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Two Civil Societies? An investigation into the boundaries surrounding the bilingual organisation of Civil Society in Wales

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Two Civil Societies?
An Investigation into the Boundaries Surrounding the Bilingual
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My parents and family have helped a great deal along the way. Diolch o galon.

Completing this work would have been significantly more difficult without the love and support of Bethan.

Summary

The research presented here is a sociological investigation into civil society in Wales with specific focus on the idea of a Welsh civil society and its relation to the boundaries surrounding bilingualism and the position of the Welsh language. The thesis examines the premise that the mobilisation of a Welsh civil society is one that is both facilitated and/or compromised by the relationship between bilingual/Welsh speakers and monolingual/non-Welsh speakers. The civility of this relationship is analysed in terms of the relative accommodations or non-accommodations made by respective speakers. The literature review in chapter one introduces the concept of civil society and provides an outline of dominant theoretical perspectives. Chapter two traces the emergence of the concept of civil society to the context of Wales in which reference to both its historical and contemporary mobilisation is made. Chapter three concentrates specifically on the social situation of the Welsh language and the divisions surrounding it. Chapter four provides a conceptual framework for empirical investigation by linking the concept of civil society to language contact and the level of interaction between respective language groups. Chapter five outlines the fieldwork undertaken and the methods used. Chapters six to eight explore the relationship in a systematic and rigorous way by drawing on the empirical data generated.

The empirical investigation begins by outlining the position of Welsh language activists in promoting and defending the boundaries of Welsh speaking society. This is then contrasted with a case study of adult learners of Welsh. The findings presented here suggest that a *bilingual* civil society, as opposed to a civil society comprising of two relatively divided language groups, requires the participation of non-Welsh speakers in *mutual* linguistic accommodation, although this does not necessarily involve learning Welsh. Rather, mutual accommodation is conceived as a gradient which may vary from setting to setting. Such *mutual* linguistic accommodation is then examined through a case study of the Countryside Council for Wales in which non-Welsh speaking staff are involved within a Welsh language training scheme. Potential for future research developments building on these investigations is then considered in the concluding chapter.

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Introduction to the thesis

This thesis aims to understand how civil society in Wales, and a so-called Welsh civil society, continues to be influenced (or compromised) by the ongoing divisions and boundaries relating to the situation of the Welsh language and the context of bilingual development in Wales.

It is now almost cliché to state that, over the last twenty to thirty years, the concept of civil society has experienced something of a revival. After first re-emerging in the 1970s and 1980's by eastern European intellectuals in opposition to the Communist regimes, it then came to be used by Western intellectuals in relation to the perceived decline of participation within the Western liberal democracies. In both cases, the return of civil society can be seen as symptomatic of the declining confidence in 'State-administered Socialism' (Keane, 1988) in both its Western and Eastern forms. In particular was a concern with how both an interventionist state, and indeed the capitalist economy, undermined the 'lifeworld' of everyday associational life. More than simply a concern with its autonomy, civil society advocates such as Habermas (1984) Keane (1988) and Cohen and Arato (1992) have pointed to, particularly in terms of an authentic space for movements, the necessity of such a realm for the ongoing democratisation of actually existing democracy. Civil society is therefore seen as underpinning the transition towards democracy.

The very term 'civil society' has for a number of years now become one of a long line of sociological and philosophical ideas to have left an exclusively academic discourse and to have entered national political discourse through its use by a number of politicians, public figures and academics within the public sphere. It has now however also come to be used quite prominently within Wales, particularly since the 1997 devolution referendum. From what has been said so far, the reasons for its attachment to political devolution may be clear in that civil society is seen as providing the impetus towards the devolution of the institutional governance of Wales which is seen as at once

more democratic and accountable than governance by an unaccountable Welsh Office. However, the fact that only just over half of the people of Wales voted in favour of devolution has led to belief by many that civil society in Wales is somewhat weak or perhaps less self-directed than say Scottish civil society. In this context, the establishment of the devolved National Assembly for Wales was seen as the first sign of a developing Welsh civil society, one in which the Assembly itself would be challenged with the responsibility of nurturing. The Assembly's role in fostering such a *Welsh* civil society however is seen as continuing to be influenced by how pre-existing divisions and tensions with civil society are negotiated. This is none more so than in the case of frictions between Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers. It is perhaps around these frictions that debates surrounding the *cultural* content of civil society, and the *cultural* direction that it should take, are hotly contested. At the same time, it is the perceived accommodations by non-Welsh speakers towards the Welsh language that is seen as a bed-rock of a more civic sense of Welsh identity[1]. For many commentators, the process of devolution is seen as based upon the widespread support that the Welsh language now experiences (Osmond, 1998a).

In these terms, the nature of the relationship between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers is both a barrier and facilitator to civil society. As the question mark within the title of this thesis suggests, the cultural direction of civil society in a devolved Wales remains to be seen: will it be based on *one bilingual civil society*? Will it be based on *two civil societies*, comprised of relatively segregated majority and minority linguistic groups? Or will it, as some have lamented, be based upon an overwhelmingly *monolingual civil society*, in which the social and public use of Welsh is marginalised even further? It is therefore these boundaries and contradictions that this thesis seeks to investigate.

I shall now provide a brief outline of the study: In chapter one, the thesis begins with a theoretical outline of the concept of civil society. In this review, a critique of the different theories of civil society is provided. The main criticism, as far as this thesis is

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[1] While this thesis is concerned primarily with *civil* society, it is important to note how the *civil* is interchangeable with the *civic*. A proper introduction to this term shall be provided later in chapter one, suffice to say at present that its use here highlights the common tendency of sociologists and political scientists to switch between terms without proper explanation.

concerned, is how its advocates *assume* a relatively uncontested collective identity to civil society. On the contrary, this chapter contends that it is precisely the manner in which civil society is influenced by conflicts around cultural identity that requires sociological attention. As is outlined above, it is precisely these contestations of collective identity that are central to many discussions of civil society in Wales, or more accurately, the collective identity that is assumed within the notion of a Welsh civil society. These debates are then outlined in chapter two. As this chapter develops, the relationship between civil society and language politics in Wales becomes clear, in which the development of a Welsh civil society is seen as going hand in hand with a concomitant de-politicisation and institutionalisation of the Welsh language. Yet such bilingual development has taken place alongside a continuing decline in speakers within the rural west and northwest of Wales. Such claims therefore only provide partial accounts of the re-legitimation of Welsh, often based upon a political agenda to underplay conflict and resistance. In chapter three, an account of the historical and contemporary social situation of Welsh is provided, in which specific attention is placed to these conflicts.

Chapter four then elaborates upon these boundaries within civil society in a more interactionist sense by developing a framework for understanding language conflict between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers. Yet it is also important to note that the separation of language differences and the organisation of everyday life into Welsh speaking or English speaking settings, is in itself central to how such differences are managed and negotiated. There is, therefore, a distinct phenomenological sense in which civil society is structured by language groups. Nevertheless, this chapter goes on to provide a framework for understanding bilingual equality in terms of the reciprocity or *mutual accommodation*[2] between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers. Chapter five then outlines the methodology surrounding the empirical investigation.

In Chapter six, a more macro-analysis is provided of Welsh language pressure groups and how they orientate towards the maintenance of the boundaries between Welsh speaking and non-Welsh speaking civil society. This includes a discussion of how devolution has modified the relationship between government and the language

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[2] See chapter four for an introduction and explanation to this term.

movement, and how this in turn brings changes upon the nature and methods of the language movement. Chapter seven then takes the empirical investigation further by examining accommodations by non-Welsh speakers towards Welsh speakers, and also the boundaries to such accommodation. This is illustrated through a comprehensive analysis of adult learners of Welsh. Such boundaries are considered in both real terms, as relating to material constraints and social ties, and in symbolic terms, relating to the adherence of both first language Welsh speakers and learners to certain codes of language use. In chapter eight, reference is then made to work and economy by drawing on a case study of a public body in which there has been an attempts to develop a bilingual organisation. Such a process is then contrasted with the difficulties of bilingualism within smaller voluntary groups. On a further note, this chapter also addresses the manner in which the career aspirations of Welsh speaking students are also structured in relation to a commitment to maintaining the Welsh language group.

This investigation is then concluded in chapter nine with an identification of the key themes raised. Overall, there are four themes are raised in this thesis. Firstly, that groups and movements within civil society are not solely concerned with defending civil society from *outside* political or economic intrusions but also from defending particular versions of civil society from other groups *within* it. Secondly, that it is in relation to competing claims between Welsh speaking and non-Welsh speaking groups that the collective identity of civil society in Wales, or the consensus within it, maybe compromised. Thirdly, that at the micro level, the conflict between Welsh speaking and non-Welsh speaking groups centres upon bifurcated codes of linguistic practice, one emphasising accommodation through English and the other emphasising protection through Welsh. And Finally, this thesis argues that a *bilingual* civil society would be based upon the development of mutual linguistic accommodation, for it is only through recognising the rights of both minority and majority language speakers that their equally authentic claims can be met.

CHAPTER ONE

Boundaries and Divisions: Contesting the Collective Identity of Civil society

Introduction to civil society

In this first chapter, I will provide a concise literature review of what might be regarded as a continuity of theories of civil society. By covering theories of civil society, I mean to outline a body of literature in which the concept of civil society refers to a variety of institutions and associations that are differentiated from both the modern state and, although not always, from the capitalist market economy. For its advocates, the presence of this autonomous realm is seen as essential not only for institutionalising democracy in 'transitional' societies but also in order to criticise, and thus institutionalise further, established democratic societies. In the latter context, it is about making democracy more democratic (Hess, 2000). It is in the terms of civil society, so it is believed, that we are able to distinguish between democratic and authoritarian elements not only between societies but also within them. In this normative sense, the idea of civil society can be seen to have its modern origins in the classical liberal and enlightenment writings of the 17th and 18th centuries. For these writers, civil society consisted of a wide range of institutions and associations that exist outside the state, with the emerging market economy perhaps its defining characteristic. In addition, however, it also pointed to, amongst other things, a range of voluntary associations, co-operative social relationships and a public sphere. Spanning the period from the mid 17th century to the mid to late 19th century, this represented the initial conception of civil society - or *civil society I* (Alexander, 1998a).

After this period however, this normative conception of civil society as an emancipatory concept went into something of a decline (Keane, 1988). Initially conceived of as a realm containing the market economy and a range of voluntary associations and a public sphere as well, it became associated with the market economy alone. Consequently, as the positive (civilising) effects of early commerce

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were overshadowed by the negative (uncivilising) effects of industrial capitalism, the idea of a civil society became viewed as more of an ideological veil, masking the realities of class exploitation. For radical and critical theorists, based within the Marxist philosophy of history, an independent civil society was viewed as merely a residual manifestation of both an expanding economy and an authoritarian state (Habermas, 1996). As the consciousness of individuals was seen as a product of economic and administrative mechanisms the retention of the concept of civil society was seen as essentially a conservative and classical liberal ideal, in no way holding any emancipatory potential. In turn, it was regulation by the State itself that emerged as the only possible solution to the contradictions and inequalities created by the capitalist market (Alexander, 1998a:5).

In the later decades of the twentieth century however, it became increasingly accepted by many stemming from left wing and Marxist circles that this reduction of civil society to capitalism, and the concomitant legitimization of the interventionist state, was an error. This realisation, as well as events in Eastern Europe, has led to a revival of the normative and positive aspects of civil society since the 1970's and 1980's. Now, it is the elements once dismissed, of voluntary activity, social movements and a critical independent public sphere, that have emerged as the central tenets of civil society. Ironically, the place of the market economy in civil society, once its driving force, is now subject to debate. For many, civil society now represents an autonomous realm between both the state and the economy (Alexander, 1998a; Cohen and Arato, 1992; Habermas 1984). In these terms, the idea of an autonomous civil society runs alongside the macro-sociological tradition concerned with the analytical differentiation of a modern 'society'. There are two aspects to this: firstly, to differentiate 'society' from the political and economic spheres. And secondly, to differentiate modern 'society' from tradition and primordial ties. In the writings of Durkheim, Parsons, Habermas and more recently in Alexander it is possible to point to a tradition whose very raison d'être was in pointing to an autonomous 'social' realm and to argue that society is far too complex to be reduced to the economic sphere. By brushing over the contradictions and complexities of modernity, Marxist functionalists and critical theorists (including those influenced by post-structuralism) have underplayed the emancipatory possibilities of civil society.

It would also be an error however, to consider the earlier demise of the concept of civil society as a direct result of the growth of the interventionist state. This seems to be the view of John Keane when he counterposes the return of civil society to the declining prestige of 'state-administered socialism' (Keane, 1988). As Donzelot (1991) has shown, the rise of the Welfare state represented a continuation of liberal and republican doctrines. The growth of the interventionist State at the end of the 19th century was related to its aim of securing the progress of civil society and ensuring its existence. The state was to become the 'guarantor of society's progress'. It is on the basis of ensuring harmony and order or 'solidarity' that the state could justify intervention in the sphere of civil and private relations while not suppressing its prior autonomy. In other words the concept of solidarity, in which the philosophy of the Welfare state was based, ensured that the liberal state remained subservient to civil society.

In view of this, the 'long interlude' between the mid 19th century and the late 20th century is also partly due to the fact that its meaning overlapped with that of the idea of society, as this came to be used by the social sciences between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (Castiglione, 2002). Much of what was discussed in Civil Society I was therefore continued by classical sociologists. As Strydom (2000) contends, while enlightenment thinkers are usually seen to belong to early modern political thought, they may equally be seen as contributors to the foundations of sociology. For Strydom, these founders were primarily concerned with the survival and self-generation of society as an autonomous space, against a background of political upheaval in which the idea of society was continually threatened. Thus Tonnies distinction between *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, Durkheim's transition from mechanical to organic solidarity and Parsons' concept of societal community can all be viewed as developing the project of enlightenment writers on (civil) society. All tried to distinguish a *modern* moral and social order, based on organised social relationships and civic attachments, as opposed to a moral cohesion founded on common religious sentiment. This would suggest that while the idea of civil society has clearly been subject to a number of historical and ideological transformations, it is nevertheless possible to point to a normative continuity from its initial conceptions, on to classical sociological concerns with 'society' and through to the revival of civil society in contemporary social and political theory. Yet as Donzelot goes on to point out, despite initial motivations, the promotion of the social

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through a Welfare state had the opposite effect – of undermining rather than promoting civil society. This was because in the 20th century the role of the state shifted from 'guarantor of progress' to 'manager of destiny'. In doing so it 'leaves little or no room for the everyday life of the citizen' (1991:175). At the end of the twentieth century therefore, the coinciding of the return of civil society in the aftermath of both Welfare state and the New Right suggests an attempt to re-instate the 'social' but in a way that does not return to late 19th and early 20th century notions of 'solidarity'. In other words, a shift back from society to civil society.

It is clear however, even within these opening remarks that civil society is not an uncontested term. For many, the formal separation of civil society and state does not function to limit political and economic forms of domination but supports and reproduces them. Civil society institutions such as schools, churches and press become key sites of the reproduction of power relations. Within positive theories of civil society, such as those put forward by Parsons and Rawls, there is a tendency to ignore issues of power in order to emphasise how existing levels of moral and social order are to be maintained. These are accounts which consider the separation of civil society and state as the basis of a democratic and just society. Furthermore, they consider the ideal of civil society to have been realised to a greater or lesser extent, within the so-called liberal democratic societies of the late 20th century. For example, Rawls' notion of a 'nearly just society' would clearly fall into this category. Similarly, Parsons also considered the 19th century processes of democratisation to be, in America at least, more or less institutionalised. However, to the extent that the maintenance of civil society itself involves the implementation of rules, regulations and sanctions, which do not necessarily stem from the state, then coercion, domination and hierarchical relationships, have an inevitable presence within the civil sphere. Such rejections of the universalism of civil society, and the civic public in particular, can be found in the work of Pateman (1988) and Young (1990). These writers consider the distinction between civil society and state as a 'myth'. In addition, they question the extent to which the ideal of civil society has been realised within the liberal democracies of the late 20th century.

In this chapter therefore, I will begin by outlining the initial elaborations of civil society by enlightenment and early liberal thinkers. This will be followed by an account of the demise of the idea in the second half of the 19th century and its return in the 1970's and 1980's. The work of Parsons will then be critically reviewed in

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order to exemplify how the enlightenment problem of maintaining moral order was continued in the second half of the 20th century. I will then outline the Marxist and post-Marxist theories of civil society developed firstly by Gramsci and subsequently Habermas and Cohen and Arato. This will be followed by a different critique in which the notion of civil society as a universal public sphere is radically rejected. In these rejections, civil society is considered in terms of difference, authenticity and recognition.

These terms also exist within communitarian theories of civil society including those of Walzer, Taylor and Etzioni. Such diverse conceptions however can be brought together by focusing on a culturalist conception of civil society. In other words, by emphasising how sacred and eternal symbols – the 'nation', language, religion, community, lifeworld and even democracy for that matter – serve as meanings through which commonality and collective interests can be articulated. Such an approach is favoured by Alexander for whom civil society becomes a form of social solidarity – a 'we-ness'. Yet it is central to all theories: Gramscian civil society for instance centres upon the ability of a dominant group reconcile its particular interests in universal terms – as promoting the common interest. Habermas' theory involves the sacredisation of the lifeworld which is violated by the system; social movements thus becoming the defensive mechanism of the lifeworld. Community and voluntary associations also work in a similar way in the attempt to get individuals to establish 'norms of acceptable behaviour'. For communitarians, it is the educating role of such associations that provides the building blocks of democratic society.

The aim here, however, is not simply to provide an overview of theoretical debates but also to relate the concept of civil society to the specificities of the research project. In terms of application to Wales, the question of collective identity will emerge as a crucial factor within this debate. In particular, I wish to demonstrate how there is an assumption of commonality and neutrality in the organisation of civil society as if it is *only* concerned with *economic* and *political* intrusions. However, as I hope to show, this focus sidesteps conflicts and disputes over the *content* of civil society itself. In other words, civil society is seen as essentially non-political in that no thought is given to conflicts *within* civil society (between 'sub-civil societies') as opposed to conflict *between* civil society, economy and the state. It is therefore on this point that I will draw this chapter to a close.

Early liberal and enlightenment conceptions of civil society

From the Scottish Moralists through to Hegel, the political thought of the enlightenment is premised upon the idea of a separation of state and (civil) society. As John Keane (1988) has pointed out, its distinction from the state represents the wholly modern, as opposed to classical, conception of civil society. As he identifies, it was not until the late 18th century that a clear distinction between state and civil society was made. Prior to this, in both classical and early modern writings, civil society could be seen as equated with the state, or government to be more precise, and it was not uncommon to find these terms used interchangeably. Locke for instance, "could speak of civil government". Similarly, for Rousseau "the etat civil is the state" (Kumar, 1993:376). Since then, particularly through the writings of Ferguson, Paine and Hegel, "civil society and the state, traditionally linked by the relational concept of societas civilis, were seen as different entities" (Keane, 1988:36). Thomas Paine for instance, writing in reflection on the revolutions in France and America, would argue that the scope and authority of the (evil) state must be restricted in favour of civil society (an unqualified good), to which in all individuals, there is a *natural* propensity. Adam Ferguson had similar ideas when he stated that civil society is a setting in which the uniformity of human *nature* is finally allowed to operate as a set of arrangements for conducting the business of a nation in an enlightened fashion (Hamilton, 1992). Civil society, both for Paine and Ferguson, was essentially a self-regulating society administered by a minimal state. Civil society was viewed as harmonious and orderly - as man in his *natural* state. For Ferguson and other writers at this time, civil society gains its legitimacy as a realm free from interference precisely because of its prior existence to the state.

Immediately however this historically indefinite conception of civil society as *natural* association, and thus naturally opposed to the state, is highly dubious. Its implausibility is put most saliently in Foucault's writings on 'governmentality', in which he provides a genealogical analysis of the early liberal thought in which the development of an autonomous civil society, gained momentum. Civil society is, in fact, not prior to the state but a direct consequence of the practice of government through which we have been led to recognise our self-identity as members of nationally defined communities. For Foucault therefore, the idea of civil society, and

the subjective identification with it, is essentially a reflection of the relative mode of governance. This is because the very idea of government "presupposes and requires the activity and *freedom* of the governed" (Burchill, 1991:120, italics added).

The very idea of civil society is a result of the processes by which individuals are objectified as a collective subject. Yet this is the very condition of liberal democracy, which depends on the valuing and subjective interiorising of a political self-identity. In other words, individuals have to "think, feel and affirm themselves as *citizens*" (Burchill, 1991:120, italics added). Foucault therefore opposes the view of civil society such as that put forward by Adam Ferguson as a 'natural given'. Once we identify its emergence in terms of the relationship between 'governer' and 'governed', then what civil society represents is a device for exercising control over a 'people' that correlates to a relative mode of government within history – the liberal mode of government. Consequently, the conception of civil society as an "autonomous order which confronts and experiences the state as an alien, incursive force" is deeply flawed (Gordon, 1991:34). Arguably however, such a critique is tied to the particular version of civil society put forward by the Scottish moralists. Hegel for instance, reacting against the tradition of natural law, saw civil society slightly differently to Ferguson.

In Hegel's view, civil society, rather than self-regulating, has the potential for self-destruction and is in constant need for a higher order - the state. Civil society has the tendency to shrink into the world of economic competition between private, non-citizen, individuals. Civil society for Hegel "cannot remain 'civil' unless it is regulated through subjection to the higher surveillance of the state" (Keane, 1988: 50). Hegel therefore had a far more sceptical view of civil society than the one perceived by Ferguson. Civil society's natural propensity, as the setting of human nature is rejected in favour of a historically determined notion - a historical constructed sphere of ethical life lying between the family and the state. The long and complex process of historical transformation in which the progressive emancipation of individuals from religious and political constraints results in the emergence of a fully civil realm: "The creation of civil society is the achievement of the modern world" (Hegel cited in Keane 1988: 50). Therefore the protection and umpiring of civil society - a private sphere of personal, business and ethical life free from

unnecessary political interference - can be seen as a defining characteristic of the theory of the liberal state.

Along with the liberal state, the emergence of the market economy was also considered, particularly by the Scottish moralists (Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson in particular) as conducive to the development of civil society. On the one hand, the emergence of capitalist economic relations was viewed as having a facilitating effect on the production of the ethical values associated with civil society. While on the other, there was an understanding into how socio-cultural factors played a key role in the successful working of the economy. As Hirschman (1977, 1982) has shown, many writing in the 17th and 18th century expected favourable effects from commerce on the citizen and civil society, and by the mid 18th century, it was widely believed that commerce was a "civilising agent" of significant force (Hirschman, 1977). Tom Paine for instance argued that "[commerce] is a pacific system, operating to cordialise mankind, by rendering nations, and individuals as useful to each other. The invention of commerce...is the greatest approach towards universal civilisation that has yet been made by any means not immediately flowing from moral principles" (Cited in Hirschman, 1982: 1464).

Other social historians such as Pocock (1985) have also traced civil society to the emergence of capitalism, or more precisely, to the emergence of egoism, from which there was a desire to temper the egoism of the private person, brought about by commerce, with the non-egoism of the citizen. This revisionism can be seen as a re-appraisal of early capitalism and a rejection of the view that its emergence led to the undermining of pre-capitalist virtues tied to feudalism and religion. But Hirschman also identifies a shift during the 19th century whereby the market economy was no longer considered to promote civil behaviour. By the mid 19th century, the relationship between market and civil society had modified drastically: "Capitalist society, far from fostering douceur and other fine attributes, exhibits a pronounced proclivity toward undermining the moral foundations on which any society, including the capitalist variety must rest" (Hirschman 1982: 1466). This modification of the relationship between civil society and capitalism led not only to the displacement of the non-economic aspects of civil society but also to the emergence of the Marxist rejection of civil society as a 'bourgeois myth' which served to sustain class exploitation. While I shall provide a more detailed outline of the Marxist critique of

civil society later on in this chapter, it is important to demonstrate at this point the impact that Marx's writings had on the demise of civil society as a normative concept.

Through Marx and Engels, the distinction between civil society and the state became seen as deeply flawed. On the contrary by defending private ownership of the means of production, the State does not remain separate or detached from the conflicting interests within civil society, but protects particular interests within it. Therefore while in Ferguson, Smith, Paine and Hegel we see the market economy as playing a central role within civil society, through Marx, this is taken further whereby civil society is defined exclusively in terms of private economic relations - where civil society is essentially 'bourgeois society'. For Keane (1998), Marx's rejection of civil society is viewed as responsible for the decline and fall of the idea of civil society. The liberating discourse of civil society, as an emancipatory idea, disappeared with the consolidation of the central state as the most desirable way to counteract social inequality and to co-ordinate welfare. Additionally, as the political concerns of democracy and participation are displaced by economic ones of social equality, little regard was given to the importance of an independent civil sphere. As is now recognised however, through both theoretical developments and actual political events, the denial of civil society is itself based on certain misconceptions regarding the relationship between civil society and economy.

The Marxist perspective, by reducing civil society to capitalism, misconceives it in two ways. Firstly, by identifying civil society as emanating from capitalism and private property, it fails to address how notions of 'society', 'nation' and 'people' as well as the 'individual' have pre-capitalist origins (Alexander, 1998a). As Joyce (1991), writing on the emergence of the working class in England, contends, "the controlling narrative of popular politics appears to have concerned a righteous and dispersed 'people' rather than a 'working class'" (1991:329). Here the working class was mobilized on the basis of being an 'excluded people' intent on reclaiming its place within the English 'nation'. And secondly, it fails to deconstruct the manner in which civil society captures both the 'private' bourgeois civil society of Adam Smith and the 'public' civil society (with distinct anti-bourgeois sentiments) of Paine and Tocqueville. As an essentially 'social' realm, civil society blurs this distinction between the public and private. Throughout the liberal era, civil society alluded not only to the market economy but also to the independent, voluntary associations and institutions that went with it. This indicates that civil society encompasses both

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private activity and public debate. As I have pointed out, one of the central notions of liberalism is the idea of the state as a neutral arbitrator, only interfering in civil society when its harmonious condition is threatened. However, in order for the state to function in this manner, it is required that there be a *public sphere* in which all individuals and points of view can attain visibility.

In Kantian terms, the public sphere stems from the notion of the rational individual. The individuals comprising the public are attributed with a rational will independent of all empirically existing institutions and particular experiences. Further, this critical reasoning and exchange of information among individuals can only take place somewhere that is separated from the 'dependent' spheres of the household and the workplace. In these terms, women, children and workers were openly excluded from the public sphere and political participation precisely because of their priorities and dependency elsewhere. Nevertheless, during the late 18th century, the process of struggle towards enlightenment led to a widening of political participation and a conception of citizenship which were aimed at subjugating traditional authority to the scrutiny of representative forms of government. Within the modernist interpretation of this process, older hierarchical principles gave way to public principles of rational discourse. An essential aspect of this civil society therefore is the existence of a space whereby agents can debate and act out different versions of the public interest.

The public dimension clearly represents a shift away from the writings of Adam Smith where the focus was placed upon a space whereby the private/economic dealings between individuals could occur. In this 'public' dimension, civil society has its origins not in the emergence of the market economy but in solidaristic notions of the 'people' which pre-date capitalism (Alexander, 1998a). Writing near the end of the 19th century, Tocqueville provided a normative account of civil society, yet one that was fully aware of the destructive nature of capitalism. Like previous writers, Tocqueville's civil society constituted not just economic relations but a vast range of civil associations. Just as these associations acted as barriers against both political despotism and, to a lesser extent, social inequality, so their presence was threatened by them as well. For Tocqueville, this 'independent eye of society' - an eye comprising a plurality of interacting, self-organising and constantly vigilant civil associations - was an essential aspect of democracy. As these associations however were in conflict with the individual's more selfish and private goals, there was a danger that civil society, through monopoly capitalism and the increasing role of the

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state as regulator, was eroding, breaking up into a mass of conflictual interests. As it turned out however, Tocqueville's more cautionary contribution was effectively the last of this first normative paradigm on civil society (Alexander, 1998a).

In what has been stated thus far, the concept of civil society as a liberating ideal emerged in the late 17th century and continued to be viewed in this manner up until the mid-late 19th century. Alexander (1998a) captures this period as 'Civil Society I'. As has been pointed out by a number of contemporary writers on civil society, the late 19th century witnessed the end of this positive conception of civil society and its transformation, mainly through the influence of Marx's writings, as a purely coercive notion. It is this Marxist conception of civil society as reduced to a bourgeois world of selfish economic interests that has dominated proceedings up to the 20th century.

The contemporary revival of civil society

It seems fairly logical therefore that the revival of interest in civil society as a liberating idea should emerge in the 1980s at a time when Marxism and its socialist variants are seen to have lost their credibility, particularly in relation to the struggles in central and eastern Europe against the state socialist regimes: "it is the crisis of socialism as an experience and an ideology, that has prompted this search for alternative concepts. The terms of civil society, its attractive combination of democratic pluralism with a continuing role for state regulation and guidance, makes it appear hopeful to societies seeking to recover from the excesses of state socialism" (Kumar, 1993:375).

For John Keane, who is perhaps the key protagonist from the 1980's onwards in re-establishing civil society in positive terms, the return of civil society in the Western states is largely tied to the crisis of legitimacy that surrounds the Welfare state and the desire to rethink socialism as a democratic, decentralist and pluralistic form of politics. Many of the inadequacies of state socialism can be understood in terms of its treatment of the civil sphere. As he states, the Keynesian welfare state "eats away at the basic ethical foundations of civil society" (1988:10) - innovation, risk taking and competitiveness are all weakened. Under the all-encompassing system "individuals become pawns in the hands of those who control and administer state power. Activities that are not regulated, financed or owned publicly are devalued. The

whole political order becomes exposed to the dangers of totalitarianism" (1988:10). For Keane, it would seem that there is a clear danger that 'state-administered socialism' in the West could quite possibly slip towards its more totalitarian counterpart in the East. Yet this 'slippery slope argument' was also effective in the rise of neo-liberalism. A common occurrence in neo-liberal discourse for instance is its tendency to homogenise social democracy and socialism (Levitas, 1998). By rolling back the state, more freedom could be granted to civil society (the market in particular).

It follows from this that Keane retains a normative attachment to the market by placing it within the boundaries of civil society. Yet this itself ignores that while on one hand neo-liberals wish to roll back the state - to limit its scope - they also wish to increase state power, particularly in relation to law and order (Held, 1996). While Keane writes at great lengths to criticise the 'property-centred' (essentially Marxist) view for its reduction of civil society to the market alone, he still wishes to retain the *central* place of the market within civil society. It would appear from this therefore that Keane's conception of civil society is essentially a neo-liberal one. In reply to this he would argue, that the ideologies of both the free-market and the Welfare state are guilty of encouraging the fragmentation of the social bonds of civil society. The return of civil society endorses neither market (economic) nor state-centred (political) solutions but argues for the need to develop the 'social' "through networks of mutual support and exchange" (Keane, 1988:10). Nevertheless his critique of the Welfare state in its creation of a 'dependency culture' is one that is shared more by the New Right and its notion of an 'underclass' (Murray, 1983). The problem for the Welfare state in Britain in the 1990's is that it fails to integrate the underclass into civil life but "imprisons it in ghettos of dependency" (Gray, 1993: 24). Moreover, it is precisely this market centred conception that opens itself to the dismissal of the renewal of civil society as mere (neo) liberal discourse.

The revival of civil society for instance coincides with the rise of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism as dominant political paradigms. In that the discourse of civil society opposes welfare dependency and state-centred administration, it is highly attractive to neo-liberal practitioners. The renewal of civil society, particularly through the concept of community, has become key political rhetoric in the post-Welfare state strategy of New Labour. Within these discourses, civil society emerges as merely a competition between different forms of capitalism -

unfettered market capitalism or socially embedded market capitalism. Following Foucault's concept of governmentality, Donzelot (1991, 1993) traces how the return of the 'social' emerges within neo-liberal discourse.

As highlighted above, central to neo-liberalism is a critique of the way in which the Welfare state has created a paternalistic and dependent relationship between individuals and the state. The Welfare state hinders not only individual creativity and autonomy but also her/his relationship to her/his community. Civil society thus re-emerges as trying to remove dependency by encouraging citizens to be more creative, autonomous and socially responsible towards their communities – in sum – to take a more participatory role in solving social problems. However, this involvement of civil society is not necessarily based on the idea of the 'citizen' but 'citizen as consumer'. The role of the state is now simply to *respond* to the needs and desires of individuals. The equalization of this is best achieved by co-operating and interacting with civil associations and leading social actors. As Donzelot (1993) argues, this points to a shift in governmentality based on the responsibility of civil society to try and solve its own social problems. What he calls 'autonomization' – the self-governing and self-regulating of society is in fact liberal doctrine as it transposes the liberal conception of the self-regulating market to society. In other words, society should be left to look after itself. Thus while implying a return of the 'social' it does in fact involve its penetration by market ideology – that public and social investment should only be made when profitable returns are likely. It is in attempting to establish this likelihood, which is derived from ascertaining individual requirements that civil society interacts with the state. As Walters (2002) points out, the language of '*investing* in our communities' and 'fostering social *capital*' suggests the imposition of an economic rationality. The assumption is "that the commitment – financial, temporal, ethical – we make to them is rewarded, paid back with interest in that we obviate many of the things that attend the breakdown of communities – drug addiction, crime, violence, political alienation" (2002:392). The 'social' becomes a form of political knowledge that is governable, calculable and quantifiable.

Clearly, however, in this discussion of self-governing society, the return of civil society should not be understood merely as an attack on Welfarism alone, but more widely as a re-affirmation of modernity itself. The rise of the civil society argument can also be attributed to a number of inter-related concerns surrounding the de-centring and localisation of knowledge and expertise. Similarly, it is a reaction to

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the perceived 'end of the social' and the decline in Western societies in levels of civic participation, associationalism and social solidarity in general. As Walzer states, "late capitalism puts associational life at risk, the decline of everyday co-operation and civic friendship. We have not thought enough about solidarity and trust or planned for the future. We have been thinking about social formations in competition with each other, and so we have neglected the networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" (Walzer, 1995:154). For Walzer (1995), it is precisely in relation to the post-modern politics of difference and its criticisms of the ideas and institutions of modernity that the current western concern with civil society should be placed. As he states: "What is the preferred setting of the good life? There are four familiar answers to this. All are wrong in that they claim completeness but are incomplete. Each of them neglects the necessary pluralism of any civil society" (1995:154). By these four familiar answers, Walzer is referring to republicanism, socialism, capitalism and nationalism - which he sees as the four main theories of how the good life is to be realised. All of which are wrong because of their singularity - their inability to incorporate each other's ideas within their own political programme. Walzer is therefore keen to stress the danger in viewing civil society as the *fifth* answer - as another meta-narrative.

In this wider context, the concerns associated with the renewal of civil society are symptomatic of the rise of 'post-modern forms of politics' and the decline of truth and certainty. As Bauman (1992a, 1992b) has argued, in a world characterised by the growing interpretation of 'post-modern politics', and given the fragmentation and dislocations they will inevitably involve, it is only to be expected that the quest to retain at least some level of certainty will become equally urgent. The return of civil society is therefore precisely this - an attempt to reinstate a degree of certainty that is perceived to be in decline. Post-modern civil society is thus a paradox in that it urges us to consider the importance of granting a self-regulating space to a variety of groups, institutions and associations from the intrusion of state governance at a time when many of these bonds are seen to be shrinking. As we witness the demise of 'modernistic' forms of social solidarity there is the fear that "people turn inwards to a private, familial or lone existence, linked to the world by the global images of the television and video simulacrum" (Baudrillard, 1983). More generally than civil society, the 'social' has also returned, in neo-durkheimian terms, as a potential replacement to the more philosophical and historically unsituated theorizations of

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universal (as opposed to relativist but equally philosophical and unsituated) forms of knowledge and morality.

The general thrust within the work of Keane and others, a body which Robert Fine calls 'civil society theory', was to justify the primacy of the 'social' over the 'political' and 'economic' spheres (or at least to grant it equal importance). The aim, as Fine (2000:113) puts it was "to privilege civil society over other spheres of social and political life, on the grounds that it is civil society that furnishes the fundamental conditions of liberty in the modern world. The mission of civil society theory is to defend civil society from the forces which beset and threaten to colonise it: on one side, the power of the political state, on the other, the economic power of capitalism". It is important to understand therefore that the aim is normative rather than empirical. Rather than describing the current conditions of actually existing civil societies, the aim is to outline, in idealistic terms, the type of civil society we should aspire. Indeed Keane (1988) explicitly argues against describing civil society in institutionalised contexts. As he states (1988:37):

Beyond such generalisations not much can or should be said about the efficacy of the distinction in specific social and political contexts. Efforts to maximise the level of 'concreteness' of the idea of civil society for political purposes should be resisted.

To which Kumar replies (1993):

This really cannot be accepted. It is not that an unwarranted degree of specificity is demanded; it is rather to leave the matter at this level of generality is to side step a central problem in state-civil society theorising. For how, without specifying concrete mechanisms and actual resources, can we project a convincing picture of a 'secure and independent civil society'?

In this sense, the idea of civil society as a 'realm' that could be studied empirically would also appear to have demised. This divide between 'ideal-type' and 'real' civil society presents us with a major weakness in the writings of civil society advocates such as John Keane. By conceptualising civil society as a realm devoid of coercion and violence, he ignores the fact that every known form of civil society is

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compromised not only by the extremes of violence but by the more widespread and everyday micro-powers of coercion, conformity and discipline. In opposition to civil society theory, Fine (2000:117) argues that "if we accept that civil society is a distinct sphere of modern social life, then the task of social theory is not to idealise this form of society but to understand its nature and location within modern social life as a whole - including the types of violence which it generates".

In opposition to the idealising of civil society, Jeffrey Alexander in a number of articles has argued in favour of a revision of conventional understandings of civil society. For Alexander, it is through its inherent "discourse of repression" that civil society generates violence. In his edited collection *Real Civil Societies* (Alexander, 1998b), he argues that the historical development of the concept of civil society can effectively be viewed as two successive paradigms - *Civil society I* - 17th century to mid 19th century when civil society was initially developed as a liberating idea; *Civil society II* - mid 19th century to late 20th century in which it was conceived negatively as referring exclusively to capitalism; and at the end of the 20th century, an emerging third paradigm - *Civil society III*. While welcoming the re-appraisal of civil society in non-economic terms, he states that the current literature (which includes Keane, 1988; Hall, 1995; and others) "devotes itself to the purely theoretical treatments of the idea of civil society, either celebrating the return of civil society I or pessimistically declaiming, usually in the tradition of civil society II, the impossibility of sustaining a civil society today" (Alexander 1998a: 12). In other words, we need to go beyond the liberal equation of civil society with legal protections of individual rights and the Marxist understanding of civil society as a world of selfish economic interest. From his own perspective, what he calls *Civil society III*, it is no longer possible to talk of civil society in such a generic way as 'outside the state'. This 18th century binary opposition of state versus civil society has since been complicated by a number of 'contingent' institutions and associations. For Alexander, theories of civil society need to come to terms with the institutional differentiation and complexity that is particular to 'advanced societies'. In recognising this, civil society can be re-conceived "as a sphere that is analytically independent of - and, to varying degrees, empirically differentiated from - not only the state and the market but other social spheres as well" (1998a: 6). Because it is interconnected and interpenetrated by its 'external referents' (Alexander, 2000), civil society can never exist as such but only to a greater or lesser extent. Thus in studying the nature of existing civil societies we are

therefore focusing our attention on the boundary relationships between the 'civil' and the 'non-civil' spheres.

Differentiation as the essence of modernity: the classical sociology of civil society

We can now turn to how civil society has been developed in terms of the analytical differentiation of a 'social' realm outside both the political and economic spheres. In rethinking civil society in terms of social differentiation, we can turn to the macro-sociological tradition, instigated by Durkheim and subsequently Parsons and Habermas that concerns itself with 'the problem of social order'. This would suggest another important paradigm, relevant to the theory of civil society, a paradigm which incidentally also helps to explain its demise for most of the 20th century. While the impact of Marxist economism on the normative concept of civil society is well documented (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Keane 1988), we also need to point to the emergence of classical sociology and the idea of 'society' at the end of the 19th century. With its aim of extrapolating the modern forms of solidarity, that 'society' took over much of what civil society was seen to represent, is not always recognised (Castiglione, 2002). Civil society theorists of a more sociological bent, such as Cohen and Arato (1992) and Alexander (1998a) have recognised the continuity between the enlightenment thinkers, Hegel and Tocqueville, and the sociological theories of Durkheim, and subsequently Parsons, who despite neither actually using the term, were both concerned with the Hobbesian problem of social and moral order.

In shifting the debate towards 'society' and 'macro-sociology' it is possible to give clarity to some of the different senses in which civil society can be understood. Firstly, through Durkheim, Parsons and on to contemporary sociologists such as Habermas, Cohen and Arato and Alexander, the concept of civil society is understood not only in terms of private interest and public freedom, but primarily in terms of a republicanist social solidarity; a "we-ness" (Alexander, 1997) or a form of "collective identity" (Cohen and Arato, 2001). Secondly, and following on from the first point, civil society refers to both a *form of society* (or an entire social system) and as a *part sphere of society* (the civil sphere or a voluntary realm distinct from the state, economy and pre-modern or primordial ties). There is a mutual relationship here in that the 'good society' - both in terms of existing arrangements and possible normative alternatives - depends on the presence of an independent civil sphere. Durkheim's

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Division of Labour and Elias' *Civilising Process* can both be seen as attempts to characterise the historical development of civility in terms of an entire social system society (Alexander, 1997). Equally, as has been argued by both Alexander (1998a) and Cohen and Arato (1992) Parson's concept of societal community, points to an autonomous civil sub-system which is an *essential* characteristic of modern, civil forms of society.

While the theories of both Durkheim and Parsons have been extensively critiqued for their conservatism, it can be argued that they both contribute to the theoretical development of civil society in the 20th century (Cohen and Arato, 1992). While sceptical of the Durkheim's overall contribution to civil society, Poggi points to how Durkheim "uses the concept of society in a way that is similar to how civil society is currently used in a political context, that is by coupling it to that of the state, and sometimes to the market" (2000:138). Likewise, in his reconstruction of the functionalist tradition, Alexander argues that "Parsons' theory of societal community provides the only viable take off point for a sociological theory of civil society" (1998a: 114). In what follows therefore I will provide a concise overview of how the classical sociological tradition of Durkheim and Parsons contributes and continues the theoretical development of civil society.

For Cohen and Arato (1992), Parsons' writings can be understood as the attempt to integrate the Hegelian and liberal theory of civil society with the sociological tradition instigated by Durkheim, which stresses social integration, solidarity and community. For Cohen and Arato, Parsons' key concept is his discussion of societal community[1] which he refers to in *The System of Modern Societies* (Parsons, 1971). Like Hegel, the societal community is differentiated from both state and economy. Indeed there are a number of similarities in Parson's work with Hegel's civil society. For both, modern society is epitomised by a plethora of civil associations and institutions. For Parsons, America - a product of the 19th century process of democratisation - is the highest realisation of these types of institutions and associations. And it is through these that 18th and 19th century values of liberty and equality are produced and reproduced. As he states himself, "the more privileged societies of the late 20th century have to an impressive degree, which

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[1] An extensive analysis of Parsons' Societal Community is provided by Cohen and Arato (1992:118-142). What is provided here therefore is an overview of both Parsons work and the critique by Cohen and Arato.

would have been impossible to predict a century ago, successfully institutionalised the more liberal and progressive values of our time" (1971, cited in Cohen and Arato, 1992:119). Immediately therefore, and as we shall return to later in the chapter, there is a clear ideological charge to Parsons' work. As put by Cohen and Arato in their critique, "he elaborates the normative achievements of modernity and acts as if they were already institutionalised" (1992:125). In doing this he roughs over the negative developments within modern society.

This tendency to mix normative and empirical claims can be seen to stem from the theoretical stream that he derives from Durkheim - that of positivistic evolutionism. Due to this, it is more than likely that many of the features of the normative 'ideal-type' of society will be present in existing societal arrangements. In other words, existing institutional arrangements exist as such precisely because they are the most stable, cohesive and durable - the strongest. This theoretical perspective has been labelled by conflict theorists as highly conservative in that it justifies inequality of resources on the basis that it provides social stability. Using the idea of social evolution, and with it analogies made here between human populations and biological ones, both Durkheim and Parsons seek to extrapolate specifically modern, as opposed to pre-modern, forms of society. And it is this emphasis which distinguishes the sociological conception of civil society culminating in Parsons (Cohen and Arato, 1992). For both Durkheim and Parsons, modernity may be understood in terms of functional and institutional differentiation.

Just like the Enlightenment thinkers were concerned with the threat that the rise of individualism posed to the moral order, Durkheim's major concern was with social or moral solidarity - what it was that held society together and stops it breaking down into chaos or anarchy. As an essentially 'modern' problem resulting from the rise of individualism, Durkheim was concerned with distinguishing between modern/industrial and pre-modern/pre-industrial forms of solidarity - what he referred to respectively as organic and mechanical solidarity. It is precisely the relationship between the individual and society that distinguishes 'modern' (civil) society.

In modern societies (characterised by organic solidarity), the individual is much more valued and given scope to develop personal inclinations and talents. The scope of both organic solidarity and the freedom of the individual thus grow hand in hand. This is different from (mechanical) solidarity in pre-modern societies. In this context, mechanical solidarity and the individual can only grow in an inverse

proportion to each other. For Durkheim, it is because the complexity of the division of labour creates interdependence between social groups that social solidarity and order is maintained.

In less advanced societies, solidarity and cohesion is maintained by 'resemblances' or what Durkheim calls the 'collective conscience'. For Durkheim, the collective conscience was "the set of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a single society [which] forms a determinate system that has its own life". It is "by definition, diffused throughout the whole of society, but it none the less has specific interests which make it a distinct reality"..."it is independent of the particular conditions in which individuals are placed, they pass on and it remains" (cited in Lukes, 1977:4). In the less advanced societies it was this collective conscience, these 'shared values and beliefs', 'common ideas and sentiments' that acted as 'normative' constraints on individual action, or moral considerations which limit individual possibilities. Durkheim's central thesis of the *Division of Labour* however was that due to the increasing differentiation of society - through which functions once performed by 'common ideas and sentiments' were now, in industrial society, largely performed by social institutions and relations - the division of labour was "more and more filling the role that was once filled by the conscience commune" (Lukes, 1977:5). In advanced societies, the collective conscience only holds a restricted part of the individual psyche.

In acknowledging this restriction of 'moral considerations' over personality and, conversely, the increase in individual possibilities that modern societies threw up, the central question became "what are the bonds that unite men with one another?" or what are the conditions for the conservation of society? If pre-industrial societies were held together by the collective conscience, by common ideas and sentiments, by shared norms and values, what holds an industrial society together? Or, is it in the process of disintegration? Yet what became evident for Durkheim however was not a decline in levels of solidarity or integration but a certain complementarity between the growth of the individual and the 'one-society'. And it was the increasing differentiation and complexity of society, characterised by the division of labour that underlined this new form of solidarity - one which went hand in hand with the growth of the individual. The division of labour, and the occupational specialisation which this entails, is more and more filling the role that once was filled by the collective

conscience. It is the process which enables the necessities of social cohesion to be reconciled with the principle of individuation.

Compared to pre-industrial societies, dominated by mechanical forms of solidarity, the division of labour turns the relationship between individual and society on its head. Mechanical solidarity, "born of resemblances, directly links the individual with society" (cited in Lukes, 1977:149). This solidarity however can only grow in inverse proportion to personality. This would seem to suggest two levels of conscience: one which we share with our entire group and the other which represents only that which is personal and distinctive to each of us, which makes him or her an individual. Where mechanical solidarity is pre-dominant it embraces virtually all of the individual conscience; in modern, differentiated societies characterised by organic solidarity, the scope of individuality is greater - people have greater freedom to follow their own preferences. As Lukes (1977) points out however, there is confusion in Durkheim's writings over the decline of the collective conscience. On one hand, in advanced societies the collective conscience weakens its hold, while on the other it becomes stronger and more precise in the way it regarded the individual. Alexander's conception of civil society "as a form of collective consciousness..." would indicate that rather than a change in strength or weakness, under organic solidarity, the collective conscience merely changes in content - increasingly secular and rational as opposed to transcendent and placing supreme value on individual dignity and equality of opportunity rather than on community and collective interests. Yet there is another manner in which the collective conscience is modernised.

Originally, the segmental type of society had a clan base, this type being "almost the most widespread among the less advanced societies", but at a later stage in evolution, "the segments are no longer familial aggregates but territorial districts" and the "mass of the population is no longer divided according to relations of consanguinity, real or fictitious, but according to territorial divisions. These segmental social structures were further characterised by a low degree of interdependence. Yet as organic solidarity grows, divisions by territory ceases to approximate to "the real and moral divisions of the population" and becomes a merely "arbitrary and conventional combination" (all cited in Lukes, 1977:150). As a consequence, because the collective conscience is spread over a vaster surface, it is itself compelled to rise above all local diversities, to range over a greater area, and become more abstract. In other words, morality is both simultaneously restricted and universalised because it

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has become sufficiently abstract and general to seem appropriate to all without exception. Durkheim therefore comes to consider the 'cult of the individual' as a belief system which could form the basis of moral unity.

Without being too critical of Durkheim at this stage, his social evolutionism and his under emphasis of the destructive effects of capitalism on the 'social', his reconciliation of the individual and the collective can certainly be regarded as a continuation of the enlightenment concerns with social and moral order and the maintenance of civil society. More significantly however, as Alexander elaborates in neo-Durkheimian terms, it is his theorising of a universal collective conscience which attaches supreme value to the individual as a basis for the societal integration of all, that represents an important contribution to the theory of civil society.

Going beyond Durkheim, Parsons elaborates this evolutionary process in terms of the differentiation of four (previously undifferentiated) sub-systems - cultural, social, economic and political. Following this, it is within this process of differentiation that the development of modern civil society is to be understood as the societal community. Parsons' elaboration of the societal community can be seen as shifting the meaning of civil society from a *form* to a *part* of society. While in Durkheim, civil society can be understood as a *form* of society characterised and developed by the division of labour, Parsons goes further by assigning a particular function to the civil sphere or sub-system. The societal community for Parsons represented the integrative sub-system of society and it performs this function by institutionalising cultural values as norms that are widely accepted and applied. As he understood, it is through the 19th century processes of industrialisation, democratisation and educational reform that this differentiation of the civil sub-system is accomplished.

With regard to democratisation, the emergence of the societal community was exemplified in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the American Constitution, both of which led to the creation of the new republicanist type of solidarity based on equal rights. The emergence of citizenship and 'rights discourse' meant that the emergence of the societal community would not be possible without a modern legal system. Indeed it can be seen as a direct outgrowth of the shift from law as an instrument of state policy to law as the "mediating interface" between state and societal community - formally constitutive of their separation. The enforceability of law against the interests of state and government is itself an outgrowth of the

differentiation of the societal community. There is a caveat here regarding 'universal' citizenship. During the democratic revolution, as the territorial unit of the societal community is effectively the 'nation-state' its values reflect those of the 'nation' and the homogenising discourses of inclusion and exclusion which this entails. In other words, citizenship can never be free of a dimension of ethnic particularism. Therefore if democracy is about institutionalising the primacy of the societal community - the 'people' - it is also about institutionalising the primacy of the 'nation'.

It is from his writings on the impact of industrialisation and the economy of societal community however that Parsons has been criticised most (Cohen and Arato, 1992). Parsons saw the Industrial revolution as parallel to the emergence of democracy. In one sense this can be accepted as the market economy was differentiated and developed autonomously alongside the modern state. In other words, they complemented each other's expansion. However, it is questionable whether the same expansion and differentiation can be attributed to the economy and the societal community. As Cohen and Arato (1992:122) point out, rather than differentiation, industrialisation "produced an economisation of society that threatened to subsume social norms, relationships and institutions". Both Durkheim and Parsons assumed complementary expansion of 'society' and 'economy'. As a consequence, both fail to account for 19th century movements, theorised by Polanyi (1957) as the 'self defence of society against economy'.

For Parsons however, it is perhaps the process of the educational revolution, more than anything else that represents a more consistent freeing of the social structure from the potentially destructive natures of the market economy and the bureaucratic state - and the policies of capitalism and socialism respectively. The University provides for the development of an associational pattern of social organisation that is to be distinguished from both bureaucratic and individualistic forms of organisation. Therefore the educational revolution is seen as a solidaristic corrective of the other two. It promises a potential completion of modernity capable of securing the autonomy and integration of the integrative sub-system. Overall therefore, through these three revolutions (democratic, industrial and educational), Parsons provides an historical account of the evolving processes involved whereby in modern America, and to a lesser extent the rest of the Western world, the societal community (or civil society), at least partially, was realised, and differentiated from the modern state and market economy. While the state is dominated by the principle

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of bureaucracy and the economy dominated by the principle of market forces, the societal community is dominated by associationalism. An association for Parsons "represents a corporate body whose members are solidary with one another, in the sense of having a consensual relation to a common normative structure" (cited in Cohen and Arato, 1992:130). This is not to say that modern business and governments do not contain forms of associationalism. Only where it forms the dominant organisational framework, the raison d'être, can it be viewed as an association. Rather than threatening his model of functional differentiation therefore, trends towards associationalism in government and business are interpreted as inputs from the societal community. The societal community therefore is a sub-system where associationalism forms the dominant organisational principle.

Parsons however is concerned not only with differentiating civil society from both the state and economy, through the idea of associationalism, but also to stress the modernity of this. In other words, he is concerned with differentiating forms of associationalism and solidarity that are distinct from 'traditional' ones. In doing so, he needs to point to the differences, as Durkheim did, between 'traditional' and 'modern' forms of consensus and solidarity. In doing this, he identifies three functions of associations that replace traditional forms of solidarity - voluntariness (allowing easy entry and exit); equality (identified through horizontal rather than hierarchical patterns of organisation) and proceduralism (the provision of rules for regulating discussion) (Cohen and Arato, 1992). Through these characteristics, the emergence of modern forms of association, typified by associational mobility and the possibility of belonging to a multiplicity of associations, the traditionalist implications of all associations are counteracted. Parsons is now able to produce an analytical separation between on one hand "the achievement of solidarity through discussion and deliberation among individuals who freely choose to participate in an association" and on the other "the generation of consensus among individuals on the basis of a pre-existing, diffuse solidarity that is not open to questioning or thematization" (Cohen and Arato, 1992:131).

I shall now turn to what are perhaps the major objections to the theory of societal community. The first of these relates to his understanding of social movements (both of the labour movements of the 19th and 20th centuries and the new social movements of the late 20th century) and their place in the model of functional differentiation. As Cohen and Arato put it, his evolutionary model denies itself the

possibility of explaining the actual mechanisms of social change involving action and conflict. Because he views democracy as more or less actualised, social movements can only be depicted as fundamentalist or as having an idealist model of an alternative society (one not essentially based on existing democracy). Put differently, Parsons considers social movements as directed towards de-differentiation rather than differentiation of society. The labour movement for example, is described as directed towards de-differentiation in that it prescribes the absorption of state and economy into society. This however for Cohen and Arato (1992), prevents Parsons from addressing both the agencies involved in the self-constitution of the social community and the agencies involved in the resistance to trends which threaten its autonomy. While he accounts for self-constitution in economy and polity he does not do the same for the societal community. Rather the societal community is residual - a result of self-differentiation on the part of elites (policy makers and jurists) for the sub-systems other than the societal community. As a consequence he excludes those social movements which struggle for the self-constitution of societal community.

Alongside this criticism, he also treats the interface or mediating structures between civil society, state and economy as only moving in one direction - from civil society to the other spheres. Evidence of associationalism in government and business is one example of this movement. Equally, lobbies, political parties and legislatures are viewed as channels through which 'the people' can influence the administration of the state. However, by viewing these mediums in a one-way direction, he sees them as undistorted by the reverse flows of power or money - by principles which dominate the political and economic sub-systems. In this sense, he fails to see how threats to the autonomy of civil society stem not only from social movements but from state and economy. As a result of these critical points, the overall impression gained from the contributions of Parsons (and Durkheim before him) is, as put by Cohen and Arato (1992) "an objectionable and inconsistent theory in need of critical reconstruction". Fundamentally, "his discourse of a potentially critical terrain of civil society is vitiated by his apologetic treatment of American society as representing some kind of 'end of history'" (1992:139). Because of his social evolutionism, through which he failed to distinguish between normative insights and an analysis of existing institutions, he is unable to include agencies, such as social movements, which envisage a civil society beyond any existing models. Somewhat inadvertently therefore we arrive at the more critical theories of civil society which emphasise

neither individual rights nor social responsibilities but more negatives sites of coercion, domination and the manner in which civil society functions to reproduce unequal power relations.

Within the normative theories of Durkheim and Parsons, there is a tendency to ignore issues of power, and consequently accept a degree of social inequality, in order to emphasise how existing levels of social order are to be maintained. In that the maintenance of civil society itself involves the implementation of rules, regulations and sanctions then coercion and domination, which might be seen as uncivil, have an inevitable and inherent presence within the civil sphere. Arguably, the most famous *critical* theory of civil society, in which ideology plays a central role, is provided Antonio Gramsci.

Gramsci: the ideological critique

Attempting to place the political writings of Antonio Gramsci within a wider theoretical framework is a difficult task. This difficulty stems in part from his lack of clarity with regard to civil society and its relationship with the state. But it is also a result of conflicting interpretations of his work by subsequent writers. Perhaps two dominant interpretations can be identified. On one hand, Gramsci's theory, like Marx's before him, can be seen to represent a critical negation of the very idea of a civil society differentiated from the state. From this perspective therefore, his work represents a continuation of the Marxist view where modern civil society, in which the cultural reproduction of the dominant group takes place, develops from the state's need for consent and thus, is functional to the reproduction of capitalist class hegemony. For Cohen and Arato (1992), who give prominence to this interpretation, it is questionable whether Gramsci produces a theory of civil society that is autonomous from the state and political economy. This is because, as they put it, "he [Gramsci] is unwilling to concede that within bourgeois civil society, some immanent possibilities extend beyond the established framework of domination" (1992: 151). For Cohen and Arato it is precisely the existence of a space outside domination/control that the liberal democratic theory of civil society is premised upon.

The interpretation of Bobbio (1988) however, would point to an alternative perspective within Gramsci's work, where a theory of an independent civil society

does emerge, one where a differentiated civil society is normatively emphasised with reference to existing civil society. Civil society here contains associations which are independent from the simple reproduction of bourgeois hegemony, in that they are able to contest this hegemony in a reformist manner. Rather than a simple continuity of the Marxist critique therefore, Gramsci's work represents a break with the functionalism and economic determinism of this tradition and involves a direct re-appropriation of Hegel's conception of civil society, thus bypassing Marx's work. Stuart Hall and the work of the Birmingham Centre of Cultural Studies provide a similar interpretation. For Hall et al (1980) Gramsci provides a critique of the kind of functionalism put forward by Louis Althusser. Althusser tended to conceptualise civil society as 'functional supports' for a given system of dominant social arrangements. This consistently underemphasizes the notions of cultural contradiction and struggle. Gramsci on the other hand, views civil society as a terrain where one form of domination is never permanent or uncontested. Consequently, through his emphasis on counter-struggle, civil society receives its independence and antagonism to the state. Clearly therefore there is ambiguity within Grasmci's writings and determining which of the interpretations is to take prominence is a highly contested issue. Before going into this deeper however, a brief introduction to Gramsci's 'anti-economism' and his concept of hegemony is necessary.

For Mouffe, Antonio Gramsci "must surely have been the first to have undertaken a complete and radical critique of economism" (1980:169). There are of course historical reasons why Gramsci should be led to reject economism. For Gramsci, writing with hindsight, saw economism as the root cause of the failures of the German and Italian working class movements of the 1920's. To outline briefly, Economism is the belief, based on a particular interpretation of Marx's thought, that the collapse of capitalism and proletarian revolution was the necessary and inevitable consequence of the development of the economic contradictions of the capitalist mode of production (Mouffe, 1980). In this view, ideology has no autonomy because working class consciousness is the *inevitable* consequence of its numerical growth. For Gramsci, the defeats of the Working class movements were a direct result of these errors and an unwillingness to grant an independent role to ideology. For Marx and subsequent others, due to their reduction of ideology to the economic structure were unable to see how the dominance of the ruling class could be protected even when economy and state are in crisis. The forces underlying the contradiction of existing

power relations therefore exist not only through the 'economic base' but outside it as well.

Therefore, despite being a follower of Marx, Gramsci generated his own conception of civil society. One in which he made direct reference to Hegel. As Bobbio (1988) points out, Gramsci viewed Hegel's conception of civil society rather differently to Marx. For Marx, Hegel's civil society is to be identified solely with economic relations. While for Gramsci, Hegel's civil society "includes not only the sphere of economic relations but also their spontaneous or voluntary forms of organisation: the corporations and their first rudimentary rules in the juridical state" (Bobbio, 1988: 84). Civil society therefore contains an ideological element - not just economic relations but also institutions which regulate these arrangements. This cannot be understood purely in economic terms. Gramsci was therefore, fully aware of how Marx's reduction of civil society to the market economy did not allow for a consideration of the barriers which prevented the genuine transition to a democratic socialist society. This was because Gramsci saw how forms of culture and association protect bourgeois society. And so it follows that it is primarily civil society that needs to be reformed before the genuine socialist transition can take place. Through his anti-economism therefore, Gramsci produces a theory which gives primacy to the role of ideology (super-structure) rather than to the economic base. In fact, as Cohen and Arato state, Gramsci proposes the differentiation of civil society from both the state and economy (1971:12):

> What we can do for a moment is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisations called 'private' and that of 'political society' or the 'state'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony', which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the state and 'judicial government'.

The decisive concept in elaborating this is 'Hegemony', on which the reproduction or non-reproduction of the existing system is dependent. Hegemony represents the ability, having the means and resources, of a dominant social group to articulate the interests of other social groups to its own. It is the realisation that one's own corporate

interests can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too. In other words, the ability of a dominant group to forge alliances, through a universalistic discourse, with another objectively antagonistic subordinate group. As Mouffe notes, the concept of Hegemony in Gramsci, first appears in Gramsci's work in 1926 in *Notes on the Southern Question*. Gramsci put the question of the alliances between the peasantry and the working Class in terms of Hegemony and stressed the political and cultural conditions, which were necessary to bring this about. In this case, the working class had to free itself entirely of corporatism in order to win over the southern intellectuals, and through them gain consent through the peasantry.

The contest for obtaining Hegemony is a struggle, which takes place on the level of 'universal discourse'. The ability to fuse the interests of different groups is only possible if this class 'genuinely' concerns itself with the interests of these social groups over which it wishes to exercise hegemony. It is through the language of "we" that the particular cultural practices of the dominant group present themselves as the cultural norms of all social groups. Only by projecting this sense of "we-ness" can the dominant group gain the consent of others.

