Decentralised Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure

Allbwn ymchwil: Papur gweithioPapur Gwaith

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Decentralised Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure. / Pelliccia, Marco.
2015.

Allbwn ymchwil: Papur gweithioPapur Gwaith

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TY - UNPB

T1 - Decentralised Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure

AU - Pelliccia, Marco

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - We model the decentralised defence choice of agents connected in a directedgraph and exposed to an external threat. The network allows players to receivegoods from one or more producers through directed paths. Each agent is endowedwith a finite and divisible defence resource that can be allocated to their own security or to that of their peers. The external threat is represented by an intelligent attacker who aims to maximise the flow-disruption by seeking to destroy one node. The set of the attacker’s potential targets is composed by critical nodes with highest brokerage power and therefore crucial to the system-flow. We show that a decentralised defence allocation is efficient when we assume perfect information: a centralised allocation of defence resources which minimises the flow-disruption coincides with a decentralised allocation. On the other hand, when we assume imperfect information, the decentralised allocation is inefficient.

AB - We model the decentralised defence choice of agents connected in a directedgraph and exposed to an external threat. The network allows players to receivegoods from one or more producers through directed paths. Each agent is endowedwith a finite and divisible defence resource that can be allocated to their own security or to that of their peers. The external threat is represented by an intelligent attacker who aims to maximise the flow-disruption by seeking to destroy one node. The set of the attacker’s potential targets is composed by critical nodes with highest brokerage power and therefore crucial to the system-flow. We show that a decentralised defence allocation is efficient when we assume perfect information: a centralised allocation of defence resources which minimises the flow-disruption coincides with a decentralised allocation. On the other hand, when we assume imperfect information, the decentralised allocation is inefficient.

KW - Networks

KW - Security

KW - Network defence

UR - http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ems/research/wp/2015%20papers/1506

M3 - Working paper

BT - Decentralised Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure

ER -