Decentralized Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure
Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolyn › Erthygl › adolygiad gan gymheiriaid
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Yn: Defence and Peace Economics, Cyfrol 31, Rhif 6, 17.08.2020, t. 659-676.
Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolyn › Erthygl › adolygiad gan gymheiriaid
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Decentralized Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure
AU - Pelliccia, Marco
N1 - This is the Accepted version (Author's original manuscript) of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics on 15.03.2019 available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2019.1587679
PY - 2020/8/17
Y1 - 2020/8/17
N2 - We model the decentralised defence choice of agents connected in a directed graphand exposed to an external threat. The network allows players to receive goodsfrom one or more producers through directed paths. Each agent is endowed witha finite and divisible defence resource that can be allocated to their own security orto that of their peers. The external threat is represented by either a random attackon one of the nodes or by an intelligent attacker who aims to maximise the flow disruption by seeking to destroy one node. We show that under certain conditionsa decentralised defence allocation is efficient when we assume the attacker to bestrategic: a centralised allocation of defence resources which minimises the flow disruption coincides with a decentralised equilibrium allocation. On the otherhand, when we assume a random attack, the decentralised allocation is likely todiverge from the central planner’s allocation.
AB - We model the decentralised defence choice of agents connected in a directed graphand exposed to an external threat. The network allows players to receive goodsfrom one or more producers through directed paths. Each agent is endowed witha finite and divisible defence resource that can be allocated to their own security orto that of their peers. The external threat is represented by either a random attackon one of the nodes or by an intelligent attacker who aims to maximise the flow disruption by seeking to destroy one node. We show that under certain conditionsa decentralised defence allocation is efficient when we assume the attacker to bestrategic: a centralised allocation of defence resources which minimises the flow disruption coincides with a decentralised equilibrium allocation. On the otherhand, when we assume a random attack, the decentralised allocation is likely todiverge from the central planner’s allocation.
KW - Networks
KW - security
KW - network defence
U2 - 10.1080/10242694.2019.1587679
DO - 10.1080/10242694.2019.1587679
M3 - Article
VL - 31
SP - 659
EP - 676
JO - Defence and Peace Economics
JF - Defence and Peace Economics
SN - 1024-2694
IS - 6
ER -