One of the 'universal discourses' that Gramsci cites is that of the 'nation' which he exemplifies through his writings on the role of the Jacobins in the French Revolution: "not only did they organise a bourgeois government but made the bourgeoisie into the leading, hegemonic class of the nation" (Gramsci cited in Mouffe 1980: 172). In other words, the Jacobins forced the Bourgeoisie to widen its class interests and to discover those interests which it had in common with the popular sectors. Domination therefore exists not only economically but also in all social and cultural practices. No ruling group can maintain position through coercive measures alone. The national character for political struggle is also central however to his analysis of the struggle for socialism in Italy, epitomised in his support for Sardinian nationalism. For Gramsci, the North/South divide was seen as the primary impediment to the achievement of socialism in Italy. The resolution of internal tensions through a synthesis of rural and urban interests was key to the creation of proletarian hegemony. Therefore the 'national question' is central to his revolutionary strategy. In its genuine adoption of oppositional interests, the elite social group is able to give rise to the "national popular collective will" (1971:31).

In what ways however, is this sense of 'national community' achieved? It is here that the concept of civil society, as a differentiated institutional structure, comes

in to play. For Gramsci, the reproduction of existing relations between dominant and subdominant groups depends on the presence of a material and institutional structure for the elaboration and spreading of ideology (Mouffe 1979:187). This structure is made up of different "hegemonic apparatuses: schools, churches, the entire media and even the architecture and the name of the streets" (Mouffe 1979:187). In other words, civil society. Therefore we have in Gramsci the depiction of civil society as the ideological structure of a dominant class - the ensemble of 'private' bodies through which the political and social hegemony of a social group is exercised (Mouffe 1979:187). It is essentially in these terms therefore that Gramsci views civil society. As he states (1971:235)

> The superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare...In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed.

Thus for Gramsci, in Western (Modern) societies, these 'ideological institutions of civil society' are far more important in maintaining hegemony:

> The school as a positive educative function, and the courts as a repressive and negative educative function, are the most important State activities in this sense; but, in reality, a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities tend to the same end - initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes

For Gramsci therefore, only the differentiation of civil society from both economy and state allowed a serious analysis of the generation of consent through cultural and social hegemony as an independent and, at times, decisive variable in the reproduction of the existing system. The reproduction of the existing system occurs not only through the 'economic base' but also through coercive domination (in the form of the state apparatus) and, more importantly, the achievement of hegemony and consent (through the institutions of civil society). In these terms therefore he moves away from economic reductionism and negates the reduction of social integration to

political coercion. It is also through Gramsci that we see the trichotomous model of State (political society); Civil Society; and Economy. However, as Cohen and Arato (1992) contend, whether Grasmci is really anti-reductionist and actually provides a theory of civil society as independent from state and economy is unlikely. As they point out, despite the distinction between consent and coercion, because he views civil society and the state as expressing the same logic, as twin forces acting together, it is questionable whether he saw civil society as independent. For them he resorts to a 'functionalist stance' by arguing that the demand of the state for consent, and its desire to organize and educate such consent, forms the major reason for the emergence and stabilisation of associations. As a result, he fails to recognise that their emergence in modern societies may be the result of societal struggles *against the state*. Further he retains the view of democracy (rights and representation) as a mask.

What elements of independence in Gramsci's civil society do emerge are in relation to social movements. It is this aspect that points to the possibility of a reformist/pluralist interpretation such as that put forward by Bobbio (1988). In contrast however for Cohen and Arato (1992) Marxist functionalism remains in this instance as well. The place of social movements is only an instrumental one while the working class are in opposition. Once civil society becomes *socialist* then social movements will disappear. As they argue (1992:147), the "functionalist reduction of political culture (democracy/rights) and associational forms of modern civil society (clubs, interest groups, parties)" leads to the "reproduction of either bourgeois hegemony and /or to the creation of socialist hegemony". In other words it is "at once both too realist and too utopian" with no room for complexity, contradiction or progressive/gradual social change. Gramsci thus fails to consider social movements as *ends* rather than simply as *means*. Precisely for this reason, and in not granting a 'space' away from domination, he remains Marxist functionalist with a revolutionary rather than reformist agenda. Clearly, the presence of ambiguity and multiple interpretations prevents any closure on the robust critique provided by Cohen and Arato (1992). The work of Bobbio (1988) and others would suggest a reformist rather than revolutionary agenda in Gramsci, one that does grant a 'space'. Nevertheless I would argue that Gramsci's work should be considered more of a Marxist critique of civil society rather than a normative appraisal. Furthermore, although coming from Marxist and critical theory backgrounds it is clear that Cohen and Arato, as with

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Habermas before them, take post-Marxist civil society onto new grounds – that of civic republicanism

Civil society and Civic republicanism: Its variants and its critics

In that they clearly reject both revolution and the reduction of civil society to bourgeois society, Cohen and Arato can be described as post-marxist (Meadwell, 1995). Their work is considered by one reviewer as "one of the most significant treatises in the realm of political theory to have been published in the last two decades (Wolin, 1993). I do not intend to provide an in-depth description of their work nor an elaborate critique, merely to highlight a few points of weakness that has consequences for civil society in ethically differentiated contexts. There are two aspects of their work here that need to be addressed – the place of new social movements in civil society; and the emphasis upon consensus or communicative agreement – in both of these levels they draw heavily on the language of Habermas. As with Habermas, a privileged place is attached to 'new' social movements which are regarded as pure expressions of the lifeworld, uncontaminated by the economic or political spheres – by money or power. In this sense, civil society is structured in Durkheimian terms of sacred and profane: for the pure undistorted and entirely moral actions to be preserved, contact with the profane must be minimised or avoided. This is why the separation of civil society is so crucial and in need of protection. The almost exclusive focus of social movements on *new* social movements, thus marginalising working class movements, is fundamentally post-Marxist. As such it is debatable whether they are able to distance themselves from Parsonsonian structural functionalism as much as they claim (Schecter, 2000). Capitalism is more or less hived off as an object of critique and the sole focus upon new social movements means that their civil society springs from the *successes* of capitalism rather than addressing its faults (Meadwell, 1995). However, the most fundamental aspect of Habermas and Cohen and Arato that needs to be questioned is the assumption of a homogenous collective identity of civil society. And it is in their endorsement of such a common culture, upon which civil society is seen to rest, that they should be conceived as civic republicanist interpretations.

As Meadwell contends, "the post-Marxist concept of civil society privileges conformity over diversity" (1995:184). This is also illustrated by their exclusion of

what they view as 'pre-modern ties' from civil society which reflects their continuation of the classical sociological concern in distinguishing 'modern' forms of association, e.g. *gesellschaft* as opposed to *gemeinshaft*. This fails to acknowledge however how different new social movements are based on particularist identities – black, ethnic, regional, or feminist – which do not necessarily aim towards the public good. Despite this, Cohen and Arato assume that such movements within civil society share a single orientation of protecting and defending the boundaries of the lifeworld against political and economic intrusions. But while there may be consensus on the notion that the lifeworld should be protected, this doesn't necessarily imply a consensus on the content of the lifeworld; or that the actions of movements wouldn't be directed against different sub-lifeworlds rather than outside it – against groups with different notions of how civil society should look. This reinforces the notion that civil society is an essentially peaceful, consensual and non-political realm.

From this we arrive at Cohen and Arato's enemy of civil society – difference, particularly the group differentiated variety. Because they place so much weight upon consensus and agreement, tolerance and recognition towards minority groups is conspicuously absent. Rather the *function* of civil society is the formation of the collective identity which is both the task and manifestation of associational life – educating and informing people into republican practices and ways of behaving. As Meadwell argues this weakness is primarily because they reproduce Habermas' conflation of distortion (the state and capitalism) with diversity (particularist identities). Both are seen as enemies because they are both seen to prevent mutual understanding. But understanding is not the same thing as agreement and differences are not distortions. Moreover there is an evolutionary implication; that as soon as one enters into debate, one is predisposed towards agreement – sooner or later. This would appear no less a pseudo-scientific claim than revolution in that it is always possible to argue that if we keep debating then agreement will eventually come to fruition! It is thus in reaction to the lack of recognition of difference and disagreement that the civic republican version of civil society has been rejected.

As it has been noted earlier, there are some confusing aspects to both historical and contemporary analyses of the concept of civil society. For instance, there appear to be two interpretations of civil society on the matter of whether it constitutes a civic public or private sphere. On one hand, civil society emerges through the separation of a public-civic republicanist world and in opposition to a private or familial or

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domestic sphere. Here civil society is synonymous with 'public society'. It represents the Kantian and neo-Kantian (as in Rawls and Habermas) impartial civic public sphere. On the other hand, as was meant by Hegel, civil society represents the market, classes and corporations of the private sphere (although he does distinguish private civil society from the family) and is contrasted with the universal, *public* state. 'Civil' life is private and in opposition to the public state. Civil society is a 'non-political' realm while the public sphere, along with the state, forms the 'political' realm. This highlights the confusion in trying to compartmentalise civil society as either a 'public' or 'private' sphere. Does civil society constitute a universal public realm that (at least potentially) includes everyone or, in opposition to this, is it a realm of particularity and difference? Or is it both – a Collectivity of collectivities?

What this does highlight, however, is that neither the concept of civil society, nor the civic public for that matter, are constructed in isolation, rather they are constructed in relation to what they are not. Civil society is constructed in relation to what it excludes. Pateman (1988) for instance shows, that within "the account of the creation of civil society as a universal realm that (at least potentially) includes everyone, we are told only half the story" ... "there is a silence about the part of the story which reveals...civil society as a patriarchal or masculine order" (1988:101). More generally, a side in which civil society appears as particularistic rather than universal. There is an uncritical acceptance within modern theory of the universal realm without questioning "the way in which the 'individual', 'civil society' and 'the public' have been constituted as patriarchal categories in opposition to womanly nature and the 'private sphere'" (1988:101). Pateman's feminist response in fact represents just one example of the wider critique of civil society, which de-constructs its universalism by pointing to how it exists in relation to its 'other' - to uncivil society. If we contend that both 'subject' and 'object' are mutually definitive, that we cannot have one without the other, that they make each other possible then we are able to arrive at the fact that concepts are defined by what they are not, by their 'other'. As 'subject' and 'object' are only linguistic functions, they cannot be subsumed within an overriding totality. Thus there is a certain inevitability to the impossibility of realising discourses on the construction of a 'universal realm', which has led to negative accounts which conceive of civil society not as a universal realm but as a particularistic one which reflects the interests not of all but of particular dominant groups. Young (1992) for instance, expands this feminist critique and

applies it more widely to the situation of ethnic and racial minorities. For her, it is the dichotomy between the universal civic public of neutrality and impartiality and the civil society of particularism and difference that forms the source of group oppression. Interestingly, in the work of Pateman and Young, the civil is dichotomised to the civic. As Young states: "the ideal of impartial moral reason corresponds to the enlightenment ideal of the public realm of politics as attaining the universality of a general will that leaves difference, particularity, and the body in the private realms of family and civil society" (1997:196). Yet such a dichotomy in relation to the general will, draws on Hegel's conception of civil society. It generates these dichotomies, between universal and particular, reason and passion, because impartiality is only obtained by abstracting from the particularities of situation, feeling, affiliation and identity. Unity, cohesion and moral order are maintained within the civic public only through "the expulsion and confinement of everything that would threaten to invade the polity with differentiation" (1997:194). The enforcibility of this homogeneity within the public means that it excludes everything that is incapable of transcending body and sentiment. From this point of view, civil society is neither public nor private but stands over this distinction. In other words, rather than an opposition, the civic public forms a part of civil society. I shall therefore use the work of Iris Young, in that it is highly relevant to issues in Wales, to exemplify the rejection of the project of the civic public sphere. In particular, the civic public's generation of a dichotomy between reason and passion, or between modernity and tradition, is one that has itself been applied to the subordination of minority language groups (Williams, 1992).

Like Habermas and others, Young agrees on the need to institutionalise public discussion (Young, 1997). However, she has reservations about uncritically accepting the models and ideals of the civic public that stem from the tradition of modern political thought. For her, the ideal of the public realm of citizenship as expressing a general will, a point of view that citizens have in common and that transcend their differences has in fact operated as a mask for homogeneity among citizens (Young, 1995). For Young therefore, because citizenship expresses the universality of humanity, its proponents consciously exclude some people from citizenship on the grounds that they could not adopt the general point of view, or that their inclusion would disperse and divide the public. Therefore the idea of a common good leads to pressure for a homogenous citizenry. Feminists for example point out the masculine

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discourses that are linked to the civic public whereby the modern state and its public realm masquerades as universal values which are derived from male experience. Such restriction of access also applies to the working class and the poor as well as blacks, ethnic minorities and indigenous groups. All of whom at some stage in history have been restricted from public access on the grounds of republicanism's explicit need for homogeneity. Yet while such critique addresses the writings of Rousseau and Kant for instance, who openly excluded women and the poor from the public sphere, can the same criticism apply to its modern proponents like Rawls and Habermas? Unlike 18th and 19th theorists, these contemporary writers recognise the need to prevent group exclusions. But while Habermas and Cohen and Arato do not wish to exclude groups such as women, they nevertheless will be excluded because of their *particular* needs and desires.

The value of Young's approach is in understanding how the republican tradition excludes diversity and treating ethnic and cultural homogeneity as a necessary consolidation of civic identity. It allows the views of dominant groups to appear as universal and as neutral while the views of the disadvantaged appears as biased and self-interested. The notion of the civic of course, also emerges in discussions of nationalism and national identity. Likewise, the idea of civic nationalism or civic identity doesn't exist in isolation but in opposition to ethnic and cultural forms of nationalism and identity. While the ethnic and cultural forms are considered to be divisive and exclusionary in their emphasis on the continuity of cultural difference, the civic is conceived in more positive and liberal terms. Civic national identity is often described, potentially at least, as a 'universal community' in the sense that all citizens irrespective of social or ethnic background can partake in the common political culture. This is because civic bonds are deemed to be more voluntaristic and, in line with liberalism, premised upon individual freedom and autonomy. In the 'civic' nation, the individual is a citizen with civic rights and duties, and receives the benefits of modernity. Understood in this way, civic nationalism is used synonymously with civil society. As Alexander (1997:122) argues, civil society is a form of culture, or in his terms a "collective consciousness" which can "include all the various groupings in a discrete, administratively regulated, territorial domain". It is thus a *national* community which transcends particular communities. And as he goes on to state, "when it is linked to civic consciousness, then nationalism can be defined in a manner that allows increasing recognition of individual autonomy

...[and]...the construction and reconstruction of the national community as a more or less civil society" (1997:124). Moreover, Alexander (1997) argues in Durkheimian terms that it is precisely the universality of this form of social solidarity that grants autonomy to the individual. The argument being that because in attachment to 'particularistic' identities, the shared values act as normative or moral constraints on individual action, which limit individual possibilities in the national community the scope of individuality is greater and people have greater freedom to follow their own preferences.

The paradox of the civic nationalism version of civil society however is summed up by A.D. Smith (1995) who states: "From the standpoint of affected minorities, this kind of nationalism is neither as tolerant nor as unbiased as its self-image suggests. In fact, it can be every bit as severe and uncompromising as ethnic nationalisms. For civic nationalisms often demand, as a price of receiving citizenship and its benefits, the surrender of ethnic community and individuality, the privatisation of ethnic religion and the marginalization of the ethnic culture and heritage of minorities within the borders of the nation-state". In other words, just as Iris Young argues, the idea of the "civic" simply "masks the ways in which the particular perspectives of dominant groups claim universality" (1992:107). However there are a number of contradictions within the claims of Young not only to reject the neutral public sphere and Kantian-based political thought but also to provide a viable political alternative for the formation of the 'good' society.

One such contradiction is evident within her claim that it is through the expression of particularity and difference that justice is achieved. For instance, Young argues that "the perception of anything like a common good can only be an outcome of public interaction that *expresses* rather than submerges particularities" (1997:197). This would be what she calls a "heterogeneous public" (1997:197). However as she also states, a heterogeneous public is "a public where participants *discuss together* the issues before them and come to a decision according to principles of justice" (1990:190 cited in Alexander, 2001:281).

There are two points to raise here: Firstly, Young's concern appears simply as the mere expression and communication of difference as if such 'voicing' would be sufficient for dominant groups to recognise and respect them. What evidence is there for instance that greater communication of difference results in greater respect or toleration? Moreover, as David Miller responds "if the presence and the making of

demands are sufficient for recognition, the republican view can provide it" (1995:446). On the contrary, civic republicanism only requires a "willingness to argue and to listen to reasons given by others, abstention from violence and coercion, and so forth" (1995:450). Secondly, if modern society is simply a mask of the interests of the dominant social group, in what social context are difference social groups able to 'discuss together'? In other words, as Alexander (2001:281) states "if the recognition of difference is to be connected to justice…we are back to the notion of an overarching "civic impartiality" from which Young has tried to escape". Respect for minority groups therefore requires more than simple communication or 'voicing' of identities – it requires a 'place' with a distinct nature, within which claims for recognition can be made.

Furthermore while Young retains a value to agreement from recognition, "she does not consider how agreement is to be reached under the form of politics that she favours…she does not ask what will happen when the (authentic) claims of some groups are confronted by *the equally authentic but conflicting claims of others*" (italics added, Miller, 1995:446). This is the crucial point here. As with Habermas' republican discourse on civil society, there is also with Young an assumed homogeneity of civil society in which groups such as women and ethnic and indigenous groups *only* direct their actions outside it, to the state. In other words, there is only one version of the sacred. As Miller states, because of this multiplicity of claims to authenticity, "there can be no guarantee that any particular demand will win acceptance, no matter how strongly the group making it feels that the demand is integral to group identity…it places no limits on what sort of demand may be put forward in the political forum" (1995: 447).

Iris Young therefore along with other radical pluralists reject notions of civic national culture and instead emphasise ties at the level of social groups for it is at this level that the politics of identity can be negotiated. Alongside these radical perspectives however, has emerged a form of communitarianism which remains wholly committed to the tradition of civic republicanism. This is particularly evident in the work of theorists such as Robert Putnam and Amatai Etzioni.

Communitarianism and the civic public

Community, in terms of community and neighbourhood associations, plays a central part within conceptions of civil society which is concerned with establishing values of civility and morality. As Kymlicka (2002:305) argues, for its advocates, it is "the voluntary organisations of civil society – churches, families, unions, ethnic associations, cooperatives, environmental groups, neighbourhood associations, charities – that we learn the virtues of mutual obligation". Similarly as Michael Walzer puts it, "the civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational networks' of civil society (1992:104). In this sense, civil society is about *conditioning* people to learn democratic values. For writers such as Walzer, it is precisely because civil society organisations are voluntary, that failure to conform to established norms of behaviour is met, not with legal sanctions, but with disapproval from family, friends, neighbours and the local community in general. As a result of such disapproval, we 'internalise' the idea of an individual responsibility and obligation to uphold the values of the community. Such perspectives have perhaps been articulated most saliently within the 'new communitarianism' of Amatai Etzioni (1995, 1997) who has been highly influential in America in his attempt to establish a new moral order (for critical reviews of his work see Levitas, 1998; Prideaux. 2002).

Against what he considers as a culture of indiscriminate conferral of rights and freedoms he calls for the revival of individual responsibility and social morality as a means of creating social cohesion. In the political obsession with 'rights' there has been a neglect of the importance of 'responsibilities' to the creation of civil society. In this sense he offers an alternative approach to the liberal theory of civil society which places the market at the centre. Essentially, Etzioni's civil society can be seen more or less equated with 'community'. For Etzioni, "communities are social webs of people who know one another as persons and have a moral voice. Communities draw on interpersonal bonds to encourage members to abide by shared values... Communities gently chastise those who violate shared norms and expresses approbation for those who violate shared norms" (1995:57). However, while Etzioni's emphasis on responsibility alongside rights is important, on a number of points, and in spite his protestations, his theory is highly conservative, particularly in its lament for the social and moral cohesion of 1950's America.

For Prideaux (2002), this conservatism stems from the structural functionalism of his days as an organisational theorist. Rather than constituting a radical shift, there is continuity for Prideaux from his micro-theory of organisations which he transposes in order to fit a macro-theory of society. The 'new' communitarianism is thus used to promote a version of the 'good' society that is reminiscent of 1950's America. In *The New Golden Rule* for instance, he talks of 1950's America as social ideal. In this decade, core values "were relatively widely shared and strongly endorsed" so helping to promote a situation where members "had a strong sense of duty to their families, communities and society" (1995:61). Following this, "if the hallmark of the 1950's was a strong sense of obligation, from the 1960's to the 1990's there was a rising sense of entitlement and a growing tendency to shirk responsibilities (1995:65). For Etzioni, in contrast to liberal conceptions of civil society, the rise of individualism "provides a normative seal of approval of approaches to a focus on the self rather than on the responsibilities to the community" (Etzioni 1997:65). The autonomy of civil society is therefore questioned within Etzioni's framework. Yet the causes of this decline are located not only in the individualism of laissez-faireism but in the 1960s counter culture, negatively viewed as promoting a demise of the work ethic both of which lead to the 'normless anarchy' of the 1980s. He thus sees diversity and fragmentation (particularly in terms of the family) as destabilising the social and moral order. This is peculiar however when contrasted to other theorists for whom the new social movements of the late 1960s, as extending the process of democratisation, form the take off point to the revival of civil society (Habermas, 1984, Cohen and Arato, 1992). Oddly, rather than emphasising their liberating and positive connotations, the removal of community sanctions and stigmas such as those tied to divorce, abortion or 'race' are seen more negatively, as promoting tensions.

His proposed solutions are equally problematic. Like civil society theory in general he points to the concentration of government and market and the neglect of civil society which Etzioni equates with community. To remedy the demise of communities we need to revive the functional institutions of family, school, community, neighbourhood etc. Through socialising and moral education we can correct the imbalances between 'rights' and 'responsibilities'. In doing so however Etzioni endorses as the functional manifestation of schools as the instillation of self-control, order, compliance and discipline. In defending this Etzioni positions himself in favour of what he calls 'moral suasion' which he endorses the basic foundation for

determining the social order, and in opposition to coercive methods of social control. In doing so however Etzioni totally ignores Foucault's writings on the 'carcereal society' in which power and control occur not in specific institutions (prisons, mental hospitals) but in all aspects of social interaction! He thus follows in the footsteps of other civil society theorists who differentiate civil society as non-coercive against the coercive state. Etzioni does not see this 'moral suasion' as involving force but 'gentle prodding'. Yet as Levitas (1998:95) asks, "how come this mild social pressure is not coercive?" Even if Etzioni's community values are not imposed but registered through democratic dialogics such as public hearings and community meetings he still has to endorse a certain degree of hierarchy and power in civil society, "for who has the power in civil society to impose their standards, as well as the difficulties of ensuring just, equitable and accountable implementation through informal mechanisms" (1998:96). Equally, as Bowring puts it, "communities are blessed with a cohesion that is neither chosen, nor hired by the people who produce them" (1997, cited in Prideaux, 2002:80). "He mistakenly suggests that there is a single identity or homogeneity of communities" (Prideaux, 2002). Questions of 'which community?" are never addressed.

Similar reservations can also be made about the work of Putnam (1993, 1999) in which American society, since the Tocquevillean era, is seen to have witnessed a steady decline in participation in civil society, measured by a decline in what he calls social capital. Again however in emphasising the need for civil society to speak with one voice, what emerges is a rather "conservative doctrine about participation in a *culturally neutral* civil society" (italics added, Delanty, 2003:83). Such perspectives can therefore be regarded as incompatible with diversity and difference. As Sennet concludes "communitarianism in my view has a very dubious claim of ownership of trust or commitment: it falsely emphasises unity as the source of strength in a community and mistakenly fears that when conflict arises in a community, social bonds are threatened" (Sennett, 1998:143).

By addressing civil society therefore we may be led down the wrong path. Should civil society be about maintaining *social* control or *economic* and *political* control by the *social*? As put by Elias, the Parsonian focus on norms has tended to lead to the neglect of the fundamental question of "how and under what circumstances can relationships that are not regulated by norms be brought under normative control" (Elias, 1970 cited in Prideaux 2002:79). In other words, it is not the social itself that

requires regulation but the ability of the social to control, regulate and influence the political and economic spheres. In relying on the Parsonian tradition of structural functionalism therefore, Etzioni and others fail to address that the inherent contradictions of the social system may themselves contribute to the demise of normative social cohesion. (I shall return to Etzioni's work later when I argue how his emphasis on 'community and social responsibility' may also underlie many of the arguments put forward by the Welsh language pressure group *Cymuned*).

While the regulation and control of the economic and political spheres underlies the theory of civil society, what tends to be either ignored or discarded as 'uncivil society' is the regulation and control of 'the social' by civil society. Fundamentally therefore in many of the accounts mentioned, both proponents and critics would fail to deal with contexts where the application of terms such as 'dominant' or 'minority' to relational groups are in themselves contested. What this suggests is the need to pay attention to how such dichotomies between majority/minority, dominant/oppressed or national/ethnic act as cultural codes through which the morality of certain actions are judged. This point will become particularly crucial in the subsequent discussion around the conflict between Welsh and English identities in Wales, for it will be concluded that this is a context in which the application of cultural codes such as majority/minority or national/ethnic are not clear cut. This maybe understood as an 'indeterminacy of moral application'.

Civil society as a cultural system

For all these reasons, Alexander's work on civil society can be seen to lead the debate on civil society into the 21st century. However, before dealing directly with his writings on civil society, it is necessary to understand the dialect involved in his philosophical and epistemological standpoint, a dialect which moves in opposition from both a free-floating abstract universalism and a post-modern cultural relativism, to a more empirically grounded *universalising* civil society.

What does it mean to have a sociologically rather than philosophically grounded universal conception of truth and reality? Durkheim perhaps made the initial intervention here when he argued that the study of society and 'the social' constituted a distinctive practice that could not be reduced to natural, psychological or philosophical forms of inquiry. In Alexander, and many other writers, this autonomy

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of the social has returned as a method of countering and replying to the rejection, by post-structuralists, communitarians and others, of universal codes of morality, truth and reality. For Alexander therefore, the 'social' can be seen as a potential replacement for the philosophically based, realist grounding of knowledge. In line with Durkheim, and yet very much still in accord with Nietzschean postmodernism, he claims that transcendental and philosophical explanations and truth are no longer possible. Therefore truth may be arbitrary in the philosophical sense, yet it is concrete and confirming in the sociological sense. Hence truth and certainty has its origins and bedrock in the social. It is from this Durkheimian legacy that Alexander finds his epistemological higher ground and the basis for moral and political universality - for civil society.

While these debates are not strictly relevant to concerns of this thesis, it is precisely within his defence of an empirical/sociological grounded universalism, that Alexander makes the claim for the existence of a widespread solidarity. In explaining this, the key element is the idea of 'over-reaching'. By 'over-reaching' Alexander (2000b) is referring to the process whereby social movements, in that they are aimed as raising awareness to certain injustices, move beyond the confines of their particular lifeworld and enter a realm that denotes 'society'. In other words they 'over-reach' in that they try to make other spheres, such as economic and political spheres, "conform to a more universal. or civil will" (2000b: 276). For Alexander therefore, "the empirical frequency of this over-reaching process points to the existence, not for a priori but for contingent, historical and sociological reasons, of a broadly encompassing civil society" (2000b: 276). It is, therefore, the very presence of demands made for recognition that in turn, assumes the existence of more universal standards. It follows that despite the fact that social movements are concerned exclusively with the promotion of 'particularistic' identities (ethnicity, language, gender, religion etc.) - and also the fact that the notion of the "impartial public" is rejected as masking "the ways in which dominant groups claim universality" (Young 1992:107) - they try do so by bringing wider 'society' into being. It is to these writings of civil society that shall now be dealt with directly

According to Alexander, civil society pre-dates the market economy but receives both facilitating inputs and destructive intrusions from it. Civil society also exists alongside other non-civil realms (e.g. religion) which compromise it. Alexander is concerned not with idealising civil society in relation to economic and political or

other non-civil spheres as a superior form of organising. In this aspect he differs from Habermas' elaboration of the lifeworld. It would be useful at this point to refer Habermas' contribution to the theory of civil society. In Habermas' writings, following on from Parsons, distinctions are made between the logics of the political and economic spheres, regulated by administrative and instrumental power and money respectively, and the 'life-world' of self-organised public spheres based on solidarity and communication. In particular he utilizes Parsons' notion of 'system' and distinguishes it from the 'lifeworld' of everyday experience. In line with the sociological tradition of Durkheim and Parsons, European modernisation is viewed as a process of differentiation and interaction of these domains of reality. The 'system' represents the objective and constraining features of external reality – what he calls the "forces of instrumental reason" – and is differentiated from the 'lifeworld' which - in encompassing subjective and personal experience – is predicated on the human ability to communicate with another. Naturally, it is the 'lifeworld' which provides the basis for his optimistic beliefs on discussion and debate which as forms of "communicative action" can resist the "forces of instrumental reason". It is clear therefore that Habermas, like Parsons, while not actually using the term 'civil society', is able to evoke the same argument regarding the importance of a sphere that is distinct from the state, through his elaboration of the lifeworld. Also like Parsons however, in Habermas there is an 'idealising' of civil society (the lifeworld) against the uncivil economic and political spheres (the 'system'). Both the economic realm of 'necessity' and the political 'realm' of 'domination' are conceived as inherent colonisers of a lifeworld that is continuously under threat. As we can recall from the albeit brief analysis of Foucault's contribution, instrumental reason, or knowledge as forms of power and domination, are not confined to the economic and political spheres but emanate from within the very micro-level of social interaction that Habermas tries to distinguish. Politically, this debate between Foucault and Habermas on the presence of an emancipatory space, has been the central thrust of the antagonism between so-called modernist and post-modernist camps.

For Alexander, the approach of Habermas and others err because they "ignore functional differentiation and complexity, not only in an institutional sense but in a moral one. The more developed the society, the more there emerge different kinds of institutional spheres and discourses" (Alexander, 2000a: 98). Put differently, the relationships between differentiated spheres should be considered as flowing in both

directions - both from economic and political and other non-civil spheres to the civil sphere and vice versa. Furthermore, these flows in both directions are no more colonising or uncivilising than they are civilising.

However, for Alexander this does not simply mean that 'civil' aspects in economic and political spheres are derived from the civil sphere. Rather, through their continuous presence they became seen increasingly as originating and stemming from within those realms. In other words, each sphere can be seen as owning distinctive forms of morality that are autonomous. It is for this reason that the civil sphere cannot be idealised above and against the political and the economic. Rather the civil sphere should simply be seen as existing but with no greater normative claim than other spheres. Clearly, Alexander's theorising is both in reflection upon, and in incorporation of, many of the criticisms that Foucault and post-modernism present to the idea of civil society, and in many ways he is able to by-pass the criticisms attributed to Habermas.

Equally, the civil sphere is penetrated not only by political and economic spheres, but also by the other non-civil spheres of society. In referring to these Alexander cites not only state and economy but also, amongst others religion, science and family - each of which have their own logics. As above, Alexander argues against the idea that the civil sphere holds a monopoly over morality and justice. Rather each sub-system is considered as having "their own criteria of justice and their own system of rewards, there is no reason to privilege any one of these non-civil spheres over any other" (1998a: 7). In promoting "civil society III" as a differentiated sub-system existing autonomous yet interconnected to not only state and economy but also other non-civil spheres, Alexander is actually rejecting the notion of civil 'society' and civil society versus the state. In response to this Alexander argues that while civil society v state society may be useful in accounting for developing societies such as those in Eastern Europe or Latin America, in advance western societies, given that institutional differentiation is their distinguishing factor, civil society cannot encompass entire social systems. Thus while civil society or the 'people' versus the state may be effective polemically or rhetorically in terms of political mobilisation (both by social movements and governments), analytically speaking, a civil society for Alexander is actually a social system which contains an autonomous yet interconnected civil sub-sphere (civil society III).

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While the presence of the civil sphere is a defining characteristic of democratic societies for Alexander, he also stresses a permanent state of incompleteness with regard to democracy. In other words, democratic societies are not democratic or universal as such but rather, in more contingent terms, continuously in a process of democratisation and universalisation. Conversely, particularism is an irremovable aspect of 'real' civil societies. By pointing to the binary discourse of civil society Alexander is able to acknowledge the restrictions of universal and democratic language - how exclusions and injustices can occur in the name of universalism or democracy. This is what he calls the 'binary structure of civil discourse' (Alexander, 2000b).

Essentially for Alexander, because the application of civil criteria to individuals, groups and events involves a number of signifiers, which construct and define not only who belongs but also in doing so labels and excludes those who do not belong, there is an inevitable undemocratic or uncivil element to civil societies. Because it is a binary structure, which defines not only the moral but also the immoral, the "discourse of repression is an inherent aspect of the discourse of liberty" (Alexander, 2000b: 308). As he states (2000b: 297), "on the one side, there is an expansive code that identifies the actors and structures of civil society in terms that promote wider inclusion and increasing respect for individual rights; on the other, there is a restrictive code that identifies actors and structures in terms that focus on ascriptively grounded group identities - identities grounded in the 'ethical' sphere - and promote exclusion that follows therefrom". As a consequence (2000b: 298), "just as there is no developed religion that does not divide the world into the saved and the damned so there is no civil discourse that does not conceptualise the world into those who deserve inclusion and those who do not". In categorising these civil/uncivil oppositions, Alexander develops three 'discursive structures' which can be applied to 'social motives', 'social relationships' and 'social institutions'. To summarise this, I have provided a narrowed down version of this in the table below:

Figure 1.1 The discursive structure of the civil sphere (see Alexander, 1998a: 100-101)

	Democratic code	*Counter-democratic code*
Social Motives	Activism Autonomy Self-control	Passivity Dependence Passionate
Social Relationships	Open Trusting Friend	Secret Suspicious Enemy
Social Institutions	Equality Inclusive Impersonal	Hierarchy Exclusive Personal

What is significant for Alexander, is that while civil society is rooted in discourse and is plural and unfixed in terms of its social application, there is "a highly generalised symbolic system that divides civic virtue and civic vice in a remarkably stable and consistent way" (2000b: 298). In other words, while it might diverge in a variety of social contexts, the binary structure of democratic and counter-democratic code is universal because all "events must be categorised in terms of one side of this discursive formation or the other" (2000b: 299). Yet while it is universally applicable this in no way implies that it is fixed or unchangeable. It is possible for example for the same public figure, social group or event to be labelled as both civil and uncivil by different signifiers or by the same signifier at different historical instances. Hence the same figure may be signified by the same authority as both 'freedom fighter' and 'terrorist' on different occasions.

Overall, Alexander's theory is clearly an attempt to reconcile the neo-Kantian realism of Parsons and Habermas in light of the postmodern cultural turn. It is thus highly pragmatic (as opposed to utopian) in that it points to the inevitability of conflict and repressive discourses within democratic societies. The inherent hegemonic contestation over the ownership of the democratic code means that certain conflicts are practically irresolvable precisely because the moral code is contested. While some conflicts "are so gross or so sublime that they generate almost immediate consensus about how the symbolic sets should be applied" (2000b: 306) for other sources of conflict, the application is highly contested. Yet the moral does re-emerge

in Alexander when he points to the possible minimisation and limiting of repressive discourses rather than their complete removal, which he concedes, is not linguistically or semiotically possible. It is on this point that he acts to continue the universalist approaches of Rawls, Parsons and Habermas and against the relativist or hermeneutic standpoints of Taylor, Young and post-structuralism. In so far as they 'expand' the 'discourse of repression' and make the 'other' larger, relativist standpoints which emphasise 'difference' rather than 'solidarity' should be rejected.

His pragmatism however may also lead to a criticism in terms of the limiting role that is assigned to social movements. Their place in his analytical framework is only in terms of how they function to concretise universalise the civil sphere and not in terms of their own particular aims and objectives. There may be a displacement of agency here in that the real quality of the social movements may not necessarily lie in their objectives as they define them. Insofar as social movements institutionalise 'rights' they are part of civil society. However, insofar as they reject civil society, depicting it as essentially as bourgeois, patriarchal or white, then they are not part of civil society. As he states, "in the course of Western history the anti-civil intrusions I have referred to have been so destructive that the social movements organised for repair, and the theorists who articulate their demands, have sometimes come to believe that these blockages are intrinsic to civil society itself" (1998a: 11). He thus makes a distinction between 'moderate' and 'radical' social movements: "radical arguments for emancipation from civil society are neither empirically accurate nor morally compelling. They generalise from particular historical instances of highly distorted and oppressive boundary relations, drawing the illegitimate conclusion that the civil sphere must always be distorted in this particular way" (1998a: 11-12).

Finally, and related to the last point, his aversion to idealistic utopian depictions of civil society, in favour of an approach in which positive developments are granted more 'limited' scope, is also objectionable in that it considers 'compromise' and 'concession' as the most civil approach to resolving issues of conflict. This is objectionable in that while he is correct in pointing that 'compromise' does have an empirical frequency it does so only to the extent that it does not modify the power relations between the groups involved. This also reflects his tendency to refer to morally contested conflicts as involving two (presumably more or less equal) opposing groups, rather than between dominant and subordinate groups. In other words, a reference to power is missing. As there is moral contestation, so the

assigning of a clear power relationship, in terms of dominant and subordinate status, is also contested. While I agree with his emphasis on the indeterminacy of moral application and, to an extent, on the blurring of the lines of power, he deduces a presence of reciprocity from this. In other words that there is an equality in the labelling and signifying of 'others'. Because this boundary maintenance is unavoidable then all groups must do it equally. In this sense he ignores how further democratisation only occurs to the extent that the dominant/subordinate power relationship is not disturbed.

Conclusion and turning to Wales

The aim of this preliminary chapter has been to outline the different theoretical accounts and conceptions of civil society from which we can understand the different ways in which civil society in Wales has been discussed and acted out. However although the approach has been eclectic, it is possible to draw some commonalities between the different versions outlined, for all versions were concerned with the boundaries and conflict surrounding the national/collective identity. As I have noted, this conception is put most forcibly by the American sociologist, Jeffrey Alexander who, working within Durkheimian cultural sociology, places the concept of civil society firmly in terms of the cultural basis of democracy. In these 'cultural' terms, civil society represents a form of culture, the 'integrative common culture', on which the proper functioning of democracy depends. It also points to a congruence not only between civil society and culture but also between civil society and the 'nation' as understood in the liberal or civic sense. This cultural conception, however, is not only drawn from Durkheim but also Gramsci who through emphasising solidaristic ties between rural tenantry and industrial labourers, also saw civil society in terms of culture and the transmission of the ideas of the ruling class. It is precisely in these terms I would argue that civil society is applicable to issues of national identity in Wales. For instance, the process of devolution in Wales and the establishment of the National Assembly is seen as contributing, for the first time, a *civic* sense of Welsh identity (Osmond, 1998), and the ability of the Assembly to promote *Welsh* cultural norms and values. However it is also from this perspective that civil society should be criticised and re-worked.

This discussion came to a close by drawing attention to the contested and politicised nature of civil society. As argued by Habermas and Cohen and Arato, civil society is considered as both sacred, in relation to the political and economic spheres and with more or a less a common and collective interest in which different groups 'defend the boundaries' of civil society against economic and political colonisation. This conception however has been criticised by pointing out that groups within civil society do not necessarily act in terms of a common interest and their focus can be no less directed at defending their boundaries from 'other' sub-civil societies than from political and economic realms. This means that there are disputes over the *cultural* content of civil society. It also means that civil society groups are concerned with regulating the 'social' and the 'cultural' as they are with the 'economic' and the 'political'. Such contestation it is argued can be examined through drawing attention to disputes over the empirical application of certain dichotomies. In concluding this section, I would therefore like to emphasise the ways in which distinctions between civil and uncivil and moral and immoral are in themselves related to distinctions between the relational structure of certain groups such as majority and minority groups, privileged and disadvantaged groups or dominant and oppressed groups. The relationship here is one whereby the distinction between dominant and oppressed groups serves as the basis for a moral and aesthetic monopolisation. For example, morality of the claims of the oppressed group against the immorality of the claims of the dominant group. Such distinctions however are not always clear cut and choosing which group is the dominant one and which is the oppressed one is often contested. This, I would argue serves as the basis for understanding Welsh/English conflict in Wales. Examples of this include notions of a Welsh speaking *elite, majority* Welsh speaking communities on one hand and the English *minority* or new *ethnicity* on the other. In other words, the ascription of civil/uncivil society is contested and is applied in opposing ways by respective groups.

If we understand civil society as the culturalists do, "as a community roughly isomorphic with the 'nation'", then the fact that the Britain contains national minorities (Kymlicka, 1995) or proto-nations (Eriksen, 1993), and is better conceived of as a multi-nation state (Kearney, 1989) has consequences for our understanding of the boundaries of civil society. To equate civil society with the 'nation' would imply that both Wales and Scotland have distinctive and autonomous civil societies. There are, however, further de-constructions which point to a more pluralistic understanding

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of civil society. Civil society may correspond not only to the boundaries between national identities (such as those between England, Wales and Scotland) but also regional/local identities or socially stratified identities. For example, in Wales it could be argued that there are several sub-civil societies: region, locality and language all act to construct boundaries between different civil societies. This again would point to a multi-layered approach to viewing civil society as a 'collectivity of collectivities'. What this leaves us with, however, is a concern with the boundaries between groups and the extent to which inclusion is accepted. As Arne (1998) puts it, the point of civil society is "to convince people to create a spirit of community that also includes strangers" and thus transcends narrow boundaries of ethnic communities. In moving from theory and political philosophy to a research programme, in the next chapter I will attempt to justify this link between the concept of civil society and issues of language and national identity in Wales.

CHAPTER TWO

Welsh Civil society or Civil society in Wales?
The Emergence of a Discourse

Devolution and a 'weak' Welsh civil society

On May 6th 1999, the people of Wales were given the opportunity to elect their own parliament - the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW). Although this still meant being subordinate to Westminster, and also having fewer powers than the concurrent Scottish Parliament, it can be argued that an Assembly *elected* by the people of Wales represents the most significant institutional development in Welsh politics since the 1536-1542 Acts of Union. Yet while this makes the Assembly a major development in itself, the marginal outcome of the referendum vote and the objections raised regarding its alleged inadequate status and powers all point to the continuing uncertainty in Wales on the issues of national identity and an autonomous, self-directed *Welsh* civil society.

Following its election in May 1997, the present Westminster government initiated a broad package of constitutional reform. The earliest of these reforms was the granting of political devolution to Scotland and Wales. As it was, only four months had passed since Labour was elected, before Scotland and Wales both voted in favour of devolution. In Wales however, the referendum a far less convincing result than had perhaps been hoped.

On September 18th 1997, a referendum was held in which Wales voted in favour of devolution. But with an overall vote of 50.3% in favour, the actual majority was less than 6000. Moreover, only 50.1% of Wales' 2.2 million electorate had chosen to vote. Regional disparities were also apparent: As shown in **Table 2.1** below, the constituencies of the more anglicised east and north east of Wales such as *Newport* and *Flintshire*, tended to vote *No*, while the constituencies of the Welsh-speaking west and north west, such as *Gwynedd*, tended to vote *Yes*. Likewise, the

traditional Labour heartlands, such as *Rhondda* and *Merthyr Tydfil* in the southern Welsh valleys, also, overall, voted *Yes*. As put by Ned Thomas, "it is difficult to resist the conclusion that devolution came about because there was a mobilised convergence of linguistic and, for lack of a better word, Welsh ethnic identity" (1999: 37). In other words, a blending of *Welsh Wales* and *Y Fro Gymraeg*.

	Electorate	Yes %	No %	Turnout %
Anglesey	54,044	50.90	49.10	56.89
Blaenau Gwent	55,089	56.09	43.91	50.60
Bridgend	100,400	54.39	45.61	50.60
Caerphilly	129,060	54.70	45.30	49.33
Cardiff	228,571	44.37	55.63	46.86
Ceredigion	54,440	59.20	40.80	56.79
Carmarthenshire	133,467	65.28	34.72	56.37
Conwy	87,231	40.92	59.08	51.46
Denbighshire	87,231	40.77	59.23	49.71
Flintshire	113,181	38.20	61.80	41.01
Gwynedd	95,520	64.08	35.92	59.75
Merthyr Tydfil	95,520	58.21	41.79	49.49
Monmouthshire	44,107	32.10	67.90	50.52
Neath/Port Talbot	65,309	66.55	33.45	52.10
Newport	94,094	37.44	62.56	45.90
Pembrokeshire	88,720	42.79	57.21	52.63
Powys	96,107	42.66	57.34	56.19
Rhondda, Cynon, Taff	175,639	58.47	41.53	49.85
Swansea	174,725	51.96	48.04	47.13
Torfaen	69,505	49.84	40.16	45.48
Wrexham	96,787	45.28	54.72	42.38
TOTAL	**2,218,850**	**50.30**	**49.70**	**50.12**

Table 2.1 The 1997 Referendum results

Along with *British Wales* (Cardiff, east and northeast Wales), *Welsh Wales* (the southern Welsh valleys) and *Y Fro Gymraeg* (the rural north and west Welsh speaking heartland) constitute the three spatially differentiated Welsh identities that Balsom (1985) characterises as the *Three Wales Model*[1]. On one level, the regional disparities identified above would seem to support the value of this approach. Such a "journalistic venture" (Williams & Morris, 1999: ix) however has been criticised for overlooking differences both within and between the constituencies that make up each of the so-called regions. It also ignores the large numerical differences between the

three regions. *British Wales*, for instance, has more than double the population of *Y Fro Gymraeg*. As a result, this model would ignore the fact that Cardiff, despite voting *No* overall in the 1997 referendum, actually returned the second highest number of *Yes* voters (47, 524) after Carmarthenshire.

In contrast to the referendum result in Wales, the referendum in Scotland (which took place the week before) produced a far more decisive vote in favour of a devolved Scottish Parliament – 74.3% to 25.7%. A turn out of 60.1% gave an overall endorsement of 45% of the total Scottish electorate. Unlike the Scottish Parliament, the NAfW was to have no legislative and tax varying powers beyond the drafting of secondary legislation. These differences between the respective proposals were a central criticism raised by the 'No' campaigners. The NAfW was deemed to be merely a 'talking shop', and thus an expensive and unnecessary additional layer of bureaucracy. This criticism could not have been employed as effectively in Scotland as it was in Wales. Indeed, this is one of the conclusions drawn by Laura McAllister (1998a) in her examination of the referendum campaign.

Alongside this negative portrayal is the fact that in its recent history, the idea of devolution in Wales has been a source of great division and uncertainty in Wales. In the only previous devolution referendum in 1979 for example, Wales rejected self-government decisively, by over four to one. Moreover, one of the most salient features of this campaign was the conflict that came from within the Labour Party itself. In the 1979 devolution referendum, Wales voted 956,000 to 243,000 against an elected Welsh Assembly. The advocates of a 'No' vote included virtually all the Conservatives and a number of South Wales Labour MPs who saw the Assembly as a costly piece of bureaucracy that might endanger the interests of non-Welsh speakers. This particular group of MPs played largely on fears that were held by some significant numbers of the English speaking inhabitants of South Wales; that a devolved Wales would fall victim to a Welsh speaking elite, corruption and isolation from Britain (Williams, G.A. 1985). Similar arguments in the Welsh Labour Party were that a Welsh Assembly would be a "sell-out to nationalism" and the first step onto the "slippery slope to separatism" (Davies, C.A. 1989). Rather than emphasise the need for Wales to take affairs into its own hands, this group argued for the

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[1] See pages 68-70 of this chapter for an account of the cultural and linguistic divisions in Wales that this model refers to.

primacy of British class-based interests, for it was through this forum that Welsh needs were best met. Again, as with the 1997 devolution campaigns, comparing events in the 1979 campaigns identify key disparities between Wales and Scotland. For instance, the parallel Scottish referendum in 1979 saw a narrow vote in favour (52 %). Although, at only 33% of the total electorate this still fell short of the 40% threshold required for change at the time.

Yet surely, given Labour's landslide victory in the 1997 General Election (the Conservative party lost all their parliamentary seats in Wales), and the apparent consensus with both Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats, a strong endorsement of devolution in Wales was more likely? Not according to McAllister (1998a), who in her analysis has cited a number of failings within Westminster's handling of the campaign as the major contributory factor to the closeness of the vote. Of particular note here is Westminster's misunderstanding of the historical complexity of the devolution debate in Wales. As she states, there was a "deliberate policy decision to tie in Welsh devolution with the wider package of proposed constitutional modernisation". This in turn meant that on one hand, there was a "tendency to offer as an argument for a 'yes vote', the need to show support for the new Prime Minister and his programme" and on the other it meant "a shift away from the more positive and intellectual arguments for democratising administrative and political arrangements in Wales" (1998a:151). Yet what was evident in both 1979 and 1997 referendum campaigns was that devolution, at least in Wales, could not be considered as a party political issue. In other words, there was an assumption within the Blair government that support for the Labour Party meant support for devolution and a lack of attention to the distinctiveness of Welsh politics and the historical antecedents on which it rests.

Perhaps one lesson learnt by the Labour party of 1997, in its devolution campaign in Wales, was to realise the fears of a 'break up of Britain' that people had in relation to devolution. One direct consequence of this maybe that the 1997 Labour government tended to stress the *democratic* benefits that could be gained, as a basis for supporting devolution in Wales. Within the government's White Paper *A Voice for Wales* (Stationary Office, 1997a) for example, there was no mention of a Welsh national identity as a reason to vote in favour of devolution. This is clearly understandable when set against the backdrop of 1979. Talk of a national identity is difficult when so many conflicting identities seem to co-exist. As Dafydd Elis Thomas

asks, "What is Welsh identity? I am uncertain although I know there are a lot of them. The idea that we need to try and re-constitute a variety of identities and place them in some kind of coherent whole seems to me itself to be a rather futile exercise" (cited in Williams, C. 1995:128).

Thus the Labour Party, in Wales at least, preferred to concentrate on the economic benefits that were to be gained and the importance in redressing the 'democratic deficit' that was believed to exist in Wales. As summed up by one commentator at the time, "the 'Yes campaign' is not about selling identity, but good governance...it is democratisation, rather than devolution" (Freedland, J. 1997: 7). This however is in stark contrast to the equivalent white paper for Scotland (Stationary Office, 1997b). In line with the overall mood in the Scottish referendum campaign, the question of Scottish national identity was almost always what underpinned the case for devolution with constant referral being made to Scotland's historical claim to nationhood and the political and moral right to reclaim this. As Ron Davies explained, "the vote in Scotland is about the re-creation of a parliament that existed 300 years ago. It's about righting a wrong, it's about national identity. That sense of confidence does not exist in Wales" (Cited in Freedland, J. 1997: 7). Given this, the claim that devolution was a 'sell out to nationalism' and would inevitably lead to the 'break-up of Britain', had little effect in Scotland, compared to Wales where this anxiety emerged as the focal point for the campaign of the anti-devolutionists. Perhaps therefore, the greatest surprise of 1997 is that Wales actually managed to vote yes at all.

What therefore, lies behind the numerous differences between Wales and Scotland with regards to the status, process and enthusiasm for devolution? Clearly, the extent to which Wales has been institutionally assimilated into the English administrative and political system – hence the administrative term 'England and Wales', is a factor. This is again in contrast to Scotland, which despite being united by treaty with England in 1707, has retained intact much of its civil society and civic institutions (e.g. legal and education systems). An argument put forward by John Osmond (1989, 1999) amongst others, is that the lack of civic consciousness in Wales compared to Scotland, through its weak civil society and lack of civic institutions, is a key factor in the differences in outlook towards devolution between the two nations. While Scottish identity has historically drawn upon its civic or institutional elements

and has gained its distinctiveness through its historical claim to self-government/ independence, Welsh identity has tended to retain distinctiveness through language and culture, thus taking place within rather than outside the British institutional framework.

As a consequence of these considerations upon the devolution referendum, questions concerning the nature and distinctiveness of civil society in Wales have received an increasing degree of attention[2]. Indeed the fostering of an autonomous Welsh civil society has been cited by many commentators involved in the whole devolution process as one of the key challenges to the new political era in Wales. Civil society has been put forward as a contributory factor to the promotion of regional economic development and the democratisation of regional institutions. This emergence of reference to civil society in discussions on Welsh economic development and the National Assembly will be outlined in more detail.

It would be too one-sided however to frame the Welsh experience of devolution in this manner as a failure of Welsh civil society. For alongside this negative portrayal is the fact that the 1997 referendum clearly indicates a re-positioning on the issues surrounding Welsh devolution. Clearly, both the re-surfacing of devolution to the party political agenda in the 1990's and the result of the 1997 referendum represent significant 'swings' in favour of devolution. In turn these changes, particularly since 1979, may indicate a shift towards a more 'civic' notion of Welsh identity which is less and less reliant on linguistic, cultural and ideological differences between Wales and England and more rooted within the growth autonomous Welsh institutions. We, therefore, have a paradox surrounding the notion of *Welsh* civil society which needs to be balanced. For while the ambiguity inherent within the 1997 devolution debate would seem to indicate a lack of autonomy within Welsh civil society, the 'pro-devolutionary' swing from 1979 to 1997 would also seen to indicate Welsh civil society and civic identity as in a state of transition. In what immediately follows, therefore, I will outline the emergence of the actual use of the term 'civil society' in relation to Wales and devolution.

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[2] See for example Day et al (2000), Jones and Paterson (1999) and Morgan (2000).

Wales and the rhetoric of civil society

In the passage below, John Osmond, Director of the Institute of Welsh Affairs and a prominent campaigner in the *Yes for Wales* referendum campaign indicates the relationship between regional economic development and civil society in the following way:

> The whole process of devolution is happening within the context of a global economy, and to what extent we can maximise Welsh autonomous expression for the development of a sophisticated economy, one which we are arguing is a 'knowledge driven economy' which is the only one which has any prospect of developing Welsh prosperity in the context of trends in the global economy and the developing of a civic culture and society is crucially important to a successful economy...the reality is that we are inevitably drifting in the direction of self-survival in a global economy, and a prosperous economy is contingent upon that.[3]

Thus a connection is made here between the development of a unified civic culture or civil society which plays a central role in the Assembly's policy process and the transition towards regional competitiveness. John Osmond's conception of the role of civic culture in promoting socio-economic well-being is also shared by Kevin Morgan, another prominent figure in the devolution campaign, who makes a connection between including civil society in the National Assembly's decision making process and the successful use of European structural funds:

> On the one hand we have what might be called Political Wales, which largely consists of the National Assembly and its civil service. On the other hand there is a wide array of bodies from the public, private and voluntary sectors which collectively constitute Civic Wales, the Assembly's social and economic partners. If these two worlds remain as separate as they are today then the position of Wales at the end of Objective One period will be less like Ireland,

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[3] Interview with John Osmond, February 2000.

the country the Assembly wishes to emulate, and perhaps more like Calabria, the Italian region, which often fails to spend its budget, the region where projects have little or no discernible effect (Morgan, K. 2000: 8)

Morgan's referral to Calabria, a region of southern Italy is significant in the context of Putnam's analysis. For Putnam, regions like Calabria and Sicily were traditionally less 'civic' in character. This is also significant given the way in which Wales is conceptualised in terms of North/South divisions. As Putnam states himself:

> For at least ten centuries, North and South have followed contrasting approaches to the dilemmas of collective action that afflict all societies. In the North norms of reciprocity and networks of civil engagement have been embodied in guilds, mutual aid societies, co-operatives, unions, and even soccer clubs and literary societies. These horizontal civic bonds have under girded levels of economic and institutional performance generally much higher than in the South, where social and political relations have been virtual structures. Although we are accustomed to thinking of the state and the market as alternative mechanisms for solving social problems this history suggests that both states and markets operate more efficiently in civic settings (1993: 181).

It follows from this, therefore, that the legitimacy of the National Assembly for Wales, both in terms of its perception and performance as a democratic institution, is itself contingent upon the part it plays in fostering partnerships with the institutions and organizations of civil society in Wales. This is theoretically supported by the view of civil society, or more accurately, *civic culture* as functional to the legitimization of government (Almond and Verba, 1989). The imperative is further outlined by Morgan and Mungham:

> Building civic capacity is only a marginally less demanding challenge than raising economic well-being. While civic capacity (the norms and networks of trust, reciprocity and civic engagement) is clearly not a responsibility of the Assembly, or indeed of any government, it has enormous implications for the

ways in which citizens and organizations are well-informed is an important ingredient in the recipe of good governance. Strong civic capacity provides governments with more demanding and more intelligent interlocutors - business networks, community organizations, citizens groups - making public policy more accountable.

...thus the Assembly for its own benefit has an interest in promoting civic capacity. Without strong and independent civic groups to keep it on its toes, the Assembly could degenerate into an insular and self-referential body surrounded by a bunker mentality. (Morgan and Mungham, 2000: 218-9)

What underlines these discussions is a consideration of civil society as part of the wider ongoing process of devolution. Civil society is viewed as contributing to this transition from the previous negative situation, prior to devolution, towards a positive future situation that can emulate other successful European regions. A common occurrence for instance, is to compare the situation in Wales to that of Scotland. Paterson and Jones (1999) for instance, put forward the argument that the lack of a distinct Welsh civil society, in contrast to the historically well-developed Scottish civil society, gives reason to the differences in their respective endorsements of devolution. John Osmond spells this out with greater clarity:

Civil society in Wales is best understood by comparing that with Scotland. In terms of how Welsh identity is understood it hasn't, until fairly recently, been understood in a civic sense or in terms of Welsh citizenship where in Scotland that has quite plainly been the case. Scottish identity seems to me to have been articulated quite saliently in terms of civic sensibility, largely because there have been important sub-state institutions that have survived the union of Scotland and England[4]

So while civil society in Scotland represents the precursor to devolution, in Wales it represents one of the consequences:

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[4] Interview with John Osmond, February, 2000.

What the Assembly is doing is making the institutions and state structure of Wales visible to the people of Wales in terms of being democratically accountable and that will begin, I would argue, a process of developing a civic consciousness so being Welsh can be understood in a civic sense for the first time ever.[5]

What the above passages illustrate is on one hand that the effectiveness of civil society is judged in terms of its ability to contribute to an ongoing process towards greater regional autonomy, and on the other, that the Assembly represents the critical player in the development of a more effective civil society. Moreover, within these passages, civil society is constructed in instrumentalist terms as a 'means to an end'. For example, there is consistent emphasis upon the importance of civil society not for its own sake but in its contribution towards the transition from an invisible, unaccountable Welsh Office to a more democratic and accountable Assembly, or from a fragmented, divisive sense of identity towards an inclusive, civic sense of identity. In many ways this goes against the grain of the majority of civil society theorists who insist that civil society should be viewed as an end in itself (Cohen and Arato 1992, Alexander, 1998a). We, therefore, need to apply greater conceptual scrutiny to the manner in which the very notion of civil society has come to the fore in Wales. For while an 'existing' Welsh civil society, or a civil society in Wales, does have historical purchase, the very use of the term 'civil society' in the Welsh context is very much a recent discourse that is inextricably tied to the devolutionary process: a scholarly discourse around a pro-devolution argument.

Is it sufficient for instance, to view Welsh civic society, as Kevin Morgan (2000) does, as the 'Assembly's social and economic partners'? This role of civil society as a 'social partner' to the Assembly can be seen as a central aspect of the Third Way sensibility that underlies the approach of New Labour. Theorists such as Giddens and Hargreaves stress the importance of 'partnership' between state and civil society in terms of policy formation. Much of the debate on civil society in Wales therefore can be seen as an extension of the Third Way/New Labour debate. However,

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[5] Ibid.

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firstly this particular role outlined above represents *only one* of the many ways in which civil society has been conceived, whether in academic or political discourse. For instance, this particular version of 'civil society as civic culture' - a site which provides support and legitimacy to state institutions is a far cry from an alternative version of 'civil society as movement' which views civil society as a site of critique and dissent - a site of alternative hegemonies where opposition to the status quo, rather than legitimacy, is formed. It is therefore necessary to distinguish, conceptually, between the different versions of civil society. Secondly, notions of third way partnership and consultation with civil society cannot be considered without reference to the changes regarding the conception of the State, particularly in terms of the Welfare state.

The idea of civil society – state in partnership is clearly one of the undercurrents to the idea of devolution in the 1990's. Yet the notion of partnership also, to an extent, blurs the very distinction between civil society and the state which democracy is premised upon. And the proposed National Assembly would seem to be viewed in a somewhat anomalous position in relation to this distinction. For instance, at first, to the extent that it represents an elected government which is answerable and accountable to a distinct 'people' it would appear to lie on the state side of the distinction. However, the Assembly would also function to provide a national, Wales-wide forum for public debate. The Assembly is also viewed as a civic forum – a voice or a public sphere. The fact that it is perhaps the latter perspective - the Assembly as a voice for the people and an institutional marker of national identity – which takes prominence also reflects its limited powers and its subordinate status in relation to Westminster, which retains its status as the State. That governments appear to *favour* partnership with a range of agencies implies a shift in governmentality (Schofield, 2002). While not all of these issues can be addressed in detail here it is considered necessary to provide a more critical perspective on the *need* of government to renew civil society. Much of this confusion can be related to the ambiguity of the relationship between *civic* and *civil* society, which as was highlighted in the previous chapter can be interpreted in two contrasting ways; in Kantian terms, the relationship is one of considerable overlap where civic society or the civic public holds a central place within civil society, while in the Hegelian terms, the civic public forms part of the state, separated from a privatistic civil society.

Why, and from which contexts, have these discourses on civil society and social capital - as applicable to events in Wales – emerged? For while civil society has become a fashionable concept and been applied to a wide variety of social and political situations, its re-emergence in the 1980's is clearly rooted in societies who are trying to make the so-called 'transition to democracy' such as those in central and eastern Europe or in Latin America. While this emphasis upon transition would seem appropriate, from what has already been outlined, it is clear that the Welsh case is both empirically and ideologically different. It is rather the **'Regionalist'** and **'New Labour'** deployments of the civil society, social capital and civic culture arguments that have caught on in Wales. In other words the need to foster civil society in Wales is more a 'top-down' discourse than a 'bottom-up' one. And this would appear to explain why such discussions seem to focus almost exclusively on the Assembly's role in fostering civil society and that its performance be judged to the extent that it 'includes previously excluded groups'. It is through these currents, rather than events in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, that the Welsh variant of the discourse of civil society springs. I shall now turn to these two wider issues in greater detail. Before doing so however, I wish to provide some historical basis to the idea of devolution in Wales, or more accurately civil movements for Welsh autonomy.

Historical antecedents to Welsh devolution and civil society

As Jones and Jones (2000:241) show, the momentum behind the drive for devolution in the 1990's was not only a result of New Labour policy but also the culmination of an ongoing debate within the Labour party in Wales, since its establishment. This impulse within the Welsh Labour Party towards devolution was not only inherited from the late 19th/early 20th century Welsh liberalism but it also represented a "political terrain which some attempted to capture from the liberals" (Jones and Jones, 2000:241). This also identifies the fact that the idea of devolution in Wales has a long history, with the original impulse being part of the emergence of Welsh liberal non-conformism. Although it has to be said that this was short-lived and that after the collapse of the Cymru Fydd movement in 1896, itself signifying the demise of non-conformist hegemony, the demand for home rule was not a major policy initiative in

any political party. Rather, it tended to voiced by individual politicians who did not necessarily promote devolution as if speaking on behalf of their party. This is certainly apparent with the case of E.T. John. However insofar as it is often with these historical movements in mind that contemporary Welsh civil society is considered as somewhat 'weak' (Paterson and Jones, 1999), then these initial mobilisations need to be elaborated.

As Williams (1985) and subsequently Adamson (1991) have argued, the development of Welsh nationalism and national identity from the mid 19th century onwards is akin to the sort of cultural conception of civil society of Gramsci, in which nationalism serves as "ideological cement", forging an 'alternative' basis for links and alliances that cut across social cleavages. As such, the Welsh nationalism of 19th century liberal non-conformism in Wales can be considered in terms of the development of a *Welsh* civil society, similar to the role of the Jacobin class during the French Revolution. However such a civil society could not to be sustained in that it was based on an alignment of 'class' and 'national' interest that was itself temporal.

