Money shouts! How effective are punishments for accounting fraud?
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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In: British Accounting Review, Vol. 51, No. 5, 100824, 30.09.2019.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Money shouts! How effective are punishments for accounting fraud?
AU - Wang, Yang
AU - Ashton, John K.
AU - Jaafar, Aziz
PY - 2019/9/30
Y1 - 2019/9/30
N2 - This study examines the impact of different punishments for Chinese accounting fraud on shareholder valuation of firms between 2007 and 2014. From an examination of both monetary and non-monetary ‘name and shame’ penalties, it is reported all punishments have a negative and significant impact on the shareholder wealth of fraudulent firms. Investors’ perceive punishments involving monetary penalties far more severely than non-monetary punishments used to combat accounting fraud. Stock market reactions are also sensitive to the type of fraud committed with manipulation of income statements viewed more negatively by investors than fraud related to disclosure. Information leakage to capital markets prior to the announcement of punishments is also observed. It is proposed fines have been relatively more effective, than ‘name and shame’ punishments in addressing Chinese accounting fraud during the last decade, due not least to information leakage.
AB - This study examines the impact of different punishments for Chinese accounting fraud on shareholder valuation of firms between 2007 and 2014. From an examination of both monetary and non-monetary ‘name and shame’ penalties, it is reported all punishments have a negative and significant impact on the shareholder wealth of fraudulent firms. Investors’ perceive punishments involving monetary penalties far more severely than non-monetary punishments used to combat accounting fraud. Stock market reactions are also sensitive to the type of fraud committed with manipulation of income statements viewed more negatively by investors than fraud related to disclosure. Information leakage to capital markets prior to the announcement of punishments is also observed. It is proposed fines have been relatively more effective, than ‘name and shame’ punishments in addressing Chinese accounting fraud during the last decade, due not least to information leakage.
KW - Accounting fraud
KW - Event study
KW - Information leakage
KW - Punishment
KW - Stock market reaction
U2 - 10.1016/j.bar.2019.02.006
DO - 10.1016/j.bar.2019.02.006
M3 - Article
VL - 51
JO - British Accounting Review
JF - British Accounting Review
SN - 0890-8389
IS - 5
M1 - 100824
ER -