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The Naval King Charles II's use of the English Navy, 1659 - 1668

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The Naval King

Charles II's use of the

English Navy, 1659 - 1668.

**Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy in Early Modern
History at Bangor University, United Kingdom By
Alastair Barnet.**

Abstract.

Question: Did Charles II use the English navy to boost his domestic and international power?

This thesis presents a set of revolutionary aspects that addresses a paucity in the study of the navy in the period 1659-1668 (the period from the first manoeuvres to restore Charles II, to the period immediately following the end of the Second Anglo-Dutch War). Outside key works by J.D.Davies and Bernard Capp, there has been little sustained study of the topic, and certainly nothing denoting how the navy supported Charles's power. So, we have missed crucial dimensions of the navy's role in political, diplomatic, and economic history. In contrast to the general scholarly neglect, this thesis demonstrates how essential the English navy was to Charles II in a plethora of ways. Throughout the seven chapters a large number of major, new contributions are made to the academic body of knowledge regarding Charles's use of the navy to support his power. However, the main themes show that the navy played the most important part in returning the King to power in 1660, in contrast to the historic assertion that this role belonged to the army, and how the navy was central to aiding the restored monarchy retain power using symbolism, propaganda and display of massive power, reaching an apex at the April 1661 coronation. It progresses to reveal a new interpretation of the ruling ethos that drove the Sovereign's policies thereafter. In essence, these constituted a covert desire to use the navy to establish as much of a domestic absolute monarchy as the context would allow, achieve pre-eminence internationally among his fellow heads of state, and to maximise trade with the attendant Customs duties to pay for all of this. It then explains why he planned to go to war with the Dutch, concocting a step-by-step plan to use the navy in achieving this. He commenced with the construction of a powerful international persona for himself, underwent a widespread propaganda campaign to prepare domestic and overseas opinions, erecting diplomatic alliances to isolate the Dutch with the Portuguese marriage playing a vital central role, and a covert plan to extract huge additional taxes from Parliament to pay for the hostilities. It ends with an analysis of why his plans were doomed, his mismanagement of the economy and government finances and their disastrous effect on navy funding, as well as his martial incompetence as a commander-in-chief leading to the inevitability of defeat at the Medway in June 1667. In total, this thesis shows that Charles II was unsuited to the crown he had strived for when in exile, failing to recognise that the country he ruled didn't have the ability to support his personal political desires, wasting vast amounts of treasure and lives in the process, leaving him humbled, weaker and more reliant on Parliament than when he came to the throne.

Declaration.

'I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. All other sources are acknowledged by bibliographic references. This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree unless, as agreed by the University, for approved dual awards. I confirm that I am submitting this work with the agreement of my Supervisor.'

Acknowledgements.

I would like to very gratefully acknowledge the help I received during the research and drafting of this work from my wife Martine Barnet, and kids, Thomas and Catherine and good friend Father David Sanchez-Courter for their patience, encouragement and invaluable suggestions. I am beholden to Dr Catriona Coutts and Terry Lennaine for their support and helpful suggestions, and discussions to help me to test my thoughts. Also, I wish to give a huge thanks to Gijs Rommelse who showed faith in my work at a very early stage, offering encouragement and advice. His passing is a huge loss both personally as well as to academia. The same thanks apply to Dr. James David Davies for his time in reviewing a lot of my work and advice thereafter. Regarding the research phase of Chapter 6 I am very grateful to Professor Yenner Altunbas and Dr. Noemi Mantivan from Bangor University Business School regarding advice on Economics aspects, and Dr. Graham Bird from Bangor University Environmental Sciences for help relating to Physical Geography facets. But, of course, a massive thanks needs to go to my academic supervisor, Professor Tony Claydon, for his wise advice, support, constancy, early guidance and encouragement. He saw the value of this project from the start unlike many others, and without his interest it could not have been commenced or completed.

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Note on Style.

Regarding the dates used, where both the Julian and Gregorian dates have been given in sources, this thesis uses the Julian, or earlier one, or the sole date provided in the source if this is the only one available. That means the start of a New Year is taken as 1 January, and where necessary the year dates 1 January-24 March have been silently changed.

The research was conducted using primary sources available online or in printed, hard copy versions like books, as travel and accommodation restrictions due to the Covid 19 virus in 2020 and 2021, during the bulk of the research phase of this work, would have severely and unduly hampered progress of the fieldwork. Academic deadlines would have been missed otherwise.

Footnotes throughout this work have been given in an abbreviated form to save space, as alternate longer versions in the same location would unduly have extended the thesis's overall length. Each source can be accessed by tracing the shortened footnote to the 'Abbreviation' section (see below) which has the full bibliographical attribution next to it.

It is worth noting the general approach in the footnotes' format is to give enough information to enable the reader to identify each item in the original or transcribed source. Mostly this has involved providing the author or originating transcript, such as 'Pepys', 'Montagu' or 'CCSP' followed by the volume's description for example '*diary*', '*journal*' or '*vol 1*'. Next will come the page number, or an alternative will be given where this is unavailable such as the Month and Year. On occasion the footnote is expanded to give further detail of the reference's title to ease the reader's access to it, for instance 'Commission to General George Monck as Commander in Chief'.

Abbreviations.

Publications, Editions and Catalogues of Manuscript Material.

- Baker *Chronicle* Baker, C., *A chronicle of the Kings of England, from the time of the Romans government unto the death of King James, where unto is added the reign of King Charles the First, and the first thirteen years of his sacred Majesty King Charles the Second* (London, 1670)
- Barlow *Journal* Barlow, E., *Barlow's journal of his life at sea in King's ships, East and West Indiemen and other merchantmen from 1659 to 1703 Volume I* Lubbock, B., (ed) (London, 1934)
- Burnet *A supplement* Foxcroft, H. C., (ed), *A supplement from unpublished MSS to Burnet's history of my own time, derived from his original memoires, his autobiography, his letters to Admiral Herbert and his private meditations, all hitherto unpublished* (Oxford, 1902)
- Burnet *History vol 1* Burnet, G., *History of his own time. From the restoration of King Charles II to the conclusion of the treaty of peace at Utrecht, in the reign of Queen Anne. To which is prefixed a summary recapitulation of affairs in church and state from King James I to the Restoration in the year 1660. Together with the author's life by the editor and some explanatory notes. The whole revised and correct by him in four volumes. Volume I* (London, 1753)
- CCSP *vol 4* Routledge, F. J., (ed), *Calendar of the Clarendon state papers volume IV, 1657-1660* (London, 1872-1970)
- CCSP *vol 5* Routledge, F. J., (ed), *Calendar of the Clarendon state papers volume V, 1660-1726* (London, 1970)
- Clarendon *Life vol 2* Hyde, E., *The life of Edward Earl of Clarendon, Lord High Chancellor of England, being a continuation of his history of the Grand Rebellion from the Restoration to his banishment in 1667, printed from his original manuscripts, given to the University of Oxford by the heirs of the late Earl of Clarendon. Volume the second* (Oxford, 1759)
- Clarendon *Life vol 3* Hyde, E., *The life of Edward Earl of Clarendon, Lord High Chancellor of England and Chancellor of the University of Oxford in which is included a continuation of the history of the Grand Rebellion. Volume the Third* (Oxford, 1827)
- Clarendon *History vol 6* Clarendon, E., *History of the rebellion and civil wars in England volume VI* (Oxford, 1887)
- Clarke *Papers* Firth, C. H., (ed), *A selection from the papers of William Clarke. Secretary to the council of the army, 1647-1649, and to General Monk and the commanders of the army in Scotland, 1651-1660 volumes III & IV* (London, New York and Bombay, 1899)
- CSP *Venice Vol 32* Hinds, B. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers and manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice and in other libraries of Northern Italy Vol XXXII 1659-1661* (London, 1931)
- CSP *Venice Vol 33* Hinds, A. B., (ed), *Calendar of state papers and manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice and in other libraries of Northern Italy Vol XXXIII 1661-1664* (London, 1931)

- CSP *Venice vol 34* Hinds, A. B., (ed), *Calendar of state papers and manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice and in other libraries of Northern Italy Vol XXXIV 1664-1666* (London, 1931)
- CSP *Venice vol 35* Hinds, A. B., (ed), *Calendar of state papers and manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice and in other libraries of Northern Italy Vol XXXV 1666-1668* (London, 1931)
- CSPD 1659-1660 Everett Green, M. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Charles II 1659-1660 Vols CCIII, CCIV, CCV, CCXIX, CCXX 1659-1660* (London, 1886)
- CSPD 1660-1661 Everett Green, M. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Charles II 1660-1661* (London, 1860)
- CSPD 1661-1662 Everett Green, M. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Charles II 1661-2* (London, 1661)
- CSPD 1663-1664 Everett Green, M. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Charles II 1663-1664* (London, 1860)
- CSPD 1664-1665 Everett Green, M. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Charles II 1664-1665* (London, 1863)
- CSPD 1665-1666 Everett Green, M. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Charles II 1665-1666* (London, 1864)
- CSPD 1666-1667 Everett Green, M. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Charles II 1666-1667* (London, 1864)
- CSPD 1667-1667 Everett Green, M. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Charles II 1667-1667* (London, 1866)
- CSPD 1667-1668 Everett Green, M. A., (ed), *Calendar of state papers domestic series of the reign of Charles II 1667-1668* (London, 1893)
- Evelyn Diary vol 1* Bray, W., (ed), *The diary of John Evelyn, 1620-1664 volume 1* (London and New York, 1901)
- Evelyn Diary vol 2* Bray, W., (ed), *The diary of John Evelyn, 1665-1706 volume 2* (London and New York, 1901)
- Fanshawe Memoires* Fanshawe, A., *The memoires of Ann Lady Fanshawe, wife of the Right Hon Sir Richard Fanshawe, Bart, 1600-1672, reprinted from the original manuscript in the possession of Mr. Evelyn John Fanshawe of Parsloes, with four photo-gravure portraits and twenty-nine other reproductions* (London, and New York, 1907)
- Henry Townsend Diary* Willis Bund, J. W., *The diary of Henry Townsend of Elmley Lovatt 1640-1663, Vol 1* (London, 1920)
- Jocelyn Diary* Hockliffe, E., (ed), *The diary of the Rev. Ralph Josselin 1616-1683* (London, 1908)
- Ludlow Memoirs* Ludlow, E., *The memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, Lieutenant of the Horse in the army of the Commonwealth of England, 1625-1672 volume II*, Firth, M. A., (ed), (Oxford, 1894)

Montagu <i>Journal</i>	Anderson, R. C., (ed), <i>The journal of Edward Montagu, first Earl of Sandwich, Admiral and General at Sea 1659-1665 volume LXIV</i> (Navy Records Society, 1929)
Mordaunt <i>Letter Book</i>	Coate, M., (ed), <i>The letter-book of John Viscount Mordaunt 1658-1660, Camden third series volume LXIX</i> (London, 1945)
Nicholas <i>Papers</i>	Warner, G. F., (ed), <i>Correspondence of Sir Edward Nicholas, Secretary of State volumes III & IV 1657-1660</i> (London, 1920)
Parker <i>History Book 1</i>	Parker, S., and Newlin, T., (eds), <i>History of his own time Book One</i> (London, 1727)
Parker <i>History Book 2</i>	Parker, S., and Newlin, T., (eds), <i>History of his own time Book Two</i> (London, 1727)
Penn <i>Memoires</i>	Penn, G., <i>Memorials of the professional life and times of Sir William Penn, 1644-1670 volume 2</i> (London, 1833)
Pepys <i>Diary</i>	Wheatley, H. B., (ed), <i>The diary of Samuel Pepys</i> (London, 1893)
Rugg <i>Diurnal</i>	Sachse, W. L., (ed) <i>The diurnal of Thomas Rugg 1659-1661, volume XCI</i> (London, 1961)
Talbot <i>Account</i>	Talbot, G., and Ellis, H., (eds), <i>Sir Gilbert Talbot's narrative of the Earl of Sandwich's attempt upon Bergen in 1665: communicated by Henry Ellis, esq. in a letter to the Right Honourable the Earl of Aberdeen, K.T. President in Archaeologia, or miscellaneous tracts relating to antiquity, published by the Society of Antiquaries of London volume 22</i> (London 1829)
Thurloe <i>State papers</i>	Birch, T., (ed), <i>The state papers of John Thurloe, Secretary of State, First to the Council of State and afterwards to the two Protectors Oliver and Richard Cromwell. In seven volumes, this being vol 7 – 1658-1660</i> (London, 1742)
Walker <i>A circumstantial</i>	Walker, E., <i>A circumstantial account of the preparations of his Majesty King Charles the Second, with a minute detail of that splendid ceremony with all the participants connected with it, to which is prefixed an account of the landing, reception, and journey of his Majesty from Dover to London</i> (London, 1820)
Whitelock <i>Memorials</i>	Whitelock, B., <i>Memorials of the English affairs from the beginning of the reign of Charles I to the happy restoration of King Charles the Second, a new edition, in four volumes, volume IV 1.4.1653-31.5.1660</i> (Oxford, 1853)

Pamphlets:

Proclamations

<i>Embezzlement of stores</i>	<i>By the King a proclamation for prohibiting the embezzlement of his Majesty's stores for shipping</i> (London, 1661)
<i>Jamaican planters</i>	<i>By the King a proclamation for the encouragement of planters in his Majesty's island of Jamaica in the West Indies</i> (London, 1661)
<i>Prohibiting seamen</i>	<i>By the King a proclamation for recalling and prohibiting seamen from the services of foreign princes and states</i> (London, 1664)
<i>Promote the fishing industry</i>	<i>A royal proclamation to promote the fishing industry</i> (London, 1661)

<i>Retailing Dutch commodities</i>	<i>By the King a proclamation for prohibiting the importation or retailing of any commodities of the growth or manufacture of the States of the United Provinces (London, 1665)</i>
<i>Saltpetre exportation</i>	<i>By the King a proclamation prohibiting the exportation of saltpetre (London, 1663)</i>
<i>Seamen to return home</i>	<i>By the King a proclamation for recalling and prohibiting seamen from the services of foreign princes and states (London, 1661)</i>
<i>Tangier in Africa</i>	<i>By the King a proclamation declaring his Majesty's pleasure to settle and establish a free port at his city of Tangier in Africa (London, 1662)</i>
<i>Touching mariners</i>	<i>By the King a proclamation touching mariners, seamen and soldiers which are to serve in his Majesties navy (London, 1664)</i>

Other Pamphlets

<i>Against the French</i>	<i>His Majesty's declaration against the French (Edinburgh 1666)</i>
<i>Andrews King and kingdoms</i>	<i>Andrews, J., <i>The King and kingdoms joyful day of triumph. Or the Kings most excellent Majesties royal and triumphant coming to London, accompanied by the ever renowned, his excellency the Lord General George Monck, and a numerous company of his royal peers, lords, knights, citizens, and gentry who conducted his royal Majesty in honour and triumph from Dover to London</i> (London, 1660)</i>
<i>Angel coin</i>	The Royal Collection Trust https://www.allaboutcoins.co.uk/coin-guides/british-coins/angel-gold-coin/ , viewed 26.5.2020
<i>Anno Regni Caroli II</i>	<i>Anno Regni Caroli II Regis Angliae, Scotiae, Franciae & Hiberniae, decimo sexto & decimo septimo. At the Parliament begun at Westminster the eighth day of May, Anno Dom. 1661. In the thirteenth year of the reign of our most Gracious Sovereign Lord CHARLES, by the Grace of God, of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland King, Defender of the Faith etc. An there continued till the 19th of May in the 14th year of his Majesties said reign: and thence prorogued to the 18th of February the next following. And there continued to the 27th of July, in the 15th year of his Majesties reign. And thence prorogued to the 16th of March then next following. And there continued to the 17th of May, 1664, in the 16th year of his Majesties reign. And thence prorogued to the 24th of November following. And on the 9th of February in the 17th year of his Majesties reign the following Act passed the Royal assent. An Act for granting a Royal aid unto the Kings Majesty of Twenty Four Hundred threescore and seventeen thousand and five hundred pounds, to be raised, levied, and paid in the space of three years (London, 1664)</i>
<i>Articles and orders</i>	<i>Anno Regni Caroli II Regis, Angliae, Scotiae, Franciae and Hiberniae, decimo tertio. At the parliament holden at Westminster the 8th May anno domini 1661, in the thirteenth year of the reign of our most gracious sovereign lord, Charles, by the Grace of God, an Act for the establishing articles and orders for the regulating and better government of his Majesty's navies, ships of war and forces by sea (London, 1661)</i>
<i>Articles of peace</i>	<i>Articles of peace concluded between his sacred Majesty and the kingdoms and governments of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli in the year 1662 (London 1662)</i>

Bishop Advertisement	Bishop, H., <i>An advertisement from Henry Bishop esquire, his Majesties Post Master General</i> (London, 1660)
Bradley Caesar	Bradley, T., <i>Caesar's due and the subject's duty in a sermon preached at the Minster at York, at the assizes there holden Aug 3 1663 by way of recantation of some passages in a former sermon preached in the same place and pulpit at the last assizes immediately before it</i> (York, 1663)
Brief and yet exact	<i>A brief and yet exact and accurate description of the present state of the great and mighty empire of Germany, both touching on the forms of their civil government and profession in religion, taken by a diligent and faithful surveyor of it, who with much pains travelled over that whole country to inform himself and others of these things</i> (London, 1665)
Brief Relation	<i>A brief relation of the surprising several English merchants goods, by Dutch men of war, their carrying them into Zealand, and there condemning them for prize, upon no other score or account, but that they were English men's</i> (London, 1664)
Brook England triumph	Brook, N., <i>England's triumph, a more exact history of his Majesty's escape after the battle of Worcester, with a chronological discourse of his straits and dangerous adventures into France, and his removes from place to place till his return to England, with the most remarkable memorials since to this present September 1660</i> (London, 1660)
Capitulations and articles	<i>Capitulations and articles of peace between the Majesty of the King of England, Scotland, France, Ireland, etc., and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire</i> (Constantinople, 1663)
Cavendish Life of the thrice noble	Cavendish, M., <i>The life of the thrice noble, high and puissant prince William Cavendish, Duke, Marquis and Earl of Newcastle</i> (London, 1667)
Charleton Character	Charleton, W., <i>A character of his most sacred Majesty, Charles the Second, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith</i> (London, 1661)
Christchurch Hall in Oxford	<i>His Majesty's gracious speech to both houses of Parliament together with the Chancellors in Christchurch Hall in Oxford in October 1665</i> (Oxford, 1665)
City loyalty displayed	<i>The City's loyalty displayed or the four famous and renowned fabrics in the City of London, exactly described in their several representations, what they are, with their private meanings and perfect actions at the day which is not yet discovered, together with a true relation of that high and stately cedar erected in the Strand, bearing five crowns, a royal streamer, three lanthorns and a rich garland</i> (London, 1661)
Collection of his	<i>A collection of his Majesty's gracious letters, speeches, messages, and declarations since April 4 1660</i> (London, 1660)
Commissioners	<i>By commissioners for disbanding the army and discharging the navy</i> (London, 1660)
Congratulation	<i>A congratulation for his sacred Majesty, Charles, the 3rd monarch of Great Britain, his happy arrival at Whitehall</i> (Edinburgh, 1660)
Coronation panegyric	<i>A panegyric on the coronation of his most sacred Majesty Charles II</i> (London, 1661)

<i>Counsel to the afflicted</i>	<i>Counsel to the afflicted or instruction and consolation for such as we have suffered lots by fire with advice to such as have escaped that sore judgement contained in the resolution of three questions occasioned by the dreadful fire in the city of London in the year 1666</i> (London, 1667)
<i>Declaration for encouragement</i>	<i>His Majesty's declaration for encouragement of seamen and mariners employed in the present service</i> (London, 1664)
<i>Declaration for reparation</i>	<i>His Majesty's declaration touching his proceedings for reparation and satisfaction for several injuries, affronts and spoils done by The East and West India Companies and other subjects of the United Provinces</i> (London, 1664)
<i>Demands</i>	<i>The demands of his gracious Majesty the King of Great Britain to the Grand Seignior or Emperor of Turkey</i> (London, 1661)
<i>Description of Tangier</i>	<i>A description of Tangier, the country and people adjoining with an account of the person and governance of Gayland the present usurper of the Kingdom of Fez; and a short narrative of the proceedings of the English in those parts</i> (London, 1664)
<i>Discourse of Dunkirk</i>	<i>A discourse of Dunkirk with some reflexes upon the late surrender thereof</i> (London, 1664)
<i>Discourse written</i>	<i>A discourse written by Sir George Downing the King of Great Britain's envoy extraordinary to the States of the United Provinces vindicating his royal master from the insolences of a scandalous libel</i> (London, 1664)
<i>Dreadfulness of the plague</i>	<i>The dreadfulness of the plague or a sermon preached in the parish church of St John the Evangelist, December 6th, being a day of public fasting</i> (York, 1666)
<i>Dryden Annus mirabilis</i>	<i>Dryden, J., Annus mirabilis the year of wonders, 1666. An historical poem containing the progress and various successes of our naval war with Holland, under the conduct of his Highness Prince Rupert, and his Grace the Duke of Albemarle. And describing the Fire of London</i> (London, 1667)
<i>Dryden His sacred Majesty</i>	<i>Dryden, J., To his sacred Majesty a panegyric on his coronation</i> (London, 1661)
<i>Dutch articles of peace</i>	<i>Articles of peace and alliance between the serene and mighty Prince Charles II by the grace of God, King of England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Defender of the Faith etc., and the High and Mighty Lords The States General of the United Netherlands,</i> (Edinburgh, 1663)
<i>Dutch drawn</i>	<i>The Dutch drawn to the life</i> (London, 1664)
<i>Dutch gazette</i>	<i>The Dutch gazette or the sheet of wildfire that fired the Dutch fleet</i> (London, 1666)
<i>Eglesfield Life and reign</i>	<i>Eglesfield, D., The life and reign of our sovereign Lord King Charles the II, in a compendious chronicle relating both to his Majesties person and affairs, with the chief transactions of state in the three kingdoms from his birth to the present</i> (London, 1660)
<i>Englands gratulation</i>	<i>Englands gratulation on the landing of Charles the Second, by the grace of God King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland at Dover, and his advance from thence to the city of London, May 29 being his birthday</i> (London, 1660)

<i>Englands joy</i>	<i>Englands joy or a relation of the most remarkable passages, from his Majesties arrival at Dover to his entrance at Whitehall</i> (London, 1660)
<i>England palladian</i>	<i>To England's palladian; or Britain's naval glory expressed in a panegyrick beginning with the loyal salutation of the Royal Navie with three additional poems</i> (London, 1666)
<i>England royal conquest</i>	<i>England's royal conquest</i> (London, 1666)
<i>English and Dutch</i>	<i>The English and Dutch affairs displayed to the life</i> (London, 1664)
<i>English resolution</i>	<i>The English seaman's resolution, or the loyal subjects undaunted valour</i> (London, between 1663 and 1665)
<i>Europae modernae</i>	<i>Europae modernae speculum or a view of the empires, kingdoms, principalities, seignieuries and commonwealths of Europe in their present state, their government, policy, different interest and mutual aspect one towards another, from the treaty of Münster anno 1648 to this the present year</i> (London, 1666)
<i>French King's declaration</i>	<i>The French King's declaration of war against England published in the manner expressed therein Paris 27th Jan 1666</i> (London, 1666)
<i>From the Spanish ambassador</i>	<i>The copy of a paper presented to the King's most excellent Majesty by the Spanish Ambassador</i> (London, 1661)
<i>Full articles of peace</i>	<i>Articles of peace between his sacred Majesty, Charles the Second, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland etc., and the city and kingdom of Algiers, concluded by Thomas Allen, esquire, Admiral of his said Majesty of Great Britain's ships in the Mediterranean seas, according to the instructions received on that behalf from his Royal Highness The Duke of York and Albany, Earl of Ulster, Lord High Admiral of England and Ireland etc.</i> (Edinburgh, 1664)
<i>Fuller Panegyric</i>	Fuller, T., <i>A panegyrick to his Majesty on his happy return</i> (London, 1660)
<i>Gent Complementum</i>	Gent, P. D. G., <i>Complementum Fortunatarum Insularum sive Galathea Vaticinans. being part of an epithalamium upon the auspicious match of the most puissant and most serene Charles II and the most illustrious Catharina Infanta of Portugal with a description of the Fortunate Islands</i> (London, 1662)
<i>Gent Preservation of the</i>	Gent, W. O., <i>The preservation of the King's Majesty's royal person, crown and dignity, the preparing of the fishing trade, maintenance of the poor, preserving of peace and safety of the Kingdom's</i> (London, 1664)
<i>Glory of these nations</i>	<i>The glory of these nations, or King and peoples happiness, being a brief relation of King Charles's royal progress from Dover to London, how the Lord General and the Lord Mayor, with all the nobility and gentry of the land, brought him through the famous city of London to his palace of Westminster the 29th of May last, being his Majesties birthday, to the great comfort of his royal subjects</i> (London, 1660)
<i>Grove Valiant Seamans 1660</i>	Grove, F., <i>The valiant seamans congratulation to his sacred Majesty King Charls the Second, with their wonderful heroical achievements, and their fidelity, loyalty and obedience</i> (London, 1660)
<i>Hammond London triumphant</i>	Hammond, C., <i>London's triumphant holiday being a brief relation of the chiefest memorable proceedings that hath attended his Majesty since his troubles, with a brief account of that late happy month of May's actions and</i>

	<i>voting, proclaiming, landing and his coming to London, to his and his nation's royal and faithful Parliament; being received in great triumph (London, 1660)</i>
Heath <i>Glories and magnificent</i>	Heath, J., <i>The glories and magnificent triumphs of the blessed restitution of his sacred Majesty from his arrival in Holland to this present (London, 1662)</i>
<i>Heroik stanzas</i>	<i>Heroik stanzas on his Majesty's coronation (London, 1661)</i>
<i>History of the Caribby-Islands</i>	<i>The history of the Caribby-Islands viz Barbados, St Christopher's, Martinico, St Vincent, Mevis, Antego etc., in all XXIII (London, 1666)</i>
<i>History of his sacred Majesty</i>	<i>The history of his sacred Majesty Charles II, King of England, Scotland and Ireland, begun from the murder of his royal father of happy memory, and continued to this present year, 1660 (Cork, 1660)</i>
<i>Instructions and rules</i>	<i>Instructions and rules to be duly observed by each and every master gunner entertained upon a ship, frigate, or vessel of war, which either now or hereafter shall be in the service of his Majesty, by order of his Royal Highness, James, Duke of York etc. (London, 1663)</i>
<i>Intelligencer</i>	<i>The Parliamentary Intelligencer comprising the sum of foreign intelligence with the affairs now in agitation in England, Scotland and Ireland, information for the people (London, 1660)</i>
<i>Jamaica viewed</i>	<i>Jamaica viewed with all the ports, harbours and their several soundings, towns and settlements thereunto belonging, together with the nature of its climate, fruitfulness of the soil, and its suitableness to English complexions, with several other collateral observations and reflections upon the island (London, 1661)</i>
Johnson <i>Exact Survey</i>	Johnson, T., <i>An exact survey of the affairs of the United Netherlands, comprehending more fully than anything yet extant, all the particulars of that subject, in twelve heads, mentioned in the address to the reader (London, 1665)</i>
<i>Kingdom</i>	<i>The Kingdom's Intelligencer of the affairs now in agitation in England, Scotland and Ireland; together with foreign intelligence: to prevent false news (London, 1661)</i>
<i>Letter from General Monck</i>	<i>A letter from George Monck to King Charles son of the late King Charles deceased together with King Charles his answer thereto (London, 1660)</i>
<i>Letter sent by his Highness</i>	<i>A letter sent by his Highness the Bishop and Prince of Münster to the Lords of the States General of the United Netherlands (Oxford, 1665)</i>
<i>Letter to the Bishop</i>	<i>A letter to the Bishop of Münster containing a panegyrick of his heroic achievements in heroic verse (London, 1666)</i>
<i>List of the Ships</i>	<i>A list of the ships belonging to his Majesty's navy-royal; with the number of men and guns; and the dividing of them into three squadrons (London, 1666)</i>
Lloyd <i>Modern policy</i>	Lloyd, D., <i>Modern policy completed, or the public actions and counsels both civil and military of his excellency the Lord General George Monck under the general revolutions since 1639, to 1660. (London, 1660)</i>

<i>Memorial delivered</i>	<i>A memorial delivered to his Majesty (July 21 1664) from Lord Van Gogh ambassador from the States General of the United Provinces, with the answer which his sacred Majesty returned thereunto (Edinburgh, 1664)</i>
<i>Mercurius Publicus</i>	<i>Mercurius Publicus (London, 1660)</i>
<i>Miller An Exact History</i>	<i>Miller, S., An exact history of the several changes of government in England, from the horrid murders of Charles I to the happy restoration of King Charles II, with the renowned actions of General George Monck (London, 1660)</i>
<i>Mun England treasure</i>	<i>Mun, T., England's treasure by foreign trade or, the balance of our foreign trade is the rule of our treasure (London, 1664)</i>
<i>Navigation Act</i>	<i>An Act for the encouraging and increasing of shipping and navigation (London, 1660)</i>
<i>Neptunes address</i>	<i>Neptunes address to his most sacred Majesty Charles II congratulating his happy coronation celebrated 22nd April 1661, in several designments and shows upon the water before Whitehall, as his Majesty returns from the land triumphs (London, 1661)</i>
<i>New ballad</i>	<i>A new ballad of a famous German prince and a renowned English Duke, who on St James's Day fought with a beast with seven heads, called Provinces; not by land but by water; not to be said, but sung; not high English nor low Dutch, but to a new French tune call'd Monsieur Ragon, or the dancing hobby-horses (London, 1666)</i>
<i>New Haven</i>	<i>A new haven at Sandwich for the honour, advantage and safety of England faithfully discovered in a letter to the right honourable the Earl of Clarendon, Lord High Chancellor of England (London, 1663)</i>
<i>Ogilby arches</i>	<i>Ogilby, J., The relation of his Majesty's entertainment passing through the City of London to his coronation with a description of the triumphal arches and the solemnity (London, 1661)</i>
<i>Oxinden Charls triumphant</i>	<i>Oxinden, H., Charls triumphant etc., that is Charls, who did from Charls proceed; who shall in greatness Charls the Great exceed (London, 1660)</i>
<i>Panegyric on Queen Katherine</i>	<i>A panegyric on her most excellent majesty Katherine Queen of England, Scotland France and Ireland, or her Highness cordial welcome into England (London, 1661)</i>
<i>Philipps Ligeancia lugens</i>	<i>Philipps, F., Ligeancia lugens or loyalty lamenting, the many great mischiefs and inconveniences which will fatally and inevitably follow the taking away of the royal pourveyances and tenures in capite and by knightservice, which being ancient and long before the conquest, were not then or are now any slavery, public or general grievance (London, 1661)</i>
<i>Poem on St James's Park</i>	<i>A poem on St James's Park as lately improved by his Majesty (London, 1661)</i>
<i>Poems elegies</i>	<i>Poems, elegies, paradoxes and sonets (London, 1664)</i>
<i>Portugal voyage</i>	<i>The Portugal voyage, with what memorable passages intervened at the shipping and in the transportation of her most sacred Majesty, Katherine, Queen of Great Britain from Lisbon to England (London, 1662)</i>

Price Letter	Price, J., <i>A letter written from Dover to the Commissioners of the Customs, London May 26 relating certain passages of his Majesties arrival and reception there</i> (London, 1660)
Privy Council advice	<i>His Majesty's declaration to all his loving subjects, published by the advice of his Privy Council, 26th December 1662</i> (London, 1662)
Relation of passages	<i>A relation of the passages in the battle at sea betwixt the fleet of England and of the United Netherlands, collected according to the charge and order of the Lords States General dated 24 June 1666</i> (The Hague, 1666)
Restauranda	<i>Restauranda or the necessity of public repairs by settling of a royal yearly and certain revenue for the King, or the way to a well-being for the King and his people, proposed by the establishing a fitting revenue for him, and enacting some necessary and wholesome laws for the people</i> (London, 1662)
Reynell Fortunate change	Reynell, C., <i>The fortunate change: being a panegyric to his sacred Majesty King Charles II, immediately on his coronation</i> (London, 1661)
Royal and loyal blood	<i>Royal and loyal blood shed by Cromwell and his party etc.</i> (London, 1662)
Royal Collection	Royal Collection Trust, https://www.rct.uk/collection/443149/charles-ii-touchpiece , viewed 27.1.2020
Royal fishing narrative	<i>A narrative of the royal fishings of Great Britain and Ireland with busses and pickled herrings, and barrel-cod, after the manner of the Hollanders, with further discoveries and helps for the management thereof in a profitable way for the undertakers</i> (London, 1661)
Second and third advice	<i>The second and third advice to a painter for drawing the history of our naval actions, the last two years, 1665 and 1666, in answer to Mr Waller</i> (Breda, 1667)
Second narrative	<i>A second narrative of the signal victory which it pleased Almighty God to bestow upon his Majesty's navy under the command of his Royal Highness the Duke of York against the States fleet of the United Netherlands on the 3rd of June 1665</i> (London, 1665)
Several statutes	<i>The several statutes in force for the observation of Lent: and fish days at all other times of the year</i> (London, 1661)
Short Narrative	<i>A short narrative of the late, dreadful fire in London together with certain considerations remarkable therein, and deducible therefrom; not unreasonable for the perusal of this age</i> (London, 1667)
Speech at Parliament dissolution	<i>His Majesty's gracious speech together with the Lord Chancellor's to both Houses of Parliament on Saturday 29th December 1660, being the day of their dissolution</i> (London, 1660)
Speech to Parliament	<i>His Majesty's gracious speech to both Houses of Parliament on Thursday November 24 1664, being the first day of their meeting</i> (Edinburgh, 1664)
Summary narration	<i>A summary narration of the signal victory which it pleased Almighty God to bestow upon his Majesty's navy under the command of his Royal Highness the Duke of York against the fleet of the States of the United Netherlands on the 2nd of June 1665</i> (London, 1665)

<i>Symplegades antrum</i>	<i>Symplegades antrum or the rumpant story, impartially relating the tyrannical dealings and clymacterical downfall, together with a congratulation of his most sacred Majesty in his most happy reign</i> (London, 1660)
<i>Triumphs of four nations</i>	<i>The triumphs of four nations; or a happy conclusion of peace, betwixt England, France, Denmark and Holland</i> (London, 1667)
TH <i>Inter boreale</i>	T. H., <i>Inter boreale, the second part, relating the progress of the Lord General Monk, calling in the secluded members, their voting King Charles the Second home, his joyful reception at Dover, and his glorious conduct through London, to his royal palace at Whitehall</i> (London, 1660)
<i>Triumphant panegyric</i>	<i>A triumphant panegyric in honour and memory of King Charles the Second his coronation</i> (London, 1661)
<i>True accompt</i>	<i>A true accompt of his Majesty's safe arrival in England as it was reported in the House of Commons, Friday 25th May, with the resolutions of both Houses thereupon</i> (London, 1660)
<i>Upon our Royal Queen</i>	<i>Upon Our royal Queen's Majesty's most happy arrival the most illustrious Donna Catherina Sole sister to the high and mighty King of Portugal</i> (London, 1661)
<i>Variety of news</i>	<i>Variety of news for all pallats as certainties, probabilities etc.</i> (London 1661)
<i>Victory of Elvas</i>	<i>A revelation of the victory of Elvas obtained over the Spaniard by the army of the high and mighty Prince Alfonso the sixth King of Portugal upon the 14th of January 1659</i> (London, 1661)
<i>Victory over the fleet</i>	<i>The victory over the fleet of the States General obtained by his Majesty's Navy Royal in the late engagement begun on 15 July instant as it came from his Highness Prince Rupert and his Grace the Duke of Albemarle</i> (London, 1666)
Wharton <i>Gesta</i>	Wharton, G., <i>Gesta Britannorum, or a brief chronicle of the actions and exploits, battles, sieges, conflicts and other signal and remarkable passages which have happened in these his Majesty's dominions from the year 1600 until the present 1663</i> (London, 1663)
<i>Young Seaman's</i>	<i>The young seaman's guide, or the mariner's almanack for the year of our lord God 1661 with a list of the ships of his Majesty's Royal Navy, distinguished into their several ranks</i> (London, 1660)
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Introduction/Historiography.

Introduction.

On 12th July 1667, in the weeks immediately following the Medway naval military disaster, Sir Thomas Peyton in a letter to Joseph Williamson concluded that

“the consequence of the King's losing his seamen, in whom his strength lies as certainly as did Sampson's in his hair, is seen in the loss of ships that follows.”¹

This quote summarises the crucial and central nature that the navy played in Charles II's reign. Even at the Restoration the army remained overwhelmingly Republican, and was speedily disbanded in the succeeding months. However, the navy was Royalist and escaped any reduction in its size and potency, making it the sole remaining arm of the Kingdom's forces. This thesis covers the chronological period of approximately April 1659 to the end of 1668. It agrees with the observation of James David Davies, the most prominent naval writer in this period, that to date Historians have not appreciated the importance that the English navy played in the early years of Charles II's regime. The inclusion of this important organisation has been either completely omitted, or at best treated almost entirely in a cursory way, events being referred to in the texts ‘in passing’.² Davies himself is the exception to this, detailing a variety of aspects of naval history in the Restoration period, but for the most part, he concentrates on how this institution operated and the effects that events had on it.³ This thesis will go wider and deeper, examining a range of political, ideological, economic, diplomatic, military and social dimensions of Charles II's fleet.

This work presents two new aspects that fundamentally turn existing scholarship in this area on its head relating to the 1660s, overall going much further than other authors, focusing on Charles's use of the navy to boost his domestic and international power. They are revolutionary and highlight the navy's crucial nature to the new King's regime. The first illustrates how the navy played the most important part in returning the King to power and its central role in enhancing his ability to retain his throne in the Restoration's early years. This

¹ CSPD 1667-1667, 12.7.1667 entry 67 vol 209

² Keeble *Restoration*, p.16, pp.40-41, p.50; Keay *Magnificent*, p.91, p.102; Davies *Kings*, p.13

³ Davies *Gentlemen*; Davies *Kings*

totally contradicts modern academia's belief that the army was predominantly responsible. This work shows that the army's geographic dispersal and suppression of local populations, as well as its in-fighting on political and religious grounds led it to being weak and ineffective, and so incapable of such momentous action. The navy's Thames blockade in the latter part of 1659 was the defining action, following events flowing from this. It caused the collapse of the Committee of Safety due to bankruptcy and the consequent desertion of Lambert's troops who had been sent north by this government to prevent Monck's descent into England and which therefore provided the main barrier to the Scottish contingent's dominance.

As regards the second new aspect, this thesis outlines the King's personal and covert aspirations for wanting to go to war with the Dutch, culminating in the 2nd Anglo-Dutch War. His continental wanderings had fashioned his admiration for the absolute nature of the French Monarchy, spurring in his Majesty a strong desire to compensate for a sense of being a second-class monarchical citizen, having been a supplicant at other courts for succour to attempt his Restoration to the English throne. To compensate for this 'chip on his shoulder', he wished to use the navy to support his attainment of absolutism domestically, pre-eminence internationally and to boost trade to provide the revenues to fund these ambitions through enhanced Customs duties. This dictated his domestic and foreign policy up to and including the conflagration with the Hollanders. Accordingly, he formulated a wide-ranging and integrated step-by-step plan to maximise the chances of success of achieving his aims based on the power that the navy provided for him. Nevertheless, this work also highlights the ultimate military defeat's inevitability, resulting from the Sovereign's own incompetence in managing the nation's economy and the consequent inadequate taxes, and his inability to actively lead a country actually at war. Detailed financial and economic rationale as well as military aspects are exposed in this regard. Therefore, unlike other modern scholars' work, this thesis supplies an holistic explanation for the complex and multifarious reasons that led Charles to lead the country to war in 1665, as well as why his plans foundered in 1667. Also, it supplies details for each component part of the bigger picture, and intricate linkages between the details. Additionally, it exhibits the Monarch's cold and calculating personality, his aspirations being bigger than the country's ability to support them. This is in stark contrast to his traditional image as the 'merry monarch'.

It is also worth noting that the reader may feel that one can never be certain of anybody's inner feelings and motivations from this distance of time, the veracity of this second aspect consequently appearing to be undermined, as well as those matters connected with it.

However, this thesis provides substantial supporting evidence, not just emanating from the personal observations of those intimately connected with the King (see Chapter Three), but also by detailing the implementation of his step-by-step plans to attain his covert goals (see Chapters Three to Five), proof being provided by 'actions speaking louder than words'.

The myriad of other fresh important issues raised in Chapters One to Seven mostly constitute a variety of methods and matters that contributed to his Majesty's achievement or failure to accomplish his personal covert ambitions, three of the weightiest being summarised below. No-one has to date put forward such a comprehensive account. So, when combining the first and second aspects mentioned above with this myriad of supporting facets, it provides a new, overarching interpretation of the King's return to power, and how this played out till he was severely humbled at the Medway, ending this phase of his career, and the navy's central and crucial role in all of this.

More detailed aspects in which this thesis advances or contradicts existing scholarship are listed below.

Issue 1 – The navy restored the King to the throne and helped maintain him there in the immediate ensuing turbulent period.

On 27th May 2021, Melvyn Bragg's radio programme *In Our Time* hosted several prominent Early Modern academics. Along with every other author they reiterated the traditional belief that it was the English Republican army that engineered Charles II's return.⁴ This involves

⁴ BBC *iplayer*, *In our Time* on Radio 4 presented by Melvyn Bragg 35 mins 10 seconds on 27.5.2021, Laura Stewart of York University. Also on the panel was Clare Jackson, Cambridge University and Michael O Siochru, Trinity College, Dublin University; Harris *Restoration*, pp.14-15, pp.43-44; Keeble *Restoration*, p.2, pp.14-19, p.32; Keay *Magnificent*, p.79, p.84; Holmes *Making*, p.3, p.17; Coward *Stuart age*, p.277; McKeon *Politics*, pp.79-80; Hutton *Restoration*, p.96; Capp *Cromwell navy*, p.354; Jones *Restoration*, pp.14-15; McDonald 'Timing', pp.363-376; Appleby 'Veteran Politics', p.324; Rodgers *Command*, pp.30-1; Miller *Restoration*, p.9, p.12; Falkus *Life and times*, p.65; Kenyon *Stuarts*, pp.107-8; Capp 'Healing the nation', p.11; Jordan *Power and the court*, Section 6; Allen 'From George', pp.95-96; Habakkuk 'Land', p.211; Parks 'New Letters', p.107; Lever 'Restoration', p.296; Davies 'Charles II in 1660', p.257; Davies 'Army', p.26; Little 'Ship of state', pp.10-16; Balleine *All for the King*, pp.113-114; Barclay 'George Monck', p.63; Maltzahn 'Henry Neville', pp.41-42; Woolrych 'Collapse', p.615; Highley 'Charles II', p.75; Seaward *Restoration*, p.1; Crowcroft *Monck*; Maltzahn 'Republication', p.283, p.285; Tresham *Restoration*, p.296; Hainsworth *Anglo*,

the belief that the Commonwealth's erstwhile commander of Scotland's occupying army, General George Monck, opposed the assumption of power by the Republican hard-line military junta, the Committee of Safety, in October 1659. His Republican ideals led him to journey to London and use his small army detachment to forcibly return the Rump Parliament to power.⁵ A small amount of comment is made on Monck's troop's political persuasion. On reaching the capital current historians state that Monck fell out with the newly installed Rump, and that he turned to Royalism only on realising the strength of popular feeling towards a Restoration, using his troops to initiate the process that led to this event by enforcing the return of the MPs that had been secluded from the House in 1648.⁶

Some scholars nuance the basic narrative, but do not fundamentally depart from it (see below). Some assert that the Committee's troops under General John Lambert's command in Northern England failed to block the path of Monck and his small band of Scottish troops from progressing from Scotland to the Capital. JR Jones, an author on the three Anglo-Dutch wars and Austin Woolrych's article 'The collapse of the great rebellion' make a passing reference to this, stating that events in the South caused their collapse, omitting any effects these events may have had.⁷ Ronald Hutton in his general survey of the Restoration period and McDonald's article 'The Timing of General Monck's March into England 1 January 1660' allege that Lambert's army returned to London on running out of supplies.⁸ Bernard Capp, an historian of the Republican navy, and others assert that this was because the Committee of Safety's lack of money had undermined army discipline, leaving the way open to Monck to cross the border unopposed, but with no further contextual explanation.⁹

However, NAM Rodgers' book *Command of the Ocean* and Godfrey Davies's article 'The

p.98; Rogers *Dutch*, p.17; Powell *Rupert*, p.4; Fitzroy *Return*, p.136; Dougan *Return*, p.97; Glassey *Reigns*, p.38; Stevenson *City*, pp.63-4; Uglow *Charles II*, pp.32-34; Lambert *Admirals*, p.81; De Krey *Restoration*, p.15; Hutton *Charles II*, p.127; Fellows *Charles II*, p.11; Wilson *All the King*, p.139; Fraser *King Charles*, p.170; Ollard *Image*, pp.124-127; Ashley *General Monck*, pp.202-8, p.211; Boxer *Anglo*, p.22; Morrah *1660*, p.32, p.58, p.73; Herman *Rule*, p.182; Marshall *Intelligence*, p.20; Miller *Charles II*, p.19, pp.20-1; Haley *Politics*, p.5; Tute *True glory*, p.59; Preston *History*, p.29; Harris *London*, p.50; Bryant *King Charles II*, pp.69-75; Coote *Royal survivor*, pp.170-1; McRae 'Welcoming', p. 196; Jenner 'Roasting', p.84; Jones *Charles II*, p.33, p.34; Clark *From restoration*, p.131; Loades *England*, pp.182-3; Harding *Evolution*, p.83; Warner *Hero*, p.130; Neufeld *Civil wars*, p.4, p.52; Ogg *England*, pp.19-23; Wormald *Clarendon*, p.212; Bryant *Samuel Pepys*, pp.3-4; Davies *Restoration*, p.283, p.289, p.310; Ashley *Charles II*, p.105

⁵ Capp *Cromwell navy*, p.353; Coward *Stuart age*, pp.276-277; Davies *Gentlemen*, p.120; Davies *Kings*, p.44; Hutton *Restoration*, p.69, p.83, p.92; Harris *Politics*, p.27, pp.43-44

⁶ Capp *Cromwell navy*, p.354; Jones *Country*, p.125, p.129; Jones *Restoration*, pp.14-15; Coward *Stuart Age*, p.277; Harris *Politics*, p.27; Harris *Restoration*, pp.43-44; McDonald 'Timing', p.376; Knighton *Pepys*, p.3

⁷ Jones *Country*, p.127; Woolrych 'Collapse', p.613

⁸ Hutton *Restoration*, p.83; Macdonald *The Timing*, p.367

⁹ Capp *Cromwell navy*, p.364; Fitzroy *Return*, p.96, p.115, p.117; Dougan *Return*, p.101; Ashley *General Monck*, p.184; Morrah *1660*, p.35; Jones *Charles II*, p.40

army and the Restoration of 1660' allege that Lambert's troops deserted as they didn't wish to confront their colleagues from Scotland.¹⁰ Yet, George Balleine's book *All for the King, the life story of Sir George Carteret* and Arthur Bryant's book *King Charles II* and others state that they simply melted away.¹¹

Monck's troops' political persuasion has attracted some comment from a couple of scholars. Jones states that the General's troops remained Republican and supported the Restoration unwittingly, yet their commander had to supervise them closely due to concerns over their reliability, despite having received their pay in contrast to the remainder of the army.¹² Hutton, McDonald, John Miller's book *Restoration England: The Reign of Charles II* and David Appleby's article 'Veteran Politics in Restoration England' agree, saying that Monck had to continually purge them of those of spurious loyalty, and that they were hostile to a Restoration.¹³ Appleby further asserts that the wider army in aggregate remained Republican till the Restoration and beyond.¹⁴

A few authors have made passing mention of the navy's fragmentary involvement. The fleet's transfer to the Thames estuary by Vice-Admiral Lawson, the navy's commander at the Interregnum's tail end, is referenced by various authors. Yet there is disagreement between the few that comment on this event's impact. Jones and McDonald and others merely refer to the event, with no analysis.¹⁵ Rodgers and David Loades' book *England's maritime empire, seapower, commerce and policy* and others allude to Lawson's action and that this simple deed caused the last Interregnum regime to disintegrate, failing to justify this claim.¹⁶

Barry Coward's book *The Stuart Age* asserts that the Committee of Safety's collapse was due to the apprehensions of General Fleetwood, a Committee of Safety leader, about the repercussions of various counties' refusal to pay their taxes.¹⁷ Miller argues that the City's

¹⁰ Rodgers *Command*, p.31; Davies 'Army', p.27; Dougan *Return*, p.101; Davies *Restoration*, p.267

¹¹ Balleine *All for the King*, p.113; p.71; Loades *England*, p.182; Ashley *Charles II*, p.103; Bryant *King Charles II*, p.71

¹² Jones *Country*, pp.128-129

¹³ Hutton *Restoration*, pp.69-70, p.73, p.113; McDonald 'Timing', p.365; Appleby *Veteran Politics*, p.324; Miller *Restoration*, p.9

¹⁴ Appleby *Veteran Politics*, p.323, p.325

¹⁵ Jones *Country*, pp.124-125; McDonald 'Timing', p.374; Knighton *Pepys*, p.3; Fitzroy *Return*, p.105; Lambert *Admirals*, p.81; Morrah *1660*, p.33; Miller *Charles II*, p.18; Ogg *England*, p.17; Davies *Restoration*, p.183

¹⁶ Rodgers *Command*, pp.30-1; Loades *England*, p.182; Hardring *Evolution*, p.83

¹⁷ Coward *Stuart age*, p.277

failure to advance loans also contributed.¹⁸ Davies merely asserts that the Committee fell due to the political ramifications of Lawson's action.¹⁹ C Knighton's book *Pepys and the navy* asserts that the Committee of Safety took fright at Lawson's actions in moving the fleet to the Thames.²⁰ Hutton and Miller refer to Lawson's Thames blockade without listing any consequences. But Hutton and others specifically state that the navy played no further part in the Restoration apart from the navy's purging of unreliable Republicans by Admiral Montagu, the nautical commander appointed in March 1660 to supersede Lawson, and along with Rodgers and others referring to the King's repatriation from Holland by the Admiral.²¹

Capp and JD Davies also assert that the mutinous Portsmouth garrison inspired Lawson to blockade the Thames, bringing down the hard-line military regime.²² Rodgers, Miller and Knighton and others merely refer to the Portsmouth mutiny.²³ Along with McDonald, they make no connection between the actions of Monck, Lawson and such of the mutinous Portsmouth garrison's leaders as Sir Arthur Haselrig, and don't continue their analysis of Lawson's blockade beyond the impact it had on re-establishing the Rump. Indeed they maintain that Monck's actions to readmit the secluded members to Parliament didn't have Lawson's support.²⁴ And Maurice Ashley's book *General George Monck* specifically asserts that he acted alone.²⁵ Capp also refers to Monck's supremacy over both army and navy, both ordering ships to different locations round the coast to strategic advantage, and for Montagu to sail with his fleet for Scheveningen without awaiting the Parliamentary Commissioners.²⁶ JD Davies alludes to the navy's acceptance of the Restoration as inevitable, its transporting of the King to Dover, that Lawson finally became a Royalist out of self-preservation and that Montagu finally turned to the Monarchy in March 1660, despite also mentioning that the Admiral claimed that it emanated from mid-1659.²⁷

¹⁸ Miller *Restoration*, p.5

¹⁹ Capp *Cromwell navy*, p.331, pp.343-4, p.347, p.349, p.350, p.354, p.356; Davies *Gentlemen*, p.120; Davies *Kings*, p.44

²⁰ Knighton *Pepys*, p.3

²¹ Hutton *Restoration*, p.80, p.110, p.125; Rodgers *Command*, p.31; Miller *Restoration*, p.7: Little 'Ship of state', pp.10-16; Pool 'Samuel Pepys', p.634; Vale 'Clarendon', p.107; Hainsworth *Anglo*, p.98; Rogers *Dutch*, p.17; Lloyd *Nation*, p.46; Dougan *Return*, pp.112-3; Uglow *Charles II*, pp.17-18; Macleod *Dynasty*, p.245; Fraser *King Charles*, p.176; Ashley *General Monck*, p.209; Morrah *1660*, p.133; Herman *Rule*, pp.183-4; Loades *England*, p.183; Ogg *England*, pp.33-4; Davies *Restoration*, pp.303-4

²² Capp *Cromwell navy*, pp.343-4, p.350; Davies *Gentlemen*, p.120

²³ Rodgers *Command*, p.30; Miller *Restoration*, p.7; Knighton *Pepys*, p.3; Warner *Hero*, p.149; Davies *Restoration*, p.181

²⁴ Capp *Cromwell navy*, p.331, pp.343-4, p.347, p.349, p.350, p.354, p.356; McDonald 'Timing', p.374

²⁵ Ashley *General Monck*, pp.1-316

²⁶ Capp *Cromwell navy*, pp.366-368

²⁷ Davies *Gentlemen*, pp.121-2, p.126

This thesis totally refutes the army as the King's saviour, and outlines the navy's deeper and wider role. Chapter One shows that it was in fact the navy that played the decisive role in restoring the King. Rather than Monck's isolated northern position leading to his powerlessness, his actions were part of a coordinated and deliberate plan by a triumvirate, the additional members being Lawson, and Haselrig and his co-conspirators, depriving the late-Interregnum junta of its use. Monck's role as 'Head of the Armed Forces' including the navy allowed him to take the leading role. The navy's intervention at the Thames estuary in November and December 1659 brought down the Committee of Safety by bankrupting them. It halted all trade in and out of London via this crucial national artery, stopping all Customs revenue, together with the consequent effect of the City refusing further loans due to the Committee's failure to keep the sea lanes open for their merchant shipping. This led Lambert's troops to desert as they now lacked both a vehicle through which to be paid and an organisation that provided their legitimacy. This resulted in the route to London being unopposed for Monck and his small band of Scottish troops, allowing the General to implement his Royalist plans in the nation's centre of power. The remainder of the army was powerless to affect events, being geographically scattered, suppressing the local population, its discontent and in-fighting making it ineffective and unreliable. The Vice-Admiral's action thus constitutes the key event in the whole Restoration process.

Central to modern scholarship is that Monck was a committed Republican from his conversion by Cromwell until the first part of 1660.²⁸ However, Chapter One of this thesis revises this erroneous assumption. He came from a Royalist West-Country family, having fought for Charles I in the Civil War's early encounters. On being incarcerated in the Tower of London by the Republicans he eventually succumbed to Cromwell's persuasion to serve the Dictator personally, transferring his loyalty to the new Lord Protector, Richard Cromwell, on Oliver Cromwell's September 1658 death. On Richard's April 1659 deposition, Monck was out of favour with the new military junta headed by Fleetwood and others. Regarding

²⁸ Keeble *Restoration*, p.19, pp.27-28, p.51; Key *Magnificent*, p.79; Davies *Kings*, p.44; Holmes *Making*, p.17; Capp *Cromwell navy*, p.353; Jones *Country*, p.113, pp.114-115, p.128; Capp *Cromwell navy*, p.355; Coward *Stuart age*, p.277; Hutton *Restoration*, pp.106-107; Hutton *Restoration*, p.71, p.94, p.102, pp.106-107; McDonald 'Timing', p.364, p.376; Miller *Restoration*, p.10; Kenyon *Stuarts*, pp.107-8; Knighton *Pepys*, p.5; Woolrych 'Collapse', pp.613-614; Maltzahn 'Republication', p.284; Balleine *All for the King*, p.113; Fitzroy *Return*, p.159, p.164; Uglow *Charles II*, p.35; Hutton *Charles II*, p.128; Morrah *1660*, p.94; Bryant *King Charles II*, p.74; Coote *Royal survivor*, p.171; Jones *Charles II*, p.40; Warner *Hero*, p.160; Ogg *England*, p.18, p.26; Ashley *Charles II*, p.106

the point at which Monck refocused onto the Monarchy, there is a widespread consensus amongst scholars that this happened somewhere between January and March 1660. However, Chapter One of this work refutes all of these statements, clearly showing that from roughly mid-1659 the General had already transferred his loyalty towards Charles.

In understanding that Monck was a Royalist at an earlier period than previously understood and given the power that his newly revealed leadership of the navy gave him, this shows that he was in a stronger position to control events leading to the Restoration than hitherto believed. A key aspect was the King's manifesto for power, the Breda Declaration. Many scholars assert that Charles was responsible for writing this.²⁹ Falkus's book *Life and Times of Charles II* and A Fraser's book *King Charles II* agree, although they assert this was under Hyde's guidance.³⁰ However, Hutton alleges that Monck suggested potential Breda Declaration clauses, but only regarding the army's requirements.³¹ And Neil Keeble, author of another general survey on the Restoration, seems confused, variously contradicting himself.³² Rodgers merely refers to the Declaration's existence.³³

This work agrees with Andrew Barclay's article 'George Monck's Role in the Drafting of the Declaration of Breda' and in fact shows that the General did dictate the Breda Declarations' terms via stipulating the main headings.³⁴ Yet, this thesis goes further in highlighting that his ability to do so was underscored by his position as head of the Armed Forces, but particularly of the navy. It was this organisation that empowered him to prevent the King's return should he wish to do so by blocking the sea lanes and which remained a potent force, unlike the army whose ineffectiveness is highlighted above, its disarray leaving it relatively powerless, the exception being Monck's small band who remained Republican and supported the Restoration unwittingly, as Jones highlights.³⁵ Further at the crucial time in late 1659/early

²⁹ Harris *Restoration*, p.44; Jones *Country*, p.132; Jones *Politics*, p.32; Holmes *Making*, p.17; Capp *Cromwell navy*, p.362; Knoppers *Historicising*, p.42; Sharpe *Rebranding*, p.5, pp.28-29; Appleby *Veteran Politics*, p.325; Miller *Restoration*, p.11; Habakkuk 'Land', p.207; Edie 'Popular Idea', p.351; Parks 'New Letters', p.107; Little 'Ship of state', pp.10-16; Wheeler *Navy Finance*, p.466; Balleine *All for the King*, p.114; Brotton 'Art', p.122; Rommelse 'Dutch', p.252; Harris 'What's new', p.194; Jacob 'Restoration', p.156; Balleine *All for the King*, p.114; Fitzroy *Return*, p.181; Dougan *Return*, p.108; Stevenson *City*, p.77; De Krey *Restoration*, p.16; Fellows *Charles II*, p.13; Ollard *Image*, p.127; Thirsk *Restoration*, p.xi; Jones *Charles II*, p.43

³⁰ Falkus *Life and times*, p.65; Fraser *King Charles*, p.172; Morrah *1660*, p.104

³¹ Hutton *Restoration*, p.107

³² Keeble *Restoration*, pp.27-28, pp.68-70

³³ Rodgers *Command*, p.65

³⁴ Barclay 'George Monck', pp.63-67

³⁵ Jones *Country*, pp.114-115

1660, Lawson's threat to bring the navy up the Thames and intimidate the centre of London including the Tower, Parliament and the commercial docks crucially supported the General.

His Majesty faced a bewildering slew of threats on accession, including political rifts between Republicans and Royalists, and religious tension between the Royalist hierarchy and various religious sects that had been prominent during the Commonwealth regarding the Church of England's re-establishment. There has been a huge interest in recent times in Early Modern Royal propaganda, and in Charles II in particular. Some authors such as Anna Keay, Kevin Sharpe and Claire Jackson's book *The Star King* and others, expound on Charles's use of imagery to support his rule. They show how the Sovereign made widespread use of symbolism and ceremonies, the coronation being used to glorify the King's majesty, portraying himself with divine characteristics, architecture such as the display of adorned or new buildings and exhibiting himself in regal attitudes in paintings and statuary, and the use of such methods as the media, plays, the ceremony 'Touching the King's Evil', the renaming of Commonwealth warships with Royal names and sermons to communicate this.³⁶ Harold Weber's article 'Paper bullets, print and kingship under Charles II' shows how this was carried out extensively in print culture, including portraying the King's sexual energy as a necessary, attractive regal feature.³⁷ Matthew Neufeld's book *The civil wars after 1660, public remembering in late Stuart England* expands on this, outlining the regime's use of sanctioned 'histories' to justify the Monarchy's return, and to vilify its preceding Republican competitor.³⁸ Interestingly, Amy Calladine's article 'Public ritual, martial forms and the Restoration of the Monarchy in English towns' outlines how these rituals were also applied by Royalist officers in their own localities, attempting to support the legitimisation of Charles's reign.³⁹ The Royal Collection Trust's late 2017 to early 2018 exhibition in the

³⁶ Harris *Restoration*, p. 16, p.19, pp.68-69; Keeble *Restoration*, pp.36-38, p.44, pp.46-47; Keay *Magnificent*, p.4; Sharpe *Rebranding*, p.20, pp.36-38, p.41, pp.45-46, p.68, p.105, p.118, p.129, p.148, p.153, pp.155-157; Hutton *Restoration*, p.128; Davies *Kings*, pp.45-7; Jackson *Star king*, pp.142-143; Gonzalez 'Kings and their', pp.103-121; Stevenson *City and*, p.7; Jenkinson *Culture*, pp.1-293; Highley 'Charles II', pp.75-94; Madway 'Rites', p.79; Paraque *Routledge*, p.324, p.352; Anderson 'Zombie', p.106; Novak 'Shaping', p.102; De Krey 'Between', p.742; Cubbit 'Revolution', p.28; Walkling 'Politics', p.1500; Brotton 'Art', p.122; Jenner 'Politics', pp.534-535, p.549; Greaves 'Great scott', p.605; Rosenheim 'Documenting', p.592; Miller 'Restoration', p.415; Oman 'Restoration Silver', p.44; Espinasse 'Decline', p.71; Gibson *Cult*, p.1, p.7; Glassey *Reigns*, p.14; Uglow *Charles II*, p.4, p.55; De Krey *Restoration*, p.57; Weiser *Charles II*, p.24; Wilson *All the King*, p.228; Ollard *Image*, pp.24-5; Weber *Paper bullets*, p.3, p.9, p.16; Fraser 'Politics', p.2; McRae 'Welcoming', p.194; Jenner 'Roasting', p.103

³⁷ Weber *Paper bullets*, p.88

³⁸ Neufeld *Civil wars*, p.28, p.52

³⁹ Calladine 'Public ritual', pp.1-19

Queen's Gallery manifests this recent interest.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, no current scholar attributes to the navy any role in supporting the King's retention of the throne following Restoration. This area has been totally neglected.

This thesis fills this important gap in academic knowledge, revealing how the navy leaders variously implemented a strategy of portraying a closeness with the King, the maritime military's popularity heightening that of their Commander-in-Chief's. This multifariously displayed his Majesty as a military leader in such a turbulent time, showing that he could use the navy to project power when he chose. This reached its apogee at the April 1661 coronation, the navy and nautical imagery playing a central role in the two days' ceremonies.

Issue 2 – the King covertly aspired to use the navy to achieve international pre-eminence, domestic absolutism, desiring to increase trade so that the heightened Customs and Excise fiscal flows would pay for it, leading to the inevitability of the 2nd Anglo-Dutch War.

This thesis outlines how the King's personal traits drove his covert ambitions, leading to the Second Anglo-Dutch War's inevitability. To provide context to the revolutionary nature of this Issue, it is necessary to outline a selection of existing hypotheses in general terms that try to explain the reasons behind the Second Anglo-Dutch War's commencement. Authors supporting these and their accompanying assertions are variously mentioned in the discussions below. Further, none provide an holistic explanation, unaccounted for events substantially undermining the veracity of their arguments. Existing authors have factually recounted circumstances, or provided only superficial rationale as to why particular episodes occurred.

The first of three prominent theories for the reasons for the 2nd Anglo-Dutch War's commencement are propounded by such scholars as Kevin Sharpe in his book *Rebranding rule, the restoration & revolution monarchy, 1660-1714*, John Miller's book *Charles II*, Johnathon Scott's article 'Good night Amsterdam. Sir George Downing & Anglo-Dutch state building' and Gijs Rommelse's article 'Dutch radical republicanism & English restoration

⁴⁰ <https://www.rct.uk/collection/themes/exhibitions/charles-ii-art-power/the-queens-gallery-buckingham-palace>, opened on 28th February 2022

politics during the 1660s', involving reasons of trade and an ongoing competition with England's commercially powerful rivals, Holland.⁴¹ They believe that there was a desire to expand commercial activity by the mercantile community and that the only way to do this was acquire some trade from their main rivals. As the Dutch would refuse to acquiesce, the only option was believed to be aggressively taking their trade, using the superior English navy as the tool. Even beyond Steven Pincus' attacks on the notion of a commercial war, Historians have supplied little justification as to why the King should agree to take this extreme action, and at a time when his finances were already in chaos, this would be counter-productive as his main fiscal sources of Customs and Excise would be severely disrupted by hostilities.⁴² Additionally, Charles's continual demands for high levels of additional taxes and both the disincentives to business and damage to his people that this caused shows his scant regard for his subjects and their livelihoods, compromising trade as a basis for this argument.

The second of the three prominent theories involve such scholars as JR Jones, JD Davies in his book *Gentlemen and tarpaulins, the officers & men of the restoration navy* and Ronald Hutton who have proposed that it was a small clique of courtiers associated with James, Duke of York, that pushed to open hostilities with the Dutch, either for personal financial gain such as through the capture of prizes or to gain social and political advancement. Additionally, it is suggested that in a similar vein, naval officers saw it as an opportunity to enhance their promotion prospects and wealth via prizes.⁴³ Yet, little has been offered as to what may have personally motivated the King to agree to the extreme measure of going to war, especially as the nascent regime was not totally secure on the throne, sizeable rebellions still breaking out

⁴¹ Sharpe *Rebranding*, p.18; Miller *Charles II*, pp.4-5; Kennedy *Rise*, p.97, p.100; Boxer 'Tromps', p.842; Rommelse 'Prizes', pp.140-141; Scott 'Good night', pp.346-347; Israel 'Competing Cousins', p.17; Seaward 'House', p.437; Seaward *Restoration*, p.73; Rommelse 'State formation', p.156; Rommelse 'Dutch', pp.258-259; Fox 'English naval', p.277; Rogers *Dutch*, pp.23-24; Richmond *Navy*, pp.141-2; Uglow *Charles II*, pp.312-4; De Krey *Restoration*, p.48; Weiser *Charles II*, pp.133-4; Fraser *King Charles*, pp.227-8; Boxer *Anglo*, p.20; Herman *Rule*, pp.190-1; Miller *Charles II*, p.116; Haley *Politics*, p.56; Tute *True glory*, p.48; Thirsk *Restoration*, p.4; Bryant *King Charles II*, p.175; Day 'Restoration', p.13; Stephenson 'Redefining', p.64; Clark *From restoration*, p.122; Harding *Evolution*, p.95; Warner *Hero*, p.198; Ogg *England*, pp.283-4; Ashley *Charles II*, p.140

⁴² Pincus 'Popery'

⁴³ Davies *Gentlemen*, p.133; Jones *Country*, p.2, p.60, p.97, pp.97-98, p.99, p.101, p.160; Holmes *Making*, p.97, p.103; Coward *Stuart age*, p.299; Hutton *Restoration*, p.214, p.275; Jones *Anglo*, pp.8-9, p.89, p.91, p.95, p.151; Rodgers *Command*, p.67, p.79; Rommelse 'Prizes', p.141; Seaward *Restoration*, p.80; Rommelse *Negative Mirror*, p.200; Hainsworth *Anglo*, p.104; Lloyd *Nation*, p.47; Glassey *Reigns*, p.44; Lambert *Admirals*, p.96; Patterson *Long*, p.73; Hutton *Charles II*, p.219; Miller *Charles II*, p.116; Haley *Politics*, p.56; Coote *Royal Survivor*, p.208; Jones *Charles II*, p.69; Harding *Evolution*, p.95; Konstam *Warships*, pp.5-6; Ogg *England*, pp.283-4

as late as 1663 and it had huge fiscal problems that could be severely worsened by hostilities, further weakening his throne.

The third prominent theory for the conflagration's initiation is highlighted by Steven Pincus's book *Protestantism and Patriotism, ideologies and the making of English foreign policy* and Megan Cherry's article 'Imperial and Political motivations behind the English conquest of New Netherlands' and others who attribute it to ideological reasons to stop the Dutch attaining universal monarchy and thereby engrossing the world's trade to themselves, and also to Charles's desire to enforce the re-establishment of the Prince of Orange as Head of the Dutch state due to fears over their rival political Republican and religious Calvinist doctrines and their perceived threat to the King's Anglo-Royalist regime.⁴⁴ However, this proposition fails to justify more than one significant event, compromising its veracity. One is why hostilities were started in the economically important Guinea prior to the war's formal commencement and how was it expected that this would damage the Dutch Government's tenure? A lot of Royal resources were allocated to this arena, including over 10 naval ships that were lent to the Royal African Company, constituting a hefty financial commitment to a cash-strapped Crown. Another issue leaves unaddressed the risky nature of warfare and the attempted regime-change which Pincus justifies as the war's objective. Holland had land forces as well as a formidable navy. Afterall, the Bishop of Münster discovered this when undertaking his campaign from the German side of Holland. Even if England were to be victorious at sea, it was uncertain that the Dutch Republican Government would have fallen as they could have reinforced their land defences, making them immune to invasion from a foe that had disbanded its army following the Restoration. Also, rather than turn Netherlander public opinion against de Witt and his cronies, it may have instigated the opposite, patriotic fervour overriding other emotions. Additionally, England's attack on the Dutch would have forced a reluctant France to honour its defensive pact, producing an even more formidable, combined, land-based force. Further, French troops could have underpinned the Dutch Government, bolstering the centre against any hostile public opinion in that country.

⁴⁴ Pincus *Protestantism*, p.198, p.207, pp.209-210, pp.239-240, p.268, p.299, p.302, pp.305-307, pp.311-312, p.318; Pincus 'Popery', p.2, p.11, p.18, p.22; Cherry 'Imperial', p.78; Baxter 'The Dutch', p.1537; Richmond *Navy*, pp.141-2; Uglow *Charles II*, pp.305-6

Apart from his role as the Head of a Government which the above interpretations suggest was motivated by the factors they highlight, few existing accounts give any systematic role to the King in explaining the War. When prevailing accounts do give a role to Charles in the War's outbreak, they tend to suggest it happened because he was out of his depth, and not controlling events. In fact, various authors such as Holmes and Michael McKeon's book *Politics and Poetry in Restoration England, the case of Dryden's Annus Mirabilis* state the King didn't wish to go to war, but that it was merely part of an increasingly anti-Dutch movement.⁴⁵ Indeed, Paul Kenyon's book *The Stuarts* alleges that the King's incompetence in foreign affairs inexorably led to the Second Anglo-Dutch War.⁴⁶ Many do not take him seriously at all. Mostly, modern Historians assert that Charles was an extreme hedonist, enjoying the 'pleasures' of Kingship emanating from mistresses, sport, and access to lots of cash to support this, earning himself the nickname 'the Merry Monarch', being the leading lecher in a similarly veined court.⁴⁷ RE Pritchard's book *Scandalous Liaisons* and Don Jordan's and Michael Walsh's book *The King's Bed, sex, power and the court of Charles II* and others make this the subject of their whole tracts.⁴⁸ Some authors suggest other characteristics, such as mentioning that he possessed a 'steely streak' and a long memory for past wrongs.⁴⁹ JD Davies and other scholars state that the king was difficult to read, being a master of dissembling.⁵⁰ Indeed, Gij's Rommelse's article 'Dutch radical republicanism and English restoration politics during the 1660s' asserts that the King was much shrewder, and more cynical and opportunistic than other people realise, Annabel Patterson's book *The Long Parliament of Charles II* asserting that he was intensely focused on what was happening in Parliament.⁵¹ Sharpe's article 'Court and Commonwealth' argues that the King was a good judge of men and events.⁵² Such authors as Keeble and Geoffrey Holmes's *The Making of a*

⁴⁵ Holmes *Making*, p.97, p.103; McKeon *Politics*, p.99, pp.101-102, p.104, pp.119-120

⁴⁶ Kenyon *Stuarts*, p.114

⁴⁷ Harris *Restoration*, p.46, pp.72-73; Keay *Magnificent*, p.3, p.121; Miller *Restoration*, p.59; Kenyon *Stuarts*, p.113; Jackson *Star king*, p.143; Davies 'Charles II in 1660', p.266, p.268; Little 'Ship of state', pp.10-16; Johnson 'Life', p.19; Smith 'Cross-channel', pp.434; Novak 'Shaping', p.105; Zwicker 'On first', p.801; Espinasse 'Decline', p.81; Dougan *Return*, pp.143-4, p.194; Glassey *Reigns*, p.26; Uglow *Charles II*, p.5; Lambert *Admirals*, p.87; De Krey *Restoration*, pp.58-9; Hutton *Charles II*, p.186; Weiser *Charles II*, pp.20-21; Fellows *Charles II*, p.27; Wilson *All the King*, p.100; Macleod *Dynasty*, pp.265-6; Ollard *Image*, p.19; Weber *Paper bullets*, pp.88-9; Marshall *Intelligence*, p.6; Miller *Charles II*, p.34, p.96; Haley *Charles II*, p.4; Bryant *King Charles II*, p.171; Aylmer *Crown*, p.67; Jones *Charles II*, pp.54-5

⁴⁸ Pritchard *Scandalous*, pp.143-145; Jordan *Power and the court*, pp.1-225; Sawday 'Re-writing', pp.171-199

⁴⁹ Keay *Magnificent*, pp.77-78, p.110; Sharpe *Rebranding*, p.164, pp.170-172, p.188; Hutton *Restoration*, p.3, p.187; Jones *Country*, p.3, pp.141-142; Davies *Kings*, p.16; Miller *Restoration*, p.59; Macleod *Dynasty*, p.218, p.248; Miller *Charles II*, p.31

⁵⁰ Davies *Kings*, p.16; Seaward *Restoration*, p.10; Miller *Charles II*, p.36

⁵¹ Rommelse 'Dutch', p.255; Keeble 'Rewriting', p.224; Patterson *Long*, p.52; Wilson *All the King*, p.190; Macleod *Painted ladies*, p.10; Marshall *Intelligence*, p.6

⁵² Sharpe 'Court and', p.737; Wilson *All the King*, p.190

Great Power, late Stuart and early Georgian Britain, argue that the King developed these traits in exile.⁵³ Yet, there is little commentary on these personal traits' application in the country's administration, apart from inconsequential statements such as Tim Harris in *Politics Under the Late Stuarts, party conflict in a divided society*, John Miller's article 'Charles II and his Parliaments' and others that Charles desired absolutism but couldn't attempt this due to his financial dependence on Parliament, Harris adding that he disliked attending to state business which ultimately contributed to his eventual unpopularity.⁵⁴ Bridget Orr's article 'Poetic-Plate-Fleets and Universal Monarchy' merely stated that both Charles and James were ambitious, specifically wishing to maintain their claim to dominion of the sea without giving any further details.⁵⁵ However, Paul Seaward's book *The Restoration* states that there is little evidence that Charles was ambitious.⁵⁶

Interestingly, some Historians have hinted at a more determined Charles, and a King who flexed his muscles with his navy, but nobody has systematically developed these insights. Keay and Sharpe touch on this Issue lightly, highlighting how the King's youthful and traumatic experiences whilst in exile shaped his personality, inculcating a strong desire to ensure his self-preservation and authority. Yet, again, they don't expand on how this specifically affected his Royal policies.⁵⁷ Only Arthur Bryant's article 'Factors Underlying British Foreign Policy' and Tristan Stein's article 'Passes and Protection in the making of a British Mediterranean' highlight the navy's use in keeping the nation safe, and the country's consequent ability to pursue its choice of foreign policy.⁵⁸ Izidor Janzekovic's article 'The rise of state navies in the early seventeenth century' develops this point, stating that England employed advanced technology to give its navy an advantage over other countries.⁵⁹ Paul Brown's article 'The Master Shipwright's Secrets: how Charles II built the Restoration Navy' even states that Charles chose the ships he wanted for each service personally.⁶⁰ However,

⁵³ Keeble *Restoration*, p.61; Holmes *Making*, p.84; Miller *Restoration*, p.59; Sharpe 'Court and', pp.736-7; Uglow *Charles II*, p.5

⁵⁴ Harris *Restoration*, p.56, p.60; Holmes *Making*, p.87; Coward *Stuart age*, p.291; Knoppers *Historicising*, p.95; Hutton *Restoration*, pp.195-196; Miller 'Charles II', p.27, p.57; Harris 'Tories', p.9; Edie 'Popular Idea', p.369, p.372; Davies 'Charles II in 1660', pp.260-1, p.266; Hansen 'Opening phase', p.98; Cubbit 'Revolution', p.27

⁵⁵ Orr 'Poetic plate', p.76

⁵⁶ Seaward *Restoration*, p.14

⁵⁷ Keay *Magnificent*, pp.45-47, p.59, p.62, pp.64-65, p.76; Sharpe *Rebranding*, p.188, p.218; Sharpe 'Court and', pp.736-7

⁵⁸ Bryant 'British Foreign', pp.338-351; Stein 'Passes', pp.608-609; Redding 'Ship', pp.402-422

⁵⁹ Janzekovic 'Rise', pp.138-208

⁶⁰ Brown 'Master', p.105

he focuses on the Elizabethan, Napoleonic and WW2 epochs mainly, rather than Charles's.⁶¹ Conversely, Gerald Belcher's article 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1661: A reassessment of Charles II's Foreign Policy at Restoration' and Gijs Rommelse's article 'Privateering as a language of international politics' hypothesise on the King's weakness following his return. Belcher states that the Anglo-Portuguese marriage dominated foreign policy, together with the strengthening of bonds with France that this would facilitate as a way to shore up his throne. Portugal was selected in preference to Spain due to the lavish dowry with both its abundance of cash, and enhanced popularity with City merchants via the acquisition of additional trading opportunities throughout the Portuguese empire and the extra territories of Tangier and Bombay.⁶² Interestingly, Belcher also asserts that Charles regarded himself as initially weak and was afraid to move against foreign powers.⁶³ Nonetheless, Rommelse alleges a different effect of the King's weakness, having to rely on anti-Dutch mercantile interests to support his throne, so the Monarch favoured anti-Dutch courtiers which heightened tensions with Holland.⁶⁴

This work highlights how parts of existing scholarly assertions are true. Chapter Seven provides a more comprehensive account of how the King's focus on his 'pleasures' damaged his rule's effectiveness. However, this thesis posits a revolutionary re-interpretation that highlights a much wider and deeper truth than this. Chapter Three highlights the previously unidentified underlying personal aspirations that were at the root of his inner-being, driving his actions. Chapter Three reveals how the King's youthful experiences left him feeling like a second-class monarchical citizen, desiring to compensate by 'proving himself'.

Accordingly, Chapters Three to Seven convey how he used the navy as a tool to achieve a carefully staged covert plan to attempt to attain his personal ambitions of international pre-eminence and domestic absolutism with the expansion of trade leading to heightened Customs and Excise receipts to pay for it. This led to the inevitability of the Second Anglo-Dutch War.

The King's Portuguese marriage was a vital plank in the King's aspirations. Keeble, Jones, Keay, Hutton, and Sharpe and others mention it, and at best solely list the dowry's contents,

⁶¹ Bryant 'British Foreign', pp338-351

⁶² Belcher 'Spain', pp.67-69, pp.72-74

⁶³ Belcher 'Spain', p.87

⁶⁴ Rommelse 'Privateering', p.185

Keay also mentioning the navy's involvement in the marriage as transporting the Infanta to her new country.⁶⁵ Holmes and Charles Boxer's book *Anglo-Portuguese marriage treaty* refer to the dowry, neglecting its terms except that its cash injection had a valuable short-term benefit to the cash-strapped Monarch.⁶⁶ Alternately, the only mention that Rodgers and Jonathon Riley's book *The Last Ironsides* and others make of the dowry's contents were England's acquisitions of Tangier and Bombay.⁶⁷ JD Davies and Tristan Stein's article 'Tangier' allude to the King's new overseas acquisitions from Portugal allowing him to use the navy to support his desire to project power overseas, but do not mention any actual plan that he had to do so.⁶⁸ Yet, Davies justifies his assertion by stating that it was because, despite his libertine attitude, Charles was concerned to attain a positive overseas reputation due to the affect it was assumed to have in securing his throne domestically. In total contrast, Appleby assigns the reason for the Portuguese marriage to a desire to rid the country of the remaining old Commonwealth troops, their disbandment costs being unaffordable, their deployment to Portugal and thereafter to Tangier being in the hope that untimely deaths abroad would negate the need to pay their arrears.⁶⁹ There is no hint at a desire to achieve international hegemony or domestic absolutism.⁷⁰

This work goes wider and deeper, Chapter Three revealing the Portuguese marriage's strategic nature, the addition of Tangier and Bombay to Jamaica and English ports, with fleets stationed in each location allowing the King to project power globally in support of his wider personal covert ambitions as already described. When added to the 'Navigation Act's' effects on overseas rulers, this clearly portrays a Britannic Sovereign with global aspirations.

Other Major Issues.

⁶⁵ Keeble *Restoration*, p.97; Jones *Country*, p.98; Keay *Magnificent*, p.122; Sharpe *Rebranding*, p.14; Hutton *Restoration*, p.188; Hardacre 'English', p.113; Seaward *Restoration*, p.20, p.78; Johnson 'Life', p.17; Dougan *Return*, p.194; Glassey *Reigns*, p.44, p.222; Uglow *Charles II*, p.150; Patterson *Long*, p.65; De Krey *Restoration*, p.26; Hutton *Charles II*, p.160; Fraser *King Charles*, p.195, p.204; Ollard *Image*, pp.133-4; Miller *Charles II*, p.114; Stein 'Tangier', p.988; Jones *Charles II*, p.54, p.68; Ogg *England*, p.185

⁶⁶ Holmes *Making*, p.3, p.88; Boxer 'Anglo', p.558; Ashley *Charles II*, p.131

⁶⁷ Rodgers *Command*, pp.65-6; Riley *Last Ironsides*, pp.5-6; Lincoln 'Samuel Pepys', p.417; Little 'Ship of state', pp.10-16; Aylmer 'Slavery', p.379; Lloyd *Nation*, p.47; Richmond *Navy*, p.141; Tute *True glory*, p.63; Clark *From restoration*, p.122; Loades *England*, p.226

⁶⁸ Davies *Kings*, pp.172-191; Stein 'Tangier', p.986

⁶⁹ Appleby 'Veteran Politics', p.331

⁷⁰ Davies *Kings*, p.202, p.205

This thesis reveals a myriad of other major elements of Charles's actions that add to the existing academic body of knowledge. The main three are listed below.

Firstly, the King revealed himself to be skilled in diplomatic affairs. Those scholars that have commented on Charles's foreign policy, including Keeble, assert that he was weak following the Restoration, inheriting a hollowed-out navy with the army having been disbanded, leading to an inglorious foreign policy.⁷¹ Jones states that his Majesty's protection of the Portuguese weakened the Monarch further.⁷² Jones additionally states that the Portuguese connection damaged England's navy and economy.⁷³ In fact, Capp even goes so far as to allege that there were no major naval actions prior to the Second Anglo-Dutch War.⁷⁴ In contrast, Bernard Pool's article 'Sir William Coventry: Pepys's mentor', mentions the preparation of a West Indies fleet, omitting either what its impact would be on arrival at its destination, or its importance to the King's plans.⁷⁵ And WB Rowbotham's article 'The Algerine War in the Time of Charles II' discusses the various actions taken against the Mediterranean pirates and the resulting, transitory peace deals.⁷⁶ Alternately, Rodgers and RC Anderson's book *The Journals of Sir Thomas Allin* refer solely to Sandwich's confrontation with Algiers as being fruitless.⁷⁷

Further, in an age with few state functions, current authors view foreign policy success as vital in securing the ruler's martial reputation. Harris and Keeble amongst others regard the King's performance as dismal, particularly following the Medway disaster.⁷⁸ Indeed Hutton alleges that this calamity allowed the historic foe, France, to grow stronger.⁷⁹ They state that this was especially apparent when compared to Cromwell's enhanced, ominous persona.⁸⁰ Pincus adds that the Protector's reputation led foreign states to strongly desire an alliance with him.⁸¹ In fact, Jones goes so far as to assert that it was Arlington and not the King that

⁷¹ Harris *Restoration*, pp.70-71; Keeble *Restoration*, p.6; Holmes *Making*, p.33; Hutton *Charles II*, p.215

⁷² Jones *Country*, p.97, p.98

⁷³ Jones *Country*, p.98

⁷⁴ Capp *Cromwell navy*, pp.381-383

⁷⁵ Pool 'Sir W Coventry', pp.104-5

⁷⁶ Rowbotham 'Algerine', p.160

⁷⁷ Rodgers *Command*, p.66; Anderson *Thomas Allin*, p.xi

⁷⁸ Homes *Making*, p.93, p.97, p.104; Harris *Restoration*, pp.70-1; Hutton *Restoration*, p.270; Hardacre 'English', p.125; Dougan *Return*, p.204; Fellows *Charles II*, p.28

⁷⁹ Hutton *Restoration*, p.286; Pincus *Protestantism*, p.369; Jones *Country*, p.96

⁸⁰ Keeble *Restoration*, p.2, p.6; Holmes *Making*, p.93, p.97; Harris *Restoration*, pp.70-1; Little 'Ship of state', pp.10-16; Hainsworth *Anglo*, p.166; Dougan *Return*, p.195, p.204; Fellows *Charles II*, p.28; Macleod *Dynasty*, p.256

⁸¹ Pincus *Protestantism*, p.1, p.361

attempted to contract any foreign alliances, the only effective one being that with Münster.⁸² Seaward and K Haley's article 'Charles II' merely mention the post-war alliance with Holland and Sweden, Seaward asserting that it was aimed at counter-balancing France's emerging power.⁸³

In complete contrast, Jackson states that Charles had a developed sense of domestic and foreign policy machinations, but gives no further details.⁸⁴ Seaward agreed with Rodgers, stating that the navy gave Charles an instrument which he used to attempt an aggressive foreign policy, adding that it was weak.⁸⁵ Carl Brinkmann's article 'Charles II and the Bishop of Münster in the Anglo-Dutch War of 1665-6' supports Jackson, signalling a coordinated diplomatic plan by asserting that Charles's Münster alliance had the attraction of the Bishop engaging the Dutch from the landward side, the English from the sea, but this theme is not expanded.⁸⁶

However, Chapters Three to Five of this thesis show the opposite is true, particularly in the years prior to the 2nd Anglo-Dutch War's commencement. His Majesty used his navy to substantially boost his reputation in the international arena, including the Mediterranean, the Caribbean and Europe through the projection of substantial power. Also, far from his Portuguese alliance causing worsening relations with Spain, the major Iberian nation was too afraid of Charles's nautical military, allowing the continuation of English trade with it at the same time as being humbled by the English navy. Additionally, the King's nautical power uniquely overawed the Ottomans and North African pirates.

Further, Chapter Five shows that the King did, in fact, implement a very effective diplomatic coup prior to the war, using the prestige that his earlier naval successes had achieved to constitute an attractive ally to overseas rulers. He created what this thesis terms an 'Arc of Isolation' in which he either allied with those nations that surrounded the Dutch on the landward side, including Münster, or ensured they remained neutral, leaving his Britannic Majesty to focus on the Dutch at sea. Concurrently, he initiated an effective domestic and overseas propaganda campaign to prepare both communities for the coming conflagration.

⁸² Jones *Country*, p.102

⁸³ Seaward *Restoration*, pp.83-84; Haley *Charles II*, p.19; Haley *Politics*, p.17

⁸⁴ Jackson *Star king*, p.142

⁸⁵ Seaward *Restoration*, pp.70-71, p.73

⁸⁶ Brinkmann 'Münster', p.687

The second ‘other’ issue highlighted by this thesis is that there is no analysis of the King’s martial leadership of the war, or its effect on his foreign policy by modern academics. The vast majority at best merely mention the battles of the war.⁸⁷ The only analysis of the King’s performance is confined to such statements made by Pincus, Hutton and others that the King’s power was threatened by the Medway defeat, Jones even stating that he would have lost his throne should a viable national leader have been apparent.⁸⁸ On the other hand, Kenyon posits that the war was lost due to poor naval administration, the split command between Albemarle and Rupert and a lack of funding, although he gives no further details on this vital monetary matter.⁸⁹

Additionally, there is some comment on the post-war alliance that included England, Holmes even asserting that the power balance argument against France was ignored for thirty years following the Restoration.⁹⁰ Only JD Davies states that this latter issue was pursued by Charles and other Powers as a counter-weight to Louis XIV.⁹¹ Surprisingly, Rodgers asserts that Parliament pushed the King into this alliance.⁹²

⁸⁷ Keeble *Restoration*, pp.102-103, Jones *Country*, pp.100-101; Keay *Magnificent*, p.135; Capp *Cromwell navy*, pp.384-385; Coward *Stuart age*, pp.300-301; McKeon *Politics*, pp.128-130; Hutton *Restoration*, pp.222-224, pp.241-245, pp.268-270; Pincus *Protestantism*, pp.281-2, pp.283-9; Jones *Anglo*, pp.158-9, pp.160-4, pp.169-173; Davies *Gentlemen*, p.138, p.140, p.144, p.147; Pool ‘Sir W Coventry’, pp.109-110; Rodgers *Command*, pp.69-70, pp.72-77; Miller *After the civil*, pp.196-7; Kenyon *Stuarts*, pp.115-6; Davies *Pepys Navy*, p.223, pp.258-261; Knighton *Pepys*, pp.66-7, pp.71-4, pp.76-7, pp.82-84; Palmer ‘Military’, p.138; Bakshian ‘Prince Rupert’, p.695; Boxer ‘Tromps’, pp.842-844; Taylor ‘Galleon (pt 2)’, p.100; Taylor ‘Galleon (pt 1)’, p.12; Kinsley ‘Three’, pp.31-34, p.36; Rowbotham ‘Soldiers’, p.26; Coox ‘Dutch invasion’, pp.223-233; Greenhall ‘Three’, p.111; Rommelse ‘Prizes’, p.144, p.153; Seaward *Restoration*, pp.80-81; Rommelse *Negative Mirror*, p.204; Miller ‘Restoration’, p.426; Hainsworth *Anglo*, pp.115-127, pp.129-135, pp.137-148, pp.149-156, pp.159-163; Balleine *All for the King*, p.128, p.131; Howarth *Sovereign*, pp.188-189; Rogers *Dutch*, pp.42-43, pp.44, pp.44-46, p.46, pp.46-47, pp.55-69; Powell *Rupert*, pp.5-6, p.7, pp.7-8, pp.185-186; Lloyd *Nation*, pp.48-9, p.50; Richmond *Navy*, p.153, pp.155-8, pp.161-2, pp.166-7; Anderson *Thomas Allin*, p.ix, pp.xvi-xxvi, pp.xxvii-xxx, pp.xxxi-xxxvi; Dougan *Return*, p.204; Glassey *Reigns*, p.223, p.224; Uglow *Charles II*, p.338, pp.344-5, pp.352-3, p.359, p.405, pp.406-9; Lambert *Admirals*, p.95, pp.98-101; Patterson *Long*, p.75, p.78; De Krey *Restoration*, p.51, p.67; Hutton *Charles II*, p.222; Weiser *Charles II*, p.64; Fellows *Charles II*, p.28; Wilson *All the King*, pp.202-204; Macleod *Dynasty*, p.256, p.258; Fraser *King Charles*, 237, pp.242-3, p.250; Ashley *General Monck*, p.221, pp.227-31, pp.232-4, pp.237-9; Boxer *Anglo*, pp.25-6, pp.32-3, p.34, p.39; Humble *Rise*, p.33; Herman *Rule*, p.192, p.193, pp.193-4, p.195; Miller *Charles II*, p.121, pp.130-1; Haley *Charles II*, p.5; Haley *Politics*, p.56; Preston *History*, p.20, p.27, p.29, p.30; Aylmer *Crown*, p.49, p.252; Coote *Royal survivor*, pp.211-13, pp.217-8, pp.222-3; Stein ‘Tangier’, p.1007; Jones *Charles II*, p.70, p.71; Jones *Cavalier*, p.125, p.127, p.237; Harding *Evolution*, p.93, p.96; Konstam *Warships*, p.15, p.39; Warner *Hero*, pp.199-204, pp.205-6, pp.209-213; Ogg *England*, pp.286-8, pp.297-301, p.302, pp.309-12; Ashley *Charles II*, p.141, p.147

⁸⁸ Jones *Country*, p.101; Hutton *Restoration*, p.270; Pincus *Protestantism*, pp.420-1; Jones *Anglo*, pp.174-8

⁸⁹ Kenyon *Stuarts*, pp.115-6

⁹⁰ Holmes *Making*, p.97; Jones *Country*, p.103; Pincus *Protestantism*, p.439; Jones *Anglo*, p.176

⁹¹ Davies *Kings*, p.203

⁹² Rodgers *Command*, pp.78-8

This thesis substantially supplements modern scholarship. Chapter Seven analyses Charles's performance as Commander-in-Chief, showing that in contrast to his effective use of the navy as a diplomatic and propaganda tool, when the need arose to lead it tactically and operationally such as during a conflict, he was incompetent. He lacked even the basic skills to direct the nation's war effort, failing to implement a robust war structure to support both him as leader and the naval operations. This led to his partial failure to achieve the international part of his personal, covert aspirations. Yet, this work also shows that he retained enough of the pre-war image that the navy had created for him that he was able to form the centre of a new, powerful post-Breda-peace-deal alliance that could challenge France's emerging might.

The third 'other' issue highlighted by this thesis outlines England's inevitable defeat in the Second Anglo-Dutch War. Modern scholars for the most part make cursory mention of the King's enduring financial woes. A large percentage of them acknowledge that Parliament voted the King an unprecedented income of £1.2 million at Restoration, and mostly acknowledge that this was insufficient for his needs.⁹³ Indeed, Rommelse and others suggest that this was a deliberate policy by Parliament to restrain the crown's power.⁹⁴ However, Tim Harris's article 'What's new about the restoration' attributes Charles's financial woes to mismanagement and corruption.⁹⁵ There is some comment on the poor harvests from Hutton and Greaves's article 'Great Scott! The Restoration in Turmoil' and others, Jones acknowledging the prevailing mini ice-age which dampened economic demand, but omitting to relate this to the King's impecuniousness.⁹⁶ There is some comment on the prevalent economic downturn, Coward astonishingly claiming that this only affected landowners, only

⁹³ Harris *Restoration*, p.37, p.60; Keeble *Restoration*, p.79; Jones *Country*, p.45, p.58; Jones *Politics*, p.34; Keay *Magnificent*, p.135; Holmes *Making*, p.88; Coward *Stuart age*, p.286; Hutton *Restoration*, pp.148-149; Miller *Restoration*, pp.20-1, p.31, p.42; Kenyon *Stuarts*, p.110; Miller *Charles II*, p.4, pp.7-9; Lever 'Restoration', p.300; Scott 'Good night', p.350; Seaward *Restoration*, p.10, pp.17-19; Nicholson 'Leading ladies', p.50; De Krey 'Between', p.745; Tresham *Restoration*, p.300; Rogers *Dutch*, p.37; Glassey *Reigns*, pp.42-43; Patterson *Long*, p.66; De Krey *Restoration*, p.27; Hutton *Charles II*, p.158; Fellows *Charles II*, p.20; Fraser *King Charles*, p.196; Miller *Charles II*, p.66; Haley *Charles II*, p.90; Haley *Politics*, p.53; Bryant *King Charles II*, pp.123.4, p.139; Johnston 'State formation', p.129; Jones *Charles II*, p.47; Jones *Cavalier*, pp.103-4; Ogg *England*, pp.157-8; Ashley *Charles II*, pp.127-8

⁹⁴ Rommelse 'Dutch', p.256; Morrill 'Later Stuarts', p.13; Walcott 'Later Stuarts', p.355; Tresham *Restoration*, p.300

⁹⁵ Harris 'What's new', p.201

⁹⁶ Jones *Country*, p.59, pp.73-74; Jones *Politics*, pp.28-29; Hutton *Restoration*, pp.157-158; Greaves 'Great scott', p.606; Dougan *Return*, p.148

Holmes highlighting that this affected Crown revenues.⁹⁷ Others either merely mention that tax yields were lower than expected, or that people had the money to pay their taxes but that substandard collection systems resulted in poor recovery ratios.⁹⁸ Remarkably, Hutton attributes his Majesty's penury to his profligacy.⁹⁹ Dagomar Degroot's article 'Never such weather known in these seas' discusses the prevailing climatic conditions, but only as they effected the sailing conditions during the three Dutch wars.¹⁰⁰

Modern academics contradict each other as to how Government finances affected the war's outcome and concentrate on the arguments' mechanics. Here is a flavour. Many authors state that it was the economic result of the Plague and Fire that damaged Crown revenues to the extent that a 1667 fleet was unaffordable.¹⁰¹ Others merely comment that the King was indebted prior to the war.¹⁰² Jones asserts that the Plague and Fire didn't help, but that it was the costly military exertions of 1666 that caused the Administration's finances to collapse.¹⁰³ However, Holmes states in opposition that Charles's finances were improving up to March 1665.¹⁰⁴ Keay and Holmes assert that the Plague and Fire disastrously affected Crown revenues, Coward discounting the Plague as they had continuously afflicted the nation for a long time, so couldn't be calamitous now.¹⁰⁵ Knighton and others merely mention the Plague and the Fire with no analysis of its impact.¹⁰⁶ And uniquely Christopher Lloyd's book *The nation and the navy* and Andrew Lambert's book *Admirals, the naval commanders who made Britain great* list the reasons for not dispatching a 1667 fleet as being due to a belief that the war was already won following the St. James Day battle with no mention of government finances, Lloyd also including that the Great Fire contributed to the decision.¹⁰⁷ Further, Coward states that the expectation of a 1667 peace deal meant that all taxes were being diverted to pay off prior Government debt, with Hutton claiming that it was due to

⁹⁷ Coward *Stuart age*, p.277, p.298; Hutton *Restoration*, p.79; Holmes *Making*, p.88; Harris *London*, p.36

⁹⁸ Harris *Restoration*, p.37, p.60; Jones *Country*, p.50; Jones *Politics*, p.34; Keay *Magnificent*, p.135; Holmes *Making*, p.88; Coward *Stuart age*, p.286, p.292; Hutton *Restoration*, p.157, p.238; Rommelse 'Prizes', p.145

⁹⁹ Hutton *Restoration*, pp.195-196, p.198

¹⁰⁰ Degroot 'Never', pp.239-273

¹⁰¹ Jones *Anglo*, p.51, pp.57-59, p.174-8; McKeon *Politics*, p.120; Sharpe *Rebranding*, pp.19-20; Hutton *Restoration*, p.237, p.249; Sharpe *Rebranding*, p.15; Keeble *Restoration*, p.104; Jones *Country*, p.59; Miller *After the civil*, p.196; Rommelse 'State formation', pp.165-166; Hutton *Charles II*, p.231, p.242; Jones *Charles II*, p.34, p.71, p.73; Jones *Cavalier*, p.238, pp.241-2; Harding *Evolution*, p.96; Ogg *England*, p.295, p.308

¹⁰² Keeble *Restoration*, p.104; Holmes *Making*, p.88

¹⁰³ Jones *Country*, p.59, pp.100-101

¹⁰⁴ Holmes *Making*, p.89

¹⁰⁵ Keay *Magnificent*, p.135; Holmes *Making*, p.89; Coward *Stuart age*, p.301

¹⁰⁶ Knighton *Pepys*, p.69, p.79; Uglow *Charles II*, p.329, p.359; Coote *Royal survivor*, p.214, pp.218-9

¹⁰⁷ Lloyd *Nation*, p.50; Lambert *Admirals*, pp.101-2

Parliament's procrastinations in deciding on a method of collecting the late 1666 tax that the King couldn't afford to put out a 1667 fleet.¹⁰⁸ Davies and Coox's article 'The Dutch invasion of 1667' assert that no 1667 fleet was dispatched due to the Crown's financial collapse and the expectation of a peace deal, yet Seaward merely suggests that the government was bankrupt by the war's end due to the damage done to Customs and Excise revenue, discounting any effects from the Plague and Fire.¹⁰⁹ Rodgers disagrees, stating that the Crown's impecuniousness was due to the economic effects of the Plague and the Fire.¹¹⁰ Yet Paul Kennedy's book *The rise and fall of the great powers* simply asserts that both sides ended the war as they agreed it was mutually unprofitable.¹¹¹ Pincus totally disagrees, claiming that people paid their taxes both prior to the war and at its end so the King could have put out a fleet should he have wished to, but that the defeat was purely due to a loss of popular support and disillusionment in Monarchical competence.¹¹² And astonishingly, JS Wheeler's article 'Navy Finance' claims that the English government had developed a sophisticated naval finance system that allowed for long-term nautical commitments, ignoring that both the Interregnum and Restoration Administrations became bankrupt using this very system, preventing any vessels from being dispatched.¹¹³ Pool merely states that in the year prior to the war the navy had no funds with which to prepare the fleet, this condition being so bad from August 1666 that no fleet could be sent out later that year or in 1667.¹¹⁴

However, Chapter Six of this thesis shows that whilst this is partly true, a wider and deeper reality existed. It reveals how the prevailing mini-ice-age caused widespread misery in the country, and combined with the precipitate recalling of approximately ten percent of the nation's currency, the resulting inflation led to people's inability to pay their taxes because they simply couldn't afford to. This simple fact and the King's financial incompetence at not recognising this and knowing how to adjust his policies lay at the core of Charles's financial

¹⁰⁸ Coward *Stuart age*, p.302; Hutton *Restoration*, p.257

¹⁰⁹ Davies *Gentlemen*, p.148; Davies *Kings*, pp.196-7; Sharpe *Rebranding*, p.20; Coox 'Dutch invasion', p.225; Rommelse 'Prizes', p.146; Seaward *Restoration*, p.21, pp.81-82; Fox 'English naval', p.277; Hainsworth *Anglo*, p.157; Balleine *All for the King*, p.130; Howarth *Sovereign*, p.189; Rogers *Dutch*, p.53; Richmond *Navy*, p.164; Glassey *Reigns*, p.224; Uglow *Charles II*, pp.405-6; Lambert *Admirals*, pp.101-2; Ashley *General Monck*, p.236; Boxer *Anglo*, p.37; Humble *Rise*, p.33; Preston *History*, p.30; Aylmer *Crown*, p.62; Coote *Royal survivor*, p.222; Ashley *Charles II*, pp.144-6

¹¹⁰ Rodgers *Command*, pp.76-7, P.79; Haley 'Dutch', p.876; De Krey *Restoration*, p.63, p.74; Bryant *King Charles II*, p.187

¹¹¹ Kennedy *Rise*, p.101

¹¹² Pincus *Protestantism*, pp.347-9, pp.363-4, p.369, p.383, p.387

¹¹³ Wheeler *Navy Finance*, pp.457-458, pp.460-461, p.465

¹¹⁴ Pool 'Sir W Coventry', pp.108-109; Pool 'Samuel Pepys', p.636, p.640

woes. Consequently, the regime's debt levels were at eye-watering levels prior to the war, with the navy's funding being near to collapse at that stage. Additional costs endured during the conflagration would have heightened this appalling situation in any case. This resulted in the inevitability of defeat, the Plague and Fire merely exacerbating an already calamitous situation. This work therefore highlights that the King's aspirations were larger than the nation's ability to support them, his incompetence being in not recognising this. Therefore, his retention of his throne was at the behest of the Parliament that he wished to distance himself from, constituting the failure of the domestic element of his personal, covert ambitions.

Further, in aggregate, throughout its Chapters this work highlights factors that can be viewed as both similarities and differences between the two historic protagonists of Cromwell and Charles II, providing a wider and deeper understanding. Both Cromwell and the King were supported by a branch of the military. The Lord Protector had built a powerful reputation, the army underlining his domestic and international power.¹¹⁵ In his reign's early years, the navy underscored Charles's prestige and power. At the time of his death Cromwell retained his control of the army and his huge reputation. In contrast, however, the King's use of the navy ultimately failed at the Medway, being near the end of the period covered by this work, leaving him as reliant on Parliament as when he came into power, having gone full circle. In contrast the dictator preserved his control of the Legislature to the end. In the reputational rivalry Charles lost through his own inadequacies.

Sources.

Various sources have been examined to construct this thesis. These include several official ones. The *Calendar of State Papers Domestic* (CSPD) is very valuable, listing official papers accessed by assorted government officials at the time. These give detailed accounts on a range of issues from a multitude of local sources and individuals, covering a slew of topics from detailed issues relating to naval affairs such as distinct vessels' victual shortages and correspondence from the regime's spies to central sources providing such useful data as the local population's reaction to national events, and give detailed accounts. They provide a

¹¹⁵ Keeble *Restoration*, p.9

‘view’ of what was really happening in the country as reported by numerous actors. This is particularly effective where different sources corroborate each other.

Clarendon’s Calendar of State Papers (CCSP) is variously useful. It covers all the correspondence that crossed Charles’s Chancellor’s desk, providing an insight into what was really going on within the government, including secret correspondence not available to any other ministers or citizens. It includes a range of topics such as letters from English ambassadors abroad and from foreign rulers to the Chancellor and provides a view on England’s diplomatic relationship with separate countries, and when assimilated chronologically reveal England’s foreign policy development.

The *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English Affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice and in other libraries of Northern Italy* (CSP Venice) list the Venetian ambassador’s reports to his Italian masters. He was well connected within the English court, meaning that his epistles have an air of veracity. However, they don’t just give a lot of detail but also analysis so that his home government could grasp context. Yet, in not being part of the English political establishment his communiquees are relatively independent.

A perceived weakness of both Calendars listed above, and the Venetian ambassador’s reports are that they are modern transcribers’ summaries. The risk exists that these transcribers may have misunderstood certain aspects, or mis-transcribed, both issues possibly misleading the researcher. However, when various entries within individual sources such as letters from different correspondents in the CSPD, or information extracted from each of the three sources of CSPD, CCSP and CSP Venice is compared in aggregate, single errors are exposed as they are usually contrary to other sources’ weight of evidence.

Memoires are particularly useful in providing detailed accounts of events from actors who had an intimate knowledge of them, such authors as Clarendon, Charles’s Chancellor, Edmund Ludlow, the high level and extreme Republican, Edward Nicholas, Charles’s secretary of state, William Clarke, Monck’s secretary and Bulstrode Whitelock, Commonwealth parliamentarian and Keeper of the Great Seal amongst others. They also give contextual explanations, facilitating the historian’s wider and deeper understanding. Caution has been exercised when taking each one in isolation as they can be partisan, such as Ludlow’s, but a wider and more impartial view can be gleaned when considered in aggregate.

Although his Memoires contain a lot of self-justification, Clarendon's central governmental position mean his accounts can provide information unavailable elsewhere.

Various journals and diaries have been accessed during this thesis's research. Mainly they were not necessarily aimed at publication when the entries were recorded, so, given each diarist's personal interests, they provide either details that may not have been observed by other contemporary people, or conversely facilitate more confidence for the Historian in their research's veracity when viewed at an aggregate level. Additionally, such diarists as Samuel Pepys give not just contextual explanations, but a projection of personal opinions, that is an impression of how an 'ordinary person' felt about contemporary events. Several diarists have been used. Some examples follow. Pepys widely 'networked' at all societal and political levels in London, also being the naval Clerk of the Acts so central to Charles's war machine. John Evelyn was a long-term diarist and a committed Royalist. He was also well connected at court so provides a Royalist viewpoint of events. And the Reverend Ralph Jocelyn was an Essex minister, supplying to the researcher a commoner's provincial view.

Pamphlets, poems, panegyrics, newspapers, sermons and visual images have also been accessed and assessed during this thesis's composition. These are important sources of information because Charles's throne at Restoration was insecure, each threat posing a substantial risk that his Majesty's incumbency would be curtailed. Joad Raymond's book *Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain* highlights that the King recognised that control of the message he wished to portray to his subjects would play an important part in securing his tenure. Accordingly, as the book terms it, he came to power with a noisy propaganda campaign.¹¹⁶

There have been many publications that discuss the reasons for this, an article written by Jason Peacey, and edited by Michael Braddick, *The Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution* nicely summarises this material. As this period had a raised volatility, a large proportion of the populace took a heightened interest in national events from the 1640s onwards, creating an expanded market for the material. Consequently, as Peacey states, there was an explosion of printed material, accompanied by other developments which facilitated its supply. The censorship laws lapsed in 1641, radically reducing restrictions on the type of

¹¹⁶ Raymond *Pamphlets*, p.100, p.324

material that could be circulated. Further the price fell, making it more affordable to “more humble people”, with the advance of technology allowing far larger print runs. The combination of a massively enlarged market and the huge expansion of the capacity to supply these tracts led to the introduction of professional authors who made a living from their pens. Although many were disreputable, publishing scurrilous material but which they knew would sell, others were creditable and distributed their personal views. Additionally, their publications provided a good way for their authors to get noticed by potential patrons in order to secure personal gain such as employment. In fact, pamphlets became such a part of everyday life that government indulged, such as issuing declarations and proclamations. Additionally, they hired people to produce pro-government tracts, often working secretly with the Authorities to attempt to secure allegiance and convey official messages to diverse audiences. Their ‘reach’ was, of course, enhanced by the more substantial budgets they were able to deploy.¹¹⁷

Following Restoration, as Peacey continues, Roger L’Estrange summarised the problem that the new King faced, stating that pamphlets had made people too familiar with governments instead of being submissive and obedient.¹¹⁸ Indeed, there was a distribution network that allowed for the circulation of this printed material to large swathes of the public, namely coffee houses.¹¹⁹ Consequently, his Majesty realised that it was vital for him to attempt to engage in this melee.

116 pamphlets of various types have been used in this thesis. However, problematic though it might circumstantially appear, an interesting narrative appears by using them as a representative sample of the pamphlets that were circulated at this time - although the total is unknowable, because not everything that was produced will exist in a surviving copy; and the number of things that do survive is obviously far greater than what was used here (for example EBO lists over 3,000 titles produced in 1660 alone).

It facilitates an attempt at discerning the authors’ political motivations, and the role they may have played in enhancing the ideological impact of the navy.

¹¹⁷ Braddick *The oxford*, p.277, p.278, p.279, p.280, p.283, p.285, p.286, p.287, p.289, p.290

¹¹⁸ Braddick *The oxford*, p.286

¹¹⁹ Raymond *Pamphlets*, p.160, p.329

There are 48 Governmental sourced pamphlets which is by far the largest single category, covering a wide range of topics. These include proclamations, declarations, tracts outlining Parliamentary business such as legislation, as well as peace treaties with foreign potentates like the Ottoman Sultan. They also outline new instructions for the governance of both the navy and the fishing industry, as well as announcing the outcome of battles in the 2nd Anglo-Dutch War. The topics of this propaganda may seem mundane and inconsequential to any analysis of the authors' motives for writing them. Yet, the sheer weight of releases signals the regime's attempt to supplement the image it was careful to inculcate by other methods, such as those highlighted by academics like Keay and Sharpe. Consequently, it might convey to the populace that they were being governed by a competent and busy Administration that had the care of the people's welfare at its core. For example, special measures to support the fishing industry at such an economically difficult time when there is a shortage of other foodstuffs, or the peace treaty that bound the North African pirates to a deal that prevented them from harassing English merchants.¹²⁰

Additionally, within this figure there are nine proclamations. Obviously, these would have been scribed by officials close to the Monarch, rather than being penned by himself. Each one addresses a specific issue, such as encouraging economic activity by spurring planters to transfer to Jamaica or outlining plans to establish Tangier as a free port. Further, they could attempt to secure the acquiescence and compliance of a particular group where the matter might be controversial, such as to encourage all English sailors to return home so that they could man the nation's warships. This could be uncommonly difficult as it would necessitate the seamen potentially foregoing more lucrative and convenient employment for the rigours of naval life. Of course, they had a burgeoning distribution network in existence, as per other pamphlets. These included sermons made in the established church, as well as through the growing popularity of coffee houses, theatres, taverns, concerts and promenades.¹²¹

A further 60 pamphlets were issued by individuals. Biographies of the authors were sought from the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography and Early English Books Online. The majority, 32, are anonymous and largely pro-royal. It is possible that the authors verbally revealed their authorship of their articles to those they sought to impress in order to

¹²⁰ *Full articles of peace; Gent Preservation of the*

¹²¹ Claydon William III, p.76

personally benefit. It is equally possible, as Peacey highlights, that the Government may have directly employed itinerant scribes to pen these tracts for their sponsor's benefit.¹²² However, as nothing is known about their identities, there is no evidence to support these hypotheses, making their inclusion problematic in any analysis of motives.

The remaining 28 individually scribed pamphlets were seemingly composed by people that supported the monarchy. 22 were from people who, from their situations and life stories, seemingly desired to personally benefit, having such clear motives as seeking employment. Some in this category sought to gain employment such as John Wade who was an ex-Republican army officer who had lost his job at Restoration which involved running the iron works in the Forest of Deane, eventually attaining employment in more traditional forest posts. Then there were priests such as Thomas Bradley, prebendary of York cathedral who sought to be forgiven for pro-Republican sermons in an earlier decade, and Thomas Fuller who had been a Calvinist minister and was eventually awarded a Doctorate and gained various other employment including chaplain to the King. Another tract was authored by the Duchess of Newcastle who wished the return of her husband's estates after they were sequestered during the Interregnum. A further one shows that Sir John Birkenhead attained a doctorate of law so that he could practice as a lawyer, with honours being desired such as by Edward Waterhouse, being awarded membership of the nascent Royal Society. Also, some writers wished to gain political advantage, such as Edward Waller who aspired to gain support in becoming a member of Parliament. Others like Fabian Philipps sought direct monetary compensation in the form of a grant.

6 were issued by ardent royalists who didn't appear to wish to directly gain from their publications, their rationale being *prima facie* unclear. It could be for various reasons, such as a desire to support the regime as it represented their preferred political system, their social status depending on its existence, such as members of the nobility. For example, the King's escape from the battle of Worcester is glorified, tracts narrating England's history with Charles's return representing the apogee, or just glorifying in the King's accession. However, these are mere hypotheses with no factual underpinning.

