Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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In: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 1, 09.12.2015.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security
AU - Pelliccia, Marco
AU - Bove, Vincenzo
AU - Elia, Leandro
PY - 2015/12/9
Y1 - 2015/12/9
N2 - The contemporary empirical literature on military spending has focused on institutional and conflict factors, and although has acknowledged the role of trade openness, it has not taken into account the position of a state in the trade network. Building on the concept of network centrality, we claim that the structure of trade networks affects the optimal investment in security, and that a country’s level of military spending is a function of its strategic position in the global network of a critical commodity, such as oil. Our empirical results show that network centrality constrains military spending.
AB - The contemporary empirical literature on military spending has focused on institutional and conflict factors, and although has acknowledged the role of trade openness, it has not taken into account the position of a state in the trade network. Building on the concept of network centrality, we claim that the structure of trade networks affects the optimal investment in security, and that a country’s level of military spending is a function of its strategic position in the global network of a critical commodity, such as oil. Our empirical results show that network centrality constrains military spending.
KW - military spending
KW - trade
KW - network
U2 - 10.1515/peps-2015-0042
DO - 10.1515/peps-2015-0042
M3 - Article
VL - 22
JO - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
JF - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
SN - 1079-2457
IS - 1
ER -