As identified by Alexander (1998a), within 'Civil Society I', it is the emerging market economy that plays the central facilitating role. Although not synonymous as Marx contended, 'civil society' was the discourse through which the emerging 'bourgeois society', and its opposition to the impeding landed or colonial class, was expressed. Although, as Paterson and Jones (1999) argue, this occurred somewhat belatedly in Wales than elsewhere "...for Wales's overwhelmingly rural and relatively backward economy did not allow the development of a relatively autonomous, urbanised middle strata – the foundation of Hegel's *burgeliche Gessellschaft* – which could successfully challenge the power of the gentry" (1999:174).

Nevertheless, it is the same contestation through which the development of Welsh civil society is driven, that is, between the existing hegemonic feudal/landed gentry and an emergent autonomous bourgeoisie which provided the material basis in order to act not merely in its own particular interests but to make appeals to the common interests with working and rural classes. This particular historical episode in Wales however was defined by an *alignment* of class and culture, that is: between a *Welsh* rural tenantry, working class and emerging bourgeoisie in opposition to an *English* landlord hegemony with its imposed religious structure. In these Gramscian terms, civil society becomes a site of contestation between *English* hegemony and a

Welsh alternative hegemony. The perception of *cultural* difference thus became crucial to the expression of common interests. As Adamson (1991:104) argues, the space created by cultural difference, predominantly through language and religion in this case, provided the discursive means through which resistance to 'landlord hegemony' could be articulated and represented in terms of the cultural, religious and linguistically 'alien' character of English.

In Wales, the importance of such a cultural articulation (Welsh/English) is that it served as a means through which the *particular* interests of the emerging Welsh/indigenous bourgeoisie (i.e. an emerging capitalist class in pursuit of its own hegemony) could appeal to industrial and rural tenant classes respectively. It is in this appeal to wider interests that religious difference in Wales was important: "Nonconformity provided at various times ideological cement for alliances between objectively antagonistic classes" (1991:115). And it was in 1868 General Election that these oppositions entered the party political sphere with the election of the first Liberal Nonconformist MP, Henry Richard, in Merthyr Tydfil. As he states in his address to the electorate:

> "...the people forming three fourths of the people of Wales, have they not the right to say to this small propertied class...We are the Welsh people and not you. This country is ours and not yours and therefore we claim to have our principles and sentiments represent in the Commons' House of Parliament" (cited in Adamson, 1991:1060)

We can for instance note the similarities between this discourse of *Welsh civil society versus English landowners* with the more recent example of the rise of civil society in Poland in the 1980s against the communist regimes. As Held (1992:19) states "...the events in Poland were shaped by *a remarkable ethnic and national unity*, the power of the Catholic church and *a strong sense of a foreign enemy* on Polish soil corrupting its growth and identity" (italics added). As Held (1992: 40) goes on to say, "the appeal of democracy lies in its denial *in principle* of any conception of the political good other than that generated by 'the people' themselves" (italics added). This has interesting connotations however when we consider where this notion of the people derives from and whether or not Welsh devolution itself rested on a conception of a *Welsh* people.

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This would be a difficult claim to make in light of the referendum result. Yet as is demonstrated by this historical episode it is contradictory to state that there is no such thing as a separate Welsh people given that it is during this period that the politicisation of Welsh nationalism gained its momentum.

From the augmentation of a number of Welsh MPs in Parliament came demands for specific legislation and institutional representation for Wales particularly on issues of land reform and disestablishment. One such enactment was the Welsh Sunday Closing Act of 1881. Also during the 1880s University Colleges at Cardiff and Bangor were opened followed by the National Library and National Museum in 1907. Thus an array of Welsh civil society institutions emerged. The high-point of demands for Welsh autonomy however surrounded the establishment of the Cymru Fydd movement in the 1890s. It is in this movement that Welsh independence became a major political aim. Such a movement however was short-lived, failing in particular to unite the increasingly divergent industrial south and rural north. It therefore follows that the displacement of such alignments of culture, nation and class: between a Welsh indigenous culture/working class and an English foreign culture/landed class should reveal the objective polarities between the Welsh non-conformist bourgeoisie, Welsh rural tenantry and the Welsh industrial working class. As Adamson states (1991:123):

The failure of Cymru Fydd to successfully unite north and south in an appeal to nationhood can be seen as the result of the erosion of the basis of the alliance between the urban bourgeoisie and the rural peasantry. In addition, the conditions which had created a nationalist perspective, in both the rural and the industrial sectors, were now dissolving, leaving no social basis for a national movement in Wales after 1890.

As with the shift from 'Civil Society I' to 'Civil Society II' so the hegemony of the non-conformist bourgeoisie weakened: thus 'civil Society II' became reduced to 'bourgeois society' (Alexander, 1998). In this civil society, advocates of commerce and 'early capitalism' were no longer radical dissenters but conservative "owners of capital and direct exploiters in their own right" (Adamson, 1991:117). In Marx's terms therefore civil society was a myth and subsequently only the submerged networks of the labour movement provided the basis for positive social change.

Consequently, it was through the discourses of British and international socialism that the interests of the Welsh working class were best articulated. It is significant therefore how accounts of the rise and decline of Welsh non-conformism mirror the wider historical transformation of the concept of civil society: from a radical and change-oriented emergent bourgeoisie to a conservative and stability-orientated one. This also provides the historical backdrop to the rejection of devolution in 1979 and the ongoing social divisions in Wales surround Welsh speaking/English speaking and rural/industrial Wales. As Adamson concludes "Nationalism as an ideological cement between an indigenous bourgeoisie and working class was redundant: nationalism was no longer articulated with class struggle" (1991:123). From this point onward, Welsh nationalism, and the desire for Welsh independence in any form, could not be considered in terms of a Welsh civil society – that is a movement which articulated common interests and attempted to unify the regional, linguistic and cultural differences within Wales. Rather through its increasingly exclusive focus on the Welsh language, Welsh nationalism was perceived mainly as a marginal force within the more populated areas of Wales.

The re-emergence of Welsh nationalism in the 1960s, constituted in the main by the twin political forces of Plaid Cymru and Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg, came from the wider resurgence of ethnicity and nationalism within the wider context of rise of political protest and new social movements. In emanating from such particularistic or single-issue standpoints however it becomes apparent that emphasising the connections of language and nation could no longer serve as the same cultural articulations of commonality and collective interest that the 19th century non-conformist civil society rested on. This has subsequently been reflected by a discursive shift in which the Welsh language is now seen as a barrier to such a process. This shift is clearly illustrated by John Osmond when he states:

Until now the Welsh have been unable to depend on an equivalent civic culture. Instead, Welsh identity has relied upon a more diffuse sense of cultural belonging in which locality and language have borne much of the weight of what Welshness meant. Moreover, *this strong sense of place, and the role of the language, have tended to be divisive rather than unifying. They*

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have distinguished Welsh people one from another rather than promoting a unifying sense of Wales as an entity (italics added, 1998:1)

Our initial discussion of Welsh language and civil society, or the civic culture version of it, is thus one in which divisions surrounding the language are conceived as *divisive* barriers to the development of a *unified* Welsh civil society. As identified, for its proponents (Osmond, 1998, Paterson and Jones, 1999) the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales signifies for the first time, the opportunity for a distinctive Welsh civil society to develop. What is also recognised by such advocates however is that such a process will be evaluated by the extent to which it negotiates divisions within Wales, particularly such as those between Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers.

Civil society, the Welsh language and problems of collective identity

As I have already mentioned, much of the opposition to devolution in 1979 resulted from a polarisation of the Welsh language issue and its attachment to the nationalist cause. On one hand, it was feared that a Welsh Assembly would be dominated by a Welsh speaking elite, solely concerned with issues surrounding the promotion of the Welsh language. As Leo Abse, MP for Pontypool and a prominent figure in the 1979 'no campaign' stated, "the English speaking majority would be condemned to be strangers in their own land. The nationalists by insisting on Welsh being spoken in the Assembly, will ensure the creation of a Welsh speaking bureaucratic elite who will attempt to impose a false homogeneity on Wales" (quoted in Osmond et al, 1985: xxxix). Thus the Welsh language was the cornerstone of many of the fears that would eventually dissuade and would-be Yes voters. For members of the Labour party and other prominent speakers in South Wales, the Welsh language movement led by a middle class minority, represented a "denial of Welshness to the English speaking Welsh" which inevitable leads to "a bitter self-exclusion of the English-speaking Welsh from the Welsh people and the nation" (Williams, G.A. 1985: 293)

On the other hand, it was feared that the hegemony that 'South Walian Labourism' had on Welsh political culture would result in a marginalising of the issues that concerned the nationalists and Welsh language protagonists. Plaid Cymru

had been concerned from the outset that an Assembly run in Cardiff would mean neglect for the rural Welsh-speaking heartlands of West and Northwest Wales. The inevitable result of these combined fears was that devolution was wholeheartedly rejected. Yet this was not only a rejection of devolution but, more significantly perhaps, also a rejection of the existence of any coherent notion of Welsh *National* Identity and the embracement of a more British based identity. As Williams concluded, "the Westminster parliament seemed the only forum in which these fragmented peoples could co-exist" (1985: 296) So rather than being the underlying, divisive issue in itself, the 1979 and 1997 referendums merely re-enforced, deep cultural and linguistic divisions that were already present in Wales. This view is supported by Dennis Balsom's post-devolution survey of attitudes in Wales that was outlined earlier (Balsom, 1985). On the basis of voting patterns during the 1979 referendum, he propounded a *Three Wales Model*, where three spatially divided identities could be seen to co-exist in Wales, all having different political priorities: *Y Fro Gymraeg, Welsh Wales and British Wales*. Within this model the natives of *Y Fro Gymraeg*, the pre-dominantly rural Welsh speaking heartland, comprising of the old county of Gwynedd and parts of Dyfed who consider themselves to have the stronger claim for true Welshness to the extent that the non-Welsh speaking South Walians may be excluded within their self-definitions. Within this space, the threat of cultural erosion and destruction of the language is central to the political debate. Here the language politics of these Plaid Cymru strongholds has resulted in a number of social and civil rights movements such as *Adfer*, *Cefn* and *Cymdeithas Tai Gwynedd* and the employment of a bilingual policy by Gwynedd County Council.

This however is in stark contrast to the more densely populated and industrialised *Welsh Wales* predominantly made up of the southern valleys where the trade unionism and the labour movement in Wales has its strongest roots and *British Wales*, the anglicised north and border regions. Between these three spatial divisions, we can identify conflicting interpretations on the boundaries and embodiments of Welsh identity. Bowie (1993) for example portrays *Y Fro Gymraeg* in the following way: the 'sucking out' of Welsh speakers from the Welsh speaking heartland's emphasises cultural divisions along insider Welsh and outside/English lines. The economic and social undermining of rural Wales by capitalist penetration, tourism and the ownership of second homes has led to the development of social-action

movements such as *Adfer* and *Cymdeithas Tai Gwynedd* to purchase homes for local people in advance of them being sold to 'outsiders' at inflated prices (Bowie, 1993)

On the other hand, in voicing the English speaking, working class in south Wales, Williams highlights how moves in favour of bilingualism in education and employment may be perceived within *Welsh Wales* as "shutting off employment for their children" in the same way that the "Irish middle class had used official Gaelic" (1985:293). The fact that 80% of the population of Wales do not and choose not to speak Welsh highlights the existence of several conflicting interpretations of Welsh identity and, more significantly, the fact that the Welsh language cannot form the basis of any coherent notion of National Identity, and indeed may be viewed as a hindrance to this process. The implication in all this is that the social divisions and conflict that occurs on the basis of language is a major barrier to the construction of a coherent sense of national identity and, as is of concern here, an autonomous civil society. However, the extent to which the Welsh language remains such a divisive political issues as it clearly did in 1979 is questionable.

With the 1993 Welsh Language Act and the establishment of the Welsh Language Board however, the language has to an extent been depoliticised, professionalised and has detached itself from its nationalist origins (Aitchison and Carter 1997, Williams C.H. 1994). This shifted can be identified in the following statement made by Ron Davies, Secretary of State for Wales at the time, in 1998:

"when I started out as a young councillor in the Rhymney Valley, the Welsh language was a hot potato which aroused angst and ire all over Wales. The Welsh language was something you were either 'for' or 'against': there wasn't much room for neutrality. But now that mode of thinking has been largely abandoned. Whether you happen to speak Welsh or not, there is increasingly the view that that language is part of what makes our identity as a nation distinctive and unique. The language is no longer the political football in the way it once was" (Western Mail, July 2, 1998, cited in Osmond, 1998:2-3)

Clearly therefore these developments associated with the Welsh language have contributed to the endorsement of devolution in Wales. Further support to this analysis can be gained from the results of the Welsh Language Attitude Survey carried

out in 1995 (NOP/Welsh Language Board Survey 1995, see also Chapter 5). As Osmond contends, "by 1997 however, the language had been swept away as an issue. Instead of a negative force it had become a positive impulse" (1998:2). Paterson and Jones (1999) make similar point stating "a paradigmatic example of civic activism whereby non-Welsh speakers have consciously embraced the language for themselves or their children" (1999:184, this will be pursued in greater detail in chapter 6). The implication is that the development of a more civic sense of Welsh identity, one based primarily on residence and living in Wales, is already underway. However in light of more recent Assembly debates in 2001, this perceived consensus over the Welsh language would appear somewhat naïve to say the least. For this year was punctuated not only by a series of antagonistic interventions regarding the future of the Welsh language but also the founding a radical pressure group – Cymuned. These developments shall be discussed in greater detail later. Suffice to say at present that, if anything, the establishment of the National Assembly has led to an intensification or *repoliticisation* of the 'language debate' in Wales. But there are two reasons why conflict rather than consensus was more likely.

Firstly, many of the main enactments in favour of the Welsh language, S4C and the 1982 Broadcasting Act, the1988 Educational Reform Act and 1993 Welsh language Act all occurred within a 'democratic deficit' and the unique political relationship between Welsh language lobbyists and the Westminster Conservative administration. Naturally, the coming of a more democratically accountable assembly was likely to bring with it more public debate and representation of the opinions – particularly those of majority language speakers in Wales. Some have even questioned whether S4C or a Welsh Language Act would ever have materialised under a devolved administration (Thomas, 1997). The suggestion being that the Welsh language lobby group had benefited from a democratic deficit and a desire to temper more 'extreme' nationalist agitation. Secondly, the Assembly was also likely to bring with it heightened expectations from the Welsh language movement itself regarding the possibility of further concessions, particularly in the form of a New Welsh language Act and the granting of official status of Welsh in Wales, and also the bilingual nature of the Assembly itself. But in any case, why should such *political* contestation and polarisation and the break-up of consensus be considered as necessarily problematic to social cohesion? To understand this we need to outline the

type of civil society being promoted here for it is one that is synonymous with the notion of *civic culture*. This maybe conceived as the 'civil society as civic culture' version which is similar to the civic republican theory outlined earlier. It thereby follows however that the same criticisms and reservations directed at the civic republican argument can also be directed at our contemporary discussion in Wales.

This type of "culture" which is considered to play such a key role in partnership to these institutions such as the Assembly is more specifically known as the "civic culture". Favell (1998) traces the emergence of this usage of the "civic culture" to the American political science of the 1950's and 1960's, and in particular, the study by Almond and Verba (1989). As Favell (1998:211) points out "it was the first study to seek to account for democratic performance and institutional continuity in terms of distinct cultural variables, taken from a comprehensive survey of attitudes and political perceptions of citizens in five different liberal democracies". Clearly, it was considered that the civic culture could be quantified which reflected the positivist and objectivist hegemony through the social sciences at this particular time. The civic culture, and thus we would assume culture in general, comprises peoples attitudes and perceptions – their ideas, beliefs and ways of thinking. Following on from this, a *civic* culture is one in which involves measurable attitudes, perceptions and dispositions which, in turn, demonstrate an electorate which is "consciously trusting, identifying and participating in abstract liberal-democratic principles and institutions" (1998:211). Yet in emanating from the structural functionalism of the 1950's and 1960's this study has since been attacked from a number of theoretical positions.

Of particular importance are the criticisms which highlight its ideological and ethno-centric assumptions. As Favell (1998) criticises, Almond and Verba completely overlook the role of ideology in leading to identification with democratic institutions and principles or that culture itself, as understood by Gramsci, is a site of ideological reproduction. Furthermore, America is read as the transparent model for all political systems. Yet despite these criticisms the question of how we are to judge the success of liberal democratic regimes and how such performance may be both measured and improved remains an important one and one which underlies concerns over the attitudes and perceptions of the National Assembly for Wales. The strength of the study by Almond and Verba (1989) is that the notion that a proper functioning democracy depends on a shared culture has since become widely accepted. In

particular the very idea of value consensus around an existing political institution is highly ideologically charged. As Lovering and Thomas have argued:

"If Wales has diverse civil societies who is to say that it is the poorer for it? No one, not even the Institute of Welsh Affairs[6], has the right to decide in advance which one matters the most – which is what is implied in making claims about the "interests of Wales as a whole". There can be no getting around the need to accept diversity…An Assembly, which genuinely believed in the virtues of a real diversity of voices, of clash and conflict, would reflect the distinctive social and economic reality of Wales. It could help to nurture the development of what Welsh civil society has enjoyed only intermittently, and in isolated geographical pockets over the last fifty years – vigour, creative tension, honesty" (Lovering and Thomas, 1999:26-28).

As Goldfarb (1998) has pointed out, democratic civil societies are structured not merely in terms of *civility* - consensus, common interests, mutual respect and dialogue – but also by *subversion* – conflict, difference, abrasion and direct action. Rather, it is the interaction between civility and subversion that is important. This point is particularly important with regard to how civil society in Wales is defined by its practitioners.

As defined by the Wales Council for Voluntary Action (WCVA) for instance, civil society is "the sphere of institutions, organisations and individuals located between the family, the state and the market, in which people associate voluntarily *to advance common interests*" (2002:1). They suggest that a healthy or strong civil society is one "that actively promotes good race relations, equal opportunities and sustainable development within its work and in wider society" (2002:13) and whereby its organisations "are seen to *peacefully promote their interests without promoting intolerance* towards other cultural groups". There are two issues raised in such statements that need to be dealt with. Firstly the notion of a *healthy* civil society by definition implies that civil society is not intrinsically 'good' in that civil society can also be found to be *unhealthy* or 'bad'. Secondly, and more importantly in this case, is

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[6] John Osmond is the director of the Institute of Welsh Affairs.

that such statements would exclude a considerable number of civil rights movements and pressure groups that have, throughout history, furthered the institutionalisation of democracy. For example where does to *peacefully promote interests* place movements, such as Black civil rights, environmental or women's movements who have engaged in civil disobedience, direct action and even law-breaking in order to voice their concerns? These are also groups who, amongst others like the Welsh Language Society, have been considered by many other voices within civil society as *promoting intolerance*.

Within the report produced by the WCVA, civil society in Wales is perceived to be in a state of 'medium health'. It also noted that civil society in Wales was 'rather strong' in terms of its 'impact'; on social and community well-being, on the ability of its organisations to provide services in ways that statutory or privates sectors could not; and in contributing to a positive national identity (WCVA, 2002). Such findings would appear to challenge the claim by Paterson and Jones (1999) that civil society in Wales is relatively weak. Again however it is necessary to point to different ways in which civil society in defined. The WCVA concede for instance, that their definition "includes the voluntary sector, trade unions and professional associations but *excludes political parties, the media and universities*". Yet it is precisely in relation to these *excluded* political, communicative and educational *institutions* that Paterson and Jones claim that civil society in Wales is weak or weaker than Scotland. Within these different investigations, civil society is judged by different criteria. For Paterson and Jones, unlike the WCVA, it is predominantly in terms of the extent to which it could be considered as *Welsh* civil society, in terms of civic consciousness, that civil society in Wales is judged. It would appear therefore that the question of 'civil society in Wales' or 'Welsh civil society' involve not only different definitions but different criteria for normative assessment.

Given the nature of certain debates within the Assembly, I would argue that the fostering of an autonomous *Welsh* civil society is perhaps a more fundamental shift in thinking than is generally perceived. I will now attempt to illustrate this by discussing one such Assembly debate surrounding a submission made by Dafydd Glyn Jones to the Assembly's Education Committee. As will be shown, this debate highlights some of the complexities of an argument to restructure the University, a

civil society institution, so as to foster a *Welsh* civil society through the nurturing of a Welsh elite that would serve Wales.

Welsh Civil Society and Organic Intellectuals: a case for elitism?

On May 17 2001, Dafydd Glyn Jones, a Reader in the Department of Welsh at University of Wales Bangor made a case for both attracting more Welsh students to the University of Wales and the establishment of a separate Welsh medium college to the Assembly's Education committee. I shall provide a brief outline of his case. With regards to rectifying the dwindling provision of Welsh medium courses at HE level, Jones proposed the creation of a Welsh Medium Federal College (WMFC). Only such an establishment it is argued would provide Welsh speaking students with a choice. The first step in implementing this he argued was the recruitment of about 200-225 teachers within 5 years to be divided equally between the colleges of Bangor and Aberystwyth.

In addition to the case for a WMFC however, and perhaps of more significance here, were arguments made regarding the need to attract more Welsh students and the role of the University in fostering a Welsh elite. The backdrop to this recent debate is one in which the number of Welsh-born students attending the University of Wales, along with the number undertaking Welsh medium courses, is seen to have significantly declined in the last 50 years in which the numbers attending Universities throughout the UK had increased. As the following table illustrates:

	Welsh-born	Other parts of UK	Overseas
1951	*84%*	*13%*	*3%*
1971	*37%*	*59%*	*4%*
1998	*37%*	*42%*	*21%*

Table 2.2 Percentage of Welsh born and non-Welsh born students within the University of Wales[7]

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[7] Data obtained from Davies (1993:463) and University of Wales Bangor (2001).

As John Davies (1993:463) states:

> "if it is accepted that Wales is a nation in the same sense as the other nations of Europe, its University by the late twentieth century was unique, for there was no other nation in which the native population was in the minority in every constituent part of the university system" (that may only be true of course if we exclude other 'proto' nations such as Wales!)

How does this current context, whereby 'Wales's most wanted students' are believed to be attending Universities outside Wales, fit with notions of nurturing a Welsh civil society? The concern here for the likes of Dafydd Glyn Jones is also a question of Welsh-born students attending Universities outside Wales, an increasing tendency since the 1960's which also contributes to this perceived decline. As he laments on one of the appendices to this paper:

> Community and local papers will be full of good wishes to this lad and this girl who have just completed a course at Ysgol Cym – or Dyffryn-Something-or-other with laudable results, and who are now departing to study for a degree at ...Nottingham, Liverpool, Birmingham, Bristol, London, Glasgow, Exeter, Sheffield, Southampton, Keele, Dundee, Leeds, York, Durham, Lancaster, Canterbury...all corners of the Kingdom except poor old University of Wales. Let us not deceive ourselves, with very few exceptions, we shan't see them again.

The repercussions of this context for Wales, for Jones, are that it hinders any attempts to promote Wales towards achieving a state of 'nationhood'. As he goes on to state:

> We should accept that Wales's central problem today is the lack of a stable and self-perpetuating native governing class. A Welsh government, at the first available opportunity, should take bold, open and decisive steps towards the resolution of this problem.

And the crunch of this matter, in terms of the role of the Assembly was outlined as follows:

> ...we ought now to be starting to consider new ways of supporting and financing university education under a Welsh government. The government of Wales should, by some means or other, make it possible for the University of Wales to *offer especially favourable terms for all who are born and brought up in Wales* and who desire to study for a degree in the University...*Every student from Wales, Welsh speaking or otherwise, because he is from Wales, should be offered an education in the University of Wales at a very advantageous price*...This should be done quite openly, in a bold attempt to break the bad habit and to build up a strong, varied and interesting community of Welsh people in the University that was intended for them. (italics added)

> The primary function of the University of Wales – I cannot see that it could be otherwise – must be to offer a reasonable education, at a reasonable charge, to a reasonable number of our children; this does not mean that it could not, or should not, at the same time *nurture a patriotic Welsh elite*, talented, enterprising, faithful *people who will stay in Wales, work in Wales and serve Wales* – we should never be coy about this function. (italics added)

In submitting this however, Dafydd Glyn Jones was met with considerable opposition from Assembly members who pointed to what were regarded as a number of exclusionary undertones, particularly within the numerous appendices attached to his submitted paper. One Assembly member in particular, Huw Lewis, AM for Merthyr Tydfil, demanded that Dafydd Glyn Jones' paper be struck off, pointing to its 'sexist and racist undertones'. Although this actual motion to remove Dafydd Glyn Jones' submission was rejected by the chair of the Committee, Cynog Dafis, in a later meeting on 13 June 2001 a second motion by Huw Lewis to disregard the papers 'subjective opinions' was passed by six votes to four.

What is significant, however, about these exchanges is that they highlight some of the complexities associated with the desire to nurture a *Welsh* civil society. For instance, there are perhaps three lines of criticism associated with this: firstly is

the ambiguity and confusion over what is meant by the term 'Welsh'; secondly, is the repercussions for the English-born population living in Wales; and thirdly, is endorsement of the creation of a 'Welsh service class'. I shall discuss these problematics in turn.

As is evident, it would appear as drawn from the above quote: "Every student from Wales, Welsh speaking or otherwise, because he is from Wales, should be offered an education in the University of Wales at a very advantageous price" that in this instance, the concern of Dafydd Glyn Jones is favouring 'all those born in Wales'. On the other hand, drawing distinctions between 'Welsh' and 'English' students within the University were interpreted by some AMs as to mean 'Welsh speakers' and 'non-Welsh speakers'. In this context perhaps this was accentuated by the fact that the different arguments for a 'Welsh Medium Federal College' and 'attracting more Welsh students to the University' were made interchangeably. It was therefore unclear whether the aim was to establish a Welsh Medium Federal College or a Welsh Federal College for all those born in Wales. Consequently, questions were raised as to whether 'Welsh students' constituted merely Welsh speakers or all students born in Wales. It highlights how confusion over definitions and boundaries of 'Welsh' are ongoing sources of tension in Wales.

While Jones' statements do include both English and Welsh speakers as all those born in Wales, it excludes those born and raised outside Wales but living within it. As has been stated earlier, a significant proportion of those living in Wales were actually born outside, mainly from England. The 1991 census for example, returned that 23% of the population were born outside Wales with 19% born in England (Census Report for Wales, 1993). Similarly, within the University of Wales College Bangor, 2 out every 3 students originate or have permanent residences outside Wales and again with the majority of this proportion from England. Consequently, the idea of favouring 'Welsh-born' students and reducing 'non-Welsh students' was considered as a reference to excluding significant social groupings from participation in the HE sector in Wales. There would appear therefore a conflict between nurturing a 'patriotic elite' and of English people being excluded on the basis of nationality. Following on from this, reservations were also raised as to the elitist and classist tendencies within the paper. As another AM Alun Pugh, Labour member for Clwyd

West argued in the subsequent committee meeting on the 13 June 2001(cited in Osmond, 2001:35):

> ...it's the offensive anti-English and sneering tone of this document that I find totally unacceptable. We all know that Wales has many problems but the lack of a self-perpetuating, patriotic elite governing class is not one of them in my judgement, and *I know that miners' sons like me would be unwelcome* at the doors of Mr Jones' proposed college, I wouldn't pass his patriotism exam because *I am not Welsh enough for him*, but I will console myself with the certain knowledge that he thinks most Welsh people aren't good enough either. This Assembly is for all the people of Wales and bigotry, even bigotry dressed up as an academic paper, is not acceptable.

Yet, while these arguments are primarily to do with the reform in the HE sector, they clearly reflect wider debates as to the presence of English identities in Wales and how this relates to the concern over a lack of a Welsh civil society and how the University might have a role in fostering this. In developing a Welsh civil society, it is therefore the conflicts between the different conceptions of 'Welsh' that are the point of concern, namely: the historical division between rural Welsh speaking Wales and industrial English speaking Wales. And this is aptly illustrated within the argument for attracting more Welsh students to the University of Wales. From Alun Pugh's response, as with all of the caveats raised here, the danger is a proliferation of conceptions of Welshness based on class or ethnic criteria rather than civil values. In this sense, this debate like so many others expose the longstanding division in Wales between a nation synonymous with middle-class nonconformism, with a self-perception as carriers of the nationalist ideal, and the self-exclusion of the working class from that, e.g. *I know that miners sons like me would be unwelcome...I am not Welsh enough for him.*

Yet there is a clear overlap between developing a Welsh civil society and the argument of Dafydd Glyn Jones. For example, as understood by Osmond (1998:14-15, italics added), a Welsh civil society is one in which "would be composed of a wide range of social institutions and networks *that thought effortlessly in Welsh terms and ...shared responsibility...for the direction Welsh society should take*". The

development of such a *Welsh* civil society is viewed as both desirable and a realistic outcome of devolution in Wales (Osmond 1998; Paterson and Wyn Jones, 1999). This view of civil society however is not too dissimilar to one in which civil society institutions such as the University of Wales functioned to *nurture a patriotic Welsh elite*. What is highlighted, for instance, by the Dafydd Glyn Jones episode, as Cynog Dafis, Plaid Cymru AM and Chair of the Education Committee, highlights is that:

> ...Wales's most able young people are being constantly drained away from Wales – the very people who should grow to be the leaders of our social, cultural, economic and political life...What nation worth mentioning hasn't got a class of people of this kind to serve it and make an effort to improve it? (cited in Osmond, 2001:35).

Significantly, there would appear to be an apparent cleavage between Labour and Plaid Cymru upon the importance or triviality of developing a Welsh elite class. It is these issues therefore that are of overall concern within this thesis – namely the structure of civil society in Wales, the notion of a developing Welsh civil society, and how they are organised, facilitated and hindered by those divisions and boundaries pertaining to bilingualism and the Welsh language. What the Dafydd Glyn Jones affair demonstrates is the extent to which the fostering of a Welsh civil society actually represents a rather fundamental shift in the current direction of Welsh society and the defensiveness in Wales to the notion of a Welsh elite. As was demonstrated by the hostility of some Assembly members the desirability of an elite is seen as anti-egalitarian and conservative. But such reactions also seem to deny that an elite does exist in Wales.

The question of Dafydd Glyn Jones' intervention was not that there wasn't an elite in Wales and that we need to nurture one but that there indeed was an elite in Wales but that this was an *imposed and external English elite* and what we need to do is remove this elite and replace it with *an organic Welsh elite*, which already exists to some degree in association with the bilingual employment requirements as the only basis on which the English elite can be contested (Lewis, 2002). As Ned Thomas (2002) remarks "it would have been interesting for instance to see the reactions of Labour and Liberal Democrat members had Dafydd Glyn Jones talked of nurturing

Gramsci's notion of Welsh 'organic intellectuals' as opposed to a Welsh elite". Before continuing with these themes directly it is necessary to conclude this chapter by tying the devolution process into the wider trends of governance, regionalism and civil society.

Globalisation, regionalism and governmentality: wider trends to devolution and the turn to devolved civil societies

There is a distinct relationship between civil society and what has been termed the 'new regionalism'. Many figures within Welsh economic policy discourse (Cooke 1997; Cooke and Morgan 1993; Morgan 2000) have cited the importance of non-state institutions and network relationships, at the regional level, to both regional economic development as well as the political and economic governance of the region. It is these relationships that I want to examine here. In doing so, there are two issues which shall be focused on: firstly, that hand in hand with the development of regional institutions in Wales, particularly since the 1980s, have been questions concerning the democratic accountability of these institutions; And secondly, that there has been an increasing tendency for governments to look to the regional, local or sub-state level for knowledge, information and expertise – hence consultation and partnership. These issues thus concern both governmental accountability and efficiency respectively. As Morgan and Roberts explain (1993:3):

> Governments in Europe and North America are exploring new forms of decentralised governance by, amongst other things, devolving powers to regional tiers of government or forging new partnerships between central and local government...In short, a devolved approach is being pursued by governments and firms alike because it is deemed to be more efficacious than their centralist approaches of the past. Unlike firms, however, governments in democratic societies are obliged to discharge their duties (including the provision of public services) in a manner that is *accountable* to the electorate (emphasis in original).

With regard to devolution in Wales, it is this last point that is crucial for it places the emphasis not on the emergence of regional institutions themselves but on their democratic accountability. Arguably compared to other regions in England, Wales has benefited favourably in the process of administrative devolution. Wales' claims to nationhood has led to the proliferation of a number of separate bodies such as the Welsh Office and the Welsh Development Agency. In the process however, concerns were raised regarding the democratic accountability of such institutions to the people of Wales. Such fears of a 'democratic deficit' in Wales were intensified by the growth in the number of Quangos in Wales after 1979 which were themselves seen as "unelected and unaccountable to the localities in which they operate, prompting some experts to speak of 'a crisis of public accountability'" (Morgan & Roberts, 1993:4).

In many ways, the Welsh institutional context prior to devolution reflects the rise of the neo-liberal discourse on civil society that was highlighted in the previous chapter. For instance, democratic accountability is premised upon market principles whereby *it does not matter if the institutions are democratically elected* so long as they are producer or consumer responsive.

These principles also underlie the then Conservative government's Citizens Charter. As a result, the sense of civic consciousness is devalued in that the individual is treated not as a citizen but as a market-consumer. Indeed the very notion of the citizen is reduced to consumer. As the Conservative MP William Waldegrave states: "The key point in this argument is not whether those who run our public services are elected, but whether they are producer or consumer responsive. Services are not necessarily made to respond to the public by giving citizens a democratic voice" (cited in Morgan & Roberts, 1993: 14). This signifies the then Conservative Party's reduction of citizenship to consumerism and economic choice.

We can also draw on wider theoretical perspectives which attribute the perceived decline, and thus interest and concern, in civil society to the growth of neo-liberal discourses on individualism (Keane, 1988; Donzelot 1991). However, it is precisely in reaction to this perceived decline in levels of citizenship that proponents of devolution are able to frame their goals. As Morgan (1994:9) states elsewhere: "to give local communities little or no opportunity for governing themselves, is the very opposite of what is required to restore the civic virtues which are the hallmark of a vibrant democracy and an enterprising society". Thus Welsh devolution stems from

the need for more inclusive forms of democracy, accountability, and a sense of involvement in the decision – making process.

A certain paradox therefore emerges in that on one hand Wales has had a measure of devolution that has been denied to the English regions, while on the other hand, this devolution process has been "prosecuted without reference to democratic accountability" (1993: 22). It therefore follows that the campaign against these quangos is "part and parcel of a much wider campaign for a directly elected Welsh parliament" (1993:5). Yet on this point, given the extensive administrative devolution to Wales from the 1970s onwards, a *Welsh* civil society would have its roots among precisely these debates and thus *prior* to the National Assembly, rather than, as others believe, as a result of it. Indeed for Morgan & Mungham (2000) it is precisely this perception of a democratic deficit in Wales that underlines the development of a pro-devolution agenda within the Labour Party in Wales. Of course, for the Labour Party, a key aspect of this democratic deficit would be the fact that these quango's were themselves appointed by a Welsh Office dominated by the Conservative government, which throughout its period in government between 1979-97, was a minority political party in Wales. However as stated above, the shift towards regional governance concerns not simply accountability but also questions of knowledge, expertise and efficiency.

As Lewis (1993, cited in Morgan and Roberts, 1993:33) argues: "[Central government]...simply does not and cannot possess the information to manage effectively throughout the localities and the regions". Furthermore, the regions themselves, through developing an institution base, "could inform the centre about local circumstance and requirements". Unquestionably therefore the devolution process reflects not only the emergence of local and regional spaces as new bases for economic organisation but also the decline in legitimacy of hierarchies and 'experts' at the level of the nation-state. Yet behind these regionalist arguments of Morgan and others is the notion that "culture" is the decisive variable in relation to the performance and success of both regions and their economic and political institutions. For Cooke (1997) in particular, there is a reciprocal relationship here which stresses "the centrality of culture to economy and economy to cultural identity" (1997:285). What Cooke and Morgan (1991) have together termed the "intelligent region" is thus one which can draw upon this relationship. Cooke (1997:288) also notes however that

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establishing such relationships are to an extent driven by the effects of reform of EU structural funds upon regions. As he notes, the effects of EU reforms is that "regions must…become more proactive towards the European Union, develop close links with their business and institutional community, elaborate policies to enhance regional innovation potential, engage increasingly in information sharing partnerships [and] establish mechanisms for self-monitoring and continuous policy development" (1997:288). Clearly therefore, it would appear that the drive towards devolution cannot be considered without reference to such global and supra-national economic developments. Moreover, neither can the current emphasis on renewing regional and local civil societies be considered as the purely altruistic and democratic concerns of government. Rather, they reflect changes in the nature of governmentality in which expertise and legitimacy lie beyond the state. How to govern better, more efficient 'good governance' is thus achieved through partnership with civil society from whom wisdom and knowledge about 'the governed' can be extracted.

As Lovering (1997, 1998, 1999) has argued on numerous occasions, the emergence of the economic argument for devolution is premised on a neo-liberal conflation of the principles of the firm to the level of region. Like firms, the success of the region is based on the extent to which they have progressed from the previously dominant *Fordist* paradigm based on hierarchical industrial sectors to one based on Japanese-type network relationships. Consequently the managerial style of firms is seen as offering lessons as to a new and better way of designing territorial governments. Lovering therefore questions whether Cooke merely puts a regionalist shade upon otherwise conventionally neo-liberal economic arguments.

The other important work which has contributed to this debate about regional civil societies is that of Robert Putnam. In *Making Democracy Work,* Putnam draws on a twenty year long study of the performance of political and economic institutions in the different regions of modern Italy. His focus on regions however means that he leaves aside the question of *national* civic culture. Despite this, Favell (1998) argues that Putnam is able to draw a much more generally valid conclusion than Almond and Verba (1989), that: "it is high levels of conscious civic sentiment, adherence and political participation that are required to create the conditions for flourishing and healthy democratic institutions" (1998:217). Moreover for Putnam, this civic culture can also be found to be the basis for the economic success of the region. Immediately

therefore, it is clear why the work of Putnam has been so appealing to the wider academic policy community in Wales. Empirically, Putnam is not primarily concerned with culture, that is *subjective* attitudes, meanings and perceptions, but with identifying what he sees as *objective* variables, such as social networks, levels of trust and co-operation – in other words – social capital. This is considered to be more methodologically reliable because he is able to draw on objective indicators of social embeddedness, rather than subjective views (attitudes), in order to explain objective phenomenon. As Granovetter (1985) has argued in his well-known piece, the focus on the social embeddedness of economic activity represents an attempt to veer between the over-socialisation of Parsonian structural functionalism, and the under-socialisation of rational choice theory. It is attractive to New Labour and third way advocates because it negates the neo-liberal assertion of the individual as a self-interested private consumer while still able to embrace the values of the market. Social capital, community and civil society therefore provided 'distinct' ground for New Labour to distance itself from the Conservative party's consumerism, while not resorting to the Welfare state.

Putnam therefore draws on much of the theoretical tradition outlined previously, from the pre-capitalist views of the market (Hirschman, 1977) to the civic community of Tocqueville. As with Etzioni however, Putnam's position is essentially a conservative one in three senses: i) a nostalgic narrative on the demise of community in modern American society; ii) a concern, not with resolving conflict, but with promoting solidarity and trust; and most significantly iii) a belief that social responsibility lies not with the state or the market but with civil society itself. The attraction of civil society to the government is therefore clear in that it has "the political effect of disburdening the state of responsibility and diluting social citizenship" (Delanty, 2003:88). It is, therefore, of concern if civil society is conceived as a possible replacement to the Welfare State because "voluntarism is generally to be found in the better-off strata and thus does not really help the deprived" (Delanty, 2003:85).

Conclusion

In concluding this chapter, a number of claims regarding the debate over civil society in Wales can be made. Overall it has been shown that the very use of the term 'civil society' in Wales by academics and, to a lesser degree, politicians and professional elites, is a distinctly pro-devolution discourse. Although having roots in debates prior to 1997, the very *use* of the term civil society, in the Welsh political and public policy discourse, occurred in the context of a debate over the nature, powers and role of the National Assembly for Wales and a post hoc analysis of how Wales ended up with the institutions it did. There are, however, four different lines upon which this pro-devolution/civil society relationship focuses: i) redressing the 'democratic deficit' and accountability; ii) regional economic competitiveness and iii) social exclusion and governance and iv) the national question. All of these consider the involvement of and partnership civil society in instrumental terms, as a means to promoting 'good governance', 'economic success', 'social inclusion' and 'national civic consciousness' respectively. I shall sum these up in turn.

Firstly, as its conventional remit, civil society has emerged in relation to a concern over the accountability of governmental institutions in terms of citizen participation and ownership. It is this discourse which underlies the shift within the Labour Party in Wales towards a more pro-devolutionary agenda in opposition to the previous Conservative government's policies on quangos and the Citizen's Charter (Morgan and Mungham, 2000). The second discourse is closely related to this in that again the Conservative Government's neo-liberal policies on economic restructuring in the 1980s served as the basis for a 'new' regionalist agenda based on revitalising the post-industrial south Wales valleys. This discourse is firmly entrenched within post-fordist and post-structuralist discourses on globalisation in which the nation-state is no longer considered the primary basis for economic organisation. Civil society forms part of this discourse in that it is through the development of collaborative links between institutions, business organisations and civic groups that economic viability of regions depends (Cooke, 1997). As such however, a full understanding of the devolutionary process cannot ignore the desire of national governments to hive-off certain administrative burdens relating to social and regional economic policy. Thirdly, civil society is related to social exclusion. In this context, civil society is

considered more precisely in terms of social capital. Again, however, there is a concern over the shift in social responsibility from the state to civil society which has repercussions for the deprived.

Finally, and less related to the previous three, is a continuation of the 'national question' in which the devolution referendum itself re-ignited ambiguities over internal divisions particularly surrounding the Welsh language and bilingualism. Such debates have been extensively reviewed in this chapter. However, it would appear that 'civil society' emerges simply as a more fashionable replacement to the hotly contested notion of 'national identity'. Indeed in some cases, one could substitute national identity for civil society and nothing would appear out of place. As such, this civil society is judged in terms of the extent to which it can be viewed as a unified Welsh civil society. Historically, the idea of a Welsh civil society is informed by the 19th century non-conformist movement which for a period of time was able to provide the bases for a unified conception of the Welsh nation. It is these more specific themes of divisions and boundaries surround the Welsh language, bilingualism within the wider context of Welsh and English identities that will become the main emphasis of the thesis.

CHAPTER THREE

Nationalism, Bilingualism and the Position of the Welsh Language: Contexts and Debates

The social situation of Welsh

The current state of the Welsh language can quite accurately be summed up as a paradox. Over several centuries, the number of Welsh speakers in Wales has dramatically declined. According to census figures, the number of Welsh speakers has declined from 977,400 in 1911 to 503,549 in 1981, a proportional loss of 50%, from 44% to 19% of the total population of Wales. For many of their residents, the majority Welsh speaking areas of Gwynedd, Ceredigion and Carmarthenshire, Welsh speaking communities have, particularly since the 1970s and 1980s, been increasingly threatened by economic and social undermining. As summed up by Plaid Cymru, the Party for Wales: "The greatest threat to the Welsh language as a living community is posed by the rate of in-migration into the territorial strongholds...placed alongside a substantial and continuing out-migration, leading to a process of population displacement on a very considerable scale...the level of in-migration also causes housing problems as homes are bought by affluent incomers at prices far beyond the reach of the local population" (Plaid Cymru, 1989). In this socio-economic situation, the future of the Welsh language within these communities becomes a central issue. Such perspectives however involve a clear cultural code which aligns a cultural structure with an economic one, i.e.: Welsh/poor versus English/affluent. It is precisely such an alignment which underlined the non-conformist mobilization within the 19th century as outlined in the previous chapter.

Yet it is also true that the last 15 years or so has seen, for the first time this century, a curtailment of the continuing decline and a growing visibility of the language in traditionally non-Welsh speaking areas. Such 'new' geographical realities have been well documented in recent years (Williams, 1994; Atchison and Carter, 1994). In particular, these 'new' areas include Cardiff where the 17,346 Welsh speakers recorded

in 1991, represents an increase of 79% on the 1951 population number. Comparing the 1981 and 1991 census results suggests that the situation of the language has to a large extent been stabilized and the downward trended arrested. More significantly, the 1991 census saw an increase in the number and percentage of young people who spoke Welsh throughout Wales. For example, between 1981 and 1991, the percentage of children aged 5-9 who spoke Welsh rose from 17.8% to 24.7%. Similarly, those aged 10-14 rose from 18.5% to 26.9%. While the safety of the Welsh language certainly cannot be guaranteed, its future has never look so promising. The Welsh Language Board believes that it is likely that the 2001 census results will show that there has been a further increase (Welsh Language Board, 1999). And these trends have since been confirmed within the recent publication of the 2001 results. According to 2001 results, 20.5% of the population speak Welsh, compared to 18.5 in 1991, a proportion that exceeds the figure for 1961 and the first increase in the number of Welsh speakers in a century. Again however, the contradiction between the expanding urban areas and declining rural areas generated an overall mixed response to the results. The following table provides a brief summary of this paradox:

	1991 %	2001 %	+/-%
Cardiff	6.6	10.9	+ 4.3
Rhondda Cynon Taff	9.0	12.3	+ 3.3
Gwynedd	72.1	68.7	- 3.4
Ceredigion	59.1	51.8	- 7.3

Table 3.1: Selected areas of proportion of Welsh speakers in 1991 and 2001 (OPCS, 2003)

For Aitchison and Carter (1997), "notions of Welsh as having a predominantly rural domain are outdated, for it is now primarily an urban language" (1997:358). Moreover, they argue that the process of de-industrialisation and economic restructuring, which underlies many social problems in contemporary Wales, has worked to the language's

advantage. The substantial loss of Welsh speakers in rural areas is to some degree counteracted by new opportunities created by the switch to service employment. As they argue, "this significant restructuring of the Welsh economy has modified the old notion of 'Englishness' as a vital qualification for position and connection" (1997:359). What are the reasons for this apparent resurgence of the Welsh language?

In a cross-cultural study of minority languages in the European Union, Nelde et al (1996) argued that the two most important and influential variables of a language group's vitality are related to i) **status**; and ii) **institutional support**. The higher the social status and the extent to which it is supported by state and cultural institutions, the greater the likelihood that a minority language (such as Welsh) is able to take control of its current predicament. The important of these two variables is stressed further by the lack of weight that is given to **demographic size** as an indicator of linguistic vitality. For some demographically larger minority language groups in Europe were considered more threatened compared with certain smaller sized groups because of the considerably lower status of their languages and concomitant lack of institutional support. Thus it is the processes of insititutionalisation and legitimisation resulting from these two variables that are considered crucial in terms of linguistic vitality (Nelde et al, 1996). In this chapter my intention is to account for the Welsh language's historical decline and subordination in the context of such status and institutional support and to how its current resurgence is related to a higher status and continuing support through the emergence of specific state and cultural institutions. This should provide the necessary backdrop from which to detail the empirical investigations undertaken in relation to language and civil society in Wales.

Power and symbolic domination in minority language contexts

Historically, the image of Wales from outside and the sense of identity of its inhabitants have been associated with several inter-related facets; its past; an economic reliance on farming, coal mining and steel making; religious non-conformism, and perhaps above all, the Welsh language (Osmond, 1989). Yet it is also argued that these facets no longer have same relevance to Welsh people and that in order to acquire a coherent sense of group identity, a 'modern' Wales must be prepared to reflect the demands and challenges

of the 21st century. In what sense, however, does a language often perceived to be associated exclusively with rural, familial and communal domains remain relevant to a modern and more advanced Welsh identity? This question has a basic assumption underlying it: that the Welsh language is somehow inappropriate or necessarily at odds with a modern, technically advanced and urbanized world. Indeed, this does stress some empirical truths. The Welsh language *is* traditionally associated with the rural and northwest regions of Wales, primarily the counties of Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion and Gwynedd – its heartland, *Y Fro Gymraeg*. Furthermore that the Welsh language suffers from a lack of utilitarian or material value. Surely, in order to be sustained in any form it must have a utilitarian or materialist justification? If not, then we have a language that is highly dispensable and no great loss to one's personal identification for being Welsh (Williams, C.H.,1994).

Working within the framework of neo-Marxist dependency theory, Michael Hechter's thesis entitled *Internal Colonialism* provides a starting point for critical analysis by placing the decline of the Welsh language in terms of the incentives for individuals to switch their cultural affiliations to that of the majority culture so as to improve economic prospects. It, therefore, places prime responsibility with industrialisation. As outlined by Davies (1989), the internal colonialism thesis contends that as "regional wealth was accumulated in the core...the cultural difference between the core and periphery was reinforced by economic organization and was commonly taken as an explanation for the economic disadvantage of the ethnic region" (Davies, 1989:22). While the idea of internal colonialism, along the Tom Nairn's theory of uneven capitalist development, has since been largely rejected (see Lovering, 1978; Evans, 1991 for critiques), not least on the issue of Wales' role in British imperial expansion, a case can be made for a cultural division of labour between the socio-economic positions of Welsh-born and non-Welsh born social groups in Wales (Williams and Morris, 1999:34). For, as the political theorist, Iris Young argues, when certain social groups "have greater economic, political or social power, their group related experiences, points of view, or cultural assumptions will tend to become the norm, biasing the standards or procedures of achievement and inclusion that govern social, political and economic institutions" (1993:133 cited in May, 2001:254). In reflection upon this, there are two distinctive

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moments in Welsh history in which this English-Welsh relationship is consolidated: the 1536-42 Acts of Union and process of State formation (including educational and industrial revolutions) from the late 18th century onwards.

In linguistic terms, 1536 and the Act of Union with England was a definitive landmark and represented a moment in time when the Welsh language became the language of the disadvantaged. Up until that point, Wales was more or less monolingually Welsh speaking. From then on, the sublimation of Wales, its language and its culture had begun, in the series of measures, established under Henry VIII (Williams, G.A., 1985:118-9). The formal incorporation of Wales into the English political, legal and administrative system in the Acts of Union abolished any differences between English and Welsh codes of law (Kearney 1989:127). In other words, the governmental and cultural institutions of Wales became those of England. Language in public life and the social hierarchy in Wales were thus decreasingly Welsh as the series of measures in the Act got underway. Yet while 1536 is important because of its conscious removal of Welsh from public life and the social hierarchy, it was not until industrialisation within the wider process of state formation that Welsh was threatened at a popular level, resulting in its rapid decline from then on.

In the heavily industrialised south, only through the embracement of English would families and their children be provided the opportunities for social mobility. The inferior status of Welsh is reflected further the fact that the 19th century non-conformist elite, who despite promoting Welsh culture, argued for Welsh in schools only on assimilationist grounds. In other words, to invite monolingually Welsh speaking children into an education system that was both English in language and cultural orientation (Davies, 1989). Accordingly, the number of Welsh monolingual speakers declined from 190,300 in 1911 to 21,183 in 1981: "relatively few people were in a position in which the Welsh language and Welsh culture were of social and economic benefit to them" (Davies, 1989:23).

The above demonstrates clearly why the Welsh language has a stronger presence in the rural areas of Wales that were less affected by industrialisation. Accordingly this association of the Welsh language with rural peasantry and economic failure resulted in it being regarded as inappropriate in other contexts such as those in modern or urbanised

situations. For Williams (1992) this 'backward' versus 'modern' dichotomy from the advent of industrialisation led to the unanimous view of English as a materialist, high-status language and Welsh as a stigmatic, low-status language. Within this description however, it is all too possible to conclude a "conspiratorial argument" in which there resides, in either the form of the state or the bourgeoisie, a specific "agent of conspiracy" (Williams and Morris, 1999:xxxv). This weakness, I would argue emanates from an exclusive focus on macro social structure with a lack of reference to the more micro-level of analysis which places the social interaction between Welsh and English speakers at the centre. By approaching the analysis from this angle, the notion of a unilinear process of domination and subordination from "conspiratorial agents" to interactions between English and Welsh speakers is untenable. To do so ignores how processes of civil interaction within the everyday domains of 'lifeworld' and 'civil society' indicate an autonomous "interaction order" (Goffman, 1983) that cannot be reduced to political and economic processes. Such analysis would examine interactions within contexts such as the workplace and other everyday and social situations in which the inequalities of economic and cultural capital are blocked. For example, within a context such as the workplace, it may be that both Welsh and non-Welsh speakers will accommodate different bilingual requirements in that to do so would demonstrate both civil and morally responsible behaviour. This will become more evident when dealing more directly with the question of civility in relation to language choice and use. Before turning to this directly however we need to turn to the notion of 'symbolic domination' and its application to minority language contexts.

For many, the shift of minority language speakers to a more 'dominant' or widely used language is simply the result of an economic and rational choice. In other words, it is simply a case of individual social and economic mobility. As Edwards (1985) states, language decline and shift is predominantly a question of "the *desire* to shift on the part of the speakers of the minority language" (italics added, 1985:50). This desire is attributable to rational choice in that the embrace of the common language is essential for social mobility and an improved standard of living. For Edwards the "rhetoric of linguistic oppression" would have us believe that languages are 'murdered', when in fact they are just as much 'suicide' as 'murder'.

As May (2001: 146) points out, the decline of minority languages is seldom the result of coercion or 'language murder'. Nation-states do not always involve themselves in coercive practices designed to prevent the use and reproduction of non-state languages. Yet as he goes on to state, neither are they as Edwards (1985) seems to suggest, the result of a voluntary act or 'language suicide'. As is widely recognised (May, 2001; Williams and Morris, 1999; Bourdieu 1991) there has been a failure by sociolinguists to give adequate appreciation to the significance of power relations in discussions of language decline. In drawing on our understanding of civil society, however, we are able to comprehend how there is a tendency for individuals and groups to adhere voluntarily to dominant cultural values. In other words, the willingness of parents not to transmit their native language to their children cannot be read off simply as a voluntary act.

Glyn Williams (1992) in attempting to address this void, has severely criticised and even dismissed sociolinguistics for "failing to produce its own theory while at the same time uncritically relying on Parsonian structural functionalism and the individual consensualist view of society associated with it" (Coulmas, 1997:5). Williams instead argues for the need to consider the significance of both social-class relations and power differentials. The crux of his approach is a critique of the discourse of modernism and in particular, its ethnocentrism and claims of the superiority of official nation-states languages over others. Such a discourse is clearly significant in understanding motivations for language shift. The following passage aptly illustrates this:

"The Welsh language is a vast drawback to Wales, and a manifold barrier to the moral progress and commercial prosperity of its people...it dissevers the people from the intercourse which would greatly advance their civilisation, and bars the access of improving knowledge to their minds (The 1847 Report of the Commissioners, cited in Tarrow, 1992:493)

This report written at the height of modernist discourse sees the Welsh language as a causal factor in the poor standards in Welsh education and in the economic failure of Wales at the time. Consequently, the language came to be viewed as a hindrance to the modernisation of Wales, which was necessary for the people's well being. The only

escape from poverty being the embracement of the common language – English. As summed up by Williams (1992:127) the assumption here is that "to achieve the good life, we must eliminate or marginalise all but the language of wider communication since economic growth is best achieved within mono-lingual states". The manner in which such one language = one nation = one state equations encompass all ideologies across the political spectrum highlights its status as a modernist paradigm (Smith, 1998). Certainly, not until the second half of the 20th century was there an intellectual outlet that questioned the formation of the modern, nation state and its need for a unified language and culture (Kymlicka, 1995a). In light of this, it seems incomplete to discuss contact between language groups without reference to power, class and the discourse of modernism.

For Bourdieu, the establishment of the state languages, and concomitant construction of the minority language, is tied to a number of related factors – the nation-state, an education system and capitalism or the formation of a unified labour market. From the combined effects of these institutional forces, people speaking *other* languages or dialects within the defined territory, were forced to collaborate in the "destruction of their instruments of expression" (1991:44).

In previous chapters the emergence of civil society as part of the enlightenment, exemplified in the democratic revolutions of France and America, was accounted for. Yet what was not mentioned was that Jacobins and Revolutionaries in both American and France believed that the best way to achieve a democratic state was to follow a tight path of centralisation and linguistic standardisation. As Nimni (1995) points out, the existence of non-Parisian French speakers within the boundaries of the state were seen as a considerable menace to the establishment of the French nation-state. As such "the combination of cultural imperialism and tight administrative centralisation led to an almost complete destruction of the culture and language of the non-Parisian French national communities (Nimni, 1995: 60-61).

As far as our discussion of civil society is concerned therefore is the way in which conceptions of the good society, by both liberals and Marxists, were inextricably linked to the value of one-nationism. What was not pointed out, and what needs to be done so here is how the development of civil society goes hand in hand with linguistic and

cultural standardisation via the construction of state defined educational and economic systems. As such the construction of languages of wider communication vis-à-vis minority languages is justified on the basis of both democratisation and social cohesion. As John Stuart Mill, a key liberal thinker at the time argued, the linguistic and culturally standardised nation-state was a pre-requisite to democracy and was the best way to achieve 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people'. As he goes on to state: "free institutions are incapable in a country made up of different nationalities...if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist" (Mill 1958, cited in Van Dyke, 1995:35). An examination of the placement of minority groups outside modernity therefore cannot be understood without reference to the ideology of nationalism that surrounds state formation. As Leith (1997:161) argues, uniquitous among liberal theorists of the 18th and 19th centuries is the view that "bi- or multi-lingualism is incompatable with a unified 'nation' and a free people, therefore the minority languages are associated with 'the enemy' – either secular, or religious; therefore to use them is to identify with the opponents of the state".

As identified by Anderson (1991) and Gellner (1983) the very possibility of national, democratic consciousness was dependent on a national, unified language taught through a universal system of state education. As Gellner contended, with mass movements of people and the break-up of local communities, nationalism emerged as a way of organising people. Due to the internal labour market, there was a need for 'standardisation of skills, leading to 'sameness' and cultural homogenisation. As such there was no room for internal linguistic or cultural differentiation. Hence the homogenising drive of modernity marginalises the internal others which were seen as confined to pre-modern societies and with no place in modern, urban life. Within such 'modernist' accounts of nationalism, particularly those of Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1982) there is a peculiar contradiction: for while they fervently deconstruct the dominant ethnic groups' claims to universalism during the development of the nation-state they appear even more critical of national minority movements who contest the one nation/one state equation. This would appear to stem from the tendency to consider such 'historic' nations in terms of their opposition to modernity.

As Eriksen (1993) points out, minority and ethnic groups are not historically continuous communities deriving from and confined to pre-modernity. On the contrary, it is the very process of linguistic and cultural standardisation that *creates* minorities by placing them necessarily outside their own categorisations. As such ethnicity is not a property of a group but the property of a relationship. Thus national identities are always constructed in relation to others and the attempt to subsume others. These writings on ethnicity and nationalism re-enforce the binary discourse of civil society suggested by Alexander and others (Alexander, 1998b).

A fair amount of sociological analysis (Bourdieu, 1991; Williams and Morris, 1999; May, 2001) has therefore been done to address questions of power relations and their place within our macro understanding of language decline and shift. What needs to be added to this however is that language hierarchies may also emerge in relation to the more micro and interactional questions of civil behaviour and how people should be addressed. In turning to the more micro level of civil society, that of civil interaction between people, we can return briefly to our outline of Norbert Elias' theory of the civilising process. This I will argue provides the historical basis for the manifestation of accommodative use of English by Welsh speakers in everyday life.

A Missing Criterion? The Importance of Civility in the Context of Minority Language Groups

In the work of Norbert Elias we are able to gain an understanding of the development and normalisation of quite micro phenomena such as table manners and bodily functions but one that is also framed in terms of macro-historical change since the medieval period. The historical shifts from this period onwards are what he deems as the civilising process. This study (1978) provides an analysis of what is considered appropriate or acceptable forms of behaviour and of how norms of appropriate behaviour have changed over time. In the main he examines the rise of civility relating to table manners and bodily functions such as spitting and littering. On the flip side of civility, restrain and the self-control of emotions are feelings of embarrassment and shame in relation to the flouting of such norms of civil behaviour. Elias (1978) notes the role of renaissance court society in

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promoting such civility. Social status he argued could be read from manners and overall body and self management. Significantly, Elias' study is similar to those of Bourdieu (1984, 1991) who extends the empirical analysis to include not only body management but also taste (1984) and the appropriate use of language (1991).

While for Elias the emergence of codes of conduct within the court society represents a major cultural shift, he also points to another cultural shift around the 18th century whereby these civil moral codes of the court society trickled down and became practiced to different degrees by all individuals and classes – they became part of accepted everyday behaviour and maintained within the family. As Kuzmics (1988) argues, despite numerous criticisms of Elias' thesis, this overall argument is uncontested. As Roniger (1998:74) highlights there are two important effects of the civilising process: firstly that it had the effect of normalising civil behaviour among all to the extent that such civility and restraint appears natural and secondly, and of equal importance, it had the effect of legitimating the superiority of the court society as it was from this realm that civility derived. In both respects what is significant is how certain forms of behaviour deemed appropriate merely for those who sought power, position and upward mobility became practiced among all classes. In this sense the civilising process goes hand in hand with the democratic, industrial and educational revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. However, in that Elias' thesis relates civility primarily to bodily functions what is its relevance to interaction in terms of language and minority languages?

In a recent empirical analysis of civility, Phillips and Smith (2003) provide an indication of some of the most frequented 'incivilities' as they were reported by respondents within their defined research field. The majority of these were categorised as physical incivilities such as 'Road rage', 'Spitting', or 'Dirty Looks' (2003:91). However they also reported a number of *verbal* incivilities such as 'Inappropriate language' and 'verbal aggression'. Indeed in their analysis, they showed how frequencies of uncivil behaviour fell "overwhelmingly into two broad categories: language/verbal and physical behaviours and actions" (2003:91).   If therefore we can extend concerns of civilising and uncivilising processes to verbal utterances and manners in terms of appropriate and inappropriate use of language, then is it not also possible to extend empirical analysis not only to *how to speak* but also *which language to speak* in certain social settings?

Civility is a key idea in terms of its value in the micro-analysis of civil society. In simple terms, civility concerns the quality of interactions between people. The qualities of these interactions are seen as established through the acceptance of certain norms and attitudes which are subsequently viewed as essential for democracy. As Phillips and Smith (2003:85) contend, by examining instances of civility and incivility, we can gain fair indication of the state of civic virtue and wider civil society. As far as this thesis is concerned however, we can understand this in terms of the quality of interactions between Welsh and English speakers in a bilingual context. What is needed is to provide a historical outline of the cultural shifts in terms of i) emergence of appropriateness of English within elite society in relation to the devaluing of Welsh and ii) the normalisation of this appropriate use of language among all individuals and classes.