¹²² Braddick *The oxford*, p.286

The other 8 were of a miscellaneous nature, such as a description of various geographic locations like Germany, Caribbean islands and Jamaica.¹²³

It would be interesting to be able to use these pamphlets to discern the kind of audiences that they were targeted at and how they were received. Sadly, this is limited. Only one in the sample progressed to a second edition, that being the King's proclamation to recall sailors, suggesting that his aspirations to divert them from their existing employment to the navy wasn't easy, substantial resistance being experienced.

Using the pamphlets' format may give a further indication, such as attempting to discern whether they were issued in a populist pattern. Although government tracts follow a standard layout, the others vary. Those issued by named individuals are generally in a narrative form. This seems unsurprising as they would have been aimed at those who wielded the power to provide the rewards that the authors sought, constituting powerful people who were literate. However, in the anonymous category there is a higher preponderance of material in verse and pictures. For example, *England's Palladian* congratulates the King on the success of Holmes' Bonfire in verse, or *English resolution* which has stirring martial images, the verse underneath encouraging mariners to fight for the King's glory, and *England's Royal Conquest* which mixes pictures and verse to praise the St. James Day naval victory.¹²⁴ This supports the view that they may have been issued to the more humble person, aspiring to acquire the recipients' goodwill, such as presenting sailors' ardent desire to live and die for the new regime, or a verse singing the praises of the new Queen, Catherine.

In total, there were a large number of pamphlets issued in this period. It is always difficult to ascertain people's motives at this distance of time without copious evidence, such as that outlining the King's covert agenda as delineated in Chapter Three. Yet, as mentioned above, pamphlets can be indicative, authors aspiring to gain personal advantage, such as those who sought commercial or political gain. Originators would need to indulge in heightened print runs to aid their wish for their publication to come to the attention of their intended audience, such as courtiers and other influential people, larger issues standing an increased chance that their target audience would notice and read their tract.

¹²³ *Brief and yet exact; History of the Caribby-Islands; Jamaica viewed*

¹²⁴ *England palladian; English resolution; England royal conquest*

However, it seems likely that the pamphlets published by the State would have been issued in far larger numbers, when considering its greater availability of resources compared to an individual, as well as the necessity to reach the whole nation compared to the localised London 'reach' of a single person, this being where potential patrons were more likely to frequent. Consequently, when considering the larger proportion of pamphlets issued by the Government in this 'unscientific' sample, it appears that greater penetration may have been attained, achieving a form of victory in this 'pamphlet war'. Tracts issued anonymously by authors who may have been royal 'employees', conveying pro-royal messages, may have aided this. Additionally, this prospective result would mirror the success that the King experienced through his use of the navy to help establish him on the throne (see Chapter Two). This supplements the view expressed by both Raymond and Peacey regarding the comprehensive and effective wider propaganda campaign conducted by the regime.

Overall Conclusion.

In its seven chapters this thesis recounts the navy's method of achieving Charles's Restoration followed by its vital support in helping him to retain the throne, despite the huge pressures that discounted this possibility. It then describes the King's covert, personal ambition to use the navy to attempt international pre-eminence and domestic absolutism, using increased trade to foster higher Customs and Excise revenues to pay for this. It shows how this inexorably led to war with the Dutch, and how in preparation for this, his Majesty used the navy to implement a careful, step-by-step plan. This thesis progresses to highlight the inevitability of the country's defeat in the Second Anglo-Dutch War, and the Monarch's weakened domestic position in contrast to his reduced but still prominent international persona. It concludes that it wasn't the navy's failings that led to the disastrous Medway defeat, but those of the King through his naivety in mishandling the nation's finances and ineptitude as Commander-in-Chief during hostilities. Further, in not recognising that the country that he headed lacked the resources to support the achievement of his personal ambitions, this points to the Sovereign's wider incompetence as a ruler, his subjects paying a heavy price in blood and treasure. JD Davies's book *Kings of the Sea* highlights how Charles was highly interested in his navy. This thesis shows for the first time, in fact, how central the navy was to the King's power and use as a tool in attempting to achieve his ambitions in his reigns' first years. It is therefore surprising that such a vital contribution to the academic

body of knowledge surrounding the Restoration hasn't been addressed previously. The study of the navy's role in Charles's later reign would consequently greatly benefit the wider understanding of the late Stuart period.

Chapter 1 - Progression to Power.

Introduction.

This Chapter covers the year ending approximately April 1660 and the King's transformation from an isolated continental nomad to a reigning Monarch, and totally contradicts conventional academic wisdom, is brand new to academia and a fundamental re-interpretation of this period's history.¹²⁵ It shows that the navy was by far the nation's most important and influential military arm in returning the King, not the army.

Modern scholarship tends to interpret the events leading to the Restoration as the result of Monck's command of the army. The General is supposed to have gained control of Britain's land forces, using this power to overthrow the Committee of Safety, encouraging his Majesty's return when he could see no alternative as a route to political stability. Yet, as we are about to see, the navy's unified command, loyalty and proximity to the seat of power in London made it substantially the most influential and effective tool in repatriating the Monarch. This contrasts starkly with the army's strong ineffectiveness, this being amply illustrated by their mutinous behaviour when en-route to confront Sir George Booth's rising in August 1659, on at least two occasions 'just sitting down', requiring more loyal units to enforce the continued march, hundreds of casualties resulting. Also, its geographic distance from the country's political heart denuded it of any serious ability to intervene in the nation's centre of power. Further, even without these impediments, its enduring Republicanism would have spurred it to prevent the Royal accession. Monck did have a useful instrument in his small band of Scottish troops, but even these were unreliable, remaining largely committed republicans, only the General's duplicitousness making them malleable to his covert Royal agenda. Consequently, he needed to use the navy as his main tool in advancing his plans. His maritime forces were far more loyal and cohesive than any armies he led. So, as will be seen, it is not possible for the current academic view of the army's supremacy in returning the King to be valid.

¹²⁵ BBC *iplayer*, *In our Time* on Radio 4 presented by Melvyn Bragg 35 mins 10 seconds on 27.5.2021, Laura Stewart of York University. Also on the panel was Clare Jackson, Cambridge University and Michael O Siochru, Trinity College, Dublin University.

The crucial event was Vice Admiral Lawson's Thames-estuary blockade, the resulting dearth of Customs revenues due to the prevention of trade and the City merchants' refusal to advance any further loans, stripping the Committee of Safety of the majority of its fiscal flows, leading to bankruptcy and collapse. Without the Administration that provided both its justification for existence and coordination, and which would provide for its substantial pay arrears, the army sent north under General Lambert to prevent Monck's smaller band descending on England's capital deserted. This left the route open unopposed for Monck's contingent to take control of the Capital, the General thereafter commencing the process that led to the King's repatriation. Without Lawson's watery action, none of this could have occurred, and totally contradicts existing scholarly wisdom.

Additionally, rather than it being the King's envoys that represented an isolated and powerless Sovereign in attempting to convert an unwitting organisation to the Monarchy, this Chapter highlights that in a wider period of mid-1659 to May 1660 it was the navy's own leadership of General Monck, Admiral Montagu and Vice-Admiral Lawson that took the initiative in its transformation towards the Crown, each leader having their own reason and completing their metamorphosis at differing times, as their individual, personal situations dictated.¹²⁶ Further, at the crucial period at the end of 1659, once circumstances had changed, a triumvirate of naval-related leaders of General Monck, Vice-Admiral Lawson and Sir Arthur Haselrig, leading the Portsmouth garrison at the time (Montagu re-joining the push for Monarchy on his re-instatement in March 1660), positively worked for the King's return, ensuring this by taking complete control of the political process, the terms on which it took place, its timing and method of transport. This included regime-change from Republican to Royalist Governments.

The following five sections commence by explaining the relevance of the three maritime figures of Monck, Montagu and Lawson to this Chapter. Then the army's unreliability and ineffectiveness both at the local and national level compared to the navy's overall loyalty and potency is illustrated. The ensuing section details various ways in which the King attempted to influence the navy to affect his recall, followed by the reasons why the three key nautical characters transferred their allegiance from Parliament towards the King. The final section

¹²⁶ CCSP vol 4, p.345, 27.8.1659; Capp *Cromwell's*, p.337; Knighton *Pepys*, p.1; Davies *Gentlemen*, p.127; Capp, *Cromwell's*, p.352; Knighton *Pepys*, p.3; Hutton *Restoration*, p.105

describes how their conversion affected the country's transition towards Charles's Restoration.

Justifications for the inclusion of the 3 figures.

The three most senior naval commanders at various times either represented the Navy's control over events culminating in Charles's Restoration, or manipulating the Navy itself to support the King's recall. Firstly, General and General-at-Sea George Monck, who was overall commander of both the Army and Navy, ultimately positioned himself to completely control the British political scene which resulted in the King's Restoration. Secondly, Admiral and General-at-Sea Edward Montagu, who was re-appointed in March 1660 as the navy's operational Head at Monck's behest and who deliberately remoulded it from a Republican to Royalist Institution. Thirdly, Vice-Admiral John Lawson retained naval operational supremacy prior to Montagu, his actions dramatically effecting a crucial period in late 1659, thereafter substantially supporting the political drive to Restoration. As this trio commanded the navy at this stage, a concentration on them automatically encompasses the Navy's role in the contemporary political convulsions.

Although Monck wasn't connected to the Navy during the earlier part of this Chapter's period, he replaced General Fleetwood as overall Head of all land and sea forces following the amalgamation of the command structures from late November 1659.¹²⁷ The secluded members confirmed this following their February 1660 readmission to the House, adding the appellation of General-at Sea.¹²⁸ Consequently he became the most senior naval commander.¹²⁹ As highlighted by John Mullinax in his pamphlet, the General's prior victories at sea were famous, emphasising his aquatic credentials.¹³⁰ Therefore, his motivations and actions throughout the earlier parts of this period are important, given their

¹²⁷ Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.67 20.10.1659 The officers at Whitehall to General Monck, p.257 22.1.1660 Nottingham General Monck to the Speaker; CCSP vol 4, p.493 23.12.1659, p.513 6.1.1659, p.526 20.1.1660; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.167 121; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.137-139 26.1.1660 Commission to General Monck as Commander in Chief; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.399 25.2.1660

¹²⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 29.2.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.236, p.237, p.249 15.3.1660; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.401 2.3.1660; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, pp.323-324; Miller *Exact History* p.368, p.370; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.50; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 5.3.1660 p.121 entry 122, 19.3.1660 p.128 entry 126

¹²⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 3.5.60

¹³⁰ *Symplegades antrum*, p.35

ultimate result. Monck's arrival in London meant he could control British politics.¹³¹ Despite being offered executive control of government, he preferred to exercise his power as combined head of the Army and Navy.¹³² Consequently, he had complete control over whether Charles was restored to his throne.¹³³

Admiral Montagu lost his command in October 1659 when returning with his fleet from his diplomatic mission for Richard Cromwell to the Baltic Sound in April of that year.¹³⁴

However, his reinstatement in March 1660 at the instigation of Monck, the overall naval commander, meant that he had operational primacy as the most senior commander at sea.¹³⁵ This meant he was enormously influential in shaping its culture, political allegiance and deployment, allowing him to lead the navy in its influential role in the King's return.¹³⁶

Vice-Admiral John Lawson was the navy's overall commander during the tumultuous late 1659 events which saw the military Committee of Safety's rise and fall, using his position to substantially influence events.¹³⁷ He attained this position because of Montagu's removal following his return from the Sound.¹³⁸ In mid-October 1659 he was promoted to Commander-in-Chief at sea.¹³⁹ Further, following Monck's political ascendancy in London, his command over the bulk of the fleet of twenty three sail with another eight or ten vessels in service elsewhere, allowed him to provide strong support to the General's policies.¹⁴⁰ Also, the Government was unable to retaliate to Lawson's pressure, its financial woes meaning it couldn't dispatch an opposing force, reinforcing Lawson's nautical power.¹⁴¹ In tandem with Monck and the Portsmouth garrison this led to the return of the Rump and its secluded members, and ultimately a Free Parliament being elected, heralding the King's Restoration.

¹³¹ CCSP vol 4, p.501 30.12.1659, p.532 26.1.1660, p.536 28.1.1660, p.550 7.2.1660, p.563 15.2.1660, p.564 17.2.1660, p.569 21.2.1660, p.570 21.2.1660, p.578 27.2.1660, p.582 2.3.1660, p.620 27.3.1660; *Pepys Diary*, 7.2.1660, 2.4.60, 18.4.60, 29.4.60

¹³² CCSP vol 4, p.615 23.3.1660, p.618 24.3.1660; *Clarendon History vol 6*, p.210 204 27.4.1660

¹³³ CCSP vol 4, p.532 26.1.1660, p.620 27.3.1660; *Pepys Diary*, 7.2.1660

¹³⁴ CSPD 1659-1660, Vol CCIV p.167 3.9.1659 179 pp.568-569, vol CCIV p.168 3.9.1659 I 98 p.185; *Thurloe State papers*, p.644 7.4.1659

¹³⁵ *Pepys Diary*, 29.2.1660, 3.3.1660, 23.3.1660, 15.4.1660, 29.4.1660, 3.5.1660, 10.5.1660; *Ludlow Memoirs*, p.237; *Whitelock Memorials*, p.401 2.3.1660; CCSP vol 4, p.618 24.3.1660, p.628 30.3.1660; *Montagu Journal*, 10.5.1660; *Miller Exact History* p.370; *CSP Venice vol 32*, 19.3.1660 p.128 entry 126; *Baker Chronicle*, p.721; *Pepys Diary*, 17.4.1660

¹³⁶ CCSP vol 4, p.602 16.3.1660; *Pepys Diary*, 1.4.1660, 3.4.1660, 30.4.1660, 2.5.1660, 3.5.1660

¹³⁷ CCSP vol 4, p.515 7.1.1660

¹³⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.376 16.9.1659

¹³⁹ CCSP vol 4, p.407 13.10.1659; *Ludlow Memoirs*, p.148 1.11.1659

¹⁴⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.502 30.12.1659; *CSP Venice vol 32*, 2.1.1660 p.105 entry 111

¹⁴¹ CCSP vol 4, p.545 3.2.1660

The Navy's Predominance Compared to the Army.

At the start of this Chapter's tumultuous period Richard Cromwell as Lord Protector was overthrown by a military junta which was politically represented by the Rump Parliament. In July and August Sir George Booth led a failed national Royalist rising, centred around Cheshire and Eastern North Wales. From October to December the Committee of Safety, an extreme military government, took power, being ousted at the end of 1659 when the Rump returned. The secluded members' February 1660 return side-lined the Rump, resulting in the consequent political progression towards free elections in April and the King's ultimate repatriation. Additionally, during this period, General Monck, the supreme military commander in Scotland and one of the seven Parliamentary Military Commissioners, began his march south to London in November 1659, securing all the counties en-route. General Lambert's opposition in northern England melted away during December 1660, leaving the route to London open for Monck unopposed. As shown below, the army was mostly unreliable and ineffectual, the General's military progress therefore initially relying on his small band of Scottish troops in the wake of the Navy's crucial action in the Thames estuary.

As mentioned, although the army might appear to be Monck's dominant military arm, in reality the Navy firmly occupied this position. Overall, the army was unreliable and ineffective at both national and local levels, unable to be pre-eminent in restoring the Monarchy as asserted by modern scholars, the navy filling this role. Regarding the army's national unreliability, during the Commonwealth's August 1659 crisis, General Lambert's foot soldiers mutinied more than once en-route to confront Sir George Booth's Royalist rising. Their lack of pay, lavish financial inducements from Royalists to swap sides and unseasonably poor weather constituted contributory factors.¹⁴² The cavalry put down the first mutiny, badly wounding several soldiers, and following officers' flowery words the troops recommencing their march.¹⁴³ However, the second mutiny was much worse, the march being resumed following a clash between the infantry and cavalry which left several hundred dead.¹⁴⁴ It is difficult to imagine a more serious collapse of military discipline during combat

¹⁴² CSP *Venice* vol 32, 22.8.1659 p.56 entry 56

¹⁴³ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 22.8.1659 p.56 entry 56

¹⁴⁴ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCIV p.132 20.8.1659; Nicholas *Papers*, p.178 8.8.1659 Mr Miles; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 29.8.1659 p.59 entry 61

operations, illustrating the organisation's fragile loyalty. Further, it highlights the army's strong unreliability when compared to more robust times such as during World War One where punishments would have included executions.

Further, in elaboration of an earlier point, Lambert's force sent north to confront Monck's small but organised band consisted of approximately four thousand foot soldiers and three thousand five hundred horse.¹⁴⁵ Once in the proximity of Monck's forces, some units including the Irish brigade deserted to him.¹⁴⁶ The rest of Lambert's force eventually refused to fight, and deserted.¹⁴⁷ Only about 100 cavalry remained.¹⁴⁸ As Monck was suspected of being a secret Royalist and desiring the King's repatriation, the Committee of Safety had ordered Lambert to go north and crush the Scottish forces before they had advanced into England.¹⁴⁹ However, the military junta pursued protracted negotiations with Monck whilst he remained in Northern England.¹⁵⁰ Also, to prevent an encounter between the two armies Lambert forbade his troops to engage with the enemy.¹⁵¹ In combination these two factors point to the Committee of Safety's deep concerns over their troops' reliability, and their keenness to avoid the risk of mass desertions which would have ended any pretensions they had to rule with the army's approval, highlighting their political vulnerability.¹⁵² After all, this seems a reasonable anxiety, given the army's mutinies when en-route to confront Booth's rebels.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, the desertion of Lambert's troops was pivotal as it removed Monck's only sizeable opposition. Other examples of the army's national unreliability include the mutiny of substantial numbers of officers and men across several regiments that had been

¹⁴⁵ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.150 4.11.1659

¹⁴⁶ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.203 24.12.1659; Clarendon *History*, p.161 27.12.1659 entry 110; CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.294 2.1.1660 entry 4, vol CCXIX p.295 3.1.1660 entry 5; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.232 31.12.1659 Newsletter; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.378 7.12.1659

¹⁴⁷ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCV p.294 2.1.1660 entry 4, vol CCV p.288 31.12.1659, vol CCXIX p.295 3.1.1660 entry 5, vol CCXIX p.311 18.1.1660; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.94 3.11.1659 Newsletter, vol IV p.102 5.11.1659 London Newsletter, pp.117-118 16.11.1659 Lt Gen Fleetwood to Maj Gen Lambert, p.237 2.1.1660 General Monck to Sir Hardress Waller; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.381 22.12.1659; Rugg *Diurnal*, December p.16 1659 Fleetwoods party leave him and go into Portsmouth; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, pp.316-317; Miller *Exact History*, pp.354-355; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 16.1.1660 p.108 entry 113; Clarendon *History vol 6*, pp.161-162 27.12.1659 entry 110

¹⁴⁸ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.162 27.12.1659 entry 4; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.387 4.1.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 4.1.1660

¹⁴⁹ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.373 11.11.1659, pp.376-377 30.11.1659; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.314

¹⁵⁰ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.374 16.11.1659

¹⁵¹ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.373 11.11.1659

¹⁵² Brook *England triumph* p.59

¹⁵³ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 29.8.1659 p.59 entry 61

tasked with guarding Scotland in the General's absence.¹⁵⁴ In Ireland approximately half the army mutinied and took control of Dublin, leaving dissenting garrisons in outlying areas isolated.¹⁵⁵ Also, they seized the deputy commander of Irish forces, Colonel John Jones, attempting to similarly capture the overall commander, Lieutenant General Edmund Ludlow.¹⁵⁶ Other factors exacerbated the situation, for example in March, April and May 1660 some individuals attempted to divert several regiments' loyalties to the agent provocateur's cause, others being similarly employed in print, alleging that Parliament wasn't going to settle the army's pay arrears after all. The Council of State were sufficiently concerned that a £10 reward was offered for their capture.¹⁵⁷

The army's national ineffectiveness is illustrated by its performance during Booth's Cheshire rebellion where Parliamentary troops' martial prowess was seriously questionable. Lambert had around 10,000 horse and foot, including 8 cannon, withdrawn from Windsor Castle for the affair, and faced about 2,000 untrained irregulars, and whose cavalry refused to engage. And at Lambert's troops' first charge, the Royalist infantry destroyed their flags, abandoned their leaders and fled.¹⁵⁸ Rather than a military triumph, this represents the rout of a rabble by overwhelming Commonwealth numbers and artillery, and it would have been astonishing had the Republican army not won. Further, the bulk of the army was nationally geographically dispersed, concentrating on subduing the local populace.¹⁵⁹ The threatened widespread Royalist rising of July/August 1659 with putative risings nationally prominently displayed the need for this, loyal local army units preventing trouble, although the units themselves often proved inadequate and needed reinforcements from the centre.¹⁶⁰ However, even here the army wasn't universally dominant. Isolated instances occurred such as in

¹⁵⁴ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.311 16.1.1660 entry 19, vol CCXX p.427 April (no further date is given); Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.158 3.12.1659; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.134 24.11.1659 One of the commissioners to the officers of the army of Scotland, pp.160-161 1.12.1659 Colonel Robinson to General Monck; Whitelock *Memorials* p.366 26.10.1659, p.369 2.11.1659, p.370 5.11.1659, p.375 21.11.1659

¹⁵⁵ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.184 13.12.1659, pp.187-190

¹⁵⁶ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.184 13.12.1659, p.190 1.1.1660

¹⁵⁷ Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.266-267 17.3.1660 General Monck to the Officers Commanding Regiments; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.409 28.4.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, pp.65-66 26.3.1660 Men drowned in the Thames; CCSP vol 5, p.11 4.5.1660 London, Hy Coventry to Mr Kirkton; Miller *Exact History*, p.369; CSPD 1659-1660, Vol CCXX p.414 13.4.1660 Whitehall, Proclamation by the Council of State

¹⁵⁸ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCIV p.108 13.8.1659, vol CCIV p.126 18.8.1659, vol CCIV p.133 21.8.1659 entry 21; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.113 6.8.59/19.8.59; Nicholas *Papers*, p.176 8.8.1659 *Mr Miles*; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.44 18.8.1659, p.46 20.8.1659; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.356 5.8.1659, p.358 19.8.1659; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 5.9.1659 p.61 entry 62

¹⁵⁹ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.347 6.2.60 entry 44

¹⁶⁰ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCIV p.68 2.8.1659 I98 p.112, I98 p.114, vol CCIV p.69 3.8.1659 I98 pp.114-115, vol CCIV p.74 4.8.1659, vol CCIV p.76 5.8.1659 I98 p.78, vol CCIV p.77 5.8.1659 I98, p.79; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 8.8.1659 p.50 entry 52, 15.8.1659 pp.52-53 entry 54, 22.8.1659 p.56 entry 56

forests where peasants defeated the professionals, the latter suffering multiple casualties.¹⁶¹ Parliamentary forces suffered other small-scale defeats nearer to the capital, some soldiers being slain, with wounded being returned to London.¹⁶² Overall, though, its distance from the centre of power and its local commitments meant it lacked any ability to interfere in central affairs. Additionally, the army's overall leadership was ineffective, the senior command variously engaging in internal power struggles during the Autumn of 1659, Fleetwood, Vane and Haselrig enacting their jealousies of Lambert in Parliament via limiting the latter's power.¹⁶³ And following the Rump's late December 1659 re-establishment, by the time Monck neared London any officers who could have resisted him were under restraint due to their previous support of the Committee of Safety, leaving the army without effective leadership.¹⁶⁴ This included Lambert, the most prominent, who was eventually incarcerated in the Tower.¹⁶⁵ Also, the institution's cohesiveness was significantly undermined, the troops being heavily factionally divided, impairing their cohesive martial focus and ability to mount united operations.¹⁶⁶ Some splits were religiously based, such as in July 1659 Anabaptists, Brownists and Quakers had gained political ascendancy in tandem with Sir Henry Vane and other rulers, Presbyterians being out of favour.¹⁶⁷ Other splits were based on political differences.¹⁶⁸ For example in January 1660 a whole unit deserted its officers and joined another commander who matched their support of the Rump.¹⁶⁹ Further, the army's effectiveness as a military machine was diluted, being massively alienated from the institution that gave it legitimacy, that is Parliament; rather than focusing its martial attention on common foes such as potential Royalist threats from abroad, at such times as April and September 1659 it plotted for Parliament's dissolution.¹⁷⁰ This left the army ill-disciplined,

¹⁶¹CSP *Venice* vol 32, 8.8.1659 p.50 entry 52

¹⁶²CSP *Venice* vol 32, 29.8.1659 p.60 entry 61

¹⁶³ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCIV p.187 10.9.1659

¹⁶⁴ Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.167 120 28.1.1660; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCXIX p.309 13.1.1660 I115 p.2, vol CCXIX p.309 14.1.1660 I91 p.103, vol CCXIX p.328 27.1.1660 I115 p.14; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.388 9.1.1660

¹⁶⁵ CCSP vol 4, p.615 23.3.1660; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCIV p.187 10.9.1659, vol CCXX p.381 5.3.1660 I116 p.3; Clarendon *History*, p.162 110 7.3.1660, p.185 150 25.4.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.241 5.3.1660; Nicholas *Papers*, p.196 9.3.1660 Col Robert Whitley, p.204 9.3.1660 John Heath; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.267 11.4.1660 General Monck to the Officers commanding Regiments; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.402 6.3.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.51 March 1660 Lord Lambert in the Tower Prisoner

¹⁶⁶ Thurloe *State papers*, p.687 21.6.1659 Barwick to Hyde

¹⁶⁷ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCIII p.5 57 2.7.1659

¹⁶⁸ Thurloe *State papers*, pp.771-774 1.11.1659 Colonel Morley and other late officers to General Fleetwood

¹⁶⁹ CSPD *1659-1660*, CCXIX p.294 3.1.1660 entry 5

¹⁷⁰ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCIII p.33 16.7.1659; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.110 30.7.1659, p.128; Thurloe *State papers*, p.744 4.10.1659 Captain Nedham to General Fleetwood

focusing on its own priorities rather than the nation's security, or the Republican political system it had created and protected for so long.¹⁷¹

Army units illustrated their unreliability in differing localities by various treacherous acts. Some were mutinous partly due to their substantial pay arrears, for example following a July 1659 meeting the Dunkirk garrison threatened to destroy the Governor's residence and fire the town unless they received their back-pay.¹⁷² Also in Dunkirk in August 1659 several soldiers deserted to the exiled King's cause due to a rumour that he was raising an army and offering advanced pay, and regular pay thereafter, money rather than allegiance to the Commonwealth proving the common trooper's biggest concern.¹⁷³ In January 1660 at Gloucester an unpaid unit mutinied after being ordered to deploy for action, becoming riotous and attacking an associated loyal troop, stealing their colours.¹⁷⁴ In the same month at Stafford troops mutinied when an attempt was made to dismiss them before they were paid, a more steadfast troop eventually affecting the discharge.¹⁷⁵ At a similar time the entire Gravesend regiment mutinied, almost killing their Colonel, prior to their embarkation for their new Dunkirk posting.¹⁷⁶ And Colonel Rich's Edmondsbury regiment in Suffolk also experienced some disturbance.¹⁷⁷ In both cases a more loyal London-based cavalry troop secured their reduction.¹⁷⁸ Others were rebellious for political reasons, like the Portsmouth garrison under Sir Arthur Haselrig's leadership, which sided with Lawson in objecting to the Committee of Safety's assumption of power, resisting the small Parliamentary forces sent to subdue them.¹⁷⁹ In one spectacular case of the collapse of military discipline, in December 1659 one troop of 60 foot soldiers wanted to select their enemy, laying down their arms until this was clarified.¹⁸⁰ In another incident, in February 1660 Windsor Castle's Governor reported his garrison's mutiny.¹⁸¹ Other methods to convey discontent were variously used,

¹⁷¹ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCV p.287 24.12.1659, vol CCXIX p.294 3.1.1660 entry 5, vol CCXIX p.297 3.1.1660 entry 6

¹⁷² CSPD *1659-1660*, Vol CCIII p.18 9.7.1659

¹⁷³ Thurloe *State papers*, p.732 23.8.1659 Col Lillington to Col Walton

¹⁷⁴ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCXIX p.298 4.1.1660 entry 9

¹⁷⁵ CSPD *1659-1660*, CCXIX pp.298-299 4.1.1660 entry 10

¹⁷⁶ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.37 7.2.1660 A mutiny at Gravesend by 5 companies; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 20.2.1660 p.117 entry 120

¹⁷⁷ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.46 Feb 1660 The cities petition to the Parliament; Miller *Exact History*, pp.368-369

¹⁷⁸ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.393 4.1.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.46 Feb 1660 The cities petition to the Parliament

¹⁷⁹ CCSP *vol 4*, p.490 21.12.1659; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.157 3.12.1659, p.170 12.12.1659; Thurloe *State papers*, p.795 14.12.1659 Haselrig etc to Fleetwood; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.165 6.12.1659 Newsletters, p.166 6.12.1659 a letter to Mr William Clarke

¹⁸⁰ Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.211 20.12.1659 Newsletter

¹⁸¹ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCXIX p.364 15.2.1660 I99 p55

such as officers expressing in writing their opposition to the various governmental experiments. Some objected to the Committee of Safety.¹⁸² Conversely, others desired a free Parliament.¹⁸³

The army's local ineffectiveness is variously highlighted. Prior to Monck's arrival at York en-route to London, Lord Fairfax easily took possession of that city with a band of irregular troops in support of the widespread popular ambition for a free Parliament.¹⁸⁴ Also, prior to the General's arrival in the South, Parliament increased central London's troop levels to between seven and eight thousand horse and foot to inoculate itself against threats from Monck when he arrived there.¹⁸⁵ However, on reaching St. Albans the General requested the Commons to disperse the troops currently quartered in Westminster, the Strand and other suburbs to diverse remote locations to make way for his own soldiers. Usefully, this meant they couldn't interfere with central politics!¹⁸⁶ The incapacity of Parliament and its associated troops to resist Monck's desires illustrates their martial ineffectiveness, the House having promptly ordered their own troops to withdraw. The promise of some back-pay finally induced them to evacuate the capital, the bankrupt Government only affording this after pawning a quantity of public plate.¹⁸⁷ So despite copious grumbling, within a couple of days the Rump's soldiers had vacated their Somerset House headquarters and departed.¹⁸⁸ Similar to Lambert's troops' desertion in the North, this left London empty of any resistance when Monck arrived about two weeks later, leaving him as the capital's sole military and political power.¹⁸⁹ Further, those troops dispatched from London made themselves unpopular in their new postings. Instead of courting local residents to ease both the conditions of their stay and the supply of local provisions, the residents of such places as

¹⁸² Thurloe *State papers*, pp.797-798 16.12.1659 Cooper etc to Fleetwood

¹⁸³ Thurloe *State papers*, pp.817-820 18.2.1660 A Declaration of the officers of Ireland

¹⁸⁴ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.165 116-117 1.1.1660 – 11.1.1660; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCXIX p.293 2.1.1660 entry 4; Miller *Exact History*, pp.355-356

¹⁸⁵ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.211 28.1.1660; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCXIX p.326 26.1.1660 John Shaw to Sec Nicholas

¹⁸⁶ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.392 30.1.1660, p.392 1.2.1660; Brook *England triumph*, p.68; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 13.2.1660 p.115 entry 119

¹⁸⁷ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 20.2.1660 p.117 entry 120

¹⁸⁸ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.214 2.2.1660; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.393 4.2.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 1.2.1660, 2.2.1660, 3.2.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.35 Feb 1660 The young men in London Makes debate; Miller *Exact History*, pp.356-357; Brook *England triumph*, p.68; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 13.2.1660 p.115 entry 119

¹⁸⁹ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.167 120 28.1.1660; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCXIX p.347 6.2.60 entry 44, p.357 10.2.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.211 28.1.1660, p.214 2.2.1660; Brook *England triumph*, p.68

Bristol angrily refused to receive them.¹⁹⁰ These troops' actions widely included mutiny.¹⁹¹ More secure units from London were often required to subdue these rebels.¹⁹²

Consequently, Monck couldn't rely on the bulk of the army to implement his project to effect the Restoration, leaving him with his small band of Scottish troops, totalling approximately 5,000 to 7,000, consisting of three horse and four foot regiments.¹⁹³ Despite these troops being relatively obedient, their loyalty and reliability was very far from secure, the General being continually concerned with their dependability.¹⁹⁴ Sometimes they actively obstructed him, on occasion in important matters. For example, they forced him to reverse attempted legislation to provide for county militias.¹⁹⁵ Further, they remained staunchly Republican, as late as March 1660 remonstrating against the King, specific single persons or house of peers before Monck curtailed this by threatening them with dismissal. Interestingly, the General's actions ensured their submission to his authority on this occasion rather than conversion from Republicanism.¹⁹⁶ However, they made more declarations against Monarchy later the same month.¹⁹⁷ Further, there were plots for Richard Cromwell's return.¹⁹⁸ These problems in themselves made them unreliable as regards his plans for Charles's Restoration. The establishment of an effective militia would have reduced the Government's need to rely on the regulars, the army's strong Republicanism being much less relevant to his political move to Restoration, their attempt to block the militia's creation being an act of self-preservation, and a hinderance to the General's plans.¹⁹⁹ Also, these troops' behaviour could be poor, like the abuse and rough handling of some Quakers in early February 1660.²⁰⁰ In mid-February 1660 two soldiers were hanged and 4 others whipped for mutiny and robbery on the highway, two of them being particularly described as cruel rogues.²⁰¹ In early March another soldier

¹⁹⁰ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.347 6.2.1660 entry 44

¹⁹¹ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.357 10.2.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 3.2.1660

¹⁹² Whitelock *Memorials*, p.396 11.2.1660

¹⁹³ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.165 116 11.1.1660; Mordaunt *Letter Book*, undated entry but placed between other entries dated 2.1.1660 and 13.1.1660; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.102 5.11.1659 London Newsletter; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.388 11.1.1660; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.247 21.1.1660 General Monck to the Speaker

¹⁹⁴ Nicholas *Papers*, p.196.9.3.1660 Col Robert Whitley

¹⁹⁵ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXX p.393 16.3.1660 Mr Mills to Sec Nicholas; Whitelock *Memorials*, pp.404-405 16.3.1660

¹⁹⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 8.3.1660, 13.3.1660, 15.3.1660; Nicholas *Papers*, p.200 and p.203 9.3.1660 Col Robert Whitley; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.53 10.3.1660 Officers put out of their places

¹⁹⁷ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.64 March 1660 A servant maid fell into the fire

¹⁹⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.627 30.3.1660

¹⁹⁹ Nicholas *Papers*, p.196 9.3.1660 Col Robert Whitley

²⁰⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 7.2.1660

²⁰¹ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.398 18.2.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.42 18.2.1660 Soldiers whipped and some hanged

was executed at Smithfield for murdering a fellow soldier while quartered in London, also confessing to stealing several gold rings from an Excise man in Doncaster.²⁰²

Consequently, despite these soldiers being important to Monck's plans, he was seriously apprehensive about their reliability, purging his command of those he regarded as mutinous under his powers as Army Commissioner.²⁰³ These purges commenced in Scotland, and ruthlessly continued during his march south and in London.²⁰⁴ No rank escaped his attention, the sole determinant being whether he regarded them as 'Fanaticks', that is belonging to one of the sects.²⁰⁵ Yet, despite this, the General was sufficiently concerned about his troops' loyalty that he continued to closely watch his officers, banning them from private meetings where discontent could be fuelled such as through discussions of state affairs.²⁰⁶ Also, their military effectiveness was substantially compromised as their weapons and powder were stored and controlled remotely for instance at Artillery barracks, units instead relying on brute force.²⁰⁷ Consequently, their ability to oppose a pro-Royalist landing from the continent was compromised. These issues evidence the army's remaining Republicanism, and unless Monck managed them carefully through both duplicitousness (covered below) and close monitoring, it could actively block Charles's Restoration rather than willingly supporting the General's agenda. It wasn't until May 1660 that the army as a whole began to reluctantly accept the King's return, although strong resentment and active opposition remained. For example, many soldiers continued to grumble against Charles, others preferring to leave the army than serve under a Monarchy, whilst several were apprehended for making threats against the King's life.²⁰⁸ In aggregate, these issues highlight the army's national and local unreliability and ineffectiveness, its disunity seriously compromising its

²⁰² Rugg *Diurnal*, p.50 6.3.1660 Arms taken from Anabaptists

²⁰³ Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.65 19.10.1659 Commission in Extracts from the order book of General Monck; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.364 12.10.1659; Miller *Exact History*, p.335; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 24.10.1659 p.79 entry 76

²⁰⁴ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.150 4.11.1659, p.158 3.12.1659, p.207 19.1.1660-23.1.1660, p.209; CCSP *vol 4*, p.490 18.12.1659; Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.156 102 15-17.11.1659; Nicholas *Papers*, p.206 30.3.1660 Thomas Mompesson; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.64-66 19.10.1659 Extracts from the order book of General Monck, p.108 8.11.1659 Extracts from the order book of General Monck, p.251 either 21.1.1660 or 22.1.1660 General Monck to the Speaker, p.257 22.1.1660 Nottingham General Monck to the Speaker; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.369 2.11.1659, p.370 5.11.1659; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.14; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 7.11.1659 p.86 entry 86, 14.11.1659 p.89 entry 90

²⁰⁵ Eglesfield *Life and reign*, pp.325-326; Miller *Exact History*, pp.336-337; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 23.4.1660 p.138 entry 135

²⁰⁶ CCSP *vol 4*, p.615 23.3.1660; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.31

²⁰⁷ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCXX p.395 16.3.1660 entry 27; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.397 15.2.1660

²⁰⁸ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.77 May 1660 *Bonfires*; CCSP *vol 5*, p.15 5.5.1660 Monck to Charles II, p.30. 11.5.1660 Slingsby to M de la Haye [Hyde], p.32 13.5.1660 *Unnamed*

ability to undertake unified martial action, opposing factions cancelling each other out, allowing Monck to use it as a tool to restore the Crown.

The Navy was substantially different. It also experienced acute financial distress, personnel remaining unpaid for protracted periods, leaving many destitute and unable to feed their families.²⁰⁹ Also, dockyards were chronically underfunded, vital refurbishment work being funded on credit to keep ships at sea, dockyard Commissioners often becoming personally indebted to continue the state's work.²¹⁰ However, this financial source also dried up, credit limits having been massively breached.²¹¹ Unreimbursed individuals feared to walk the streets in case of arrest for debt.²¹² Nevertheless, the navy continued reliable and effective. Regarding reliability, during the critical period in late 1659 and 1660 the bulk of the navy remained united under Vice-Admiral Lawson's single strategic command.²¹³ For example, it rejected the Committee of Safety's concerted efforts to disperse it via requesting deployments to different stations, justifying this by asserting the necessity to defend against the risk of attempted Royalist landings.²¹⁴ In January 1660 the *Oxford's* seamen refused to obey their Captain Allgate, a refugee from an opposing political faction, to divert their vessel to a location where he could escape Parliamentary wrath, instead remaining loyal to Vice-Admiral Lawson's overall command, whom they knew to be steadfast to the current political regime.²¹⁵ And throughout this period Lawson's dedication to his pact with Monck (covered below) in which he firmly believed they were restoring Parliamentary democracy ensured the Navy's reliability when it came to the General's real aim to repatriate the King.²¹⁶ Additionally, once the pro-Royalist Montagu had been appointed, the institution's loyalty to the King was assured (covered below).²¹⁷ This left it able to undertake unified action.

The navy's effectiveness is illustrated by its engagement in such activities as Lawson's summer deployment to monitor Dutch naval activity, and his patrols with 12 vessels to

²⁰⁹ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXX p.338 31.1.1660 entry 33, p.373 21.2.1660 entry 56

²¹⁰ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXX p.401 27.3.1660 entry 43

²¹¹ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXX p.385 6.3.1660 entry 12, p.401 26.3.1660 entry 40, p.407 5.4.1660 entry 67, p.408 7.4.1660 entry 68, p.412 12.4.1660 entry 76, p.412.12.4.1660 entry 76, p.420 23.4.1660 entry 102

²¹² CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXX p.419 20.4.1660 entry 100

²¹³ CCSP vol 4, p.502 30.12.1659; Penn *Memoires*, p.188

²¹⁴ Penn *Memoires*, pp.187-188; Penn *Memoires*, pp.189-190

²¹⁵ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.18.1.1660 entries 20 & 21

²¹⁶ CCSP vol 4, p.449 17.11.1659; Penn *Memoires*, p.185

²¹⁷ CCSP vol 4, p.592 9.3.1660

prevent foreign forces intervening in the 1659 summer Royalist rising.²¹⁸ The Navy also engaged in routine activities such as Irish Sea anti-pirate operations throughout the period of this Chapter, convoy protection over a wide geographic area from the North Sea, to France and the Mediterranean, actions against enemy forces and upholding the ‘honour of the flag’.²¹⁹ Indeed, this reliable naval support was in such demand that local port commanders requested fresh vessel deployments to their areas for operations such as protecting the fishing fleet and the coastal collier trade.²²⁰ Also, unlike the army, the navy retained its substantial firepower, and was easily able to relocate itself to the Thames estuary if required. This meant it could access London and the seat of power quickly via the river, being consequently easily able to intervene in central politics.²²¹ And, of course, crucially its command of the English Channel could allow/facilitate or deny the King’s physical return. This highlights that, despite Monck’s command jointly covering the army and navy, maritime supremacy was the most important arm, providing him with a reliable and effective partner in his plans, and consequently his command’s naval element playing the dominant part in the King’s Restoration.

Tools available to the King to influence the Navy’s support for his putative regime.

As mentioned above, the King was keen to affect his Restoration and used various ways to attempt this. However, his weak position meant that his endeavours lacked effectiveness. Booth’s failed rising only highlighted his impotence. Instead, he employed envoys to attempt to convert key naval figures such as Monck, Montagu and Lawson to his cause. This was mooted following the late April 1659 military coup to try and take advantage of these senior military leaders’ disquiet caused by political events and Richard Cromwell’s deposition.²²² These envoys would either apply their own arguments or transmit communication from others such as the King or his Chancellor, Edward Hyde.²²³ The General’s brother acted as his intermediary whilst he remained in Scotland.²²⁴ In London it was Colonel John

²¹⁸ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCIII p.31 15.7.1659 entry 85, vol CCIV p.101 12.8.1659; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 18.7.1659 p.42 entry 42

²¹⁹ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCIII p.17 9.7.1659 entry 63, vol CCXIX p.353 9.2.1660 entry 46, vol CCXIX p.376 27.2.1660 entry 62, vol CCXIX p.377 27.2.1660 entries 62-64; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.66 April 60 The Lord General dined in London

²²⁰ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCXIX p.378 27.2.1660 entry 65

²²¹ CCSP *vol 4*, p.570 21.2.1660

²²² *Nicholas Papers*, p.124 29.4.1659 Mr Johnson, p.130 6.5.1659 Mr Johnson

²²³ CCSP *vol 4*, p.246 24.6.1659, p.255 June [no specific date recorded]

²²⁴ CCSP *vol 4*, p.263 8.7.1659, 4 p.359 5.9.1659; Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.155 99

Clobery.²²⁵ Royalist agents were overseen by Sir John Grenville.²²⁶ Admiral Edward Montagu's agents were his cousins Edward Montagu and Christopher Hatton, and Thomas Whetstone.²²⁷ For Vice-Admiral John Lawson it was the Dover Merchant, Arnold Braems.²²⁸ Arguments included the importance of the Navy's declaration for the King in marking the nation's first step towards a return to Royal government.²²⁹ Additionally, they emphasised the recipient's potential fate at the existing government's hands, or that future rewards awaited them should they prove loyal to the King.²³⁰ However, in addition to high naval commanders, others were also variously contacted by the King's agents. These included Captains Stayner and Godstone, letters being delivered directly from the King seeking their affection and promising rewards.²³¹ However, these communications, conducted from a distance and employing persuasion, flattery and promises, merely highlighted Charles's relative powerlessness to control events.

Contact between Royal agents and their targets could be particularly difficult as Parliament kept a close vigilance to circumvent Royal correspondents, Royalists needing to exercise caution. These measures constituted thorough searches and detention of Royal letters, including intervention at the Post Office to inspect the mail.²³² To side-step this surveillance, for a long time Monck only communicated verbally through trusted agents, refusing to receive Royal letters.²³³ This was because he was being closely spied on by Messrs Scott and Robinson.²³⁴ Other measures included the use of code in correspondence, Royal agents using substitute names in case correspondence was intercepted.²³⁵ Further, Parliament ruthlessly

²²⁵ CCSP vol 4, p.439 11.11.1659, p.451 18.11.1659, p.471 5.12.1659

²²⁶ CCSP vol 4, p.359 5.9.1659, p.471 5.12.1659.

²²⁷ CCSP vol 4, p.244 23.6.59, p.294 23.7.1659, p.296 27.7.1659, p.332 20.8.1659, p.354 2.9.1659, vol 4 p.359 5.9.1659; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.408 25.4.1660

²²⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.533 27.1.1660, p.550, 7.2.1660

²²⁹ CCSP vol 4, p.246 24.6.1659

²³⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.244 23.6.1659, p.255 June [no specific date recorded]

²³¹ CCSP vol 4, p.244 23.6.1659

²³² CCSP vol 4, p.354 2.9.1659; CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCIV p.222 25.9.59; Thurloe *State papers*, p.667 2.5.1660 Barwick to Hyde (2nd letter); Nicholas *Papers*, p.181 22.9.1659 Marquis of Ormond; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.28-29 30.7.1659 Newsletter; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 4.7.1659 p.39 entry 37

²³³ CCSP vol 4, p.465, 2.12.1659; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.30

²³⁴ CCSP vol 4, p.537 30.1.1660, p.538 30.1.1659, p.538 30.1.1659; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.166 119 16.1.1659; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.194 166 19.3.1660; CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.310 16.1.1660 I91 p.103; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.209; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.389 16.1.1660, p.390 25.1.1660, p.391 26.1.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 10.1.1660; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.319; Miller *Exact History*, pp.355-356; Brook *England triumph*, p.66; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.30; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 13.2.1660 p.114 Entry 119, 20.2.1660 p.115 entry 120

²³⁵ CCSP vol 4, p.263 8.7.1659, p.354 2.9.1659; Nicholas *Papers*, p.105 15.4.1659 Mr Johnson; Thurloe *State papers*, p.763 14.10.1659 Barwick to the King, and Barwick to Hyde (2 letters), pp.775-776 1.11.1659 An

pursued suspects, instituting varying punishments. Envoys could expect arrest and imprisonment in the Tower, with rewards for their capture and their goods and estates confiscated.²³⁶ And of course Montagu was sacked on his return from the Sound over suspicions of Royal sympathies.²³⁷ In another case bloodhounds were used to track Major-General Massey, who only escaped his six captors by deliberately falling from his horse in some woods and rolling down a nearby bank.²³⁸ Executions were firmly possible.²³⁹ And, again, Charles's lack of powers to punish or reward in order to induce his targets to switch allegiance highlighted his inability to influence events. Further, the importance to Charles of winning over the navy is highlighted by the virtually limitless rewards including high offices and land grants offered to Monck and Montagu.²⁴⁰ Indeed, the King was even willing to expose any one of his servants to detention by sending them as envoys, including his Chancellor, Edward Hyde and the Duke of York.²⁴¹ Additionally, Charles was willing to bestow on Monck command of the Army for life.²⁴² In contrast, no such delegation of command from the King was contemplated for the Navy, illustrating the Navy's importance to the Monarch.

The King employed other measures to use the Navy to sway events including using agents to influence Commons' business. Charles took Monck's London representative's advice to put forward his own contenders for the Convention Parliamentary elections.²⁴³ Accordingly Royalist agents were encouraged to stand, three of them from the maritime interest, that is Christopher Hatton and Edward Montagu, and Admiral Montagu himself.²⁴⁴ However, navy-related candidate numbers remained small. Additionally, given their venality, gaining the support of ordinary sailors' was attempted.²⁴⁵ The Government's financial crisis left it

Intercepted Letter, pp.852-856 16.3.1660 Barwick to the King, Barwick to Hyde, Massey to Hyde, pp.857-858 27.3.1660 Hyde to Barwick

²³⁶ Nicholas *Papers*, p.176 8.8.1659 Mr Miles, p.180 8.8.1659 Mr Miles; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCIII p.38 22.7.1659 col 57, vol CCIII p.43 I98 p.36 26.7.1659, vol CCIII pp.46-7 28.7.1659 I91 pp.47, 57, 59, 60, 73, 79, p.48 29.7.1659 I91 pp.46, 78, vol CCIV p.178 7.9.1659, p.222 29.9.1659 entry 4, vol CCXIX p.326 26.1.1660 I115 p14, p.348 7.2.1660 I99 p38, vol CCXIX p.338 31.1.1660

²³⁷ CCSP vol 4, p.376 16.9.1659

²³⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.318 6.8.1659; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.118 31.7.1659; Nicholas *Papers*, pp.178-179 8.8.1659 Mr Miles; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.36 Narrative of Events at Gloucester; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.355 3.8.1659; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 15.8.1659 pp.53-54 entry 54

²³⁹ Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.220 220 3.5.1660

²⁴⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.246 24.6.1659, p.259 2.7.1659, p.263 8.7.1659, p.268 11.7.1659

²⁴¹ CCSP vol 4, p.265 9.7.1659, p.336 23.8.1659

²⁴² CCSP vol 5, p.25 9.5.1660 Enclosure, 'The General's Paper', p.29 11.5.1660 Charles II to Monck

²⁴³ CCSP vol 4, p.578 27.2.1660

²⁴⁴ CCSP vol 4, p.589 7.3.1660

²⁴⁵ CCSP vol 4, p.493 23.12.1659

unable to remunerate naval personnel.²⁴⁶ Most seamen remained unpaid for lengthy periods, in some cases over three years, such as Captain Stoakes' squadron that returned home after three years' deployment to discover that it wasn't to be paid off.²⁴⁷ This was exacerbated by mariners' terrible circumstances whilst afloat, enduring deplorable living conditions, high sickness levels and not given shore-leave when within sight of their native soil.²⁴⁸ This led to many instances of extreme and mutinous action.²⁴⁹ Examples included refusing to go ashore till they had been paid.²⁵⁰ Crews at both Gravesend and Chatham refused to obey sailing orders.²⁵¹ Further, feelings were heightened when the seamen discovered that soldiers were receiving pay instead of them, and that funds intended for naval pay was redirected to the soldiers, such as happened to 2,000 naval personnel at Portsmouth.²⁵² Charles's Chancellor therefore sought to maximise this pecuniary anti-Parliamentary sentiment, for example by prompting Royal agents in early March 1660 to secretly try to have all funds available from the latest City loans targeted at the Army rather than the Navy.²⁵³ An additional Parliamentary intercession by a Royal agent, Samuel Morland, was to stir up jealousies of Monck within the House, which led to their refusal to confirm his military supremacy in February 1660. The General used this as an excuse to have the secluded members readmitted, kick-starting the political process that culminated in the King's invitation to return.²⁵⁴

Furthermore, Royal agents dealt directly with sailors on board ships.²⁵⁵ Efforts were made to increase their dissatisfaction with the current regime, such as heightening their sense of grievance at remaining unpaid and generally sowing divisions amongst them.²⁵⁶ Also, Charles sought to raise funds that his agents could use to attempt the conversion of whole ships, aspiring to a whole squadron for Royal use.²⁵⁷ However, the King's desperate financial plight prevented success with this ploy. Mordaunt's letters show that Charles's

²⁴⁶ Mordaunt *Letter Book*, 16.1.1660

²⁴⁷ CCSP vol 4, p.457 25.11.1659

²⁴⁸ Mordaunt *Letter Book*, 18.1.1660

²⁴⁹ CCSP vol 4, p.449 17.11.1659

²⁵⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.364 9.9.1659

²⁵¹ CCSP vol 4, p.545 3.2.1660

²⁵² CCSP vol 4, p.457 25.11.1659; Pepys *Diary*, 13.2.1660; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCIII p.52 30.7.1659 I91 pp.47-9, 78; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.102 5.11.1659 Newsletter

²⁵³ CCSP vol 4, p.581 2.3.1660

²⁵⁴ CCSP vol 4, p.604 16.3.1660

²⁵⁵ CCSP vol 4, p.469 3.12.1659

²⁵⁶ CCSP vol 4, p.432 3.11.1659, p.434 4.11.1659

²⁵⁷ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCXIX p.332 28.1.1660 Sec Nicholas to Col Whitley

financial plight meant he was unable to reimburse his agents' expenses, let alone access enough money to suborn whole naval squadrons.²⁵⁸ Pepys dramatically illustrated the King's dire financial position, reporting the poor state of the Sovereign's and his Court's clothing whilst on the continent, and their excitement at receiving Parliament's gift of £50,000 at Restoration, his Majesty calling on others to behold the unprecedented spectacle of so much money.²⁵⁹ Promises were made to other crews that a future Royal Administration would pay all arrears, this ultimately being included within the Breda Declaration.²⁶⁰ These measures seemed partially successful, commanders reporting that things had settled down a little in the fleet by mid-April 1660.²⁶¹ It also led to sailors being more overtly positive towards the putative Monarchy, such as copiously enjoying celebratory drinks and shouting and cheering at Royal proclamations.²⁶² More tangibly, mariners could be persuaded to petition the Commons for a Free Parliament at a time when the Rump still tried to control Monck in early February 1660.²⁶³ Yet the success of these instances remained small. As shown above, when required the navy generally deployed when ordered, illustrated by the unity displayed by both Lawson's squadron when blockading the Thames and Montagu's fleet whilst collecting the King from Holland (see below). This evidences the Navy's reliability and effectiveness at the national level as a tool to aid the King's Restoration. This contrasts with the army's mutinies during both its national campaigns during this period, that is en-route to confront Booth and against the General on his march south from Scotland, denoting its unreliability and ineffectiveness.

Reasons why the 3 figures changed their allegiance towards the King.

Each candidate's successful conversion depended on their receptiveness to these approaches, each person reaching this position at different times. Therefore, the circumstances leading to their receptiveness are important to give a comprehensive understanding. This is important as it highlights the King's impotence, and that the Navy's transfer of allegiance was due to the three leading nautical figures' personal reasons being the decisive factor in Charles's Restoration. Regarding Monck, crucially, the new military junta that replaced Richard

²⁵⁸ Mordaunt *Letter Book*, p.159 entry 217 Brussels 4.1.1660; CCSP vol 5 p.34 16.5.1660

²⁵⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 16.5.1660; CCSP vol 5, p.7 3.5.1660

²⁶⁰ CCSP vol 4,4 p.502 30.12.1659, p.638 6.4.1660.

²⁶¹ CCSP vol 4, p.666 19.4.1660

²⁶² Pepys *Diary*, 2.5.1660, 3.5.1660

²⁶³ CCSP vol 4, p.533 10.2.1660

Cromwell in April 1659 strongly suspected that he was disloyal to them.²⁶⁴ This new regime was headed by Generals John Desborough, Charles Fleetwood, John Lambert and others, and the General strongly disapproved of the military coup that they perpetrated.²⁶⁵ Monck staunchly ideologically supported government by a civil and not military authority.²⁶⁶ He had firmly supported Richard Cromwell's civilian administration, and despite his historic strong loyalism he recognised that he would lose his position if he opposed the current government as it was too powerful, this being his prime concern.²⁶⁷

Monck's disapproval manifested itself initially through a studied neutrality, avoiding central affairs for some months, hoping that this latest Republican government would also fall.²⁶⁸ Indeed, he wrote letters purporting to support this latest political settlement, but which were actually purposely vague and ambiguous.²⁶⁹ However, he was selective in which orders he obeyed. For example, he refused to replace some of his existing officers with those more acceptable to Parliament, preferring to retain those who were loyal to him.²⁷⁰ Also, following Parliament's repeated requests for Monck to send 3 Scottish regiments to aid against Booth's rising, he justified his continuing rejection of the order and maintenance of his apparent neutrality by stating they were required in Scotland due to Royalist threats there.²⁷¹ In fact, despite the General's inclination to join the rebellion had it shown signs of success, he judged it not to be so and demurred.²⁷² However, he was still greatly concerned about his position.²⁷³ To protect himself his allegiance was refocused from the current regime to one that might support him, that is the King.²⁷⁴ Indeed, as the Venetian ambassador reported to

²⁶⁴ Ludlow *Memoirs*, pp.72-73 22.4.1659, p.110 30.7.1659; Nicholas *Papers*, p.121 9.5.1659 Percy Church, p.122 29.4.1659 Mr Miles; Clarke *Papers*, vol III p.194 23.4.1659 General Fleetwood to Monck, p.195

26.4.1659 Thurloe to Monck; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.4-6 3.5.1659 Letter from the officers in England
²⁶⁵ CCSP vol 4, p.186 22.4.1659 (2 entries), p.197 6.5.1659; Penn *Memoires*, p.182; Nicholas *Papers*, p.121 9.5.1659 Percy Church, p.122 29.4.1659 Mr Miles, p.124 3.5.1659 Marquis of Newcastle, p.140 13.5.1659 Mr Miles, p.146 23.5.1659 Mr Miles; Clarke *Papers*, vol III p.192 22.4.1659 GM, vol III p.193 23.4.1659 GM, p.196 30.4.1659 GM, vol iv p.8 5.5.1659 ER; *Whitelock Memorials*, pp.342-345 21.4.1659-9.5.1659

²⁶⁶ CCSP vol 4, p.565 17.2.1660

²⁶⁷ Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 1 p.28, Chapter p.4; CCSP vol 4, p.194 2.5.1659, p.595 9.3.1660; Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.150 94 29.10.1659

²⁶⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.197 6.5.1659, p.341 26.8.1659; Thurloe *State papers*, p.666 2.5.1659 Barwick to Hyde, p.667 3.5.1659 Monck to Thurloe, p.669 12.5.1659 Monck etc to Fleetwood; Nicholas *Papers*, p.138 13.5.1659 Percy Church, p.167 8.7.1659 Mr Miles, p.171 15.7.1659 Mr Miles; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.4, pp.4-5, pp.6-7, p.8

²⁶⁹ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 30.5.1659 p.25 entry 23, 6.6.1659 p.25 entry 26, 27.6.1659 p.35 entry 33

²⁷⁰ Nicholas *Papers*, p.161 17.6.1659 Mr Miles, p.164 21.6.1659 Mr Miles

²⁷¹ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.112 5.8.1659; CCSP vol 4, p.346 28.8.1659, p.354 2.9.1659; Nicholas *Papers*, p.179 8.8.1659 Mr Miles; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 22.8.1659 p.57 entry 56, 28.8.1659 p.60 entry 61

²⁷² Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.11; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 5.9.1659 p.63 entry 62

²⁷³ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.156 101

²⁷⁴ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.231 11.2.1660

his Italian masters, as well as other sources, from this point he formulated plans to restore his Majesty.²⁷⁵ He commenced secret communications with Charles, even indicating that should the King make a landing, Monck would join forces with him, constituting a formidable army.²⁷⁶ The General was equally disapproving of the Committee of Safety's October 1659 assumption of power, and the further threat to his position.²⁷⁷ He wrote to them confirming his discontent.²⁷⁸ His antagonism towards the Committee of Safety and their ongoing suspicion about his suspected pro-Monarchist leanings meant that it eventually sent an army north under Lambert's command to oppose any march Monck might make towards London in favour of the King.²⁷⁹

The strength of Monck's conversion to the Royal cause is illustrated by the fact that, following the commencement of his late 1659 march south from Scotland, he paused to partake in negotiations with Fleetwood and others near Newcastle to try to find a peaceful resolution. Yet, this pause was in reality procrastination.²⁸⁰ It was enacted through continuous questions regarding various proposed clauses.²⁸¹ For example, requesting a venue change for the putative treaty's conclusion.²⁸² Alternately, he requested that two more Commissioners be added to each side's negotiation team.²⁸³ And he delayed replies to

²⁷⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 21.5.1660.1660 p.146 entry 142, 30.12.1661 entry 106; Penn *Memorials*, pp.215-216

²⁷⁶ CCSP vol 4, p.208 22.5.1659, p.359 5.9.1659, p.425 28.10.1659, p.465 2.12.1659; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 14.11.1659 p.90 entry 89

²⁷⁷ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.366 17.10.1659; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 31.10.1659 p.83 entry 82, 7.11.1659 p.86 entry 86

²⁷⁸ Ludlow *Memoirs*, pp.132-133, p.142 20.10.1659; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.64-66 19.10.1659 Extracts from the order book of General Monck, pp.75-76 General Monck to the officers at Whitehall, pp.84-86 3.11.1659 General Monck to Lieut-General Fleetwood; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.366 26.10.1659, p.369 2.11.1659; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.314; Miller *Exact History*, p.333; Brook *England triumph*, p.59; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.15; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 7.11.1659 p.86 entry 86

²⁷⁹ Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.150 94 2.9.1659 and 29.10.1659; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.368 29.10.1659, p.369 3.11.1659, p.370 8.11.1659, p.373 11.11.1659; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.314; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 pp.21-23; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.112 5.8.1659, p.158 3.12.1659; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.70-72 25.10.1659 Lieut-General Fleetwood to General Monck, p.368 29.10.1659; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 14.11.1659 p.90 entry 89

²⁸⁰ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.387 6.1.1660; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.314, p.316; Miller *Exact History*, pp.354-355; Brook *England triumph*, p.62; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 pp.24-25; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 21.11.1659 p.92 entry 94, 12.12.1659 p.99 entry 104, 19.12.1659 p.101 entry 106

²⁸¹ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.160 6.12.1659, p.162 6.12.1659; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.126-129 24.11.1659 The council of officers of Scotland to their commissioners in England, pp.129-131 24.11.1659 General Monck to Lt Gen Fleetwood, pp.131-132 General Monck to Maj-Gen Lambert, pp.136-137 24.11.1659 The commissioners of the army of Scotland to General Monck, pp.140-141 26.11.1659 General Monck to the commissioners of the army of Scotland, pp.162-163 1.12.1659 Lt Gen Fleetwood to Gen Monck; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 12.12.1659 p.99 entry 104

²⁸² Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.127 24.11.1659 The council of officers of Scotland to their commissioners in England

²⁸³ Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.130 General Monck to Lieut-Gen Fleetwood; Brook *England triumph*, p.62; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 26.12.1659 p.103 entry 108

maintain the Committee of Safety's expectation of a positive outcome.²⁸⁴ Some Committee of Safety members highlighted these tactics to others, but were ignored.²⁸⁵ The covert aim was to provide time for foreign troops' potential landing.²⁸⁶ Further, given the Government's huge debt levels, very poor tax collection rates and Lawson's blockade of the Thames which eliminated Customs revenues (covered below), Monck was keen to prolong his negotiations.²⁸⁷ He knew that their continuation drained the Committee of Safety's dwindling resources further.²⁸⁸ And very simply, lengthier delays gave the Scottish forces increased time for military preparations.²⁸⁹ Additionally, once the General reached London in early February 1660, when he still publicly retained a staunch Republican aura, making anti-Royalist speeches in Parliament, some exiled Royalists were confident enough both of his pro-Monarchist emotions and the consequent low risk of them being arrested that they returned to England and boasted of Charles's imminent return.²⁹⁰ This strategy's success is highlighted by the increasing numbers of soldiers around London that began to display support for Monck due to want of their pay.²⁹¹ Further, this strengthened the effect of Lawson's blockade, this latter point and the fact that Lawson was appointed to the interim command of the fleet in late February 1660 at the General's request in gratitude for bringing down the Committee of Safety provide supplementary evidence of a pact between him and Lawson.²⁹² Additionally, Royalists within the Scottish establishment firmly believed the General to harbour Monarchist tendencies, an impression he didn't quash.²⁹³ This prompted Monck to galvanise the Scottish Convention Government towards resisting the English Parliament.²⁹⁴

Other factors also drove his political realignment. Monck's immediate family were Royalist, his wife, Ann, and her brother, Dr Clarges, being renowned Monarchists.²⁹⁵ Indeed, his

²⁸⁴ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.162 6.12.1659; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 5.12.1659 p.97 entry 102

²⁸⁵ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.162 6.12.1659

²⁸⁶ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCV p.260 31.10.1659, vol CCV p.280 10.12.1659, vol 4 p.466 2.12.1659; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.373 11.11.1659

²⁸⁷ Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.102 5.11.1659 Newsletter

²⁸⁸ Whitelock *Memorials*, pp.376-377 30.11.1659; Rugg *Diurnal*, December 1659 Some of the Members in Portsmouth; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.25

²⁸⁹ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 12.12.1659 p.99 entry 104

²⁹⁰ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.39. 6.2.1660, pp.393-394 6.2.1660

²⁹¹ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.377 4.12.1659, p.380 21.12.1659

²⁹² Pepys *Diary*, 21.2.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.160 6.12.1659, p.162; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 5.3.1660 p.121 entry 122

²⁹³ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.157 103

²⁹⁴ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.156 102 15-17.11.1659; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.314; Miller *Exact History*, pp.342-343; Brook *England triumph*, p.60, p.62; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 12.12.1659 p.99 entry 104

²⁹⁵ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.160 6.12.1659; Nicholas *Papers*, p.206 30.3.1660 Thomas Mompesson

young son publicly declared when dining with his parents at St James's that he was also staunchly Royalist, adding that he was sure that his parents discussed the King every night. It would seem that parental attitudes were influential!²⁹⁶ Further, his wife significantly swayed the General's actions and Governmental change.²⁹⁷ Although from this distance of time it is difficult to expand on how this precisely manifested itself as the records are sparse, her contribution's importance is signalled by the King's personal recognition of, and gratitude for, her actions.²⁹⁸ Her onward journey ahead of the General and his troops when they halted in St. Albans at the end of January 1660, using their centrally assigned quarters at Whitehall to progress her Royalist programme, signals further evidence.²⁹⁹ Additionally, Monck retained traditional Royalist leanings, his family being staunch Royalists, and having entered Royal service at the civil war's commencement, fighting for Charles I in such battles as Nantwich, these allegiances continued into his incarceration in the Tower of London.³⁰⁰ In fact, the General's Royalist emotions remained during the ensuing years, temporarily acquiescing to dominant Republican governments to preserve his position.³⁰¹ However, he was able to act upon his Royal allegiance in conjunction with his two partners of Lawson and the Portsmouth garrison once the Committee of Safety assumed power.³⁰² Also, early affirmation of his change of allegiance is evidenced in the pamphlet *A letter from General George Monck to King Charles son of the late King Charles deceased*, highlighting negotiations between the two parties for his Majesty's return. The General's December 1659 letter illustrates that the correspondence had been ongoing for some period prior to this exchange. Therefore, to reach the point of detailed correspondence the General must have been considering the matter for some time, his caution leading him to carefully ponder his personal risks.³⁰³

Additionally, Monck had contact with the French Court whilst still in Scotland, the French King strongly supporting his cousin, Charles. Indeed, the French approached him to solicit

²⁹⁶Nicholas *Papers*, p.203 9.3.1660 *Col Robert Whitley*; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.36

²⁹⁷ Nicholas *Papers*, p.203 9.3.1660 *Col Robert Whitley*; CCSP vol 5, p.32. 13.5.1660 *Unnamed*; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.35

²⁹⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.593 9.3.1660, p.694 6.4.1660, p.665 19.4.1660; CCSP vol 5, p.29 11.5.1660, p.32 13.5.1660, p.21 7.5.1660

²⁹⁹ Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 pp.34-36

³⁰⁰ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.152 96; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 1 p.28 no.s 31, 32

³⁰¹ Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.4

³⁰² Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.29

³⁰³ *Letter from General Monck*

his aid in the King's Restoration at an early stage via their London ambassador.³⁰⁴ Indeed, the French rejected the English Republican Government's request for a loan of 300,000 crowns.³⁰⁵ Yet Cardinal Mazarin's Administration offered this amount to Monck, this gift being conditional that he instigate pro-Royalist changes in England.³⁰⁶ Lord Mordaunt, the contemporary chief Royal-agent in England, confirmed the beneficial result that on his descent into England the General was well funded, taking £50,000 with him.³⁰⁷ This was additional to the offer of French military support, if desired.³⁰⁸ Also, he received Scottish funds, the Convention advancing him a year's general taxation.³⁰⁹ And the City of London provided money on his arrival there.³¹⁰ In total, these valuable financial resources would have allowed him to fund his campaign, pay his soldiers and procure supplies.³¹¹ This starkly contrasted with the army throughout the rest of the country which sustained huge pay arrears (covered above). Additionally, Hyde reported that the French offered other 'encouragement' to the General.³¹² The prominent Royal agent, Sir John Grenville, requested that the French King send messages to Monck, with French envoys also communicating with his wife.³¹³ And the French Ambassador visited the General after Parliament's March 1660 dissolution.³¹⁴ A public demonstration of his French link would have been toxic in earlier times, but the House's dissolution removed this danger along with its ability to publicly highlight this relationship. The French wouldn't have been so supportive to someone who they weren't convinced was a committed Royal ally. Accordingly Monck started to desire the return of the 1648 secluded members.³¹⁵ The secluded members' expected Royal leanings would have counter-balanced the new military authority.³¹⁶ Further, it would have aided his plans for eventually establishing a free Parliament.³¹⁷ Additionally, he would have been in tune with the wider population, it being evident that the public wished for the

³⁰⁴ Baker *Chronicle*, 1659 p717

³⁰⁵ Nicholas *Papers*, p.141 13.5.1659 Sir Richard Browne

³⁰⁶ CCSP *vol 4*, p.668 20.4.1660

³⁰⁷ Mordaunt *Letter Book*, Undated but placed between two letters dated 2.1.1660 and 6.1.1660; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.376 25.11.1659, p.376 30.11.1659; CCSP *vol 5*, p.9 4.5.1660 Hyde to Sir J Grenville

³⁰⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, p.9 4.5.1660 Hyde to Sir J Grenville

³⁰⁹ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.150 4.11.1659; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.114 15.11.1659 General Monck's Proceedings with the Commissioners of Scotland; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 pp.19-20; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 12.12.1659 p.99 entry 104

³¹⁰ Nicholas *Papers*, p.203 9.3.1660 Col Robert Whitley

³¹¹ Clarendon *History*, p.156 102 15-17.11.1659

³¹² CCSP *vol 4*, p.457 25.11.1660

³¹³ CCSP *vol 4*, p.485 16.12.1659, vol 5 p.12 4.5.1660 Thomas Dowde to Hyde

³¹⁴ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.405 24.3.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.65 24.3.1660 Alderman Bunce

³¹⁵ CCSP *vol 4*, p.244 21.6.1659; Penn *Memoires*, p.182

³¹⁶ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.398 18.2.1660, 21.2.1660, p.402 7.3.1660, p.403 13.2.1660

³¹⁷ CCSP *vol 4*, p.433 4.11.1659, vol 4 p.483 15.12.1659

secluded members' return and a free Legislature.³¹⁸ It was expected that the latter would be Royalist.³¹⁹ Indeed, the returning Parliament was overwhelmingly Royal, those with power to nominate candidates ensuring only Royalist candidates were selected, approximately three quarters of the eventual new members being cavaliers.³²⁰ In fact Monck was keenly aware from several sources that the population was increasingly for a free Parliament, with its overt association with a Royal Restoration.³²¹ He had copiously observed this throughout many counties and corporations including that of Westminster, confirming this in his first Parliamentary speech.³²² He had also received numerous correspondence and addresses from various county nobility. These included Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Leicestershire, Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Hertfordshire, Norfolk and Suffolk.³²³ In aggregate this context may have reinforced his ultimate move towards Monarchy.³²⁴

On Monck's eventual arrival in the capital, his military-might enabled him to enact his desire to control government.³²⁵ Indeed, prior even to his London arrival he had ensured his martial hegemony and control of the metropolis by persuading Parliament to remove all other soldiers to distant quarters.³²⁶ However, he also employed Machiavellian tactics. This is strongly illustrated in the momentous period towards the end of February 1660. The General was incensed by Parliament's duplicity in attempting to remove his command whilst he was carrying out their orders in the City (see below).³²⁷ Consequently, he met several secluded members and other sympathetic Parliamentary members on 17th February 1660, covertly

³¹⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.405 9.10.1659; Clarendon History vol 6, p.166 118 29.12.1659

³¹⁹ Pepys Diary, 29.4.1660; CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.324 25.1.1660; Ludlow Memoirs, p.230; CSP Venice vol 32, 23.4.1660 p.138 entry 135

³²⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.628 30.3.1660; CSP Venice vol 32, 16.4.1660 pp.136-137 entry 133, 7.5.1660 pp.140-141 entry 138

³²¹ CCSP vol 4, p.459 25.11.1659, p.466 2.12.1659, p.614 23.3.1660; Pepys Diary, 20.2.1660

³²² Clarendon History vol 6, p.168 122 6.2.1660; Penn Memoires, p.198 entry 23.1.1660, p.216 6.2.1660, pp.215-216; Whitelock Memorials, p.390 23.1.1660; Brook England triumph, pp.66-67; CSP Venice vol 32, 13.2.1660 p.114 entry 119, 20.2.1660 p.116 entry 120

³²³ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.330.28.1.1660 entry 27, p.332 28.1.1660 entry 28, p.332 28.1.1660 entry 29, p.335 30.1.1660 entry 30, pp.340-341 'Jan' (no further detailed date given) 1660 entries 36 – 41, p.361 13.2.1660 entry 50; Ludlow Memoirs, p.209; Whitelock Memorials, p.391 28.1.1660; Rugg Diurnal, pp.31-32 28.1.1660 Mr Fenn killed by a mischance, pp.41-42 Feb 1660 Yorkshire and Lincolnshire Declaration; Eglesfield Life and reign, p.319; Miller Exact History, pp.356-357; Brook England triumph, p.68; Lloyd Modern policy, Chapter 2 p.29; CSP Venice vol 32, 13.2.1660 p.114 entry 119

³²⁴ Pepys Diary, 15.4.1660, Pepys Diary, 18.4.1660

³²⁵ Whitelock Memorials, p.398 18.2.1660

³²⁶ Clarendon History vol 6, p.167 120 28.1.1660; Miller Exact History, pp.356-357

³²⁷ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.367 17.2.1660 Percy Church to Sec Nicholas; Whitelock Memorials, p.396 11.2.1660; Pepys Diary, 8.2.1660; Evelyn Diary vol 1, p.330 11.2.1660; Eglesfield Life and reign, p.321; Lloyd Modern policy, Chapter 2 pp.44-46, p.46

agreeing to force the Rump to vote for their return.³²⁸ Interestingly, Monck's previous correspondence shows that he had already planned this.³²⁹ He was also aware that Parliament had advanced notice of this.³³⁰ Nevertheless, he participated in the Parliamentary debate which concluded for the Commonwealth's continuation, actively dissenting in writing with the decision following the sitting.³³¹ Consequently, he advised them to cease their meddling with his forces.³³² Simultaneously a trusted Rump official, Samuel Morland, who was a secret Royal agent, fomented jealousies of the General and his power amongst the Republican members.³³³ This led to the Rump refusing to confirm the General's military position, as he had requested.³³⁴ This gave him the formal excuse he had anticipated, acting swiftly to force the secluded members' re-admission, his soldiers ensuring they could physically gain entry to the House on the 21st.³³⁵ This added over 100 members to the House, outnumbering the existing Rump.³³⁶ However, the General remained determined to control events, limit their actions and ensure they issued writs for a free Parliament within eight days.³³⁷ The ensuing elections and the pro-Royal House of Commons set the scene for the King's recall.

Regarding Edward Montagu, he had also strongly supported Richard Cromwell.³³⁸ He had sailed for the Baltic Sound in April 1659 as Admiral of a fleet of 40 vessels and 2,000 guns.³³⁹ This was whilst Richard Cromwell still held power.³⁴⁰ His diplomatic mission aimed at keeping the area open to English merchant shipping by mediating a settlement between the Danish and Swedish Kings.³⁴¹ Cromwell's deposition by the military backed

³²⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.572 24.2.1660; Penn *Memoires*, p.199 18.2.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.231 11.2.1660; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.264 15.2.1660 General Monck to Sir Arthur Haselrig; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.398 18.2.1660, 19.2.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 21.2.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.43 Feb 1660 The secluded members meet and General Monck; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 5.3.1660 p.121 entry 122

³²⁹ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.397 15.2.1660; Miller *Exact History*, p.364

³³⁰ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.372 20.2.1660 I99 p66

³³¹ CCSP vol 4, p.564 17.2.1660; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.169 124 – p.174 131; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.224 11.2.1660; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.46; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 27.2.1660 p.118 entry 121

³³² CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.367 17.2.1660 Percy Church to Sec Nicholas

³³³ CCSP vol 4, p.604 16.3.1660; CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.326 27.1.1660 I86; Pepys *Diary*, 13.5.1660

³³⁴ CCSP vol 4, p.568 18.2.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, pp.222-223 11.2.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.40 Feb 1660 The Parliament begins to dissolve the General

³³⁵ CCSP vol 4, p.569 21.2.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.235 21.2.1660; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.398 21.2.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.43 21.2.1660 *Moncks speech to the Parl*; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.323; Miller *Exact History*, p.364; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 pp.47-48; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 5.3.1660 p.121 entry 122

³³⁶ Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.323

³³⁷ CCSP vol 4, p.569 21.2.1660, p.570 21.2.1660; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.169 124 – p.174 131; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.232; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.38 Feb 1660 Lord Generals letter to the Parliament

³³⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.194 2.5.1659, p.255 June [no specific date given], p.595 9.3.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 21.6.1660

³³⁹ Nicholas *Papers*, p.92 1.4.1659 Percy Church, p.100 8.4.1659 Percy Church

³⁴⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.173 8.4.1659; Nicholas *Papers*, p.80 25.3.1659 Percy Church

³⁴¹ CCSP vol 4, p.170 1.4.1659; Nicholas *Papers*, p.88 1.4.1659 Mr Miles, p.102 8.4.1659 Mr Miles; Clarke *Papers*, vol III p.183 25.2.1659 JR, p.195 26.4.1659 Thurloe to Monck

regime dramatically and speedily changed Montagu's position. Additionally, similar to Monck, he disapproved of the new Administration.³⁴² He felt sufficiently strongly to refuse to obey their commands, particularly from Fleetwood and Desborough.³⁴³ Further, his fleet shared this feeling, quickly becoming disaffected.³⁴⁴ The new Government itself greatly feared Montagu, suspecting him of disloyalty and planning to remove his fleet from Parliamentary use by taking it to a port outside its sphere of influence.³⁴⁵ Accordingly they sent Commissioners to the Sound under the pretence of enhancing political negotiations, but actually aimed at securing the fleet's loyalty.³⁴⁶ Additionally, the Commons considered sending a small fleet of about 6 frigates under Lawson's command to reinforce Parliamentary will.³⁴⁷ In total, the new Government initially considered removing Montagu from office.³⁴⁸ They attempted to reduce their risk by replacing Montagu with Lawson.³⁴⁹ Further, they aspired to appoint more reliable new officers to the Fleet.³⁵⁰ The junta failed in their aims, with Montagu remaining in post more than two months as well as having his diplomatic office in the Sound confirmed.³⁵¹

The Admiral remained deeply concerned about the threats to his position, admitting as much to Pepys in May 1660.³⁵² They proved prescient, an early indication being his removal from his colonelcy in the army in absentia, Colonel Allured assuming the command.³⁵³ And on his return to England he was dismissed from his naval office.³⁵⁴ Royal agents such as Thomas Whetstone underscored such fears, variously suggesting the Admiral's realignment to the Monarchy would be honourable now that his previous master, Richard Cromwell, had been deposed.³⁵⁵ Montagu's desire to preserve his appointment was the first reason that prompted

³⁴² Thurloe *State papers*, p.687 21.6.1659 Barwick to Hyde; *CSP Venice vol 32*, 30.5.1659 p.26 entry 23

³⁴³ *CCSP vol 4*, p.197 6.5.1659

³⁴⁴ *CCSP vol 4*, p.265 9.7.1659, p.293 22.7.1659; *CSP Venice vol 32*, 30.5.1659 p.26 entry 23

³⁴⁵ *CCSP vol 4*, p.234 14.6.1659, p.254 30.6.1659; *Ludlow Memoirs*, p.92 1.6.1659; *CSP Venice vol 32*, 30.5.1659 p.26 entry 23, 6.6.1659 p.27 entry 26; *Nicholas Papers*, p.161 17.6.1659 Mr Miles; *CCSP vol 4*, p.211 24.5.1659

³⁴⁶ *Nicholas Papers*, p.152 3.6.1659 Mr Miles

³⁴⁷ *Nicholas Papers*, p.161 17.6.1659 Mr Miles; *Ludlow Memoirs*, p.92 1.6.1659; *CSP Venice vol 32*, 6.6.1659 p.27 entry 26

³⁴⁸ *CCSP vol 4*, p.198 6.5.1659

³⁴⁹ *Nicholas Papers*, p.124 29.4.1659 Mr Johnson, p.161 13.6.1659 Mr Miles

³⁵⁰ *CCSP vol 4*, p.224 8.6.1659; *CSP Venice*, vol XXXII 20.6.1659 p.34 entry 31

³⁵¹ *CCSP vol 4*, p.290 19.7.1659

³⁵² *CCSP vol 4*, p.255 June; *Pepys Diary*, 15.5.1660

³⁵³ *CCSP vol 4*, p.231 10.6.1659; *Thurloe State papers*, p.687 21.6.1659 Barwick to Hyde; *Nicholas Papers*, p.179 8.8.1659 Mr Miles; *Clarke Papers*, vol IV p.38 6.8.1659 GM.

³⁵⁴ *CCSP vol 4*, p.403 7.10.1659, p.407 13.10.1659; *Thurloe State papers*, p.731 21.8.1659 Sydney to the Council of State; *CSP Venice vol 32*, 3.10.1659 p.72 entry 70

³⁵⁵ *CCSP vol 4*, p.255 June (no specific date given)

him to realign his loyalty towards the alternate potential Royal regime.³⁵⁶ A second reason was a traditional family obedience to the Monarchy, his father having been socially elevated by James I.³⁵⁷ This undoubtedly increased the younger Edward Montagu's public profile, raising his visibility to later potential patrons. A third reason was that whilst he remained in the Sound, his family of a wife and ten small children and an estate yielding £2,000 per annum were at risk from the existing regime.³⁵⁸ To shepherd in the Monarchy would remove this threat to his family. In aggregate, these three concerns made Montagu so receptive to Royal envoys, and his transfer of loyalty so complete that he returned early to England to support Booth's rising, shortage of provisions being his official justification.³⁵⁹ However, he arrived home after the rebellion's collapse the previous August, Booth now being incarcerated in the Tower.³⁶⁰ He was re-instated by Parliament at Monck's behest following the drastic improvement in Royal fortunes in early 1660.³⁶¹ Interestingly, this may have resulted from Royal pressure, indicated by Hyde's early knowledge of it before Parliament announced any decision.³⁶² On return to office Montagu's Royalist zeal is reflected both in his commitment to the King's cause and daily expressions of loyalty in correspondence to the Royal agent, Christopher Hatton.³⁶³ In aggregate, these circumstances led Montagu to make his own separate terms with the alternate Royal government.³⁶⁴

Similar to Monck, Lawson opposed the Committee of Safety's October 1659 assumption of power.³⁶⁵ The General declared against the new Army regime at the end of October 1659.³⁶⁶ He rejected the Committee's peace overtures and commenced hostilities, successfully capturing important parts of Northern England by early November 1659.³⁶⁷ Lawson was a

³⁵⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 15.5.1660

³⁵⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 7.11.1660

³⁵⁸ CCSP *vol 4*, p.234 15.6.1659

³⁵⁹ CCSP *vol 4*, p.353 1.9.1659, p.396 1.10.1659; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 3.10.1659 p.72 entry 70

³⁶⁰ CCSP *vol 4*, p.308 3.8.1659, p.354 2.9.1659; Clarendon *History vol 6*, pp.119-120 19.8.1659-24.8.1659; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.47-48 25.8.1659, p.50 6.9.1659

³⁶¹ Pepys *Diary*, 21.2.1660

³⁶² CCSP *vol 4*, p.533 10.2.1660

³⁶³ CCSP *vol 4*, p.592 9.3.1660, p.610 21.3.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 11.4.1660; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.408 25.4.1660

³⁶⁴ Whitelock *Memorials*, 25.4.1660 p.408

³⁶⁵ CCSP *vol 4*, p.434 4.11.1659; Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.159 106; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCV p.268 19.11.1659

³⁶⁶ CCSP *vol 4*, p.408 14.10.1659, p.425 28.10.1659, p.426 28.10.1659; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCV p.268 19.11.1659

³⁶⁷ CCSP *vol 4*, p.428 31.10.1659, p.433 4.11.1659; Penn *Memoires*, pp.184-185; Nicholas *Papers*, p.192 16.12.1659 Col Robert Whitley; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.64-66 19.10.1659 Extracts from the order book of General Monck; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 14.11.1659 p.89 entry 90

confirmed Republican.³⁶⁸ He was also a staunch member of the Independent religious sect, the Anabaptists.³⁶⁹ Consequently, he believed he shared core political principles of Parliamentary loyalty with his friend, the General.³⁷⁰ As a result, Lawson joined Monck's pro-Parliamentary crusade.³⁷¹ It is perfectly understandable for Lawson to have believed the General's declared Republican intentions, given that his private actions and public protestations differed.³⁷² Indeed, the General's intentions were widely regarded as being unintelligible.³⁷³ His duplicitousness was so effective that he appeared to be pro-Parliamentarian and be anti-Monarchical.³⁷⁴ Yet his underlying Royalism meant he simultaneously undertook secret communications with Charles.³⁷⁵ Many were puzzled that his public protestations of Republicanism contradicted some of his actions like placing those who were known to be unenamoured of Parliamentary rule in charge of key defensive installations like Carlisle, Newcastle, Lyn, Plymouth and Pendennis Castle.³⁷⁶ Additionally, on the one hand, the General decided to comply with Parliament's very public test of his loyalty, obeying orders to tear down the City's gates and portcullises to encourage them to make loans to the cash-strapped government.³⁷⁷ On the other, shortly afterwards he was in clandestine verbal contact with Charles through trusted agents Sir John Grenville and William Morrice, nothing being put in writing.³⁷⁸ Also, he chaired secret meetings between high level personages and his officers regarding the Restoration.³⁷⁹ Indeed, the General's duplicitousness was noted more widely, referenced in publicly distributed material, even the

³⁶⁸ CCSP vol 4, p.502 30.12.1659; Clarendon *History*, p.159 106; Penn *Memoires*, p.186; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.243; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.384 25.12.1659

³⁶⁹ CCSP vol 4, p.440 11.11.1659, p.502 30.12.1659, p.515 7.1.1659; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.159 106

³⁷⁰ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.215 3.2.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.32 28.1.1660 Mr Fenn killed by a mischance

³⁷¹ CCSP vol 4, p.449 17.11.1659; Penn *Memoires*, p.185; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.227

³⁷² CCSP vol 4, p.508 2.1.1660; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.166 118 29.12.1659; Thurloe *State papers*, p.861 20.3.1660 Letter of Information to Secretary Thurloe; Whitelock *Memorials*, pp.402-403 10.3.1660; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 30.1.1660 pp.111-112 entry 116; Burnet *History* vol 1, p126

³⁷³ Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p319, p.320; Mordaunt, *Letter Book* 13.1.1660; Brook *England triumph*, pp.66-67; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 pp.29-30; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 30.1.1660 pp.111-112 entry 116, 13.2.1660 p114 entry 119; Clarendon *History* vol 6, 27.4.1660 p.225 entry 230

³⁷⁴ Penn *Memoires*, p.198 23.1.1660, 6.2.1660, pp215-216; Nicholas *Papers*, p.194.9.3.1660 Col Robert Whitley; Baker *Chronicle*, 1959 p.717; Burnet *History* vol 1, p126

³⁷⁵ Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.30; Burnet *History* vol 1, p126

³⁷⁶ Thurloe *State papers*, p.861 19.3.1660 *Barwick to Hyde*; Nicholas *Papers*, p.179 8.8.1659 *Mr Miles*; Pepys *Diary*, 18.1.1660

³⁷⁷ Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.169 124 8.2.1660 – p.170 126 9.2.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, pp.218-219 8.2.1660-9.2.1660; Whitelock *Memorials*, pp.394-395 9.2.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 9.2.1660, 10.2.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.38 Feb 1660 Lord Generals letter to the Parliament; CCSP vol 5, p.15. 5.5.1660 William Morrice to Charles II; Fuller *Panygeric*, p.4 verse 11; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, pp.320-321; Miller *Exact History*, pp.358-359; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 20.2.1660 p.116 entry 120

³⁷⁸ Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.194 166 19.3.1660 – p.195 168 20.3.1660; CCSP vol 5, p.11 4.5.1660 London, Sir John Greenville to Hyde; Baker *Chronicle*, 1659 p.718

³⁷⁹ Whitelock *Memorials*, p.403 10.3.1660

Venetian Ambassador reporting this to his Italian masters.³⁸⁰ The reason for his façade was that a large proportion of his troops remained Republican.³⁸¹ Consequently, there was a serious threat of mutiny were the General's real loyalty to be revealed.³⁸² For example, much of the army wouldn't even agree to the King's name being spoken.³⁸³ Additionally, after Monck's initial incursion into England, several hundred of his troops suspected that his real objective was Monarchical Restoration and deserted.³⁸⁴ Following the secluded members' re-admission a number of the General's officers plotted to halt Parliamentary moves towards the King's return, only the General's vigilance and firm assertion of his authority arresting the plan.³⁸⁵ Consequently, he had to maintain an apparent Republicanism.³⁸⁶ This was illustrated in writing to Col John Jones, commander of Ireland's army, swearing to die in upholding the Commonwealth and keep out the King.³⁸⁷ Similarly in a bitter speech to the Rump against Monarchy.³⁸⁸ And he ensured his reply to petitioners from the South-West in support of the Republic were published.³⁸⁹

However, various factors led Lawson to re-evaluate his Monarchical opposition. As Monck increased his hegemony in London, he continued the process begun in Scotland of aggressively and comprehensively purging his army of the religious sects.³⁹⁰ Whilst this didn't initially threaten the Vice-Admiral, it forewarned of the General's intentions, and once he had been appointed Head of all Armed Forces and had authority over naval appointments, his aggressive policy of purging all sectarians imperilled Lawson's position.³⁹¹ Additionally, the Royal agent, Arnold Braems, was actively attempting to convert Lawson to Royalism.³⁹² His arguments eventually proved influential.³⁹³ One of his rewards for this important service

³⁸⁰ Fuller *Panygeric*, p.3 verse 10; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 21.5.1660 p.146 entry 142

³⁸¹ Pepys *Diary*, 8.3.1660

³⁸² Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.246 5.3.1660, p.248 12.3.1660; Baker *Chronicle*, p.718

³⁸³ CCSP *vol 4*, p.621 28.3.1660

³⁸⁴ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.158

³⁸⁵ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 19.3.1660 p.128 entry 126

³⁸⁶ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.231 11.2.1660, p.232 11.2.1660, p.237

³⁸⁷ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.190 2.1.1660

³⁸⁸ CCSP *vol 4*, p.570 21.2.1660

³⁸⁹ Ludlow *Memoirs*, pp.208-209 23.1.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.31 Jan 1659 The Parliaments first declaration, About the fourteenth day

³⁹⁰ CCSP *vol 4*, p.490 18.12.1659; Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.156 102 15-17.11.1659; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.150 4.11.1659, p.158 3.12.1659, p.207 19.1.1660-23.1.1660, p.209; Thurloe *State papers*, p.867 23.3.1660 Massey to Hyde, p.871 26.3.1660 Barwick to Hyde; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.64-66 19.10.1659 Extracts from the order book of General Monck; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.37 Feb 1660 Lord Generals Speech in the House of Parliament

³⁹¹ CCSP *vol 4*, p.516 11.1.1660

³⁹² CCSP *vol 4*, p.533 27.1.1660, p.550 7.2.1660, p.564 17.2.1660, p.618 24.3.1660, p.628 30.3.1660; CCSP *vol 5* p.30.11.5.1660

³⁹³ CCSP *vol 4*, p.618 24.3.1660; CCSP *vol 5* p.30 11.5.1660

was the King's favour for his son.³⁹⁴ Nevertheless, matters changed substantially on Montagu's appointment as General-at-Sea.³⁹⁵ This meant that he superseded Lawson as operational naval Head, being appointed as Vice-Admiral under Montagu's command.³⁹⁶ Montagu therefore had the ability to retain or dismiss any mariner, personally issuing commissions for all subordinate flag and ship commanders. Consequently, this latter action and the wording within the commissions highlighted his superior command position, with the accompanying legal authority.³⁹⁷ Further, he was a declared Royalist.³⁹⁸ This left Lawson, with his religious and Republican ideals, at risk of dismissal.³⁹⁹ Accordingly, to save himself, he transferred his allegiance to his new naval chief and the King less than 2 weeks after Montagu's formal appointment.⁴⁰⁰ This tactic was successful, his position accordingly being confirmed immediately.⁴⁰¹ In fact, he thereafter became a staunch Royalist, frequently displaying his conversion. For example, he upheld discipline in potentially mutinous Republican captains, ordered subordinates to drink the King's health, enthusiastically and copiously firing guns in salute of higher authority and writing to the King with protestations of comprehensive loyalty.⁴⁰² Of course it's possible that, like many converts, he may have felt he needed to illustrate his change more elaborately compared to long-term Royal adherents. However, it's equally possible he was attempting to hide remaining Republican sympathies by outward devotional displays.

Effects of their actions as Navy representatives to help the King.

As the Navy's most senior commander, Monck could variously aid the King's return. Achieving regime-change was the most fundamental.⁴⁰³ His insurmountable martial position allowed him to recall the King without recourse to any other authority.⁴⁰⁴ However, he preferred to use more constitutional means, managing Parliamentary transformation from the military-backed Republican Rump to a freely elected Royalist Chamber. This is consistent

³⁹⁴ CCSP *vol 5* p.30.11.5.1660

³⁹⁵ *Pepys Diary*, 29.2.1660

³⁹⁶ CCSP *vol 4*, p.574 24.2.1660

³⁹⁷ *Pepys Diary*, 26.3.1660, 17.4.1660

³⁹⁸ CCSP *vol 4*, p.592 9.3.1660

³⁹⁹ CCSP *vol 4*, p.602 16.3.1660

⁴⁰⁰ *Pepys Diary*, 3.3.1660, 23.3.1660; CCSP *vol 4*, p.602 16.3.1660, p.610 21.3.1660, p.618 24.3.1660

⁴⁰¹ CCSP *vol 4*, p.602 16.3.1660

⁴⁰² CCSP *vol 5*, p.19 7.5.1660; *Pepys Diary*, 29.3.1660, 7.5.1660

⁴⁰³ *Pepys Diary*, 11.2.1660; CCSP *vol 4*, p.564 17.2.1660, p.569 21.2.1660, p.570 21.2.1660, p.628 30.3.1660; *Pepys Diary*, 18.4.1660

⁴⁰⁴ CCSP *vol 4*, p.674 25.4.1660

with his personal views that government should be conducted through a civilian rather than military authority (see above), albeit using both martial power and more subtle methods (see above) to achieve this manipulation. Consequently, it not only set a favourable legal and political framework for the King's recall.⁴⁰⁵ It also reflected the public mood.⁴⁰⁶ Record numbers of bonfires, plentiful bell ringing and copious drunkenness overwhelmingly evidenced this.⁴⁰⁷ Consequently, the country transitioned to Monarchy with full public support.⁴⁰⁸

Further, General Monck's position as Army and Navy Chief meant he could personally and confidently negotiate with Charles to set the terms of the King's return.⁴⁰⁹ Significantly, through his early and ongoing secret Royal communications, he could ensure it was on his terms, intimating through his agents as early as the start of December 1659 the general contents of Charles's pre-Restoration manifesto, encapsulated in the Breda Declaration.⁴¹⁰ Indeed, in about mid-March 1660, using Grenville and Morrice, General Monck dictated the specific headings that he required the King to use, additionally advising the King to move from Catholic Flanders to protestant Holland to better impress his protestant people. Grenville was instructed not to return to the General until he had personally seen the King arrive at Breda.⁴¹¹ This document was vital in determining Parliamentary and military acquiescence, absolutely proving that the King's return was at the behest of, and under the control of, a determined Navy. After all, it was the navy, not the army, that could prevent the King crossing the sea.

Additionally, within the Navy itself, Monck could ensure that the senior ranks below him were filled with Royalist-supporters, that is Edward Montagu as Admiral and General-at-Sea and John Lawson as Vice-Admiral.⁴¹² These personnel implemented further strategic and operational policies to transition the navy towards Monarchy (see below). However, the General also involved himself with lower-level issues. For example, appointing favoured officers and purging undesirable ones to change the Navy's political make-up.⁴¹³ He had

⁴⁰⁵ CCSP vol 5, p.23 8.5.1660

⁴⁰⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 19.3.1660, 2.5.1660, 5.5.1660; CSPD 1659-1660, Vol CCIII p.18 9.7.1659

⁴⁰⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 2.5.1660

⁴⁰⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660; John Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, 29.5.1660

⁴⁰⁹ CCSP vol 4, p.641 6.4.1660; CCSP vol 5, p.25 9.5.1660; Pepys *Dairy*, 2.4.1660

⁴¹⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.471 5.12.1659, p.476 9.12.1659; CCSP vol 5, p.25 9.5.1660

⁴¹¹ Clarendon *History vol 6*, pp.194-5 166 19.3.1660 – 168 20.3.1660

⁴¹² Pepys *Diary*, 21.2.1660

⁴¹³ Pepys *Diary*, 15.4.1660; CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.378 27.2.1660 entry 66

pursued these policies in the Army.⁴¹⁴ He also involved himself in ship-deployment, such as ordering frigates to escort a merchant convoy to the Baltic Sound.⁴¹⁵ And he interested himself in naval propaganda to promote the King, such as ordering the recording of seamen's reaction to the Breda Declaration and its communication to Parliament.⁴¹⁶ Tellingly, he also controlled the very moment of Charles's physical return. Some Parliamentary members continued to try and frustrate the King's return.⁴¹⁷ Consequently the General ordered Montagu to sail immediately for Holland with his fleet to collect the King without awaiting the Parliamentary Commissioners, the Royal repatriation settling all debate surrounding the Restoration as *fait accompli*.⁴¹⁸

Regarding Montagu's ability to support the Restoration using the navy, overall he used his operational command to remould the organisation towards Monarchy. He commenced whilst in the Sound, using the Fleet's physical isolation from Parliamentary influence to start the process. He initially managed this by restricting communication with the central authority in London.⁴¹⁹ He could therefore control the message the Fleet received. This proved successful, disaffection and displeasure with events at home resulting.⁴²⁰ Montagu's manipulation of the Fleet's allegiance into a personal following of himself so that they would support his favoured political settlement was successful. Christopher Hatton, the Royal envoy to Montagu, reported that the seamen repledged their allegiance to their Admiral, even following his removal from command, the Venetian Ambassador reporting similarly to his Italian masters.⁴²¹ This manifested itself via their promises to back the wider movement towards Royal Restoration.⁴²² This tactic's success in the Sound is illustrated via the King's expression of gratitude a few weeks prior to his Restoration, recognising the Admiral's risks run in the Royal cause, stating that he would be ashamed if Montagu were thereafter disappointed with forthcoming rewards.⁴²³

⁴¹⁴ CCSP vol 4, p.628 30.3.1660, p.629 30.3.1660.

⁴¹⁵ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXX p.400 23.3.1660 entry 37

⁴¹⁶ Montagu Journal, 3.5.1660; Pepys Diary, 4.5.1660; CCSP vol 5, p.9 4.5.1660

⁴¹⁷ CCSP vol 5, p.15. 5.5.1660 William Morrice to Charles II, CCSP vol 5, p.29 11.5.1660

⁴¹⁸ Montagu Journal, 10.5.1660; Pepys Diary, 10.5.1660; CCSP vol 5, p.29 11.5.1660, p.34 16.5.1660

⁴¹⁹ CCSP vol 4, p.206 20.5.1659, p.207 20.5.1659, p.250 24.6.1659

⁴²⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.265 9.7.1659, p.293 22.7.1659

⁴²¹ CCSP vol 4, p.493 23.12.1659, p.523 19.1.1660; CSP Venice vol 32, 30.5.1659 p.26

⁴²² CCSP vol 4, p.538 30.1.1660

⁴²³ CCSP vol 4, p.649 13.4.1660

Following his formal re-appointment as General-at-Sea and Admiral at the start of March 1660, Montagu recommenced his work of reorienting the Navy, and preserving his new fleet of 30 ships for the King.⁴²⁴ He variously achieved this. One important method constituted an enforced culture change towards the King. He decided to follow Monck's example with the Army.⁴²⁵ Consequently, he purged the Navy of Republican and sectarian officers, reconstituting the navy's personnel.⁴²⁶ This was accompanied by the appointment of officers whose political opinions he could rely on.⁴²⁷ In fact, this was an express desire of the Council of State, proving Government's pro-Royal credentials in the highest echelons by this time.⁴²⁸ A second measure was to control the Fleet commanders' publicly expressed opinions, successfully creating an example to lower ranks. This is aptly illustrated where meeting minutes were rigged where the King's Breda Declaration was read to all ship commanders. The recorded unanimous loyalty was read to the seamen assembled on deck to their joyous acclamation, although Pepys was sceptical that many of the commanders were happy with the proceedings.⁴²⁹ An additional measure involved communicating information to the King relating to the Fleet, keeping Charles abreast of events and allowing him to direct his attention to matters of importance.⁴³⁰

The control of propaganda was also variously important. It was plain from the start that Montagu's Fleet had been allocated to transport the King to England.⁴³¹ As a renowned Royalist, Montagu's appointment would have confirmed this. The sight of a Fleet waiting to perform this function would have publicly reinforced the message of the Restoration's inevitability, as well as exhibiting the Navy's support of it. Additionally, the Fleet's allocation to the task was several weeks prior to the actual event, Pepys mentioning it in the early April prior to the eventual mid-May voyage.⁴³² As contemporary pamphlets remarked, this protracted period raised public anticipation.⁴³³ The Fleet's physical presence in several locations would have enhanced these expectations, over this time journeying slowly from Lee

⁴²⁴ CCSP vol 4, p.646 10.4.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 17.4.1660, 2.6.1660; Clarendon *History*, p.186 152

⁴²⁵ CCSP vol 4, p.621 28.3.1660, p.629 30.3.1660

⁴²⁶ CCSP vol 4, p.602 16.3.1660, p.646 10.4.1660, p.665 19.4.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 1.4.1660

⁴²⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 26.3.1660; Montagu *Journal*, 27.5.1660; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.408 25.4.1660

⁴²⁸ Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.186 152

⁴²⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 3.5.1660; Montagu *Journal*, 3.5.1660; Brook *England triumph*, p.86

⁴³⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.651 13.4.1660, p.687 30.4.1660; CCSP vol 5, p.5 2.5.1660

⁴³¹ CCSP vol 4, p.621 28.3.1660, p.673 23.4.1660

⁴³² Pepys *Diary*, 5.4.1660

⁴³³ CCSP vol 5, p.5 2.5.1660; Fuller *Panygeric*, p.6 verse 22

Roads, via the Downs and ending up in Dover.⁴³⁴ Montagu ordered the transformation of the Fleet's visual image, presenting a further pro-Royal message, Royal insignia replacing the Commonwealth's, bunting and pennants flying and bright paint applied.⁴³⁵ Additionally, aural salutes complemented visual imagery, copious gun salutes signifying the Navy's joy at the King's imminent arrival.⁴³⁶ Further, following the Fleet's commanders meeting and the seamen's loyal acclamation, the Admiral ensured the proceedings were communicated to the Commons, advertising the Navy's Royal support to the heart of Government, and for onward communication as per all Parliamentary business.⁴³⁷

Montagu used his naval operational oversight to support the King in other ways. He allocated vessels to transport Royal envoys to the continent, facilitating Charles's communication with his agents.⁴³⁸ Hordes of gentlemen were also transported to beg favours from the King.⁴³⁹ A sign of the Admiral's commitment to the Royal cause was that he dined on board his flagship with these supplicants.⁴⁴⁰ The highly visible large volume of aristocrats wishing to ingratiate themselves would have advertised the King's imminent ascendancy. Additionally, in the Convention's elections, the proportion of cavaliers in the House was boosted through several naval candidates being put up. Montagu was active here, heightening his local popularity on one occasion by arranging to have some undesirable soldiers removed from a town, potentially raising the vote for his chosen candidates, intervening directly in other constituencies for favoured nominees and completing a successful campaign at both Dover and Weymouth for himself.⁴⁴¹

Regarding Lawson, although he was unaware at the time, he played a crucial role in aiding the King's return in support of Monck's campaign to acquire political hegemony in London. In common with the General he disliked the Committee of Safety's October 1659 assumption

⁴³⁴ Montagu *Journal*, 11.5.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.70 12.4.1660 John Lambertt; Pepys *Diary*, 5.4.1660

⁴³⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 4.5.1660.13.5.1660, 3.5.1660; Brook *England triumph*, p.87; Whitelock *Memorials*, 7.5.1660 p.412; CCSP *vol 4*, p.625 30.3.1660

⁴³⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 9.4.1660, 3.5.1660, 4.5.1660, 8.5.1660; Brook *England triumph*, p.87

⁴³⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 4.5.1660, 8.5.1660; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 21.5.1660.1660 p.145 entry 142; Whitelock *Memorials*, 5.5.1660 p.412

⁴³⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 20.4.1660; Montagu *Journal*, 10.4.1660, 18.4.1660

⁴³⁹ CCSP *vol 4*, p.662 16.4.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 20.4.1660, 27.4.1660; Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.226 232, p.227 234; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.262, p.405 19.3.1660; Fuller *Panygeric*, p.7 verse 23

⁴⁴⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 27.4.1660

⁴⁴¹ Penn *Memoirs*, pp.209-210; Pepys *Diary*, 14.3.1660, 25.3.1660, 19.4.1660, 2.6.1660

of power in Westminster.⁴⁴² This was starkly illustrated when the Vice-Admiral spurned the Committee of Safety's 16th November 1659 invitation for ten of his officers to join a Common Council to attempt the military junta's survival by engaging in the peace negotiations whilst the General was still in the North of England.⁴⁴³ In fact, a meeting set up between the Committee of Safety's and Lawson's representatives onboard the Flagship ended acrimoniously, taunts being hurled at the visitors as they left.⁴⁴⁴ He therefore subsequently joined Monck and the Portsmouth garrison, the latter under the leadership of Haselrig, Morley and Walton (Haselrig is mainly mentioned hereafter as he is more prominent in sources).⁴⁴⁵ Together this triumvirate formed a three-pronged attack aimed at bringing down the new regime.⁴⁴⁶

This pact's existence is confirmed by the House's later praise and thanks to both commanders and the Portsmouth leaders, rewarding Monk and Lawson handsomely.⁴⁴⁷ Additionally, Rugg's *Diurnal* mentions Lawson's pact with the Portsmouth Garrison, a London Newspaper also reporting the rebellious Portsmouth garrison's leaders journeying by ship to visit the General in the North of England.⁴⁴⁸ And in January 1660 Lawson and one of his commanders visited the General in his St. Albans' quarters, being received like old friends, with all courtesy and great kindness.⁴⁴⁹ Letters published simultaneously by Monck and Lawson had identical contents, proving their coalition.⁴⁵⁰ Further, commentators such as General Penn retrospectively confirmed this triumvirate, especially mentioning the General's

⁴⁴² CCSP *vol 4*, p.395 30.9.1659, p.395 October [no specific date given], p.408 14.10.1659, p.425 28.10.1659, p.434 4.11.1659; Penn *Memoires*, pp.184-185, pp.188-189, p.380 17.12.1659

⁴⁴³ Penn *Memoires*, p.184; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.374 16.11.1659; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.15 December 1659 The Members, and Vice Admiral Lawson, and Portsmouth, p.18 December 1659 Lawson; Miller *Exact History*, pp.348-349

⁴⁴⁴ Miller *Exact History*, pp.348-349; Brook *England triumph*, p.64; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 2.1.1660 p.105 entry 101

⁴⁴⁵ Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.188 13.12.1659 Newsletter; Penn *Memoires*, p.185, pp.196-197, p.378 10.12.1659, p.380 17.12.1659, p.383 23.12.1659, pp.384-385 27.12.1659; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.15 December 1659 The Members, and Vice Admiral Lawson, and Portsmouth; Miller *Exact History*, p.345, pp.354-355; Brook *England triumph*, p.64; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 26.12.1659 p.104 entry 108; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.8 Vol 1 May 1660 entry 83 Sir Arthur Haselrig; CSPD *1661-1662*, pp.232-262 vol 49 entry 67 Whitehall; CCSP *vol 4*, p.449 17.11.1659, vol 4 p.564 17.2.1660; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.391 28.1.1660

⁴⁴⁶ Mordaunt's *Letter Book*, 30.12.1659; Penn *Memoires*, p.189, p.197; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.15 December 1659 The Members, and Vice Admiral Lawson, and Portsmouth, p.15 December 1659 Some of the Members in Portsmouth; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, pp.315-316; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.26

⁴⁴⁷ Penn *Memoires*, p.195; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.385 29.12.1659, p.388 9.1.1660; Miller *Exact History*, p.353; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 9.1.1660 p.106 entry 112

⁴⁴⁸ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.15 December 1659 The Members, and Vice Admiral Lawson, and Portsmouth; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.188 Newsletter

⁴⁴⁹ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.32 Mr Fenn killed by a mischance

⁴⁵⁰ Rugg *Diurnal*, December 1659 *Lawson*

instruction to Montagu to secure a £10,000 grant as a reward to Lawson for his services.⁴⁵¹ And during the Indemnity and Oblivion Bill's later progress through Parliament following the Restoration, the General's agents actively sought to override moves to exempt Lawson from the Act's protection, in accordance with the General's prior commitment to the Vice-Admiral.⁴⁵² He also undertook a similar duty for Sir Arthur Haselrig in return for Sir Arthur's services to the Restoration, further evidencing the Portsmouth garrison's inclusion as the triumvirate's third leg.⁴⁵³ The General's role was to overwhelm Lambert's opposing Army.⁴⁵⁴ Consequently he commenced a slow march south with his forces.⁴⁵⁵ First, he secured various major centres in the North of England such as Berwick and Carlisle, making Berwick his HQ.⁴⁵⁶ This was followed by all the counties that he passed through en-route to London.⁴⁵⁷ Further, through correspondence and his agents, Colonels Wilkes and Knight, and Lieutenant-Colonel Clobery, he coordinated his activities with the Portsmouth Garrison, removing the use of that important port to Parliament.⁴⁵⁸

However, Lawson's role was the triumvirate's defining event in determining the Monarch's return by bringing about the Committee of Safety's downfall, blockading the Thames with his fleet and taking over the defences there.⁴⁵⁹ This variously supported the Royalist cause. Given that Lawson commanded the bulk of the fleet currently in service, together with Portsmouth garrison's defection, this deprived the Committee of Safety of the Navy's use and of this major port to support its policies.⁴⁶⁰ This contrasted with Parliament's naval operations during Booth's rising when Lawson was ordered to prevent a potential pro-Royal military landing in England.⁴⁶¹ Further, and crucially, Lawson's blockade throttled

⁴⁵¹ Penn *Memorials*, pp.215-216, pp.253-254

⁴⁵² Ludlow *Memoirs*, pp.277-278

⁴⁵³ Baker *Chronicle*, p.740; CSPD *1659-1660*, 22.1.1662, entry 67 Book 49 Whitehall

⁴⁵⁴ Penn *Memoires*, p.198 letter of 4th January 1660; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 14.11.1659 p.89 entry 90, 21.11.1659 p.92 entry 94

⁴⁵⁵ CCSP *vol 4*, p.440 11.11.1659; CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCV p.268 19.11.1659; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.379 14.12.1659

⁴⁵⁶ CCSP *vol 4*, p.433 4.11.1659; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.368 29.10.1659; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.314; Miller *Exact History*, p.335; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.24; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 7.11.1659 p.86 entry 86, 14.11.1659 p.89 entry 90

⁴⁵⁷ CCSP *vol 4*, p.525 20.1.1660

⁴⁵⁸ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.153 3.11.1659, p.157 3.12.1659; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV pp.207-208 19.12.59 Coldstream 'Officers at Coldstream to Sir Arthur Haselrig and others', pp.208-209 19.12.1659 Coldstream 'The officers at Coldstream to the officers at Newcastle'; Miller *Exact History*, pp.354-355

⁴⁵⁹ CCSP *vol 4*, p.481 12.12.1659, p.494 23.12.1659; Penn *Memoires*, pp.186-187; Nicholas *Papers*, p.192 16.12.1659 Col Robert Whitley; Miller *Exact History*, pp.348-349

⁴⁶⁰ Penn *Memoires*, p.185, pp.187-188

⁴⁶¹ CSPD *1659-1660*, vol CCIII p.52 30.7.1659 Col 43

mercantile trade, thus denuding the Government of Customs revenues.⁴⁶² These fiscal flows were particularly important in providing the funds to pay the armed forces, being specifically set aside for the Treasurers-at-War's use.⁴⁶³ This expenditure was one of the military junta's primary costs, Customs being comparatively easy to collect, the funds being relatively swiftly available for Government use as the principal collection points at the docks were close to the Treasury. Additionally, the Government was heavily indebted, owing over £5,000,000 in April 1659, and was desperately short of money to fund its daily functions as it didn't generate adequate revenues to cover expenses.⁴⁶⁴ Consequently, increased borrowing necessary to cover its costs would have raised the debt pile even higher.⁴⁶⁵ This situation was exacerbated as both the City and large parts of the country refused to pay taxes.⁴⁶⁶ This was in compliance with laws passed by the previous Parliament making it treasonous to raise, levy or collect any taxes.⁴⁶⁷ Alternate Government funding sources could be sought from such lenders as the City, but this was undermined by two factors. One was that Monck, Lawson and Portsmouth garrison leaders undertook a campaign to drive a wedge between the City and the Government, aimed at reducing the former's willingness to provide subsidies to the latter.⁴⁶⁸ Further, the City was annoyed at the regime's failure to keep the trade routes open, and with the bulk of the fleet concentrated in the Thames estuary, English merchant shipping in other areas such as the Mediterranean suffered increased piratical predations.⁴⁶⁹ Also, the City resented the government's defaulting on Oliver Cromwell's loans which were used for his 'Western Design'.⁴⁷⁰ Other lenders like goldsmiths were also unwilling to lend, fearing that their funds and other assets would be stolen by the Committee of Safety's agents, that is the unruly soldiery, rather than being repaid.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶² CCSP vol 4, p.486 16.12.1659

⁴⁶³ CSPD 1659-1660, Vol CCIII p.7 60 5.7.1659; CSPD 1659-1660, Vol CCIII p.10 6 8.7.1659 Cols 26, 79

⁴⁶⁴ CCSP vol 4, p.176 10.4.1659 and 14.4.1659, p.504 [no date given]; Clarendon *History*, p.168 123; CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCIII p.33 16.7.1659; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 28.11.1659 pp.94-95 entry 97; Thurloe *State papers*, p.667 2.5.1659 Barwick to Hyde; Nicholas *Papers*, p.102 8.4.1659 Mr Miles

⁴⁶⁵ CCSP vol 4, p.442 11.11.1659

⁴⁶⁶ CCSP vol 4, p.463 1.12.1659; Pepys *Diary*, 13.1.1660; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 28.11.1659 pp.94-95 entry 97

⁴⁶⁷ Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.145 11.10.1659; CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCV p.250 11.10.1659; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.137 11.10.1659; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.364 11.10.1659

⁴⁶⁸ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCV p.287 14.12.1659; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 23.1.1660 p.109 entry 114, 30.1660 pp.111-112 entry 116; CCSP vol 4, p.463 30.11.1659, p.498 24.12.1659; Penn *Memoires*, p.191; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.380 21.12.1659

⁴⁶⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 24.12.1659 pp.102-103 entry 107

⁴⁷⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.492 23.12.1659; Clarke *Papers*, vol IV p.194 15.12.1659 Newsletter; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 28.11.1659 pp.94-95 entry 97

⁴⁷¹ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCV p.268 19.11.1659

Secondly, with such high indebtedness and very limited ability to collect further taxes, the Government was simply a very poor credit risk. This latter point is strongly doubly illustrated. Firstly, the Administration's failure to pay its forces, being at least nineteen months in arrears.⁴⁷² Seamen were unpaid for up to 50 months.⁴⁷³ Further, it couldn't supply its Armed Forces.⁴⁷⁴ Indeed, on occasion the lack of pay had left some units so destitute that they were incapable of performing any duties, such as naval vessels unable to go to sea to drive enemy vessels from the coast, or army units unable to march to new deployments.⁴⁷⁵ And secondly, despite the Army's substantial pay arrears, it could only provide a derisory one month's pay of the money already owed to General Lambert's troops at the time of the Booth rising.⁴⁷⁶ This is despite the fact that these troops had protected the regime during the August 1659 crisis.⁴⁷⁷ In aggregate, this left it unable to subsidise the armed forces from other sources, illustrating the importance and effectiveness of Lawson's blockade, and highlighting the starkness of the situation. By the time of the Committee of Safety's rule, the regime's lack of funds left it extremely vulnerable when its very survival was under serious threat, the success of Lawson and the Navy's activities leaving the Government unable to afford to provide adequate forces to counter the threat from Monck.⁴⁷⁸ In contrast, however, both the General's and Lawson's campaign to ingratiate themselves with the City achieved success, marked by the General's appointment as their Major-General and the loosening of their purse strings to him.⁴⁷⁹ This also meant that, following Montagu's appointment, the money was available so that Montagu's newly refocused Monarchist fleet could be provided and prepared for active service.⁴⁸⁰ Further, the City made funds available for the King's immediate use at his Restoration.⁴⁸¹

Lawson and the navy provided further important support to Monck during the latter's manipulation of Parliamentary proceedings for the secluded members' February 1660 re-

⁴⁷² CCSP vol 4, p.492 23.12.1659

⁴⁷³ CCSP vol 4, p.409 14.10.1659, p.432 3.11.1659, p.457 25.11.1659, p.473 9.12.1659; Mordaunt *Letter Book*, 16.1.1660; CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.338 31.1.1660 entry 33

⁴⁷⁴ CCSP vol 4, p.457 25.11.1659, p.463 1.12.1659

⁴⁷⁵ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXIX p.338 31.1.1660 entry 33, vol CCXIX p.370 18.2.1660 I99 p64 Council of State to the Army Committee

⁴⁷⁶ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCIV p.145 25.8.1659 I98 pp.165-166

⁴⁷⁷ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCIV p.147 25.8.1659

⁴⁷⁸ Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.316; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 28.11.1659 pp.94-95 entry 97

⁴⁷⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 13.2.1660; Clarendon *History*, p.176 136 23.2.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.238; Whitelock *Memorials*, p.399 23.2.1660, p.404 14.3.1660; CCSP vol 4, p.606 16.3.1660

⁴⁸⁰ CCSP vol 4, p.595 9.3.1660, p.595 9.3.1660 (2nd entry)

⁴⁸¹ CCSP vol 5, p.7 3.5.1660

instatement (see above). Lawson was a party to the secret pact, and underlined the General's power with the powerful navy. On the 17th of February Lawson prepared the Fleet for service.⁴⁸² On the 21st, following the secluded members' re-inclusion, Lawson reinforced the General's power by threatening to bring his ships up the Thames into central London next to the Tower.⁴⁸³ The prospect of this military-might projected from very powerful floating gun batteries in close proximity to the commercial docks and warehouses, the ancient symbol of power of the Tower and other government buildings would have demonstrated the General and Lawson's determination. A further result of Lawson's ongoing closure of the Thames estuary would have been the strong Royalist support exhibited by the suppliers of the huge amount of Government debt, that is the City.⁴⁸⁴ This was enhanced by their desire to see the political stability promised by Royal return, combined with the removal of Lawson's blockade and the City's re-establishment of mercantile trade. Consequently, it is no wonder that the Commons acquiesced following the secluded members' return, voiding all Rump legislation since 1648 and issuing writs for free pro-Royal Parliamentary elections.⁴⁸⁵

Therefore, to reiterate, the most important aspect of Lawson's Thames blockade and the Committee of Safety's commensurate bankruptcy and collapse was in allowing Monck's political predominance.⁴⁸⁶ This was the defining action in the King's return. Indeed, Clarendon's *Life* refers to the incident, stating Lawson "brought the whole fleet into the river, and declared for that which was called the Parliament, which break the neck of all other designs".⁴⁸⁷ It is well established that the Commonwealth army was largely responsible for the continued existence of the various Interregnum regimes, the supply of military might to underwrite these Governments being their *raison d'être*, and through whom their pay should flow. The Committee of Safety's disintegration denuded General Lambert's army of these important elements, causing their desertion (see above). This left Monck's descent on London unopposed, allowing him to continue his secret campaign to facilitate the Monarchy's recall via the secluded members' return to the Rump and the elections to the ensuing pro-Royalist free Parliament. Without Lawson's action, the General would not have been able to advance southwards, unable to progress his plot!

