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Regulation, Bonding and the Quality of Financial Statements

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Standard Standard

Regulation, Bonding and the Quality of Financial Statements. / Jaafar, Aziz; Dargenidou, C; McLeay, S.
Accounting and Regulation: New insights on Governance, Markets and Institutions. ed. / R Di Petra; S McLeay; J Ronen. New York: Springer, 2013. p. 191-228.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

HarvardHarvard

Jaafar, A, Dargenidou, C & McLeay, S 2013, Regulation, Bonding and the Quality of Financial Statements. in R Di Petra, S McLeay & J Ronen (eds), Accounting and Regulation: New insights on Governance, Markets and Institutions. Springer, New York, pp. 191-228.

APA

Jaafar, A., Dargenidou, C., & McLeay, S. (2013). Regulation, Bonding and the Quality of Financial Statements. In R. Di Petra, S. McLeay, & J. Ronen (Eds.), Accounting and Regulation: New insights on Governance, Markets and Institutions (pp. 191-228). Springer.

CBE

Jaafar A, Dargenidou C, McLeay S. 2013. Regulation, Bonding and the Quality of Financial Statements. Di Petra R, McLeay S, Ronen J, editors. In Accounting and Regulation: New insights on Governance, Markets and Institutions. New York: Springer. pp. 191-228.

MLA

Jaafar, Aziz, C Dargenidou and S McLeay "Regulation, Bonding and the Quality of Financial Statements"., Di Petra, R McLeay, S Ronen, J (editors). Accounting and Regulation: New insights on Governance, Markets and Institutions. New York: Springer. 2013, 191-228.

VancouverVancouver

Jaafar A, Dargenidou C, McLeay S. Regulation, Bonding and the Quality of Financial Statements. In Di Petra R, McLeay S, Ronen J, editors, Accounting and Regulation: New insights on Governance, Markets and Institutions. New York: Springer. 2013. p. 191-228

Author

Jaafar, Aziz ; Dargenidou, C ; McLeay, S. / Regulation, Bonding and the Quality of Financial Statements. Accounting and Regulation: New insights on Governance, Markets and Institutions. editor / R Di Petra ; S McLeay ; J Ronen. New York : Springer, 2013. pp. 191-228

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Regulation, Bonding and the Quality of Financial Statements

AU - Jaafar, Aziz

AU - Dargenidou, C

AU - McLeay, S

PY - 2013/11

Y1 - 2013/11

N2 - In this study, we show that the exposure of European firms across European capital markets is associated with significant constraints in financial reporting discretion. By exploiting the variation in the regulatory environment in this setting, we are able to demonstrate that incentives for reducing financial reporting discretion stem from a form of legal bonding within Europe, in the sense of the exposure to at least one capital market with better regulation than the firm’s origin. Furthermore, we provide evidence for the presence of reputational bonding in cases where the firm is exposed to capital markets with weaker regulation than the regulation in its home jurisdiction. We corroborate the evidence on reputational bonding by extending this investigation to circumstances that are likely to trigger managers’ engagement with more transparency even in the absence of strong legal regulations, such as stock exchange consolidation and geographical proximity.

AB - In this study, we show that the exposure of European firms across European capital markets is associated with significant constraints in financial reporting discretion. By exploiting the variation in the regulatory environment in this setting, we are able to demonstrate that incentives for reducing financial reporting discretion stem from a form of legal bonding within Europe, in the sense of the exposure to at least one capital market with better regulation than the firm’s origin. Furthermore, we provide evidence for the presence of reputational bonding in cases where the firm is exposed to capital markets with weaker regulation than the regulation in its home jurisdiction. We corroborate the evidence on reputational bonding by extending this investigation to circumstances that are likely to trigger managers’ engagement with more transparency even in the absence of strong legal regulations, such as stock exchange consolidation and geographical proximity.

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9781461480969

SP - 191

EP - 228

BT - Accounting and Regulation

A2 - Di Petra, R

A2 - McLeay, S

A2 - Ronen, J

PB - Springer

CY - New York

ER -