Do bank bailouts have an impact on the underwriting business?
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In: Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 49, 100756, 31.08.2020.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Do bank bailouts have an impact on the underwriting business?
AU - Carbo-Valverde, Santiago
AU - Cuadros Solas, Pedro
AU - Rodriguez Fernandez, Francisco
N1 - 18 months embargo
PY - 2020/8/31
Y1 - 2020/8/31
N2 - We explore the effects of bank bailouts on competition in the underwriting business. We exploit a sample of underwriters active in the European corporate bond markets from 2006–2013 and find that reputable underwriters suffer market share losses (of 12.43%) after being bailed out. However, the market share of non-reputable underwriters is found to increase after a bail out. An exploration of the firm–bank underwriting matching reveals that the probability of being chosen as underwriter in a given deal decreases for reputable bailed-out banks, while it increases for non-reputable bailed-out banks. These results provide evidence of the effects of bailouts on underwriting competition. The economic impact depends on the ex-ante reputational capital of the bailed-out bank.
AB - We explore the effects of bank bailouts on competition in the underwriting business. We exploit a sample of underwriters active in the European corporate bond markets from 2006–2013 and find that reputable underwriters suffer market share losses (of 12.43%) after being bailed out. However, the market share of non-reputable underwriters is found to increase after a bail out. An exploration of the firm–bank underwriting matching reveals that the probability of being chosen as underwriter in a given deal decreases for reputable bailed-out banks, while it increases for non-reputable bailed-out banks. These results provide evidence of the effects of bailouts on underwriting competition. The economic impact depends on the ex-ante reputational capital of the bailed-out bank.
U2 - 10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100756
DO - 10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100756
M3 - Article
VL - 49
JO - Journal of Financial Stability
JF - Journal of Financial Stability
SN - 1572-3089
M1 - 100756
ER -