The open method of co-ordination (OMC) has been seen as an important mechanism by which European integration may proceed. Drawing on the Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results reports that were backed by the European Commission, this article seeks to assess whether the actions of the social partners, which have been studied much less than those of national politicians, can set limits to the OMC. Any ability that they have to do so is likely to be contingent upon the national business system in which they operate. Using national, statistically representative data, this article illustrates how the varying preferences of the social actors in Germany and the UK, which can be traced back to the two countries’ contrasting business systems, have resulted in continuing differences in the prevalence of employee share ownership and profit-sharing schemes in those two countries. This has implications not just for the success of measures that rely on the OMC for their implementation, but also for attempts to undertake reforms, such as the Takeover Directive, that have implications for actors whose preferences and interests are shaped by the business system within which they operate.