⁴⁸² CCSP *vol 4*, p.563 17.2.1660

⁴⁸³ CCSP *vol 4*, p.570 21.2.1660

⁴⁸⁴ *Pepys Diary*, 11.2.1660

⁴⁸⁵ CCSP *vol 4*, p.569 21.2.1660, p.570 21.2.1660

⁴⁸⁶ CCSP *vol 4*, p.532 26.1.1660; *Pepys Diary*, 7.2.1660

⁴⁸⁷ Clarendon *Life vol 6*, pp.509-510

Conclusion.

The King variously attempted to regain his dynastic regal inheritance, his powerlessness highlighting his inability to achieve this. His communication with potential targets via envoys emphasised his impotence, the remoteness preventing any chance of wielding influence through a physical presence. It was only when circumstances converted the Navy's senior commanders, those being General George Monck, Admiral Edward Montagu and Vice-Admiral John Lawson, to the Royalist cause that Charles's fortunes changed, the Navy's own Royalism transforming the situation. The senior naval command's actions in regime-change had the biggest effect, with its control over events absolutely ensuring that the King was recalled. Further, the Navy dictated the terms and timing of the King's Restoration, as well as his method of transport.

During the critical period in late 1659 and early 1660, although Montagu was out of commission at this point, it was a triumvirate of General Monck, Vice-Admiral Lawson and Arthur Haselrig that conducted a covert plan to repatriate his Majesty. Lawson's blockade of the Thames was the crucial, defining event that commenced the process. Without this, it is highly probable that Charles would have remained a continental nomad. Lawson's action halted trade, depriving the last cash-strapped Commonwealth regime of Customs revenue. In a fit of pique at being unable to trade, City merchants consequently refused further loans to the Committee of Safety, resulting in this Government's bankruptcy and collapse. This denied Lambert's substantial army of the Administration that provided its *raison d'être* and coordination, and through which its massive pay arrears could flow. The army's desertion allowed Monck and his small band of troops to progress from Scotland to London unopposed, beginning the Restoration process, commencing with the secluded members' late February 1660 re-instatement. The navy also underwrote this operation with the alarming threat of coming up the Thames and menacing London's centre, including the commercial docks, Tower and the House, with the floating gun batteries that their vessels represented should MPs refuse to acquiesce.

Monck had previously been appointed Commander of all forces, including the navy. He used this position to ensure the Sovereign's return on the terms and at a time dictated by the navy. Whilst it is intrinsically appealing to assert that the army was responsible for the Restoration,

this was impossible. The vast bulk of the 40,000-60,000 soldiers were scattered throughout the Kingdom, suppressing local populations, too remote from the centre of power to affect events. Additionally, it remained Republican even after Charles's return (see above and Chapter Three). Further, its martial incoherence and incapacity meant any efforts to prevent a Royalist landing would have been weak. Only the General's small band retained some discipline, his duplicitous public protestation in favour of Parliamentary authority, in contrast to his private negotiations with the King, in combination with the progressive purging of his unit of troublemakers deluded them into compliance with his wishes for a Monarchical future. However, due to Montagu's manipulation of the fleet whilst on isolated detachment in the Baltic Sound, the navy was Royalist, its unity, strategic coherence and adherence to martial regimen meaning that the nautical military's command had a willing tool with which to affect its scheme. Once the General had completed his negotiations with Charles, reflected in the King's Breda Declaration, he was able to order Montagu to repatriate the Monarch from the continent at a suitable moment without awaiting the completion of Parliament's deliberations. Consequently, the navy was undeniably the senior arm of Monck's command. Further, the Royalist propaganda emanating from this popular Institution, encapsulated in the deafening acclamations of joy in Dover at their new Commander-in-Chief's landing on shore, helped to shape the public's welcome for the King.

In total, the evidence provided by this Chapter turns existing scholarship on its head. It demonstrates that rather than the King manipulating an unwitting navy for his own ends, or the army being the key actor in the King's return, it was the navy's keenness for the King's re-instatement that was the deciding factor, circumstances driving its conversion to the Royal cause, thereafter playing a central and vital role in the Restoration. It was impossible for the army to be responsible for this seismic political event, its mutinous and ineffective behaviour due to pay arrears, Republican leanings and essential geographic dispersal precluding this. Without the triumvirate's determined efforts in late 1659 and early 1660, the apogee being Lawson's action in the Thames which allowed General Monck and Admiral Montagu's manoeuvres, the Restoration would not have happened. The evidence for this is overwhelming, and it is surprising that traditional views of the army's primacy haven't been widely revised.

Chapter 2 - The Restoration.

Introduction.

Chapter One recounts the navy's vital role in ensuring the King's return in the year to approximately April 1660, controlling events to ensure it happened. Chapter Two continues this, outlining the navy's pivotal function from about early April to early June 1660, that is the Restoration itself. This period covers the King's preparations to return to his homeland, his physical departure from Holland to his arrival in Dover and his ceremonial entry into the Capital and ascension to Monarchy. This signifies a transition phase, the process of moving from one reality to another, from a stateless nomad to assuming the reins of power of an important state. Charles II's Parliamentary invitation to occupy the throne highlighted his precarious position. In lieu of the increased legitimacy and acceptance by his subjects by becoming Monarch through divine inheritance, and with no army to underscore his rule beyond the initial Restoration period, Charles had to establish an alternate narrative to justify his right to sovereignty.

Charles faced a number of problems at Restoration. His lengthy absence abroad meant that he had to compete with Oliver Cromwell's strong domestic and international reputation. Also, it was essential that the King secure his regime's financial viability, yet he didn't control the provision of taxes, that instead lying with Parliament. Furthermore, the country was politically riven between Royalist cavaliers and staunch but resentful Republicans. Additionally, during the Interregnum Republicans had replaced the Royal officials responsible for implementing Government policies in the counties, necessitating the Royalists' speedy reinstatement. Many of these cavaliers had suffered during the Commonwealth, their large expectations of rewards from the incoming Administration outstripping the Monarch's resources, leaving aggrieved and unreliable gentry. Further, the extreme religious issues that had partly helped to initiate the Civil Wars remained. These tensions arose from the sects who wanted to retain their rights of worship and the Episcopalian Royalists who wished to re-establish the Church of England. Consequently, in the absence of an effective army, it was essential to use soft power to gain his new subjects' acceptance, cultivating the image of a competent, majestic and semi-divine ruler to establish himself with an elevated status compared with his people. Charles's use of imagery has been

explored by such scholars as Anna Keay and Kevin Sharpe.⁴⁸⁸ This thesis won't repeat their findings, instead concentrating on the King's use of the navy to bolster his nascent reign.

As Chapter One additionally reveals, Charles was relatively powerless whilst on the continent, his remote existence highlighting his inability to influence domestic English events towards re-securing his throne. However, from the moment Parliament proclaimed him and following the navy's arrival at Scheveningen, this changed. From that point he was formally a head of state, and visibly directly commanded a major military machine. Yet his tentacles of power remained weak, given that he was unknown both to his new country and to the military as its leader, his new subjects having had Republican governments for a lengthy term. Further, as explained by Neil Keeble and JD Davies, Oliver Cromwell had gained high prestige as a successful international statesman founded on military might.⁴⁸⁹ This created a difficult reputational hurdle for Charles. Therefore, it was vital to use the transition period to maximise his smooth accession.

In summary, Chapter Two covers these events. At General Monck's request Parliament formally appointed Edward Montagu as the navy's operational head in early March 1660, and thereafter he assembled a powerful fleet which eventually arrived in the Downs in late April. On May 8th Charles was formally proclaimed King in London, elaborate processions taking place to announce this throughout the Capital, other parts of the country mirroring this. Parliamentary commissioners were dispatched from both the Commons and Lords to Holland to welcome their new head of state. However, Montagu complied with Monck's orders to embark prior to their arrival at Dover, a separate ship being left behind for them. The fleet sailed on May 13th, arriving at Scheveningen on the 15th.

Foul weather prevented the Royal party from embarking till the 23rd, the Dutch filling the intervening time by elaborately feting the new English King. On May 22nd the Duke of York, as Lord High Admiral and the King's deputy, boarded the flag ship to prepare for the King's arrival onboard, this event taking place the following day. Immediately the fleet sailed from Holland the dreadful weather cleared, benign conditions dominating till the King's May 25th disembarkation at Dover. General Monck was first to meet the new Sovereign at the water's

⁴⁸⁸ Keay *Magnificent*; Sharpe *Rebranding*,

⁴⁸⁹ Keeble *Restoration*, p.103; Davies *Pepys Navy*, p.20

edge, the King progressing through Dover to Canterbury where he remained till the 28th. During the 28th Charles and his cavalcade processed to Chatham, leaving there on May 29th, his 30th birthday, to enter London. En-route to his final Whitehall destination, the streets were strewn with ribbons, bells ringing and thronged with countless numbers of his new subjects. As this shows, the navy was the first arm of state to greet the King. This was incredibly symbolic. It was this institution that had manufactured his return, making sure that it actually happened by providing his conveyance home at a time of its choosing. That is, it widely displayed its adoption of him as its new commander-in-chief and head of the English state, its presence underlining his nascent stature, its power ensuring his safe return and the successful completion of the naval commanders' project. Additionally, the fleet's size and power advertised his martial leadership credentials, and that he could call on this successful institution to undertake his bidding. The army merely provided a land-based ceremonial escort with an element of security included.

This Chapter therefore shows that to maximise soft power's effects, both the King and navy employed a strategy of using the navy to maximise the Monarch's image in order to overcome the lack of army and divine inheritance to legitimate his rule. This is multi-faceted, and it's possible to separate the Sovereign and navy's efforts. On the one hand, Charles attempted to create a statesman-like image, together with the accompanying aloofness and majesty, prior to leaving Holland, the awaiting navy off Scheveningen providing a powerful backdrop to enhance his persona both as a reputable international player that can project impressive power and a martial leader. Further, he took the opportunity that the closed world of the return journey to England provided to undertake various activities to aid his accession to the throne, such as building closer bonds with his navy and starting to address some of the social problems awaiting him like the country's political rifts and the necessity to reward past faithfulness.

On the other hand, the navy's role was crucial, and was driven by its top three commanders, George Monck, Edward Montagu and John Lawson. Therefore, during this transition phase they variously ensured the King's return, ranging from using the navy to transmit heightened propaganda, enhancing Charles's diplomatic coup whilst in Holland and ensuring the King's safe passage from Holland to London. Overall, this provided the new King with a willing tool to implement his policies. Foreign and domestic audiences would have been impressed with his martial image, establishing the Monarch as a desirable international statesman and a

credible rival to Cromwell. It would also imbue patriotism in the domestic populace with himself as the focal point, aspiring to cement himself at the country's societal pinnacle.

Importantly, it was vital to both the King's and the three naval commanders' survival that Charles's Restoration was successful. As Chapter One highlighted, the three maritime leaders had gone to extraordinary lengths to secure the Monarchy and should this fail, a possible returning Republican government might condemn them as traitors, with an associated grisly death. For Charles, it could lead either to a return to permanent exile, or suffer similarly to his father. This was no abstract threat, with General Desborough and others planning to assassinate both the King and General in April 1660, and riots in various parts of the country against Monarchy's re-instatement.⁴⁹⁰ Also, political moves to thwart the Restoration were afoot. Consequently, for all leading parties the stakes couldn't be higher.

Pamphlets are important in assessing the nation's reaction to the King's and navy's various attempts to maximise the transition phase's use to boost Charles's accession. Although they don't prove what ordinary people thought about the Monarchy's Restoration outside of official messages, they give an indication. The regime would not have attempted propaganda that they felt was totally contrary to the public mood. This can confirm the regime's communication strategy to modern scholars and heighten the probability that they have received views contemporary to the events being examined. Eye-witness accounts provided by pamphlets add colour and veracity to that supplied by memoirs, letters and diaries. Further, they frequently involved large print runs for commercial circulation, allowing an understanding of additional insights absorbed by the populace. Consequently, pamphlets, circulars and panegyrics have been used in addition to other sources in this Chapter and thereafter.

Several headings are used to highlight how the navy was variously of use to Charles in this transition phase. These are 'The Powerful King', 'The Statesman King', 'The Warrior King', 'The King's Semi-Divinity', 'The Majestic King', 'The King's Charm Offensive', 'The Grateful King and Rewarding Faithfulness', 'Symbolism of Monarchy', and 'The King's Media of Propaganda'. The 'Conclusion' completes the Chapter.

⁴⁹⁰ CSPD 1659-1660, Vol CCXX pp.409-411 8.4.1660 Llanothing, pp414-415 entry 81 *Anonymous to the King*, Vol CCXXI p.433 Order in Parliament

The Powerful King.

As expounded by Paul Seaward, Cromwell had been successful at constructing a substantial reputation internationally, yet his military-backed method of acquiring prestige was not available to Charles.⁴⁹¹ This was because it was vital for the army to be swiftly disbanded both in order to reduce its substantial cost burden on the country and to eliminate the threat that this Republican institution posed to the foundling Monarchy.⁴⁹² Consequently, the population's lengthy experience of the Commonwealth meant that the King needed to create an alternate image to counter that of the old Protector and the absence of formal monarchy. Therefore, the navy was used to partially fill the void left by the army, and maximise the King's opportunities provided by the transition phase to successfully accede. Clearly its land-based opportunities were restricted, but it could alternately boost the King's overseas prestige. For example, a fearsome fleet bristling with guns hovering off a strategic part of a foreign country's coast, or the threat of that fleet interfering with a nation's merchant shipping could dramatically project naval power in support of international diplomacy, aiding Charles's attempts to imbue respect in both domestic and foreign audiences (see also Chapters Three to Five).

The navy variously supported Charles, commencing prior to his formal Restoration, endeavouring to provide his journey to power with a formidable start. Firstly, the navy's existence and pro-royal credentials would have underscored to domestic and overseas audiences that the King could call on the support of the navy's impressive might, enhancing his international reputation. Consequently, the powerful fleet of 30 vessels allocated to escort the King from Holland, under the command of England's most senior operational Admiral, Edward Montagu, parading round the closest part of England to the continent, that is the South East, couldn't have failed to impress both English and continental voyeurs.⁴⁹³ It appeared at the Hope on March 27th, the Nore on April 5th, the Spits the following day, and on April 9th passed South Foreland to finally anchor at the Downs at Dover.⁴⁹⁴ That domestic audiences were very aware of the assembling fleet is evidenced by the early 1660 rumours

⁴⁹¹ Seaward *Restoration*, p.32

⁴⁹² Keeble *Restoration*, p.49; Seaward *Restoration*, p.77

⁴⁹³ Barlow *Journal*, p.41, p.42; Penn *Memorials*, pp215-216

⁴⁹⁴ Montagu *Journal*, 27.3.1660, 5.4.1660, 6.4.1660, 9.4.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 27.3.1660, 5.4.1660, 6.4.1660, 9.4.1660

that circulated widely.⁴⁹⁵ Foreign audiences may also have been able to view this fleet, its existence being visible from Calais.⁴⁹⁶ Certainly, the fleet could see the French coast whilst in the Downs.⁴⁹⁷

Secondly, that this fleet was strongly pro-Royal was obvious. The public Royal acclamations, colourful banners and copious celebratory gunfire whilst awaiting sailing orders would have easily reinforced this.⁴⁹⁸ Indeed, its gunfire would have advertised its existence and would have been audible in France. For example, when the King finally landed at Dover the resonance from the castle's celebratory canon volleys could be heard up to forty miles inland, a greater distance than Calais.⁴⁹⁹ Consequently, the navy's gunfire could have sparked the curiosity of France's English agents, warranting their investigation, reporting home thereafter. And following Parliamentary orders Montagu maintained naval patrols of the channel, his correspondence to the French regarding captured shipping made whilst awaiting the time for his fleet to repatriate the King supporting this.⁵⁰⁰ Further, merchant vessels continued to sail independently, or benefitted from escorted convoys allocated by Montagu to such places as the Baltic, Hamburg, Rochelle, and on towards the Mediterranean. These merchants would have constituted informational conduits to their foreign destinations.⁵⁰¹

The Statesman King.

This display of military might at the King's command would have substantially supported other diplomatic manoeuvres whilst in Holland. Once he was proclaimed by Parliament on 8th May 1660, Charles's international stature was transformed, foreign governments keen to treat him as a reigning Sovereign. This is evidenced by the French, Spanish and all the other ambassadors present in the country promptly congratulating him, the Spanish King augmenting this with copious gifts. Furthermore, all of the Dutch states courted Charles,

⁴⁹⁵ Barlow *Journal* p.41

⁴⁹⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 9.4.1660

⁴⁹⁷ Barlow *Journal*, p.42

⁴⁹⁸ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.78 *Fleet*; Montagu *Journal*, p.75 3.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 9.4.1660, 3.5.1660, 4.5.1660, 7.5.1660, 11.5.1660, 13.5.1660; Brook *England triumph*, p.87; Barlow *Journal*, p.42

⁴⁹⁹ Barlow *Journal*, p.45

⁵⁰⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 7.5.1660; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 19.3.1660 p.128 entry 126

⁵⁰¹ Montagu *Journal*, p.75 30.4.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 8.4.1660, 30.4.1660, 8.5.1660; CSPD *1659-1660*, Vol CCXX 1.4.1660 p. 404 entry 58, General Monck to the Admiralty Commissioners, p.405 1.4.1660 Gen Montagu to Sir Ashley Cooper, Bart, Whitehall, 3.4.1660 p.406 Capt Hen Hatsel to Robt Blackborne

other ambassadors paying their addresses once the King had arrived in London, including the Portuguese and Swedish. Additionally, Holland invited him to transfer to the Hague from the more politically provincial Breda, where they extensively entertained him.⁵⁰² In fact, even during the journey to the Hague his Majesty was regaled. Enough yachts were sent to Breda for the King's entire party, and the five-mile coach journey from Rotterdam to the capital was lined with so many people

“that they seemed to pass through one continued street, by the wonderful and orderly appearance of the people on both sides, with such acclamations of joy as if themselves were now restored to peace and security.”

Once there, the Sovereign was provided with a “magnificent residence”.⁵⁰³

The impressive sight of the large Royal fleet when anchored at Scheveningen couldn't have failed to enhance the King's image with the Dutch. Its Royal credentials were highlighted by such things as multiple gun salutes, Royal insignia consisting of various silk flags including the Duke of York's anchor and cable symbol, a further 166 silk pennants and streamers, and scarlet cloth and other decorations ordered by the Admiralty Commissioners wound round the flagship's waist and rigging. Other vessels also had magnificent adornments, such as the ships transporting the two Dukes, the *Swiftsure* and the *London*, having copious reams of scarlet-coloured Kersey embellishing their decks.⁵⁰⁴ And when combined with the fleet's size and strength, the Monarch's power as its commander-in-chief would have been stark.⁵⁰⁵

The Netherlanders were also keen to have audiences with Charles, both sides conducting these in French, the Hollanders aggrandising this by gifting him £6,000 for his immediate needs.⁵⁰⁶ In fact, the Dutch invited the King to their States Assembly, and unprecedentedly

⁵⁰² Fanshawe *Memoires*, p.93; Fuller *Panegyric*, p.7 verse 26; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.330; Brook *England triumph*, p.98; *True account*; Barlow *Journal*, p.42; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 20; 10.5.1660-17.5.1660 Article 2 p.8, Article 3 p.4, Issue 22 Article 4 p.4; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 28.5.1660 p.149 entry 145; Clarendon *History vol 6*, pp.226-227 Entries 232-233, 15.5.1660 p.228 entry 235; Whitelock *Memorials*, 10.5.1660 p.414

⁵⁰³ Clarendon *History vol 6*, 15.5.1660 p.228 entry 235

⁵⁰⁴ CSPD *1659-1660*, Vol CCXXI p.437 entry 23, Order by the Admiralty Commissioners

⁵⁰⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 16.5.1660, 22.5.1660, 23.5.1660; Walker *A circumstantial*, p.11; Barlow *Journal*, p.43; CSPD *1659-1660*, Vol CCXXI p.437 11.5.1660 entry 23 Order by the Admiralty Commissioners

⁵⁰⁶ *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.5; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 28.5.1660 p.149 entry 145

the President allowed his Majesty to make a speech from his chair.⁵⁰⁷ The newspaper, *Mercurius Publicus*, helped convey to his new English subjects Holland's splendid treatment of the Monarch, his international reception being represented as so warm that it was as if he was their King.⁵⁰⁸ Further evidence of Charles's enhanced international standing resulted from his delayed departure for England caused by bad weather, again being feted by the Dutch for 4 days, being shown much respect, with the room's fittings including glass-lined walls, a royal canopy, state glasses and solid gold plates. The King took the place of honour at the banqueting tables, surrounded by the English Royal family and the Prince of Orange. Various valuable gifts with the appearance of "a profusion of gold" were presented to Charles, including the gold plates valued at £6,000, a bed worth £7,000, table linen at £1,000 and 600,000 gilders as pocket money.⁵⁰⁹ The ceremonies variously ended with music, fireworks and waterworks, and volleys from small and large guns. And of course the Hollanders followed this up with the November 1660 presentation of the 24 art works by Dutch Masters.

Mercurius Publicus reported that news of these festivities was received by every part of Holland. The newspaper also ensured that the King's international reception was received throughout large parts of England.⁵¹⁰ In fact, the news spread even further afield, ambassadors such as the Venetian one adding with concern to his reports home that such Dutch profligacy was aimed at using the King's physical presence to cement a strong relationship, this close association presenting the world with a formidable power. To enhance this opportunity all courtiers in attendance were also provided with both accommodation and presents.⁵¹¹ Further, the Dutch provided a military escort to the shoreline consistent with a visiting head of state (this being the temporary border between Holland and the English territory signified by the ships), consisting of many horse and foot and about 40 pieces of ordnance, accompanied by many Dutch dignitaries. The Dutch cortege copiously matched gun salutes with the fleet. The latter's enthusiasm was highlighted by every ships' crew voluntarily extending the standard round of gun salutes,

⁵⁰⁷ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 11.6.1660 p.156 entry 157

⁵⁰⁸ *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.5

⁵⁰⁹ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.87 His Majesty is in Holland at this day: May 60; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.330; Brook *England triumph*, p.98; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 pp. 5-6; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 28.5.1660 p.149 entry 145, 8.6.1660 p.153 entry 153; Clarendon *History* vol 6, 2.5.1660 p.233 entry 245; Whitelock *Memorials*, 10.5.1660 p.414; Baker *Chronicle*, p.733

⁵¹⁰ *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.5

⁵¹¹ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 8.6.1660 p.153 entry 153, 11.6.1660 p.156 entry 157; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.227 entry 234

replacing the formal homage by such a spontaneous and chaotic free for all which lasted for such a protracted period that listeners could have been forgiven for believing that

“a great storm or tempest of thunder and rain had descended”.⁵¹²

Visually this was significantly enhanced by up to 100,000 spectators lining the shoreline to see this spectacular international diplomatic event, marking the Monarch’s wider reputational enhancement beyond mere elite political circles.⁵¹³ In total, this treatment by the major powers of France and Spain and extended by Holland, one of England’s major international rivals, substantially raised Charles’s kudos. Further, domestic audiences must have been impressed, news of their new Sovereign’s diplomatic triumph being variously communicated to England by the naval ships’ crews and merchants. Consequently, Charles’s exploits must have heightened patriotism via their new head of state’s treatment, the navy furnishing a powerful backdrop to underline the King’s reputation.

On its May 15th arrival at Scheveningen it was immediately obvious that the fleet’s mission included a major international diplomatic element as well as repatriating the King. Some Dutch gentlemen promptly boarded the ship to pay their respects to the Admiral, kissing his hands. Montagu also sent envoys with large retinues to Dutch dignitaries such as the Prince of Orange and the Queen of Bohemia to pay his respects. On the 16th Admiral Opdam and others visited the flagship. On the 22nd Montagu wrote to the Danish Ambassador to Holland, and Admiral Opdam paid another visit. Also, on the same day, such a multitude visited the *Naseby* that the crew had great trouble performing their duties. The stories conveyed of this 80 gun, 3-deck leviathan when the voyeurs returned ashore would have reinforced to the Dutch the new English Monarch’s martial power, enhancing him as a head-of-state to be respected.⁵¹⁴

Furthermore, the fleet constituted the King’s first entrance onto English ‘soil’. The Prince of Orange and other Dutch royalty and dignitaries accompanied the King onboard the flagship.⁵¹⁵ Following the formal greetings from Montagu and other English nautical

⁵¹² Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.93-94; *True accompt*; Barlow *Journal*, p.43, p.44

⁵¹³ Montagu *Journal*, p.77 23.5.1660; Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.93-94

⁵¹⁴ Montagu *Journal*, p.76 14.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 14.5.1660, 16.5.1660, 22.5.1660; Barlow *Journal*, p.42

⁵¹⁵ Walker *A circumstantial*, p.11; Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1660; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.330; *True accompt*; Barlow *Journal*, p.44; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.6

dignitaries, Charles and his brothers dined with the Dutch head of state and his associates, the Princess Royal, the Queen of Bohemia and the Dutch Admiral Opdam. This represents a return diplomatic event, the King entertaining his foreign guests on his own English territory. This took place in the flagship's Coach, this being the ship's most prestigious part, normally being the Admiral's domain, taking the event out of the public gaze, emphasising the participants' aloofness and majesty. The Dutch visitors left the flagship before she sailed, evidencing them as visitors to the English party, marking this as a state visit.⁵¹⁶ Amongst other methods, news of these events would have been transported via the ships' crews and the multitude of nobles on board the fleet as it returned to England with its Royal cargo, enhancing the King's statesman reputation. Further, *Mercurius Publicus* reports ensured the message was widely domestically dispersed. An indication of the King's heightened international influence is that simultaneous to him being feted in the Hague he was requested to intercede with the Dutch authorities to promote the application of a candidate for an officer post in their army.⁵¹⁷ Also, in total, all of these continental diplomatic triumphs allowed the Monarch to successfully rival Cromwell's past diplomatic glories.⁵¹⁸

The Warrior King.

In addition to Cromwell's positive international reputation, as Davies stated the King also keenly felt Cromwell's military reputation at his shoulder, resulting in his strategy to construct an equal or superior image (see also Chapter Three).⁵¹⁹ Given the urgency to rapidly disband the army (mentioned above), this left the navy with which the King could achieve this. Charles variously attempted this. The Admiral augmented this in such ways as providing a personal escort and publicly showing homage to the King, evidencing the efforts that both parties made to enhance the transition phase's contribution to successfully conclude his Majesty's repatriation.

For England to commit such a sizeable fleet outside of battle conditions to collect its new Monarch made important statements, visibly confirming to the world his new realm's

⁵¹⁶ Montagu *Journal*, p.77 23.5.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.87 His Majesty is in Holland at this day: May 1660; Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1660; Walker *A circumstantial*, p.11; Brook *England triumph*, p.98; *True accompt*; Barlow *Journal*, p.44; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.6; Baker *Chronicle*, p.733

⁵¹⁷ CCSP vol 5, pp.34-35 17.5.1660

⁵¹⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1660

⁵¹⁹ Davies *Pepys Navy*, p.20

intention to firmly support its new ruler, forcibly if necessary. This would have delivered the substantial message that it regarded Charles as a warrior King. The impressive visage would have been heightened by the many vessels' huge size. In addition to enhancing Charles's martial credentials as its new commander-in-chief, the flotilla presented the image of a daunting armada, underscoring the Sovereign's and country's ancient claim at such a conspicuous time to be 'Sovereign of the Seas', indicating from the reign's commencement that Charles intended this to be fundamental to his new regime. Pamphlets and other publications evidence that domestic audiences particularly appreciated this message, possibly mirroring the public mood. Such captions as "Your narrow seas for foreigners do wrong To claim them", and "Witness thee Holland, and the rest/but I Now leaving you striking sail to's Majesty" refer to the fear-driven duty of England's great maritime rival, Holland, to dip her sails in salute to Charles's vessels.⁵²⁰ And such phrases as "For we will make their top-sails/Unto our fleet shall bow" highlight that even ordinary seamen appreciated the importance of upholding this ritual, forcibly if necessary.⁵²¹ Additionally, foreign audiences would have recognised the overt meaning, given the King's very widely advertised progress to his new domain.

As his representatives the King's brothers could aid him, the Duke of York's post of Lord High Admiral under Charles's overall command swelling Royal naval supremacy. On 22nd May 1660 the Dukes of York and Gloucester boarded the flagship prior to the King, anticipating Charles's imminent arrival. This also marked the Duke of York formally taking over his naval role, further accentuating Charles's Royal authority. Evidence of the navy's acceptance of its new Commander-in-Chief is that the Admiral met the royal brothers en-route in his own barge, providing an honoured escort. Once onboard ship the fleet's guns fired salutes, publicly illustrating a martial support, respect and a welcome for the Royal party. During their short stay, the two Royal brothers toured the flagship, making themselves visible to the whole crew, later repeating the exercise in the Vice and Rear-Admirals' vessels. This would have enhanced the personal link between the Royal family and the navy at this early stage, aspiring to an accompanying heightened loyalty. Further, the Admiral accompanied the two Dukes while they visited the other vessels, validating his illustrious companions' exalted position to the sub-commanders. Soon after boarding, the King's

⁵²⁰ Fuller *Panegyric*, p.8 verse 28; *Congratulation*; Oxinden *Charls triumphant*, p.10 verse 11

⁵²¹ Grove *Valiant seamans 1660*, verse 5

representatives reclined under an awning on the quarterdeck, allotting the various vessels' places and roles for the return journey to England.⁵²² A meal followed this, attended by the two Royal princes and the ships' commanders, James and Henry occupying the places of honour. During the meal a harper belonging to one of the captains, Captain Stayner, played, displaying additional pleasure at the Royal visit via providing entertainment.⁵²³ These highly visible activities on the fleet's most important vessel, located where the ship was controlled during sea-going operations firmly illustrates the Royal family's naval leadership. In total, all these aspects strongly evidence the King's command of a navy that wanted him at its pinnacle, publicly raising Charles's warrior credentials.

On the fleet's arrival at Scheveningen Montagu sent a message to the King requesting an order to come ashore so he could visit his Majesty at Breda to kiss his hands.⁵²⁴ This was a common greeting between people, the social inferior performing this function to show respect, but on this occasion both the request for the order in combination with the kissing of the King's hands signified the fleet's operational chief's acceptance of the King's new overall command. Then, on meeting the Admiral on 23rd May 1660 the King returned the courtesy, kissing Montagu's hands.⁵²⁵ Consequently, although Charles was socially dominant, it displayed his respect for the navy, the Admiral acting as the organisation's proxy, the King's superior position conveying the commander-in-chief's desire to have a close relationship with it. That both parties took the opportunity to do this at this early stage evidences that both parties were keen to work together to heighten the transition phase's success.

Further, following the state dinner with Dutch dignitaries hosted by the King once onboard the flagship, he renamed all of the fleet's vessels sent to attend him, having been provided with a list of them in advance by the Duke of York following his visit to the flagship. For example, the *Naseby* was renamed the *Royal Charles*, the *Richard* into the *Royal James*, the *Speaker* into the *Mary*.⁵²⁶ This clearly illustrates the new Monarch publicly closely

⁵²² Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.93-94; *Pepys Diary*, 22.5.1660; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.6; Clarendon *History vol 6*, 21.5.1660 p.229 entry 238; *Baker Chronicle*, p.733

⁵²³ *Pepys Diary*, 22.5.1660; *Barlow Journal*, p.43

⁵²⁴ *CCSP vol 5*, p.35 May 18/28.5.1660 4 o'clock. Maj R Harley to Hyde; Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.228 entry 237

⁵²⁵ *Pepys Diary*, 23.5.1660

⁵²⁶ *Montagu Journal*, p.77 23.5.1660; *Rugg Diurnal*, p.87 May 1660 His Majesty is in Holland at this day; *Pepys Diary*, 23.5.1660; Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.14-15; *Englands joy* p.3; Fuller *Panegyric*, p.8 verse 28; *Brook England triumph*, p98; *Barlow Journal*, p.29, p.36; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.6; Clarendon *History vol 6*, 21.5.1660 p.229 entry 238; *Barker's Chronicle*, p.733

associating with the navy, demonstrating his ascendancy over the defunct Commonwealth's erstwhile military arm. Further, his ability to undertake such an important task evidences his overall command, clearly stating both that the navy was his personal domain, and conveying a message to the wider world of a warrior King that has a formidable tool to do his bidding. *Mercurius Publicus* additionally amplified the message by its wider domestic distribution. JD Davies has also recognised the importance of the King's renaming exercise, being in tune with the points stated here, that is that on boarding his flagship Charles "immediately took possession of his navy in a very personal and symbolic way".⁵²⁷ That these points were appreciated widely, including by sailors, is evidenced by the ordinary seaman Barlow's statement

"the next day after, his Majesty was pleased to new name some of the ships, which he might now call his own without fear", the renaming taking place because "some which were called after the names of some towns which Crumbwell had won, or which stood out against the King, and they were all named anew, he not well affecting them which were traitors to the crown, and which had murdered his father".⁵²⁸

Prior to disembarking at Dover the King and his two brothers sampled seamen's rations for their breakfast, including pease, pork and boiled beef.⁵²⁹ The Royal party ate nothing else, portraying a closeness with the navy by breaking their fast on such common fare. About one o'clock in the afternoon the Royal party went ashore. A brigantine with 12 oars, a galley sail and a small amount of brass ordnance, had been built for the purpose.⁵³⁰ Yet the Royal party spurned this, accompanying the Admiral in his barge, attended by a large flotilla of boats from other ships to land the associated nobles, copious gun salutes from the ships being reported to sound like the rocks themselves heralding and welcoming the King's arrival.⁵³¹ Selecting Montagu's barge illustrates the King's desire to further emphasise his closeness to the navy, the Admiral's escort, the other boats and the impressive gun volleys advertising the navy's adoption of their new Commander-in-Chief, and its emotional attachment to him by ensuring his safe repatriation. Pepys reported that on the shoreline there were

⁵²⁷ Davies *Pepys Navy*, p.18; Davies *Kings*, p.45

⁵²⁸ Barlow *Journal*, p.44

⁵²⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660

⁵³⁰ Barlow *Journal*, p.44

⁵³¹ Montagu *Journal*, p.78 25.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660; Barlow *Journal*, p.45

“infinite the crowd of people and horsemen, citizens, and noblemen of all sorts”.⁵³²

This vast horde of witnesses must have been impressed with the ebullient nautical loyal display, raising the King’s warrior credentials and maximising the chances of making the transition phase a success. Further, contemporary pamphlets reinforce this. Phrases such as “By sailing to and fro/And will fight day and night/To preserve you from your foe” represent the desired official message of the ordinary seaman’s willingness to weather all climates, and undergo all sorts of other trials, on their beloved Monarch’s behalf.⁵³³

The King’s 25th May journey from Dover to Canterbury ostensibly marked the formal end to the navy’s involvement in his transitional journey, and the new Monarch’s focus on it. It would consequently be expected that his attention would now focus on the army. Indeed, this mostly happened, and as pamphlets copiously reported, the army made its presence felt almost immediately. Prior to arrival at Canterbury Charles passed Barham Down where many foot regiments and their leaders presented themselves for his inspection. Each soldier had their swords drawn, bowed and kissed their hilts, shouts and trumpets voicing their acclamations. The Sovereign’s 28th May journey from Canterbury to Rochester had a large army escort.⁵³⁴ The following day, during his progression into London the army lined the road to honour the King.⁵³⁵ At Dartford Heath Monck’s officers presented a declaration of loyalty.⁵³⁶ At Blackheath substantial troop numbers were arrayed for the King to review, before providing an additional escort to his grand procession through the Capital. In fact, the army dominated this parade, thousands of troops participating.⁵³⁷

Yet, despite all of this, on May 28th, when surrounded by such large troop numbers, Charles detoured to Chatham dockyard. Here he spent copious amounts of time inspecting all the ships there, including the behemoth *Royal Sovereign*, also receiving loyal gun salutes from all the vessels. Following this, the King attended a banquet held by Chatham’s Dockyard

⁵³² Pepys, *Diary* 25.5.1660

⁵³³ Grove *Valiant seamans 1660*

⁵³⁴ Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.15-16, p.17; Hammond *London triumphant*, p.5

⁵³⁵ Brook *England triumph*, p.99; *Mercurius Publicus* Issue 22 Article 4 p.2

⁵³⁶ Hammond *London triumphant*, p.6; *Mercurius Publicus* Issue 22 Article 4 p.2

⁵³⁷ Brook *England triumph*, pp.102-103; Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.17-18; Hammond *London triumphant*, p.6; *Mercurius Publicus* Issue 22 Article 4 pp.3-4; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 11.6.1660 pp154-155 entry 156; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.274; Baker *Chronicle*, p.733

Commissioner, Peter Pett.⁵³⁸ On arriving at Cobham House the army re-established its presence, Charles receiving Colonel Gibson's addresses, the house owner, as well as from his regiment, prior to spending the night there.⁵³⁹ All eyes would be watching the new Monarch's every move, such papers as *Mercurius Publicus* reporting these events, ensuring that the required message was received.⁵⁴⁰ In fact, Kent's high-profile nature at this point in history is underscored by the masses of people of all social conditions rushing there, including many nobles who vied with each other to make the most extravagant display, including strikingly appavelled entourages, including Monck, together with the apparition of his Majesty's new coach.⁵⁴¹ In fact, many impoverished cavaliers were so keen to impress the King that they indebted themselves to fund their apparel.⁵⁴² So, despite the army's dominant attendance, and that it was vital for this transition phase to go smoothly and create a magnificent spectacle, the King desired to publicly portray both his closeness with, and interest in, his navy by interrupting his procession to inspect the vessels and enjoy the Dockyard Commissioner's banquet. Further, the navy's noisy homage evidences its desire to concur with this. In combination, these aspects would have strongly contributed to Charles's attempted construction of himself as a warrior King, the navy hugely contributing to this by being specially picked out in such public circumstances and where the army would have expected prominence.

It was vital for the erstwhile naval supremos' survival that the Restoration was successful. However, the combination of the people having got used to Government maintaining its power through force of arms and threats to the King's life meant that their project was seriously at risk. Various plots to assassinate the King and his family had been active, such as that led by Lambert and Desborough the previous month, preparations being well advanced including with ammunition and funds. Further, the plotters firmly expected that the majority of the army throughout multiple counties would be actively supportive.⁵⁴³ Indeed, the King even received warnings of them whilst on the continent, such as one issued by a

⁵³⁸ Walker *A circumstantial*, p.17; Brook *England triumph*, p.100; Hammond *London triumphant*, p.5; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 Article 4 pp.1-2; Baker *Chronicle*, p.733; Heath *Glories and magnificent*, pp.130-131

⁵³⁹ Walker *A circumstantial*, p.17; *Englands joy*, p.5; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.331; Brook *England triumph*, p.100; Hammond *London triumphant*, p.5; Baker *Chronicle*, p.733

⁵⁴⁰ Brook *England triumph*, p.99; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 Article 4 pp.1-2

⁵⁴¹ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 4.6.1660 p.151 entry 148, 11.6.1660 pp154-155 entry 156

⁵⁴² Ludlow *Memoirs*, 22.5.1660-25.5.1660 p.273

⁵⁴³ CSPD *1659-1660*, Vol XXXII 8.4.1660 pp.409-411 entry 70 Llanothing, Desboro President; Ludlow *Memoirs*, 10.4.1660 p.258

very concerned anonymous German youth.⁵⁴⁴ Also in April another plot by sectaries was uncovered in the Capital, the potential rebels' loaded weapons being discovered on searching the suspected house.⁵⁴⁵ And the Government was incredibly concerned about adverse public reaction to the May 8th 1660 official proclamation of the King's accession, and the likelihood of widespread riots and popular uprisings. Consequently, they ordered that all

“sheriffs, justices of peace, mayors, constables and other ministers of justice who were in office 25th April 1660 shall be continued, acting in the King's name and style, and endeavour to suppress all riots and misdemeanours against the laws and peace of the realm, and all treasonable words against the King's person and authority, and proceed against all offenders according to law and justice. All military officers and soldiers to assist them therein”.⁵⁴⁶

Furthermore, the reason that the King lodged at Colonel Gibbons' home in Rochester, surrounded by his loyal regiment, was due to fears to his safety.⁵⁴⁷

Additionally, prior to his actual repatriation there were Parliamentary attempts to frustrate the Restoration. As Chapter One shows, the 25th April 1660 return of Parliament was overwhelmingly cavalier. Yet there were several vocal anti-Royalists, particularly Presbyterians. Consequently, in addition to potential physical threats to the King, political attempts to hinder or delay the King's return existed.⁵⁴⁸ Consequently, during Charles's transition to accession, both military institutions remained at full strength. As pamphlets and other sources celebrated, this allowed the navy to safely deliver the Monarch to Dover. In fact, the navy was so keen to circumvent problems that, on Monck's instructions, Montagu ignored Parliament's orders and sailed with the whole fleet to collect the King without awaiting the Commons' Commissioners sent to formally invite the Monarch over. The Commissioners' delayed arrival at Scheveningen particularly highlights the navy's ultimate control over events, determined to ensure the project's success to safely repatriate his Majesty.⁵⁴⁹ As pamphlets and other sources highlight, the land-based supreme naval

⁵⁴⁴ CSPD 1659-1660, Vol CCXX 15.4.1660 pp.414-415 entry 81, ---- to the King

⁵⁴⁵ CSP Venice vol 32, 23.4.1660 p. entry 131

⁵⁴⁶ CSPD 1659-1660, vol CCXXI 7.5.1660 p.433, Order in Parliament on information on riots and tumults in sundry parts by unquiet spirits

⁵⁴⁷ Ludlow *Memoirs*, 22.5.1660-25.5.1660 pp.273-274

⁵⁴⁸ CCSP vol 5, p.13 4.5.1660; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.481

⁵⁴⁹ Montagu *Journal*, 10.5.1660 p.75, 13.5.1660 p.76; Rugg *Diurnal*, 1.5.1660 p.81; Clarendon *History* vol 6, p.491, pp.498-499

commander, Monck, who also commanded a sizeable army presence, then assumed the duty of conducting him safely from Dover, through the exposed countryside to the Capital. Monck's processional position next to the King into London and through its streets allowed him to defend the new Sovereign till he reached the Monarch's new Whitehall palace's relative safety should the need arise.⁵⁵⁰ To supplement this, soldiers were ordered to march through London with their swords drawn, merging magnificence and security. The soldiers lining the route not only assured Charles's progression through the streets, but also could intervene should sudden threats emerge.⁵⁵¹ And to complement this the King informed the General in advance of his intended arrival point of Dover, and his route to the capital thereafter.⁵⁵² To continue the protection, Charles was asked which London residence he would initially use so that preparations could be made.⁵⁵³

In conglomeration this large military presence surrounding the Monarch communicated a warrior King image to the populace and the world, highlighting the military's support of the Monarchy and the military commanders' desire, including the navy ones, to apply the same force as had sustained the Commonwealth should it be necessary. It also evidences the navy's pre-eminent role, because once the King had landed, ongoing opposition was futile, the project being *fait accompli*. Everything thereafter en-route to London constituted the King's person being safeguarded by the army, compared with the navy's role in ensuring the successful completion of the Restoration itself. No stronger illustration of Charles as a military commander and warrior King is possible at this stage, and of the navy's importance to his Majesty's nascent regime.

The King's Semi-Divinity.

Portraying himself as semi-divine was important to Charles, his new subjects believing that God's providence provided the nation's ruler. Consequently, as Anna Keay stated, acquiring his new subjects' religious support could enhance the new King's rule, its absence further threatening it.⁵⁵⁴ As Bishop Gilbert Burnet wrote, Charles sought

⁵⁵⁰ *Congratulation*; Andrews *King and kingdoms*, verse 2; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, pp.330-331; Oxinden *Charls triumphant*, p.22 verse 10; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.55; *Symplegades antrum*, p.47

⁵⁵¹ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.274, 29.5.1660 p.416

⁵⁵² Baker *Chronicle*, p.732

⁵⁵³ Baker *Chronicle*, p.732

⁵⁵⁴ Keay *Magnificent* p.145

“to govern both our religion and our laws”.⁵⁵⁵

To establish a semi-divine Monarchical status would have substantially enhanced his ability to rule with his people’s acquiescence. Therefore, the navy was variously used to erect an image for the King to maximise the transition phase’s opportunities through the appropriation of a spiritual persona. Consequently, extensive messages were transmitted that God ordained Charles’s Restoration, the navy providing a sacred conveyance.

The ‘Touching the King’s Evil’ ceremony would have supported this, this ritual’s commencement prior to leaving Holland advertising his sacred persona. Therefore, as Pepys reported, he ‘touched’ 260 at Breda, and others at Bruges and Brussels.⁵⁵⁶ And, following the Restoration, it was swiftly reintroduced into Britain.⁵⁵⁷ Indeed, Anna Keay shows nearly 7,000 being ‘touched’ in 1660 alone.⁵⁵⁸ Chapter Three will provide more details including about the Angel Coin, but Charles II’s resurrection of it was purely as a token, given to the supplicant to continue the healing process thereafter.⁵⁵⁹ The navy was important here, one side of the token figuring a ship in full sail, the other representing the significantly religious St. Michael the Archangel. Whilst ‘touching the King’s evil’ itself signified the King’s semi-divinity, the navy’s central position in this deeply spiritual and important occasion associates the King with this popular institution at an event at the core of his rule. Further, Charles’s immediate reintroduction of this defunct coin specifically to reinforce his semi-divinity illustrates the importance that the navy held both to him and his perception that his subjects held of it, allowing him to bask in reflective glory from this successful military organisation, portraying himself as a nautical and military ruler. It also provides supplementary confirmation of Charles’s desire to be ruler of the seas, a role constituting mystical significance in the ‘touching’ ceremony. This would have further emphasised his aspirant image as a strong divinely approved martial leader and would have been crucial in such a religious age. Evidence of Charles’s success at communicating his semi-divinity is highlighted by supplicants travelling from such distant regions as remote parts of Germany to

⁵⁵⁵ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.611

⁵⁵⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 23.6.1660

⁵⁵⁷ Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, 6.7.1660; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.98 The Duke of York; Pepys *Diary*, 23.6.1660

⁵⁵⁸ Keay *Magnificent* p.211 Appendix 1

⁵⁵⁹ *Angel coin*

participate in this spiritual ritual prior to his journey to England.⁵⁶⁰ English supplicants' application to partake of this religious healing further affirms this policy's accomplishment.

Following the fleet's arrival at Scheveningen the weather was foul, Pepys explaining that it

“hath not been known for days together such weather at this time of year, a great while. Indeed, our fleet was thought to be in great danger”.⁵⁶¹

Yet this substantially changed following the fleet's subsequent departure for England. The “fresh” wind provided ideal sailing conditions, the “glorious” weather and cloudless sky presenting a suitably benign backdrop to the jovial shipboard atmosphere.⁵⁶² In a highly religious age and where sea travel was dangerous, this portended sacred approval on the Monarch's transitional journey to his new kingdom, the navy providing the blessed conveyance towards the divine future. Also, it appropriates a quasi-divine persona to the navy, its sacred conveyance of the King portraying the divine hand conducting him to his ‘appointed’ future, nautical risk being celestially obviated. Celebratory panegyrics and other publications strongly reinforced this message, passages such as “No wonder then that calm the waters were/Since Neptunes Master Charles himself was there/Besides the Sea-God the winds commanded/Not to be boisterous till his guest had landed” portraying God commanding the sea deity, Neptune, to provide calm sailing conditions. Other phrases depicted nymphs surfacing from their watery domain to witness the King's glorious passage.⁵⁶³ Poems also exalted this phenomenon, “The Gods did guide their sail and course, the winds were at command/And Dover was the happy place where first they came on land”. In fact, tracts stating “From Holland's Hague the seas rejoiced much more/To bring our King and princes to our shore” represented that the sea itself was even involved in this sacred enterprise.⁵⁶⁴

The flagship's onboard mood on the transitional return journey was full of joy and mirth.⁵⁶⁵ Being led by the head of the Church of England it denotes the end of the puritan sects'

⁵⁶⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 23.6.1660

⁵⁶¹ Pepys *Diary*, 20.5.1660

⁵⁶² Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1660; Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.14-15; Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.94-95

⁵⁶³ Fuller *Panegyric*, p.8 verse 27; Oxinden *Charls triumphant*, p.10 verse 11

⁵⁶⁴ *Symplegades antrum*, p.46

⁵⁶⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 24.5.1660

ascendancy including Anabaptists and Presbyterians, the new era permitting and encouraging fun. This colourful atmosphere evidences this new attitude's embracement by society's nobility and opinion formers, illustrated by the profusion of onboard alcoholic drinks, sheep, fowl, bread, tongue and sweetmeats.⁵⁶⁶ Trumpets and other instruments provided a constant musical ambiance.⁵⁶⁷ Canon fire throughout the journey was constant.⁵⁶⁸ During the voyage the extremely benign weather added to the atmosphere, synergistically enhanced via the wherries going between the vessels and spreading the merriment.⁵⁶⁹ Even the seamen and officers played a full part by retaining a spotless cleanliness and keeping the banners and streamers flying.⁵⁷⁰ Further, the King's message to his new subjects was reinforced in print, such phrases as "Hail Charls once more of whom the sea gods care/So great was, that he in your arms bear/And in whose presence so much mirth did pass" reflecting the sea-gods' oversight of both the journey and the mirth.⁵⁷¹ In total, the onboard activities and the propaganda highlights the King's bid for Anglican support, this social strata consisting of high levels of Monarchists who would hold influential positions in post-Commonwealth politics, constituting a powerful Royalist 'party'.

On first landing at Dover and during his welcome-meeting with Monck next to the shoreline, the King dropped to his knees with his arms thrown to heaven, his private prayers being inaudible to anyone.⁵⁷² He had just left the sea with which he desired to foster strong associations in his new strongly religious subjects' minds. Charles presented himself as the divinely ordained returning Monarch. His display communicated strong piety, acknowledging the Almighty's Will in restoring him, his imperceptible words conveying a deeply personal relationship with God. Further, it portrayed the wandering prince being divinely returned to the 'chosen land', similar to the culmination of Joshua's wanderings in leading his tribe to Israel. Indeed, pamphlets even likened this rebirth of the country to the book of 'Genesis', darkness banished by the new light of the King's reign arriving from over the sea.⁵⁷³ However, given the shoreline's close proximity and that he was in the presence of the erstwhile supreme naval commander, he was also allegorically communicating the navy's

⁵⁶⁶ Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.93-94, pp.94-95

⁵⁶⁷ Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.94-94

⁵⁶⁸ Clarendon *History vol 6*, 23.5.1660 p.233 entry 245

⁵⁶⁹ Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.93-94

⁵⁷⁰ Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.94-95; Barlow *Journal*, p.43

⁵⁷¹ Oxinden *Charls Triphant*, p.11 verse 12

⁵⁷² Price *Letter*, 26.5.1660 pp.3-4

⁵⁷³ *History of his sacred Majesty*, p.217

crucial part in the exiled Sovereign's miraculous return. This would have allegorically associated the institution with an image of divine purity, the King's close association with it bolstering his own reputation in return. Thousands of people witnessed this scene on the beach, and it was reported in print to the wider public in tones such as the prayers being intended

“to be as much in secret as such an act at that time and place could permit him to be, and to speak more to God in his mind, than he thought meet should be heard by men”.⁵⁷⁴

This evidences the messages' extensive transmission and the objectives' successful achievement.

The public were presented with further religious nautical allegories. Pamphlets emphasised the King's wanderings as maritime voyages. God was the pilot, eventually returning the hallowed Monarch to England's port to his people's joy.⁵⁷⁵ Another message represented Charles's physical landing place on the Dover beach as a holy sight, akin to the location of St. Thomas's murder, consequently worthy of being kissed by pilgrims.⁵⁷⁶ And the King's blessed conveyance, *the Charles*, was likened to the *Ark*, delivering the saviour through the waters to the final destination.⁵⁷⁷ One verse even likened Charles's return to the coming of Jesus Christ, and the Saviour's banishment of all evil.⁵⁷⁸ Even Monck was accredited with divine powers, his role in engineering the King's return and banishing the chaos left by the Republic being likened to God's creation of the world, and turning night into day.⁵⁷⁹ In aggregate, these passages mirror the myriad of divine images that the King wished his new subjects to receive, his desire to transmit them reflecting the official perception of the popular mood, substantially contributing to the overall strategy of enhancing the King's image to win his new subjects' hearts and minds. Also, they present a holy image for the navy, its task of repatriating the King being a sacred undertaking, his watery continental adventures reinforcing his association both with the sea and the hallowed navy. Additionally, Charles

⁵⁷⁴ Price *Letter*, 26.5.1660 pp.3-4

⁵⁷⁵ Fuller *Panegyric*, p.11 verse 39; *Congratulation*; Oxinden *Charls triumphant*, p.11 verse 12

⁵⁷⁶ Oxinden *Charls triumphant*, p.14 verse 2 (i)

⁵⁷⁷ *History of his sacred Majesty*, p.219

⁵⁷⁸ Oxinden *Charls triumphant*, p.15 verse 2 (ii)

⁵⁷⁹ Oxinden *Charls triumphant*, p.45 verse 15

gains reflective martial glory from this popular institution, its successful military halo sanctifying its hostile activities.

The Majestic King.

At Restoration, the King's childhood governor, the Duke of Newcastle, repeated his advice to the new Monarch, stating that

“there is nothing that keeps up a King more than ceremony and order, which makes distance and this brings respect and duty and obedience”.⁵⁸⁰

In other words, majesty needs to be majestic. Therefore, the strategy to use the navy to heighten the Monarch's image complimented the other attempts he made to establish an exalted image during his transition, aspiring to boost his persona on accession.

The navy enhanced the Sovereign's majestic impression, positively boosting it prior to the transition's start. On 8th May 1660 the King was proclaimed in London.⁵⁸¹ This involved elaborate processions to various venues where ceremonies took place. For example, the cavalcade of dignitaries was forced to halt at the City gates as they were barred shut, needing to proclaim themselves before entry was granted, the King at Arms then formally informing the Mayor that the King had been proclaimed. Monck was with the Speakers of both Houses at the head of the extensive procession. The General's prominent place and journeying in his coach compared with the ensuing numbers on horseback or on foot highlights the navy's place of honour at the very centre of the country's political moves to repatriate the King. It celebrates its vital role in the Sovereign's forthcoming Restoration, contributing to the King's majestic image via the pageant that this early extravaganza provided. That the people enthusiastically received this ceremony's important message is evidenced by the large crowds who witnessed it. Windows and streets were laden with spectators, their loud and joyous screams when the new Monarch was proclaimed drowning the celebratory church bells.⁵⁸²

⁵⁸⁰ Sharpe *Rebranding*, p.148

⁵⁸¹ Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.330

⁵⁸² Rugg *Diurnal*, pp.79-80 8.5.1660 His Majesty Proclaimed in London; Baker *Chronicle*, p.730

Furthermore, Charles himself commenced his presentation of majesty prior to leaving Holland, personally maximising the transition period's opportunities. In addition to his experiences listed under 'the King as a Statesman', the new Monarch undertook other ceremonies. On 22nd May 1660, the day before he finally embarked onto the flagship, the King appeared on the shore, which was lined with so many spectators that the sand couldn't be viewed. On receiving news of this Montagu's orders of two rounds of gunfire as a salute descended into disorder, the vessels firing salutes voluntarily for the rest of the day, indicating the navy's genuine welcome to its new Commander-in-Chief.⁵⁸³ This very public demonstration of the navy's joy at the vision of their Monarch would have elevated the King's image, standing at a distance, surrounded by multitudes, receiving the powerful fleet's military acclamation. This would have emphasised his aloofness and majesty. Pamphlets published at the time by sailors evidences the success of the King's action, verses such as "Twas we did sail you over/To English ground again/And landed you at Dover/With all your noble men" signalling the ordinary sailors' joy in their duty to collect their King.⁵⁸⁴

At the first day's culmination on board the flagship on his return to England, Charles dined alone in the Coach, having spent the whole day with the ship's crew and accompanying nobles (see above). Mostly the people on board dined with friends, continuing the party atmosphere thereafter.⁵⁸⁵ Had the King behaved similarly to his companions, he would have dined in their company. However, the Monarch's voluntary solitary meal points to a deliberate decision to create a barrier between himself and the merry accompanying crowd. Further, to dine in the Coach, that is the ship's most prestigious part, highlights his exalted status. In combination, these latter two points illustrate Charles's intentional attempt to use the circumstances of the transition provided by the navy to enhance his mystique, maximising every opportunity to boost his successful ascension.

The King's Charm Offensive.

In the absence of an army to underscore his reign, Charles's strategy to use the navy to apply soft power to enhance his image crucially included his need to win his new subjects' hearts

⁵⁸³ Pepys *Diary*, 22.5.1660

⁵⁸⁴ Grove *Valiant seamans 1660*, verse 4

⁵⁸⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1660

and minds. The King's personality could be enormously useful here. As Gilbert Burnet stated

“the King had the art of making people grow fond of him”, telling his “stories with good grace”, being “the best bred man of the age”.⁵⁸⁶

Additionally, Burnet stated that

“the King has a vast deal of wit and a great deal of judgement when he thinks fit to employ it”.⁵⁸⁷

These traits' positive application during the transition phase could be profitable to the nascent Sovereign. The fact that the transition phase constituted a closed world, bounded by the perimeters of each ship, allowed the King to utilise this facet of the journey provided by the navy, maximising the effect on his captive audience, the exclusion of outside influences provided by the sea accentuating his activities' effects and enhancing his opportunities to bond with his most influential subjects.

Many English gentlemen of quality were in Holland with the King prior to his return, trying to solicit Royal favours by promptly impressing the Monarch, large numbers either travelling there during April and early May 1660, or accompanying the fleet to collect his Majesty.⁵⁸⁸ The King used the transition phase to implement his charm offensive, attempting to positively engage his nautical companions' emotions. Much like in modern times, when our current Sovereign issues an invitation to a Buckingham Palace Garden party, those selected to share the King's flagship for the return journey would feel greatly honoured.⁵⁸⁹ Further, he charmed them with many stories of his adventures full of both humour and pathos. In one poignant story he described himself walking after the battle of Worcester for three or four

⁵⁸⁶ Burnet *History vol 1*, pp.94-95, p.611

⁵⁸⁷ Burnet *Supplement*, p.48

⁵⁸⁸ Montagu *Journal*, 6.5.1660, 8.5.1660, 9.5.1660; CCSP *vol 5*, p.8 3.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 4.4.1660, 20.4.1660, 21.4.1660, 27.4.1660, 7.5.1660, 9.5.1660, 11.5.1660, 17.5.1660; Walker *A circumstantial*, p.11; Fuller *Panygeric*, p.7 verse 23; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.330; Barlow *Journal*, p.42, p.43; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 14.5.1660 p.143 entry 139, 21.5.1660 p.146 entry 142; Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.226 entry 232, p.227 entry 234; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.262

⁵⁸⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1660, 24.5.1660; Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.11-12, pp.14-15; Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.93-94; Price *Letter*, 26.5.1660 pp.3-4; Andrews *King and kingdoms*, verse 1; Grove *Valiant seamans 1660*, verse 4

nights without any rest in nothing but rags. Other amusing tales involved his deeds on the continent, like the time he visited a Rouen inn, looking so poor that the owners thereafter checked all the rooms to ensure that he hadn't stolen anything. Further, this atmosphere continued the following day, attendants that had accompanied the King on his wanderings recounting further instances of the monarch's exploits, such as Thomas Killigrew's anecdote of Charles's clandestine meeting in the Hague with the visiting dowager Queen of Judea and Palestine, as recorded by Pepys (although he may have mistook Palestine for Palatine).⁵⁹⁰ These influential societal leaders would have eventually disbursed to their homes nationally, having been thoroughly charmed, significantly enhancing their existing Royal support, Charles aspiring that this pro-Royal emotion would recruit their localities willingly to his rule. This has many similarities to Jesus, gaining the disciples' loyalty prior to them travelling widely to relay his religious message and draw people to the Faith. That the King's approach worked is evidenced by the whole company's excitement, the auditors recounting Charles's stories to each other in his absence until they went to bed on the first night.⁵⁹¹

When transferring ashore at Dover, the King's two brothers and Montagu accompanied him in the Admiral's barge, *Cuttance*, the Flag Captain, taking the helm. In their close wake another boat contained Pepys, Mr Mansell (the King's devoted and incredibly valuable supporter), a footman and his Majesty's favourite dog. This canine fouled the boat, inducing mirth in the vessel's occupants, and an accompanying sense of the Monarch's human mortality. Pepys stated that it made

“me think that a King and all that belong to him are but just as others are”.⁵⁹²

As a long-term canine owner, Charles must have been fully aware of the risk of this kind of reaction from his pet as it was transported through the nautical unsettling motions. This, and the fact that the Sovereign chose to include the dog in a separate boat to himself, signals a deliberate decision to expose the dog's actions more widely, attempting to portray himself as containing human characteristics. The audience's amusement and their fond words display an affection for the King, evidencing the policy's success. This points to the Sovereign's clever use of naval vessels to achieve his persona's enhancement.

⁵⁹⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 24.5.1660

⁵⁹¹ Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1660

⁵⁹² Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660

Charles conducted a larger charm offensive and deliberate plan to woo all his new subjects, attempting to reduce political opposition, the navy's experience of the King during the transition phase being important here. In fact, the navy was used extensively for this purpose. As reported by *Mercurius Publicus*, this was initiated in Holland prior to the arrival of Montagu's fleet, the newspaper's correspondent travelling independently via Breda and Flushing and reporting on May 10th. The King sought to convey to his new Kingdom a message of the upright and righteous morals of himself and his court. The journalist reported the King's court as "ordered and disciplined" and his Majesty being full of "prudence," rejecting debauched courtiers. Charles used his navy to repatriate this messenger, the vessel constituting a swifter and surer method of conveyance than a commercial ship and its delay to await a full complement of cargo and passengers.⁵⁹³ Whilst still in the Hague the King behaved towards the Parliamentary Commissioners

"very graciously" and with "sweet countenance", treating "every one of them severally and particularly obligingly."⁵⁹⁴

The City's deputies were flattered with extravagant compliments, many being knighted.⁵⁹⁵ Indeed, many more knights were created on Charles's journey from Dover to London.⁵⁹⁶ Even the visiting Presbyterian party were similarly treated, although their entreaties for the curtailment of Episcopalianism were rebuffed.⁵⁹⁷ Naval ships were used to transport these Commissioners, affording them the status and security that only a warship could provide.

Once ashore Charles continued to apply his charm. For instance his attitude was described by John Price as displaying

"piety, clemency, a sweetness of nature and meekness"

⁵⁹³ *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 20 Article 5 p.4

⁵⁹⁴ Clarendon *History vol 6*, 14-16.5.1660 p.229 entry 239; Baker *Chronicle*, p.732

⁵⁹⁵ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.230 entry 240

⁵⁹⁶ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.274

⁵⁹⁷ Clarendon *History vol 6*, p.241 entries 243-244

amongst other characteristics to the illustrious escorting noblemen.⁵⁹⁸ Further, Dover's Mayor and Aldermen presented him with a bible, the Sovereign declaring that this was the most important thing to him in all the world.⁵⁹⁹ Also, as the Venetian ambassador reported, whilst at Dover the Monarch greeted Parliament's and the City's additional Commissioners

“most graciously and with every sign of affection”,

this being appreciated by witnesses as it was “to the general satisfaction” of all.⁶⁰⁰ At Canterbury his Majesty stood for many hours

“at great personal inconvenience”

to receive the congratulations and submission of very large numbers of well-wishers. To amplify the impression, the Dukes of York and Gloucester performed similar duties.⁶⁰¹ When staying overnight in Rochester at Colonel Gibbon's house, during an address to the King by the Colonel the Sovereign made

“many expressions to the Colonel, gave a testimony of his affection to him in particular, and to all the army in general”.

Of course, by temporarily residing at Cobham House, the King was also conveying a ‘special’ treatment and honour on the owner.⁶⁰²

This charm offensive was extended to foreign powers, Charles using the transition phase's exuberance to initiate positive overseas relationships. Many foreign ministers travelled towards Dover to greet the new Sovereign, Charles variously appearing gracious in such ways as discoursing with them in their own languages.⁶⁰³ And following his installation at Whitehall, the King continued to live his life publicly, making time for “the hordes” of people who wanted to offer their devotion, and eating his meals in public ‘à la française’, to

⁵⁹⁸ Price *Letter*, 26.5.1660 p.6

⁵⁹⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660

⁶⁰⁰ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 4.6.1660 p.151 entry 148

⁶⁰¹ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 11.6.1660 pp.154-155 entry 156

⁶⁰² *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 Article 4 p.2

⁶⁰³ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 11.6.1660 pp.154-155 entry 156

everyone's delight.⁶⁰⁴ The message would have been exponentially magnified by being published in *Mercurius Publicus*, ensuring exposure to the wider public. However, the navy's contribution during the transition phase was key, the King's work on society's elite during the return journey's closed world providing a precursor to his onward charm offensive. Following his nautical audience's disembarkation, the influence constituted in both their superior social status and their sharing of the King's return journey would have influenced the awaiting shore-bound nobility, Charles's reception in Holland and Royal stories whilst on board being transmitted and enhanced as per human nature. Further, as these elite would have accompanied the King in his cavalcade towards London, their Royalist influence would have continued and spread, gossip being a powerful method of transmitting messages. These messages would have been further magnified via widely distributed publications such as *Mercurius Publicus*.

The Grateful King and Rewarding Faithfulness.

Burnet stated that Charles

“had a very ill opinion both of men and women”, that “nobody did serve him out of love” and that “the world is governed wholly by interest”.⁶⁰⁵

As Knighton and Keeble explained, many cavaliers and their families had suffered for their continued loyal support during the 'troubles', such as through heavy fines and loss of estates. The King's strategy to use the navy to erect a suitable image for himself to aid his accession included appearing grateful, partly manifesting this via rewarding faithfulness. Critically, the King therefore instinctively desired to encourage the future loyalty of his traditional followers by appealing to their self-interest, the public display of this also being important.⁶⁰⁶

However, Charles had committed to Monck that no honours would be awarded without the General's approval. Yet, as Keeble expounds, a paucity of honours risked this vital social class's alienation and diminution of support, especially as Charles would have been very conscious that his future policies' implementation in the counties would rely on these

⁶⁰⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 11.6.1660 pp154-155 entry 156

⁶⁰⁵ Burnet *History* vol 1, p.94; Burnet *Supplement*, p.48

⁶⁰⁶ Knighton *Pepys*, p.10; Keeble *Restoration*, p.82

influential individuals.⁶⁰⁷ Consequently, the King only presented minimal rewards to loyal followers at this stage, such as offering employment.⁶⁰⁸ However, other opportunities for providing rewards existed, allowing the King to positively use the transition phase to woo the accompanying cavaliers.

In addition to the large number of gentry who travelled to Holland prior to the King's repatriation, many had accompanied him during his wanderings (see above), a multitude returning home on board the flagship with the Monarch.⁶⁰⁹ Similar to our current Sovereign's invitations to garden parties at Buckingham Palace to more informally reward subjects, this would have been prestigious to these people in an age when 'honour' was highly important, the lucky few being chosen to share the Monarch's temporary watery domain on the navy's flagship. That honour was incredibly important is highlighted by the nobles' strict processional order in the King's cavalcade as it progressed through London on 29th May 1660. For example, nobles were ranked according to their peerages, such as Dukes being followed by Earls.⁶¹⁰ Similarly when disembarking at Dover the King spurned the brigantine that had been prepared to convey him ashore. Instead, he and his two brothers chose to travel in the Admiral's barge.⁶¹¹ This publicly displayed trust and intimacy between the King and Admiral, and a bestowal of Royal approval on Montagu, designed to engender heightened Monarchist emotions and support from the Admiral. The approach's success is evidenced by Montagu's transports of joy that his arrangements had gone smoothly, and that shortly afterwards he held the strong opinion that he was so friendly with the King that he could ask any favour he pleased.⁶¹²

On arrival at Dover Charles gifted £500 to the flagship's servants, officers and crew.⁶¹³ A further one month's pay was promised to the whole fleet that transported him from Scheveningen, totalling £6,538. The flagship's share alone was £777.⁶¹⁴ Contrary to previous governmental promises to fully remunerate sailors, this one was fulfilled, Captain Henry Cuttance collecting the amount from the Admiralty just three months later.⁶¹⁵ This

⁶⁰⁷ Keeble *Restoration*, p.82

⁶⁰⁸ CCSP vol 5, p.3 1.5.1660, p.14 4.5.1660, p.34 17.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660

⁶⁰⁹ Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.11-12

⁶¹⁰ Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.19-20

⁶¹¹ Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660

⁶¹² Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660, 2.6.1660, 3.10.1660

⁶¹³ Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660; Barlow *Journal*, p.45

⁶¹⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 2.6.1660

⁶¹⁵ CPSD 1660-1661, p.146 Vol VIII July 1660 entry 150; Pepys *Diary*, 14.8.1660; Barlow *Journal*, p.45

signals two messages. Firstly, the King's gratitude to the fleet, itself forming a substantial proportion of the total fleet in service, achieving the desired effect of soliciting the recipients' joy. For example, Pepys was "very much joyed".⁶¹⁶ Secondly, the promise and actual payment of one month's pay would have highlighted a new era, in contrast to the Commonwealth's dismal performance in meeting the armed forces' arrears, and that the King's promises in the Breda Declaration would be honoured. This symbolism instilled further loyalty in the fleet, evidenced by their enthusiasm to celebrate the King's birthday by firing the ships' guns without the Admiral's orders, the latter having been ashore for the day.⁶¹⁷ Additionally, this highlighted the importance of the navy's support to the new regime, no such promises or gratuities being made to the army other than the general Breda Declaration's promises.

Furthermore, shortly after landing at Dover Charles bestowed the Order of the Garter on both Monck and Montagu, the former receiving it immediately the King arrived in Canterbury, Charles's brothers also taking part in the General's ceremony. The Admiral received the honour the following day, the King at Arms, Sir Edward Walker, being sent to the flagship in Dover in the early hours of the morning.⁶¹⁸ The Admiral summoned all his commanders to the flagship to witness the ceremony, his insistence on the public display signalling both his pleasure in the award and the King's objective to heighten his servants' loyalty being achieved.⁶¹⁹ In fact, such was the King's hurry to publicly reward his illustrious faithful servants that this initial informal presentation was performed, the formal investiture's solemnisation, including the presentation of the Order's habit and other requisites, having to wait till Charles could enact them at a later date at Windsor Castle.⁶²⁰ Normally the Garter was only awarded to high nobles such as Emperors, Kings, Princes, Dukes and Earls.⁶²¹ Yet both the Generals-at-Sea received theirs prior to their ennoblement using special letters from the King to undergo a speedy and unofficial process.⁶²² Also, the King and his brothers

⁶¹⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660

⁶¹⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 29.5.1660

⁶¹⁸ Montagu *Journal*, p.78 27.5.1660; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.98; Pepys *Diary*, 27.5.1660; Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.16-17; *Englands joy*, p.5; Hammond *London triumphant*, p.5; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 Article 1 p. 6; Clarendon *History*, 23.5.1660 p.233 entry 245; Ludlow *Memoirs*, 22.5.1660-25.5.1660 p.273; Baker *Chronicle*, p.733

⁶¹⁹ Montagu *Journal*, p.78 27.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 27.5.1660; Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.16-17

⁶²⁰ CSPD 1659-1660, 26.5.1660 Vol CCXXI p.447 entry 54, Canterbury. The King to Gen Monk

⁶²¹ Pepys *Diary*, 27.5.1660; Hammond *London Triumphant*, p.5; CSPD 1659-1660, 26.5.1660 Vol CCXXI p.447 entry 54, Canterbury. The King to Gen Monk

⁶²² CCSP vol 5, p.37 May 1660 Two Copies; Pepys *Diary*, 27.5.1660

personally placed the Garter on Monck.⁶²³ These were the first major awards bestowed, publicly demonstrating the King's closeness to the navy, further emphasising his warlike credentials as the commander-in-chief, bestowing rewards on his new underlings. Additionally, it uses the navy to communicate a message more widely, tangibly demonstrating the new Sovereign's gratitude in his rewarding faithful service. That *Mercurius Publicus* reported these two events evidences that the wider public received this message through the newspaper's distribution. Further, prior to the King's return Monck had indicated his expectations for his rewards.⁶²⁴ Charles's willingness to comply after his arrival exhibits the navy's remaining strong influence in the King's mind.

These messages were reinforced by the plethora of additional titles that both Monck and Montagu received within a few months. The General became the Duke of Albemarle, Earl of Torrington, Baron of Potheridge, Beauchamp and Teyes, and commanders of the armies throughout the King's dominions. Montagu was created Earl of Sandwich, Viscount Hinchinbrook, Baron of St Neots. Both also received important household appointments and were appointed as Privy Counsellors.⁶²⁵ In total, it directly proves the vital role and high gratitude that Charles felt that the navy had performed in his Restoration, and the navy's role in maximising the transition phase's opportunities to boost the fledgling regime by portraying a grateful Sovereign. No army generals were honoured at such an early stage.

Symbolism of Monarchy.

Charles's lengthy continental absence meant that his new subjects had been used to associating power with Republican symbols. Consequently, in accordance with his strategy to use the navy to raise his persona, the King used the transition phase to send subliminal messages to the wider public. Consequently, the use of symbols and allegories became important. The King commenced this whilst in Holland.

George Downing was the Commonwealth's Ambassador to Holland.⁶²⁶ Prior to embarking onto the flagship the King knighted him, providing Downing with a naval ship for his and his

⁶²³ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.88 May 1660 His Majesty Lands

⁶²⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, p.10 4.5.1660 Lord Craven to Charles II

⁶²⁵ Brook *England triumph*, pp.115-116; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 Article 4 p.1; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.178 Vol X 3.8.1660 entry 36 Westminster

⁶²⁶ CCSP *vol 5*, p.34.16.5.1660 Monck to Charles II

household's repatriation.⁶²⁷ This knighting provided an early display of an attribute that only Monarchs possess, that is bestowing such honours, using the navy to highlight the King's superior status by repatriating the newly titled ambassador in advance of the Sovereign. Further, it symbolises the King claiming the Ambassador for himself. This signals the allegiance change by the erstwhile Republican official, allegorically highlighting Charles's victory over the Republic. Sir George's return with his entourage symbolically ends the Commonwealth's foreign presence, and its replacement by Charles's foreign policy. Evidence of this policy's success can be gleaned from Downing's enthusiasm for this honour, expressed in such ways as insisting that his new epithet be used in all future correspondence.⁶²⁸ The recipients of this type of communication would often have been politically influential, with the proud knight taking every opportunity to advertise his new status, and exhibits the Monarch's covert message's success via its receipt by prominent audiences.

On leaving Scheveningen's shore, Charles initially entered a Dutch boat provided to convey him to the *Naseby*. However, before it had launched he and his whole party transferred to the Rear-Admiral's boat which was onshore nearby, further transferring to the Admiral's barge which was close-by in the surf.⁶²⁹ The King also spurned the brigantine that had been sent from England especially to transfer him and his party from the Hague to the awaiting fleet.⁶³⁰ Other highly bedecked English boats were supplied to take off the accompanying nobles, with further nearby craft containing soldiers to provide a military escort for this short voyage, firing a volley in salute as the King boarded the flagship.⁶³¹ This publicly provides tangible evidence to the waiting fleet that at the earliest opportunity their Monarch and supreme commander had chosen to rely on his own navy for his escort, spurning the foreign aid provided. Additionally, the English martial escort waiting in the small vessels points to the navy's acquiescence, evidencing its desire to protect the King from the earliest possible moment. This is in sharp contrast to his years in exile when he had to rely on overseas powers' potential military support, such as for putative landings with foreign troops. Additionally, it strongly indicates a prompt desire to broadcast his appreciation and trust in his maritime service, wishing a close association with it. Further, the navy conveyed a

⁶²⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 22.5.1660

⁶²⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 22.5.1660

⁶²⁹ Montagu *Journal*, pp.76-77 23.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660; Barlow *Journal*, p.44

⁶³⁰ *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 20 10.5.1660-17.5.1660 Article 2 p.8

⁶³¹ Barlow *Journal*, p.44

similar message, illustrating its desire to protect their King from the first possible moment, beginning at the Dutch shore, and ending at the Dover water's-edge.⁶³² This subliminal message's success is evidenced by the fleet's spontaneous gunfire in response to the musket salute from the water-borne soldiers.⁶³³

Prior to his English disembarkation Charles hit his head on a deck-beam in the vessel's coach, providing him with a tangible painful souvenir of his human frailty when starring in his forthcoming elaborate land-based processions. Accordingly, he made light of the matter by marking his height at that spot with his own hand. Additionally, Admiral Montagu ordered that the exact position be gilded, with the place occupied by the King at the coach's table to be marked with a 'CR' and a crown.⁶³⁴ These permanent signs of the Monarch's presence in the flagship at such an auspicious time left a tangible reminder, marking in the ship's most prestigious part the Sovereign's close association with the navy, its permanence reflecting the relationship's durable and perpetual nature to future generations of captains and fleet commanders.

At first landing at Dover's beach near the pier, having been delivered safely by Montagu, the navy's operational head in command at sea, following receipt of Parliamentary permission the first greeting that the new Sovereign received, as Clarendon described "on the brink of the sea", was by Monck, supreme commander of the armed forces including the navy, with huge emotion and respect, the General kneeling as the King embraced and kissed him.⁶³⁵ This presents the navy's supplication to the new Sovereign, reinforcing that this successful and popular military arm regarded the Monarch as 'one of its own', evidencing the navy's affection for the King, and its desire for him to be its new Commander-in-Chief, adding to Charles's image as a warrior King. Further, as outlined above, the events in Dover and Kent were extremely visible to the world's gaze, the navy's supplication and the associated symbolism being consequently highly advertised.

⁶³² Montagu *Journal*, p.78 25.5.1660

⁶³³ Barlow *Journal*, p.44

⁶³⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660

⁶³⁵ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.88 May 1660 His Majesty Lands; Montagu *Journal*, p.78 25.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660; Walker *A circumstantial*, p.15; *Englands joy*, p.3; TH *Inter boreale*, verse 7; *Glory of these nations*, verses 2 and 3; Brook *England triumph*, p.99; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.54; Hammond *London triumphant*, p.4; Barlow *Journal*, p.45; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 21 17.5.1660-24.5.1660 Article 4 p.4; Clarendon *History*, 23.5.1660 p.233 entry 245; Ludlow *Memoirs*, 22.5.1660-25.5.1660 p.273; Whitelock *Memorials*, 22.5.1660 p.414, 26.5.1660 p.415; Baker *Chronicle*, p.733

As reported in *Mercurius Publicus*, Monck made a point of being seen to hasten to greet the King, displaying an attitude commensurate with a nervous subordinate meeting his new superior for the first time, ensuring that this important moment was appreciated more widely than those immediately present. Also, on meeting the King, Monck knelt.⁶³⁶ Both the haste and kneeling publicly signals the navy's submission to its new Commander-in-Chief, the King's public warm greeting signifying that he accepts this charge and his desire to have a close relationship with his navy, aspiring to plant these aspects in the popular mind. It would also have enhanced the Monarch's martial credentials via this commander's public supplication to his new leader. Both parties were keen for this scene to take place and therefore to ensure the maximisation of the transition phase's opportunities by widely communicating this mutually warm message.

To this end, advance communications took place to arrange the date and venue for the King's arrival. On the King's side this is illustrated by his desire for the General to head the Dover welcome proceedings, also providing advance warning of his intended arrival date and location. On Monck's side by stationing a loyal messenger to advise him when the fleet had been sighted.⁶³⁷ Evidence of this carefully constructed symbolism's success is highlighted by the fact that once Monck had made his obeisance to Charles, the surrounding fleet and castles fired their guns

“with such a thundering”.⁶³⁸

Further, *Mercurius Publicus* reported the desired official message of the widespread popularity of all this, stating

“Now did all put themselves into a posture for to observe the meeting of the best of Kings, and the most deserving of subjects; The admirers of Majesty were jealous on the King's behalf, of too low a condescension; and the lovers of duty fearful of the other side of an ostentation of merit; but such a humble prostration was made by his Excellency kneeling, and

⁶³⁶ Price *Letter*, 26.5.1660 pp.3-4; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.6

⁶³⁷ CCSP vol 5, p.34 17.5.1660 Charles II to Monck; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.88 May 1660 His Majesty Lands; Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.94-95; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.54; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.6; Baker *Chronicle*, p.732, p.733

⁶³⁸ Walker *A circumstantial*, p.15; Barlow *Journal*, p.45

so fitting a reception by his Majesty kissing and embracing him, that all parties were satisfied".⁶³⁹

The King's cavalcade from Dover to Canterbury was a very grand affair. The Monarch was in a coach, followed by those of a few other high nobles, each carriage being drawn by six horses. Immediately behind were many hundreds of mounted gentlemen cavaliers. With the King in his coach were his brothers and Monck. One of the most senior nobles, the Duke of Buckingham, was consigned to the boot.⁶⁴⁰ This preference was repeated during the Monarch's processional entry into London, Monck riding either next to Charles, or next to the Marquis of Newcastle immediately in front of the King and his two brothers.⁶⁴¹ The General was the supreme head of the navy, under the newly appointed Prince James as Lord High Admiral. His conspicuous place at the very centre of both processions strongly illustrates the navy's importance to the King, also conveying messages of both gratitude from Charles, and the closeness between the navy and the Sovereign to the wider populace. This is evidenced by the inclusion of its erstwhile most senior commander in the principal coach when leaving Dover and his prominent place in the London cavalcade. Further, *Mercurius Publicus's* reporting of the instances meant that the symbolism's communication was successfully delivered to wider domestic audiences.

Those officers that participated in the King's repatriation had previously received their commissions from the Commonwealth, that is from the Rump or Admiral Montagu, who at that time was still officially a Parliamentary officer. Those officers with unacceptable political or sectarian leanings to the Admiral had been replaced through his purges, such as Anabaptists (see Chapter One). However, it was important for the new Royal naval Administration to consider which officers it desired to retain.⁶⁴² This would tangibly evidence the King's authority over the organisation, the King and his brother, the Lord High Admiral, being seen to exert oversight through the issuance of commissions, further advertising the Monarch's close association with this successful and popular military organisation, as well as enhancing his martial credentials. Additionally, the replacement of

⁶³⁹ *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.6

⁶⁴⁰ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.88 May 1660 His Majesty Lands; Price *Letter*, 26.5.1660 p.6; Eglesfield *Life and reign*, p.331; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 24.5.1660-31.5.1660 Article 1 p.6; Whitelock *Memorials*, 26.5.1660 p.415; Baker *Chronicle*, p.733

⁶⁴¹ *Englands gratulation*, p.3; TH *Inter boreale*, verse 8; Lloyd *Modern policy*, Chapter 2 p.55

⁶⁴² Montagu *Journal* p.79 27.5.1660; Whitelock *Memorials*, 10.5.1660 p.413

tarpaulin by cavalier officers would increase the whole navy's Royal allegiance, aiming at a more biddable service for the Royal policies' implementation.

As JD Davies has explained, it would be important that the service retained some Republican officers (tarpaulins) as an influx of cavalier officers would need to be balanced with existing experienced ones.⁶⁴³ Also, visible discrimination against Commonwealth officers might exacerbate the existing Republican population's alienation. Consequently, this deliberate demonstration of the Royal authority would illustrate to those Republicans remaining in post where the fount of their future employment and promotion prospects lay, providing loyalty in all practical senses, if not emotional, as Pepys suspected.⁶⁴⁴ Davies also highlighted that tarpaulin officers constituted the majority of naval officers until at least the end of the Second Anglo Dutch War. This signals their acceptance of the new Royal reality and evidences this policy's success in highlighting the Royal supremacy.⁶⁴⁵ Additionally, the continuation of adequate tarpaulin numbers would complement other Royal policies aimed at reducing fears in the wider Republican population that they faced public exclusion.

The ultimate symbol of the King's desire to use the navy as a tool to do his bidding is that as part of his negotiations with General Monck prior to his return, Royal confirmation was granted for the General's request to retain command of the army for life.⁶⁴⁶ The King considered no such delegation of command of the navy, retaining full control for himself.

The King's Media of Propaganda.

Consistent with the strategy to employ the navy to construct a positive image for the incoming Sovereign, both the King and the navy undertook propaganda during the transition phase. Charles's efforts started once on board the flagship at Scheveningen. The navy's contribution commenced well in advance of setting sail, continuing once it had returned to Dover. Various other sections include elements of propaganda. However, here the concentration is on the method of delivery, or media.

⁶⁴³ Davies *Gentlemen*, p.35

⁶⁴⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 3.5.1660

⁶⁴⁵ Davies *Gentlemen*, p.35

⁶⁴⁶ CCSP vol 5, p.25 9.5.1660 Enclosure, 'The General's Paper', p.29 11.5.1660 Charles II to Monck; Walker *A circumstantial*, p.15

A substantial fleet assembled in Dover prior to performing its primary function of collecting the King from Holland (see above). In addition to the publicity already mentioned relating to the fleet's existence, the fleet variously contributed other valuable propaganda. Whilst moored in this harbour for several weeks the ships received several visitors. On April 22nd numerous friends from London of various captains dined on board. They brought many tails of events from the Capital such as the King's arms being set up in public places, and the City commissioning the King's arms for the Exchange. On May 7th various nobles visited to view the flagship, Montagu giving them a tour. And later the same day the Jurates from Dover boarded, dining with the Admiral before returning ashore. On May 10th Lord Winchelsea, Dover Castle's Governor dined on board with Montagu. The records reveal that all the visitors had socially superior statuses. As noted, the visitors from London brought news with them, it being highly probable that they transmitted news from the fleet to the outside world following their departure.⁶⁴⁷ The new system of contemporary post houses and the regular, swift post service for visitors to travel on substantially aided this.⁶⁴⁸ And, given the visitors' higher social quality, the messages they conveyed would have gone to others of a similar societal condition, possibly influential opinion formers at English politics' centre in the Capital. Letters from those on board would also have been dispatched to friends and relations at the sender's distant home. That the fleet was strongly pro-Royal by this time meant that the verbal and written messages would have contained strong Monarchical strains. The success of this was evidenced by Pepys, his 4th May 1660 letter to his friend, Mr Doling, variously describing the fleet's Royal emotions, including the unambiguous epithet "vive le roys".⁶⁴⁹ This would have provided active Royal propaganda that this popular institution supported the putative Sovereign, influencing public opinion. Panegyrics also communicated the fleet's Royal support in such phrases as

"But when we saw the Royal Fleet at Dover",

reflecting that these contacts in conjunction with other communications were absorbed by wider audiences.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁷ Montagu *Journal*, p.75 10.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 22.4.1660, 7.5.1660

⁶⁴⁸ Bishop *Advertisement*, Line 1

⁶⁴⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 4.5.1660

⁶⁵⁰ Fuller *Panegyric*, p.6 verse 22

Once the flagship had sailed from Holland, the King was very active, exploring the ship and consequently being seen by crew members.⁶⁵¹ The King's presence together with his legendary charm is highly likely to have won the hearts of many of the crew, heightening the fleet's loyalty to the Monarchist cause, making it a more effective tool for implementing Royal policies. The Royal presence's effects were raised as the Duke of York sailed in the 76 gun *London* with its complement of around 400, and the Duke of Gloucester in the 60 gun *Swiftsure* which would have consisted of a few hundred too. When added to the 80 gun *Royal Charles* with its crew of 600, this would have totalled up to 1,500 seamen and officers.⁶⁵² The sailors' tales to their peers or civilians when ashore or transferred to other ships would have spread the Royalist message, magnifying the propaganda effect. In aggregate, this was part of a process in culturally and emotionally turning this successful organisation from the Commonwealth into the Royal Navy. Pamphlets evidence the approach's success, highlighting the spontaneous

“joyous shouts and acclamations” by ships' crews.⁶⁵³

The navy had other positive influences on propaganda to the wider country. In Dover the locals copiously celebrated the King's forthcoming return. On May 1st the King's flag was placed atop their maypole, the celebrants consuming large quantities of beer and firing guns. Further festivities occurred on May 5th, the streets being strewn with herbs at the arrival of a notable Royalist, Dr. Clarges, on his way to see the King. The fleet's sailors joined in when they had any money or credit for drink, contributing to the joyous atmosphere. The army was strongly Republican till a very late stage (see Chapter One), and at the first instance of these pro-Royal celebrations on May 1st they threatened to intervene to halt proceedings. However, they found that they didn't dare to do so, the pro-Monarchist fleet sitting close-by, bristling with guns and thousands of seamen.⁶⁵⁴ This would have stultified any attempts to interfere with celebrations, illustrating the Navy's pivotal role in continuing to promote the Royalist movement. Further, festivities continued following the King's return, the navy's continuing presence in the port adding to the port and town's pro-Royalist atmosphere. When Charles first landed at Dover, many thousands of locals thronged the shoreline, competing with the

⁶⁵¹ Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1660

⁶⁵² Montagu *Journal*, p.77 23.5.1660; Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1660; Brook *England triumph*, p.98; *True account*; Baker *Chronicle*, p.733

⁶⁵³ Price *letter*, pp.3-4

⁶⁵⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 1.5.1660, 2.5.1660, 5.5.1660

fleet and castles' gun salutes to provide the loudest acclamations of joy, conveying an impressive popular welcome.⁶⁵⁵ Also, local inhabitants built bonfires on the King's 29th May birthday.

Interchanges between the fleet and the town continued similarly to those prior to the King's arrival, such as the Admiral hosting many local dignitaries at dinner on the day following the King's personal anniversary.⁶⁵⁶ Indeed, as popular pamphlets highlighted, phrases such as "You land at Dover, shoals of people come/And Kent alone now seems all Christendom" exhibit that such was the extreme excitement at the King's return that Kent became the very centre of the country's and the wider world's attention.⁶⁵⁷ This evidences that the transition phase's propaganda was very active, these messages being successfully communicated to wider national and international audiences. Further, Dover was a major entrepot to England (see above), this being particularly pertinent with the fleet there and large numbers of merchants and merchant crews passing through the area to the convoys assembling for their departure with accompanying naval escort. After all, ordinary duties continued despite the fleet's involvement in the King's return, pamphlets reflecting in such verses as "We are the prop of trading/What kind so ever it be/The original of lading/Your ships with treasury/None goes beyond a seaman" that sailors fully expected this activity to continue once the transitory excitement from the King's return was ended.⁶⁵⁸ These transitory individuals would have transmitted the Royal message widely, both within England, and abroad, the pro-Monarchist fleet's presence adding an impressive back-drop to the scene.

Of course, the huge public attention focused on Kent during the transition period, and wide transmission of this both domestically and overseas by pamphlets, newspapers such as *Mercurius Publicus* and foreign ambassadors (see above), would have provided a massive propaganda coup for the King. These included the circumstances of his safe delivery by the navy at Dover and arrival onshore, the pomp and the crowds' adulation on his journey to London, his armed forces' acclamation, initiated by the navy in such a dramatic and loyal fashion and which set a precedent for the army to emulate, and his popular image as a majestic, semi-divine but martial Monarch who possessed such charm and graciousness,

⁶⁵⁵ Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.14-15; Pepys *Diary*, 25.5.1660; Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.94-95; Price *Letter*, 26.5.1660 pp.3-4; *Englands joy*, pp.3-4

⁶⁵⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 29.5.1660, 30.5.1660

⁶⁵⁷ Fuller *Panegyric*, p.8 verse 29

⁶⁵⁸ Pepys, *Diary* 31.5.1660; Grove, *The Valiant Seaman* verse 10

again all very substantially enhanced by the navy. The message's positive receipt by his public is evidenced by the Monarch's new subjects' overwhelming demonstrable joy, manifesting itself via three nights of uninterrupted bonfires and enhanced by the profusion of free wine.⁶⁵⁹ In total, all these aspects combined to provide a synergistically larger message that maximised the transition phase's benefits, hugely enhanced by the navy.

Conclusion.

Chapter One outlined how in the year prior to the King's return the navy went to extraordinary lengths to affect the Restoration. The stakes to the triumvirate that undertook this hazardous venture from a possible returning Republican Government should they fail were incredibly high. Consequently, they followed their efforts in repatriating the King by using the navy to maximise the chances that Charles's shaky nascent throne would be stabilised.

However, the Monarch lacked the legitimacy of divine inheritance or an army to underscore his regime in this militaristic and religious age. Chapter Two consequently outlines how both Charles and the navy implemented a strategy to use the navy to construct a positive image for the returning Monarch to maximise the transition phase's opportunities to achieve their project, using soft power to win the nation's 'hearts and minds'. This centred around erecting a Monarchical persona based on the image of the King's power, his majestic and semi-divine status. The backdrop of a large fleet moored off Scheveningen, Holland made a powerful statement to commence his Majesty's transition to accession, a plethora of tactics being used to secure the Crown for Charles thereafter, till he ceremoniously entered London on 29th May 1660.

Overall, this Chapter has revealed how deep, multi-faceted, important and central the navy's role was in implementing the transition phase's over-arching strategy for the King's Restoration, and to smoothing his accession. Also, it reveals how clever both the overt and covert messages and allegories were, and how successfully they were communicated to the various intended audiences. Much more has been presented in this Chapter than has been previously appreciated regarding the navy's involvement. Indeed, the over-riding strategy

⁶⁵⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 11.6.1660 pp154-156 entry 156

consisting of its individual components has not been seen before, only being revealed by this work. And in combination with what has been uncovered in Chapter One regarding the crucial role played by the navy in preparing the ground for Charles's succession, it is surprising that this significant area of research has not been previously addressed. Further it reveals how large the hole has been in this period's body of academic knowledge to date.

Chapter 3 - Consolidating Power.

Introduction.

This Chapter encompasses a time-line from the end of May 1660 to approximately mid-1661, that is immediately following Charles's re-entry into London to the period prior to the commencement of foreign ventures. It marks a substantial change in direction for this thesis, revealing further ground-breaking work that highlights a completely new version of this period's history, ending after the Medway disaster. Chapters One and Two outline how the navy was key to the King's return, and following Restoration how it provided crucial support to the Monarchy in settling an unstable throne. Chapter Three commences by highlighting further measures where the navy was crucial to this domestic phase of his Majesty's power, culminating in its central role at the apex of the King's early reign, that is the coronation. However, it progresses onto the underlying personal, covert ambitions that drove the formulation and attempted implementation of step-by-step plans to achieve them.

King Charles II received a rapturous reception during his triumphant journey from Dover to Whitehall, followed by his 29th May 1660 ceremonial entry into London on his thirtieth birthday. This popularity continued for some time, being particularly manifest during his coronation on 22nd and 23rd April 1661.⁶⁶⁰ However, there were various problems within the country that posed such serious threats to the nascent throne that the Monarchy's survival was uncertain. This is aptly illustrated via Pepys's fear that his new lucrative employment in the King's service may be temporary and consequently he was loathed to permanently replace his old private residence with the new more lush but job-related house.⁶⁶¹

As pamphlets and other sources regale, the King spent the first few months of his rule focusing on domestic problems in order to attempt to secure and consolidate his throne.⁶⁶²

Those of England will be considered in this Chapter, Scotland and Ireland being excluded.

This approach is suitably evidenced by the Sovereign's October 1660 private declaration to

⁶⁶⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 11.6.1660 p.154 entry 156, 9.7.1660 p.167 entry 174, 16.7.1660 p.170 entry 177, 23.7.1660 p.174 entry 185; *Pepys Diary*, 1.1.1661, 23.4.1661; Walker *A circumstantial*, p27

⁶⁶¹ *Pepys Diary*, 23.7.1660, 2.8.1660

⁶⁶² CSP *Venice* Vol 32, 15.10.1660 p.204 entry 222, 13.11.1660 p.215 entry 235; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p153; Walker *A circumstantial*, pp27-28; CCSP vol 5, 31.8.1600/10.9.1660 p.51 Memoranda, De Vicquefort qui est a la Haye pour Priandy a Paris; Symplegades antrum, p.51

the Venetian ambassador to London that the King couldn't offer the military aid that he would like to provide to the Venetians to support them in their hostilities with the Ottomans due to his essential current domestic focus.⁶⁶³ The domestic problems that Charles faced were encapsulated in his 4th April 1660 Breda Declaration. The four main issues related to neutralising the political rifts, concluding the royal finances, paying off and disbanding the armed forces and settling the religious strife within the country. Others existed, such as appointing judges and other administrative officials, and rewarding cavaliers who had suffered for their loyalty during the Interregnum. However, including religion, at this stage the navy was unable to aid the solution to these other aspects, so they won't be covered in this Chapter. The concentration will solely be on resolving the political fractiousness, settling the Royal finances and disbanding the army.

It should be noted that this Chapter does not comment comprehensively on the contemporary domestic politics following the Restoration. Other authors such as Ronald Hutton, Neil Keeble, Paul Seaward and Tim Harris have done this already. However, despite the enormous difficulties outlined by these writers that Charles faced at this time, an amazing resource available to the King has been omitted, that is the navy. Consequently, this Chapter highlights the strong supporting role provided by the navy to key parts of the Monarch's domestic political agenda. It embodied a strategy to publicly exhibit a close relationship between the Monarch and his navy. This was multi-faceted, aiming to enhance his Majesty's warrior image and transmit a message that he could call for martial aid from his military's nautical arm should the need arise. It also included the appointment of the naval commanders as either the heads or full members of important committees that implemented Royal policy, such as to disband the army or oversee the regicides' trials and condemnation. This was magnified substantially by the rigour with which England's claim of 'sovereignty of the seas' was enforced, the regularisation of the 'touching the King's evil' and thus raising its and the King's semi-divine status, and the incredibly central role the navy played during the pinnacle of this period, that is the coronation.

The following details are revolutionary to modern scholarship. Charles had been a nomad for fourteen years prior to his repatriation, starting at the impressionable age of 16, with his physical presence permitted in various countries depending on the prevailing relationship that

⁶⁶³ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 15.10.1660 p.204 entry 222

nation had with the contemporary Commonwealth Government. His kingly existence was tolerated due to expedience rather than welcomed. This exposed him to various forms of government, allowing him to identify his preferred style as being absolute monarchy. However, it inculcated in the Sovereign a feeling of being a second-class Monarchical citizen, and to compensate it induced him to formulate a covert aspiration for domestic absolutism via seeking an independence from the Parliamentary ties that involved the approval of further taxes. Further, he sought international pre-eminence, enabled by his unfettered foreign prerogative. The ability to attempt to fund this came from the House's early attribution of Customs and Excise for life, providing a motivation to the Monarch to maximise international trade, heightening Crown revenues from this source. These additional fiscal flows would fund the achievement of both of his domestic and overseas agendas, the navy being the tool through which they would be implemented. Prevailing mercantilist theory incorporated a limit to global trade, this leading to the inevitability of an Anglo/Dutch war as the Hollanders resisted the King's desire to acquire some of theirs to meet his aspirations. The Sovereign initiated a step-by-step plan to accomplish these aspirations (see below and Chapters Four to Seven).

The first step is outlined in this Chapter, and was multi-faceted. In essence, it incorporated establishing a framework to aid future phases, aspects being expanded below, impecuniousness prohibiting actual ventures at this stage but allowing for preparatory work. One was the 'Navigation Act', employing soft power by using merchants as unofficial ambassadors for his Britannic Majesty as well as countering Dutch merchants' similar effects. A second aspect was the Portuguese marriage, and although the cash provided by the dowry was immensely useful, the real prizes for Charles were Tangier and Bombay, allowing the completion of a ring of worldwide bases which included Jamaica and the naval bases in England. Together with the deployment of fleets in each location this would allow him to project power globally. In a period in which the army was being rapidly disbanded, the third element was to actively preserve the navy in readiness for its role as the Sovereign's tool to implement his covert ambitions. And although overseas projects were unaffordable, the fourth point was to commence international relations with foreign ambassadors in London.

The second step delineated in Chapter Four was also multifarious and aimed at substantially raising his domestic international prestige. One aspect was to strengthen the framework mentioned above, such as commencing the establishment of Tangier and developing Jamaica.

A second point was to portray a ‘Warrior King’ image to aid the consolidation of his reign domestically, and to appear an attractive ally internationally. Consequently, using the navy, he unprecedentedly destroyed the Algerian pirates and subdued the Spanish so that his Portuguese allies could maintain their independence from their larger Iberian neighbours. Additionally, he ruthlessly enforced his claim to ‘Sovereignty of the Seas’. The third element involved keeping his major neighbours, those being France and Holland, either as allies or effectively neutral so that he could maintain an undistracted focus on his domination of Algiers and Spain. A fourth facet was a propaganda campaign preparing domestic and international audiences for the forthcoming conflagration.

The third step laid out in Chapter Five was to maintain gains made from earlier steps, and to commence actual war preparations, again being manifold. One feature was to crush the re-emerging Algerian pirate threat, preserving his heightened prestige. A second element incorporated provoking the Dutch into hostilities, portraying them as the aggressors so as to render void their defensive treaty with France. This played out both in the Guinea and the Americas. The third point was to erect what this work terms an ‘Arc of Isolation’, that is either allying or keeping effectively neutral all those countries on Holland’s landward side, leaving the Dutch devoid of succour, allowing the English navy to confront them at sea. The fourth aspect was to prepare the navy for the forthcoming conflagration. Five involved a covert plan to extract massive additional taxes from Parliament to replace anticipated decimated Customs revenues. Six incorporated a further, expanded propaganda campaign to prepare domestic and foreign audiences for hostilities.

Therefore, as will become apparent, the navy allowed the King to successfully implement his covert personal agenda. Charles was fully aware of his navy’s superior and feared reputation and its ability to serve his policies. This Chapter and later ones therefore show that this factor crucially allowed him to select his foreign policies with impunity, ignoring active attempts by other rulers to divert him into their orbit. Consequently, although major efforts were made to disband the army as quickly as possible, the Sovereign was highly motivated to preserve his maritime military for his future use.

Domestic Focus.

The political rift between the Republicans that resented the Monarch's Restoration and the cavaliers who wholeheartedly supported it constituted the first of the Monarch's substantial domestic issues. Despite widespread rejoicing, the Government was firmly aware that these Commonwealth supporters refused to join the celebrations, keeping their resentment hidden.⁶⁶⁴ This was aptly illustrated when many of the potential recruits to the new Militia refused to take the Oath of Allegiance which was administered in January 1661. Their hidden loyalty was only revealed when it was publicly tested. Accordingly, so many were arrested that the magistrates were unsure what to do with them all. For example, in Croydon alone 50 were incarcerated.⁶⁶⁵ As one Governmental official noted

“if all were taken who refuse the Oath of Allegiance, six men would not be left in some parishes”.⁶⁶⁶

The mooted solution to this potential inferno was the Indemnity and Oblivion Act 1660, which forgave all prior treacherous acts except for a few as proscribed by Parliament. It would be impossible for the King to pursue any other serious policies and gain his subjects' support until those affected felt safe from persecution.⁶⁶⁷ For example, prior to his financial settlement being agreed by Parliament, Charles needed to raise loans from the City to fund his Administration, merchants refusing to co-operate till they knew how they stood.⁶⁶⁸ However, as reported contemporaneously in such publications as *The Intelligencer* newspaper, delays were caused in both the Commons and Lords due to continuous calls for amendments, such as those to be exempted as regicides.⁶⁶⁹ Consequently, *The Intelligencer* and other pamphlets reported that the King's speeches to the Commons and Lords reflected his frustration at the House's procrastination at passing this legislation.⁶⁷⁰ The newspaper and other sources later reported that the law eventually reached the statute books in early

⁶⁶⁴ Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.13, p.14, p.35

⁶⁶⁵ CSPD 1660-1661, pp.477-478 Vol XXVIII 19.1.1661 entry 86

⁶⁶⁶ CSPD 1660-1661, p.478 Vol XXVIII 19.1.1661 entry 87

⁶⁶⁷ Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.132, p.134

⁶⁶⁸ CSP *Venice* Vol 32, 27.8.1660 p.187 entry 204

⁶⁶⁹ Ludlow *Memoirs*, pp.287-294; Baker *Chronicle*, p.735; *Intelligencer*, Issue 24 3.6.1660-10.6.1660 p.373 4.6.1660, Issue 25 p.391 11.6.1660

⁶⁷⁰ CSP *Venice* Vol 32, 18.6.1660 pp.158-159 entry 159, 2.7.1660 p.163 entry 168, 13.8.1660 pp.182-183 entry 198; Burnet *History* vol 1, pp.230-231; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.15, p.35, p.129, p.132; Rugg *Diurnal*, 18.6.1660 p.93 His Majesty's Chapel, July 1660 p.104 The King's Speech; CCSP vol 5, p.42 June 1660; CSPD 1660-1661, p.57 Vol IV 18.6.1660 entry 82, p.135 Vol VIII 30.7.1660 entry 100; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.57 August; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.287; Baker *Chronicle*, pp.736-737, p.738; *Intelligencer*, Issue 26 p.403 25.6.1660, Issue 31.23.7.1660-30.7.1660 pp.495-496; *The Collection*, pp.36-42, pp.43-49

September 1660, the signing ceremony being symbolically held in the Banqueting House outside which his father had been executed.⁶⁷¹

Settling the King's finances comprised the second crucial domestic issue. It was necessary for this to cover the Government's ordinary expenses as well as meeting the army and navy's arrears of pay and other debts accruing to them. This latter was essential for two reasons. Firstly, the longer both arms of the military remained in service, the higher their pay arrears would be, and the more intolerable the financial burden to the King.⁶⁷² The scale of this burden was starkly highlighted by *The Intelligencer* at £55,000 per month for the army, and just under £6,000 per day for both.⁶⁷³ The actual amounts paid were staggering. For example, in the first week of November three regiments of horse were paid off in the counties of Yorkshire, Shropshire and Salisbury, the amounts totalling over £46,400.⁶⁷⁴ Secondly, the regime was acutely aware that, despite their previous loyal acclamations such as at Blackheath, the army's lingering Republican ideals constituted a strong and brooding threat to the crown. A panegyric confirmed this necessity of disbanding the army by referring to it as "that great and factious army".⁶⁷⁵

It was apparent that gargantuan amounts would be needed, especially as the numbers involved were huge, being just under 40,000 soldiers. Of course, given the substantial remodelling already undertaken by this point, this is probably somewhat lower than the number the Commonwealth originally fielded.⁶⁷⁶ As reported in *The Intelligencer* an initial vote was approved by the House granting the revenues from Customs and Excise for the duration of the Sovereign's life, it being estimated that this would raise £784,100 per annum.⁶⁷⁷ However, the newspaper and other sources reported that every penny of this was diverted to meeting the army's arrears, but despite the conscientiousness of the collectors, it

⁶⁷¹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 10.9.1660 p.193 entry 212; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.106 August 1660 Acts; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.205 Vol XI 29.8.1660 entries 75 and 76, pp.266-267 Vol XIV 13.9.1660 entry 102; Jocelyn *Diary*, pp.135-136 29.8.1660; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.59 29.8.1660; Baker *Chronicle*, p.736, p.740 25.8.1660, pp.744-745; *Intelligencer*, Issue 36 26.8.1660-3.9.1660 p.575

⁶⁷² Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.17; CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 10.6.1661 pp.300-301 entry 360; Baker *Chronicle*, p.739

⁶⁷³ *Intelligencer*, Issue 44 22.10.1660-29.10.1660 p.702

⁶⁷⁴ *Intelligencer*, Issue 46 5.11.1660-12.11.1660 p.735

⁶⁷⁵ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.18-20; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.225; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.59 29.8.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.283; Reynell *Fortunate change*, p.7

⁶⁷⁶ Baker *Chronicle*, p.741, p.750

⁶⁷⁷ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 2.7.1660 p.163 entry 168; CCSP *vol 5*, p.45-46 25.7.1660; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.15; *Intelligencer*, Issue 26 p.404 9.6.1660

proved inadequate.⁶⁷⁸ Consequently, *The Intelligencer* and other sources reported that further amounts were approved, such as the additional poll taxes signed into law in early June, September 1660 and early December which were entirely devoted to meeting the costs of disbanding the army.⁶⁷⁹ The one from December was particularly large, raising £420,000 over six months.⁶⁸⁰ Further, as also variously reported including in *The Intelligencer* the ordinary revenue of the crown was substantially improved in October, further Excise duties being attributed to the government, resulting in an expected annual total of £1,200,000.⁶⁸¹ However, as *The Intelligencer* and other sources also reported so colossal was the financial task of disbanding the army that there remained no residue to cover other Governmental costs. The resulting substantial Royal debts meant that a further amount needed to be raised, an emergency figure of £70,000 being approved for the King's immediate use, with a further similar amount raised later in the year.⁶⁸² This mammoth task continued into early 1661.⁶⁸³ Attention then turned to reducing the navy's debts (see below), thus the Monarch's financial plight persisted beyond the end of the period covered by this Chapter, that is mid-1661, as Crown revenues continued to be absorbed by military retrenchment. Consequently, reference in this Chapter to the initial focus on the army is necessary in order to explain the continuing contribution of military expenditure on Charles's extended impecuniousness (see Chapter 6).

