Fairness and Futility
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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In: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 79, No. 2, 04.2016, p. 101-111.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Fairness and Futility
AU - Betenson, Toby
PY - 2016/4
Y1 - 2016/4
N2 - William Lane Craig argues that both God and immortality are required for life to have meaning; life is futile without either of the two. I argue that combining William Lane Craig’s arguments for the futility of life without God or immortality, together with a plausible amendment to his working definition of ‘futility’, entails the counterintuitive conclusion that life is futile if God does exist. Craig says that God must exist as a guarantor of ultimate justice, and that this ultimate ‘fairness’ is necessary for life to have meaning. I will argue that this ultimate ‘fairness’ entails that our lives are futile, since, given the existence of God, our actions are causally irrelevant to the achievement of the satisfaction of the ‘Good’. This discussion serves to pinpoint a major flaw in Craig’s reasoning: the claim that events of merely ‘relative’ significance do not have the potential to counter the futility of life.
AB - William Lane Craig argues that both God and immortality are required for life to have meaning; life is futile without either of the two. I argue that combining William Lane Craig’s arguments for the futility of life without God or immortality, together with a plausible amendment to his working definition of ‘futility’, entails the counterintuitive conclusion that life is futile if God does exist. Craig says that God must exist as a guarantor of ultimate justice, and that this ultimate ‘fairness’ is necessary for life to have meaning. I will argue that this ultimate ‘fairness’ entails that our lives are futile, since, given the existence of God, our actions are causally irrelevant to the achievement of the satisfaction of the ‘Good’. This discussion serves to pinpoint a major flaw in Craig’s reasoning: the claim that events of merely ‘relative’ significance do not have the potential to counter the futility of life.
U2 - 10.1007/s11153-015-9519-0
DO - 10.1007/s11153-015-9519-0
M3 - Article
VL - 79
SP - 101
EP - 111
JO - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
JF - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
SN - 0020-7047
IS - 2
ER -