Is an investing institution one shareholder or a collection of separate funds?

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Is an investing institution one shareholder or a collection of separate funds? / Armitage, S.; Haig, A.; Hodgkinson, L.
In: Corporate Governance: An International Review, 04.02.2016.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Armitage S, Haig A, Hodgkinson L. Is an investing institution one shareholder or a collection of separate funds? Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2016 Feb 4. doi: 10.1111/corg.12159

Author

Armitage, S. ; Haig, A. ; Hodgkinson, L. / Is an investing institution one shareholder or a collection of separate funds?. In: Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2016.

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Is an investing institution one shareholder or a collection of separate funds?

AU - Armitage, S.

AU - Haig, A.

AU - Hodgkinson, L.

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Is an investing institution one shareholder or a collection of separate funds?, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12159/abstract. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

PY - 2016/2/4

Y1 - 2016/2/4

N2 - There is much discussion about the merits of co-ordinated action between investing institutions. But many institutional holdings consist of subholdings managed by separate fund managers. We examine the extent to which the fund managers within a given institution behave in a co-ordinated manner, in terms of their trading around the announcement of major takeovers. We find evidence of material disagreement within institutions, suggesting that blocks, at the level of the institution, do not always exist.

AB - There is much discussion about the merits of co-ordinated action between investing institutions. But many institutional holdings consist of subholdings managed by separate fund managers. We examine the extent to which the fund managers within a given institution behave in a co-ordinated manner, in terms of their trading around the announcement of major takeovers. We find evidence of material disagreement within institutions, suggesting that blocks, at the level of the institution, do not always exist.

U2 - 10.1111/corg.12159

DO - 10.1111/corg.12159

M3 - Article

JO - Corporate Governance: An International Review

JF - Corporate Governance: An International Review

SN - 1467-8683

ER -