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Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Standard Standard

Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman. / Al Lawati, Hidaya; Hussainey, Khaled; Sagitova, Roza .
In: Review of Accounting and Finance, 01.06.2023.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

HarvardHarvard

Al Lawati, H, Hussainey, K & Sagitova, R 2023, 'Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman', Review of Accounting and Finance.

APA

Al Lawati, H., Hussainey, K., & Sagitova, R. (2023). Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman. Review of Accounting and Finance.

CBE

Al Lawati H, Hussainey K, Sagitova R. 2023. Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman. Review of Accounting and Finance.

MLA

Al Lawati, Hidaya, Khaled Hussainey and Roza Sagitova. "Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman". Review of Accounting and Finance. 2023.

VancouverVancouver

Al Lawati H, Hussainey K, Sagitova R. Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman. Review of Accounting and Finance. 2023 Jun 1. Epub 2023 May 24.

Author

Al Lawati, Hidaya ; Hussainey, Khaled ; Sagitova, Roza . / Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman. In: Review of Accounting and Finance. 2023.

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman

AU - Al Lawati, Hidaya

AU - Hussainey, Khaled

AU - Sagitova, Roza

PY - 2023/6/1

Y1 - 2023/6/1

N2 - PurposeThis study aims to examine whether, and which type of, busy audit committee (AC) directors affect the quality and quantity of forward-looking disclosure (FLD).Design/methodology/approachThe authors use content analysis to measure the quality and quantity of FLD. The authors use a sample of Omani financial institutions listed on the Muscat Securities Market for the period 2014–2018.FindingsThe authors find that overlapped AC chairs and total overlapped AC directors negatively (positively) affect disclosure quantity (quality). The authors also find that overlapped AC directors with financial expertise and those with multiple directorships positively affect disclosure quantity and quality.Originality/valueThis study offers new insights to policymakers (and managers) as it informs them about the benefits of overlapping AC directorship. It suggests that corporate governance codes should not limit overlapped AC direcotorship.

AB - PurposeThis study aims to examine whether, and which type of, busy audit committee (AC) directors affect the quality and quantity of forward-looking disclosure (FLD).Design/methodology/approachThe authors use content analysis to measure the quality and quantity of FLD. The authors use a sample of Omani financial institutions listed on the Muscat Securities Market for the period 2014–2018.FindingsThe authors find that overlapped AC chairs and total overlapped AC directors negatively (positively) affect disclosure quantity (quality). The authors also find that overlapped AC directors with financial expertise and those with multiple directorships positively affect disclosure quantity and quality.Originality/valueThis study offers new insights to policymakers (and managers) as it informs them about the benefits of overlapping AC directorship. It suggests that corporate governance codes should not limit overlapped AC direcotorship.

M3 - Article

JO - Review of Accounting and Finance

JF - Review of Accounting and Finance

SN - 1475-7702

ER -