The mechanist thesis and the brain as a Turing machine is shown to be a poor model of mind due to its idealisation concerning memory length and precision algorithms. While the Gödelian argument demonstrates the the brain not to be of first-order arithmetic in the language of PA, this is not all which may be concluded, meaning the Gödelian argument stands, yet requires extension. We shall demonstrate that the Chinese room cannot be intelligence since it lacks the required properties concerning sub-symbolic networking and representation. Both the Gödelian argument and the Chinese room operate on the intention
of proving the limitations of formal systems, they architecture as deterministic systems raises a problem of free-will. The alternative to the mechanist thesis and the computational theory of mind are addressed here. Due to the far reaching scope of mechanism, our purpose is to remain focused on the grounding works of mechanism from formal systems of logic and the
equivalence of minds and these formal systems. It is determined that equivalent systems which are described in terms of a formal system lead one to determinism. This is explored under a direct, yet expansive set of philosophic and mathematical works.