Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Standard Standard

Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security. / Pelliccia, Marco; Bove, Vincenzo; Elia, Leandro.
In: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 1, 09.12.2015.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

HarvardHarvard

Pelliccia, M, Bove, V & Elia, L 2015, 'Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security', Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 1. https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2015-0042

APA

Pelliccia, M., Bove, V., & Elia, L. (2015). Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 22(1). https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2015-0042

CBE

Pelliccia M, Bove V, Elia L. 2015. Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. 22(1). https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2015-0042

MLA

Pelliccia, Marco, Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia. "Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security". Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. 2015. 22(1). https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2015-0042

VancouverVancouver

Pelliccia M, Bove V, Elia L. Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. 2015 Dec 9;22(1). doi: 10.1515/peps-2015-0042

Author

Pelliccia, Marco ; Bove, Vincenzo ; Elia, Leandro. / Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security. In: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. 2015 ; Vol. 22, No. 1.

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Centrality in Trade Networks and Investment in Security

AU - Pelliccia, Marco

AU - Bove, Vincenzo

AU - Elia, Leandro

PY - 2015/12/9

Y1 - 2015/12/9

N2 - The contemporary empirical literature on military spending has focused on institutional and conflict factors, and although has acknowledged the role of trade openness, it has not taken into account the position of a state in the trade network. Building on the concept of network centrality, we claim that the structure of trade networks affects the optimal investment in security, and that a country’s level of military spending is a function of its strategic position in the global network of a critical commodity, such as oil. Our empirical results show that network centrality constrains military spending.

AB - The contemporary empirical literature on military spending has focused on institutional and conflict factors, and although has acknowledged the role of trade openness, it has not taken into account the position of a state in the trade network. Building on the concept of network centrality, we claim that the structure of trade networks affects the optimal investment in security, and that a country’s level of military spending is a function of its strategic position in the global network of a critical commodity, such as oil. Our empirical results show that network centrality constrains military spending.

KW - military spending

KW - trade

KW - network

U2 - 10.1515/peps-2015-0042

DO - 10.1515/peps-2015-0042

M3 - Article

VL - 22

JO - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

JF - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

SN - 1079-2457

IS - 1

ER -