Recasting Anti-Theism

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Standard Standard

Recasting Anti-Theism. / Betenson, Toby.
Does God Matter?: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. ed. / Klaas Kraay. Routledge, 2017. (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

HarvardHarvard

Betenson, T 2017, Recasting Anti-Theism. in K Kraay (ed.), Does God Matter?: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Routledge.

APA

Betenson, T. (2017). Recasting Anti-Theism. In K. Kraay (Ed.), Does God Matter?: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion). Routledge.

CBE

Betenson T. 2017. Recasting Anti-Theism. Kraay K, editor. In Does God Matter?: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. Routledge. (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion).

MLA

Betenson, Toby "Recasting Anti-Theism". Kraay, Klaas (ed.). Does God Matter?: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. Chapter 8, Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. 2017.

VancouverVancouver

Betenson T. Recasting Anti-Theism. In Kraay K, editor, Does God Matter?: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. Routledge. 2017. (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion).

Author

Betenson, Toby. / Recasting Anti-Theism. Does God Matter?: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. editor / Klaas Kraay. Routledge, 2017. (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion).

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Recasting Anti-Theism

AU - Betenson, Toby

PY - 2017/12/18

Y1 - 2017/12/18

N2 - I offer a new defence of anti-theism by casting doubt on the notion that anti-theism should be understood as the judgement that God’s existence ‘makes the world worse’. Instead, anti-theism should be understood in terms of reasonable preferences that are not necessarily connected to rational judgements about the comparative value of possible worlds. I argue that it is reasonable to detach our preferences from our rational judgements about which possible worlds are ‘better’ or ‘worse’. It follows that it can be reasonable to prefer the non-existence of God even whilst accepting that God’s existence would be a good thing.

AB - I offer a new defence of anti-theism by casting doubt on the notion that anti-theism should be understood as the judgement that God’s existence ‘makes the world worse’. Instead, anti-theism should be understood in terms of reasonable preferences that are not necessarily connected to rational judgements about the comparative value of possible worlds. I argue that it is reasonable to detach our preferences from our rational judgements about which possible worlds are ‘better’ or ‘worse’. It follows that it can be reasonable to prefer the non-existence of God even whilst accepting that God’s existence would be a good thing.

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780415793513

T3 - Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion

BT - Does God Matter?

A2 - Kraay, Klaas

PB - Routledge

ER -