply interruptions*, and *GHG*
 221 *emissions*. These indicators were chosen to represent the primary functions of water companies, from

222 spending on operations, to producing water, to delivering good service with minimal adverse
223 environmental impact (Walker et al., 2022).

224 The configuration of the indicators into inputs and outputs logically would be to have *TOTEX* as the
225 input and the rest as outputs since they are a result of water company expenditure. However, two
226 conventional outputs, *GHG emissions* and *water supply interruptions*, had to be handled differently
227 since they are undesirable outputs. If they were to remain as conventional outputs within the HMPI
228 or similar models, as their values got relatively higher, it would appear as though the sector or
229 company within question was more efficient for performing worse. Halkos & Petrou (2019) reviewed
230 the various methods used to treat undesirable outputs when employing DEA. Direct approaches, such
231 as parametric outputs and input distance functions, treat an undesirable output in its original form
232 (Ho et al., 2017).

233 Conversely, indirect techniques manage the undesirable output as a classical input since both inputs
234 and undesirable outputs are the values to be minimised; it can thus be appropriate to treat both in
235 the same manner (Khan et al., 2015). Seiford & Zhu (2002) suggested that moving undesirable outputs
236 over to the input side of the model can distort the actual production process because the relationship
237 between inputs and outputs can be lost. In this study, the HMPI is used to simultaneously evaluate a
238 collection of key indicators. Treating *water supply interruptions* and *GHG emissions* as undesirable
239 outputs and moving them over to the input side of the model is an elegant solution to the problem.
240 The HMPI was thus conducted with *TOTEX*, *water supply interruptions* and *GHG emissions* as inputs
241 and *customer satisfaction* and *volume delivered* as outputs. The drawback to losing this relationship is
242 that some of the features of computing HMPI, namely scale and technical change, could not be
243 evaluated robustly.

244 The sample size and the balance between water companies and indicators used within the DEA model
245 must satisfy specific criteria to bypass relative efficiency discrimination issues. Cooper et al. (2006)
246 developed a minimum sample size threshold relative to the number of inputs and outputs, dubbed
247 'Cooper's rule'. The rule states that the number of units, in this instance water companies, must be \geq
248 $\max\{m \times s; 3(m + s)\}$, where m represents inputs and s represents outputs. With 16 companies,
249 three inputs, and two outputs being used, Cooper's rule was followed. The input and output distance
250 functions were computed in 'R', a statistical computing software with the package 'productivity'
251 created by Dakpo et al. (2018).

252 **3. Results and discussion**

253 3.1. Sector-wide performance indicator investigation

254 3.1.1. Best and worst performers

255 The UK and Irish water sectors were evaluated with 19 companies and 18 indicators, broadly covering
 256 all company operations and service aspects. This approach enabled an understanding of economic,
 257 service, and environmental performance before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Table 2 displays
 258 the change from the three years leading up to the pandemic to the first year of it, in percentages. The
 259 percentage changes highlighted in green, red, and amber represent positive, negative, and neutral
 260 and mixed implications in real-world performance for each factor.

261 **Table 2.** Average performance indicator results for the three years (2018-2020) leading up to, and
 262 the first year of, the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021). Red in the percentage change column implies
 263 a negative effect, green a positive effect, and amber a neutral, negligible, or mixed impact.

	2018-2020	2021	Percentage change	Trend
Post-tax return on regulated equity (%)	6.1	4.8	-20.6%	Deteriorating
Adjusted Gearing (%)	68.1	69.7	2.3%	Deteriorating
Interest Cover Ratio	2	1.6	-21.2%	Deteriorating
Credit rating*	8.3	8.5	2.7%	Deteriorating
Operational expenditure (£m)	404.1	393.2	-2.7%	Improving
Capital expenditure (£m)	357.8	345.4	-3.5%	Deteriorating
Operating profit (£m)	196.1	160.5	-18.1%	Deteriorating
Leakage (MI/day)	205	197.1	-3.9%	Improving
Consumption per capita (MI/d)	144.2	147.2	2.1%	Static/mixed
Volume delivered (MI/d)	1022.4	1063.1	4%	Static/mixed
Water quality compliance**	3.5	2.5	-26.7%	Improving
Treatment works compliance (%)	99.1	99.1	0.0%	Static/mixed
GHG emissions*** (kgCO ₂ e/MI)	300.2	272.7	-9.2%	Improving
Pollution incidents (per 10,000km)	39.7	40.6	2.2%	Deteriorating
Supply interruptions (mins/properties)	10.8	10	-7.6%	Improving
Risk of sewer storm flooding (%)	20.3	13.8	-32.1%	Improving
Unplanned outage (%)	3.7	2.3	-36.8%	Improving
Customer satisfaction****	77.7	81.1	4.4%	Improving

264 * Credit rating based on Fitch and Moody's rating scales and converted to numbers for ease of comparison

265 ** Based on compliance risk index figures (lower values = less risk and more compliance)

266 *** Location-based carbon calculations for water production and wastewater treatment

267 **** From C-mex and D-mex surveys by OFWAT

268

269 The UK and Irish water sectors had mixed results in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
 270 highlighted in Table 2 above, with a nearly even split of improved to declined performance over 18
 271 indicators.

272 The neutral result for *treatment works compliance* is due to an established baseline of high levels of
 273 compliance across the sector; thus, there are only very minor changes in results. This finding is,
 274 however, according to the available water company data shared with Ofwat and the Environment
 275 Agency; the reality may be different. In November 2021, an ongoing investigation was launched by
 276 Ofwat and the Environment Agency into potential illegal discharging of raw sewage. Permits are
 277 granted for companies to discharge untreated sewage to waterways in extreme events where rainfall

278 puts the network or treatment works at risk of being overwhelmed; however, Hammond et al. (2021)
279 showed wastewater treatment plants between 2009-2020 made non-compliant discharges under the
280 guise of precipitation overflows. Due to a quirk in the discharge permits, companies are not required
281 to measure the continuation of the minimum amount of effluent treated, meaning the untreated
282 sewage discharges could be magnitudes greater than what is intended under the permits. Therefore,
283 not only are potential breaches of *treatment works compliance* likely being made, but the extent of
284 the breaches is also unknown; thus, this neutral result may not represent actual performance and
285 performance trends.

286 The other neutral results were *consumption per capita*, and *volume delivered*, which increased by 2.1%
287 and 4%, respectively, and showed mixed implications. They were posed as mixed results because
288 although an increase in these indicators was negative in the sense that companies and regulators did
289 not want them to increase for efficiency purposes and to protect the sustainability of water resources,
290 they can also be viewed as positive because increased demand for necessary hygiene and personal
291 use could be met.

