The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has been in existence since 1970 and has
undergone two reforms. However, as a result of the CFP, European fisheries remain heavily subsidised and over-capitalised such that too many vessels chase too few fish. Consultation for the third reform of the CFP suggests that the cause of the failure of the CFP is institutional; if the right rules and governance structures had been put into place earlier, then natural resources would have been used wisely and conservation goals could have been met. At the same time, institutional success requires that all components (biological, socio-political and economic) of a fishery system are taken into account during policy-making. This thesis draws on the lessons that can be learnt from the historical legacy of the CFP. A multidisciplinary approach was adopted to identify how the Common Fisheries Policy's (CFP) governance structures and management system have influenced the European fisheries sector in economic and social terms, with specific reference to the European North/South divide. The CFP's conservation regulations were analysed to identify their spatial distribution and the biological and socio-political contexts which led to that distribution. The economic and structural changes that potentially arose as a result of some of these regulations
were explored for selected European fishing fleets from the U.K., Denmark, Spain
and Cyprus. Ports in these four countries were visited, and questionnaires were
conducted to identify fishers' perceptions of the economic impact of regulatory
measures using a conjoint analysis method which originated in the market research arena. These perceptions were compared to those of fisheries experts regarding the success of regulatory measures designed to sustain fisheries in order to identify any disparities between three potential management scenarios; the ideal scenario according to fishers, the ideal scenario according to fisheries experts and the status quo. Finally, social knowledge collected during field visits was used to fill in the information gaps which can lead to a robust and compliant fishery sector. As shown in Chapter 2 there is some degree of regionalization in the CFP, and the countries in the Northern European latitudes have to comply with a more burdensome management regime than those countries in the Southern latitudes. However, despite the CFP being a framework with a high degree of regulatory burden has not achieved its goals for sustaining the fisheries resources and as shown from Chapter 3, successes or failures of measures can depend on the socio-political and ecological settings in which they have been applied. For example, the correct implementation of the Buyers and Sellers regulation in the UK increased fish prices and helped reduce black landings and thereby gained the industry's support. In Spain however, there is no indication that this regulation has been implemented effectively with landings and fish value data suggesting misreporting of landings. The findings in Chapter 4 and 5 supports the importance of industry participation in decision-making, as understanding of the function and the importance of measures imposed can increase acceptability of the regime. Chapter 6 demonstrated that there are localised differences in compliance and enforcement culture but also in factors such as isolation
of the community, invasive species which can have a more pronounced impact on the fishery Social-Ecological System than any of the imposed measures. In conclusion, the CFP 2012 reform needs to focus on restructuring of its governance framework: a simplified regulatory framework with different methods of governance across different regions, allowing a greater involvement of stakeholders and a fast-track decision-making process.