Financial misconduct and bank risk-taking: evidence from US banks

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygladolygiad gan gymheiriaid

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    Embargo yn dod i ben: 21/09/26

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Dangosydd eitem ddigidol (DOI)

We test for a link between bank risk-taking and regulatory enforcements against US banks for financial misconduct. Misconduct-related enforcements are associated with increased bank risk-taking on several measures of risk, and there is some evidence that the impact of enforcements on risk-taking is accentuated in the presence of powerful CEOs and a higher proportion of institutional investor ownership and mitigated when executive boards are larger, older, more independent, more gender diverse, busier, and where independent directors are relatively inexperienced. The results are robust to alternative measures of bank risk-taking, and alternative estimation techniques, including controlling for endogeneity bias.

Allweddeiriau

Iaith wreiddiolSaesneg
Rhif yr erthygl107433
Nifer y tudalennau21
CyfnodolynJournal of Banking and Finance
Dyddiad ar-lein cynnar21 Maw 2025
Dynodwyr Gwrthrych Digidol (DOIs)
StatwsE-gyhoeddi cyn argraffu - 21 Maw 2025
Gweld graff cysylltiadau