Persistency of Window Dressing Practices in the U.S. Repo Markets after the GFC: The Unexplored Role of the Deposit Insurance Premium
Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolyn › Erthygl › adolygiad gan gymheiriaid
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Yn: European Financial Management, Cyfrol 29, Rhif 2, 03.2023, t. 634-663.
Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolyn › Erthygl › adolygiad gan gymheiriaid
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Persistency of Window Dressing Practices in the U.S. Repo Markets after the GFC: The Unexplored Role of the Deposit Insurance Premium
AU - Jaafar, Aziz
AU - Reghezza, Alessio
AU - Polizzi, Salvatore
N1 - Open Access Funding provided by Universita degli Studi di Palermo within the CRUI-CARE Agreement.
PY - 2023/3
Y1 - 2023/3
N2 - We investigate whether the regulatory improvements made in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) have been effective in limiting bank downward window dressing by means of repos in the U.S. Using hand-collected data of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) over the period 2011Q2-2016Q1, we find that a strict application of the Basel III regulation wipes out incentives to engage in window dressing to bolster the level of leverage Tier 1 ratio at quarter-end. We also uncover an unexplored channel that induces banks to window dress. Specifically, we show that the persistency of window dressing is related to the computation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assessment base, which motivates banks to engage in window dressing to reduce the deposit insurance premium. Our findings call for greater emphasis on supervision of banks’ window dressing practices.
AB - We investigate whether the regulatory improvements made in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) have been effective in limiting bank downward window dressing by means of repos in the U.S. Using hand-collected data of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) over the period 2011Q2-2016Q1, we find that a strict application of the Basel III regulation wipes out incentives to engage in window dressing to bolster the level of leverage Tier 1 ratio at quarter-end. We also uncover an unexplored channel that induces banks to window dress. Specifically, we show that the persistency of window dressing is related to the computation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assessment base, which motivates banks to engage in window dressing to reduce the deposit insurance premium. Our findings call for greater emphasis on supervision of banks’ window dressing practices.
KW - Window Dressing
KW - Leverage Tier 1 Ratio
KW - Deposit Insurance Premium
KW - Repurchase Agreements
KW - Bank Holding Companies
U2 - 10.1111/eufm.12367
DO - 10.1111/eufm.12367
M3 - Article
VL - 29
SP - 634
EP - 663
JO - European Financial Management
JF - European Financial Management
SN - 1354-7798
IS - 2
ER -