292 The largest positive changes were exhibited by *unplanned outage*, which declined by 37%; this was
293 closely followed by *risk of sewer storm flooding* with a decrease of 32%, and *water quality compliance*,
294 which had its measurement of compliance risk decline by 27%. These are significant reductions and
295 improvements to the service and security of water to consumers, despite an increase in total and
296 residential water demand (Abu-Bakar et al., 2021a). It is possible that *unplanned outage and risk of*
297 *sewer storm flooding* had considerable improvements due to exogenous factors such as a reduction
298 in the frequency and intensity of meteorological events. However, with *pollution incidents* increasing
299 by 2.2% and the Met Office (2021) noting that 2020 (the COVID-19 variable year covered April 2020-
300 April 2021) was a year of extremes with the sunniest spring on record, a heatwave in the summer, a
301 day in October breaking rainfall records, and mean temperature, rainfall, and sunshine increasing
302 compared to the average across the UK by 0.8°C, 14%, and 9%, respectively, the positive results are
303 unlikely to have been exclusively dependent on weather. Furthermore, the significant improvement
304 in *water quality compliance* could partly be attributed to the lack of residential sampling opportunities
305 caused by government-imposed restrictions, although alternative sampling was sought from staff
306 homes, commercial premises, and company property, and when these options were unavailable,
307 surrogate samples at service reservoirs (Ofwat, 2021). Since these were data from water companies
308 from alternative sampling, the positive results should be taken cautiously. However, there has been a
309 trend of sector-wide improvement in the compliance risk index for several years, with particular
310 improvements in taste and odour and Iron concentration being recorded (Drinking Water
311 Inspectorate, 2020).

312 Whilst there were some considerable performance improvements, some aspects of performance were
313 substantially adversely impacted – primarily related to economic performance. COVID-19 affected the
314 global economy, with developed and developing countries experiencing an estimated decline in
315 output of 5.6% and 2.5% in 2020 (UN DESA, 2021). However, the economic decline appears to have
316 disproportionately affected the water sector. For example, in the sample provided by the World Bank
317 (World Bank, 2020), water utilities saw their income fall by 40% globally due to the suspension of
318 water billing for low-income consumers and moratoriums on supply cut-offs, which were put in place
319 to ensure access to hygiene and ultimately slow the spread of the virus (Butler et al., 2020). The UK
320 and Ireland water sectors were no exception to these economic downturns, although to a lesser and
321 more mixed extent. The analysis revealed the most negatively affected aspects of the UK and Ireland
322 water sectors: *interest cover ratio*, which suffered the greatest negative impact of -21%, followed by
323 *post-tax return on regulated equity* with -21%, and *operating profit* with -18%. Generally, these
324 indicators show that revenue and income declined significantly. The economic indicators are naturally
325 interlinked, though; for example, *operating profit* influences *interest cover ratio*, which affects *credit*
326 *rating*. However, by utilising multiple and varied economic indicators, it is possible to narrow down
327 key problem areas, and *interest cover ratio* is one of these. This indicator measures a company's ability
328 to cover outstanding debt with incoming revenue, so the lower this ratio is, the less stable and resilient
329 the company is. A significant negative shift is dangerous for the sector, especially if this trajectory
330 occurs over a sustained period. The negative economic results over the COVID-19 period are not
331 unique to the water sector in the UK, with corporate debt rising by 6% in the UK from the end of 2019
332 to the first quarter of 2021 (UK Parliament, 2022); fortunately, water sector credit ratings only
333 declined modestly.

334 3.1.2. Economic, environmental, and service groupings

335 All the economic indicators used in this study show negative results in their change from pre-COVID-
336 19 years, apart from *operational expenditure*, which marginally declined by 2.7%, possibly due to
337 declining personnel, travel, and meter reading costs, along with some staff costs being provided by
338 the government (Atkins and Frontier Economics, 2020), as opposed to an operational efficiency
339 improvement; the effect would thus be expected to be temporary. Conversely, the decline in *capital*
340 *expenditure (CAPEX)* of 3.5% was because capital programmes were delayed or reprioritised from
341 original asset management plans. The reduction in *CAPEX* and new investments in the water sector is
342 an international trend, which is likely to continue in the short to medium terms (Mukhtarov et al.,
343 2022) due to allocation issues and delays in foreign investments, with low- and middle-income
344 countries having possible *CAPEX* declines up to two-digit number percentages. A decline in capital

345 expenditure is a dangerous trend for sector-wide resilience, with infrastructural problems likely to
346 build up over this period.

347 The economic performance of the UK and Irish water sectors declined during the first year of the
348 COVID-19 outbreak. However, a study by Hall (2022) showed that dividend pay-outs to shareholders
349 from the private UK water and sewage companies were £1.4 billion in 2020 and approximately £0.5
350 billion in 2021. Furthermore, Hall (2022) proposes that there is evidence that companies likely pay out
351 larger sums than their documented figures, with three devices used to conceal the actual level of
352 dividends: deferring payments, claiming that they are paid to immediate shareholders and not
353 shareholding companies, and so is somehow less significant, or by 'round-tripping', where dividends
354 are paid out to a holding company to use the money to pay off a loan from the operating company to
355 its immediate owner. This is not exclusive to 2021, with an average dividend pay-out per year
356 estimated to be £1.6 billion from 2010-2021 from UK water companies. Hall (2022) and others
357 (Armitage, 2012; Bayliss & Hall, 2017; Yearwood, 2018) argue that excessive dividend pay-outs reduce
358 the money available for investment and have increased the cost of water for the customer, whilst
359 company debts have continued to rise; essentially meaning that companies are financing payments
360 for dividend pay-outs with loans, and the customers are paying more against these debts and interest
361 payments. It appears that the COVID-19 outbreak adversely affected the economic performance of
362 companies, yet shareholder profits were prioritised over company resilience during the disruption.
363 Shareholder payments should be reduced at least in the short term and be flexible to do so into the
364 future if resilience is to be achieved in the water sector, with the decline in interest cover ratio of 21%
365 a warning for what could happen to revenue and debt payments.

366 Given the economic performance indicators used here, it is surprising to observe an improvement in
367 seven service and environment indicators, with three more having negligible or mixed impacts. The
368 expectation was that as companies' financial performance and stability decline, so does the quality of
369 the delivery of services, particularly under the lockdown provisions imposed across the UK and Ireland,
370 with many staff unable to fulfil their job roles. It is probable that the long history of regulation via
371 asset management plans within the UK water sector, with the first plan dating back to 1990 and the
372 seventh (current) plan in operation until 2025 (Mounce, 2020), has contributed to this sector-wide
373 service resilience. Throughout the years, the specific targets of asset management plans have
374 changed. Collectively, however, they have focussed on *leakage*, efficiency, and customer service, with
375 an emphasis in recent years on resilience, reducing environmental impacts, and digitalisation (Kijak,
376 2021). These themes and past innovations are apparent in the indicator results, with *supply*
377 *interruptions* and *unplanned outage* reducing by 8% and 37%, respectively, despite more drinking
378 water entering the system than usual and *greenhouse gas emissions* and *leakage* continuing their

379 declining trends with further reductions of 9% and 4%, respectively, in 2020. It is also possible that
380 these indicators, excluding *greenhouse gas emissions*, were somewhat improved since COVID-19
381 disruptions because the lower interference of urban traffic may have made maintenance interventions
382 easier. Furthermore, these metrics likely, at least partially, contributed to the improvement in
383 *customer satisfaction* of 4%.