Notwithstanding the Monarch's severe resource constraints, the navy was able to provide substantial succour, providing its services via goodwill. Whether on a voluntary or compulsory basis, it nevertheless continued in its duty in supporting the regime. This was variously delivered. Sailors performed their duties with no immediate prospect of receiving wages. Multiple examples illustrate sailors' sacrifices, although they were unhappy with this situation.⁶⁸⁴ In early June 1660 Captain Harrison reported that he couldn't travel up to the

⁶⁷⁸ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 17.9.1660 p.195 entry 214, 8.10.1660 p.202 entry 221; *Intelligencer*, Issue 36 26.8.1660-3.9.1660 pp.575-576

⁶⁷⁹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 10.9.1660 p.193 entry 212, 10.12.1660 p.223 entry 246; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.266 Vol XIV 13.9.1660 entry 101; *Jocelyn Diary*, p.136 11.10.1660; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.62 13.9.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.301; Baker *Chronicle*, p.735, p.740 25.8.1660, p.745; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.336 6.10.1660; *Intelligencer*, Issue 26 pp.412-413 21.6.1660, Issue 36 26.8.1660-3.9.1660 pp.575-576, Issue 38 10.9.1660-17.9.1660 p.602

⁶⁸⁰ Baker *Chronicle*, p.754; *Kingdom*, Issue 1 31.12.1660-7.1.1661 p.6 entry 25

⁶⁸¹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 1.10.1660 p.199 entry 218, 17.12.1660 p.226 entry 250; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.138; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.222; *Intelligencer*, Issue 48 19.11.1660-26.11.1660 p.763

⁶⁸² Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.17, p.138; CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 8.10.1660 p.199 entry 218; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.266 Vol XIV 13.9.1660 entry 101; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.62 23.9.1660; Baker *Chronicle*, p.740 25.8.1660, p.745, p.754; *Intelligencer*, Issue 36 26.8.1660-3.9.1660 pp.575-576, Issue 40 23.9.1660-30.9.1660 p.628; *Kingdom*, Issue 1 31.12.1660-7.1.1661 p.6 entry 31

⁶⁸³ CCSP *vol 5*, 23.1.1661 p.76; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.65 24.11.1660

⁶⁸⁴ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.179 Vol X 4.8.1660 entry 41

Admiralty as he was worried his sailors would mutiny in his absence, the men eventually going to London to see the Navy Commissioners and the Duke of York themselves.⁶⁸⁵ And Captain Bowry reported to the Navy Commissioners in late July that he had needed to take the drastic step of leaving some men behind when setting sail to perform his orders as they were preparing a legal action to recover their long outstanding pay.⁶⁸⁶

Another sacrifice was incurred by victuallers who furnished provisions and funded ship repairs through use of personal credit, reimbursement often being severely delayed causing heightened personal difficulties including the threat of having to flee the country to avoid arrest for debt. However, on some occasions the suppliers were so desperate that they refused to furnish more provisions.⁶⁸⁷ In fact, the Victualling Commissioners reported that most bills from suppliers remained unpaid for over 6 months, with one cordage supplier being in this sorry state for over 2 years.⁶⁸⁸ Indeed, on occasion this added embarrassment to the operational effects of insufficient supplies, for example in October 1660 almost all the ships were so short of powder that they were unable to fire the traditional salutes for returning Royal parties, including the Queen Mother from France.⁶⁸⁹ The amounts owed were vast. In May 1661 a coordinated approach was made to the King by a conglomeration of suppliers requesting that he pressure Parliament into paying the approximately £140,000 owed to them, earlier revenues having been diverted to paying off the army.⁶⁹⁰ This could result in ships being sent to sea lacking essential stores such as tar and spare canvas.⁶⁹¹

However, worryingly for the country, the extreme cash shortage sometimes prevented vessels from proceeding to sea to perform their orders, including protecting the nation's overseas interests, or if they did venture out they were not of a suitable standard to fully protect against the seas' rigours. In April 1661 the *Montagu* left harbour with only half of her painting completed. All work stopped on the *Monk* as there was no prospect of money for men, ordnance or provisions to make the vessel operational. Captain Cuttance's vessel, the

⁶⁸⁵ CSPD 1660-1661, p.39 Vol III 5.6.1660 Elias, Chatham entry 41, p.56 Vol IV 18.6.1660 Chatham entry 74, p.61 Vol IV 21.6.1660 Chatham entry 113

⁶⁸⁶ CSPD 1660-1661, p.129 Vol VIII 23.7.1660 Drake frigate, Deptford entry 39

⁶⁸⁷ CSPD 1660-1661, pp.42-43 Vol III 7.6.1660 *Dover* entry 66, p.54 Vol IV 15-16.6.1660 entries 49-57, p.131 Vol VIII 25.7.1660 entry 59, p.180 Vol X 6.8.1660 *The Swallow*, Plymouth Sound entry 54

⁶⁸⁸ CSPD 1660-1661, p.60 Vol IV 20.6.1660 entry 103, p.79 Vol V June 1660 entry 93

⁶⁸⁹ CSPD 1660-1661, p.324 Vol XIX 28.10.1660 entry 62, p.326 Vol XIX 31.10.1660 entry 80

⁶⁹⁰ CSPD 1660-1661, p.603 Vol XXXVI May 1661 entries 62 and 63

⁶⁹¹ CSPD 1660-1661, p.599 Vol XXXVI 31.5.1661 entry 43 *Dover*

Speedwell, let in dangerous amounts of water.⁶⁹² In May 1661, no work had been performed on 4 ships for at least 3 months.⁶⁹³ More importantly, the departure of the fleet for the Mediterranean to confront the pirate menace was substantially delayed due to an extreme lack of funds, despite desires for speed (see Chapter Four).⁶⁹⁴

Further, those vessels allotted for departure could even be short of mariners. For example Captain Dimond wrote to the Navy Commissioners, confirming his orders to proceed with Montagu's fleet for the Mediterranean, but begged urgent repairs were carried out to his ship as well as the addition of 20 or 30 men to his existing 50 to bring the number up to those commensurate with the combat conditions that the ship had enjoyed during the First Dutch War.⁶⁹⁵ This reality directly contravened the King's orders, the Sovereign desiring in Council merely two days after ascending the throne that the Admiralty and Navy Commissioners ensure the full victualling of all vessels required for duty.⁶⁹⁶ This poses interesting points. On the one hand, to rely on an institution that had significant operational problems in an era of huge financial constraint was to apparently raise the risk level to his new position beyond that already in existence from the issues already discussed elsewhere. But on the other hand, it illustrates how much faith Charles had in his navy's power, and how important the King knew it was to his reign. However, if potential rivals had fully appreciated the scale of these problems, their view of England's formidable navy might have differed, possibly diminishing the country's security. Yet, the fact that the Dutch and other nations continued to fear England's navy (covered below) and the country's ability to put a powerful fleet to sea if needed points to the organisation's formidable reputation and the strength of support that this provided to the King in the early part of his reign. In reality, it points to the King's extremely high faith in his navy through relying on its reputation, despite the knowledge of its substantial operational defects, and the value of the support it supplied to the throne despite these issues, including the Crown's poverty.

The Navy's Tangible and Symbolic Support to the Throne during the Domestic focus.

⁶⁹² CSPD 1660-1661, p.579 Vol XXXIV April 1661 entry 124, p.596 Vol XXXVI 28.5.1661 entry 29

⁶⁹³ CSPD 1660-1661, p.607 Vol XXXVI May 1661 entry 81

⁶⁹⁴ CSP Venice Vol 32, p.277 5.4.1661 entry 321, p.295 3.6.1661 entry 353

⁶⁹⁵ CSPD 1660-1661, p.596 Vol XXXVI 29.5.1660 entry 32

⁶⁹⁶ Penn *Memoires*, p.241 31.5.1660 and 2.6.1660

Despite the strong initial domestic focus of Charles's Administration, the navy played a significant part in supporting his regime. A crucial difference when compared to the army was that the navy had genuinely remained loyal to the King, critically at the institution's highest command echelons, constituting an important tool which his Majesty could use to support his policies.⁶⁹⁷ This manifested itself in both 'Tangible' and 'Symbolic' ways.

The Navy's Tangible Support.

At accession the King inherited a war with Spain which wasn't formally ended by treaty till the end of August 1660.⁶⁹⁸ This meant that Ostend privateers in the Spanish Netherlands were able to raid English shipping for profit.⁶⁹⁹ The Spaniards also carried out these raids in the Mediterranean, using bases such as Cadiz.⁷⁰⁰ Indeed, English merchants frequently requested tangible support like naval escorts, for example in early June, eight Southampton shipmasters requested a convoy from Jersey to their homeport because of

“the times being so dangerous”.⁷⁰¹

Colliers and fishing vessels were captured, depriving Charles's subjects of coal for heating and cooking and fish for their tables.⁷⁰² Merchant ships were also seized, their valuable cargoes including those carried by the Levant vessels *Reformation* and *St. Mary*, captured in August 1660 with loads containing 100 bales of silk, cotton and galls.⁷⁰³ This meant that substantial commercial losses were experienced, sailors and fishermen losing their livelihoods.

Even worse was suffered through incarceration in Belgium, as highlighted in early June 1660 when it was necessary to arrange a prisoner swap for the English crews of 12 or 14 vessels.⁷⁰⁴

⁶⁹⁷ CCSP vol 5, p.49 26.8.1660-3-5.9.1660; Barlow *Journal*, p.46;

⁶⁹⁸ CSPD 1660-1661, p.200 Vol XI 24.8.1660 entry 32 Sec Nicholas to Sir Wm Curtis, p.262 Vol XIV 10.9.1660 Whitehall entry 69; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.61 13.9.1660

⁶⁹⁹ CSPD 1660-1661, p.40 Vol III 6.6.60 Portsmouth frigate off Scarborough entry 44, p.42 Vol III 7.6.1660 Satisfaction, Yarmouth Roads entry 63

⁷⁰⁰ CSPD 1660-1661, p.43 Vol III 8.6.1660 Newbury, Leghorn Road entry 71

⁷⁰¹ CSPD 1660-1661, p.40 Vol III 6.6.1660 Southampton entry 47, p.68 Vol V 27.6.1660 Yarmouth entry 30, p.68 Vol V 27.6.1660 Yarmouth entry 30

⁷⁰² CSPD 1660-1661, p.48 Vol III 11.6.1660 Yarmouth Road entry 117

⁷⁰³ CSPD 1660-1661, p.206 Vol XI 30.8.1660 London entry 83, p.254 Vol XIV 3.9.1660 London entry 16

⁷⁰⁴ CSPD 1660-1661, p.43 Vol III 7.6.1660 Ostend entry 67

Additionally, and crucially for the Crown, it meant that his Majesty's Customs revenues would be reduced. Most importantly, this highlighted the King's failure to undertake his primary responsibility, that is to protect the country from foreign attack, impacting his reputation as an effective ruler and a martial leader. However, the navy was able to provide some tangible help to the King by safeguarding his maritime subjects, and indeed did achieve some success in this. It convoyed the colliers, fishing and merchant vessels from various English ports to their destinations, including over longer distances like to the Baltic Sound and within the Mediterranean.⁷⁰⁵ Some came from further afield, such as on 24th June Sir John Lawson reported the arrival of the Barbados ships to his boss, Lord Montagu.⁷⁰⁶ Further, the navy often retook captured vessels. In June Captain Wilkinson rescued a ship laden with Grain and leather, the captured Ostenders being incarcerated in Yarmouth prison. And in the same month Captain King arrived at Harwich with a rescued merchant vessel laden with masts.⁷⁰⁷

However, as the peace treaty negotiations with Spain neared conclusion during August the scourge of their privateers disappeared, patrolling English navy ships reporting that they hadn't seen any for many weeks.⁷⁰⁸ And on the treaty's conclusion naval vessels at sea further tangibly supported trade by informing any merchants ships they encountered of the new Anglo-Spanish alliance.⁷⁰⁹ When added to those merchants on shore receiving this news, trade with Iberian lands could potentially increase, with the consequent rise in his Majesty's Customs revenues. Also, the reduction in the number of naval vessels required for convoy duty would have reduced the King's expense. In total, this shows that during this early and crucial period of the new King's reign the navy was able to actively and tangibly support his regime at sea, attempting to uphold his vital role of protecting his subjects against foreign aggression and the preservation of his aspirational reputation as a warrior King.

⁷⁰⁵ CSPD *1660-1661*, pp.36-37 Vol III 4.6.1660 Newbury off Genoa entry 20, pp.40-41 Vol III 6.6.1660 Yarmouth entry 49, p.48 Vol III 11.6.1660 Yarmouth entry 116, p.48 Vol III 11.6.1660 Yarmouth entry 116, p.62 Vol IV 22.6.1660, P193 Vol X 16.8.1660. Norwich frigate, off Scarborough. 149 P193 Vol X 16.8.1660. Norwich frigate, off Scarborough. 149 Leghorn entry 122, p.110 Vol VII 4.7.1660 The Charles entry 34, p.193 Vol X 16.8.1660 Norwich frigate, off Scarborough entry 149, p.196 Vol XI 21.8.1660 Constant Warwick, Plymouth Sound entry 16, p.201 Vol XI 25.8.1660 Happy Return, the Hope entry 44

⁷⁰⁶ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.64 Vol IV 24.6.1660. London, Downs entry 143

⁷⁰⁷ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.42 Vol III 7.6.1660 Satisfaction, Yarmouth Roads entry 63, p.49 Vol IV 12.6.1660 Harwich entry 1

⁷⁰⁸ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.134 Vol VIII 27.7.1660 John Ketch, Rolling Ground entry 83, p.134. Vol VIII 27.7.1660 entry 86, p.186 Vol X 10.8.1660 Basing, Yarmouth Road entry 90

⁷⁰⁹ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.264 Vol XIV 10.9.1660 entry 78

The Navy's Symbolic Support.

The most precarious part of the King's new reign following his Restoration was the period up to the enactment of the Oblivion and Indemnity Act (covered below), ending in September 1660.⁷¹⁰ The Presbyterians aptly reflected this, recognising that they no longer had such power to disrupt his Majesty's plans, given that public opinion was now against them and the King's situation was much strengthened.⁷¹¹ However, although threat levels were reduced the throne remained at risk for some months thereafter. Further, although the army was being actively disbanded, the navy remained largely intact (covered below) and consequently retained much of its military potency. So, one way that the navy could be of use to the Monarch through this time span was to engage in copious symbolism to enhance the crown's hold on power. This manifested itself via exhibiting a close relationship between it and the Monarch, illustrating that the King could rely on force from this branch of his military if needed. Additionally, the navy's domestic popularity could provide reflective benefits to its Commander-in-Chief. Monck had been given command of all land forces, leaving Montagu as Admiral under the Duke of York as Lord High Admiral, constituting the Monarch's deputy.⁷¹² However, Monck's nautical role was a main influence in affecting the King's Restoration, so his ongoing exploits will be referred to here as well.

Charles's strategy of symbolically displaying a close relationship with the navy was reflected in the sphere of official relationships. As observed by Burnet, as a general approach, immediately following his Restoration the King gave the highest preference to Monck and Montagu.⁷¹³ And as reported by *The Intelligencer* this attitude was replicated by Parliament, as evidenced by the formal thanks they recorded to the Admiral for his services to his Majesty and the Kingdom.⁷¹⁴ Furthermore, as highlighted in January 1661 in the newspaper, *the Kingdom's Intelligencer* as well as other sources the General was so publicly favoured that he was joint godfather with the King to the Duke of York's new son, Charles the Duke of Cambridge.⁷¹⁵ He also received manors and other commercial concerns ranging across six

⁷¹⁰ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 28.6.1660 p.162 entry 166

⁷¹¹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 15.10.1660 p.204 entry 222

⁷¹² Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.45-46; CSPD *1660-1661*, p79 Vol V June 1660 entry 90; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.45 29.5.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.284; Baker *Chronicles*, p.734

⁷¹³ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.135

⁷¹⁴ *Intelligencer*, Issue 26 p.403 9.6.1660

⁷¹⁵ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.466 Vol XXVIII 3.1.1661 entry 14, p.470 Vol XXVIII 11.1.1661 entry 42; Rugg *Diurnal*, Pp.138-139 Jan 1661 Sir Arthur Haselrig died in the Tower; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.66 1.1.1661; *Kingdom*, Issue 1 31.12.1660-7.1.1661 p.2

counties, generating an income of thousands of pounds annually.⁷¹⁶ And as publicly announced in *The Intelligencer* both Monck and Montagu were made Privy Councillors within a few weeks of the King's return, the newspaper also confirming that Montagu was one of the Commissioners of the King's Treasury.⁷¹⁷ Also, as might be expected they both joined the Duke of York as principal officers of the Navy Board, overseeing the whole organisation, and therefore well placed to supervise the vital appointment of loyalists as Navy Commissioners.⁷¹⁸ Shortly after the King's return, Monck was confirmed as head of the army throughout the three kingdoms (mentioned above). In August *The Intelligencer* amongst other sources announced that the General was made Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.⁷¹⁹ Further, both served as judges that tried, convicted and condemned the 10 regicides in October 1660.⁷²⁰

Additionally, as outlined in Chapter Two both were ennobled, entitling them to a seat in the House of Lords. There were just over 100 nobles in the Upper House in this period, so that their dual incumbency was more influential than in modern times.⁷²¹ Also, according to *The Intelligencer* and other sources Monck was appointed as Lord Lieutenant of Devon, and a member of the small Committee for Foreign Affairs, with Montagu being created Lord Lieutenant of Huntingdon.⁷²² Furthermore, at the 26th September 1660 Privy Council meeting the King raised his desire to have a sub-committee to oversee his coronation, the dates of which were eventually allocated as April 22nd and 23rd 1661.⁷²³ As Privy Councillors both Monk and Montagu were eligible to take seats on this small committee, Monck being specifically commissioned to do so.⁷²⁴ And as mentioned in *The Intelligencer* and other sources, on the establishment of the Council for Trade in November 1660, designed to implement the important 'Navigation Act' (covered below), both Albemarle and Sandwich

⁷¹⁶ CSPD 1660-1661, p.523 Vol XXXI Feb 1661 Grant to George Duke of Albemarle; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.284

⁷¹⁷ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 18.6.1660 pp. 158-159 entry 159; Walker *A circumstantial*, p.28; Brook *England triumph*, pp.115-116; *Mercurius Publicus*, Issue 22 Article 4 p.1; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.129 Nov 1660 Lords and knights; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.50 14.6.1660; Baker *Chronicles*, p.735; *Intelligencer* Issue 24 3.6.1660-10.6.1660 p.374, Issue 31 23.7.1660-30.7.1660 p.495

⁷¹⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 3.10.1660, 20.4.1661; Penn *Memoires*, p.242 27.6.1660, p.247

⁷¹⁹ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.107 August 1660 *Acts*; Pepys *Diary*, 21.8.1660; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.135 26.8.1660; *Intelligencer*, Issue 35 20.8.1660-27.8.1660 p.558

⁷²⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 10.10.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.302; Baker *Chronicles*, p.753

⁷²¹ Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.108-113; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.50 14.6.1660, p.51.25.6.1660; *Intelligencer*, Issue 31 23.7.1660-30.7.1660 p.495

⁷²² Rugg *Diurnal*, p.123 October Lord Lieutenants; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.49; *Intelligencer*, Issue 44 22.10.1660-29.10.1660 pp.698-699

⁷²³ Walker *A circumstantial*, p.28

⁷²⁴ Walker *A circumstantial*, p.28; CSPD 1660-1661, p.510 Vol XXX 13.2.1661 entry 82

were added as full members.⁷²⁵ Also, the Earl of Sandwich was to be special ambassador to Portugal at the time of the Infanta's transportation to England, also acting as his Majesty's proxy in the nuptials with the putative Queen whilst still in her native country.⁷²⁶ In total, it meant that Charles had very loyal lieutenants in powerful positions, providing reliable voices and votes on each committee, judges' panel, in the counties and in Parliament. Further, in occupying so many influential positions a strong message was sent that the navy not only supported the King emotionally, but were prepared to back this support with actions, possibly including martial aid.

This demonstration of closeness between the King and navy was also reflected symbolically in the informal, social domain. Only a few days after the Monarch's 29th May 1660 triumphal entry into London, Admiral Montagu joined his Majesty for his leisurely and public perambulation around St. James's Park.⁷²⁷ On June 10th *The Intelligencer* reported that the King joined Monck at the Cock-Pit for supper, the General then entertaining his Majesty with various sorts of music.⁷²⁸ Further, there were various instances where it was publicly noted that Charles and Admiral Montagu dined together.⁷²⁹ On one of these occasions it was so intimate and ended so late that Montagu stayed in bed until well into the following day in order to recover!⁷³⁰ At another time, having finished their meeting in the public Shield Gallery, it was remarked that the King hugged Montagu on parting.⁷³¹ And in early October the Admiral decided to take advantage of the relative security of the King's residence to store some of his valuables in an iron bound chest in his Majesty's closet.⁷³² Further, in late November Montagu joined the King, the Queen Mother and Princess Henrietta when Monck treated them all to a play at the Cockpit theatre.⁷³³

Charles also symbolically reinforced this strategy by displaying an intimacy with the operational level of the navy. In August he dined on board a ship at Woolwich.⁷³⁴ And in late September, in a very high profile event, he brought a party of noblemen including the

⁷²⁵ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.129 Nov 1660 Lords and knights; *Intelligencer*, Issue 49 26.11.1660-3.11.1660 p.787

⁷²⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 10.6.1661; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.243; CCSP *vol 5*, p.94 20.4.1661

⁷²⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 9.6.1660

⁷²⁸ *Intelligencer*, Issue 24 3.6.1660-10.6.1660 p.383

⁷²⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 27.6.1660, 4.8.1660, 15.8.1660

⁷³⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 19.6.1660, 20.6.1660

⁷³¹ Pepys *Diary*, 3.9.1660

⁷³² Pepys *Diary*, 3.10.1660

⁷³³ Pepys *Diary*, 20.11.1660

⁷³⁴ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.107 August 1660 Acts

Duke of York to dine on board the 50 gun ship *Resolution*. The King and the Duke stayed on board overnight, returning to London with their party the next day on the royal yacht *Mary*.⁷³⁵ In October the King just took off to Portsmouth

“to view his navy”.⁷³⁶

Additionally, his Majesty took every opportunity to display to nautical personages his great knowledge of navigation and ships’ architecture, and took advantage of every chance to enhance his nautical expertise, such as in November 1660 when Captain Straughan gave a lecture on such aspects of good ship husbandry as efficient ballasting.⁷³⁷ In fact, this was put to useful effect, his Majesty personally ordering that his new yacht had an additional ten tons of ballast added, the order being highly visible as the King deliberately passed it to the dockyard through all available official channels.⁷³⁸

That this strategy of portraying a closeness between the Monarch and the navy in both the official and informal spheres was successful is evidenced by the fact that Admiral Montagu had imbibed the court’s culture so completely that Pepys referred to him as “the perfect courtier”, reflected in Sandwich’s desire to have a French cook, footmen and pages in special liveries and encouraging his wife and daughter to wear black patches.⁷³⁹ Further, Montagu admitted to Pepys in an intimate moment that he

“believed that he might have anything he would ask of the King”,

the implication being that if Montagu had made this assumption, then it is likely the populace will have absorbed it too, highlighting the success of this strategy.⁷⁴⁰ The veracity of this is aptly illustrated by the King’s warrant to transfer the ownership of the manors of Liveden and Churchfield and other lands in Northamptonshire from Sirs Lewis and William Tresham to Montagu, providing the Admiral with increased material substance.⁷⁴¹ And interestingly,

⁷³⁵ Montagu *Journal*, 24.9.1660 & 25.9.1660 p.82 an abstract out of Capt. Teddiman’s *Journal*

⁷³⁶ Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.63 6.10.1660

⁷³⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 23.11.1660; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.128

⁷³⁸ CSPD 1660-1661, p.573 Vol XXIV 29.4.1661 Whitehall

⁷³⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 20.10.1660, 20.4.1661

⁷⁴⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 3.10.1660

⁷⁴¹ CSPD 1660-1661, p.351 Vol XXI 2.11.1660 entry 5, p.367 Vol XXI Nov 1660 entry 140 Grant to Edw Earl of Sandwich

highlighting the historical importance to the nation of the King's association with the sea, in August a Mr Frensham, who had carried the King to the continent following his 1651 Worcester defeat, brought his 'bark' up to Whitehall, and was created a naval captain of a man-of-war.⁷⁴² Dryden summarised the success of this propaganda, stating the public perception of his Majesty as "In stately frigates most delight you find", going on to express the view that the Monarch's complete command of the sea is a consolation to all, "Here in a royal bed the waters sleep/When tired at sea within this bay they creep".⁷⁴³ In total this conveyed important messages. It stated that the Sovereign retained the backing of the main belligerent arm of state, augmenting his image by enhancing his warrior credentials, as well as advertising his ability to call on substantial military support if necessary. The public nature of these events would make them evident to both domestic and foreign audiences via their London-based ambassadors. Additionally, it showed that this highly popular organisation was pleased to have the King as its Commander-in-Chief, his Majesty benefitting from reflective glory through the bestowal of this successful organisation's approval.

An important symbolic policy was the enforcement of England's claim to 'Sovereignty of the Seas', and involved the country's claim to mastery of the seas surrounding it, manifesting itself in England's requirement for foreign vessels to dip their colours in salute of English men-of-war. This was required to uphold international prestige, but also domestic patriotic expectation, as summarised publicly by Dryden's panegyric, "Born to command the mistress of the seas/Your thoughts themselves in that blue empire please".⁷⁴⁴ This was rigorously enforced. Whilst delivering Queen Henrietta Maria and Princess Henrietta to Le Havre Captain Teddiman, the Squadron's Flag Captain, reported that several French ships entering harbour refused to strike their colours. As a result, Teddiman opened fire on them in accordance with instructions. Further, this instruction was taken so seriously that when Captain Holmes, who commanded the leviathan the *Royal Charles*, failed to enforce it on a Swedish ship carrying that country's ambassador, he was jailed in November 1661 for 2 months and refused permission to return to his old vessel, being immediately replaced by Captain Robert Clarke. In fact, the law prescribed the death penalty for his failure, his

⁷⁴² Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.58 7.8.1660

⁷⁴³ Dryden *His sacred Majesty*, p.7

⁷⁴⁴ Dryden *His sacred majesty*, p.7

eventual release resulting from the intervention of senior noblemen at court. Further, Charles gave serious consideration as to whether Swedish ambassadors would be received at court.⁷⁴⁵

An additional and important symbolic ancillary to this stringent policy was to convey an image of English dominance of the waters surrounding Charles's Kingdom. Between September 1660 and January 1661 several voyages were undertaken to transport members of the Royal family either to or from England. To uphold Royal dignity it can be seen that a substantial ship should be used, perhaps with an additional escort for security. However, on each occasion a formidable squadron was used. To collect the Princess Royal from Holland in September 1660 the *Resolution*, the *Royal Charles* and 10 other vessels were allocated, under the command of the most senior admiral, Lord Sandwich.⁷⁴⁶ Shortly afterwards, "several ships" escorted the Queen of Bohemia to England.⁷⁴⁷ Similarly when Queen Henrietta Maria travelled from France in October 1660.⁷⁴⁸ To transport the Queen Mother and Princess Henrietta to France in January 1660, merely a day's voyage, a substantial and powerful squadron of 6 ships was allotted, including the *London* (76 guns), the *Bredah* (70 guns) and the *Swiftsure* (60 guns).⁷⁴⁹ And in June 1661 Admiral Montagu had orders to transport the Infanta de Braganza over to England with a substantial fleet as escort.⁷⁵⁰ The deployment of such impressive force to perform the ostensibly mundane tasks of transporting VIPs on short journeys and the desire of the Monarch to have his claim of nautical sovereignty upheld through force made an impressive visage to foreign countries in highlighting England's nautical power and its willingness to use it. Additionally, it would have aided his journey through this turbulent period by improving his domestic image. In total this proved that Charles had huge military power to support his regime, reinforcing his warrior credentials, and acting as a deterrent to domestic and foreign potential foes. Further, it provided the King with a strong martial reputation, giving both a heightened position

⁷⁴⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 12.11.1661; CSP *Venice Vol 33*, 18.11.1661 vol 33 entry 87, 25.11.1661 vol 33 entry 92, 2.12.1661 vol 33 entry 95; CSPD *1661-1662*, pp.132-165 17.11.1661 Volume 44 entry 64; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.82 4.11.1661; Wharton *Gesta*, p.39 27.11.1661

⁷⁴⁶ Montagu *Journal*, 7.9.1660 pp.80-81 an abstract out of Capt. Teddiman's Journal; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.259 vol XIV 6.9.1660 Whitehall entry 42 Sec Nicholas to Sir Hen Bennet; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.62 13.9.1660

⁷⁴⁷ Barlow *Journal*, p.46

⁷⁴⁸ Jocelyn *Diary*, p.136 27.10.1660

⁷⁴⁹ Montagu *Journal*, 3.1.1661 p.82, 28.1.1661 p.84 Out of Sir John Lawson's Journal

⁷⁵⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 10.6.1661

during international treaty negotiations such as the one with Denmark (covered below), and a respectable reputation to compete with that of Oliver Cromwell's (see Chapter Two).⁷⁵¹

Charles II re-introduced Edward IV's religious ceremony for 'Touching the King's Evil' (see Chapter Two), the supplicant leaving the ritual with the attendant 'Angel' coin, providing a sanctified token to continue the healing. The coin had an ancient lineage, emanating from the reign of Edward IV, with the image of the Archangel, Michael, on one side (see Appendix A). This fuses both a martial and a deeply religious message as St. Michael led God's armies against the Devil in the book of Revelations. St Michael is depicted slaying a dragon. The coin's reverse side displays the image of a ship under sail. The 'Angel' was in circulation as legal tender till Charles I's reign. Charles II reintroduced it, but purely for the ceremony aimed at curing 'scrofula'.⁷⁵² The King treated this public ceremony and its strong religious associations with gravity, the seriousness with which he took it being reported in *The Intelligencer*, amongst other sources, 'touching' approximately 15,000 sufferers in the first two years of his reign.⁷⁵³ Initially, his Majesty 'touched' over 600 in one sitting, on other occasions over 250. He also remained vigilant for further supplicants who hadn't received the Royal attention.⁷⁵⁴ In combination with reporting via pamphlets and newspapers, the sheer numbers involved would advertise the ceremony's existence. *The Intelligencer* reported that by mid-July Charles had touched over 1,700 with a further 1,400 in London alone awaiting the ceremony's benefit.⁷⁵⁵

However, the various sources also reported that by late July Charles decided to regularise matters, setting aside time every Friday and involving a maximum of 200 of those granted tickets by the King's Chirurgeon.⁷⁵⁶ Cleverly, the unfulfilled demand would create an additional advertisement, the evidence for the success of this strategy of restricting supply of tickets being analogous to a modern popular sporting event, ticket-touts' existence to satisfy the frustrated demand proving the validity of this point. In such a religious society his Majesty's domination in the ceremony sent incredibly strong messages to his subjects. The

⁷⁵¹ CCSP vol 5, p.82 Feb 1661, p.93 11.4.1661; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.154 February 1661 An Ambassador; CSP *Venice* vol 32, 11.3.1661 pp.258-259 entry 296

⁷⁵² All about coins; Royal Collections Trust

⁷⁵³ Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.87 April 1662

⁷⁵⁴ *Intelligencer*, Issue 26 p.416 18.6.1660-25.6.1660

⁷⁵⁵ Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.55 16.7.1660; *Intelligencer*, Issue 30 p.478 16.7.1660-23.7.1660

⁷⁵⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 23.6.1660, 13.4.1661; Barlow *Journal*, p.48; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.93 June 1660 His Majesty's Entertainments, p.98 July 1660 The Duke of York; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.53 July; Evelyn *Diary* vol 1, p.334 6.7.1660; *Intelligencer*, Issue 24 3.6.1660-10.6.1660 p.383, pp.436-437 27.6.1660 Whitehall

‘Angel’s’ presence at the centre of the ceremony merged strong religious connotations emanating from St Michael’s combat against the Devil, coalescing martial, divine and essentially English overtones portrayed in the image of St. Michael slaying the dragon. And in the context of the times and the Monarch’s presiding presence, the image of a ship in full sail strongly associated the King with the navy. It also provided the navy with a religious element to its persona. Consequently, the King’s commanding ceremonial function strongly enhanced his semi-divine image that was entwined with the hallowed navy. Additionally, this ceremony was supplemented by other attempts to enhance the Monarch’s popular semi-divinity, these including personally baptising the child of Alderman Robinson, Lieutenant of the Tower.⁷⁵⁷ This augmentation to his persona would have helped him through this difficult early stage of his reign.

Charles used other symbolic ways to enhance his image as a nautical prince and closeness to water in the first few months of his reign. He portrayed a delight in combatting nature, augmenting his reputation in a male-dominated society by exhibiting a heightened masculinity. Contextually, his actions, escapades in and around water, and revelling in associations with them, implied a sense of bravery, invoking martial images that linked him to the navy’s watery domain, reinforcing his aspirational military persona. Further, in performing these activities in every-day life, close to his palace, in combination with undertaking voyages to the coast, it presented an image that his Majesty’s daily existence was indelibly entwined with his navy. In short, his very DNA was represented as being martial, nautical and highly virile. This manifested itself at an apparent simple level via his Majesty swimming in the Thames. This was publicly viewed, the King requesting the onlookers to pray for his safety. In an age when few could swim, this would have enhanced his adventurous and sporting image and reinforced his closeness to water. Further, his request for prayers for divine protection from onlookers would have strengthened public perception of the danger that the King was happy to take.⁷⁵⁸ And the Dutch gifted to his Majesty the *Mary* yacht to which he added one personally commissioned from the English dockyards, the *Catherine*, at 80 tons and costing £1,935.⁷⁵⁹ The *Catherine* was designed to ‘outdo’ her Dutch counterpart to illustrate English nautical superiority, the best materials being used such

⁷⁵⁷ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.104 July 1660 Heidelberg

⁷⁵⁸ Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.54 5.7.1660

⁷⁵⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 15.8.1660, 15.1.1661, 16.4.1661; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.351 Vol XXI 3.11.1660 entry 10

as Holland Duck for sail, Pepys describing it as “a most pretty thing”.⁷⁶⁰ Together with deploying these yachts for naval service, such as transporting the Queen Mother and Princess Henrietta ashore from the fleet in Harve in January 1661, the King was frequently observed taking his pleasure aboard one of them in and around the coast.⁷⁶¹

Further, in order that he could take more casual delight in aquatic adventures nearer to home, he employed 300 workmen to construct a broad canal through St James’s Park to add to the existing river water available to him.⁷⁶² This was portrayed in pamphlets in such phrases as “Instead of river rolling by the side/Of Edens garden/here flows in the tide/The sea which always served his empire now/Pays tribute to our Prince’s pleasure too”, reflecting the success of the King’s propaganda in exhibiting aquatic associations. Further, in constructing an ‘inland’ sea Charles was able to flaunt his nautical image and prowess in the centre of his capital to all his subjects including his influential nobility. Importantly, pamphlets conveyed this message more widely.⁷⁶³ Additionally, the King arranged through London-based foreign ambassadors for their mother countries to send him typical native craft, for example two gondolas and gondoliers from Venice, two handsome Feluccas from Naples, rich barques from Holland.⁷⁶⁴ His high enthusiasm for sailing and the water was made even more evident via this project’s sheer scale, and in combination with his impatience for his canal project to be ready and the delight he anticipated in using the wide variety of vessels he expected from abroad, his desire for strong nautical associations would have been widely evident to his subjects, and his strong masculinity exposed to public gaze.⁷⁶⁵

However, the coronation presented the clearest portrayal of the Monarch’s closeness with his navy, this public ceremony and divine sanctioning constituting the pinnacle and ultimate symbol of monarchical power. Charles’s was widely regarded as second to none by other European Monarchs and was absolutely dripping with symbolism.⁷⁶⁶ Panegyrics eulogised the King’s nautically aspired antecedents, one comparing the King’s return as the rising of a

⁷⁶⁰ CSPD 1660-1661, p.501 Vol XXX 4.2.1661 entry 13; Pepys *Diary*, 16.4.1661

⁷⁶¹ Pepys *Diary*, 21.5.1660, 13.6.1661; Montagu *Journal*, p.84 28.1.1661 Out of Sir John Lawson’s *Journal*, p.84 7.1.1661, p.85 8.1.1661, p.85 28.1.1661 Abstracted out of Capt Teddman’s *Journal*

⁷⁶² CSP *Venice vol 32*, 22.10.1660 p.207 entry 224; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.120 October 1660 Mr Peters Sermon, p.121 October 1660 Many New Things

⁷⁶³ *Poem on St James’s Park*, p.3

⁷⁶⁴ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 22.10.1660 p.207 entry 224, 10.12.1660 p. 225 entry 246, 22.2.1661 p.250 entry 285, 7.5.1661 p.288 entry 342; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.358 2.6.1662

⁷⁶⁵ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 10.12.1660 p.225 entry 246

⁷⁶⁶ CSPD 1660-1661, p.580 Vol XXXV 2.5.1661 entry 4 Sec Nicholas to Jos Kent

phoenix returned home by “swift-footed nymphs”, the population’s heightened elation described as

“swelling tides our joys to overflow”.

The coronation itself was likened to the sea-god’s palace, overseen by all the maritime deities, stating “And as you meet in Neptune’s Azure hall/Bid them, bid Sea-Gods keep this festival”.⁷⁶⁷ In addition, on April 22nd, during the King’s London pre-coronation procession an extraordinary aquatic display on the Thames comprised a lifelike figure of the Tower, a rotating circle containing three rings, each displaying the three crowns of England, Scotland and Ireland. The climax was a castle with Neptune exiting it on a whale, the mammal encompassing platforms from where music hailed until Neptune made his speech to the King as he passed, welcoming the Monarch to his Kingdom and singing his praises.⁷⁶⁸ This portrays a clear message. The Tower signifies his Majesty’s power, the three emblems of the Kingdom representing the Monarch’s rule, with Neptune’s commanding figure and his supplicatory speech symbolising Charles’s oceanic mastery and that this was the preeminent part of his sovereignty.

Pamphlets also reported the City’s participation in expounding laudatory nautical emblems. They commissioned four magnificent arches of their own as well as a lavish maypole, the Duke of York ordering the physical erection of the latter, twelve seamen using their pulleys and tackle to replace the carpenters who struggled due to a lack of appropriate equipment. It was a-topped with streamers, and half-way down its trunk three lanthorns reflected the glory of the Lord High Admiral, the Vice-Admiral and the Rear-Admiral. The lanthorns were to remain in place for as long as the pole stood to light the locality and as a visual reminder of the navy. Both the King and Prince James were delighted with it.⁷⁶⁹ Further, as Master of the Horse Monck organised all of the horses for both days, visibly riding immediately behind the King in the procession through London on 22nd April with a spare should his Majesty require one. And as Master of the Robes Montagu was responsible for all of the vestments that the King wore throughout his coronation, which Pepys reported as making a very fine

⁷⁶⁷ *Coronation panegyric*, pp.1-2

⁷⁶⁸ *Neptunes address*, pp.1-8

⁷⁶⁹ *City loyalty displayed*, pp.4-5

visage.⁷⁷⁰ More specifically, between April 15th and 17th, the General and Admiral were both formally invested into the Order of the Garter, this being a much more publicly visible ceremony than the informal one following the Sovereign's arrival at Dover.⁷⁷¹

Additionally, in the pre-coronation investiture of new peers Montagu supported the new Earl of Essex.⁷⁷² And with incredible symbolism, both were central to the core of the coronation. Montagu carried St Edward's Staff, and Monck the Sceptre with the Dove. Also, Sir George Carteret, Treasurer of the Navy, was especially appointed by the King to be his Almoner for the day. Further, during the King's anointing, both Albemarle and Sandwich supported two of the four corners of the Pall of Cloth of Gold that was held above his Majesty while he was at the altar, the Duke of Buckingham and the Earl of Berkshire holding the other two, the material later being wrapped around his Majesty's shoulders when he was being 'clothed' immediately prior to the crowning ceremony.⁷⁷³ Lastly, of course, they both publicly paid homage to the newly crowned Monarch along with all other peers.⁷⁷⁴ Further, the appointments and symbolisms were incredibly important on multiple fronts. In addition to publicly exhibiting their continuing closeness to the King, Monck and Montagu had a very practical effect in supporting the King through this turbulent time. In total these factors emphasise how close and important the naval leaders were to the regime, and how widely recognised this was within the country.

However, the most public and high profile spectacle surrounded the procession. This is aptly illustrated by the nautical symbolism of overwhelming significance on display. During the procession through the capital on 23rd April 1661 Charles's entourage rode under four triumphal arches, each representing an important aspect of his monarchy. The second arch was devoted to the navy and was known as the naval arch. According to John Ogilby's detailed pamphlet documenting the coronation itself, and its preceding procession on 22nd April 1661, no arch was dedicated to the land forces, army or militia.⁷⁷⁵ One panegyric lauded the naval arch as showing the King as ruling the seas, stating "The second arch would

⁷⁷⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 22.4.1660; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.45 29.5.1660; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.284; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.188

⁷⁷¹ Walker *A circumstantial*, p.43

⁷⁷² Walker *A circumstantial*, p.59

⁷⁷³ Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.86-87, pp.99-100; Baker *Chronicle*, p.760, p.762, p.764; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.15.7.1660, p.345 23.4.1661

⁷⁷⁴ Walker *A circumstantial*, pp.107-108; Baker *Chronicle*, p.766

⁷⁷⁵ Baker *Chronicle*, p.759; Ogilby *arches*, pp.1-28; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, pp.345-346 23.4.1661

to the world declare/Neptune and all his nymphs your subjects are”.⁷⁷⁶ Ogilby and other sources progress to describe how, sited near the Exchange in Cornhill, the naval arch overflowed with nautical images and mottos glorifying the Monarch, divinely sanctioning him as ruler of the seas, and linking him with mythical gods such as Neptune. Also, two stages were erected on the arch’s east side. The southern one portrayed a figure representing the river Thames. On the stage’s northern side, “which was made like the upper deck of a ship”, were three seamen, one clothed like a boatswain.⁷⁷⁷ The three seamen sang to the nobility as they passed, and on the King’s approach the individual impersonating the Thames made a speech followed by the three sailors singing again, all glorifying the King’s sovereignty of the seas through his all-conquering navy with its loyal sailors.⁷⁷⁸ There was music consisting of trumpets and wind music.⁷⁷⁹

Also, on various panels of the naval arch a variety of classical gods such as Mars glorified the King’s symbolic associations as ruler of the sea. And in a highly prominent and visible place Charles I was depicted viewing the leviathan ship *Sovereign of the Sea* (see Appendix C), holding his son’s hand, the young prince Charles leaning on a cannon (see Appendix B). Given that this was a naval arch, this weapon can only have been a maritime one. Depictions of James, Duke of York were also included, mythical images of Neptune and His Highness standing on a shell drawn by sea horses, pointing to his dynastic nautical inheritance.⁷⁸⁰ This conveyed the ancestral nature of his Majesty’s throne, reinforcing his warrior King image, as part of a military nautical dynasty, aiming to substantially raise his warrior persona. Dripping in such symbolism, this was the most popular aspect between the start of the coronation procession on April 23rd at the Tower and its termination at the Abbey and would have provided a startling visage.⁷⁸¹ Further, in retaining its prominent position for a whole year the arch reinforced the nautical messages to the public.⁷⁸² In fact, at society’s most influential level the navy had been so conspicuous and had so successfully portrayed its importance to the new head of state that its image had been significantly altered, now representing an honourable service for young gentlemen to pursue their careers.⁷⁸³ Overall,

⁷⁷⁶ *Heroik stanzas*, p.9 verse 17

⁷⁷⁷ *Penn Memoires*, pp.257-258; *Jocelyn Diary*, p.138 3.5.1660

⁷⁷⁸ *Rugg Diurnal*, p.152 25.2.1661 Scotland, p.175 Monday 22.4.1661 Coronation; Walker *A circumstantial*, p.76

⁷⁷⁹ *Ogilby arches*, pp.11-18

⁷⁸⁰ *Penn Memoires*, pp.257-258, *Ogilby arches*, pp.11-18

⁷⁸¹ *Penn Memoires*, pp.257-258

⁷⁸² *Evelyn Diary vol 1*, p.343 22.4.1661

⁷⁸³ *Pepys Diary*, 4.6.1660

the coronation very powerfully showed the navy at the very heart of the King's regime, underlining how close and central this nautical military arm of state was to his rule.

In total, in May 1660 Charles returned to massive initial popularity and a very supportive Parliament, but the contentious domestic issues facing him presented incredible difficulties. In troubled times like this it is crucial to have as many influential and powerful friends as possible. As evidenced by the plethora of tangible and symbolic ways listed above, the navy was overwhelmingly useful to the new King. Popular opinion fluctuates over time, as to prevailing political alliances and opinions. However, during the period considered in this Chapter the navy remained constant, arguably making it the Monarch's most consistent and beneficial ally.

The King's Covert Personal Ambitions.

Central to this Chapter, and indeed, the rest of this thesis, will be a new interpretation of Charles's personality and objectives. In summary and as mentioned above this was to use the English navy to attain domestic absolutism and international pre-eminence. Customs and Excise had been voted by Parliament to attribute to Charles for life, incentivising him to use his maritime military to help maximise international trade, providing the means to pay for his aspirations. This led to the inevitability of war, the step-by-step plan concocted to achieve this being outlined in the Chapters up to and including number Five. Chapters Six and Seven highlight how this played out during and after the actual hostilities.

Although we can never be absolutely sure what the motivations of historical actors were - especially in the case of a man who was forced by political circumstances to play his cards very close to his chest - this interpretation seems to extremely closely fit his actions in the period 1661-1667, and is signalled by the opinions of such intimate contemporaries of the King as Bishop Burnet and his personal physician. It begins with that feeling of inadequacy and powerlessness before the Restoration, which we have already touched upon. In 1660 Charles had been a continental nomad for fourteen years, from the impressionable age of 16. His welcome in various countries depended on their friendliness with the English Commonwealth government at the time, receiving a pension as a hand-out from different countries when expedient. This period was very difficult for him, and as expressed in 1661 in his 'Character' of the young prince, Dr Charleton, his personal physician, highlighted the

“cares, hardships, wants and continual danger” that his “exile and adverse fortunes” had exposed him to.⁷⁸⁴

Therefore, it would be very surprising if it hadn't helped to form his opinions and shape his character. His attendance at multiple courts gave him exposure to the various models of European kingship and government, together with their associated politics, and the consequent opportunity to evolve his preference of personal monarchical style. In fact, Bishop Gilbert Burnet, the one-time favourite and confidant of his Majesty, confirmed in his famous character description of Charles, that

“he knew well the state of affairs both at home and abroad”.

Further, his overseas nomadic wanderings would make anyone feel like a second-class citizen, and therefore to compensate it would encourage them to maximise the opportunity to create a new and powerful reputation for themselves to exceed that of their rivals, should the situation allow. The Duke of Newcastle summarised this, stating

“most states are governed by secret policy.”⁷⁸⁵

And as expressed by one panegyric, the King had “endured an ostracism/In many a foreign land” and in consequence wished to turn this into a position of international supremacy, the panegyric progressing to say “Does now captivity captive lead/Strokes panthers tame with's hand”.⁷⁸⁶ Therefore, Charles developed a preference for ‘absolute monarchy’ as a form of government. Burnet highlighted the young Monarch's predilection for this, stating that the King

“He often said, he thought government was a much safer and easier thing where the authority was believed infallible, and the faith and submission of the people was implicit, about which I had once much discourse with him”.

⁷⁸⁴ Charleton *Character*, pp.11-12

⁷⁸⁵ Cavendish *Life of the thrice noble*, Book 4 p.181 LXXI

⁷⁸⁶ *Triumphant panegyric*

The reason the King selected this style of regime was that he was attracted to the French system, Burnet confirming that

“He had made such observations on the French government, that he thought a King who might be checked, or have his ministers called to an account by a Parliament was but a King in name”.⁷⁸⁷

Additionally, the corollary to this, as highlighted by Burnet’s recounting of his conversations with his Royal patron, is a strong antipathy to any form of Parliamentary democracy that would fetter his Majesty’s arbitrary rule.

The English constitution meant that his Majesty had to endure Parliament’s domestic oversight of his affairs, the achievement of this being through control of the Royal purse strings. The Cavalier Parliament had no compunction exercising this function, such as in July 1663 it forced the King to expel all Catholics in return for granting additional funds. This directly contravened the King’s Breda declaration, which promised toleration for ‘tender consciences’.⁷⁸⁸ In fact, this can only have highlighted to Charles his weakened, constitutional position compared to the French governmental model he idealised, the French King being able to raise as much tax as he pleased, the resulting amount far exceeding English fiscal revenues. This strengthened Charles’s determination to distance himself from Parliamentary control.⁷⁸⁹

However, the House had no desire to restrict the Sovereign’s prerogative over foreign matters, passing the 1661 Militia Act, giving him sole command over all military forces, both by land and sea.⁷⁹⁰ As a result, the King had available to him a method of achieving the first element of his ambition of absolute power, his chosen policy being to project power globally to establish a reputation for himself as a pre-eminent monarch. Further, as pamphlets pointed out, this included the aspiration to be ‘Arbiter totius Europe’, to dominate Europe by holding the balance of power.⁷⁹¹ The navy with its fearsome international reputation provided the

⁷⁸⁷ Burnet *History vol 1*, pp.127-128

⁷⁸⁸ CSP *Venice Vol 33*, 10.7.1663 pp. 250-256 Vol 33 entry 334

⁷⁸⁹ Pepys Diary, 29.2.1664

⁷⁹⁰ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 1.10.1660 p.199 entry 218; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.382; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.68 8.1.1661

⁷⁹¹ *Restauranda*, pp.56-57

mechanism to achieve this, Charles using it as a tool to implement his will overseas.⁷⁹² As the King's personal physician stated

“His Majesty's extraordinary sufficiency in the sacred mysteries of empire; and that is his great preparations to improve the principal dowry of this his Kingdom of Great Britain, the vantage of strength by sea that nature hath given it. The daily increase of his Royal Navy speaks him to be of that opinion. The vast excess of power his Majesty hath in that particular above all princes and states of Europe, duly considered; as well because he that is master of the sea is at liberty to begin or end a war, where, when, and upon what terms he pleaseth; as because the wealth of both Indies seems in great part but an accessory to the Sovereignty of the Seas.”⁷⁹³

And in his poem ‘On St James's Park’ Edward Waller confirmed the King's aspirations for overseas domination, regaling “The world from India to the frozen north/The prospect thought and contemplation gives/That seat of empire here salutes his eye”.⁷⁹⁴ Additionally, the Venetian ambassador observed to his Italian masters that for Charles

“to stand thus armed renders him considerable in the whole world”.⁷⁹⁵

Of course, this attitude needed to be financially sustainable, the necessary funds being independent of Parliamentary scrutiny otherwise his Majesty's overseas policy would be compromised, thus failing to meet its overall objective. Luckily, the House had voted that England's Customs and Excise revenue should accrue to the Sovereign for life, expected to be about £1.2 million per annum, providing the vital independent income stream (see above). As Cecil, Lord Salisbury and Lord Treasurer to King James, observed to the Parliament in the reign of King James, as mentioned in pamphlets

“it is a certain rule that all princes are poor and unsafe who are not rich and so patent as to defend themselves upon any sudden offence and invasion, to help their allies and neighbours.”⁷⁹⁶

⁷⁹² Burnet *History vol 1*, p.242

⁷⁹³ Charleton *Character*, pp.15-16

⁷⁹⁴ Gent *Complementum*, p.4 Poem on St James's Park

⁷⁹⁵ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 10.7.1665 entry 215

⁷⁹⁶ *Restauranda*, pp.56-57

Therefore, Charles's overseas policy was theoretically possible, conditional upon Customs and Excise revenues being sufficient to support his military ambitions. So, it was in Charles's interest to introduce policies to maximise this revenue, higher amounts providing him with increased independence from Parliament and the ability to implement his policies. Consequently, this was a direct incentive for the Monarch to maximise the country's external trade. Further, the fulfilment of an independently funded overseas policy would maximise the chances of the attainment of the second element of the King's ambitions, that of absolutism. Were international trade to be raised by a sufficient proportion, the consequent Customs could obviate the Monarch's need to achieve Parliamentary approval for fiscal subsidies. The independence this provided would make his Majesty as close to an absolute ruler as he could achieve, and mark a considerable triumph compared to the attempt made by his father!

The contemporary prevailing mercantilist theory stated that there was a fixed amount of global trade, so if the King wished to expand his nation's Customs receipts emanating from heightened overseas trade, he would need to take it from another country. As Holland was England's main mercantile rival it would therefore be necessary to acquire some of theirs. The inevitability of Dutch resistance would inexorably lead to war. Therefore, Charles implemented a step-by-step plan to achieve his aspirations (see below and Chapters Four to Seven).

Preserving the Navy.

The navy was absolutely vital to Charles achieving this twin approach, that being to augment his independent revenue from Customs in order to provide him with the funds to project power globally to attempt international pre-eminence. It provided the force to enhance the King's overseas reputation, and the means to protect and boost trade.⁷⁹⁷ This would also make him an attractive ally to overseas rulers. The Venetian ambassador gave a measure of the fear the English engendered in foreign powers

⁷⁹⁷ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 10.7.1665 entry 215

“Spain will never of her own accord abandon the good understanding which she has with England, for knowing that that warlike nation cannot live at ease, she has to see it and to desire that the fire should be kindled by preference in the house of others. Sweden and Denmark depend today on England owing to the compacts and articles concluded, and they certainly would not venture to thwart such a power at sea. The Hanse towns, because freedom of navigation can be denied to them by the English alone, are fearful if they do not identify themselves with the wishes and interests of that crown”.⁷⁹⁸

In the Restoration’s early days, with the King’s concentration being on stabilising his domestic scene, Charles had little ability to implement his dual policies. However, he was able to undertake preparations for a future wider focus, that is creating the framework in readiness for future policy delivery. Despite the initial pressure to disband the armed forces, Charles took active steps to preserve the means of implementing his overseas vision, that is his maritime military, enshrining this policy in legislation. This would provide the means to both project his power globally and to protect trade. As reported in *The Intelligencer* and pamphlets, in the Acts of Parliament to authorise the raising of money for disbanding the Kingdom’s forces, although the summary sections mentioned the need to reduce the navy, the legal detail only specified amounts for disbanding the army. Similarly, in the King’s and Chancellor’s speeches following the enactment, the navy’s debts were only to be discharged, preserving the vessels. In fact, money was to be primarily channelled towards the army, the navy only receiving attention once this had been accomplished. Even then, only small parts of the navy were cited, pointing to a clear effort to substantially preserve it.⁷⁹⁹ The relevant section of the Act, also reported in *The Kingdom’s Intelligencer*, stipulated the practical effect of this as being that the Commissioners’ attention was focused on discharging the navy’s debt, not discharging the navy itself. This concentrated on the amounts owing to such people as victuallers, dockyard workers and seamen, leaving the ships available for future service.⁸⁰⁰ Also, in the period following the Restoration, navy officials selected a mere 25 vessels to be paid off and sold out of the service, many remaining in service thereafter due to money lacking for their discharge.⁸⁰¹ Yet, these were only ships identified as “out of repair

⁷⁹⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 31.7.65 entry 228

⁷⁹⁹ Baker *Chronicle*, pp.745-747; *Intelligencer*, Issue 38 10.9.1660-17.9.1660 p.602, Issue 40 23.9.1660-30.9.1660 p.627; *The Collection*, pp.52-54, pp.59-65

⁸⁰⁰ *Kingdom*, Issue 9 25.2.1661-4.3.1661 pp.129-131; *Commissioners*

⁸⁰¹ *Pepys Diary*, 15.9.1660; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.192 Vol X 15.8.1660 Dunkirk entry 143, p.305 Vol XVIII 4.10.1660 entry 21

and useless”, or were surplus to any foreseeable requirement.⁸⁰² In January 1661 the King further preserved his navy by ensuring that the Commissioners for paying off the army and navy took over direct responsibility for implementing the armed forces’ reduction from the more junior officials like Pepys.

To guarantee the success of this change, as announced by *The Intelligencer* and other sources the Commission was headed by Monck, the erstwhile supreme naval commander and the King’s loyal champion (see chapter one).⁸⁰³ *The Intelligencer* also reported that all money collected for disbanding the forces was to be paid directly into the Government’s treasury, and as a Commissioner for the Treasury (see above) Montagu would have had an oversight and consequent ability to influence the navy’s protection.⁸⁰⁴ This evidences that his Majesty had two trusted lieutenants heavily protecting his maritime military, and despite substantial amounts owing to the navy, the policy was successfully implemented. This is starkly illustrated by the number of vessels left available for his Majesty to deploy. The *Young Seamen’s Guide* lists 131 ships of all rates, from first to sixth, remaining in service later in 1661. This overwhelmingly highlights the success of the King’s efforts to preserve his navy.⁸⁰⁵

Additionally, it was demonstrably evident to the population that not only did the King want to preserve his navy, he was actively expanding it. This was reflected in contemporary pamphlets, evidencing the Monarch’s knowledge of the power of controlling the sea, stating

“the daily increase of his royal navy speaks him to be of that opinion”.⁸⁰⁶

As highlighted in *A Narrative of the Royal Fishings of Great Britain and Ireland*, a strong foundation for this was the fishing industry’s regularisation.⁸⁰⁷ In addition to providing coastal employment, it also created a training “seminar” for sailors for men-of-war. Also,

⁸⁰² CPSD 1660-1661, p.255 Vol XIV 4.9.1660 entry 26; Baker *Chronicle*, p.739

⁸⁰³ Pepys *Diary*, 21.1.1661; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.59 25.8.1660; *Intelligencer*, Issue 38 10.9.1660-17.9.1660 p.603

⁸⁰⁴ *Intelligencer*, Issue 40 23.9.1660-30.9.1660 p.627

⁸⁰⁵ *Young seaman’s*, pp.2-3; Rugg *Diurnal*, pp.160-162 March 1661 Ships; *Intelligencer*, Issue 47 12.11.1660-19.11.1660 p.759

⁸⁰⁶ Charleton *Character*, pp.14-16

⁸⁰⁷ *Royal fishing narrative*, pp.1-25

this paper, prefaced by a proclamation from the King, entwined a national naval strategy with the fishing scheme, numerating the fleet size to be 156 vessels, and to be

“both in strength and in wealth, to defend against any 2 Kings in Christendom.”⁸⁰⁸

This clearly indicates his Majesty’s future naval plans for pre-eminence based on a powerful navy. Further, under direct Royal command, some additions were made to the fleet, for example in August the Duke of York ordered the launching of the newly built *Princess* frigate constructed at Lydney in the Dean Forest, to be manned and victualled at Portsmouth.⁸⁰⁹ And in September the *Monk* was also to be launched at Portsmouth.⁸¹⁰ This is incredibly important as it substantially conflicts with the army’s situation, whose disbandment was almost complete by the end of January 1661, as reported by *The Kingdom’s Intelligencer*.⁸¹¹ The contrast is clear, highlighting the Sovereign’s desire to preserve the maritime arm of his military to support future policies.

An essential accompaniment to the retention of such a large naval fleet were adequate numbers of trained seamen. Consequently, the King instituted a policy to secure the availability of a large pool of sailors should their services be needed. For example, shortly after his accession, as reported in *The Intelligencer*, a proclamation annulled all privateering licences which had been issued by the Royal family when in exile, all associated sailors as well as those in the service of foreign maritime concerns were to make themselves available to his Majesty’s service.⁸¹² This was reinforced with a similar proclamation just prior to the coronation, to include all highly skilled workers involved in building ships.⁸¹³ Further, in the same month the King’s measure to develop the fishing industry on a national scale partly aimed at addressing unemployment issues, but also provided the

“breeding of country youths to be made serviceable mariners in short time” (see above) “to increase the strength unto our sea forces”.⁸¹⁴

⁸⁰⁸ *Royal fishing narrative*, pp.17-20

⁸⁰⁹ CSPD 1660-1661, p.175 Vol X 1.8.1660 entry 9, p.205 Vol XI 29.8.1660 entries 77 and 78

⁸¹⁰ CSPD 1660-1661, p.269 Vol XVI 18.9.1660 entry 21

⁸¹¹ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.158 March 1661 *Scotland*; CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 4.3.1660 p.255 entry 291; *Kingdom*, Issue 4 21.1.1661-28.1.1661 p.61

⁸¹² CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 9.7.1660 p.167 entry 174; CSPD 1660-1661, p.53 Vol IV 15.6.60 entry 47

⁸¹³ CSPD 1660-1661, p.570 Vol XXXIV 19.4.1661 Whitehall; *Seamen to return home*

⁸¹⁴ Rugg *Diurnal*, p102 July 1660 The King’s Letter; Promote the fishing industry

This was supported by the fishing industry itself, recognising that the training and provision of seamen was part of its *raison d'etre*.⁸¹⁵ The third pool of mariners were those already in service. This was the most important contingent. They had already gained the required skills, experience and familiarity with their vessels.

However, the navy's high debt levels and its inability to pay the sailors risked them leaving the service for alternative employment which would pay immediate cash, making efforts never to return.⁸¹⁶ For example, some wages were more than two years outstanding.⁸¹⁷ The King found Sir George Carteret's scheme for clearing the substantial unpaid wages via 100% payment by ticket to be unacceptable, as it would have left the sailors at the mercy of money lenders who made their profit by offering a lower proportion of the face value and also charging the government eight percent interest.⁸¹⁸ His Majesty insisted on it being softened, being replaced with an initial one month's cash payment, the rest to be handed over four months hence.⁸¹⁹ To some extent this worked, Barlow reporting that his ship received their twelve months outstanding money in March 1661.⁸²⁰ However, Charles's intervention in Sir George's preliminary scheme exhibits his concern for the mariners' welfare and his desire to retain them.

In May 1661 Parliament enacted the *articles and orders for the regulating and better government of his Majesty's navies, ships of war and forces by sea*.⁸²¹ These were issued in the King's name, further emphasising both the King's close association with the navy and his overall command. This impression was enhanced by article thirty-four which gave the Lord High Admiral, the King's brother and deputy, the power to personally appoint any personnel.⁸²² This provides strong encouragement for the loyalty of all officers and crew, knowing that their ongoing appointments and promotions were entirely at the Duke of York's discretion on behalf of the Sovereign. It also included articles to support sailors' welfare, such as article twenty-two which stipulated that complaints about victuals should be

⁸¹⁵ *Royal fishing narrative*, p.5, p.8

⁸¹⁶ *Pepys Diary*, 31.7.60, 2.8.1660, 5.11.1660, 11.6.1661

⁸¹⁷ *Barlow Journal*, p.48

⁸¹⁸ *Pepys Diary*, 30.11.1660

⁸¹⁹ *Pepys Diary*, 3.12.1660, 4.12.1660

⁸²⁰ *Barlow Journal*, p.47

⁸²¹ *Articles and orders*, pp.1-12

⁸²² *Articles and orders*, p.10

addressed by the commander as soon as possible.⁸²³ However, interestingly, to ensure the service's ongoing operations, given its severe funding crisis, article fifteen stipulated no seaman could disobey orders due to non-payment of wages.⁸²⁴ Further, to these articles Charles added a proclamation aimed at regulating shipyard operations. Although its title suggests it targeted embezzlement by personnel of the Kings stores, it also regulated the performance of important sections of the yards, as well as the use of the King's various pennants.⁸²⁵ In total, it is clear that the King's active measures to preserve his navy and create a pool of sailors should they be needed were successful. Further, with the '*articles for the better government of the navy*' being issued in his Majesty's name, and the proclamation aimed at regulating the King's naval stores and the use of royal pennants, the navy was evidently his Majesty's personal domain. And together with the Royal brothers' monopoly over making appointments, this hugely increased the regime's control over the institution, helping to shape it into a tool for implementing the Monarch's policies. Personal influence, emotional ties and structural command had been reinforced in law.

Act for Encouraging and Increasing of Shipping and Navigation – the 'Navigation Act' of 1660.

A particularly high-profile policy introduced by Charles, as reported in *The Intelligencer* and other sources, was the 'Navigation Act' 1660, becoming law in late September, making it mandatory for all goods brought into England to be transported in English ships. In essence, this re-enacted the Commonwealth's similar law, adding that certain goods such as sugar, indigo, tobacco, rice and molasses could only be shipped to England or another English colony.⁸²⁶ Although this legislation apparently exemplified the Monarch and Parliament working together for the betterment, in fact it was sponsored by his Majesty. This is clearly indicated in pamphlets, as highlighted in the King's and Chancellor's speeches following the passing of the Act, the Government thereafter promoting the establishment of committees to enhance its application, such as founding the councils for both trade and foreign colonisation.⁸²⁷ In the article 'How the Old World Ended' Jonathon Scott is shown to

⁸²³ *Articles and orders*, p.8

⁸²⁴ *Articles and orders*, pp.1-12

⁸²⁵ *Embezzlement of stores*

⁸²⁶ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*

⁸²⁷ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 1.10.1660 p.199 entry 218, 11.2.1661 p.245 entry 279; Baker *Chronicle*, p.746 entry 7, p.749; *Intelligencer*, Issue 38 10.9.1660-17.9.1660 p.602, Issue 38 10.9.1660-17.9.1660 pp.618-622; *Collection of his*, p.78, pp.78-79; *Navigation Act*, pp.1-17

hypothesise that Charles tried to build on the Commonwealth regime's Navigation initiatives, stating "the Republican experiment of 1649 may not have lasted long, but the commercial and naval revolutions it brought survived Restoration in 1660".⁸²⁸ This Chapter demonstrates that the King took this further, his 'Navigation Act' being an important plank in effecting his covert personal agenda, achieving both diplomatic and economic objectives. It encouraged trade as English merchants would receive a warmer welcome in foreign markets as local rulers needed them to gain access to Charles's markets.⁸²⁹ However, it also gave his Majesty a stronger informal influence over those overseas potentates as he had the ability to ostracise them for noncompliance.

Consequently, the Act was crucial. It substantially heightened the likelihood that English merchant vessels would be welcome in foreign destinations as they were the only way for these vendors to get their goods into markets in his Majesty's territories, raising English political influence there.⁸³⁰ The more important English trade was to foreign potentates, the more attractive Charles was as an ally as they were more likely to wish to stay politically aligned to him. The appointment of Sir John Shaw as Surveyor to oversee the Act's implementation at an annual salary of £600 indicates the seriousness with which it was taken.⁸³¹ Interestingly, the legislations' enactment was communicated as a Parliamentary initiative, allowing the King to present this to foreign politicians as the reinforcement of Parliamentary will rather than his own, removing some potential antagonism from these relationships.⁸³²

The navy was incredibly important in this. As stated by Venice's London ambassador

"as long as Charles was master of the seas" he had the ability to both ensure the compliance of the 'Navigation Act' and uphold the Royal prestige internationally.

This commenced in early 1661. Through the Council for Trade established under the 'Navigation Act' thirty-three ships were allocated to support nautical commerce, such as convoying merchants and protecting vessels against pirates. Crucially, these ships were to be

⁸²⁸ Scott 'How the Old World' pp.1051-1052

⁸²⁹ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.152

⁸³⁰ *Navigation Act*

⁸³¹ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.359 Vol XXI 20.11.1660 entry 83

⁸³² CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 1.10.1660 p.199 entry 218

based globally in England's main mercantile spheres, including the Mediterranean, the East and West Indies and the Baltic. Of course, these were in addition to the vessels stationed in and around England. Similarly mooted was the creation of a Council for Foreign Colonisation to boost the numbers of English subjects overseas, further increasing the English presence abroad.⁸³³ The navy would bind these colonies to the mother land, providing protection, communication and enforcing the Sovereign's rule by acting as his Majesty's representatives. Also, the presence of the local fleet would raise the colony's status, the available military power underlining the colony's political and commercial importance. And as the King's representatives the enhanced colony and fleet would raise the King's prestige, supporting his attractiveness as an ally. Consequently, it is apparent that Charles's preservation of the fleet during his period of intense domestic pressure was strategically driven. Indeed, it evidences the initial stages in his Majesty's step-by-step plan to achieve his aspirations for domestic absolutism and overseas pre-eminence, using the navy as a tool to implement it.

Other Foreign Alliances.

Charles was incredibly short of money, so he couldn't afford to dispatch his ambassadors to represent him in overseas countries.⁸³⁴ There were exceptions to this, such as Lord Winchelsea becoming ambassador to Constantinople, and Lord Jermyn acting as envoy to France.⁸³⁵ Nonetheless, these were for specific reasons, the former being paid by the Levant Company as a large proportion of his duties were commercial in nature, these costs comprising £10,000 per year.⁸³⁶ And the latter was to support the Queen Mother's negotiations regarding Princess Henrietta's marriage to the Duc d'Anjou, the Queen Mother also constituting an enthusiastic but unpaid ambassador.⁸³⁷ Yet, the King still dealt with foreign governments through their London-based ambassadors, pursuing his foreign policy, his navy raising his appeal to foreign potentates. The Danish treaty heavily featured his Majesty's maritime military, in early April 1661 the Danes using this to request naval assistance to protect their fort at Friderichsburg from pirates and

⁸³³ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 11.6.1660 p.156 entry 157, 1.10.1660 p.199 entry 218, 11.2.1661 p.245 entry 279; Pepys 22.1.1661; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.359 Vol XXI 19.11.1660 entry 82

⁸³⁴ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 13.11.1660 p.215 entry 235, 25.3.1661 pp.266-267 entry 306

⁸³⁵ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.412 Vol XXIII 13.12.1660 entry 86 Whitehall

⁸³⁶ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.204 Vol XI 28.8.1660 Whitehall entry 70

⁸³⁷ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 9.7.1660 p.167 entry 174, 13.11.1660 p.215 entry 235, 22.10.1660 p.207 entry 224; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.65 Vol V 25.6.1660 Whitehall entry 1

“others who think to engross the trade of the whole world”.⁸³⁸

Further, the navy was used to deepen this relationship, the King ordering a frigate to transport the departing Danish minister to his destination.⁸³⁹ Also, a substantial military alliance was concluded with the Elector of Brandenburg, containing 24 articles.⁸⁴⁰ Consequently, this evidences the navy as a very important element in the King’s foreign policy. Given the power that it provided, it underlined the Monarch’s attractiveness as an ally, providing him with a substantially enhanced negotiating position.

A major friendship was between France and England, both sides desiring a closer relationship and a re-construction of old alliances, albeit that they were to remain secret.⁸⁴¹ As a single Monarch, it was vital that Charles should marry, this concerning ordinary people as well as the elite.⁸⁴² The Queen Mother, Henrietta Maria, was prominent in trying to organise this, for example encouraging the French ambassador to suggest to Charles that he marry a French Princess, a daughter of the Duc d’Orleans.⁸⁴³ This didn’t proceed, similar to the proposals from the Danish and Dutch for his Majesty to marry one of their princesses.⁸⁴⁴ But the Queen Mother’s design for Princess Henrietta’s marriage (her daughter) to the Duc d’Anjou was welcomed on both sides of the channel, the dowry being £40,000 in cash, a further £20,000 in jewels with a substantial income for life.⁸⁴⁵ The result of this was a secret defensive alliance. Charles was partly prompted by his desire for support to ease his financial woes, the French potentially providing substantial amounts of money.⁸⁴⁶ A partial attraction for King Louis XIV was his desire to obviate enhanced Spanish power should it defeat Portugal (see below). Consequently, under the treaty he supported Charles’s marriage to the Infanta de Braganza, and was willing to secretly help the Portuguese against Spain, such as in

⁸³⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, p.93 11.4.1661, p.82 February 1661; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 11.3.1661 p.259 entry 296; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.109 21.9.1660

⁸³⁹ Rugg *Diurnal*, p.154 February 1661 An Ambassador

⁸⁴⁰ CCSP *vol 5*, p.105 8.6.1661; CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 11.3.1661 p.258 entry 296

⁸⁴¹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 20.8.1660 p.184 entry 200; CCSP *vol 5*, pp.87-88 25.3.1661, p.92 1.4.1661

⁸⁴² CCSP *vol 5*, pp.49-50 27.8.60 London. Bellings to Abbot Montagu; Pepys *Diary*, 14.2.1661, 18.2.1661, 19.2.1661

⁸⁴³ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 3.8.1660 p.178 entry 190, 17.9.1660 p.195 entry 214, 8.10.1660 p.202 entry 221; CCSP *vol 5*, p.57 27.10.1660

⁸⁴⁴ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 8.10.1660 p.202 entry 221

⁸⁴⁵ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 17.9.1660 p.195 entry 214; CCSP *vol 5*, p.87 13.3.1661, p.87 Mar 1661

⁸⁴⁶ CCSP *vol 5*, pp.49-50 27.8.1660 London. Bellings to Abbot Montagu, p.94 18.4.1661, p.94 26.4.1661, p.99 14.5.1661, p.107 17.6.1661; CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 28.6.1660 p.162 entry 166

November 1660 when 400 or 500 French officers and men were dispatched to Portugal.⁸⁴⁷ However, the navy was crucial to this treaty, military aid being central to its clauses. Of course, this mainly meant naval aid, given the army's disbandment. Both sides were to receive military assistance should the other be attacked, that is a defensive alliance, the attraction for the French being the English navy, highlighting the heightened attraction to international rulers that the navy provided for the King by having a powerful military tool at his disposal.⁸⁴⁸

Portuguese Alliance.

The navy was also crucial for Charles's major overseas objectives. He could select the partner of his choosing, the navy making him an attractive ally. His nautical military allowed him to follow an independent policy, resisting pressure from other powers such as Spain to follow theirs. And with the navy, powerful overseas bases became practicable.

The King's major alliance was with Portugal, this meeting his strategic policy objectives. Additionally, given the important historic cooperation between the two monarchies, the King had a natural inclination towards Portugal as a strategic partner. For example, as observed in pamphlets, Portugal had provided tangible support to the King's father, Charles I as well as during Charles II's exile.⁸⁴⁹ Previous treaties were formally renewed in early October 1660.⁸⁵⁰ However, in reality the strategic relationship commenced early in the King's reign, and by July 1660 the arrangement encompassed the provision of English sea power in return for a badly needed financial subsidy, that is 800,000 crowns per annum.⁸⁵¹ Portugal under the Duke of Braganza had unilaterally declared independence from Spain starting in 1641, and during Charles II's early reign English help was needed to counter Spain's ambition to dominate the Iberian Peninsula by retaking their neighbour.⁸⁵² Indeed, as reported by an

⁸⁴⁷ CCSP *vol 5*, p.58 7.11.1660, p.74 20.1.1661, pp.87-88 25.3.1661, p.94 26.4.1661, p.96 2.5.1661, p.99 14.5.1661, p.98 9.5.1661, p.99 14.5.1661, p.103 3.6.1661; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp170-172

⁸⁴⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, p.107 17.6.1661; CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 28.6.1660 p.162 entry 166

⁸⁴⁹ CCSP *vol 5*, p.54 Sept 1660 *Memoranda*, p.58 5.11.1660; *Victory of Elvas*, preface

⁸⁵⁰ *Intelligencer*, Issue 42 5.10.1660-8.10.1660 p.657

⁸⁵¹ CCSP *vol 5*, p.46 29.7.1660; CSP *Venice*, 22.9.1660 p.197 entry 215

⁸⁵² CCSP *vol 5*, pp.49-50 29.8.1660, p.59 13.11.1660, p.62 28.11.1660, p.74 20.1.1661; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.69 1.3.1661

English envoy, Thomas Maynard, the Portuguese were desperate, English help being their only potential saviour.⁸⁵³

Therefore, English ships joined with those of Portugal, but given Charles's impecuniousness at this time, and that Portuguese funds couldn't have reached England as yet, the Sovereign allowed loyal privateers remaining from his period in exile to provide 12 frigates to support his new ally, albeit these buccaneers were motivated by profit from prizes.⁸⁵⁴ Although all privateering licences had been publicly rescinded early in the King's reign as reported in such sources as *The Intelligencer*, they were continued for this purpose, strict secrecy being maintained. Usefully, in not being officially sanctioned it also allowed the King to support Portugal without openly breaking with Spain.⁸⁵⁵ This evidences his Majesty's confidence in wider English nautical superiority, and his early willingness to use nautical power to support his foreign policies, albeit on a small and outsourced basis. Indeed, there seems to have been some justification in Charles's confidence. Overall, early privateer activity involved in attacking Spanish shipping was successful, such as in July 1660 when 3 English frigates entered Alicante and profited by carrying off several Spanish craft. Also, the same month they triumphed in a skirmish with more numerous Spanish vessels, capturing a Spanish Galleon in the Gibraltar Straits.⁸⁵⁶ These arrangements remained till early August, the King rescinding them in a political move to maintain apparent harmony with Spain.⁸⁵⁷

However, more formal measures were required, partially because the privateers, with their profit focus, were not protecting English shipping, proving this option's transitory nature. For example, in early July 1660 Minorca-based Spanish frigates captured two English merchant vessels from Smyrna transporting a cargo of silk and cotton valued at £1,000,000.⁸⁵⁸ Charles's inability to protect his country's interests would have dented his warrior image and wider prestige, in addition to the reduction in crucial Customs revenues for the Crown. Consequently, in tandem with the privateering operations, discussions for a marriage treaty were progressed, significantly enhancing the King's ability to meet his dual

⁸⁵³ CCSP vol 5, p.59 19.11.1660, p.60 20.11.1660, p.64 22.12.1660 Queen of Portugal to Charles II; CSP *Venice*, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282

⁸⁵⁴ CCSP vol 5, pp.49-50 29.8.1660

⁸⁵⁵ CCSP vol 5, p.46 29.7.1660, CSP *Venice*, 28.6.1660 p.162 entry 166; *Intelligencer*, Issue 25 p.399 17.6.1660

⁸⁵⁶ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 14.7.1660 p.169 entry 176; CCSP vol 5, p.44 3.7.1660

⁸⁵⁷ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 4.8.1660 p.178 entry 191

⁸⁵⁸ CCSP vol 5, p.44 3.7.1660

foreign policy aims, as well as providing for his marital needs.⁸⁵⁹ Pamphlets lauded this union, one stating “To come and honour those neptunian waves/Have brought us home with such propitious gales/A princely mother to a prince of Wales”. This highlights divine blessings on the union from those sea gods that purported to favour the Sovereign, the marriage enhancing the naval imagery at the centre of the Monarch’s regime. The pamphlet also highlights the augmentation to Charles’s ability to project power overseas due to the Portuguese alliance’s benefits.⁸⁶⁰

His Majesty announced his marriage to his Council on May 8th 1661, communicating it to Parliament towards the end of May 1661, making a public declaration to popular acclaim at the end of June.⁸⁶¹ However, the negotiations began shortly after the King’s Restoration, for example following the Portuguese ambassador’s formal arrival in early July 1660, within a month his Majesty welcomed him into private audience to conduct confidential negotiations.⁸⁶² And interestingly, an English agent, John Page, wrote to Hyde from Bombay on 3rd August 1660 with his assessment of the harbour as being excellent for a naval base, and its convenience for building ships with details of the natives, climate and soil.⁸⁶³ Page’s letter also requested payment of his expenses for the trip, signifying that he had been dispatched to Bombay to provide this report. The quickest method of reaching India, that being the overland route via the Sinai peninsula, took a minimum of two months. In combination with the commissioning process this denotes that the idea to research one of the ports integral to the Portuguese dowry had been initiated and planned prior to Restoration.

The navy was absolutely essential to this option due to the prestige and military power it provided. It underscored his attractiveness as an ally and power on the international stage, significantly supporting his desire for overseas kudos. Further, it illustrates his confidence in the navy’s superior reputation and its ability to intimidate other powers, allowing the King the ability to ignore potentially distracting pressures from other rulers. The treaty provided for the marriage of Princess Catherine, the Infanta de Braganza, a dowry of £500,000 cash,

⁸⁵⁹ CCSP vol 5, pp.49-50 27.8.1660

⁸⁶⁰ *Upon our Royal Queen; Panegyric on Queen Katherine*

⁸⁶¹ CSP Venice Vol 32, 20.5.1661 p.291 entry 349; CCSP vol 5, p.109 22.6.1661, p.98 9.5.1661; CSPD 1660-1661, p.586 Vol XXXV 10.5.1661 entry 47; *Diary of Rev Ralph Josseln*, p.138 3.5.1660; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.70 8.5.1661; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.347 8.5.1661

⁸⁶² Rugg *Diurnal*, p.104 July 1660 Heidelberg; CSP Venice Vol 32, 13.8.1660 pp.182-183 entry 198, 20.8.1660 p.184 entry 200, 25.8.1660 p.186 entry 203

⁸⁶³ CCSP vol 5, p.91 March 1661

Tangier and Bombay and some colonies on Africa's west coast.⁸⁶⁴ The cash was later increased to £2,000,000.⁸⁶⁵ The treaty also entitled the English fleet to use Lisbon's harbour as well as those of their other Portuguese possessions.⁸⁶⁶ Interestingly, there were proposals to transfer to Charles the Brazilian silver producing district of Chiara, but this was not ultimately achieved.⁸⁶⁷ In return England would offer military assistance to Portugal, the alliance's very high cost saving it from Spanish aggression and domination.⁸⁶⁸

Charles's navy enabled the establishment of overseas bases at distant centres, allowing his Majesty's presence to be felt globally. In addition to other overseas possessions such as Barbados in the Eastern Caribbean, England held Jamaica at the Western end, both of which Charles was determined to retain.⁸⁶⁹ Indeed, at his instigation both were incorporated into the Crown by Parliament to strengthen his possession of them and in an attempt to justify his refusal to return them to the Spanish.⁸⁷⁰ Jamaica was captured by Oliver Cromwell in 1655. The navy was vital here for protecting local merchant shipping. However, as highlighted by pamphlets it was also integral as a tool for both guarding the base and from where the Spanish or any other belligerent in contention with England could be harassed, as it

“is in the bowels of the Spanish territory”.⁸⁷¹

Charles was keen to ensure the island's effectiveness in fulfilling these functions. In order to strengthen his control of the island, in late September he appointed a loyalist, Sir Edward Massey as Governor.⁸⁷² Further, on finding that the island was destitute of many supplies, as regaled in pamphlets, he sent vessels with provisions and materials to fortify it and the harbours and fortifications protecting them.⁸⁷³

⁸⁶⁴ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282, 20.5.1661 p.291 entry 349, 10.6.1661 pp.300-301 entry 360; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.149

⁸⁶⁵ CCSP *vol 5*, p.56 Oct 1660 Draft by Hyde, p.78 4.2.1661

⁸⁶⁶ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.146-146

⁸⁶⁷ CCSP *vol 5*, p.91 Mar 1661 Remonstrance, pp.91-91 Mar 1661 Annexes

⁸⁶⁸ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 25.8.60 p.186 entry 203, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.148, pp.151-152, pp.154-155; CCSP *vol 5*, p.78 4.2.1661, pp.78-79 Feb 1661

⁸⁶⁹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 2.7.1660 p.163 entry 167; *Intelligencer*, Issue 43 15.10.1660-22.10.1660 p.657

⁸⁷⁰ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 1.10.1660 p.199 entry 218

⁸⁷¹ *Jamaica viewed*, p.46

⁸⁷² Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.336 27.9.1660

⁸⁷³ CPSD 1660-1661, p.203 Vol XI 27.8.1660 entry 64; CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 22.2.1661 p.250 entry 285; *Jamaica viewed*, pp.35-37. P.48

As highlighted by pamphlets, when Tangier's acquisition in North Africa and Bombay in the East Indies is added to Jamaica in the West Indies and England itself off the coast of Europe, and the siting of naval fleets at each of these locations, this gave Charles the ability to project power and support trade globally, hugely potentially increasing his Majesty's international reputation and potential Customs revenues.⁸⁷⁴ This was substantially enhanced by the ability of the English fleet to use other global Portuguese bases, such as in Africa, Persia, China and Brazil.⁸⁷⁵ This comprehensively supported his Majesty's dual strategic foreign policies, no dowry from other potential marriages providing anywhere near this impact, and explains why the Braganza marriage was eagerly selected, even though some suspected that the Portuguese would not be able to meet the treaty's financial commitments and therefore were baffled as to why this preference was pursued.⁸⁷⁶ Interestingly, the Portuguese made strenuous efforts to convince Charles that the cash existed and that transfer of the geographic possessions were already in hand, suggesting that Portugal's Queen had sold her jewellery and governors of the locations had already been instructed to hand over their charges at the appearance of an English fleet, highlighting his nautical military's importance to the King's foreign policy. However, Portugal also imposed heavy taxation to help finance this deal.⁸⁷⁷ And the anticipated glory to the King's name that flowed from this global esteem would have raised his prestige domestically, enhancing his reputation as a warrior King and international statesman.⁸⁷⁸ None of this would have been possible without the navy, and its formidable reputation.

The navy, via its fearsome persona, also allowed Charles to resist other powers' pressure to comply with their agenda, enabling him to remain focused on his chosen twin foreign policies. As reported by *The Intelligencer* and other sources, England and Spain signed a peace deal shortly after the Restoration, recognised as a continuation of that between the Catholic King and Charles I in 1630.⁸⁷⁹ It was expected that the two powers would grow

⁸⁷⁴ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 11.2.1661 p.245 entry 279; *Victory of Elvas*, preface; CCSP *vol 5*, p.92 April 1661; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.73 13.5.1661

⁸⁷⁵ *Victory of Elvas*, preface

⁸⁷⁶ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 11.2.1661 p.245 entry 279, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282, 18.3.1661 p.262 entry 302

⁸⁷⁷ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.176-177; CCSP *vol 5*, p.60 23.11.1660 Lisbon. Don Francisco de Mello to Charles II, p.99 10.5.1661 Clarendon to Villaret

⁸⁷⁸ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282, 18.3.1661 p.262 entry 302, 25.3.1661 p.265 entry 306, 20.5.1661 p.291 entry 349; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.242; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.152, pp.312-313

⁸⁷⁹ CCSP *vol 5*, pp.83-84 Feb 1661, p.84 Feb or Mar 1661; CPSD *1660-1661*, p.200 Vol XI 24.8.1660 entry 32, p.262 Vol XIV 10.9.1660 entry 69; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.61 13.9.1660; Baker *Chronicle*, p.751; *Intelligencer*, Issue 37 3.9.1660-10.9.1660 p.592

politically closer over time. However, England's treaty with Portugal substantially undermined Spain's own foreign policy.⁸⁸⁰ Spain was determined to reconquer Portugal imminently.⁸⁸¹ Consequently, Charles attempted to avoid trouble with Spain, for example dissimulating that he didn't intend to marry the Infanta, outwardly appearing to investigate other options such as that with the Princess of Parma (covered below), expressing his admiration and respect for the country, emphasising that it wouldn't benefit England and that he desired nothing but full friendship with the Catholic Monarch.⁸⁸² Sadly this partially backfired, as the Spaniards felt resentment on eventually realising the charade.⁸⁸³ And as pamphlets highlighted the Spanish were also very worried about the threat to their power from the English and Portuguese alliance.⁸⁸⁴ Their ambassador in London, Baron de Batteville, frantically attempted to derail the Anglo-Portuguese deal, in terms of both 'carrots and sticks'.⁸⁸⁵

As 'carrots', or encouragements to side with Spain, alternate spouses for Charles were suggested, endeavouring to keep England tied to Spain. For example, as highlighted in the Spanish Ambassador's submission to the King, various princesses were mooted as a future English Queen, such as those of Parma, Saxony and Denmark and astonishingly (given their protestant antecedents compared with Spain's devout Catholicism) even of Nassau, Princess of Orange's daughter, sister to William II, the late Prince of Orange.⁸⁸⁶ Accompanying this Spain would adopt the substitute, and pay the commensurate cash element of the Portuguese dowry. Additionally, other inducements were raised, offering huge amounts of cash in return for Jamaica.⁸⁸⁷ And Spain attempted to raise English protestants and the City against the

⁸⁸⁰ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.153; CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 25.6.1660 p.162 entry 164, 4.8.1660 p.1789 entry 191, 6.8.1660 p.179 entry 193, 11.8.1660 p.181 entry 195, 13.8.60 pp182-183 entry 198; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.109 Sept 1660 Statutes Set Up in the Exchange

⁸⁸¹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282; CCSP *vol 5*, pp.49.50 29.8.1660, p.53 11.9.1660, p.59 19.11.1660, p.62 28.11.1660, p.74 20.1.1661, p.59 13.11.1660, p62. 28.11.1660; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.69 1.3.1661

⁸⁸² CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 21.7.1660 p.172 entry 180, 13.8.1660 pp.182-183 entry 198, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282, 22.2.1661 p.250 entry 285, 16.3.1661 p.261 entry 300, 18.3.1661 p.262 entry 302, 7.5.1661 pp.288-289 entry 344, 15.6.1661 p.303 entry 366; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p153

⁸⁸³ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 15.6.1661 p.303 entry 366

⁸⁸⁴ *Victory of Elvas*, preface

⁸⁸⁵ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 25.8.60 p186 entry 203, 8.12.1660 p.222 entry 245, 11.2.1661 p.245 entry 279, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.277 Vol XVI 28.9.1660 entry 84; Baker *Chronicle*, p.751

⁸⁸⁶ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282, 18.3.1661 p.262 entry 302, 13.4.1661 p.276 entry 319, 13.5.1661 p.289 entry 345, 18.5.1661 pp.290-291 entry 348, 20.5.1661 p.291 entry 349; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.168; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.70 9.3.1661; *From the Spanish ambassador*

⁸⁸⁷ CCSP *vol 5*, pp.88-89 28.3.1661; *From the Spanish ambassador*

putative Catholic Portuguese match, sending a Spanish agent, Andrada, to Portugal to propose a different suitor for the Infanta.⁸⁸⁸

As regards the ‘stick’, although strenuous attempts were made to keep the Portuguese negotiations secret, de Batteville was kept informed of progress and the terms of the deal via a spy close to the English side, rumoured to be the Earl of Bristol who was opposed to the Portuguese match, his Spanish loyalty emanating from his time as English ambassador to Madrid.⁸⁸⁹ This allowed de Batteville to heavily bribe Charles’s advisers in an attempt to influence the King’s choice of bride, on one instance alone 200,000 pieces of eight being made available by Spain for these inducements.⁸⁹⁰ Also, as affirmed in the Spanish ambassador’s letter to Charles, this was accompanied by threats of dire consequences such as the cancellation of all political relations and of perpetual war between the two countries, Portugal not being in a condition to aid England in that conflagration.⁸⁹¹ Crucially, this would also have meant the complete loss of trade with Spain and possible interference with English trade to other locations.⁸⁹²

However, this is where the English navy gave Charles the freedom to choose his overseas objectives. Pamphlets reflected the country’s general feeling of the English navy’s invincibility, one even stating

“the vast excess of power his Majesty hath in that particular above all princes and states of Europe, duly considered: as well because he that is master of the sea is at liberty to begin or end a war, where, when, and upon what terms he pleaseth, as because the wealth of both Indies seems in great part but an accessory to the sovereignty of the seas”.⁸⁹³

Another patriotically expounded that as a consequence the Portuguese alliance would

⁸⁸⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, p.94 26.4.1661

⁸⁸⁹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 2.7.1660 p.163 entry 168, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282, 11.3.1661 p.258 entry 296, 16.3.1661 p.261 entry 300, 7.5.1661 pp.288-289 entry 344; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.151-152, p.153, p.161, p.167; Pepys *Diary*, 28.2.1661; CCSP *vol 5*, p.54 Sept 1660 Memoranda, p.55 Sept 1660 Charles II to Queen of Portugal, p.57 4.11.1660, p.97 3.5.1661 Fontainebleau. Villaret to Clarendon

⁸⁹⁰ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 22.2.1661 p.250 entry 285, 16.3.1661 p.261 entry 300, 13.5.1661 p.289 entry 345

⁸⁹¹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 18.2.1661 p.248 entry 282, 18.3.1661 p.262 entry 302, 25.3.1661 p.265 entry 306, 8.4.1661 p.274 entry 316; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.162, 168; CCSP *vol 5*, pp.83-84 Feb 1661 Spanish ambassador to Charles II; *From the Spanish ambassador*

⁸⁹² CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 25.3.1661 p.265 entry 306, 3.6.1661 p.295 entry 353; *From the Spanish ambassador*

⁸⁹³ Charleton *Character*, pp.14-16

“erect a third interest in Christendom, which may subsist of itself, and be no way dependent on the House of either France or Austria”.⁸⁹⁴

A further one hailed Charles as

“one of the greatest emperors of the world, being happy in an invincible navy.”⁸⁹⁵

Other continental rulers mirrored these sentiments, the navy’s high international prestige being so highly respected, and its power so feared that the King could pursue the policies of his choice without apprehension of such threats as those from Spain.⁸⁹⁶ In fact, the angst that the English navy provided to other countries is illustrated by the Dutch mobilisation of their own fleet, being worried that the English fleet that was being assembled in the Downs in the second quarter of 1661 under Lord Sandwich’s command but whose destination was kept secret was actually targeting themselves.⁸⁹⁷

Both his Majesty and the Spanish were fully aware of Spain’s inability to mobilise a meaningful fleet to compete with English nautical strength.⁸⁹⁸ In fact, English naval power was so strong that both countries were fully aware that English support of Portugal would render it impossible for Spain to achieve its invasion aspirations.⁸⁹⁹ Further, should hostilities commence between England and Spain, interference from naval squadrons based in either Lisbon, the English south coast or Jamaica meant that England could deprive Spain of its financial lifeline, that is their annual treasure flotilla (see Chapter Four). In aggregate, this terrified the Spanish, prompting desperate measures such as changing the route of the treasure fleet due in July or August 1661 to avoid nautical ambushes. They also halted that year’s treasure fleet at the Canaries as they lacked the necessary ships to provide an adequate escort to protect it from the famed English navy from there onwards.⁹⁰⁰ This highlighted that

⁸⁹⁴ *Victory of Elvas*, preface

⁸⁹⁵ *Jamaica viewed*, p.53

⁸⁹⁶ CCSP vol 5, p.84 Feb or Mar 1661, p.92 1.4.1661 Hyde to M. Bastide

⁸⁹⁷ *Pepys Diary*, 28.2.1661, 20.4.1661; CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 13.5.1660 p289 entry 345, 10.6.1661 pp.300-301 entry 360, 24.6.1660 p306 entry 369, 25.3.1661 pp.266-267 entry 306, 8.4.1661 p.274 entry 316, 13.5.1661 p.289 entry 345, 3.6.1661 p.295 entry 353, 10.6.1661 pp300-301 entry 360, 24.6.1661 p.306 entry 369; CCSP vol 5, pp.106-107 14.6.1661; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.586 Vol XXXV 10.5.1661 entry 47

⁸⁹⁸ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 2.3.1661 p.253 entry 289, 15.6.1661 p.303 entry 366

⁸⁹⁹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 2.3.1661 p.253 entry 289

⁹⁰⁰ CCSP vol 5, p.93 15.4.61; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 15.6.1661 p.303 entry 366

England held the balance of power, commanding the sea lanes from the North Sea to the Iberian Peninsula and beyond, nullifying any moves Spain might make against Portugal.⁹⁰¹ Indeed, their sense of panic was so great that it led some in the Spanish government to attempt a u-turn, that is a rapprochement with England.⁹⁰² Interestingly, de Mello, the Portuguese ambassador, paid larger bribes to the English privy councillors, meaning that Spanish money had been wasted in this sphere, resulting in English privy councillors advising the King to support the Portuguese alliance.⁹⁰³

The navy also allowed Charles to ignore the other Spanish threats, that is the loss of trade.⁹⁰⁴ Trade with Portugal and all its colonies such as Brazil outweighed that with Spain, and English merchants received preferential customs treatment throughout Portuguese domains.⁹⁰⁵ Additionally, the termination of Anglo/Spanish trade meant Spain would also suffer, highlighting the dual nature of commercial relationships, and be contrary to Spain's interests as it would lead to a diminution of its influence.⁹⁰⁶ The King was fully aware of this, allowing him to call the Spaniards' bluff.⁹⁰⁷ And it was well known that Spain couldn't afford their putative dowries of hundreds of thousands of pounds as the Portuguese war had drained their resources. This information was fully available to Charles, it being so publicly available that it was *en courant* in such places as Italy.⁹⁰⁸ However, the navy's huge international prestige wasn't just of use in allowing Charles freedom over his foreign policy. It also catapulted him to possibly the most pre-eminent position amongst Europe's leaders, his will being sought by other rulers prior to them committing to alliances. This illustrates the early and real accomplishment of Charles establishing a superior international image. For example, his Majesty was requested by both Holland and Portugal to mediate their treaty negotiations, firmly engaging not to sign anything until they understood the King's wishes as communicated by Sir George Downing.⁹⁰⁹ Additionally, the navy carried correspondence between the King and Downing, ensuring the Monarch's secret instructions could be safely

⁹⁰¹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 13.4.1661 p.276 entry 319, 15.6.1661 p.303 entry 366

⁹⁰² CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 2.3.1661 p.253 entry 289, 16.3.1661 p.261 entry 301, 13.4.1661 p.276 entry 319, 10.6.1661 pp.300-301 entry 360

⁹⁰³ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 13.5.1661 p.289 entry 345, 20.5.1661 p.291 entry 349; CCSP *vol 5*, p.96 2.5.1660

⁹⁰⁴ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 16.3.1661 p.261 entry 300

⁹⁰⁵ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.148-149; Rugg *Diurnal*, pp. 128-129 Nov 1660 Portugal; CCSP *vol 5*, p.72 7.1.1661

⁹⁰⁶ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 16.3.1661 p.261 entry 300

⁹⁰⁷ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 16.3.1661 p.261 entry 300, 13.4.1661 p.276 entry 319

⁹⁰⁸ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 27.4.1661 p.282 entry 332; CCSP *vol 5*, p.53 11.9.1660

⁹⁰⁹ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 11.3.1661 p.258 entry 296, 17.6.1661 pp.304-305 entry 367; CCSP *vol 5*, p.104 5.6.1661, p.104 6.6.1661 Downing to Clarendon, p.105 7.6.1661 Downing to Clarendon, p.105 8.6.1661 Copy of Downing's, p.109 21.6.1661 Extracts; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.77 2.7.1661; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.330

received.⁹¹⁰ This was particularly important as Charles was keen to secretly direct the negotiations to his own advantage via his envoy.⁹¹¹

In total, these aspects very strongly highlight that Charles was fully confident of the huge international prestige that his navy provided for him, supported by his subjects, propelling him to the pinnacle of European royalty. He could also pursue the foreign policies of his own choosing with impunity, ignoring threats from other nations, using the navy as a powerful tool to underscore his preferred foreign policy strategies to project power and support trade globally. In fact, not only were the Monarch and his navy fully entwined. One pamphlet stated that the navy was core to all his policy deliberations, as it

“runs in full streams through all his Majesty’s councils and proceedings”,

with the Chancellor in a speech to the House repeating the King’s views that

“the King is the happiest prince of the world, from the security of his dominions and the power of his great navy, with which he can visit his neighbours, and keep them from visiting him”.⁹¹²

The navy truly gave Charles the ability to counteract his prior feeling of being a second-class nomadic monarchical persona by establishing a superior international reputation, boosting his pride and establishing a solid reputation for himself, as well as protecting and enhancing trade in order to increase his Customs revenues. In turn these aspects had the potential to allow the King to maintain a distance from Parliament, augmenting the reality of his aspiration for the trappings of ‘absolute monarchy’. In aggregate, it constituted the first plank in his step-by-step plan to achieve his aspirations.

Conclusion.

⁹¹⁰ CCSP vol 5, p.105 7.6.1661

⁹¹¹ CCSP vol 5, p.104 6.6.1661, p.105 7.6.1661 Downing to Clarendon, p.108 21.6.1661 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon, p.109 21.6.1661 The Hague. Conde de Miranda to Charles II

⁹¹² Charleton *Character*, pp.14-16; *Speech at Parliament dissolution*, p.17

As highlighted in the Introduction, this Chapter marks a big change in this work's direction. After highlighting how the navy was central to the last part of the reign's actions to stabilise the throne, it outlines the Monarch's covert personal domestic and international agenda and how he used the navy as a tool to commence its implementation. This involved a step-by-step plan, each phase being presented in this portion of the thesis and the next two in chronological order. None of these aspects would have been possible without the navy and the King's strong willingness to use it. These aspects are new to modern academia and are revolutionary, presenting a completely fresh version of the period's history.

In total, this illustrates how entwined the navy and its supreme commander had become, as well as the King's ability to implement long-term step-by-step plans to support these diplomatic aims. Should this relationship have been less symbiotic, and the navy less loyal and powerful, it is likely that the King would have had to pursue a different and less influential global existence, changing the whole course of his reign and the history of the period.

Chapter 4 - Impressive But Fragile Power.

Introduction.

As highlighted in Chapter 3, Charles spent approximately the first year of his reign attempting to resolve the various tensions that threatened his throne's survival and how the navy provided essential support. This Chapter approximately covers the period March 1661 to March 1664, that is from when foreign ventures commenced, ending just prior to the start of the build-up to the Second Anglo-Dutch War.

It highlights how Charles used the navy to attain phenomenal progress in the pursuit of his covert personal dreams and enactment of the second part of his step-by-step plan (see Chapter Three), that is to raise his domestic and international prestige. He used the navy to gain an unprecedented victory over the Mediterranean pirates and to severely harass Spain so that it failed in its ambition to defeat his Britannic Majesty's close ally, Portugal. Further, the King used the intimidation provided by his feared navy to facilitate procrastination in treaty negotiations with Holland and France in order to postpone friction with them, freeing naval resources for these projects, as well as achieving ascendancy over the Ottomans. The delay that this created allowed the use of propaganda to attempt to gain the goodwill of both international and domestic audiences in readiness for an Anglo-Dutch war. The settlement of two of the three overseas bases, those being Tangier and Jamaica, produced very positive results, and together with the powerful fleets stationed there, allowed for the substantial projection of force in the Americas and Mediterranean. Various strong actions to maintain the ancient claim to 'Sovereignty of the Seas' as well as effective propaganda also worked successfully in sustaining his aspirations for a persona of overseas ascendancy. It concludes that Charles made substantial progress within the timeframe of this Chapter towards their achievement, also strengthening the factors contributing to domestic absolutism.

Mediterranean Pirates.

England's trade within the Mediterranean, and particularly the Levant, comprised a major proportion of the King's independent revenues (see Chapters Five and Six). However, pirates operating from Tunis, Tripoli and especially Algiers were substantially disrupting this, capturing large quantities of shipping, stealing cargoes with crews only escaping enslavement

via the payment of significant ransoms, substantially curtailing revenues from Customs and Excise. This was prior to comprehensive maritime insurance being available, heightening mercantile and personal misery. Further, his Majesty was informally represented by merchants abroad, the Navigation Act ensuring that foreign potentates who wished to trade in England's markets would be cautious when dealing with English traders (see Chapter Three). In other words, to treat English merchants badly impinged on the nation's sovereignty, consequently negatively impacting the King's reputation and his overseas pre-eminent aspirations. Thus, from both a political as well as commercial viewpoint, defeating the piratical menace was crucial, forming an early test of his Majesty's resolve to achieve his dreams.

Shortly after the Restoration the North African corsairs demanded the right to search English ships and take all the goods and people of other nations.⁹¹³ Charles rejected this, and the pirates declared war, strengthening their fortresses and raiding English commerce using their own sizeable fleet of small vessels.⁹¹⁴ This would have variously damaged English interests. The impact was underscored in correspondence to the Navy Commissioners from captains stationed in the Mediterranean, reporting that until a substantial squadron was stationed there, English merchants wouldn't trust their goods to compatriot vessels as they were too susceptible to loss from pirates.⁹¹⁵ Merchants expected a safe navigational environment as a result of the King's vaunted mastery of the seas, one coronation panegyric aspirationally stating

"The merchant fears no foes, but angry skies, His ships fly home with wealth not made a prize".⁹¹⁶

However, by April 1661 this contrasted with reality, national as well as Royal prestige being damaged as English subjects were enslaved, subject to ransoms being paid.⁹¹⁷ As an elegy in a pamphlet stated, those captured were

⁹¹³ CSP *Venice Vol 32*, 16.2.1661 p.247 entry 281, 25.3.1661 pp.266-267 entry 306; Penn *Memoires*, pp.261-262

⁹¹⁴ Barlow *Journal*, p.49; CSP *Venice vol 32*, 25.3.1661 pp.266-267 entry 306, 29.3.1661 pp.268-268 entry 310, 23.4.1661 p.280 entry 329, 13.5.1661 p.289 entry 345, 3.6.1661 p.295 entry 353; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.312-313

⁹¹⁵ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.490 Vol XXIX 28.1.1661 entry 54

⁹¹⁶ *Heroik stanzas*, p.8 verse 16

⁹¹⁷ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 3.5.1661 pp.285-286 entry 339; Barlow *Journal*, p.57

“in couples led, were marketed like cattle, by the head. Let it no more in history be told, that Turks their Christian slaves for aspers sold”

describing them as

“Algiers or Tunis shameful merchandise”.⁹¹⁸

One high profile case was of a peer of the realm and friend to the King, Lord Inchiquin, as reported in *The Intelligencer*, his case even being raised in Parliament. He desired the Sovereign to take action.⁹¹⁹ The newspaper and other sources later reported that His Lordship returned home on the *Nantwich* after a lengthy enslavement to raise the ransom to free his son, Lord O’Brien, having been forced to leave him behind as a hostage, as well as for other captured slaves.⁹²⁰

The King’s early impecuniousness meant that his Majesty made alternate, feeble attempts to reinforce his will and thereby safeguard his subjects in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless these efforts failed, bolstering the Monarch’s embarrassment. For example, Captain Robert Holmes’s mission to pressure the ‘Turks’ into compliance with English wishes, accompanied by three frigates, was easily repulsed.⁹²¹ And Lord Winchelsea’s attempt at an Algerian treaty including the release of slaves when en-route to his ambassadorial destination in Constantinople on board the impressive 54 gun *Plymouth* frigate commanded by Captain Allen, was similarly rejected. Ultimately, the King was forced to agree to the ransom demands, consequently attempting to reassert his prestige. Charles dispatched Captain Thomas, on board the *Plymouth* frigate, to hand over the ransom of 4,000 reals and many ships’ masts.⁹²²

⁹¹⁸ *Poems elegies*, Elegies p.13

⁹¹⁹ *Intelligencer*, Issue 25 p.391 12.6.1660

⁹²⁰ *Intelligencer*, Issue 36 26.8.1660-3.9.1660 p.572

⁹²¹ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 6.10.1660 p.202 entry 220

⁹²² CSP *Venice vol 32*, 10.9.1660 p.193 entry 212, 8.12.1660, p.222 entry 245, 22.12.1660 p.228 entry 252; Rugg *Diurnal*, p.107 Aug 1660 Acts; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.178 Vol X 3.8.1660 entry 36 Whitehall, p.183 Vol X 7.8.1660 entry 73, p.199 Vol XI 23.8.1660 Royal Charles entry 28, p.200 Vol XI 24.8.1660 entry 32; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.333 18.6.1660; *Intelligencer*, Issue 44 22.10.1660-29.10.1660 p.693, Issue 49 26.11.1660-3.12.1660 p.792

Due to the crown's poverty, it attempted to raise the money privately by such means as permitting private lotteries throughout England and Wales. However, this was unsuccessful, and in November 1660 the King had to use Customs receipts to cover the ransom.⁹²³ A further £10,000 was also required from public funds for the English slaves' release, allocated from the proceeds of prize goods and fines paid under the Indemnity Act for those not pardoned.⁹²⁴ However, this didn't solve the problem, the embarrassment ongoing. Daily attacks on English shipping persisted, such as the Turkish capture and plundering of the *Rainbow* shortly after Lord Winchelsea's visit.⁹²⁵ And in April 1661 Charles was severely embarrassed and annoyed when the retiring English consul at Aleppo was captured en-route home, only escaping after paying his own ransom.⁹²⁶ And in June 1661 an English ship in an unescorted convoy of 6 merchantmen was captured, the stolen goods consisting of 2,500 chests of sugar and numerous precious stones, all non-English subjects having to pay a ransom of 120,000 reals to avoid enslavement.⁹²⁷ This substantially dented English claims of nautical supremacy, starkly illustrating the King's inability to protect his subjects and his nation's interests. This caused additional problems. Charles's foreign policy relied on his navy's feared reputation, allowing him to keep the sea lanes open to English merchants, the pirates' apparent successes impairing this, reducing his ability to follow the foreign policy of his choice with impunity. And his warrior image was also prejudiced, small pirate states seemingly able to pursue their predations without fearing retaliation. The importance of this is starkly highlighted as domestic pressure was building on the King, revealed by the public and commercial representations to Parliament for a resolution.⁹²⁸

Consequently, Charles equipped a fleet of 10 vessels to confront this threat, later raised to 20. Lord Sandwich's fleet (mentioned below) with the 82 gun *Royal James* as flagship was tasked with enforcing a treaty, softening the message with a gift of £300 of English cloth.⁹²⁹ After a postponement due to the King's penury, the fleet eventually sailed in early July 1661.

⁹²³ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.182 Vol X 7.8.1660 entry 65, p.355 Vol XXI 10.11.1660 entry 39

⁹²⁴ CSPD *1660-1661*, p.405 Vol XXIII 6.12.1660 entry 40

⁹²⁵ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 5.11.1660 p.212 entry 230, 11.2.1661 p.245 entry 279, 16.2.1660 p.247 entry 281, 19.2.1661 p.250 entry 284, 25.3.1661 pp.266-267 entry 306, 13.5.1661 p.289 entry 345; *Pepys Diary*, 18.8.1660, 8.2.1661

⁹²⁶ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 26.4.1661 p.281 entry 330, 3.5.1660 pp.285-286 entry 339

⁹²⁷ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 25.6.1661 pp.308-309 entry 372

⁹²⁸ *Rugg Diurnal*, p.126 Nov 1660 A Present Presented to the King; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 2.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 43

⁹²⁹ CSP *Venice vol 32*, 25.3.1661 pp.266-267 entry 306, 8.4.1661 p.274 entry 316; *Barlow Journal*, p.49, p.50; *Pepys Diary*, 20.4.1661, 21.5.1661, 10.6.1661, 12.6.1661; CCSP *vol 5*, p.103 3.6.1661; CSPD *1660-1661*, p.586 Vol XXXV 10.5.1661 entry 47; *Penn Memoires*, pp.261-262

The success of this wouldn't just protect English shipping, but also that of other nations. As highlighted by the Venetian ambassador, England would have dealt with this international scourge to the relief of multiple countries.⁹³⁰ Indeed there was a sense of continental desperation as the piratical attacks worsened, the Turks having no opposition and could do as they pleased. They became emboldened, for example in August 1661 nine Algerian vessels appeared off Lisbon harbour searching for victims.⁹³¹ And in February 1662 Algerian pirates sailing under Dutch colours gained access to the heart of a merchant convoy to carry out their predations, sending their Christian slaves on deck to fool the escorting men-of-war.⁹³² In fact, this mission additionally enhanced the King's semi-divine status, as particularly highlighted by Venice's London ambassador. It was regarded by Christendom as a crusade against the Muslims, no other nation being able to mount it.⁹³³ Indeed, pamphlets regaled Montagu's part, stating he'd been sent

“To catachise the bold Mahometan”

his protection of the Christian world being so strong that the pamphlet continued

“you'd laid a padlock on all Christendom.”⁹³⁴

Further, in contrast to 'Protector of Christendom' being a role claimed variously by the Holy Roman Emperor, with the French Most Christian and Spanish Most Catholic Kings overtly attempting ownership of it as reflected by their monarchical titles, Charles was factually contradicting their theoretical claims by achieving it in practice and assuming the position. In fact, his Majesty's religiously portrayed foray contrasts with a previous Holy Roman Emperor's (Charles V) attempts to subdue Algiers in 1541 with 500 ships and 24,000 troops, culminating in the Hapsburg's total defeat, including the substantial damage inflicted by the Algerians on his accompanying navy. This highlights the divine backing of the Britannic Sovereign's venture, his sacred credentials accentuated.