While it is true that significant reductions in the proportion and numbers of Welsh speakers in Wales did not occur until the 20th century, the formal exclusion of Welsh from public use was actually laid down centuries earlier - within the 1536-42 Acts of Union. These Acts, while acknowledging that "the people of Wales have and do daily speech nothing like, nor common to the natural or mother tongue used within this realm [of England]" goes further, proclaiming that "no persons that use Welsh speech or language shall enjoy any manner of office or feel within the realm of England. Wales or any other of the King's dominions...unless he or they use English" (Walters 1978, cited in C.H. Williams, 1994:121). In effect, it was only the existing Welsh elite, who sought property or position who as a matter of self-preservation, became part of the English, Saxon/Norman amalgamation, which represented the English class elite (Kearney, 1989). Concomitantly, the Welsh peasantry continued unhindered in their use of their language. Nevertheless this led to a class division along cultural and linguistic lines which placed the Welsh language and its speakers into a low status, economically backward category. That said, as is stated above, the significance of the civilising process is that it legitimises the superiority of elite society in that it is from here that civility stems. Thus what we have with the Acts of Union is the same kind of impression management and conduct of behaviour but specifically to do with linguistic and cultural behaviour. It established the requirement to speak English in official settings in order to obtain property and position

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and conversely, it established the need to abandon Welshness and adopt Englishness in order to achieve this.

Again, in terms of the civilising process we can understand the next cultural shift of parents needing to 'civilise' their children. This relates to how they should address people and whether it should be in Welsh or English. What we have with the case of the Blue Books Commission therefore is an exemplification of the second cultural shift whereby the behavioural requirements of court society extend throughout society to all individuals and classes. This also relates to the growth of the very notion of 'society' or 'the social' with the role of the state being to ensure or guarantee its progress (Donzelot, 1991). However it is precisely in reaction to such governmental efforts to discourage the use and teaching of Welsh, and a perceived threat of Anglicisation by the cultural uniformity of state formation within the UK that a specific motivation for Welsh nationalism emerged.

Welsh nationalism and the institutionalisation of the Welsh language

Although not establishing itself in independent party political terms until the 20th century, the origins of Welsh nationalism can be found in the two previous centuries. The continued survival of Welsh oral culture and language at a 'popular' level, though divided by its local dialects was tied to developments in the 17th and 18th centuries (Kearney, 1989:180). In particular, Calvinistic Methodist movements were a major incidental factor in the language's survival. By the final quarter of the 18th century, a majority of the adult population had become technically literate in Welsh, learnt in an almost exclusively religious context. As Gwyn Williams (1985:155) considered, this led to the construction of a Welsh identity defined primarily in terms of language and the imagery and concepts of the Bible and protestant sectarianism. Such developments culminated in the emergence of Welsh liberal non-conformism during the mid to late 19th century.

Whether the nonconformist movement was actually a nationalist one in questionable. For instance, the movement had no constitutional aspirations for Wales and prominent Welsh figures in the British Liberal Party considered the status quo to be

flexible enough to accommodation a more strident Welsh national identity within the concept of an embracing British state. Davies (1989) is critical of the movement's aims regarding language and Welsh identity. It was for one thing, dismissive of the impact of industrialization of Wales and a cultural division of labour. Instead, it encouraged depictions of Wales "as a pastoral people occupying a semi-magical land of Celtic romance" (Davies, 1989:11). This kind of image construction as a mythical land distanced itself from the grim realties of the conditions of 19th century industrial capitalism. Ironically it was probably this pastiche, offering nothing in terms of a realistic identity for the majority of inhabitants of Wales (both Welsh speaking and English speaking at the time) that was the only one that would not threaten the British state and its constitutional arrangements.

In the early 20th century, a strong working class movement in industrial Wales led to the displacement of liberalism by socialism and to the breakdown of non-conformism as a movement. It is this breakdown that led to the founding of a national party of Wales: Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru in the 1920's. From the outset, Plaid Cymru took a linguistic definition of nationalism, placing the language at the centre of their political agenda. Plaid rejected the integration and participation of Wales in the wider political framework of the UK, and the crisis of the future of the Welsh language led to its politicisation as an issue central to their cause. Plaid's aims to maintain the language were to be guaranteed through self-government for Wales and this was regarded as the basis of Welsh identity. Not until the 1960s however did Plaid gain either electoral successes or widespread public appeal when Gwynfor Evans won the 1966 Carmarthen bi-election, thus giving Plaid their first parliamentary seat. It was at this point that Plaid emerged for the first time in its history as a political party aimed at representing the whole of Wales.

Within Plaid was situated a groundswell of activists that founded the Welsh language society (Cymndeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg) in 1962, which is regarded as the most successful manifestation of the Welsh nationalist movement (Davies, 1989). Although established largely from within the ranks of Plaid, the society itself sprang from the fears and frustrations of many younger members that Plaid was moving away from its linguistic roots. For Gwynfor Evans, the only Plaid Cymru MP at the time, Plaid could not "combine an effective fight for the Welsh language with being a political party"

(cited in Davies, J., 1993:650). In other words, in order to appeal to the whole of Wales (with a majority of non-Welsh speakers), Plaid had to go beyond purely linguistic aims. During the late 1960's with its strong youth element, *Cymdeithas* became associated with militancy and law-breaking in order to make its case. The principal objective at this point was that Welsh and English should be treated with 'equal validity' in legal and constitutional terms. A major breakthrough in achieving this was the 1967 Welsh language act. For the first time since 1536, the relationship between the Welsh and English languages had been altered. And at the same time as these cultural activists were making strides, separate provisions for Wales were also created in 1964 in the form of a Welsh Office by the British state.

These institutional developments are often regarded as defining moments in the resurgence of late twentieth century Welsh nationalism. However as Davies (1989) points out, the development of separate institutions for Wales is more a result of the political climate of a growing Welfare state, and the need for regional bureaucracies to administer the widened role of the state, than any official recognition of national difference. Furthermore, as the political ideology that underpinned the Welfare state began to lose credibility in the 1970's, so the nationalist movement in Wales began to decline. This tends to reconfirm the notion that Welsh identity is supported only to the extent that it can be negotiated within the framework of the British state. Similarly, Glyn Williams (1992) considers the 1967 Welsh Language Act extremely limited in terms of a 'concession'. As he argues, the 1967 Act is based on "the rights of individuals without any reference to their group affiliation" and in doing so it does not "challenge the rights of the dominant language group [and] does not trespass into areas which can in any way diminish the effectiveness of English as the language of power" (Williams, 1992:134-5). Despite such criticisms however, it is unquestionable that the subsequent growth of bilingualism in Wales, through a number of further enactments which do indeed reflect group differentials, can be said to be the greatest achievement of the Welsh nationalist movement (Williams, Gwyn, 1985).

Emergence of a bilingual state

Colin Williams (1994) contends that "if a fully functional bilingual society [is to be achieved], where choice and opportunity are the twin pillars of individual language rights, then clearly that possibility has to be constructed through both the promotional and regulatory powers of the state" (1994:162). Since the early 1980s, a number of legislations can be referred to which have begun the process of re-legitimising Welsh through bilingualism. These include, the establishment of the Welsh language channel S4C in 1982, the 1988 Education Reform Act, and, above all, the 1993 Welsh Language Act.

The 1988 Education Reform Act provided an institutional distinction between the education systems of England and Wales, creating what could perhaps be regarded as an 'All Wales' education system. This piece of legislation not only recognized Welsh as the principle language of instruction within Welsh medium schools, but also as a language to be taught, to different degrees, through all schools within Wales. As the official report of the National curriculum states: "Our objective is to ensure that non-Welsh speaking pupils in Wales, by the end of their compulsory schooling at 16 will have the opportunity to learn sufficient Welsh to enable them to use it in their everyday life and to feel part of a bilingual society" (cited in May 2001:268). More important still has been the 1993 Welsh Language Act from which Welsh is to assumed as having "a basis of equality" with English in Wales. Perhaps the most significant aspect is the authorisation of a Welsh Language Board (Bwrdd Yr Iaith Gymraeg) not only to encourage use of the Welsh language but to ensure, through language schemes submitted by individual public sector organisations, the provision of a bilingual service within the public sector. As the Board states:

> Every public body...which provides services to the public in Wales, or exercised statutory authority functions in relation to the provision by other public bodies of services to the public in Wales, shall prepare a scheme specifying the measures which it proposes to take...for the purpose of giving effect, *so far as is both appropriate and reasonably practical*, to the principle that in the conduct of

public business and the administration of justice in Wales the English and Welsh languages should be treated on the basis of equality (Welsh Language Board, 1995: 4, italics added).

While there are ambiguities regarding the statement "so far as is both appropriate and reasonably practical" as well as the absence of any requirement upon the private sector in Wales, there are also significant outcomes relating to the implementing and monitoring of such schemes, which should:

Ensure that workplaces which have contact with the public in Wales seek access to sufficient and appropriately skilled Welsh speakers to enable those workplaces to deliver a full service through the medium of Welsh.

As such, there is some stipulated requirement upon such organizations to actively recruit Welsh speaking staff. The outcome of these developments is as Gwyn Williams states: "Wales is now officially, visibly and audibly a bilingual country. The equal official status of Welsh is nearing achievement. Whole Welsh language structures, serviced by an effective training and supply apparatus, exist in education, administrative life and the media" (Williams, 1985:293). Yet it is perhaps through these developments, that there has been a heightened sense of the fragility of the Welsh language particularly in terms of its claim to reflect Welsh identity for the whole of Wales.

Furthermore, it can be argued that social and cultural cleavages on the basis of the Welsh language have become more pronounced in the last 30 years or so. For while language divisions and language conflict in Wales as such, have been recorded over many centuries, the more recent successes of the language movement in the form of a number of enactments in the areas of education, public sector employment, the media and in bringing Welsh into the public sphere has undoubtedly brought with it new forms of language conflict that are centred upon the group rights of Welsh speaking communities and the individual rights of non-Welsh speakers (May, 2001).

Discriminatory practices? Some sociological caveats to the bilingual process.

After centuries of decline, and restriction to the private sphere, the ability to speak Welsh is now emerging as a form of linguistic and cultural capital. Consequently, the perceived exclusion of non-Welsh speakers[1] from gaining access to this capital, for whatever reason, has thrown up new forms of conflict. As Williams states (1985:293) there is, through these developments, "evidence of a much deeper malaise" within the language movement: the exclusion of the English-speaking Welsh from any definition of Welshness, "the adjective 'Welsh' is increasingly applied…only to the Welsh-speaking component of the people, which is one-fifth of the actual number" (Williams, 1985:293). Notions of racism and discrimination have been turned on their head where this time it is the non-Welsh speaking majority rather than the Welsh speaking minority that is viewed as the recipient. In light of this claim, and a number of criticisms of the bilingual process, it is necessary to conclude this chapter by referring to some of the current debates over bilingualism in Wales. Such caveats I would argue can be understood along two lines:

i. Discrimination against English/monolingual speakers and the emergence of a Welsh speaking elite

ii. A lack of consideration to Wales' ethnic minorities and their languages

i. Discrimination against non-Welsh speakers and the emergence of a Welsh speaking Elite

It is particularly in relation to the first caveat raised here that the revitalization of the Welsh language has occurred alongside a backlash of reactions, more often than not from within Wales. A good example of this is the 1985 case of *Jones and Doyle v Gwynedd County Council*, where the council, in refusing a permanent job working with old people to a monolingual English speaker, was accused of being discriminatory under the 1976

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[1] It is understood that the term 'non-Welsh speakers' is inadequate in covering all aspects of language exclusion. Exclusion occurs not just between English immigrants and Welsh speakers or the non-Welsh speaking Welsh but also between Welsh speakers of different levels of ability. It is not uncommon that a 'Welsh' speaker may feel excluded from certain communicative formats on the basis of his 'imperfect' grasp of the language and consequently may resent many of the advances made in the areas of employment, education and the media.

Race Relations Act. The argument was that the requirement for an ability to speak Welsh for certain employment positions amounted to differentiation and discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. Although the case against Gwynedd County Council was initially successful, it was overturned on appeal in 1986, where it was concluded that language differences within an ethnic group were not applicable under the Race Relations Act (May, 1999). It has since been argued that language differences cannot be seen as a marker of ethnicity and the position of Gwynedd County Council has since received backing from the Welsh Language Board, the statutory body with the responsibility for promoting and safeguarding the language, who refer to the law of the European Union in stating that "it will not be discriminatory to insist that a post-holder should be able to speak a specific language if linguistic knowledge is required to fulfill the duties of the post" (Welsh Language Board, 1995).

The conflict is well illustrated in the academic exchanges between Denney et al (1991, 1992) and Glyn Williams (1994). Denney et al (1991) wonder whether this example of the employment practices of certain local authorities indicates an increasingly racist or extremist line of thought in Welsh speaking Wales. Alongside the recruitment policies of Gwynedd County Council they also refer to the activities of *Meibion Glyndwr*, who in their typology, amount to a social construction of nationalism along 'racial separatist lines'. The perceived "unjust situation and threat of cultural erosion" is viewed as giving Welsh nationalism a sense of legitimacy and justice in its actions (Denney et al, 1991). In reply to this, Glyn Williams (1994) points out that, in any bi-lingual or multi-lingual society, language qualifications will always serve to narrow the labour market but this does not make it racist or extremist. For Williams, the very accusation of racism, is itself, a manifestation of a narrow 'monolingualist' perspective, one whereby minority languages are placed outside reason in the same way that anything that does not conform to the State is treated. As Williams (1994:91) also points out, there is a confinement of Denney et al's discussion of Welsh nationalism and indeed Welsh racism to their associations with the Welsh language and Welsh speakers. In no place is an English speaking Welsh nationalism or Welsh racism considered. As such, Denney et al appear to reproduce the essentialist link between 'language' and 'nation' that they would otherwise oppose.

In addition to this, in comparing nationalist conflict in Wales to that of the North of Ireland, Denney et al reinforce the common tendency of national governments to define both violent and non-violent movements as 'terrorist' or 'extremist'. For example, all of the Conservative Governments between 1979 and 1997 had refused to hold talks with the Welsh Language Society on the grounds that they were a 'law-breaking' organization. As such, any emergent 'extremism' in Welsh nationalism cannot be considered without reference to the actions (or lack of actions) of the state. This is something that Denney et al (1991, 1992) failed to do. Yet this is vital given that, as A.D. Smith (1998) has highlighted, the rise and establishment of the modern nation-state manifested an ideological transformation where its very existence became 'common-sensical' and 'naturalised'.

Nationalism thus only becomes visible amongst those who wish to *re-draw* existing territorial boundaries or those who threaten the status quo. As a consequence, Michael Billig (1995) in his account, insists on stretching the concept of nationalism to cover the ideological reproduction of nation-states, what he entitles *Banal Nationalism*. Part of this ideology is that state languages are seen to exist *naturally* and as a result the promotion of minority languages is always seen as an *unnatural* imposition. This in turn requires a consideration of the historical marginalisation of Welsh as part of the growth of English as the common vernacular and official language of Britain, and the resulting unequal power relationship between them. However, I would argue that the fundamental question surrounding such arguments of an exclusion of monolingual English speakers by Welsh speakers is whether it is *only* the responsibility of the Welsh speaker to accommodate, or alternatively whether a notion of mutual accommodation in which English speakers also accommodate Welsh speakers, is also justifiable. The possibility of such mutual accommodation will be pursued in the following chapter.

Hand in hand with the successes of the pro-active Welsh language movement is the reality of opposition that was mobilized during the 1979 devolution campaign. A number of South Wales MPs played largely on the fears that were held by some significant numbers of the English speaking inhabitants of South Wales; that a devolved Wales would fall victim to a Welsh speaking elite, corruption and isolation from Britain (Gwyn Williams, 1985:294). As Leo Abse stated, "The English speaking majority would

be condemned to be strangers in their own land. The nationalists by insisting on Welsh being spoken in the Assembly will ensure the creation of a *Welsh speaking bureaucratic elite* who will attempt to impose a false homogeneity on Wales" (cited in Jones et al, 1982:136). Putting aside the subjectivity of such claims, it is possible to turn to some more rigorous analysis of the existence of an elite in Wales.

Both Giggs and Pattie (1992), and Drinkwater and O'Leary (1996), argue that Welsh speakers hold an advantageous economic position in Wales, in terms of both earnings and unemployment rates, compared to non-Welsh speakers. As Drinkwater and O'Leary state, "Welsh speakers are often portrayed as a disadvantaged group. In fact, they actually do far better within the Welsh job market than non-Welsh speakers" (Drinkwater & O'Leary, 1996:583). Moreover, this may not simply be a result of the requirements of the Welsh Language Act to recruit Welsh speakers or indeed, the 'better education' of Welsh speakers but, more sinisterly, a result of what Borland et al (2002) contend as a "culturally closed construction" of community and nationalism in order "to influence the public sector labour market" (Borland, Fevre & Williams, 2002:175). In other words, a Welsh speaking elite emerges from a form of social closure which seeks to limit the "allocation of territorially bound 'goods'" (2002:175).

In contrast, Williams and Morris (1999) provide an opposing perspective to the above interpretations. They argue that compared to the non-Welsh born group working in Wales, Welsh speakers are in fact marginalized within managerial socio-economic categories. For them, both the 1981 and 1991 census data suggest the existence of a cultural division of labour" in which managerial positions tend to be filled by individuals working within 'branch' organizations within Wales. In understanding these contradictions, there are perhaps two distinctions to be made. Firstly, it is important to account not only for Welsh speakers but to distinguish between non-Welsh speaking Welsh born and non-Welsh born. And secondly, to account for the regional variations of these groups within Wales. For as Day (2002:224) illustrates, while on one hand "English born individuals are indeed over-represented in high-status occupational positions in north and west Wales", on the other, "Welsh speakers, especially those who are 'literate' in the sense of being able to read and write Welsh, are over-represented in similar positions in the south". There would also appear to be a contrast between a concentration

of non-Welsh born individuals in both managerial and small business sectors and Welsh speakers in governmental and public sector jobs. In other words there may be both a non-Welsh born elite and a Welsh speaking elite in Wales, differentiated by both region and labour market segments. As a result of both these trends however, it is the non-Welsh speaking Welsh that are excluded, as "doubly colonized, by both outsiders and privileged insiders" (Day, 2002: 225). But regional differences are also important in this regard. For it can be argued that the experiences of both the English speaking Welsh working class of the southern valleys along with the Welsh speaking Welsh working class of the northwest may represent contexts of "colonialist economic exploitation" (Day, 2002:225).

In taking this argument of a 'dualistic elite' further, the notion of hegemony is instructive (see Chapter One). The concept of hegemony is particularly useful in understanding how respective groups can arrange their dominance within respective labour market segments in such a way as to not conflict with each other. In other words it could be argued that there is an 'implicit consensus' between Welsh speaking and non-Welsh born professionals. As Lewis (2002) argues, "A Welsh elite is effectively the by-product of this consensus, which created an environment, albeit a limited one, where Welsh-speaking professionals can survive. The consensus survives because it is moderated by the need for valuable skills. As these are almost exclusively middle-class professionals, only low income groups among monoglot English-speakers are affected". Thus there is, intentional or otherwise, a collusion between Welsh speaking and non-Welsh born professionals. And this is none better illustrated than within the University of Wales in which these dualistic elites has been able to maintain their respective positions through their possession of scarce skills – scientific/professional on one hand and linguistic on the other. Only through understanding this consensus is it possible to understand why the current Welsh Language Act is endorsed across the political spectrum – an act which gives significant weight to Welsh language ability in the public sector but does not extend beyond it to the private sector; hence a Welsh speaking elite within public and statutory institutions on one hand and, on the other, a managerial monolingual elite within the private sector.

Bilingualism or multilingualism? Extending democracy to the 'new' languages of Wales

One of the major criticisms of both bilingualism and biculturalism is that is fails to acknowledge a multilingual and multicultural reality. While some of these criticisms are legitimate ones, it is necessary to clarify these debates. Many of the confusions in this regard relate to failures to distinguish between what Kymlicka (1995) refers to 'national minorities' on one hand and 'ethnic minority groups' on the other. While national minorities refer to "distinct and potentially self-governing societies incorporated into a larger state", ethnic minority-groups refer to "immigrants who have left their national community to enter another society" (Kymlicka, 1995b: 19). Steve May (2001) argues that there has been a consistent failure among both proponents of multicultural or group-differentiated citizenship such as Young (1990) and also critics such as Porter (1965), Gouldbourne (1991) and Schlesinger (1992) to distinguish between the unique rights-claims of *national* minorities from other ethnic and immigrant minorities such as urban ethnic minorities and ethnic groups in plural societies (May, 2001:115). In *Multicultural Citizenship*, Kymlicka (1995b) emerges as one of the few political theorists to draw such a distinction. His views are therefore ones worth taking on board. As summarised by May (2001), while national minorities "at the time of their incorporation constituted an ongoing 'societal culture'" ethnic minorities "may well wish to maintain aspects of their cultural and linguistic identities within the host nation-state but this is principally in order to contribute to and modify the existing national culture rather than to recreate a separate societal culture of their own" (May, 2001:116). As we have seen however there are different conceptions of the direction upon which the (re)creation of a Welsh societal culture should take, and also of which conceptions can be considered as Welsh. Nevertheless, the failure to distinguish between these different types of minority groups is clearly a failure to accommodate both groups simultaneously. As May argues, in the USA "there is recognition of the country's polyethnicity...but an unwillingness to distinguish and accept the rights of national minorities such as Native Americans, Hawaiians and Puerto Ricans...In Belgium and Switzerland, however, the reverse applies. The rights of national minorities have long been recognised but an accommodation of immigrants and a more polyethnic society has been less forthcoming" (May, 2001:117). Yet one could also argue that Kymlicka does not go far enough in this

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distinction in that he still considers both of them within a framework of *multicultural* citizenship. I would argue for instance that in the case of Wales and Catalonia, in empirical terms, there is very little *multicultural* about language policies but no small amount that is bicultural. As such in these cases the distinction between national and ethnic minorities is one between bicultural and multicultural agendas. The issue in Wales therefore is that according to the 1991 census (OPCS, 1993) ethnic minority groups amounted in total to 1.3% of the Welsh population.

A concern with language policy and civil society in Wales therefore cannot ignore the situation of the other languages spoken within Wales. Bengali, for example, is Wales' third language. The language rights of Welsh Bengali speakers have themselves been mobilised in recent years through UNESCO's establishment of an International Mother Language Day. Significantly one of the celebrations of this international occasion which, organised by Bengali-speaking activists in Swansea, was attended by Lord Dafydd Elis Thomas, (see Cheeseman, 2001:165). As Cheeseman states, "here was a powerful symbolic representative of 'bilingual Wales', obliged to confront the continuing discrimination against Bengali" (2001:165). An incident of such discrimination, for instance, occurred in a Swansea primary school, when a teacher was reported to have told to pupil speaking Bengali to "Wash your mouth out!" (Cheeseman, 2001:147). It would seem apparent that the overwhelming focus upon English-Welsh relations has led to the perception that 'there are no other groups in Wales'. From this perspective, the somewhat static and ongoing Welsh/English conflict has been a major barrier to the development of multicultural education policies (Tarrow, 1992). Cheeseman (2001:147) also for example, in his examination of the EU context, questions whether the promotion of 'old' and 'new' lesser-used languages has been one of been a common cause. Yet one could also argue that it is more likely that multilingual policies and mainstream multilingual discourses will emerge in the context of Wales than in the rest of Britain[2].

In taking a British perspective the requirement for a debate over multilingual policy is even more pressing given that the vast majority of 'other' language speakers

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[2] For example, Plaid Cymru has in more recent years, in attempting to widen its electoral appeal, increasingly adopted a multicultural stance. As they state, "Plaid Cymru stands and fights for every single person in Wales whatever their background, their birthplace, the character of their skin, their religion or the language they speak" (1998:1).

reside in England. In London, for example, it is estimated that in 1999 there were close to 300 languages in regular use (Cheeseman, 2001). Moreover, a language other than English is spoken in about 30% of all London homes. Similar diversity is reported in other cities in the UK.

Yet, while the relationship between societal bilingualism and societal multilingualism is a taut one, they are not mutually exclusive. And rather than viewing bilingualism or biculturalism in static terms, they should be viewed in more temporal and flexible terms and as in many ways a platform from which multilingual policies can develop (Edwards, 1994). That said there is no doubt that a recognition of Wales' multilingualism represents some of the work yet to be done on language policy in Wales and that the tensions between biculturalism and multicultural agendas, as well as the difficulties associated with immigrants' acquisition of both English and Welsh represent areas of much needed analysis. Moreover, as May (2001:116) states, it is "recognising both dimensions and the respective rights attendant upon them, [that] is the central challenge for developing a more plurally conceived approach to public policy in modern nation-states". As far is this thesis is concerned therefore it is acknowledged that the approach that will now be undertaken in the remainder of this thesis is both limited and partial in solely addressing the case of Welsh/English cultural politics.

CHAPTER FOUR

Civil Interaction and Civil society Organisations in the Bilingual Context: a Conceptual Framework for Empirical Investigation

This chapter is intended to serve as a linkage from the theoretical discussion of civil society (Chapter one) and the account of its usage within the Welsh context (Chapter two and three), to the empirical analysis of the maintenance and organisation of civil society in the context of language frictions as part of the process of constructing a bilingual state (Chapters five to eight). This chapter will draw on the concept of civil society outlined earlier in two ways in order to provide a framework for empirical investigation, and will thus consist of two main sections. Firstly, I will attend to the maintenance of civility at the level of social interaction and secondly, to the processes through which public and civil organisations both accommodate and resist bilingualisation. It is thus concerned with issues of civil interaction between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers across different settings and also with how civil society in Wales is organised in relation to the Welsh language and how bilingualism may be further implemented within such organisations. This conceptual framework is then illustrated through the generation of empirical data in the subsequent chapters. In developing this framework I will in this chapter draw on inter-disciplinary literature that is more specifically related to both the social situation of the Welsh language and that of minority languages in other contexts.

The structure of this chapter will thus be as follows: I will firstly provide a brief recap of the specific domains, activities and processes that constitute civil society. As was concluded in chapter 1, attention is primarily directed at the divisions around which the collective identity of civil society is contested. It will then be necessary to introduce related concepts of bilingualism and biculturalism and to affirm the relevance of civil society to their development. Having done this it is then possible to summarise a conceptual framework regarding the maintenance of civility

in bilingual societies which, in almost all situations, are constitute by a dominant and minority language group; having done this I will then perform the same task but with more specific regard to public and civil organisations.

A brief recap on civil society

As was outlined in earlier chapters, civil society refers to a specific domain, separate from both state and market. In theorists such as Habermas and Cohen and Arato there is focus upon relations *between* civil society and the political and economic spheres. In these terms, it was 'new' social movements that were considered as the essentially sacred or authentic voices of civil society that were uncontaminated by either economic or political influences. The central role granted to movements within these conceptions means that they're preservation and protection from these influences is crucial to democracy. Hence, democracy rests on the independence of civil society. This was criticised on a number of points. However as far as this thesis is concerned, the important criticism relates to its assumption of a collective identity of civil society which is widely subscribed to by its members. Civil society is thus seen as neutral or non-political in terms of cultural identity. Such conceptions underplay the extent to which civil society is an essentially political realm in which its cultural boundaries are highly contested. For example, as was illustrated, 'new' social movements are seen as exclusively concerned with 'defending' the boundaries of a *singular* civil society from *external* threats. What is not considered is how movements are also concerned with defending *particular versions* of civil society from threats which are *internal* to civil society. In other words, conflict not only exists between civil society and the economic and political spheres but also within civil society or between sub-civil societies. It is this latter form of conflict that is underplayed by the republicanist theories of civil society. What this highlights, a point that is particular relevant to this study, is that not everyone agrees upon what is considered to be 'sacred' or what needs to be kept separate. It is precisely on this point that civil society is a double-edged sword of inclusion and exclusion. As has been shown in chapter two, and to an extent in chapter three, the idea of civil society in Wales and the collective identity of a Welsh civil society can be understood as contested precisely in this way; as influenced by conflicts *within* civil society such as those surrounding language and bilingualism.

Civil society however is not just manifested by cultural divisions and boundaries. Also through attempts to establish norms of behaviour, it maintains such boundaries that are internal to it. On this point civil society encompasses not simply movements but a range of associations and institutions concerned with maintaining norms of acceptable behaviour. One of the main rules or norms governing the acceptable/unacceptable code is the distinction between voluntarism and compulsion, or as I prefer to call it, the Gramscian distinction between consent and coercion. The boundary between civil/non-civil societies is often defined by whether that behaviour is voluntary or consented (given the choice) as opposed to whether it is forced or coercive (or not given the choice). However even when given the choice, the absence of coercion or forced behaviour cannot by itself be interpreted as a voluntary act. To do so would be to infer an economic rationality to civil society and to reduce it to rational choice theory. As stated above, civil society has rules which structure behaviour and which are both constructed and maintained internally. Because it can do this, civil society cannot be seen in idealistic terms as horizontal. On the contrary, it must and should contain hierarchical social structures, which must and should to some degree be accepted or consented to by others in order for these rules to be maintained. This follows on from the Gramscian concept of hegemony, which as I have outlined earlier, concerns the ability of a group to persuade (as opposed to coerce) another group to accept its moral, political and cultural values as the norm or as natural or legitimate. For the question arises: who or what makes these rules and who or what maintains them? Given that civil society is not homogenous and contains a diverse range of opinion and conflicting views and activities, we arrive at the question of *which* civil society? or *whose* civil society? Drawing on the theories of Gramsci (1971) and subsequently Bourdieu (1990) for instance we know that even if some acts are consented to it doesn't mean that that particular act is a voluntary one and not the result of socio-political power relations. As such given the prominence of ideological reproduction within civil society, the objective quality of certain acts or requirements as either voluntary or compulsory is subject to interpretation. This can be illustrated in the following table with what I refer to as the **Continuum of civil-uncivil discourse**.

Figure 4.1 Continuum of civil-uncivil discourse

Make Aware	Inform	Encourage	Persuade	Endorse	Ensure	Pressurise	Coerce	Force

Autonomy ← ↔ → *Regulation*

This continuum serves as a basis for understanding the public discourse of civil society through which attempts to institutionalise certain rights-claims or norms of practice are made. Each instance represents a linguistic mechanism through which attempts by actors to get others to agree to certain norms are made. Yet it also notes the interpretive aspect of civil discourse: for what is merely informing and encouraging for one may be interpreted as pressurising or coercive to another, particular among those who question the legitimacy of certain cultural hierarchies. As will be acknowledged through the subsequent chapters, there is a fine line between persuading on one hand and pressurising on the other. Consequently, the manner in which rights-claims are made is extremely significant to their perceived legitimacy. Furthermore, understanding these conflicting interpretations cannot be made without referring to legal, political and economic structures outside of civil society. What this means is that there is a relationship between how actions and discourses are interpreted and their legal and political status. The significance of this is that the legal/illegal distinction can determine what can and cannot be done in a civil society and the scale to which certain rules can be maintained because law is in itself a moralising and normalising force. Consequently, civil society directs its action not simply to producing and reproducing norms or rules but to changing the law itself – e.g. rights and regulations. It is in this respect that civil society moves out of itself and directs its attention to the political, economic and legal spheres. Each of these discourses, even 'force', may be viewed as either acceptable or unacceptable even when such discourses are directed outside civil society. For example, within public discourse, a trade union may argue employers should be *forced* to comply with regulations regarding health and safety. Thus the direction of voices is from within civil society towards the economic sphere. While this may not be contested in cultural

terms it clearly is subject to interpretation in relation to political ideology. It may also therefore be in the absence of such direction from the political and legal system that civil society concentrates itself on the more complicated efforts of producing and reproducing norms – what is essentially the regulation of the social. From this perspective, it is not whether something is objectively voluntary or coercive that determines its acceptability and thus its normative force - but its acceptability that determines its placement as either a voluntary or coercive act. So by what, and by whom, is acceptability or consent determined? Consent cannot be determined without hierarchical social structures or dominant voices within civil society or 'intellectuals' which are seen as legitimate, as acting on behalf of, and as providing fair representation of the 'rank and file'. Such legitimate voices are thus crucial to either the reproduction or non-reproduction of this consent. It would also be a mistake however to consider the notion of consent as a conspiratorial process. There is for instance such a tendency within the work of Bourdieu (see for example the critique provided by Alexander, 1995). In avoiding such a tendency it is necessary to emphasise the process of hegemony upon social practices is very much an unintended by-product. In other words the legitimisation of certain social practices as normal and moral has unintentional consequences for those whose social practices lie outside. I shall now turn to the conceptual outline of the first site of empirical investigation.

Bilingualism, biculturalism and the organizational level of civil society

Broadly speaking, the concern with civil society involves the integration of sociological and normative aims. Put another way, it points to an analysis of the relationship between how society *actually is* to how society *should be*. As Cohen and Arato (1992:567) conclude:

> ...a fully democratic society and just civil society is, of course, a utopia in the classical sense; it can never be realised or completed but operates as a regulative ideal that informs political projects. Civil society can always become more just, more democratic.

Indeed for Cohen and Arato, without taking political utopias seriously, there would be no motivation for social movements. It is thus the social movements and voluntary

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associations within civil society that act as a moral standpoint from which to criticise 'existing' levels of democracy. Thus the concept of civil society presupposes that it is through the actions of groups and associations outside the state that this aim is achieved. However civil society is not simply a compartmentalised sphere containing social movements, pressure groups and voluntary associations. It is also a *form* of society in the generic sense. While utopian discourses on 'rights', 'equality' and 'democracy' have their roots in this civil sphere (voiced by actors in social movements) it is the normalisation of these ideals into wider society such as in the workplace or in education that points to civil society in the generic sense. One example of this may be the relationship between the green movement and the extent to which economic activity is regulated or the extent to which individual investments are made (e.g. recycling). This therefore points to the connection between civil society as a sub-system (the civil sphere) and civil society as a *form* of society. Yet the reverse is also true, the failure of groups and movements within the civil sphere to normalise their utopias as part of wider society leads these groups to reject wider society altogether – to close themselves off. Consequently, the environmental movement is often associated with 'alternative' lifestyle or 'escape attempts' (Cohen & Taylor, 1992). In view of this, the Welsh language becomes relevant to civil society in Wales precisely in relation to the political project of attempting to normalise bilingualism and biculturalism in Wales. Equally, the failure to normalise leaves groups to put up boundaries as they remain a marginal/deviant feature, defined by their difference from the 'one-society'. It is necessary at this stage to outline terms such as biculturalism and bilingualism.

The *Oxford Companion to the English Language* defines biculturalism simply as "two cultures in one area". It also goes on to state that biculturalism involves "familiarity with and membership of two cultures, often including knowledge of two languages". The aims of biculturalism may also be democratic aims when viewed as based on the following principles. Firstly, that both relevant cultures should have the opportunity to exist and flourish and that government should be concerned with establishing whether each culture has distinct institutions and whether both cultures are represented in common institutions. And secondly, that each culture is able to coexist and collaborate in an effective manner while retaining its distinctiveness. Such principles are evident in the Canadian *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (1975). Biculturalism is more often seen as synonymous with

bilingualism. In relation to biculturalism there are two types of bilingualism which are important – *individual* and *societal* bilingualism. While *individual* bilingualism involves the knowing of two or more languages – mother tongue and second language – *societal* bilingualism does not necessarily require this. For instance, while Canada (French/English) and Wales (Welsh/English) are seen as bilingual at the societal level, the majority of both Canadians and Welsh are not bilingual at the individual level. Rather the majority are monolingual. At the societal level however, we can distinguish between biculturalism (involving membership of two cultures and knowledge of two languages) and two relatively distinct communities, one bilingual minority and one unilingual majority. Arguably it is the latter that is more widespread in Wales.

Yet bilingualism may also differ from biculturalism because the latter does not *necessarily* involve identification and membership with both cultures. In other words, knowledge of Welsh does not necessarily presume a Welsh identity, or a desire to attain one (this is particularly true among English adult learners of Welsh whose motivations for learning are related to work). Rather it involves the acceptance and respect of the rightful presence of the *other* culture. In Wales, the *other* culture can refer to both Welsh and English identities. The connection between civil society and the sociology of language is thus on the issue of how the interaction between two language groups remains *civil*. There is however another crucial aspect to this: as Joshua Fishman points out, stable bilingualism involves support and assistance for the language under threat – the "marked language". Biculturalism obviously depends on the existence and continuation of two cultures. Given that Welsh is the "marked language" then promoting biculturalism means promoting the Welsh language. Moreover, as bilingualism and biculturalism are ideals (utopias) which can never exist as such, only to a greater or lesser extent, then like all other aspects of democratisation, they require continuous attention from civil rights groups from within the civil sphere. This emphasis on the minority/dominant relationship between the two language groups is important because of the claim that biculturalism assumes a certain equality or partnership between groups. Such arguments have also been made in the context of English/Maori bilingualism in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Sissions, 1990). Through biculturalism therefore it maybe, theoretically at least, possible to provide a framework for bilingual development in Wales that acknowledges the marginal status of the Welsh language which resorts to neither

ethnic nationalism, a discourse which would deny the rightful presence of English identities, and a politics of difference, a discourse that would deny any notion of universal rights, and thus, civil society.

How therefore does civil society in Wales make investments or contributions towards the aims of normalising a bilingual or bicultural society in Wales? And how is economic activity in Wales regulated on the issue of language. It is this task that drives the analysis. In attempting to link the analysis to the theory of civil society it will be argued that each of the groups attended to within the empirical investigation can be seen as making different yet considerable individual civic and voluntaristic *investments* and thus produce and reproduce bilingualism and biculturalism in Wales. In the civil sphere, the Welsh language has historically been 'voiced' in utopian fashion by a number of civil movements. Yet the significance of these movements is how they enter and regulate other spheres, and thus normalise Welsh as part of everyday life. For example, through informal social networks and movements of people there are interconnections between the Welsh language society and the specific institutions such as in local government, media or education.

It is for this purpose of understanding the relationship between certain social movements and a public or local governmental institution that the Countryside Council for Wales will be investigated in chapter eight. The aim is to account for the processes, both positive and negative, through which bilingualism is regulated and normalised. It is argued that such a process is not possible without the presence of key actors within organisations. The role of these key actors being not only one of informing and ensuring but also one that is reflexive and innovative in its approach to legitimising this process.

Rules of linguistic practice and the maintenance of civil society in a bilingual context: a summary of the conceptual framework

Overall this thesis will argue that within bilingual contexts (involving minority and majority language speakers), the production and maintenance of civility, and the acceptable/unacceptable code, has been predicated on the requirement of minority language speakers to switch to the majority language within mixed settings. By mixed settings I mean situations in which both minority and majority language speakers form part of the same enclosed communicative domain. Such communicative domains

may include for instance the canteen within a workplace or within school or within a public house. It is not simply settings in which both minority and majority language speakers are present, but situations in which the recipients or the objects of conversation and discourse include both types of speakers. This rule is what, in her ethnographic studies of Catalan and Castilian speakers in Catalonia, has been described by Woolard (1989) as the 'accommodation norm'. This refers to an informal rule whereby strangers should always be addressed in the majority language. As she states elsewhere (1988:56) "most Catalan speakers (all bilingual) habitually and automatically switched to Castilian upon detecting the presence of a native Castilian-speaking interlocutors". Similarly, therefore, it denotes situations where Welsh speakers will automatically switch to English in linguistically mixed groups, or in the presence of someone not known to be a speaker of Welsh. To break the rule of the accommodation norm is considered to be unacceptable on the basis that it excludes the majority language speaker(s) from participation within the communicative realm.

The 'accommodation norm' also here falls into the wider concept of 'code switching'. Within the field of socio-linguistics, this refers to the switching from one language or dialect to another within the same communicative episode which may result for example from changes in the nature or subject of conversation or changes in the characteristics of other members present (of course that code-switching, the use of more than one language, is seen as something odd or abnormal brings into light the mono-lingual expectation, that only the use of one language is normal). It should also be stated at this point that code switching represents a wider concept than the accommodation norm. That is, not all code switching can be understood in terms of accommodating or civil behaviour. It may for instance result from the shift from informal introduction towards a more official or formal meeting thus reflecting the different status and prestige attached to the languages or dialects in question. It would therefore be limited to reduce all episodes of code switching (or non-code switching) to accommodation or non-accommodation.

What is being stated here therefore is not that code switching can be read off as a manifestation of internalised civil behaviour. Rather that internalised civil behaviour can result in language switching in order to accommodate a non-specified language speaker – a switch to the language of wider communication in order for one speaker to include another non-speaker. As argued by Heller (1988) the switching

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from one language to another is a "verbal strategy" aimed at the management of conflict or the overcoming of both vertical (class/status) and horizontal (cultural/ethnic) barriers. Likewise as Scotton (1988) states, code switching is an important part of maintaining good relationships because it is motivated by a desire to narrow the social distance between addressees: "a major way of expressing deference is to accommodate the addressee by switching to the variety used in his/her turn, or to a variety otherwise associated with the addressee (e.g. his/her mother tongue)" (1988:171).

However the accommodative rule or code cannot be read off as simply based on the democratic requirement to include all or allow all to participate within a certain communicative realm. *The fact that 'accommodation norm' only requires the minority language speaker to accommodate clearly reflects the unequal power relations between linguistic groups.* As such, in as much as it reflects civility it also reflects unequal power and thereby, incivility. The by-product and unintended consequence of this norm is that Welsh gets excluded from public life and from use within civil society. And as Woolhiser (2001:117) also acknowledges, another by-product of this rule is "the frequent feeling of speakers of the dominant language that 'no one speaks the local language', since they themselves are never addressed in it". Significantly, as will be referred to later, this rule also has consequences for the experience of adult learners of Welsh who often experience difficulty in getting 'local' Welsh speakers to continually address them in Welsh once they are categorised as not a 'local first language Welsh speaker' but as an 'outsider' Welsh learner. One highly competent Welsh learner for instance stated that he had always spoken Welsh with one local Welsh speaker. But as soon as the local Welsh speaker found out that Welsh was not his first language, and that he was English-born, and had actually learnt the language he gradually began to address him, somewhat unintentionally, in English. It is precisely these power relations between language groups that also need to be clarified when accounting for why minority language speakers consent to abandoning their use of Welsh and not passing it on to their children. And moreover, why it is that they feel to not do so would be to disadvantage both them and their children.

The realisation of this inequality is therefore the motivation for language agitation and its growing politicisation. In the context of the rise of Welsh language protest, this naturally occurred alongside the growth of widespread political protest within the 1960's (Phillips, 1995). The result is a growing confidence and insistence

on the right to use Welsh within both public life and civil society. On one hand, this has also meant that the pervasiveness of the 'accommodation norm' has declined, although this may vary with regard to different levels of confidence. On the other however this in turn has led to reactions by majority language speakers in that by flouting the accommodation norm Welsh speakers then exclude. As such it is not the accommodation norm itself that has declined but its adherence. The decline of the accommodation norm leads to the increase in language conflict and decline in civility. This perspective however tends to mirror the Parsonian concern with social order which justifies the inequality between groups on the basis that it maintains civility. From the discussion of Parsons' notion of societal community earlier, I concluded, like others, that it tended to justify inequality and domination between groups on the basis that such relations were conducive to consensus and civility. In other words that the hierarchical structures of civil society should be accepted as necessary to maintaining order. Within this work there was also ignorance to the question of ideology in maintaining this. This meant that consenting to and acceptance of existing relations was read off as proof of their just and democratic nature (such an example of this type of analysis is that of Almond and Verba (1989) also outlined earlier.

With respect to the minority language speaker, such prescribed rules and norms lead to an Either/Or situation: The linguistic practices of the minority language speaker act to *either* legitimize *or* contest the authority of this rule. And as stated above, within Wales at least, the prevalence of this rule is increasingly contested and subverted as Welsh speakers affirm their right to use Welsh within the public sphere and civil society. Indeed because of this, the very social act of using Welsh is a highly political act - but it is a political act which is censured on the basis that it disrupts the mythical stature of civil society as a non-political and peaceful realm. Contemporary civil society in a bilingual Wales therefore can no longer rely on the accommodation norm which is both inappropriate and unjust within a bilingual society. This is primarily because the accommodation norm, by definition, places the requirement to accommodate solely with the minority language speaker. Nowhere does it make any requirements on the majority language speaker to accommodate the minority language speaker. It is not in itself the sort of reciprocated accommodation that occurs on a relatively equal playing field, the kind of reciprocity imagined by Putnam (1993). Rather for Putnam, it is the kind of unequal reciprocity more akin to unequal or hierarchical contexts of Southern Italy. Despite this, we can nevertheless conclude

from this that 'keeping things civil' is increasingly important in the context of the declining prevalence of the 'accommodation norm'. This however only represents one side of the problem.

As Bourhis (1984:177) states "though speakers from different language groups may wish to converge linguistically towards each other, there may be circumstances where speakers wish to *maintain* their own language or *diverge* linguistically from their interlocutor". This is also perhaps more likely to occur with *minority* language speakers in the absence of *institutional* markers or legal representations of group identity. The social distancing by minority language speakers, through establishing separate institutions or simply through expressing hostility towards majority language speakers, is often a strategy for asserting group identity. And as Bourhis (1984:177) goes on to state, asserting a *positive* social identity "can also lead speakers to display in-group favouritism when evaluating representative speakers of their own group relative to out-groups". What such investigations highlight is not only the need for minority groups to claim the moral and aesthetic ascendancy, but also that it is precisely because they are *minorities* that they do so. In other words, the attachment of values of tolerance, beauty and talent to minorities (vis-à-vis the intolerant and unappealing dominant culture) thus serves as a basis for the retention of group identification. And if for instance Welsh speakers feel assured about the survival and status of Welsh then their assertion of group identity in interaction with non-Welsh speakers may not be deemed necessary. Consequently, switching to English may occur not because it is dominant but simply in order to engage in a civil manner. To elaborate on this point, a parallel can be made with Stuart Hall's notion of an 'end of innocence' with regard to Black cultural production. What is meant by this notion is an increasing critique of the moral and aesthetic monopoly of Black culture vis-à-vis White culture. In other words, just because a film has a 'black' director, doesn't necessarily make it a good film or "right on" (Hall, 1991). This point would seem highly applicable not only in relation to a perceived tolerance but to the more recent cultural production of 'Cool Cymru'.

In counteracting and subverting the accommodation norm, minority language speakers often argue in favour of and involve themselves in the construction and maintenance of spaces outside the sphere of application of the 'accommodation norm' in which normalised, everyday usage of Welsh can take place – within civil society such spaces include the formal and informal practices within educational institutions

(Welsh medium schools, Welsh medium Universities), cultural events (e.g. Eisteddfod) and in the Welsh language media (Radio Cymru, S4C). This also includes realms of informal sociability such as public houses or work place canteens where, although there are no formal boundaries, they may remain settings of normalised and ordinary usage of Welsh in that Welsh speakers constitute a majority within them. Within these situations the accommodation norm is to a greater or lesser extent absent. It is from the confusion that surrounds this that stems the myth of the internal radar of Welsh speakers who, through their ability to locate the nearby presence of an Englishman, will immediately start speaking Welsh on his entry into the public house.

But this does not mean that there are no linguistic rules within these confinements. Given that these spaces are constructed in opposition and in terms of their interaction to the dominance of the accommodation norm, norms and rules act to ensure that they are not infiltrated by the accommodation norm. In these spaces therefore the rule is that Welsh should be used on all occasions and on no occasion, in the event of the presence of someone not known to be a minority language speaker, should the accommodation norm be resorted to. In many ways therefore, these counterbalancing rules can be even more stringent and strict than the accommodation norm itself. As one non-Welsh speaking student interviewed states:

> Last summer I worked in a bakery in Rachub. Almost everyone there was Welsh speaking apart from a few of us students who were just working there for a few weeks. Everyone else was local…even the bosses spoke Welsh. I remember on one occasion one local girl sitting next to me started talking to me in English. But another guy then came up to us and interrupted and said to her "why are you speaking English?". The girl said that "Bethan [the respondent] doesn't speak Welsh" but he basically said that she still shouldn't speak English. I mean yeh I can understand why they want to keep it Welsh but it wasn't very nice and made me feel about that big [respondent makes sign with fingers denoting small)

Such experiences are not isolated in areas where Welsh is the majority language. Another respondent for example, who was local and Welsh speaking, had talked about her experiences in school where other students wouldn't speak to her because they thought she wasn't a Welsh speaker. We can therefore frame such experiences in

terms of the maintenance of linguistic rules within civil society, rules which are polarised between the accommodation norm and its opposite. In conceptualising these norms of linguistic use within a bilingual society, we can term the accommodation norm as **Code 1: Accommodative Usage of English** (AUE) and its opposite we can identify as **Code 2: Protectionist Usage of Welsh** (PUW). However, this difference between the relative strictness of these conventions as illustrated in the examples above can be explained in the following way: In relation to Code 1 maintaining the sacredness of using English and *not Welsh* does not really matter. What does matter is the dominance of one language over the other and with this, the dominance or conventionality of rights and obligations normally associated with that language. As such speaking Welsh is not a problem as long as in competitive settings (mixed/inter-group settings) it is English that remains the majority language. In code 2 however the 'sanctity' and sacredness of using Welsh and not using English (or the profanity of using English) clearly does matter precisely because it is outside such segregated domains, Welsh is not dominant. Rather they take place within a context of language shift and decline. For to the extent that accommodation through code switching (from Welsh to English) appears the norm within inter-group domains, as opposed to non-code switching within separate Welsh speaking in-group domains, then there is the interpretation by Welsh speakers of 'inter-group mainstream society' as an essentially English speaking in-group domain.

This interpretation would imply a significant distancing between in-group and inter-group domains. However, although in one sense these two codes appear disconnected, they are in fact subsumed within a certain overarching shared meaning. For what is significant in the Welsh case is that both non-code switching and code switching respectively represent shared conventions which can only be violated, because one cannot adhere or not adhere to one convention without an understanding of the other. As Heller (1988:1) states in relation to code switching, "it is effective only where interlocutors share an understanding of the significance of the pool of communicative resources from which code switching is drawn. *Conventions must be shared in order for their violation to have meaning*" (Italics added). The significance of violating the respective conventions of code switching and non-code switching relates to the existence of boundaries between conventions. As Heller (1988:6) goes on to state, "any violation of these conventions constitutes a reference to other situations or distancing from the currently operative one". Moreover ambiguities over

which convention should prevail are thus common in bilingual and bicultural settings where different in-group and inter-group language domains are in close contact.

In light of these polarising experiences the maintenance of civil society I would argue will increasingly rely on the requirement for 'mutual accommodation' or a 'norm of *linguistic* reciprocity' which on one hand places some degree of responsibility, albeit unspecified and discretionary, on English speakers to learn Welsh and on the other hand, requires Welsh speakers to accept the equal and rightful place of English speakers. The construction of a Welsh bilingual state/society thus rejects both a linguistic conception of Welshness *and its opposite* – the exclusion of any public role for Welsh within contemporary Wales (May, 2001).

However, this is easier said than done. One of the responses to the idea that majority language speakers should reciprocate is that they can't – they don't speak the minority language. To this it is replied that majority language speakers have a responsibility to learn the language. In Wales for instance, it is often argued that given the accessibility of learning provisions throughout Wales, from nursery up to adult education, there are no excuses for not learning. But how one actually goes about getting people to do this, as shown in Figure 5.1, is crucial to the question of civil society. For as was stated earlier, civil society is structured in the main by rules of voluntarism as opposed to compulsion. If certain bilingual requirements are perceived as coercive then generating the consent of people to participate in such a process will not only be difficult but is likely to have the reverse effect of dis-encouraging the learning of Welsh. As such, there is a delicate line between encouraging people to participate and learn Welsh on one hand, and forcing them to on the other. This therefore represents the theory: that the maintenance of civil society in a bilingual context is based on *mutual linguistic accommodation*, which is in itself based upon the 'best practice' of encouraging majority language speakers to learn the minority language. But as we shall see, mutual linguistic accommodation is very much a question of degree which can vary in its appropriateness to different contexts. Accommodation does not *necessarily* infer a requirement to learn Welsh. What we need now therefore is to provide a framework for the different types of mutual linguistic accommodation (MLA). Before turning to this directly however, we need to understand what we mean by terms such as majority/minority language and Welsh/non-Welsh speaking.

At first it should be stated is that in viewing language in terms of social action, there is no sharp dichotomy between minority and majority language groups. On one hand the Welsh speaker is necessarily bilingual (Welsh/English) speaker but on the other a English speaker is not necessarily monolingual English speaker because a minority language speaker is also part of the majority language group. Just as she enters the minority language group every time she speaks Welsh then likewise, she enters the majority language group every time she uses English as opposed to Welsh. Thus when we talk of mutual linguistic accommodation as the accommodation of majority language speakers towards minority language speakers we are necessarily solely concerned with non-Welsh speakers. Where a sharp distinction does enter is in relation to language production and language reproduction.

As we can see in figure 4.2 while actual learning of Welsh represents a higher degree of accommodation, it does not limit it. Thus it is possible to engage in mutual accommodation without actually learning. As the table shows active accommodation can occur when children of non-Welsh speaking parents attend Welsh medium schools. Furthermore, accommodation need not be active. If for instance we take the perspectives of Taylor (1992), Kymlicka (1995) and others then notions of tolerance and recognition are primarily normative principles rather than being based on active participation. Moreover they're focus is exclusively upon reforming the political sphere through special representational or self-government rights. They do not deal with the trickier question of *social* responsibility. In fact Kymlicka, in distinguishing between *internal restrictions* and *external protections* as two forms of group rights clearly wishes to endorse the protection of minority cultures from external (economic and political) threats while at the same time disapproving of forms of minority group maintenance which restrict individual liberty. Because of this it can be argued that his suggestions for remedying inequalities relating to national and indigenous groups are somewhat tokenistic. At the same time however it questions whether the 'politics of recognition' does actually place requirements upon individuals other than to simply respect and tolerate the presence of other cultures.

Figure 4. 2. Continuum of Mutual Linguistic Accommodation

(degrees of investment. i = highest; viii = lowest)

i   Fully participating member

ii   Active voluntary involvement

iii   Committed learner-speaker

iv   Attended adult learner classes

v   Children attending Welsh-medium school

vi   Involvement in/contribution to Welsh cultural activities

vii   Respect/Principled agreement with language policies and minority rights-claims

viii   Mixed/Passive acceptance of language policies and minority rights-claims

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As such, accommodating minority groups need not be active but may also be passive. This for instance may involve a principled agreement or passive acceptance of certain minority language policies and rights-claims. Added to this we should note that this model deals purely with normative-based accommodation as opposed to accommodation resulting from economic rationality (e.g. learn Welsh to improve employment opportunities) or technological resources (e.g. translation facilities). In this respect accommodation may be non-normative. In concluding therefore we can summarise the three codes of civility in a bilingual society as follows:

Figure 4.3 Code 1: Accommodative Usage of English (AUE)

- Occurs within mixed settings or in the presence of someone not known to be a Welsh speaker
- Use of English by Welsh speakers in order to accommodate non-Welsh speaker.
- Language switch justified on the basis of needing to be hospitable, courteous or welcoming.
- To flout this rule is thus seen in opposite terms as evidence of inhospitability or exclusion
- Reflection of unequal power relationship in that it can lead to exclusion of Welsh from mixed and public settings

Figure 4.4 Code 2: Protectionist Usage of Welsh (PUW)

- Contestation with Code 1 through assertion of group identity and through social distancing from majority group
- Occurs within differentiated/segregated settings of normalised usage of Welsh
- Use of English within such settings is frowned upon.
- Maintenance of Code 2 can be stricter than Code 1.

Both these codes however reflect power differentials and social status both between and within language groups. For example, with Code 1, it is only the Welsh speaker that accommodates. Similarly the very act of language switching reflects the lesser social status of Welsh as a language of limited communication. The by-product of this therefore is the disavowal of Welsh from public and civil life. Code 2 therefore emerges in contestation with this through the need to construct settings in which Welsh can be normalised and code-switching is not encouraged. However in these settings the code can be even stricter in its maintenance of 'Welsh only'. Because of this tendency to distance it could be argued that there is a need to foster civil society. More specifically, the kind of civil/uncivil codes that reflect bilingual equality. This is conceptualised as:

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Figure 4.5 Code 3: Mutual Linguistic Accommodation (MLA)

- Settings in which there is to varying degrees a requirement on majority language speakers to also accommodate the minority language speaker
- Such settings refer to both normative (civic or morally responsible) and non-normative (economic and technological) motivations
- MLA doesn't necessarily imply that non-Welsh speakers should learn Welsh
- The active fostering of mutual accommodation may only be possible within institutionally regulated contexts (i.e. where bilingual requirements are already in place)

Thus mutual linguistic accommodation refers settings in which there is to varying degrees (see Figure 4.2) a requirement on majority language speakers to also accommodate the minority language speaker. Such accommodation may be possible in settings which provide mutual simultaneous translation (such as in the National Assembly for Wales debating Chamber and in its subject and regional committees) and provisions for adult learning. It also denotes the attendance of children of non-Welsh speaking parents at Welsh medium and bilingual schools. What becomes clear from this is that *Mutual* linguistic accommodation does not necessarily imply that non-Welsh speakers should learn Welsh. Rather it considers this responsibility as one of the strongest forms of accommodation that may or may not be a requisite within different settings.

Arguably, this conceptual framework examines not only existing tendencies within the bilingual context but also provides a framework for the development of the bilingual context along civil lines. For the sake of brevity, I shall be subsequently referring to these three codes in their abbreviated form: Code 1: AUE; Code 2: PUW; Code 3: MLA. Having provided an outline of the conceptual framework the task of the next chapter is to provide a more systematic analysis of the empirical research undertaken, and to place it within the context of civil society.

CHAPTER FIVE

Methodology and Fieldwork

While the aims and concerns of this thesis are primarily of a theoretical and contextual nature, it is also based on a number of related empirical investigations concerned with highlighting ongoing tensions and frictions over bilingualism and the Welsh language. Overall, a range of data has been generated including interviews, survey data, conversations, media discourse, documentary evidence and informal discussions with key contacts. In turn this data has taken place with a variety of individuals and groups who in some form or another *use* the Welsh language. In the main this has included Welsh language activists in different organisations such as the *Welsh Language Society*, *Cymuned, Cefn, Cylch Yr Iaith*; it has also included an analysis of 'Welsh learners' undertaking *Welsh for Adults* classes, Welsh speaking students at *University of Wales Bangor* and Language officers and staff within the *Countryside Council for Wales*. Also included are interviews with non-Welsh speaking students at Bangor. The aim of this chapter therefore is to provide a methodological account of these empirical investigations. However, before turning to the fieldwork, it is necessary to return to the concept of civil society and following on from this, to identify how existing research into the relationships between Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers provides indications of linguistic accommodation and non-accommodation, as aspects of the boundaries within civil society in Wales.

Civil Society: A Researchable Field?

As was highlighted in debates surrounding the concept of civil society in chapter one, the very idea of researching existing civil society is a contested one. As was shown, many civil society theorists considered the very idea of examining the nature of civil society within existing institutional arrangements as potentially damaging to its status as the key

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idea for the future of democracy (see chapter one, pp.15-16). This in turn was criticised for idealising civil society and for failing to account for how uncivil pressures arise from within it. The result being, as put by Alexander that such literature "devotes itself purely to the theoretical treatment of the idea of civil society, either celebrating its return...or pessimistically declaiming...the impossibility of civil society today" (Alexander, 1998a:12). It is precisely such "theoretical treatment" of civil society that the volume *Real civil societies* edited by Alexander (1998c) himself, attempts to avoid. Indeed, this collection aims to distinguish itself from such writers by proposing "a new research programme" for investigating civil society: "Rather than voting yes or no on the 'idea' of civil society, the contributors to this volume convert the abstract idea into an operational sociological concept" (1998a:12). The common empirical focus running through the volume is its aim of examining and identifying the 'boundaries' of civil society – the boundaries between the civil sphere and the political, economic and other social spheres that make up modern differentiated social systems. As Alexander states himself within the introduction to this collection, "only by understanding the 'boundary relations' between civil and uncivil spheres can we convert civil society from a normative into a 'real' concept which can be studied in a social scientific way" (1998a:3). However, whether this collection lives up to its self-image as demonstrating an "empirical, social science perspective" is open to question.

On one level, the approach is certainly empirical and sociological in that it dismisses the idealisation of civil society. Not only does it examine how civil society is only partially realised within a variety of institutional contexts but it also, through taking a semiotic or culturalist conception, aims to avoid both moralising civil society as intrinsically 'good' and the concomitant denunciating of anything that compromises, distorts or limits it (e.g. ethnic and other particularistic identities) as 'bad'. Rather the perceived enemies – primordial nationalism, state socialism and unfettered capitalism – are potentially no less 'facilitators' than they are 'destructors' of civil society. Indeed such a conception, one which runs throughout the volume, is one which is of course adopted within this thesis. Likewise the focus upon 'boundaries' particularly in terms of how the breadth and depth of civil societies are contested is one that is considered applicable to this particular thesis. It is a definition that relates directly to the very notion

of a *Welsh* civil society and how this is contested around language conflict. Yet on another level, the use of the term "empirical" can be misleading. For in none of the contributions is any primary research either presented or drawn upon.

In this case, the very term 'empirical' is used in terms of its opposition to 'ideal' or 'normative' investigations. The collection is thus 'empirical' only in terms of its focus upon the extent to which 'real' civil societies reflect the 'ideal' civil society. While achieving this however, it stops short of providing any insights into how one might go about conducting primary research in order to measure or evaluate a particular aspect of it. As a result this collection may be less helpful for those wishing to examine "real", "existing" or "institutionalised" civil societies. For example, rather than attempting to "transform" civil society into an empirical tool the focus could have been a different one of identifying and drawing on a range of empirical investigations, from the statistical to the anthropological, in order to show how such studies, while they may or may not actually using the term civil society, do in fact point to the presence of processes which can either facilitate or compromise both its nature and extent. It is precisely such a task of both generating data and drawing upon existing data in order to identify the specific boundaries within civil society surrounding the Welsh language and bilingualism that is the concern of this thesis. I shall draw on some existing data surrounding these issues first in order to highlight this.

Investigating linguistic accommodation as an aspect of civil society: the use of attitudinal data

As was highlighted in chapter 2, a distinct converse relationship was identified within certain literature between *divisions* surrounding the Welsh language and the development of a *unified* Welsh civil society. This development was also recognised as surrounding a *pro-devolutionary* argument. Language, and divisions pertaining to it, was thus seen as a decisive variable in the production or non-production of a civic kind of Welsh national identity, particularly in relation to the very notion of 'Welsh' is contested around language. Within such rhetoric, it was the appeasement of divisions surrounding the language that was seen as a major factor in bringing about a Yes vote within the 1997

devolution referendum. Such a view would appear to be supported by the findings of one survey carried out by NOP on behalf of the Welsh Language Board (NOP, 1995). Within this survey, 71% of the 815 respondents 'supported the use of Welsh' and 75% 'felt that the Welsh and English languages should enjoy equal status (NOP, 1995). As the Welsh Language Board concludes there is now a "consensus in favour of bilingualism" in which "support for the Welsh language, by individuals and organizations, is broad and widespread. It also noted that "politically speaking, the Welsh language is now enjoying widespread cross-party support" (1999:16). The implication here is that the development of a more civic sense of Welsh identity, one based primarily on residence and living in Wales, is already underway. A more recent survey conducted by Beaufort Research Ltd (an independent social/market research company based in Cardiff) on behalf of BBC Cymru also provides useful attitudinal data. In that this particular survey distinguishes Welsh speakers from non-Welsh speakers, it would be worthwhile here to provide an outline of some of the findings[1]. This would then serve as a starting point for further empirical investigation into the boundaries between consensus and conflict surrounding the Welsh language and bilingualism within civil society.