384 The positive environmental and service results are juxtaposed against the negative economic outlook;
385 however, it is likely that the deteriorating financial position during, and possibly because of, the
386 COVID-19 pandemic, could be felt in the future if continued. The most obvious example is *capital*
387 *expenditure*, where integral capital projects may have been delayed. In a shorter-term analysis,
388 spending appears to have declined, but the negatives of underspending are not yet shown within
389 available indicators and data (Walker et al., 2020). Leakage management often suffers when
390 companies fall behind on their asset management plans due to less ability to assess, repair, and update
391 infrastructure (Speight, 2015). A similar effect may be expected for *customer satisfaction* since there
392 will likely be increased bills to make up for lower operating profits and a weaker financial position, as
393 well as the increased cost of energy, with UK water prices already rising by 1.7% on average in 2022
394 (Water UK, 2022). Currently, these are only hypothetical scenarios because the changes are being
395 evaluated one year into the change induced by COVID-19, and it is unlikely that one year of reduced
396 spending would severely affect other areas of water services. However, an extended period of
397 underspending due to either poorer financial positions, misaligned shareholder payments, or
398 restrictions could be significant.


399 Results can vary from year to year due to the nature of intertwined performance indicators (Walker
400 et al., 2019), and the trends presented here would probably change if the years of the sample were
401 extended, both into the past and future. Broadening the sample further into the past, for example,
402 would change the average or baseline years compared to the COVID-19 variable year, although that
403 would generate questions of validity and representativeness of those years to current market and
404 operating conditions. In this study, a three-year control period was deemed appropriate to capture
405 variances within indicators without using data from an extraneous period (e.g., a different asset
406 management plan and regulation cycle). The time series from the COVID-19 variable year onwards is
407 limited; however, this can only be addressed with future studies applying a comparative approach.
408 Equally, results could differ if alternative or additional indicators were used, but indicators were
409 carefully selected to represent the vital aspects of company performance and regulatory requirements
410 – informed by recent studies (Walker et al., 2020). This study generates a timely yet tentative insight
411 into how the pandemic impacted key performance indicators pertinent to the water sector's short-
412 and long-term resilience.

413 3.2. Water sector productivity analysis

414 3.2.1. Whole sector productivity

415 For 16 UK water companies, productivity analysis was conducted utilising the HMPI to evaluate the
416 efficiency change between the three years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic (2018-2020) and the
417 pandemic's first year (ending April 2021). To represent the primary operations of water companies,
418 the choice of inputs and outputs is pivotal, which is why *TOTEX*, *water supply interruptions*, and *GHG*
419 *emissions* were selected as inputs and *volume of water delivered* and *customer satisfaction* were
420 chosen as outputs to cover all aspects of a water company. The methodology's nature and sample size
421 meant that no more indicators could be incorporated into this part of the analysis.

422 Company scores were generated relative to their peers over time, and productivity change was
423 deemed to increase when TFP was >1 and to decrease when estimates were <1. The average TFP
424 change was positive, with a value of 1.35 from the average of the three years pre-COVID-19 to the
425 first year of the pandemic, as shown in Figure 1, which indicates an average increase in productivity
426 of 35%. This finding signifies that the outputs have significantly grown compared to the levels of inputs
427 across the sector, which is supported by the results in Table 2, showing the outputs of *volume of water*
428 *delivered* and *customer satisfaction* increasing, but with inputs such as *GHG emissions*, *water supply*
429 *interruptions*, and *TOTEX* decreasing. Interestingly, the COVID-19-induced temporary reduction in
430 *OPEX* positively affects TFP results since it appears that outputs are being performed more efficiently.
431 Nevertheless, this substantial improvement is a surprise considering the extent and speed of changes
432 imposed by COVID-19. The UK water sector has been focussing on creating a resilient industry
433 (Rodríguez et al., 2020), where companies actively review operational procedures and responses to
434 anticipated and unanticipated threats (Linnenluecke, 2017). The goal of this process is for firms to
435 have a broad capacity to mitigate, adapt, cope, and learn from a crisis (Butler et al., 2017), and these
436 initial results show that this has been delivered to an extent. There are and will be other challenges in
437 the future, from extended alternative consumption patterns and limited capital project progress from
438 COVID-19, along with increasing energy prices and climate change, but during the year of the
439 pandemic, the indicators chosen showed that the sector's preparation served it well.



440

441 **Figure 1.** Total factor productivity (TFP) change for the UK sector covering the three years (2018-
 442 2020) leading up to, and the first year of, the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021).

443 The positive and resilient performance displayed in the results is echoed in other studies, too. For
 444 example, Lawson et al. (2022) conducted 11 interviews with UK water executives to evaluate
 445 organisation responses during COVID-19. They found the UK water sector’s preparation to be
 446 effective, with pandemic contingency plans, past incident management experience, water network
 447 pressure management, and existing customer support, to all be contributing factors to the positive
 448 response of the sector. Furthermore, industry-wide collaboration in response to Brexit and preparing
 449 for that by securing reliable supply chains helped ensure sound strategies were deployed when the
 450 pandemic began (Cotterill et al., 2020). Despite the positives found across the studies, a concluding
 451 point from Lawson et al. (2022) was that the pandemic highlighted some pre-existing system
 452 vulnerabilities, with a realisation of risk displayed across the sector, and perhaps pre-existing
 453 pandemic plans were not prepared for the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic.

454 The mixed response of the UK water sector displayed across Sections 3.1 and 3.2 can still be
 455 considered resilient in core activities; however, according to a report by the Stockholm International
 456 Water Institute (SIWI) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (2021), this appears not to have
 457 been a universal response. Outside of the UK, changes to demand patterns, supply disruptions, and
 458 government measures have posed a significant risk to the operational reliability of services,
 459 sustainability, and the financial viability of providers. The pressures have exposed inadequate and

460 fragile services, resulting in lower levels of sanitation, which has disproportionately affected poorer
461 communities. Furthermore, COVID-19-induced government restrictions, supply chain disruptions, and
462 increases in chemical and fuel prices have culminated in a lack of maintenance and poorer operation
463 of infrastructure. As noted in Section 3.1, *CAPEX* has declined in the UK, and is a trend seen elsewhere.
464 A study by Goldin et al. (2022) showed how such underspending negatively impacted 46% of water
465 industry projects in South Africa. The resulting global service gaps have been a major theme in the
466 water sector alongside the threatened financial sustainability of providers (Mukhtarov et al., 2022).
467 SIWI and UNICEF (2021) document how these shortcomings may be a springboard for reform towards
468 resilience via digitisation, leakage reduction, increased efficiency, and stakeholder and citizen
469 engagement, somewhat similar to how the UK has developed over the past couple of asset
470 management planning cycles.

