TY - UNPB

T1 - Bargaining in Global Communication Networks

AU - Pelliccia, Marco

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - We study a Rubinstein-Stahl two-player non-cooperative bargaining game played by n players connected in a communication network. We allow the players to communicate with any peer in the same component via the existing paths connecting the peers in a given communication network (global interaction). The unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium profile characterizes the players’ expected payoff as function of their betweenness centrality score. Secondly, we study a dynamic link-formation game which allows the players to activate new linkages or sever existing ones in order to increase their bargaining power for a given marginal cost per link. We identify the conditions under which the resultant pairwise stable network structures belong to the family of the nested split graphs.

AB - We study a Rubinstein-Stahl two-player non-cooperative bargaining game played by n players connected in a communication network. We allow the players to communicate with any peer in the same component via the existing paths connecting the peers in a given communication network (global interaction). The unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium profile characterizes the players’ expected payoff as function of their betweenness centrality score. Secondly, we study a dynamic link-formation game which allows the players to activate new linkages or sever existing ones in order to increase their bargaining power for a given marginal cost per link. We identify the conditions under which the resultant pairwise stable network structures belong to the family of the nested split graphs.

KW - Noncooperative bargaining

KW - Network formation

KW - Network

KW - Communication

UR - http://www.marco-pelliccia.it/uploads/8/2/0/0/8200322/bgnmp.pdf

M3 - Working paper

BT - Bargaining in Global Communication Networks

ER -