Evaluating deterrents of illegal behaviour in conservation: Carnivore killing in rural Taiwan

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygladolygiad gan gymheiriaid

StandardStandard

Evaluating deterrents of illegal behaviour in conservation: Carnivore killing in rural Taiwan. / St John, Freya A. V.; Mai, Chin-Hsuan; Pei, Kurtis.
Yn: Biological Conservation, Cyfrol 189, 09.2015, t. 86-94.

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygladolygiad gan gymheiriaid

HarvardHarvard

APA

CBE

MLA

VancouverVancouver

St John FAV, Mai CH, Pei K. Evaluating deterrents of illegal behaviour in conservation: Carnivore killing in rural Taiwan. Biological Conservation. 2015 Medi;189:86-94. doi: 10.1016/j.biocon.2014.08.019

Author

St John, Freya A. V. ; Mai, Chin-Hsuan ; Pei, Kurtis. / Evaluating deterrents of illegal behaviour in conservation : Carnivore killing in rural Taiwan. Yn: Biological Conservation. 2015 ; Cyfrol 189. tt. 86-94.

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Evaluating deterrents of illegal behaviour in conservation

T2 - Carnivore killing in rural Taiwan

AU - St John, Freya A. V.

AU - Mai, Chin-Hsuan

AU - Pei, Kurtis

PY - 2015/9

Y1 - 2015/9

N2 - Rules restricting resource use are ubiquitous to conservation. Recent increases in poaching of iconic species such as African elephant and rhino have triggered high-profile interest in enforcement. Previous studies have used economic models to explore how the probability and severity of sanctions influence poacher-behaviour. Yet despite evidence that compliance can be substantial when the threat of state-imposed sanctions is low and profits high, few have explored other factors deterring rule-breaking. We use the randomised response technique (RRT) and direct questions to estimate the proportion of rural residents in north-western Taiwan illegally killing wildlife. We then model how potential sources of deterrence: perceived probabilities of detection and punishment, social norms and self-imposed guilt, relate to non-compliant behaviour (reported via RRT). The perceived likelihood of being punished and two types of social norms (injunctive and descriptive) predict behaviour and deter rule-breaking. Harnessing social norms that encourage compliance offers potential for reducing the persecution of threatened species.

AB - Rules restricting resource use are ubiquitous to conservation. Recent increases in poaching of iconic species such as African elephant and rhino have triggered high-profile interest in enforcement. Previous studies have used economic models to explore how the probability and severity of sanctions influence poacher-behaviour. Yet despite evidence that compliance can be substantial when the threat of state-imposed sanctions is low and profits high, few have explored other factors deterring rule-breaking. We use the randomised response technique (RRT) and direct questions to estimate the proportion of rural residents in north-western Taiwan illegally killing wildlife. We then model how potential sources of deterrence: perceived probabilities of detection and punishment, social norms and self-imposed guilt, relate to non-compliant behaviour (reported via RRT). The perceived likelihood of being punished and two types of social norms (injunctive and descriptive) predict behaviour and deter rule-breaking. Harnessing social norms that encourage compliance offers potential for reducing the persecution of threatened species.

U2 - 10.1016/j.biocon.2014.08.019

DO - 10.1016/j.biocon.2014.08.019

M3 - Article

VL - 189

SP - 86

EP - 94

JO - Biological Conservation

JF - Biological Conservation

SN - 0006-3207

ER -