This thesis pursues two strands of research: The first area involves fine motor control and conscious awareness of it. The second area involves conscious processing and how it interferes with performance under pressure. In Experiment one, participants were required to identify perturbations to a force production task. Results supported the notion that individuals have difficulty consciously identifying low level corrections to movements that they have made. Experiment two expanded on this by examining the effect of different display resolutions and different force outputs on the ability to identify change. Together, these two sets of findings indicate that people have a relatively poor perception of low level movement correction and that the threshold for perception of correction is constant across effectors and KR resolution. Furthermore, results also tentatively suggested that thresholds for the determination of change are linked to intrinsic variability associated with a given task. The second area of investigation tried to resolve a conflict between two replications of an experiment by Masters (1992) which offer contradictory results. One experiment supported a conscious control explanation (Hardy et al., 1996), another supported a task difficulty explanation (Bright & Freedman, 1998). It was argued that differences between the two lay with quantity of practice. Experiment three examines this suggestion by replicating the methods used by both investigators. This study failed to successfully replicate either method due to an ineffective stress manipulation. Experiment four revealed results supporting the learning based explanation of the difference between results. Overall these findings offered unique support to the conscious processing hypothesis through learning effects. The broad interpretation of these findings supports the view that conscious control of movement can prove problematic under stressful conditions. These problems might be explained by different languages of representation being employed at different levels of cognitive functioning.