Accommodations by Non-Welsh speakers

To begin with, the responses of non-Welsh speakers towards the Welsh language appear mixed. For instance, when asked 'To what extent do you support or oppose the use of the Welsh language?' only a small majority (53%) stated that they either strongly or mostly supported its use. That said, only 5% returned a distinct opposition (strongly or mostly oppose) to this statement. Again similar results were found in regard to questions such as 'How important is the future of the language to you?' and 'Do you believe that the Welsh language is gaining, declining or about the same in strength and status?'. In these cases, 48% considered the future of the language as either very or fairly important to themselves while 22% considered the Welsh language to be declining in terms of strength and status.

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[1] This study was conducted by Beaufort Research Ltd on behalf of BBC Cymru. A total 1004 interviews were conducted with a representative sample of Welsh speakers between 1st and 20th of November 2001. A further 992 interviews with a representative sample of the total adult population of Wales were also conducted between 21st and 30th November 2001. I would like to thank both Beaufort Research and BBC Cymru for permission to reproduce the findings of this study

More specifically, when asked 'Would you like to be able to speak Welsh yourself', non-Welsh speakers were evenly divided with 43% stating 'Yes' and 41% stating 'No'.

While none of these cases report conclusively high levels of accommodation, on one level they do on one level contest the notion of an *overwhelming* insensitivity of non-Welsh speakers towards the Welsh language. Moreover, a distinction between Welsh born and non-Welsh born within this data may also have revealed significant differences in linguistic accommodation. Nevertheless on the question of 'Would you like to be able to speak Welsh yourself?', 66% of non-Welsh speaking respondents in North West Wales[2], where perhaps language issues are more pervasive, stated Yes to this question, while only 32% stated yes in the Cardiff and South East Wales[3] area. Significantly however, the more *conclusive* levels of linguistic accommodation were on the question of whether non-Welsh speaking parents would like their children to learn Welsh. In this regard, 37% stated they would while 41% stated that their children were already doing so. In other words, 78% of non-Welsh speakers had accommodative responses in relation to their children learning Welsh in school. Likewise, albeit to a lesser degree, 61% believed that 'all children in Wales should be able to receive education entirely in Welsh'.

Accommodations by Welsh speakers

As one might expect, Welsh speakers demonstrated far more convincing levels of support towards the Welsh language and its promotion. For example when asked, 'How important is the future of the Welsh language to you' 89% stated that it was either very or fairly important. Similarly, 89% of Welsh speakers stated that they either strongly or mostly supported the use of the Welsh language. Although less conclusive, high levels of support were also reported with regard to the future of the language. For example, 65% thought that 'the Welsh language will be a living language in daily use in 40 years time, although responses were more mixed with regard to the use of Welsh within their 'Local Area' where only a third (30%) of respondents considered the use of Welsh to be on the increase.

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[2] North West Wales consists of the counties of Anglesey, Conwy, and Gwynedd.
[3] Cardiff and South East Wales consists of Cardiff, Vale of Glamorgan, Monmouthshire, Torfaen and Newport.

Of equal significance however were accommodating responses regarding non-Welsh speakers within Welsh speaking communities. For example, when asked whether 'incomers to Welsh speaking communities make a valuable contribution to the local economy' 60% either slightly or strongly agreed. Moreover, this figure was 69% within the more linguistically aware North West region. Likewise, only 25% of Welsh speakers thought that 'new laws are required to control immigration into traditionally Welsh speaking communities'. What is also significant about such responses is that they appear to question certain Welsh language pressure groups claims to *represent* the voice of the Welsh speaking group. This appears to be the case not only in terms of the contributions made by 'incomers' to the local communities but also on whether new laws on restricting inward migration would be widely supported.

In both groups therefore, there is a tendency towards convergence as opposed to polarisation. For example, on the issues of whether 'introducing measures to protect the Welsh language in Welsh speaking communities would be racist' both Welsh and non-Welsh speakers seemed in mutual disagreement. In this case only 31% of non-Welsh speakers and 29% of Welsh speakers thought that the introduction of such measures would be racist.

Boundaries of accommodation

Thus far, there appears no small amount of accommodation by both Welsh and non-Welsh speakers towards each other which suggests a consensus over the language. However there are two issues, crucial to civil society, surrounding which more conflictual attitudes emerge. These are on one hand, *individual citizenship rights* and on the other *equality of opportunity*. In particular is a concern with how these principles were seen to be contravened through notions of *social responsibility* and *minority group rights*. For instance, as was shown above in the case of non-Welsh speakers, the most positive responses were found on the question of the right to receive education in Welsh. However, when asked 'should it be *compulsory* for every child in Wales to be taught Welsh in secondary school?' (italics added), clear differences between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers emerged. Whereby 64% of Welsh speakers agreed that it should be compulsory, this figure was only 31% for non-Welsh speakers. Moreover, when asked,

'should there be an expectation on non-Welsh speakers to learn Welsh in Welsh speaking areas?' only 18% agreed that there should be an expectation. Yet in North West Wales, 60% of Welsh speakers agreed that 'non-Welsh speakers who move into Welsh speaking communities should learn Welsh'.

It becomes apparent that attitudes to the Welsh language modify when its promotion is seen to *contravene* principles of individual rights. In other words, as the focus shifts from notions of individual entitlement and choice to questions of social responsibility, expectation or compulsion, so conflict tends to emerge. Similar boundaries and divisions between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers are also found on the issue of 'equality of opportunity'. For example when asked whether 'local people in Welsh speaking communities should be able to buy subsidized housing' 53% of Welsh speakers either strongly agreed or agreed that they should. In contrast, only 26% of non-Welsh speakers stated that they supported (either Agreed Strongly or Agreed) this. Similar responses were also found when asked whether 'a person who has lived in an area for 10 years+ should have priority when buying a home'. While only a quarter (27%) of non-Welsh speakers supported this, this figure was over half (57%) for Welsh speakers in North West Wales.

To summarise these findings, we can state that both Welsh and non-Welsh speakers demonstrate levels of consensus and of accommodation towards each other but that divisions tend to emerge when principles of individual choice and equality of opportunity are perceived to be contested. The boundaries of accommodation would tend to be based on the shift from notions of opportunity, choice, and entitlement to expectation, responsibility or compulsion. Although as May (2000) argues while this boundary itself reflects the way minority language policies may contest individual rights, it is questionable whether without a degree of compulsion, such equality of opportunity would be available in the first place.

Criticisms of large scale language surveys
The degree to which we can take such quantitative research as evidence of consensus or accommodation is questionable. Clearly such research was motivated by a politically

polarised climate which saw the emergence of Cymuned[4] receiving regular media coverage. Moreover, it is not surprising for neither Welsh speakers nor non-Welsh speakers to wish to demonstrate feelings or views which may be perceived as hostile, politically incorrect or deviant. This tendency to converge would also be intensified by the charges of racism that tend to emanate from both groups towards each other. That respondents would unintentionally converge towards the other is therefore a potential weakness of this kind of quantified research. There is also the question of the reliability of language attitude research in general. Williams and Morris (1999:153-158) question whether attitudes can be considered in behavioural terms – as predispositions to act. As such, accommodative attitudes cannot be concluded to mean active support. To this however the reverse should also be stated: that non-action cannot be read as a *lack* of principled agreement or respect. The biggest potential weakness of such surveys however is raised by May (2000). As he argues, because of their objective/positivist nature they are more likely to extract cognitive (reason and thought) as opposed to affected (emotion and feeling) responses. In other words respondents would tend to reply to statements in terms of universal principles as opposed to feelings from particular experiences. While not wishing to dismiss such findings nor the political importance of consensus, they give us little indication of either the effects of certain language policies or the remaining obstacles to bilingualism (May, 2000).

Given such criticisms of attitudinal data, it was considered that a more qualitative approach to investigation mutual linguistic accommodation will be undertaken here. Such an approach would be one that focused primarily upon the interactions between Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers and which aimed to examine the 'boundary relations' between the Welsh speaking and non-Welsh speaking components of civil society in Wales. In particular the use of interview data, through drawing on individual experiences of such interaction, can itself provide indications of the quality or civility, or conversely the incivility, of those particular relationships. However while qualitative research was carried out in the form of in-depth and semi-structured interviews this was in some cases undertaken, for reasons stated below, *in combination* with more quantitative analysis. For example with regard to the case study of adult learners of Welsh, one of the stated

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[4] See chapter six.

reasons for using a structured questionnaire schedule was the absence of any comprehensive survey data. Existing research into learners tended to be of a small-scale qualitative nature. Furthermore, survey data also allowed a more systematic examination of learners' social use of Welsh. Therefore, despite the stated criticisms of large scale surveys, it was felt that there was a strong case for using a survey with regard to adult learners of Welsh. Before turning directly to the fieldwork however, it is also necessary to outline how the empirical investigation relates to the conceptual framework outlined in the previous chapter.

Linking the conceptual to the empirical

The empirical investigation is intended to mirror the conceptual framework outlined in the last chapter. This framework therefore needs to be briefly re-iterated here. As is stated in the last chapter, the starting point of the conceptual framework is the code by which Welsh speakers (as minority language speakers) switch to English (the dominant language) within mixed or inter-group settings. This is the code of accommodation – of the accommodative usage of English. In opposition to this is the code involving settings which 'sets apart' Welsh in order to prevent it from domination of English. This is the code of protection – of the protectionist usage of Welsh. These two codes therefore, emerging in relation to each other, constitute the binary structure of civil society in Wales, or rather, the way in which language differences are organised and structured within civil society. However a third code of mutual linguistic accommodation was then introduced in order to point to processes whereby both Welsh and non-Welsh speakers accommodate each other. Such an example of mutual accommodation includes Welsh learners and also children of non-Welsh speaking parents attending Welsh medium schools.

The empirical investigation thus intends to test out this conceptual framework and each aspect of the empirical investigation has been chosen on the basis that it provides examples of each aspect of the framework. The conceptual framework identified the relation between the codes; how segregationist settings emerged in protection from the norm of accommodative use of the dominant language. In this framework it is the

dominant language settings that are central while the protectionist settings are peripheral and defined in opposition to it. In the investigation undertaken here however it is the protectionist settings that form the central point – taken from the perspective of Welsh speaking society – they form the normative framework. In other words because the investigation looks at a Welsh speaking perspective then this forms the normative society. For example, as is illustrated through the interviews conducted with Welsh speaking students, to pursue university education through the medium of Welsh was often reasoned on the basis that it was the 'normal' or 'natural' thing to do. It is thus from the perspective of its participations, normative. As a result the non-Welsh speaking group are defined through distance to such society. Such an approach has been taken by Williams and Morris (1999) through their generation of a sample of 'competent' Welsh speakers as well as the ethnographic studies of Trosset and Bowie who view certain Welsh speaking activities as the core aspect of Welsh identity. A brief outline of these can be provided.

Williams and Morris (1999), in viewing language use and language reproduction in terms of social action, interpret their sample as a normative core, defined by their competence in Welsh. This competence then provides the resources for social action. As they state, "our goal was that of treating minority language groups as normative rather than by reference to deviation from the rationality of normativity" and to avoid presenting "ethnic groups as non-normative, sustained by allegiance to outmoded, non-rational, emotive cultures" (1999: xxxiii). For Williams and Morris, treating minority language groups as normative meant relating the production and reproduction of language to economic restructuring. In others, minority languages are used and retained for rational and instrumental purposes (that is they are if they are to survive). Furthermore, Williams and Morris relate language use to competence and as a result define their sample of Welsh speakers "by reference to Welsh speakers with sufficient competence to use the language in interaction" (1999:58).

Inevitably by treating Welsh speakers as normative, the non-normative is simply displaced which now refers non-Welsh speakers, whether of Welsh or English attachments, and indeed Welsh speakers of lesser competence are defined by their own deviation from this normative core. Nevertheless, what emerges is the de-centring of

normative cores in that what is normative is seen to be contested from different locations. In other words, what is normative or non-normative may differ and is pluralized across the social space of Britain.

Although examined from an alternative standpoint, the same relationship is provided by the more ethnographic studies of Bowie (1993) and Trosset (1993). Like Williams and Morris, both Trosset and Bowie conceptualise a Welsh speaking society in in which to be a non-Welsh speakers is to be an 'outsider'. Bowie (1993:168) for example identifies the "desire for acceptance" of the Welsh learner among the Welsh speaking community. Overall she examines the ways in which some incomers attempt to "learn Welsh, mix exclusively with other Welsh speakers and where possible find work which allows them to use Welsh. They may change or adapt their names, play down any non-Welsh connections and join some of the more active and radical Welsh language movements" (Bowie, 1993:171). Bowie therefore examines the Welsh speaking/non-Welsh speaking relationship in terms of how the latter attempts to integrate in the former, which also represents an ethnic core. Overall however she questions whether "Welsh learners" are ever accepted as "Welsh speakers". Likewise Trosset (1993) defines Welsh speaking associational life as the core production of Welsh identity. Welsh identity is defined in terms of degree, as a gradient in which social organisation through the interplay of language survival, performing arts (eisteddfodau, competitive music and poetry festival) and ethnic politics is placed at the centre. Welsh identity is thus graded in terms of its degree of separateness from England.

This thesis therefore draws upon this core-periphery relationship in the following way; firstly, Cymdeithas, Cymuned and other Welsh language pressure groups, along with Welsh speaking students comprise investigations into the core or normative group of Welsh speakers and secondly, Adult learners of Welsh and English speaking students comprise investigation into the peripheral or non-normative group, defined through their distance from Welsh speaking society which is 'set apart'.

But while the above studies treat Welsh speaking society as normative, none of them refer to its incorporation within an over-arching framework of biculturalism in which other conceptions of Welshness are recognised. Rather any other conceptions of Welshness are simply and inevitably subject to interpretation, to contestation, or to

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different meanings emanating from their different positions within the cultural system. It is the original premise of this thesis that the notion of mutual linguistic accommodation denies the conception of a single normative social group vis-à-vis a non-normative social group. In other words, it denies the notion that there is one host language group which the immigrant language group integrates into. Rather the idea of mutual linguistic accommodation, and that of Wales as a bicultural society, is that integration is reciprocated. Thus adult learning of Welsh is an example of mutual linguistic accommodation precisely because it simultaneously exemplifies both *accommodations into* Welsh speaking society as well as the *accommodation of* Welsh speakers within the wider bicultural framework. Adult learning thus constitutes a 'two-way street'. It is on this point that this thesis differs from the others mentioned here, none of whom place the normativity of the Welsh speaking group within a wider bilingual and bicultural framework. So having outlined the empirical investigation's relation to the conceptual premises of the thesis, it is now possible to account for the fieldwork undertaken.

The Fieldwork

During March 2001, I began my fieldwork for this thesis. The initial thought at this point being to gain a sample of a group that represented a core cultural aspect of Welsh speaking society; one that viewed the Welsh language in sacred terms. In following this aim, the Welsh Language Society (*Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg*), or *Cymdeithas* as I shall be referring to it, became an obvious starting point. As a longstanding movement working on behalf of the Welsh language, *Cymdeithas* could certainly be regarded as a 'new social movement' of the 1960's. As pointed out in chapter one, following Habermas, Cohen and Arato (1992) considered such movements as 'pure expressions' of the lifeworld, which aim defend the boundaries of civil society, defined in sacred terms; in this case therefore, Cymdeithas can be defined in terms of the 'self-defence' of 'Welsh-speaking society'. Taking this conception as the starting point, two further questions were subsequently considered; firstly, in what ways do Cymdeithas, or other similar groups, move beyond 'Welsh speaking 'society'? For example, to a concern with the English speaking Welsh working class? And secondly, what are the 'boundary

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relations'? Or in this case, what is the relationship with non-Welsh speaking civil society?

The first issue then became a question of what size and kind of sample I was after. Or more importantly, what kind of sample was available. I had decided to concentrate on gaining a relatively small sample of around fifteen to twenty activists (see Appendix I). In particular, those who had been working centrally within the organisation for a number of years. In pursuing the two 'further questions' listed above, I decided that part of the analysis of this group should consider the particular political networks that they, and Cymdeithas itself, were part of and how this had changed over the years. For example, what are the activist networks between Cymdeithas on one hand, and on the other, organisations more typically associated with the English speaking working class in Wales. For example, such relationships might include the Labour Party or trade unions. Again, the motivation here was, as outlined in Chapter Two, that the emergence of a Welsh civil society is one based upon the dissolution of previous divisions such as those between English speaking/industrial and Welsh speaking/rural dichotomies. Thus a network analysis was considered useful in two ways: firstly, at a *political* level, in terms of political alliances and the interaction of Cymdeithas with government; and secondly, at an *institutional* level, in terms of how activists might 'input' their values through their participation in other institutions or spheres. For example, how they 'input' their values into the workplace through monitoring bilingual practice – as 'bilingual watchdogs'. This institutional inter-dependence was apparent in public organisations such as in the case of the Countryside Council for Wales for whom a few of the activists interviewed in Cymdeithas had worked for. Other activists were also involved in other local governmental or educational bodies. As a result they were able to use their role within the organisation in order to ensure bilingual practices. It was through reflection upon these connections that I began to consider how an examination of civil society also needed to look at how values were 'inputted' into the political and economic spheres (I shall turn to this later when discussing the case study of the Countryside Council for Wales). So it was with regard to these considerations that I decided upon such a sample. The question remained however of how to 'gain access' to such a sample.

Given that the concern was to generate a sample of 'core activists' it was decided that a 'snowball sample' would be appropriate. 'Snowballing' generally refers to the process of accumulating a sample in which the initial informant or interviewee provides the names and contact details of other activists who can then be interviewed. These subsequent activists then may also provide further contacts if required and so on. It is commonly used in researching 'deviant' groups or sub-cultures (Plant, 1975). While the advantage is that is provides access to relatively tight-knit groups, it is limited if the aim is to investigate cleavages or fractures within certain groups. In these cases, it is conventional to re-start the snowball at a different point.

As is conventional with the snowball technique, I began to gain a sample at the top, by turning to the headquarters of Cymdeithas in Aberystwyth. The then chairman of Cymdeithas, Dafydd Morgan Lewis thus served as both the first activist interviewed as well as the first point of the snowball sample. From here on outward that I was able to gain a sample of twenty activists. Significantly, not all those interviewed still considered themselves as activists within *Cymdeithas* as some had moved on to concentrate on other things. All twenty however had been heavily active at one point or another from the early 1970s onwards, and all twenty described their political standpoints as 'radical socialist' or 'community socialist'. However while undertaking this particular sample, certain events had overtaken the fieldwork, and as a result, had influenced its subsequent direction. In particular was the apparent re-emergence of language conflict through the intervention of Seimon Glyn in January 2001 and the foundation of *Cymuned* in June of 2001 (these events are outlined in chapter six). As a result it became apparent that perhaps the particular 'radical socialist' stance of the *Cymdeithas* activists interviewed did not capture all the perspectives involved. Moreover, that it failed to capture a distinctive cultural or communitarian aspect of the language movement which was not necessarily 'radical socialist'.

Since its inception during the Summer of 2001, the pressure group *Cymuned* has threatened to supersede *Cymdeithas* as the main organisation speaking for and acting on behalf of Welsh speaking Wales. In particular here is its stated aim of voicing the concerns of the rural majority Welsh speaking communities; mainly Gwynedd, Anglesey, Ceredigion and Carmarthen. In order to examine their specific political and cultural

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position, as well as their concomitant position on non-Welsh speakers, a systematic analysis of their documents was undertaken. This included documents such as their numerous submissions to the National Assembly's Welsh Language Review which took place from April 2001 to March 2002. The majority of these documents were available either on Cymuned's own website or on the National Assembly's website. In addition, the group Cylch Yr Iaith, in their protests against the use of English on S4C, provides a precise example of the need for Welsh to be 'set apart' and 'uncontaminated' from English. Again here, relevant documentary evidence was available on the various websites listed. The combined investigations into the role of the sacred in Welsh language pressure groups constitute the mainstay of the next chapter (chapter six).

While chapter six deals with both 'radical socialist' and 'conservative communitarian' positions within Welsh speaking pressure groups they both examine Welsh speaking society from the activist or organisational perspective. What this level of analysis does not account for is the cultural reproduction which occurs within educational institutions at both the secondary education and university levels. Certainly in the case of Cymdeithas, it is these levels that form the primary social base for gaining new members (Phillips, 1995). It was therefore decided to examine a level of cultural reproduction in the form of Welsh speaking students at the colleges of Bangor, although it should be stated that this only constituted a minor part of the study. In the end it was decided that a small number of twenty short interviews with Welsh speaking students living within John Morris Jones, the University's Welsh speaking halls of residence would be carried out. This was done between March and May 2002 (see appendix II). As with the study of Cymdeithas, this was again achieved via the snowball technique. In this case a member of staff within the department who taught within the Welsh-medium programme was able to introduce me to three students who lived within the Welsh speaking halls. From these students I was then able to gain further interviews with students residing within the halls. Overall it was considered that this study would provide two particular insights; firstly, in that the Welsh speaking halls constituted a specific protectionist setting, how was the use of Welsh and concomitant non-use of English ensured? And secondly, how did students reconcile their future career aspirations with a stated (moral) aspiration to remain within and reproduce Welsh speaking society? While issues of the strictness of using Welsh are

dealt with in chapter six, the issue of career aspirations is presented in chapter eight. Because chapter eight dealt with economic issues in terms of the bilingual requirements of public organisations, it was felt that issues to do with students' career aspirations fell more appropriately with the overall theme of this chapter. In addition in order to contextualise the case of Welsh speaking students, an overall analysis of the University of Wales Bangor's bilingual policy is also provided.

All of the above aspects of the empirical investigation embody the notion of the Welsh language, or a particular version of it, as sacred and in need of protection from English. It then became apparent however that these examinations of a core Welsh speaking society, and the arguments around its 'setting apart' from the rest of English speaking society needed to be counterposed with those outside yet in contact to this society. In other words, to examine the 'boundary relations' between the English and Welsh speaking sub-civil societies. In particular, I wished to examine those who make investments or accommodations towards Welsh speaking society but from a position external or peripheral position to it. It was therefore considered that adult learners of Welsh embodied such a group.

During March of 2001 I began enquiries into this particular aspect of the fieldwork. The starting point to this were the informal meetings that took place between myself the co-ordinators involved in the Adults for Welsh provision at the University of Wales. It was through the discussions with these co-ordinators that the type of research to be undertaken with Adult learners was decided upon. Although no strict procedure was employed in gaining this sample, emphasis was placed on gaining a representative picture by selecting respondents from all the concurrently running classes within this summer school, from beginners to advanced levels. On the basis of discussions with the Welsh for Adults co-ordinator, it was believed that such a sample would gain a fair representation of the North West Consortium. On this basis it may be possible to secure generalisations from this data in relation to the particular consortium. However, the North West consortium represents just one of eight consortia across Wales therefore due to potentially vast regional discrepancies, the research is not intended to paint a representative picture of adult learners across the whole of Wales. It is expected for instance that learners' backgrounds and attitudes would vary considerably between areas

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of high and low density Welsh speaking populations (e.g. between Gwynedd and Gwent). Although this is not to say that differences do not exist *within* each consortia. For instance, this research was taken at the Bangor summer school which may vary considerably for instance to the Pwllheli summer school or to weekly classes in village halls in more rural areas. The possibility of claiming to represent the whole consortia therefore is open to interpretation and partly a result of the perceptions of the practitioners themselves who, on the whole, considered the Bangor summer school to form a fair cross-section.

Also through discussions with tutors and administrators within the Centre for Continuing Education at Bangor, a certain consensus could be discerned regarding who they regarded as the *typical* adult learner of Welsh: for these practitioners, most learners tended to be predominantly middle aged, born outside Wales and of professional/managerial status, and mostly female. At the same time, reasons and motivations for learning and the degree of commitment were seen as diverse, ranging from family/personal ties, job requirements to a chosen path of lifelong learning or simply a past time. Also, one of the main difficulties was seen to be not only attracting 'new' potential learners, but also retaining existing ones and getting them to pursue a higher-level course. In light of political debates surrounding language, in many ways, this socio-economic background, the range of motivations and difficulties in retaining learners reflect adult education in general in its perception as 'middle class' or extra-curricular. Conversely therefore, it became clear that a concern amongst tutors/administrators was the failure to attract potential learners from certain demographic, socio-economic and ethno-cultural backgrounds: namely younger learners, those of non-professional status and non-Welsh speaking Welsh born (as it will emerge, this last grouping may be more prominent to certain parts of Wales such as the South Wales valleys). On this last case, it would be important to note that non-Welsh speaking Welsh born would have experienced some form of Welsh learning within statutory education. As such their absence among adult learners may be linked to school expectations.

The final point of discussion with the convenors was to decide upon the appropriate type of research. The first issue here, as the co-ordinators themselves

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stressed, was that very little statistical data is available on adult learners of Welsh. This was true both in terms of data that the Welsh Language Board had at their disposal, as well as the academic research undertaken. For example, academic research undertaken by Trossett (1993), Jones (2000) and Newcombe (2002) were all of a specifically qualitative nature involving a relative small sample. Trosset (1993) for example was of an ethnographic nature based upon her own observations as a Welsh leaner in northwest Wales; Jones (2000) also provides an ethnographic study, utilising a research diary approach, in her study of fourteen Welsh learners based at the Clwyd Language Centre in Denbigh. In addition to these is Newcombe's (2002) study which is based on qualitative interviews conducted with learners in Cardiff. Thus while for reasons given earlier in this chapter, more qualitative methods were favoured, it was felt, given the nature of prior research undertaken, that this could be combined with a more quantitative analysis of the motivations, attitudes, and language use of Welsh learners. The procedure of this combined methodology was that an initial in-depth survey (see appendix III) of about fifty learners would be conducted within the summer school classes and that this would then be supplanted with follow up interviews with about 10 learners at a later date. These interviews took place during the months of August, September and October.

On the Bangor University summer school were approximately 170 registrations. In order to gain a sample of fifty learners it was decided to split the survey into three groups, one of beginners, one of intermediate and one of advanced. The benefit of getting the tutors to distribute the survey was that they were able to incorporate the survey into the learning programme. However due to constraints of time of the fifty questionnaires distributed among the different classes, only thirty seven were returned. While this was marginally lower than the number initially intended, this was not considered to affect the representative nature of the survey as all the requirements of gaining a cross-section of the different levels of ability or different stages of learning. The following quantitative data presented in chapter seven is thus based upon these thirty seven (20% of the school total) questionnaires, while more in-depth responses from learners are based on the ten subsequent interviews carried out. With regard to the follow-up interviews, these are based on a non-random sample of ten respondents who were representative of the thirty seven survey respondents. Thus the interviews conducted reflected the differences within

the survey samples. These differences included not only those to do with level of ability, age and gender but also birth place (i.e. born within or outside Wales), national identity and socio-economic status. All of these differences therefore came into consideration. Before moving on to the final aspect of the fieldwork (that of the Countryside Council for Wales), a methodological point about language differences also needs to be raised.

All interviews and surveys pertaining to either Welsh language activists or Welsh speaking students were in Welsh. What is present in this thesis is an English translation of these. Original Welsh interview transcripts are, for reasons of clarity and space, not included. The survey of adult learners was bilingual with each question written in Welsh followed by an italicised English translation directly underneath. This method, as opposed to two separate Welsh and English questionnaire sheets, was suggested by the Welsh learner's tutors in that it encouraged learners to respond in Welsh as opposed to English. The tutors were also keen to treat the survey as part of the Welsh learning process.

With regard to interviews with learners, there was an additional problem relating to the fact that I was myself a Welsh speaker. It was felt that there may be tendency for learners to wish to demonstrate an affiliation with the interviewer by responding to questions about the Welsh language in a more supportive or agreeable way. In other words, of not wanting to reveal distinct reservations about certain Welsh language policies or in terms of their interactions with Welsh speakers because I was myself a Welsh speaker. In remedying this, it was considered necessary for the interviewer to *also* converge towards the learner. One of the ways in which this was done was through describing my own background, in which as a first language Welsh speaker I have attended adult learning classes in order to improve my Welsh language ability. In addition, was to also for myself to demonstrate some understanding of the difficulties faced by newcomers to Welsh speaking areas (e.g. feeling like an 'outsider'). Although, as it will be shown, given the diverse responses of learners to such Welsh language issues, it is felt that such problems were more or less overcome.

The final aspect of the fieldwork was undertaken between November 2002 and May 2003, this was the case study of the organisation the Countryside Council for Wales (CCW). I have already touched on the motivations for undertaking this particular study.

To reiterate, it became apparent during the interviews that there was a distinct relationship between the promotion and ensuring of bilingual employment practices and the roles of both Cymdeithas activists and conversely, adult learners of Welsh. In other words, activists were able to input values in an institutionalised manner through participation in the workplace by ensuring bilingual practices while non-Welsh speaking staff also participated through learning Welsh as part of their employment contract with the CCW. As is highlighted in the chapter on adult learners, many of the learners who took part in the study were employed by CCW and were learning as part of their contract with CCW.

To initiate this case study, I arranged to meet the CCW's language officer in November of 2002 for an interview. Following on from this I was also able to meet several 'language mentors' within the organisation for further discussions. 'Language mentors' are designated Welsh speaking staff within the CCW in order to provide assistance to non-Welsh speaking Welsh learners. As a result of these meetings, I was able to gain access to a number of relevant documents provided an evaluation of the body's bilingual service. Moreover these documents provided indications of how the current bilingual service, and the gaps within it, could be improved or maximised. These documents then provided information on how bilingualism was regulated within the CCW. This documentary evidence was also combined with participation in certain social events aimed at further learners' use of Welsh. These included for example lunch time walks or evening trips to the pub in which learners along with their mentors would get together in order to encourage the use of Welsh. These social events therefore provided the opportunity for informal discussions with members of staff in which any problems or anxieties which staff had regarding learning Welsh or the CCW's bilingual policy could be identified. These investigations then formed the basis of the case study on the CCW which constitutes chapter eight.

Also considered in chapter eight however is how the situation of bilingualism within the CCW can be dichotomised to the difficulties that smaller voluntary groups face in attempting to provide a bilingual service. In particular here is the reliance of such voluntary groups on voluntary translators. The work of the Menter Iaith Initiatives is cited here as the key facilitator of bilingualism at the level of voluntary organisations.

The data used to illustrate this particular problem is based upon a survey undertaken by Menter Gwynedd who are based in Porthmadog. While this data is only briefly referred to, it is intended to merely provides a basis for contrasting bilingualism within large public or governmental bodies on one hand with perhaps the difficulties of bilingualism within smaller or grassroots voluntary associations.

Summing up the remainder of this thesis therefore, the following three chapters form the presentation of the empirical fieldwork undertaken. In the next chapter (chapter six) I begin with the investigation into Welsh language pressure groups, focusing in particular on the *Welsh Language Society*, *Cymuned* and less prominent organisations such as *Cylch Yr Iaith*. Then in chapter seven, I contrast this with the case study on *adult learners of Welsh*, in particular focusing on the difficulties that learners face in their attempts to both accommodate, and participate within, the Welsh speaking space. And then thirdly in chapter eight I refer to the situation of Welsh speaking students which emphasises attempts to reconcile moral attachments to the Welsh language on one hand and careers aspirations on the other. The regulating of bilingualism within bodies such as the *University of Wales* and the *Countryside Council for Wales* is then examined. This is then contrasted with the difficulties of bilingualism at the grassroots level of voluntary organisations. The thesis then concludes with chapter nine, which draws out areas for further research into the particular concerns surrounding the divisions around bilingualism and the Welsh language in Wales.

CHAPTER SIX

Maintaining Difference: Pressure Groups and the Role of the Sacred in Welsh-speaking Society

As was concluded within the theoretical outline of civil society (chapter 2) the twin processes of *rights* of participation (within the group) and *responsibility* (to the group), particularly in their attribution to specific communities, (sub)cultures or social groups, are key to the maintenance and reproduction of the norms and values of civil societies. In relation to specific communities or cultures, the organisations and institutions of civil society aim to encourage participation within the community or culture and a sense of responsibility to it, and to encourage conformity and adherence to dominant values. As was illustrated this emphasis is particularly prominent in the more communitarian theories of Amatai Etzioni and Michael Walzer. In addition however, the emphasis upon 'value internalization' is key to other theories as well such as Gramsci's ideological theory and Alexander's neo-durkheimian/culturalist theory. All in all therefore, it is concluded that all civil societies have a distinctive cultural and educative role, as the arena in which societal values, through encouraging participation and responsibility, are informally learned. This can in turn lead to a specific political programme aimed at renewing or developing civil societies.

As was raised in chapter 2, the political discourse of civil society, such as that voiced within the National Assembly, centres upon the desire to encourage or increase levels of participation and involvement within civil society organisations. It is upon this that civil society is judged. However, participation can only be encouraged to the extent that it remains voluntary and is consensual. As such, the moment participation within a certain group is forced then it is no longer part of civil society.

Within this chapter I will argue that the theory of civil society outlined above is central to the development of a bilingual society in Wales. If the language of civil society is applied to this context, then encouraging participation and action within a bilingual society becomes a distinctive political programme not only for government but primarily for Welsh language groups within civil society. The aim of these groups

being to encourage participation through the learning and social use of the Welsh language. There are a range of pressure groups, organisations and institutions that can be referred to here. It is these activities that I shall be referring to in this and the subsequent empirical chapters. Within this chapter however I wish to bring in the analysis by drawing on the activities of the political and cultural defence of the Welsh language through pressure groups such as Cymuned. In doing so, I will also provide an outline of the political climate in which Cymuned and the notion of the civic responsibility to learn Welsh emerges. Before engaging in this directly however I also wish to provide an outline of the importance of the Welsh language for its speakers in terms of the defence of civil society. First of all in this chapter therefore, I will argue that in order to help explain the weight given to preserving the 'Welsh speaking community' it is necessary to understand it in terms of its mobilisation at points of crisis. Following the Gramscian and Durkheimian elaborations on culture, it is possible to understand the recurrent politicisation of the Welsh language in terms of *periodic sacredization* at moments of crisis of social order, particularly as a result of perceived rapid changes due to fluctuations in the market economy.

Sacred/Profane and the Periodic Sacredization of the Welsh language

The framework of cultural sociology identifies "culture" as a system of meaning through which meaning is symbolically structured and applied in a binary fashion – e.g. good/bad, self/other, insider/outsider, civic/ethnic. Another example of such classification is "sacred" and "profane". In this fundamental classification, the "sacred" represents what is "good", what is to be respected, revered, protected, precious or pure, to be guarded or preserved. On the other hand the "profane" represents what is "poor", what is common, banal, everyday, and impure. Characteristically, in that they are symbolic opposites, the "profane" implies a violation of the sacred. While Durkheim originally applied this dichotomy to the religious realm, the classification of the symbolic meaning of culture into sacred and profane within the recent body of 'cultural sociology', is considered "a basic symbolic dichotomy which underlies all kinds of cultural systems" (Edles, 2002:7)

The sacred must therefore be segregated from the profane because it is in danger of being lost, wiped out, colonised by the profane or mass/popular or 'low' cultural

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forms. It is also through the achievement of sacred status that intellectuals are imbued with the authority and responsibility for ensuring the maintenance of what is sacred. The role of social movements and intellectuals is that of making certain cultural forms sacred and arguing for their need to be separated from the profane. Following a number of cultural sociologists (Alexander, 2000; Edles 2002) this symbolic classification is a near fundamental characteristic of all groups within all cultural systems. As such the defining of the sacred/profane occurs 1) *within* minority or subordinate groups as well as majority or dominant groups and also 2) between groups in terms of their relationship. Welsh speakers, a social group structured in relation to language, therefore have a particular symbolic relationship to the Welsh (sacred) and English (profane) languages, cultures and identities in terms of the internal violation of the sacred (Welsh) by the profane (English). Thus what is known as 'Wenglish' 'bad Welsh' represents a partial violation, while the English speaking Welsh constitutes a complete violation, as does the more ambiguous notion of Welsh speakers speaking English to other Welsh speakers. The point of this task is to try and make sense of the range different experiences and attitudes towards the Welsh language/culture by structuring them in relation to this classification.

As is identified by both Durkheim and Gramsci, modern societies experience periodic sacredizations of otherwise banal/everyday activities or symbols at moments of perceived crisis of social order in which symbolic attachments are made. The shared meanings attached to cultural forms, such as language have a sacred disposition or can take on a sacred disposition when stimulated by emotional appeals or threats. The search for the sacred involves the collecting and classifying of the numerous "stratified deposits" (Gramsci, 1971:234) or, in other words, all of "the previous ways of thinking that make up a culture" (Thompson, 1995:234). From both Gramscian and Durkheimian perspectives, which were outlined previously as the traditions from which the cultural conception of civil society draws, the concern is with how modern societies retain something from the pre-modern. This leads to the production of a self-understanding based upon the internalisation of numerous historical processes. We can thus understand boundary maintenance in relation to the Welsh speaking society/community in these terms and the intervention of Welsh language intellectuals or leaders and/or social movements can be viewed as making the notion of the Welsh language community, and its survival, sacred. This is not to resort to the "modernist fallacy" of placing the Welsh language and Welsh speakers

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on the side of tradition and in opposition to modernity (Williams, 1992; Williams and Morris, 1999). Rather it is to place the Welsh language group within a wider framework which contends that *all* modern societies retain something from the pre-modern. Such an approach would be coterminous with the work of Anthony Smith on nationalism and their ethnic roots (Smith, 1986). In this respect it is not the Welsh language itself that is retained but a particular aspect of it, the 'Welsh speaking rural community' which becomes sacredized at moments of crisis.

As will become apparent, such periodic sacredization occurs specifically in relation to the intensification of perceived threats such as declines in the demographic make-up (ratio of Welsh speakers to in-migrant non-Welsh speakers and out-migrant Welsh speakers) and/or fluctuations within the housing market, leading to the out-pricing of Welsh speakers. Other crises may also be drawn upon to raise awareness which relate to the exclusion or marginalisation of Welsh speakers or issues of linguistic equality. Throughout this chapter therefore I will be drawing on this theoretical framework of sacredization and the classification of sacred/profane in order to illuminate empirical findings.

Language Politics in England and Wales

As has been stated earlier, civil society contains a discourse on trying to encourage people to welcome and accommodate 'strangers' or 'foreigners' within their communities. What happens however, if those strangers speak a different language to that spoken within the community? What expectations or obligations are there from each group to accommodate, linguistically, the other? Clearly the outcome of such contact between language groups depends considerably on the specific power relationship between these groups. This in turn relates to the relative size, prestige and bilingualism of each group. Is it the sole responsibility of the host group to accommodate strangers? Or does the stranger or the immigrant group also have some obligations to respect and integrate into the host culture? This is not only a normative question but an empirical one. For what degrees of accommodation do each group, host and incoming, actually achieve.

In October 2001, the current home secretary David Blunkett stimulated a debate over citizenship in the UK by suggesting that new immigrants to Britain should 'take citizen classes'. Under the reported plans, new citizens to the UK would

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be obliged to learn English and be "schooled in British democracy and culture" (BBC News, 2001a). As David Blunkett states himself, "a political community can require new members to learn about its basic procedures and fundamental values...I believe we need to educate new migrants in citizenship and help them to develop an understanding of our language, democracy and culture" (BBC News, 2001a). Although it was unclear whether these proposals would apply to all newly arrived immigrants or merely those applying for British citizenship, this was clearly an attempt to establish a 'national home' in the aftermath of the riots in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in the summer of 2001 and the events of 'September the 11th' later that year.

In the weeks following September 11th for instance, newspapers had been full of tales of 'British-born Muslims' with 'unmistakably British accents' talking of their desire to fight for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Most shocking of all for some, was that such declarations implied a sense of duty to Islam that overrides their affiliation to Britain. This in turn led to demands that such individuals should be stripped of their British Nationality or even prosecuted for treason (The Guardian, 2001).

Likewise, the need to instil a sense of belonging was also raised within the government commissioned reports into the riots in the various cities of northern England. The main Cantle report commissioned by the Home Office for instance centred on deep-rooted segregation and "a complete lack of contact between some communities" as the underlying cause of the riots (Home Office, 2001). It also warned, that "segregation, albeit self-segregation, is an unacceptable basis for a harmonious community and it will lead to more serious problems if it is not tackled". In his response to these reports, David Blunkett went on to state that "today's reports show that too many of our towns and cities lack any sense of civic identity or shared values" (BBC News, 2001b).

Of central concern to such protagonists therefore is the need to create "shared values" or a sense of "civic consciousness" which would help bind and integrate Britain's ethnic diversity. However, while these issues may be a fairly recent concern for the Westminster Labour government, for Wales and Welsh speaking communities the issues of in-migration, language learning and self-segregation have been longstanding. Coincidently or not, the issue of in-migration into Welsh speaking communities was most vociferously raised, immediately prior to the above events. In January of 2001, the issue of (English) migration into the majority Welsh speaking

communities was raised on a BBC Radio Wales talk show by one Plaid Cymru councillor, Seimon Glyn, chairman of Gwynedd County Council's housing committee. As he states "if they (the English) were coming here under strict monitoring and control, were made aware of the cultural aspects and made to learn Welsh there wouldn't be a problem…They're coming here and you know frankly, they're telling us 'listen we're the new kids on the block and you do as we say now'" (cited in Lamport, J., 2001:1).

The contemporary debate however took another turn when BBC's Question Time came to Caernarfon in February of 2001. During the programme the longstanding antagonism between the Labour Party in Wales and Plaid Cymru, not least on the question of the Welsh language, also seemed to re-emerge when Glenys Kinnock, a Labour MEP, challenged the Plaid Cymru leader, Ieuan Wyn Jones to dismiss Seimon Glyn from the party. The 'Seimon Glyn affair' however was not the first occasion that the accusation of 'racism' had been applied to the Welsh language movement (see also Denney et al 1992; Williams, 1994).

That the defence of Welsh speaking communities allegedly amounts to nationalism and even racism therefore has a long history. What was particularly significant about the Seimon Glyn incident however was that it was followed by the establishment of a new Welsh language pressure group - Cymuned. Historically, Plaid Cymru and the Welsh Language Society (Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg) have represented the main political voices of the Welsh speaking communities (Rawlings, 1979). With Cymuned however, a new group has come to the fore, which threatens, particularly the Welsh Language Society, to emerge as the most prominent agitator. At the same time, it is against specific members of Cymuned that accusations of racism have been most fervently raised. In particular *The Welsh Mirror* and its editor Paul Starling (2001) has taken it upon itself to alert the people of Wales to what is believed to be the racist intentions of the group. Such labels however need to be subjected to greater scrutiny.

In reply to attacks on Seimon Glyn and the view he was propounding, Simon Brooks, a founder member of Cymuned produced a collection entitled "*Llythrau at Seimon Glyn*" (Letters to Seimon Glyn) which was considered to demonstrate the widespread support for Seimon Glyn's intervention at a time when the voice of the Welsh speaking communities was seen to be going unheard. As such, the only intervention that would get people to listen was one that would rock the boat.

However what these accusations and counter-accusations of racism, is a polarisation of the language debate and an inability on both sides recognise the complexity of a situation in which there are legitimate views both for and against. As McGuiness has argued (2002) the attack on Cymuned by the Welsh Mirror, and the very accusation of racism, is merely the latest manifestation of the historical hostility that certain sections of the mainstream media have held against a minority language group and indeed against anything that poses a potential threat to the status quo of the homogenous nation-state.

While the number of Welsh speakers does appear to have stabilised around the 20-25% mark, the number of communities in which Welsh is the majority language continues to decline unabated. For example, a comparison of the census figures between 1961 and 1991 shows that the percentage of communities in which at least 80% could speak Welsh has dropped from 28.1% to just 3.2%. In light of the emphasis on perception it is important to point to the very real process by which inward migration of non-Welsh speakers has an effect on the maintenance of the Welsh language. This is illustrated in **Table 6.1** on the following page.

Table 6.1 Migration data for the districts of Welsh speaking Wales

District	% of Welsh speakers	% in-migration from outside Wales	% of in-migrants Welsh speaking
Ynys Mon	62.0	88.5	17.3
Arfon	74.6	82.8	27.6
Dwyfor	75.4	87.2	28.4
Meirionydd	65.4	78.7	24.1
Ceredigion	59.1	81.2	21.3
Preseli	24.4	83.3	8.9

Source: **OPCS** (cited in Carter, 2002)

Significantly, the National Assembly in its recent policy review of the Welsh language has recognised the negative effect that in-migration of non-Welsh speakers has, along with other things, on the sustainability of *Welsh speaking* communities.

Given this reality, it is understandable that minority groups would wish to construct boundaries between themselves and the more dominant culture. As the political philosopher Walzer (1983) states: "the distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived of as a stable feature of human life. If this distinctiveness is a value, as most people...seem to believe, then closure must be permitted somewhere". In a similar vein, Kauffman (2000) argues that in the face of language decline and threat, in which the magnitude of this threat is established, stronger barriers to entry for newcomers should be tolerated. And as Glyn Williams has stated elsewhere, in his exchange with Denney et al (1992), it is precisely by viewing such claims for special rights as 'racist' that such claims are pushed to the margins.

However in many ways the riposte, as embodied in *Llythrau*, employs the same discursive move as its accusator. For instance, it is more than likely that Seimon Glyn would have received letters that were critical of his views. Yet all of the letters within this collection were supportive of his views, bar one. The only unsupportive letter within this collection was by the neo-nazi group COMBAT 18 simply stating "WE KNOW WHERE YOU LIVE". While not dismissing the significance of this single letter, its inclusion as the *only* oppositional view performs the same function of de-legitimising and extremising any position that disagrees or is critical of the content of Seimon Glyn's statement. Consequently, the complexity of this matter, not least on the difficulties of immersion, are never addressed.

Unquestionably however, the recent English debate on citizenship has certain implications for the debate on newcomers to Wales. For instance, Cymuned has been able to justify its principles on the grounds that the Westminster Labour government has drawn up proposals regarding the need for newcomers to learn English: "Cymuned believes that the Labour government ought to be consistent on this matter, making it clear that it is expected that newcomers into Welsh-speaking areas will learn Welsh" (Cymuned, 2002:5) Similarly as one of Cymuned's founders, Simon Brooks states: "Blunkett is proposing far stronger measures [than we have in mind] to tie language in with citizenship...I think we have a greater moral right to do that than he has because no one could begin to claim that the English language is in danger". There would appear therefore a certain similarity, albeit ironic, to these two debates. For what is present in both of the 'English' and 'Welsh' contexts is a concern with the need to establish 'norms of acceptable behaviour' and a sense of responsibility to the

community. As Levitas (1998:2) points out the idea of community along with ideas such as social exclusion, inclusivity and civil society, is a central part of New Labour's political language and as many have since pointed out, the use of such terms has also fed down to the National Assembly for Wales (Day, G. et al, 2000). Likewise the term 'community' is also recognised as central to the ideology of Welsh nationalism (McAllister, 1998b, 2001).

As such these ideas are present within the arguments of Welsh language pressure groups such as Cymuned. It would be useful therefore to refer directly to some of Cymuned's own documents[1].

Cymuned and in-migration

As stated within the resolutions adopted in their Annual general meeting held at Harlech, 20th April 2002, Cymuned adopts the following aim and philosophy (2002:1):

> Cymuned's proper task will be to act on behalf of Welsh-speaking communities where ever they exist in Wales...Cymuned will be an anti-colonial and anti-racist organisation: it will respect every nation, language and race and will regard each as equal; and will state that each nation has the right to exist *in its proper communities and territories*; and that no nation has the right to colonize the communities and territories of another nation (italics added)

In practical terms it campaigns for the following (2002:2):

1) controlling in-migration into Welsh-speaking areas
2) checking outward migration through the provision of jobs and housing
3) assimilating in-migrants linguistically
4) establishing Welsh as the main language of the Welsh speaking areas

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[1] It is not my intention here to provide a critical analysis of Cymuned but merely to illustrate how certain perspectives within the Welsh language movement appear to be encapsulated by notions of community and social responsibility.

Moreover, as stated in its submission to the Assembly's culture committee in November 2001 (2001:18):

> Cymuned believes that newcomers in Welsh-speaking communities have a *civic responsibility to learn Welsh*...We also believe that Welsh-speaking areas have a responsibility too; the responsibility to facilitate the task of teaching Welsh to newcomers, making it as attractive, effective and convenient as possible (italics added)

This last point argues for the need for reciprocity and the need for commitment on the part of both Welsh and non-Welsh speakers to promote the common good. This task is further reinforced in the following statement (2001:13):

> Cymuned calls upon the Government of Wales to provide sufficient resources and also calls upon its own members and branches to help newcomers in the task of learning Welsh and thereby assimilating into their new community...The Welsh language has to be a social tool to *condition* learners to expect to live their lives through the medium of Welsh (italics added)

In this chapter so far, it has been argued that within Welsh language pressure groups such as the Welsh language society and Cymuned, hand in hand with their more political agendas such as lobbying and interaction with government and direct protests and demonstrations aimed at raising awareness, there is a clear cultural concern within civil society surrounding inclusion within the community, itself premised upon individuals 'internalising' the shared values. While the concern with community is a longstanding one for Welsh language groups, in the more recently established group Cymuned, we can see the explicit exposition of these notions. In particular the emphasis is placed upon participate within and responsibility to *the* community. And as is reflected within the literature on community orientated theories of civil society, this raised critical questions regarding *which* community. Nevertheless within Cymuned, a key emphasis is placed on the *responsibility* that applies to both Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speaking newcomers. We therefore have two expectations: firstly, that newcomers make the effort to participate and learn Welsh; and secondly, that local residents (presumably Welsh speaking) undertake the responsibility of

encouraging the involvement of newcomers. Welsh speakers therefore not only have the responsibility to speak Welsh to newcomers and do so in a manner that facilitates their learning, but also to involve new Welsh speakers in their natural social activities. What is of significance therefore is that emphasis is also placed on the rights of non-Welsh speakers to not only learn Welsh but to become an integrated part of Welsh speaking community life.

The premise of mutual accommodation as a basis for inclusion/exclusion is outlined by one Cymuned member Jerry Hunter (2002:3) as follows:

[Cymuned] believes that the huge influx of people who refuse to learn the Welsh language into Welsh-speaking communities must be addressed. We welcome the in-migration of individuals from non-Welsh backgrounds into Wales who learn the Welsh language and contribute to cultural and social life: we believe that they add to the diversity of experiences that exist in Wales. But we do not believe that an influx into our communities of individuals who refuse to respect the existence of a minority culture is conducive to social justice, multiculturalism or linguistic diversity

In examining this passage in relation to the model of gradients of MLA outlined earlier, the boundaries between MLA and non-Accommodation are not entirely clear. Firstly we have those who 'learn the Welsh language' then those who 'contribute to cultural and social life'. It is not clear whether the former is viewed as a pre-requisite to the latter, or, whether the latter does not require the former. As I have stated earlier, people have participated in MLA in ways other than learning the language themselves. Contributing to the culture could for example mean non-Welsh speaking parents sending their children to a Welsh-medium school, it may mean participation in Welsh-speaking social activities or cultural events. Alternatively it may even mean a deliberate non-involvement out of a concern with not wanting to prevent a group from speaking Welsh. None of these actually lead to learning the language oneself. Secondly non-Accommodation occurs on the basis that individuals 'refuse to respect the existence of a minority culture'. Again this lacks clarity because it is possible to respect, recognise and have a supportive attitude to minority language rights and cultural difference in general without actually behaving differently or acting upon one's principles.

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The point being made here is whether the problem is with those who do not respect or with those who may or may not respect but either way do not learn the language or contribute to the culture. In other words, there would appear to be a collapse of attitudes, values and principles on one hand and behaviour or social action on the other. The degree of MLA required is not clear. Perhaps more clarity as to the degree of MLA required is present upon the issue of learning provisions. As Hunter (2002:3) also states:

> Cymuned also campaigns for the right of non-Welsh speakers to learn the Welsh language, and to be supported by the State to do so. We campaign for those who wish to learn to receive language tuition free of charge and to receive compensation for any economic loss incurred as a result of time away from the workplace learning the language. Cymuned is also committed to the equality of all Welsh speakers, and for Welsh learners to be integrated successfully into Welsh-speaking society.

The issue of the 'equality of all Welsh speakers' as this passage puts it could be understood in two ways. It could be referring to the equality of Welsh speakers in relation to majority language speakers – what might be regarded as inter-group relations. But it could also be referring to equality between Welsh speakers – or intra-group relations. As I would argue, recent studies tend to be preoccupied with inter-group relations – relations between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers (e.g. Giggs and Pattie, 1992; Williams and Morris, 1999). As a result questions concerning differences in terms of competence and differences in spoken Welsh, particularly the use of English words while using Welsh are not so often addressed. And if we move beyond 'Welsh speakers' to all those who have had educational contact with Welsh, to include all those who have received some form of Welsh education, then issues of equality and participation become even more pertinent. For it is often feelings of disinheritance that underlie attitudes of the non-Welsh speaking Welsh to the Welsh language.

In analysis of the Cymuned's documented aims and a discussion of the activities of members the crux of the matter appears to be the degree to which participation of non-Welsh speakers within Welsh speaking civil society is either encouraged and welcomed or pressured and/or not really welcomed. This can be taken

further by examining arguments surrounding the non-inclusion of English within Welsh speaking institutions.

A bilingual Wales for whom?

In its policy review of the Welsh language *Our Language: Its Future*, published jointly by the Culture Committee and Education and Lifelong Learning Committee in 2002, the National Assembly sets out its aim of creating a bilingual Wales. The following passage, typical of other references through the document, defines 'a bilingual Wales' in the following way:

> In a truly bilingual Wales, both Welsh and English will flourish and be treated as equal. A bilingual Wales means a country where people can choose to live their lives through the medium of either or both languages"

This appears on one level both an ambitious and committed task. It implies the availability of a full range of bilingual public and commercial services thus enabling anyone to live their daily life wholly through the medium of Welsh. This of course also applies to the right to use English throughout Wales as well. Yet there is a positive and negative to this. On the positive side, it involves bilingualising situations in which Welsh is rarely used. This process is illustrated through the growth of the numbers of Welsh speakers in areas such as Gwent and Cardiff. On the negative side however, it would appear to justify the bilingualisation of settings that were monolingually Welsh. This is a difficulty between two types of bilingualism: that of i) parallel bilingualism and of ii) integrated bilingualism. I shall illustrate these with use of policy documents and activist statements:

For i) parallel bilingualism, the maintenance of minority language groups is through the establishment of separate parallel institutions in their own language. For ii) integrative bilingualism, the concern is the equal participation of both minority and majority languages within the same common institutions. The dichotomy is in many ways a false because even in single bilingual institutions there is a tendency to compartmentalise the minority language – for example within University colleges. For proponents of i), integrative bilingualism is perceived not as leading to equality

between groups but to the further subordination of the minority group. One example of this is the pressure group *Cylch Yr Iaith* (The Welsh Circle) in which activists have been involved in the Television Licence Refusal Campaign, for which a number have been fined, as part of their opposition to the bilingualisation (or anglicisation as they see it) of both S4C and Radio Cymru. Declining numbers of speakers and listeners have led both S4C and BBC Radio Cymru to introduce the use of the English language in Welsh language channels as an attempt to attract more (non-Welsh speaking) viewers and listeners. This is also supported by the argument that it encourages non-Welsh speakers to both learn Welsh and participate in Welsh speaking cultural activities.

Since September 1999, a number of Welsh speakers have refused to pay the statutory TV license on the grounds that the increasing presence of the English language on both S4C and Radio Cymru is in breach of the Broadcasting Act. As one activist (Ieuan Wyn) arguing against this sort of bilingualism on S4C, states (Cylch Yr Iaith, 27/8/99):

The Broadcasting act which gave birth to the channel, with its statutory direction to "prepare programmes in Welsh". It was for this that people asked, fought and suffered. Note that it was not for programmes in Welsh and English and not for programmes in Welsh with some English content, either...What would be the situation if the National Eisteddfod and local Eisteddfodau should follow S4C and begin to prepare English competitions and performances?

And similar statements referring to the use of English on one Welsh language programme on S4C, Heno (Tonight), are made by other activists such as Eirwen Meiriona Gwynn (Cylch Yr Iaith, 17/8/99):

We object to the unnecessary inclusion of English in *our* programmes...These channels were established for Welsh speakers. There are plenty of other channels in English. English interviews are included far too often, without any attempt at voice-overs...*And too often the Welsh used is incorrect, untidy, and full of English words and phrases.* (italics added)

This above statement would appear to epitomise the issue regarding 'proper' or 'sacred' Welsh. What such statements argue for is the importance of separate or parallel bilingualism in which there are minority language institutions in which the majority language is not allowed to enter (Rule 2). As a result, within protectionist spaces, such as S4C, 'bilingualism' is referred to negatively as 'Anglicisation'. This was clearly evident among the protesters themselves who held up banners stating: "Sianel Ddwyieithog i Gymru? Dim Diolch" ("A Bilingual Channel for Wales? No thanks"). The following statement by Ieuan Wyn also illustrates the need for such separatism:

> Because it is the minority that is bilingual they fail to integrate the majority into the community. Thus the only defence minority-language speakers have against being absorbed by the majority is to maintain their difference through creating separate parallel institutions in their own language. Opening the door to the majority language must be seen in terms of *breaching the defences by an enemy which, after it gains admission, will certainly take complete possession of the fortress*. (Italics added, Cylch Yr Iaith, 27/8/99)

Such remarks are consistent with the notion of periodic sacredization. The sacredness of Welsh, as opposed to the profanity of English, is constructed not only in moral/political terms (i.e. the right for Welsh to continue to exist) but also in terms of aesthetic quality. The defence of minority cultures for instance are often imbued with an aesthetic dichotomy. For instance an analogy with ecological and natural beauty is often made: "if the Welsh language was a dying species of tree or an animal on the verge of extinction then you would protect it from invaders wouldn't you". This particular episode therefore, although referring to S4C in particular, perhaps gives us the understanding into the argument *against* the use and presence of English within the settings of Protectionist usage of Welsh. Because of this, bilingualism should take place outside these settings but not within them. Bilingualisation of such settings is thus interpreted as Anglicisation. This is one of the criticisms brought up by Cymuned in relation to the National Assembly's policy review of the Welsh language. As they state in similar fashion to Cylch Yr Iaith:

Cymuned is deeply dismayed by proliferating evidence that a flawed conception of bilingualism, and of 'equality' between the two languages, is being used as a justification for diluting the use of Welsh in settings that formerly were securely monolingual. At a community level, this includes bilingualising such activities as school assemblies and school concerts in majority Welsh speaking communities (The centrality of the school to the life of a community, particularly a village community, surely needs no emphasising) and the devising, for the purposes of bilingual signage policies, of English names for places where none have ever existed or been needed.

Such issues are complex. Following the model of linguistic accommodation, the kind of bilingualisation argued against here would appear to based on the Rule of 'accommodative use of English' rather than an attempt to establish mutual linguistic accommodation in which the incentive to learn and use Welsh is in place. As Cymuned go on to state:

> the effect of developments such as these is to move further from, rather than closer to, a situation in which it would be possible for individuals who wished to do so to live daily life wholly through the medium of Welsh. *It also further reduces the incentive for monoglot English speakers to learn Welsh and take a full part in community activities and interactions conducted in Welsh*... (italics added)

In institutionalising MLA therefore it should be clear that situations of *Welsh only* are also necessary. It implies that in order for bilingualism to develop across Wales, situations in which Welsh is the normalised language of use, are also required.

What's best for the language? Welsh across the whole of Wales or a separate Welsh speaking heartland?

In analysing the argument of Cymuned we can see that the responsibility of Welsh speakers to welcome and help non-Welsh speakers to integrate and learn Welsh can actually fall into the remit of Rule 2 Protectionist usage of Welsh (PUW) rather than Rule 3 Mutual Linguistic Accommodation (MLA). This is because Welsh speakers

have a responsibility not to resort to Rule 1 when speaking to Welsh learners but to continue to speak Welsh. From the perspective of Rule 2, the worst enemies of the language may be those Welsh speakers who are all too willing to speak English. Given the fact that Welsh and English are not equal, it is necessary to have settings of 'protectionist usage of Welsh'. However, they are not sufficient in a bilingual society which also requires the expansion of settings of MLA.

As was stated earlier, the establishment of the Welsh language pressure group Cymuned was seen as particularly significant in the wake of the perceived post-devolutionary consensus. The implication of such perceptions however, is that the emergence of Cymuned and the comments made by Seimon Glyn and others, represents some kind of regression to the pre-devolution era of the 1970's and 1980's where Welshness and the Welsh language where highly contested issues. Plaid Cymru for example, has made considerable ground in basing itself in a civic conception of Welshness, as a party for the whole of Wales. Cymuned therefore, rather than representing a new agenda, can be seen as the latest manifestation of a long line of pressure groups since the 1970's which see the maintenance of the rural West and northwest as majority Welsh speaking areas as their main aim. To understand this better we need to provide a brief overview of this agenda since the 1970's and its relationship to the moves in the 1980's by Plaid, and by Cymdeithas to a certain extent, to take an all-Wales perspective.

As Adamson notes: "that Plaid Cymru should have embraced socialism at a time when that ideology commands declining electoral support is ironic" (1991:137). Arguably however the kind of socialism presented by both Plaid and Cymdeithas was not of the state-administered kind: rather it can be considered as a decentralised or 'community socialism'. In a wider sense, it follows the New Left's reconciliation of minority nationalisms and socialism as evidenced within the writings of Raymond Williams. This doctrine of 'Community socialism', as rejection of both market and welfare state ideologies, is also explicit within Cymdeithas. As Janet Davies (1992) argues, referring to a number of their publications, there has been a shift in Cymdeithas since the 1970's from an exclusive preoccupation with the status of the Welsh language to an agenda that will "secure a foundation for the future of every community throughout Wales" (1999:4). Here the priority lies not with Welsh speaking communities or Welsh speakers but will all local communities and local people. And it is within their defined notions of 'local people' that they base their

arguments for housing and planning policies. As is stated in the 1992 Manifesto: "we no longer contend for the future of the Welsh language itself but also the future of our communities as Wales is decimated economically by the policies of the free market" (1992:1). Underlying this is its call for people to join in their notion of Cymdeithasiaeth (roughly translating as societies or communities which are both pluralistic and solidaristic). As such there are calls to widen their appeal to both other radical movements and other groups in need: "our struggle is no less than an attempt to create democracy in Wales...we totally oppose the prejudice against groups within our communities such as women, gay men and lesbians, ethnic minorities and the state dependents. Community freedom belongs to all" (1992:9). Like Cymdeithas, similar strategies of developing a 'popular front' were advocated within Plaid. As John Davies notes, there was a desire to "create bridges between Welsh nationalism and a wide range of movements including those of the trade unionists, the feminists, the anti-nuclear campaigners, the liberation theologists, the ecologists, the anti-racists and the advocacy of the validity of an English-language Welsh culture (Davies, 1985:150). Such rhetoric however speaks volumes when placed within Habermas' assertion of the collective identity of civil society. For on what basis can such diverse, marginal, and in some case objectively antagonistic, movements be considered as having a common interest?

Alongside this have been discursive shifts by within Plaid Cymru towards a more inclusive stance. Plaid have over a number of years of attempting to appeal to the electorate across the whole of Wales, increasingly adopted a more civic and multicultural discourse: "Plaid Cymru stand and fights for every single person in Wales whatever their background, their birthplace, the character of their skin, their religion or the language they speak - be it English or Welsh" (1998:1; italics added). However, the emergence of these notions of Cymdeithasiaeth and Community freedom in the late 1990's however occur at a time when the very relevance of Cymdeithas has been called into question by a number of Plaid Cymru AM's who are themselves former members (McAllister, 2001).