471 3.2.2. Company productivity

472 Average productivity results for the UK water sector were above what was anticipated; however, the
473 range of relative company performance was vast (Figure 1). SES Water and South West lead the sector
474 over the sample period, with +89% and +84% productivity change, respectively. SES water
475 interestingly had slight declines in performance across *TOTEX*, *water supply interruptions* and
476 *customer service* but had substantial improvements in *GHG emissions* of 77%. Similarly, South West
477 did not improve in all indicators with the increase in *TOTEX*; however, it significantly improved *water*
478 *supply interruptions* by reducing them by 69.5%. In a more traditional efficiency and productivity
479 analysis of water companies (Molinos-Senante et al., 2017; Molinos-Senante & Maziotis, 2020), these
480 companies would have performed much differently since the big improvements were in service and
481 environmentally based indicators, which are often neglected.

482 In reality, companies have not improved in efficiency by an average of 35% or had individual peaks of
483 89% in the traditional sense, i.e., operations as a whole; however, when taking into account the
484 specific selected key performance indicators as we have here, companies and the sector as a whole
485 have performed surprisingly well during the pandemic. The perceived substantial increases in
486 productivity were mainly due to the inclusion of sustainability-focused metrics, which have taken
487 more of a priority in recent years. Due to the recent focus on such metrics compared to conventional
488 indicators, they will naturally have more influence on perceived performance, and *GHG emissions* are
489 a perfect example of this. There was a sector-wide change of -9% in *GHG emissions* per m³ from the
490 average of the three years preceding the pandemic to its occurrence. This finding is likely due in part
491 to the continued decarbonisation of the electricity grid that supplies much of the sector's energy and
492 not operational efficiency gains within companies' control, which has inflated the productivity results.

493 For example, the UK electricity grid lowered the average kgCO₂e/kWh from 0.232 across 2017, 2018,
494 and 2019 (years of the pre-COVID baseline) to 0.156 in 2020 (BEIS, 2021).

495 Only one company, Welsh Water, exhibited a negative TFP change, albeit narrowly at -1%. This result
496 was the outcome of the comparative nature of the methodology and having low levels of
497 improvement, for example, being the second worst performer in *customer satisfaction* and *GHG*
498 *emissions* change, with results of 0.6% and -8.2%, respectively, in conjunction with an increase in
499 spending of 1.2%. Welsh Water note in their 2021 annual report the challenges from COVID-19, which
500 had a 'detrimental effect' on their energy self-sufficiency, reporting self-sufficiency of 23%, falling
501 short of their 31% target for the year (Dŵr Cymru Welsh Water, 2021). The two attributable factors
502 documented were a hydropower system being offline for five months and an advanced anaerobic
503 digestion plant being delayed by several months, and it is these shortcomings, amongst others, that
504 likely caused the company's *GHG emissions* not to have declined as much as their peers. Although
505 Welsh Water did have a negative TFP score, they were amongst a distinct group of four, additionally
506 made up of Southern (2%), South East Water (4%), and Yorkshire (4%), who trailed behind the next
507 company Portsmouth Water by at least 10%. It is feasible that these companies can improve further
508 by learning from resilient structures, procedures, and practices from top performers by, for example,
509 evaluating their approach to *GHG emissions*, both at management and technological scope, and
510 assessing their strategies to lower *water supply interruptions*, particularly in a period of overall
511 increased consumption and shifting consumption patterns to residential over the business.

512 The results presented and discussed here can have real value in informing the process of building and
513 maintaining resilient operations; however, the study did have limitations. Foremost, productivity
514 results are driven by indicator choice, and whilst the indicators in this study attempted to cover all
515 aspects of a water company's operation in a manner encompassing key sustainability themes of
516 economics, society, and the environment, alternative perspectives and objectives could significantly
517 change results. For example, more economic indicators would likely have shown a poorer
518 performance and response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with *operating profit* and *interest cover ratio*
519 declining considerably (Table 1). Varying scopes across Sections 3.1 and 3.2 allows for the fullest
520 display of response from the UK and Ireland water sectors based on data availability and quality.

521 Indicators and the nature of efficiency models, particularly when evaluating the water sector, have
522 interesting quirks. As such, the way *volume delivered* is treated in the analysis is noteworthy since
523 when company efficiency is based on minimising inputs and maximising services, delivering more
524 water at the lowest cost is deemed positive (which it is to an extent). However, the water providers
525 are unique as a business since attempts are made to reduce the volume of water consumed via

526 education campaigns and water-saving devices, to manage water resources more sustainably (Abu-
527 Bakar et al., 2021b), which is why the increase in *volume delivered* is highlighted as a mixed result in
528 Table 2. *Volume delivered* is still treated as a typical yet imperfect output here because a company still
529 performs more efficiently if it provides its core service for lower costs. Because COVID-19 induced
530 increased water consumption, though, the entire sector appears more efficient. Furthermore, *Volume*
531 *delivered* does not include all water put into the network and leakage, so it is possible there are
532 inefficiencies not being captured, leading to skewed productivity results.

533 In addition to temporal sample coverage effects outlined in Section 3.1.2, which impact many
534 efficiency analyses evaluating year-on-year change (Albrizio et al., 2017; Walker et al., 2022), proactive
535 companies possibly performing well over the long term are viewed relatively unfavourably in a
536 shorter-term study. For example, early adopters of sustainability-focused metrics may have already
537 reduced their *GHG emissions* in the years preceding the sample period in this study. Therefore, it is
538 possible that the significant gains that are often achieved in the early adoption stages (Forés, 2019;
539 Sousa-Zomer & Miguel, 2018) are not captured, and companies can appear that they are performing
540 comparatively worse than their peers who may have only started improving in recent years. This
541 idiosyncrasy is often a risk; however, it is unavoidable under data availability constraints. However,
542 when analysing this possible skew, the baseline performance of all companies showed a weak
543 relationship with the percentage changes of each of the five indicators used, with a R^2 ranging from
544 0.001-0.29 (details can be found in the Supplementary Information), showing that the starting point
545 for companies did not significantly impact their COVID-19 comparative performance results, i.e., lower
546 baselines did not necessarily mean larger positive changes. Remembering the eminent words of
547 George Box, “all models are wrong, but some are useful” (Box and Draper, 1986) provides the
548 appropriate context for the results in Section 3.2 in light of the limitations outlined.

