Do fiscal rules reduce government borrowing costs in developing countries?
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Standard Standard
In: International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 25, No. 4, 13.10.2020, p. 499-510.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
HarvardHarvard
APA
CBE
MLA
VancouverVancouver
Author
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Do fiscal rules reduce government borrowing costs in developing countries?
AU - Thornton, John
AU - Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis
PY - 2020/10/13
Y1 - 2020/10/13
N2 - We examine whether adopting numerical fiscal rules framework to guide fiscal policy helped reduce the cost of borrowing by governments in a sample of 61 low- and middle-income countries for 1985–2017, 24 of which adopted such rules. We address the self-selection problem of policy adoption by applying a variety of propensity score matching methods and show that the average treatment effect of fiscal rules on government borrowing costs is quantitatively quite large and statistically significant in rule adopting countries. We also find that the presence of institutional arrangements to strengthen fiscal rules results in a larger reduction in borrowing costs than is the case without these arrangements, which is consistent with strong rules adding to the credibility of the fiscal policy framework.
AB - We examine whether adopting numerical fiscal rules framework to guide fiscal policy helped reduce the cost of borrowing by governments in a sample of 61 low- and middle-income countries for 1985–2017, 24 of which adopted such rules. We address the self-selection problem of policy adoption by applying a variety of propensity score matching methods and show that the average treatment effect of fiscal rules on government borrowing costs is quantitatively quite large and statistically significant in rule adopting countries. We also find that the presence of institutional arrangements to strengthen fiscal rules results in a larger reduction in borrowing costs than is the case without these arrangements, which is consistent with strong rules adding to the credibility of the fiscal policy framework.
KW - credibility
KW - developing countries
KW - fiscal rules
KW - government borrowing costs
KW - Propensity score matching
U2 - 10.1002/ijfe.1771
DO - 10.1002/ijfe.1771
M3 - Article
VL - 25
SP - 499
EP - 510
JO - International Journal of Finance and Economics
JF - International Journal of Finance and Economics
SN - 1099-1158
IS - 4
ER -