It might be illustrative therefore to highlight some of the differences between Cymdeithas and Cymuned. There are a number of clear differences over membership, methods of action, and overall aims. I shall deal with these in turn. Overall the aims of Cymdeithas and Cymuned would appear to differ in that Cymdeithas emphasise the need to develop Welsh across the whole of Wales while Cymuned emphasise the

defence of areas in which Welsh constitutes the majority language – namely the rural north and northwest. As put by one activist in Cymdeithas:

> Cymdeithas believe that the language should be developed across the whole of Wales and not to try and create pockets of Welsh speakers here and there like Cymuned are trying to do. The good thing about Cymuned is that they have shown the new government the importance of the language to people in Wales. *It is important though to include non-Welsh speakers* in the effort to develop the language, and to secure Welsh education for them. The Assembly needs far more powers in order for it to have an effect on the economy and communities in Wales and the next decade will be crucial to obtaining these new powers. It is needed to secure an agenda much greater than what is currently present. (italics added)

For many that one group looks at the former and another looks at the latter is not necessarily problematic. However, in an interview with one Cymdeithas member, a rather more sceptical view of Cymuned was given.

Interviewer: What is the relationship between Cymuned and the Welsh language society?

> (laughs) honest answer? I would say that Cymdeithas was quite surprised when Cymuned was set up because…the programme that Seimon Glyn was on, that radio program, Angharad Tomos was also on. They more or less said the same things put they all piled into Seimon Glyn because he was in Plaid Cymru. So they didn't actually say anything about Angharad's contribution and for about a month afterwards we were under real pressure to organise something with people ringing up the office in Aberystwyth saying 'when are you going to organize something about this?' not 'I want to organize something can we help?'. People were looking to Cymdeithas to organise something. And we organised a rally in Caernarfon which was one of the biggest rally's we've had in quite a while - about 500 people were there and again members of Cymdeithas Yr Iaith spoke and Seimon Glyn spoke and I think in a way that was the root of Cymuned, there was a small group of

people who saw the response that there was and they decided OK we're gonna pile in and organise something different.

And as another states:

> Publicly Cymdeithas has said the more the merrier. Privately we think it was a big mistake to launch Cymuned, that some of the people involved in Cymuned, not so much Seimon Glyn, but whose history goes back to Cymdeithas quite a while but were also on the *Adfer* wing and are quite right wing, their agenda is quite right wing and we wouldn't share that agenda at all really. And there are personalities as well. Cymdeithas was quite upset by the personalities who had been involved in Cymdeithas Yr Iaith in the past and had opted to join Cymuned without actually having any discussion with us. Maybe we didn't have any right to have a discussion, but they had spoken a lot but not done anything in the past, so I think some people in Cymdeithas were a bit bitter about that and are still not really impressed with the fact that Cymuned was set up. Personally I've spoke to quite a few people about it and the real test is whether it will go in 12 or 24 months because I can see why people reacted the way they did because there is a real crisis - it is much better I think to be seen to be involved in something new rather than in Cymdeithas which has been slogging for 40 years.

There would appear a certain inverse relationship between Cymdeithas and Cymuned. The more Cymdeithas (and Plaid) are seen as taking on an all-Wales, economic based and even international agenda, the more this creates a reaction to hold on to the language based agenda. Again however, this is not a recent manifestation but a longstanding issue. As identified in a systematic analysis provided by Rawkins (1979), the dynamism of the Welsh nationalist movement has been focused around the negotiation of a range of views within it. At one end, was the 'Fortress nationalism' aimed at defending the values of Welsh speaking rural Wales, at the other, the more recent emergence in the 1960's of 'Modernists' which in viewing Plaid Cymru as a social democratic alternative to the British Labour Party, focused on a more economic agenda to appeal to Wales' industrial electorate (Rawkins, 1979).

The tensions between these different fractions within the Welsh nationalist movement would certainly appear to be appropriate in understanding the emergence of groups such as *Adfer* in the 1970's and 1980's as Plaid Cymru undertook a more socialist and economic agenda. Similarly, it was in the 1980's that Cymdeithas first attempted to make inroads into the Labour dominated South Wales valleys and to forge networks with other radical groups in Wales. As was mentioned earlier, the rejection of devolution in 1979, and the incoming Conservative administration, and the events of the Miners' strike were in themselves crucial to the development of wider perspectives of both Plaid and Cymdeithas.

Yet as Harold Carter (2002) states, the decline and more recent resurgence have been more a case of wider changes throughout the Western world, out-migration, rural depopulation and counter-urbanisation on one hand and the shift from manufacturing to service economies on the other, rather than the result of internal/local language policies. The current situation of the Welsh language, its growth in urban areas and decline in rural ones, is therefore "not because of formal internal policies. The catalyst has been the way in which large scale socio-economic changes in the Western world have impinged upon the local situation. It is unlikely therefore that local initiatives to protect the language will be of themselves sufficient" (2002:46).

It is in light of these developments by both Plaid and Cymdeithas that we can see certain reactions leading to the establishment of other nationalist groups focused primarily on the majority Welsh speaking communities. In fact the formation of Cymuned itself is highly reminiscent of the formation of the Welsh-language separatist movement *Adfer* (The Return) in the wake of Cymdeithas' increasing take on developing an all-Wales perspective. As stated by Adfer's founder Emry Llewelyn (1973:2-3):

Y mae ein rhyddid cyfreithiol ar ei ffordd – dau dwyieithrwydd ymhob agwedd gyhoeddus cyn bo hir – ond nid dyma'r gwi'r ryddid. Fe feddwn ni'n dal heb ein gwir ryddid – rhyddid cymdeithasol. Fe feddwn ni'n dal yn lleifrifoedd di-rym yn ein pentrefi a'n broydd. Fe ddaw statws awynobol yfory – ond ble mae statws, eich rhyddid cymdeithasol chi? Beth ydw I'n feddwl wrth ryddid cymdeithasol? Rhyddid cymdeithasol yw medru cerdded allan o'r ty a gallu siarad Cymraeg yn naturiol a phawb a welech chi yn eich pentre

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a'ch bro...Ie, edrychwch o'ch cwmpas I weld eich gwir ryddid yn cael grebachu fwy fyw bob dydd. Oni theimlwch chi'r boen wrth weld y cyfan yn mynd fesul ty, fesul fferm, fesu pentrefi? Bob tro y mae yna gartre yn y fro Gymraeg yn mynd I estrom rydyn ni'n marw; bob tro mae dyn ifanc o Gymro yn gadael y fro gymraeg rydyn ni'n marw.

(Legal rights are on the way – there will be bilingualism in all public settings before long – but that is not true freedom. We will remain a minority in our villages and our land. Equal status will come tomorrow – but where is the status, your social freedom? What do I mean by social freedom? Social freedom would be to walk out of your home and be able to speak Welsh naturally with *everyone* you see in *your* village and *your* area...Yes, look around and you'll see your true freedom shrinking more and more everyday. Do you feel the pain from seeing it all disappear, the house, the farms, the villages? Every time a home in the Welsh speaking heartland goes to a stranger we die; every time a young Welsh speaking man leaves the heartland we die)

Within this statement with its emphasis of social or community rights are two ambiguities that need to be pointed to. Firstly, is the misconception of Welsh language and the Welsh speaking group as an *essentially or predominantly* rural or community language. As has been illustrated on numerous occasions (Davies, 1993, Aitchison and Carter, 1992) most Welsh speakers, for the last 150 years at least, always existed in comparatively *urbanised* areas such as Swansea or regional centres such as Aberystwyth, Carmarthen, Caernarfon and Bangor. As such talk of "theimlech chi'r boen wrth weld y cyfan yn mynd fesul ty, fesul fferm, fesul pentrefi (feeling pain from seeing it all go the house, the farm, the villages)" is an inaccurate and outdated picture of the Welsh speaking group. The second ambiguity, relating to the first, is the individualist (non-community) implications regarding urban settings, and Welsh speakers within urban settings. In this respect the growth of Welsh as a 'network-language' which exists within and cuts across both rural and urban settings is not considered.

As Trosset (1992) contends from her study: "some who support Plaid and Cymdeithas think Adfer are crazy, or at least misguided, to think it is either possible or desirable to gather all the Welsh speakers in the North West part of the country and

keep them separate from everyone else" (1992:62). The aims of such groups as Adfer have of course led to suggestions that Welsh nationalism has become more extreme (Denney et al, 1992). In reality however that there are different degrees of intensity and different political aims, an essential heterogeneity, is common to all social groups, whether they be minority or majority groups.

In relation to the surfacing of the incomers debate in the late 1980's two leading MPs within Plaid Cymru had quite significant points to make. Dafydd Wigley for example insisted that "the attitude of blaming immigrants for economic, social and cultural changes is reminiscent of much of the obnoxious talk of the European right" (the Guardian, 12/5/88). Plaid Cymru in attempting to represent the whole of Wales was seen as losing touch with its concern with the language and Welsh speaking heartland. Thus even in 1988 there were criticisms of Plaid Cymru on its slowness to respond to the question of in-migration and even suggestions that it wouldn't last the 1990's as a party (Thomas, 1988). As Dafydd Ellis Thomas states (1998) "I am the president of a national party which reflects the nation as it is". As it is, Wales has a minority bilingual Welsh culture, a majority monolingual Welsh culture and a third immigrant English culture. The role of the national party therefore being to represent all three of these groups. However the role of a national party, or indeed of any political party, is not just to represent current social relations but to have a vision of a future which it attempts to direct all constituents towards and to persuade them that such a path is the right one. As such, there is an element of non-directionality to claim that the main aim of the political party is to represent and respond rather than direct. In other words while the claim "to be Welsh is to be speak Welsh" is unrepresentative and exclusive this doesn't mean that it is unviable as an envisaged future! The issue then becomes a question of legitimising the process which ensures that non-Welsh speaking Wales participates in the process of developing a fully bilingual society.

As Carter (2002:50) states: "the notion that somehow the family farm and the old rural condition in which the language was a vibrant and central part can be restored is unreal…it follows that the future of the language must rest not solely and explicitly on the old heartland but on a wide bilingualism where the division of the past into Cymry Gymraeg and Cymry Ddi-Gymraeg no longer predominates". So "while it is apparent…that the divide that once separated Wales into two is weakening and the gradient of change along that line is diminishing. Nonetheless, any policy that results in the restoration of that divide is surely mistaken". Carter's brief analysis in

this article highlights the negativity and futility on attempting to concentrate on the rural North and Northwest heartland: "it tends to perpetuate the division of Wales into two, Welsh Wales and Anglo-Wales (Cymry Gymraeg and Cymry Ddi-Gymraeg) and stress the antagonisms between them" (2002:50).

While Carter correctly emphasises the need to treat the whole of Wales as a heartland, the conceptualisation of Wales into Welsh/English speaking however is more fundamental in sociological terms and therefore more difficult and complex to address than simply through the prescription of a few language policies. As I will now turn to in the next chapter, the dichotomisation of the social world into 'use of English' and 'Welsh only' is part of the way in which Welsh speakers, non-Welsh speakers and Welsh learners negotiate language differences and also how they attribute expectations of language use to different social settings. In other words, it is often ignored that part and parcel of this macro-analysis of language groups is a more micro-analysis of the ways in which Welsh/non-Welsh speakers construct and compartmentalise their social world. Moreover, the need for 'Welsh only' settings or 'Welsh mainly' settings is tied not only to the lesser status of Welsh in relation to English but also as a way of speaking Welsh while not contesting the 'ethic of politeness' from which Welsh speakers revert to English. In other words it is the need for settings in which all individuals present can be *assumed* to be Welsh speaking that underlies their importance.

New Directions or Old Divisions?

My survey of 20 prime activists in Cymdeithas (see chapter five), who have been involved since the 1970's and 1980's, shows for instance a distinct involvement in wider networks of radical democratic politics. I shall provide an outline of this survey, the other groups they are involved with and also an understanding of their political standpoint, in order to analyse this. Firstly, as one would expect, there is a strong relationship between Cymdeithas and Plaid Cymru. This also ties into involvement in a number of similar Welsh language organisations such as Welsh teaching unions such as UCCAC along with other groups such as Rhieni Dros Addysg Gymraeg. Moreover a significant number were also involved within the education sector as either teachers or lecturers or on the planning side within local government or with 'Mentrau Iaith' Language initiatives. As will be shown later, the significance of these

networks between Cymdeithas and economic and local government sectors in particular, is an indication as to how the enforcement of bilingualism can be inputted into these non-civil sectors. I shall turn to this later however. What I wish to point out at present is an increasing counter trend where by all activists interviewed had pointed to their involvement in a wider range of pressure groups since the 1980's. There would appear moves to go beyond the language in two ways:

1. firstly in attempting to gain a consensus with English speaking Wales
2. and secondly to gain a consensus with other radical pressure groups. E.g. environmental, feminist or peace groups.

As one current activist states in relation to this first point:

It goes back to the 1980's when Cymdeithas started working with anti-apartheid and were heavily involved in supporting different groups in the miner's strikes – before that there wasn't much linkage.

And this view is supported by another activist who states:

The miner's strike was pivotal because since the 1980's Cymdeithas' analysis has always been based around the importance of communities and they say what happened to the miners which was all about the defence of communities.

In relation to this interpretation of the miners' strike, it should be noted that Cymdeithas were themselves highly active in supporting the miners through petitions and undertaking various forms of collections. Such activities are often underemphasised in relation to the so-called divisions between Welsh speaking Wales and Labour Wales. As Cymdeithas state in their 1992 manifesto "…it was recognised that all this could not be achieved only by our own efforts, and the creation of a radical front in Wales. A great chance came within the clash of values between us and the government in the coal mining struggle. But the development of a radical front was impeded *by the reactionary elements of the left in Wales*" (italics added).

Given the historical divisions along this line, it is perhaps unsurprising, if not ironic, that Cymdeithas should have more success in gaining networks with other

radical groups with no specifically Welsh agenda. Again, examples of such involvements go back to the 1980's and women in Cymdeithas and Greenham common and the anti-apartheid and CND campaigns of that period. One recent example of this kind of networking is the All-Wales network 'Cynefin Y werin'. Founded and run by one activist in Cymdeithas this network has about 35 Welsh organisations, pressure groups, charities as its members and supporters. As the founder member states: Cynefin Y Werin is about

> "trying to address some of the issues to do with globalisation…personally, I don't think that Welsh can continue as a community based language if globalisation is allowed to unroll and this cannot be addressed without involving a lot of different organisations so it involves people from development agencies, from campaigning groups, cultural groups, from the women's movement, peace movement so it is a much broader type of network but one which seeks to bring in common issues that there are between those groups and asks us to work together on specific things"

Evidence of some reciprocation between environmental activists and those with Cymdeithas. This also relates to the establishment of a more formalised partnership such as the Countryside Council for Wales' sponsored Ogam language initiative in Pembrokeshire. This project can be seen as an example of reciprocation in that it aims to increase the understanding of the Welsh language culture among environmental groups while also raising awareness of the environment amongst Welsh speakers. However, in light of Cymuned and differences between Welsh language pressure groups, then perhaps more significant partnerships or links would be in terms of the development of a unified language movement. On this point, the Assembly itself however may perhaps have the greatest impact upon Welsh language pressure groups.

As Colin Williams asks, "how far will the Assembly be part of the process of creating (or re-making) Wales as a bilingual country as opposed to one comprised of two relatively discrete linguistic communities?" (Williams, 1998:113). Clearly therefore, the establishment of the National Assembly brings with it questions over the *direction* that Welsh society will take over bilingualism in the coming years. Namely will there be *one bilingual Welsh civil society* or *two Welsh civil societies* made up of majority and minority linguistic groupings. Having recently completed its

own review of the Welsh language, it has since stated its aims regarding the promotion of Welsh within a number of subsequent documents. Although pressure by Welsh language groups to develop distinctive policies aimed at the primarily Welsh speaking communities was avoided, there are perhaps two significant points to make. Firstly, is the emergence of a Labour government within the Assembly that is "wholly committed to revitalizing the Welsh language and creating a bilingual Wales" (NAfW, 2002a). Given the Welsh Labour Party's historical ambiguity towards both devolution and the Welsh language itself (see Chapters 2 and 3), this commitment would appear highly significant. And secondly, a recognition of the threats posed to the continuing use of Welsh within primarily rural areas:

> Whilst several factors have contributed to the decline in the use of the Welsh language, two of the most influential factors which have hastened this decline, particularly in rural communities, are the in-migration of non-Welsh speakers and the out-migration of local people due to the lack of affordable housing and of local employment (NAfW, 2002b: 24)

Undoubtedly the inclusion of this last statement reflects the input not only of Plaid Cymru but the involvement of Welsh language pressure groups within the review. On this point it is unquestionable that the National Assembly has changed the relationship between the language movement and government for the better. As a former chair[2] of the Welsh language society explains:

> I think they're (Assembly Members) quite open because for us between 1987 and 1997 the government would not speak to us at all. So this is a massive change for us. In the period between 1987 and 1997 the Welsh Office the various Conservative Secretaries of State had refused to hold any discussions with Cymdeithas because we were a law breaking organisation. Along with Sinn Fein we were the only two organizations that the Conservatives refused to discuss anything. So really there was no relationship whatsoever with one major exception really - in the early 90's when there was no dialect at all between Cymdeithas Yr Iaith and the government. The exception was when 2

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[2] Interview with Dafydd Morgan Lewis, Aberystwyth, March 2001.

of our members were imprisoned in 1991 during a campaign for a Welsh Property Act one of the members went on a hunger strike. So there was absolutely no relationship between Cymdeithas Yr Iaith and the Welsh Office up to 1997.

The current dialogue between Cymdeithas and the Assembly therefore represents a significant shift in itself. As well as doing their own monitoring of the bilingual nature of the Assembly, in June of this year they were invited to present a paper as part of the Assembly's Welsh Language review, itself a result of their own protests, and in this they have been able to make the case for a New Welsh Language Act. Furthermore, a number of members, who previously would not have been that active, have devoted themselves purely to lobbying within the Assembly. From another perspective therefore it is undeniable that the Assembly represents a more inclusive approach to governance. It is also doubtful whether a language review would have taken place without the pressure applied by civil society and the Welsh language society in particular.

Moreover, since its inception, calls have been made for a complete overhaul of the language movement, which in its present state is not considered able to deal with the new realities of governance and knowledge-based technologies. As Cynog Dafis (BBC News, 2000) states:

> The Welsh language needs a professional and effective movement working for it…without that there would be a big gap left in language politics in Wales…what proves this without question is the way the language has been almost completely ignored during the first year of the National Assembly

Such a movement would involve a range of existing pressure groups such as the Welsh language Society, Rhieni Dros Addysg Gymraeg (Parents for Welsh Medium Education) and Cefn coming together to form a single movement. Only such a united movement it is believed, in which groups put aside their differences, would provide the numbers for sufficient political pressure. However during conversations, many members of Cymdeithas suggested that they would resist such institutionalisation in which the production of policy documents and briefing papers along with lobbying the Assembly formed the main forms of action and pressure. In other words, they still

regard direct protest as the more effective form of political action. This is despite the fact that a number of members of Cymdeithas have themselves engaged to some degree in lobbying the Assembly. It is therefore significant that it is Cymuned itself that has emerged as the one Welsh language pressure group most involved in lobbying the Assembly with a number of submissions to relevant committees. Yet as illustrated by some members of Cymdeithas this emergence is considered to more of a marginalising and divisive campaign than a united and broad-based one.

Encouraging accommodation while not forcing it

This analysis of Cymuned provides an introduction to the issues of civil society in the context of language frictions. In general, it highlights how the rules of civil society, namely voluntarism and inclusivity, limit the extents to which or the ways in which it is possible to get majority language speakers to partake in MLA, whatever the degree. There is a delicate line here: clearly participation in MLA requires encouragement and persuasion. If participation in MLA is forced or pressured then it is clearly no longer voluntary. When it is no longer voluntary MLA becomes non-accommodation. We thus have a fine line of trying to encourage participation but not to the extent that it is no longer voluntary. This problem illustrates both the aims of Cymuned and some of the reservations regarding these aims.

A prominent example of such 'encouragement' and 'awareness raising' is the case of the Menter Iaith's "Welcome Pack" initiative. Since October 2001, estate agents in the three North Wales counties of Gwynedd, Conwy and Denbighshire have been willing to show their support of Welsh speaking communities by distributing so called "Welcome Pack's" or "Pecyn Croeso" to people thinking of moving into these counties. The aim of this initiative being to ensure a *suitable* welcome to people moving into the area. As Iddon Edwards from Gwynedd Welsh language Initiative states (2001: Menter Gwynedd, my emphasis) "The Welcome pack is undoubtedly a positive step towards solving the effect of the demographic movement of non-Welsh speakers to areas where the Welsh language is the predominant language...newcomers need to be *made aware* that Welsh is a living language". And as Meirion Davies goes on to say, (2001, Menter Iaith, my emphasis) "We're extremely grateful for the support given the Welcome Pack by local estate agents...they are after all *the first local point of contact* to most incomers and are

therefore ideally placed to promote the pack". These "Welsh Welcome Pack" provides newcomers with information regarding the state of the Welsh language within the area, listing the advantages of learning Welsh and how to go about doing so. This is backed up by a list of case studies of newcomers who have successfully learnt Welsh and who now take a full and meaningful role as members of their newly adopted communities. In addition it includes details of local authorities' educational policies regarding the teaching of Welsh in schools. The significance of these is they illustrate the placement of bilingual development at the level of 'awareness' 'informing' 'support' and 'encouragement' rather than in terms of 'responsibility' or 'duty'. And as highlighted above, the role of estate agents is clearly one of raising awareness and encouragement from outset rather than somewhere down the line. Clearly, the National Assembly itself is far more comfortable in dealing with bilingualism at these levels in that the packs were fully endorsed across the political spectrum. The extension of these packs has since been included as one of the recommendations within the language review.

Similar and additional indicators to the Welcome Packs include for example "Table top" language awareness leaflets for Cafes which aim at encouraging Welsh speakers to use Welsh rather than English and to encourage non-Welsh speakers to give Welsh a go. What is of interest therefore is whether this rather different emphasis upon awareness and encouragement pulls the rug from under the feet of groups such as Cymuned with their emphasis on community regulation and civic responsibility.

It is clearly unrealistic to presume that Welsh and English are *de facto* equal languages; rather they represent a minority language group and a majority language group respectively. As such to base bilingual development without taking this into account and without respect of separate protectionist institutions is clearly debilitative. MLA should not therefore be seen as replacing PUW but rather as complementing it as a means of integrating competing aims. For example in the case of the University, it is not the presence of separate Welsh speaking halls that represent 'the problem' but rather the establishment of adjacent and intermediate settings in which MLA can occur.

As has also been pointed out however, participation in MLA can not be based simply in terms of social obligation or responsibility that stems from the respecting and recognition of cultural differences. Participation more often than not requires some form of incentive or benefit, whether it be an economic one or otherwise. It is

by providing such incentive that consent is likely to be obtained. As such an important component of developing MLA is the integration of the learning and subsequent use of Welsh within the workplace. The significance of such integration is that it takes into account the structural barriers to learning Welsh. It is to the analysis of adult learners of Welsh, as an example of MLA that I shall now turn to in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Developing a Bilingual Civil Society: The Role of Adult Learners of Welsh

> The community of Welsh speakers can be viewed as a voluntary organisation, since every member of that community belongs to it by virtue of having chosen to speak one of two available languages. The most fundamental problem faced by voluntary organisations is how to retain their membership, how to encourage people to continue to want to volunteer (Trosset, 1992:64)

The above quote, taken from one anthropologist's study of Welsh speaking society, illustrates well the problem that Welsh speaking communities, like other threatened language groups, face – that is – the retention of their numbers in light of both the inward migration of non-Welsh speakers and the outward migration of Welsh speakers; and the non-reproduction of Welsh speakers in their shift to English. Both these migratory and homogenizing tendencies are tied up with wider sociological and demographic trends throughout the Western world. It also however reflects the specific standpoint of the Welsh learner; a standpoint from which ethnicity is clearly *chosen*. For it would be difficult to claim that one had *chosen* to speak one's mother tongue. In other words, there would appear a significant difference between first language Welsh speakers and in-migrant Welsh learners in terms of the extent to which ethnicity is seen as chosen. That said, even first language Welsh speakers may have the choice to subsequently use or not use one of the two languages available. This statement however also hints at the non-voluntary aspect of all voluntary associations that was raised in the theoretical discussions of chapters 4 – that retaining members, in terms of the maintenance of civil society, requires either:

1) a degree of incentive or economic motivation.

2) a degree of encouragement or informal persuasion.

3) a degree of closure in order to stabilise entry/exit levels.

There are of course many ways in which voluntary groups not only try to get new people to participate and to get existing members to *continue* to participate but also to get them to adhere to the norms of behaviour. The value of considering national and linguistic minority groups as civil society groups is that it highlights the *democratic* requirement of states to respect and in some cases support national and linguistic minorities – because while first language Welsh speakers do not necessarily *choose* to identify themselves as a distinctive group in the first place, they may *choose* to do so subsequently. As was highlighted earlier, within liberal and democratic theory it is precisely the practice of voluntary association that is considered to be sacrosanct – a core aspect of human existence. But what makes this complex is that people also have the right not to be part of such a system. It is precisely this right to not participate that defines the limits of voluntary association and the extent to which groups can persuade, encourage and try to convince individuals to participate. In other words, they can only persuade people to participate to the extent that such participation remains voluntary, although as was shown, distinctions between voluntarism and coercion are themselves subject to interpretation. There is a further question however, which is: what kind of responsibility is there on individuals to respect cultural norms and values and does this respect require some kind of participation? Is not a sense of moral responsibility itself one of the prime motivations, if not the prime motivation, for participation within voluntary groups whether they be social movements or whatever. Or alternatively is motivation more a question of incentive, financial or otherwise, a question of the benefits that we receive from participation in groups – a question of what participation has to offer? There are two aspects to this as far as the Welsh speaking group is concerned:

1. encouraging bilingual Welsh speakers to use Welsh rather than English and in doing so participate in the Welsh speaking group (Language Reproduction).

2. encouraging non-Welsh speakers to learn Welsh (Language Production).

Notions of Language Production and Reproduction stem from work by Nelde et al (1996), O'Raigan (1998) and Williams and Morris (1999) which are aimed integrating the situation of minority languages within general sociological analysis. In other words, to treat language groups as social groups and as subject to general processes of production and reproduction of social groups. In terms of social groups therefore, it thus deals with maintaining a *Welsh speaking* civil society through reference to both existing Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers. In this chapter I wish to concentrate on the second of these two aspects – the case of non-Welsh speaking adults who choose to learn Welsh – the Language Production of adult learners of Welsh. I will then refer to the first aspect in the next chapter when I examine the case of Welsh speaking students at Bangor University. Here however, I wish to address these issues by drawing on further empirical research undertaken with current Welsh learners, many of who are newcomers to Wales. For instance, are learners' motivations linked to any notion of social responsibility? And do they feel the kind of 'social pressure' or 'moral suasion' that forms an integral part of the value maintenance within *all* civil societies. Before answering this question directly, a brief background to the development and current provision of adult learning of Welsh needs to be provided.

A Background to Adult learners of Welsh

The continuing rise in the number of adult learners of Welsh is one of the most encouraging statistics for the future of the Welsh language. It also demonstrates a certain civic Welsh identity in terms of both the ability and willingness to integrate into the Welsh-speaking group. In 1993, 13,000 students enrolled on adult learning courses throughout Wales. In 1998, this figure was approximately 20,000 and this year (session 2001-2) there were approximately 22,000 enrolments on courses in institutions across the country (Welsh Language Board 2002). In 1993, a system of 8 consortia was established in order to service geographical areas corresponding to the 8 old counties of Wales – Gwynedd, Clwyd, Dyfed, Powys, Gwent, West Glamorgan, South Glamorgan and Mid Glamorgan. These are funded by the Further Education Funding Council. The aim of these consortia is to ensure that classes are offered in every single area and that classes are available for learners of all levels. Further to weekly classes taking place in Further and higher education establishments, schools and village halls, many businesses also provide in-house Welsh language courses (e.g.

the Countryside Council for Wales). Alongside these classes is the voluntary organisation CYD[1] established in 1984 based in Aberystwyth. Primarily organised by volunteers CYD organises regular social activities in order to give learners the opportunity to use their Welsh beyond the classes. The organisation has thousands of members nationally.

I shall not provide a methodological outline of the research on adult learners undertaken here as this has already been provided within the methodology chapter (chapter Five). What will follow in this chapter is a presentation of both the quantitative and qualitative data that was undertaken with the group of learners that were included in the study. As such we can begin by outlining some of the more general characteristics of the learners in question.

For instance dealing with the demographic make-up first, of the total 37 adult learners interviewed, 21 (56.8%) were aged 41 or above and 31 (81.1%) were aged 30 or above. In that the provision of adult learning is integrated into the category of adult education, there may be a problem in attracting potential learners between 18-30. This may be because people of such ages wishing to continue education tend to go straight in the further/higher education sector rather than the adult/lifelong sector. This confirms the perception of adult learners of Welsh as being 'middle-aged' with 24 (64.9%) between the ages of 35 to 60. Only 7 (18.9%) were between 18 and 30. That said there were more between 18 and 30 than over 60. This suggests that the learning of Welsh by adults is tied to a certain stage within the life cycle – that of being settled with the intention of remaining within that locality in the long term. Indeed, the vast majority of learners (32: 86.5%) stated that they envisaged remaining within their current location for the long-term. In addition to this, we can add that 27 (73%) were presently married and that 23 (62.2%) had children, of whom 11 were or had learnt Welsh in school. The importance of this as a motivational factor will be addressed later. But put simply at this stage, an underlying motivation for learning Welsh therefore is that they want or intend to live within Wales, or a Welsh-speaking area, for the foreseeable future.

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[1] It should be noted that the establishment of the 8 consortia as the main provision for Adult Learners of Welsh was not entirely supported among those involved in CYD (The Welsh Learners' Society). The point of conflict would appear to over whether emphasis should be placed on quantity that can be provided by the Consortia or the quality or Social context to learning that CYD provides. It is noticeable for instance that only a handful of the learners questioned in this study were also members of CYD.

Having dealt with age, we can now turn to the issue of gender. Of the total 37 respondents, 15 (40.5%) were male and 22 (59.5%) are female. The predominance of female adult learners of Welsh may relate to the gendered nature of both paid work and domestic labour. Given that many of the learning classes and summer schools tend to be in daytime hours they may require flexible working practices such as part-time work. Even in the evening it has the perception of being extra-curricular. In other words, unless the learning classes are integrated into the workplace, as it already is in some cases, there may be structural barriers for many full time workers to learn Welsh. Given that the majority of female workers tend to work part time and the majority of male employees work full time, then there is a relationship between adult education and flexible work practices. Furthermore, female workers are prominent in particular public sectors such as health, education, clerical/administration and personal and secretarial services. It is precisely areas such as these that are subject to the Welsh language Act which are required to ensure sufficient numbers of Welsh speaking staff in order to deliver public services. In addition to this, a more philosophical point may be made: as some would argue both minority language speakers (Williams and Morris, 1999) and women (Pateman, 1988) tend to be placed on the side of emotion as confined to the private sphere of the family rather than reason and public life in relation to the modernist dichotomy. From this perspective, minority languages come to be seen as appropriate to the realms of the family, nurturing, religion and as inappropriate to the realms of public life. And as a result, mothers might be more driven to keep up with their children's learning of Welsh.

Socio-economic status

Again, like adult education in general, the tendency is to attract the members of professional socio-economic groupings rather than the non-professional class. Related to this we have the lack of non-Welsh speaking Welsh-born individuals, the *Cymru ddi-gymraeg*, taking learning classes. Giggs and Pattie (1992) and Williams and Morris (1999) both highlight the subordinate professional status of Welsh born in relation to non-Welsh born employees in Wales. Giggs and Pattie (1992) however, also argue that non-Welsh speaking Welsh born tend to have lower occupational status than Welsh speakers. Although for Giggs and Pattie (1992) this is tantamount to elitism or social closure within the Welsh speaking social group, Williams and Morris (1999) interpret this differently. For them, census data in both 1981 and 1991 reveal

an over-representation of non-Welsh born in higher socio-economic groups such as professional and managerial categories and, conversely, an over-representation of all Welsh-born in unskilled, semi-skilled and agricultural categories (1999:33). For them such comparisons reveal the reality of a cultural division of labour. Thus rather than a case of elitism, the higher percentage of Welsh speakers compared to non-Welsh speaking Welsh born within professional and managerial socio-economic groups simply highlights the way in which Welsh speakers, as opposed to the non-Welsh speaking Welsh born, are "successfully resisting the cultural division of labour by resorting to an insistence on the relevance of Welsh for employment" (1999:33). Moreover, for Williams and Morris (1999), the reference was also made to how in some parts of Wales, this cultural division of labour is reinforced by the in-migration of the non-Welsh born social group (1999:34). As Day (2002) concludes however the case for a cultural division of labour is not conclusive in that Welsh speaking and the non-Welsh born groups may in fact occupy different labour market segments. If so then one could argue the presence of a dualistic elite in Wales in which Welsh speaking and non-Welsh born groups dominate adjacent labour market segments (see Chapter 3).

Either way, this would indicate a correlation between a failure to attract both lower occupational status and non-Welsh speaking-Welsh born. There is however a further category to add to this: that of Welsh speakers themselves who may wish to improve their current level of competence. Through discussions with tutors/administrators and patterns within the data, this category is the *least* likely to undertake adult Welsh learning. It is clear for instance that fluency in Welsh is not merely a question of communication but also of social identification. As such the Welsh speaker of lesser competence who undertakes learning classes represents a difficulty for his/her interaction with other first language Welsh speakers. As one Welsh speaker/learner stated: "Ie, mae Cymraeg yn iaith cyntaf...ond dw'in *ail-ddysgu*" ("Yes, Welsh is my first language...but I'm *re*-learning). To learn Welsh therefore firstly gives the impression of not being a native Welsh speaker, then requires confirming one's native credentials, and then requires justification for *re*-learning.

What we need to do now however is to ground these theoretical contributions in relation to class and learning Welsh by reflecting on the data. In order to identify potential class and social status specificities in relation to Welsh learning, the

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respondents were asked to give details of their employment history, of their spouse/partners employment history and their level of education. This was to simply examine the contention that the majority of adult learners tended to be of professional status with a higher education. **Table 7.1** for example, presents the current employment of each respondent (respondents who were retired were asked to give details of their main employment undertaken).

Type of Work	Frequency	Percentage
University/College Lecturer/Scientist	8	21.6
Other Scientist	5	13.5
IT Technician	1	2.7
Police Officer	1	2.7
Teacher	4	10.8
Administrative worker	6	16.2
Social Worker	2	5.4
Nurse	1	2.7
Clerical Worker	1	2.7
Catering	1	2.7
Self-employed	1	2.7
Student	2	5.4
Unemployed/Not in work	4	10.8
Total	*37*	*100.0*

Table 7.1 Current/primary employment of respondents

Clearly, as the table shows, given that the summer school was run by the University, there is a bias towards its employees, namely lecturers, and research scientists and also students. Also a number of the clerical and administrative workers were also employed by the University. Nevertheless, there is clearly a professional bias. In total, of all the occupations above, 29 of the 37, that is 78%, would be viewed as self-employed or employed professionals. And even if we disregard the 11 university employees, we can still see a clear professional bias to the respondents overall. This

was reinforced by asking details of the spouse/partners employment and also of education.

In outlining the professional status of the majority of learners, it is also noticeable that there is a clear public and service sector bias to the respondents. Particularly absent are respondents from the private sector. This could be related to the fact that the Welsh Language Act does not extend to the private sector, particularly with regard to the requirements of public bodies to provide a bilingual service.

Linguistic and national identities

The claim that bilingualism (knowledge of two languages) does not necessarily imply identification with both cultures can be aptly illustrated through the case of adult learners of Welsh. The following table shows the breakdown of learners' responses to how they would define their national identity:

National Identity	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Welsh	11	29.7	29.7
English	15	40.5	70.3
Scottish	1	2.7	73.0
British	8	21.6	94.6
Others	2	5.4	100.0
Total	37	100.0	

Table 7.2 National Identity and Welsh learners

As is clearly shown in the above table, 40% of learners identified themselves as English and 70% as other than Welsh. Moreover, of the 26 learners who didn't consider themselves as Welsh, only 3 stated that they were *hoping to gain a Welsh identity* as a reason for learning. The prominence of English identities here however leads us to another important breakdown – that of birthplace of learners and their length of residence in Wales. I shall outline these in turn:

	Place of Birth		Place of Upbringing	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Wales	11	29.7	12	32.4
England	20	54.1	21	56.8
Scotland	2	5.4	1	2.7
Europe	4	10.8	3	8.1
Total	37	100.0	37	100.00

Table 7.3. Birthplace/place of up-bringing of Welsh learners

In examining place of birth and place of upbringing the above table is concerned with the number of learners who consider themselves as from Wales and/or as having spent most of their life in Wales. As we can see, just under one third of learners were born and/or brought up in Wales, with the highest number of learners (just over half) being born and/or brought up in England. Significantly therefore, the greater number of Welsh learners would appear to be English born rather than non-Welsh speaking Welsh born. The following tables therefore deals with the 26 or 67.6% of learners who were neither born nor brought up in Wales (in other words have moved to Wales at a later stage in life) in order to establish their length of residence in Wales. As we can see in **Table 7.4** below, of the total number of in-migrant learners, half (50%) of the in-migrant learners have lived in Wales for over 5 years, and stated that they would like to remain in Wales for the remainder of their lives. It would appear that the longer the residence, the greater the likelihood of undertaking the learning of Welsh. It would be worthwhile to integrate these results into the wider statistics available on levels of migration in Wales.

Given the differences in levels of Welsh born and non-Welsh born within Wales, and also the different proportional levels of Welsh speakers in relation to the population of the areas, we could presume that these trends may be reversed in contrasting areas of Wales. For instance, in the Cardiff/Gwent area, due to factors such as the higher proportion of Welsh born compared to non-Welsh born, lesser proportion of Welsh speakers, and also the increasing prestige of Welsh within these

areas, we may find that the greater number of Welsh learners in such areas are Welsh-born, rather than, as we find in the Bangor/Gwynedd area, the area of this study, non-Welsh born, particularly English-born.

Years in Wales	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Less than 1 year	1	3.8	
1-2 years	3	11.6	15.4
2-3 years	5	19.2	34.6
3-4 years	2	7.7	42.3
4-5 years	2	7.7	50.0
Over 5 years	5	19.2	69.2
Over 10 Years	3	11.6	80.8
Over 20 Years	5	19.2	100.0
Total	26	100.0	

Table 7.4 Length of residence in Wales of in-migrant Welsh learners

Motivations for learning

The aim of the survey undertaken was to examine two main aspects of the Welsh learner: that of motivation and that of use. In sociological terms we may understand these in terms of the distinction between attitude/values and behaviour/action. It is accepted within both Sociology and Psychology that attitude does not necessarily determine action and vice versa, that action is not in itself the result of a particular valuing or inclination towards the meaning of that action. In relation to the Welsh speaker and the non-Welsh speaker we can understand this in the following way: firstly, that a positive or negative attitude to Welsh does not in itself indicate, respectively, a greater or lesser likelihood to use (or not use) Welsh (learning in this respect may be viewed as a social act). Concomitantly, that the social act of using or not using Welsh does not in itself indicate a respective positive or negative evaluation of the language. This in many ways is a criticism of the over-concentration of the

Welsh Language Board in commissioning language attitude surveys aimed at demonstrating the extent of positive attitudes, or good will, towards the Welsh language without any comprehensive analysis of the social use of Welsh (NOP Survey, 1995; see Williams and Morris, 1999, for a critique). However, the same opposite relationship must also be stated: that non-use of Welsh by the Welsh speaker, or the non-learning of Welsh by the non-Welsh speaker, does not *necessarily* imply a negative attitude towards the Welsh language. This point is particularly important in relation to the simplistic equations regarding in-migrant non-Welsh speakers into Welsh speaking communities – in other words – that not learning Welsh (a non-action) infers a lack of respect (an attitude) towards the Welsh speaking group, even when other accommodative social action may have been undertaken. It is this mistaken collapsing of the action/attitude distinction that is common within the arguments of some Welsh language activists. Related to this, is the tendency is to make a value judgement regarding the non-use or non-learning of Welsh rather than consider in terms of structural barriers such as work and family priorities, psychological barriers in terms of confidence and awareness. In examining the case of Welsh learners therefore, I wish to retain this distinction between motivation, values and attitudes on one hand, and on the other, actual use and intended usages of Welsh. I shall firstly deal with motivation and then turn to the question of uses.

Following the language use survey undertaken by Williams and Morris (1999) it was initially conceived that we may distinguish both motivation and use in terms of distinct domains – family, community, work and education. In the case of Welsh learners it was decided however that the domain of education maybe less appropriate. This was precisely education, in the form of adult or lifelong education, could be considered as distinctly voluntary. On the other hand family, work and community (in the wider sense of social networks and relationships) all represented either unavoidable contexts in one form or another. Moreover the non-voluntariness of adult Welsh learning stems precisely from its association to the domains of family, community and work. As such motivations and uses were distinguished in terms of the three remaining conceptual domains: family; community/civil society; and workplace. As shown in the following table, learners were asked to rank the relative importance of each of these domains to their own motivations for learning.

Table 7.5 Ranking of importance of family, community and work as motivations for learning Welsh (First being most important, second being second most important and third being of least of importance).

	Family	*Community*	*Work*
First	8 (21.6%)	14 (39.1%)	15 (41.3%)
Second	13 (35.2%)	15 (41.3%)	9 (25.5%)
Third	16 (43.2%)	8 (21.6%)	13 (35.2%)

As we can see above, 41.3% considered Work rather than Community (39.1%) or Family (21.6%) as the most important factor to their motivation for learning. Likewise, the Family (43.2%) was considered most often as the least important factor compared to Community (21.6%) and Work (35.2%). I shall now discuss each of these domains in turn, dealing the motivations first and usage second.

Family as motivation for learning

In the survey, learners were asked whether Welsh had been spoken in their family history and whether this influenced their decision to learn. Many for example wished to reconnect themselves to a language which they felt was lost to them. But the fact that the majority of learners were born outside Wales and had no family connections to Wales means that this could not be viewed as a primary motivation for learning. We therefore need to cross tabulate these two questions.

Table 7.6 Cross tabulation of Welsh speaking parents with Family history as motivation

		Welsh speaking parents/grandparents		
		Yes	*No*	
	Definitely True	8	2	10
Part of family history	*Mostly True*	2		2
as motivation	*Maybe*	2	2	4
	Mostly False		1	1
	Definitely false	1	17	18
Total		13	22	35

Of the 13 learners who had either Welsh speaking parents or grandparents, 10 stated that the fact that Welsh was part of their family history was an important reason for them learning. Conversely, of the 22 who did not have Welsh speaking backgrounds, 18 did not consider family history to be important. The table below (Table 6.7) however does not provide such a convincing relationship. The learners who took part in the questionnaire were asked given the choices of Work, Family, Community as different motivational factors for learning Welsh. As the table shows, family was not considered a significant motivational factor by either type of learners, with or without Welsh speaking parents or grandparents. Rather, it was considered by most as the least important factor of these three.

Table 7.7 Cross tabulation of Welsh speaking parents with Importance of family factors for motivation

		Welsh speaking parents/grandparents		Total
		Yes	*No*	
Importance of family factors for motivation	*First*	2	4	8
	Second	5	7	12
	Third	6	10	16
Total		13	23	36

Although in these instances the family as a motivation appears inconclusive the significance of the family as motivation comes in to force with regard to the non-Welsh speaker whose partner speaks Welsh and thus enters a Welsh-speaking family.

As one would expect that one's partner is a native Welsh speaker is a major motivation factor for learning Welsh. For example, of the 8 learners whose partners were native Welsh speakers, all emphasised that fact as one of the main reasons for them learning.

Table 7.8 Cross tabulation of Partner Welsh speaking with Importance of family factors for motivation

		Partner Welsh speaking				Total
		Yes, first language	*Yes, second language*	*Learning*	*no*	
Importance of family factors for motivation	*First*	6			2	8
	Second	2		2	5	9
	Third		1	3	8	11
Total		8	1	5	15	29

This is also supported in **Table 7.8** whereby the importance of family as a motivational factor was considerably higher among learners whose partners were native Welsh speakers. As we can see, all 8 of those learners with native Welsh speaking partners considered the family as either their first or second most important motivation for learning. Thus three-quarters of those who considered the family factors as important to their motivation had native Welsh speaking partners. Moreover, if we consider the family as motivation in terms of the desire or intention to bring up a family Welsh speaking then the following table (Table 7.9) provides an extension of this in that 5 of the 8 learners with Welsh speaking partners/spouses stated that they would like to bring up their (future) children Welsh speaking. Conversely, as **Table 7.9** also shows, of the other 17 learners with non-native Welsh speaking partners/spouses, only 3 considered bringing up a family Welsh speaking in positive terms. The case can therefore certainly be made for a correlation between these two variables.

Table 7.9 Cross tabulation of Partner Welsh speaker with Would like to bring up family Welsh speaking

		Partner Welsh speaking				Total
		Yes, first language	*Yes, second language*	*Learning*	*no*	
Would like to bring up family Welsh speaking	*Definitely true*	4				4
	Mostly true	1	1		2	4
	Unsure			1		1
	Mostly false	1			2	3
	Definitely false	1		2	9	12
Total		7	1	3	13	24

It is significant that in the case of Language exogamy, that the family emerges as a site of contestation between Code 1 (Accommodative use of English) and Code 2 (Protectionist use of Welsh). Moreover the inclusion/exclusion relationship between these two codes is particularly acute. This can be illustrated by drawing on the contrasting experiences of two Welsh learners. One learner for instance appeared to have particular difficulties in getting his native Welsh speaking wife and her family to speak Welsh:

Interviewer: Do you find it difficult to get your wife and her family to speak Welsh to you because you're a learner?

Oh definitely I mean if say we meet a member of her family or a family friend who I've never met before then she'll (learner's wife) speak to them in Welsh then she'll say this is Paul my husband in English, he doesn't know an awful lot of Welsh and then they'll speak English and then I feel a bit guilty like you shouldn't have to speak English just because I'm here but like Gwenan's best friend Marian when they're together they'll speak Welsh together but then they'll apologise for not turning to English if I've come across or try to listen in into the conversation then I get cross and have to say that I can still understand them. Now though they'll know I can understand enough so that they don't have to be polite because I know enough about what they're talking about.

Again in this passage, as is illustrated throughout this thesis, the switch from code 2 (PUW) to code 1 (AUE) occurs as the Welsh speaker tries to accommodate or be "polite" to the non-Welsh speaker. In contrast to this example however, another learner had found it particularly difficult to include herself within conversations as her husband and his family spoke Welsh to each other around her and did not switch unless prompted by her starting a conversation in English. As such the non-switching was perceived as non-accommodation but that it was also mainly the responsibility of the learner to do the accommodating. As she states:

> My own reasons for deciding to learn are really because of the pressure of having to get my husbands family to speak English in order to speak to me.

Interviewer: do you feel that you are not accepted because you don't speak Welsh?

> Yeh I do, I can't help that. I always feel like I'm an outsider but I feel it's my fault more than anything else because I haven't got over the language barrier, because I haven't learnt it enough to hold proper conversation. Like I think there is a threshold to how much you can speak before you get accepted. And I think some people do get a bit impatient with learners and others appreciate that you're learning, it's making the initial contact. It does bother me but I see it more as my own fault and it's my responsibility to do something about it to become accepted. I mean saying that no one in my husband's family has come out with any comments and I never really had any negative comments. But I'm probably a bit paranoid thinking that I'm not accepted when I probably am and that's my fault because I should learn the language better.

Along with adult learners of Welsh themselves, one of the most commonly cited indicators of the development of a civic Welsh identity has been the increase in the number of children from non-Welsh speaking families attending Welsh medium schools (Paterson and Jones 1999). It should not be unsurprising therefore that the two should also go hand in hand and that the learning of Welsh by their children in schools is a motivation for adult learners themselves. Although in itself it did not represent a significant proportion of all the learners, we can highlight its prominence in comparison with other motivational factors listed. The following table (Table 7.10) for instance shows learners' attitudinal responses to statements which were prefixed

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with "I am learning Welsh because". This allowed an ability to account for multiple reasons for learning and the overall relative and comparative emphasis given to each reason.

Table 7.10 Learners' attitudinal responses to different statements regarding their motivations for learning Welsh[2]

	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Unsure	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree	% of both SA & MA	Ranking of % both SA
I find it a personal Challenge (N=3)	8	6	9	6	5	41.2%	7/16
I Like learning languages (N=1)	10	2	4	1	19	33.3%	11/16
It is part of my family history (N=0)	8	3	1	2	23	29.8%	12/16
Because I am Welsh (N=2)	14	5	2	1	13	54.3%	4/16
I need knowledge for work (N=3)	10	4	1	4	15	41.2%	7/16
I am required to learn for work (N=3)	10	4	1	4	15	41.2%	7/16
To help me gain work in the area (N=3)	10	7	5		12	50.0%	5/16
My partner/spouse speaks Welsh (N=3)	8			1	25	23.5%	14/16
My children are learning in school (N=5)	5	2	1	3	20	21.9%	15/16
I would like to bring up a family Welsh speaking (N=1)	5	5	3	3	15	27.8%	13/16
To be accepted in the local community (N=1)	8	9	15	1	3	47.2%	6/16
The shops are run in Welsh (N=1)	3	3	9	11	10	16.7%	16/16
My friends and neighbours speak Welsh (N=1)	2	11	11	2	10	36.1%	10/16
If you live in a Welsh speaking community it is only right to learn (N=1)	18	10	4	1	3	77.8%	1/16
The Welsh language as a community language relies on learners to survive (N=1)	14	6	14		2	55.6%	3/16
I have a responsibility support the community where I live (N=0)	14	10	7	2	4	64.9%	2/16

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[2] N=missing entries. For example in Table 7.10, three respondents had left the "I find it a personal challenge" statement empty.

Given the amount of information provided within this table, it is necessary to devote some space here to clarify it. It is significant for instance that of all 16 statements the three ranked highest for moderately and strongly agree were specifically related to the notion of the Welsh speaking community. Of all 16 statements only with 5 did a majority of the respondents either moderately or strongly agree. In addition to the three relating to the community, 54.3% agreed that the fact that they were Welsh was important to them as a motivational factor. Of course, not all respondents were Welsh and therefore this needs to cross examined with those who considered themselves to be Welsh. With this it was found that 10 out of the 11 (90.9%) who reported their national identity as Welsh agreed that this was a motivational factor for them. Further to this, 50% of respondents agreed that 'to help me gain work in the area' was a motivational factor.

Community/Civil society as motivation for learning

As Table 7.10 shows above, it would appear in relation to the concern over the maintenance of the 'Welsh speaking community' that learners were particularly motivated. For example in response to the prefix, 'I am learning Welsh because…', 77.8% stated '…if you live in a Welsh speaking community it is only right to learn'. Also supportive, albeit to a lesser degree, 64.9% stated 'I have a responsibility to support the community where I live'. These high level returns would suggest a primarily *moral* basis for learning Welsh, or learning Welsh out of *principle*. Yet as was highlighted in chapter 4, statistical responses to questions regarding peoples principles towards the Welsh language do not in themselves allow consideration of the ongoing ambiguities surrounding its institutionalisation. Thus while learners to report highly supportive attitudes towards the maintenance of Welsh as a community language this needs to be supplemented with more in-depth discussions of these issues. To examine this, learners were interviewed about the issues surrounding the idea that incomers *should* learn Welsh and whether they themselves felt 'social pressure' to learn Welsh. On one hand the majority of the learners interviewed supported or were at least sympathetic to these ideas and agreed that incomers had a responsibility to learn Welsh. As some learners stated:

Well I have a lot of sympathy with them (Cymuned). I think when you go into someone else's country you should do your best to learn the language in which you are living. I think it's important. I think it's ignorant not to at least learn the basics

Oh I definitely agree with that I mean from living somewhere like Llyn and seeing places like Llanbedrog and Abersoch and seeing how those communities have pretty much died I mean there's not an awful lot of Welsh people who live there who speak Welsh there, mainly holiday homes and things like that so I think the emphasis should be placed on people to make an effort to learn and its difficult and I think when you get like migration of people coming over here its very difficult to persuade people to speak Welsh I mean you know some people will but I'd say the majority won't and I think its up to us - I mean I've got no excuse born Welsh, I am Welsh and I should speak Welsh you know.

I know a lot of people say its racist but I don't know because I think the death of a language is a very sad thing. Something that's been around for hundreds and hundreds of years and see it disappear in my generation is very upsetting. I definitely think there should be a monitoring of the influx of people who come over.

I always felt that I'm missing something after being born Welsh and raised here. I feel I need to do something to stop the language dying out. I also want our children to speak Welsh. I feel the Welsh language is on the brink of disappearing, and I want to do what I can, as soon as I can to help. I want my family to grow up with Welsh as a first language to help keep it alive. Hopefully the process will become exponential.

Within the first statement here is the argument that the Welsh language should be given parity with official state languages. In other words, if you move to the UK it's expected that you learn English, if you move to France it's expected that you learn French and therefore if you move to Wales, you should learn Welsh. What is of note in the next two statements however is that the 'death' of Welsh speaking communities

like those mentioned infers the 'death' of the Welsh language altogether. On one hand this would appear to ignore the advances of the Welsh language in other parts of Wales, particularly the south east. On another this simply further reflects the communitarian and hermeneutic notion of the situated self (Benhabib, 1992). For the socially anchored individual, the concern with the (Welsh) language is not simply an abstract one for the symbolic attachment lies not in a reified language but in a language which is part of one's specific (culturally relative) social world. In other words, if one's immediate experience is of 'decline' or 'disappearance', then the fact that the Welsh language is expansive in other parts of Wales may be of little comfort. Other learners however were slightly more critical of the idea that everyone should learn:

> I sort of appreciate that its important not to lose the language but I feel if there's people like us who are trying our best to fit into society, we're not coming here and refusing to fit in with how things are, if we're trying to learn the language then that's fair enough as well. Although I don't think you should expect everybody to learn because people have different reasons for doing it. I think in Menai Bridge and Bangor you don't notice it but as soon as you go into rural areas like Bethesda and small villages you really do notice it and it does become Welsh speaking country.

> Well I've lived in Wales now for seven years. I haven't learned before now because I was waiting for my daughter to go to school so that I could have the time to do it. Otherwise it was baby sitters and I didn't think it was fair with her being so young. So I waited until she was in school full time and then decided to do the course. Its been going on now since last September just over a year...what motivated me? Because I felt around here no one would employ me without a second language which is fair enough you know and my children are obviously learning it in school so that helps as well. Whereas when my son was bringing home books from school I couldn't understand them I couldn't help him whereas now I'm at my daughters reading stage you know so I can help her along. So it was sort of 50-50 I wanted to stay around here and I wanted to be employed.

In this last statement not only is it important to point to structural factors such as 'life-cycle' or work intentions which motivate learning but also the degree of differentiation within the so called Welsh speaking heartland. Both of these points are reiterated by another learner states:

> I live in Llanddaniel on Anglesey. We live in a row of cottages and nobody speaks Welsh. Maybe its because its so close to Menai Bridge and the University. So I find the idea of a 'Welsh speaking community a bit difficult because I don't know if I feel part of a community yet because I haven't actively joined things in my area. But I don't think you can force it. I think perhaps there are certain things in life that make you become involved in a community such as having children. Definitely when I have children I would become more involved in the community and things like that.

However as has been pointed out, 'community sanctions' can be no less coercive than legal restrictions. As some other learner's state:

> Are *you* going to tell me that I *should* and make sure that I speak it? Are you going to watch over what I do and don't do? That's a very dangerous thing if that's what the majority of people think. The whole basis of adult learning is that its voluntary and anything other than that isn't right.

> I'm always really uncomfortable with this kind of 'outsider thing' with the awareness of being an 'outsider'. I think that creating that kind of thing can be a bit negative. I think that as long as people who move here and are willing to accept where they are moving to and to actually learn Welsh and to use it when they can then you can't ask anymore.

What is interesting about this last statement is how being a non-Welsh speaker in an area like Gwynedd constitutes being an 'outsider' or even an 'other'. Further that the presence of an 'other' is acceptable only on the basis that they try to integrate and conform to certain cultural norms. In other words it is because they are recognised as 'Welsh learners' rather than 'English' that they feel accepted. As one learner states:

Yeh well I live in Bethesda which is quite a Welsh speaking area so I do feel very English when I go down to the shop for a pint of milk. So yeh I try little things like saying 'diolch' instead of thank you so yeh, when I first moved there I did feel really English I suppose a bit like an outsider. But I'm glad I'm learning and I feel more at home as a 'Welsh learner' rather than an English person not making any effort. When I talk to members of the public through work and I say I'm learning Welsh they say oh very good and they're quite impressed that I'm making the effort so I do feel that it's appreciated.

This view is supported by an ethnographic account of the same area (Bowie, 1992:134)

To remain monolingual in Bethesda is to be forever an outsider. This perception was brought home to me during a concert in aid of Plaid Cymru in the recently opened Neuadd Ogwen. This sense of community was pulsating, but what was that community? Not a cross-section of the population but those who had treasured and preserved the language. Local people congratulating themselves and one another on something alive and precious, conscious that they were the last bastions of 'Welshness', an island in the midst of a sea of Anglicisation. Ordinary people, our neighbours, as well as local dignitaries and the Welsh intelligentsia. The literary society's lectures, the beirdd competitions, eisteddfodau, nosweithau llawen, all celebrations of a community, a community which is still solidly Welsh speaking, and into which those who take the plunge to learn Welsh are warmly welcomed.

On the other hand, others felt that even learning Welsh wouldn't get them accepted by some:

I think by and large people are pleased that I'm learning and I can't say that I have ever been made to feel unwelcome or unaccepted. However there are those who are supportive and are committed to having as many others as they possibly can speak there language but there's another group who see it as a badge of exclusion, and would be quite happy if no one else ever learned the language like a way of deliberately excluding. For some I don't think anything

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would be good enough...it's basically an exclusive band who have an interest in keeping you excluded.

In sum, while therefore the majority of learners agreed in principle and sympathised with the concerns of groups like Cymuned, there were enough ambiguities in their responses regarding the implications of actual policy implementation, to suggest that some of the issues are more complex and less clear cut than is suggested. One such ambiguity was a lack of clarity over who exactly were the immigrants and newcomers to Welsh speaking areas? For instance not all 'newcomers' to designated Welsh speaking areas are immigrants from outside Wales. Some may be from Flintshire or Wrexham, or even Bangor and Menai Bridge as some suggest. Are they also expected to learn Welsh, do they also have a social responsibility and is their movement into, say, Gwynedd, also to be monitored or restricted? In other words there is a failure to distinguish between "English" in-migrants to Wales and English speaking Welsh born who may or may not feel equally Welsh. There is clearly a linguistic definition of nationalism here, which contends that language, and territorial boundaries should be coterminous. For many this narrowing of the boundaries of who 'we' are, and the simultaneously expansion of who the 'they' are, is an inevitable consequence of the communitarian vision and the 'politics of difference'.

Work as a motivation for learning

As was stated briefly earlier with regard to **Table 7.10**, half of the respondents (50%) agreed that this was a motivational factor to them learning Welsh. Moreover, as shown in **Table 7.5**, 41.3% considered Work rather than Community (39.1%) or Family (21.6%) as the most important factor to their motivation for learning. In respect of work, we can consider motivation for learning Welsh in three ways: firstly, in order to improve chances of gaining work within the area; secondly, as part of an employer's responsibility to encourage and opportunities for non-Welsh speaking staff to learn Welsh and thirdly, as part of a contractual agreement with the employee. The following table deals with the first of these; that of improving chances of gaining work.

Table 7.11: Cross tabulation To help gain work as motivation for learning and Importance of work for motivation

		Importance of Work for motivation			Total
		First	*Second*	*Third*	
To help me gain work	*Definitely True*	8	1	1	10
	Mostly True	5	0	2	7
	Maybe		2	3	5
	Mostly False				0
	Definitely False	2	4	6	12
Total		15	7	12	34

As we can see in the table above, 13 (either strongly or mostly true) out of the 15 who saw work as the primary motivation, also so considered learning 'to help me gain work' as a reason for them learning. In addition to this, as **Table 7.12** also shows, it is clear that work was perhaps the most important motivational factor for the majority of those learners who stated that they were 'required to learn for their work'; 11 out of 15 of those who stated work as the most important reason for learning were those who were required to learn for work (based on definitely or mostly true responses).

Table 7.12: Cross tabulation of Required to learn for work and Importance of work for motivation

		Importance of Work for motivation			Total
		First	*Second*	*Third*	
Required to learn for work	*Definitely True*	8	1	1	10
	Mostly True	3		1	4
	Maybe			1	1
	Mostly False	1	1	2	4
	Definitely False	3	5	7	15
Total		15	7	12	34

Similar findings are also evident in the table below regarding 'need knowledge for work', whereby the majority with work based motivations (either through job requirements or in order to improve employment opportunities) had considered work in the general sense, as opposed to family, community or personal factors, as the most important factor for their learning.

Table 7.13: Cross tabulation of Need knowledge for work and Importance of work for motivation

		Importance of Work for motivation			Total
		First	*Second*	*Third*	
Need Knowledge for work	*Definitely True*	10	4	0	14
	Mostly True			1	1
	Maybe		1	1	2
	Mostly False			1	1
	Definitely False	5	5	7	17
Total		15	10	10	35

However we may also argue that with the work incentive for learning – that is the *economic* or *required* motivation – there maybe a lacuna over responsibility or values as a motivation. For instance it was the respondents who were learning Welsh primarily as part of their employment contracts that had more mixed feelings regarding their valuing of the requirement to learn. Furthermore it was among these that motives were less positive about notions of community responsibility and were generally mixed about the need for them to learn.

Table 7.14 Cross tabulation of required to learn for work and Responsibility to the Community as motivations

		I am required to learn for work					Total
		Definitely true	*Mostly true*	*Maybe*	*Mostly false*	*Definitely false*	
Responsibility to support the Community where I live	*Definitely true*	2			3	6	11
	Mostly true	2	3		1	4	10
	Maybe	2	1	1		3	7
	Mostly false	1				1	2
	Definitely false	3				1	4
Total		10	4		4	15	34

As we can see in this table above, there would appear to be mixed responses from those who were required to learn for work regarding the notion of responsibility to the community as a basis for learning. This is further illustrated by pointing out that of the 16.2% who *disagreed* with the question of responsibility to the community in table, two-thirds strongly agreed that they were required to learn for work (as we shall see in the following chapter, some employees have tried to implement means of tackling such mixed feelings towards bilingual requirements). Perhaps, to strongly agree with a statement containing the word *required*, does in itself imply a certain negativity or even resentment towards learning.

In all these cases, this may be because they are learning purely in relation to either the *economic* benefits of doing so or because they view it purely as a job requirement. As such the integration of Welsh into the workplace takes with it a group

of learners who do not necessarily have a moral motivation for learning. On this note we can now turn to questions of usage of Welsh. Again this will be examined through categorisation of domains in terms of family, community and work.