⁹³⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 25.3.1661 pp266-267 entry 306, 29.3.1661 pp268-269 entry 310, 3.5.1661 pp.285-286 entry 339, 13.5.1661 p289 entry 345; Montagu *Journal*, p.89 19.6.1661; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.312-313

⁹³¹ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 8.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 7, 19.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 35; CSPD 1661-1662, 28.8.1661 pp.54-79 vol 40 entry 94, 28.8.1661 pp.54-79 vol 40 entry 94

⁹³² CSPD 1661-1662, 26.2.1662 pp.281-294 vol 51 entry 24

⁹³³ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 11.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 33, 26.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 38, 2.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 43; Clarendon *Life* pp.312-313

⁹³⁴ *Portugal voyage*, pp.13.14; Johnson *Exact survey*, p.88

International tension was high, given the Admiral's lauded extensive experience and large fleet set against such numerous and ruthless foes.⁹³⁵ Montagu arrived off Algiers in early September 1661 with strict instructions. If the pirates didn't agree to English demands, he must declare war.⁹³⁶ On presentation of the English ultimatum, Lord Sandwich received a negative reaction, so entered the harbour with the fleet to attack. According to contemporary pamphlets, although changing winds meant the first assault failed, two days later they were favourable and the attack re-commenced. The initial target of battering the castle walls and destroying all the cannon that could return fire and damage the English fleet was achieved within a couple of hours. The fleet then attacked the 30 pirate ships in the harbour, only 9 escaping, the rest being sunk, with 1,100 Christian galley slaves being rescued. Then during the following day and a half the fleet fired at the town in order to overawe its citizens. The next morning an escaping slave from the beleaguered settlement reported that more than half the town had been badly damaged.⁹³⁷ Montagu then divided his fleet so that the various squadrons could hunt down pirate vessels, subsequently capturing and destroying dozens of them both at sea and in harbour and enslaving their crews.⁹³⁸ At least 1,000 'infidels' were sold to the Spanish, with Christian slaves being freed and Christian collaborators being summarily executed.⁹³⁹ As per his orders, after a few weeks Montagu proceeded to Lisbon to collect the Portuguese marriage dowry and transport the Infanta to her new country, leaving Vice-Admiral Sir John Lawson with at least twelve ships to pursue the campaign.⁹⁴⁰ On two important occasions in May 1662 the Vice-Admiral ran two Algerian ships aground which were carrying grain, a commodity of which their home city was very short. Additionally, he entered Algiers harbour under the fort's disabled guns, wrecked large parts of the remainder of the castle, sinking or burning all corsairs' vessels there.⁹⁴¹ In April and mid-May the

⁹³⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 2.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 43

⁹³⁶ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 9.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 46; *Montagu Journal*, p.91 29.7.1661, p.91 30.7.1661, pp.288-289 *Appendix III*; CCSP *vol 5*, p.116 17.7.1661 Madrid; *Barlow Journal*, pp.55-57; *Henry Townsend Diary*, p.78 2.7.1661

⁹³⁷ *Demands*, pp.3-8; *Royal and loyal blood*, pp.67-68

⁹³⁸ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 10.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 47, 16.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 49, 17.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 50, 24.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 54, 21.11.1661 pp.67-72 entry 89; *Montagu Journal*, pp.91-92 31.7.1661, p.98 10.9.1661; CCSP *vol 5*, p.137 7.9.1661; *Barlow Journal*, pp.55-57; *Penn Memoires*, pp.261-262

⁹³⁹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 17.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 50, 24.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 54, 7.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 62, 8.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 65, 21.11.1661 pp.67-72 entry 89

⁹⁴⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 7.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 62, 8.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 65, 12.11.1661 pp.67-72 entry 84; *Pepys Diary*, 8.5.1662; *Montagu Journal*, p.94 8.8.1661; *Barlow Journal*, p.65, p.71; *Penn Memoires*, pp.261-262; *Henry Townsend Diary*, p.76 28.5.1661; *Royal and loyal blood*, pp.67-68

⁹⁴¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 6.5.1662 pp.137-146 entry 180, 19.5.1662 pp.137-146 entry 184, 26.5.1662 pp.137-146 entry 188; *Montagu Journal*, p.98 10.9.1661; *Penn Memoires*, pp.261-262

English captured both the Algerian Admiral and Vice Admiral whilst they were at sea.⁹⁴² Yet, the pirates continued their predations, in one month over October and November capturing 24 merchant vessels, some of them laden with particularly rich cargoes such as cloth and rich silks.⁹⁴³

Success was ultimately achieved by late May/early June 1662 through Sir John Lawson's peace treaty.⁹⁴⁴ This was substantially aided by the Algerian citizens who, being so incensed at the war's prolongation, the disruption to their own trade and the heavy losses and damage caused by the English, that they rebelled against those opposing peace, six hundred being killed, and 50 of the city's leaders including the Pasha being executed.⁹⁴⁵ The destruction of the port's mole by bad weather contributed to the English victory, providing them with easier access to exposed Algerian vessels.⁹⁴⁶ Also, the pressure of Andrew Jackson, the English consul at Smyrna, and Lord Winchelsea, the English ambassador at the Porte, who both interacted with the new Algerian Pasha in plain sight of the suzerain Ottoman authorities in Constantinople, had a positive effect.⁹⁴⁷ By the end of 1662 the other two corsair cities, Tunis and Tripoli, had similarly acceded to English terms. This stunning victory was celebrated in the panegyric *The Fortunate Islands*, stating "The yielding ocean, and restore that law/Which ships does free from greedy pirates harms/The great name of Charles shall be/A strong safeguard to shelter us and thee".⁹⁴⁸ The treaty banned the pirates from interfering with all English vessels, including those with any foreign goods and citizens on board.⁹⁴⁹ All English captives were to be freed subject to a small payment in the form of coins for which the relevant, important export licence was granted (see Chapter Six). As can be expected this was very warmly received by merchants.⁹⁵⁰ Lawson returned home to laudatory acclamations and much Royal favour.⁹⁵¹ However, there was a recognition of the

⁹⁴² Montagu *Journal*, pp.132-133 15.4.1662, pp.135-136 1.5.1662

⁹⁴³ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.11.1661 pp.62-72 entry 90, 24.12.1661 pp.72-90 entry 103, 13.1.1662 pp.91-101 entry 112; Montagu *Journal*, p.105 26.10.1661

⁹⁴⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, p.221 22.5.1662 *Paris*; Wharton *Gesta*, p.40 30.1.1662; Heath *Glories and magnificent*, pp.245-6

⁹⁴⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 28.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 73, 12.11.1661 pp.67-72 entry 84, 16.12.1661 pp.72-90 entry 101; Pepys *Diary*, 22.5.1662; Montagu *Journal*, pp.98-99 11.9.1661

⁹⁴⁶ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 14.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 133; Pepys *Diary*, 1.2.1662

⁹⁴⁷ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 3.4.1662 pp.125-137 entry 158, 7.4.1662 pp.125-137 entry 162

⁹⁴⁸ Gent *Complementum*, p.63 *The Fortunate Islands*

⁹⁴⁹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 15.12.1662 pp.216-224 entry 287; Pepys *Diary*, 22.1.1662; Barlow *Journal*, p.80

⁹⁵⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 3.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 195, 9.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 198, 14.7.1662 pp.158-168 entry 211; CSPD *1661-1662*, 1.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 no entry number given, 15.9.1662 pp.474-492 vol 59 entry 57; Montagu *Journal*, p.140 23.5.1662; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.260; *Articles of peace*, pp.1-24

⁹⁵¹ Pepys *Diary*, 22.1.1662, 5.1.1663

necessity of a squadron, albeit a diminished one, to remain in the ‘Straits’ to monitor the pirates’ compliance with the treaty, given their acknowledged contemporary perfidy and independence of any higher authority, such as their theoretical overlord, the Ottoman Sultan.⁹⁵² Consequently, half a dozen vessels were chosen under the command of ‘Captain Smith’.⁹⁵³

The project had been closely observed by a large proportion of the Western World. The English navy’s success was incredibly important, being an unprecedented achievement that was widely visible to all of the King’s ruling peers.⁹⁵⁴ As the Venetian ambassador reported, the English terms were a great advantage to the trade and prestige of England. Charles’s international supremacy had been particularly accentuated by the failure of England’s maritime rivals, the Dutch. They had sent a fleet of about eighteen ships under de Ruyter. This Admiral’s capitulation was starkly illustrated by the contrast with Lawson’s treaty, consisting of the payment of huge ransoms of around 20,000 to 30,000 reals for the release of Dutch hostages, conceding consent for Holland’s merchant’s vessels to be intercepted and goods removed. In fact, his treaty with the Algerians was so poor that the States General refused to ratify it.⁹⁵⁵ This was heightened by the Algerians’ later refusal to grant the English terms to the Dutch.⁹⁵⁶ And a sense of triumphalism was evident in other nations at his Britannic Majesty’s achievement compared to his Netherland rivals.⁹⁵⁷ This English victory variously advanced Charles’s aspirations to use his navy as a foreign policy tool. His martial image and international prestige were substantially heightened, underpinned by the reinforcement of the navy’s superior reputation.⁹⁵⁸ Further, his Majesty had apparently freed Mediterranean trade routes, the potential trade increase raising his finances from Customs and Excise, granting an increased distance from Parliament. Also, this propaganda coup was loudly declared at home in an attempt to both further encourage trade, and to seek an

⁹⁵² CSP *Venice* vol 33, 4.1.1662 pp.91-101 entry 107, 23.1.1662 pp.91-101 entry 117, 2.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 124, 14.7.1662 pp.158-168 entry 211, 28.7.1662 pp.158-168 entry 217, 5.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 221, 23.10.1663 pp.265-267 entry 358, 30.11.1663 pp.267-270 366; CSPD *1661-1662*, 12.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 entry 51

⁹⁵³ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 19.1.1663 pp.225-228 entry 296

⁹⁵⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 7.4.1662 pp.125-137 entry 162; *Clarendon Life* vol 2, pp.312-313

⁹⁵⁵ CCSP vol 5, p.222 24.5.1662 The Hague; Heath *Glories and magnificent*, pp.245-6

⁹⁵⁶ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 6.5.1662 pp.137-146 entry 180, 2.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 193, 9.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 198, 14.7.1662 pp.158-168 entry 211, 15.12.1662 pp.216-224 entry 287; *Montagu Journal*, p.102 13.10.1661

⁹⁵⁷ CCSP vol 5, p.365 22.1.1664 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon, p.366 29.1.1664 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon, p.371 12.2.1664 Downing to Clarendon

⁹⁵⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 15.12.1662 pp.216-224 entry 287

enhanced domestic goodwill for his Majesty. For instance, proclamations of the corsairs' peace deal were made throughout the Capital to the accompaniment of trumpet fanfares.⁹⁵⁹ Additionally, the acquisition of Tangier would give a strong base from which to control the pirates in the future, that city forming a part of the global possessions from which the Monarch could project power.⁹⁶⁰

Importantly, the clause of Lawson's treaty that included the unhindered carriage of foreign goods and citizens in English merchant vessels not only provided a safe transport method for overseas merchants, but also highlighted Charles's success on behalf of Christendom, boosting his foremost position amongst rulers. Additionally, it directly supported the English 'Navigation Act' which provided that only English ships could enter his Majesty's ports (see Chapter 3). This project supported both of Charles's objectives. Firstly, hard naval power had enhanced both his overseas pre-eminence and reinforced the potential future spread of his Majesty's soft power by merchants. Secondly, not only would the reduction in Customs and Excise due to piratical activities be curtailed, but a safer Mediterranean would encourage future trade and the ensuing increase in independent Crown revenues. The King's confidence in his navy combined with its formidable force had made this possible.

Relations with Various Countries.

Spain.

Charles had three objectives in his relations with Spain. Contradictory though they seem, the first was to maintain outward good relations, the second to seize the treasure fleet from the Americas and the third to give succour to Portugal.⁹⁶¹ The first point was vital to his Majesty as the continuation of trade that this facilitated contributed to the crucial Customs revenue that both funded his international policy and reduced his reliance on Parliament. Additionally, many City merchants were involved in Spanish mercantile activities, and were the source of a large proportion of loans which the Crown required to fund its policies till tax revenues were received (see also Chapter Six).⁹⁶² Further, a positive diplomatic veneer

⁹⁵⁹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 1.3.1663 pp.232-239 entry 302

⁹⁶⁰ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.151-152

⁹⁶¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 12.9.1663 pp.261-265 entry 351

⁹⁶² CSP *Venice vol 33*, 14.7.1662 pp.158-168 entry 211

meant that the Sovereign's navy, in its operations against both the Mediterranean pirates and transporting supplies to Tangier, could access victuals more effectively in Cadiz or Alicante than if it were necessary to return to either Lisbon or England (Tangier was not operational at this point). The seizure of Spain's annual treasure fleet would leave that country critically short of the funds necessary to support its empire. As confirmed by Thomas Mun in his contemporary pamphlet

“all the mines of gold and silver which are as yet discovered in sundry places of the world, are not of so great values as those of the West Indies which are in the possession of the King of Spain; who thereby is enabled not only to keep in subjection many goodly states and provinces in Italy and elsewhere (which otherwise would soon fall from his obeisance) but also by a continual war taking his advantages doth still enlarge his dominions, ambitiously aiming at a Monarchy by the power of his moneys, which are the very sinews of his strength”.⁹⁶³

The amounts of treasure were staggering, in July 1661 being valued at 40 million pieces of eight.⁹⁶⁴ England's vital succour to Portugal (see Chapter 3) involved supporting the Braganza regime's attempts to resist Spanish aggression which aimed at incorporating Portugal into the Spanish empire. The English navy was essential to all of these elements.

To maintain good relations Charles sent reassuring but duplicitous messages to the Spanish King, protesting his desire for friendship.⁹⁶⁵ This was seemingly successful. English merchants feared that various actions like the Portuguese marriage would inflame relations and lead to their goods being confiscated. In fact, they were so concerned that many commenced removing their possessions.⁹⁶⁶ However, the English navy ensured the success of Charles's tactic, the Catholic Monarch, fearing its superiority and the damage it could inflict on Spanish interests, was determined to resist any kind of formal breach with his Britannic Majesty, given the Spanish fleet's total inadequacy. They were desperate to maintain the formal peace.⁹⁶⁷ For instance, in September 1661 the Swedish ambassador,

⁹⁶³ Mun *England treasure*, pp.56-57

⁹⁶⁴ CSPD 1661-1662, 29.7.1661 pp.31-54 vol 39 entry 102

⁹⁶⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 21.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 51

⁹⁶⁶ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 1.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 1

⁹⁶⁷ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 8.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 7, 20.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 18, 3.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 27, 8.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 147, 12.9.63 pp.261-265 entry 351

Count Brahe, was to be formally presented at the Court of St James. During the preceding formal procession, the French and Spanish ambassadors engaged in what was close to a pitched battle on London's streets, involving paid locals as well as their attendants, to achieve precedence in the cavalcade. Many were hurt and seven or eight were killed. Charles expressed his displeasure, and despite Spain's strong desire for him remain, their ambassador, Baron de Batteville, was summarily repatriated at his Majesty's request. This was an astonishing breach of diplomatic etiquette.⁹⁶⁸ Additionally, the Spanish King ordered all his ports to remain open to both English merchants and the English navy for victuals, all English visitors to be treated with courtesy.⁹⁶⁹ For example, when en-route to confront the pirates, Admiral Montagu landed at Alicante to recuperate from an illness he had contracted at sea, being treated with all kindness.⁹⁷⁰ Further, contrary to all precedent, when Lord Fanshaw arrived in Cadiz harbour as ambassador in early March 1663, his Catholic Majesty ordered all his ships and forts to fire the salute first.⁹⁷¹ And at the Spanish Government's command every town the ambassador and his family arrived at en-route to Madrid was to give a magnificent welcome.⁹⁷² This justifies Charles's confidence in his navy's ascendancy. Indeed, England actually increased its trade with Spain in this period.⁹⁷³

Spain was terrified that the English navy would seize its American treasure fleets.⁹⁷⁴ This provided pecuniary funding for extensive imperial possessions, its forfeiture having disastrous consequences such as damaging its ability to protect its Italian domains during the confrontation between France and Rome in late 1662 and early 1663, and undermining its ability to invade Portugal.⁹⁷⁵ Indeed, Spain needed to redirect resources from its navy to land forces, leaving its treasure flotilla even more exposed than otherwise.⁹⁷⁶ Once again, Charles's confidence in his superior navy proved founded. During 1661 and 1662 the

⁹⁶⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 8.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 7, 2.12.1661 pp.72-91 entry 95, 30.12.1661 pp.72-90 entry 105; CSPD 1661-1662, 3.10.1661 pp.103-132 vol 43 entry 12, 3.10.1661 pp.103-132 vol 43 entry 12; Evelyn *Diary* vol 1, p.350 1.10.1661; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.79 30.9.1661; Wharton *Gesta*, p.38 30.9.61; *Royal and loyal blood*, p.68

⁹⁶⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 1.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 1, 20.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 18, 3.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 27, 8.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 147, 23.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 231; CCSP vol 5, p.205 11.4.1662 Clarendon to Downing

⁹⁷⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 3.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 27; Montagu *Journal*, p.90 12.7.1661, 19.7.1661

⁹⁷¹ Fanshawe *Memoires*, p.126

⁹⁷² Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.126-144

⁹⁷³ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 28.12.1661 pp.72-90 entry 104

⁹⁷⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 20.7.1661 pp.1-20 entries 19, 28.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 20, 3.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 27, 25.4.1663 pp.239-244 entry 317; Montagu' *Journal*, pp.99-100 28.9.1661

⁹⁷⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 30.1.1663 pp.225-228 entry 297; CCSP vol 5, pp.243-244 30.7.1662 *London*, p.355 24.12.1663 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon

⁹⁷⁶ CCSP vol 5, p.248 6.8.1662 Madrid

treasure fleet was intercepted by Spanish officials at the Island of St Mary's where the majority of it remained due to fear of English naval predations. This was deemed to have been the largest flotilla for 21 years, totalling the amazing amount listed above. However, only about 6 or 7 million reached Madrid, the rest not being trans-shipped due to the unavailability of an adequate escort.⁹⁷⁷ This was illustrated in the poem feting England's dominance over Spain in the Caribbean, "Meanwhile the Spaniards in America/Hoped their European coasts to find/Cleared from our ships by the Autumnal wind/Their huge capacious gallions stuffed with plate/The labouring winds drive slowly to their fate." However, as the poem continues, "And now some months encamping on the main/Our naval army had besieged Spain/They that the whole world's monarchy designed/Are to their ports by our bold fleet confined/From whence our red cross they triumphant see/Riding without a rival on the sea."⁹⁷⁸

Further, in 1663, operating from his Majesty's base in Jamaica, English vessels undertook a terror campaign, creating great fear in the Spaniards by causing havoc in the Caribbean. Using England's nautical supremacy, English soldiers landed at Campagni on Cuba and burned fifteen Spanish ships and carried off huge booty, having overcome the garrison of 2,000 soldiers. Additionally, they destroyed the castle, forts and blockhouses. Further, during the San Giacomo raid on the Spanish Main they removed large amounts of booty and many ships. In fact, this venture was particularly audacious, soldiers landing from seventeen naval frigates marched 20 leagues inland killing several inhabitants and laying the country waste and plundering it, tried to raise a mutiny, raiding the port, carrying off four fully laden vessels and burning the rest, causing great mercantile losses. Also, the numerous English vessels in those seas let it be known that they were determined to capture that year's flotilla.⁹⁷⁹ Ultimately, the Spanish could not supply adequate numbers of escorting vessels and the treasure fleet never left the Americas.⁹⁸⁰ Despite this, the English still captured two Cadiz ships, putting into London where the silver was taken to the mint for conversion into English coins to help Charles's attempts to overcome his economic crisis (see Chapter

⁹⁷⁷ CSPD 1661-1662, 29.7.1661 pp.31-54 vol 39 entry 102; Montagu *Journal*, pp.99-100 28.9.1661, p.111 13.12.1661, p.120 5.2.1662

⁹⁷⁸ Gent *Complementum*, p.23 Of the Late war with Spain and our victory at sea near St Lugar

⁹⁷⁹ CSPD 1663-1664, 4.5.1663 pp.128-143 vol 73 entry 12; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 14.5.1663 pp.245-248 entry 324, 30.5.1663 pp.245-248 entry 327, 6.6.1663 pp.249-250 entry 328, 24.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 338; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.97 27.2.1662

⁹⁸⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 338

Six).⁹⁸¹ This strategy was dramatically successful. Following Spain's shattering defeats at the battle of Evora and elsewhere under Don Juan, it couldn't afford to raise enough troops to launch counter-attacks. This further vindicated Charles's faith in his navy, Spain's reluctance to formally break with England prompting an increased likelihood of its recognition of Braganza as a legitimate ruler.⁹⁸²

A central plank of Charles's strategy to achieving international pre-eminence involved his marriage to the Portuguese Infanta (see Chapter 3). England's martial assistance to the beleaguered Portuguese regime was total, incredibly high profile, and absolutely vital to the struggling Duke of Braganza.⁹⁸³ Pamphlets stated such emotional Spanish reaction as

“The Portuguese marriage, would blear the eyes, or break the heart of Spain.”⁹⁸⁴

Indeed, at the campaign's commencement the Spanish admitted that English help would make their war against Portugal “difficult, lengthy and costly”.⁹⁸⁵ The failure of this military support would undermine Charles's reputation, his marriage highlighting his heavy personal investment in this project. Further, many people couldn't understand its rationale, believing that Portugal lacked the resources to pay the dowry's large cash component.⁹⁸⁶ However, yet again the King's total faith in his navy proved variously substantiated. The navy ensured that troops could be transported to the Peninsula unhindered by naval vessels of other nations, particularly Spanish. These troops proved crucial. For example, one of the main commanders, Count Schomberg, a French mercenary in England's employ, reported the arrival of 4,000 troops from England, a quarter of whom were French, stating that he now had no fear of the Spanish.⁹⁸⁷ In fact, the navy's formidable reputation meant that there were times when the Spanish fleet didn't put to sea in case it encountered the English, such as in

⁹⁸¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 338, 24.12.1663 pp.270-275 entry 374

⁹⁸² CSP *Venice vol 33*, 17.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 336; CCSP *vol 5*, p.26.6.1663 London. Bellings to d'Estrades; Fanshaw *Memoires*, pp.111-112; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.143 28.6.1663; Henry Townsend *Diary*, pp.93-94 23.8.1662

⁹⁸³ CCSP *vol 5*, p.285. 5.12.1662 Memorial

⁹⁸⁴ *Portugal voyage*, p.18

⁹⁸⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 3.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 27

⁹⁸⁶ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 1.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 1; as well as Chapter 3

⁹⁸⁷ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 29.5.1663 pp.245-248 entry 326, 17.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 336, 24.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 338; CCSP *vol 5*, p.236 9.7.1662 Lisbon, p.295 Jan 1663 Memorial to Louis XIV; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.240; Barlow *Journal*, p.75; Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.111-112; Wharton *Gesta*, p.42 18.6.1662

November 1662 under the Duke of Albuquerque's command.⁹⁸⁸ Pamphlets highlighted this, eulogising

“its England's Empress rules the seas, the Royal Charles with several gallant squadrons by her side”

and regarding Montagu's role,

“you'd now the Spaniard by the throat”.⁹⁸⁹

Dunkirk had been conquered by Cromwell in 1658 and now constituted one of Charles's possessions, and cleverly, the King increased its garrison to levels beyond those necessary for its defence in order to tie Spanish troops down in Flanders in case of a rupture with England.⁹⁹⁰ Indeed, the English levied contributions from the local Flanders population, causing antagonism and raising the potential of hostilities (covered below). Again, here the navy provided support, undertaking the transport of the extra troops to Dunkirk and providing the vital control of the sea lanes that ensured its impregnability (see Chapter 3), stopping the Spanish or any other nation from interfering with this diversionary tactic.

In total, in all three aspects of Charles's strategy against Spain the navy proved highly successful. The King's confidence and willingness to deploy its formidable power and reputation proved decisive in achieving his three objectives against Spain, enhancing his Majesty's international pre-eminence.

France.

As highlighted by Gilbert Burnett, Charles had a natural admiration and attraction to the French King.⁹⁹¹ Further, he realised that both crowns shared international interests in effecting the Spanish defeat in Portugal. The English King's rationale was to both support his new brother-in-law, Portugal's defeat constituting a major set-back for his reputation and

⁹⁸⁸ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 1.11.1662 pp.204-216 entry 268

⁹⁸⁹ *Portugal voyage*, p.12, pp.13-14

⁹⁹⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 16.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 14, 28.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 20, 10.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 32

⁹⁹¹ Burnett *History vol 1*, p.128

his aspirations to become internationally hegemonic. On the other hand, successful English backing would emphasise to the world the Britannic Monarch's superiority to the hitherto major superpower, Spain. The English navy was crucial to this. However, Louis XIV also wished to see the defeat of Spain, both worrying about an increasingly powerful Spain should they achieve victory over Portugal, as well as aspiring to possession of the Spanish throne and empire, including the Spanish Netherlands.⁹⁹² Indeed, were the Spanish King to die, his French counterpart expected to act as tutor to the Iberian inheritor.⁹⁹³ Consequently, given their joint interests in this sphere, it made sense for both thrones to become allies.⁹⁹⁴ Charles therefore progressed discussions with the French envoys, consecutively being L'Estrade followed by M. de Commings, manifesting itself in Princess Henrietta's and Duc D'Anjou's marriage, as well as French complicity in Charles's desire for a Portuguese espousal.⁹⁹⁵ And astonishingly, the French made a further substantial commitment to this relationship, promising secret payments totalling between 1.8 and 2 million livres over two or three years, starting in 1661.⁹⁹⁶ These are signs of a strong, but secret, alliance that was in effect at this stage.⁹⁹⁷

France played a role in Spain's defeat at Evora in July 1663, the battle which finally reversed Spanish military fortunes against Portugal, and in the wider war. It contributed a regiment of around 1,200 to 1,500 troops.⁹⁹⁸ However, although France donated around two million francs to the Portuguese regime, this was clearly not necessary for concluding the hostilities as it arrived several days after Portugal's victory.⁹⁹⁹ In contrast, the English supplied the vast majority of the 4,000 soldiers and the general who commanded at Evora, Count Schomberg, in addition to the vital maritime aid (see above).¹⁰⁰⁰ Yet, France indirectly contributed in other ways to the Portuguese situation too. Charles was desperate for funds due to the

⁹⁹² Pepys *Diary*, 19.10.1663; CCSP Vol 5, pp.87-88 25.3.1661, p.364 15.1.1664 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.380; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.334

⁹⁹³ CCSP vol 5, p.366 29.1.1664 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon

⁹⁹⁴ CCSP vol 5, p.96 2.5.1661, p.124 12.8.1661 Clarendon to Villaret

⁹⁹⁵ CCSP vol 5, pp.87-88 25.3.1661, p.92 1.4.1661, p.93 8.4.1661, p.95 30.4.1661, p.99 14.5.1661, p.104 7.6.1661, p.187 24.1.1662 Clarendon to Downing; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.68 19.1.1661

⁹⁹⁶ CCSP vol 5, p.123 9.8.1661 Villaret to Clarendon, p.131 26.8.1661 Clarendon to Villaret, p.144 8.10.1661

⁹⁹⁷ CCSP vol 5, p.95 30.4.1661 St Albans to Clarendon, p.144 8.10.1661 Memorial delivered to d'Estrades, p.144 October 1661 Memorandum by d'Estrades, 22.8.1662 London. D'Estrades to Clarendon, p.285 7.12.1662 Paris. Louis XIV to Clarendon, p.307 10.4.1663 The Hague, p.314 22.5.1663 London. Bellings to d'Estrades, p.315 29.5.1663 The Hague. D'Estrades to Bellings; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.277

⁹⁹⁸ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 10.4.1663 pp.239-244 entry 311, 17.4.1663 pp.239-244 entry 313, 1.5.1663 pp.245-248 entry 319; CSPD *1661-1662*, March 1662 p.294-328 vol 52 entry 146, 5.4.1663 pp.96-114 vol 71 entry 18, 6.4.1663 pp.96-114 vol 71 entry 23

⁹⁹⁹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 10.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 334

¹⁰⁰⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 29.5.1663 pp.245-248 entry 326; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.143 28.6.1663

underlying failure of his economy and its resulting inability to provide him with the taxes to support his overseas aspirations (see Chapter 6). A strong reason for retaining Dunkirk was to tie down Spanish forces that might otherwise have been diverted for use in Portugal.¹⁰⁰¹ The sale of Dunkirk (see Chapter Six) to another power might mean an unwanted alliance between the city's new owner and the Iberian Flanders' authorities. This would pose a threat at Charles's backdoor across the English Channel, given his joint North African and Portuguese focus at this time. Strategically, for obvious reasons it's never a good idea to fight on two fronts if possible. However, were Dunkirk's new owner to be an ally with a common anti-Spain agenda, this worry would be alleviated, in combination with continuing to tie up Spanish armies in Flanders. In fact, to counter the potential threat to the Spanish Netherlands, Spain needed to withdraw troops from its hostilities in Portugal, those from Galicia and Estremadura being identified, emphasising the efficacy of Charles's policy.¹⁰⁰² Additionally, its pure common sense to establish friendly relations with another party if you wish to maximise the price you achieve from the sale of an asset to them such as the city of Dunkirk. Further, the siting of English ports strategically controlled the channel, negating the need for the Belgian port as a strategic naval asset. As stated by James Howell in his pamphlet

“the position of her seas, with the straightness thereof in point of distance from her neighbours is such and her ports upon those seas are so advantageously situated that none can pass or repass through her sleeve of channels, but she may control them without the help of Dunkirk”.¹⁰⁰³

Consequently, the French provided a desirable option, albeit that secret negotiations were necessary as France did not wish to overtly breach its existing peace treaty with Spain at this time.¹⁰⁰⁴

However, as can be seen, Charles's intercession in Portugal was overwhelmingly the dominant one, France's contributions being minimal. The navy was also crucial, Louis XIV

¹⁰⁰¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 22.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 20, 3.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 27; CCSP *vol 5*, p.238 17.7.1662 *Twickenham*

¹⁰⁰² CSP *Venice vol 33*, 1.11.1662 pp.204-216 entry 268; CCSP *vol 5*, p.238 17.7.1662 *Twickenham*

¹⁰⁰³ *Discourse of Dunkirk*, p.19

¹⁰⁰⁴ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 3.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 27, 10.11.1662 pp.204-216 entry 272, 24.11.1662 pp.204-216 entry 279, 19.12.1662 pp.216-224 entry 290, 17.4.1663 pp.239-244 entry 313; CCSP *vol 5*, pp.87-88 25.3.1661, p.236 8.7.1662 *St Germain*, p.249 7.8.1662 *Boreel to States General*

relying on the English navy as French maritime forces were inadequate. English naval vessels transported both France's troops and its money to the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁰⁰⁵ Conversely, Charles's control of the situation is emphasised by the fact that, should he have wished to withhold English naval services to the French, Louis XIV would have been powerless. After all, not all dominating force needs to be complicated. Its omission instead of application can be just as effective! Yet again his Britannic Majesty's aspiration to achieve international supremacy had proved triumphant, using the superior navy to accomplish this.

The Dutch.

The Dutch were England's main maritime rival, constituting the major obstacle to Charles's achievement of his aspirations to overseas pre-eminence. It would be necessary to squash Dutch sea power using the superior English navy. However, another aspect was crucial. The King's desire to be independent from Parliament and yet have the funds to support his ambitions meant that he had to grow the country's trade in order to increase Customs revenue. Nevertheless, the prevailing economic Mercantilism model dictated that there was a limited amount of global trade. Consequently, if his Majesty wished to raise England's trade levels, it signalled the sequestration of that of other nations. As England's principal trade rival, the Dutch were the primary focus.¹⁰⁰⁶ However, it is also important to note the 'soft' power that trade provides. The Sovereign's realisation of this was incorporated in the Navigation Act (see Chapter 3). The high levels of Dutch mercantile activity provided them with a great deal of indirect leverage with foreign rulers, undermining Charles's ability to achieve his pre-eminent international position. Without any doubt, therefore, the enactment of Charles's ambition must lead to war with the Dutch unless that country surprisingly demurred.¹⁰⁰⁷

As mentioned, it is general military common sense to avoid fighting a war on multiple fronts, especially if one foe is substantial. Thus, although it's clear that during this period Charles intended to engage in a war with Holland, his joint hostilities with Spain and the

¹⁰⁰⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 10.4.1663 pp.239-244 entry 311, 17.4.1663 pp.239-244 entry 313, 1.5.1663 pp.245-248 entry 319; CSPD *1661-1662*, March 1662 p.294-328 vol 52 entry 146; CSPD *1663-1664*, 5.4.1663 pp.96-114 vol 71, 10.7.1663 pp.250-256 vol 33 entry 334; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.312-313

¹⁰⁰⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 2.2.1664

¹⁰⁰⁷ CCSP vol 5, p.108 21.6.1661; Burnet *History* vol 1, pp.278-279; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.312-312

Mediterranean pirates meant that he was fully encumbered. Consequently, as Clarendon's *Life* as well as other sources highlight, the King postponed this conflict until such time as his nautical forces were less committed. Further, it's clear that his Majesty kept this plan to himself, even giving such justifications to his brother regarding his desire to postpone a military focus on the Dutch as the necessity to quell domestic concerns first.¹⁰⁰⁸ In the interim Charles undertook a campaign to isolate the Dutch from acquiring allies. For example, he persuaded his firm allies, the Portuguese, to let his Britannic Majesty's envoy, Sir George Downing, mediate in the Dutch/Portuguese negotiations, with the express but covert intention of directing them towards English interests.¹⁰⁰⁹ In fact, this was seemingly successful, the eventual treaty being subsidiary to England's with Portugal, stating that nothing could be binding if it was contrary to the peace between England and Portugal.¹⁰¹⁰ This effectively meant that there was no peace treaty between Portugal and the Netherlands, resulting in Charles's desire to deny Dutch trading parity with England in Portuguese domains being fulfilled.¹⁰¹¹ He even declined a French offer to join their alliance with Holland, stating that he preferred to pursue something unique, and of course over which he had more control. Joining the mooted alternate accord would have heightened the obstacle to launching later hostilities, a formal alliance being difficult to breach.

One method was to outwardly negotiate a Dutch peace treaty whilst in reality deliberately but covertly delaying progress, meaning that the Netherlands, believing that both sides were seriously attempting a conclusion, maintained the status quo for a protracted period, the control over the duration of this procrastination being at the King's behest.¹⁰¹² His Majesty was able to fully play this stratagem knowing that De Witt, the Grand Pensionary, had no choice, because in addition to privately dreading a war with England as well as the States' Treasury being exhausted, his ability to retain power was severely compromised as the Dutch people were strongly opposed to war with England due to the havoc this would cause to trade. Further, the Netherlanders were increasingly concerned about the growing threat from France and its potential to acquire territory on their border, that is Flanders, despite their

¹⁰⁰⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 30.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 206, 3.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 27; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.p.379-381

¹⁰⁰⁹ CCSP vol 5, p.109 21.6.1661 Conde de Mirande to Charles II, De Will to Clarendon, Extracts, p.112 5.7.1661 *The Hague*, p.118 26.7.1661 The Hague, p.244 31.7.1662 Clarendon to Downing

¹⁰¹⁰ CCSP vol 5, p.121 2.8.1661 The Hague, p.159. 21.11.1661 Clarendon to d'Estrades

¹⁰¹¹ CCSP vol 5, p.116 19.7.1661 Clarendon to Downing, p.131 26.8.61. Lisbon

¹⁰¹² CCSP vol 5, p.122 9.8.1661 Westminster

French-treaty, and wished an alliance with England to counter-balance this.¹⁰¹³ In combination these factors necessitated not just the States General's ongoing engagement in the peace negotiations, but additional offers to placate his Majesty, such as proposing monetary and military help in case of insurrection.¹⁰¹⁴ The Monarch's policy could be effected simply, such as submitting propositions that the Dutch negotiators needed to resort to Holland for guidance.¹⁰¹⁵ Alternately, insisting on the examination of prior treaties to identify old clauses for reuse, such as the one from 1495.¹⁰¹⁶ Such court activities as a Royal 'progress' round the country or trips away to Hampton Court were also used to prevent conferences in order to delay proceedings.¹⁰¹⁷ This was reinforced by outward appearances of maintaining diplomatic calm between the two potential protagonists, such as banning English privateers sailing under Portuguese flags from bringing Dutch prizes into either English harbours or Dunkirk.¹⁰¹⁸ There were encouraging signs that these delaying tactics worked, various presents by the States to his Majesty, including a yacht, highlighting their belief that a positive outcome remained probable.¹⁰¹⁹ Additionally, were the final treaty to lack substance, it could be easily broken without international recriminations. Ultimately, his Majesty was successful with its swift collapse being widely expected. The resulting 'peace treaty' was agreed in October 1662, formal ratification coming in February 1663.¹⁰²⁰ It merely restated the two nations' ancient friendship, avoiding the resolution of multiple important current issues such as fishing and compensation for commercial losses (see Chapter Five).¹⁰²¹

In total, Charles's delaying tactic was successful, formal hostilities being avoided during the period of this Chapter, tensions being raised but kept at a 'simmer'. The navy was crucial to

¹⁰¹³ CCSP *vol 5*, p.330 4.9.1663 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon, p.332 11.9.1663 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon, p.336 18.9.1663 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.334

¹⁰¹⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, p.157. 15.11.1661 The Hague, p.182 10.1.1662 Downing to Clarendon, p.222 24.5.1662 The Hague, p.246 1.8.1662 The Hague, p.134 6.9.1661 The Hague, p.250 8.8.1662 The Hague, p.253 15.8.1662 Downing to Clarendon, p.287 1662 Considerations, p.342 23.10.1663 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon, p.345 6.11.166 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon

¹⁰¹⁵ CSPD *1661-1662*, 20.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 entry 82; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 30.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 206, 18.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 226, 25.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 233, 8.9.1662 pp.182-193 entry 242; CCSP *vol 5*, p.110 24.6.1661, p.132 30.8.1661 *Hague*

¹⁰¹⁶ CCSP *vol 5*, p.111 28.6.1661 Westminster, p.113 5.7.1661 Westminster

¹⁰¹⁷ CCSP *vol 5*, p.114 10.7.1661 Extract, p.249 8.8.1662 Dutch ambassadors to De Witt; Fanshawe *Memoires*, p.99

¹⁰¹⁸ CSPD *1661-1662*, 20.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 entry 80 and entry 82

¹⁰¹⁹ CCSP *vol 5*, p.138 13.9.1661 Whitehall

¹⁰²⁰ CSPD *1661-1662*, 29.9.1662 pp.494-502 vol 60 entry 32; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 22.9.1662 pp.182-193 entry 249, 1.2.1663 pp.228-231 entry 298; Clarendon *Life vol 2* p.378; *Dutch articles of peace*, p.1

¹⁰²¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 5.5.1662 pp.137-146 entry 178, 18.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 226, 22.9.1662 pp.182-193 entry 249; CCSP *vol 5*, p.103 2.6.1661, p.107 17.6.1661; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.341

this. The King's ability to deploy his superior navy when he chose provided a strong negotiating hand. Despite his procrastination and anti-Dutch propaganda the Hollanders continued the peace negotiations in preference to returning without a deal and facing a potentially catastrophic war, the navy's reputation being so formidable that a shallow treaty was regarded as better than nothing. Even if it lacked legal constraints on Charles's deployment of his navy against the Dutch, at least it provided a moral impediment.

Ottomans

The fourth power over which Charles would need to achieve ascendancy in order to achieve his aspiration of international pre-eminence was the Ottomans. His success at this is variously indicated, the navy being important here too due to both his Majesty's command over it and the high level of trade between the two nations. As regards trade (see Chapters Five and Six), the Levant trade was incredibly important to England, Charles's Customs revenue benefitting substantially from it. However, the large mercantile activity was also essential to the Sultan. The Porte's ruler was prepared to go to surprising lengths to maintain positive relations with his Britannic Majesty, acquiescing to English attacks on notional Ottoman territory, that is against the Mediterranean pirates. In fact, so strong was Charles's influence that the Sultan ordered the Algerians to conclude peace terms, underlined by the Sultan's own treaty with his Britannic Majesty, this censure applying solely to English shipping.¹⁰²² Militarily, the Anglo menace was obviously backed up with the English navy's mighty reputation, whose prestige in those parts was summarised by Venice's London ambassador, stating that the Sultan did not wish to upset Charles as he feared his power too much.¹⁰²³ This starkly contrasts with the Dutch, their failure to engage the pirates to gain such a robust treaty emanating from their fear of upsetting their Levant trade through offending the Grand Signor.¹⁰²⁴ This internationally conspicuous Dutch failure highlighted the superiority of his Majesty's navy, and advanced the King's overseas pre-eminence agenda.

¹⁰²² *Capitulations and articles*, p.19 article 59; *CSP Venice vol 33*, 7.4.1662 pp.125-137 entry 162, 22.1.1664 pp.276-282 entry 381; *CCSP vol 5*, p.356 29.12.1663 Clarendon to Lord Winchelsea

¹⁰²³ *CSP Venice vol 33*, 16.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 15

¹⁰²⁴ *CCSP vol 5*, p.375 26.2.1664 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon

In aggregate, Spanish and French ambassadors' conflict in London at the formal arrival of the Swedish ambassador in October 1661 (mentioned above) widely highlighted that Charles had already acquired pre-eminence over other crowned heads. The mighty Spanish regime's compliance to his Britannic Majesty's order to remove their ambassador was an astonishing political coup, and highlighted to many that the Monarch was the arbiter over other kings.¹⁰²⁵ Although this may appear far-fetched, other events give it some substance. For example, prior to concluding their Dutch treaty, the French King enquired whether Charles had any objections. Further, in addition to having failed to attract Charles into the Franco/Dutch defensive alliance (covered above), Louis was so keen to formally ally himself with Charles that he separately attempted to attract him into a different one with Portugal and Sweden.¹⁰²⁶ Additionally, in April 1662 the Sovereign was contemplating taking over all the Porte's tin trade in order to benefit from the profits, including that of all other nations, the conclusion being that he would be likely to succeed as no other ruler wished to fall out with him.¹⁰²⁷

Other Matters.

Various smaller matters also supported Charles's apparent successful progress towards achieving his aspirations of overseas pre-eminence. In the Dutch/Franco defensive treaty mentioned above, the French were so keen to include the English that Louis XIV ensured that England could be incorporated at a later date, should his Britannic Majesty change his mind.¹⁰²⁸ And interceding on behalf of their firm ally, English ambassadors in both Constantinople and Germany persuaded the local regimes to accept permanent representatives from Portugal, additionally gaining permission for Portugal to recruit troops in Ottoman territory.¹⁰²⁹ Indeed, the King's naval forces were so reputed that the Swedish and Danish additionally desired this style of defensive alliance, adding prestige to his Majesty's persona (see Chapter Five).¹⁰³⁰ However, more crucially it secured the important Baltic trade without an allocation of cherished naval resources similar to Admiral Montagu's 1659 Commonwealth fleet of 40 vessels (see Chapter One), protecting valuable Customs

¹⁰²⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 1.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 66, 30.12.1661 pp.72-90 entry 105, 11.4.1662 pp.125-137 entry 164

¹⁰²⁶ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 2.5.1662 pp.137-146 entry 177, 10.11.1662 pp.204-216 entry 272

¹⁰²⁷ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 3.4.1662 pp.125-137 entry 158

¹⁰²⁸ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 21.5.1662 pp.137-146 entry 177; CCSP *vol 5*, p.89 29.3.1661

¹⁰²⁹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 16.12.1661 pp.72-90 entry 101, 2.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 124, 12.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 132, 12.8.1663 pp.256-261 entry 343

¹⁰³⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 4.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 28; CCSP *Vol 5*, p.93 11.4.1661

revenues. Also, Royal finances may not have stretched to such a nautical deployment at this time.

None of these international diplomatic triumphs would have been possible without the navy's fearsome reputation. It boosted the King's attractiveness as both a military and economic partner, other rulers going to some lengths to avoid falling out with him. However, Charles's confidence in his nautical military arm was vital, ensuring that he could follow his chosen foreign policies with impunity. In fact, breathtakingly, so confident were the English of their navy's supremacy that in return for trading rights in the Ottoman-owned Black Sea, they offered to deploy it to those waters to help defend the rulers against the Russian Cossacks, additionally suggesting that the navy's mere reputation would be enough to maintain the peace. On this occasion, the offer was declined!¹⁰³¹

Projection of Power from Overseas Possessions.

Tangier.

Tangier was a component in the Portuguese Infanta's dowry to Charles, and was part of the King's strategically sited bases to allow him to project power globally (see Chapter Three). His Majesty wanted it to control the Mediterranean and the Straits.¹⁰³² Its founding as an English colony encountered several problems; establishing good relations with the local Moors, lack of money and soldiers initially unwilling to serve in North Africa being the most prominent.¹⁰³³ However, these were overcome within approximately twelve months, and when completed, the mole to protect shipping from inclement weather would enhance Tangier's attractions.¹⁰³⁴ Indeed, to aid the colony's commercial viability and support its running costs, in September 1662 his Majesty attempted to attract merchants of all nations,

¹⁰³¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 12.8.1663 pp.256-261 entry 343

¹⁰³² CSP *Venice vol 33*, 30.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 56; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.242; *Glories and Magnificent*, p.254

¹⁰³³ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 14.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 66, 28.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 73, 4.11.1661 pp.67-72 entry 79, 18.11.1661 pp.67-72 entry 87, 25.11.1661 pp.67-72 entry 92, 10.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 130, 1.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 141, 7.4.1662 pp.125-137 entry 162, 30.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 206, 16.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 225; *Pepys Diary*, 22.7.1663; Burnet *History, vol 1*, p.242; *Barlow Journal*, p.51; *Henry Townsend Diary*, p.92 14.6.1662

¹⁰³⁴ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 8.9.1662 pp.182-193 entry 242, 31.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 339, 9.10.1663 pp.265-267 entry 355; *Pepys Diary*, 10.9.1663, 28.9.1663; *Montagu Journal*, pp.135-136 1.5.1662; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.242

declaring that it would be a free port for at least five years, consequently being exempt from the 'Navigation Act'.¹⁰³⁵ Charles eventually stationed a substantial garrison of nearly 10,000 troops there to man the city's fortifications and for deployment anywhere along the North African coast, including to defend against Moorish armies potentially numbering many tens of thousands.¹⁰³⁶

Tangier provided specific but enormous advantages. It improved the navy's efficiency, reducing vessel numbers involved in convoying merchant vessels to the Mediterranean, the larger convoys requiring fewer frigates. Tangier acted as a 'collecting point', eventually being able to hold up to two hundred ships.¹⁰³⁷ On reaching Tangier, the merchants proceeded to their onward destinations, variously using the twenty two locally based naval ships to protect against pirates.¹⁰³⁸ Militarily, Tangier was extraordinarily important, these naval vessels being able to project formidable power.¹⁰³⁹ In addition to providing a base for anti-pirate operations, as stated by Venice's London ambassador, Spain was seriously threatened. Firstly, all of the annual treasure flotillas had to pass in front of Tangier en-route to Spain. Secondly, the English naval fleet was at hand to accost a Spanish fleet venturing out of port. This was particularly important during the Portuguese hostilities.¹⁰⁴⁰ However, Tangier allowed the English fleet to dominate the Mediterranean and threaten other powers. For example, this extended even as far as the Porte (see above).¹⁰⁴¹

The navy was absolutely vital to both the founding and ongoing operations of Tangier. After all, it was founded primarily as a naval base. As a remote new colony, the navy was indispensable in transporting troops and provisions to it.¹⁰⁴² Also, during the early period when the town experienced a strong menace from the local Moors, including being besieged, the navy acquired provisions from other more friendly parts of the Mediterranean at relatively

¹⁰³⁵ *Tangier in Africa*

¹⁰³⁶ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 20.11.1663 pp.268-270 entry 362, 11.12.1663 pp.270-275 entry 374; *Montagu Journal*, pp.120-121 16.2.1662; CCSP *vol 5*, p.243 28.7.1662 Lisbon

¹⁰³⁷ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 15.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 149, 16.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 225, 9.10.1663 pp.265-267 entry 355

¹⁰³⁸ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 1.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 141, 20.11.1663 pp.268-270 entry 362; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.242; *Tangier in Africa*

¹⁰³⁹ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.242

¹⁰⁴⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 29.5.1663 pp.245-248 entry 326; Heath *Glories and magnificent*, p.254

¹⁰⁴¹ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.242

¹⁰⁴² CSP *Venice vol 33*, 1.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 142, 21.7.1662 pp.158-168 entry 214, 10.5.1663 pp.245-248 entry 322

short notice, such as Genoa.¹⁰⁴³ In fact, prior to the city's Portuguese hand-over, the navy secured the fortifications with around four hundred sailors due to a shortage of Portuguese troops.¹⁰⁴⁴ The navy's formidable power was crucial, allowing it to over-awe and discourage Moorish bases such as Ceuta and Arcilla from fomenting trouble.¹⁰⁴⁵ These tactics proved successful, particularly against Morocco's Moorish overlord, Abd Allah al Ghaillan, known as Gayland, and his enormous forces of up to 200,000 men, as reported in a contemporary treatise.¹⁰⁴⁶ He eventually agreed to a peace deal, and a weekly market which allowed locals to engage in commerce and residents to acquire provisions.¹⁰⁴⁷ Indeed, Gayland was so impressed by the English navy that when the treaty was due for renewal he attempted to add a clause stipulating that it should be available to support his rule "in any place".¹⁰⁴⁸ Even though Tangier wasn't fully operational during all of the period of the conflict against both Spain and the pirates, its establishment within about twelve months illustrated its potential to support ongoing military and commercial operations.

Jamaica.

Although Oliver Cromwell acquired Jamaica, it proved invaluable to the ensuing Royalist regime, Charles attempting to improve its long-term commercial viability as a key crown possession, encouraging emigration by promising that all those who settled there were eligible for a grant of thirty acres of land.¹⁰⁴⁹ However, its essential importance was as a navy base for the projection of substantial power in support of Charles's overseas aspirations for pre-eminence. A powerful fleet of seventeen ships was accordingly based there.¹⁰⁵⁰ A major objective was to disrupt the flow of Spanish treasure from the Americas (covered above).¹⁰⁵¹ Luckily, the Spanish themselves gave the King the formal excuse to commence hostilities, with Lord Windsor, the Jamaican Governor, having repeatedly warned the Iberians

¹⁰⁴³ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 3.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 331; Barlow *Journal*, p.51

¹⁰⁴⁴ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 10.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 148; Pepys *Diary*, 20.2.1662; Montagu *Journal*, p.114 4.1.1662, 6.1.1662, p.115 14.1.1662, 15.1.1662, 16.1.1662, 17.1.1662, p.116 23.1.1662, p.117 31.1.1662; Barlow *Journal*, p.70

¹⁰⁴⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 16.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 225, 18.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 226, 15.9.1662 pp.182-193 entry 244, 8.12.1662 pp.216-244 entry 285; CCSP *vol 5*, p.243 28.7.1662 Lisbon

¹⁰⁴⁶ *Description of Tangier*, p.18

¹⁰⁴⁷ CSPD *1663-1664*, pp.224-244 8.8.1663 vol 78 entry 59; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 18.3.1664 pp.286-289 entry 402; Pepys *Diary*, 20.8.1662, 10.9.1663; CCSP *vol 5*, p.203 3.3.1662 *Tangier*; CCSP *vol 5*, p.325 8.8.1663 The Hague. D'Estrades to Bellings

¹⁰⁴⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, pp.343-344 Oct 1663 Additional Articles

¹⁰⁴⁹ *Jamaican planters*

¹⁰⁵⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 21.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 203, 14.5.1663 pp.245-248 entry 324

¹⁰⁵¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 21.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 203

of English retribution should their exactions continue.¹⁰⁵² The swift and fierce Anglo retaliatory raids on Cuba and the Spanish Main have been covered above, as has the successful achievement of his Majesty's strategy to attempt to eradicate the flow of treasure reaching Spain. Indeed, these raids were extremely profitable for both His Majesty and for individual ships. For example, in December 1663 the *Diamond's* officers lobbied the King for a proportion of a Flemish prize in Jamaica harbour laden with African slaves.¹⁰⁵³ This encouraged the arrival of privateers, including one fitted out by Prince Rupert.¹⁰⁵⁴ In fact, overall, a signal that these anti-Spanish operations in the Caribbean were very successful is that, on his return home, the erstwhile governor, Lord Windsor, received honour and significantly enhanced his reputation.¹⁰⁵⁵

Other Bases.

Obviously, England's domestic naval bases were fully operational at this time. However, given its remoteness, unsurprisingly Bombay was yet to be fully established, but offered huge potential to support his Majesty's objectives, allowing the projection of power in distant parts from a reportedly benign harbour (see Chapter Three), as well as supporting increased access to lucrative markets and the corresponding rise in Customs.¹⁰⁵⁶

In total, at this stage of his reign, the King's aspiration to gain international pre-eminence was proving highly successful, his overseas bases providing a substantial contribution. As summarised by Venice's London ambassador,

“England's possessions now fully support its primacy of the oceans.”

Further, the ambassador fully appreciated and supported Charles's use of his navy as his foreign policy tool, stating

“maritime nations and their treasures cannot be kept without navies”.¹⁰⁵⁷

¹⁰⁵² CSP *Venice vol 33*, 1.3.1663 pp.232-239 entry 302; *Pepys Diary*, 10.4.1662; *Henry Townsend Diary*, p.97 27.2.1662

¹⁰⁵³ CSPD *1663-1664*, 2.12.1663 pp.359-378 vol 85 entry 2

¹⁰⁵⁴ CSPD *1661-1662*, 30.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 entry 122

¹⁰⁵⁵ *Pepys Diary*, 13.2.1663; *Henry Townsend Diary*, p.97 27.2.1662

¹⁰⁵⁶ *Pepys Diary*, 17.2.1662, 18.3.1662, 24.3.1662

¹⁰⁵⁷ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 28.12.1661 pp.72-90 entry 104

Sovereign of the Seas and other strong nautical associations.

The importance of ‘Sovereign of the Seas’ has been illustrated in such ways as the circumstances surrounding the Swedish ambassador and Captain Holmes (see Chapter Three). His Majesty continued this policy in this Chapter’s time span, which was fully commensurate with his desire to project power globally to aid his ambition to be a hegemonic ruler. It was vital for this ancient claim to be maintained, the King continuing to insist on the acquiescence of all other nations, without exception. He was even willing to go to war over it.¹⁰⁵⁸ Addressed to ‘The World’, pamphlets vented such emotion as, “The Royal Navy now being put to sea/Their loyalty and duty for to pay/Let no bold interruption that can/Bid others stand, upon the ocean/Twixt us and the horizon, presumed appear/On peril of being sent to their own sphere/Down with your flags, proud Hollander and Spain/Let no bold French-man dare to come too high/That English flags or ensigns can decry/Let all your several squadrons homage pay/To the great Lord and Lady of the sea/To England’s monarch still; now to his Queen/Let not the thoughts of Ruben intervene/England, thy floating Isles, thy wooden walls/Damps the discourse of ten escurials/A navy so puissant ne’er was known/To cross the seas, since seas knew Oleron.”¹⁰⁵⁹

Or in other words, as Venice’s French ambassador put it,

“Charles never yields a jot in such matters”!¹⁰⁶⁰

In fact, in order to reinforce this vital tradition, the King issued orders to all naval captains that they were to enforce the salute from all non-English ships “upon pain of death”.¹⁰⁶¹ This was variously illustrated. In early 1662 Louis XIV insisted that the English should dip their colours to his vessels, dispatching 200,000 crowns to speed the sailing of Admiral Duc de Beaufort’s fleet. Charles refused to compromise. Although there are no figures for the contemporary French fleet size, as highlighted by the Venetian ambassador amongst other sources, despite the expending of a lot of diplomatic energy, the French King ultimately

¹⁰⁵⁸ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 27.1.1662 pp.91-101 entry 121; CCSP *vol 5*, p.183 17.1.1662 The Hague

¹⁰⁵⁹ *Portugal voyage*, p.35

¹⁰⁶⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 7.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 128 18.3.1664 pp.286-289 entry 402

¹⁰⁶¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 27.1.1662 pp.91-101 entry 121

refused to let his fleet set sail in case it should encounter English ships, knowing that they would always be superior.¹⁰⁶² Modern scholars have highlighted French land forces' superior strength at this time. The English Monarch was unable to compete in this arena as his army had been emaciated following the Restoration. However, the opposite was true at sea, his Britannic Majesty's ability to use his navy to interject in other nations' activities with impunity meant that the French Monarch was reluctant to confront Charles, worried what consequences he would inflict on French aspirations to Flanders (see above). Additionally, in May of the same year Captain Gilpin brought a recalcitrant Dutch frigate into the Downs.¹⁰⁶³ Also in the same month, Sir John Lawson was refused permission to careen his vessel in Toulon unless he lowered his flag, so undertook this tricky procedure elsewhere.¹⁰⁶⁴ In July 1662 the Lisbon estuary saw an engagement between English and Dutch ships "over flags", the Dutch coming off worst.¹⁰⁶⁵ This approach even applied to merchant ships. In March 1664 de Beaufort came across an English merchant in a port near Cadiz who refused to lower his flag. The French admiral sent some soldiers overland to belabour the merchant captain for his perceived failure. On returning to London, the captain angrily reported the issue, stating that he had been under no obligation to salute the French, Charles subsequently formally complaining to the French King.¹⁰⁶⁶

English mastery of the sea was conveyed in other ways. A mighty fleet of eighteen frigates with sixty guns each escorted the Queen to her new country, the flag ship carrying one hundred guns.¹⁰⁶⁷ Similarly, the Duke of York greeted the Queen Mother with "several ships" when she was making the short journey from Paris to London.¹⁰⁶⁸ On both occasions the escorting fleets were much larger than needed to fulfil the joint roles of transportation and escort, and would have impressively displayed an image of maritime dominance. Other actions on the wider oceans supported this symbolism. The Dutch were merely willing to use their fleet under de Ruyter to engage with the Mediterranean corsairs at sea rather than attack their Algerian base because they didn't wish to offend the Ottoman Sultan and risk losing

¹⁰⁶² CSP *Venice* vol 33, 27.1.1662 pp.91-101 entry 121, 31.1.1662 pp.91-101 entry 122, 3.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 126, 7.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 128, 14.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 133; CCSP vol 5, p.183 17.1.1662 The Hague

¹⁰⁶³ CSPD 1661-1662, 8.5.1662 pp.357-385 vol 54 entry 30

¹⁰⁶⁴ Montagu *Journal*, pp.135-136 1.5.1662

¹⁰⁶⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 28.7.1662 pp.158-168 entry 217

¹⁰⁶⁶ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 18.3.1664 pp.286-289 entry 402

¹⁰⁶⁷ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 26.4.1662 pp.125-137 entry 173

¹⁰⁶⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 4.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 219

trade.¹⁰⁶⁹ Charles was so confident in his maritime supremacy and the resulting Ottomans' connivance with his anti-piratical actions that he employed maximum force to subdue the North African menace (covered above). In fact, it was fully known to his Majesty that the Sultan's fear of English naval dominance was so strong that he would support Charles's campaign, making no complaint at all.¹⁰⁷⁰

Throughout this period the King also continued to portray his nautical associations. For example, at the Monarch's request several other nations supplied native craft for his personal use, such as gondolas from Venice (see Chapter Three). Good use was made of these boats for publicity purposes. For instance, in October 1661 the King entered a £100 wager with the Duke of York that his Majesty's Dutch-designed yacht could outsail his Highness's own vessel from Greenwich to Gravesend and back, Charles often taking the helm. The attendance of the King's 'kitchen boat' enhanced the propaganda, serving breakfast to the assembled courtiers, including many nobles and lords. Ultimately no money changed hands, the Monarch losing the outward-bound leg due to contrary winds but winning the return journey!¹⁰⁷¹ Further, in July 1662 his Majesty's barque encountered a dreadful storm, experiencing great danger when the vessel grounded on the Goodwin Sands. In such exalted company as Prince Rupert and other high-born gentlemen the King's nautical skill was instrumental, re-floating the barque and conning it into the nearest port at Queenborough. With such large numbers of aristocracy in company, the propaganda effect would have been valuable. Additionally, coins comprising specie were in desperately short supply (see Chapter Six), the population having a heavier reliance on copper coinage such as farthings, which carried an inscription *the dominion of the 4 seas*. Such a prominent statement in such a place, as part of the nation's daily life, leaves no room for doubt as to England's nautical aspirations, and the King's paramountcy in it.¹⁰⁷²

Charles's strict enforcement of this ancient claim, together with the powerful fleets he fielded for simple tasks and his confident application of belligerence reinforced his Britannic Majesty's entitlement to be 'Sovereign of the Seas', enhancing his aspirations to international

¹⁰⁶⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 4.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 59

¹⁰⁷⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 16.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 15

¹⁰⁷¹ Evelyn *Diary* vol 1, pp.351-352 1.10.1661

¹⁰⁷² Penn *Memoires*, p.264

pre-eminence. Obviously, none of this would have been possible without his powerful and highly feared navy.

Propaganda.

The navy's superior reputation existed prior to the King's ascension, emanating from the first Anglo-Dutch war and Cromwell's Western Design (both are outside this thesis's scope). This was variously demonstrated following the Restoration by the comprehensive international expectation that the English navy would defeat the pirates, and that it was the only one that could achieve this.¹⁰⁷³ However, such a military asset can only maintain its prestige according to its supreme commander's competence, requiring the persona of having both the knowledge of the organisation and the willingness to use it (see also Chapter Seven). Consequently, using propaganda to highlight Charles's attainment of these attributes was crucial. The heightened conveyance of these messages to international audiences would reduce the need for actual hostilities, Charles's impecuniousness meaning that it was essential to minimise this risk (see Chapter Six). *Ipsa facto*, propaganda promoting the King's credentials were vital to enhancing the use of the navy's reputation as an effective deterrent. The achievement of this was multi-faceted.

In addition to the determination never to waiver from upholding the 'Sovereignty of the Seas' (covered above), his Majesty carefully conveyed a willingness to use his amazing navy whenever the desire took him, together with the confidence that English martial success would result. The use of unofficial diplomatic occasions to transmit this message to critical audiences, that is foreign rulers, was important. For example, Charles took the opportunity during a seemingly private conversation with Venice's London ambassador to float the idea that he was considering using his navy to support the Venetians in their war against the Ottomans. Accordingly, the ambassador duly reported this home.¹⁰⁷⁴ Further, the English were notoriously bellicose.¹⁰⁷⁵ Given that the King had command of overseas policy and was also Commander-in-Chief of the country's armed forces, particularly the navy (see Chapter Three), his willingness to deploy force could only enhance his reputation as a military leader. Seemingly, in combination with those victories against the pirates and Spain, other instances

¹⁰⁷³ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 3.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 44

¹⁰⁷⁴ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 23.9.1661 pp.35-49 entry 52

¹⁰⁷⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 6.6.1663 pp.249-250 entry 328

aided his Majesty's aspiration to international pre-eminence. In fact, the message was apparently received in far-flung places. The Persian King acquiesced over demands for the payment of customs arrears from his Britannic Majesty, the eastern potentate desiring not to go to war with England.¹⁰⁷⁶ And Cocheel Calimata, King of Ternate (Malaysia) sought Charles's help against his brother in a dynastic dispute, promising that no other people but the English would be known in his territories.¹⁰⁷⁷ Needless to say, this can only be due to the navy's reputation and the King's willingness to use it, such a remote war only being possible by sea.

However, such messages as the Monarch's closeness with the navy require continual emphasis to remain current (see previous Chapters also). Charles variously communicated this. In October 1660 he just took off to Portsmouth so that he could "see his navy".¹⁰⁷⁸ On a highly visible occasion, the King displayed his delight in his navy by visiting the dockyards to view the ships being fitted out.¹⁰⁷⁹ Additionally, the King emphasised his command over his navy via presence at the launching of new ships, this being particularly effective should the occasion involve an especially large vessel.¹⁰⁸⁰ Further, displaying an acute knowledge of nautical matters conveyed a Monarch deeply involved with his maritime institution. As stated by Gilbert Burnet, the King

"knew navigation well, but above all he knew the architecture of ships so perfectly, that in that respect he was exact rather more than became a prince".¹⁰⁸¹

For example his Majesty exhibited a keen interest in novel naval inventions. In March 1662 the King attended a demonstration by the German Dr. Kuffler of his new engine that could blow up ships.¹⁰⁸² In September 1662 he publicly rewarded Don Thomas de Fonseca for discoveries beneficial to navigation. Cleverly, Charles prompted six high profile court nobles such as Lord Broucker to petition on behalf of Don Thomas, effectively advertising the King's nautical interest at court, this being such a conspicuous venue that would convey it to

¹⁰⁷⁶ CSPD 1663-1664, 11.2.1664 pp.463-484 vol 92 entry 69

¹⁰⁷⁷ CCSP vol 5, p.287 Dec 1662 Cocheel Calimata

¹⁰⁷⁸ Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.63 1.10.1660, 6.10.1660

¹⁰⁷⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 8.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 7

¹⁰⁸⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 26.4.1663 pp.239-244 entry 318

¹⁰⁸¹ Burnet *History* vol 1, p.128

¹⁰⁸² Pepys *Diary*, 14.3.1662

foreign ambassadors.¹⁰⁸³ In May 1663 his Majesty displayed his personal interest in another of his new yachts' construction, publicly discussing the timber for the keel with the yard.¹⁰⁸⁴ In September 1663 the Sovereign visited Portsmouth to view a development in steering ships, two rudders allowing the vessel to swiftly go against both tide and wind.¹⁰⁸⁵ The repeat of this demonstration with a model on the Thames in the heart of London significantly raised its visibility, the audience additionally including the Duke of York, the Monarch and many others.¹⁰⁸⁶ Ambassadors would easily have been able to witness this event, having the opportunity to feed details back to their masters. The King further personally interacted with naval vessels via his yachts. These were highly painted and gilded, enabling him to demonstrate his nautical appreciation by awarding his Sergeant painter, Robert Howard, a knighthood.¹⁰⁸⁷ Also, the maritime Commander-in-Chief substantially enhanced his image by displaying the ultimate military attribute of bravery and within an every-day setting, being seen as such a natural thing as to be an instinctive trait. For example, in February 1664 the King visited the Earl of Sandwich at his Cambridgeshire home at Hinchbrook. Just for fun, he boarded the Admiral's barge, and surrounded by swans shot the bridge at Huntingdon!¹⁰⁸⁸

As a result, Charles managed to successfully maintain the nautical credentials he had previously established (see Chapters Two and Three), enhancing both the appearance of his closeness to the navy and his warrior image. The effect of this substantially contributed to the naval triumphs his navy achieved in the period covered by this Chapter, including his use of the deterrent to postpone a confrontation with Holland.

Conclusion.

As Chapter Three highlighted, following his Restoration Charles II took strong steps to use his navy to commence stage one of his plan to achieve his covert domestic and international ambitions. This Chapter sees the commencement of the second phase, aimed at substantially raising his internal and overseas image.

¹⁰⁸³ CSPD *1661-1662*, 4.9.1662 pp.474-492 vol 58 entry 19

¹⁰⁸⁴ CSPD *1663-1664*, 19.5.1663 pp.143-159 vol 74 entry 8

¹⁰⁸⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 4.9.1663 pp.261-265 entry 350

¹⁰⁸⁶ CSPD *1663-1664*, Undated 1663 pp.399-413 vol 88 entry 102

¹⁰⁸⁷ CSPD *1661-1662*, 28.1.1662 pp.233-262 vol 49 entry 98, 8.2.1662 pp.262-281 vol 50 entry 31

¹⁰⁸⁸ CSPD *1663-1664*, 19.2.1664 pp.484-501 vol 93 entry 22

Notable military successes were achieved against the pirates, with hostile naval Caribbean activities against Spain fatally undermining its land-based campaign against the King's firm ally, Portugal. The navy's awesome reputation, and his Majesty's proven willingness to use it allowed him to follow his policies against other powers too, France, Holland and the Porte maintaining the peace that the Monarch desired, providing him with the time to allocate resources to more immediate concerns. Further, although not all of the overseas naval bases had been fully established during this Chapter's time period, Tangier and Jamaica proved that the Sovereign had the ability to project power into remote parts of the globe. Also, the navy's defeat of the Mediterranean pirates, the Ottomans' intimidation and apparent good Spanish relations meant that his policy to support trade in order to enhance his Customs revenue with a view to distancing himself from Parliament proved successful. Additionally, the transmission of the message of Charles's naval power reached far-flung parts, as illustrated by the Persian and Malaysian scenarios.

It total, these events highlight Charles's progress in his use of his navy to achieve his dreams of pre-eminence and the enhancement of the mercantile trade that yielded the Customs revenue that paid for this. His augmented reputation as a martial leader based on his fearsome nautical military raised his attraction as an ally to foreign governments. These triumphs were accompanied by the King's persona being heightened via the ongoing effective application of 'Sovereignty of the Seas', and the use of propaganda to begin to prepare the domestic and international audiences in readiness for his planned war with Holland. Further, the raised prestige that this provided aided his domestic presence, the anticipated elevated Customs assisting his desire to distance himself from Parliament. Ultimately, it left him admirably situated to pursue the next phase of his step-by-step plan. And all this was due to the navy's superior reputation and the fear it engendered, and the King's willingness to use it.

Chapter 5 – Preparing for War.

Introduction.

This Chapter outlines the events during the chronological period immediately prior to the Second Anglo-Dutch War, that is from approximately late Spring 1663 to the Spring of 1665. Chapters Three and Four outline how Charles used the navy to implement the first two phases of his step-by-step plan to achieve his covert personal aspirations. This Chapter highlights his progress towards achieving the third part of his plan, that is to commence actual preparations for the anticipated conflagration.

As mentioned in Chapter Three this was multi-faceted. It involved maintaining the steps already achieved, such as reinforcing the treaty with the pirates by force. Also, the nation had to be prepared for war in terms of the country's finances, suitable propaganda to acclimatise the people to the thought of hostilities and ensuring the navy's preparedness. A crucial element was to entice the Dutch into conflict to portray them as the aggressors and therefore void the defensive alliance with France, the Guinea and the Americas being the chosen focal points. An essential aspect to this stage was to launch a diplomatic campaign to isolate the Hollanders from land-based succour, leaving the English navy to focus on their enemy from the sea.

A further success was to impose on the Algerian pirates an unprecedented second peace treaty. The campaign to achieve this was commenced by Sir John Lawson and was completed by Captain Allen, as reported by Pepys and other sources, including the new treaty document itself.

This Chapter concludes that preparations for the forthcoming war with the Dutch were as complete as possible, given the context (see Chapter Six). It also reveals for the first time the true nature of Charles's character, that being a cold, calculating ruler, devoted to using his very high diplomatic skills, the nation's resources and his navy to achieving his personal goals rather than governing as a benign Monarch with the best interests of his people at heart.

The Netherlands.

Charles's desire for international dominance demanded the subjugation of the Dutch through force. Although this reason for taking the nation to war was never broadcast, it is clear that the Monarch fully had this pre-meditated intention. As Bishop Gilbert Burnet, his Majesty's one time confidant, stated in his *History*

“the grounds were so slight that it was visible there was somewhat more at bottom than was openly owned.”¹⁰⁸⁹ Indeed, even the arch Republican Edmund Ludlow in his *Memoirs* stated that “there was more in the design of this war than was commonly understood.”¹⁰⁹⁰

The English Government determined that the best way to achieve this was to destroy their commerce. As reported by the Venetian ambassador to his Italian masters, one of the Sovereign's senior ministers stated to a group of prominent English nobles, the English have to make war on the Dutch as it's the only way to ruin their trade.¹⁰⁹¹ The ambassador also stated

“foreign wars can stir a monarchy to incalculable greatness”

helping to meet Charles's desire for international prestige.¹⁰⁹² Importantly, the Dutch had to be portrayed as the aggressors, allowing the King to more easily recruit other countries to his side. As stated by Sir George Downing, English ambassador to the Hague, to Clarendon, the success of this move would be equally decisive in attracting countries such as Sweden and Denmark.¹⁰⁹³ Additionally, avoiding conflict on two fronts was essential, particularly against the French. They were particularly important as the Franco/Dutch treaty provided for mutual protection should one of the parties be attacked, this provision being void where one of the parties was regarded as the aggressor.¹⁰⁹⁴

Chapter Four highlights how Charles used the superior English navy to subdue both the Mediterranean pirates and the Spanish, and to intimidate the Dutch into protracted

¹⁰⁸⁹ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.305

¹⁰⁹⁰ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.379

¹⁰⁹¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 26.12.1664 entry 107 Enclosure; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.377

¹⁰⁹² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 10.4.1665 entry 154

¹⁰⁹³ CCSP *vol 5*, 23.12.1664 pp.453-454 The Hague, 27.1.1665 p.464 The Hague

¹⁰⁹⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 13.5.1664 entry 20, 12.12.1664 entry 100, 2.1.1665 entry 111; Pepys *Diary*, 23.12.1664; CCSP *vol 5*, 22.9.1664 pp.423-424 The Hague, 18.11.1664 p.444 Downing to Clarendon; CSPD *1664-1665*, 19.3.1665 entry 43 vol 115

negotiations aimed at maintaining an outward peace. However, in parallel the King made preparations for the next stage of his plan. To raise the pool of available sailors, in 1662 and again in 1664 Charles issued similar proclamations aimed at the repatriation of all English mariners in foreign service.¹⁰⁹⁵

Further, given the prevailing Mercantilist theory, the Dutch would be unlikely to willingly enter hostilities as it would disturb the crucial overseas trade upon which they relied so heavily. Consequently, they needed to be provoked, the easiest route emanating from friction surrounding trade rivalry, particularly complaining about injuries inflicted on English merchants, including the Amboyna affair.¹⁰⁹⁶ As highlighted in a pamphlet conveying his Majesty's response to the Dutch ambassador ostensibly on behalf of his people, the complaints covered

“the many and daily injuries sustained from the subjects of the United Provinces by depredations by sea, in other places as well as in the East Indies, in which there were some circumstances of that presumption, in declaring their dominion and inhibiting of commerce against the law of nations, as all princes are equally concerned therein with us”.¹⁰⁹⁷

In fact, according to Downing's *Memorial* in December 1664 quoting the 1662 peace treaty between the two nations, Article Fifteen (see Chapter Four) provided for a list of damages for the Netherlanders to address. This included the return of the island of Pulau Run, which is part of the Indonesian archipelago and was seized by the Dutch from the English East India Company in the 1620s.¹⁰⁹⁸

Twenty seven months after the treaty's ratification, further injuries had occurred additional to those ones remaining unresolved, such as the capture of the *Speedwell*, *Charles*, *James*, *Mary* and *Hopewell*.¹⁰⁹⁹ *Europae Moderna* summarised the public mood,

¹⁰⁹⁵ CSPD 1661-1662, 20.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 entry 80; CSPD 1663-1664, 30.5.1664 entry 133 vol 98 Proclamation

¹⁰⁹⁶ CCSP vol 5, p.115 12.7.1661 The Hague, p.116 18.7.1661, p.145 11.10.1661 Westminster, p.335 17.9.1663 The Hague. Memorial, p.338 2.10.1663 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon, p.344 4.11.1663 The Hague. Memorial; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.279; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.429

¹⁰⁹⁷ *Memorial Delivered*, pp.10-11

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Dutch articles of peace*, pp.9-12

¹⁰⁹⁹ *Discourse written*, pp.7-8

“the many miseries and violences they have done to trade in all nations of the world, both by private men and public commission, have made it too notorious and this kingdom chiefly feeleth the mischief thereof”, having their objective to rival England and “to try title for the Dominion of the Sea.”¹¹⁰⁰

In providing Charles with this surfeit of opportunities to exploit as an excuse for war, Dutch exacerbation of matters by their continual refusal to settle these affairs provided an official veneer that could be used to diplomatically legitimise English aggression against the Netherlanders to foreign powers.¹¹⁰¹ For example, in October 1661 Sir George Downing raised the issue of the seizure by three Dutch warships of the English ship *Experience* en-route from Brazil, despite displaying an English flag.¹¹⁰² In March 1662 the Dutch seized two English ships carrying Portuguese goods, the *Monarch* lodging public and official complaints.¹¹⁰³ In June 1662 it was reported that in West Africa, the Dutch East India Company General sequestered two English vessels that were lading in Guinea, threatening their crews with barbarities. This allowed the King to highlight illegitimate Dutch acts to an international audience by appearing to support his subjects, vociferously demanding compensation, and threatening the seizure of Dutch ships in English harbours in retaliation.¹¹⁰⁴ In February 1664 in the East Indies the Dutch declared themselves masters of India and the Southern Seas, announcing that only Dutch shipping would be tolerated in those waters, all others subject to confiscation.¹¹⁰⁵ In the same month, in a bid to display predominance, in Surat the Dutch beat up several Englishmen and flew the English flag, the *St. George*, below that of their own country.¹¹⁰⁶ In fact, there were so many instances following the King’s Restoration that Charles proposed establishing a joint Commission of Extraordinary Judges to examine them all.¹¹⁰⁷ Cleverly, this gained increased publicity, heightening the stakes by translating a series of individual complaints into a more formal affair. Future occurrences would provide far greater propaganda in the build up to war.

¹¹⁰⁰ *Europae moderna*, p.62

¹¹⁰¹ CCSP vol 5, p.248 6.8.1662 The Hague; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.89 13.5.1662

¹¹⁰² CCSP vol 5, p.150 25.10.1661 The Hague, p.181 8.1.1662 The Hague

¹¹⁰³ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 24.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 153

¹¹⁰⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 2.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 193; CCSP vol 5, p.212 3.5.1662 The Hague; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.427-428

¹¹⁰⁵ *Pepys Diary*, 9.2.1664; CCSP vol 5, p.336 18.9.1663 The Hague. Downing to Clarendon; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.427-428; Barlow *Journal*, pp.62-63

¹¹⁰⁶ *Pepys Diary*, 15.2.1664

¹¹⁰⁷ CCSP vol 5, p.166 6.12.1661 *Extract*, p.166 6.12.1661 Downing to Clarendon, p.168 10.12.1661 The Hague, p.225. May 1662 Project, p.336 21.9.1663 The Hague. Memorial; Brief relation, pp.2-13

Further, other tactics to undermine Dutch trade and so weaken their influence were undertaken. In 1621 the English East India Company had aided the Persian King to defeat Omus in return for the right to collect customs on foreign goods entering Gombroon. Although this remained unenacted, in early 1664 Charles decided to pursue this, proposing to compensate the English East India Company with £10,000 for the loss of these theoretical rights. This would damage the Dutch, given their dominant trading position in this port. Interestingly, the project was expected to be self-funding, the King of Persia's arrears being anticipated to cover all the venture's costs, with this project's supplies being transported for minimal marginal cost by vessels en-route to Bombay.¹¹⁰⁸ Additionally, in early 1664 complaints were levelled at the Hollanders for harbouring outlawed English Republicans such as Desborough and White, together with allowing the printing of scurrilous pamphlets about the English and their King. In fact, there were more English desperadoes in Arnheim and Rotterdam than anywhere else.¹¹⁰⁹ This was in direct contravention of article six of their earlier 4th September 1662 joint peace treaty, as mentioned above.¹¹¹⁰ Needless to say, occurrences of English aggression were kept quiet, such as in June 1662 when Dunkirk privateers captured some Dutch vessels, only being freed following the payment of a large ransom.¹¹¹¹

It was also vital to prepare the nation for a war. After all, they would be required to pay for it as well as undertake the fighting! The campaign started early, in 1661 the King's court associates, the 'young blades', commencing a concerted campaign, the culture shift towards hostilities being enacted in such ways as attempting to remove those with contrary views, denigrating older and more 'serious' heads.¹¹¹² Rumours of animosity towards the Dutch thereafter flowed outward to the King's subjects. Indeed, Pepys confirmed this tactic to spread the message to the populace, in June 1662 stating that "great talk there is of a fear of a war with the Dutch", Venice's ambassador reporting home in August regarding the court's keenness for a war with Holland, and Pepys similarly stating in October 1663

¹¹⁰⁸ CSPD 1663-1664, 11.2.1664 pp.463-484 vol 92 entry 70, 13.2.1664 pp.463-484 vol 92 entries 86 and 87; CCSP vol 5, p.357 1663 Papers

¹¹⁰⁹ CSPD 1663-1664, 1.1.1664 pp.426-427 vol 90 entry 1, 4.3.1664 pp.501-523 vol 94 entry 18; CSP Venice vol 33, 18.3.1664 entry 402

¹¹¹⁰ Dutch articles of peace, p.5

¹¹¹¹ CSP Venice vol 33, 20.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 206

¹¹¹² Pepys Diary, 4.8.1661, 2.10.1662, 22.2.1664; Burnet History vol 1, p.279; Clarendon Life vol 2, p.422

“there is great likelihood of a war with Holland”.¹¹¹³

And in November 1663 Rev. Ralph Jocelyn recorded in his diary that

“our English merchants would fain break with the Dutch”, adding in June 1664 that
“discourses aloud of our breach with the Dutch.”¹¹¹⁴

Indeed, even the navy were seemingly in accord with the nation’s mood, encapsulated by the pamphlet purporting to come from loyal sailors, stating “The Dutch are as false as the devil”, we’ll “send you away at a blast/As Opdam was served before you/When into the air you did fly”, and “pray for King Charles and his navy/And let the proud Hollanders die.”¹¹¹⁵ In June 1662 a subterfuge was enacted, involving the preparation of twenty additional ships for service in a potential Dutch war, the hoax being that the King was well aware that his impecuniousness prevented this order’s achievement. The following month the number of ships mooted to be fitted out was raised to 40, this rise attempting to heighten tension and inculcate an expectation of looming war.¹¹¹⁶ And in May 1663 rumours commenced of Dutch weakness in order to raise anticipation of English success, for example in the East Indies the Netherlanders were presented as being “in decay” and that local populations under their sway were rebellious.¹¹¹⁷

There were signs, though, that the King’s propaganda merely heightened his subjects’ existing desire for war. Early in the process Clarendon reported to his French counterpart that

“the whole nation desires a fair war with the Dutch”.¹¹¹⁸

Indeed, simultaneously Charles’s moves towards hostilities were noticed by unintended recipients of the message, that is the Dutch people themselves.¹¹¹⁹ Crucially, as national

¹¹¹³ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 18.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 226; *Pepys Diary*, 28.6.1662, 2.10.1663

¹¹¹⁴ *Jocelyn Diary*, p.144 29.11.1663, p.145 9.6.1664

¹¹¹⁵ *The English Seamen’s Resolution*

¹¹¹⁶ *Pepys Diary*, 28.6.1662; CSP *Venice* vol 33, 28.7.1662 pp.158-168 entry 217; CCSP vol 5, p.232 27.6.1662
Clarendon to Downing

¹¹¹⁷ *Pepys Diary*, 15.5.1663

¹¹¹⁸ CCSP vol 5, p.115 15.7.1661 Clarendon to Villaret

¹¹¹⁹ CCSP vol 5, p.116 19.7.1661 The Hague

representatives with the ability to financially support this war, Parliament would need to be prepared. This commenced in June 1662, the Chancellor speech to the House pursuant to the King's emphasised Dutch ambitions to take over as much English trade as possible and their rapidly growing maritime sovereignty, stressing that England must oppose this by every means.¹¹²⁰ This was continued in a concerted national propaganda campaign.¹¹²¹ Also, the protection of vital supplies was essential. Particularly crucial commodities in short supply were those constituent elements of gunpowder such as brimstone, saltpetre and gunpowder itself, a *proclamation* in March 1663 ultimately being issued to prohibit export. The importance of this was heightened as the Netherlanders were attempting to acquire all available supplies from England.¹¹²²

Commencement of Hostilities and Guinea.

Charles took a significant step towards war in late March 1664, whilst ostensibly attempting to gain restitution for injuries perpetrated to his subjects by the Dutch. The Guinea on the coast of North West Africa was ideal for aiding the Monarch in both his aspirations of pre-eminence and enhancing his financial position by generating additional revenues independent of Parliament. Further, conflagration there would substantially damage Dutch trade and their economy. As the Dutch West India Company admitted, should the Netherlands lose their West Africa trade it would cause more damage than their very profitable East India enterprise.¹¹²³ This would match the English Government's covert policy (see above), that is to undermine the Netherlands economy as a route to engineering their defeat. It was therefore fully expected that the Dutch would retaliate, leading to the desired effect of having provoked them into war.¹¹²⁴ The assumption was that the Dutch would prefer war to capitulation as they would remember that they had lost more vessels in Cromwell's time due to reprisals during negotiations than they would have suffered in a war.¹¹²⁵

The English strategy was to mirror the Hollanders' attitude, which was to exclude all other nations from the Guinea, implemented via enshrining a new company's monopoly into

¹¹²⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 2.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 123; *Pepys Diary*, 15.2.1664, 22.2.1664, 30.3.1664

¹¹²¹ CSPD 1663-1664, 4.3.1664 pp.501-523 vol 94 entry 18, 17.3.1664 entry 94 vol 94 Whitehall. Proclamation

¹¹²² *Saltpetre exportation*; CPSD 1663-1664, 9.4.1663 entry 47 vol 71, 17.3.1664 entry 93 vol 94 Whitehall, 9.4.1664 entry 73 vol 96 *Tower*, 13.4.1664 entry 103 vol 96

¹¹²³ CCSP vol 5, 5.8.1664 p.413; Burnet *History* vol 1, p.310

¹¹²⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 19.8.1664 entry 51 enclosure, 23.9.1664 entry 69

¹¹²⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 29.4.1664 entry 15 vol 34, 8.7.1664 entry 43

English law in January 1663. Consequently, in partnership with his brother the Royal African Company of Adventurers (Royal Co.) was founded to trade for gold as well as providing a source of negro slaves for the British plantations in the Americas.¹¹²⁶ Charles planned to benefit doubly from this trade. Firstly, he personally purchased £6,000 of stock in the company, including £400 worth for his Portuguese bride.¹¹²⁷ Secondly, and more importantly, as recorded in State Records his Majesty issued a warrant which split all prizes and forfeitures between the Royal Co. and the King.¹¹²⁸ However, the Dutch incumbents were well ensconced, unwilling to be deprived of their trade there. Indeed, they took a hostile attitude to all other merchants. As highlighted in September 1664 in Clarendon's State Papers and by the Venetian ambassador reporting home, Sir George Downing complained in a *Memorial* to the States General on three fronts. Firstly, the Dutch had taken several English vessels on the Guinea coast. Secondly, the Dutch General in command based at their fort in Mina, John Valkenburg, had forbidden the trade of all other nations. Further, the Anglo envoy belaboured this point in his *Memorial*, accusing the Netherlanders in West Africa of barbarous treatment of English subjects, torturing and incarcerating them in vermin-infested dungeons at Mina. Thirdly, they stirred the local King of Fantin to launch his unsuccessful attack on the English fort at Cormatine with ten thousand ounces of gold, which the African King attempted with 3,500 men.¹¹²⁹ Charles decided to boost the chances of his successful domination of the Gambia, the navy and its superior 'muscle' being central. For instance, in 1661 eight naval ships were allocated to the area, a further three being deployed in September 1663.¹¹³⁰ Ultimately, as highlighted in Downing's memoranda from the Hague displayed in Clarendon's State Papers, the belief endured that through displaying a 'firm hand' the Dutch would back down.¹¹³¹

However, the King's revenue from Customs would be severely curtailed once the war commenced, Jocelyn in his *Diary* in early 1665 as well as Clarendon's State Papers

¹¹²⁶ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 29.4.1664 entry 15, 24.6.1664 entry 38 enclosure

¹¹²⁷ CSPD 1663-1664, January 1663 pp.1-36 vol 67 entry 156, June 1663 pp.158-189 vol 63 entry 138, June 1663 entry 138 vol 75; CSPD 1661-1662, 20.3.1662 pp.294-328 vol 52 entry 86

¹¹²⁸ CSPD 1663-1664, 28.4.1664 entry 57 vol 94

¹¹²⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 9.9.1664 entry 64 Enclosure, 19.8.1664 entry 57 enclosure, 23.9.1664 entry 69; CCSP vol 5, 17.9.1663 p.335 *The Hague*, 2.10.1663 p.338 *The Hague*, 4.8.1664 p.411, 5.8.1664 p.412; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.427-428; *Memorial Delivered*, pp.12-14; *Discourse written*, pp.12-14

¹¹³⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 2.6.1662 pp.146-158 entry 193, 24.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 338; CSPD 1661-1662, Undated pp.200-213 vol 47 entry 80; CSPD 1663-1664 5.9.1663 pp.263-280 vol 80 entry 22

¹¹³¹ CCSP vol 5, 2.9.1664 p.420 *The Hague*, 16.9.1664 pp.422-423 *The Hague*

confirming that this indeed occurred.¹¹³² Merchants would be either reluctant to go to sea due to threats from privateers, or officially discouraged, Charles therefore covertly planning to extract the requisite funds from a Parliament that would be highly motivated to vote them. In his diary, Pepys's conversation in March 1664 with the court insider, Captain Cocke, reveals the startling nature of this, confirmed by the King in his speech to the House in October 1665. It involved encouraging merchants, and particularly those connected to the West African trade, to present their complaints of injuries caused by the Dutch to a newly established Parliamentary Trade Committee, its founding partly quietly initiated by his Majesty.¹¹³³ This aimed at the House, following evidence from its Trade Committee, formally requesting the King to protect his subjects and their interests, by force in a war if necessary. This would give Parliament 'ownership' of the ensuing conflict, consequently being highly motivated to back this with votes for substantial tax revenues.¹¹³⁴ Indeed, Pepys confirms the plan's existence by outlining the Duke of York's hope that Parliament will find a reason for falling out with the Dutch.¹¹³⁵ Additional confirmation came later, once Parliamentary support had been secured. State Papers containing correspondence from William Coventry, the Duke of York's secretary, to Joseph Williamson, the King's chief "spy master", state

"Lord Fitzharding brings news of the excellent votes in the House of Commons. Hopes the King may always be thus happy in the obedience and affection of his people. The whole business has been supernaturally successful".¹¹³⁶

Indeed, as Clarendon's *Life* states, to promote the impression of his insouciance, his Majesty avoided mentioning increased Parliamentary financial votes leading up to this stratagem.¹¹³⁷

In a pamphlet conveying the King's response to the Dutch ambassador's, Charles confirmed the success of this plan with Parliament. Highlighting their fervour for him to take action, he wrote

¹¹³² Jocelyn *Diary*, p.146 12.2.1664; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.p.379-381

¹¹³³ Pepys *Diary*, 6.4.1664, 11.6.1664; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 29.4.1664 entry 15

¹¹³⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 30.3.1664; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 29.4.1664 entry 15; CCSP *vol 5*, 22.4.1664 p.393 Downing to Clarendon; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.422; *Christchurch Hall in Oxford*, p.3

¹¹³⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 1.4.1664

¹¹³⁶ CSPD *1664-1665*, 26.11.1664 entry 92 vol 105 W Coventry to Williamson

¹¹³⁷ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.422

“our Parliament, upon the cry of the whole nation, with some earnestness pressed us to take an extraordinary way to repair our people, for the many and daily injuries they sustained from the subjects of the United Provinces by depredations by sea”.¹¹³⁸

Further, Pepys and State Papers reveal the commercial community’s approval of this strategy, reporting in early April 1664 that the Exchange was full of the City companies’ merchants preparing to attend the Trade Committee to present their grievances against the Dutch, and for action being taken against them.¹¹³⁹ Indeed, the complaints went back 30 years, totalling between £700,000 to £800,000, with £330,000 estimated to relate to losses suffered off the coast of Africa.¹¹⁴⁰ Further, following confirmatory votes in both Houses, in late April 1664 they requested that his Majesty demand restitution from the Hollanders or forceful retribution, State Papers showing that the politicians affirmed that they would ‘support the King with life and fortune against all opposition’.¹¹⁴¹

The Venetian ambassador highlighted his Majesty’s success in manipulating Parliament, as evidenced by the Houses’ expression of “appreciation and indebtedness for his Majesty having graciously taken under his protection the interests of their merchants, who have suffered in their trade for so long a space from these Dutch”. And as highlighted in a pamphlet, following the King’s speech to both Houses, reminding them of their oath, their willingness to back him is illustrated by their vote of the staggering additional amount of £2,500,000 in taxes, approved in January 1665 to be collected over three years.¹¹⁴² Burnet supports this, stating

“that without any difficulty” the House “gave the King two and a half million”

towards the war, Clarendon additionally highlighting that there was minimal resistance to the vote.¹¹⁴³ And in August Parliament demanded that his Majesty make preparations for naval

¹¹³⁸ *Memorial delivered*, pp.10-11

¹¹³⁹ *Pepys Diary*, 1.4.1664, 2.4.1664, 5.4.1664, 19.4.1664, 20.4.1664; *CSP Venice vol 34*, 29.4.1664 entry 15, 13.5.1664 entry 21; *CSPD 1663-1664*, 1.4.1664 entries 6-8 vol 96, 7.5.1664 entry 35 vol 98 Westminster

¹¹⁴⁰ *CSP Venice vol 34*, 13.5.1664 entry 21, 20.5.1664 entry 23; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, p.422

¹¹⁴¹ *Pepys Diary*, 20.4.1664, 21.4.1664, 23.4.1664, 30.4.1664; *CSP Venice vol 34*, 29.4.1664 entry 15, 13.5.1664 entry 21, 17.6.1664 entry 35; *CCSP vol 5*, 8.4.1664 pp.389-390 Downing to Clarendon; *CSPD 1663-1664*, 19.4.1664 entry 11 vol 97, 21.4.1664 entry 15 vol 97; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, p.422

¹¹⁴² *CSP Venice vol 34*, 20.5.1664 entry 23, 12.12.1664 entry 100, 19.12.1664 entry 105, 2.1.1665 entry 112; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, pp.434-441; *Speech to Parliament*, p.5; *Anno Regni Caroli II*, pp.3-118

¹¹⁴³ *Burnet History vol 1*, pp.305-306; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, pp.434-441

hostilities.¹¹⁴⁴ Cleverly, the Sovereign stated he would respond in writing after consideration, maintaining the façade that he was complying with the Legislature’s will, eventually giving the impression that his order to Downing to pursue these losses in the Hague was in compliance to the House’s request.¹¹⁴⁵ Of course he eventually ‘acquiesced’, thanking them for their care of the nation’s trade, and stating that he would rely on their offer of aid in case of hostilities.¹¹⁴⁶ Additionally, the Venetian ambassador’s inclusion of the staggering English losses to the Dutch in his report highlights that this information was publicly available. This constituted an incredible propaganda coup for his Majesty to both domestic and overseas audiences in his portrayal of the English as victims of Dutch hostility, and his depiction of the Netherlanders as the aggressors. Further, contrary to the Netherlanders’ belief in his Majesty’s impecuniousness, it strongly signalled to the Dutch that the King would be adequately funded for hostilities via an aggressive Parliament that seemingly fully supported him. This heightening of the threat he posed produced the desired effect, raising the Netherlanders’ apprehensions.¹¹⁴⁷ Consequently, full advantage was taken to broadcast widely each substantial vote in the House in support of hostilities, especially to the Dutch via Downing.¹¹⁴⁸

In a further move in late May 1664 to represent the English as injured parties peacefully seeking redress for Dutch aggression, as also reported by the Venetian ambassador, the King announced that he wished to come to terms with the Dutch in order to avoid war. Accordingly, the Dutch dispatched two envoys to London to conduct negotiations which gave the desired impression, with the Venetian ambassador commenting shortly afterwards that “the affair with the Dutch is quieting down with great rapidity”. Yet both sides continued to expand their fleets.¹¹⁴⁹ The continuation of the arms race and the ongoing negotiations continued for some time, the Dutch also not wishing to appear the aggressors.¹¹⁵⁰ In a diplomatic move to attempt to neutralise the threat from a Franco-Dutch alliance, the King

¹¹⁴⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 5.8.1664 p.412

¹¹⁴⁵ *Pepys Diary*, 27.4.1664; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, p.423

¹¹⁴⁶ CSPD 1663-1664, 29.4.1664 entry 68 vol 97 Message from the King to the Houses of Parliament

¹¹⁴⁷ *Pepys Diary*, 13.4.1664; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 29.4.1664 entry 15; CCSP *vol 5*, 8.4.1664 pp.389-390 Downing to Clarendon, 29.4.1664 pp.396-397 The Hague, 5.8.1664 p.412 Charles II memorial to the Dutch ambassador; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, pp.426-427, p.445

¹¹⁴⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, 29.4.1664 p.393 Downing to Clarendon, 2.12.1664 pp.448-449 The Hague

¹¹⁴⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 27.5.1664 entry 26, 17.6.1664 entry 35, 24.6.1664 entry 38

¹¹⁵⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 24.6.1664 entry 38 enclosure, 1.7.1664 entry 40, 8.7.1664 entry 42, 15.7.1664 entry 44, 22.7.1664 entry 45, 29.7.1664 entry 46, 5.8.1664 entry 47, 12.8.1664 entry 49, 19.8.1664 entry 50, 2.9.1664 entry 59 enclosure, 9.9.1664 entry 63, 21.11.1664 entry 89

offered Louis XIV substantial concessions in an attempt to establish an offensive and defensive pact. Charles regarded this as a real opportunity, given Dutch disillusionment over France's mediation between the two protagonists, rather than actively supporting the Hollanders as per their existing defensive treaty.¹¹⁵¹ However, despite these seemingly placatory moves, Charles's underlying aspiration was to enter hostilities with the Netherlanders. Even Sir George Downing in the Hague, who had been attempting to bring the Dutch to a settlement for a protracted period, suspected a surreptitious scheme to provoke a war, variously requesting clarification in memoranda. For example, as shown in Clarendon's State Papers, on 6th May 1664 he

“desires a dispatch saying what the King drives at, whether war or a reasonable satisfaction for his subjects”.

Further, on 13th May he stated that “unless the design is to bring on a war, thinks he should not stir from here until he sees how far he can bring things here”, his ongoing confusion being evident, so he

“takes it for granted that the King's design is not to have a war but to bring things to an honourable close”.¹¹⁵²

And, indeed, according to Clarendon's *Life*, even the Dutch didn't suspect Charles's underlying plan, believing his domestic religious and financial woes obviated this possibility.¹¹⁵³

As the year progressed, matters continued to escalate. As highlighted by both Pepys's diary and the Venetian ambassador, from July 1664 onwards the Dutch started committing an increased number of men-of-war and troops to the Guinea.¹¹⁵⁴ The English used this as an excuse to raise their own naval forces there, escalating sequestrations of Dutch ships and territory, whilst still complaining about unwanted aggression from the Netherlanders.¹¹⁵⁵

¹¹⁵¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 6.3.1665 entry 135, 3.6.1665 entry 136, 20.3.1665 entry 141

¹¹⁵² CCSP *vol 5*, 6.5.1664 p.399, 13.5.1664 p.401

¹¹⁵³ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.426-427

¹¹⁵⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 16.9.1664 entry 68; *Pepys Diary*, 28.7.1664, 3.8.1664, 23.8.1664; CCSP *vol 5*, 17.8.1664 p.414

¹¹⁵⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 7.3.1664 entry 400; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 23.9.1664 entry 69; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.428

From mid-1663, by the King's orders, Captain Holmes cruised off the Guinea coast in order to seize prizes and inflict other losses on the Dutch. This included the capture of Cape Verde.¹¹⁵⁶ From early August 1664 Holmes was to be joined by a fleet of eighteen vessels under the command of Prince Rupert.¹¹⁵⁷ This was Royally justified on the grounds of General Valkenberg's monopolistic declaration (see above).¹¹⁵⁸ Interestingly, Royal approval of this was highly evident, the King, Duke of York and many nobles journeying to Portsmouth to see the fleet off.¹¹⁵⁹ Further, again as illustrated by the Venetian ambassador, Charles publicly took a more assertive attitude towards the Dutch. For example, in an audience given to the Netherland's ambassador, van Gogh, the King forcefully pressed his demands for restitution of injuries inflicted, stating that

“if the Dutch didn't do his subjects justice, it would become his affair”,

and further escalation of Dutch naval assets in that region would be met by a new overwhelming English nautical military presence.¹¹⁶⁰ The navy's power proved itself again, these assets making substantial gains in addition to those already acquired by Holmes, adding Cape Corso and the Netherlands' main base at Mina to Cape Verde.¹¹⁶¹

In retaliation the Dutch intensified matters further, in early October 1664 orders being dispatched to Admiral de Ruyter to move his fleet to the Guinea from the Mediterranean where he had been engaged in anti-piratical operations, and maximise disruption to the English.¹¹⁶² It had been previously accoutred in case of its diversion to the West African coast.¹¹⁶³ Or as a pamphlet states,

¹¹⁵⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 8.7.1664 entry 42, 5.8.1664 entry 47; CSPD *1664-1665*, 14.1.1665 entry 87 vol 110; *Jocelyn Diary*, p.146 2.10.1664

¹¹⁵⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 23.9.1664 entry 69; *Pepys Diary*, 19.8.1664, 23.8.1664, 31.8.1664, 6.9.1664, 8.9.1664; CSPD *1663-1664*, 20.8.1664 entry 68 vol 101, 23.9.1664 entry 104 vol 102, 7.10.1664 entry 17 vol 103; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, p.429; *Barlow Journal*, p.92; *Jocelyn Diary*, p.146 9.10.1664

¹¹⁵⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, 26.8.1664 pp.417-8; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, pp.427-428

¹¹⁵⁹ CSPD *1664-1665*, 7.10.1664 entry 17 vol 103

¹¹⁶⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 30.9.1664 entry 72 enclosure

¹¹⁶¹ *Pepys Diary*, 29.9.1664; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 5.8.1664 entry 47, 12.8.1664 entry 49, 7.10.1664 entry 74 enclosure, 21.10.1664 entry 78 enclosure, 21.10.1664 entry 79

¹¹⁶² *Pepys Diary*, 1.10.1664, 12.10.1664; CCSP *vol 5*, 9.9.1664 p.421-23, 9.1664 p.424, 30.9.1664 pp.426-7; CSPD *1664-1665*, 14.11.1664 entry 102 vol 104; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, p.428, p.431

¹¹⁶³ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 29.4.1664 entry 15 vol 34, 7.11.1664 entry 81

“The Hollanders first having invited us to a conjunct engagement with them, and afterwards not only quitting place by stealth and surprise, but invading at the same time our rights in Guinea.”¹¹⁶⁴

A further substantial fleet was prepared in the Netherlands under the command of Admiral Opdam.¹¹⁶⁵ However, cleverly, Charles was able to force the Dutch to postpone Opdam’s departure. The Dutch admiral was delayed due to awaiting a mercantile convoy, Charles using his superior navy to cause a pro-longed deferment in Opdam’s sailing by maintaining an English fleet under the Earl of Sandwich in the Downs to threaten the Dutch passage through the channel.¹¹⁶⁶ Indeed, the Downs fleet impacted Dutch trade more widely, the Duke of York ordering the seizure of all Netherlander vessels navigating the Channel.¹¹⁶⁷ After all, as pamphlets highlighted,

“the Downs is the Lock and key of the Narrow Seas”, and so the way to “keep the Dutch under” is “by commanding the Narrow Sea, their coast and ours.”¹¹⁶⁸

Notwithstanding, as multiple sources highlight, including the Venetian ambassador and Pepys, de Ruyter’s enterprise was highly successful, recovering all the places previously annexed by the English.¹¹⁶⁹ Prima facie this was disastrous news, both to English mercantile interests as well as reputationally to the King’s forces. However, in reality it constituted the achievement of a major milestone in Charles’s plan to provoke the Dutch into a war using his navy as the instrument to achieve this, de Ruyter’s success being hailed as proof of the Dutch as the aggressors, and their complete intransigence.¹¹⁷⁰

Matters continued to escalate. The English continued to capture large numbers of Dutch ships, such as Captain Teddiman’s seizure of about eighteen to twenty Bordeaux ships, and

¹¹⁶⁴ *Articles of peace*, p.3

¹¹⁶⁵ *CSP Venice vol 34*, 7.10.1664 entry 74 enclosure; *CCSP vol 5*, 19.9.1664 pp.422-3; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, p.428

¹¹⁶⁶ *CSP Venice vol 34*, 15.7.1664 entry 44, 16.9.1664 entry 68, 7.10.1664 entry 74 enclosure, 24.11.1664 entry 91, 5.12.1664 entry 97; *CCSP vol 5*, 14.9.1664 p.422, 27.10.1664 p.436; *Pepys Diary*, 31.12.1664

¹¹⁶⁷ *CCSP vol 5*, 17.2.1665 p.46p The Hague; *CSPD 1664-1665*, 26.11.1664 entry 90 vol 105; *Penn Memoires*, pp.303-304; *Barlow Journal*, p.94

¹¹⁶⁸ *Dutch drawn*, p.53; *New Haven*, p.5

¹¹⁶⁹ *CSP Venice vol 34*, 26.12.1664 entry 107 enclosure, 9.1.1665 entry 114; *Pepys Diary*, 22.12.1664, 23.2.1665; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, p.432

¹¹⁷⁰ *CSP Venice vol 34*, 28.11.1664 entry 94 enclosure; *CCSP vol 5*, 29.12.1664 p.456 The Hague

Lord Sandwich's continuous dispatch of vessels under his command in the channel to hunt out prizes.¹¹⁷¹ The Dutch continued to commit increasing numbers of men-of-war to the Guinea.¹¹⁷² The English readied a fleet under Sir John Lawson who had newly returned from the Mediterranean, as well as diverting Captain Allen and his squadron from there.¹¹⁷³ Additionally, in home waters both combatants built-up their fleets in readiness for the expected conflagration.¹¹⁷⁴ In fact, matters had escalated so far by the start of 1665 that war was inevitable, both sides feeling that they couldn't back down as their honour was now at stake.¹¹⁷⁵ In reality the rapidly rising hostilities at Guinea constituted 'war in all but name', Charles's decision in November 1664 to issue letters of marque, closing all English ports and an order in Council for the seizure of all Dutch ships evidencing this.¹¹⁷⁶ Further, in order to contribute towards the military costs State Papers show that the King was to receive one fifteenth of the value of all prizes.¹¹⁷⁷ He felt able to justify this further escalation as the deadline in the Anglo-Dutch treaty (see Chapter Four) had expired without satisfactory redress for commercial losses being finalised.¹¹⁷⁸ Naturally, with so much at stake, both sides blamed the other as the aggressor. Indeed, as pamphlets highlighted Charles used both de Ruyter's Guinea predations and the Netherlanders' alleged continual refusal to grant reparations for prior losses to validate his accusation of them being the aggressors, as well as justifying the granting of letters of marque, and banning the import or sale of all Dutch goods throughout his dominions.¹¹⁷⁹ To the blaze of fanfares from nine trumpeters, accompanied by four mace bearers and two troops of horses, heralds finally pronounced Charles's formal declaration of war in March 1665 in prominent places in the Capital, citing de Ruyter's

¹¹⁷¹ Pepys *Diary*, 21.11.1664, 9.12.1664, 10.12.1664, 31.12.1664; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 26.12.1664 entry 107 enclosure; Montagu *Journal*, 18.8.1664 p.148, 11.9.1664 p.153; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.432

¹¹⁷² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 7.10.1664 entry 81 enclosure

¹¹⁷³ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 9.1.1665 entry 114; Pepys *Diary*, 12.10.1664

¹¹⁷⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 5.12. 1664 entry 96 enclosure; Pepys *Diary*, 31.10.1664, 21.11.1664; CCSP *vol 5*, 30.9.1664 pp.426-7; CSPD *1664-1665*, 2.12.1664 entry 5 vol 106

¹¹⁷⁵ CSPD *1664-1665*, 31.10.1664 entry 159 vol 103, 2.12.1664 entry 5 vol 106; CCSP *vol 5*, 26.7.1664 p.410, 16.9.1664 pp.422-423; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 16.9.1664 entry 68, 7.11.1664 entry 82, 14.11.1664 entry 87, 21.11.1664 entry 88; Pepys *Diary*, 18.10.1664

¹¹⁷⁶ CSPD *1664-1665*, 17.11.1664 entry 1 vol 105, 25.11.1664 entry 83 vol 105, 30.11.1664 entry 119 vol 105, 16.12.1664 entry 102 vol 106, 22.2.1665 entry 39i vol 113, 1.3.1665 no entry number given vol 114; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 29.4.1664 entry 16 enclosure, 28.11.1664 entry 94 enclosure; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.462; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, 27.10.1664 p.378

¹¹⁷⁷ CSPD *1664-1665*, 28.1.1665 entry 58 vol 111 Blank form

¹¹⁷⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, 25.11.1664 p.447 Memorial by Downing to States General

¹¹⁷⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 20.3.1665 entry 143 enclosure; CCSP *vol 5*, 29.12.1664 p.456; CSPD *1664-1665*, 24.11.1664 entry 75 vol 105; *His Majesty's Declaration*, pp.5-8; *Retailing Dutch commodities*

aggression in Guinea as the cause.¹¹⁸⁰ A general fast was ordered in prayer for the naval forces.¹¹⁸¹ In England, as both Pepys and the Venetian ambassador highlight, this proved very popular.¹¹⁸² Without the English navy, the King's achievement of this objective to provoke war would not have been possible.

New England.

Globally, Charles used the navy to achieve pre-eminence and provoke the general movement towards war. He ordered it to sail into New Amsterdam's harbour, attack and take over New Amsterdam and Manhattan. This was accomplished in late summer 1664 by the Duke of York's local Deputy Governor, Col Richard Nicholls, who took the surrender from the Dutch Governor, Peter Stuyvesant, the news reaching Europe in November the same year.¹¹⁸³ In another naval action Captain Scott captured Long Island.¹¹⁸⁴ According to Downing's *Memorial* (see above), the Dutch settlement was within the boundaries of English territory, the Hollanders being suffered to stay there. However, they had behaved inappropriately, attempting to levy taxes on English subjects, providing the King with official justification for removing the States' citizens.¹¹⁸⁵ This deprived the Dutch of one of their American operating bases. English State Papers show that Council ordered all Dutch shipping anywhere to be captured, including any that might venture near his Majesty's new acquisitions in New England, further damaging the Netherlanders' trade.¹¹⁸⁶

This territorial acquisition also enhanced the achievement of another of the Monarch's objectives, that being to provoke the Dutch into taking action that widely portrayed them as the aggressor. As Pepys noted, Charles hoped that the wider global political community wouldn't be able to ascertain the hostilities' details, given their remote geographic location.¹¹⁸⁷ The Dutch made many forceful demands for territorial restitution which went

¹¹⁸⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 20.3.1665 entry 143 enclosure; *Pepys Diary*, 4.3.1665; CSPD *1664-1665*, 22.2.1665 entry 39i vol 113, 3.3.1665 entry 23 vol 114 Sec Bennet to the Lord Mayor of London, 6.3.1665 entry 61 vol 114 *Chelsea*; Ludlow *Memoirs*, 2.3.1665 p.376

¹¹⁸¹ CSPD *1664-1665*, 6.3.1665 entry 62 vol 114 Whitehall

¹¹⁸² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 9.1.1665 entry 114; *Pepys Diary*, 31.12.1664

¹¹⁸³ CCSP *vol 5*, 7.8.1664 p.413; CSPD *1664-1665*, 11.11.1664 entry 75 vol 104; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 21.11.1664 entry 89 enclosure

¹¹⁸⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 16.9.1664 pp.422-423

¹¹⁸⁵ *Discourse written*, pp.15-16

¹¹⁸⁶ CSPD *1664-1665*, 25.11.1664 entry 83 vol 105

¹¹⁸⁷ *Pepys Diary*, 29.9.1664

unheeded by his Majesty.¹¹⁸⁸ Consequently, the Netherlanders took retaliatory action, partly to try and recover their territories, and partly as they felt honour bound to do so.¹¹⁸⁹ As recorded in Downing's missive to Clarendon, on completion of his mission in the Guinea in December 1664, de Ruyter was dispatched to the Americas with orders to re-take the previous Dutch possessions.¹¹⁹⁰ The transfer of such a high-profile figure as de Ruyter to a different operational theatre would be highly conspicuous, aiding the King's portrayal of the Hollanders as aggressors after all.¹¹⁹¹

Yet again, the navy was crucial here, highlighting its ability to project power globally and reinforce Charles's claim to pre-eminence. It was prominent in the capture of New Holland, the most strategic Dutch asset in the area. Further, and more crucially, it contributed to the achievement of the King's higher-level objective, that is to goad the Dutch into martial action to contribute to an outbreak of war.¹¹⁹²

The Caribbean.

Additional to the Spanish/Portuguese peace treaty and New Amsterdam (see above), Charles had two further designs for his Caribbean possessions to aid his achievement of international pre-eminence. One was to reinforce Jamaica (see Chapter Four), providing a long-term future for it. The fortifications were boosted subsequent to the Restoration, the local economy being next.¹¹⁹³ Following a new Governor's appointment, the Earl of Malborough, about 300 emigrant planters and their families from Barbados were encouraged to relocate to the island, some taking 30 or 40 negro slaves or other useful contemporary implements with them.¹¹⁹⁴ This is important. Jamaica was Charles's major regional naval base for the projection of power, the local economy's enhancement giving the colony a longer-term viability independent of the King's domestic impecuniousness. That is, a strengthened Jamaica would more robustly support his Majesty's achievement of his overall military strategy of projecting power globally via his superior navy (see Chapter Three). A second ambition was to take advantage of the paucity of Dutch naval forces in those seas, reducing

¹¹⁸⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 14.11.1664 entry 87 enclosure; CCSP *vol 5*, 29.9.1664 pp.425-6, 4.11.1664 pp.439-40

¹¹⁸⁹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 5.2.1664 entry 393

¹¹⁹⁰ CCSP *vol 5*, 6.12.1664 pp.449-450

¹¹⁹¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 21.11.1664 entry 89 enclosure; CSPD *1664-1665*, 31.10.1664 entry 103 vol 103

¹¹⁹² CCSP *vol 5*, 11.11.164 pp.443-444 Downing to Clarendon

¹¹⁹³ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 27.5.1664 entry 27 Enclosure, 24.6.1664 entry 39 Enclosure

¹¹⁹⁴ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 28.8.1664 entry 347; CCSP *vol 5*, 26.2.1664 p.375, 5.3.1664 p.377

the States' trade by annexing their islands.¹¹⁹⁵ Of course, the navy would be crucial to this, the Governors of Barbados and Jamaica having been ordered to commence this campaign by sending forces via the King's naval military to both Tobago and Curacao.¹¹⁹⁶ As can be seen, Charles's naval pre-eminence allowed him to dominate the Americas at this time. Further, de Ruyter had received orders to proceed to the Caribbean to retaliate (see above), diverting Dutch naval resources from the potential main theatre of hostilities. Overall, these moves in those seas heightened tension between the two adversaries, enhancing Charles's provocation in the move towards war.

Mediterranean Pirates.

