Money shouts! How effective are punishments for accounting fraud?

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygl

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  • 2019 Money shouts

    Llawysgrif awdur wedi’i dderbyn, 953 KB, dogfen-PDF

    Embargo yn dod i ben: 28/03/21

    Trwydded: CC BY-NC-ND Dangos trwydded

Dangosydd eitem ddigidol (DOI)

This study examines the impact of different punishments for Chinese accounting fraud on shareholder valuation of firms between 2007 and 2014. From an examination of both monetary and non-monetary ‘name and shame’ penalties, it is reported all punishments have a negative and significant impact on the shareholder wealth of fraudulent firms. Investors’ perceive punishments involving monetary penalties far more severely than non-monetary punishments used to combat accounting fraud. Stock market reactions are also sensitive to the type of fraud committed with manipulation of income statements viewed more negatively by investors than fraud related to disclosure. Information leakage to capital markets prior to the announcement of punishments is also observed. It is proposed fines have been relatively more effective, than ‘name and shame’ punishments in addressing Chinese accounting fraud during the last decade, due not least to information leakage.


Iaith wreiddiolSaesneg
CyfnodolynBritish Accounting Review
Dyddiad ar-lein cynnar28 Maw 2019
Dynodwyr Gwrthrych Digidol (DOIs)
StatwsE-gyhoeddi cyn argraffu - 28 Maw 2019
Gweld graff cysylltiadau