Learners using Welsh

As with motivation, learners' use of Welsh shall be considered in terms of three domains: Family; Community/Civil Society; and Work. Before turning into these separately we can again overview the responses given by learners in the questionnaire. Because of the specifically intermediate status of learning, it was felt important not only to acknowledge current uses of Welsh as a learner trying to use the language but also to acknowledge the learners envisaged uses of Welsh thereby gaining an indication of the extent to which they intend on using it or hope to use and the level of ability to which they intend or hope to achieve. First of all therefore, in **Table 7.15** is an indication of the current contexts in which learners have attempted to use Welsh. In the first column is a setting in which a learner may or may not use Welsh. In the survey, each of these was prefixed by "I have tried using Welsh with..." or "I have tried using Welsh in (e.g. as in the first row, "I have tried using Welsh with 'partner'" or "I have tried using Welsh in 'public house'"). The subsequent columns then show the extent, if it all, the learners have tried using Welsh within these settings. Also following Williams and Morris (1999) research, the aim was to examine language in terms of social action. In other words there was a focus on actual use of Welsh rather than a focus on values or proficiency/competence or ability. While this research also focuses on the use of Welsh, it was nevertheless considered important to *also* examine learners' values of Welsh through use of attitudinal questions and also to gain an understanding of levels of competence both prior to learning and changes in competence through the learning process (although in many ways accounting for social use gives an indication of ability in itself). Having already dealt with the issue of values in relation to learners it is therefore necessary to briefly account for competence or ability before turning to the primary focus of the social use of Welsh by learners'. Accounting for the competence of learners was done by asking respondents to evaluate their levels of ability both at present and at the point at which they started learning. The following table illustrates this:

Figure 7.1. Learners self perception of level of ability in Welsh (Level of Ability: 1 No knowledge; **2** Understand only a little; **3** Understand a lot but couldn't talk; **4** Understand a lot but could only say a few words; **5** Hold conversations but couldn't read or write; **6** Speak well but only read and write a little; **7** Speak, read and write well.)

From this table we can identify levels of learner ability and also their own assessments of their progress. Indeed this table would appear to show quite positive responses from learners with distinct progressions from their initial ability levels in level 4 and above. Although not identified in this table, of the 15 who had started learning with no previous knowledge, 7 stated that they could at their present stage of learning, at least hold conversations in Welsh. It is therefore appropriate now to consider learners' use of Welsh.

Table 7.15. Learners' questionnaire responses to their usage of Welsh

	All of the time	Most of the time	Some of the time	Rarely	Never	% of use of Welsh at least some of the time
Partner/spouse (N=4)	1	1	13	3	15	40.5
Child(ren) (N=5)	2	1	10	2	17	35.1
Relative(s) (N=4)	1		14	4	14	40.5
Friend (N=1)	2	5	17	10	2	64.9
Neighbour (N=2)	1	6	10	7	11	45.9 ·
Public House (N=1)	2	3	11	7	13	43.2
Local shop (N=1)	1	8	14	11	2	62.1
Post Office (N=2)		6	12	8	9	48.6
Bank (N=2)		4	9	10	12	37.1
Work (N=4)	6	5	4	4	14	40.5
Voluntary work (N=6)		1	4		26	16.1
Religious service (N=9)	1	1	2	3	21	10.8
Other social or cultural activities (N=5)	2	4	6	8	12	32.4
Total of all settings (N=48)	19	45	126	77	166	100.0%
% of total	3.9	9.4	26.2	16.0	44.5	
Cumlative %		13.3	39.5	55.5	100.0	

In taking all contexts into account, the above table shows that on average, 43.9% of learners would use Welsh (as opposed to English) at least some of time. Conversely, 44.5% had on average, never used Welsh as opposed to English within any of the contexts listed above. There were however considerable differences in terms of usage between different settings. For example, about two-thirds of learners (64.9%) had stated that they used Welsh rather than English with a 'Friend' at least 'some of the time'. This along within 62.1% in the 'local shop' represented the highest figures of use by learners. Some settings such as 'voluntary work' or 'religious service' reported particularly low uses of Welsh. Clearly however this also reflects the fact that only a minority of learners would actually be engaged within such settings in the first place. Even with 'Partner/spouse' or 'Child(ren)' settings, where uses of Welsh were also overall low (for example only 8.1% of learners use Welsh with children at least most of the time) the figures may be distorted by learners who are single or who have no children. What also needs to be taken into account is that not all settings are universal to all learners. For example, not all learners have a partner or spouse or children thus a differentiation of this needs to be accounted for in Table 6.16. This is also explains why the missing values were higher for these categories as respondents would have simply left blank rather than stated 'never'. In the table below therefore, selected contexts have been raised in order to highlight the 'relevance' of each category. For example, the relevance category for 'Partner/Spouse' is 'Partner speaks/learning Welsh' while for 'Children' it is 'Children speak/learning Welsh'. From this we can get an indication of whether existing opportunities for using Welsh are taken advantage of.

Table 7.16. Selected responses to current usage of Welsh with Relevance Category

	% of use of Welsh at least some of the time	*Relevance of category*	*% of relevant category*	*% of use of Welsh either most or all of the time with relevant category*	*% of use of Welsh at least some of the time with relevant category*
Partner/spouse (N=4)	40.5	Partner speaks/learning Welsh	37.8% (14)	7.1% (1)	100.0% (14)
Child(ren) (N=5)	35.1	Children speak/learning Welsh	29.7% (11)	27.3% (3)	100.0% (11)
Relative(s) (N=4)	40.5	Relatives speak/learning Welsh	45.9% (17)	11.8% (2)	64.7% (11)
Work (N=4)	40.5	Currently employed	62.2% (23)	43.5% (10)	60.9% (14)

As is shown in **Table 7.16** above, only approximately 40% of learners would use Welsh with their partner/spouse at least some of the time. However only 37.8% of learners' partner's or spouse's could actually speak Welsh or were learning Welsh. In those cases, *all* (100%) learners' spoke to their partner/spouse at least some of the time. This was also the case for learners with children who either spoke or were learning Welsh. And of equal of significance, 60.9% of learners who were 'currently employed' had spoken Welsh in work at least some of the time. Moreover just under half (43.5%) of learners stated that they used Welsh in work either all or most of the time. Overall therefore, while Welsh remains a 'lesser-used' language for the majority of learners, there was a strong utilisation by learners of existing opportunities for using Welsh. To take this analysis further, we can now report findings upon learners' envisaged uses of Welsh.

Envisaged usage of Welsh (e.g. when having achieved target learning level)

In addition to questions regarding current usage of Welsh, learners were also asked to state on a scale (from Definitely True to Definitely False) the resources and contexts which they intended to make use of having reached their desired level of ability. This then would give some further indication into how far and which contexts learners envisaged taking their Welsh. Unlike Table 7.15 this also included reference to use of the Welsh Medium Media (such as television, radio and newspapers) and forms of written communication such as writing letters or completing forms. These were included in this section as it was felt necessary to account for writing and reading ability as well as conversational ability. As we can see below, Table 7.17 shows the responses of learners to a prefix of 'I envisage using Welsh in order to...' (e.g. ...Understand TV and Radio).

Table 7.17: Learners' envisaged uses of Welsh

	Definitely true	Mostly true	Unsure	Mostly false	Definitely false	% of at least mostly true
Understand TV and Radio (N=0)	21	10	5		1	83.7%
Read books and newspapers (N=0)	19	11	6		1	59.5%
Write letters (N=0)	15	8	8	3	3	62.1%
Complete forms (N=1)	16	8	6	3	3	64.9%
Speak Welsh with partner/spouse (N=5)	10	4	4	1	13	37.8%
Speak Welsh with child(ren) (N=7)	9	5		3	13	37.8%
Speak Welsh to friends (N=1)	16	6	11	1	2	59.5%
Speak Welsh with neighbours (N=2)	16	6	8	3	2	59.5%
Use Welsh in shops and services (N=1)	15	11	8	1	1	43.2%
Use/Understand Welsh in work (N=4)	18	2	1	2	10	54.1%
Use Welsh to gain work (N=4)	10	6	5	1	11	43.2%
Use Welsh in voluntary work (N=7)	1	3	5	4	17	10.8%
Use/Understand Welsh in school/community meetings (N=7)	7	5	4	2	12	32.4%
Use/Understand Welsh in Religious services (N=9)	5	1	2	1	19	16.2%
Use/Understand Welsh in Social and Cultural Groups (N=3)	11	5	4	5	9	43.2%
	189	91	77	30	97	

Taking all possible uses into account, the responses, as with current uses of Welsh, were fairly mixed. In general, use of Media and written communication reported the more likely uses of Welsh. For example, 83.7% considered 'I envisage using Welsh in order to understand TV and radio' as either mostly or definitely True. In this regard, Writing Letters (62.1%) and Completing Forms (64.9%) also received fairly positive responses. Noticeably mixed responses however were found in relation to 'speak Welsh with spouse/partner' (37.8%) and 'speak Welsh with children' (37.8%). But again, as with current uses of Welsh, these particular results are distorted by those who didn't have a spouse of partner and those who didn't have children. It is necessary therefore to examine envisaged uses in a similar way.

Table 7.18. Selected responses to envisaged usage of Welsh with Relevance Category

	% of use of Welsh at least mostly true	Relevance of category	% of relevant category	% of use of Welsh definitely true with relevant category	% of use of Welsh at least mostly true with relevant category
Partner/spouse (N=5)	37.8%	Partner speaks/learning Welsh	37.8% (14)	57.1% (8)	78.6% (11)
Child(ren) (N=7)	37.8%	Children speak/learning Welsh	29.7% (11)	54.5% (6)	90.9% (10)
Work (N=4)	54.1%	Currently employed	56.8% (21)	66.67% (14)	76.2% (16)

As shown here in Table 7.18, only 37.8% of learners considered the statement 'I intend using Welsh with partner/spouse' as either definitely or mostly true to themselves. However, when in relation to learner's whose partner/spouse either speaks or is learning Welsh, then this figure is 78.6%. The table also shows similar differences in relation to both Children and Work categories. The conclusion to be

gained from this therefore is that the likelihood of using Welsh is dependent on existing social networks and relationships. In other words, it is a question of whether a learner has the opportunities on one hand and, if so, whether he/she is able to make use of the opportunities that are available. As I shall now illustrate however, making use of opportunities is itself tied up with more symbolic boundaries that relate to codes of language use.

Speakers and Learners: Symbolic codes and barriers of language use

As was identified in previous chapters, values of civility and hospitality towards 'outsiders' lead to the tendency of Welsh speakers to revert to English when in mixed settings. The by-product of this was the removal or marginalisation of Welsh within such settings. As I will show now however such an ethic of politeness can also be found to have debilitating consequences for the learning of Welsh. As has been identified bilingual Welsh speakers constitute a voluntary group in that they always have a choice of whether to use either Welsh or English. As such the (voluntary) use of Welsh becomes the basis of participation within the Welsh-speaking (voluntary) group. Participation presupposes a certain competence in Welsh. As was also stressed however, as with all groups, notions of voluntarism, choice and consent must be taken with a pinch of salt. As in all groups, such notions cannot be abstracted from the status and prestige that are attached to certain social actions over others, which can also vary across different fields or social settings. Therefore to say that choosing whether to use Welsh or English is a question of individual volition is mythical in that it ignores the specific significance of using one language or the other within particular social settings. As such, given that there is a high value on civility, courtesy, hospitality and politeness then this to a certain extent dictates that strangers and outsiders should not be excluded and that they should be spoken to in the language that we all assume everyone can speak – the hegemonic language. The result being that Welsh speakers crucially speak English within 'mixed settings'. Conversely the need for minority group members to assert their group identity would lead them not to switch but to insist on the use of Welsh, in that it is the non-hegemonic language as a form of protection. Inevitably, both these tendencies have repercussions for the case of the adult learner of Welsh.

The by-product of Rule 1 (the accommodative use of English) the desire to include everyone present has an effect on learners. For even when first language Welsh speakers are aware that someone is learning Welsh and would like to hear it spoken, the Welsh speaker will still tend to use English in his/her presence. Furthermore, learners, in attempting to speak Welsh to Welsh speakers often find that making a linguistic mistake or hesitancy, thus signalling their lack of fluency, often leads to the Welsh speaker switching to English. Many Welsh speakers would therefore not pursue an error-strewn conversation not only because it seemed impractical or too time-consuming in hectic everyday life, but also because they thought it was on one hand rude or unfair and on the other because it was embarrassing for both parties. Learners were therefore asked questions about their attempts to speak Welsh to first language Welsh speakers. The replies here in many ways reflect the perseverance of desires to include everyone and to use English so as to not leave anyone out. Moreover, the desire to include (by using English instead of Welsh) was often interpreted as a desire to exclude (preventing English speakers from the using and learning Welsh). I shall run through some examples of this:

Whenever I try to use it at work they always speak to me in English. I asked (name) not to speak English to me because I wanted to learn and even though my conversations aren't that good I understand a fair bit, but he kept forgetting and going back to English which was really frustrating because I began to feel a bit like it was on purpose like I was being alienated.

Yes well I did try and speak Welsh to the people where I live but they don't seem very good at encouraging me. I've kind of given up a bit now because they seem a lot happier speaking to me in English anyway.

Yes but that's more to do with my own inhibitions. When I've half-heartedly tried to use it in shops *people very rapidly switch to English when they realise you are not Welsh.* I've had very few... there are *people I know* who will talk to me in Welsh so say the partners of various colleagues who are Welsh speaking they are very good at starting to speak to me in Welsh and sticking to it even when you are faulting. But I could count on the fingers of one hand the successful encounters I've had. Sometimes in "Tesco" I've managed a whole

exchange in Welsh and they haven't switched to English but generally people switch to English very rapidly. (Italics added)

Um, I think in general they're positive but (pause) impatient. Jobs to do and lives to lead they don't have time for you to…but then on more social occasions as I say typically with partners of people I know, on more relaxed occasions they will often labour through in Welsh.

As is identified in research conducted by Trosset (1986) and Newcombe (2002), there appears a consensus among learners that one of the most discouraging aspects of learning Welsh was that first language Welsh-speakers turned to English either immediately or after a very short time of trying to use Welsh. As the first respondent above states, "he kept forgetting", gives an indication of how different expectations of language use are ingrained or internalised. This is even more apparent in the next respondent's experiences, a highly competent Welsh speaker who had begun learning over 25 years ago:

I have known this one Welsh speaker for years, he lives just up the road from me, and he's a good friend. Up until recently we've always spoke Welsh to each other since I've known him, for about 15 years now. But I had a funny experience with him recently because he must of assumed that it was my first language. When he found out that I'd learnt it and that I was English he stopped speaking Welsh to me. We still speak Welsh to each other now but I thought it was odd that he would stop speaking Welsh after realising that I wasn't a native Welsh speaker

These statements indicate the degree to which language switching as an inclusive technique is internalised. The significance of these statements also is that the burden of effort, of getting the native speaker to speak Welsh, is almost always the sole responsibility of the learner. However as was also indicated above the fear of many learners is that of embarrassment and fraudulence.

Interviewer: Have you ever made attempts to use Welsh outside your classes?

Only tiny little chicken ones in the Spar in Bethesda. I had this one occasion when I just started learning and I said 'diolch' when I gave her my money and stuff and she said something back to me and I just froze in horror and thought oh my god what did she just say 'cos I didn't understand it at all. She said it really quickly and I couldn't pick out any words. I just froze in horror and nodded and smiled and hoped that that might of covered what she said. But I think that's the thing that stops me is the fear that they'll say something back to me and I won't understand. I'll come though as the fraud that I am for having learnt for only six months.

I don't think it's a lack of opportunity but to have the courage to try it out. I've got a major confidence thing like I said I fear that I'll start talking to a Welsh speaker and they'll say something back and I'll get in a muddle and won't know what they've said. It'll all just dissolve into chaos. I don't mind it with people I know like people around the office I'm quite happy to have a go with and if there's a word I don't know I'll use an English word within the sentence and that's alright but I wouldn't feel happy trying that with strangers or in shops. You know our Welsh teacher always says next time you go to the pub order your pint in Welsh which sounds like a really simple thing to do, yeh I can do that, and then you get to the pub and you think ahhh what if they say something back and I don't understand it. It's easier to just do it in English and then you feel guilty for not trying it in Welsh.

This second statement highlights how a subject's choice of language gives its recipients an indication of identity. To choose to speak Welsh is thus to express a Welsh identity. This is significant in terms of both expressing identity and also a desire to belong to a certain group or to be seen as belonging to this group. Feelings of being a fraud therefore arise in that learners give the impression of being Welsh when they feel they are not. The learner feels a fraud because by speaking Welsh she/he is portraying her/himself, giving other people the perception, of being not only a Welsh speaker but a local Welsh person. Being something that you are not (or do not yet feel

to be). In other words to speak a language is to assume a cultural identity. Thus the learner is 'found out'; revealed as not local or Welsh speaking. There is a desire to convince people of ones Welshness here but also that the learner is judged by others, others who have what she wants. Concomitantly there is a feeling of safety in certain environments such as the learning classes or workplaces where people know that you are a learner. In this sense its more comfortable with "people you know" – people who know you to be a learner.

As Trosset (1986) argues, learners are therefore an anomaly to native Welsh speakers in that they are unsure whether to categorise them as Welsh or English and, as a result, are unsure which rule of language use to appropriate. As there is no category of a non-Welsh Welsh speaker then there is confusion as to whether they should be treated as Welsh or English. In this confusion it is thus inevitable that Welsh speakers will resort to the accommodative code and switch to English. Yet from the interviews undertaken, it is clear also that learners, although maybe not consciously aware, also imply a classification of different rules for language use. As one respondent states:

> When I first started here sometimes I would go in to the canteen because you think you'll try and mix and get to know people and sometimes I'd go in and it was all admin Welsh speakers and I'd sit down and they'd all just carry on speaking Welsh and I'd feel a bit ooh what do I do now, do I sit down and read the newspaper or start talking to them in English because at the time I hadn't started learning Welsh so that was a bit awkward but then you think that's just their first language that's just what's coming naturally to them to all get together and be talking in Welsh and it probably hasn't even crossed their minds that if you don't speak Welsh you can't join in.

What is interesting here is that the learner had made a judgement not to join in because it would result in the group switching from Welsh to English. And although the respondent felt excluded from joining in, it was accepted on the basis that she was entering a realm in which the use of Welsh is normalised – the domains of rule 2. Trosset (1986:168) argues that given the prevalence of the accommodation norm (rule 1) in interactions between Welsh speakers and Welsh learners, successful immersion often required entering domains of Rule 2 – settings of the normalised use of Welsh.

Yet as was highlighted within the previous chapter, it is precisely within the realms of such normalised usage of Welsh that the use of 'English' requires mimimisation; where bilingualism is interpreted as Anglicisation.

Conclusion

The aim of the empirical investigation in this chapter was to give a detailed description of the background, values and uses of Welsh by adult learners. In doing this it aimed to exemplify accommodations by non-Welsh speakers towards the language, through learning it themselves. It also aimed to examine the limits of such accommodation in terms of the difficulties learners faced. These difficulties were on one hand related to the availability of opportunities for putting learning into use. For example, having a member of family who can speak Welsh (e.g. partner, child) or a workplace with other Welsh speakers. It can be concluded that the vast majority of learners with such opportunities did take advantage of them through using Welsh at least some of the time. Overall in terms of linguistic accommodation, the findings presented here are on the whole positive. Using or not using Welsh however was not simply a case of having the available opportunities. Other 'symbolic' barriers were also present in terms of the interactions between learners and first language Welsh speakers. This related to different codes of language use in which learners had difficulties getting Welsh speakers to use Welsh with them. While for many this was interpreted as a 'desire to exclude' learners from participation, it can also be related to the 'desire to include' non-Welsh speakers by switching to English. The fact that using one language rather than another may be interpreted as 'excluding' however also shows that there are distinct limits to accommodation. It also reinforces the point made earlier that support of the Welsh language by non-Welsh speakers often becomes blurred through reflection upon one's particular experiences, such as those related to codes of language use. It is for this reason that the statistical data provided here was supplemented with in-depth interviews and conversations with learners. It would appear generally in reflection upon such personal experiences that subsequent accommodation will rest. In other words, it is in reflection upon positive or accommodative inter-group experiences that subsequent linguistic accommodation is more likely.

It is at this point however that this investigation also needs to take into account the role of the economy in terms of accommodation. As has been shown above, work is a major motivation for learning Welsh, either in terms of an additional labour market skill, or as a requirement for fulfilment of the post. So while universal principles and particular social connections can influence learning, we need to also consider the cost-benefit analyses that people make.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Constructing Bilingual Spaces: The Case of Public and Voluntary Organisations

The previous two chapters have attempted to draw on empirical investigations to understand boundaries within civil society in Wales surrounding the Welsh language and bilingualism. In simple terms, they sought to understand the problems between Welsh speaking and non-Welsh speaking groups, to understand why they conflict, and to provide a framework for addressing how a common civil society maybe maintained within a bilingual context. This, as is argued throughout, is a case of negotiating different degrees of *mutual* accommodation between bilingual and monolingual speakers. The difficulty of achieving this was identified as the problem of symbolic classification within all cultural systems, although in the Welsh bilingual context this classification is divided into two predominant rules of language use: Rule 1 'accommodative use of English'; and Rule 2 'protectionist use of Welsh'. On a macro level this dichotomy is evident in arguments in favour of segregating Wales into Welsh and English speaking zones (this was illustrated extensively in chapter 4). On a micro level the dichotomy is evident in the tendency of Welsh users (first and second language speakers *and* learners) to divide their lives into Welsh speaking and English speaking settings. The prevalence of these rules or sacred/profane codes means that nurturing a third rule of mutual linguistic accommodation is difficult. Although this is not to say that it does not and/or cannot occur. The Adult learners of Welsh, most of whom are English-born provide a strong example of how non-Welsh speakers partake in mutual linguistic accommodation. Moreover, such reciprocity is not confined to learners. At the most subtle level it can simply manifest in the tendency of non-Welsh speakers to also self-segregate, or as one respondent put it, 'to leave Welsh speakers to themselves'. Likewise, the code-switching of Welsh speakers to English in interaction with non-Welsh speakers is itself partly a normalised ethic of accommodating and general civil behaviour towards non-Welsh speakers.

This third and final fieldwork chapter aims to expand upon these socio-linguistic themes associated with civil society by considering the role of the economic system in both facilitating and debilitating the maintenance of a *Welsh-speaking* civil society. In achieving this, I will provide draw upon two case study organisations. Initially, the University of Wales Bangor and the Countryside Council of Wales will be used to provide an analysis of two public sector organisations which are subject to the requirements of the 1993 Act. The motivations for choosing these specific organisations were numerous. Firstly, both of these organisations are located in the research area of North Wales. With the regard to the CCW there was an added benefit of its head offices being based in Bangor. Secondly as it will emerge both of these organisations are well intertwined with each other and thirdly both had pro-active policies with regard to Welsh language learning. Indeed they represented the greatest intakes of adult learners of Welsh within the sample questionnaire. Having examined these public bodies I then wish to counterpoise them by concluding this chapter with a return to an area that is core to civil society – that of small and grassroots voluntary organisations. In particular I wish to point to the manner in which such groups are structured by their chosen language use and the degree to which such grassroots organisations have the ability to provide a bilingual service. In this case, rather than drawing on a specific case study organisations I will draw on some of the data available regarding the role of the Mentrau Iaith initiatives in attempting to *bilingualise* such small voluntary and community organisations. I will then conclude by contrasting the well resourced simultaneous translation services of large governmental and public bodies with the role of volunteer translators in more grassroots organisations. In all cases however, both large and small organisations, what remains problematic is the question of convincing associates of the *need* for such bilingual services. Before turning to this however, it is necessary to outline the legal context of the Welsh language in which these public and civil bodies work.

In chapter 3, the requirements laid out to employers within the 1993 Welsh language Act were outlined along with an account of the debates surrounding such a requirement for Welsh in the workplace. It is argued here however that arguments *against* increasing bilingual requirements in the workplace are flawed. Rather than providing a case *against* the insistence upon bilingual skills for certain positions, they simply highlight inequalities in relation to the current provision of bilingual education and the need for a standardised bilingual education throughout all schools in order to

meet the requirements of the labour market. Where critics of bilingual employment requirements do have a case is that the current levels of bilingual education may not meet the requirements of the labour market and that the labour market is narrowed as a result. Given the increasing degree to which Welsh is seen as a requirement for employment, and the function of education to supply the labour market with a skilled labour force, it is clearly of concern that existing Welsh-born people may be excluded from this labour market segment, or in a weaker position in relation to it, due to lack of skills or merely confidence in a self-perceived lower level of competence in Welsh.

The University of Wales, Bangor, language policy: the provision of Welsh medium education and a comprehensive bilingual service

As documented in the University of Wales, Bangor, *Language, Education and Training Scheme (LET Scheme)* (2000), there are, at present (2000), 6358 full-time students. 37% of the total come from Wales, 42% from the rest of the UK and the remainder (21%) from other countries. During the 1998/9 session, 14.2% of the full-time students were Welsh-speaking. During the 1999/2000 session, the total number of staff employed by the institution was 2165. Of these, the total number of Welsh speakers was 784 (36.2%) with 32 learners. This immediately gives an indication of the bi-cultural structure of the University not only between English and Welsh born, but also between Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers. It is in representation of this that, since the mid 1960's, a programme of Welsh-medium higher education has developed, along with Aberystwyth, at the University of Wales, Bangor. At Bangor, it was decided that this development would be in certain curricular areas only, namely the arts and social sciences. On one hand, Williams and Morris (1999) argue that the confinement of Welsh medium provision to non-scientific subjects is a reflection of a pejorative modernist tendency to consider minority languages in relation to emotion and tradition and in opposition to science and rationality. As we shall see, an understanding of minority languages in relation to this dichotomy underlies many of the issues associated with Welsh medium study. On the other it may simply reflect the fact that English is the *international* language of science and technology. Nevertheless, the establishment of this provision led to subsequent calls for incorporating the use of Welsh into the entire administration of the University and in 1977/8 the first Bilingualism policy was adopted at the college. As a result of this

policy, in 1981, the University recognised both Welsh and English as *Official* languages of the University of Wales, Bangor. Out of this legacy, the institution's current language policy, revised in 1996 in conjunction with the Welsh Language Act 1993, defines the nature of its commitment to promoting this bilingual and bicultural reality in the following way:

> *The University of Wales, Bangor, is committed to implementing the principle of equality of Welsh and English in all its activities.*

And it goes on to state that in order to implement this principle of equality, the University has adopted the following aims:

> *i. to promote, develop and extend the Welsh-medium work of the University aiming at realising the right of students to receive higher education through the medium of Welsh and/or English;*

> *ii. to develop the Welsh ethos of the University by implementing the principle of equality in all its activities and by fostering a spirit of harmony and support between the cultures;*

> *iii. to ensure the facilities for individuals to deal with the University on all occasions and for all purposes in Welsh or English according to their own choice.*

Through all three of these aims, the University's language policy is consistent with the underlying principles of both the Welsh Language Act 1993, and the Welsh Language Board established in 1995. As Williams and Morris (1999:176) also point out, the principle of the Act, and the one adopted by the Welsh Language Board, is an *enabling* one which draws on the notion of 'non-directionality', or the belief that the role of governance is to *respond* to the needs and expectations of the citizen. Through ascertaining these needs and expectations of consumers therefore, the government can subsequently establish the level of the provision of services required. The University's language policy also adopts these principles by basing its level of provision, in terms of both Welsh medium and bilingual public services,

in terms of the right of the individual to use either Welsh or English according to their choice. The University thus aims to "make it possible for the University's central administration and each Resource Centre to *respond* to each Welsh speaker in his/her chosen language" (UWB:2000:13, my emphasis). How therefore does the University ensure that sufficient numbers of bilingual staff are available in order for Resource Centres to provide a comprehensive bilingual service? This leads us to staff recruitment. To an extent, the principle of equality between Welsh and English also extends into the economic realm through its staff recruitment literature. As stated in the LET Scheme:

*Any advertisements for posts where Welsh is **essential** will be published bilingually in the Welsh press as well as the British press. Advertisements for posts where knowledge of Welsh is **essential** will usually be in Welsh with an explanatory sentence in English.*

In ensuring sufficient numbers of bilingual staff, the scheme sets out that Resource Centres (the academic departments and schools) will be asked to provide a 'staffing strategy' in order to note their needs and priorities. Significantly however there is something of a discrepancy between *Academic* staff and *Non-academic* staff. For instance, *all new* administrative, secretarial and clerical appointments (including some academic-related posts) will be bilingual (i.e. require a knowledge of Welsh). In contrast to this, academic resource centres need only have one member of staff who is able to discuss his/her own subject area through the medium of Welsh. In addition, when appointing academic staff, the University will consider proficiency in the Welsh language only as an additional qualification, with all other things being equal. There is another caveat here: some resource centres will offer more Welsh medium opportunities, and thus be more positive towards the requirements laid out in the University's language policy, than others.

Officially therefore, the University of Wales at Bangor, along with Aberystwyth, has undertaken a number of measures which reflect the bilingual and bicultural context. As is made clear within the statement sent to prospective candidates:

The University recognises that it has a responsibility to enrich the life of the bilingual and bicultural society in which it is located...Furthermore, the University will, in view of its tradition and location, expect an appointee to work positively within a bilingual and multicultural environment and questions to establish this are asked at interview. Facilities for learning and improving Welsh are available and every encouragement will be given to those who wish to avail themselves of these.

However, for many working to consolidate and promote the provision of Welsh medium education, there is stark contrast between this rhetoric of commitment and responsibility to promoting biculturalism (i.e. promoting the use of Welsh), of the colleges at Bangor and Aberystwyth as *Welsh* institutions and benefactors of the Welsh language and the reality of a dwindling provision of Welsh medium education. As the LET scheme (2000) recognises, in order to implement the ideals of the language scheme, it will be necessary to appoint *additional* academic staff, who are able to teach through the medium of Welsh. Yet as Morris, Jones et al (2002) contend, of the 5000 academic staff employed throughout the University of Wales, only around two dozen were specifically appointed to teach through the medium of Welsh in subjects other than Welsh language and literature. This for the authors has led to a situation of a 'cultural division of labour' in that the vast majority of Welsh speakers are in non-academic (administrative, secretarial and clerical) positions. We therefore have a conflict within the principle of enabling and non-directionality due its removal of ethical principles, or any function of governance as directing the people towards certain ends (Williams & Morris, 1999). Rather than take seriously their commitment to the Welsh language and culture they are seen as further anglicizing the traditionally Welsh speaking communities in which they are located. It is this predicament however that has led to calls to not only attract more Welsh students to the University of Wales but also for the establishment of a Welsh medium federal college (this call was voiced to the National Assembly by Dafydd Glyn Jones).

Encouraging non-Welsh speakers to learn Welsh in the University
It is clear therefore that the University language policy, rightly or wrongly, is constricted to a predominantly individualistic and modernist framework. What needs

to be addressed however are questions regarding the demand of Welsh speaking students Wales for Welsh medium education or the desire of Welsh-born students to attend a university in Wales. For instance, a survey of the sixth forms of Welsh medium/bilingual schools (52 institutions) conducted by the University Board of Welsh medium studies[1] found that 84% of students wanted to pursue HE in Wales and that this compared to only 60%, some 10 years ago. Furthermore, given that in 2003 a further 177 schools would provide an operational level of bilingualism, the availability of HE through the medium of Welsh needed to be expanded. Consequently, as the survey also found, a number of sixth form students had turned to English courses because Welsh medium courses were not available. The issue therefore would appear to be the provision of a 'real' choice between both English and Welsh medium courses and Universities in and outside Wales. At the same time however this perspective is unable to explain why Bangor for example, does not attract *more* Welsh medium students. In other words if there is more demand for Welsh medium courses, why is the current intake of Welsh medium students declining. It would appear that while more students wish to pursue their higher education in Wales, they do not necessarily wish to pursue it through the medium of Welsh.

The principles of individual choice and freedom are also reflected by the University's emphasis on the volition of individual members of staff in relation to the learning of Welsh. Having already provided a detailed discussion of the overall provision of adult learning of Welsh in the previous chapter, I shall only make a few points at this stage in order to outline how it is incorporated in to the University's language scheme. As is stated within the LET Scheme:

members of staff who wish to learn Welsh or develop their knowledge of the language are able to register on the courses provided by the Centre for Continuing Education. The fees for these courses will be paid by the University and every encouragement is given both to members of staff to attend and to Heads of Resource Centres to facilitate their attendance.

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[1] See minutes of the Education and Lifelong Learning Committee, NAfW, 17th May 2001.

It is only when a non-Welsh speaker is appointed to an academic post, where the ability to speak Welsh is considered to be essential, that the learning of Welsh is a condition of employment – and therefore not of the individual employee's volition. Apart from positions therefore where the ability to speak Welsh is considered to be essential, the learning of Welsh is entirely a matter of individual volition. That said, from my own research, it would appear that a considerable number of all the adults learning Welsh at the Centre for Continuing Education are academic staff within the University, mainly from outside Wales, who have decided to learn of their own volition. The paradox of this situation is clearly illustrated by on Welsh learner/academic:

> Well considering that I was allowed two weeks off to do the course (Welsh summer school) and that it was paid for, I mean they could have turned round and said no, but it's a difficult one because there is no real pressure on you here to learn Welsh...I mean I think possibly there should be more encouragement to learn Welsh here (in the University) ... I mean I could quite happily go through University life and never speak a word of it but I wouldn't feel right about it. The University really should do more of an effort.

It is also on this aspect that the University incorporates a commitment to servicing not only staff and students but to work in partnerships with the local community in its strategic plan. Clearly, the availability of adult learning classes to individuals not employed by the University is one example of this. As will be shown later, the Centre provides services not only to individuals outside the University but also works in partnership with specific companies in order to integrate Welsh into the workplace.

Career aspirations of Welsh speaking students

I will now examine how within its provision of separate and exclusive Welsh speaking institutions such as the Welsh speaking Halls of residence, Welsh medium degree courses and Welsh speaking Student Union, the University provides a 'space' through which Welsh speakers are able to 'exit' the private realm of the family and enter a part of civil society – one of the few parts in which Welsh has 'normal status'. In outlining this, I will address some of the existing frictions that surround the

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'boundary relationships' between this 'normalised space' and the adjacent institutions in which Welsh is either marginally present or virtually absent. Likewise, as is the argument throughout this thesis, one cannot appreciate fully the nature of boundary construction within the rational and normalised Welsh speaking group without reference to its more pervasive external artificiality and irrationality. In other words how spaces of 'protectionist' or 'normalised' usage of Welsh exist are structured in terms of their protected difference from wider accommodative usage of English. Significantly, through interviews conducted with Welsh speaking students residing within the Welsh speaking halls at Bangor, both these processes become apparent. On one hand, linked to the exit from a Welsh speaking familial sphere and the extent to which Welsh is seen as a skill for the labour market, then the undertaking of a Welsh medium degree appears 'natural'. On the other, given that any emergence of social prestige is *confined* to particular labour market segments (Williams and Morris, 1999) and to Wales itself then the view that retaining Welsh is limiting remains a widespread one.

Before going into detail of this, there are perhaps two further institutional factors which contribute to the bi-cultural structure of the University. Firstly, the dual nature of the Bangor Student Union and the Welsh Students Union, Undeb Myfyriwr Cymraeg Bangor (UMCB). And secondly, the provision of a separate Welsh speaking Hall, John Morris Jones. I shall provide an outline of both these institutions. The UMCB for instance has a branch office within the JMJ halls itself. It forms a focal point of the Welsh speaking community through organising social and cultural events. Here there is a strong relationship between the UMCB and Urdd Gobaith Cymru which also forms a central aspect of student life through organising for instance trips to Rugby matches in Cardiff. Also the University night club occasionally puts on Welsh band nights.

Working in tandem to the UMCB is the provision of a separate Halls of residence for Welsh speakers called *Neuadd John Morris Jones* (JMJ). After no small amount of dispute, Neuadd Pantycelyn at Aberystwyth became a Welsh hall of residence in 1974, as did Neuadd John Morris Jones in Bangor in the following year. This hall holds approximately 180-200 Welsh speaking students. It differs from other Halls in that it is not just for first years students but for second and third year students as well. All three of these provisions (Welsh Medium Education, UMCB and JMJ) can be seen to reflect not only the University's official language policy but a

commitment to promoting the bilingual and bicultural society in which it is located. It is also clear however that a fair degree of tension and conflict between English and Welsh identities is very much a normalised aspect of everyday life within the University. Recognition of such an English/Welsh divide can clearly be illustrated through interviews with students at Bangor. For example, when asked questions regarding the provision of a separate Halls of residence for Welsh speakers, two conflicting positions can be identified: As one student from Cardiff states:

> It's a good idea to begin with, you have to have it because it's a way of *protecting* the Welsh language as well (italics added)

On the other hand, the provision of such Halls are seen negatively as voluntaristic segregation on the part of Welsh speakers as wanting to 'keep themselves to themselves'. In other words, as promoting 'division' and 'rivalries' rather than 'coexistence' and 'co-operation'. As another student living at the Ffriddoedd site states:

> Most of the Welsh students are in Neuadd John Morris Jones. They say that this allows them to preserve their culture, language and way of life as well as sharing a friendly community spirit. This is true. But if you follow this logic then you'd have to give separate halls to Asian students so they could maintain the same values. Ditto Europeans, Latin Americans, Africans, Christians, Muslims, Jews and so on.

Yet these particular negative standpoints tend to reflect widespread misconceptions on bilingualism. One such misconception I would argue is the view of Schlesinger (1992:99), that "bilingualism shuts doors. It nourishes self-ghettoisation, and ghettoisation nourishes racial antagonism". This tendency to equate 'Welsh (speaking) students' with 'Asian students' ignores fundamental differences between two types of multicultural citizenship – the rights of *national minorities* (such as Welsh) and the rights of *other ethnic and cultural minorities* (Kymlicka, 1995a). Consequently the argument against provisions for separate institutions for Welsh speakers is the 'slippery slope to ghettoisation' one made on the basis that the same provisions should therefore also be granted to all other ethnic and cultural minorities.

In other words the rights of Welsh speakers are seen to conflict not only with the majority group (English speakers) but other minority groups as well (Williams, 1995).

Finally however, I wish to conclude this discussion by turning to the crux of this section – that is – how the social group identity influences the economic behaviour of Welsh speakers. To extrapolate this I conducted a number of in-depth interviews with Welsh speaking students, most of whom were students on Welsh medium degrees, all of whom resided within the Welsh speaking hall of residence at Bangor, John Morris Jones. Overall, 20 students were consulted and what follows constitutes a translation into English of some of the responses from Welsh speaking students.

From social identity and civil society to the economic sphere

Here I wish to examine the relationship between social group identity and work intentions. While for many Welsh speakers this relationship maybe arbitrary and marginal, for Welsh speaking students living in JMJ there is a strong relationship in that these students tend to orientate careers and work paths towards sectors not only where 'Welsh' is beneficial but also where it allows them to remain in areas which are predominantly Welsh speaking. Indeed for many this influence is already apparent in their University and degree choices. This is clearly highlighted within the following table.

	Within 10 mile radius	Within 50 mile radius	Within 100 miles	Within 200 miles
No. of students	4	10	3	3

Table 8.1 The Localism of Welsh speaking students

As this table shows, of the 20 Welsh speaking students interviewed, just under 75% of the students came from within a 50 mile radius of Bangor University. The other 25% coming from Aberystwyth (3), Cardiff (2) and Cardigan (1). Moreover, just under a quarter of the students came from places within as little as a 10 mile radius of Bangor University such as Caernarfon, Ddeiniolen and Llanfair PG. From this evidence, we could state, although tentatively at this stage, that language, as one marker of social

group identity, can hold a significant structural role in relation to individual actions. As one student from Cardiff states:

> Keeping Welsh alive is definitely a factor when deciding where to live and work. Because like I said in the future I want to bring up a family in Welsh. There wouldn't be a problem just to work there [in England] on my own but if I get older and settle down I wouldn't want to settle down in England because I want to bring up a family in Welsh. I'm not that comfortable in English anyway.

This connection between language and work is made more explicitly by another student from Pandytudur (nr Llanrwst) when asked what her plans were when she finishes her degree:

> I want to be a social worker or work with special children so I might do a DipSW at Bangor. I think in the future it helps [to speak Welsh] because they ask for Social workers who can speak Welsh...hopefully I can find work in North Wales but if not then I would take a job anywhere in Wales.

Interviewer: Would you take a job outside Wales?

> No, I'm not comfortable in English.

This tendency to orientate future decision around language differences can only be stated tentatively however, because of the way the Welsh language overlaps with localism, rurality and community. As another student from Pwllheli states (again this student was asked about his career plans after finishing his degree):

> I'd like to work in Caernarfon or in the local area.

Why?

> Because it's where I am from, and I want to stay in the same area. If not then maybe down south to Cardiff.

What about anywhere else in Britain?

No maybe somewhere like Liverpool but I have no interest in working outside Wales, I've seen enough of other places like Liverpool, Manchester and London and they don't appeal to me.

Similarly as another student from Pandytudur states:

Why did you choose Bangor University?

A number of reasons really, I already know a lot here, a lot of my friends have come here as well. Also I didn't see it as too far from home. If I was in Aberystwyth, *it would take me more than two hours to go there* and only three quarters of an hour to Bangor (itallics added)

Apart from Bangor or Aberystwyth where else did you think of going to?

I didn't think of going anywhere else to say the truth.

What about Cardiff or outside Wales?

No, *Cardiff is too far for me* and I couldn't live in a big city like Manchester or Liverpool because I was brought up on a farm and I don't think I like people who live in big cities to tell the truth. I would fail to settle there (itallics added)

Decisions regarding choice of University therefore are influenced not only by language therefore but by factors of community and rurality. In all interviews however, what emerges is a certain symbolic boundary where Bangor and Aberystwyth become dominant centres. Cardiff is also considered but often only as a secondary choice. It is seen as secondary not only in terms of not being as Welsh speaking as Bangor or Aberystwyth but also for being both too large and too far away from North Wales. Such statements are even more significant given that most students

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would still study away from home. Equally, the Welsh language is seen as beneficial to gaining employment in Wales and conversely as a disadvantage to gaining work outside Wales due to lack of confidence in speaking English.

This raises an important and difficult question however regarding a conflict between social group identity and individual opportunities. Do Welsh speaking students sacrifice individual possibilities in order to reproduce the Welsh speaking group? In relation to this the responses of Welsh speaking students were not in terms of sacrifice or a moral choice but what comes natural:

> I don't think of it like that because to me it's just the natural thing to do. I've had all my education through Welsh so it would only be natural for me to continue in Welsh in university.

In addressing this, we return to the position of minority languages in relation to the dichotomy between science/rationality/modernity on one hand and emotion/tradition on the other. This can also be tied to Durkheim's distinction between *mechanical* and *organic solidarity* in relation to *collective consciousness* (see Ch. 1 for an outline of this) and Tonnies *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. To recap this, for Durkheim there was, under organic solidarity, a mutual reinforcement of the collective and the individual. Under mechanical solidarity however, solidarity can only grow in an inverse proportion to individuality. In other words, Mechanical solidarity involves the restriction of individual possibilities. Moral considerations are seen as embracing all aspects of the individual conscience. In societies characterised by organic solidarity however, the scope for individuality is greater and moral considerations are restricted – people have greater freedom to follow their own preferences. This does not mean that the collective conscience disappears; rather it places supreme value on individual dignity and equal opportunity rather than on community and collective interests. The only collective conscience that can do this is the one society vis-à-vis the state. Other collectivities, such as minority language groups, are thus seen as restricting the basis of both economic progress and liberal democracy.

This inverse association of 'speaking Welsh' (and therefore bilingualism) with both economic progress and liberal values of individual freedom is widespread. Many Welsh speaking parents for instance choose not to bring up their children through Welsh and argue against their children learning Welsh in schools on the basis that it

restricts their future economic opportunities. Equally, parents who bring up their children Welsh speaking are seen to restrict the opportunities of their children. These perceptions continue to form powerful barriers to the normalising of bilingualism in Wales. The isomorphism of democracy, economic development and the 'one-society' means that the retention of any linguistic or cultural difference must be irrational. As Bourdieu (1991) argues however, this is precisely how national/standard languages acquire a position of hegemony within society. It involves a process of 'symbolic domination' (1991:51) whereby subordinate speech communities, including speakers of both non-standard dialectical varieties and minority languages, unconsciously accept the authority, value, correctness and moral superiority of the legitimate language. Clearly, therefore the idea that Welsh medium education, at all levels, is detrimental to individual opportunities cannot be considered uncritically. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that Welsh speakers are placed in an either/or position in relation to the retention of ethnic identity and individual opportunities that underlies unequal power relationship between dominant and subordinate language groups. Consequently English speakers are not placed in an either/or position, rather speaking English and economic progress is seen to go hand in hand.

In addition to this however, there may also be an empirical indeterminacy as to whether undertaking Welsh-medium degrees can be considered in such terms as 'sacrificing of individual possibilities' – as irrational! As has already been shown, many students considered their courses as *beneficial* for finding work in Wales. Organisations such as the Countryside Council for Wales, Snowdonia National Park and the Welsh media were cited as potential future employers. Furthermore, and following on from this, what emerges in the interviews undertaken is that studying though the medium of Welsh is perceived by students as neither a *voluntary act* nor an *obligation* but as simply *normal* and a *natural* extension having already received primary and secondary education through the medium of Welsh. Subjectively, it thus appears as common sense, rational and self-interested rather than futile or sacrificial, stemming from moral considerations. From one perspective, this reflects the degree to which the institutionalisation and legitimation of Welsh (May, 1999) goes hand in hand with the development of an autonomous Welsh public and service sector, subject to the 1993 Welsh language act. From another perspective, it points to an acknowledgement on the part of students of the consequences of undertaking University studies *entirely* through the medium of Welsh – namely that they limit

their future careers to Wales. This paradox surrounding the prestige of Welsh within employment sectors is highlighted by Williams and Morris (1999) in their analysis of 1991 census data. While on one hand we may argue that knowledge of Welsh now brings with a fair amount of economic capital, as they argue, it is important to recognise that "the prestige of Welsh [is] restricted to certain locations where public-sector employment linked to the language prevailed – the administrative centres of Cardiff and the various local authorities" (1999:34).

Countryside Council for Wales: Developing a bilingual occupational culture

In outlining the policies of the University of Wales, Bangor we can identify a certain cultural division of labour in relation to the degree to which non-Welsh speakers are required to learn Welsh. For while a policy of bilingualism is applied at the stage of the recruitment for administrative and non-academic or non-scientific staff this does not extend into the recruitment of academic and scientific staff. Rather this policy was to be implemented at the departmental level whereby each academic sub-division would arrange its own Welsh language provision. As such it is a question of ensuring a minimum number of Welsh-speaking academic staff in each of the sub-divisions. Beyond this requirement, it was a question of individual volition with the role of the university to ensure provisions and encourage such individuals to learn. In the case of the following case study workplace – that of the Countryside Council for Wales (CCW) we may appear to have something of a middle way. Like the University, the CCW employs both administrative and scientific staff. Again like the University there appears a clear cultural division of labour here between predominantly Welsh speaking administrative staff and predominantly non-Welsh speaking scientific staff. However unlike the University, the CCW is unique in that it does provide some requirement of non-Welsh speaking scientific staff to learn Welsh as stipulated within their employment contracts. In other words, for non-Welsh speaking scientific staff, their employment is conditional on agreeing to learn Welsh. I shall now therefore provide more detail on the policy of the CCW.

The Countryside Council for Wales (CCW) was established by Act of Parliament in 1991 and is the Government's executive authority for the conservation of species of wild animals and plants as well as the habitats in which they live. The head office of the Council is in Bangor, Gwynedd and this is supported by the CCW's

local activities which are run in five area offices in Cardiff, Aberystwyth, Mold, Llandridnod Wells and Bangor. The CCW has approximately 630 members of staff throughout Wales with about 225 members of staff based at Bangor. Currently 33% of the Council's staff is Welsh speaking and about three quarters of the Welsh speakers are based in Bangor. **Table 8.2** gives a current outline of the currents levels of Welsh speaking ability among the council offices throughout Wales.

Table 7.2: Welsh Ability of staff by groups and areas (April 2002) (see Annual Report to the Welsh Language Board 2001-2)

Team/Area	W1	W2	W3	W4	Total
Central Office	4	0	2	0	6
Conservation Directorate	1	0	6	3	10
Countryside Policy Directorate	2	0	1	0	3
East Area	4	2	16	23	45
Environment Audit	1	1	4	7	13
Finance	10	1	4	3	18
Information Management	5	1	15	17	38
Interpretation, Communaltion & Education	12	1	2	3	18
Land Management and Site Safeguard	4	0	8	2	14
Land Use & Land Policy	7	0	4	4	15
Maritime & Earth Science	3	1	14	15	33
Natural Science Support	0	3	12	14	29
North East Area	10	0	17	11	38
North West Area	39	8	22	13	82
Personnel & Facilities Management	12	2	8	9	31
Recreation, Access and European	10	3	10	7	30
Resource Planning & Efficiency	3	2	6	2	13
Science Directorate	2	0	0	1	3
South Area	2	3	20	32	57
West Area	14	8	27	34	83
Total	**145**	**36**	**198**	**200**	**579**

W1= Fluent W2= Working Knowledge W3= Learner/basic knowledge W4= Little or no Knowledge

In this table, a number of trends can be outlined. Firstly that the highest numbers of Welsh speakers can be found in the 'North West Area' and 'West Area'. As is stated in the CCW's language scheme:

The Welsh language scheme is based on delivering service to the general public in Welsh to a large extent through a team responsibility approach

The following table gives an indication of the bilingual requirement in relation to responding to members of the public

Table 8.3: Calls received by CCW Bilingual Enquiry Line Collected Jan-March 2002

	January	*February*	*March*
Enquiries in Welsh	55 (37.2%)	70 (39.1%)	60 (28.7)
Enquiries in English	93 (62.8%)	109 (60.9%)	149 (71.3%)
Total number of Enquiries	148	179	209

Following on from this the scheme states "the members of the area teams are the members of staff who have the most contact with the public. The teams are very aware that the public relations part of their work is a very important one." As such it is indicative that the 'North West Area' and the 'West Area' should return the highest number of Welsh speaking staff in that it is in these areas that report the highest proportion of Welsh speakers. This is also supported by the fact that the CCW is a primarily rural focused organisation thus field staff come into frequent contact with farmers and landowners. As such there is an emphasis on ensuring by means of recruitment that the proportion of Welsh speaking staff in field teams is maintained. Furthermore, non-Welsh speaking members of field teams, namely those in 'NorthWest' and 'West' areas are encouraged to learn Welsh.

The recruitment stage:

In determining the varying need for bilingual ability, the following categories are referred to:

Category A: Posts for which fluency in Welsh is essential
Category B: Posts for which fluency in Welsh is highly desirable
Category C: Posts for which the ability to speak Welsh is desirable

As stated within the scheme (1998:17):

> Ideally, bilingual ability is desirable for all posts in the Countryside Council…when a suitable Welsh speaker cannot be found to fill the post, it may be acceptable for a non-Welsh speaker to be appointed *on condition that Welsh is learned* to the required standard within a clearly defined timescale. Staff appointed to these posts will be committed to a four year training programme that will lead to them achieving 'A' level standard at the end of the training period. Where the ability to speak Welsh is not essential in a particular post, the council will still refer to its proactive policy to encourage the use of the language throughout the organisation.

And elsewhere (1998:19)

> Non-Welsh speaking members of all field teams, particularly those in areas where Welsh is strong, will be encouraged to learn Welsh.

The potential for such a cultural division of labour is then outlined:

> The Council will seek to encourage the interest of Welsh speakers in the organisation and its work. In the past it has been extremely difficult to recruit Welsh speaking staff of the requisite calibre into some grades, notably *scientific* grades. The council will seek to address this particular problem in a proactive way.

This perhaps reflects two things. Firstly, the modernist dichotomy outlined earlier whereby minority languages are placed in opposition to science and rationality and consequently its use not considered appropriate for such tasks. Secondly it reflects the nature of the Welsh language act which would inevitably attract Welsh speaking students to areas more appropriate to the public sector – e.g. local government, social services, media etc. A governmental body offering scientific occupations thus becomes an anomaly. Significantly the CCW has recently begun to attempt to address this. For example, it has set up sponsorship aimed at attracting Welsh speaking students to undertake postgraduate courses in areas such as environmental science and rural development. And as is also stated within the scheme 2:

> The Council will liaise with the constituent colleges of the University of Wales and other Universities with a view to *increasing their awareness* of the Council and its work as one of the most significant employers of natural scientists in Wales, with a view to *encouraging* more job applications from Welsh speaking graduates of the requested calibre...The Council will also continue to progress and monitor its current scheme for sponsoring Welsh speaking students following relevant post-graduate courses. (italics added)

In addition to this, the CCW has also considered the creation of a number of 'trainee grade' positions in order to encourage more Welsh speaking applicants who otherwise would not have the scientific credentials to warrant appointment. Overall the CCW's targets for Welsh training and recruitment are as follows:

Table 8.4 : CCW Corporate Plan for Welsh training and recruitment.

Target	03/04	04/05	05/06
Increase the proportion of staff fluent in Welsh, by a further 6% by June 2006.	5 by June 2003	19 by June 2004	26 by June 2005

It is the achievement of this target that underlies the current programme of Welsh learning which supports 35 staff following a 4-year training programme to learn Welsh to A level standard. It is therefore these 35 staff members that constitute the non-Welsh speaking Welsh learners within the CCW. Although overall a total of 137 staff had attended weekly courses during the 2001/2 session throughout Wales.

In this section I will draw on documents relating to the CCW as well as interviews conducted with members of staff to gain a deeper understand of how such a scheme is implemented. In particular, emphasis will be placed on the 'civil society issues' that have been consistently pointed to throughout this thesis: in relation to the Welsh language, these issues include discourses on 'informing' or 'raising awareness'; 'encouraging consent or participation' and how these are perceived as pressure or enforcement. While on one hand this relates to an organisations role in providing a public service (e.g. 'making customers/the public aware of a bilingual service' or 'encouraging customers to use the language of their choice') on the other such civil society issues relate internally, to the bilingual workings of the organisation. In this latter respect civil society issues relate to encouraging staff or making staff aware. This scale of civil/uncivil society is particularly crucial in attempts by employers to normalise bilingualism or what might be regarded as developing 'a bilingual occupational culture'. As outlined in previous chapters, this scale can be illustrated in the following way:

Figure 8.1: Continuum of civil-uncivil discourse (see also Figure 4.1 pp.)

Make Aware	Inform	Encourage	Persuade	Endorse	Ensure	Pressurise	Coerce	Force

Autonomy ← ↔ → *Regulation*

Put more theoretically, it exemplifies the inputting of civil society into the workplace and, in doing so, stresses the inter-dependency between civil society and economy. In

turn this reflects the communitarian discourse of Cymuned in which the maintenance and implementation of bilingual policy takes place primarily within the community. In the economic sphere however, discourses on liberalism and regulation have different positive/negative meanings than in civil society itself. As such the regulation of the economic sphere in terms of bilingualism is more likely to be consented to than regulation of the social. However the framework of **Figure 8.1**, can therefore also be applied to the direction of civil society towards the political and legal spheres and the economic spheres in terms of informing, encouraging or persuading and enforcing. Related to this is evidence of how through such implementation of Welsh language schemes, a 'skilling' of the Welsh language is apparent.

Scheme Implementation: Developing a Bilingual Occupational Culture

As is hinted above, an important aspect of the 1993 Welsh language act is not only the development of Welsh language schemes but also their implementation and monitoring. In both these regards (the identification of a level of bilingualism, and the implementation of this level) the public sector organisations subject to the Act can vary. For example in the CCW with regard to 'correspondence' the scheme states the following:

> The Council welcomes correspondence in both Welsh and English. Council staff will respond in Welsh to correspondence received in Welsh, and in English to correspondence received in English. If the correspondence follows verbal discussions, it will be initiated in the preferred written language of the recipient.

On a number of occasions the degree of implementation is placed at the level of 'making aware' to 'encouragement'. For example:

> All incoming calls to the Council's offices will be answered with a bilingual greeting given in Welsh and then in English. The caller will be *encouraged* to use his/her preferred language thereafter.

> At each bilingual meeting the Chair will open the proceedings with a bilingual greeting, *draw attention to* the availability of the translation service and *invite*

Welsh speakers and learners to contribute to the meetings in Welsh. Officers of the Council will also be *encouraged* to use Welsh at public meetings, conferences and seminars.

In each of these cases, italics have been added to indicate the use of language such as 'encouraged' 'draw attention to' 'invite'. But questions remain here over how such bilingual procedures are maintained and how is it ensured that such procedures are adhered to? In this respect there are two points of action: firstly, a monitoring of 'customer satisfaction'; and secondly, a monitoring of staff responses to customer enquiries. Both forms of action were administered by the CCW in the period between November 2001 and February 2002. In November 2001 for example, a Customer satisfaction survey[2] was undertaken in which a questionnaire was sent out to the CCW's "customers" – those who either used or were seen as likely to use the CCW's services through the medium of Welsh. From this it would be possible for the council to gauge levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Perhaps telling, the findings reported higher levels of satisfaction regarding written correspondence such as letters, leaflets and forms and higher levels of dissatisfaction with regard to verbal interaction such as the telephone service and meetings with CCW staff. With regard to monitoring of Welsh language service among staff, a number of actions have been taken. For example, immediately following the Customer satisfaction survey in November 2001, a small survey was undertaken by Cwmni Iaith (a language consultancy set up by the Welsh language board to help organisations meet the requirements of their language scheme) in December 2001 in which 25 letters were sent to a number of the Council's offices throughout Wales. Among the findings from this exercise was that of the 19 responses to letters sent in Welsh, 3 responses were in English. Such failures were thus followed up with further guidance to staff to ensure full awareness of the scheme. For instance, in January 2003, reminders were sent to non-Welsh speaking staff of the procedure for offering a service by Welsh speakers to the public, either immediately or by return phone call.

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[2] A questionnaire was sent out to 487 'customers' with 118 responses (23.6% of sample). With regard to the Welsh language service, 91% of respondents expressed satisfaction with letters and leaflets and 83% with forms. While 16% expressed dissatisfaction with the telephone service and 10% with meetings with CCW Staff. In addition, 52% of respondents thought the Welsh language service could be significantly improved.

This exercise was then followed by a larger one to test staff responses to telephone calls in Welsh (A total of 125 calls were made to all the Council's HQ groups, area offices and sub offices). Amongst other findings relating to the standard of customer service were those relating to the Welsh language service. For example, with regard to the ability of local offices to deal with specific enquiries, despite almost all calls receiving the official bilingual greeting, less than half (49%) of the enquiries made in Welsh succeeded in obtaining a response in Welsh. How therefore are efforts to encourage non-Welsh speakers implemented?

From one perspective, this encouragement manifests solely in making the learning as supportive as possible thus making it more attractive. For example this would include the CCW providing time, course fees and support. This Welsh language training is then incorporated into the 'staff training scheme' in order to improve Welsh skills to the required standard. But how are such requirements on language training perceived by members of staff? In this respect, the responses from Welsh learner employees were generally mixed. Firstly, there were positive responses not only because of a genuine desire or interest but also because some staff felt it was an easy option to take Welsh language classes instead of having to do 'proper work'. Such Welsh training was thus perceived as more like 'time-off' work and a 'social' occasion.

The negative feelings associated with it seemed to fall into two categories: Firstly, those who did not see the need in their work to be able to speak Welsh. One non-Welsh speaker for example had been working in the same post for over 10 years. Naturally therefore, to be asked to consider learning Welsh was met with reluctance in that he considered that as he had been able to do his job successfully for the past 10 years was the need really there. Secondly, there were those who were fearful of losing their employment for having not reached the required level of ability. As is outlined above, many non-Welsh speaking appointments were made on the stipulation that the person would learn Welsh to a certain standard within a certain time frame. As Scheme Two also states, "if attainment targets are not reached in time allowed, the post holder's performance will be reviewed in accordance with the Contract of Employment".

In many of these respects the kind of argument provided by Cymuned, as outlined earlier, takes on an added legitimacy because it is imbued with a certain reciprocity whereby non-Welsh speakers can see the benefits or incentive to learn

Welsh. With some this was evident even when they did not really see the need, either from a work point of view or a more general societal one. On the other hand however, particularly when it was not considered necessary for their work, many viewed the requirement as unfair or coercive, referring to some colleagues as militant in their enforcement of it. Following this, it was then necessary to consider how those responsible for implementing the Welsh language scheme would respond to mixed feelings, to opposition and even hostility to learning.

It is in respect of this problematic that we see a wider notion of 'Welsh language training'. We see a concern not only with developing the bilingual ability of staff members but also developing their cultural awareness and attitudes towards the Welsh language – this is identified within the scheme as "Welsh language awareness training". As it states: "Welsh language awareness training will form an integral part of the council's staff training programme and will be included on training routes such as customer care training, diversities and equalities training, Welsh language skills training and induction training sessions". Thus the role of the Welsh language training extends from a purely linguistic one to a cultural one aimed at legitimising and normalising bilingual practice. As was identified by the language officer when I interviewed her, the purpose of this was primarily to deal with feelings of opposition to the Welsh language scheme particularly in relation to responses regarding a lack of need to do so. In many ways therefore language awareness training is a way of getting staff members to see the need to use Welsh and to be bilingual, not only in terms of their work but also in terms of the relationship of the CCW to its environment. It is a way of counteracting hostility and mixed feelings in the workplace as well as identifying how work contributes to a normalised bilingual culture. It is part of the process of getting employees to adhere to the laid down work norms – in this case a norm of bilingualism. This language awareness training is instigated from the outset as part of new staff's induction programme. Part of their induction for example is an outlining of the main principles of the Welsh language scheme where emphasis is placed on informing staff why a bilingual policy is not only needed but is a fair one.

One of the ways in which the 'need for bilingualism' has been stressed is its incorporation into wider induction programmes regarding norms of interaction with the public. Such a norm relates to 'business transactions' in which the "customer is always right". This then implies that it is the sales person (or in this case the public body person) that should accommodate by converging to the language of the

customer. The difference here however is the added requirement of informing the customer that a bilingual service is available and that a Welsh speaker is at hand if required.

Part of developing a bilingual occupational culture extends into encouraging the use of Welsh in workplace particularly among the non-Welsh speaking Welsh learners. Consequently, a group called Defnyddio'r Gymraeg (Using Welsh) was set up which meets three times during the year to discuss ways of promoting the use of Welsh within the organisation. Additional training sessions have also been arranged for less confident Welsh speakers and learners to encourage the use of Welsh on the phone, in meetings and in internal e-mails.

This also implies however that it is at the level of culture that the cause of the problem lies and that culture is somehow a barrier on attempts to institutionalise certain reforms at all levels within the organisation. A final point needing to be made here however relates to what might be regarded as a skilling of Welsh. It is apparent for instance how the learning of Welsh within CCW is integrated into the wider package of training courses available as part of career development programmes which aim to enhance the 'skill' of employees. Credits for example are awarded for all learners under the Open College Network Accreditation Scheme. In addition interviews with independent tutors are arranged for learners based at Bangor in order for each course undertaken to be awarded an additional credit. These independent tutors also act as personal trainers for the 35 Category B post holders on the 4 year training programme, arranging timetabled plans to ensure targets are met. With the CCW therefore we have a prime example of how the Welsh language and bilingualism has been 'skilled' and how an organisation can involve or contract an external training provider, in this case the University of Wales Bangor's Welsh for Adults provision to develop such skills. But what are the consequences of this 'skilling' or rationalisation of Welsh with regard to Welsh speakers in general?