In the autumn of 1663 Captain Berkeley delivered a letter from Algiers' Pasha to Charles stating that they were going to break their peace treaty, commencing to seize English ships and goods.¹¹⁹⁷ Indeed, the predations commenced immediately, in November alone the capture of 15 Dutch ships, 6 English and 2 French were reported by the Venetian ambassador, with Venice's Spanish ambassador complaining that the corsairs were inflicting 'serious' damage' on English and Dutch shipping.¹¹⁹⁸ Further, in February 1664 three ships laden with oil were seized.¹¹⁹⁹ As Rev. Ralph Jocelyn's *Diary* aptly summarises,

“the Turkish pirates harsh to our traders in the midland seas.”¹²⁰⁰

This was in total contravention of their nominal Turkish overlord's orders to continue in their existing treaty.¹²⁰¹

It was variously very important why his Majesty needed to urgently resolve this matter. Firstly, as illustrated by a note read in the King's Council and recorded in the Domestic State Papers, economically the trade through the Mediterranean to the Levant was crucial to England's economy. It employed up to a million people, it was worth at least £600,000 per

¹¹⁹⁵ CCSP vol 5, 30.9.1664 pp.426-427, 17.3.1665 p.474

¹¹⁹⁶ CCSP Vol 5, 26.8.1664 pp.417-418, 17.3.1665 p.474

¹¹⁹⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 9.11.1663

¹¹⁹⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 30.11.1663 entry 366, 5.12.1663 entry 369

¹¹⁹⁹ CCSP vol 5, 26.2.1664 p.375

¹²⁰⁰ Jocelyn *Diary*, p.144 24.1.1664

¹²⁰¹ Pepys *Diary*, 9.11.1663; CSP *Venice* vol 33, 23.10.1663 entry 358, 1.12.1663 entry 367, 18.12.1663 entry 372; *Capitulations and articles*, p.19 article 59

annum and used between 100 to 200 small ships, the sailors of which would be an important source of trained seamen for the navy (see Chapter Three).¹²⁰² Secondly, a crucial element of Charles's strategy for preparing for a Dutch war was to get merchants to complain to a special Parliamentary Trade Committee that he helped to establish (see above). This aimed at getting the House to 'feel ownership' of the war, requesting the King to seek reparation or retribution for prior injuries by the Dutch to English mercantile interests, voting extra taxes to fund it. He commenced this Parliamentary process in March 1664, by which time the Barbary corsairs had already started their predations. His Majesty would lack credibility and possibly fail in his efforts if he didn't support the merchants by sending a fleet to confront this renewed threat to their trade. Thirdly, as Charles aspired to be 'Sovereign of the Seas', as a matter of honour he needed to reinforce a treaty he had made with the 'infidels' using his vaunted navy.¹²⁰³ Further, the Monarch's attractiveness as an ally was based on his navy's fearsome reputation and his willingness to use it, so it was important to demonstrate that England's nautical prowess could not be trifled with. Similar to the previous naval-enforced peace deal, if England could subdue this piratical breach of faith, it would illustrate its superiority compared to the Dutch, this being highly important in the Sovereign's attempts to attract various European powers to his side. As reported by Downing's letter to Clarendon, it's something that caused the Netherlanders concern.¹²⁰⁴ Fourthly, as highlighted by Thomas Clutterbuck, the English navy's Leghorn agent, in a letter to the Navy Commissioners as recorded in the Domestic State Papers, commensurate to the King's overall strategy when dealing with all the other Western European states, the pirate threat needed to be promptly neutralised to free his vessels for the forthcoming hostilities with the 'Hollanders'.¹²⁰⁵

Accordingly, Charles ordered Vice-Admiral Lawson to take a fleet of about twenty-two vessels to the Straits, the sanction for this action having been previously received from the Ottoman Sultan.¹²⁰⁶ The Tunis and Tripoli corsairs had honoured their peace deal with England due to their fear of his Majesty's navy.¹²⁰⁷ However, Algiers was different. On his arrival the Algerians responded to Lawson's demands for full restitution of ships, crew and

¹²⁰² CSPD 1663-1664, 8.1.1664 entry 44 vol 90; CSPD 1664-1665, 3.2.1665 entry 10 vol 112; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 12.12.1664 entry 99

¹²⁰³ CSPD 1663-1664, 22.1.1664 entry 15 vol 91; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 11.12.1663 entry 370, 24.12.1663 entry 374, 15.1.1664 entry 379

¹²⁰⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 9.12.1664 p.451; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 12.1.1664 entry 378

¹²⁰⁵ CSPD 1663-1664, 5.12.1664 entry 27 vol 106

¹²⁰⁶ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 22.1.1664 entry 381, 24.2.1664 entry 398, 27.3.1664 entry 404; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 24.5.1664 entry 24; *Montagu Journal*, 30.7.1664

¹²⁰⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 14.6.1664 entry 33; CSPD 1663-1664, 12.6.1664 entry 21 vol 104

goods and the completion of a further peace deal by returning eighteen English merchant ships and seamen they had in port, but withheld the associated merchandise. Interestingly, the English navy had previously instilled enough fear in the Algerians that they hadn't sold these vessels until they found out how Charles would react.¹²⁰⁸ The Vice-Admiral also demanded the return of other vessels and merchandise, valued at 800,000 crowns, but this was refused. Lawson consequently obeyed his orders and declared war, harassing their vessels at sea.¹²⁰⁹ He left six powerful men-of-war before the port to ensure no enemy vessels set forth, capturing a rich Algerian ship which mounted forty bronze guns, 300 men and 40 slaves shortly afterwards.¹²¹⁰ Lawson progressed this strategy until he was ordered home in August 1664, first cleaning his ships at Cadiz, arriving in October at Portsmouth, leaving Captain Allen to continue the campaign.¹²¹¹ Following a concerted offensive by Allen and his squadron, a peace deal was achieved by November that year, a ship of sixty guns that had been off the North African city delivering the news to London. As pamphlets reported, the agreement

“imports the benefit and security of English commerce”.¹²¹²

And impressively, it repeated the treaty clauses of two years earlier. The deals' pre-amble confirms this, stating

“being the same articles concluded by Sir John Lawson, knight, on the 23rd of April 1662 and afterwards confirmed on the 10 of November following, and since ratified by the Grand Signor”.¹²¹³

This was of great prestige to the King and his fearsome navy, achieving such a settlement, again, unlike any other nation.

¹²⁰⁸ CCSP *Vol 5*, 21.4.1664 p.393

¹²⁰⁹ *Pepys Diary*, 3.5.1664; *CSP Venice vol 34*, 20.5.1664 entry 23, 24.5.1664 entry 24; *CCSP vol 5*, 6.5.1664 p.399

¹²¹⁰ *CSP Venice vol 34*, 20.5.1664 entry 23

¹²¹¹ *CSP Venice vol 34*, 19.8.1664 entry 57, 7.11.1664 entry 81; *Pepys Diary*, 12.10.1664

¹²¹² *CSP Venice vol 34*, 12.12.1664 entry 104, 13.12.1664 entry 104, 19.12.1664 entry 105 enclosure; *Pepys Diary*, 28.11.1664; *CSPD 1664-1665*, 4.11.1664 entry 21 vol 104; *Jocelyn Diary*, p.146 9.10.1664; *Articles of peace*, p.3

¹²¹³ *Full articles of peace*, p.1

This news fulfilled Charles's objectives. Firstly, it allowed English Merchant shipping to recommence their lucrative journeys to the Levant unmolested. This additionally signalled the fruition of his second objective, enhancing his image with the merchant community in his ability to protect them, providing a propaganda coup that would encourage the House to be confident in his ability and willingness to comply with their request, and so vote additional funds for the forthcoming war.¹²¹⁴ Thirdly, this deal augmented the navy's reputation for being able to project substantial power, something that no other nation could do, or dare hazard. That is, underline Charles's claim to be 'Sovereign of the Seas' and reinforce his aspirations to international pre-eminence. In contrast, the Dutch pursued a less forceful strategy towards the corsairs, combining the dispatch of representatives like Mortaigne and Trump to negotiate a new treaty, including for ransoming the release of Dutch captives, accompanying threats limited to a promise to possibly join with the English.¹²¹⁵ As previously, the reason for this less robust approach was a fear about a negative reaction from the Algerian's Ottoman overlords, and damage to their lucrative trade. In comparison, as highlighted in Charles's peace treaty with the Turkish Sultan, the King's credibility emanating from his sea power meant that the Porte had previously fully approved of English action (see Chapter Four), not wishing to antagonise his Britannic Majesty by a refusal.¹²¹⁶

Additionally, the English success gained further kudos when compared to the French failure. They had launched their own campaign against the Algerians, landing 6,000 chosen men to attack the fortress of Gigory. As Captain Allen reported from Algiers Bay to the Navy Commissioners, they were repelled, losing 400 prisoners and 35 brass guns. For a powerful European state, this was a disaster.¹²¹⁷ Also, in contrast with Lawson's visit to Cadiz to clean his ships, the Dutch were refused permission to perform this task at Malaga. This highlights the navy's success in strengthening Charles's political power when conducting the Iberian part of his strategy to isolate the Dutch, that is attempting to 'win over' the Spanish and freeze out the States General.¹²¹⁸ In fact, Mortaigne reported home that de Ruyter's ships were getting worms for want of cleaning.¹²¹⁹ Further, Charles was able to dispatch his fleet

¹²¹⁴ CCSP vol 5, 1.2.1664 pp.367-368

¹²¹⁵ CCSP vol 5, 18.9.1663 p.336, 16.2.1664 p.372, 18.2.1664 p.372, 1.4.1664 p.387, 12.8.1664 p.414; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.431

¹²¹⁶ *Capitulations and articles*, p.19 article 59; CCSP vol 5, 11.12.1663 p.355, 29.12.1663 p.356, 26.2.1664 pp.374-375

¹²¹⁷ CSPD 1664-1665, 4.11.1664 entry 21 vol 104; CCSP vol 5, 29.7.1664 p.411; Pepys *Diary*, 11.10.1664

¹²¹⁸ CCSP vol 5, 26.8.1664 pp.417-418

¹²¹⁹ CCSP vol 5, 4.11.1664 pp.439-440

more swiftly than the Dutch, Lawson having reached Algiers whilst de Ruyter was still safely moored in the Texel, Holland, reflecting a stronger determination and more efficient military machine. Indeed, in the rivalry between the two nations, England's success augmented the Monarch's image as an attractive ally.¹²²⁰ Fourthly, the English deal with Algiers freed up a number of Lawson's fleet from their Mediterranean duties, allowing a reallocation of assets in readiness for the forthcoming war. However, through experience the English knew that the only method of keeping the pirates to the deal was to retain a powerful enough naval squadron in the vicinity.¹²²¹ Consequently, Allen was ordered to remain in the Mediterranean with his squadron of 7 vessels. However, he also progressed a campaign to seize Netherlander merchant ships in conjunction with the hostilities already underway off the Guinea.¹²²² For example, on 17th December Allen informed Lord Fanshawe in Spain of the capture of a dozen merchants, and on December 25th of his success against fourteen Dutch ships, including three men-of-war.¹²²³ Interestingly, this second peace treaty endured for several years, including throughout the 2nd Dutch war where England's ability to react was curtailed due to its more localised focus. In August 1668 Pepys recorded Allen's comments

“that the Turks have, to this day, been very civil to our merchant-men everywhere; and, if they would have broke with us, they never had such an opportunity over our rich merchant-men, as lately, coming out of the Straits”.¹²²⁴

Given the Algerians' acknowledged perfidy by contemporaries, this highly illustrates their respect for Charles II, founded on the fearsome reputation and effectiveness of his Majesty's maritime military.

The English navy and Charles's willingness to use it to support his policies had yet again been variously successful. Further, the failure of both the Dutch and the French, the two other major European military nations, highlighted the superiority of the King's nautical military and his Majesty's international reputation.

East Indies.

¹²²⁰ CCSP *vol 5*, 6.1.1664 p.361, 22.1.1664 p.365, 29.1.1664 p.365, 12.2.1664 p.371, 15.4.1664 pp.391-392

¹²²¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 11.12.1663 entry 370

¹²²² CSPD *1664-1665*, 27.1.1665 entry 49 vol 111

¹²²³ CSPD *1664-1665*, 17.12.1664 entry 111 vol 106, 25.11.1664 entry 38 vol 107

¹²²⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 7.8.1668

Catherine of Braganza's dowry included Bombay (see Chapter Three). This was important, the naval vessels to be deployed there allowing Charles to potentially project substantial power in that part of the world in support of his international ascendancy aspirations.¹²²⁵ As the report dated 3rd August 1660 sent back from the Bay of Bombay by John Page evidences (see Chapter Three), it was suitable as a naval base, facilitating the sheltering of vessels and the building of ships etc. However, two problems were contemporaneously extant. Firstly, the local Dutch were bellicose, determined on a monopoly, inflicting losses on other nations' merchants, particularly the English.¹²²⁶ Secondly, the Portuguese Governor refused to hand over the city on the new English Governor's arrival.¹²²⁷ This was due to both the potential rebellion of the local Portuguese inhabitants, egged on by the dominant incumbent Jesuits, and a paucity of available military force to 'reduce' this opposition.¹²²⁸ The English Governor designate, Lord Malborough, lacked adequate military forces to enforce his tenure, consequently having to return home.¹²²⁹ Given his Britannic Majesty's objectives of provoking the Dutch into a war and the necessity for concentrating his forces in Western Europe, this meant that he needed to leave this matter unresolved, contenting himself with periodic letters of complaint to the Portuguese.¹²³⁰ The King's lack of naval assets to deploy to this part of the world led to the relegation of any redress required by merchants for losses incurred at the hands of the Dutch in the East, his Majesty recommending that they pursue restitution themselves.¹²³¹ Seemingly, English sea power had its limits, English ownership of Bombay being a casualty!

Other Countries – An 'Arc of Isolation'.

In addition to directly challenging the Dutch globally, as Clarendon's *Life* outlines, Charles also pursued a strategy to isolate the Netherlanders by surrounding them with a ring of English allies on the landward side to the States who would coordinate action against the common foe, or at a minimum remain effectively neutral.¹²³² This constituted an 'Arc of

¹²²⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 5.9.1663; CCSP vol 5, 6.7.1664 pp.408-409

¹²²⁶ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 7.3.1664 entry 400; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 7.11.1664 entry 82; Pepys *Diary*, 5.9.1663, 29.1.1664, 9.2.1664, 15.2.1664; Barlow *Journal*, pp.62-63

¹²²⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 5.9.1663, 29.1.1664; CCSP vol 5, 18.8.1665 pp.414-415

¹²²⁸ Montagu *Journal*, 28.7.1664 p.145; CCSP vol 5, 9.11.1664 p.441

¹²²⁹ CCSP vol 5, 18.8.1664 pp.414-415; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.508

¹²³⁰ CCSP vol 5, 6.7.1664 pp.408.409, 9.11.1664 p.441

¹²³¹ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 7.3.1664 entry 400; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 26.12.1664 entry 107; Pepys *Diary*, 15.2.1664

¹²³² Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.445-454; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 24.7.1665 entry 225, 31.7.1665 entry 228 vol 34

Isolation', commencing from Sweden and Denmark, through the German states that bordered the Hollanders, to France and Spain. Portugal was already strongly pro-English. The navy's campaigns against both the Mediterranean pirates and the Spanish raised its fearsome reputation, and together with Charles's proven willingness to use it, his Britannic Majesty's attractiveness as an ally was enhanced. The navy could not directly project power on land, hence the need to deprive Holland from succour from its land-ward side. However, given the approaching conflagration, this powerful naval institution would be engaged in hostilities against the common foe who relied utterly on its sea capacity for its survival. This would be crucial when Western European leaders were choosing who to align themselves with. Had the navy not been so successful, the King's prestige would have been diminished, and consequently he would have had an immensely more difficult task in implementing his foreign policy.

Scandinavia.

Denmark.

Denmark would be useful to Charles's desire to defeat the Dutch by undermining their trade globally, the Baltic constituting another area where the Dutch would need to be confronted (see Chapter Four). Should England be able to acquire Denmark and Sweden as allies, the Dutch would have to abandon their Baltic trade, or agree to Charles's terms. This greatly worried the Hollanders.¹²³³ Both Scandinavian countries were under a bond to support the Dutch in any warfare with England, but it was strongly regarded that they both would try to evade the obligation.¹²³⁴ The Danish variously represented an important potential ally for England due to previous expressions of friendship, the greater importance of Danish/Anglo trade compared to other Baltic states and their control of the Sound.¹²³⁵ English aspirations were aided by the Danes' deep resentment of the Netherlanders. As recorded in a note by Sir Gilbert Talbot, England's Danish ambassador, to Clarendon in Clarendon's State Papers, one reason was that the Dutch had engrossed the Danish trade. Clarendon confirmed this, as did Burnet, the latter directly quoting Talbot's message to him, adding that the Danish King protested that the States aimed to control both all the Customs of the Sound and that strategic

¹²³³ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 29.4.1664 entry 15; CCSP vol 5, 20.11.1663 p.348, 5.11.1664 pp.440-441

¹²³⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 21.11.1664 entry 89, 27.3.1665 entry 145; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.445-447

¹²³⁵ CCSP vol 5, 1.4.1664 pp.387-388

waterway.¹²³⁶ Thus, there was little domestic employment for Danish mariners, leading them to pursue their occupations with the Dutch.¹²³⁷ Not only did this leave few skilled seamen available to crew Danish merchant vessels, reducing the country's economic activity, it also restricted the number free to man Danish naval vessels, impacting the nation's military potential. Additionally, the Netherlanders were threatening the Danes' Guinea interests, particularly their Frederixburg base.¹²³⁸ However, crucially, the Danish were very unhappy with the peace treaty that they felt they had been forced to sign at the recent conclusion of the hostilities with Sweden, also fearing another Swedish attack.¹²³⁹

Interestingly, a potential Anglo-Danish alliance was begun in the Hague during conversations between Downing and Zested, the Danish ambassador. As highlighted in Clarendon's State Papers, Zested requested that Downing go to Copenhagen to negotiate a treaty relating to the Guinea, the Sound and to unite England and Denmark so that the latter could reduce its reliance on the States. It was additionally suggested that Sweden should be included in relation to Africa and the Sound.¹²⁴⁰ As also mentioned in Clarendon's State Papers, this was followed in May 1664 by a letter from the Danish King to Clarendon asking the English Chancellor to have regard for Danish interests when dealing with the Dutch, whether a treaty or in war.¹²⁴¹ Downing swiftly complied with this. In February 1664 he began representing Danish issues to the Dutch in some of his requests for reparation for injuries inflicted by the Dutch in Guinea.¹²⁴²

Key to the implementation of Charles's plans to sew up the Baltic was the navy. The Danes' aspirations for safety led them to request English help in negotiating a Swedish treaty, acting as guarantor between Denmark and Sweden to ensure compliance, using the navy to achieve it.¹²⁴³ This desire for self-protection would wed the Danes to the English yolk, other treaty clauses and cooperation flowing from this. In return, Charles proposed to both nations that they join a defensive treaty against the States.¹²⁴⁴ The negotiations were strictly secret lest

¹²³⁶ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.311; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.445-447

¹²³⁷ CCSP *vol 5*, October 1664 pp.431-432

¹²³⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 17.6.1664 entry 35; CCSP *vol 5*, 6.11.1663 p.345

¹²³⁹ CCSP *vol 5*, January 1665 p.460; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.445-447

¹²⁴⁰ CCSP *vol 5*, 6.11.1663 p.345, 5.2.1664 p.369, 18.2.1664 p.372

¹²⁴¹ CCSP *vol 5*, 19.5.1664 p.404

¹²⁴² CCSP *vol 5*, 8.2.1664 p.370, 26.4.1664 p.396

¹²⁴³ CCSP *vol 5*, October 1664 pp.431-432, January 1665 p.460, 21.1.1665 p.464, 11.3.1665 pp.473-474; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.445-447

¹²⁴⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 2.1.1665 entry 111

the Dutch take pre-emptive action prior to their completion, and despite Dutch suspicions, this was realised.¹²⁴⁵ In fact, the Danes were so keen on this treaty and had such faith in the English navy's invincibility and its ability to uphold the treaty terms that they offered control of all Danish ports to English frigates in order to hinder the Dutch sending ships to the Baltic, as well as granting any other terms Charles wished.¹²⁴⁶ Should Charles achieve this outcome with both Scandinavian states, his hopes for the Baltic part of his 'Arc of Isolation' would have been accomplished. The Danish alliance was duly ratified, Major Wood leaving Copenhagen for London with a copy of the document negotiated by ambassador Henry Coventry in March 1665.¹²⁴⁷ And in a propaganda coup for Charles in his attempt to avoid France siding with the Dutch in the eventuality of war, the Danish let it be publicly known that they regarded the Dutch as the aggressors in the lead up to the outbreak of hostilities, citing the Netherlanders' inducement of the King of Fantin's attack on Cormatine fort as cause.¹²⁴⁸

Sweden.

Sweden constituted the other Baltic state that Charles wished to bring within his orbit. In July 1663 he sent an envoy to propose that the Guinea trade be shared between Sweden and England, excluding all others.¹²⁴⁹ This was to exploit Swedish dissatisfaction at Dutch intransigence in compensating the Scandinavians for injuries perpetrated in West Africa which the King believed would be used to excuse them from their treaty obligations under their defensive league with the States.¹²⁵⁰

Downing's mission to Denmark (mentioned above) included a similar one to Sweden. Sir George took with him Charles's personal letter of recommendation, additionally delegating full authority to secretly negotiate a treaty, to include trade and the exclusion of the States from those Northern realms.¹²⁵¹ Sweden seemingly welcomed this trip. Clarendon's State Papers include a letter written shortly afterwards from its King, Charles XI, to Hyde agreeing

¹²⁴⁵ CCSP *vol 5*, 5.11.1664 pp.440-441, 9.12.1664 p.451; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 29.4.1664 entry 15

¹²⁴⁶ CCSP *vol 5*, October 1664 pp.431-432, 5.11.1664 pp.440-441

¹²⁴⁷ CCSP *vol 5*, 25.3.1665 p.476; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 31.7.1665 entry 228 *vol 34*

¹²⁴⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 21.11.1664 entry 89

¹²⁴⁹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.7.1663 entry 338

¹²⁵⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 29.7.1664 entry 46, 9.1.1665 entry 115, 20.3.1665 entry 142; CCSP *vol 5*, 16.10.1663 p.341, 27.11.1663 pp.349-350; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.445-447

¹²⁵¹ CCSP *vol 5*, 18.3.1664 p.382

that the two Kingdoms should be close, and that the Chancellor would earn the Scandinavian Monarch's gratitude and favour should he achieve this 'understanding'. The Swedish ambassador in the Hague additionally stated that the Swedes intended a 'strict understanding' with England, and is 'far from a near union with the Dutch'.¹²⁵² And Montagu, having knowledge of the Swedes, emanating from his time in the Sound in 1659 (see Chapter One), stated in a letter to Secretary Bennet that he believed they desire a 'close correspondence' with England.¹²⁵³

As English ambassador to Stockholm, Henry Coventry fleshed out common ground. The Swedish also wished England to guarantee peace between them and Denmark with its navy.¹²⁵⁴ Additionally, in a further propaganda coup for the English Sovereign, both Sweden and Denmark publicly rejoiced at England's Cape Corso capture, regaling it as his Britannic Majesty's defence of Scandinavian interests and revenge on the Dutch for injuries caused. That is, justifying attacks on the Dutch as the aggressors.¹²⁵⁵

In November 1664 the two parties began negotiations, Charles XI and Charles II appointing representatives to conclude an alliance. It was to oblige Sweden to join England should Anglo-Dutch hostilities commence, as well as stipulating that the English navy was to guarantee the Swede-Dane peace.¹²⁵⁶ According to Venice's London ambassador, the Swedish made an early promise in December 1664, stating that they would deny corn, wood and cordage to the Dutch.¹²⁵⁷ Also in the same month, as highlighted by a letter from Clarendon to Denmark's London ambassador, recorded in Clarendon's State Papers, the deal's outline was sealed by the Swedish and Danish acceptance of England's security guarantee between the two Baltic powers.¹²⁵⁸ And seemingly, the treaty was finalised by late March 1665, Henry Coventry dispatching his colleague, Major Wood, to London with the end product (see above).¹²⁵⁹ Further, similar to the Danes, the Swedes handed his Britannic Majesty a propaganda coup. De Ruyter's victories on the Guinea had annoyed the Swedish

¹²⁵² CCSP *vol 5*, 20.3.1664 p.383, 20.5.1664 p.404, 12.8.1664 p.414; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.445-447

¹²⁵³ CSPD *1663-1664*, 2.8.1664 entry 111 vol 101

¹²⁵⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 1.10.1664 p.427; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.445-447

¹²⁵⁵ CCSP *vol 5*, 7.10.1664 pp.428-429

¹²⁵⁶ CCSP *vol 5*, 2.11.1664 p.438, 4.11.1664 p.439

¹²⁵⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 5.12.1664 entry 97

¹²⁵⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, Dec 1664 p.454

¹²⁵⁹ CCSP *vol 5*, 25.3.1665 p.476; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 31.7.1665 entry 228 vol 34

King, openly naming the Dutch as the aggressors.¹²⁶⁰ Also, interestingly, the Swedish subsequently attempted to include Brandenburg and Holstein in this defensive pact.¹²⁶¹

German States.

In a continuation of the ‘Arc of Isolation’ and the attempt to isolate the Dutch from their land-ward side, freeing the English navy to focus on them at sea, Venice’s London ambassador reported that Charles was attempting to ally himself with some German rulers, particularly the Bishop of Münster, the Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke of Neoburgh. And according to Clarendon, Münster was particularly prominent.¹²⁶² This connection was encouraged by Sweden, particularly relating to Brandenburg and Holstein (see above).¹²⁶³ Consequently, Clarendon’s State Papers reveal the King’s discussions with the deputies of the Circle of Westphalia states, offering seven English regiments as an incentive that otherwise would have been paid off.¹²⁶⁴ It was believed that German States’ involvement would encourage the participation of the Swedes.¹²⁶⁵ The Venetian ambassador also reported that in May 1664 his Majesty had turned down the German Emperor’s request to join with him in his war against the Turk, in case it might compromise England’s Levant trade, also fearing the overstretching of English resources.¹²⁶⁶ However, as the outbreak of hostilities grew nearer, in early 1665 he reversed this policy, approaching the Austrian emperor directly.¹²⁶⁷

Many of these advances to princely states were successful. For example, Clarendon’s State Papers record a letter from the Elector of Brandenburg to Charles II in which the Elector’s Hague agent was ordered to ‘act in concert with Downing’.¹²⁶⁸ Further, the Bishop of Münster was even more inclined to an Anglo alliance, stating in the May 1664 informal understanding that he would declare war on the States if they broke with England.¹²⁶⁹

¹²⁶⁰ CCSP *vol 5*, 29.12.1664 p.456, 18.1.1665 pp.462-463

¹²⁶¹ CCSP *vol 5*, 19.4.1665 p.480, 30.4.1665 p.483

¹²⁶² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 9.1.1665 entry 115; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.448-454

¹²⁶³ CCSP *vol 5*, 19.4.1665 p.480

¹²⁶⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 14.2.1664 pp.468-469

¹²⁶⁵ CCSP *Vol 5*, 5.4.1665 p.478

¹²⁶⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 13.5.1664 entry 21

¹²⁶⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 9.1.1665 entry 115

¹²⁶⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, 25.2.1665 p.470

¹²⁶⁹ CCSP *vol 5*, 6.5.1664 p.399; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.448-454

Similarly with Cologne and Neuburg.¹²⁷⁰ Additionally, Clarendon's State Papers also list Charles's proposals to the prelate suggesting a more formal treaty, aspiring that a secret resolution be speedily concluded with an envoy being sent to London, promising not to conclude peace with the Dutch without mutual consent.¹²⁷¹

There are signs that the King's strategy bore some fruit. In December 1664 Downing reported to Clarendon that the Netherlanders feared an attack from his Grace of Münster, with a Dutch general, Overysell, demanding a considerable reinforcement of troops for the frontiers' defence against Münster and other neighbours.¹²⁷²

France.

England and France enjoyed a close relationship following Charles's Restoration (see Chapter Four), evidenced by Louis XIV's secret financial subsidies to Charles during his early penury, and pursuing a common military strategy regarding Portugal against Spain. Charles was particularly attractive to Louis XIV at this time as the French Monarch lacked a meaningful navy (see Chapter Seven), his growing power being predominantly land-based. His Britannic Majesty's superb maritime military had made him a very attractive ally generally (see Chapter Four), and when the two countries joined together, the English navy filled France's martial gap.

Following the victory of Evora, made possible by overwhelming Anglo-French aid, both sides desired that this close relationship would continue. For example, as reported by the Venetian ambassador, the French ambassador, Comminges, spent a considerable time in mid-July 1663 in clandestine conversations with the King and the Chancellor for the alliance's renewal.¹²⁷³ Also in the same month his Britannic Majesty finally dispatched his own ambassador, Lord Hollis, to Paris, signalling Charles's desire for a closer union by having a representative close to the French King's centre of power.¹²⁷⁴ And in November, both Monarchs swiftly smoothed over Cominges' political upset when he peremptorily left London's Lord Mayor's banquet in a fit of pique after arriving late and finding that the diners

¹²⁷⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 31.7.1665 entry 229

¹²⁷¹ CCSP *vol 5*, 5.4.1665 pp.478-479

¹²⁷² CCSP *vol 5*, 9.12.1664 p.451, 20.1.1665 p.463

¹²⁷³ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 8.7.1663 entry 333, 10.7.1664 entry 334; CCSP *vol 5*, 28.7.1663 p.323, 28.8.1663 p.328

¹²⁷⁴ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 10.7.1663 entry 334

had not waited for him prior to commencing their meal.¹²⁷⁵ Further, when Charles refused permission to Lord Hollis to take a subsidiary position to the French ‘princes of the blood’ in the procession for his official entry to the capital due to an argument over precedence, Louis smoothed this affair by journeying from his official court to St Germain to receive the English ambassador alone, avoiding another potential rift.¹²⁷⁶ Certainly, Charles’s ‘Arc of Isolation’ strategy and the consequent concentration of his forces meant maintaining these prior close relations with his cousin in order to keep them out of any conflict with the Netherlanders, or in lieu of that to keep them effectively neutral.¹²⁷⁷

However, a fundamental hindrance to their anticipated union appeared as both monarchs wished to pursue differing strategies as regards Spain from this point onwards. Louis XIV’s aspiration to annex Spanish Flanders conflicted with Charles’s need to offer English protection for this Low Country in order to achieve his desired treaty between Spain and England’s strongest ally, Portugal.¹²⁷⁸ Additionally, although the French had ruled out supporting any Dutch offensive moves, the operation of their defensive pact (see above) hinged on the determination of which side was the aggressor in a potential Anglo-Dutch conflagration.¹²⁷⁹

The French attempted to ‘hedge their bets’. On the one hand they publicly declared their support for the Dutch in any war with England.¹²⁸⁰ On the other hand their secret negotiations with England aimed at continuing their alliance, expecting that the covert negotiations conducted in London by Louis’s ambassadors extraordinary, M de Courtin and M de Vernueil, and in Paris by Charles’s envoy, Fitzharding, in late 1664 would yield a treaty.¹²⁸¹ Charles and Louis still believed that their bond with each other remained strong, both being reluctant to enter hostilities against each other. This is clearly signalled in such

¹²⁷⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 20.11.1663 entry 365 Encl, 11.12.1663 entry 3720

¹²⁷⁶ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 11.12.1663 entry 370, 24.12.1663 entry 374, 15.1.1664 entry 379, 29.1.1664 entry 388, 19.2.1664 entry 397, 7.3.1664 entry 400; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 1.4.1664 entry 1, 8.4.1664 entry 6; *Pepys Diary*, 14.12.1663; CCSP *vol 5*, 11.3.1664 p.378

¹²⁷⁷ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.445

¹²⁷⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 16.5.1664 entry 17, 2.6.1664 entry 28; *Pepys Diary*, 31.12.1663; CCSP *vol 5*, 16.10.1663 p.341, 11.12.1663 p.353, 8.1.1664 p.362, 15.1.1664 p.364, 29.1.1664 p.366, 3.3.1665 pp.470-471, 10.3.1665 pp.472-473

¹²⁷⁹ CCSP *vol 5*, 23.12.1664 pp.453-454; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.445

¹²⁸⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 5.12.1664 entry 95, 27.3.1665 entry 144, 27.3.1665 entry 145; *Pepys Diary*, 23.12.1664; CCSP *vol 5*, 22.9.1664 pp.423-424, 14.2.1665 pp.468-469, 21.4.1665 pp.480-481, 28.4.1665 pp.482-483; CSPD *1664-1665*, 25.2.1665 entry 65 vol 113, 28.12.1664 entry 50 vol 107

¹²⁸¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 28.11.1664 entry 93, 5.12.1664 entry 95; *Pepys Diary*, 8.4.1665; CCSP *vol 5*, 2.12.1664 pp.448-9, 9.12.1664 p.451

reassurances in Abbot Montagu's letter from Paris to Clarendon, recorded in Clarendon's State Papers, secretly promising that the French Sovereign had not changed his 'temper'.¹²⁸² Additionally, Venice's French ambassador reported that Louis was secretly attempting to extract himself from his Dutch treaty.¹²⁸³ The desire for this venture's success is illustrated via the French Sovereign's gift to the English emissary of a jewel of the unprecedented value of ten thousand crowns.¹²⁸⁴ Further, Charles unusually offered a furnished house to the two Frenchmen in Whitehall.¹²⁸⁵ The discussions were publicly excused by stating that France was attempting to buy Tangier, a not-unreasonable expectation given England's earlier sale of Dunkirk to them.¹²⁸⁶ Interestingly, his Britannic Majesty was so keen on completing this deal that he offered to divide the East and West Indies trade between the two countries, jointly clearing the States out of both areas.¹²⁸⁷ These Anglo-French negotiations were unsuccessful, both sides engaging in further procrastination to delay France's honouring of its Dutch Treaty obligations. Louis publicly offered to mediate between the English and Dutch.¹²⁸⁸ This last move particularly appealed to Charles. As long as he could keep France in an effectively neutral position, it allowed him to concentrate his nautical forces without hindrance. Accordingly, his Britannic Majesty feigned reluctance to engage with this measure, stating that the Dutch had been unreasonable so that it was they who should compromise, thus prolonging this process even after the war's commencement. French frustration at this tactic is summed up by Abbot Montagu's report from Paris in January 1666, stating that he

“has heard complaints that when the ambassadors were in England, they could never obtain a direct answer as to what England desired.”¹²⁸⁹

Portugal and Spain.

Portugal.

¹²⁸² CCSP vol 5, 19.10.1664 p.435

¹²⁸³ CSP Venice vol 34, 5.12.1664 entry 95

¹²⁸⁴ CSP Venice vol 34, 19.12.1664 entry 104

¹²⁸⁵ CSP Venice vol 34, 20.3.1665 entry 141

¹²⁸⁶ CSP Venice vol 34, 25.2.1665 entry 131; CCSP vol 5, 2.12.1664 pp.448-9

¹²⁸⁷ CSP Venice vol 34, 23.9.1664 entry 69

¹²⁸⁸ CSP Venice vol 34, 9.1.1665 entry 116; CCSP vol 5, 29.12.1664 p.456

¹²⁸⁹ CSP Venice vol 34, 30.9.1664 entry 72 Enclosure, 9.1.1665 entry 116, 6.3.1665 entry 134, 20.3.1665 entry 143; CCSP vol 5, 1664 pp.457-458, 25.1.1666 p.528; Clarendon Life vol 2, p.445

Following the Portuguese and English victory at Evora, the Portuguese government believed the Spanish threat had disappeared.¹²⁹⁰ Indeed, as reported by Venice's Spanish ambassador, it was widely believed that the Spanish would sue for peace, any future campaign against the Portuguese being difficult.¹²⁹¹ Thus, the Portuguese reconsidered their need for foreign intervention, ill-treating all foreign troops to encourage them to be removed from the country.¹²⁹² For example, by withholding pay, which by July 1664 was eight months overdue, Portuguese commanders replacing the English one, Count von Schomberg, to the disquiet of the English troops in the country.¹²⁹³ In fact, this misuse was significantly illustrated in June 1664 during the Valancia offensive by two English regiments which was repelled, the attackers suffering heavy losses, but with the defenders nevertheless surrendering the following morning. The Portuguese troops failed to leave their trenches.¹²⁹⁴

However, the Portuguese King and his chief minister, the Conde de Castelmelhor, had seemingly forgotten the English navy's power over their country. The Portuguese absolutely relied on their mercantile fleet's arrival from Brazil, a Portuguese territory, to fund their regime and its defence.¹²⁹⁵ The contents of a letter from Clarendon to Count Schomberg were seemingly leaked to the Portuguese where the English Chancellor stated

“if some reparation is not made, our ships will speedily do it”.¹²⁹⁶

This brought this recalcitrant ally to heel. The startling evidence of the success of this was that just two months later, the time it would have taken for Clarendon's letter to have been received in Portugal and 'leaked' to the local authorities, England's Portugal resident, Thomas Maynard, reported to the English Chancellor that the Portuguese King had instructed all his ministries to 'observe punctually the whole treaty' with the English, noting that without revenue from the Brazil fleet their next campaign would be unaffordable.¹²⁹⁷ Three weeks later a very rich fleet arrived from their overseas colony, providing the resources to compensate the English troops.¹²⁹⁸ Urgency was applied to the resolution by a rumoured

¹²⁹⁰ CCSP *Vol 5*, 27.5.1664 p.405, 29.8.1664 p.419

¹²⁹¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 17.7.1663 entry 336, 12.9.1663 entry 351; CCSP *vol 5*, 29.9.1664 p.425

¹²⁹² CCSP *vol 5*, 1.6.1664 pp.405-406, 1.6.1664 p.406, 18.8.1664 pp.414-415

¹²⁹³ CCSP *vol 5*, 1.7.1664 p.408, 18.8.1664 pp.414-415

¹²⁹⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 21.6.1664 p.407, 1.7.1664 p.408, 18.8.1664 pp.415-416

¹²⁹⁵ CCSP *vol 5*, 28.10.1664 pp.436-437

¹²⁹⁶ CCSP *vol 5*, 18.8.1664 pp.415-416

¹²⁹⁷ CCSP *vol 5*, 28.10.1664 pp.436-437

¹²⁹⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, 20.11.1664 pp.445-446

looming Spanish invasion with an estimated twenty thousand foot and ten thousand or more horse (see below).¹²⁹⁹

Spain.

In all practical sense, the July 1663 battle of Evora ended Spanish pretences to annex Portugal.¹³⁰⁰ As admitted by the Duke of Medina (also see Chapter Four), English sea power in the Caribbean had denuded the Spanish of the funds required to progress any further campaigns.¹³⁰¹ Similarly, as reported in Fanshawe's letter to Clarendon recorded in Clarendon's State Papers, this situation remained into 1664, in March it being felt that a Spanish attack against Portugal that year was unlikely.¹³⁰² However, whilst the Spanish threat continued to exist at all, albeit reduced in potency, it was possible that English naval vessels may be needed for Portugal's protection. This would divert valuable resources away from Charles's main strategic focus, that is war with the Dutch. Consequently, it was essential to have a full peace treaty between Spain and Portugal that avoided this risk, rather than a short-term suspension in hostilities. A further, initial and unsuccessful, objective was to attempt to recruit Spain to join England in future hostilities against the Dutch.¹³⁰³ The King was asked to mediate between both Iberian powers for a complete accord. Accordingly, the ambassador Charles sent to Spain at the request of both Spain and Portugal, Lord Richard Fanshawe, attempted to achieve this.¹³⁰⁴ Fanshawe was selected due to his prior employment by his Majesty as secretary to Lord Bristol's Iberian ambassadorship, so was well known to the Spanish.¹³⁰⁵ In December 1664 Fanshawe stated that

“he was not content with a simple suspension of arms, but that the fire ought to be put out altogether, or else set blazing more fiercely as merely to smother it is not” appropriate.¹³⁰⁶

The power of his negotiating hand was starkly illustrated by his business manner, his haughtiness in referring to Portugal's alleged current strength and Spain's weakness being

¹²⁹⁹ CCSP *vol 5*, 7.12.1664 p.450, 7.2.1665 p.467, 5.5.1665 pp.483-484

¹³⁰⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.7.1663 entry 338

¹³⁰¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 17.7.1663 entry 336, 12.9.1663 entry 351, 5.12.1663 entry 368,

¹³⁰² CCSP *vol 5*, 23.3.1664 p.384; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 2.4.1664 entry 3

¹³⁰³ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 5.12.1663 entry 368

¹³⁰⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 31.1.1664 p.367, 25.4.1665 p.452

¹³⁰⁵ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 2.4.1664 entry 3

¹³⁰⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 31.12.1664 entry 108

accepted by Spain due to their fear of England and Charles's willingness to use his powerful navy.¹³⁰⁷ Interestingly, Portuguese intransigence also had to be overcome due to their belief that the Spanish were no longer able to attack them. English agents in Portugal such as Thomas Maynard therefore forwarded rumours about looming Spanish attacks with a large army of up to 40,000 men, and were advancing on Albuquerque.¹³⁰⁸ This, together with the 'leaked' threat of the navy's use (see above), had the desired effect.

Spain was in a very difficult political situation, preferring to maintain its neutrality regarding France, Holland and England.¹³⁰⁹ She feared that Louis XIV wished to invade her possessions in Flanders.¹³¹⁰ Additionally, as reported by Venice's Spanish ambassador, due to its threatening position in regard to Spain, the latter was terrified of France's moves to attempt to buy Tangier.¹³¹¹ And the Dutch were deeply concerned at a potential French ownership of Flanders, uncomfortable at having a strong military land-based power on their doorstep. Consequently, and given their expected conflagration with England, the States wished to ally with Spain to protect against both France and their nautical rivals. However, England caused the highest dread to Spain, given England's superior navy and her King's willingness to use it. Further, thanks to England's previous Caribbean predations, Spain lacked the resources to offer financial incentives to other players to counter any threats.¹³¹² In order to bring the larger Iberian state to heel, his Britannic Majesty used two tactics. Firstly, he continued his pressure on the Spaniards in the Caribbean, maintaining his threat to their annual treasure flotilla (see Chapter Four), consequently reducing the amount available to fund their Portuguese campaign.¹³¹³ For example, in July 1664 English frigates captured three Spanish vessels journeying from Cuba to Spain, two being sunk and one taken as a prize to Jamaica.¹³¹⁴ Secondly, in a less than honourable move, the Portuguese held on Charles's behalf the sons of Don Luis de Haro and the Duke of Medina as captives from the battle of Evora. Thus, as reported by Venice's Spanish ambassador, Charles ordered Fanshawe to compose differences between Portugal and Spain, and to 'mediate' the release of

¹³⁰⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 31.12.1664 entry 108

¹³⁰⁸ CCSP *vol 5*, 29.8.1664 p.419, 20.11.1664 pp.445-446, 7.12.1664 p.450, 29.12.1665 pp.455-456

¹³⁰⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 10.12.1664 entry 98, 28.1.1665 entry 123, 11.2.1665 entry 127; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.445

¹³¹⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 11.2.1665 entry 127, 11.2.1665 entry 127

¹³¹¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 25.2.1665 entry 131

¹³¹² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 25.2.1665 entry 131

¹³¹³ Mun *England treasure*, pp.56-57

¹³¹⁴ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 28.8.1663 entry 347, 12.9.1663 entry 351; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 8.7.1664 entry 42

the hostages, that is use them as part of the peace negotiations. The Portuguese were fully informed of this latter ploy.¹³¹⁵

These tactics worked, the Duke of Medina being the largest influence on initiating the Anglo-Spanish negotiations, motivated by achieving the release of his son.¹³¹⁶ According to Lady Fanshawe's *Memoires*, following his departure from England in February with Lawson's fleet bound for the Mediterranean, at Medina's behest Fanshawe's journey in March 1664 from Cadiz to Madrid was continuously and lavishly feted with bull fights, bonfires, comedies, plays, games and other festivities.¹³¹⁷ On reaching Seville, the ambassador and his entourage stayed in his Catholic Majesty's palace.¹³¹⁸ Indeed, Medina even travelled to Cadiz with part of his family to welcome the English representative.¹³¹⁹ Lady Fanshawe further described how, in June 1664, following an earlier demand, the English ambassador was particularly favoured by an audience with the Spanish King as soon as he arrived at the capital. The King also requested all other foreign representatives to stay away, the customary ceremonious cavalcade of ambassadorial coaches consequently being cancelled, giving Fanshawe automatic precedence. And the Catholic Monarch sent the Marquis de Malpica, thirty gentlemen, captain of the guard accompanied by all of the 'German' guard' and twenty footmen as escort. The Iberian Sovereign also provided the English representative with a magnificent steed.¹³²⁰ Additionally, in an astonishing diplomatic coup, the Fanshawe troop was provided with the Venetian ambassador's residence, the Italian having been removed by the Spanish Government.¹³²¹ Interestingly, to the annoyance of the Dutch premier, de Witt, the States were shown disfavour, on his journey to the Mediterranean with a fleet de Ruyter being refused supplies at Cadiz, having to seek them at a less convenient location.¹³²²

As highlighted in Fanshawe's letter to Clarendon in Clarendon's State Papers, copies of a preliminary deal to cover the relationship between Spain and Portugal were drafted in

¹³¹⁵ CCSP vol 5, 31.1.1664 p.367; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 1.4.1665 entry 149

¹³¹⁶ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 27.2.1664 entry 399, 19.12.1664 entry 373; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 2.4.1664 entry 3, 26.11.1664 entry 92, 18.2.1665 entry 128

¹³¹⁷ CCSP vol 5, 11.3.1664 pp.378-9, 8.4.1664 p.390; CSP *Venice* vol 33, 15.1.1664 entry 379, 12.2.1664 entry 394, 19.3.1664 entry 403; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 2.4.1664 entry 3, 16.4.1664 entry 11, 17.5.1664 entry 19; Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.124-144

¹³¹⁸ Fanshawe *Memoires*, p.138

¹³¹⁹ Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.133-134

¹³²⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 29.4.1664 entry 15, 22.6.1664 entry 37; Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.145-148

¹³²¹ Fanshawe *Memoires*, p.151

¹³²² CCSP vol 5, 23.9.1664 p.424

January 1665.¹³²³ This built on earlier discussions between the Iberian powers and England that had occurred in 1662/1663.¹³²⁴ Both Spain and Portugal responded the following month with suggestions.¹³²⁵ A treaty between England and Spain was signed in March 1665. Ostensibly it was for ‘maritime interests’ only, but included comments on the defence of Portugal and Spain’s interests in Flanders. Additionally, there were rumoured secret clauses, conjectured to include the hostages’ release. Certainly, at this point Fanshawe was motivated to dispatch letters to facilitate their deliverance!¹³²⁶

In total as regards the ‘Arc of Isolation’s’ construction, the image provided for Charles by his navy portrayed him as an attractive ally. It had allowed the King to achieve another stage in his step-by-step plan, that is to use the navy to help him isolate the Dutch in his preparation for war with them. The King’s nautical forces would dominate the sea, the Netherlander’s landward side being either threatened by hostile states aligned with his Britannic Majesty, or succour withheld by nations maintaining an effective neutrality. This released naval assets for use against the King’s main foe. Without the English navy and its recent display as a fearsome institution, this would have been impossible, denting a major plank in the Monarch’s plan to achieve a victory over his main military rival, and his aspiration to international pre-eminence.

The Ottomans.

The Ottomans did not want a breach with Charles due to their fear of his navy (see Chapter Four). In fact, as reported by Venice’s Constantinople ambassador, the English enjoyed a very favoured status, the Sultan promising his Britannic Majesty true friendship, the English ambassador to the Porte being received “beyond the ordinary”.¹³²⁷ This was important to Charles’s strategic plans. He easily acquired Ottoman permission to attack the Barbary pirates, the Venetian ambassador representing the Sultan’s views that he

¹³²³ CCSP *vol 5*, 14.1.1665 p.462

¹³²⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 31.10.1664 pp.437-438

¹³²⁵ CCSP *vol 5*, 25.2.1665 p.470, 10.3.1665 p.472

¹³²⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 6.5.1664 entry 17, 13.5.1664 entry 20, 7.6.1664 entry 30, 26.11.1664 entry 92, 1.4.1665 entry 148, 1.4.1665 entry 149; CCSP *vol 5*, March 1665 pp.477-478 Clarendon to Fanshawe

¹³²⁷ CSP *Venice 33*, 14.7.1663 entry 335, 4.12.1663 entry 367

“disapproves absolutely of the piracies practiced by them, and the breaches of faith they have committed”.¹³²⁸

The Dutch did not receive this approval. Further, it meant that no threat would come from this quarter once the war had commenced, negating the need for naval ships to be diverted to that potential theatre.

Preparing the Navy.

Charles aimed at provoking the Dutch into a war (see above), working steadily towards this objective following his Restoration (see Chapters Three and Four). When this finally happened, vast numbers of ships were clearly going to be needed, each ship capable of operating efficiently, being adequately manned and provisioned, and obeying orders when deployed in fleets. In January 1664 there were just over forty five ships in service, discounting those allocated to specific stations such as Jamaica, the majority being earmarked for both the Guinea and Mediterranean.¹³²⁹ According to Pepys, Charles aimed at having at least 130 vessels by the Spring of 1665.¹³³⁰ Ultimately this was achieved, Admiral Montagu’s *Journal* recording a total fleet of 168 ships, just over 30 being on ‘other’ duties.¹³³¹ 42 vessels were ordered by Council to be prepared in May 1664 alone.¹³³² However, should the Dutch plan a fleet to outnumber this, English vessel numbers would have to be increased. As reported by Downing from the Hague, this was certainly the Netherlanders’ aspiration.¹³³³ The larger fleet size needed to be accompanied by a suitable fleet structure, and a similar rise in the number of mariners, and associated supplies.

The vessels were to be supplied from various sources. Some new ships were to be constructed, together with the necessary armaments and munitions.¹³³⁴ For example in May 1664 Pepys recorded his conversation with the Duke of York, where His Royal Highness

¹³²⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 22.1.1664 entry 381

¹³²⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 15.1.1664 entry 379

¹³³⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 15.1.1665; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 14.11.1664 entry 87 Enclosure

¹³³¹ Montagu *Journal*, 7.4.1665 pp.174-178; CSPD *1664-1665* Undated 1664 entry 94 vol 104

¹³³² Penn *Memoires*, p.290 13.5.1664 From the Council to HRH the Lord High Admiral

¹³³³ CCSP vol 5, 21.4.1665 pp.480-481 Downing to Clarendon

¹³³⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 5.11.1664 entry 97 Enclosure, 27.3.1665 entry 146 Enclosure; CCSP vol 5, 30.9.1664 pp.426-427

“spoke to me of a new ship at Woolwich”,

the *Royal Katherine*, 84 guns.¹³³⁵ In October of that year, he also documented that both Royal brothers attended the launching of a ship which the Monarch claimed had the best bow he had ever seen.¹³³⁶ And in late December 1664 the Duke of York attended the launch of the *Experiment*, designed by Sir William Petty at Rotherhithe.¹³³⁷ Also in December Lord Montagu recorded the *Royal Oak*’s launch, 100 guns, at Portsmouth.¹³³⁸ Additionally, ships *laid up in ordinary* were to be reintroduced into service. For instance, the first rates *Royal Sovereign* and the *London* were both moored up in Woolwich, the *Royal James* at Chatham, with Pepys logging that

“very hot we are at getting out some ships”.¹³³⁹

The hiring of vessels was also important, with merchant convoys sometimes being ordered not to sail so that their ships could be transferred to the navy.¹³⁴⁰ In fact, this was such a vital source that the King and the Privy Council were involved in detailed decisions, such as in January 1665 when Pepys and his colleagues persuaded his Majesty to suspend the pending convoy to the all-important Levant.¹³⁴¹ Also, Dutch prizes recently captured were introduced into service, such as the twelve confiscated Hollander ships reassigned in March 1665.¹³⁴² Indeed, the City’s support for the forthcoming war was so enthusiast that they even supplied a replacement vessel for the *London*, 80 guns, which sank at Chatham in March 1665 after its magazine exploded, killing 300 men.¹³⁴³ Interestingly, the launching of new ships was also used to advertise the navy’s power to other countries, in terms of the vessels, officers and armaments, reinforcing the navy’s fearsome reputation. For example, Penn’s *Memoirials* outline the French ambassador, Count de Comminges, recounting one such event to his royal master in Paris, stating that

¹³³⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 4.4.1664

¹³³⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 26.10.1664

¹³³⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 22.12.1664

¹³³⁸ Montagu *Journal*, 26.12.1664 p.159

¹³³⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 21.5.1664, 23.5.1664

¹³⁴⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 27.3.1665 entry 146 Enclosure; Barlow *Journal*, p.93

¹³⁴¹ Pepys *Diary*, 15.1.1665

¹³⁴² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 13.3.1665 entry 140; Penn *Memoires*, pp.303-304

¹³⁴³ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 27.3.1665 entry 146 Enclosure; Pepys *Diary*, 8.3.1665, 10.3.1665; Barlow *Journal*, p.99

“Yesterday the King of England did me the honour to take me with him to see a vessel of 1200 tons launched, the finest and most royal I have ever seen... We there saw all Cromwell’s old generals and captains who are very zealous and full of confidence on account of their last victories against the Dutch... I confess to you, sire, that nothing finer can be seen than this marine; nothing more majestic than this great number of vessels, built and building, this vast quantity of cannon, masts, cordage, planks, and other machines requisite for that kind of warfare.”¹³⁴⁴

For the fleet to be effectively and strategically commanded and deployed, a strong command structure was needed into which the existing and new vessels would be allocated. By the beginning of April 1665 this was in place. The Lord High Admiral carried the overall command, and led the Red squadron of 47 ships, Sir John Lawson as his Vice Admiral. Prince Rupert commanded the White squadron of 42 ships, Captain Mins as Vice Admiral. Lord Sandwich commanded the Blue squadron of 42 ships, Sir George Ascue as Vice Admiral. In assigning the flag colours to each squadron, this maintained the First Anglo-Dutch War’s convention emanating from 1653. Importantly, this conveyed a continuation of the earlier fleet’s formidable nature, aspiring to send a strong message to a potential enemy.¹³⁴⁵ Each squadron additionally contained Rear Admirals.¹³⁴⁶

Such a large fleet required an incredible number of mariners to man it. The King supplied these from three main sources. Firstly, a June 1664 Royal proclamation recalled sailors to England from foreign service (see above).¹³⁴⁷ Secondly, the recruitment of experienced officers and seamen who were currently in other employment, particularly valuable being those who had served under Cromwell and were skilled in navigation and voicing loyalty. After all, as William Penn put it in his memoirs,

“James picked them thereafter by their ability, not their opinions, and he was right, for that was the best way of doing the King’s business”.

¹³⁴⁴ Penn *Memoires*, pp.300-302

¹³⁴⁵ Penn *Memoires*, p.299; Barlow *Journal*, pp.93-94, p.101

¹³⁴⁶ Montagu *Journal*, 7.4.1665 pp.174-178, CSP *Venice* vol 34, 5.11.1664 entry 97 Enclosure; Penn *Memoires*, p.295

¹³⁴⁷ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 24.6.1664 entry 39 Enclosure, 1.7.1664 entry 40; *Prohibiting seamen*

Interestingly, these included large numbers from the sects, such as Anabaptists and Presbyterians, swearing fealty to the Anglican Royal regime.¹³⁴⁸ Further, as pamphlets highlighted, fishermen were diverted, these recruits constituting seasoned sailors.¹³⁴⁹ Thirdly, impressment provided large numbers. Pepys and his colleagues estimated that up to 14,000 might be required to be pressed, sourced from all trades, including carpenters and fishermen.¹³⁵⁰ Towns all over the country provided recruits.¹³⁵¹ Some even took extraordinary measures, such as the Dover mayor who pressed men from the cross channel packet boat, and in Tilbury a vessel was strategically placed to press the best collier sailors.¹³⁵² In fact, as related by the sailor Edward Barlow's *Journal* when referring to the press,

“and the press increasing so that few men could walk the streets, who had not tickets to show”.¹³⁵³

Merchantmen were copiously raided for extra ‘hands’, as Barlow also outlined on his forceable transfer from a commercial vessel to his Majesty’s frigate *Monke*.¹³⁵⁴ In some cases soldiers were deployed to crew his Majesty’s nautical military, such as the transfer by Charles’s direct order of Sir William Killigrew’s regiment of twelve hundred soldiers to naval service.¹³⁵⁵ In some cases recruits were even sought from privateer ships.¹³⁵⁶ Additionally, to encourage officers in the performance of their duty of impressment, the King in Council proclaimed their exemption from all prosecution.¹³⁵⁷ Of course, an increased workload in preparing the enlarged navy for sea necessitated additional skilled artisans for the dockyards, numbers for this vital service also being enhanced by impressment.¹³⁵⁸ In June 1664 Commissioner Peter Pett at Chatham wrote to Samuel Pepys expressing his need of 200 ropemakers and riggers, and in September John Tumbrill informed the Navy

¹³⁴⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 12.12.1664 entry 100 Enclosure; CSPD *1663-1664*, 27.5.1664 entry 123 vol 98; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.456-457

¹³⁴⁹ Penn *Memoires*, p.293; Gent *Preservation of the*, p.8

¹³⁵⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 15.1.1665; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 28.11.1664 entry 94 Enclosure; CSPD *1663-1664*, 27.5.1664 entry 123 vol 98

¹³⁵¹ CSPD *1664-1665*, 24.10.1664 entry 111 vol 113

¹³⁵² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 28.11.1664 entry 94 Enclosure; CSPD *1663-1664*, 27.5.1664 entry 123 vol 98

¹³⁵³ Barlow *Journal*, p.92

¹³⁵⁴ Barlow *Journal*, p.93

¹³⁵⁵ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 28.11.1664 entry 94 Enclosure

¹³⁵⁶ CSPD *1664-1665*, 19.11.1664 entry 18 vol 105

¹³⁵⁷ CSPD *1663-1664*, 7.6.1664 entry 28 vol 99

¹³⁵⁸ CSPD *1663-1664*, 13.6.1664 entry 11 vol 99

Commissioners that he needed the ability to press men to progress the work at Portsmouth dockyard due to the great haste required.¹³⁵⁹

Further, the Royal brothers were determined that religion and politics did not interfere with the institution's smooth running. This is starkly illustrated by a court martial, chaired by James. Lieutenant Mansell was convicted of insubordination, including taunting Captain Hannam and Major Smooth for having been rebels and serving under Cromwell. He was dismissed the service, the Duke's speech afterwards reinforcing strong Royal displeasure at this offender, admonishing all others in the service to put past divisions behind them.¹³⁶⁰ Additionally, those already pressed had to be prevented from absconding, a number having already taken their press money, this being a compensatory amount given to those seized for naval service. William Coventry in a letter to Secretary Bennet suggested the introduction of hanging some of the escapees as a deterrent.¹³⁶¹ Correspondingly, according to a pamphlet the King issued a proclamation to implement this, ordering all those captured to be gaoled, be subject to prosecution and to be potentially punished by death.¹³⁶² Positive incentives were also instigated, the King issuing a declaration outlining the rewards seamen would receive from prizes, the care to be taken of sick and wounded both in terms of onshore accommodation and hospital provision, for the maintenance of widows and orphans, and the awarding of medals to those who had given eminent service.¹³⁶³ It was felt that these measures had some success, William Coventry again reporting to Secretary Bennet that the seamen were heartened and it had added to their courage.¹³⁶⁴ Additionally, as usual, those on board would receive free victuals while in service, the scale of this undertaking being indicated by the forecast cost for one year for 25,000 men being £304,166.¹³⁶⁵

Suitable discipline in such a large military undertaking was crucial. This is starkly illustrated by Pepys in July 1663. On boarding a number of ships at Woolwich when performing one of his periodic inspections on the fleet's condition, he variously found no officers on board, no arms loaded and ready for use, all of the men asleep and on one ship there were only three

¹³⁵⁹ CSPD 1663-1664, 19.6.1664 entry 103 vol 99; CSPD 1664-1664, 22.9.1664 entry 95 vol 102

¹³⁶⁰ Montagu *Journal*, 6.4.1665 p.173

¹³⁶¹ CSPD 1664-1665, 12.11.1664 entry 93 vol 104

¹³⁶² *Touching mariners*, pp.1-2

¹³⁶³ CSPD 1664-1665, 28.10.1664 entry 145i vol 103; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 28.11.1664 entry 94; Evelyn *Diary* vol 1, 27.10.1664 p.378; *Declaration for encouragement*

¹³⁶⁴ CSPD 1664-1665, 16.11.1664 entry 148 vol 104

¹³⁶⁵ CSPD 1664-1665, November 1664 entry 130 vol 105

boys in attendance in total. All these issues were reported to the Duke of York.¹³⁶⁶

Consequently, by the following April the Lord High Admiral had outlined plans to improve the fleet's discipline.¹³⁶⁷ This included recruiting old 'tarpaulin' officers who had served Cromwell. As William Coventry stated,

“the more the cavaliers are put in, the less discipline hath followed in the fleet”.¹³⁶⁸

Further, this was enhanced by the issuance of standing orders that governed the regulation of a vessel at sea by captains, officers and other crew members, entitled 'Duties of a Commander at sea' as well as 'Instructions and Rules'. They covered a wide variety of matters, including specifying the rules surrounding gun salutes, the stowing and administering of all types of stores onboard including powder and shot, and the maintenance of accounts.¹³⁶⁹

These mammoth arrangements were crucial for the implementation of the King's plan to commence hostilities against the Dutch. Accordingly, as various sources outlined, he and his brother personally oversaw many of the preparations.¹³⁷⁰ For example, in a pamphlet conveying his November 1664 speech to both Houses, the King strongly emphasised his personal involvement and ownership of the conflict and especially the navy. He stated

“I have a fleet now at sea worthy of the English nation not inferior to any that hath been set out in any age; and which to discharge to tomorrow and replenish all my stores, I am persuaded would cost ME little less than £800,000”.¹³⁷¹

In May 1664 Pepys recorded the Royal brothers had gone at the break of day to Chatham.¹³⁷² In March 1665 Venice's London ambassador reported that the King frequently visited Portsmouth, where

¹³⁶⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 12.7.1663

¹³⁶⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 25.4.1664

¹³⁶⁸ Penn *Memoires*, 2.6.1663 p.282

¹³⁶⁹ Penn *Memoires*, pp.305-309; *Instructions and rules*

¹³⁷⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 12.12.1664 entry 100; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.434

¹³⁷¹ *Speech to Parliament*

¹³⁷² Pepys *Diary*, 23.5.1664

“he encourages and supports the fleet, giving orders, and presses them to the utmost vigour”.¹³⁷³

Edward Barlow confirmed this, his Majesty having been in the fleet to check on progress, and even boarded the sailor’s own vessel on its return from a cruise for prizes in order to check its condition.¹³⁷⁴ In October 1664 Christopher Pett, the Woolwich Commissioner reported to the Navy Commissioners that the King called for a draft of the stern and galleries of a new ship being built, ordering a report to be prepared on what parts of the vessel were ready for gilding and which parts were not ready. Such was the force of this Royal interest that the commissioner requested extra labour from Deptford to help on the day of launching.¹³⁷⁵ And as regards hastening out the fleet, Clarendon’s *Life* stated,

“towards which the Duke left nothing undone, which his unwearied industry and example could contribute towards it”.¹³⁷⁶

In total, huge efforts were taken to prepare the fleet for the forthcoming hostilities with the Dutch. The whole nation was involved, including towns from all over the country, and involving large sections of the social structure, from the King downwards. The King had made efforts to achieve the buy-in of all his subjects (see above), this becoming vital during these manic preparations.

Conclusion.

Chapter Three highlighted Charles’s use of the navy to achieve his long-term strategic ambitions for international pre-eminence, and to attempt to raise the Customs attributed to the King for life so he could establish a Monarchical absolutism by distancing himself from Parliament and the control they exerted over the Crown via the necessity to achieve their approval for additional taxes. Following accession, the Monarch used the navy to commence a step-by-step plan to achieve this, each part being multi-faceted. The first stage highlighted in the third Chapter aimed at establishing a framework to support future phases. Step two

¹³⁷³ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 27.3.1665 entry 144, 27.3.1665 entry 146 Enclosure

¹³⁷⁴ Barlow *Journal*, p.101

¹³⁷⁵ CSPD *1664-1665*, 22.10.1664 entry 102 vol 103

¹³⁷⁶ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.477

outlined in Chapter Four aspired to raise the Sovereign's domestic and international prestige and continue to strengthen the initial framework.

The third aspect described in this Chapter involved actual preparations for the anticipated hostilities. It outlines how the prevailing mercantilism economic theory, the Sovereign's desire for international pre-eminence and trade expansion meant the acquisition of a proportion of that of England's greatest rival, the Dutch. The Hollanders would be reluctant to enter hostilities due to the disruption it would cause to their vital trade. Dutch retaliation to Charles's use of his navy to attack Dutch interests in the Guinea and the Americas allowed him to portray the Netherlanders as the aggressors, attempting to persuade the French that their defensive treaty with the Dutch was void.

The raised persona provided by the navy for the King by their repeated defeat of the Mediterranean pirates and action against the Spanish in the Caribbean portrayed the Monarch as an attractive ally, facilitating the construction of an 'Arc of Isolation', enabling Charles to use his navy to focus on the Netherlanders.

The Royal brothers spearheaded the navy's martial readiness for the forthcoming conflagration. Further, to replace the anticipated loss of Customs invoked by the war, the King covertly induced Parliament into taking ownership of the war, demanding restitution or retribution for mercantile losses that the Sovereign had inflated into a national issue through the use of propaganda. This aspired to persuade the House into voting unprecedented new taxes to fund the hostilities. In combination these two measures heightened the navy's readiness to prosecute war with the Dutch.

In conclusion, it can be seen that the King was a very competent long-term diplomatic strategist, using the navy as a tool to carefully implement his step-by-step plan to achieve his aims of international ascendancy and domestic absolutism. It is undoubtedly true that his experience of 14 continental nomadic years were of high use to him in establishing his graduated scheme, the intimate knowledge of foreign courts allowing the Monarch to gauge foreign rulers' reactions to his plan. With his diplomatic endeavours complete, he was now poised to militarily confront the Dutch formally. Further, at this stage of this thesis Charles is revealed as a successful calculated schemer, strongly focused on using the nation he ruled as

a vehicle for achieving his personal ambitions rather than ruling benignly for the benefit of his subjects.

Chapter 6 - Domestic Bankruptcy and Collapse of Power.

Introduction.

Previous Chapters have outlined how following the Restoration Charles II aspired to use the navy to achieve absolute monarchy domestically and pre-eminence internationally, and to facilitate enhanced customs to pay for it by acquiring a portion of the Netherlanders' mercantile activity. Immediately prior to his ascension he commenced planning for a step-by-step strategy to attain this (see Chapter Three).

Chapter Six marks another change in direction in this thesis, charting the crucial financial aspects of the King's reign, from Restoration until approximately the end of 1668, and is once again new to academia, and commences the explanation for the inevitability of English defeat in the Second Anglo-Dutch war (completed in Chapter Seven). In contrast to illustrating Charles's success at progressing his military and political aspirations, this tract delineates his failure to comprehend the basics of governmental funding, leading to the total collapse of his overpowering domestic aspirations. As always, money crucially either facilitated or prevented the implementation of Governmental policy. So, this instalment describes how the King handled the financial aspects leading up to the war, and for the conflagration itself. It commences with an important addition that highlights the significance of prevailing climatic conditions to the dire economic situation. This is followed by the recession's effect on tax collection and the ensuing damage done to naval funding in combination with his Majesty's mishandling of the nation's finances. The fiscal impact of the Plague, Great Fire and Medway battle and the consequences for the nautical military's revenues ensue. The Chapter ends with a focus on how his Majesty's desire for the maximisation of internal Royal power was wrecked, leaving him humbled and substantially weaker. A new aspect introduced here is that the bulk of Dunkirk's sale proceeds merely provided a temporary relief for funding the navy's deficit.

This Chapter concludes that the King's financial incompetence overwhelmingly contributed to England's defeat in the Second Anglo-Dutch War. He didn't dispatch a fleet in 1667 not only because he couldn't afford it, but because he had destroyed the very institution on which his power was based, that is there was no navy left to dispatch. This left the country wide-open to Dutch and French whims.

It is shown here that the Monarch was already in severe financial difficulties prior to declaring war, the economic catastrophes of the Plague and Great Fire merely enhancing the country's financial woes. His fiscal difficulties would have been exacerbated as the war progressed without these unforeseen tragedies, calamitously faltering taxes never meeting contractual commitments. Consequently, it can be seen that the King was not merely a victim of unforeseen events that stopped him dispatching a fleet in 1667, but it was as a result of his financial mismanagement and ineptitude that led directly to the Medway disaster. Debt-funding enabled earlier military successes, his Majesty's failure to deal with this crucial issue meaning that it constituted a 'ticking time-bomb', financial insolvency preventing Charles from ever having the chance of winning the Second Anglo-Dutch War. In other words, in failing to learn crucial financial and economic lessons following Restoration, despite Charles's early military and political successes, this issue constituted a threat of gargantuan and near fatal proportions to the dynasty.

Further, it is shown that this caused the King's aspiration for domestic absolutism to be thwarted. He was correct to be fearful of his failure's consequences. Of the two societal strata, the first incorporated the 'ordinary' people who were openly unhappy with their monarch, many brazenly talking treason in the streets, with a heightened expectation that the country would re-adopt Republicanism. The second societal level, the elite who were represented by Parliament, were looking for confrontation, reducing the King's powers and his ability to take independent action. Given the extremely negative public reactions to the country's condition following the Medway, Charles feared his deposition. This threat was ultimately mitigated by two factors. Firstly, as mentioned by JR Jones, the lack of an alternate viable leader prevented this possible outcome. Secondly, as revealed below, the Cavalier Parliament's self-interest in maintaining the Monarchy meant that they wouldn't have deposed him, their social and financial future relying on its survival.¹³⁷⁷ Consequently, this marks the failure of the domestic part of the Monarch's aspirations. Chapter 7 focuses on international and military aspects.

Historiographical Comparison.

¹³⁷⁷ Jones *Anglo*, pp.174-178

Due to the erratic and disastrous weather patterns emanating from the prevailing mini-ice-age, the English economy at the Restoration was in deep recession, possibly depression. This caused significant supply-side inflation (see below), particularly in such staples as food commodities, as well as rents. In conjunction with the acute coin shortage caused by the rapid calling in of approximately ten percent of those in circulation, the populace didn't have the funds to pay the taxes that were approved by Parliament. These revenues were crucial to Charles in order that he could fund his covert aspirations.

A structural problem with the tax system was that it assumed that all taxes could be collected, allowing the raising of loans from the City to fund the regime's activity, using the Finance Act as collateral. This covered the time lag until all fiscal flows had been received so that debt could be repaid. However, a large proportion of tax revenue remained uncollected (see below), yet the country borrowed to the limits of the Acts, debt rising to the point where Governmental credit limits were breached, acute funding shortages resulting. This meant that prior to the second Anglo-Dutch War the navy was critically devoid of money and was unable to pay for its operations. The massive financial strains of the conflagration in conjunction with worsening collection problems resulting from decimated Customs would have overwhelmingly worsened this situation, the Plague and Great Fire merely exacerbating the catastrophe. The King's financial and economic incompetence in not recognizing this reality led to his defeat in the war, not just lacking the funds to put a fleet out in 1667, but in fact destroying it, with sailors in open mutiny and suppliers refusing to honour their contracts, meaning that de facto there was no navy to deploy.

There are a few modern scholars who comment on the phenomenon. John Brewer's book *The Sinews of Power, War, Money and the English State* mainly discusses England's fiscal situation post-the Glorious Revolution when matters dramatically changed due to the Bank of England's establishment. However, he does highlight that the main beneficiaries of the build-up of the country's military were the money-lenders, although his book only refers to the army over its broad sweep of time, and which was rapidly disbanded by Charles following his repatriation.¹³⁷⁸ Robert C Allen's article 'Real wages once more: a response to Judie Stephenson' mainly discusses workers' wages in the eighteenth century, and although there are some comments on the seventeenth century none relate to the precise period covered by

¹³⁷⁸ Brewer *The sinews*, p.xviii

this thesis. Further, where supply-side economic issues exist, suppliers have more control over prices, especially where the commodity that they supply such as foodstuffs has a low elasticity of demand, allowing an enhanced ability to hike prices. However, in an age devoid of collective bargaining and with few workers' rights, except as regards apprenticeships, the ability for workers to push up wages to provide them with the higher spending power that can increase demand-side inflation would have been curtailed. Consequently, Allen's article has very limited applicability to this thesis's findings.¹³⁷⁹

Henry Phelps-Brown's book *A Perspective of Wages and Prices* is of more use. Table 1 'Distribution of Outlay between certain heads of household expenditure' shows that 80% of household income was spent on foodstuffs.¹³⁸⁰ Using a different chart, figure 1 'Price of a composite unit of consumables in Southern England 1264-1954' shows a large spike in prices after the mid-1600s.¹³⁸¹ Also, Figure 2 'Index of price of composite unit of consumables in Southern England 1264-1954' shows an even larger price surge.¹³⁸² Additionally, Appendix C 'Indexes of prices of components of composite unit of consumables, mainly in Southern England', with 1451-1475 equalling 100, shows the reading for farinaceous foods in 1652 is 742 with 1662 being considerably higher at 1181.¹³⁸³ Explanations for this data may come from the book's statement that the population virtually doubled between 1500 to 1700, heightening demand, rising from around 2.5 million to 3 million for the earlier date to 5.8 million for the latter.¹³⁸⁴ Further, there was a steady decline in the quantity of commodities, particularly of foodstuffs. With 1450 marking 100, this being near the start of the mini-ice-age, Figure 2 'Indexes of the quantity of foodstuffs obtainable in exchange for a physical unit of industrial product in Southern England 1400-1700', shows that around 1600 the number was about 50, declining over the first half of the century to 1650 at 45, dropping much more dramatically over the following ten years to less than 40.¹³⁸⁵ No analysis of these figures is provided, the text instead highlighting a number of problems with the underlying data that has been used to compile it. It mentions that for consumables it's based on wholesale and not retail prices, potentially underplaying the scale of the inflation experienced by those in

¹³⁷⁹ Allen 'Real wages', pp.738-754

¹³⁸⁰ Phelps-Brown *A perspective*, p.14

¹³⁸¹ Phelps-Brown *A perspective*, p.16

¹³⁸² Phelps-Brown *A perspective*, p.17

¹³⁸³ Phelps-Brown *A perspective*, p.53

¹³⁸⁴ Phelps-Brown *A perspective*, p.66

¹³⁸⁵ Phelps-Brown *A perspective*, p.68

London, retailers controlling prices charged to end consumers. Also, there was a sparsity of data for the period following 1660, making the tables that are presented in the book of a lower reliability than would be hoped for.¹³⁸⁶ Nevertheless, it total, for the period that this thesis covers, the data presents a picture of decreasing supply, rising prices with heightened population adding to pressures. Further, with households spending 80% of their income on food, it is no wonder than Venice's London ambassador (see below) bitterly complains of dramatic price inflation. Interestingly, although not conclusive in itself, the reduction in the availability of foodstuffs from 1450, when the records start, is consistent with this thesis's findings that the mini-ice-age played a massive part in London residents' financial suffering following the Restoration, and the consequent severe damage to government revenues.

Brewer also points out that war was as much an economic as well as a military matter, recognizing the massive associated costs of martial activity, but does not relate this to the 1660s.¹³⁸⁷ He also refers to the 1651 and 1662 Navigation Acts and that all naval activity was an off-shoot of that, such as escorting merchant convoys and defeating the Mediterranean corsairs to free up the route to the Levant.¹³⁸⁸ Additionally, though, in the 200 years leading up to the Glorious Revolution Brewer states that England never endured the "gruelling fiscal-military test" that drained the continental nations like during the thirty years war, failing to acknowledge the overwhelming financial strain that the 2nd Anglo-Dutch War placed on the country's finances.¹³⁸⁹

Hubert Hall's book *A history of the custom-revenue in England. From the earliest times to the year 1827. Compiled exclusively from original authorities* provides a great deal of interesting detail on the development of the statute and case law for customs. For example, giving an "analysis of the Speech of Sir Francis Bacon in Parliament, 1610", or for "analysis of Baron Clarke's Argument in Bates' Case", showing that the authority of the Court of Exchequer is sufficient for deciding customs cases, or discussing the poundage rates such as 6s 8d for sack and 14d on short cloth under Queen Elizabeth I.¹³⁹⁰ Sadly a tabulation of the actual governmental receipts is absent from both its volumes.

¹³⁸⁶ Phelps-Brown *A perspective*, p.1

¹³⁸⁷ Brewer *The sinews*, p.xx

¹³⁸⁸ Brewer *The sinews*, pp.9-11

¹³⁸⁹ Brewer *The sinews*, p.21

¹³⁹⁰ Hall *History of the customs*, p.158, p.170

Gregory Clark's paper 'The price history of English agriculture 1209-1914' is a little more useful, although caution needs to be exercised when using it.¹³⁹¹ For example, a lot of data examined by the paper's author comprises annual figures for individual commodities.¹³⁹² As expected, given the prevailing climatic conditions revealed in this thesis, considerable variation is displayed, but with no detailed analysis provided for these fluctuations by Clark, context is missing. The use of trend graphs can supply a better understanding as it can help smooth out these annual variations. Figure 1 illustrates "Barley, Peas and Oats prices relative to wheat 1209-1909", and shows there is a massive price spike just after the mid-1600s.¹³⁹³ Also, there is huge price volatility throughout the 1600s, consistent with the unpredictable prevailing weather patterns resulting from this apex of the mini-ice-age. Figure 3 illustrates "Arable prices relative to pasture" and gives a similar picture of prices just after mid-1600s, showing a large price surge.¹³⁹⁴ A problem that these indices suffer is that the cause of the price rises is not given, so it is impossible to discern whether they are demand-side or supply-side driven. Further, the prices displayed by the book are those charged 'at the farm gate', ie by the farmer, so don't necessarily co-relate to those charged in the markets in such conurbations as London. For instance, as the contemporary Administration itself recognised (see below), some middlemen hoarded produce in a bid to artificially drive-up prices, causing increased affordability and heightened inflation supply-side problems. Additionally, despite there being no data on rents of domestic properties, Table 3 "Firewood, Timber and Miscellaneous Product Prices" shows the price of timber, an important component in construction in the period. Using a trend approach again, that being the early 1650s to the 1660s, there is an approximate doubling in this period.¹³⁹⁵ This is an input cost on the supply-side of the demand/supply equation. In total, this supports a picture of severe price pressures on urban consumers as summarised by this thesis.

There are three relevant works by Michael Braddick, all making very similar points. This is summed up in his book *The nerves of state: taxation and the financing of the English state, 1558-1714*, which is a general survey of the history of the development of England's taxation system. Despite its limited application to the period and circumstances covered by this thesis,

¹³⁹¹ Clark 'The price history', pp.1-109

¹³⁹² Clark 'The price history', p.1

¹³⁹³ Clark 'The price history', p.28

¹³⁹⁴ Clark 'The price history', p.30

¹³⁹⁵ Clark 'The price history', p.82

it makes some interesting points. In general, it agrees with the situation as represented by this thesis, having similarities to Thomas Munn's tracts (see below), stating

“Increased spending caused financial problems for the Stuarts. Their ordinary revenues were insufficient to meet their ordinary expenses with the result that there was an accumulating deficit. This reduced the capacity of the Government to meet war-time expenses because there was no accumulated surplus with which to meet the initial costs of war. This contrasts with the Elizabethan situation, where a surplus was achieved, which allowed the accumulation of something of a war-chest”, and “in the comparably lightly taxed period 1485-1690, it was during wartime that revenues represent substantial proportions of national wealth – the 1540s, the 1640s, the 1650s, the 1660s and 1670s.”¹³⁹⁶

That is, in broad terms, taxes never covered the government's expenditure, accumulating debt resulting. Further, the extremely heightened costs associated with the second Anglo-Dutch War would have exacerbated this precarious situation. However, Braddick's work is variously flawed. Firstly, whilst it agrees that merchants and goldsmiths lent against the collateral of a Tax Act, it assumes that all fiscal revenues were collected.¹³⁹⁷ For example, he states that the second Anglo-Dutch War cost £5.25 million, which incidentally is also broadly the figure that Pepys highlights as being the taxes that Parliament anticipated would be raised (see below).¹³⁹⁸ Yet it ignores that a significant proportion was uncollected, that being between a quarter and a half of the total expected amount, as highlighted by Sir Philip Warwick, secretary to the Treasurer (see below). Accordingly, this could amount to between over £1.3 million and over £2.6 million. This situation existed prior to the war's commencement, the Plague and Great Fire merely worsening the matter. Also, no mention is made of the prevailing climatic conditions and its effect on the economy, causing massively faltering taxes which devastated Charles's revenues.

A further problem is that government finances in the illustrative tables are aggregated into fairly lengthy periods. For example, table 1.1 gives total government revenues for 1660-1685, making comparisons with this work's chronological duration of 1659-1668 impossible. A

¹³⁹⁶ Braddick *The nerves of state*, p.26, p.29

¹³⁹⁷ Braddick *The nerves of state*, p.39; Braddick *State formation*, pp.213-214, pp.222-223, p.233, p.258, p.260, p.268

¹³⁹⁸ Braddick *The nerves of state*, p.29

drop in government fiscal receipts for the whole reign compared to the preceding and succeeding periods show annual amounts 1649-1659 £1.719 million, 1660-1685 £1.642 million, 1686-1688 £1.975 million, yet this is deceptive.¹³⁹⁹ It is known that Charles received an increased amount during the final few years of his reign, these higher figures distorting the reader's impression, compensating for potentially dramatically different government receipts in other periods. Consequently, whilst broad assertions made by Braddick may be useful, any reliance on more detailed figures need to be viewed with extreme caution.

Braddick's book *State Formation in Early Modern England 1550-1700* adds that the state's income increased ten-fold between Elizabethan times and the Glorious Revolution, taking a heightened proportion of national income for its use. However, this work also seemingly has two problems. Firstly, it focuses on the history of the development of England's governmental revenues, taking a broad sweep through the period mentioned in the title, rather than specific fiscal difficulties in a smaller period. Similar to Clark's work, this means that fluctuations in shorter intervals such as that covered by this thesis are 'glossed over' to provide longer-term trends. Secondly, the relevant sections of Braddick's publication rely on secondary instead of primary sources. For example, works by Wheeler, Childs and Holmes.¹⁴⁰⁰ This means previous academic assumptions and possible errors are recycled, considerably conflicting with the findings presented in this thesis which are totally based on primary sources.

Henry Phelps Brown's article 'State formation and the historiography in early modern England' adds little, but for one point. It states that the government doubled the amount of national income that it took in tax from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, so that "partly as a consequence of this fiscal-military transformation, the later seventeenth-century state was more capable of fostering territorial and commercial expansion".¹⁴⁰¹ This directly supports this thesis's findings that Charles was able to use this facet to attempt to achieve his covert aspirations to boost his domestic and international power.

CD Chandaman's book *The English Public Revenue 1660-1688* strongly supports the findings of the research presented in this thesis. In the book's conclusion it states that the

¹³⁹⁹ Braddick *The nerves of state*, p.10

¹⁴⁰⁰ Braddick *State formation*, p.222, pp.230-234, pp.257-259, pp.259-261, pp.266-270

¹⁴⁰¹ Braddick 'Historiography', p.7

expected tax yield of £1.2 million took more than twenty years to attain in full, the average over Charles's tenure being £980,000.¹⁴⁰² Net expenditure was typically just under £1,170,000. However, this doesn't take account of extraordinary costs and reduced income due to additional events such as the impact of the 2nd Anglo-Dutch War.¹⁴⁰³ For example, according to Chandaman the Government's revenue between 1664-70 averaged around £830,000 per annum.¹⁴⁰⁴ Also, on accession the King inherited debt of £975,000, attracting substantial interest payments, which boosted the Crown's outgoings.¹⁴⁰⁵ He summed the Monarch's situation aptly

“During the first decade of the reign, the deficiencies of the financial settlement, aggravated by war, made it impossible to give effect to the Restoration convention's expectation that the King should ‘live on his own’”, and “subjected as it was to numerous adverse pressures, the permanent ordinary revenue settled upon the Crown at Restoration clearly proved, for more than 20 years, incapable of meeting the demands of legitimate ordinary expenditure and its inadequacy abundantly justified the constant appeals to Parliament by Charles for further supply.”¹⁴⁰⁶

In total, these various scholarly works present a variety of aspects that relate to the main themes of their books. Despite their flaws highlighted above, a clear sense emerges that Charles had financial difficulties during the period of this thesis. The inadequacy of the estimated financial settlement never proved achievable, the King suffering from a number of factors, including the substandard system of tax collection. Yet, no-one has presented the underlying reasons for his financial woes. Professor Chandaman mentions the severe economic depression at Restoration, suggesting financial reasons such as accumulated debt at accession for Charles's financial woes. Yet, no-one has highlighted the very real disastrous, and primary underlying reason for the King's faltering fiscal revenue. The calamitous effects of the mini-ice-age cannot be overlooked. Further, Professor Chandaman and the other authors present Charles's financial position in a way that negates the King's influence over them. For example, should he have undertaken different political policies such as the preferred one suggested by this work in Chapter Seven's conclusion, his monetary position

¹⁴⁰² Chandaman *The English Public*, p.263

¹⁴⁰³ Chandaman *The English Public*, p.266

¹⁴⁰⁴ Chandaman *The English Public*, p.272

¹⁴⁰⁵ Chandaman *The English Public*, p.228

¹⁴⁰⁶ Chandaman *The English Public*, p.277, p.272

could have been dramatically improved, whilst still substantially meeting his covert agenda. Overall, the inescapable fact is that the King was largely the author of his own fiscal misery. Indeed, Professor Chandaman potentially supports this view, stating

“The Restoration tax system was peculiarly sensitive to outside pressures and the fluctuations of revenue yield cannot be understood without a careful consideration of the vicissitudes, legislative and administrative, and economic, to say nothing of chance factors, to which individual taxes were subject.”¹⁴⁰⁷

This thesis goes further, pointing to the King’s massive ambition, his incompetence in not recognising the country couldn’t support his aspirations, also being devoid of the skills to manage the economy effectively in the light of the prevailing deep recession. Indeed, in addition to Chapter Seven’s suggested revised policy, were Charles to have pursued a more expansionist trade policy such as borrowing for capital purposes so that the money flows could be invested in such things as economically advantageous projects, his fiscal woes could have been rather different. For example, he attempted to spur economic growth in Jamaica by encouraging planters from other colonies to relocate to the island (see below), and in Tangier by proclaiming it as a Customs-free port for five years (see below). Maybe a similar attention paid to Bombay in the early to mid-1660s would have heightened East India company trade, enhancing Customs revenues.

The Crown’s Finances.

The adequacy of those Royal finances that were independent of Parliamentary control were crucial to the funding of the King’s three policies of achieving international pre-eminence, domestic absolutism and supporting trade. In late 1660 Parliament voted him for life £1.2 million annually to comprise both Customs and Excise, this being an estimate of expected yields and should have been more than sufficient for his needs.¹⁴⁰⁸ For example, his land forces, including garrisons throughout England and in Dunkirk were expected to cost approximately £307,000, the naval budget anticipated at £372,000, totalling £679,000,

¹⁴⁰⁷ Chandaman *The English Public*, p.6

¹⁴⁰⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 32, 1.10.1660 p.199 entry 218, 17.12.1660 p.226 entry 250; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.138, pp.309-310; Burnet *History* vol 1, p.222; *Intelligencer*, Issue 48 19.11.1660-26.11.1660 p.763; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.82 21.10.1661

leaving a substantial amount for other priorities.¹⁴⁰⁹ Pamphlets illustrated the importance of fully achieving these sums, highlighting that foreign princes with overseas ambitions had large revenues available to them too. For example, the French Monarch's ordinary revenues were about £5 million, the Spanish possibly treble that, the Dutch ordinary revenue of £1.2 million being enhanced by further revenues from Amsterdam and their seven provinces.¹⁴¹⁰ However, the English system was variously flawed. Once naval operations commenced his Majesty's costs increased, exacerbated by a nautical 'arms race' with the Dutch over fleet size. This naturally raised the Crown's annual required income, the new estimate in August 1661, barely a year later, being £1.5-£1.6 million, but which was not catered for.¹⁴¹¹ At least £800,000 of this was consumed by the land and sea forces.¹⁴¹² Further, as stated amongst others by Sir Phillip Warwick, Secretary to Lord Southampton, the Lord Treasurer, as well as in pamphlets, between a quarter and a half of total tax due remained uncollected, totalling £300,000-£600,000.¹⁴¹³ Indeed, piratical predations caused a large reduction in the important Levant trade during the early years of Charles's reign, undoubtedly accounting for an undue proportion of this deficit (see Chapters Four and Five).¹⁴¹⁴ Few merchants ventured to the Mediterranean because of this scourge, this also exhibiting his Majesty's inability to protect national interests, indicating a failure of his aspiration to project power globally.¹⁴¹⁵ Further, at Restoration the naval stores were so dangerously low that attacks on the Kingdom couldn't have been thwarted, meaning that the King had to immediately assign £432,000 towards their replenishment, with an additional £120,000 for ordnance, these sums being borrowed against his £1.2 million annual Customs and Excise revenue.¹⁴¹⁶ Additionally, as Chapter 3 highlights, all the tax receipts immediately following the Restoration were channelled to disbanding the army and reducing the navy's historic debts, necessitating the King to apply to Parliament for small additional amounts for his immediate needs. Despite these extra allowances for personal costs, the King's debts rapidly amassed from this period, his Majesty

¹⁴⁰⁹ CSPD 1661-1662, June 1661 pp.16-31 Vol 38 entry 49

¹⁴¹⁰ *Restauranda*, pp.56-57; *Europae moderna*, p.92

¹⁴¹¹ CCSP vol 5, pp.125-126 16.8.1661 The Hague; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.312-313

¹⁴¹² Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.312-313

¹⁴¹³ *Pepys Diary*, 30.9.1661, 30.6.1663, 30.12.1663, 29.2.1664; CSP *Venice* vol 33, 29.7.1661 pp.1-20 entry 23, 30.12.1661 pp.72-90 entry 106; CSPD 1661-1662 28.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 entry 111; CCSP vol 5, pp.125-126 16.8.1661 The Hague; *Restauranda*, pp.54-55

¹⁴¹⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 5.8.1661 pp.20-35 entries 29 & 30, 30.12.1661, pp.72-90 entry 106, 24.2.1662 pp. 101-112 entry 137

¹⁴¹⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 30.12.1661 pp.72-90 entry 106, 13.1.1662 pp.91-101 entry 112

¹⁴¹⁶ CSPD 1661-1662, 21.8.1662 pp. 454-472 vol 58 entry 71; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.275-278

thereafter frequently needing to harangue Parliament for extra funds. Of course, interest on the accrued debts further depleted available Crown funds.¹⁴¹⁷

The Impact of Climatic Conditions, Inflation and Paucity of Coins on the Economy Following Restoration.

The most important issue was rapid price inflation. This derived from harvest failures over a number of years caused by the prevailing mini-ice-age. This adverse climatic condition extended from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries, its zenith being in the mid-1600s.¹⁴¹⁸ The resulting erratic weather patterns were confirmed in multiple contemporary sources. For example, in December 1660 Henry Townsend recorded that there had been great tempests, the like never known before.¹⁴¹⁹ Pepys confirmed in early June 1661 that extreme and protracted rain was experienced so that the populace was very worried about crop failure and a resulting famine.¹⁴²⁰ In fact, the extended torrential rain in September that year was so heavy that coaches had to detour “through the Mews” as Charing Cross was too flooded to be traversed.¹⁴²¹ And flash flooding also caused mayhem, Townsend highlighting that an inundation in May 1661 had been so extreme that the drainage facilities in Coleman Street were so overwhelmed that the water rose four feet high, rushing into cellars and warehouses, causing £10,000 worth of damage to goods.¹⁴²² In January 1662 both Pepys and Evelyn also lamented that the winters of 1660/1661 and 1661/1662 were so warm that they felt like early summer.¹⁴²³ Both additionally confirmed that sustained periods of rain continued for three months in the spring of 1662.¹⁴²⁴ This destroyed many buildings as well as crops, including the parlour of Evelyn’s house at Sayes Court!¹⁴²⁵ The same similarly occurred the following summer.¹⁴²⁶ Even the Portuguese Infanta’s journey was delayed due

¹⁴¹⁷ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 5. 8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 29, 26.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 30, pp. 113-125 17.3.1662 entry 150; Pepys *Diary*, 30.9.1662; CCSP *vol 5*, p.138 13.9.1661 Whitehall

¹⁴¹⁸ Climate Websites

Dr Noemi Mantivan, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Bangor University Business School, Professor Yener Altunbas, Professor of Economics, Bangor University Business School, Dr Graham Bird, Reader, Physical Geography, Bangor University School of Natural Sciences

¹⁴¹⁹ Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.65 24.12.1660

¹⁴²⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 2.6.1661

¹⁴²¹ Pepys *Diary*, 25.9.1661

¹⁴²² Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.75 24.5.1661

¹⁴²³ Pepys *Diary*, 15.1.1662, 26.1.1662; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 137; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.355 15.1.1662

¹⁴²⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 31.5.1662; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.355 15.1.1662

¹⁴²⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 137, 3.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 147; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.355 15.1.1662

¹⁴²⁶ Jocelyn *Diary*, p.143 12.7.1663

to stormy weather in July 1662 causing the fleet being dispatched to collect her to return to the Downs after having reached Boulogne.¹⁴²⁷ Amazingly, people were able to go skating on the lakes in St James's and other Royal parks.¹⁴²⁸ The Thames was frozen over at times such as in December 1662, making that transport route unnavigable.¹⁴²⁹

Consequently, the country experienced steep inflation, for example rents in London doubled in twelve months. However, 'staples' suffered the most dramatic hyper-inflation, such as bread and other 'eatables', their prices doubling in a few weeks, famine being feared.¹⁴³⁰ In terms of 'supply and demand', this inflation wasn't caused by a surplus of 'demand' induced by surplus money chasing the existing supply of goods and bidding up prices. Instead, it resulted from 'supply-side' problems, a dwindling supply of coins, that is available money (see below), chasing an even more drastically reduced supply of goods. Consequently, merchants could charge exorbitant prices knowing that people would have to pay the heightened prices for essential products made scarce by the climatic conditions, that is the items were 'price-inelastic', with merchants' price rises causing the inflation. Interestingly, they had increased so much that the Government attempted to regulate the prices the King would have to pay during his anticipated journey to greet his new Queen at Portsmouth.¹⁴³¹

The Government tried alternative measures to mitigate the situation. As pamphlets and other sources highlighted, fish was promoted as an alternative to meat, the fishing industry receiving extravagant encouragement. This encompassed such things as a Fishing Board being established, the Duke of York's patronage adding kudos. Elaborate incentives included the removal of Customs on fishing catches, exemption from the navy press for fishermen and even offering a bounty of £200 for everyone taking a fishing busse out.¹⁴³² And in a novel approach, the Government ordered people to fast at such times as Lent to reduce food consumption. This was to be strictly observed, and as highlighted in pamphlets such as '*The Several Statutes in force for the observation of Lent: and fish days at all other times of the*

¹⁴²⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 22.7.1662, 26.7.1662, 31.12.1661

¹⁴²⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 1.12.1662, 15.12.1662; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.366 1.12.1662

¹⁴²⁹ Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, p.366 1.12.1662

¹⁴³⁰ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 11.8.1661 pp.20-35 entry 33, 24.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 137; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.139 8.9.1661, p.139 17.11.1661; Henry Townsend *Diary*, p.85 15.1.1662

¹⁴³¹ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 19.5.1662 pp.137-146 entry 184

¹⁴³² Pepys *Diary*, 19.10.1661, 28.11.1662, 3.12.1662; CSPD *1661-1662*, 22.8.1661 pp.54-79 vol 40 entry 75; CSPD *1663-1664* 12.3.1664 pp.501-523 vol 94 entry 74; CCSP *vol 5*, p.128 22.8.1661 Letters Patent; Gent *Preservation of the*, p.6

year' penalties included twenty shillings fines and up to twenty days imprisonment.¹⁴³³ Obviously, this adversely affected the Government's financial position. For instance, between June 1661 to January 1662 the navy's running costs rose by £45,000 above the budgeted amount, this being exacerbated by the Crown's requirement to pay extortionate interest rates on the necessary additional borrowing to cover heightened costs.¹⁴³⁴

The largest problem caused by this hyper-inflation and hence for Crown revenues resulted from the coin shortage.¹⁴³⁵ This was variously derived. One was the aggressive recalling of Republican coins to be re-minted with Royal insignia, substantially reducing coinage in circulation, removing £600,000 immediately, as recorded by Pepys this constituting about ten percent of the total.¹⁴³⁶ Additionally, a large proportion of that remaining had been heavily clipped during the previous three reigns. At the recoinage rate of £10,000 per month this was too slow, taking at least five years to replace this currency in the economy.¹⁴³⁷ Additionally, many people had to borrow to meet their daily needs, future household income thus being denuded further by exorbitant interest payments. For instance, interest rates of up to 70% were regarded as so exorbitant that Parliament legislated to reduce them to a more acceptable level of 15%, this latter being regarded high in itself. The problem was enhanced by clipping and forging on an industrial scale, this organised crime being fronted by leading aristocrats. Public faith in the currency was consequently undermined as innocent but impoverished subjects found their precious coins worthless, their ability to purchase sustenance being further eroded.¹⁴³⁸ In total, individuals' cumulative sufferings culminated in a reduction in demand at the macro level for goods, Clarendon consequently stating that

“trade was very dead”.¹⁴³⁹

¹⁴³³ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 24.2.1662 pp.101-112 entry 137; *Pepys Diary*, 15.1.1662; CCSP vol 5, p.178 1661 Proposals for encouragement; *Evelyn Diary* vol 1, p.355 15.1.1662; *Henry Townsend Diary*, p.85 15.1.1662; *Several statutes*, pp.2-13

¹⁴³⁴ CSPD *1661-1662*, June 1661 pp.16-31 Vol 38 entry 49, 16.1.1662 pp.233-262 vol 49 entry 46; *Pepys Diary*, 29.12.1662

¹⁴³⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 24.2.1662 pp. 101-112 entry 137; CSPD *1661-1662*, 10.6.1661 pp. 1-16 vol 37 entry 44; *Clarendon Life* vol 2, p.364; *Penn Memoires*, p.264

¹⁴³⁶ *Pepys Diary*, 27.1.1665

¹⁴³⁷ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 24.2.1662 pp. 101-112 entry 137; CSPD *1661-1662*, 7.9.1661 vol 41 entry 29, 27.11.1661 pp.132-165 vol 44 entry 104, 3.2.1662 pp.262-281 vol 50 entry 8; *Pepys Diary* 19.5.1663; *Penn Memoires*, p.264

¹⁴³⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 11.8.1662 pp.168-182 entry 222; CSPD *1661-1662*, 10.6.1661 pp. 1-16 vol 37 entry 44

¹⁴³⁹ CCSP vol 5, p.242 25.7.1662 Worcester House; *Clarendon Life* vol 2, p.364

This impacted his Majesty's finances adversely, because in addition to attempting to raise extra taxes, demand for goods that yielded Customs and Excise revenues plummeted, commensurately lowering independent Crown income. As the Duke of Newcastle stated,

“the taxes should not be above the riches of the commonwealth.”¹⁴⁴⁰

Contemporary sermons even recorded this exigency, for instance that by Thomas Bradley, prebendary of York Minster on 3rd August 1663.¹⁴⁴¹ This was in addition to Mediterranean piratical predations.¹⁴⁴² As highlighted by the law 43 Elizabeth, chapter 12, merchants' commercial activities enhanced the nation's wealth, which included vast spending and lending power when successful. When considering the money supply's circulation, these additional outflows would speed it up, stimulating both the wider economy and the demand for goods that yielded Excise, providing higher tax flows. Obviously, the early 1660's recessionary circumstances, with reduced demand for imports and the associated diminished mercantile wealth, stemming from the dearth of coins, led to a money supply reduction and the related demand for those goods generating Excise, further diminishing Crown revenues. Also, as Zouch's pamphlet '*The Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England Asserted against Sir Edward Coke's Articuli Admiralitatis*' highlights, the usual alternate funding source, City loans, became very difficult to achieve, being either unable to lend due to their impecuniousness, or unwilling to do so.¹⁴⁴³ For example, in February 1662 the King failed to raise £200,000 as very few moneymen had adequate available resources.¹⁴⁴⁴ And in April 1662 the City couldn't deliver a loan of £300,000, causing the King to cancel undisclosed policies.¹⁴⁴⁵ Attempts were made to rectify the situation, such as reviving old laws banning bullion exports, this being a particularly stark cause of precious metal paucity. For example, in the three years following Restoration a net £869,433 was sent abroad.¹⁴⁴⁶ An Act was proposed to increase trade, but particularly to encourage bullion imports.¹⁴⁴⁷ Attractive rewards were offered to informers in an attempt to arrest further exports, amounting to half the value of the seized treasure, another measure attempting to decrease the amount used in

¹⁴⁴⁰ Cavendish *Life of the thrice noble*, Book 4 p.168 XXVIII

¹⁴⁴¹ Bradley *Caesar*, p.36

¹⁴⁴² CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.2.1662 pp. 101-112 entry 137; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.357, p364

¹⁴⁴³ Zouch *Admiralty Jurisdiction*, p.140

¹⁴⁴⁴ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.2.1662 pp. 101-112 entry 137; Pepys *Diary*, 19.5.1663

¹⁴⁴⁵ CSPD *1661-1662*, 25.4.1662 pp.329-357 vol 53 entry 74; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 24.2.1662 pp. 101-112 entry 137

¹⁴⁴⁶ CSPD *1663-1664*, 15.5.1663 pp.128-143 vol 73 entry 58

¹⁴⁴⁷ CSPD *1663-1664*, 26.6.1663 pp.159-189 vol 75 entry 123

gold and silver lace.¹⁴⁴⁸ Further, the Frenchman, Peter Blondeau, introduced a new coining process, aimed at both decreasing clipping and forging of coins and raising production rates.¹⁴⁴⁹ There were also attempts to regulate grain prices, but this was doomed, even the new regulation recognising that unscrupulous people were hoarding grain to raise its price.¹⁴⁵⁰ Interestingly, it was also proposed to establish a ‘Bank of England’ with the ability to mint its own money and to lend, including to merchants, but its creation was delayed several decades.¹⁴⁵¹

Impact on Naval Finances Following the Restoration.

This appalling economic state devastated naval finances. As the pamphlet *Ligeancia Lugens* highlighted, referring to the Crown’s tax collection ability, should

“the king thereby failing of an assistance at land may lose also the help of his navy at sea.”¹⁴⁵²

Despite an attempt in 1661 at naval debt reduction, by the year’s end they remained stubbornly high, totalling £374,000, the situation progressively worsening. Following copious complaints by naval victuallers, within two years many like those at Portsmouth couldn’t afford to supply the fleet, and London purveyors petitioned Parliament for a speedy remedy, in aggregate being owed £145,919.¹⁴⁵³ One warrant paid to Richard Lush and 14 others for £16,477 hadn’t been honoured, the suppliers having to re-apply for another one.¹⁴⁵⁴ This situation was mirrored abroad. In two locations, the navy agents Thomas Clutterbuck in Leghorn and Robert Cock in Lisbon were both refused local credit, having to personally guarantee the payment of local suppliers’ bills, instead of using funds emanating from the Navy Board.¹⁴⁵⁵ This caused huge personal problems, Thomas Clutterbuck reporting that he

¹⁴⁴⁸ CSPD 1661-1662, 10.6.1661 pp. 1-16 vol 37 entry 44, 19.6.1661 pp.1-16 vol 37 entry 84

¹⁴⁴⁹ CSPD 1661-1662, 17.5.1662 pp.357-385 vol 59 entry 54, 21.9.1662 pp.494-504 vol 60 entry 10 (i); CSPD 1663-1664, 10.4.1663 pp.96-114 vol 71 entry 59; Evelyn *Diary vol 1*, 9.3.1664 p.372

¹⁴⁵⁰ CSPD 1661-1662, 26.4.1662 pp.329-357 vol 53 entry 75

¹⁴⁵¹ CSPD 1661-1662, August 1661 pp.54-79 vol 41 entry 131

¹⁴⁵² Philipps *Ligeancia lugens*, p.6 entry 39

¹⁴⁵³ Pepys *Diary*, 31.12.1661; CSPD 1663-1664, 24.11.1663 pp.342-359 vol 84 entry 36, 16.6.1663 pp.159-189 vol 78 entry 34; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.273

¹⁴⁵⁴ CSPD 1661-1662, December 1661 pp.188-200 vol 46 entry 45

¹⁴⁵⁵ CSPD 1661-1662, 19.7.1662 pp.426-452 vol 57 entry 81, CSPD 1663-1664 17.2.1663 pp.36-63 vol 68 entry 79; CCSP vol 5, p.133 30.8.1661 Robt Cock to Clarendon, p.137 7.9.1661 Lisbon

had suffered great injury, Robert Cock having had to sell his Portuguese estate for half price.¹⁴⁵⁶ English victuallers were similarly afflicted, such as those at Portsmouth who refused to supply vessels due for operations due to penury.¹⁴⁵⁷ Further, this affected dockyard operations, workmen remaining unpaid for lengthy periods, leading to appalling personal consequences. Hundreds of Chatham sawyers refused to work, leading to shipwrights being laid off, the Dockyard Commissioner petitioning the Navy Commissioners for immediate cash as some families were close to starvation.¹⁴⁵⁸ Daniel Furzer reported from the Forest of Dean the refusal of unpaid waggons who transported wood for the repair and construction of ships to work, some even having sold their oxen to buy food.¹⁴⁵⁹ Indeed, some wages were unpaid for two years, poverty resulting. Consequently, dockyards had great difficulty getting workmen, having to take extreme measures to remain operational.¹⁴⁶⁰ In October 1662 William Batten, the Navy's Surveyor was ordered to press dockyard workers, such as carpenters, shipwrights and other trades, the use of prisons and magistrates being authorised for uncompliant labourers.¹⁴⁶¹

Fleet operations were also adversely impacted. Most commonly and alarmingly, fleet departures were delayed. Preparations for the fleet to collect the Portuguese Infanta progressed very slowly.¹⁴⁶² In fact, although these arrangements commenced in July 1661, the fleet still hadn't sailed by the following March; making a poor impression to domestic and foreign audiences of Charles as an eager bridegroom, and obstructing his overseas policy.¹⁴⁶³ Also, when it was finally ready, its victual shortage meant the Admiral, Lord Sandwich, put the whole fleet on short food allowance before even leaving port. This always adversely affects sailors' morale.¹⁴⁶⁴ In April 1662 Charles had to delay sending vessels to support Portugal in its hostilities with Spain.¹⁴⁶⁵ In October 1661 vessels destined to maintain pressure on the Mediterranean pirates and conduct crucial merchant fleet convoys

¹⁴⁵⁶ CSPD 1661-1662, 13.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 entry 51, 16.10.1662 pp.504-538 vol 61 entry 53

¹⁴⁵⁷ CSPD 1661-1662, 14.8.1661 pp. 31-54 vol 39 entry 26; CSPD 1663-1664, 24.11.1663 pp.342-359 vol 84 entry 36

¹⁴⁵⁸ CSPD 1661-1662, 16.9.1661, pp.79-91 vol 41 entry 57; CSPD 1663-1664 4.8.1663 pp.224-244 vol 78 entry 34

¹⁴⁵⁹ CSPD 1661-1662, 17.6.1661 pp.1-16 vol 37 entry 75, 11.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 entry 46

¹⁴⁶⁰ CSPD 1661-1662, 14.8.1661 pp.54-79 vol 40 entry 52

¹⁴⁶¹ CSPD 1661-1662, 18.10.1662 pp.504-538 vol 61 entry 67

¹⁴⁶² CSP Venice vol 33, 21.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 69

¹⁴⁶³ CSP Venice vol 33, 21.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 69, 17.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 150; CSPD 1661-1662 21.10.1661 pp.49-62 vol 33 entry 69

¹⁴⁶⁴ Montagu Journal, 20.6.1661 p.89

¹⁴⁶⁵ CSP Venice vol 33, 28.4.1662 pp.125-137 entry 174

were postponed, sailors refusing to sail until they'd been paid.¹⁴⁶⁶ In June 1661 the *Monk's* captain, Nicholas Tattersell, reported that he'd had to sail without some vital items.¹⁴⁶⁷ In January 1662 the *Mattias* had to remain in port as there was no money to complete vital repairs.¹⁴⁶⁸ Further, pursers couldn't get crucial stores to speed vessels' departure to operational destinations due to money shortages, forcing them to borrow or steal.¹⁴⁶⁹

As the navy's efficiency and effectiveness was paramount to the achievement of his Majesty's covert aspirations, its logical to assume he would take urgent measures to rectify the desperate naval funding crisis by for example reducing costs, high levels of financial astuteness being needed. However, sources signal the opposite, costs being increased instead. For example, in March 1662 Portsmouth authorities prepared a £8,677 estimate for a new second-rate's construction.¹⁴⁷⁰ In October 1662 the Navy Commissioners assessed the cost of a new Chatham wet dock for first and second rates at nearly £31,000.¹⁴⁷¹ Also in October 1662, the projected charge for two new ships to be constructed at both Woolwich and Portsmouth was £19,000.¹⁴⁷² Although it may be noted that these were capital costs, and therefore non-recurring, they also constituted the outlay of actual cash, this being the basis on which taxes were assessed and raised. So, in this regard revenue and capital costs came from the same finite 'pot', that being the tax revenue, proceeds needing to cover both types of expenditure. Consequently, although they are both technically different categories of spending, in aggregate they both needed to fit within the Monarch's overall fiscal restraints. This points to both fiscal incompetence, and more worryingly a cavalier attitude and a deep naivety. The King's single focus of moulding the navy into a tool for implementing his overseas policies seemingly overrode the institution's long-term solvency and consequent survival, and subsequent ability to deliver and maintain Charles's dreams.

Attempts to Resolve the King's Poor Fiscal Position.

The secret French subsidy in late 1661 of around 1.8 to 2 million livres 'in specie' gave some respite from this financial collapse. Also, the King urgently requested Parliament to rectify

¹⁴⁶⁶ CSPD *1661-1662*, 21.10.1661 pp.49-62 vol 33 entry 69; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 21.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 69

¹⁴⁶⁷ CSPD *1661-1662*, 16.6.1661 pp.1-16 vol 37 entry 65

¹⁴⁶⁸ CSPD *1661-1662*, 23.1.1662 pp.233-262 vol 49 entry 74

¹⁴⁶⁹ CSPD *1661-1662*, 11.9.1662 pp.474-492 vol 59 entry 44i

¹⁴⁷⁰ CSPD *1661-1662*, 29.3.1662 pp.294-328 vol 52 entry 133

¹⁴⁷¹ CSPD *1661-1662*, 14.10.1662 pp.504-538 vol 61 entry 42

¹⁴⁷² CSPD *1661-1662*, 29.10.1662 pp.504-538 vol 61 entry 113

the Crown's financial embarrassment, but nothing was totally successful.¹⁴⁷³ In March 1662 they voted the new, controversial 'Hearth Tax', two shillings being levied for every hearth, attributable to the King for life.¹⁴⁷⁴ However, this raised about £151,000 per annum, half the expected amount as high staple prices and the coin shortage meant that the populace couldn't afford the taxes. In fact, many people actually walled up their hearths to avoid paying.¹⁴⁷⁵ And new tax farmers were appointed in June 1662 to try and raise tax collection rates. Unfortunately, this policy was compromised as these 'outsourced' officials received handsome contractual rewards of up to £100,000 per annum, reducing amounts available to the Government. Additionally, they tended to be lax in their assessment of individuals, like relying on the tax payers' assurances as a substitute for personal inspections.¹⁴⁷⁶ Alternately, the Sovereign attempted to increase the recovery rate of Royal assets not handed in by recalcitrant Republicans at Restoration, such as gold, plate and jewels, Lords Lieutenants and High Sheriffs being commissioned to perform this task.¹⁴⁷⁷ And as per the King's Declaration to Parliament and his subjects, attempts were to be made to reduce naval costs, various garrisons and the Household.¹⁴⁷⁸ However, this could never achieve the staggering sums required to solve the Crown's impecuniousness.

