Decentralised Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure
Allbwn ymchwil: Papur gweithio › Papur Gwaith
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2015.
Allbwn ymchwil: Papur gweithio › Papur Gwaith
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Decentralised Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure
AU - Pelliccia, Marco
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - We model the decentralised defence choice of agents connected in a directedgraph and exposed to an external threat. The network allows players to receivegoods from one or more producers through directed paths. Each agent is endowedwith a finite and divisible defence resource that can be allocated to their own security or to that of their peers. The external threat is represented by an intelligent attacker who aims to maximise the flow-disruption by seeking to destroy one node. The set of the attacker’s potential targets is composed by critical nodes with highest brokerage power and therefore crucial to the system-flow. We show that a decentralised defence allocation is efficient when we assume perfect information: a centralised allocation of defence resources which minimises the flow-disruption coincides with a decentralised allocation. On the other hand, when we assume imperfect information, the decentralised allocation is inefficient.
AB - We model the decentralised defence choice of agents connected in a directedgraph and exposed to an external threat. The network allows players to receivegoods from one or more producers through directed paths. Each agent is endowedwith a finite and divisible defence resource that can be allocated to their own security or to that of their peers. The external threat is represented by an intelligent attacker who aims to maximise the flow-disruption by seeking to destroy one node. The set of the attacker’s potential targets is composed by critical nodes with highest brokerage power and therefore crucial to the system-flow. We show that a decentralised defence allocation is efficient when we assume perfect information: a centralised allocation of defence resources which minimises the flow-disruption coincides with a decentralised allocation. On the other hand, when we assume imperfect information, the decentralised allocation is inefficient.
KW - Networks
KW - Security
KW - Network defence
UR - http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ems/research/wp/2015%20papers/1506
M3 - Working paper
BT - Decentralised Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure
ER -