549 **4. Conclusions**

550 The objectives of this study were to evaluate how the water sectors in the UK and Ireland were
551 affected by COVID-19 from a holistic sustainability and resilience-based perspective, using publicly
552 available key performance indicator data and productivity analysis. When evaluating performance
553 change with 18 indicators spanning all areas of company operation, the sector displayed mixed results,
554 with a near even divide between declining metrics, which were predominantly economic, and
555 improving metrics, which mainly were service based. The most improved indicators were *unplanned*
556 *outage*, *risk of sewer storm flooding*, and *water quality compliance risk*, which decreased by 37%, 32%,
557 and 27%, respectively. Despite the increase in total and residential water demand, these results
558 represented significant improvements to the service and security of water to customers. Conversely,

559 the worst affected indicators were *interest cover ratio*, *post-tax return on regulated equity*, and
560 *operating profit*, which exhibited declines of 21%, 21%, and 18%, respectively.

561 Further conclusions were drawn following the productivity analysis, where *TOTEX*, *volume of water*
562 *delivered*, *customer satisfaction*, *water supply interruptions*, and *GHG emissions* were modelled as
563 inputs and outputs within the HMPI. The average productivity change of all companies was positive at
564 35%, compared to the preceding three years of COVID-19. However, the productivity model was
565 necessarily based on a limited number of indicators, chosen to encompass the main aspects of
566 company operations, and the balanced representation between financial and service indicators
567 displayed the sector to be much more productive in the breakout year of the pandemic.

568 The results suggest that the UK and Ireland water sectors were somewhat resilient to the COVID-19
569 pandemic, supported by past innovations and planning. However, it is possible that many of the
570 adverse effects arising from a poorer financial position following COVID-19, if continued, could
571 manifest in the future, exacerbating exogenous pressures such as climate change. Although the
572 economic downturn across the sector is likely only to be temporary, it is recommended that non-
573 critical spending, including shareholder payments, should be scrutinized during periods of the
574 economic downturn to support long-term resilience and that lower-performing companies learn from
575 the best practice of their peers. Furthermore, resilience in response to COVID-19 does not necessarily
576 mean the water sector will be resilient to all future disruptive events, such as climate change and
577 exposure to new contaminants. Thus, it is vital to continue to build on the successful aspects that put
578 the sector in a good position, like digitisation and the management structure that allowed a fast
579 response. Future research could overcome the limitations of the study by expanding the sample years
580 and indicator selection, which would capture any lag effects or slower changing indicators, significant
581 variation in sustainability metrics, and environmental influences and generate a complete picture of
582 the long-term impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the water sector. This study provides novel
583 insight for the water industry, sector regulators, and academia by generating preliminary quantitative
584 sustainability-focused analyses of the resilience of the UK and Ireland water sectors in response to
585 COVID-19.

586 **Acknowledgments**

587 This research was undertaken within the Dŵr Uisce project, partly funded by the European Regional
588 Development Fund (ERDF) through the Ireland Wales Co-operation programme 2014–2020 (grant
589 number 14122).

590 **References**

- 591 Abu-Bakar, H., Williams, L., & Hallett, S. H. (2021a). Quantifying the impact of the COVID-19
592 lockdown on household water consumption patterns in England. *Npj Clean Water* 2021 4:1,
593 4(1), 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41545-021-00103-8>
- 594 Abu-Bakar, H., Williams, L., & Hallett, S. H. (2021b). A review of household water demand
595 management and consumption measurement. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 292, 125872.
596 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JCLEPRO.2021.125872>
- 597 Albrizio, S., Kozluk, T., & Zipperer, V. (2017). Environmental policies and productivity growth:
598 Evidence across industries and firms. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*,
599 81, 209–226. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JEEM.2016.06.002>
- 600 Antwi, S. H., Getty, D., Linnane, S., & Rolston, A. (2021). COVID-19 water sector responses in Europe:
601 A scoping review of preliminary governmental interventions. *Science of The Total Environment*,
602 762, 143068. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SCITOTENV.2020.143068>
- 603 Armitage, S. (2012). Demand for Dividends: The Case of UK Water Companies. *Journal of Business*
604 *Finance & Accounting*, 39(3–4), 464–499. <https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-5957.2011.02277.X>
- 605 Atkins and Frontier economics. (2020). *Economic impacts of COVID-19 on the water sector*.
- 606 Bayliss, K., & Hall, D. (2017). Bringing water into public ownership: costs and benefits. *Public Services*
607 *International Research Unit, University of Greenwich*.
608 https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/17277/10/17277%20HALL_Bringing_Water_into_Public_Owne
609 [rship_%28Rev%27d%29_2017.pdf](https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/17277/10/17277%20HALL_Bringing_Water_into_Public_Owne_rship_%28Rev%27d%29_2017.pdf)
- 610 Berglund, E. Z., Buchberger, S., Cunha, M., Faust, K. M., Giacomoni, M., Goharian, E., Kleiner, Y., Lee,
611 J., Ostfeld, A., Pasha, F., Pesantez, J. E., Saldarriaga, J., Shafiee, E., Spearing, L., Zyl, J. E. van, &
612 Yang, Y. C. E. (2022). Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Water Utility Operations and
613 Vulnerability. *Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management*, 148(6), 04022027.
614 [https://doi.org/10.1061/\(ASCE\)WR.1943-5452.0001560](https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0001560)
- 615 Bivins, A., North, D., Ahmad, A., Ahmed, W., Alm, E., Been, F., Bhattacharya, P., Bijlsma, L., Boehm, A.
616 B., Brown, J., Buttiglieri, G., Calabro, V., Carducci, A., Castiglioni, S., Cetecioglu Gurol, Z.,
617 Chakraborty, S., Costa, F., Curcio, S., de Los Reyes, F. L., ... Bibby, K. (2020). Wastewater-Based
618 Epidemiology: Global Collaborative to Maximize Contributions in the Fight against COVID-19.
619 *Environmental Science and Technology*, 54(13), 7754–7757.
620 https://doi.org/10.1021/ACS.EST.0C02388/ASSET/IMAGES/LARGE/ES0C02388_0001.JPEG
- 621 Bjurek, H., Førsund, F. R., & Hjalmarsson, L. (1998). Malmquist Productivity Indexes: An Empirical
622 Comparison. *Index Numbers: Essays in Honour of Sten Malmquist*, 217–239.
623 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4858-0_6
- 624 Box, G. E. P., & Draper, N. R. (1986). *Empirical Model Building and Response Surfaces (Wiley Series in*
625 *Probability and Statistics)*. Wiley-Blackwell. [https://www.amazon.co.uk/Empirical-Building-](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Empirical-Building-Response-Probability-Statistics/dp/0471810339)
626 [Response-Probability-Statistics/dp/0471810339](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Empirical-Building-Response-Probability-Statistics/dp/0471810339)
- 627 Butler, D., Ward, S., Sweetapple, C., Astaraie-Imani, M., Diao, K., Farmani, R., & Fu, G. (2017).
628 Reliable, resilient and sustainable water management: the Safe & SuRe approach. *Global*
629 *Challenges*, 1(1), 63–77. <https://doi.org/10.1002/GCH2.1010>

