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Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies

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Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies. / Dobbins, Anthony; Dundon, Tony ; Cullinane, Niall et al.
In: International Labour Review, Vol. 156, No. 3-4, 12.2017, p. 395-422.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

HarvardHarvard

Dobbins, A, Dundon, T, Cullinane, N, Hickland, E & Donaghey, J 2017, 'Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies', International Labour Review, vol. 156, no. 3-4, pp. 395-422. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x

APA

Dobbins, A., Dundon, T., Cullinane, N., Hickland, E., & Donaghey, J. (2017). Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies. International Labour Review, 156(3-4), 395-422. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x

CBE

Dobbins A, Dundon T, Cullinane N, Hickland E, Donaghey J. 2017. Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies. International Labour Review. 156(3-4):395-422. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x

MLA

Dobbins, Anthony et al. "Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies". International Labour Review. 2017, 156(3-4). 395-422. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x

VancouverVancouver

Dobbins A, Dundon T, Cullinane N, Hickland E, Donaghey J. Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies. International Labour Review. 2017 Dec;156(3-4):395-422. Epub 2015 Dec 30. doi: 10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x

Author

Dobbins, Anthony ; Dundon, Tony ; Cullinane, Niall et al. / Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies. In: International Labour Review. 2017 ; Vol. 156, No. 3-4. pp. 395-422.

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies

AU - Dobbins, Anthony

AU - Dundon, Tony

AU - Cullinane, Niall

AU - Hickland, Eugene

AU - Donaghey, Jimmy

N1 - Irish Research Council (IRC); Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) [RES-062-23-1139]

PY - 2017/12

Y1 - 2017/12

N2 - Employee participation is a vital ingredient of what the International Labour Organization (ILO) calls ‘representation security’. This article provides theoretical and empirical insights relating to social policy impact of worker participation, specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive (ICD) for employee voice rights. While existing research on the ICD offers important empirical insights, there is a need for further theoretical analysis to examine the potential effectiveness of the regulations in liberal market economies (LMEs). Drawing on data from 16 case studies, the article uses game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework to explain why national implementing legislation is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in two LMEs: UK and the Republic of Ireland. Three theoretical (metaphorical) propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of national information & consultation regulations in LMEs.

AB - Employee participation is a vital ingredient of what the International Labour Organization (ILO) calls ‘representation security’. This article provides theoretical and empirical insights relating to social policy impact of worker participation, specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive (ICD) for employee voice rights. While existing research on the ICD offers important empirical insights, there is a need for further theoretical analysis to examine the potential effectiveness of the regulations in liberal market economies (LMEs). Drawing on data from 16 case studies, the article uses game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework to explain why national implementing legislation is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in two LMEs: UK and the Republic of Ireland. Three theoretical (metaphorical) propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of national information & consultation regulations in LMEs.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00053.x

M3 - Article

VL - 156

SP - 395

EP - 422

JO - International Labour Review

JF - International Labour Review

SN - 0020-7780

IS - 3-4

ER -