Consequently, the cumulation of Charles's financial woes meant he had to attempt to address the coin paucity and the wider dire economic situation which was resulting in reduced tax revenues. His domestic and global project would otherwise be unattainable. The sale of Dunkirk was the solution identified.¹⁴⁷⁹ This made sense as it was unimportant to his power projection ambitions for overseas and in the seas around England, instead being possible from domestic ports (see Chapter Four for other strategic considerations).¹⁴⁸⁰ So, secret negotiations to sell the city to France were commenced in at least July 1662, the handover

¹⁴⁷³ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.273, pp.284-285, pp.309-310

¹⁴⁷⁴ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 17.3.1662 pp.113-125 entry 150; Pepys *Diary*, 3.3.1662; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.419; Johnson *Exact survey*, p.94

¹⁴⁷⁵ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 21.10.1661 pp.49-62 entry 69; CSPD *1663-1664*, 11.12.1663 pp.359-378 vol 85 entry 72, Undated 1663 pp.399-413 vol 88 entry 129, 11.12.1663 pp.359-378 vol 85 entry 72; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.419

¹⁴⁷⁶ CSPD *1661-1662*, March 1662 pp.294-328 vol 52 entry 142, 28.6.1662 pp.396-426 vol 56 entry 111; CSPD *1663-1664*, 11.12.1663 pp.359-378 vol 85 entry 72

¹⁴⁷⁷ CSPD *1661-1662*, 4.10.1662 pp.504-538 vol 61 entry 9, 31.10.1662 pp.504-538 vol 61 entry 125

¹⁴⁷⁸ *Privy Council advice*, pp.13-14

¹⁴⁷⁹ CCSP *vol 5*, p.262 28.8.1662 Clarendon to d'Estrades, p.275 Sept 1662 Memorandum

¹⁴⁸⁰ *Discourse of Dunkirk*, p.19

occurring the following October.¹⁴⁸¹ Charles originally requested seven million livres, eventually settling at five million, about three million to be paid immediately, the remainder due within two years. The English insisted that the remittance be in silver coins, the King being so eager for the cash that he gave a discount of between 340,000 and 450,000 francs if it was paid immediately.¹⁴⁸² On arrival the money was taken straight to the mint in the Tower to be converted into English tender.¹⁴⁸³ It was mostly used to eradicate the navy's debts. The raw numbers illustrate this. As already noted, in December 1661 the navy's debts were about £374,000.¹⁴⁸⁴ Obviously, naval costs and the allocation of tax revenues were ongoing. However, the continuing deficit between these two items persisted, as previously highlighted.¹⁴⁸⁵ Therefore, when considering a number of aspects, it is clear that the proceeds of approximately £400,000 from Dunkirk's October 1662 sale were applied to the navy debt. For example, by September 1663 Sir Philip Warwick, Secretary to the Treasurer, and December 1663 Sir George Carteret, Navy Treasurer both confirmed the navy debt's elimination, Pepys confirming that the navy's credit rating had been restored on the Exchange.¹⁴⁸⁶ Further, in February 1664 Pepys reported that not only were Government reserves at zero, but that a mere £80,000 of the Dunkirk money remained.¹⁴⁸⁷ Blondeau's new coin manufacturing process would aid this via a speedier reminting of the French money, but it would not be as expeditious as required. Accordingly, Charles pawned the Dunkirk money to realise ready funds, reducing his available cash by paying £35,000 interest for this arrangement, further decreasing the benefit of having sold such a militarily strategic asset.¹⁴⁸⁸

However, the Dunkirk money was a 'one-off', longer term solutions being needed. From mid-1663 Parliament approved further taxes, but due to its frustration at the King's licentiousness (see Chapter 7) it was conditional upon the House being allowed to reduce Royal expenditure.¹⁴⁸⁹ Nevertheless, ineffective tax collection problems remained. Also,

¹⁴⁸¹ CCSP *vol 5*, p.236 8.7.1662 St Germain, pp.236-237 9.7.1662 St Germain, p.238 16.7.1662 St Germain, p.249 7.8.1662 Boreel to States General, p.254 17.8.1662 Louis XIV to d'Estrades, p.257 22.8.1662 Chelcy, p.262 28.8.1662 Memorial to d'Estrades; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.383-388

¹⁴⁸² CSP *Venice vol 33*, 10.11.1662 pp.204-216 entry 272, 14.11.1662 pp.204-216 entry 275; CCSP *vol 5*, 22.8.1662 London. D'Estrades to Clarendon, CCSP *vol 5*, 22.8.1662 London. D'Estrades to Clarendon, p.269 7.9.1662 London. D'Estrades to Clarendon; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.390

¹⁴⁸³ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 28.11.1662 pp.204-216 entry 282, 8.12.1662 pp.216-224 entry 285

¹⁴⁸⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 31.12.1661

¹⁴⁸⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 29.2.1664

¹⁴⁸⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 24.9.1663, 3.12.1663

¹⁴⁸⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 22.2.1664

¹⁴⁸⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 11.12.1665

¹⁴⁸⁹ *Privy Council advice*, p.12

Parliament exacted the enormous price of the expulsion of all the Catholics from England, threatening to breach his Majesty's crucial Breda Declaration promise to tolerate 'tender consciences'.¹⁴⁹⁰ There were at least two important casualties of Parliamentary oversight of the Royal finances. Firstly, that hospitality expenditure was to be curtailed, conveying an image of a diminished court that couldn't entertain foreign ministers according to etiquette, damaging the King's international standing.¹⁴⁹¹ Secondly, cutting loyalists' pensions, causing deep resentment, damaging his Majesty's domestic popularity.¹⁴⁹² Also, although the King ostensibly attempted to reduce his expenses, as reported by Pepys, in reality he continued to squander money on licentiousness.¹⁴⁹³

Yet the importance of the long-term balancing of the Royal finances remained as the underlying climatically-spurred economic circumstances continued. For example, in August 1663 Pepys reported that London encountered a great frost, having had almost no summer at all.¹⁴⁹⁴ Conversely, the winter of 1663/4 was so mild that Pepys and his wife visited friends by water, the

"very warm" weather allowing this, and some March snow surprised everyone due to the "mildness of the winter".¹⁴⁹⁵

Further, the coins' dearth persisted, Lord Lucas's speech to the House of Lords as late as February 1671 lamenting the very heavy reliance on copper farthings as a result.¹⁴⁹⁶ In fact, farthings were introduced following an early December 1664 recommendation to the King in recognition of the desperate lack of bullion-based specie.¹⁴⁹⁷ Also, even if Parliament were to vote further taxes, their substantial ineffective collection remained, the climatic conditions continuing to result in subjects' inability to fully pay their legal fiscal dues. Consequently, it is obvious that without a durable resolution to this overwhelming problem, any increased

¹⁴⁹⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 10.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 334, 24.7.1663 pp.250-256 entry 338; CSPD *1661-1662*, 26.12.1661 pp.592-609 vol 65 entry 54, November 1662 pp.559-578 vol 63 entry 135; *Pepys Diary*, 14.4.1663, 31.5.1663, 30.6.1663

¹⁴⁹¹ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 18.9.1663 pp.261-265 entry 352, 25.9.1663 pp.261-265 entry 354; CSPD *1663-1664*, 25.8.1663 pp.244-263 vol 79 entry 82

¹⁴⁹² CSP *Venice* vol 33, 28.8.1663 pp.256-261 entry 347; CSPD *1663-1664*, 23.8.1663 pp.244-263 vol 79 entry 33

¹⁴⁹³ *Pepys Diary*, 31.12.1662, 30.6.1663

¹⁴⁹⁴ *Pepys Diary*, 28.8.1663

¹⁴⁹⁵ *Pepys Diary*, 20.1.1664, 21.3.1664

¹⁴⁹⁶ *Penn Memoires*, p.264 30.11.1661

¹⁴⁹⁷ *Pepys Diary*, 3.12.1664

military activity like commencing a naval war would be incredibly risky, the heightened probability of finances restricting operations, negating the King's ability to emerge victorious.

Given warfare's extremely unpredictable outcome, it's crucial to ensure that hostilities are adequately funded. As Thomas Munn outlined in the 1664 reprint of his 1641 pamphlet on the funding of government revenues,

"there are some States ... [that do not enjoy] wealth by ordinary revenues as might support them against the suddain and powerful invasions of those mighty Princes which do environ them; they are therefore enforced to strengthen themselves not only with confederates and Leagues (which may often fail them in their greatest need) but also by massing up store of treasure and Munitiōn ... will ever be ready to make a good defence, and to offend or divert their enemies." And "those princes which do not providently lay up Treasure, or do immoderately consume the same when they have it, will soddenly come to want and misery."¹⁴⁹⁸

To magnify the risks of warfare by exposing them to existing funding shortfalls, let alone unforeseen ones is the height of folly, illustrating the King's dangerous economic and financial naivete and overwhelming single focus.

The Dunkirk money, which had been used to fund the navy's ongoing operational costs and accrued liabilities was exhausted by early 1664, with no other Government reserves to cover contingencies.¹⁴⁹⁹ Yet, as the war approached, naval expenditure was expected to dramatically rise. For example, according to Pepys, in ordinary times six months naval costs would total approximately £160,000.¹⁵⁰⁰ Yet, the diarist recorded the comment of the Lord Treasurer's Secretary, Sir Philip Warwick, that in a single year in the last war naval costs had risen to about £1,623,000.¹⁵⁰¹ This was similarly true in the year prior to the war's outbreak. As Chapter Five mentions, this period was spent frantically improving the navy's preparedness, leading to substantially heightened expenditure. The House approved an

¹⁴⁹⁸ Munn *England treasure*, pp.153-154, p.164

¹⁴⁹⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 22.2.1664

¹⁵⁰⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 8.9.1663

¹⁵⁰¹ Pepys *Diary*, 22.11.1664

estimate of £1,700,000 for 1665 naval costs.¹⁵⁰² In November 1664 Pepys referred to “the extraordinary charge already incurred against the Dutch”.¹⁵⁰³ In a pamphlet outlining the King’s speech to both Houses, his Majesty specified the additional cost to that date at just under £800,000.¹⁵⁰⁴ And according to William Coventry’s letter to Secretary Bennet, that year’s accrued costs were £504,000 for sailor’s wages alone, new ship building costs estimated at £600,000 (being capital expenditure), victuals anticipated at just over £304,000 per annum, with additional line items such as the provision of stores.¹⁵⁰⁵ And of course, as also mentioned above, the perennial problem of poor tax collection rates persisted. Consequently, the navy was short of money by December 1664. For instance, in October in Portsmouth St. John Steventon complained to Sir William Penn that financial shortages meant he had great trouble paying seamen and other dockyard workers, having to use sailors from Admiral Montagu’s ships to help rig vessels under construction.¹⁵⁰⁶ And Commissioner Thomas Middleton continually requested more money due to his dockyard’s impecuniousness, emphasising that money is

“a commodity that cannot be done without”.¹⁵⁰⁷

As Chapter Five highlighted the King realised that, once the war commenced, trade would substantially contract, partly because merchants may wish to avoid privateers seizing their vessels and cargoes, but also because the navy would press the mariners required to crew them. This is illustrated by the Sovereign’s covert measures covered in Chapter Five that prompted Parliament to establish a special Trade Committee to take merchants’ complaints, giving the House ‘ownership’ of the forthcoming war. This induced them to request Charles to either ensure redress for mercantile losses from the Dutch or to exact military retribution. The same Chapter conveys this initiative’s success via Parliament’s vote in January 1665 of £2,500,000 to be collected over the ensuing three years, specifically designed to fund naval costs and the forthcoming war.¹⁵⁰⁸ In fact, as the Venetian ambassador outlined, it had been

¹⁵⁰² CSPD 1664-1665, 24.11.1664 entry 76 vol 105

¹⁵⁰³ Pepys *Diary*, 25.11.1664

¹⁵⁰⁴ *Speech to Parliament*

¹⁵⁰⁵ CSPD 1664-1665, November 1664 entry 130 vol 105, 24.11.1664 entry 76 vol 105, 15.12.1664 entry 89 vol 106

¹⁵⁰⁶ CSPD 1664-1665, 11.10.1664 entry 39 vol 103

¹⁵⁰⁷ CSPD 1664-1665, 21.12.1664 entry 18 vol 107, 12.1.1665 entry 70 vol 110, 22.1.1665 entry 25 vol 111

¹⁵⁰⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 8.4.1664 entry 6, 29.4.1664 entry 15, 12.12.1664 entry 100, 19.12.1664 entry 105, 2.1.1665 entry 112, 6.3.1665 entry 137 Enclosure; Pepys *Diary*, 3.12.1664, 10.2.1665; CCSP *vol 5*, 2.12.1664

so successful that this Bill faced only slight opposition.¹⁵⁰⁹ Also, as highlighted by a pamphlet conveying the Sovereign's speech to both Houses, MPs acquiesced by speedily voting additional funds as the build-up of the Kingdom's forces would be too slow without them.¹⁵¹⁰ However, senior naval officials realised that even this was inadequate, Pepys reporting in late March 1665 that Lord Berkeley complained about the navy's lack of ready money, and that Parliament would need to yield further taxes.¹⁵¹¹ In fact, the diarist forcefully emphasised this in April 1665, stating in a presentation to a committee of nobles, including the Lord Treasurer and Lord Albemarle, that he

“gave them a large account of the charge of the navy and want of money”.¹⁵¹²

Other attempts to solve the Crown's pending destitution were pursued. These included attempts to reign in Government expenditure, the House often taking the lead.¹⁵¹³ Further, again as the Venetian ambassador reported, it was decided to follow Cromwell's success in funding his forces by seizing Dutch prizes. For example, in January 1665 a high value Netherlander merchant vessel was captured, containing drugs, spices and other merchandise, by naval vessels commanded by the Earl of Sandwich and Duke of York, acting under the latter's direct orders, these vessels continually patrolling the Channel hunting for victims.¹⁵¹⁴ And the sailor Edward Barlow's *Journal* recounts his involvement in seizing many Netherlander vessels, carrying wine, salt, brandy and other commodities.¹⁵¹⁵ Indeed, the navy's power was felt to be so great that, once the first anticipated overwhelming victory was achieved, the war could be funded totally out of prizes, the Dutch being incapable of resistance.¹⁵¹⁶ Chapter Five outlines the King's proclamation covering this, including similar naval activities like Captain Allen's in the Mediterranean. In late summer 1664 the King personally approached the City to arrange a £100,000 loan at 5% for the navy's use, to be secured against future but currently unallocated tax revenues, which was promptly paid into

pp.448-449; CSPD 1664-1665, 15.12.1664 entry 89 vol 106, 9.2.1665 entry 62 vol 112; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.434-441; *Anno Regni Caroli II*, pp.3-118

¹⁵⁰⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 19.12.1664 entry 105; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.434-441

¹⁵¹⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 23.9.1664 entry 69, 2.1.1665 entry 112; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.441; *Speech to Parliament*, p.5

¹⁵¹¹ *Pepys Diary*, 27.3.1665

¹⁵¹² *Pepys Diary*, 12.4.1665

¹⁵¹³ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 18.3.1664 entry 402

¹⁵¹⁴ *Penn Memoires*, pp.303-304

¹⁵¹⁵ *Barlow Journal*, p.94

¹⁵¹⁶ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 23.9.1664 entry 69, 2.1.1665 entry 112; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.432, p.463

the state coffers, and forwarded to the navy Treasurer.¹⁵¹⁷ Also, the King announced to Parliament in April 1664 that the economy was to be stimulated. A Trade Committee including Lord Sandwich and other ‘great lords of the court’ was established to examine options, although the extent of their commercial experience is not revealed.¹⁵¹⁸ However, merchants favourably received some of its suggestions.¹⁵¹⁹ Another resolution was focused on increasing coin quantities in circulation (see above). A further one aimed to replace bullion transactions by encouraging domestic merchants to make purchases with bonds or bills, these being forms of paper money, and to force foreign merchants to import precious metal when purchasing goods in England.¹⁵²⁰ And following Sir Edward Ford’s suggestion, copper farthing supplies in everyday use were to be increased.¹⁵²¹ Of course, raising the physical supply of money in circulation risked heightening inflation, ultimately deepening people’s woes.¹⁵²²

Therefore, as can be seen, the government’s financial situation was already very poor as it entered the war in March 1665. Clarendon’s *Life* highlights the lax attitude taken in preparing the fleet, stating

“every day added new expense which had not been thought of” and that the officials “cared not how much they increased the expense”.¹⁵²³

To exacerbate matters, according to Sir Phillip Warwick, the continuance of massive naval expenditure meant that a full year’s worth of the £2.5million tax approved in January 1665 had been committed by early April 1665.¹⁵²⁴ Further, as highlighted by the King’s speech to the House, by November 1665 an estimated £1.5 million or more had been absorbed.¹⁵²⁵ However, it should be noted that this hid the crucial underlying issue which stored up problems for later. Using Parliamentary votes for taxes as collateral against which to raise loans from such lenders as City Bankers and Goldsmiths assumed that all taxes could be

¹⁵¹⁷ CSPD 1663-1664, 6.7.1664 entry 22 vol 100; CSPD 1664-1665, October 1664 entry 126 vol 103, 25.10.1664 entry 129 vol 103; CCSP vol 5, 9.6.1664 p.406; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.432

¹⁵¹⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 33, 7.3.1664 entry 400; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 8.4.1664 entry 6, 29.4.1664 entry 15

¹⁵¹⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 7.10.1664 entry 74 Enclosure

¹⁵²⁰ CSPD 1664-1665, 26.6.1663 entry 123 vol 75

¹⁵²¹ Pepys *Diary*, 3.12.1664; CCSP vol 5, 10.3.1665 pp.472-473

¹⁵²² CCSP vol 5, 10.3.1665 pp.472-473

¹⁵²³ Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.503

¹⁵²⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 7.4.1665

¹⁵²⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 1.4.1665; *Christchurch Hall in Oxford*, p.4

raised.¹⁵²⁶ Any interruption in these fiscal flows meant that an accumulation of debt could reach unsustainable proportions. This was indicated as early as June 1665 when the goldsmiths refused further lending to the King, even at increased interest rates.¹⁵²⁷ Additionally, unpaid workmen and their families remained unfed. As they continued to work the personal debts that they contracted in exchange for food and other necessities constituted an informal, but nevertheless important, source of Government finance. This similarly applied to other suppliers such as victuallers, wood merchants etc. The Portsmouth dockyard workers illustrated this in July 1665, as they could no longer afford to toil at their normal work, unilaterally leaving to labour in the fields at haymaking in order to earn some cash.¹⁵²⁸ In combination with the ongoing coin paucity and the war's effects, this led to both a substantial drop in trade and inflation of staples.¹⁵²⁹ The consequent resulting poverty meant that the Government continued unable to collect taxes.¹⁵³⁰ This explains why in August 1665 Captain Teddiman took a breath-taking risk in attempting to capture the rich Dutch Smyrna fleet under the guns of Bergen castle as the country needed the wealth this would have provided for its war effort. Sir Richard Ford told Williamson that the proceeds would pay for a whole year's powder and shot.¹⁵³¹ In fact, the problems were so evident that even the Dutch were fully aware of England's penury, and that the expenses of preparing the fleet continued to tire the King's resources.¹⁵³² The shortages were mocked by pamphlets, stating "Never such ill housewives in the managing/Out of the very beer the steel the malt/Powder out of powder, powder'd beef the salt/The victual with French pork that hath the pox".¹⁵³³

Both to enter the war, and to continue it under these circumstances constitutes an extreme calculated risk, or incredible folly. As Clarendon's *Life* states, just before the war started "there was visibly great want of money, though there were vast sums raised", and "it was demonstrable how much his expenses exceeded his income; and how impossible it would be, without lessening these to provide wherewithal to supply necessary occasions."¹⁵³⁴

¹⁵²⁶ CSPD 1666-1667, 15.11.1666 entry 69 vol 178; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, pp.8-9

¹⁵²⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 21.6.1665; CSP *Venice* vol 34, 12.6.1665. entry 196

¹⁵²⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 1.7.1665

¹⁵²⁹ CSPD 1664-1665, 16.6.1665 entry 6 vol 127, 16.7.1665 entry 6 vol 127, 17.8.1665 entry 45 vol 129

¹⁵³⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 27.1.1665, 27.3.1665, 3.9.1665

¹⁵³¹ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 25.8.1665 entry 241, 1.9.1665 entry 246; CSPD 1664-1665, 12.8.165 entry 16 vol 129

¹⁵³² CSP *Venice* vol 34, 12.6.1665 entry 196; CSPD 1664-1665, 5.5.1665 entry 68 vol 120

¹⁵³³ *A second and third advice*, p.28

¹⁵³⁴ Clarendon *Life* vol 3, pp.3-4

It is therefore plain that even before the war commenced, its disastrous outcome was pre-ordained, albeit the exact manner was undetermined. Undeniably the King achieved early military successes, such as against the Spanish and the Mediterranean pirates, yet these were achieved against a backdrop of accumulating debt, despite a short-term reprieve provided by Dunkirk's sale. To mix metaphors, the rising financial woes constituted a 'ticking timebomb', with the firm fiscal foundations necessary for military activity consisting of sand. This meant that defeat was inevitable in the conflict against the Dutch.

The Economic Effects of the Plague.

Samuel Pepys's October 1663 diary entry records that

"the plague is got to Amsterdam, brought from a ship from Algier; and is also carried to Hamburg".¹⁵³⁵

Both the Venetian ambassador and Downing in one of his regular reports from Holland to Clarendon confirm this, adding that the vessel that transported this highly undesirable cargo was a man of war.¹⁵³⁶ In late 1663 the King initially tried to curtail the bacteria's entry into England, issuing strict orders that all vessels coming from Holland had to be quarantined.¹⁵³⁷ For example all merchant vessels entering the Thames had to seclude themselves at Gravesend. And in Hull, port officials were very aware of the need to quarantine all incoming craft.¹⁵³⁸ The measure was variously successful, such as in Plymouth where John Clerke reported to Joseph Williamson that those who originated there and visited infected places fully complied with forty days quarantine.¹⁵³⁹ However, this wasn't universal. At Whitby vessels from Zealand, Holland and Hamburg and other diseased locations were ordered to isolate, but mariners from one ship slipped ashore. Local customs officials incarcerated them, but large numbers of sailors from other ships swarmed ashore and threatened to free the perpetrators unless they were released. The Government was forced to dispatch the militia to enforce quarantine regulations, those refusing compliance being

¹⁵³⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 19.10.1663; Penn *Memoires*, 30.10.1663 p.286

¹⁵³⁶ CCSP *vol 5*, 4.12.1663 p.351; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 20.11.1663 entry 365 Enclosure

¹⁵³⁷ CSP *Venice vol 33*, 20.11.1663 entry 365 Enclosure; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 23.9.1664 entry 70 Enclosure; Pepys *Diary*, 19.10.1663, 26.11.1663; CCSP *vol 5*, 5.2.1664 p.369, 5.8.1664 p.412

¹⁵³⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 19.10.1663, 26.11.1663; CSP *Venice vol 33*, 20.11.1663 entry 365; CSPD *1664-1665*, 22.11.1664 entry 57 vol 105

¹⁵³⁹ CSPD *1663-1664*, 3.7.1664 entry 9 vol 100

punished.¹⁵⁴⁰ As highlighted by the July 1664 pamphlet conveying the King's reply to the Dutch ambassador, Van Gogh, the King eventually had to close all English ports to Netherlander vessels.¹⁵⁴¹ However, although the Whitby incident didn't result in local infections, other locations weren't so lucky. In Yarmouth some seamen from a Holland ship made unauthorised journeys ashore. The authorities were forced to shut up two houses, and although there was only one death initially, according to Henry Muddiman's journalistic reports, it quickly spread.¹⁵⁴² Further, a Rotterdam vessel clearly didn't follow isolation rules, several dying from the bacteria it brought to London.¹⁵⁴³

As Bishop Burnet's *History* states,

“as soon as the war broke out a most terrible plague broke out also in the City of London, that scattered all the inhabitants that were able to remove themselves elsewhere.”

Clarendon's *Life* recounts how it commenced in the poor districts of London's outskirts and narrow alleys. However, by March 1665 it had grown so much that the King, court and Parliament were preparing to decamp from London, eventually to Oxford, where Government continued, the Houses having been prorogued. Actually, this was considered essential to the war effort also, given that a large number of Parliamentarians and court officials performed war-related duties. In fact, the pestilence quickly spread nationally.¹⁵⁴⁴ As Burnet continued,

“it swept away about 100,000 souls; the greatest havoc that any plague had ever made in England. This did dishearten all people”.¹⁵⁴⁵

Growing throughout the year, the zenith constituted the second week of September 1665 with a weekly death toll of 7486.¹⁵⁴⁶

¹⁵⁴⁰ CSPD 1663-1664, 18.8.1664 entry 62 vol 101, 28.8.1664 entry 81 vol 101

¹⁵⁴¹ *Memorial Delivered*, pp.14-15

¹⁵⁴² CSPD 1664-1665, 22.11.1664 entry 50 vol 105, 23.11.1664 entry 58 vol 105, 30.11.1664 entry 123 vol 105; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.147 28.5.1665

¹⁵⁴³ CSPD 1664-1665, 18.11.1664 entry 12 vol 105

¹⁵⁴⁴ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.314; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.466-467, pp.536-537; Evelyn *Diary vol 2*, 2.3.1665 p.3; CSPD 1664-1665, 5.9.1665 entry 28 vol 132; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 1.9.1665 entry 247

¹⁵⁴⁵ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.306; CSPD 1664-1665, Dec 1665 entry 95 vol 140

¹⁵⁴⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 23.6.1665 entry 205, 15.9.1665 entry 256; Barlow *Journal*, p.112; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.149 23.9.1665

As Burnet also recorded the plague

“broke the trade of the nation”,

with the Earl of Peterborough opining to Williamson, as State Papers record, that the plague infinitely disrupted the nation’s trade.¹⁵⁴⁷ Importantly, it wasn’t just the court that vacated the capital, but any who had the means to escape, leaving the empty streets feeling like a country village. Mostly it was the poor who remained, their numbers increasing as they were unable to get paid work as the employers had fled.¹⁵⁴⁸ As Evelyn stated, that

“in the streets, now thin of people; the shops shut up”, and “the multitudes of poor, pestiferous creatures begging alms; the shops universally shut up, a dreadful prospect!”.¹⁵⁴⁹

This resulted in extreme poverty. In London begging was rife, Pepys recording that there were only poor wretches in the streets.¹⁵⁵⁰ In Norwich Robert Scrivener reported to Joseph Williamson that the shops were shut and only the poor remain, asking for church collections to aid them.¹⁵⁵¹ And according to State Papers, in Commissioner Middleton’s letter to Pepys, in Portsmouth workmen pawned their goods to buy bread, with prices rapidly rising due to the failure of the harvest to be collected.¹⁵⁵² As stated in Rev. Hunter’s December 1666 sermon at York Minster,

“the liberty of commerce is very necessary, hereby it is that men get a subsistence and livelihood for their families, but this liberty likewise the plague debars a man from, none dare traffic with him” and so “he is much disabled by the plague”.¹⁵⁵³

Consequently, the King’s inability to fund his Government and particularly the war effort was overwhelming. As the Venetian ambassador and other sources reported, in addition to underlying poor economic conditions, the coin paucity and inflation, the plague’s devastation

¹⁵⁴⁷ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.306; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 17.8.1665 entry 54; CSPD *1664-1665*, 18.8.1665 entry 59 vol 129, 11.7.1666 entry 67 vol 162; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.149 22.10.1665

¹⁵⁴⁸ CSPD *1664-1665*, 16.6.1665 entry 96 vol 124, 3.7.1665 entry 12 vol 126, 16.7.1665 entry 39 vol 63; Pepys *Diary* 8.8.1665

¹⁵⁴⁹ Evelyn *Diary vol 2*, 7.9.1665, 11.10.1665

¹⁵⁵⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 20.9.1665, 5.1.1666

¹⁵⁵¹ CSPD *1664-1665*, 11.7.1665 entries 66 and 67 vol 162

¹⁵⁵² CSPD *1664-1665*, 10.6.1666 entry 72 vol 158, 5.10.1665 entry 39 vol 134

¹⁵⁵³ *Dreadfulness of the plague*, p.11

meant that the King had even more trouble raising taxes as the population as a whole didn't have the available money.¹⁵⁵⁴ So, it was irrelevant how much additional tax Parliament voted, such as the £1.25 million passed in November 1665.¹⁵⁵⁵ For example, in the approximate eighteen months to September 1666 the total taxes raised from all sources were merely £959,345.¹⁵⁵⁶ Naturally Customs receipts were drastically denuded, for instance Bristol Collectors stated that they had nothing to hand over due to a lack of trade, Pepys signalling that London Customs Houses were unmanned.¹⁵⁵⁷ As Clarendon stated,

“the plague and the war had so totally broken and distracted those receipts”.¹⁵⁵⁸

Further, bankers' desertion of the capital to their various remote native localities made it incredibly difficult for Charles to raise loans, increasing his fiscal tragedy.¹⁵⁵⁹ In fact, the tradition of raising loans using an Act for taxation as collateral collapsed as the few bankers available were unwilling to lend as they disbelieved the country's ability to yield taxes, exposing his Majesty's dreadful credit worthiness, Pepys reporting this being heightened by previous failures to repay loans.¹⁵⁶⁰ Matters were so desperate that Charles resorted to borrowing small amounts, such as the £50,000 from the East India Company against two recent prizes.¹⁵⁶¹ And as State Papers revealed, the King wrote to the Deputy Lords Lieutenants to encourage counties and corporations to lend.¹⁵⁶²

The Economic Effects of The Great Fire.

The Great Fire took the country's economic catastrophe emanating from the plague to an appalling new level. The economy had begun to recover. For instance, some of the nobles

¹⁵⁵⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 22.9.1665 entries 256 and 159, 30.12.1665 entry 318; *Pepys Diary*, 9.9.1665; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.126-127

¹⁵⁵⁵ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 3.11.1665 entry 289; *Pepys Diary*, 15.10.1665, 27.11.1665, 27.7.1666; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.126-127

¹⁵⁵⁶ CSPD *1664-1665*, 15.9.1666 entry 125 entry 171

¹⁵⁵⁷ CSPD *1667-1667*, 25.8.1666 entry 180 vol 168; *Pepys Diary*, 7.11.1665; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.126-127

¹⁵⁵⁸ Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.126-127

¹⁵⁵⁹ *Pepys Diary*, 15.10.1665; CSPD *1664-1665*, 11.9.1665 entry 65i vol 132; CSPD *1665-1666*, 20.11.1665 entry 54 vol 137, Feb 1666 entry 88 vol 149; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 1.9.1665 entry 247; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.126-127

¹⁵⁶⁰ CSPD *1665-1666*, 9.12.1665 entry 71 vol 138; *Pepys Diary*, 3.9.1665, 27.11.1665, 18.6.1666

¹⁵⁶¹ CSPD *1665-1666*, 3.11.1665 entry 22 vol 136; *Pepys Diary*, 11.12.1665

¹⁵⁶² CSPD *1665-1666*, 1.2.1666 entry 2 vol 147, 13.2.1666 entry 110 vol 147, 12.6.1666 entry 95 vol 158

with their associated spending power had returned to London, Pepys in January 1666 noting that

“everyone staring to see a nobleman’s coach come to town”, with the shops beginning to open as the “town fills again”.

Indeed, according to Evelyn the King had returned to Hampton Court by the end of January.¹⁵⁶³ And Sir George Downing wrote to Joseph Williamson, as State Papers show, that

“the city is wonderfully full of people”.¹⁵⁶⁴

And Burnet stated that returning merchants were building up their stock in the expectation of increased sales.¹⁵⁶⁵ However, as pamphlets recounted, starting in the evening of 2nd September 1666, a conflagration of biblical proportions engulfed London, Pepys describing one dreadful scene as

“we saw the fire as only one entire arch of fire in a bow up the hill of above a mile long”.¹⁵⁶⁶

Burnet stated it was

“as if it had a commission to devour everything that was in its way.”¹⁵⁶⁷

Clarendon’s *Life* states that

“the nights more terrible than the days. And the light the same, the light of the fire supplying that of the sun.”¹⁵⁶⁸

Evelyn summed it up,

¹⁵⁶³ Evelyn *Diary vol 2*, 29.1.1666; Parker *History Book 1*, pp.117-122

¹⁵⁶⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 5.1.1666, 31.12.1666; CSPD 1665-1666, 13.1.1666 vol 8 vol 145; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.35

¹⁵⁶⁵ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.321

¹⁵⁶⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 2.9.1666, 3.9.1666; *Counsel to the afflicted*, to the reader; *Short narrative*, pp.1-2

¹⁵⁶⁷ Burnet *History vol 1*, p.322

¹⁵⁶⁸ Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.88

“London was, but is no more”.¹⁵⁶⁹

Chaos reigned, people’s panic in trying to save their lives and goods mixed with others involved in looting.¹⁵⁷⁰ An anonymous correspondent aptly described the scene, writing from London to Philip Pedder of Newport, as State Papers record on 13th September, stating

“in three days the most flourishing city in the world is a ruinous heap, the streets only being known by the maimed remainder of the churches”.¹⁵⁷¹

Of course, as the country was at war, the protection of the Tower’s powder stores was vital, surrounding houses being blown up to create fire breaks.¹⁵⁷² The Venetian ambassador summarised the financial effects,

“a lot of money and capital has been lost”.¹⁵⁷³ He added “the merchants have lost everything and the nobles are for the most part impoverished. London held the best of that kingdom; so one may believe that the losses was considerable”.

Clarendon stated that

“if so vast a damage as £200,000 befell that little company of stationers in books and paper and the like, what shall we conceive was lost in cloth (of which the country clothiers lost all that they had brought up to Blackwell-Hall against Michaelmas which was all burned with that fair structure) in silks of all kinds, in linen and those richer manufactures? Not to speak of money, plate and jewels”.¹⁵⁷⁴

In fact, they were estimated at around £100 million, Pepys reporting that booksellers’ losses alone were £150,000.¹⁵⁷⁵ Further, London’s Mayor reported the destruction of 16,000

¹⁵⁶⁹ Evelyn *Diary vol 2*, 3.9.1666; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.154 2.9.1666, pp.154-155 9.9.1666, p.155 23.9.1666

¹⁵⁷⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 2.9.1666, 3.9.1666, 6.9.1666; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 28.9.1666 entry 77; CSPD *1664-1665*, Sept 1666 entry 105 vol 173, 6.9.1666 entry 125 vol 170, 19.9.1665 entry 44 vol 172; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.97-99

¹⁵⁷¹ CSPD *1664-1665*, 13.9.1666 entry 96 vol 171

¹⁵⁷² Pepys *Diary*, 4.9.1666; CSPD *1666-1667*, 8.9.1666 entry 150 vol 170; Evelyn *Diary vol 2*, 7.9.1666

¹⁵⁷³ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 28.9.1666 entry 77

¹⁵⁷⁴ Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.99

¹⁵⁷⁵ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 5.10.1666 entry 84

houses, and up to £600,000 per annum lost in rents.¹⁵⁷⁶ And as Clarendon highlighted, the loss of so many houses meant Chimney money was denuded.¹⁵⁷⁷ This latter was exacerbated as London's population was depleted, 250,000 wandering around homeless. Many took shelter in fields outside London, the King ordering up dockyard canvas for protection and ship's biscuits for sustenance.¹⁵⁷⁸

Rents for remaining properties significantly rose, magnifying financial hardship.¹⁵⁷⁹ And worse, the commercial docks, wharfs and customs houses were lost, vital to future mercantile activity and the consequent King's Customs revenues.¹⁵⁸⁰ The effects were felt nationally, London constituting a national trading hub, Clarendon stating

“the effects of this calamity covered the whole country”.¹⁵⁸¹

From Coventry Raymond Hope wrote to Joseph Williamson, as State Papers record, that that city's clothiers' loss was £2,000.¹⁵⁸² From Norwich Robert Scrivener informed James Hickeys that people were in despair as they couldn't carry on their trade due to the Fire.¹⁵⁸³ And the story was repeated everywhere, from Hull, Chester, Whitby, Glasgow, Bridgewater to Falmouth.¹⁵⁸⁴

Accordingly the King was absolutely financially desperate, unable to pursue governmental business till further amounts were approved.¹⁵⁸⁵ Indeed his Majesty chased Parliament, so extreme was his position.¹⁵⁸⁶ The House eventually voted a poll tax, including sealed paper and Excise, of £1.8 million.¹⁵⁸⁷ However, similar to the Plague's effects, the country was financially on its knees, and combined with the ongoing coin paucity, the impoverished population couldn't meet the fiscal demands.¹⁵⁸⁸ For example, tenants were so poor that

¹⁵⁷⁶ CSPD 1666-1667, Nov 1666 entry 178 vol 179; Pepys *Diary*, 15.9.1666

¹⁵⁷⁷ Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.126-127

¹⁵⁷⁸ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 5.10.1666 entries 82 and 84; CSPD 1666-1667, 5.9.1666 entry 95 vol 170

¹⁵⁷⁹ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 10.8.1666 entry 323

¹⁵⁸⁰ CSPD 1666-1667, Sept 1666 entry 120 vol 173

¹⁵⁸¹ Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.100

¹⁵⁸² CSPD 1666-1667, 29.9.1666 entry 83 vol 173

¹⁵⁸³ CSPD 1666-1667, 17.9.1666 entry 6 vol 172

¹⁵⁸⁴ CSPD 1666-1667, 15.9.1666 entries 138 and 141 vol 171, 10.9.1666 entry 41 vol 171, 12.9.1666 entry 79 vol 171, 14.10.1666 entry 18 vol 175, 15.10.1666 entry 36 vol 175,

¹⁵⁸⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 17.2.1667

¹⁵⁸⁶ CSPD 1666-1667, 21.9.1666 entry 98 vol 172, 1.11.1666 entry 6 vol 177

¹⁵⁸⁷ CSPD 1666-1667, 6.11.1666 entry 80 vol 177, 15.11.1666 entry 69 vol 178; Pepys *Diary*, 13.10.1666

¹⁵⁸⁸ CSPD 1666-1667, 15.10.1666 entry 66 vol 175; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.126-127

landlords had to take goods instead of rents, Lord Bulkeley receiving at least 300 head of cattle.¹⁵⁸⁹ In fact, in several places such as King's Lynn, Hereford and Newcastle people rioted against the tax collectors, authorities appeasing locals by agreeing only to collect from those willing to pay in order to attain peace and some money.¹⁵⁹⁰ The total tax collected reflected these multiple local conditions. During 1666 Hearth Tax raised was only £73,158, the normal expected amount being £300,000 (see above), from the poll tax £540,035 and the seal tax £200,325, totalling £813,518. Compared to the Commons vote of £1.8 million, this was disastrous, representing just over 45%. Consequently, in January 1667 the King requested more money from Parliament, this time being voted £1,256,347.¹⁵⁹¹ And of course collection problems persisted due to the dire economy, many tenants being so poor that loads of them "flung up" their land, rents being unaffordable. The Duke of Buckingham alone lost £6,000 annual revenue.¹⁵⁹² And according to Richard Bower when writing to Joseph Williamson,

"the poll bill in Yarmouth will not amount to £400".¹⁵⁹³

London's Lord Mayor petitioned the King for remission of the city's taxes of £23,641 as it couldn't be gathered from those parts destroyed by the Fire and which were depopulated.¹⁵⁹⁴ Indeed, the population was becoming hugely disillusioned with the high tax levels in addition to their inability to pay, many being assessed for 3 or 4 taxes concurrently.¹⁵⁹⁵ Many country gentry and merchants attempted to avoid their dues, people burying their money, that is hoarding it.¹⁵⁹⁶ And disastrously, yet again, the bankers refused to lend to the Government, having no faith in the state's ability to repay the loans due to the poor collection process and public financial maladministration, cutting off the Crown's virtually only source of cash.¹⁵⁹⁷ Indeed, the bankers' worries had some foundation. Burnet stated Parliament had voted over £5 million towards the war.¹⁵⁹⁸ Pepys confirmed this, adding that by October 1666 the King

¹⁵⁸⁹ CSPD 1666-1667, 27.10.1666 entry 60 vol 176

¹⁵⁹⁰ CSPD 1666-1667, 16.11.1666 entry 88 vol 178, 5.12.1666 entry 88 vol 180, 7.12.1666 entry 127 vol 180, 8.12.1666 entry 15 vol 181

¹⁵⁹¹ CSPD 1666-1667, 18.1.1667 entry 151 vol 188, 8.2.1667 entry 8.2.1667 entry 53 vol 191

¹⁵⁹² Pepys *Diary*, 24.10.1666, 9.4.1667

¹⁵⁹³ CSPD 1666-1667, 20.3.1667 entry 84 vol 194; Pepys *Diary*, 12.11.1666

¹⁵⁹⁴ CSPD 1667-1668, Dec 1667 entry 236 vol 225

¹⁵⁹⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 27.11.1666

¹⁵⁹⁶ CSPD 1666-1667, 6.3.1667 entry 59 vol 193; Pepys *Diary*, 5.11.1666, 5.4.1667

¹⁵⁹⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 10.10.1666, 19.10.1666, 3.4.1667, 27.1.1667, 17.2.1667; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, pp.157-158

¹⁵⁹⁸ Burnet *History* vol 1, pp.351-352

had been voted £5,590,000 towards the hostilities, with the navy's charge totalling £3,200,000. This left £2,390,000 unaccounted for, possibly reflecting the staggering amount of revenue uncollected.¹⁵⁹⁹

Consequently, due to these accumulated economic conditions the navy's fiscal situation virtually collapsed, both in terms of tax revenues and formal loans. For instance, as State Papers show, in December 1666 Sir George Carteret, the Navy Treasurer, reported to the Navy Commissioners that he could borrow a measly £5,000 or £6,000, formal lending sources having all but dried up.¹⁶⁰⁰ Informal debt sources were also exhausted, individuals having consumed their private credit lines. As State Papers highlighted, vital supplies dried up. In December 1666 Thomas Beckford informed the Navy Commissioners that he couldn't provide slops as he was £20,000 out of pocket and with no personal credit remaining to him.¹⁶⁰¹ From the Forest of Dean, Dan Furzier reported that he couldn't supply wood as his men had left to find alternate work for money for food, no local credit being available to them, with Mr. Furzier being personally in "an extreme state".¹⁶⁰² The victualler supplier, Dennis Gawden, requested in January 1666 that he either be paid or released from his contract, a year later refusing to supply provisions as he remained unpaid, being owed around £425,000.¹⁶⁰³

In the dockyards poverty similarly reigned. From Dover, Thomas White informed the Navy Commissioners that he had

"exhausted all personal credit"

and was at risk of incarceration.¹⁶⁰⁴ At Plymouth John Lanyon in his letter to the same body stated that he owed £7,950 and couldn't borrow more to keep the dockyard operating.¹⁶⁰⁵

From Portsmouth, Commissioner Thomas Middleton informed Pepys that the dockyard's lack of money meant that unpaid workers were being arrested for debt.¹⁶⁰⁶ And in Harwich

¹⁵⁹⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 10.10.1666

¹⁶⁰⁰ CSPD *1666-1667*, 20.12.1666 entry 65 vol 182; Pepys *Diary*, 19.7.1666, 7.10.1666

¹⁶⁰¹ CSPD *1666-1667*, 22.12.1666 entry 91 vol 182

¹⁶⁰² CSPD *1666-1667*, 11.1.1667 entry 77 vol 188, 4.10.1667 entry 41 vol 219

¹⁶⁰³ CSPD *1665-1666*, 13.1.1666 entry 19 vol 145; CSPD *1666-1667*, 24.1.1667 entry 47 vol 87; CSPD *1667-1667*, July 1667 entry 125 vol 211; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, pp.157-158

¹⁶⁰⁴ CSPD *1666-1667*, 26.1.1667 entry 63 vol 189

¹⁶⁰⁵ CSPD *1666-1667*, 1.2.1667 entry 15i vol 190

¹⁶⁰⁶ CSPD *1666-1667*, 2.11.1666 entry 116 vol 177

Commissioner John Taylor apprised the Navy Commissioners that dockyard workers are owed so much pay that they couldn't meet their debts, leading to many towns people being undone.¹⁶⁰⁷

The result was that the navy's operational effectiveness was ruined. Unpaid sailors mutinied. Even soldiers that otherwise could be relied upon to man the dockyards and ships deserted due to a lack of pay.¹⁶⁰⁸ Also, most dockyards such as Hull, Bristol, Dover and Plymouth reported that the vessels currently in port would remain there due to their lack of funds to effect repairs.¹⁶⁰⁹ Of course, as Dan Fuzier reported to the Navy Commissioners, new ships under construction would remain unfinished.¹⁶¹⁰

Some authors assert that Charles did not put a fleet to sea in 1667 because he couldn't afford to, heightening the country's vulnerability to such Dutch incursions as at the Medway. However, although as has been clearly shown above this was true, in reality the navy's operational collapse was so thorough that he virtually had no navy to deploy, denuding him of any choice in the matter. For a King that relied totally for the fulfilment of both his aspirations and reputation on this hitherto magnificent military asset, this displays an overwhelming Royal negligence.

The Economic Effects of the Battle of Medway.

The Dutch encroachment into the Medway substantially compounded the economic destitution caused by both the Plague and the Great Fire. The Dutch humiliated the English navy, attacking it in a home port and towing away the King's flagship (see Chapter Seven). The population fully expected the Hollanders and French to invade.¹⁶¹¹ As if the country hadn't undergone enough economic turmoil, it was plunged into further depths, having had no time to recover from the previous two calamities.¹⁶¹² The panic the Medway disaster engendered virtually caused the economic system's collapse, leading to various appalling results. There was a run on the banks and other deposit takers like goldsmiths, causing

¹⁶⁰⁷ CSPD 1667-1667, 14.9.1667 entry 22 vol 217

¹⁶⁰⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 31.10.1666, 31.12.1666, 4.4.1667; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.157-158

¹⁶⁰⁹ CSPD 1666-1667, 18.1.1667 entry 144 vol 188, 26.1.1667 entry 63 vol 189; CSPD 1667-1667, 22.4.1667 entry 3 vol 198, 27.4.1667 entry 78 vol 198; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.157-158, p.187

¹⁶¹⁰ CSPD 1666-1667, 11.1.1667 entry 77 vol 188

¹⁶¹¹ CSPD 1667-1667, 3.6.1667 entry 37 vol 203, 15.6.1667 entry 76 vol 206; Pepys *Diary*, 13.6.1667

¹⁶¹² CSP *Venice vol 35*, 6.7.1667 entry 305

bankers to run out of cash and close their doors, signalling a near collapse in this vital sector.¹⁶¹³ Consequently, depositors were denied access to their money, naturally leading to them hoarding their cash. Pepys candidly reported that he was burying his money in a variety of places, the Government's Exchequer taking in so much of the citizen's savings that there was a fear the floors would collapse.¹⁶¹⁴ The King's promise to underwrite the financiers was apparently the only thing preventing a complete melt down, providing some relief from the terror that would otherwise have occurred.¹⁶¹⁵ Accordingly, the economic system seized up. In January 1668 Col Birch told Pepys that the nation's lack of money meant that land was selling for nothing, the correspondent also recording the Kingdom's great poverty.¹⁶¹⁶ Or as Rev Jocelyn simply put it,

“we have scarcity of money”.¹⁶¹⁷

Unsurprisingly, his Majesty was extremely concerned about the country's economic state, and his associated heavy debts, a newsletter reporting the Treasury's ill condition due to the great anticipations on it, its debts exceeding £1 million.¹⁶¹⁸ Immediately following England's military humbling in the Medway, there was no point in the King requesting Parliament to vote new taxes, Pepys reporting that none could be raised as

“the Parliament itself cannot be thought able at present to raise money, and therefore it will be to no purpose to call one”.¹⁶¹⁹

Further, in such extremis with the possible loss of his throne to a foreign power, the Monarch could only borrow a measly £10,000 from the City to secure the Thames.¹⁶²⁰ Consequently, Charles was forced to sue for a swift peace, highlighting both his total military failure and inability to defend the nation. This constitutes a total collapse in prior attempts to portray himself as a ‘warrior King’ (see Chapter Two) and a total shadow compared to Cromwell's high profile martial prowess.

¹⁶¹³ CSPD 1667-1667, 15.6.1667 entry 76 vol 206; 29.6.1667 entry 113 vol 207; *Pepys Diary*, 13.6.1667, 17.6.1667

¹⁶¹⁴ *Pepys Diary*, 13.6.1667, 14.6.1667

¹⁶¹⁵ CSPD 1667-1667, 29.6.1667 entry 113 vol 207; *Pepys Diary*, 23.6.1667

¹⁶¹⁶ *Pepys Diary*, 31.1.1668, 30.4.1668

¹⁶¹⁷ *Jocelyn Diary*, p.158 9.2.1668

¹⁶¹⁸ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 30.11.1668 entry 382; CSPD 1667-1667, 2.9.1667 entry 19 vol 216

¹⁶¹⁹ *Pepys Diary*, 18.6.1667

¹⁶²⁰ *Pepys Diary*, 22.6.1667

Further, the Medway's aftermath led to a scramble to rectify the Crown's financial fiasco, lasting well into 1668 and beyond. The immediate impact was the Crown's restriction of payments, a committee of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury approving every payment, effectively controlling and delaying outflows.¹⁶²¹ Given the Government's dreadful credit worthiness, in a humiliating attempt to acquire at least minimal sums, in August 1667 Charles resorted to borrowing directly from the public, embarrassingly small amounts being received of between £20-£50 per person, to be repaid in two years at 10% interest.¹⁶²² This was regarded as the King's nadir, and probably for the whole reign.¹⁶²³ His subjects were loathed to part with their money as they feared that they'd never see it again.¹⁶²⁴ In an additional humiliation, in early 1668 the King was forced to essentially beg his Legislature for further taxes. Following a speech to the Houses, Parliament reluctantly debated the grant of a meagre £300,000, £100,000 to be from Customs on wine, the remainder from a poll tax, having already voted for over £5 million in just three years.¹⁶²⁵ How anyone expected the collection of even this relatively small amount is a mystery, for example even before the Medway disaster, in January 1667, only a third of poll tax was realised.¹⁶²⁶ And in July 1668 as highlighted in Richard Bower's letter to Joseph Williamson in the State Papers, the Act is "so lame that it will never answer the fourth penny of what was intended to be raised by it",

and in fact the large proportion based on Customs on wine discouraged this lucrative trade.¹⁶²⁷ The economy remained in a protracted extremely severe recession, possibly even a depression, ongoing heavy inflation adding to fiscal woes.¹⁶²⁸ And of course the coin shortage remained acute, with organisations like the Royal Fishing Company petitioning Charles to be allowed to mint its own farthings.¹⁶²⁹ However, by April 1668 the Legislature failed to approve further, but miserly amounts, the Commons demanding the Royal finances'

¹⁶²¹ *Pepys Diary*, 23.6.1667; CSPD 1667-1667, 16.10.1667 entry 42 vol 220

¹⁶²² *Pepys Diary*, 23.8.1667, 24.8.1667, 30.8.1667; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.259

¹⁶²³ *Pepys Diary*, 24.8.1667

¹⁶²⁴ *Pepys Diary*, 27.12.1667

¹⁶²⁵ CSPD 1667-1668, 9.12.1667 entry 86 vol 224, 2.3.1667 entry 190 vol 235, 17.3.1667 entry 182 vol 236; CSP *Venice* vol 35, 21.12.1668 entry 386; *Pepys Diary*, 10.2.1668, 26.2.1668, 17.3.1668, 30.4.1668

¹⁶²⁶ *Pepys Diary*, 27.1.1667

¹⁶²⁷ CSPD 1667-1668, 23.5.1668 entry 111 vol 239, 3.7.1668 entry 130 vol 242

¹⁶²⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 17.8.1668 entry 327, 21.12.1668 entry 386

¹⁶²⁹ CSPD 1666-1667, 4.1.1667 entry 24ii vol 188

wholesale retrenchment.¹⁶³⁰ These swingeing changes anticipated future Government revenue totalling £1,030,000, expenses dropped to £996,475, including £90,000 from the Royal household, and navy and army costs reduced respectively to £200,000 and £167,698. Surplus tax receipts were to be applied to pension payments. However, this seems optimistic, for example his Majesty's total 1667 revenue totalled £922,580 with collection costs at £44,300, a net position of £878,280, the Crown's financial position worsening due to the possible ongoing future deficit.¹⁶³¹

It is widely acknowledged that a Government's primary duty is to defend the nation. As Pepys firmly observed Charles showed himself a total failure in this.¹⁶³² The problems emanating from naval funding's absence being worsened during and following the Dutch Medway incursion. During an acute military necessity, that is an expected invasion, sailors refused to serve without receiving advanced pay, the same applying to dockyard workmen.¹⁶³³ And of course a paucity of sailors caused by naval impecuniousness meant no navy by definition. In fact, some sailors deserted to the Dutch as they were totally alienated from the English navy and its pecuniary problems, in the full expectation of receiving ready money, passing auditors hearing them saying

“we did heretofore fight for tickets; now we fight for dollars!”¹⁶³⁴

The same applied to stores, such as the inability to purchase the grapnels crucial to boarding enemy vessels from smaller boats where the deployment of ships to counter the Dutch was impossible. Indeed, the small boats themselves were extremely scarce.¹⁶³⁵

The problems continued beyond the immediate crisis. The navy's enduring money shortage meant that it couldn't afford a fleet of any size for a considerable period, and certainly within this thesis's time period. In August 1667 Pepys recorded a defunct proposal for a fleet consisting of ten ships for a winter guard and twenty-four for the summer. Further, in

¹⁶³⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 10.2.1668, 26.2.1668, 17.3.1668, 30.4.1668; CSPD *1667-1668*, December 1667 entry 251 vol 225

¹⁶³¹ CSPD *1667-1668*, 23.1.1668 entry 24 vol 233, 16.3.1668 entries 158 and 159 vol 236, 22.7.1668 entry 102 vol 143

¹⁶³² Pepys *Diary*, 15.6.1667

¹⁶³³ Pepys *Diary*, 10.6.1667, 17.6.1667, 25.6.1667; CSPD *1667-1667*, 27.6.1667 entry 66 vol 207, 2.9.1667 entry 29 vol 216

¹⁶³⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 14.6.1667

¹⁶³⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 2.7.1667, 15.6.1667

January 1668 the diarist reported that the King and Council decided to dispatch a fleet of fifty vessels the following year, further recording that as there was no money, this was just a “bluff” to try and achieve some money from Parliament.¹⁶³⁶ Additionally, the problem with mutinous sailors continued.¹⁶³⁷ In fact, the navy commenced to sell various vessels, especially damaged ones as it didn’t have the money to repair them, absorbing any proceeds into its own funds.¹⁶³⁸ And as the Venetian ambassador highlighted, some of those remaining were offered to foreign powers on hire, such as to the Venetians to aid their conflict against the Ottomans.¹⁶³⁹ In total, this meant that not only did the Sovereign lack a fleet to repel invaders, but also that he couldn’t protect the coastlines from privateer attacks, this failure being vividly illustrated in full view of his coastal subjects, these people representing part of the population that he wished to reign over as absolute monarch!¹⁶⁴⁰

The Humbling of the King.

Overall, the King hoped the war would leave him independent of Parliament and de facto absolute monarch. However, his catastrophic martial defeat meant he was domestically humbled and further from his goal than ever. As State Papers record, and as previously mentioned in this work, in his letter to Joseph Williamson from Knowlton, Sir Thomas Peyton summarised the situation,

“the consequence of the King’s losing his seamen, in whom his strength lies as certainly as did Samson did his hair, is seen in the loss of ships that follows”.¹⁶⁴¹

Further, in modern lingo, bluntly, the Government was bankrupt. His Majesty’s condition was perilous, and legitimately feared for his throne.¹⁶⁴² After all, the Commonwealth’s Committee of Safety lost power due to fiscal collapse enacted by pressure from the navy, causing Lambert’s unpaid troops to desert, leaving Monck’s route south unopposed (see Chapter 1). In Charles’s case he was overwhelmingly defeated, bankrupt and had no

¹⁶³⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 15.1.1668, 16.1.1668, 4.3.1668, 28.3.1668, 4.6.1668

¹⁶³⁷ Pepys *Diary*, 30.4.1668

¹⁶³⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 3.9.1667; CSPD 1666-1667, 9.9.1667 entry 106 vol 216

¹⁶³⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 24.1.1668 entry 272

¹⁶⁴⁰ Pepys *Diary*, 28.12.1667

¹⁶⁴¹ CSPD 1667-1667, 12.7.1667 entry 67 vol 209

¹⁶⁴² CSP *Venice vol 35*, 23.11.1667 entry 248

functioning military, the Dutch and French being unopposed in their designs. The comparison is startling.

His Majesty legitimately feared the reaction of society's two strata. The first constituted the 'ordinary people', whose opinions were evident in 'the streets'. The second were the aristocracy and squirearchy, that is those who voted and had Parliamentary influence. Regarding the 'people', the records show that they hated the Monarch's Administration, many sources reporting they desired a change, possibly reverting to a Republic, one anonymous correspondent stating to the King that

"the people are so desperate that they wish Cromwell were back".¹⁶⁴³

Pepys reported that "many expect England to revert to a Commonwealth, Parliament is taking so much power".¹⁶⁴⁴ From Yarmouth Richard Bower informed Williamson that people see similarities with 1641, the King at odds with Parliament, and only a lack of leader preventing a rebellion.¹⁶⁴⁵ Indeed, Charles genuinely feared an imminent revolt, Pepys reporting that

"people think nothing of talking open treason in the streets",

an anonymous correspondent to Lord Conway stating

"the people are still in arms".¹⁶⁴⁶

Such reasons were variously recorded. For example, as State Papers show, in November 1666 writing from Hull J Whittington wrote to Williamson of people's dissatisfaction with his Majesty leaving convoys unprotected, unlike Cromwell. In June 1667 J Bentham stated to Williamson, the King was blamed for the ships being undefended at the Medway, and so easy prey for the Dutch. James Hickeys reported the nation's unhappiness at perceiving the country's loss of honour; it used to command the sea and now it didn't. And from Deal Richard Watts wrote of people's deep unhappiness about the Medway, adding that if things

¹⁶⁴³ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 5.7.1667 entry 206; *Pepys Diary*, 9.8.1667

¹⁶⁴⁴ *Pepys Diary*, 30.11.1667

¹⁶⁴⁵ CSPD *1667-1667*, 5.8.1667 entry 74 vol 212, 9.12.1667 entry 77 vol 234

¹⁶⁴⁶ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 26.7.1667 entry 212; *Pepys Diary*, 14.6.1667; CSPD *1665-1666*, 30.6.1666 entry 104 vol 160; CSPD *1667-1667*, 15.6.1667 entry 64 vol 205

didn't change a serious rising would result.¹⁶⁴⁷ Popular sentiment was heightened by a fear that the French would invade simultaneous to the Dutch Medway incursion.¹⁶⁴⁸ As the Venetian ambassador summarised, the English

“naval forces are greatly diminished and the internal difficulties increased. If they do not concur in the peace it will also be a fatal disaster”.

This was particularly acute, given Charles's fear of a domestic insurrection.¹⁶⁴⁹ In fact, as Clarendon's *Life* highlights, his Majesty was so worried about his throne that in the Privy Council

“he told them, that they all saw the straits that he was in, the general distemper of the nation, which made it manifest that it was necessary for him to have an army”.

However, this was impossible as

“he had no money or knew where to get any”.¹⁶⁵⁰

As regards society's higher level, the King was forced to call a Parliament to attempt a vote for extra taxes. After all, as the Earl of St Albans said to Venice's Paris ambassador,

“without it nothing can be done”.¹⁶⁵¹

Nevertheless, Charles greatly feared the ramifications, refusing to take decisions in the hope he would imperil himself less.¹⁶⁵² There were early indications of Parliament's wrath from late 1666, when it insisted on examining his Majesty's accounts, Pepys declaiming the outcome as the King would

¹⁶⁴⁷ CSPD 1666-1667, 16.11.1666 entry 92 vol 178; CSPD 1667-1667, 14.6.1667 entries 63 and 64 vol 205, 15.6.1667 entry 77 vol 205

¹⁶⁴⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 13.6.1667

¹⁶⁴⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 26.7.1667 entry 212

¹⁶⁵⁰ Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.254

¹⁶⁵¹ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 31.1.1668 entry 274

¹⁶⁵² CSP *Venice* vol 35, 18.7.1667 entry 210; Pepys *Diary*, 27.7.1667

“lose his power by submitting himself to this way of examining his accounts, and is become but as a private man”.¹⁶⁵³

Indeed, at the Chamber’s particularly full first meeting the Sovereign’s reservations were more than justified, Pepys recording that

“it is clear that they will fall foul upon the faults of the court”.¹⁶⁵⁴

Burnet’s *History* quoted his Majesty’s view that

“he made such observations on the French court, that he thought a King who might be checked, or have his ministers called to an account by a Parliament was but a King in name”.¹⁶⁵⁵

Fully recognising this and that the regulation of taxes meant controlling the King, the House took many months to approve funds, knowing that once this was accomplished, the regime’s peacetime costs would be lower, potentially being covered by ongoing Customs and Excise revenues, so the Legislature could be dispensed with. Therefore their opportunity to hold the King to account and reduce the Crown’s power would be lost.¹⁶⁵⁶ A committee to examine the ‘miscarriages of the war’ was established, its attention focused variously on military intelligence failings, the fleet’s division at the Four Days Battle, and the double failures of neglecting to pursue the Dutch fleet after the Lowestoft battle and the Bergen raid (see Chapter Seven).¹⁶⁵⁷ Further, MPs desired to hold individual Government officials to account, the King’s weakness meaning he couldn’t protect them, evidencing the reality of Burnet’s apposite summary above. Additionally, his Majesty even sacrificed some of his ministers, such as Lords Clarendon and Anglesey, other high officials like Sir George Carteret and Commissioner Peter Pett either losing their posts or coming under pressure.¹⁶⁵⁸ Of course,

¹⁶⁵³ Pepys *Diary*, 4.10.1666

¹⁶⁵⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 25.7.1667

¹⁶⁵⁵ Burnet *History vol 1*, pp.127-128

¹⁶⁵⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 7.7.1667, 6.12.1667, 27.12.1667, 28.12.1667

¹⁶⁵⁷ CSPD *1667-1667*, 2.9.1667 entry 19 vol 216, 25.10.1667 entry 24 vol 221; Pepys *Diary*, 17.10.1667, 20.10.1667, 21.10.1667, 14.2.1668

¹⁶⁵⁸ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 29.6.1667 entry 113, 22.11.1667 entry 247, 30.11.1668 entry 382; Pepys *Diary*, 24.4.1667, 8.9.1667, 28.9.1667, 12.10.1667, 30.10.1667, 29.1.1668; CSPD *1667-1667*, 21.6.1667 entry 131 vol 206, 29.6.1667 entry 113 vol 207; CSPD *1667-1668*, 19.12.1667 entry 41 vol 225, February 1668 entry 140 vol 235

the Chancellor's flight to France for fear of his life from the Legislature's attentions dramatically illustrates the King's fragility.¹⁶⁵⁹ Also, war expenses were examined.¹⁶⁶⁰ Curtailing Charles's power was attempted, including a bill stipulating tri-annual Parliaments and restricting proroguing powers, strongly enforcing Royal financial retrenchments and trying to identify ancient laws that could be recycled for use in diminishing Royal prerogatives.¹⁶⁶¹ In other words, as the Venetian ambassador summarised, his Majesty "yields to the good or evil disposition that Parliament may have".¹⁶⁶²

Of significant note is that Parliament initially invited Charles to ascend the throne. That is, substantial parts of the Interregnum House's powers remained. Aristocratic MPs elected in the May 1661 'Cavalier Parliament' were loyal to Kingship, partly through self-interest in sustaining their social and material positions. Despite their desire to curtail his Majesty's power, given 'ordinary people's' (see above) violent feelings it is obvious that the King retained his crown due to their fidelity. This brought Charles full circle to his status at accession, that is reliance on Parliament for his Kingly existence. This took him further away from the absolute monarchy of his dreams too!

The House's initial attempts to further control the King commenced in October 1666, replacing the Hearth tax which attributed to the Crown for Charles's life with a one-off, generous amount of £1.8 million (see above regarding poor collection rates). Following their protracted investigations into misdemeanours, the £300,000 eventually approved reflected a tiny amount compared to that which was necessary, identification of the collection method further delaying the Bill's enactment.¹⁶⁶³ This left his Majesty continually submitting to Parliament's will due to his pecuniary position, the House having thus achieved its aim.¹⁶⁶⁴ And the perennial problem of raising loans against a Finance Act continued, necessitating his Majesty's humbling himself to the Legislature for heightened taxes again.¹⁶⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 20.9.1667 entry 232, 27.9.1667 entry 232, 3.1.1668 entry 264; CSPD 1667-1668, 14.12.1667 entry 162 vol 224

¹⁶⁶⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 2.8.1667 entry 215; *Pepys Diary*, 21.2.1668

¹⁶⁶¹ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 27.12.1667 entry 263; CSPD 1667-1667, 8.8.1667 entry 130 vol 212, 18.3.1668 entry 193 vol 236; *Pepys Diary*, 21.11.1667, 29.1.1668, 18.2.1668, 21.2.1668

¹⁶⁶² CSP *Venice* vol 35, 23.11.1667 entry 248; *Pepys* 8.9.1667, 12.10.1667

¹⁶⁶³ *Pepys Diary*, 30.4.1668

¹⁶⁶⁴ *Pepys Diary*, 30.4.1668

¹⁶⁶⁵ *Pepys Diary*, 28.8.1667, 30.8.1667

In total, the King fully expected to emerge victorious from the war, acquiring Dutch trade to enhance his Customs and Excise revenues, achieving absolute monarchy by attaining autonomy from Parliament (see Chapter 7 for Charles's overseas pre-eminence aspirations). However, as this Chapter reveals, his financial incompetence led to disastrous defeat, a real fear he'd lose his throne, and a protracted dependence on MPs, leaving the King weaker and humbled. This part of his long-term strategy had totally failed. Of course, the English navy was so degraded that it could no longer enforce Charles's claim to 'Sovereignty of the Seas', the ultimate humiliation that represents both the contemporary and historical embarrassment of a title inherited from many monarchical generations.¹⁶⁶⁶

Conclusion.

Prior to the war Charles had achieved great success in the three stages of his step-by-step plan to use the navy to implement his covert personal agenda of acquiring domestic absolutism, international pre-eminence and purloining some Dutch trade to add to England's to provide the increased Customs and Excise to pay for it all. It was aimed at bringing the Hollanders into a conflagration.

This Chapter highlights for the first time that at Restoration Charles inherited an economy in deep difficulties, exacerbated by the mini-ice-age that was at its zenith and a paucity of coins, resulting in poor fiscal collection rates, leaving the King unable to fund his Government. Dunkirk's sale provided temporary relief, the proceeds eradicating naval debt. However, one-off solutions can never cure ongoing problems, and within months the Monarch's finances were in disarray again. Thomas Mun's 1641 pamphlet and its 1664 reprint on government funding are so germane as to bear repeating here

"there are some States ... [that do not enjoy] wealth by ordinary revenues as might support them against the suddain and powerful invasions of those mighty Princes which do environ them; they are therefore enforced to strengthen themselves not only with confederates and Leagues (which may often fail them in their greatest need) but also by massing up store of treasure and Munition ... will ever be ready to make a good defence, and to offend or divert their enemies." And "those princes which do not providently lay up Treasure, or do

¹⁶⁶⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 23.2.1668

immoderately consume the same when they have it, will soddenly come to want and misery.”¹⁶⁶⁷

There were built-in delays within the process for financing the Royal regime, the collection of the proceeds of Parliamentary votes being protracted, loans being necessary in the interim. Should tax receipts be lower than the loans contracted, a cumulative debt would result.

Charles was fully aware that wars were expensive, evidenced by his desire for substantial extra taxes, resulting in the unprecedented amount of £2.5 million in January 1665, that is two months prior to war being declared on the Dutch. Further, he had experienced insufficient taxes since his accession, amply warning him of the country’s inability to fund his ambitions for power using the navy as a tool. However, a prudent actor would have complied with Thomas Mun’s advice, the conflagration’s commencement being delayed a few months till adequate tax receipts to finance the war were in Royal coffers, or embarked on an alternate strategy such as that outlined in Chapter Seven’s Conclusion. Consequently, the substantial debts incurred in preparing the navy were added to those that had been accrued following the exhaustion of the Dunkirk money. This financial and economic incompetence comprised the root of the ensuing catastrophe, the Plague and Great Fire catastrophes merely exacerbating them.

The Second Anglo-Dutch War’s martial outcome was the opposite of that expected by the King, his Legislature and his subjects. Had victory been achieved it was quite possible that raised Customs receipts from heightened trade would have resulted, leaving him less dependent on Parliament, providing an existence close to his desired domestic ‘absolutist monarchical’ condition. Instead, he was severely humbled due to his financial incompetence and naivety, nearly losing his throne with the population openly talking treason, and farther than ever from being independent from Parliament. Indeed, he was as reliant on Parliament as when it invited him onto the throne, highlighting as far as his domestic agenda was concerned that all the intervening events had wasted time and money. Therefore, the sole role for his beloved navy’s remnants came close to being to transport him to the continent and exile for good. That is, his domestic plan had spectacularly failed, leaving him at risk of being the House’s ‘puppet’, the Legislature’s loyalty spurred by self-interest obviating the

¹⁶⁶⁷ Mun *England treasure*, pp.153-154, p.164

possibility of repeated exile. This issue constituted a colossal ‘ticking time-bomb’, commencing with his total failure to learn the vital lesson that was evident from accession, viz the necessity to carefully handle the nation’s finances, ensuing fiscal woes consequently rapidly accumulating. His ineptitude resulted in a dearth of money to pay mutinous sailors and long-suffering suppliers, with dockyards unable to repair damaged vessels. Consequently, rather than a mere inability to afford it as modern scholars assert, it is obvious that Charles couldn’t put a fleet to sea in 1667 because he had destroyed it, leaving no nautical military to dispatch. So, despite early martial successes like those against the Spanish and the Mediterranean pirates (see Chapters Four and Five) the Monarch’s structural financial weakness prior to the war’s commencement meant that it was virtually certain that defeat would result.

In total, this highlights the clear difference between the romantic myth of the ‘Merry Monarch’ and the stark reality of his massive ambition and calculated strategy for achieving domestic power, and its calamitous failure. Also, the fact of the King having failed in two central duties, those of expertly managing the nation’s finances and defending the nation, points to his total unsuitability for the role to which he had so long aspired whilst on the continent and now occupied.

Chapter 7 -Power Defeated.

Introduction.

Chapter Three outlined the King's personal covert agenda, and his use of the navy to implement a step-by-step plan to achieve it. That Chapter and the following two expanded on the details. However, Chapter Six highlighted the structural weakness in the English economy, and the King's financial and economic incompetence, leading to the failure of the domestic part of his ambitions. It was only the self-interest of the Cavalier Parliament that saved him from losing his throne, returning him to the situation that he wished to escape, his later reliance on the Legislature for his Kingly existence mirroring that at Restoration.

Chapter 7 delineates the collapse of the Sovereign's scheme's most dramatic component, the hostilities themselves, followed by an analysis of the effect on his aspirations' international segment, that is to achieve international pre-eminence. It commences by summarising the main military actions, then outlines and analyses the underlying reasons for the Medway disaster, England's worst naval defeat. It then details the effect of this martial outcome on his Majesty's carefully constructed 'Arc of Isolation' (see Chapter Five) and his attractiveness as an ally. Beyond the domestic arena the European picture is more nuanced, the King not achieving overseas dominance, but remaining an attractive enough ally to constitute the centrepiece of a powerful alliance with Spain, Austria and Holland. Beyond Europe, however, his Majesty maintained all of the persona provided by his navy, powerful Mediterranean rulers retaining a heightened fear of him.

Chronologically the Chapter covers from the start of 1665 to approximately the second half of 1668. It concludes that the Monarch's military incompetence meant the country missed the opportunity to end the war at an earlier advantageous point, negotiating a peace and trade treaty with Holland following the Lowestoft battle. Had this course been followed, the King could have achieved most of his aims. Instead, Charles's naivety and single focus ruined the country, distancing him from his dreams' fulfilment. Therefore, within this thesis's remit, this returned Charles to the point of his accession, his throne's initial Restoration being at Parliament's behest and his Crown's retention following the 1667 Breda peace treaty depending on the same Institution.

Military Details.

The Second Anglo-Dutch War raged approximately from March 1665 to July 1667 when the Breda Peace Treaty was signed between the English, Dutch and French. Both before and during the war there were numerous small actions and skirmishes of mixed blessings to both sides. However, given the King's covert aspirations the results from the major naval actions were the most important in determining his reputation and consequent achievement of them. This is because they had higher visibility and a consequent potential raised impact on the resulting glory and enhancement to his reputation to other rulers, as well as major actions potentially degrading the enemy's martial capability more effectively via destroying more vessels in a short period. Consequently, this Chapter omits lesser skirmishes. The large actions consisted of the June 1665 Battle of Lowestoft, the August 1665 Bergen Raid, the June 1666 Four Days Battle, and the July 1666 St James's Day Battle. Dreadful weather halted a prospective fifth major action in September 1666, the positive indicative result still appearing to provide a boost to his Majesty's prestige. The June 1667 Medway Battle constituted the war's last military action. 'Holmes Bonfire' in August 1666 is excluded as it was merely a highly successful raid with minimal Dutch resistance.¹⁶⁶⁸ Other scholars such as JR Jones, Bernard Capp and Barry Coward have covered these various battles, so they won't be repeated here.¹⁶⁶⁹ This thesis relates to the power Charles attempted to glean from the use of his navy, not actual military adventures' 'nitty gritty'.

It is useful to note that the English fleet enjoyed some technical advantages. Its vessels' soft wood construction meant shot holes caused less injury-inducing splinters and could be plugged more swiftly and efficiently in 'running repairs' during the battle, so were likely to be more serviceable for longer, leaving more healthy men for hostile operations. In comparison, Dutch ships' harder wood construction caused the opposite effect as regards splinters, with repairs potentially needing to be made in port, making battle-inflicted damage more crucial at the time. Also, English ships contained lower gun tiers when compared to the Dutch, the resultant water-line holes being more critical than those experienced higher in the hull. Further, the English 'between decks' had more headroom, allowing gunners to work

¹⁶⁶⁸ *Dutch gazette; England palladian*

¹⁶⁶⁹ *Jones Anglo; Capp Cromwell navy; Coward Stuart age*

more easily as battle smoke cleared quicker. And the English proportionately used more brass cannon compared to Dutch iron weapons, allowing guns to be fired at greater distances and inflict more damage before any ensuing close action.¹⁶⁷⁰

According to Lord Sandwich's journal, the Lowestoft Battle lasted from 4 am to 8pm. The English fleet consisted of 105 vessels, three squadrons and was under the Duke of York's sole command. The Dutch had 115 sail.¹⁶⁷¹ This was an emphatic Anglo victory, Roger L'Estrange in his dispatch describing it as

“God hath been pleased to give his Majesty a great and signal victory”.¹⁶⁷²

The English followed standard military practice, pursuing and attempting to eliminate their foes in order to stop them regrouping and continuing the fight.¹⁶⁷³ However, during darkness the victors ceased hounding the enemy so that larger numbers escaped, and a month later the Dutch had another viable battle fleet to challenge the English, whose own fleet was only partially refitted due to the state's impecuniousness (see Chapter Six).¹⁶⁷⁴

Regarding the Bergen Raid, 28 richly laden Dutch East India merchantmen were harbouring there.¹⁶⁷⁵ Lord Sandwich's fleet had somewhat reconstituted following 'Lowestoft', and accordingly he headed north to Norway's Naze.¹⁶⁷⁶ The Danish King, Norway's overlord, informed the English he would support any Dutch vessels' capture in his ports, and as Burnet highlights, split the proceeds.¹⁶⁷⁷ Consequently, according to his journal Sandwich dispatched Captain Teddiman with 18 ships to capture the Netherlanders.¹⁶⁷⁸ Shortly

¹⁶⁷⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 26.6.1665 entry 208; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 10.8.1666 entry 52

¹⁶⁷¹ *Montagu Journal*, 7.4.1665 pp.174-178, 20.4.1665 pp.194-198, 19.4.1665 pp.188-194, 26.5.1665 pp.217-220, 3.6.1665 p.224; *Barlow Journal*, p.93, p.101, p.106; *Penn Memoires*, p.295 1664; *List of the ships*

¹⁶⁷² *Penn Memoires*, p.324; *Parker History Book I*, pp.90-92; *Second narrative; England palladian*

¹⁶⁷³ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 23.6.1665 entries 203 and 205, 26.6.1665 entry 208; CSPD *1664-1665*, entry 40 vol 123, 5.6.1665 entry 46 vol 123; *Pepys Diary*, 8.6.1665; *Montagu Journal*, 4.6.1665 p.230; *Fanshawe Memoires*, p.174; *Jocelyn Diary*, p.147 11.6.1665; *Summary narration*

¹⁶⁷⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 9.6.1665 p.491, 27.6.1665 pp.493-4, 7.7.1665 pp.494-495; CSPD *1664-1665*, entry 41 vol 123, 9.6.1665 entry 97i vol 123, 20.6.1665 entry 138 vol 124, 18.8.1665 entry 158 vol 129; CSPD *1665-1666*, 16.10.1665 entry 111 vol 133; *Burnet History vol 1*, p.306; *Evelyn Diary vol 2*, 8.6.1665; *Barlow Journal*, p.106; *Penn Memoires*, p.330

¹⁶⁷⁵ *Montagu Journal*, 23.7.1665 pp.249-250; *Talbot Account*, pp.35-48

¹⁶⁷⁶ *Montagu Journal*, 17.7.1665 p.247; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 18.8.1665 entry 238, 25.8.1665 entries 241 and 242, 1.9.1665 entry 245; *Pepys Diary*, 4.7.1665; *Barlow Journal*, p.107; *Second and third advice*

¹⁶⁷⁷ *Montagu Journal*, 17.7.1665 p.248; *Burnet History vol 1*, pp.310-314; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, pp.527-534; *Talbot Account*, pp.35-48

¹⁶⁷⁸ *Montagu Journal*, 23.7.1665 pp.249-250 and p.251, 30.7.1665 p.252; *Pepys Diary*, 19.8.1665; *Barlow Journal*, p.107; *Penn Memoires*, pp.362-363; *Talbot Account*, pp.35-48

afterwards Sandwich proceeded to Shetland to rewater and then southwards to revictual, the onboard inadequacy of which was due to suppliers remaining unpaid due to Governmental monetary woes (see Chapter Six). This also meant that the fleet's poor condition would take a protracted period to rectify.¹⁶⁷⁹ However, according to the Venetian ambassador, and against the Danish Monarch's wishes, the Dutch had bribed Bergen's Danish Governor with 25,000 crowns.¹⁶⁸⁰ This resulted in the English squadron attracting fire from the castle's and harbour-side's 300 guns.¹⁶⁸¹ Thus, Teddiman's squadron lost 5 or 6 ships, the Captain in his report to Sandwich stating that 421 men and 6 officers were killed or wounded during the three and a half hour fight.¹⁶⁸²

In the Four Days Battle the English fleet's command was split between Lord Albemarle who led 57 ships and Prince Rupert who led 30. The Hollanders had about 90 sail opposing the Duke.¹⁶⁸³ On the King's orders, Rupert cruised off Brittany to prevent the Duc de Beaufort's French squadron of about 30 ships from joining the Dutch.¹⁶⁸⁴ However, English intelligence failures meant there was no awareness that the French admiral was in the Lisbon estuary waiting to escort the Portuguese Princess, Mdme d'Umala, to her new French husband, so had no intention of intervening in the battle. On discovering this the King sent orders to the Prince to join Albemarle.¹⁶⁸⁵ After delaying some hours Rupert sailed north, arriving on the battle's last day. However, he arrived too late, Monck's fleet being in tatters, the Dutch pursuing the English fleet to Harwich.¹⁶⁸⁶ And as recorded by Pepys following conversations with both Captain Harman and General Penn, bad weather during the battle meant the English ships couldn't use their lower gun tiers, fearing they'd sink from water ingress.¹⁶⁸⁷

¹⁶⁷⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 1.9.1665 entry 246; *Montagu Journal*, 5.8.1665 p.256, 12.8.1665 p.259; *Barlow Journal*, p.107

¹⁶⁸⁰ CSPD *1665-1666*, 27.8.1665 entry 34 vol 131

¹⁶⁸¹ *Montagu Journal*, 12.8.1665 pp.264-265; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, pp.527-534; *Barlow Journal*, p.107; *Talbot Account*, pp.35-48

¹⁶⁸² *Montagu Journal*, 12.8.1665 pp.261-264, Appendix VIII pp.295-297; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 1.9.1665 entry 245; *Pepys Diary*, 19.8.1665; *Burnet History vol 1*, pp.310-314; *Clarendon Life vol 2*, pp.527-534; *Barlow Journal*, p.107; *Penn Memoires*, pp.362-363; *Talbot Account*, pp.35-48

¹⁶⁸³ CSPD *1665-1666*, 7.6.1666 entry 50 vol 158, 8.6.1666 entry 61 vol 158; *Pepys Diary*, 4.6.1666; *Burnet History vol 1*, pp.320-321; *Clarendon Life vol 3*, p.71, pp.73-74; *Barlow Journal*, p.115, p.116, pp.117-119

¹⁶⁸⁴ *Pepys Diary*, 24.6.1666; *Barlow Journal*, p.116; *Parker History Book 1*, pp.101-105

¹⁶⁸⁵ *Pepys Diary*, 4.6.1666, 24.6.1666; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 15.6.1666 entry 11, 6.7.1666 entry 24; *CCSP vol 5*, 16.7.1666 p.551

¹⁶⁸⁶ *Pepys Diary*, 10.6.1666; *Burnet History vol 1*, pp.320-321; *Evelyn Diary vol 2*, 3.6.1666, 17.6.1666; *Barlow Journal*, pp.117-119; *Parker History Book 1*, pp.101-105; *Relation of passages*, p.4, p.6, p.9, p.11, p.12, p.15

¹⁶⁸⁷ *Pepys Diary*, 11.6.1666, 4.7.1666; *Clarendon Life vol 3*, p.73; *Barlow Journal*, pp.117-119

English and Dutch vessel numbers during the St James's Day Battle were even bar one, totalling about 90 each.¹⁶⁸⁸ The command was split between Albemarle and Rupert.¹⁶⁸⁹ The engagement commenced about 9 am and at 3 pm after only five hours the Dutch fled.¹⁶⁹⁰ This constituted a clear English victory, the Dutch being chased to shore, the victors patrolling the Netherland coastline in front of Flushing to prevent their escape. Pamphlets portrayed the triumph as the Dutch having been given a

“thump, thump”, and “we put the Dutch to total rout...and forced them to shamefully run away.”¹⁶⁹¹

The final sighting between the fleets in 1666 occurred in September, giving the English a moral victory. According to English Domestic State Papers Dutch morale was already low following the St James's Day Battle and Holmes Bonfire in which 160 rich merchant ships with cargoes worth between £1 million and £4 million were burned.¹⁶⁹² Prior to this the English blockaded Dutch ports, the Venetian ambassador stating this caused the Hollanders “great inconvenience”.¹⁶⁹³ According to a newspaper, the Dutch ventured out because they expected the English to be divided. Also, as Pepys asserted the Netherlanders did this only to make a ‘show’ to their population, and fled on sighting the enemy.¹⁶⁹⁴ Prince Rupert chased the enemy fleet of 90 vessels, attempting to engage but atrocious weather prevented the use of their lower gun tiers, eventually retreating to port at St Helens on the Isle of Wight and then to the Gunfleet.¹⁶⁹⁵ As Chapter Six mentioned, impecuniousness stopped a fleet being dispatched thereafter.¹⁶⁹⁶

¹⁶⁸⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 30.7.1666; CSPD 1665-1666, 20.7.1666 entries 140 and 142 vol 163; Barlow *Journal*, p.124

¹⁶⁸⁹ CSPD 1665-1666, 18.7.1666 entry 64 vol 163, 27.7.1666 entry 5 vol 165,

¹⁶⁹⁰ CSPD 1665-1666, 27.7.1666 entry 5 vol 165

¹⁶⁹¹ CSPD 1665-1666, 28.7.1666 entries 41 and 48 vol 165, 29.7.1666 entry 65i vol 165; CSPD 1666-1667, 2.8.1666 entry 33 vol 166, 7.8.1666 entry 119 vol 166; Pepys *Diary*, 31.7.1666; CCSP vol 5, 30.7.1666 p.554, 4.8.1666 p.554; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 17.8.1666 entry 54; Evelyn *Diary vol 2*, 29.7.1666; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.398 25.8.1666; *New ballad; Victory over the fleet; England palladian; England royal conquest*

¹⁶⁹² CSPD 1666-1667, 8.8.1666 entry 146 vol 166, 10.8.1666 entry 42 vol 167, 11.8.1666 entry 75 vol 167, 12.8.1666 entry 77 vol 167, 13.8.1666 entry 108 vol 167, 15.8.1666 entry 146 vol 167, 3.9.1666 entry 57 vol 170; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 31.8.1666 entry 62

¹⁶⁹³ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 24.8.1666 entry 59

¹⁶⁹⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 7.9.1666; CSPD 1666-1667, 3.9.1666 entries 55 and 57 vol 170

¹⁶⁹⁵ CSPD 1666-1667, 1.9.1666 entries 11 and 14 vol 170, 2.9.1667 entry 34 vol 170, 3.9.1666 entry 55 vol 170, 21.9.1666 entry 87 vol 172; Pepys *Diary*, 7.9.1666, 26.9.1666, 27.9.1666; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 5.10.1666 entry 83; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, pp.80-82

¹⁶⁹⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 7.10.1666; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.187

The Second Anglo-Dutch War's culmination was the Medway Battle. The Dutch believed that England and France had a secret understanding, England remaining neutral during France's invasion of Flanders, the Hollanders fearing new aggressive neighbours on their border. As *Europae Modernae* stated,

“they are now more nearly interested that the French nor no other potent prince get any further footing in Flanders”.¹⁶⁹⁷

This led the Hollanders to alter their approach to gain a swift peace.¹⁶⁹⁸ Therefore, their hastily constructed fleet of 80 ships and 25 fire ships entered the Thames and progressed up the Medway. The English had no operational vessels due to the Crown's bankruptcy (see Chapter Six).¹⁶⁹⁹ In fact, in late May the King rescinded an earlier order to send out all the third rates.¹⁷⁰⁰ After taking Sheerness and attacking Canvey Island and Thanet, the Dutch broke the six-inch chain which was assumed would prevent the enemy encroaching into the English Chatham naval dockyards. They reached the Hope, burning 20 ships including the three first rates, the *Royal Oak*, *Royal James* and *Royal London*.¹⁷⁰¹ They towed away the Monarch's flag ship, the *Royal Charles*, taking the vessel with a boat load of nine men as the leviathan was unmanned, substantially embarrassing the Sovereign.¹⁷⁰² The attack encountered minimal resistance from land forces either, unpaid sailors refusing to fight (see Chapter Six), the blockhouses and forts like Upnor Castle unable to return fire for very long as their gun batteries had been badly maintained.¹⁷⁰³ Additionally, it was feared the French would invade.¹⁷⁰⁴ Orders were dispatched to Lords Lieutenants to arouse the militia but they were sent too late, and these irregulars took too long to mobilise thereafter. The Hollanders stayed in the Thames estuary, preventing merchants from entering or leaving, and harried the English Southern coast from Suffolk to Plymouth until August, splitting into squadrons to

¹⁶⁹⁷ *Europae modernaee*, p.72

¹⁶⁹⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 10.5.1667 entry 184, 5.7.1667 entry 206, 28.6.1667 entry 204

¹⁶⁹⁹ Pepys *Diary*, 3.6.1667, 2.1.1667; CSPD *1667-1667*, 19.5.1667 entry 47 vol 201; Evelyn *Diary* vol 2, 8.6.1667; Barlow *Journal*, p.133; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.400 1667, p.401 1667

¹⁷⁰⁰ CSPD *1667-1667*, 24.5.1667 entry 117 vol 201

¹⁷⁰¹ CSPD *1667-1667*, 10.6.1667 entry 43 vol 204, 16.4.1667 entry 58 vol 205, 15.6.1667 entry 78 vol 205; Pepys *Diary*, 11.6.1667, 12.6.1667, 13.6.1667, 22.6.1667, 27.6.1667; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.249, p.250; Evelyn *Diary* vol 2, 8.6.1667, 28.6.1667; Barlow *Journal*, p.133; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.157 12.6.1667, p.157 27.6.1667; Ludlow *Memoirs*, pp.402-404 11.6.1667

¹⁷⁰² Pepys *Diary*, 12.6.1667, 13.6.1667

¹⁷⁰³ CSPD *1667-1667*, 14.6.1667 entry 58 vol 205, 21.6.1667 entry 116i vol 206; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, pp.247-248; Evelyn *Diary* vol 2, 28.6.1667; Barlow *Journal*, pp.133-134

¹⁷⁰⁴ CSPD *1667-1667*, 16.6.1667 entry 119 vol 206, 18.6.1667 entry 48 vol 206; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.157 7.7.1667

spread themselves further.¹⁷⁰⁵ The court panicked and speedily concluded a peace with the Dutch by late July 1667, desultory negotiations previously having started in August 1666 and dragged on for many months.¹⁷⁰⁶ This represented total Netherlander military domination.

It is interesting to note that in both battles where the enemies had equal numbers, that is Lowestoft and St James's Day, the English were victorious. At the Bergen Raid and the Four Days Battle, English forces faced other disadvantages, that is overwhelming land-based firepower at Bergen and stormy seas preventing the use of their lower gun tiers and very unfavourable odds in June 1666. This signals that when "God stayed neutral" (see below), a relatively 'level playing field' resulted, the English claim of maritime martial superiority and to be 'sovereigns of the seas' carrying some justification. As pamphlets stated,

"we hear indeed of war upon the borders of the empire, but we have peace in our borders being walled in first with the ocean, and that ocean secured by as strong a navy as is this day in Christendom," and that "a prince should hinder his neighbours as much as he can, from being strong at sea."¹⁷⁰⁷

Or as Sir W Temple is cited in Penn's *Memoires*

"these two summers of 1665, 1666, were renowned with three battles of the mightiest fleets that ever met upon the oceans, whereof two were determined by entire and unquestioned victories, and pursuit of our enemies into their very havens", whereas "the third began by the unfortunate division of our fleet...and odds of fifty of our ships against ninety of theirs".¹⁷⁰⁸

Military Analysis.

The efficient use of resources during a military confrontation maximises the country's chances of success. To be effective various aspects must be in place, mainly emanating from

¹⁷⁰⁵ CSPD 1667-1667, 28.6.1667 entry 83 vol 207, 2.7.1667 entry 28 vol 208, 3.7.1667 entry 55 vol 208; Pepys *Diary*, 9.7.1667, 19.7.1667; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.247; Evelyn *Diary* vol 2, 8.6.1667, 28.6.1667

¹⁷⁰⁶ CSPD 1667-1667, 27.7.1667 entry 18 vol 211; Pepys *Diary*, 9.8.1667; Evelyn *Diary* vol 2, 24.8.1667; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.156 5.12.1666, p.157 28.7.1667; Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.399 c. September 1666, Ludlow *Memoirs*, pp.402-404 11.6.1667; Penn *Memoires*, p.451; Parker *History Book 2*, pp.123-128; *Triumphs of four nations*

¹⁷⁰⁷ *Europae modernaе*, p.257; Cavendish *Life of the thrice noble*, p.165

¹⁷⁰⁸ Penn *Memoires*, p.419

the highest command level, this being the King during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. Consequently, it is vital to have a vision of what victory ‘looks like’ so that when this is attained hostilities can be ceased, accompanied by a strategic and coordinated plan so that all assets can be deployed to maximum advantage. Further, strong command and control systems must exist so that the centre can adequately monitor periphery activities. Therefore, a good system for receiving and processing Intelligence is vital. Good communications systems are also needed for the prompt dispatch of orders to the periphery where operational adjustments are required. And of course, it is absolutely crucial to be able to properly fund heightened war costs, inadequate funding leading to a premature halt to any campaigns (see Chapter Six), such as Charles inflicted on the Spanish in order to arrest their aggression towards Portugal (see Chapter Four).

With this in mind, the military actions listed above expose the English war machine’s various inherent flaws, substantially weakening its ability to achieve overall victory. As mentioned, as Commander-in-Chief, Charles’s war leadership was the single most important factor in deciding England’s martial direction and effectiveness. Therefore, he is fully responsible for the eventual outcome. The King’s military approach to directing his naval forces included various deficiencies. Firstly, there is no sign that he had a vision of what victory ‘looked like’, signalling that he wouldn’t know when to halt the nation’s efforts. To achieve his covert personal objectives via war required a substantially enhanced military reputation where foreign governments would fear him and domestic audiences would respect him as a successful military leader. However, early chances of success of achieving these personal goals were squandered. For instance, following the Lowestoft battle his Majesty had attained this objective to a high degree. Despite the fleet’s failure to annihilate the Dutch, the Venetian ambassador reflected the King’s heightened international reputation to his domestic masters. He stated that

“due to his arms, Charles now stands considerable in the world”, and “the victory means Charles has grown in stature, and enhanced his reputation and greatness”.¹⁷⁰⁹

¹⁷⁰⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 8.7.1665 entry 214, 31.7.1665 entry 228, 12.6.1665 entry 194, 26.6.1665 entry 207

And according to Henry Muddiman's anonymous correspondent the victory would bring honour to the King and Kingdom.¹⁷¹⁰ It would have been prudent to have used the victory's leverage to attain a peace, given his Majesty's impecuniousness (see Chapter Six). After all the Dutch and the Spanish knew of the Crown's poverty, so it would have been sensible for Charles to have taken more cognisance of this aspect.¹⁷¹¹ Indeed, Clarendon's *Life* stated various courtiers like Lord Falmouth had warned him about this crucial issue prior to Lowestoft.¹⁷¹² Clarendon continued that

“with this victory a new vast charge and expense (beside the repairing the hurt ships, masts and rigging, and fitting out new ships of war and buying more fireships) appeared, that was never foreseen or brought into any computation, which was provisions for sick and wounded men” and that the money to put out the fleet again was acquired “with great difficulty”.¹⁷¹³

That is, the King was actually weakened by the battle – a factor that was ignored. Further, Hyde revealed the Netherlanders' depth of unhappiness at the defeat, being so disillusioned with the war that they

“now wanted peace, and in the opinion of all men, any reasonable terms would have been accepted”.¹⁷¹⁴

Crucially, this starkly highlights the King's myopic view and single focus on achieving his ambition to the exclusion of everything else.

Instead, according to the Venetian ambassador, in a display of hubris Charles increased his demands of the Dutch, summarising his Majesty's attitude as being

“England is so confident of victory that they say that all they need is for God to be neutral to obtain victory”.¹⁷¹⁵

¹⁷¹⁰ CSPD 1664-1665, 12.6.1665 entry 42 vol 124

¹⁷¹¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 12.6.1665 entry 196; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 14.7.1666 entry 34, 1.3.1667 entry 154

¹⁷¹² Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.504

¹⁷¹³ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.515-516

¹⁷¹⁴ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.516-517

¹⁷¹⁵ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 24.4.1665 entry 163, 8.7.1665 entry 214, 24.7.1665 entry 224

A pamphlet aptly summarises this, questioning why the Dutch continued fighting,

“Now why will ye persist... I doubt twill only be to fail.”¹⁷¹⁶

For example, given English Caribbean territorial holdings, Charles demanded that the Hollanders only send unarmed vessels ‘beyond the line’ in the Atlantic, this being a symbolic and invisible border in the middle of that ocean beyond which the Spanish historically claimed sovereignty.¹⁷¹⁷ Additionally, immediately following the English supremacy at the St James’s Day Battle and the abortive September 1666 action, the Venetian ambassador again complimented the English, saying

“the English have thus done much to restore their naval reputation”.¹⁷¹⁸

And Pepys diary notes that we’d had

“victory over the Dutch, leaving us masters of the sea giving us the name of conquerors.”¹⁷¹⁹

Negotiations were in progress from August 1666, mediated by the Swedish, several months being spent merely debating the treaty location.¹⁷²⁰ In fact, Pepys confirmed this wasn’t announced until the end of March 1667, eight months later, but being concluded swiftly following the Medway Battle in mid-June 1667, being signed by the end of July 1667, the King fearing a domestic insurrection.¹⁷²¹ Additionally, as the Venetian ambassador opined, international and domestic audiences would have greatly understood should Charles have attempted a peace following the unexpected events of the Plague and Great Fire.¹⁷²² To have capitulated after such catastrophes wouldn’t have been shameful. The navy had performed well operationally, but Charles didn’t recognise the organisation’s limits, severe financial constraints stopping it capitalising on the Lowestoft and St James Day victories. Consequently, his Majesty heightened his demands, attempting to enhance his reputation by

¹⁷¹⁶ *England palladian*, p.15

¹⁷¹⁷ *CSP Venice vol 34*, 8.7.1665 entry 214

¹⁷¹⁸ *CSP Venice vol 35*, 17.8.1666 entry 54

¹⁷¹⁹ *Pepys Diary*, 31.7.1666

¹⁷²⁰ *CSP Venice vol 35*, 17.8.1666 entry 54, 7.12.1666 entry 119, 29.3.1667 entry 164; *Pepys Diary*, 14.2.1667

¹⁷²¹ *CSP Venice vol 35*, 26.7.1667 entry 212; *Pepys Diary*, 23.3.1667

¹⁷²² *CSP Venice vol 34*, 14.8.1665 entry 233, 8.9.1665 entry 252, 22.9.1665 entry 259; *CSP Venice vol 35*, 17.8.1666 entry 54

reinforcing and widening his claims to sovereignty of the seas beyond the Mare Clausum, the Monarch's naivety displaying his detachment from operational realities.

The King's deficiencies were further highlighted by the absence of a coordinated plan to control the war's direction, including pre-identified contingencies for deviations from this. A standard strategy in later times was to blockade the enemy's ports, like the French suffered during the Napoleonic war. This constrained the enemy to harbours, leaving England free to enact its activities elsewhere. This would have allowed the English to follow their strategy expounded prior to the war to defeat the Dutch via crippling their economy through the mass capture of prizes (see Chapter Five). And, indeed, in late June 1665 Captain Manley stated

“a sure way of ruining their country would be to keep them in and clip their commerce.”¹⁷²³

Instead, following the war's commencement a different strategy was followed, that being to concentrate on set battles (see above), these being of higher profile, the expectant victories providing the King with the heightened international prestige that he sought.

Blockading the Dutch in port would certainly have been cheaper than the costs of recurring battles and the resultant damage inflicted on both naval vessels and mercantile trade. Indeed, as Clarendon's *Life* amongst other sources highlight, at the Second Anglo-Dutch War's commencement the Duke of York stationed his fleet off the Dutch coast, blockading the warships in port, keeping merchant vessels out and taking some as prizes.¹⁷²⁴ Consequently, his Royal Highness could dictate the terms on which he encountered the enemy, attempts to induce them to come out and fight allowing the English to station their fleet to maximum advantage, including achieving the crucial weather gauge.¹⁷²⁵ Additionally, according to the Venetian ambassador, the English could move freely about the sea, penetrating Netherlander ports and capturing Dutch coastal vessels.¹⁷²⁶ It was so effective that the Dutch even feared an English landing.¹⁷²⁷ And, of course, Charles could have used the dominance of the channel that was facilitated by the English fleets' South Eastern English bases to bar Dutch

¹⁷²³ CCSP vol 5, 27.6.1665 pp.494-495

¹⁷²⁴ CSP Venice vol 34, 8.5.1665 entry 173, 15.5.1665 entry 178 Enclosure, 15.5.1665 entry 178 Enclosure, 22.5.1665 entries 181 and 182; CSPD 1664-1665, 27.4.1665 entry 121 vol 118, 28.4.1665 entry 43 vol 119; Montagu Journal, 17.4.1665 pp.180-182; Clarendon Life vol 2, p.479, p.503

¹⁷²⁵ CSP Venice vol 34, 24.4.1665 entry 163, 5.6.1665 entry 193

¹⁷²⁶ CSP Venice vol 34, 1.5.1665 entry 166, 15.5.1665 entry 177

¹⁷²⁷ CSP Venice vol 34, 15.5.1665 entry 178 Enclosure

mercantile vessels from transiting through there, returning home via more precarious routes.¹⁷²⁸ However, instead, throughout the war, Charles's impecuniousness meant that the English always had to retreat to port for refits following engagements, leaving such Dutch threats as bottling up the Thames and directly threatening English merchants unchallenged.¹⁷²⁹ Continued patrols to blockade the Dutch in port, avoiding major battles, would have been a more effective as well as financially viable strategy. Further, this meant the enemy were able to dispatch vessels to other operational theatres like the Straits and, according to the Venetian ambassador, with no English vessels there the Hollanders could sail and trade unhindered, as well as making prizes of English merchants. The French could act similarly, as a pamphlet summarized,

“hedge the Dutch in, only to let them out.”¹⁷³⁰

Therefore, as is evident, in the conflict's first four months the English moved from a victorious position to a reversal of fortunes. Had Charles had a coordinated plan for the war, including thoroughly preparing, such as storing a mass of treasure and vital equipment (see Chapter Six), the war's course could have been more predictable and had a more successful trajectory.

The English Intelligence system was severely sub-standard, as various sources including pamphlets highlighted, scathingly criticising the notoriously poor sources, such as

“the secretary who had never yet, Intelligence but from the court Gazette.”¹⁷³¹

For example, as the Venetian ambassador outlined an English mercantile convoy from Hamburg fell into Dutch hands for lack of intelligence. This was particularly important as they carried vital masts for the English navy.¹⁷³² Prior to the Four Days Battle Prince Rupert was sent Westward to prevent the French joining with the Dutch.¹⁷³³ However, the French

¹⁷²⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 14.8.1665 entry 233

¹⁷²⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 12.6.1665 entries 195 and 196

¹⁷³⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 24.6.1665 entry 206, 17.7.1665 entry 221; CSPD *1665-1666*, 1.12.1665 entry 6 vol 138; *Second and third advice*, p.5

¹⁷³¹ *Second and third Advice*, p.26

¹⁷³² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 23.6.1665 entry 203; CSPD *1664-1665*, 18.9.1665 entry 10i vol 133

¹⁷³³ *Pepys Diary*, 31.5.1666; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 8.6.1666 entry 6

fleet was at Lisbon with no intention of moving.¹⁷³⁴ This was a catastrophic Intelligence failure, Sir Thomas Clifford reporting to Lord Arlington that even the sailors later severely bemoaned the fleet's division, pamphlets mocking the appalling Intelligence, "Beaufort is in the channel/Hixy here, doxy Thoulon/Beaufort is everywhere."¹⁷³⁵ Thus, as Lord Albemarle reported to Lord Arlington, the English were defeated due to overpowering Dutch numbers. Monsieur Roquet's letter to Charles's chief spymaster, Joseph Williamson, highlights the system's deplorable nature, stating

"all wonder the English, who have so many friends in France, were so ill-informed of Beaufort's movements".¹⁷³⁶

Pepys summarised the bad Intelligence's result,

"we are bad at Intelligence, and Prince Rupert could have left his position earlier", as "the dividing of the fleet was due to a lack of Intelligence, which we do want".¹⁷³⁷

Even when timely Intelligence was received, its treatment was unsatisfactory. Pepys illustrated the High Command's contempt for Intelligence, recording that Charles's Secret Service annual budget was around £700. This starkly contrasts with Cromwell who budgeted £70,000, Colonel Birch reporting that the Dictator

"carried the secrets of all Europe at his girdle".¹⁷³⁸

The failure to avert the Dutch incursion into the Medway was the most catastrophic Intelligence collapse. There were warnings almost two years prior to the invasion. For example, as State Papers highlighted, in October 1665 Warham Jennett wrote to Williamson that the Dutch were thinking about going up the Thames.¹⁷³⁹ In June 1666 RS reported to Williamson that

¹⁷³⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 6.7.1666 entry 24

¹⁷³⁵ *Second and third Advice*, p.27

¹⁷³⁶ CSPD 1665-1666, 20.6.1666 entry 50 vol 159

¹⁷³⁷ *Pepys Diary*, 4.6.1666, 10.6.1666

¹⁷³⁸ *Pepys Diary*, 14.2.1668, 17.2.1668

¹⁷³⁹ CSPD 1665-1666, 16.10.1666 entry 72 vol 135

“the Dutch have taken on board for the Thames to fire the English fleet”.¹⁷⁴⁰

M Roquet wrote to Williamson in early July 1666 that

“de Ruyter and Tromp expect to surprise the English at the Nore and even the Thames”.¹⁷⁴¹

And in early March 1667 the matter was so publicly known that the Venetian ambassador reported that

“the Dutch are preparing a large fleet and plan to blockade the Thames”,

the Rev Jocelyn confirming in April 1667 that it is

“said the Dutch will presently block up the Thames mouth.”¹⁷⁴²

Some derisive preparations were made, for example the Duke of York wrote to the Navy Commissioners in March 1667, reporting that some persons were to consider the safety of ships within the Medway, with some recommendations.¹⁷⁴³ Yet nothing substantial was done until it was too late. On 10th June 1667 Pepys reported that the Dutch were as high as the Nore. Yet only then were

“we doing all we can to fortify Chatham, Deptford and Gravesend”.¹⁷⁴⁴

Indeed, following Monck’s post-invasion arrival at Chatham, Penn’s *Memoires* outline the defences’ disastrous state around the river and Chatham itself.¹⁷⁴⁵ And simultaneously there was an Order in Council that Lord Arlington was to order the Lords Lieutenants of Wiltshire, Berkshire, Hampshire and Dorset to prepare the local militias in case of invasion.¹⁷⁴⁶ Obviously this was far too late to be effective. Or, as Ludlow summarised,

¹⁷⁴⁰ CSPD 1665-1666, 6.6.1666 entry 55 vol 159, 26.6.1666 entries 10 and 11 vol 160

¹⁷⁴¹ CSPD 1665-1666, 1.7.1666 entry 1 vol 161

¹⁷⁴² CSP *Venice* vol 35, 8.3.1667 entry 155; CSPD 1667-1667, 10.6.1667 entry 23 vol 204; *Jocelyn Diary*, p.154 8.7.1666, p.156 7.4.1667

¹⁷⁴³ CSPD 1666-1667, 23.3.1667 entry 15 vol 195; *Pepys Diary*, 6.3.1667, 23.3.1667

¹⁷⁴⁴ *Pepys Diary*, 10.6.1667; *Evelyn Diary* vol 2, 8.6.1667, 28.6.1667

¹⁷⁴⁵ *Penn Memoires*, pp.442-447

¹⁷⁴⁶ CSPD 1667-1667, 10.6.1667 entry 27 vol 204

“the court of England having made no preparations for the defence of the nation was alarmed to the last degree with the news of their approach.”¹⁷⁴⁷

In addition to poor Intelligence, the communication system was inadequate, meaning that orders from the centre wouldn't be received promptly by the periphery, delaying any necessary adjustments to operations. For example, the most spectacular failure was when it was finally discovered during the Four Days Battle that Prince Rupert should hurriedly join Albemarle, Sir William Coventry drafted a message. He awoke the Duke of York to sign it, sending it via ordinary post instead of having a dispatch rider standing by as a matter of routine. Pamphlets contemptuously stated

“at night he sends it by the common post, To save the King an express the cost”.

This meant that the message took two crucial days to reach Rupert, who compounded the matter by failing to appreciate its urgency, staying on his existing station for several more hours, journeying to Albemarle via the Downs. The crucial failure was that the provision of dedicated messengers did not exist, and who could also have enhanced the message with contextual information like the need for haste. In the afore mentioned Napoleonic War Generals had aides-de-camp for such eventualities.¹⁷⁴⁸

The Commander-in-Chief's competence is also vitally important. A single point of direction in the field can maximise the forces' coordination and efficiency. As the Venetian ambassador stated regarding the Lowestoft battle, Charles established

“a single command under the Duke of York, so the English attacked with one mind”.¹⁷⁴⁹

However, a split command can cause the opposite, leading to dilution and weakening of command as the Dutch discovered at the St James's Day Battle. The Venetian ambassador observed that the Hollanders defeat was due to its commanders' disagreements, de Ruyter

¹⁷⁴⁷ Ludlow *Memoirs*, p.402 1667

¹⁷⁴⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 4.6.1666, 24.6.1666; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.72; *A second and third advice*, p.27

¹⁷⁴⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 26.6.1665 entry 208

and Tromp, confused leadership resulting.¹⁷⁵⁰ Indeed, following the Lowestoft battle his Majesty wanted to permanently split the fleet between Lord Sandwich and Prince Rupert, this undesirable outcome being halted by the Prince's refusal to acquiesce. Yet the King persisted, Penn's *Memoires* describing the split command as

“the fleet being irrevocably condemned for the ensuing campaign to the chief command of those two discordant and mutually jealous land-admirals.”¹⁷⁵¹

Lord Albemarle reported the result, the fleet's division for the Four Days Battle being directed from above, Pepys recording Lord Crew's early scepticism, fearing the war couldn't be won as those at the top didn't understand.¹⁷⁵² And the confusion caused by a split command would have been devastating in the event of the English progressing hostilities into 1667, Pepys recording that

“the Duke of Albemarle and Prince Rupert disagree, so we're in pieces and no-one knows what will be done next year,”

complete confusion ensuing. The appointing of the command structure is the Commander-in-Chief's responsibility, this evidencing another of his Majesty's failures.¹⁷⁵³

Field commanders' competence is also crucial. The Duke of York's failure to chase the Dutch following the Lowestoft battle constitutes extreme incompetence. The fault was so glaring that the civilian, John Evelyn summarised the situation,

“came news of his Highness's victory, which indeed which might have been a complete one, and at once ended the war, had it been pursued.”¹⁷⁵⁴

According to Burnet, even the Dutch believed that a proper English pursuit would have culminated in the Hollanders' capture, ending the war in one stroke.¹⁷⁵⁵ Further, whilst

¹⁷⁵⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 24.8.1666 entry 59

¹⁷⁵¹ Penn *Memoires*, p.369

¹⁷⁵² Pepys *Diary*, 9.1.1665, 24.6.1666; Montagu *Journal*, 2.7.1665 p.236

¹⁷⁵³ Pepys *Diary*, 8.10.1666

¹⁷⁵⁴ Evelyn *Diary* vol 2, 8.6.1665

¹⁷⁵⁵ Burnet *History* vol 1, p.308; Barlow *Journal*, p.106

Monck was undoubtedly experienced on land, his nautical skills seemingly weren't always commensurate. Prior to the Four Days Battle's commencement a War Council was held on board the flagship. Captain Harman reported that everyone recommended the battle's postponement, poor weather denying the lower gun tiers' use. Pepys reported that General Penn confirmed this, adding that Albemarle should have awaited Prince Rupert. Yet the Duke commenced the battle with the result listed above, stating that

“what should he do? should he not fight them? especially having beat them heretofore at as great disadvantage”.¹⁷⁵⁶

This is despite having previously informed Lord Arlington that he needed a minimum of 70 ships, yet still commenced the confrontation with the reduced numbers listed above.¹⁷⁵⁷ This matter so surprised contemporaries that Pepys recorded Mr Creed's statement that we need

“to checke our pride and presumption in adventuring upon hazards upon unequal force against a people that can fight”.¹⁷⁵⁸

Evelyn confirmed this hubris, stating that

“the Duke of Albemarle, who, in good truth, made too forward a reckoning of his success now, because he had once beaten the Dutch in another quarrel; and being ambitious to outdo the Earl of Sandwich, whom he had prejudicated as deficient in courage.”¹⁷⁵⁹

Penn's *Memoires* stated that

“thus Monck forced an engagement, contrary to all naval judgement, at a time when the fleet was physically disabled from employing all its strength”.¹⁷⁶⁰

¹⁷⁵⁶ Pepys *Diary*, 11.6.1666, 24.6.1666, 4.7.1666; CSPD 1665-1666, 6.6.1666 entry 46i vol 158; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.73, p.74; Barlow *Journal*, pp.117-119

¹⁷⁵⁷ CSPD 1665-1666, 28.5.1666 entry 38 vol 157

¹⁷⁵⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 4.6.1666

¹⁷⁵⁹ Evelyn *Diary* vol 2, 6.6.1665

¹⁷⁶⁰ Penn *Memoires*, pp.403-404

Further, discipline within the fleet was poor, lower-level officers being unruly, apt to obey orders at a whim. Burnet's *History* highlights a particularly unhelpful contributory aspect, that being where perpetrators of indiscipline had high political backing they would remain immune from sanction. And according to Clarendon's *Life* this growth into factions was particularly noticeable between Lord Falmouth and William Coventry.¹⁷⁶¹ For instance, the English fleet's chase of the Dutch following the Lowestoft battle was nocturnally halted due to Lord Brouncker's intervention, erroneously claiming to pass on the Duke of York's orders to slacken sail. This is an incredible disciplinary breach. The minimum should have been a Court Martial, severe punishment ensuing, as desired by the Duke of York. However, although shortly afterwards the Duke dismissed Brouncker from the fleet, he felt unable to pursue the peer as he enjoyed the King's favour.¹⁷⁶² And Commissioner Pett explained to Pepys how

“everyone is doing as they please”,

some officers even threatening to run their seniors through with their swords when they dislike their orders, it being endured as the Generals are so inexperienced.¹⁷⁶³ Pepys summarised the deleterious effect that this had on the sailors' discipline in addition to that emanating from their lack of pay (see Chapter Six). He stated

“the seamen grow very rude, and every thing out of order; commanders having no power over their seamen, but the seamen do what they please. Few stay on board, but all coming running up hither to towne, and nobody can with justice blame them, we owing them so much money; and their familys must starve if we do not give them money.”

Yet, even the Commons was involved in command decisions.¹⁷⁶⁴ For example, although it was felt that the Duke of York could control it all, as heir to the throne the House didn't want him risking his life at sea again, despite being concerned how the fleet would be governed without him.¹⁷⁶⁵

¹⁷⁶¹ Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.504

¹⁷⁶² Burnet *History* vol 1, p.307; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, p.506, pp.513-514

¹⁷⁶³ Pepys *Diary*, 21.7.1666

¹⁷⁶⁴ Pepys *Diary*, 31.10.1666

¹⁷⁶⁵ Pepys *Diary*, 25.6.1665, 30.7.1666

Even where an efficient overall command exists, this is negated where the Commander-in-Chief ignores his duties. As Bishop Burnet's *History* stated,

“the ill life the King led, the viciousness of the whole court, gave but a melancholy prospect”,

and in quoting Sir Thomas Littleton,

“the King had worse intentions than his brother, but that he had a more dextrous way of covering and managing them; only his laziness made him less earnest in prosecuting them.”¹⁷⁶⁶

Clarendon stated that the ‘sober’ men around the King

“would often profess to him that they were so much afflicted at the King’s course of life that they even despaired that he would be able to master those difficulties which would still press him.”¹⁷⁶⁷

Pepys had a ‘front row seat’, occupying such an integral naval position as well as via his court contacts. His diary variously refers to the King’s failings. He recorded the issue’s importance on 27th February 1665, that is before the war’s official declaration. The diarist was at an immensely important Council committee to progress plans for pressing sailors. Several senior Government Ministers attended it. The meeting lasted two hours, the outcome being that it had been a waste of time as nothing could be decided. Lord Annesly summed up the moral of the meeting to the attendees, stating

“I think we must be forced to get the King to come to every committee for I do not see that we do anything at any time but when he is here.” Pepys concluded that “I believe he said the truth”.¹⁷⁶⁸

¹⁷⁶⁶ Burnet *Histor*, vol 1, p.306, p.325

¹⁷⁶⁷ Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.107

¹⁷⁶⁸ Pepys *Diary*, 27.2.1665

The Clerk of the Acts frequently referred to the reason for the Monarch's neglectful behaviour and inattention to business. In May 1667 he recorded the Navy Treasurer as saying

“Sir G Carteret tells me he fears all will come to naught in the nation if the King do not mind his business which he is not likely to do.” The reason was that “nothing done while the King minds his pleasures so much.”

And during the Dutch threat to the Medway, Captain Cocke was reported as saying

“speaking of the horrid effeminacy of the King, that the King hath taken ten times more care and pains in making friends between my Lady Castlemain and Mrs Stewart, when they have fallen out, that ever he did to save his Kingdom.”¹⁷⁶⁹

Indeed, at such a crucial time the Court were so out of touch with events that Pepys progresses to report that

“the King and Court are all troubled, and the gates of the Court were shut up upon the first coming of the Dutch to us, but they do not mind the business no more than ever.”¹⁷⁷⁰

However, on 21st June 1667 the diarist recorded the most astonishing collapse of the King's attention to duty. On the first day of the Dutch incursion into the Medway and their attack on the Throne's mainstay, that is the navy, Pepys recorded that

“Sir H Cholmley come to me this day, and tells me the Court is as mad as ever; and that the night the Dutch burned our ships the King did sup with my Lady Castlemain at the Duchess of Monmouth's, and there were all mad in hunting a poor moth.”¹⁷⁷¹

Burnet confirmed this, stating that the night of the invasion saw the King

¹⁷⁶⁹ *Pepys Diary*, 24.6.1667

¹⁷⁷⁰ *Pepys Diary*, 17.6.1667

¹⁷⁷¹ *Pepys Diary*, 21.6.1667

“cheerfully at supper with his mistresses”. Further “upon news of the Dutch fleet’s being in the river the King did not ride down himself, nor appear at the head of his people who were then in such imminent danger. He only sent the Duke of Albemarle down, and was intending to ride to Windsor. But that so looked like flying from danger that he was prevailed upon to stay.” In fact, “he was compared to Nero who sung while Rome was burning”, and consequently “if the Dutch had pursued their advantage in the first consternation, they might have done more mischief, and have come a great way up the Thames, and burned many merchant ships.”¹⁷⁷²

For a Commander-in-Chief with so much at stake in terms of achieving his covert personal goals, his Majesty’s actions seem short-sighted and self-indulgent. He dispatched his navy to war, but made little exertion himself during the hostilities. In fact, Pepys summed up the result of these multiple failures that contributed to the eventual, but foreseeable defeat, that the

“Kingdom is in a desperate condition”, and “that Cromwell got England a good reputation. It’s now being lost”.¹⁷⁷³

As Chapter Six highlighted, Charles came close to losing his throne following the Medway Battle. However, the Sovereign’s military performance also fell miserably short in a direct reputational comparison with the arch-nemesis, Cromwell, that he attempted earlier in his reign to highlight as a traitor and who’s tenure went against nature’s laws. That is, his Majesty had proved himself as both a contemporary and historic failure as a ruler and war leader.