- 630 Chen, X., Lio, X. and Zhu, Q. (2022). Comparative analysis of total factor productivity in China's high-
631 tech industries. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 175, 121332.
632 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2021.121332>
- 633 Cooper, W., Seiford, L., & Tone, K. (2006). *Introduction to data envelopment analysis and its uses:
634 with DEA-solver software and references*.
635 <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=kYzCRulhTzkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=nKRUYAO>
636 [BLB&sig=7m2dYJB1uqnJY6FAI7OQEdnfm1I](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=kYzCRulhTzkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=nKRUYAO)
- 637 Cotterill, S., Bunney, S., Lawson, E., Chisholm, A., Farmani, R., & Melville-Shreeve, P. (2020). COVID-
638 19 and the water sector: understanding impact, preparedness and resilience in the UK through
639 a sector-wide survey. *Water and Environment Journal*, 34(4), 715–728.
640 <https://doi.org/10.1111/WEJ.12649>
- 641 Dakpo, K. H., Desjeux, Y., & Latruffe, L. (2018). *productivity: Indices of Productivity Using Data
642 Envelopment Analysis (DEA)*. <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/productivity/index.html>
- 643 Drinking water inspectorate. (2020). *Drinking water 2020*. [https://cdn.dwi.gov.uk/wp-
644 content/uploads/2021/07/09174358/1179-APS-England_CCS1020445030-
645 003_Chief_Inspectors_Report_2021_Prfl_52.pdf](https://cdn.dwi.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/09174358/1179-APS-England_CCS1020445030-003_Chief_Inspectors_Report_2021_Prfl_52.pdf)
- 646 Dŵr Cymru Welsh Water. (2021). *Dŵr Cymru Welsh Water Annual Performance Report 2020/21*.
- 647 Fitzgerald, S. F., Rossi, G., Low, A. S., McAteer, S. P., O’Keefe, B., Findlay, D., Cameron, G. J., Pollard,
648 P., Singleton, P. T. R., Ponton, G., Singer, A. C., Farkas, K., Jones, D., Graham, D. W., Quintela-
649 Baluja, M., Tait-Burkard, C., Gally, D. L., Kao, R., & Corbishley, A. (2021). COVID-19 mass testing:
650 harnessing the power of wastewater epidemiology. *MedRxiv*, 2021.05.24.21257703.
651 <https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.05.24.21257703>
- 652 Forés, B. (2019). Beyond Gathering the ‘Low-Hanging Fruit’ of Green Technology for Improved
653 Environmental Performance: an Empirical Examination of the Moderating Effects of Proactive
654 Environmental Management and Business Strategies. *Sustainability 2019, Vol. 11, Page 6299,
655 11(22), 6299*. <https://doi.org/10.3390/SU11226299>
- 656 Giacobbo, A., Rodrigues, M. A. S., Zoppas Ferreira, J., Bernardes, A. M., & de Pinho, M. N. (2021). A
657 critical review on SARS-CoV-2 infectivity in water and wastewater. What do we know? *The
658 Science of the Total Environment*, 774, 145721.
659 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SCITOTENV.2021.145721>
- 660 Goldin, J., Nhamo, L., Ncube, B., Zvimba, J. N., Petja, B., Mpandeli, S., Nomqophu, W., Hlophe-
661 Ginindza, S., Greeff-Laubscher, M. R., Molose, V., Lottering, S., Liphadzi, S., Naidoo, D., &
662 Mabhaudhi, T. (2022). Resilience and Sustainability of the Water Sector during the COVID-19
663 Pandemic. *Sustainability 2022, Vol. 14, Page 1482, 14(3), 1482*.
664 <https://doi.org/10.3390/SU14031482>
- 665 Halkos, G., & Petrou, K. N. (2019). Treating undesirable outputs in DEA: A critical review. *Economic
666 Analysis and Policy*, 62, 97–104. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EAP.2019.01.005>
- 667 Hall, D. (2022). Water and sewerage company finances 2021: dividends and investment - and
668 company attempts to hide dividends. *Public Services International Research Unit, University of
669 Greenwich. Working Paper*.
670 [https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/34274/14/34274%20HALL_Water_and_Sewerage_Company_Fi
671 nances_%28Rev.2%29_2021.pdf](https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/34274/14/34274%20HALL_Water_and_Sewerage_Company_Finances_%28Rev.2%29_2021.pdf)

672 Hammond, P., Suttie, M., Lewis, V. T., Smith, A. P., & Singer, A. C. (2021). Detection of untreated
673 sewage discharges to watercourses using machine learning. *Npj Clean Water* 2021 4:1, 4(1), 1–
674 10. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41545-021-00108-3>

675 Ho, T. Q., Hoang, V. N., Wilson, C., & Nguyen, T. T. (2017). Which farming systems are efficient for
676 Vietnamese coffee farmers? *Economic Analysis and Policy*, 56, 114–125.
677 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EAP.2017.09.002>

678 Howard, G., Bartram, J., Brocklehurst, C., Colford, J. M., Costa, F., Cunliffe, D., Dreibelbis, R.,
679 Eisenberg, J. N. S., Evans, B., Girones, R., Hruday, S., Willetts, J., & Wright, C. Y. (2020). COVID-
680 19: urgent actions, critical reflections and future relevance of ‘WaSH’: lessons for the current
681 and future pandemics. *Journal of Water and Health*, 18(5), 613–630.
682 <https://doi.org/10.2166/WH.2020.162>

683 Khan, S. A. M. N., Ramli, R., & Baten, M. D. A. (2015). Enhanced DEA model with undesirable output
684 and interval data for rice growing farmers performance assessment. *AIP Conference*
685 *Proceedings*, 1691(1), 030016. <https://doi.org/10.1063/1.4937035>

686 Kijak, R. (2021). *Water Asset Management in Times of Climate Change and Digital Transformation*.
687 Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79360-9>

688 Kevill, J. L., Pellett, C., Farkas, K., Brown, M. R., Bassano, I., Denise, H., McDonald, J. E., Malham, S. K.,
689 Porter, J., Warren, J., Evens, N. P., Paterson, S., Singer, A. C. & Jones, D. L. (2022). A comparison
690 of precipitation and filtration-based SARS-CoV-2 recovery methods and the influence of
691 temperature, turbidity, and surfactant load in urban wastewater. *Science of the Total*
692 *Environment*, 808, 151916. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.151916>

