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Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Standard Standard

Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress. / El Diri, Malek; King, Timothy; Spokeviciute, Laima et al.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 209, 110098, 12.2021.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

HarvardHarvard

El Diri, M, King, T, Spokeviciute, L & Williams, J 2021, 'Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress', Economics Letters, vol. 209, 110098. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110098

APA

El Diri, M., King, T., Spokeviciute, L., & Williams, J. (2021). Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress. Economics Letters, 209, Article 110098. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110098

CBE

El Diri M, King T, Spokeviciute L, Williams J. 2021. Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress. Economics Letters. 209:Article 110098. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110098

MLA

El Diri, Malek et al. "Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress". Economics Letters. 2021. 209. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110098

VancouverVancouver

El Diri M, King T, Spokeviciute L, Williams J. Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress. Economics Letters. 2021 Dec;209:110098. Epub 2021 Oct 6. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110098

Author

El Diri, Malek ; King, Timothy ; Spokeviciute, Laima et al. / Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress. In: Economics Letters. 2021 ; Vol. 209.

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Hands in the Cookie Jar: Exploiting Loan Loss Provisions under Bank Financial Distress

AU - El Diri, Malek

AU - King, Timothy

AU - Spokeviciute, Laima

AU - Williams, Jonathan

N1 - 18 months embargo

PY - 2021/12

Y1 - 2021/12

N2 - We investigate earnings management (EM) behaviour at failed banks by examining the intensity and direction of EM around FDIC-insured commercial bank failures. Our empirical analysis indicates that failing banks engage in EM to a significantly greater extent than non-failing banks. Our results show that failing banks’ discretion over loan loss provisions ranges from aggressive (upwards EM) to conservative (downwards EM).

AB - We investigate earnings management (EM) behaviour at failed banks by examining the intensity and direction of EM around FDIC-insured commercial bank failures. Our empirical analysis indicates that failing banks engage in EM to a significantly greater extent than non-failing banks. Our results show that failing banks’ discretion over loan loss provisions ranges from aggressive (upwards EM) to conservative (downwards EM).

KW - Earnings Management

KW - Bank failures

KW - Banks

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110098

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110098

M3 - Article

VL - 209

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

M1 - 110098

ER -