At the heart of this question is the issue of competence in Welsh. In this regard from 1991 Census Data (OPCS, 1993) it is possible to gauge discrepancies in competence through distinguishing whether those who report themselves as Welsh speakers were able to speak, read and write Welsh or only one or two of these three. For example, as evidence within the 1991 report, only 72.7% of the total number of Welsh speakers were able to speak, read and write Welsh. This means that 138,489 Welsh speakers, just over a quarter of the total, did not report an ability to perform all

three tasks. This significance of this to the skilling and rationalisation of Welsh is that many Welsh speakers who perceive themselves as of lesser competence would tend to justify or 'explain' this through what Williams (1992) refers to as reason/emotion distinction. In turn this then becomes a basis for not seeing the need to improve competence and justifying their wish to use English rather than Welsh with other Welsh speakers. While this may or may not be the case in private or social interaction, it becomes a justification for Welsh speakers of lesser competence when dealing in public or official 'stranger' contexts. Summing up this dichotomy, as put by one Welsh speaker, "Welsh is the language of my heart while English is the language of my head". Thus the heart//head or emotion/reason distinction serves as a discourse through which Welsh speakers justify their preference of English in relation to such formal situations. Moreover, because Welsh is merely a "language of the heart", the need to improve ability, for rational purposes such as a 'skill for work' is not considered necessary for social mobility. The emergence of Welsh in the 'rationalist' realms of the economy and public life is thus resented precisely because of not viewing Welsh in such terms.

Furthermore, a number of recent initiatives illustrate an intensification of this direction with the CCW interfacing with a number of other organisations in arranging shared courses and sharing ideas for Welsh training. These partner organisations form the North Wales Bilingual Forum. These have included a number of public bodies including the North West Wales Health Authority, North Wales Police, Local Authorities, the Environment Agency and the Land Registry. Undoubtedly that a number of public organisations are motivated in Welsh training is highly significant in terms of normalising bilingualism: it creates the image of a common aim of encouraging staff to improve their Welsh and to use Welsh and that such an aim is necessary in order to deliver a better service to the public. In addition to the involvement of the University's Welsh for Adults provision, is the involvement of the Cwmni Iaith language consultancy which carries out the monitoring and assessing of how the Welsh language scheme has been implemented. It is on the back of recommendations made by this organisation for instance that emphasis on promoting awareness has been adopted.

"Bilingualising" the grassroots: The case of voluntary organisations

Thus far, civil society in Wales has been examined with regard to the Welsh language as a focal point of differentiation. That is, that in Wales, civil society takes on a specific organisational structure due to the presence of two language groups – a minority of bilingual Welsh/English speakers and a majority of monolingual English speakers. This dualism was able to take on a more central role by focusing the empirical research upon the Northwest region of Wales where the proportions of Welsh speakers are greater and in many respects can also constitute the majority. By beginning with a highly sociological conception of civil society as relating to cultural codes, civil society in the bilingual or bicultural context was outlined as differentiating around certain cultural codes that pattern and organise norms of language choice. This sociological conception was then used to examine the maintenance of the Welsh speaking group firstly in terms of the defensive and protectionist activities of Welsh language pressure groups and secondly in terms of the integration and accommodation of non-Welsh speakers. Together these constituted a concern over reproduction (how existing members can be held on to) and production (how new members can be recruited). This then related to the wider theoretical concern of the production and reproduction of civil society. Within this chapter however the analysis been an examination of more organisational settings. In the case of the CCW for instance I have illustrated an attempt to legitimise and normalise a bilingual occupational culture and some of the difficulties that have been associated with this, not least from the ambiguities of monolingual English speakers within this organisation. However this normalising process is founded upon the regulating aspect of Welsh language schemes developed by all public, governmental bodies. In relation to civil society therefore it is necessary to contrast this scenario with the case of private and voluntary bodies that are not held within the remit of the Welsh language act. What this means is that resource available for public organisations to normalise bilingualism are considerably greater than those of smaller voluntary organisations. As the final section of the penultimate chapter of this thesis therefore, I wish to conclude the empirical analysis with a refocus on an area perhaps more closely associated with civil society – that of voluntary groups in the narrow sense.

To extrapolate this contrast, the remainder of this chapter will therefore concentrate on efforts, and the difficulties associated with these efforts of legitimising

bilingualism within certain voluntary organisations. Central to this effort has been the work of the Menter Iaith Language initiatives. Before turning directly to this it would be useful to draw on what quantitative information was available on the bilingual nature of voluntary organisations with Wales and in particular North West Wales.

A survey conducted by Menter Gwynedd[3] for instance found that nearly 40% of voluntary organisations in Gwynedd employed only monolingual/English speaking staff. Likewise informal research collected by members of the Welsh language pressure group Cymuned[4] highlighted the divisions between civil society groups in relation to language within the small Northwest Wales town of Criccieth. As they report, of the 72 business and shops, 44 had Welsh speaking staff, 18 with mixed Welsh and English speaking staff, and 10 with English speaking staff (Osmond, 2002). And of the numerous associations were distinctions between those who operated through Welsh (e.g. Merched Y Wawr), those through English (e.g. Women's institute) and those who used both languages.

What we see in the case of large public sector or governmental bodies and within the committee meetings within the Assembly, is an availability of resources and facilities which allow a bilingual service to take place. Central to this is the provision of a translation unit and the use of simultaneous translation (ST) within public and internal meetings. This to an extent takes place also within the certain public and educational bodies such as the Countryside Council for Wales and the University of Wales. Although both had translation units, only the CCW in their public meetings provided ST services. In University departmental meetings for instance, the tendency is for Welsh speaking staff to repeat their responses in English after Welsh. What becomes apparent however is that the ability to provide bilingual services such as ST depends on the nature and size of the body in question. Consequently, we are able to identify a concern over bilingualism within conventional civil society organisations such as voluntary associations. For while ST has been used for a number of decades in public meetings and in large public organisations and governmental institutions, it is yet to be significantly extended to the realm of smaller, local voluntary groups. As such, in line with the rise of civil society issues, there is a

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[3] See Menter Gwynedd's website for further details of this: www.mantellgwynedd.org.uk.
[4] In preparation for their presentation to the National Assembly's Culture Committee in November 2001, Cymuned asked its 913 members to send in reports on the state of the language within their communities. Some members had also collected detailed accounts of language use within the business and civil associations of their communities. Osmond (2002) also provides a brief account of this.

growing feeling over the need to make available ST to smaller organisations as well. And an important part of bilingualism within voluntary organisations has therefore been the emergence of "Community Translators".

Community translators are unpaid Welsh speaking volunteers working on behalf of voluntary organisations who devote their time to providing a ST service. In allowing voluntary organisations to become bilingual it allows its members to use the language they are most comfortable with. Dewis for example is a network of 6 full time community translators working across Carmarthenshire. And in Gwynedd there are approximately 50 translators working to provide a low cost service. Combined with this has been the availability of ST equipment within the community. Moreover is the concomitant emphasis on the themes of 'awareness' and 'encouragement' identified. These have included the provision of language awareness seminars for business and voluntary organisations and the encouragement of groups to make use of such translation equipment. In Pembrokeshire also there has been a new found interest in developing bilingualism in the voluntary sector such as that within the Estyn Llaw Scheme.

Conclusions: A Bilingual State, A Bilingual Society?

In this chapter the aim was to go beyond primarily *civil* or *moral* aspects of a linguistically structured society and to attend to how bilingual equality and mutual linguistic accommodation is facilitated through reference to the *organisational* level of civil society; in terms of the *bilingualisation* of organisations. In doing so this chapter identifies how within certain public organisations, there are attempts to establish such a 'bilingual' organisational culture. The importance of bilingual organisations, particularly in the public sector was also illustrated through an investigation of the career aspirations of Welsh speaking students. As was found here, students tended to orientate their careers to certain labour market segments, in this case local public sector and governmental organisations, in which proficiency in Welsh was of value. Yet just as such Welsh language schemes have resulted in specific positions for Welsh speakers, they have also led to compulsory learning of Welsh by some non-Welsh speakers in order to fulfil such positions. As was argued in Chapter Four, the notion of *mutual* linguistic accommodation would rest on the provision of certain contexts where non-Welsh speakers may also be required to learn.

Such positions can be regarded as *mutual* accommodation in that the 'progressive' learning of Welsh is subject to contractual agreement between employer and employee. An organisation such as the Countryside Council for Wales would appear to be such a case in that non-Welsh speakers are encouraged and in some cases required to learn as part of their work. Such a process however is inevitably resisted, particularly among 'established' employees. Nevertheless there were significant developments towards attempts to establish a bilingual occupational culture through the wider notion of 'language awareness' training. It is argued here that this built upon discussions with the language officer and language mentors who through referring to occupational norms saw culture as a barrier and as resistance to bilingualism. As such the role of training can be seen as an organisational response to develop this consent through persuading staff of the need through reference to the wider cultural context.

This was then contrasted through identifying the difficulties that smaller voluntary groups face in relation to bilingualism. The conclusion here was that while public and governmental bodies had the ability to *bilingualise*, the situation of voluntary groups and everyday interactions within civil society was more difficult. In these contexts it is a bifurcation of bilingual/Welsh speaking and monolingual/English speaking groups that was more prominent. In sum therefore while the idea of a bilingual state would appear forthcoming in terms of the bilingual nature of governmental and public authorities who fall directly within the remit of the Welsh Language Act, the idea of a bilingual civil society, made up of both voluntary associations and the everyday 'lifeworld' of social interaction, would appear much less of an empirical reality. Rather civil society in Wales, particularly in areas where the proportion of Welsh speakers is higher, tends to have been organised around a bifurcation of Welsh-speaking and non-Welsh speaking spaces. The degree of interface between these realms is thus minimal.

Conclusions: New Directions or Old Ground?

Inevitably with any piece of research, one can, with the benefit of hindsight, identify available data sources which were overlooked or unobtainable and which could have strengthened the conclusions of this thesis. All the research presented here on adult learners, Welsh language activists and organisations such as the Countryside Council for Wales could have been done in different ways. For example, focus groups could have been used with adult learners of Welsh, or a comparative analysis of learners in north and south Wales could also have been undertaken. Likewise, a more in-depth investigation into bilingualism and language differences in voluntary organisations, a sector at the heart of civil society, would have proved fruitful. What the limitations within this thesis raise however, is the potential for many of the investigations presented here to be pursued in greater depth. For example, a more in-depth investigation of learners, one designed to obtain a nation-wide sample was clearly beyond the scope of this study. Indeed such a large-scale investigation of learners is one which would provide a fruitful development upon the small sample of learners used here, and go some way to remedying the current lack of data available on learners. Even more limited in scope, is the data available on bilingualism and language differences at the level of voluntary organisations. While some information regarding this has been identified here, such as that generated by organisations such as Menter Gwynedd, the conclusions drawn were tentative at best. As a result, further research into how bilingualism can be developed at the level of smaller voluntary associations also represents an area which could be pursued in greater depth. However, before summing up the key themes of this thesis, I would like to emphasise one particular area through which the main arguments developed here could be taken a step further, namely, a more systematic analysis of the relationships between language identities, language reproduction and social class in Wales.

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Language, Identity and Class in Wales

As has been identified on numerous occasions within this thesis, the integration of the Welsh language into economic restructuring, and more broadly with modernity, instrumentality and rationality, is seen as essential to its long-term reproduction. In other words, its use and value within rational and institutionalised settings such as employment is critical not only to get Welsh speakers to continue to use Welsh but also to create the incentive for non-Welsh speakers to acquire it, and subsequently use it. As has also been identified here, this process of integration is evident in the 1993 Welsh Language Act in terms of the requirement for public bodies to provide a bilingual service. Conventionally these public bodies include local government, educational bodies and the Welsh language media and now of course, the National Assembly for Wales. Chapter eight provided a specific example of such regulation of bilingualism in the case of the CCW. In functionalist terms, the position of Welsh medium and bilingual education then becomes one of role allocation, in terms of providing bilingual skills for such organisations. Clearly, extending bilingual requirements into the private sector would further the need for such skills. Furthermore, the integration of the Welsh language into rational settings, and its use for rational purposes (e.g. translation, public service, business transaction, marketing), clearly leads to a focus on Welsh language skills, competence and ability. A central concern therefore emerges as to whether Welsh speakers are stratified in terms of competence and whether competence is stratified by class. It is clear for instance that Welsh speakers can vary considerably in terms of their respective abilities to speak, read and/or write Welsh.

In relation to this possible stratification, a number of further questions are posed by the process of integrating Welsh into rational settings: firstly, similar to how the 'Welsh person' can become associated exclusively with the 'Welsh speaker', is the 'Welsh speaker' being increasingly associated, perhaps exclusively, with those who are able to put such ability to rational use? Secondly, how do attitudes of Welsh speakers towards this integration process vary in relation to both competence and class? This in turn would involve an examination of the relationship between class and competence. And finally, as a result of the integration process, is there a negative effect whereby a 'less competent' Welsh speaker's association of the language with

stigma, is furthered by a distance, or self-perceived inability to use Welsh for such rational purposes? Is Welsh disowned (in terms of both non-reproduction and negative identification) as a result?

A further point may also be added in relation to rationality. Language competence clearly has associations with rationality, reason and social status. To be able to put language to use within formalised settings is clearly a sign of a rational individual. Conversely linguistic inability is seen as irrational, immature or associated with childhood. Such is the case with identifying language ability with certain ages. Consequently, for the less-competent Welsh speaker, attaining a status of rationality could mean one of two things: it could mean improving one's Welsh or it could mean not using Welsh at all; for there is no room for insecurity within such settings. As a result it may be questionable whether bilingual employment requirements provide a mechanism for the social mobility of Welsh speakers. This in turn points to a question of elitism and whether or not the individuals filling such bilingual roles are reproduced from the same socio-economic background. It is therefore a case for further study to examine whether the process whereby Welsh is increasingly rationalised, has negative consequences for Welsh speakers of a perceived lesser competence.

The relationship between language and class is a contested one. It is also one which is subject to cultural codification. As was shown in chapter two for example, the historical mobilisation of Welsh nationalism relates a cultural code which places 'the Welsh' on the side of the rural tenantry and industrialising working class and on the other 'the English' as the landowner or ruling class; in other words, an alignment of nation and class. Conversely, critics of the Welsh language movement may code this relationship in the opposite way: as between a Welsh speaking middle class elite and an excluded English speaking working class. Investigating the claim of a stratified Welsh speaking group is therefore one which points to significant changes in the *symbolic meaning* of the relationships between Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers. It also points to the need to reconsider the symbolic relationship between English and Welsh identities. Put simply, to what extent does this perception of Welsh/subordinate in relation to English/dominant hold up in a post-devolution and bilingual Wales? This process is demonstrated in the following passage in which the

ability to speak Welsh is associated with *privilege* and the English speaking Welsh with *disadvantage*:

> ...I received hardly any Welsh language tuition at school. We were taught the Welsh National Anthem and that was about it. Many people in Newport have told me that they feel robbed of their inheritance because they never had the opportunity to learn Welsh in school. They rightly believe that as a result, they have missed out a great deal in terms of language and inheritance.[1]

From this statement, the empirical and moral complexity of the many Welsh/English relationships becomes clear for in this case it is the *English speaking Welsh* that are excluded. Moreover, given the references to education and opportunity, this exclusion draws upon a class discourse just as much as it does on an ethnic or cultural one. As is also demonstrated in this thesis with the case Welsh learners, notions of being an 'other' or an 'outsider' provide a step towards treating these issues in that they involve a deconstruction of Englishness. In other words, they question taken-for-granted notions of Englishness as occupying a position of ubiquitous domination in terms of its cultural majoritarianism and socio-economic advantage. It is therefore on these grounds, between old and new identities, that the position of the Welsh language within the framework of a devolved and bilingual Wales will remain hotly contested within civil society.

Key Themes of the Thesis

This aim of this thesis was to investigate how civil society in Wales is influenced by divisions surrounding the situation of the Welsh language and bilingual development in Wales. What can be concluded here is that the idea of a *Welsh* civil society is continually compromised by the ways in which the bifurcation of Welsh speaking and non-Welsh speaking groups form part of the everyday negotiation of the bilingual reality.

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[1] John Griffiths, Labour AM for Newport East, Assembly Record (9/7/02) cited in Osmond (2002:6).

In Chapter One, an outline of the concept of civil society was provided. Here, civil society was defined as a realm of solidarity (Alexander, 1997) or a collective identity (Cohen and Arato, 1992, 2001), defined through its autonomy and authenticity from both the state and economy. This definition constituted the main point of theoretical investigation. However the assumption of homogeneity to this collective identity was criticised in that the boundary relationships to civil society are not only 'external' (in terms of the state or economy) but also 'internal' in terms of contestation of its cultural content. In respect of this, groups and movements within civil society are not solely concerned with defending civil society from *outside* political or economic intrusions but also from other groups *within* civil society. This also applied to sceptics of civil society such as Iris Young for whom, the idea of a common culture was simply a mask of the dominant culture. For Young, group-differentiated citizenship consisted of cases where the dominant group recognised the authentic claims of minority groups. The weakness of this position however is that Young, like her republican adversaries, assumes an easy distinction between the authentic or sacred on one hand and the profane on the other. While for Habermas and Cohen and Arato this easy distinction occurred between civil society (sacred) and the state and economy (profane), for Young this occurred between minority groups (sacred) and dominant groups (profane). What neither perspective addresses is what happens when the authentic claims of groups within civil society come up against opposing, yet equally authentic claims.

Chapter Two examined how the concept of civil society had been used quite specifically in the case of Wales. Since the establishment of the National Assembly, increasing concerns have been raised regarding the nature of civil society in Wales and whether, indeed, a unified Welsh civil society can be seen to exist. One such problematic over the development of a Welsh civil society was seen in terms of the division between a bilingual/Welsh speaking and monolingual/English speaking Wales. Thus in respect of language and bilingualism, we undoubtedly get competing versions of what civil society should look like. *It is therefore in relation to competing claims between Welsh speaking and non-Welsh speaking groups that the collective identity of civil society in Wales, or the consensus within it, maybe compromised.*

Chapter Three followed directly on from this by providing a historical overview of the social situation of the Welsh language. Also examined was the contemporary paradox of bilingual development on one hand, while on the other, ongoing concerns over its perceived decline within the rural Welsh speaking communities. This chapter concluded with an outline of some of the outstanding caveats associated with the re-legitimation of Welsh. These caveats, along with the paradox between the institutionalisation of Welsh on one hand and perceived threats on the other, serve as the basis of language conflict in Wales.

Chapter Four then outlined the conceptual framework for understand how language conflict is played out at a more phenomenological level and also how such differences might be managed or negotiated. In analytical terms, this was understood as a conflict over two codes of language use by Welsh speakers: that of an accommodative use of English and how this related to a protectionist or normalised use of Welsh. Thus in terms of civility, it may be that in the accommodation of the 'outsider', the non-Welsh speaker, that Welsh is traded in for English. However as it is only the Welsh speaker that is bilingual, this form of linguistic accommodation cannot be reciprocated. It is on this lack of reciprocity therefore that conflict is seen to emerge. This is because the code of accommodative through English is in conflict with the other code of protecting the Welsh speaking group, particularly in terms of settings where use of Welsh is considered 'normal'. Such settings are then defined as situations where the accommodation of the non-Welsh speaker does not apply. Chapter five then provided a methodological outline of the fieldwork conducted which was presented in chapters six, seven and eight.

At the micro level therefore, *the conflict between Welsh speaking and non-Welsh speaking groups centres upon bifurcated codes of linguistic practice, one emphasising accommodation through English and the other emphasising protection through Welsh*. What we can understand from our empirical analysis however is that such generalised polarisations at the micro level in terms of how Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers participate in the social distancing of Welsh and English speaking settings can also be understood at the macro-level in terms of Welsh speaking and English speaking Wales. This was investigated in Chapter Six, by examining the arguments of Welsh language pressure groups to maintain such a

boundary. From this perspective, Welsh speaking society constituted the scared and authentic which must be defended from the profane English speaking society. Anomalies (e.g. Wenglish, Bad Welsh, English speaking Welsh, Welsh learner) are then distanced by the degree to which they violate the autonomy and distinctiveness of this space. At the same time, part of the negotiation of language differences in Wales must involve some degree of reciprocity or mutual accommodation between respective language groups. Such a sacredisation of the Welsh language for example, as outlined in chapter six, was considered as more likely to result in non-accommodation.

An expansion upon the idea of *mutual* accommodation also constituted one of the main objectives of the empirical investigation. This would involve accounting for accommodations made by the non-Welsh speaker towards the Welsh speaker. However, one of the main points raised here is that *such accommodation does not necessarily involve an individual non-Welsh speaker learning the language themselves*. Accommodation may also result in non-Welsh speaking parents sending their children to Welsh medium schools. At the subtlest level, it may simply mean agreeing with principles of cultural difference. Such a case study in accommodation was illustrated in chapter seven with adult learners of Welsh. Three points can be concluded from this analysis. Firstly, that learners, and non-Welsh speakers in general, constitute an 'other' within the majority Welsh speaking communities. Secondly, that the motivation for learners is structurally dependent, not only materially but in terms of their access to utilising Welsh through social relationships. And thirdly, that codes of language use, accommodative and protectionist, also serve as symbolic barriers to learners *using* Welsh. This was highlighted in cases where learners had found that first language speakers tended to switch to English in order to accommodate them.

Finally in chapter eight, it was considered necessary to move beyond the primarily *civil* or *moral* aspects of a linguistically structured society and to attend to how bilingual equality and mutual linguistic accommodation is facilitated through reference to the *organisational* level of civil society; in terms of the *bilingualisation* of organisations. In doing so this chapter identified how within certain public organisations, there were attempts to establish such a 'bilingual' organisational culture. The importance of bilingual organisations, particularly in the public sector

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was also illustrated through an investigation of the career aspirations of Welsh speaking students. As was found here, students tended to orientate their careers to certain labour market segments, in this case local public sector and governmental organisations, in which proficiency in Wales was of value. Yet just as such Welsh language schemes have resulted in specific positions for Welsh speakers, they have also led to compulsory learning of Welsh by some non-Welsh speakers in order to fulfil such positions. As was argued in Chapter Four, the notion of mutual linguistic accommodation does cases some contexts where non-Welsh speakers may also be required to learn. An organisation such as the Countryside Council for Wales would appear to be such a case in that non-Welsh speakers are encouraged and in some cases required to learn as part of their work. Such a process however is inevitably resisted. This in turn has led to an organisational response of trying to develop consent through a wider notion of 'Welsh language training' which encompassed an induction to the wider cultural context.

This was then contrasted through identifying the difficulties that smaller voluntary groups face in relation to bilingualism. The conclusion here was that while public and governmental bodies had the ability to *bilingualise*, the situation of voluntary groups and everyday interactions within civil society was more difficult. In these contexts it is a bifurcation of bilingual/Welsh speaking and monolingual/English speaking that was more prominent.

The thesis therefore argues that *a bilingual civil society would be based upon the development of mutual linguistic accommodation,* for it is only through recognising the rights of both minority and majority language speakers that the equally authentic claims of respective groups within civil society can be met. Moreover, as illustrated through the case of adult learners of Welsh, it is through attending to the structural and symbolic barriers to participation, as opposed it's moralising through the notion civic responsibility, that the development of such participatory accommodation may be endorsed.

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Appendix I

Interview schedule for Activists within the Welsh Language Society

HOFFWN DDECHRAU TRWY OFYN RHAI CWESTIYNAU I CHI AM EICH CEFNDIR

1. **O ble rydych chi'n dod yn wreiddiol?**

2. **Pryd y gwnaethoch ddechrau ymwneud gyntaf gyda Chymdeithas yr Iaith?**

3. **Ellwch chi ddisgrifio'n fyr sut y gwnaethoch ddechrau ymwneud gyda Chymdeithas yr Iaith?**

4. **Ellwch chi ddisgrifio eich swyddogaethau neu swyddi blaenorol a phresennol o fewn Cymdeithas yr Iaith?**

HOFFWN EICH HOLI AM SEFYDLIADAU NEU FUDIADAU ERAILL YR YDYCH WEDI CWRDD = HWY NEU FOD MEWN CYSYLLTIAD = HWY AR RAN CYMDEITHAS YR IAITH GYMRAEG. YM MHOB ACHOS NODWCH Y DYDDIAD *YN FRAS* (MIS/BLWYDDYN), NIFER Y CYFARFYDDIADAU A DIBEN Y CYFARFOD.

5. **Ydi eich gwaith gyda Chymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg wedi cynnwys cwrdd gyda'r canlynol neu drefnu cyfarfodydd gyda hwy?**

(i) Llywodraethau Prydeinig?

Gweinyddiaeth	Dyddiadau Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod
1997 - Presennol			
1992 - 1997			
Hyd at 1992			

(ii) Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru?

	Dyddiadau Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod
Pwyllgorau Pwnc			
Pwyllgorau Rhanbarthol			
Yn anffurfiol ag Aelodau'r Cynulliad			

(iii) Y Swyddfa Gymreig?

	Dyddiadau Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod
1997 – Presennol			
1992 – Presennol			
Hyd at 1992			

(iv) Awdurdodau lleol neu gynghorau Sirol?

Enw'r ALl/CS	Dyddiadau Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod

(v) Aelodau Seneddol?

AS	Dyddiadau Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod

(vi) Pleidiau Gwleidyddol?

Plaid Wleidyddol	Dyddiad Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod

(vii) Mudiadau Iaith Gymraeg (e.e. Bwrdd yr Iaith Gymraeg, Merched Y Wawr, Cefn, Urdd Gobaith Cymru)?

Mudiad	Dyddiad Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod

(viii) Grwpiau dwyn pwysau neu hybu buddiannau eraill?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y Cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod

(ix) Mudiadau gwirfoddol neu elusennau?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y Cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod

6. **Fel aelod gweithredol o Gymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg ydych chi wedi ymwneud ag unrhyw fforymau neu rwydweithiau?**

Rhwydwaith/Fforwm	Dyddiadau Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y Cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod

7. **Ydi eich gwaith gyda Chymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg wedi cynnwys cwrdd gyda grwpiau neu fudiadau mewn gwahanol wledydd?**

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Cyfarfodydd	Nifer y Cyfarfodydd	Diben y Cyfarfod

HOFFWN EICH HOLI YN AWR AM EICH CYSYLLTIAD = MUDIADAU ERAILL FEL AELOD **AC/NEU** WEITHREDWR. YM MHOB ACHOS A FYDDECH CYSTAL = NODI DYDDIADAU EICH AELODAETH YN FRAS, EICH CYSYLLTIAD GWEITHREDOL (MIS/BLWYDDYN) A'CH SAFLE/SWYDDOGAETH O FEWN Y MUDIAD.

8. **Ydych chi, fel unigolyn, wedi bod yn chysylltiad gyda'r canlynol fel aelod neu fel gweithredwr?**

(i) Pleidiau Gwleidyddol?

Plaid Wleidyddol	Dyddiadau Aelodaeth	Dyddiadau Cysylltiadau Gweithredol	Swyddi a Ddaliwyd

(ii) Grwpiau Iaith Gymraeg?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Aelodaeth	Dyddiadau Cysylltiadau Gweithredol	Swyddi a Ddaliwyd

(iii) Grwpiau dwyn pwysau neu hybu buddiannau eraill?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Aelodaeth	Dyddiadau Cysylltiadau Gweithredol	Swyddi a Ddaliwyd

(iv) Undebau Llafur?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Aelodaeth	Dyddiadau Gweithredol	Cysylltiadau	Swyddi a Ddaliwyd

(v) Grwpiau busnes?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Aelodaeth	Dyddiadau Gweithredol	Cysylltiadau	Swyddi a Ddaliwyd

(vi) Mudiadau gwirfoddol neu elusennau?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Aelodaeth	Dyddiadau Gweithredol	Cysylltiadau	Swyddi a Ddaliwyd

(vii) Mudiadau crefyddol neu eglwysig?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Aelodaeth	Dyddiadau Gweithredol	Cysylltiadau	Swyddi a Ddaliwyd

9. Fel unigolyn, ydych chi wedi ymwneud gyda sefydlu unrhyw fforymau neu rwydweithiau?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Aelodaeth	Dyddiadau Gweithredol	Cysylltiadau	Swyddi a Ddaliwyd

10. Fel unigolyn, ydych chi wedi ymwneud ag unrhyw grwpiau neu fudiadau mewn gwahanol wledydd?

Mudiad	Dyddiadau Aelodaeth	Dyddiadau Gweithredol	Cysylltiadau	Swyddi a Ddaliwyd

HOFFWN EICH HOLI YN AWR AM Y MATH O SWYDDI YR YDYCH WEDI BOD YNDDYNT.

11. Pa rai o'r mathau o swyddi canlynol yr ydych wedi gweithio ynddynt? YM MHOB ACHOS A FYDDECH CYSTAL = NODI'R DYDDIADAU CYFLOGAETH YN FRAS (MIS/BLWYDDYN) A'R LLEOLIAD.

Math o Swydd	Dyddiadau Cyflogaeth	Lleoliad (e.e. Caerdydd)
(a) Y Llywodraeth Brydeinig		
(b) Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru		
(c) Y Swyddfa Gymreig		
(ch) Y Gwasanaeth Sifil		
(d) Cynllunio Iaith (e.e. Bwrdd yr Iaith; Cynlluniau Menter Iaith)		
(dd) Awdurdodau Lleol/ Cynghorau Sir		
(e) Pleidiau Gwleidyddol		
(f) Datblygu Economaidd		
(ff) Tai		
(g) Iechyd		
(ng) Addysg Bellach/Uwch		
(h) Addysg Gynradd/Uwchradd		
(i) Gwasanaethau Cyfreithiol		
(l) Undebau Llafur		
(ll) Grwpiau Dwyn Pwysau		
(m) Gwerthu/Masnachol		
(n) Sector breifat		
(o) Mudiadau Gwirfoddol		
(p) Elusennau		
(ph) Crefydd/Eglwysig		
Eraill? (Nodwch)		

YN OLAF, HOFFWN EICH HOLI AM EICH ADDYSG.

12. Pa Ysgol(ion) Uwchradd yr aethoch iddi/iddynt?

13. Oes gennych chi unrhyw gymwysterau addysg bellach neu addysg uwch? OES/NAC
OES

OS OES, NODWCH PA GYMWYSTERAU SYDD GENNYCH A PHA GOLEG NEU BRIFYSGOL YR AETHOCH IDDO/IDDI.

Cymwysterau	Coleg/Prifysgol	Dyddiadau

I'D LIKE TO START BY ASKING YOU SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR BACKGROUND

1. Where are you from originally?

2. When did you first become involved with Cymdeithas Yr Iaith?

3. Could you briefly describe how you got involved with Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg?

4. Could you describe your previous and current roles or positions held within Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg?

I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT OTHER INSTITUTIONS OR ORGANISATIONS THAT YOU HAVE MET WITH OR BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ON BEHALF OF CYMDEITHAS YR IAITH GYMRAEG. IN EACH CASE PLEASE STATE *APPROXIMATELY* THE DATE (MONTH/YEAR), NO. OF TIMES MET AND PURPOSE OF MEETING.

5. **Has your work with Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg involved meeting or arranging meetings with:**

(i) British Governments?

Administration	Dates of Meetings	No. of times met	Purpose of Meeting
1997 - Present			
1992 - 1997			
Up to 1992			

(ii) National Assembly for Wales?

	Dates of Meetings	No. of times met	Purpose of Meeting
Subject Committees			
Regional Committees			
Informally with Assembly Members			

(iii) Welsh Office?

	Dates of Meetings	No. of times met	Purpose of Meeting
1997 - Present			
1992 - Present			
up to 1992			

(iv) Local authorities or County councils?

Name of LA/CC	Date of Meetings	No. of times met	Purpose of Meeting

(v) MP's?

MP	Dates of Meetings	No. of times Met	Purpose of Meeting

(vi) Political Parties?

Political Party	Date of Meetings	No. of times met	Purpose of Meeting

(vii) Welsh Language Board/Other organisations (e.g. Merched Y Wawr, Cefn, Urdd Gobaith Cymru)?

Organisation	Date of Meetings	No. of times met	Purpose of Meeting

(viii) Other Pressure groups or interest groups?

Organisation	Dates of Meetings	No. of times Met	Purpose of Meetings

(ix) Voluntary organisations or charities?

Organisation	Dates of Meetings	No. of times met	Purpose of Meetings

6. **As an active member of Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg have you been involved in any forums or networks?**

Network/Forum	Dates of Meetings	No. of times met	Purpose of Meeting

7. **Has your work with Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg involved meeting with groups or organisations in different countries?**

Organisation	Dates of Meetings	No. of times met	Purpose of Meeting

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR INVOLVEMENT WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS AS A MEMBER **AND/OR** ACTIVIST. IN EACH CASE PLEASE STATE APPROXIMATE DATES OF MEMBERSHIP, YOUR ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT (MONTH/YEAR) AND YOUR POSITION/ROLE WITHIN THE ORGANISATION.

8. **As an individual, have you been involved as a member or an activists with:**

(i) Political Parties?

Political Party	Dates of Membership	Dates of Active Involvement	Positions Held

(ii) Welsh Language groups?

Organisation	Dates of Membership	Dates of Active Involvement	Positions Held

(iii) Other Pressure groups or Interest groups?

Organisation	Dates of Membership	Dates of Active Involvement	Positions Held

(iv) Trade Unions?

Organisation	Dates of Membership	Dates of Active Involvement	Positions Held

(v) Business groups?

Organisation	Dates of Membership	Dates of Active Involvement	Positions Held

(vi) Voluntary or charity organisations?

Organisation	Dates of Membership	Dates of Active Involvement	Positions Held

(vii) Religious or church organisations?

Organisation	Dates of Membership	Dates of Active Involvement	Positions Held

9. As an individual, have you been involved in setting up any forums or networks?

Organisation	Dates of Membership	Dates of Active Involvement	Positions Held

10. As an individual, have you been involved with any groups or associations in different countries?

Organisation	Dates of Membership	Dates of Active Involvement	Positions Held

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO ASK ABOUT YOUR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY.

11. **Which of the following types of employment have you worked in?** IN EACH CASE PLEASE STATE THE APPROXIMATE DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH/YEAR) AND THE LOCATION

Type of Employment	Dates of Employment	Location (e.g. Cardiff)
(a) British Government		
(b) National Assembly for Wales		
(c) Welsh Office		
(d) Civil Service		
(e) Language Planning (e.g. Language Board; Menter Iaith Initiatives)		
(f) Local Authorities/County Councils		
(g) Political Parties		
(h) Economic Development		
(i) Housing		
(j) Health		
(k) Higher/Further Education		
(l) Primary/Secondary Education		
(m) Legal Services		
(n) Trade Unions		
(o) Pressure/ Interest groups		
(p) Sales/ Commercial		
(q) Private sector		
(r) Voluntary Associations		
(s)Charities		
(t)Religion/Church		
Others? (Please specify)		

FINALLY I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR EDUCATION

12. **Which Secondary School(s) did you attend?**

13. **Do you have any further or higher educational qualifications?** YES/NO

IF YES, PLEASE STATE WHAT QUALIFICATIONS AND THE COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY ATTENDED.

Qualifications	College/University Attended	Dates Attended

Appendix II

Interview schedule for Welsh speaking students within John Morris Jones
(University of Wales Bangor, Welsh Halls of Residence)

1. Hoffwn i ddechrau trwy ofyn rhai cwestiynau I chi am eich cefndir

Lle? Teulu? Addysg? Bywyd Cymdeithasol? Gweithgaredd hamdden?

2. Fedrwch chi disgrifio eich bywyd ym JMJ?

Rheolau defnyddio Cymraeg? Rheolau defnyddio Saesneg? Cymdeithau?

3. Fedwych chi disgrigio eich rheswmau am dewis Bangor/cwrs?

Lloegr? Caerdydd? man arall?

4. Fedrwch chi disgrifio eich bwriadau gwaith?

Pa fath o gwaith? Lloegr? Caerdydd? man arall?

Interview schedule for Welsh speaking students within John Morris Jones
(University of Wales Bangor, Welsh Halls of Residence)

1. I would like to start by asking you some questions about your background

Home? Family? Education? Social activities? Leisure?

2. Could you describe living in JMJ?

Rules about using Welsh? Rules about using English? Societies/groups?

3. Could you describe your reasons for choosing Bangor/Course?

English? Cardiff? Elsewhere?

4. Could you describe your career intentions?

Type of work? England? Cardiff? Elsewhere?

Appendix III

Questionnaire for Adult Learners of Welsh, University of Wales Bangor Adult Learners of Welsh Summer School, Centre for Continuing Education.

HOFFWN GYCHWYN TRWY OFYN YCHYDIG AM EICH CEFNDIR
I'D LIKE TO START BY ASKING YOU SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR BACKGROUND

Ymhob achos rhowch gylch o gwmpas y rhif priodol, os gwelwch yn dda:
In each case please circle the appropriate number:

1. Rhyw/*Sex*:   Gwryw/*Male*   1
                     Benyw /*Female*   2

2. Oed/*Age*:   18-30   1
                     31-40   2
                     41-50   3
                     51-60   4
                     61-70   5
                     70+   6

3. Cenedl/*National Identity*:   Cymreig/*Welsh*   1
                                 Seisnig/*English*   2
                                   Prydeinig/*British*   3
                                   Albanaidd/*Scottish*   4
                                   Gwyddelig/*Irish*   5
                                   Arall/*Other*   6

Os dach chi wedi nodi 'arall', nodwch yn benodol, os gwelwch yn dda:
If 'Other', please specify:

---

4. Fel rhywun sydd yn dysgu Cymraeg, nodwch sut fasech chi'n eich diffinio eich hun mewn perthynas â'r iaith Gymraeg trwy roi cylch o gwmpas y rhif priodol/*As a learner of Welsh, please indicate how you would define yourself in relation to the Welsh language by circling the appropriate number:*

Siaradwr Cymraeg – Hunaniaeth Gymreig/   1
Welsh Speaking-Welsh Identity

Siaradwr Cymraeg – Hunaniaeth Ddigymreig/   2
Welsh Speaking-Non-Welsh Identity

Ddim yn siarad Cymraeg – Hunaniaeth Gymreig/   3
Non-Welsh speaking-Welsh Identity

5. Lle gaethoch chi eich geni?_____
Where were you born?

6. Lle gaethoch chi eich magu?_____
Where did you grow up?

7. Lle dach chi'n byw ar hyn o bryd? ——————————————
Where do you live at present?

8. Ers pryd dach chi'n byw yno? _____
Since when have you lived there?

9. Dach chi wedi bod yn byw yn rhywle arall? Do/Naddo
Have you lived anywhere else Yes/No
Os do, nodwch lle ac am ba hyd, os gwelwch yn dda/*If Yes, please state where you lived
and for how long*

_____

_____

10. Beth yw eich gwaith ar hyn o bryd? ———————————————
What is your current occupation?

11. Fedrwch chi ddisgrifio eich gwaith a'ch swydd?
Can you describe your work and your position held?

_____

_____

_____

12. Lle dach chi'n gweithio?_____
Where is your work based?

13.Ers faint dach chi i gweithio yno? ————————————
How long have you worked there?

14. Dach chi wedi bod yn gweithio yn rhywle arall? Do/Naddo
Have you worked anywhere else? Yes/No
Os do, rhestrwch y math o waith, y gweithle ac am ba hyd y buoch yn gweithio yno, os
gwelwch yn dda./*If Yes, please list type of employment, place of work and for how long
you worked there.*

_____

_____

_____

15. Fedrwch chi ddweud wrtha i am natur eich addysg drwy lenwi'r tabl isod:
Could you tell me about the extent of your education by completing the table below:

Coleg/Prifysgol *College/University*	Cymhwyster/ *Qualification*	Dyddiadau/ *Dates*

HOFFWN OFYN RHAI CWESTIYNAU AM EICH TEULU/*I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR FAMILY*

16. Oes gynnoch chi briod/partner? Oes/Nac oes
Do you have a spouse/partner? Yes/No
Os nad oes, ewch i gwestiwn 21/ *If No, go to question 21.*

Os oes/*If Yes:*
17. Lle gaeth eich priod/partner ei eni/geni?_____
Where was your spouse/partner born?

18. Lle gaeth eich priod/partner ei fagu/magu?_____
Where did your spouse/partner grow up?

19. Beth yw gwaith eich priod/partner ar hyn o bryd? _____
What is your partner's current occupation?

20. Ydy eich priod/partner yn siarad Cymraeg? Ydy/Nac ydy
Does your partner speak Welsh? Yes/No
Os ydy, sut y dysgodd eich priod/partner?/*If Yes, how did your spouse/partner learn?*

_____

_____

21. Oes gynnoch chi blant? Oes/Nac oes

Do you have any children? Yes/No
Os nad oes, ewch i gwestiwn 28/*If No, go to question 28.*

Os oes/*If Yes:*
22. Faint o blant sy gynnoch chi?   _____
How many children do you have?

23. Ydy eich plant i gyd naill ai mewn ysgol gynradd neu uwchradd? Ydyn/nac ydyn
Are all of of your children still in either primary or secondary school? Yes/No
Os ydynt/*If Yes:*

24. Pa ysgol(ion) mae eich plant yn mynd iddi/iddynt?
What school(s) do your children go to?

_____

_____

25. Oes rhai o'ch plant mewn Addysg Bellach neu Addysg Uwch neu wedi bod mewn AB/AU? Oes/Nac oes
Are any of your children in, or have been in, Further or Higher Education? Yes/No
Os oes, fedrwch chi nodi pa goleg/prifysgol y maen nhw ynddo/ynddi, neu wedi bod ynddo/ynddi
If Yes, could you state what college/university they attend or attended:

_____

_____

26. Ydy rhai o'ch plant mewn gwaith cyflogedig? Ydyn/Nac ydyn
Are any of you children in paid employment? Yes/No
Os ydynt, fedrwch chi ddweud wrtha i beth maen nhw yn ei wneud a lle maen nhw yn byw?
If Yes, could you state what they do and where they live?

_____

_____

27. Ydy unrhyw rai o'ch plant yn gallu siarad Cymraeg? Ydyn/Nac ydyn
Can any of your children speak Welsh? Yes/No
Os ydynt, sut wnaethon nhw ddysgu?
If Yes. How did they learn?

_____

_____

28. Oes gynnoch unrhyw berthnasau neu deulu estynedig yn byw yng Nghymru?
Oes/Nac oes
Do you have any relatives or extended family living in Wales? Yes/No
Os nad oes, ewch i gwestiwn 32/*If No, go to question 32.*

Os oes/*If Yes:*
29. Pa berthnasau sy gynnoch chi a lle maen nhw yn byw?
What relatives do you have and where do they live?

_____

_____

30. Oes gynnoch chi berthnasau sydd yn siarad Cymraeg? Oes/Nac oes
Do you have any relatives who speak Welsh? Yes/No
Os oes, a fedrwch ddweud sut wnaethon nhw ddysgu?
If Yes, could you state how they learnt?

_____

_____

31. Oes gynnoch chi unrhyw berthnasau sydd wrthi'n dysgu Cymraeg ar hyn o bryd?
Oes/Nac oes
Do you have any relatives who are currently learning Welsh? Yes/No
Os oes, nodwch lle maen nhw yn dysgu/*If Yes, please state where they are learning:*

_____

_____

HOFFWN EICH HOLI AM EICH GWEITHGAREDDAU Y TU ALLAN I WAITH A'R TEULU
I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE WORK AND FAMILY

32. Dach chi'n gwneud unrhyw waith gwirfoddol neu elusennol?
Do you do any voluntary or charity work?

Ydw, drwy'r amser/*Yes, all the time*	1
Ydw, ambell dro/*Yes, occasionally*	2
Nac Ydw, byth/*No, never*	3

Os ydych fedrwch chi ddisgrifio eich gweithgarwch, gan nodi lle dach chi'n gweithio, i bwy, pa mor aml, a'r tasgau a wnewch:
If Yes. could you describe your activities stating where you work, for whom, how often and the tasks involved:

_____

_____

_____

33. Dach chi'n mynd i unrhyw gyfarfodydd yn ymwneud â'r ysgol neu'r gymuned leol? Ydw/Nac ydw
Do you attend any meetings to do with the local school or the local community? Yes/No
Os ydych, fedrwch chi ddisgrifio pwrpas y cyfarfodydd hyn a pha mor aml y cynhelir nhw/*If Yes. could you describe what these meetings are for and how often they take place:*

_____

_____

34. Dach chi'n mynd i wasanaethau crefyddol?
Do you attend religious services?

Ydw, yn rheolaidd/*Yes, all the time*	1
Ydw, ambell dro/ *Yes, occasionally*	2
Nac ydw, byth/*No, never*	3

Os ydych, fedrwch chi ddweud lle a pha mor aml dach chi yn mynd i wasanaeth crefyddol/*If Yes, could you state where and how often you attend religious services:*

_____

35. Dach chi'n mynd i wasanaethau crefyddol Cymraeg?
Do you attend religious services in Welsh?

Ydw, bob amser/*Yes, all the time*	1
Ydw, ambell dro/*Yes, occasionally*	2
Nac Ydw, byth/*No, never*	3

36. Dach chi'n cymryd rhan mewn chwaraeon neu weithgareddau hamdden gyda phobl eraill?
Do you do any sports or leisure activities, with other people?

Ydw, yn rheolaidd/*Yes, all the time*	1
Ydw, ambell dro/*Yes, occasionally*	2
Nac ydw, byth/*No, never*	3

Os ydych, a fedrwch chi ddisgrifio'r gweithgareddau a dweud lle y cynhelir nhw.
If Yes, could you describe your activities and state where they take place:

_____

37. Dach chi'n cymryd rhan mewn unrhyw grwpiau neu gymdeithasau cymdeithasol neu ddiwylliannol? Ydw/Nac ydw
Are you involved in any social or cultural groups or associations? Yes/No
Os ydych, fedrwch chi ddisgrifio pa grwpiau dach chi i rhan ohonyn nhw a'ch safle o fewn y grwpiau hyn:
If Yes. could you describe which groups you are involved with and your position within these groups:

_____

_____

_____

38. Dach chi'n cymryd rhan mewn grwpiau Iaith Cymraeg? Ydw/Nac ydw
Are you involved with any Welsh language groups? Yes/No
Os ydych, a fedrwch chi ddisgrifio pa grwpiau dach chi'n rhan ohonyn nhw a'ch safle o fewn y grwpiau hyn:
If Yes, could you describe which groups you are involved with and your position within these groups:

_____

_____

HOFFWN OFYN RHAI CWESTIYNAU ICHI AM EICH PROFIADAU O'R GYMRAEG AC O DDYSGU CYMRAEG
I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCES OF WELSH AND LEARNING WELSH

39.Ers pryd dach chi'n mynd i ddosbarthiadau dysgu Cymraeg? _____
Since when have you been attending Welsh learning classes?

40. Pa gwrs dach chi'n mynd iddo ar hyn o bryd? _____
What courses are you currently attending?

41. Faint o oriau bob wythnos dach chi'n eu treulio yn y dosbarthiadau?_____
How many hours each week would you spend in classes?

42.Faint o oriau bob wythnos dach chi'n eu rhoi i ddysgu Cymraeg? ————————
How many hourse each week would you devote to learning Welsh?

43. Dach chi wedi mynychu unrhyw gyrsiau dysgu Cymraeg eraill? Do/Naddo
Have you attended any other Welsh learning courses? Yes/No
Os do, fedrwch chi ddweud wrtha i pa gyrsiau a wnaethoch chi cyn yr un presennol?
If Yes, can you tell me what courses you did before your present one:

_____

44. Dach wedi mynychu unrhyw ysgolion haf neu ysgolion undydd? Do/naddo
Have you attended any summer schools or one day schools before? Yes/No
Os do, lle a pha phryd y buoch yn gwneud hyn?
If Yes, Where and when did you attend?

_____

45. Dach chi wedi dysgu Cymraeg yn unrhyw le arall? Do/Naddo
Have you learnt Welsh anywhere else? Yes/No
Os do, nodwch lle arall yr dach chi wedi dysgu Cymraeg:
If Yes, please when and where else you have learnt Welsh:

_____

46. Dach chi wedi ymuno ag unrhyw grwp arall neu wedi cymryd rhan mewn unrhyw
grwp lle medrwch ddysgu Cymraeg? *Do/Naddo*
Have you joined or been involved with any Welsh learning groups? Yes/No
Os do, nodwch y grwp a'ch rhan chi ynddo/ *If Yes, please state which groups you have
been involved with:*

_____

_____

_____

47. Rhowch gylch o gwmpas y gosodiad sydd yn disgrifio eich dealltwriaeth chi o'r
Gymraeg *cyn ichi fynychu'r dosbarthiadau:*
*Please circle which of the following statements reflects your understanding of Welsh
prior to attending classes:*
Roeddwn i'n medru sgwrsio ond doeddwn i ddim yn medru darllen   1
nac ysgrifennu'n dda
I could hold conversations but couldn't read or write well

Roeddwn yn deall llawer ac roeddwn yn medru dweud ychydig   2
eiriau wrth bobl
I understood a lot but could only say a few words to people

Roeddwn yn deall llawer ond doeddwn i ddim yn medru siarad   3
â phobl
I understood a lot but couldn't talk to people

Roeddwn yn deall ychydig ond dim byd mwy   4
I understood a little but no more

Doeddwn i ddim yn deall dim Cymraeg o gwbl   5
I couldn't understand any Welsh

48. Os dach chi wedi rhoi cylch o gwmpas 1-4, nodwch isod sut oedd gynnoch
ddealltwriaeth cyn mynd i'r dosbarthiadau (e.e. efallai eich bod yn deall rhywfaint o
Gymraeg o'r ysgol neu oddi wrth aelodau o'ch teulu)
*If you circled 1-4 to the above, state below how you gained an understanding prior to
attending classes(for example, you may have understood some Welsh from school, from
family members)*

_____

_____

_____

49.Rhowch gylch o gwmpas y gosodiadau isod sydd yn disgrifio orau eich dealltwriaeth
bresennol o'r Gymraeg ar ôl ichi fod yn mynd i ddosbarthiadau
*Please circle which of the following statements best reflects your **current** understanding
of Welsh having attended classes:*

      Dwi'n medru sgwrsio a darllen ac ysgrifennu'n dda   1
      I can hold conversations and read and write well

      Dwi'n medru sgwrsio ond ddim ond yn darllen ac ysgrifennu ychydig   2
      I can hold conversations but only read and write a little

      Dwi'n medru sgwrsio ond dw i ddim yn medru ddarllen nac   3
      ysgrifennu o gwbl
      I can hold conversations but can't read or write at all

      Dwi'n deall llawer a dw i'n medru dweud rhai geiriau wrth bobl   4
      I understand a lot and can say a few words to people

      Dwi'n deall llawer ond dw i ddim yn medru siarad â phobl   5

I understand a lot but can't talk to people

Dwi'n deall rhywfaint ond ddim mwy na hynny   6
I understand a little but no more

Dw i ddim yn deall Cymraeg o gwbl hyd yn hyn   7
I don't understand any Welsh as of yet

RHESYMAU DROS DDYSGU CYMRAEG
MOTIVATIONS FOR LEARNING WELSH

50. Fedrwch chi ddisgrifio eich prif resymau dros ddysgu Cymraeg?
Could you describe your main reasons for learning Welsh?

_____

_____

_____

_____

51. Ceir isod gyfres o resymau pam y gall oedolion ddewis dysgu Cyymraeg. A fedrwch chi nodi pa rai sydd yn disgrifio orau eich rhesymau chi eich hun trwy roi cylch am y rhif priodol pan fo 1 = yn bendant yn wir, 2 = yn wir ar y cyfan, 3 = efallai, 4 = ddim yn wir ar y cyfan, 6 = yn bendant ddim yn wir
Below are a series of reasons why adults may choose to learn Welsh. Could you indicate which best describe you own reasons by circling the appropriate number where 1= definitely true, 2= mostly true, 3= maybe, 4= mostly false, 5= definitely false.

Dwi'n yn dysgu Cymraeg oherwydd/*I am learning Welsh because:*

Mae'n sialens bersonol i mi	1	2	3	4	5
I find it a personal challenge					
Dwi'n hoffi dysgu ieithoedd	1	2	3	4	5
I like learning languages					

Mae'n rhan o hanes fy nheulu *It is part of my family history*	1	2	3	4	5
Cymro/Cymraes dw i ac dw i eisiau siarad Cymraeg *I am Welsh and want to speak Welsh*	1	2	3	4	5
Rhaid imi gael gwybodaeth o'r Gymraeg ar gyfer fy ngwaith *It is necessary to have a knowledge of Welsh for my occupation*	1	2	3	4	5
Rhaid imi ddysgu ar gyfer fy ngwaith 5 *I have to learn for my work*	1	2	3	4	
Bydd yn gwella fy rhagolygon o gael gwaith yn yr ardal *It will imporve my chances of gaining work in the area*	1	2	3	4	5
Mae fy mhriod/partner yn siarad Cymraeg *My spouse/partner speaks Welsh*	1	2	3	4	5
Mae fy mhlant yn dysgu Cymraeg yn yr ysgol *My children are learning Welsh in school*	1	2	3	4	5
Mi faswn i'n hoffi fy nheulu i fedru siarad Cymraeg 1 *I would like to bring up my family Welsh speaking*		2	3	4	5
Mae angen medru siarad Cymraeg er mwyn cael eich derbyn yn llawn yn y gymuned *It is necessary to speak Welsh in order to be fully accepted in the local community*	1	2	3	4	5
Mae'r holl siopau a gwasanaethau lleol yn cael eu gweithredu yn Gymraeg *All of the local shops and services are run in Welsh*	1	2	3	4	5
Mae fy nghymdogion i gyd yn siarad Cymraeg *My neighbours and friends in the area all speak Welsh*	1	2	3	4	5

Dwi'n byw mewn cymuned Gymraeg ei hiaith
felly mae'n iawn imi ddysgu Cymraeg   1   2   3   4   5
I live in a Welsh speaking community and feel it
is only right that I should learn Welsh

Mae cymunedau Cymraeg eu hiaith yn dibynnu
ar i newydd-ddyfodiaid ddysgu Cymraeg er mwyn
iddynt oroesi   1   2   3   4   5
Welsh speaking communities depend upon
newcomers learning Welsh in order to survive

Dwi'n teimlo dyletswydd i'r gymuned Gymraeg
ehangach   1   2   3   4   5
I feel a responsibility to the wider Welsh speaking
community

52. Isod ceir rhagor o resymau pam yr ysgogir pobl i siarad Cymraeg neu beidio. Eto,
ymhob achos a fedrech restru pob un o'r gosodiadau isod sydd yn disgrifio orau **eich
rhesymau chi** drwy roi rhif yn y bocs wrth ochr y gosodiad lle mae 1 = y pwysicaf, a 6 =
y lleiaf pwysig.
Below are some more reasons why people may or may not be motivated to learn Welsh.
Again, in each case could you rank each of the following statements which best describes
your own motivations. Place a number in the box next to the statement where 1 is the
most important and 6 is the least important:

Dwi'n yn dysgu Cymraeg oherwydd:
I am learning Welsh because:

Mae'n ffordd dda o gyfarfod pobl sydd mewn sefyllfa debyg   ☐
It's a good way to meet people in a similar situation

Dwi'n mwynhau dysgu Cymraeg er ei mwyn ei hun   ☐
I simply enjoy learning Welsh

Dwi'n teimlo fod yn rhaid imi ddysgu Cymraeg er mwyn cael
gwaith yn yr ardal   ☐
I feel I have to speak Welsh in order to get work in the area

Mae fy swydd yn gofyn am hyn   ☐
My job requires me to

Rhaid ichi siarad Cymraeg er mwyn chwarae   ☐

rhan lawn yn y gymuned
You have to speak Welsh in order to play a full role in the local community

Dwi'n teimlo dyletswydd allan o barch at yr iaith
Gymraeg a'r diwylliant Cymreig

☐

I feel a responsibility out of respect for the Welsh language and culture

53. Isod ceir nifer o anfanteision y gallai pobl eu dioddef drwy beidio â gallu siarad neu ddeall Cymraeg. Ymhob achos a fedrech chi nodi pa un sydd yn disgrifio eich teimladau chi orau trwy roi cylch o gwmpas y rhif priodol lle mae 1 = yn bendant yn wir, 2 = yn wir ar y cyfan, 3 = efallai, 4 = ddim yn wir ar y cyfan, 5 = yn bendant ddim yn wir
Below are a number of disadvantages which people may suffer from not being able to speak or understand Welsh. In each case could you indicate which best describes your own feelings by circling the appropriate number where 1= definitely true, 2= mostly true, 3= maybe, 4= mostly false, 5= definitely false.

Dwi'n teimlo fod methu â siarad Cymraeg yn anfantais oherwydd:
I feel not being ablse to speak or understand Welsh is a disadvantage because:

Y Gymraeg yw iaith gyntaf fy mhriod/partner 5 *It is my spouse/partner's first language*	1	2	3	4
Mae fy mhlant yn dysgu Cymraeg yn yr ysgol *My children are learning Welsh in school*	1 2	3	4	5
Mae fy ffrindiau i gyd yn siarad Cymraeg â'i gilydd *My friends all speak Welsh to each other*	1 2	3	4	5
Mae fy nghymdogion i gyd yn siarad Cymraeg â'i gilydd *My neighbours all speak Welsh to each other*	1 2	3	4	5
Mae'n anodd gwneud ffrindiau yn yr ardal *It is difficult to make friends in the area*	1 2	3	4	5
Dwi'n teimlo fy mod wedi fy nghau allan o'r gymuned leol *I feel excluded from the local community*	1 2	3	4	5
Dwi'n teimlo fy mod wedi fy nghau allan o ddigwyddiadau'r ysgol/gymuned *I feel left out of schools/community events*	1 2	3	4	5

Dwi'n ei chael hi'n anodd dod o hyd i waith

yn yr ardal   1   2   3   4   5
I have difficulty finding work in the area

54. O ran eich rhesymau dros ddysgu Cymraeg, ym mha drefn fyddech chi'n gosod y pedwar categori isod , lle mae 1 = y pwysicaf a 4 = y lleiaf pwysig: Personol, Teulu, Gwaith, Cymuned
In terms of your motivation for learning Welsh, in which order would you place the following four categories, where 1 is the most important and 4 is the least important: Personal, Family, Work, Community
1.
2.
3.
4.

55. Fedrwch chi ddweud pam eich bod wedi gwneud y dewisiadau hyn?
Could you tell me why you have made these choices?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

56. Isod ceir rhestr o sefyllfaoedd lle gallai dysgwyr geisio defnyddio'r Gymraeg. Ymhob achos rhowch gylch lle mae 1 = bob amser; 2 = y rhan fwyaf o'r amser; 3 = peth o'r amser; 4 = anaml; 5 = byth.
Below are list of situations that learners may try to use Welsh while still learning. In each case please inidicate your current use of Welsh by circling the appropriate number where 1= all of the time, 2=most of the time, 3=some of the time, 4= rarely, 5= never.

Priod/Partner *Partner*	1	2	3	4	5
Plant *Children*	1	2	3	4	5
Perthnasau *Relative*	1	2	3	4	5
Ffrindiau *Friend*	1	2	3	4	5
Cymdogion *Neighbour*	1	2	3	4	5

Y dafarn *Public house*	1	2	3	4	5
Siopau lleol *Local shop*	1	2	3	4	5
Swyddfa Bost *Post Office*	1	2	3	4	5
Banc *Bank*	1	2	3	4	5
Yn y lle gwaith *In Work*	1	2	3	4	5
Yn fy ngwaith gwirfoddol /elusennol *In my voluntary/charity work*	1	2	3	4	5
Mewn gwasanaethau crefyddol *In Religious service*	1	2	3	4	5
Mewn grwpiau cymdeithasol a diwylliannol *In social and cultural groups*	1	2	3	4	5

57. Isod ceir cyfres o osodiadau yn disgrifio sefyllfaoedd lle bwriada oedolion ddefnyddio'r Gymraeg. Ymhob achos rhowch gylch o gwmpas y rhif sydd yn disgrifio orau y lefel y gobeithiwch chi ei chyrraedd. 1 = yn bendant yn wir; 2 = yn wir ar y cyfan; 3 = efallai; 4 = ddim yn wir ar y cyfan; 5 = yn bendant ddim yn wir.
Below are a series of statements describing thr situations where adult learners intend on using Welsh. In each case please circle the number which best describes the level you hope to achieve, where 1=definitely true, 2= mostly true, 3= maybe, 4= mostly false, 5= definitely false.

Trwy ddysgu Cymraeg dwi'n gobeithio gwneud y canlynol:
From learning Welsh I hope to:

Deall teledu a radio Cymraeg 5 *Understand Welsh language TV and Radio*	1	2	3	4
Darllen llyfrau a phapurau newydd *Read books and newspapers*	1	2	3	4	5

Ysgrifennu llythyrau *Write letters*	1	2	3	4	5
Llenwi ffurflenni *Complete forms*	1	2	3	4	5
Siarad Cymraeg efo fy mhriod/partner *Speak Welsh with my spouse/partner*	1	2	3	4	5
Siarad Cymraeg efo fy mhlant 5 *Speak Welsh to my children*		1	2	3	4
Siarad Cymraeg efo fy ffrindiau *Speak Welsh to friends*	1	2	3	4	5
Siarad Cymraeg efo fy nghymdogion *Speak Welsh to neighbours*	1	2	3	4	5
Defnyddio Cymraeg yn y siopau a gwasanaethau lleol *Use Welsh in local shops and services*	1	2	3	4	5
Defnyddio'r Gymraeg fel rhan o fy ngwaith *Use Welsh as part of my work*	1	2	3	4	5
Gwella fy rhagolygon o gael gwaith yng Nghymru *Improve my chances of gaining work in Wales*	1	2	3	4	5
Defnyddio'r Gymraeg yn fy ngwaith gwirfoddol/elusennol *Use Welsh in my voluntary/charity work*	1	2	3	4	5
Defnyddio'r Gymraeg yng nghyfarfodydd yr ysgol/gymuned *Use Welsh in school/community meetings*	1	2	3	4	5
Defnyddio'r Gymraeg mewn gwasanaethau crefyddol *Use Welsh in religious services*	1	2	3	4	5
Defnyddio'r Gymraeg mewn grwpiau cymdeithasol a diwylliannol *Use Welsh in social and cultural groups*	1	2	3	4	5

Diolch ichi am eich cydweithrediad wrth lenwi'r holiadur hwn. Os gwelwch yn dda, gofalwch eich bod yn ei roi i'ch tiwtor i'w ddychwelyd i mi. Yn dilyn yr holiadur hwn byddaf yn cynnal rhagor o gyfweliadau trwyadl gydag oedolion sydd yn dysgu Cymraeg. Os byddech yn fodlon cael eich cyfweld ymhellach byddwn yn ddiolchgar pe baech yn gadael eich enw a rhif ffôn cyswllt er mwyn inni fedru trefnu apwyntiad.

Thankyou for your co-operation in completing this questionnaire. Please ensure that you hand it to your tutor in order for it to be returned to me. Further to this questionnaire I will be conducting more in-depth interviews with Adult learners of Welsh. If you would be willing to be interviewed further I would be grateful if you could leave your name and a contact number in order for an appointment to be arranged.

Enw/*Name*:   Rhif ffôn cyswllt/*Contact No*:

                                               Neu e-bost/*or e-mail*: