CEO pay in UK FTSE 100: pay inequality, board size and performance

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygladolygiad gan gymheiriaid

StandardStandard

CEO pay in UK FTSE 100: pay inequality, board size and performance. / Forbes, W.P.; Pogue, M.; Hodgkinson, L.
Yn: European Journal of Finance, Cyfrol 22, Rhif 8-9, 06.2016, t. 712-731.

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygladolygiad gan gymheiriaid

HarvardHarvard

Forbes, WP, Pogue, M & Hodgkinson, L 2016, 'CEO pay in UK FTSE 100: pay inequality, board size and performance', European Journal of Finance, cyfrol. 22, rhif 8-9, tt. 712-731. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2014.885457

APA

CBE

MLA

VancouverVancouver

Forbes WP, Pogue M, Hodgkinson L. CEO pay in UK FTSE 100: pay inequality, board size and performance. European Journal of Finance. 2016 Meh;22(8-9):712-731. Epub 2014 Ebr 9. doi: 10.1080/1351847X.2014.885457

Author

Forbes, W.P. ; Pogue, M. ; Hodgkinson, L. / CEO pay in UK FTSE 100: pay inequality, board size and performance. Yn: European Journal of Finance. 2016 ; Cyfrol 22, Rhif 8-9. tt. 712-731.

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - CEO pay in UK FTSE 100: pay inequality, board size and performance

AU - Forbes, W.P.

AU - Pogue, M.

AU - Hodgkinson, L.

N1 - This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of Finance on 09/04/2014, available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com doi 10.1080/1351847X.2014.885457.

PY - 2016/6

Y1 - 2016/6

N2 - In this paper we examine the costs of seemingly excessive pay awards to CEOs within the UK FTSE 100 in the last decade and the consequent growth in executive pay inequality. In presenting this evidence we describe variations in the whole distribution of executive pay, rather than invoking some arbitrary cut-off point, to determine how changes in shareholder value match with concurrent changes in the distribution of executive pay. We ask whether the impact of executive pay inequality is a function of board size, rendering the CEO pay slice measure problematic in this context? We then question whether the interaction of board size and corporate performance, as measured by shareholder returns, explain variations in the sensitivity of the pay–performance relationship for UK FTSE 100 executives. We advance the Gini coefficient as a preferable measure of executive pay inequality in order to capture the impact of perceived inequality upon corporate performance.

AB - In this paper we examine the costs of seemingly excessive pay awards to CEOs within the UK FTSE 100 in the last decade and the consequent growth in executive pay inequality. In presenting this evidence we describe variations in the whole distribution of executive pay, rather than invoking some arbitrary cut-off point, to determine how changes in shareholder value match with concurrent changes in the distribution of executive pay. We ask whether the impact of executive pay inequality is a function of board size, rendering the CEO pay slice measure problematic in this context? We then question whether the interaction of board size and corporate performance, as measured by shareholder returns, explain variations in the sensitivity of the pay–performance relationship for UK FTSE 100 executives. We advance the Gini coefficient as a preferable measure of executive pay inequality in order to capture the impact of perceived inequality upon corporate performance.

U2 - 10.1080/1351847X.2014.885457

DO - 10.1080/1351847X.2014.885457

M3 - Article

VL - 22

SP - 712

EP - 731

JO - European Journal of Finance

JF - European Journal of Finance

SN - 1351-847X

IS - 8-9

ER -