693 Lawson, E., Bunney, S., Cotterill, S., Farmani, R., Melville-Shreeve, P., & Butler, D. (2022). COVID-19
694 and the UK water sector: Exploring organizational responses through a resilience framework.
695 *Water and Environment Journal*, 36(1), 161–171. <https://doi.org/10.1111/WEJ.12737>

696 Linnenluecke, M. K. (2017). Resilience in Business and Management Research: A Review of
697 Influential Publications and a Research Agenda. *International Journal of Management Reviews*,
698 19(1), 4–30. <https://doi.org/10.1111/IJMR.12076>

699 Met Office. (2021) *2020 - a remarkable year*. [https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/about-us/press-](https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/about-us/press-office/news/weather-and-climate/2021/2020-statistics-round-up)
700 [office/news/weather-and-climate/2021/2020-statistics-round-up](https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/about-us/press-office/news/weather-and-climate/2021/2020-statistics-round-up)

701 Mohammadian, I., & Jahangoshai Rezaee, M. (2020). A new decomposition and interpretation of
702 Hicks-Moorsteen productivity index for analysis of Stock Exchange companies: Case study on
703 pharmaceutical industry. *Socio-Economic Planning Sciences*, 69, 100674.
704 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SEPS.2018.12.001>

705 Molinos-Senante, M., & Maziotis, A. (2020). Drivers of productivity change in water companies: an
706 empirical approach for England and Wales. *International Journal of Water Resources*
707 *Development*, 36(6), 972–991.
708 https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2019.1702000/SUPPL_FILE/CIJW_A_1702000_SM0175.DOC
709 [X](#)

710 Molinos-Senante, M., Maziotis, A., Sala-Garrido, R. (2017a). Assessment of the total factor
711 productivity change in the English and Welsh water industry: a fare-primont productivity index
712 approach. *Water Resources. Management*, 31 (8), 2389–2405. [https://doi.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-016-1346-2)
713 [org/10.1007/s11269-016-1346-2](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-016-1346-2)

- 714 Molinos-Senante, M., Maziotis, A., & Sala-Garrido, R. (2017b). Assessing the productivity change of
 715 water companies in England and Wales: A dynamic metafrontier approach. *Journal of*
 716 *Environmental Management*, 197, 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JENVMAN.2017.03.023>
- 717 Molinos-Senante, M., Sala-Garrido, R., & Hernandez-Sancho, F. (2016). Development and application
 718 of the Hicks-Moorsteen productivity index for the total factor productivity assessment of
 719 wastewater treatment plants. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 112, 3116–3123.
 720 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.10.114>
- 721 Mounce, S. R. (2020). Data Science Trends and Opportunities for Smart Water Utilities. In *Data*
 722 *Science Trends and Opportunities for Smart Water Utilities* (Vol. 102, pp. 1–26). Springer.
 723 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82339-9_12
- 724 Moutinho, V., Madaleno, M., & Macedo, P. (2020). The effect of urban air pollutants in Germany:
 725 eco-efficiency analysis through fractional regression models applied after DEA and SFA
 726 efficiency predictions. *Sustainable Cities and Society*, 59, 102204.
 727 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SCS.2020.102204>
- 728 Mukhtarov, F., Papyrakis, E., & Rieger, M. (2022). Covid-19 and. *COVID-19 and International*
 729 *Development*, 157–173. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82339-9_12
- 730 Neal, M. J. (2020). COVID-19 and water resources management: reframing our priorities as a water
 731 sector. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2020.1773648>, 45(5), 435–440.
 732 <https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2020.1773648>
- 733 Ní Ghráinne, B. (2020). Covid-19, Border Closures, and International Law. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
 734 <https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3662218>
- 735 O’Donnell, C. J. (2012). An aggregate quantity framework for measuring and decomposing
 736 productivity change. *Journal of Productivity Analysis* 2012 38:3, 38(3), 255–272.
 737 <https://doi.org/10.1007/S11123-012-0275-1>
- 738 O’Donnell, C.J. (2014). Econometric estimation of distance functions and associated measures of
 739 productivity and efficiency change. *Journal of Productivity Analysis*, 41 (2), 187–200.
 740 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11123-012-0311-1>.
- 741 Ofwat. (2019a). *Securing long term resilience*. [https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-](https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/PR19-final-determinations-Securing-long-term-resilience.pdf)
 742 [content/uploads/2019/12/PR19-final-determinations-Securing-long-term-resilience.pdf](https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/PR19-final-determinations-Securing-long-term-resilience.pdf)
- 743 Ofwat. (2019b) *Monitoring financial resilience*. [https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-](https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Monitoring20financial20resilience2020-20201820Report20-20Final-1.pdf)
 744 [content/uploads/2019/01/Monitoring20financial20resilience2020-20201820Report20-20Final-](https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Monitoring20financial20resilience2020-20201820Report20-20Final-1.pdf)
 745 [1.pdf](https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Monitoring20financial20resilience2020-20201820Report20-20Final-1.pdf)
- 746 Ofwat. (2021). *Service delivery report*. [https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-](https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Service-Delivery-Report-2020-2021.pdf)
 747 [content/uploads/2021/11/Service-Delivery-Report-2020-2021.pdf](https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Service-Delivery-Report-2020-2021.pdf)
- 748 Ofwat. (2022). *Ofwat’s 3rd Climate Change Adaptation Report*. [https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-](https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Ofwats-3rd-Climate-Change-Adaptation-Report.pdf)
 749 [content/uploads/2022/01/Ofwats-3rd-Climate-Change-Adaptation-Report.pdf](https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Ofwats-3rd-Climate-Change-Adaptation-Report.pdf)
- 750 Ondrej, M., & Jiri, H. (2012). Total Factor Productivity Approach in Competitive and Regulated World.
 751 *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 57, 223–230.
 752 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SBSPRO.2012.09.1178>