Foreign Policy – the ‘Arc of Isolation’.

Chapter Five outlined Charles’s success in constructing an ‘Arc of Isolation’, that is a ring of pro-English states surrounding Holland’s landward side, isolating them from succour. The military activity’s effects once the conflagration commenced are now relevant as his Majesty’s perceived attractiveness as an ally to these foreign powers depended on his ability

¹⁷⁷² Burnet *History vol 1*, pp.351-351

¹⁷⁷³ Pepys *Diary*, 3.6.1667, 21.6.1667, 24.6.1667

to use his navy to militarily dominate his foes. Weaknesses could encourage them to switch sides.

Scandinavia.

Sweden.

Both Sweden and Denmark either declared for, or were favourable towards, England during the Monarch's pre-war construction of his 'Arc of Isolation'.¹⁷⁷⁴ The Venetian ambassador reported that this was because neither would venture to thwart such a powerful nautical nation.¹⁷⁷⁵ Indeed, both commenced providing military aid to England, as the Venetian ambassador disclosed in July 1665, where both Scandinavian states combined to deny

“the Dutch all succour from the Meuse and all commerce by way of Lille”.¹⁷⁷⁶

Sweden's foreign interests particularly aligned with England's, *Europae Modernaе* and other pamphlets highlighting that

“Sweden's interest is to seek all occasions for war in Germany”, and that there are “continual wars with Germany”.¹⁷⁷⁷

Despite French and Dutch attempts to detach the Swedes from their English treaty they remained committed to Charles, even providing ten thousand troops to another of England's allies, the Bishop of Münster, in the Autumn of 1665 and further assistance to other German states, including the capture of a major Netherlander town.¹⁷⁷⁸ A substantial reason emanated from their historic friction with Denmark.¹⁷⁷⁹ Once hostilities had commenced, Sweden feared that England wouldn't honour its commitment to protect both Baltic nations against

¹⁷⁷⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 15.4.1665 entries 158 and 159, 24.4.1665 entry 164, 15.5.1665 entry 178, 12.6.1665 entry 94, 26.6.1665 entry 207

¹⁷⁷⁵ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 31.7.1665 entry 228

¹⁷⁷⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 26.6.1665 entry 207, 3.7.1665 entry 209; CSPD *1665-1666*, 18.1.1666 entry 76 vol 145; CCSP *vol 5*, 1665 p.522

¹⁷⁷⁷ *Europae modernaе*, p.45; *Brief and yet exact*, p.26

¹⁷⁷⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 7.8.1665 entry 231, 21.9.1665 entry 261, 13.10.1665 entries 276 and 277, 30.10.1665 entry 285, 17.11.1665 entry 299, 4.12.1665 entry 308; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 10.8.1666 entry 48; CSPD *vol 1665-1666*, 10.11.1665 entry 94 vol 136; CCSP *vol 5*, 1665 p.522

¹⁷⁷⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 24.11.1665 entry 302

each other, potential Danish attacks on Sweden following.¹⁷⁸⁰ Although Denmark was initially aligned to England, it gradually shifted its allegiance towards the Dutch, leading Sweden's self-interest to dictate an alliance with the nautically powerful England to counter-balance that axis.¹⁷⁸¹ This predilection is aptly illustrated by Sweden's Parisian ambassador's celebration with bonfires in the summer of 1666 when he initially mistakenly believed that England had won the Four Days Battle.¹⁷⁸² Importantly, this maintained the balance of power in the Baltic, neither Sweden's or Denmark's naval vessels straying too far from home waters in case their urgent protection were needed against each other.¹⁷⁸³ Consequently, although England didn't benefit from Swedish attacks on the Dutch, neither did they need to divert vital naval resources away from their conflict with Holland.¹⁷⁸⁴ Further, Sweden's ongoing threat to Denmark distracted the Dutch in their concern for their new ally.¹⁷⁸⁵ Thus, as regards Sweden, Charles's efforts in his construction of his 'Arc of Isolation' were successful, his navy's reputation maintaining the alliance with this Baltic state.

Denmark.

At the conflict's commencement Denmark and England had a secret treaty (see Chapter 5).¹⁷⁸⁶ This contained a clause that the Danish King would only announce the alliance when advantageous, like when there were many Dutch vessels in Danish controlled ports. The agreement stipulated that if the English raided those ports any proceeds would be split between the two countries. According to Montagu, who commanded the fleet engaged in raiding Bergen in August 1665, it was this offer that induced him to attempt the Netherlander vessels sheltering there.¹⁷⁸⁷ Meanwhile, Denmark was to publicly remain neutral, although a partiality for England via a treaty was suspected, as the Venetian ambassador commented.¹⁷⁸⁸

¹⁷⁸⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 13.10.1665 entry 277; CCSP *vol 5*, 21.7.1665 p.501; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.527-528

¹⁷⁸¹ Pepys *Diary*, 6.4.1666; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 16.10.1665 entry 278, 4.12.1665 entry 308, 7.3.1666 entry 362; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 12.11.1665 entry 106; CSPD *1666-1667*, 15.8.1666 entry 136 vol 167; CCSP *vol 5*, 21.6.1665 p.493, 20.9.1665 p.507, 31.1.1666 pp.528-529, 1.5.1667 p.607

¹⁷⁸² CSP *Venice vol 35*, 6.7.1666 entry 25

¹⁷⁸³ CSP *Venice vol 34* 30.3.1666 entry 365; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 18.7.1666 entry 36, 20.7.1666 entry 37, 21.12.1666 entry 123; CSPD *1665-1666*, 15.5.1666 entry 38 vol 156; CSPD *1666-1667*, 15.8.1666 entry 148 vol 167; CCSP *vol 5*, November 1665 pp.517-518

¹⁷⁸⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 7.3.1666 pp.535-536; Pepys *Diary*, 27.7.1666

¹⁷⁸⁵ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 21.12.1666 entry 123, 11.1.1667 entry 130

¹⁷⁸⁶ Barlow *Journal*, p.109

¹⁷⁸⁷ Montagu *Journal*, 17.7.1665 p.248; Pepys *Diary*, 20.8.1665; CCSP *vol 5*, 4.10.1665 pp.510-511; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.527-534; Talbot *Account*, pp.35-48

¹⁷⁸⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 15.4.1665 entries 158, 159 and 161, 24.4.1665 entry 164, 15.5.1665 entry 178, 12.6.1665 entry 207; CCSP *vol 5*, May 1665 pp.488-489; Talbot *Account*, pp.35-48

The Spanish ambassador also acknowledged an English, Swedish and Danish alliance, fearing that they were jointly so nautically powerful, they could control the seas.¹⁷⁸⁹ Indeed, the Venetian ambassador commented that neither Scandinavian nations would dare to cross such a powerful maritime nation as the English.¹⁷⁹⁰ *Europae Modernaе* confirmed this, stating that

“the interest of Denmark is to love and respect the crown of England above all other friendships whatsoever.”¹⁷⁹¹

This conjunction is illustrated by all succour being severed to Dutch commerce using the Meuse and Lille (see above).

Following the Bergen raid the Danish King initially worried about Charles’s reaction to Danish support of Dutch ships at the port. He hesitated in breaching with his Britannic Majesty, placatory envoys being dispatched to both England and Holland, consistent with their apparent neutral stance.¹⁷⁹² Despite this, the Danish Sovereign resented the English action in his territory.¹⁷⁹³ Ultimately, the French financial inducement finalised his breach with England, siding with the Dutch to gain support amid fears of potential Swedish aggression.¹⁷⁹⁴ And, influentially, the Dane observed England’s weakening power. Sir Thomas Clifford wrote to his Britannic Majesty,

“the French are doing what they can to support Denmark and lesser princes in the empire to curb the Swede. The Chancellor said that the King of England’s affairs had not an inviting aspect in relation to France for their money seemed to prevail in Portugal to prevent a peace between Portugal and Spain”.¹⁷⁹⁵

¹⁷⁸⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 13.5.1665 entry 1786

¹⁷⁹⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 31.7.1665 entry 246 Enclosure

¹⁷⁹¹ *Europae modernaе*, p.52

¹⁷⁹² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 8.9.1665 entry 252, 29.11.1665 entry 305; CCSP *vol 5*, 23.8.1665 pp.503-504; Talbot *Account*, pp.35-48

¹⁷⁹³ CCSP *vol 5*, 19.8.1665 p.503; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.38

¹⁷⁹⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 13.10.1665 entry 277, 17.10.1665 entry 299 Enclosure, 29.1.1666 entry 331, 9.2.1666 entry 342, 17.2.1666 entry 351, 21.3.1666 entry 377; CCSP *vol 5*, 31.1.1666 pp.528-529, 14.2.1666 pp.531-532, 22.2.1666 pp.533-534; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.38

¹⁷⁹⁵ CCSP *vol 5*, November 1665 pp.517-518

Therefore, England's erstwhile superior naval reputation evidently failed to support Charles's policy of including Denmark in his 'Arc of Isolation', denting his international dominance aspirations.

Consequently, indignant at Denmark's defection, in April 1666 the English Monarch authorised letters of marque to be issued and for all Danish vessels in English ports to be seized, the formal war declaration against Denmark being in September 1666.¹⁷⁹⁶ Yet, this move was 'academic', England's impecuniousness preventing it from pursuing hostilities against this Scandinavian nation (see Chapter 6).¹⁷⁹⁷ Also, with all Danish forces being retained in the Baltic to counter potential Swedish aggression, this effectively neutralised both Northern powers from interfering elsewhere (see above).¹⁷⁹⁸ Full defensive and offensive treaties would have been more desirable, but the substitute allowed England to maintain its focus on its more immediate adversaries.

Bishop of Münster, the German States and Austria.

In the Spring of 1665 the Bishop of Münster signed an offensive and defensive treaty with Charles II against the Dutch. The prelate was to provide twenty thousand foot and ten thousand horse to invade the United Provinces within two months. The King agreed to furnish three hundred thousand rix dollars immediately to subsidise the costs of these troops, the contribution to reduce to a half should the Brandenburg's Elector join the alliance, and to a third should Neuburg's Duke also participate. He also agreed to protect Münster against outside attack.¹⁷⁹⁹ And as Henry Coventry reported to Clarendon, both Spain and Austria also provided support.¹⁸⁰⁰ For Charles this opened a second front for the Netherlanders on their landward side as part of his 'Arc of Isolation' (see Chapter Five). As Clarendon stated this

¹⁷⁹⁶ CSPD 1665-1666, 27.4.1666 entry 71 vol 154, April 1666 entry 121 vol 151, 8.5.1666 entry 75 vol 155; CSPD 1666-1667, 19.9.1666 entry 45 vol 172; CCSP vol 5, 30.9.1665 p.508; Pepys *Diary*, 20.10.1666; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.37, p.39; Barlow *Journal*, p.109

¹⁷⁹⁷ Barlow *Journal*, p.109

¹⁷⁹⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 9.2.1666 entry 342, 6.3.1666 entry 365; CSP *Venice* vol 35, 8.6.1666 entry 6, 18.7.1666 entry 36, 21.12.1666 entry 123; CSPD 1665-1666, 15.5.1666 entry 38 vol 156, 28.5.1665 entry 38 vol 157; CSPD 1666-1667, 15.8.1666 entry 148 vol 167; CCSP vol 5, 7.3.1666 pp.535-536; Johnson *Exact survey*, p.127

¹⁷⁹⁹ CCSP vol 5, 3.6.1665 pp.489-490; Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.522-523; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.40; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.149 22.10.1665; *Christchurch Hall in Oxford*, p.4

¹⁸⁰⁰ CCSP vol 5, 6.9.1665 p.505; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.42

“was expected to put the counsels of Holland into great confusion.”¹⁸⁰¹

With the English navy’s maritime focus, this should have meant the splitting of Dutch forces.¹⁸⁰² Or as a panegyric stated, “Whoever sees you in the field must grant/That now the church is truly militant/The faith’s defender promised to appear/Great Britain’s Monarch to be God-Father/He did last year baptise their admiraltie/As God did the Aegyptians I’th the Red Sea.”¹⁸⁰³ For the Bishop, victory would achieve his ambition to dominate the League of the Rhine compared to his current member status.¹⁸⁰⁴ He justified his aggression by alleging Dutch violation of the Treaty of Münster, including religious persecution against Catholics and the failure to make the expected reparations.¹⁸⁰⁵

Initially things progressed well, Sweden and various German states promising to supply support, Münster forces achieving early success in capturing such Dutch territory as Bremen.¹⁸⁰⁶ Additionally, Münster instituted risings using native papists within Dutch territory, focused on taking over Arnheim and Douesbough.¹⁸⁰⁷ However, various factors altered the trajectory.¹⁸⁰⁸ Despite making initial remittances, Charles failed in his financial responsibilities, only £27,357 out of a total due of £278,500 being paid due to his ongoing impecuniousness (see Chapter Six).¹⁸⁰⁹ He also didn’t carry out his military responsibilities.¹⁸¹⁰ And France’s diplomacy successfully isolated Münster from other German princes’ succour, bolstered by cash subsidy offers, combined both with threats of military intervention to protect his Dutch ally, and the dispatch of troops to eject Münster’s troops from Holland.¹⁸¹¹ The Bishop’s desperate March 1666 plea to Charles in London was scorned, the Court stating that it could well defend itself without Münster’s aid, so no more

¹⁸⁰¹ Clarendon *Life* vol 2, pp.522-523

¹⁸⁰² CSP *Venice* vol 34, 31.7.1665 entry 229, 29.12.1665 entry 317; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.40

¹⁸⁰³ *Letter to the Bishop*, pp.4-5

¹⁸⁰⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 22.9.1665 entry 259

¹⁸⁰⁵ *Letter sent by his Highness*, pp.4-5, p.7

¹⁸⁰⁶ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 31.7.1665 entry 229, 7.8.1665 entry 231, 14.8.1665 entry 233; CSPD 1665-1666, 10.11.1665 entry 94 vol 136, 16.11.1665 entry 15 vol 137, 18.1.1666 entry 76 vol 145; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, 38

¹⁸⁰⁷ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 8.9.1665 entry 253, 15.9.1665 entries 256 and 257, 22.9.1665 entry 262, 29.9.1665 entry 265; CSPD 1664-1665, 31.8.1665 entry 79 vol 131, 9.9.1665 entry 52 vol 132; CCSP vol 5, 6.9.1665 p.505

¹⁸⁰⁸ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 17.11.1665 entry 299 Enclosure

¹⁸⁰⁹ CSPD 1666-1667, 24.9.1666 entry 149 vol 172; CCSP vol 5, 7.12.1665 pp.518-519; *Pepys Diary*, 7.4.1666; *Christchurch Hall in Oxford*, p.4

¹⁸¹⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 28.7.1665 entry 226, 31.7.1665 entry 229

¹⁸¹¹ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 31.7.1665 entries 228 and 229, 7.8.1665 entry 231, 14.8.1665 entries 234 and 253, 8.9.1665 entry 250, 22.9.1665 entry 262, 4.12.1665 entry 308, 10.1.1666 entry 320, 2.3.1666 entry 364, 21.3.1666 entry 374; CCSP vol 5, 30.6.1665 pp.494-495, 14.7.1665 p.499, 1.11.1665 pp.512-513, 7.3.1666 pp.535-536; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.40

money would be forthcoming.¹⁸¹² Of course, the Bishop also failed to dominate the League of the Rhine, many other constituent princes disowning him.¹⁸¹³

This resulted in the Bishop of Münster's advances collapsing, the ensuing treaty with the French and Dutch stipulating that he must militarily support Dutch and French martial activities against the English.¹⁸¹⁴ Consequently, Charles lost the most active ally on Holland's landward side, highlighting the failure of this part of his 'Arc of Isolation'. And in further humiliation, the Bishop claimed England owed him 150,000 crowns, stopping English Merchants' money in Antwerp as recompense. His Majesty was powerless to resist this.¹⁸¹⁵ The reduction in Charles's prestige is encapsulated in the Duke of Brandenburg's "raising of jealousies" against Münster, as termed by Clarendon, that is to break with the prelate meant a breach with England, a theoretically much more powerful state. Yet this breach meant no German states remained to Charles.¹⁸¹⁶ The King's diminution in influence highlights the navy's further failure to support his reputation and consequent attractiveness as an ally.

However, in a twist, the Austrians renewed the negotiations with Charles's envoy, Lord Taf, as a counterweight to the threat of French troops massing on Holland's side of the Flanders border. Indeed, on reaching Prague Lord Taf whilst on his way home was requested by Caesar's (the Holy Roman Emperor) emissaries to return. As Venice's German ambassador reported, an understanding was concluded shortly thereafter that was strongly tied to the outcome of England's discussions with Spain (see below).¹⁸¹⁷ And Caesar's friendship held immense potential not just of itself but also in conjunction with a Spanish treaty. Indeed, the Venetian ambassador reported that both Spain and Austria had an interest in Münster's activities.¹⁸¹⁸ This was because they feared French threats to Flanders.¹⁸¹⁹ In fact, the Italian also recorded that Spain had sent early remittances to Münster to support this, via England, in

¹⁸¹² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 30.3.1666 entry 384; CSPD *1665-1666*, 15.3.1666 entry 23 vol 151

¹⁸¹³ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 17.11.1665 entry 299 Enclosure

¹⁸¹⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 18.4.1666 entry 397, 2.5.1666 entry 402, 11.5.1666 entry 407; CSPD *1665-1666*, 27.4.1666 entry 71 vol 154, 15.5.1666 entry 38 vol 156; CCSP *vol 5*, 24.4.1666 p.541; *Pepys Diary*, 22.4.1666; *Clarendon Life vol 3*, p.44; *Jocelyn Diary*, p.152 26.4.1666

¹⁸¹⁵ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 11.1.1667 entry 130

¹⁸¹⁶ CCSP *vol 5*, 4.10.1665 pp.510-511

¹⁸¹⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 8.11.1665 entry 293, 28.2.1666 entry 360, 28.3.1666 entry 383, 2.5.1666 entry 402, 16.5.1666 entry 410; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 25.7.1666 entry 42, 7.11.1666 entry 104, 1.2.1667 entry 138, 23.2.1667 entry 151, 1.3.1667 entry 153, 29.3.1667 entry 164, 21.8.1667 entry 220, 20.11.1667 entry 246

¹⁸¹⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 15.9.1665 entry 257, 22.9.1665 entry 261, 10.1.1666 entry 320

¹⁸¹⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 21.3.1666 374, 2.5.1666 entry 402

order to help protect Flanders from French encroachment.¹⁸²⁰ French requests for their troops to be allowed passage to Holland via Flanders exacerbated these fears, the Iberians fearing that once over the border they wouldn't leave.¹⁸²¹ This new development would substantially raise Charles's prestige on the global stage, contributing to his aspiration for international pre-eminence.¹⁸²² Thus, despite his Majesty's heavy military defeat in the Dutch war, the King retained some of his attractiveness as an ally due to his navy's previous Mediterranean and Caribbean exploits against the Spanish (see Chapter Four). Failure with Münster had been counteracted by success with more important states, albeit tempered as Charles's international clout now relied on partnership with other nations, and not as a unilateral power.

France.

As Chapter Five outlined, Louis XIV's Flanders' annexation was his primary long-term focus, all other actions designed to facilitate it.¹⁸²³ According to the Venetian ambassador, even Sweden had noticed Louis's fickleness, only keeping his word when absolutely necessary.¹⁸²⁴ The Italian additionally commented that at this stage, prior to the war, both the English and French Monarchs wished to retain good relations.¹⁸²⁵ Interestingly, they even commenced secret treaty negotiations.¹⁸²⁶ So, on the Dutch war's commencement in March 1665, French mediation for a peace deal between the two main protagonists continued, and Clarendon's *Life* and other sources revealed that the ambassadors extraordinaire, those being Charles's uncle the Duke of Vernuil, M de Comminges and M de Courtin, were received in London with great honours.¹⁸²⁷ This pleased Charles as it delayed Louis's entry into the war, effectively keeping France 'in limbo', allowing him to concentrate on Holland.¹⁸²⁸ This was also desirable to the French as the delay allowed them to preserve their forces for attacks on

¹⁸²⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 14.8.1665 entry 233, 15.9.1665 entry 257; CSPD *1665-1666*, 15.11.1665 entry 3 vol 137; CCSP *vol 5*, 26.7.1665 pp.501-502

¹⁸²¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 31.7.1665 entry 229, 14.8.1665 entries 233 and 234, 2.9.1665 entry 248, 8.9.1665 entry 250; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.43

¹⁸²² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 16.5.1666 entry 410

¹⁸²³ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 22.12.1665 entry 314; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 15.3.1667 entry 159, 24.5.1667 entry 192; CCSP *vol 5*, 17.4.1667 p.402, 29.6.1667 pp.619-620; Pepys *Diary*, 24.6.1667; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.356; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.211, p.261; Jocelyn *Diary*, p.157 4.8.1667; Dryden *Annus mirabilis*, p.3

¹⁸²⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 24.7.1665 entry 225, 7.8.1665 entry 231; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 22.9.1665 entry 76

¹⁸²⁵ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 17.7.1665 entry 220

¹⁸²⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 1.4.1665 entry 148, 3.4.1665 entry 150

¹⁸²⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 3.4.1665 entry 150, 25.4.1665 entry 162, 1.5.1665 entry 167 Enclosure, 12.6.1665 entries 194 and 196 Enclosure; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.500-501; *French King's declaration; Declaration for reparation*

¹⁸²⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 8.5.1665 entry 173 Enclosure; Clarendon *Life vol 2*, pp.501-502

Flanders.¹⁸²⁹ Indeed, the plenipotentiaries had instructions only to propose to each nation a return to the ‘status quo’ prior to the conflict’s commencement rather than suggesting new propositions.¹⁸³⁰ In fact, the Swedish Chancellor, M Applebome, in a report to his boss, confirmed suspicions of Louis’s aspirations to ‘Universal Monarchy’, stating

“the designs of the French to affect a universal monarchy are evident”.¹⁸³¹

As *Annus Mirabilis* outlined “Such deep designs of empire does he lay/O’re them whose cause he seems to take in hand/And prudently would make them Lords at sea/To whom with ease he can give laws by land.”¹⁸³² His army would obviously be needed for the land campaign.¹⁸³³ However, as the Venetian ambassador explained, the French King anticipated his navy’s destruction should it confront the English, so he took measures to ensure that this never happened. Clarendon’s *Life* confirmed this, stating

“it was not expected that the French would send out their fleet which was much inferior to the English.”¹⁸³⁴

Part of Louis’s problem was his great difficulty in recruiting sailors, especially experienced ones. As John Lysle highlighted to Williamson

“the French fleet is in a bad way”.¹⁸³⁵

¹⁸²⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 201 Enclosure, 3.7.1665 entry 209, 10.7.1665 entry 215, 14.8.1665 entry 233, 1.12.1665 entry 306; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 14.7.1666 entry 34, 28.9.1666 entry 78; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.45

¹⁸³⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 8.5.1665 entry 169, 8.5.1665 entry 173 Enclosure, 15.5.1665 entries 177 and 178, 24.11.1665 entry 303

¹⁸³¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 13.5.1665 entry 176; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 14.7.1666 entry 33, 12.10.1666 entry 88; CSPD *1665-1666*, 31.1.1666 entry 72 vol 146; CCSP *vol 5*, 6.10.1666 p.511

¹⁸³² Dryden *Annus mirabilis*, p.3

¹⁸³³ CSPD *1666-1667*, 20.10.1666 entry 117 vol 175; CSPD *1667-1667*, 4.6.1667 entry 64 vol 203; CCSP *vol 5*, 13.3.1667 pp.589-590

¹⁸³⁴ Clarendon *Life vol 2*, p.523

¹⁸³⁵ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 15.7.1665 entry 218, 9.2.1666 entry 342; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 15.6.1666 entry 11, 13.7.1666 entry 30 Enclosure, 3.8.1666 entry 49, 31.8.1666 entry 63, 28.9.1666 entry 77, 16.6.1668 entry 298; CSPD *1665-1666*, 21.7.1666 entry 1 vol 164; CSPD *1666-1667*, 5.9.1666 entry 9 vol 168, 14.9.1666 entry 120 vol 170; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.352; Pepys *Diary*, 22.4.1667

Of course, this caused considerable consternation to the Netherlanders.¹⁸³⁶ Yet it equally meant that Charles's forces never encountered combined French and Dutch fleets. This very tangibly illustrates the English navy's reputation, that is deterring a major European power with substantial resources (see Chapter Six) through fear of a confrontation. This reflected well on his Britannic Majesty's persona.

However, the ramping up of the Bishop of Münster's August 1665 campaign against the Dutch clearly portrayed the prelate as the aggressor, automatically bringing Louis into the conflagration according to his Dutch treaty (see Chapter Five).¹⁸³⁷ French military threats failed to halt Münster's designs.¹⁸³⁸ Louis requested Spanish permission to transit his troops across Flanders, but the Iberians procrastinated, suspecting that this was a trick and that the French had no intention of helping the Dutch.¹⁸³⁹ As Henry Muddiman reported to Williamson, Louis consequently used alternate but unspecified methods to transport his soldiers to Holland.¹⁸⁴⁰ Nevertheless, as the Venetian ambassador reported, the paucity of Spanish troops in the province meant they would be unable to resist should Louis transit his troops across Flanders anyway.¹⁸⁴¹ Of course, these French troops in Holland would also be eminently placed for the provision of a second front when the time came for French aggression against Flanders.¹⁸⁴² Given the firm alliance between Charles and the Bishop of Münster, this automatically brought the French into conflict, war being declared in early 1666.¹⁸⁴³

As reported by Sir George Downing to Clarendon, French policy was to divert a thorough understanding between England and Spain; to hinder English affairs in Sweden and Denmark and to reconcile those crowns to the Dutch; and to delay Münster from attacking the

¹⁸³⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 3.4.1665 entry 151, 25.4.1665 entry 162, 15.5.1665 entry 178 Enclosure, 29.5.1665 entry 187 Enclosure; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 17.8.1666 entry 54; CSPD *1665-1666*, 11.7.1666 entry 73 vol 162; CCSP *vol 5*, 5.5.1665 pp.484-485; *Pepys Diary*, 23.7.1666

¹⁸³⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 28.7.1665 entry 226, 7.8.1665 entry 231; *French King's declaration; Against the French*

¹⁸³⁸ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 14.8.1665 entry 234, 10.1.1666 entry 320; CCSP *vol 5*, 14.7.1665 p.499

¹⁸³⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 2.9.1665 entry 248, 11.11.1665 entry 295, 18.11.165 entry 300; *Pepys Diary*, 3.3.1667, 4.3.1667

¹⁸⁴⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 8.9.1665 entry 250, 15.9.1665 entry 257, 29.9.1665 entry 264 Enclosure; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 3.8.1666 entry 49; CSPD *1664-1665*, 9.9.1665 entry 52 vol 132

¹⁸⁴¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 2.11.1665 entry 288 Enclosure; *Clarendon Life vol 3*, p.43, p.261

¹⁸⁴² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 15.12.1665 entry 312

¹⁸⁴³ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 14.8.1665 entry 234, 2.10.1665 entry 271 Enclosure, *13.9.1665 entry 276*, 3.11.1665 entry 290 Enclosure, 24.11.1665 entry 302 Enclosure, 4.12.1665 entry 308, 29.12.1665 entry 316, 29.1.1666 entries 331 and 332, 2.3.1666 entry 362 Enclosure; CSPD *1665-1666*, 9.2.1666 entry 65 vol 147; *Jocelyn Diary*, p.151 30.1.1666; *Ludlow Memoirs*, p.389 10.2.1666; *French King's declaration; Against the French*

Hollanders.¹⁸⁴⁴ It was also to prevent the German Princely states from entering the war on Charles's and the Bishop of Münster's side (see above).¹⁸⁴⁵ Diplomacy, using a mixture of threats and promises of heavy financial subsidies, was the principal method of attempted influence.¹⁸⁴⁶ Using this approach in the Iberian peninsula achieved varying success.¹⁸⁴⁷ Portugal initially succumbed to Louis's bribes, illustrated in their intransigence during their peace negotiations with Spain.¹⁸⁴⁸ In fact, John Fitzherbert informed Williamson that the French also aided Braganza with between 8,000 and 10,000 men.¹⁸⁴⁹ This meant Spain couldn't fully focus on French threats to its Low Countries' territory.¹⁸⁵⁰ Consequently, they remained firmly in England's orbit (see below).¹⁸⁵¹ Nevertheless, this division in the Iberian peninsula was temporary, Lord Hollis reporting to Clarendon in July 1667 that the two Iberian states had done a deal. In fact, it did materialise, but not until 1668 (see below).¹⁸⁵²

Ultimately, France's Spring 1667 Flanders' invasion led to her complicated foreign policy unravelling, Dutch fear of a new aggressive neighbour on their Low Countries' border triggering their Medway adventure in order to speed peace negotiations with England (see above).¹⁸⁵³ As *Europae Modernaе* stated, the Dutch

“are now more nearly interested that the French nor no other potent prince get any further footing in Flanders”.¹⁸⁵⁴

The resulting treaty between Holland, Spain, Austria and England was aimed at protecting Flanders from French aggression.¹⁸⁵⁵

¹⁸⁴⁴ CCSP vol 5, 30.6.1665 pp.494-495; Pepys Diary, 25.1.1666, 11.2.1666

¹⁸⁴⁵ CCSP vol 5, 6.10.1665 p.511; CCSP vol 5, November 1665 pp.517-518

¹⁸⁴⁶ CSP Venice vol 34, 14.8.1665 entry 235 Enclosure, 2.3.1666 entry 364

¹⁸⁴⁷ CSP Venice vol 34, 2.9.1665 entry 248, 6.4.1666 entry 388, 3.5.1666 entry 403; CSP Venice vol 35, 28.7.1666 entry 44, 18.8.1666 entry 57; Pepys Diary, 11.3.1667

¹⁸⁴⁸ CSPD 1665-1666, 4.1.1666 entry 37 vol 144; CCSP vol 5, November 1665 pp.517-518, 18.9.1666 pp.559-560; Pepys Diary, 30.4.1667

¹⁸⁴⁹ CSPD 1665-1666, 9.7.1666 entry 13 vol 162

¹⁸⁵⁰ CSP Venice vol 34, 314; CCSP vol 5, October 1666 pp.564-565

¹⁸⁵¹ CSP Venice vol 34, 4.11.1665 entry 291, 23.2.1666 entry 355; CSP Venice vol 35, 28.7.1666 entry 44;

CSPD 1667-1667, 3.5.1667 entry 38 vol 199; CCSP vol 5, 28.3.1667 p.595

¹⁸⁵² CCSP vol 5, 16.7.1667 p.622

¹⁸⁵³ CCSP vol 5, 22.2.1667 pp.584-585; Pepys Diary, 3.3.1667

¹⁸⁵⁴ *Europae modernaе*, p.72

¹⁸⁵⁵ CSP Venice vol 34, 2.9.1665 entry 248; CSP Venice vol 35, 2.6.1666 entry 3, 28.12.1666 entry 125, 4.1.1667 entry 128, 22.2.1667 entry 149, 8.3.1667 entry 156, 10.5.1667 entry 184, 18.7.1667 entry 210, 11.10.1667 entry 235, 24.1.1668 entry 271, 17.4.1668 entry 285, 19.5.1667 entry 47 vol 201; CSPD 1667-1667, 29.6.1667 entry 113 vol 207, 4.9.1667 entry 55 vol 216, 2.10.1667 entry 28 vol 219; CSPD 1667-1667, 19.4.1667 entry 120 vol 197, 12.9.1667 entry 9 vol 217, 22.10.1667 entry 111 vol 222; CSPD 1667-1668,

Although the navy's fearsome reputation hadn't totally prevented France entering the war, it caused a delay as well as deterring French nautical support of Holland. This resulted in England's navy confronting a diminished foe during its battles with the Dutch, its martial superiority only being undermined by both England's fiscal weakness and lack of Strategic command and control (see above).

Spain and Portugal.

As mentioned above, France's overriding objective throughout this period was to annex Flanders.¹⁸⁵⁶ Naturally this greatly concerned both Spain and Austria, regarding themselves as political partners.¹⁸⁵⁷ However, Spain also regarded the Portuguese Braganza regime as rebels, being at war with them. It was therefore vital for Spain to concoct a peace with Portugal to allow the release of money and troops for its defence of Flanders.¹⁸⁵⁸ Yet, Portugal insisted on permanent peace and to be recognised as a 'King', Spain preferring a truce and refusing to accept Braganza as Monarch.¹⁸⁵⁹

Charles was becoming concerned with France's aspirations to Universal Monarchy (see above), seeking to counterbalance this by allying with both Spain and Austria.¹⁸⁶⁰ In fact, as Clarendon highlighted Austria and Spain desired this arrangement too (see above), stating they

“would be glad that they might have the assistance of England for their defence”.¹⁸⁶¹

As John Carlisle wrote to Williamson as early as June 1665,

27.11.1667 entry 115 vol 223, 13.4.1668 entry 93 vol 238; CCSP vol 5, 14.9.1666 pp.559-560, 22.2.1667 pp.584-585, 13.3.1667 pp.589-590; Pepys *Diary*, 23.1.1668

¹⁸⁵⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 24.7.1665 entry 225; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 23.6.1666 entry 19; Pepys *Diary*, 26.4.1667; Burnet *History vol 1*, p.356; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.201

¹⁸⁵⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 14.8.1665 entry 235; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 18.8.1666 entry 57, 24.8.1666 entry 59; Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.201

¹⁸⁵⁸ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 14.9.1666 entry 69, 28.8.1667 entry 222

¹⁸⁵⁹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 17.2.1666 entry 351, 24.3.1666 entry 380, 3.5.1666 entry 403; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 15.12.1666 entry 121; CCSP vol 5, 7.5.1666 p.543; Fanshawe *Memoires*, pp.182-183

¹⁸⁶⁰ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 14.4.1666 entry 394; CSP *Venice 35*, 23.6.1666 entry 19, 24.8.1666 entry 59, 12.10.1666 entry 89, 12.1.1667 entry 131, 23.8.1667 entry 221, 11.10.1667 entry 235; CCSP vol 5, 22.2.1667 pp.584-585, 19.7.1667 p.622

¹⁸⁶¹ Clarendon *Life vol 3*, p.201

“the Austrians are marching 8,000 troops into Flanders”.¹⁸⁶²

Spain also wished to expand existing agreements with England.¹⁸⁶³ Eventually, of course, the Dutch wanted to join this coalition against France and its Flanders’ annexation.¹⁸⁶⁴ However, Caesar would only conform if the Spanish/Portuguese conundrum were resolved.¹⁸⁶⁵ Thus, unlocking the Iberian stand-off was key.¹⁸⁶⁶ Consequently, Charles initially dispatched Lord Fanshawe to mediate between the two parties (see Chapter Five), followed by Lord Sandwich in early 1666.¹⁸⁶⁷ As stated in *Europae Modernaе*,

“it is hoped therefore he [the King of Spain] will hearken, now in his old age, to a composure with Portugal, from which he hath reaped more loss and dishonour than the Kingdom can be worth to him,” as “Millions of Crowns yearly, whereof much is engaged for the debts of the crown, the rest is spent in the charges of the wars “. ¹⁸⁶⁸

Charles’s strong persona with the Spanish provided by the English navy proved decisive in this theatre. *Europae Modernaе* summarised this, as the Spanish Monarch feels that

“for the King of England he cherish more than the usual respect, testified by those public honours done his ambassador Sir Richard Fanshawe”.¹⁸⁶⁹

As the Venetian ambassador highlighted, Louis XIV’s greatest fear throughout this period was that Spain, Austria, Portugal and England would “proceed in agreement”, leaving him and his Low Countries’ aspirations to face a monolithic block.¹⁸⁷⁰ In mitigation, the French Monarch sent Abbé Rueges, a confidant of the French Minister, Colbert, to prevent a

¹⁸⁶² CSPD 1664-1665, 20.6.1665 entry 139 vol 124

¹⁸⁶³ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 1.2.1667 entry 138, 23.2.1667 entry 151, 29.3.1667 entry 164, 14.6.1667 entry 198, 30.7.1667 entry 213

¹⁸⁶⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 29.3.1667 entry 164, 4.5.1667 entry 182, 18.7.1667 entry 210, 26.7.1667 entry 212, 17.9.1667 entry 229; Clarendon *Life* vol 3, p.202

¹⁸⁶⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 31.1.1666 entry 333, 7.2.1666 entry 341; CSP *Venice* vol 35, 18.6.1667 entry 200, 10.11.1666 entry 105

¹⁸⁶⁶ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 10.7.1665 entry 216, 31.7.1665 entry 229; CSP *Venice* vol 35, 21.7.1666 entry 40

¹⁸⁶⁷ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 6.4.1666 entry 388; CSP *Venice* vol 35, 30.6.1666 entry 22; CSPD 1665-1666, 4.2.1666 entry 28 vol 147

¹⁸⁶⁸ *Europae modernaе*, p.106-7, p.110

¹⁸⁶⁹ *Europae modernaе*, p.110

¹⁸⁷⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 31.7.1665 entries 228 and 229

Spanish/Portuguese treaty, separately offering to both parties large cash bribes and the promise of troops.¹⁸⁷¹ The longer these two protagonists quarrelled, the longer it delayed Spain transferring military assets to Flanders to spoil Louis XIV's plans. As outlined in Sir Thomas Clifford's paper to Charles, the Portuguese were diverted by these lucrative offers, to such an extent that they relied on them to sustain their attacks on Spain and delay a deal.¹⁸⁷² And as Lord Sandwich reported to Clarendon in September 1666,

“Portugal is eager to join a league with France against Spain”,

thus agreeing a ten-year offensive and defensive treaty.¹⁸⁷³ In fact, a marriage between the French princess Annale to Braganza was dangled as an added inducement.¹⁸⁷⁴ However, England's Caribbean campaign's success (see Chapter Four) meant the Spanish wished to continue English mediation for fear of upsetting Charles, also seeking English power for the protection of Flanders.¹⁸⁷⁵ As the Venetian representative recorded, this was starkly illustrated where the English ambassador's servants attacked an alcalde who was passing the ambassadorial residence. Although the matter was referred to the Duke of Medina, nothing was done for fear of upsetting England's embassy, Spain believing it was militarily dwarfed by his Britannic Majesty.¹⁸⁷⁶ This reflected Charles's powerful reputation constructed by the navy, resulting in an enhanced attractiveness as an ally. This meant that England could influence the negotiations' direction, excluding French influence. Negotiations became protracted due to both French pressure on the Portuguese, and Spanish procrastination in the hope that matters would resolve themselves without being forced to acquiesce to Braganza's demands.¹⁸⁷⁷ However, Spanish desire for an English treaty heightened when France finally commenced its Flanders invasion, by mid-1667 resulting in some urban centres being lost,

¹⁸⁷¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 22.12.1665 entry 314, 13.1.1666 entry 323, 23.2.1666 entry 355, 6.4.1666 entry 394, 3.5.1666 entry 403; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 28.7.1666 entry 44, 1.12.1666 entry 116; CCSP *vol 5*, 5.3.1667 p.588

¹⁸⁷² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 8.5.1665 entry 169, 10.3.1666 entry 368; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 16.6.1666 entry 12, 23.6.1666 entry 193, 1, 4.6.1667 entry 194, 5.12.1666 entry 121, 28.5.1667 entry 193, 4.6.1667 entry 194, 11.6.1667 entry 196, 23.11.1667 entry 248; CSPD *1665-1666*, 4.1.1666 entry 37 vol 144, 14.3.1667 entry 113 vol 193; CCSP *vol 5*, November 1665 pp.517-518, 25.9.1666 p.561, 16.11.1667 entry 244

¹⁸⁷³ CCSP *vol 5*, 25.9.1666 p.561, 26.3.1667 p.595; CSP *Venice vol 34*, 13.10.1665 entry 277 Enclosure

¹⁸⁷⁴ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 2.2.1666 entry 334, 2.3.1666 entry 362; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 8.6.1666 entry 6

¹⁸⁷⁵ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 26.6.1665 entry 207, 8.7.1665 entry 214, 31.7.1665 entry 228, 2.9.1665 entry 248; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 16.6.1666 entry 12, 28.7.1666 entry 44, 18.8.1666 entry 57, 15.12.1666 entry 121, 4.1.1667 entry 128

¹⁸⁷⁶ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 21.10.1665 entry 261; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 21.7.1666 entry 40, 24.8.1666 entry 59

¹⁸⁷⁷ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 2.3.1666 entry 361; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 24.8.1666 entry 59, 8.9.1666 entry 67, 12.10.1666 entry 89; CCSP *vol 5*, 1.10.1665 pp.510-511

including threats to Bruges, Ypres and Brussels.¹⁸⁷⁸ England, Holland, Spain and Austria agreed an alliance, focusing on Flanders' defence (see above).

Thus, as is evident, Charles's earlier Iberian Peninsula domination (see Chapter Four) had waned by 1666. As the Venetian ambassador reported, just like the Danes, even his Portuguese brother-in-law believed England to be weakened due to the Dutch war, failing in its Münster commitments, and its troop and cash scarcity for projecting power overseas.¹⁸⁷⁹ However, the King's reputation emanating from the navy's previous achievements remained somewhat intact. In addition to preventing the Spanish from veering towards the French, it provided other advantages for Charles. Although the Dutch war had revealed the King's weaknesses such as poor finances (see Chapter Six), as already mentioned the navy's pre-war exploits raised his reputation enough to be attractive as an ally to European Powers, including Holland. The Spanish/Portuguese treaty was finally achieved towards the Spring of 1668, according to the Venetian ambassador Spain having acquiesced to the Pope's mediation to accept Braganza as a Sovereign in September 1667.¹⁸⁸⁰ A popular revolt triggered Portugal's agreement at the end of 1667, the populace being troubled that the French/Portuguese treaty would lead to the war lasting for the agreement's full ten years. Braganza was replaced by an interim regime of the Estates, led by his brother, Don Pedro, described by *Europae Moderna* as "a very hopeful gentleman".¹⁸⁸¹ He seized the opportunity to end hostilities.¹⁸⁸² According to the Venetian ambassador, the English ambassador, the Earl of Sandwich, was the new Administration's chosen intermediary, Portugal feting him as the bringer of peace.¹⁸⁸³ This reinstated his Britannic Majesty's influence over the whole Iberian peninsula, family bonds between Charles and his bride's homeland trumping France's cash. The final Spanish/Portuguese treaty gave tangible evidence of this, only being finalised with his Britannic Majesty's ratification in London.¹⁸⁸⁴ Further, as a Venetian State's letter highlights, Charles managed to achieve a halt to hostilities between Spain and France shortly thereafter, even overcoming Louis's desire to dominate all of Flanders.¹⁸⁸⁵

¹⁸⁷⁸ CSPD 1667-1667, 4.6.1667 entry 64 vol 203; CCSP vol 5, 16.7.1667 p.622; Pepys *Diary*, 1.6.1667

¹⁸⁷⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 31.12.1665 entry 318

¹⁸⁸⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 9.2.1667 entry 142, 8.3.1667 entry 156, 10.9.1667 entry 226, 7.4.1668 entry 283, 30.4.1668 entry 288; Burnet *History* vol 1, p.356

¹⁸⁸¹ *Europae moderna*, p.114

¹⁸⁸² CSP *Venice* vol 35, 21.12.1667 entry 260, 4.1.1668 entry 260; CCSP vol 5, 26.3.1667 p.595

¹⁸⁸³ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 11.1.1668 entry 267, 1.2.1668 entry 275, 15.2.1668 entry 278

¹⁸⁸⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 30.4.1668 entry 288; Johnson *Exact survey*, p.148

¹⁸⁸⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 11.5.1668 entry 292

It total, although the Iberian Peninsula conflict initially diminished Charles's reputation, ultimately it recovered. This consequently boosted the English Monarch's international persona, family ties being enhanced substantially by the King's military reputation provided by his navy's, emanating from its previous exploits. Indeed, England's original attractiveness to Portugal was its naval power, encouraging the Anglo/Portuguese marriage. His Britannic Majesty's new Iberian dominance restored this link.

Additionally, his international prestige remained substantial enough to encourage other major European States to succumb to his intercession. Further, following the Medway, Holland's addition to the Austria/Spanish/English alliance potentially formed an incredibly powerful union. As *Europae Moderna*, stated regarding the English and Dutch,

“if they were friends they would defy the world”.¹⁸⁸⁶

The Caribbean Islands and the Americas.

The limits of Charles's attempts to use his navy to project power globally during the war were starkly illustrated by his inability to protect his more distant possessions such as the Caribbean Islands and the Americas. He couldn't detach naval assets or supplies to other localities due to the essential focus on the Dutch around the British Isles.¹⁸⁸⁷ As Clarendon recorded to Lord Willoughby, Governor of Barbados in April 1666,

“hopes the summer will see an end to the wars and then the plantations will be more considered”.¹⁸⁸⁸

The only military forces available were those already there. Indeed these achieved small successes, as per William Newell's November 1665 letter to Henry Muddiman, 300 Jamaican men captured the French island of St. Eustace.¹⁸⁸⁹ They also took the Spanish island of Providence in August 1666.¹⁸⁹⁰ However, more widely this limitation to the Monarch's military resources meant that in 1665 Admiral de Ruyter dominated the Caribbean, cruising

¹⁸⁸⁶ *Europae moderna*, p.65

¹⁸⁸⁷ CCSP vol 5, 15.7.1666 pp.550-551, 27.9.1666 p.561, 1.4.1667 p.598

¹⁸⁸⁸ CCSP vol 5, 13.4.1666 pp.539-540

¹⁸⁸⁹ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 10.11.1665 entry 194

¹⁸⁹⁰ CSPD 1666-1667, 21.8.1666 entry 87 vol 168

unopposed from Barbados to Virginia, Newfoundland and other English colonies.¹⁸⁹¹ Using the French Island of Martinique as a base, he attacked Barbados but after burning several sugar mills and 45 ships, the Island's defences defeated him, repulsing the would-be invaders and wounding the Admiral. Ruyter also destroyed or captured many more English vessels around Guadeloupe.¹⁸⁹² And George Pley's letter to the Navy Commissioners stated, recorded in State Papers, that he landed in Newfoundland and destroyed several ships and plantations.¹⁸⁹³

As Clarendon also outlined in his same April 1666 letter to Lord Willoughby,

“there's not so much danger in those parts from the Dutch as from the French”.¹⁸⁹⁴

Matters escalated in 1666 when the French on St Christopher's Island (St Kitts) feared an attack from the more numerous English, with whom they shared the island. Pre-emptively they launched a surprise attack, routing the English.¹⁸⁹⁵ On Charles's orders, various attempts to retake the island using Barbados soldiers were made, but they failed. And in D Grosse's November 1666 report to Williamson, a violent hurricane hit one flotilla destroying 13 vessels and killing most of the sailors and men, but also Lord Willoughby.¹⁸⁹⁶ Several further failed attempts were made, severe losses being suffered, hampered because the King couldn't send any support.¹⁸⁹⁷ And in the Spring of 1667 the Netherlanders recaptured New York and its surrounding conurbations, using 4 men-of-war and 4 privateers. They landed forces nearby and attacked the settlements after the English had ignored an ultimatum.¹⁸⁹⁸

No English warships were dispatched from any English port from late 1666 onwards (see Chapter 6) due to Charles's impecuniousness, this being advantageous to the nautically unencumbered French, dispatching a fleet of 20 vessels.¹⁸⁹⁹ Due to the scarcity of local men

¹⁸⁹¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 14.8.1665 entry 233

¹⁸⁹² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 12.6.1665 entry 195, 10.7.1665 entries 215 and 216, 14.8.1665 entry 233

¹⁸⁹³ CSPD *1664-1665*, 1.7.1665 entry 7 vol 126; CSPD *1665-1666*, 8.5.1666 entry 72 vol 155

¹⁸⁹⁴ CCSP *vol 5*, 13.4.1666 pp.539-540

¹⁸⁹⁵ CSPD *1665-1666*, 10.7.1666 entry 60iv vol 162; CSPD *1666-1667*, 21.8.1666 entry 87 vol 168; CCSP *vol 5*, 8.6.1666 p.547; *Pepys Diary*, 18.6.1666; *History of the Caribby-Islands*, p.21

¹⁸⁹⁶ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 10.6.1666 entry 11, 6.7.1666 entry 26, 7.9.1666 entry 66; CSPD *1666-1667*, 27.11.1666 entries 92 and 98 vol 179; CCSP *vol 5*, 27.9.1666 p.561, 29.3.1667 p.597; *Pepys Diary*, 18.6.1666

¹⁸⁹⁷ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 30.8.1667 entry 223, 19.10.1667 entry 237; CSPD *1667-1667*, 25.6.1667 entry 3 vol 207, 6.9.1667 entry 79 vol 216, 23.9.1667 entries 126 and 129 vol 217

¹⁸⁹⁸ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 14.5.1667 entry 187 Enclosure; CCSP *vol 5*, 30.7.1665 p.502, 25.5.1666 p.546

¹⁸⁹⁹ CSPD *1666-1667*, 2.2.1667 entry 31 vol 190; CCSP *vol 5*, 1.9.1666 pp.558-559

and arms to defend these English possessions, they took several islands such as Antigua, Tobago, Nevis, Montserrat and Anguilla.¹⁹⁰⁰ This paucity of an English Caribbean fleet also meant Charles couldn't perform such anti-Spanish tactics as were used to subdue them just two years before (see Chapter 4). As mentioned above, luckily for Charles, the reputation previously created by the navy for him retained enough potency to give the outcome listed above during the Spanish/Portuguese negotiations, albeit that there was no chance the navy could provide any support to them at this time. Luckily for the King his embarrassment at losing some lucrative islands was mitigated, the Breda Peace Treaty stipulating the return of all territory annexed during the war to the original Power.¹⁹⁰¹ However, this was due to the Dutch need to conclude negotiations swiftly (as above) and not to any military merits exhibited by his navy.

Consequently, despite the King's covert aspirations to use the naval war to overcome Dutch rivals, his authority was actually weakened, highlighted by his inability to dispatch navy vessels to other global locations to project power. It seems that in engaging in a full-blown Dutch war, the observations of the Kings of Portugal and Denmark that Charles had reduced himself were correct. And for an enemy to consider that the invasion of Barbados might be possible, one of Charles's two main bases in the area, constitutes tangible evidence of his fragility.

The Ottomans.

Portuguese and Danish doubts over England's power at this time were not shared by the Ottomans (see Chapter Four). This was variously indicated. In November 1665 the Sultan ordered the sequestration of all native and foreign ships to aid the Turk in their campaign against Venice. However, as the Venetian ambassador highlighted, on representations from England's Ottoman ambassador, English vessels were excepted.¹⁹⁰² In February 1667 Lord Sandwich informed Spain's Venetian ambassador that it was a shame that an English fleet couldn't be sent to confront the Ottoman one as, on seeing it, the Turks would beat a

¹⁹⁰⁰ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 26.1.1666 entry 113, 8.2.1667 entry 141; CSPD 1666-1667, 21.8.1666 entry 88 vol 168, 26.1.1667 entry 70 vol 189, 28.1.1667 entry 94 vol 189, 14.2.1667 entry 106 vol 191; CSPD 1667-1667, 19.6.1667 entry 76 vol 206; CCSP vol 5, 25.5.1666 p.546; Pepys *Diary*, 18.6.1666, 31.1.1667

¹⁹⁰¹ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 15.3.1667 entry 159, 30.8.1667 entry 223; CSPD 1667-1668, 15.1.1668 entries 128 and 189 vol 232

¹⁹⁰² CSP *Venice* vol 34, 24.9.1665 entry 263, 14.11.1665 entry 297

cowardly and disorderly retreat.¹⁹⁰³ And in July 1668 Venice's London ambassador requested Lord Arlington to solicit English naval succour from the King on Venice's behalf. The Secretary of State regretted his refusal as it might disrupt trade when the Ottomans discovered England's involvement. Also, the Mediterranean pirates had been peaceful since the English navy had previously so comprehensively crushed them, and so didn't want more trouble. This acted as an example to Constantinople. His Majesty didn't want to disturb this. The Venetian then asserted that therefore England's Levant trade wouldn't suffer at all as the widely acknowledged fear held by the Turks for the English meant that any mere hint that his Britannic Majesty's would become involved would deter them, and the Turks consequently wouldn't dare to constrain the Levant Company's trade in case it incurred Charles's wrath.¹⁹⁰⁴ This illustrates that the Monarch's ascendant reputation previously constructed by his navy had survived in some distant parts, and that his Majesty's international power had been damaged but not destroyed. However, this distinguishes between the reality of England's ability to project power during the conflagration compared to the reputation previously established. The former had waned, the latter retained its allure.

Mediterranean Pirates.

Throughout the war all nations bar one suffered Mediterranean corsair predations. The problem's scale is variously indicated. In September 1665 Venice's Spanish ambassador reported the country's merchants were still being treated badly by pirates.¹⁹⁰⁵ In November 1666 Henry Muddiman's newsletter reported to Sir Edward Stradling the Algerian capture of Spanish and Dutch craft.¹⁹⁰⁶ French merchants endured such hazards that Admiral Beaufort was dispatched to enforce a peace treaty.¹⁹⁰⁷ As the French Gazette recorded this was attained following their September 1665 Franco victory over the buccaneers.¹⁹⁰⁸ However, the effects didn't last long. By the following June John Lysle informed Williamson that since Beaufort's Mediterranean evacuation

“the pirates were admirals of those parts.”

¹⁹⁰³ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 16.2.1667 entry 146

¹⁹⁰⁴ CSP *Venice* vol 35, 6.7.1668 entry 305

¹⁹⁰⁵ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 2.9.1665 entry 249

¹⁹⁰⁶ CSPD *1666-1667*, 17.1.1666 entry 101 vol 178

¹⁹⁰⁷ CSP *Venice* vol 34, 27.3.1666 entry 382

¹⁹⁰⁸ CSPD *1664-1665*, 9.9.1665 entry 52 vol 132, 11.9.1665 entry 65 vol 132

And Thomas Clutterbuck reported from Leghorn in December 1666 to the Navy Commissioners that the Franco/Algerian peace is likely to be short.¹⁹⁰⁹ More widely, as late as June 1667 Venice's Florence ambassador reported that

“the high demands of merchants for ships under the present circumstances serve to bring into even greater prominence the lack of business at the port of Leghorn. The number of ships is so scanty that nothing like this has ever been known within the memory of elder persons. This state of affairs is attributed to the war between England and Holland, and it is hoped that with the adjustment of their differences the former flow of ships to Leghorn will return and that trade will flourish again. But the wisest recognise that even if the war were ended Leghorn cannot look for complete relief unless the sea is cleared of Barbary corsairs.”¹⁹¹⁰

However, as Chapter Five mentioned, England's merchants didn't suffer this nightmare, Algerian miscreants recognising Charles's nautical supremacy thanks to his erstwhile superb navy. For example, prior to their French attacks the Venetian ambassador reported that the North Africans sought Charles's permission. This was unprecedented, and contrasted with the pirates' disregard of their formal suzerain's demands, the Ottoman Sultan, to cease their predations in an earlier period (see Chapter Four).¹⁹¹¹ Indeed, an early 1666 incident occurred where some Algerine vessels being pursued by eight Dutch vessels took refuge with their 'English friends' in Tangier harbour, expecting protection. In fact, some Anglo privateers sacked the vessels of 300,000 crowns of booty, the corsairs complaining to the King of this breach of faith.¹⁹¹² Yet, despite this their respect for Charles was so great that they remained true to their treaty with England, as Sir Thomas Morgan's June 1666 report to Clarendon stated,

“news from the Levant of the punctual observing of the English peace treaty with Tunis and Algiers”.

¹⁹⁰⁹ CSPD *1665-1666*, 27.6.1666 entry 33 vol 160; CSPD *1666-1667*, 20.12.1666 entry 67 vol 182

¹⁹¹⁰ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 4.6.1667 entry 195

¹⁹¹¹ CSP *Venice vol 34*, 22.2.1665 entry 314

¹⁹¹² CSP *Venice vol 34*, 23.2.1666 entry 355; CCSP *vol 5*, 1665 p.502

And in the same month John Lysle informed Williamson that the *Patrick* met four Algerines who treated her civilly.¹⁹¹³ Captain Allen confirmed this admirable status to Pepys in August 1668 (see Chapter Five).¹⁹¹⁴ However, in the same month as Sir Thomas Allen's pronouncement to Pepys, Mr Francis reported a single breach by the Algerians to Williamson, apparently in belated retribution for the Tangier incident, fitting out a seized Bristol merchant as a man-of-war.¹⁹¹⁵ Accordingly, Captain Allen was promptly dispatched to extract a further Algerian peace treaty. However, contrary to previous episodes, mere threats of overwhelming English force against the port and the enclosed pirate vessels sufficed to extort the required deal.¹⁹¹⁶ On his journey to Constantinople, England's new Ottoman ambassador diverted to Algiers to reinforce Captain Allen's treaty by reminding the city of the consequences of future ruptures with his Britannic Majesty.¹⁹¹⁷ Indeed, as part of Allen's deal some slaves were released, constituting further unparalleled Algerian behaviour, the English captain's orders possibly resulting from a Merchant's report of June that year that around 30 English slaves remained in captivity.¹⁹¹⁸

When compared to France's requirement to uphold its national honour by Admiral Beaufort's application of force, Captain Allen's mere threat to achieve England's aims illustrates that his Britannic Majesty's feared reputation remained intact amongst what contemporaries considered an otherwise faithless corsair race. Obviously, Charles's reputation would have been severely tarnished had he failed to enforce his might against the pirates, its strength emanating from his willingness to resolutely use his navy to support his international pre-eminence aspirations. However, the navy's prior piratical confrontations had so severely impressed the English navy's power and the Sovereign's willingness to use it on the corsairs that they left English subjects unmolested throughout a period when intervention would have been incredibly difficult due to the Dutch conflagration. The pirates' initial defeat was one of the two methods Charles used to establish his martial reputation, the other being dominance over Spain (see Chapter Four). This latest corsair subjugation pointed at England's remaining potency, advertising the King's continuing attraction as an ally, albeit derived from previous deeds. This supports the view expressed above that, excepting its leadership,

¹⁹¹³ CCSP *vol 5*, 18.6.1666 pp.559-560; CSPD *1665-1666*, 30.6.1666 entry 109 vol 160, 22.8.1666 entry 111 vol 168; CSPD *1666-1667*, 21.2.1667 entry 42 vol 192; CSPD *1667-1667*, 4.4.1668 entry 218 vol 237

¹⁹¹⁴ *Pepys Diary*, 7.8.1668

¹⁹¹⁵ CSPD *1667-1668*, 18.8.1668 entry 207 vol 244

¹⁹¹⁶ CSPD *1667-1668*, 18.8.1668 entry 207 vol 244; CSP *Venice vol 35*, 14.12.1668 entry 385

¹⁹¹⁷ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 24.8.1668 entry 330, 21.12.1668 entry 387

¹⁹¹⁸ CSP *Venice vol 35*, 14.12.1668 entry 385; CSPD *1667-1668*, entry 36 vol 240

Charles's navy in itself was superior to all others, upholding the Monarch's cherished and ancient claim to 'Sovereignty of the Sea'.¹⁹¹⁹ It also reinforces the difference in his Majesty's reputation established prior to the navy's full engagement in the war, and that emanating from its diminished state during the wider hostilities.

As mentioned, the navy's exploits prior to the war had enhanced Charles's reputation throughout Europe and the Mediterranean, the conflagration only tarnishing his European persona. Such powerful and feared actors such as the Ottomans and North African corsairs retained a great respect for his Majesty. And as Chapter Five evidences, this was mirrored even by such far flung potentates as Persian and Malaysian rulers. The King's assessment of the navy's ability to support his overseas aspirations was largely justified, even internationally. However, in Europe Charles was still regarded as an attractive enough ally to form the centrepiece of a multi-national European alliance, showing that the navy's use as a foreign policy tool even in his nearer environs had been partially justified. Yet, in having to enter this alliance to counterbalance an increasingly powerful France illustrates that the navy lacked the strength to satisfy Charles's desire for international pre-eminence in its entirety. England lacked a wider ability to support the King's aspirations, starkly highlighting that the Monarch's ambitions had been too big for the nation that he headed. This consequently undermined his domestic absolutist goal, the naval Medway defeat leaving him weaker than prior to the war's commencement and further from this objective than ever.

Conclusion.

Prior to the Second Anglo-Dutch War's commencement, Charles made substantial preparations in both the domestic and international diplomatic arenas as well as the military one to heighten the chances of the conflagration's victorious outcome (see Chapters Three to Five). This was to achieve his overriding dreams. As Commander-in-Chief of England's forces he commanded the amazing English navy, which already had acquired the title of 'Sovereign of the Seas' for its monarchs.

The war constituted the culmination of all his efforts, commencing from his accession, his Majesty fully expecting success and achievement of his goals. During the war's initial phase

¹⁹¹⁹ Johnson *Exact survey*, p.203

the English were victorious, winning the Lowestoft battle. This enhanced the King's persona as a powerful military leader and ruler. All military activity is inherently risky, always unknown till 'the final whistle'. As highlighted above, Charles could have established a very advantageous settlement had he been wise enough to complete a peace deal at this point, having decisively proved through battle that his navy was superior to the Dutch. Although the Government's coffers were denuded (see Chapter Six), domestically a swift peace treaty would have reduced the country's outgoings, that being naval expenditure, letting it endure the Plague and Great Fire without the distraction of hostilities. A suitable Dutch treaty could have facilitated enhanced Customs and Excise, allowing the King a substantially reduced reliance on the House. Internationally, in addition to retaining all his existing allies, or zero competition from potential rivals such as the French via ongoing treaty negotiations, his reputation had been massively enhanced, positioning him amongst influential leaders' highest levels. This is what was possible had the King had a suitable 'vision of victory' and known when to 'stop'.

Instead, domestically, he bankrupted the country, the navy was in tatters and himself both more reliant on Parliament than ever and risking losing his throne (see Chapter Six). Internationally, the picture was not as bad. The King sapped his power by engaging in hostilities in and around England, resources committed there being unavailable to counteract issues in other operational theatres such as the Caribbean and Americas. His impecuniousness had a similar affect. This blocked his Majesty from international paramouncy. However, in contrast he retained enough of his pre-war reputation (see Chapter Four) that states in the wider arena like the Ottomans, Spain or the pirates still feared him, or had attained sufficient respect for Charles to be an attractive ally and be the centre piece of such alliances as with Spain and Austria to act as a serious counter-block to France.

Military assets can be variously used to enhance a country's existence, in England's case that being the navy. At one end of the spectrum a navy can deter such threats as invasion. At the other end, if judiciously deployed an amazing navy such as England's could project power to overwhelm other nations and commence a physical empire. However, for England, suffering such a profound recession at Restoration and with a flawed fiscal system (see Chapter Six), a middle course seems advisable. This would underscore overseas ambitions with military threats, achieving advantageous political alliances and trade deals to acquire influence over foreign potentates. This would provide both an international pre-eminence and the enhanced

Customs and Excise necessary for domestic independence from Parliament. The Sovereign commenced this middle road, heightening his image by smashing the pirates, impressing the Ottomans and bringing the former world power, Spain, to its knees in such dramatic fashions. With a balanced domestic budget, the resulting smaller navy could have achieved these feats and been more effective in supporting the King's ambitions than an unsustainably large one. The fact that Charles attempted to project power without recognising the country he ruled couldn't support this exhibits a naivety and a single focus to the point of obsession, inculcating a blindness to reality. The strong possibility of losing his throne following the Medway battle was only avoided because the 'Cavalier Parliament' was loyal to 'Kingship', albeit wishing to constrain the institution. In other words, the King kept his throne not because he comprised an innate force for good in his country, but because the organisation that he wished to distance himself from remained loyal! Embarrassingly, within this thesis's remit, this returned his Majesty to the point of his accession, that is that his early Parliamentary dependence highlighted that his ascension was a gift from the Legislature and that the Monarch depended on it. Further, in the journey to this point, a failure to recognise reality had cost his country dear.

Overall Conclusion.

Over many decades various modern scholars have written works about the years both before and after the Restoration, many such as Ronald Hutton in much detail. Each contribution has its own focus. Some recount the main events in chronological order with explanations according to the author's interpretation. Others focus on specific aspects such as Anna Keay's and Kevin Sharpe's use of such things as statuary, artwork and architecture to convey subliminal messages of the new Monarch's reign. With two exceptions, the navy has generally been excluded from these works, its inclusion being only where relevant to the theme being discussed. The two authors who have given further thought to the navy's important role to Charles's rule are James Davies and Bernard Capp. The title of Davies's book *The Kings of the Sea* aptly illustrates this institution's importance to the Sovereign. However, in Davies's various authoritative publications he mainly outlines either the 'nitty gritty' of the navy's many facets like the differentiation between cavalier and old Commonwealth officers, the types of ships and sailor's service conditions or how events affected the navy itself. Bernard Capp's volume outlines the Commonwealth, events around the Restoration and the immediate period afterwards, with slightly more detail regarding the navy's role, but still only deals with the organisation in what might be called a cursory way.

This thesis outlines two new important themes that show how the navy was fundamental to the King's return and his exercise of power thereafter. Without a fuller understanding of its involvement in Charles II's reign, it's impossible to gain a complete understanding of this momentous period. Firstly, it explains why the navy played the crucial role in bringing about the Monarch's accession, and secondly how it supported his underlying motives for his actions thereafter in attempting to gain a powerful domestic and overseas ascendancy, and recounting how he attempted to use the navy as a tool to implement these motives, and the practical implications this had for him and the country. It highlights his Majesty's foreign policy success, yet his regal inadequacy in failing to recognise the nation's prevailing appalling economic conditions and how this severely damaged his tax receipts, and when combined with his dreadful attributes as a military leader, it led to the inevitability of defeat in the Second Anglo-Dutch War. This illustrates how, instead of being the 'merry monarch' as he is often portrayed, he was a calculating ruler who was prepared to see his people's treasure and lives squandered for his own personal whims, his incompetence highlighting his unsuitability for the role he had yearned for during his long exile. In summary, his

aspirations were larger than his country's ability to support them, Charles proving his inaptitude as a ruler in failing to recognise this strategic level constraint. Additionally, the seven chapters outline numerous other important additions to the academic 'body of knowledge'.

A comparison with other modern scholars has been undertaken in three areas of modern academic interest in order to give an appreciation of the wider significance of this work. In aggregate these highlight the importance of the 1660s and the Restoration regime in the sweep of time, this work contributing crucial new dimensions and milestones in these debates. The three areas are 'the effect on the change in monarchical power', 'the consolidation in state formation' and in 'the development of the English empire and how imperial possessions affected the homeland'.

As regards changing Monarchical Power, such authors as Sharpe and Kishlansky in his book *A Monarchy Transformed, Britain 1603-1714* suggest that the Interregnum represented a turning point in the diminution in monarchy's power. Charles II had to adjust to a new reality, working in Parliament to a larger degree than had previously been needed by Sovereigns. At the Glorious Revolution William III needed to surrender a number of his constitutional powers in order to secure the state's resources. After all, a stark demonstration of a weakened crown was the execution of one of its incumbents by the Commons in 1649. Also, whereas Charles II and James tried to present themselves as being divinely appointed, William and Anne didn't even attempt this.¹⁹²⁰

John Miller's article 'The potential for absolutism in later Stuart England' differentiates between a King that controls executive and legislative power, and rules benignly for the benefit of his people, and a despotic one which encompasses capricious and brutal tyranny.¹⁹²¹ Miller, in this article and his book, as well as other scholars, state that the English constitution and integrated system of government allowed the King a lot of room for political manoeuvre, having control over a wide range of executive functions. Jones agrees, but adds that this situation was attributable to Clarendon, and that new techniques were developed for managing the Commons, without specifying which decades this applies to. Coward supplements this with the view that his Majesty had almost as much power as Louis XIV at

¹⁹²⁰ Sharpe *Rebranding*, pp.671-676; Kishlansky *A monarchy*, pp.338-342

¹⁹²¹ Miller 'The potential', pp.188-190

Restoration, emanating from the adoption of the political settlement of 1641, which Holmes highlights as being considerable.¹⁹²² For instance, he controlled the appointment of all officers of state and the implementation of law through control of the appointment and dismissal of JPs.¹⁹²³

However, Miller claims that there were constraints over this. Firstly, Charles was too lazy to attempt absolutism, as well as fearing the consequences if he tried. Miller alleges that “Charles lacked the application or fixity of purpose to develop a systematic policy. He also lacked the nerve.”¹⁹²⁴ Coward and Jones disagree, stating that post-1660 there were fears that the King was aspiring to absolutism. Yet, although Hutton maintains that the King was energetic and conscientious in his attention to duty following his repatriation, Coward asserts that his dissolute lifestyle prevented him from ever running the country effectively, let alone attempting absolutism.¹⁹²⁵ Further, the political nation was wary of disturbing the new constitutional settlement, having experienced the disorder that they perceived had accompanied the civil war and Commonwealth. This meant they would have been more tolerant were Charles to have attempted a move towards despotism.¹⁹²⁶ Keeble agrees with this, highlighting that the Cavalier Parliament acquiesced in July 1661 with the Sovereign’s desire that the Indemnity and Oblivion Act be confirmed as enacted the previous year, despite its initial attempt to vary it.¹⁹²⁷ Secondly, the Commons controlled the purse strings, with the associated power to scrutinise and sanction the regime’s actions. Coward alleges that they deliberately desired this outcome although Jones adds that MPs had no fiscal or financial expertise or experience.¹⁹²⁸ Therefore, in essence, modern scholars state that Charles retained a great amount of political power at Restoration, but was unwilling to use it, which overall suggests that they believe that monarchical power was in decline.

¹⁹²² Miller ‘The potential’, pp.201-2; Miller *Charles II*, p.64; Southcombe *Restoration*, p.7; Harris *Restoration*, p.47; Seaward *Restoration*, p.10, p.14; Harris *Politics*, pp.33-4; Jones *Country*, p.1, p.9, p.17, p.45; Coward *Stuart age*, p.282, p.290; Holmes *Making*, p.30, p.31; Hutton *Restoration*, p.150, p.167, p.181

¹⁹²³ Miller ‘The potential’, p.194; Harris *Restoration*, p.58; Seaward *Restoration*, p.27; Harris *Politics*, p.34; Jones *Country*, p.47; Coward *Stuart age*, p.286; Holmes *Making*, p.31; Hutton *Restoration*, p.127, pp.128-9

¹⁹²⁴ Miller ‘The potential’, pp.195-196; Miller *Charles II*, p.42; Harris *Restoration*, p.50; Seaward *Restoration*, p.3; Hutton *Restoration*, p.187

¹⁹²⁵ Coward *Stuart age*, pp.282-283, p.57; Jones *Country*, p.57; Hutton *Restoration*, p.128

¹⁹²⁶ Miller ‘The potential’, p.205; Southcombe *The Restoration*, p.15

¹⁹²⁷ Keeble *Restoration*, p.90; Hutton *Restoration*, p.162

¹⁹²⁸ Miller ‘The potential’, p.194, pp.201-2; Southcombe *The Restoration*, pp.8-9; Harris *Restoration*, p.60; Seaward *Restoration*, p.17; Harris *Politics*, p.34; Jones *Country*, p.45, p.47; Coward *Stuart age*, p.286; Holmes *Making*, p.88; Hutton *Restoration*, p.158

This thesis suggests that this picture is at best partial. It agrees that the King's powers in the 1660s were substantial, emanating from the re-introduction of those from 1641. However, it fundamentally disagrees that he was too lazy to exercise them. He didn't merely apply them to the implementation of domestic policy in order to operate a competent Administration. As Chapters Three to Seven convey, he used his formal and informal power to execute his own covert agenda, using the nation's resources via the navy to attempt to accomplish it. This ranged from the manipulation of Parliament to achieve enormous funding as well as approval for his project, and corraling manpower and other materials towards its achievement. This included the political system and its personnel to support his plans, such as Treasury and naval officials, ministers and his Chancellor. His prerogative powers over foreign policy and the military were used to apply these state resources to the achievement of his ambitions.

In terms of the mechanics of the application of this approach, some examples of the formal authority that Charles applied included the engagement of a great deal of his government's time with Parliament, encouraging MPs to acquiesce to his desires. Both he and his Chancellor made copious speeches, encouraging the implementation of the King's policies via their votes. For example, the Sovereign was desperate for the Indemnity and Oblivion Act to hit the statute books, the city refusing to lend money until they were absolved from prior offences against the fledgling Monarchy. Given the fiscal model that operated at the time, these revenue flows were crucial. Further, the King learned efficient ways to manipulate the Commons to attain his ends, such as the covert methods used to achieve the vote for £2.5 million in January 1665. His approach may have seemed underhand, but was, after all, perfectly legal and within his formal constitutional powers.

Additionally, in a highly structured society which greatly valued 'honour', Charles was able to influence his country in a way that only Kings can, that being through the power of patronage. For instance, he offered massive rewards to Monck and Montagu for achieving his Restoration. Further, large numbers flocked to the continent prior to the Monarch's repatriation in order to elicit favour and pecuniary advantage such as through titles or employment. This was substantially enhanced by his Majesty's control of the navy. Enshrined in its regulations, the appointment of officers was at the behest of Charles and his brother as Lord High Admiral. Accordingly, in this period, attaining an officer's post in the maritime military became a respected profession for the elite, as well as a route to accomplish further honour and wealth such as through battles and prizes.

Additionally, the King retained informal power. Situated at the pinnacle of the nation, and in this highly structured society, his opinions could strongly sway his subjects. For example, as Chapter Two highlights, Charles was able to wield this influence very effectively during the transition phase. The *Royal Charles* repatriated the Sovereign to England, accompanied onboard by a number of important aristocrats. In the hitherto Republican period where personal enjoyment was discouraged, the onboard frolics advertised that a new era had begun, the formal head of the Church of England personally indulging in the party atmosphere. His fellow passengers would have conveyed these Royal messages to their distant neighbourhoods, their local status encouraging others to follow their example.

Further, Pepys continuously complains of the King's licentiousness and the court's similar behaviour. The shared bonds emanating from these joint antics would have been particularly useful in providing willing accomplices to aid in implementing Royal policy. For example, these collaborators were particularly valuable during Charles's propaganda drive which aimed at preparing the nation and foreign audiences for the war that he sought. The anti-Dutch campaign was commenced by those that followed a similar licentious lifestyle, characterised by Pepys as the youngsters denigrating those with older and wiser heads in an attempt to remove opposition.

However, as this thesis copiously points out, the navy provided an enormous boost to Charles's power, elevating him to the pinnacle of European rulers. At a simple level this was demonstrated by the sheer size and formidable nature of the fleet sent to collect him from Scheveningen, which was reinforced by the oversized flotillas sent to perform mundane tasks such as transporting the Queen Mother across the Channel to France. This underlines the power that he commanded and, as shown, provided him with domestic imagery to enhance his crown. Further, as this work mentions, the navy's peacetime budget was just over £300,000. This represents approximately five percent of the English economy, as Pepys records. As we have seen, this massive spending power was distributed around the whole country, resulting in the crown being able to wield economic influence, gaining indigenous loyalty as those supplying the navy would be dependent on government contracts. Additionally, in contrast to the beliefs of modern scholars, the heightened international persona his fearsome navy supplied facilitated his rise to close to the international pre-eminent position that he aspired to, for instance allowing the erection of the 'arc of isolation'.

Therefore, as this thesis displays, the navy provided Charles with a wonderful tool to increase his monarchical power.

In total, as we have seen, modern scholars have overlooked the extent of royal power in the early 1660s in the debate surrounding the changing nature of monarchical power, generally regarding the King as weak. However, this work substantially revises this. It shows that in the first few years of Charles's reign, his militaristic governmental policies, implemented through the navy, stretched constitutional powers to the limit, actually increasing his monarchical power. It highlights that his Majesty's use of formal and informal power to achieve his ends was widespread and clever, driving his government's strategy. Machiavellian methods were often used, aimed at reintroducing as much despotic power as the contemporary context would allow. That is, he was using constitutional methods to attain increased despotic power. This certainly displays a deep and comprehensive understanding of the crown's powers, comparing very favourably with the examples of his father's and his brother's failed attempts to exercise the power that they aspired to. Had he succeeded he could have moved substantially towards his goal of absolutism through having distanced himself from Parliament's purse string. Up and until the summer of 1665 he almost achieved this. It was only his own failings that caused this attempted monumental shift to fail, rather than the weakness of the Sovereign's available constitutional powers. This evidences that the powers available to the Restoration crown were extensive and capable of being applied, and that modern understandings in this field need to be revised. So, maybe academia should think of 1689, the 1690s or 1714 as the point at which royal power commenced its decline.

In relation to the debate on the emergence of the modern state in England, a general definition is given as "the processes leading to the centralisation of political power within a well-defined territory."¹⁹²⁹ The academic discussion over when the first important stage occurred in England has been variously disputed.

John Brewer's book *The Sinews of Power, war, money and the English state 1688-1783* firmly attributes this to the Glorious Revolution. Patrick O'Brien in his article 'The rise of a fiscal state in England, 1485-1815' broadly agrees with this. Brewer suggests that the financial transformation that accompanied this political change ushered in an era where

¹⁹²⁹ <https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/intlpoliticalscience/n582.xml> (accessed 24.1.2023)

Britain could dominate the international arena.¹⁹³⁰ For example it states “the overweening power of the Treasury” meant that “European armies, most noticeably those of Austria, Prussia and other minor German states, marched if not to the beat of British drums then to the colour of English money”.¹⁹³¹ It is also striking that he places the strongest emphasis on British armies, questioning as regards the navy “how many victories can you name between Agincourt (1415) and Blenheim (1704)...nor will the obvious naval victories compensate for the poor showing of the nation’s armies. Before the late seventeenth century spectacular naval victories never amounted to control of the oceans.”¹⁹³²

By contrast, Michael Braddick’s books *The Nerves of State; Taxation and the financing of the English state* and *State Formation in Early Modern England 1550-1700* posit the 1640s as the crucial period. Jonathon Scott’s article ‘How the old world ended: the Anglo-Dutch-American resolution, 1500-1800’ as well as his book *How the Old World Ended: the Anglo-Dutch-American Resolution 1500-1800* agree, adding that the transatlantic trade to the New World was also important. Braddick asserts that the state became much more centralised in the guise of Parliament taking control of both the raising of tax and its martial forces. He alleges that “the fiscal-military capacity of the state was transformed in the 1640s” and “it was the military revolution of the 1640s which was the most significant single moment in the development of the armed forces.”¹⁹³³ This was because tax revenues became more secure as a result, encouraging government debt to be more attractive to lenders.¹⁹³⁴ However, similar to Brewer, Braddick disparages the navy, saying that under normal conditions it was only used to support trade, such as escorting merchant convoys.¹⁹³⁵ Further, he belittles its battle performance, stating that the 2nd Anglo-Dutch War “wasn’t an era of success”.¹⁹³⁶

Both publications are variously troublesome, some of the reservations having been tackled separately (see Chapter Six) in this thesis. However, there is no assertion by the two authors regarding the importance of the 1660s. This thesis has highlighted more than one factor that promotes this decade as having a claim to contribute to the development of the state. Firstly,

¹⁹³⁰ Brewer *The sinews*, p.250, O’ Brien ‘The rise’, pp.129-176

¹⁹³¹ Brewer *The Sinews*, p.xiii

¹⁹³² Brewer *The sinews*, pp.xiii-xiv

¹⁹³³ Braddick *State formation*, p.178; *The nerves of state*, p.17; Scott ‘How the old world’, pp.1051-1052; Scott *The old world*, pp.1-392

¹⁹³⁴ Braddick *State formation*, pp.222-223

¹⁹³⁵ Braddick *State formation*, p.233

¹⁹³⁶ Braddick *Nerves of state*, p.29

although the 1640s did revolutionise England in its progression towards the modern state as emphasised by Braddick, the much-vaunted evolution of the fiscal-military state wasn't as robust as he portrayed. Charles's implementation of his covert plan tested the system introduced by the Commonwealth to the limit, and it failed. The central assumption that the government's receipt of tax revenue was secure was erroneous. Certainly, all tax receipts were governed by the laws that regulate their assessment and collection. However, a crucial determinant of the sum received by the exchequer was, and is, the condition of the underlying economy. Should this be in recession, as this thesis shows was experienced by English consumers due to the apex of the mini-ice-age, then economic activity will fall, the circulation of money will slow down and tax revenues will consequently reduce. Where this phenomenon is due to demand-side issues, Administrations can implement policies to stimulate it in the hope that consumer confidence will be boosted and more positive times will return. With supply-side issues, very different government action is needed such as stimuli to producers. Charles attempted this in a small way, such as providing incentives to fishermen (see Chapter Six), but nothing on the scale needed. This major flaw undermines Braddick's work dramatically.

Secondly, Brewer is keen to promote the 1690s as the major epoch for England's formulation as a state. Yet, no recognition is given to the fact that without the changes in the 1640s, the practical effects of the introduction of the Bank of England could not have happened. Evolution relies on each progressive step building on the previous one. This somewhat undermines Brewer's assertions as to the primacy of the 1690s in isolation.

This thesis promotes a new stage in state formation. Rather than the army being the main military organ of state, it highlights the navy's ability to fill that position. As this work highlights, at Restoration Charles aspired for a navy that consisted of 156 ships, equal to the size of the maritime military of the nearest two rivals. Of course, this was expected to expand as the competitors adjusted the scale of theirs. During the early 1660s the budgeted cost of the navy was approximately £160,000, not too dissimilar to that of the army. However, this was never achieved, usually being over twice that amount, that is more than double the amount spent on the army, the organisation that other scholars such as Brewer and Braddick promote as the primary military arm. Afterall, the cost of building and running a single ship would fund a substantial army unit! However, during wartime, as Chapter Six outlines, this expenditure could rise to over £1.6 million annually. This was enormous, in either peace time

or war, considering the money in circulation as a reflection of the national economy was around £6 million. Further, it absorbed around 25,000 sailors during hostilities, by far constituting the nation's largest military. Additionally, the navy had exponentially more firepower available to them. Ships were floating gun batteries that could be transferred to suitable points around the globe, posing substantial threats to the strategic installations of local potentates, such as the pirates.

To achieve this early success, Charles had corralled the resources of the whole state, that is central control over the nation's resources. Certainly, the navy sucked in resources from around the nation, such as supplies provided by one of the main contractors, Denis Gawden, and press gangs scoured the country for unwilling recruits. And, importantly, given the King's tenuous hold on power at succession, his Majesty undertook a successful propaganda campaign (see Chapters Four and Five) to gain popular support nationally for the forthcoming naval war that he planned, aimed at domestic audiences, although international ones were also included, universal expectations of victory and the consequent raised reputation for the King being provided by the navy's prestige. This was something that the Commonwealth never attempted, despite their reliance on their much-vaunted army, and marks a significant step forward in state formulation.

The Monarch's attempt to gain his subjects' support recognised the power of public opinion, which is an element of democracy, involving the inclusion of the whole population, being wider than the limited Parliamentary franchise. As this thesis shows, the navy largely underwrote Charles's efforts to achieve his covert plans for pre-eminence and domestic absolutism. Of course, these facets were in addition to those initiated by the Commonwealth, most crucially being the centralisation of the control over taxation, Tax Acts being passed by Parliament.

In total, these aspects have been overlooked by modern scholars, and contrast with their focus on the army which they assert was the main belligerent arm of state. Yet, the size, firepower and amount of money that the navy consumed dwarfed the equivalent aspects in the land-based military. Consequently, this thesis shows that the 1660s were an important stage in the evolution of England in its formation as a modern state.

In terms of the interaction between England and its empire, there are two facets. Firstly, England's foreign policy and its growth of colonies, and secondly how these imperial possessions effected domestic politics. At this stage the empire consisted of the colonies on America's East Coast and a number of islands scattered around the Caribbean, including Jamaica, Barbados and Antigua. There were also pockets of territory held for trading purposes in the Guinea, West Africa. In addition to a few trading posts on the Indian subcontinent, Charles added Tangier and Bombay via his Portuguese marriage, and for the first couple of years Dunkirk was included, until its 1662 sale to France. However, as this thesis points out, the navy provided the King with a great deal of informal international influence, particularly in Western Europe including at various times those incorporated in the 'Arc of Isolation' and in the Mediterranean with the North African pirates, and the Ottoman Sultan.

As regards England's foreign policy and its growth of colonies, generally the 1660s are discounted as a major source of government-led imperial control and expansion, pointing to a lack of coherence in the King's approach. Although not all modern scholars comment on this, those that do are split in their views of Charles's overseas policy. Jones, Holmes and Seaward regard England as a minor player on the European stage, Holmes stating that the nation endured a declining reputation, but that the King was willing to use both domestic and foreign prerogatives to further his own interests. However, he doesn't expand on this latter point.¹⁹³⁷ Seaward even contends that England's place in Europe was weak.¹⁹³⁸

Authors such as Harris and Coward expound another view of England's overseas policies, generally asserting that it was dominated by a determination to enter hostilities, promoted for commercial reasons by both the Duke of York and other merchants.¹⁹³⁹ Pincus agrees with the overall assertion of the obsession with a conflagration, but instead asserts that the policy was driven by the explicit desire to accomplish the return of the Prince Orange as Stadholder.¹⁹⁴⁰

¹⁹³⁷ Jones *Country*, p.6, Holmes *Making*, p.93, p.103, p.70

¹⁹³⁸ Seaward *Restoration*, p.77

¹⁹³⁹ Harris *Restoration*, p.71, Seaward *Restoration*, p.74, Coward *Stuart age*, p.283, pp.298-9

¹⁹⁴⁰ Pincus *Protestantism*, pp.199-204

A different vein is expounded by such authors as Roger Louis in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*. He states that Cromwell and the Commonwealth's attempts to expand empire such as via the Western Design achieved nothing significant except the acquisition of Jamaica.¹⁹⁴¹ Further, Louis alleges that at Restoration Charles's award for life of all Customs duties incentivised him to take more interest in the Americas, and in the trade emanating from the Caribbean Islands where a large proportion of these revenues derived from.¹⁹⁴² Louis also asserts that, apart from its ability to generate enhanced fiscal revenues, the empire was of low priority for the crown. As commerce was the main attraction for overseas expansion, merchants acted as its sponsors. They all had a similar approach, so the various colonies were bound together by culture and trade rather than formal constitutional ties to the homeland.¹⁹⁴³ Philip Stern's book, *'The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the early modern foundations of the British empire in India'*, stresses in addition to acting as a colonising body, trade was the reason for imperial expansion, citing the Asian scenario where the East India Company negotiated deals with local potentates and inserted themselves between the political gaps created by the wars between Mughals and Maratha rivals, attaining sovereignty.¹⁹⁴⁴

Tristan Stein in his article 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire' concurs in relation to the prime motivator for imperial expansion constituting trade, this being the justification for Tangier. However, to emphasise the point he says that the colony's inherent problem was that, as the empire was based on a closed trading system, supported by the Navigation Act, its existence as a crown colony meant that it was outside of this, the government's lack of resources leading to its eventual abandonment.¹⁹⁴⁵

Carla Pestana's book *'The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution'* emphasises Pestana's disagreement with Louis as regards the Commonwealth's impact on the development of empire, particularly the Atlantic one. She propounds that it was transformed between 1640 and 1660, becoming more homogeneous, especially religiously. Additionally, she proposes that the Republic tightened its grip in the Americas as it needed to secure the colonists' loyalty, notably after 1649, this heightened control including trade via the Navigation Act

¹⁹⁴¹ Louis *The oxford history*, p.21

¹⁹⁴² Louis *The oxford history*, p8, pp.21-2

¹⁹⁴³ Louis *The oxford history*, p.9, p.22, p.25, p.26, p.28

¹⁹⁴⁴ Stern *The company-state*

¹⁹⁴⁵ Stein 'Tangier', p.985-6, p.986, p.988, p.994, p.997, p.1005, p.1007

1651.¹⁹⁴⁶ David Scott's book '*Leviathan: The Rise of Britain as a World Power*' highlights that Scott agrees with Pestana's assertion that the Republic enhanced England's international reputation, but explains that the next stage in the country's imperial journey commenced in 1689.¹⁹⁴⁷

As has been seen, yet again this thesis goes wider and deeper than any modern scholar in this field. It agrees that the King was fixated with entering hostilities with the Dutch. However, in the timeframe that it covers, it fundamentally disagrees that Charles was weak in this period, Chapters Three to Seven revealing how his navy provided the tool with which he largely attained his aims of international predominance up to the period immediately following the battle of Lowestoft.

So, in summary this work highlights that the King had a coherent imperial vision, driven by himself and not individuals such as merchants as asserted by other modern scholars. Further, trade was important as it increased crown revenues, but this was because it was central to supporting his Majesty's personal policies of imperial expansion and attaining domestic absolutism, not as a means in itself. Also, it reveals that the early 1660s were at least as significant, if not more so, than the Commonwealth period, given the failure of Cromwell's Western Design.

In relation to the second aspect mentioned above, that is the extent to which the empire effected English politics, scholarly debate has only just commenced in this nascent area, so far only attracting three works that make any interventions. Those are Paul Monod's book *Imperial Island, a history of Britain and its empire, 1660-1837*, Gabriel Glickman's book *Making the Imperial Nation: colonisation, politics and English identity, 1660-1700* which was only published on 14 February 2023 and this thesis, which was researched and examined co-terminus with Glickman's work.

Monod's 2009 publication doesn't specifically discuss Charles's colonial arrangements per se, but does highlight the disorganised nature of the late Stuart empire, arguing that this meant it had limited impact on England itself. He states that each American colony had a

¹⁹⁴⁶ Pestana *The English Atlantic*

¹⁹⁴⁷ Scott *Leviathan*

Governor, but the distance between the centre and these peripheries was so large that there was no way for effective control to be exercised. To compound matters, locals regarded them as mere officials.¹⁹⁴⁸ In combination with the Caribbean islands, and similar to more modern academics such as Stern and Stein writing on the first facet mentioned above, this amalgam was held together by inter-colonial trade as well as the similarity of culture. Additionally, each possession's organisational structure varied as they had been formed independently, having disparate constitutions. Also, the mainland East Coast colonies were largely privately owned by a number of absent landlords, the owner's personal preferences compounding these divergencies.¹⁹⁴⁹ Consequently, during the 1660s the English empire had minimal effect on English politics, remaining as such until the formation of the Committee formed in the House of Lords for Trade and Plantations in the mid-1670s started a process of changes.¹⁹⁵⁰

Glickman progressed the debate in 2023, agreeing that comparable culture and inter-colonial trade were the binding agents for these colonies, and that the scattered settlements were isolated and constituted private fiefdoms.¹⁹⁵¹ He asserts that it was the 1660s that saw a determined attempt by the court to centralise and militarise the looser arrangements emanating from the first half of the century. There was a geographic expansion and more intrusive measures to control and exploit the colonies, enhanced by the Navigation Act and the navy.¹⁹⁵² The Stuart monarchy aspired to empire, establishing new forts and settlements in India, Guinea and Tangier, evidencing that, despite their empire's scattered nature, the crown had an ideology and strategic approach.¹⁹⁵³

Glickman also states that both Charles and James used the royal prerogative to achieve this new approach, shifting foreign policy away from Europe to ventures across continents, and that control of the sea lanes was integral.¹⁹⁵⁴ Therefore the Braganza match was central to these plans, the bases in Jamaica, Tangier and Bombay facilitating this desired expansion, the profit from enlarged markets being the lure. Of course, an attraction was the anticipated resulting rise in Customs. Glickman continues that this would allow an expanded military to

¹⁹⁴⁸ Monod *Imperial island*, pp.78-9

¹⁹⁴⁹ Monod *Imperial Islands*, pp.78-9, p.82

¹⁹⁵⁰ Monod *Imperial Island*, p.80, p.86

¹⁹⁵¹ Glickman *Making*, pp.5-7

¹⁹⁵² Glickman *Making*, pp.13-15

¹⁹⁵³ Glickman *Making*, p.7, pp.15-16

¹⁹⁵⁴ Glickman *Making*, p.19, p.27, p.45, p.48

support further growth. Consequently, this established a firm foundation for a future empire that grew as the seventeenth century progressed into the following one.¹⁹⁵⁵ However, the development of the colonies unsettled the motherland. The increased trade with destinations outside of Europe affected England in such areas as architecture, fashions and commodities. Glickman conveys that it increased the economy, and that the colonial governors refocused away from their localities, adding their voices to the demands of the centre. Print culture was also affected.¹⁹⁵⁶ Glickman highlights that this new concentration on empire changed both national identity and the bulwarks and guards of the nation.¹⁹⁵⁷

As can be seen, there are similarities between Glickman's work and this thesis. In fact, not only do the arguments in the Cambridge academic's book support this thesis's findings, but also exhibit the closest overlap compared to any other scholar's output. This thesis agrees that Charles was intent on imperial expansion and that maritime dominance was pivotal. Also, the two works concur on the importance of the Portuguese match to Charles's overseas plans, and that an attraction for him was the anticipated consequent rise in Customs. 'So far, so good'. However, like all other works, there is no rationale provided as to why the increased fiscal flows were regarded by the Restoration crown as being so desirable.

The letter sent by John Page from Bombay shows that his Majesty had aspirations to project global power, formulating plans for this prior to his accession. This exposes the strategic nature of the Navigation Act and Portuguese marriage, the former enhancing the Sovereign's soft power, with the latter providing him with a string of bases from where his vaunted navy could project power globally. Details of these factors have been discussed copiously in this work. The worldwide nature of his Majesty's possessions, linked to his military force, signal that, similar to Glickman, this constituted the foundation of the final British empire, moving away from the domination of the Americas to a truly international empire.

His Majesty's achievements in this regard during the first few years of his reign were commensurate with his desire for international pre-eminence and were intercontinental in scale and compare extremely favourably when viewed alongside Cromwell's Western Design. Using his navy, he was able to dominate the Americas and Caribbean, using

¹⁹⁵⁵ Glickman *Making*, p.16, p.18, p.22, p.51, p.54, p.85, pp.88-89, p.94

¹⁹⁵⁶ Glickman *Making*, p.8, p.16, p.17

¹⁹⁵⁷ Glickman *Making*, p.22

Barbados and Jamaica as bases. This included the expansion of his North American holdings, commencing England's longer-term ownership of New Amsterdam. Additionally, this allowed him to harass the Spanish in that region, preventing their annual treasure flotillas from taking their vital cargo to their homeland. In Europe Louis XIV took extensive precautions to ensure that his navy never encountered their English counterparts. Scandinavian, German and Portuguese rulers willingly formed alliances with his Britannic Majesty due to his navy's fearsome reputation. This allowed the King to construct his 'Arc of Isolation'. In the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East Charles unprecedently completely subdued the pirates, and in contrast to other nations he acquired the Ottoman Sultan's approval for this endeavour. Indeed, his action against the corsairs was seen as a crusade against the infidels on behalf of Christianity, that is for all of the major rulers and nations of Europe.

The revelation of the King's underlying, personal, covert ambitions as the root cause of his aspirations provides the rationale that is missing in any other publication. Also, Chapters Three to Seven display his plans to implement this, outlining the step-by-step plan. It wasn't a mere theoretical ambition, but well on the way to being implemented. This had a profound effect on domestic politics, driving his political agenda both at home and overseas, leaching into various corners of the nation. He corralled the state's resources in terms of finances, manpower, materials and supplies to support this, engaging the political system as well as the ordinary, more humble members of the public to underscore his designs. Had he succeeded, empire's effect on English politics would have involved the ultimate change in the country's unwritten constitution, that is a move away from the King in Parliament to absolutism via the substantially enhanced Customs. It was purely his personal failings that led to this strategy's collapse.

As ex-US President Bill Clinton stated in his 1992 election campaign, "it's the economy stupid!". This highlights the perennial importance of commerce to governmental activity and how much it would have impacted the country's political scene in this decade too.¹⁹⁵⁸ Consequently, had his Majesty's military campaign against the Dutch succeeded in redirecting some of the Hollanders' trade to English merchants up to and including the period immediately following the battle of Lowestoft, it is probable that those highly influential

¹⁹⁵⁸ Clinton *Political*

members of contemporary society, the city merchants, would have provided the King with additional political support. This may well have meant that the Monarch's newly acquired absolutism would have been more durable. As stated above under the section discussing Monarchical power, although Charles failed to ultimately achieve his ambitions, his actions exposed the weakness of England's constitution, the power to attempt his imperial ambitions stemming from his unfettered royal prerogatives as reinstated by the Convention Parliament at Restoration.

So, Glickman's book makes interesting contributions to the debate surrounding whether Empire effected English politics. However, this thesis points to a much wider and deeper reality. Imperial actions fundamentally effected English politics in the period covered by it. Further, his Majesty's actions exposed the world for the first time to the potential power that the English navy could wield, providing the glue to bind these disparate imperial possessions, and project power globally. Certainly, it was many years till its military rival, the army, was able to accomplish such feats.

This work has taken a chronological approach to move the 'story' forward both in time as well as illustrating how events played out. Yet, of course, the King's humiliation due to his June 1667 martial defeat was not his reign's finale. This thesis stops in the few months following the Medway disaster. However, it would be a very useful addition to academia's corporate knowledge were this vital research to be continued into the following years.

Looking ahead, further research into Charles's reign could yield further reforms to academic debate. His reign's fundamentals remained following the Medway disaster, Charles retaining the Royal prerogative over foreign policy and his command over the nation's military, the Customs and Excise flows attributing to him for life proving inadequate for financing his needs. As the army was a shadow of its former size, his military resources mainly constituted the navy. Given its massive impact on Charles's power in the early part of his reign, it is therefore likely to have continued beyond this period. It is intriguing to contemplate the navy's potential role in supporting the King's alliance with France, his crucial but secret treaty of Dover, the new CABAL ministry's policies and the lead-up and engagement in the Third Anglo-Dutch War.

Further, it is entirely possible that such a nautically enthusiastic Monarch would have continued his navy's central role for the remainder of his reign, this organisation playing important roles in supporting the throne during later plights. The Exclusion Crisis was an attempt to de-legitimise the Royal succession both in Parliament and the country. This thesis has shown that the navy played a central role in the Restoration's early years in supporting the King's nascent power, and there is no reason why it could not have variously replicated this support during this later period. For instance, the navy was a very important and very valued national institution. Both brothers were heavily associated with it, albeit in different ways. Just as Charles had attempted to legitimise his rule by presenting himself at Restoration as a dynastic continuation, so the navy during the Exclusion crisis may have been used to highlight a continuation of Royal policy into the heir's reign, reflecting the importance of the dynasty's continuity. Additionally, given the navy's popularity, the Stuart duo may have gained popularity in the country from their close association with it, supporting Charles's attempts to maintain the succession. And in participating so closely in the navy's management, including substantially contributing to ship design innovations, being frequently seen in and around the dockyards and at new ship launches, as well as taking regularly to the water in the royal yachts, this could communicate his strong masculinity, enhancing his popularity in a period when this was an attractive societal attribute.

In turn, in a period, with the King's dynasty coming under political attack, his position could be perceived as weak. Yet, as Commander-in-Chief of the nation's only substantial military force, this may have endowed his Majesty with an enhanced image as a warrior King, portraying a stronger position than may have otherwise been the case, blunting the force with which his position was being assailed.

Separate to the Exclusion Crisis, the navy may have constituted an important factor in the King's rule. The navy had previously been regarded with awe and fear by foreign regimes. This substantially aided his Britannic Majesty's international reputation, having the ability to project formidable power at his whim. A superb example was played out during the Second Anglo-Dutch War, Louis XIV keeping his navy in port for large periods in the fear that it would be destroyed should it venture out and meet the English navy. Other factors prior to the war's commencement with the North African pirates and the Spanish in the Caribbean have also been outlined in this thesis. These portrayed Charles as an attractive ally, and there is the chance that this navy-induced reputation in some way contributed to the resumption of


Louis's subsidy to Charles in the 1680s, the French King keen to keep England 'on-side' or neutral during his ongoing continental adventures. This would see the navy having finally supported the King's personal covert aspirations to some international ascendancy without the actual need for hostilities, and the associated heightened costs.

Additionally, the 1680s saw the English economy's recovery, Charles's resulting heightened tax yields from improved Customs and other taxes producing enough of a fiscal surplus to facilitate a decreased reliance on Parliament. The navy could have substantially contributed to this new state of affairs, in ways ranging from escorting merchant convoys so that trade would be lower risk for merchants, encouraging more commercial activity. Also, with a heightened reputation overseas due to his navy, other markets may have been opened to English merchants, his reputation as a desirable monarch to be associated with rubbing off onto his merchants. Consequently, this distancing from the House's control saw Charles attain as much of absolutism as was contextually possible, constituting a degree of fulfilment of the domestic part of his personal covert ambitions.

In summary, research into the navy's role in supporting the rest of the Stuart dynasty may yield very positive contributions to our understanding of the period.

Appendix A.

Touching the King's Evil.



The Angel Coin.




Appendix B.

Coronation Naval Arch.



Navy Dynastic Panel.



Appendix C.

The *Royal Sovereign Ship*.

Built in the 1630s by Charles I, it had over 100 guns and a crew of many hundreds, but was still a strong part of Charles II's fleet.



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By the King a proclamation for prohibiting the embezzlement of his Majesty's stores for shipping (London, 1661)

By the King a proclamation for prohibiting the importation or retailing of any commodities of the growth or manufacture of the States of the United Provinces (London, 1665)

By the King a proclamation prohibiting the exportation of saltpetre (London, 1663)

By the King a proclamation for recalling and prohibiting seamen from the services of foreign princes and states (London, 1661)

By the King a proclamation for recalling and prohibiting seamen from the services of foreign princes and states (London, 1664)

By the King a proclamation touching mariners, seamen and soldiers which are to serve in his Majesties navy (London, 1664)

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An Act for the encouraging and increasing of shipping and navigation (London, 1660)

A brief and yet exact and accurate description of the present state of the great and mighty empire of Germany, both touching on the forms of their civil government and profession in religion, taken by a diligent and faithful surveyor of it, who with much pains travelled over that whole country to inform himself and others of these things (London, 1665)

A brief relation of the surprising several English merchants goods, by Dutch men of war, their carrying them into Zealand, and there condemning them for prize, upon no other score or account, but that they were English men's (London, 1664)

Andrews, J., *The King and kingdoms joyful day of triumph. Or the Kings most excellent Majesties royal and triumphant coming to London, accompanied by the ever renowned, his excellency the Lord General Monck, and*

a numerous company of his royal peers, lords, knights, citizens, and gentry who conducted his royal Majesty in honour and triumph from Dover to London (London, 1660)

Anno Regni Caroli II Regis, Angliae, Scotiae, Franciae and Hiberniae, decimo tertio. At the parliament holden at Westminster the 8th May anno domini 1661, in the thirteenth year of the reign of our most gracious sovereign lord, Charles, by the Grace of God, an Act for the establishing articles and orders for the regulating and better government of his Majesty's navies, ships of war and forces by sea (London, 1661)

Anno Regni Caroli II Regis Angliae, Scotiae, Franciae & Hiberniae, decimo sexto & decimo septimo. At the Parliament begun at Westminster the eighth day of May, Anno Dom. 1661. In the thirteenth year of the reign of our most Gracious Sovereign Lord CHARLES, by the Grace of God, of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland King, Defender of the Faith etc. An there continued till the 19th of May in the 14th year of his Majesties said reign: and thence prorogued to the 18th of February the next following. And there continued to the 27th of July, in the 15th year of his Majesties reign. And thence prorogued to the 16th of March then next following. And there continued to the 17th of May, 1664, in the 16th year of his Majesties reign. And thence prorogued to the 24th of November following. And on the 9th of February in the 17th year of his Majesties reign the following Act passed the Royal assent. An Act for granting a Royal aid unto the Kings Majesty of Twenty Four Hundred threescore and seventeen thousand and five hundred pounds, to be raised, levied, and paid in the space of three years (London, 1664)

Articles of peace and alliance between the serene and mighty Prince Charles II by the grace of God, King of England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Defender of the Faith etc., and the High and Mighty Lords The States General of the United Netherlands, (Edinburgh, 1663)

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By commissioners for disbanding the army and discharging the navy (London, 1660)

Capitulations and articles of peace between the Majesty of the King of England, Scotland, France, Ireland, etc., and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire (Constantinople, 1663)

Cavendish, M., *The life of the thrice noble, high and puissant prince William Cavendish, Duke, Marquis and Earl of Newcastle* (London, 1667)

Charleton, W., *A character of his most sacred Majesty, Charles the Second, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith* (London, 1661)

The City's loyalty displayed or the four famous and renowned fabrics in the City of London, exactly described in their several representations, what they are, with their private meanings and perfect actions at the day which is not yet discovered, together with a true relation of that high and stately cedar erected in the Strand, bearing five crowns, a royal streamer, three lanthorns and a rich garland (London, 1661)

A collection of his Majesty's gracious letters, speeches, messages, and declarations since April 4 1660 (London, 1660)

A congratulation for his sacred Majesty, Charles, the 3rd monarch of Great Britain, his happy arrival at Whitehall (Edinburgh, 1660)

The copy of a paper presented to the King's most excellent Majesty by the Spanish Ambassador (London, 1661)

Counsel to the afflicted or instruction and consolation for such as we have suffered lots by fire with advice to such as have escaped that sore judgement contained in the resolution of three questions occasioned by the dreadful fire in the city of London in the year 1666 (London, 1667)

The demands of his gracious Majesty the King of Great Britain to the Grand Seignior or Emperor of Turkey (London, 1661)

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A discourse of Dunkirk with some reflexes upon the late surrender thereof (London, 1664)

A discourse written by Sir George Downing the King of Great Britain's envoy extraordinary to the States of the United Provinces vindicating his royal master from the insolences of a scandalous libel (London, 1664)

The dreadfulness of the plague or a sermon preached in the parish church of St John the Evangelist, December 6th, being a day of public fasting (York, 1666)

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Englands joy or a relation of the most remarkable passages, from his Majesties arrival at Dover to his entrance at Whitehall (London, 1660)

To England's palladian; or Britain's naval glory expressed in a panegyrick beginning with the loyal salutation of the Royal Navie with three additional poems (London, 1666)

England's royal conquest (London, 1666)

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Europae modernaе speculum or a view of the empires, kingdoms, principalities, seignieuries and commonwealths of Europe in their present state, their government, policy, different interest and mutual aspect one towards another, from the treaty of Münster anno 1648 to this the present year (London, 1666)

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The glory of these nations, or King and peoples happiness, being a brief relation of King Charles's royal progress from Dover to London, how the Lord General and the Lord Mayor, with all the nobility and gentry of the land, brought him through the famous city of London to his palace of Westminster the 29th of May last, being his Majesties birthday, to the great comfort of his royal subjects (London, 1660)

Grove, F., *The valiant seamans congratulation to his sacred Majesty King Charls the Second, with their wonderful heroical achievements, and their fidelity, loyalty and obedience* (London, 1660)

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The history of his sacred Majesty Charles II, King of England, Scotland and Ireland, begun from the murder of his royal father of happy memory, and continued to this present year, 1660 (Cork, 1660)

The history of the Caribby-Islands viz Barbados, St Christopher's, Martinico, St Vincent, Mevis, Antego etc., in all XXIII (London, 1666)

Instructions and rules to be duly observed by each and every master gunner entertained upon a ship, frigate, or vessel of war, which either now or hereafter shall be in the service of his Majesty, by order of his Royal Highness, James, Duke of York etc. (London, 1663)

Jamaica viewed with all the ports, harbours and their several soundings, towns and settlements thereunto belonging, together with the nature of its climate, fruitfulness of the soil, and its suitableness to English complexions, with several other collateral observations and reflections upon the island (London, 1661)

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A letter from General George Monck to King Charles son of the late King Charles deceased together with King Charles his answer thereto (London, 1660)

A letter sent by his Highness the Bishop and Prince of Münster to the Lords of the States General of the United Netherlands (Oxford, 1665)

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A list of the ships belonging to his Majesty's navy-royal; with the number of men and guns; and the dividing of them into three squadrons (London, 1666)

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His Majesty's declaration against the French (Edinburgh 1666)

His Majesty's declaration for encouragement of seamen and mariners employed in the present service (London, 1664)

His Majesty's gracious speech to both houses of Parliament together with the Chancellors in Christchurch Hall in Oxford in October 1665 (Oxford, 1665)

His Majesty's declaration to all his loving subjects, published by the advice of his Privy Council, 26th December 1662 (London, 1662)

His Majesty's declaration touching his proceedings for reparation and satisfaction for several injuries, affronts and spoils done by The East and West India Companies and other subjects of the United Provinces (London, 1664)

His Majesty's gracious speech to both Houses of Parliament on Thursday November 24 1664, being the first day of their meeting (Edinburgh, 1664)

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A memorial delivered to his Majesty (July 21 1664) from Lord Van Gogh ambassador from the States General of the United Provinces, with the answer which his sacred Majesty returned thereunto (Edinburgh, 1664)

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A narrative of the royal fishings of Great Britain and Ireland with busses and pickled herrings, and barrel-cod, after the manner of the Hollanders, with further discoveries and helps for the management thereof in a profitable way for the undertakers (London, 1661)

Neptunes address to his most sacred Majesty Charles II congratulating his happy coronation celebrated 22nd April 1661, in several designments and shows upon the water before Whitehall, as his Majesty returns from the land triumphs (London, 1661)

A new ballad of a famous German prince and a renowned English Duke, who on St James's Day fought with a beast with seven heads, called Provinces; not by land but by water; not to be said, but sung; not high English nor low Dutch, but to a new French tune call'd Monsieur Ragon, or the dancing hobby-horses (London, 1666)

A new haven at Sandwich for the honour, advantage and safety of England faithfully discovered in a letter to the right honourable the Earl of Clarendon, Lord High Chancellor of England (London, 1663)

Ogilby, J., *The relation of his Majesty's entertainment passing through the City of London to his coronation with a description of the triumphal arches and the solemnity* (London, 1661)

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A panegyric on her most excellent majesty Katherine Queen of England, Scotland France and Ireland, or her Highness cordial welcome into England (London, 1661)

A panegyric on the coronation of his most sacred Majesty Charles II (London, 1661)

The Parliamentary Intelligencer comprising the sum of foreign intelligence with the affairs now in agitation in England, Scotland and Ireland, information for the people (London, 1660)

Philipps, F., *Ligeancia lugens or loyalty lamenting, the many great mischiefs and inconveniences which will fatally and inevitably follow the taking away of the royal pourveyances and tenures in capite and by knight-service, which being ancient and long before the conquest, were not then or are now any slavery, public or general grievance* (London, 1661)

Poems, elegies, paradoxes and sonets (London, 1664)

A poem on St James's Park as lately improved by his Majesty (London, 1661)

The Portugal voyage, with what memorable passages intervened at the shipping and in the transportation of her most sacred Majesty, Katherine, Queen of Great Britain from Lisbon to England (London, 1662)

Price, J., *A letter written from Dover to the Commissioners of the Customs, London May 26 relating certain passages of his Majesties arrival and reception there* (London, 1660)

A relation of the passages in the battle at sea betwixt the fleet of England and of the United Netherlands, collected according to the charge and order of the Lords States General dated 24 June 1666 (The Hague, 1666)

Restauranda or the necessity of public repairs by settling of a royal yearly and certain revenue for the King, or the way to a well-being for the King and his people, proposed by the establishing a fitting revenue for him, and enacting some necessary and wholesome laws for the people (London, 1662)

A revelation of the victory of Elvas obtained over the Spaniard by the army of the high and mighty Prince Alfonso the sixth King of Portugal upon the 14th of January 1659 (London, 1661)

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The second and third advice to a painter for drawing the history of our naval actions, the last two years, 1665 and 1666, in answer to Mr Waller (Breda, 1667)

A second narrative of the signal victory which it pleased Almighty God to bestow upon his Majesty's navy under the command of his Royal Highness the Duke of York against the States fleet of the United Netherlands on the 3rd of June 1665 (London, 1665)

The several statutes in force for the observation of Lent: and fish days at all other times of the year (London, 1661)

A short narrative of the late, dreadful fire in London together with certain considerations remarkable therein, and deducible therefrom; not unreasonable for the perusal of this age (London, 1667)

A summary narration of the signal victory which it pleased Almighty God to bestow upon his Majesty's navy under the command of his Royal Highness the Duke of York against the fleet of the States of the United Netherlands on the 2nd of June 1665 (London, 1665)

Symplegades antrum or the rumpant story, impartially relating the tyrannical dealings and clymacterical downfall, together with a congratulation of his most sacred Majesty in his most happy reign (London, 1660)

T. H., *Inter boreale, the second part, relating the progress of the Lord General Monk, calling in the secluded members, their voting King Charles the Second home, his joyful reception at Dover, and his glorious conduct through London, to his royal palace at Whitehall* (London, 1660)

A triumphant panegyric in honour and memory of King Charles the Second his coronation (London, 1661)

The triumphs of four nations; or a happy conclusion of peace, betwixt England, France, Denmark and Holland (London, 1667)

A true accompt of his Majesty's safe arrival in England as it was reported in the House of Commons, Friday 25th May, with the resolutions of both Houses thereupon (London, 1660)

Upon Our royal Queen's Majesty's most happy arrival the most illustrious Donna Catherina Sole sister to the high and mighty King of Portugal (London, 1661)

Variety of news for all pallats as certainties, probabilities etc. (London 1661)

The victory over the fleet of the States General obtained by his Majesty's Navy Royal in the late engagement begun on 15 July instant as it came from his Highness Prince Rupert and his Grace the Duke of Albemarle (London, 1666)

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The young seaman's guide, or the mariner's almanack for the year of our lord God 1661 with a list of the ships of his Majesty's Royal Navy, distinguished into their several ranks (London, 1660)

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