- 753 Poch, M., Garrido-Baserba, M., Corominas, L., Perelló-Moragues, A., Monclús, H., Cermerón-Romero,
754 M., Melitas, N., Jiang, S. C., & Rosso, D. (2020). When the fourth water and digital revolution
755 encountered COVID-19. *Science of The Total Environment*, 744, 140980.
756 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SCITOTENV.2020.140980>
- 757 Renukappa, S., Kamunda, A., & Suresh, S. (2021). Impact of COVID-19 on water sector projects and
758 practices. *Utilities Policy*, 70, 101194. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JUP.2021.101194>
- 759 Rodríguez, M., Lawson, E., & Butler, D. (2020). A study of the Resilience Analysis Grid method and its
760 applicability to the water sector in England and Wales. *Water and Environment Journal*, 34(4),
761 623–633. <https://doi.org/10.1111/WEJ.12539>
- 762 Sala-Garrido, R., Molinos-Senante, M., Mocholí-Arce, M. (2018). Assessing productivity changes in
763 water companies: a comparison of the Luenberger and Luenberger-Hicks-Moorsteen
764 productivity indicators. *Urban Water Journal*, 15 (7), 626–635. [https://doi.org/](https://doi.org/10.1080/1573062X.2018.1529807)
765 [10.1080/1573062X.2018.1529807](https://doi.org/10.1080/1573062X.2018.1529807).
- 766 Sala-Garrido, R., Molinos-Senante, M., Mocholí-Arce, M. (2019). Comparing changes in productivity
767 among private water companies integrating quality of service: a metafrontier approach. *Journal*
768 *of Cleaner Production*, 216, 597–606. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.034>.
- 769 Seiford, L. M., & Zhu, J. (2002). Modeling undesirable factors in efficiency evaluation. *European*
770 *Journal of Operational Research*, 142(1), 16–20. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00293-4)
771 [2217\(01\)00293-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00293-4)
- 772 Shao, B.B.M. and Lin, W.T. (2016). Assessing output performance of information technology service
773 industries: productivity, innovation and catch-up. *International Journal of Production*
774 *Economics*, 172, 43–53. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.10.026>
- 775 Shephard, R. W. (1953). Cost and production functions. *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, 1(2),
776 171–171. <https://doi.org/10.1002/NAV.3800010218>
- 777 Silva, T. C., Tabak, B. M., Cajueiro, D. O., & Dias, M. V. B. (2017). A comparison of DEA and SFA using
778 micro- and macro-level perspectives: Efficiency of Chinese local banks. *Physica A: Statistical*
779 *Mechanics and Its Applications*, 469, 216–223. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.PHYSA.2016.11.041>
- 780 Simoes, P. and Marques, R.C. (2012). Influence of regulation on the productivity of waste utilities.
781 What can we learn with the Portuguese experience? *Waste Management*, 32 (6), 1266–1275.
782 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2012.02.004>.
- 783 Sousa-Zomer, T. T., & Cauchick Miguel, P. A. (2018). Sustainable business models as an innovation
784 strategy in the water sector: An empirical investigation of a sustainable product-service system.
785 *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 171, S119–S129. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JCLEPRO.2016.07.063>
- 786 Sowby, R. B. (2020). Emergency preparedness after COVID-19: A review of policy statements in the
787 U.S. water sector. *Utilities Policy*, 64, 101058. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JUP.2020.101058>
- 788 Speight, V. L. (2015). Innovation in the water industry: barriers and opportunities for US and UK
789 utilities. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water*, 2(4), 301–313.
790 <https://doi.org/10.1002/WAT2.1082>
- 791 Stockholm international water institute (SIWI), & United nations children’s fund (UNICEF). (2021).
792 *Socio-economic effects of COVID-19 on water, sanitation, and hygiene*.
793 <http://www.watgovernance.org>

794 Tumelty, M.-E., Ó Néill, C., Donnelly, M., Farrell, A.-M., Frowde, R., & Pentony, L. (2022). The
795 Management of COVID-19 in Care Homes in Ireland And England: Ethical and Legal Issues in a
796 Time of Pandemic. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.4126248>

797 UK Parliament. (2022). *UK corporate debt after Covid-19: what might the impact be? - House of Lords*
798 *Library*. [https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-corporate-debt-after-covid-19-what-might-the-](https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-corporate-debt-after-covid-19-what-might-the-impact-be/)
799 [impact-be/](https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-corporate-debt-after-covid-19-what-might-the-impact-be/)

800 Walker, N. L., Norton, A., Harris, I., Williams, A. P., & Styles, D. (2019). Economic and environmental
801 efficiency of UK and Ireland water companies: Influence of exogenous factors and rurality.
802 *Journal of Environmental Management*, 241, 363–373.
803 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JENVMAN.2019.03.093>

804 Walker, N. L., Williams, A. P., & Styles, D. (2020). Key performance indicators to explain energy &
805 economic efficiency across water utilities, and identifying suitable proxies. *Journal of*
806 *Environmental Management*, 269, 110810. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JENVMAN.2020.110810>

807 Walker, N. L., Williams, A. P., & Styles, D. (2021a). Pitfalls in international benchmarking of energy
808 intensity across wastewater treatment utilities. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 300,
809 113613. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JENVMAN.2021.113613>

810 Walker, N. L., Styles, D., Gallagher, J., & Pryor Williams, A. (2021b). Aligning efficiency benchmarking
811 with sustainable outcomes in the United Kingdom water sector. *Journal of Environmental*
812 *Management*, 287. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JENVMAN.2021.112317>

813 Walker, N. L., Styles, D., Coughlan, P., & Williams, A. P. (2022). Cross-sector sustainability
814 benchmarking of major utilities in the United Kingdom. *Utilities Policy*, 78, 101417.
815 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JUP.2022.101417>

816 Water UK. (2022). *Water bills forecast to see below-inflation increase of 1.7% with a range of support*
817 *available for those struggling to pay | Water UK*. [https://www.water.org.uk/news-item/water-](https://www.water.org.uk/news-item/water-bills-forecast-to-see-below-inflation-increase-of-1-7-with-a-range-of-support-available-for-those-struggling-to-pay/)
818 [bills-forecast-to-see-below-inflation-increase-of-1-7-with-a-range-of-support-available-for-](https://www.water.org.uk/news-item/water-bills-forecast-to-see-below-inflation-increase-of-1-7-with-a-range-of-support-available-for-those-struggling-to-pay/)
819 [those-struggling-to-pay/](https://www.water.org.uk/news-item/water-bills-forecast-to-see-below-inflation-increase-of-1-7-with-a-range-of-support-available-for-those-struggling-to-pay/)

820 World Bank. (2020). *Supporting Water Utilities During COVID-19*.
821 [https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/06/30/supporting-water-utilities-during-](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/06/30/supporting-water-utilities-during-covid-19)
822 [covid-19](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/06/30/supporting-water-utilities-during-covid-19)

823 Yearwood, K. (2018). The Privatised Water Industry in the UK. An ATM for investors. *Public Services*
824 *International Research Unit, University of Greenwich. Working Paper*.
825 <https://www.gre.ac.uk/business/research/centres/public-services/home>

826 Zhu, G., Chou, M. C., & Tsai, C. W. (2020). Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic Exposing
827 the Shortcomings of Current Supply Chain Operations: A Long-Term Prescriptive Offering.
828 *Sustainability 2020*, Vol. 12, Page 5858, 12(14), 5858. <https://doi.org/10.3390/SU12145858>

829