Subordinate Executives’ Horizon and Firm Policies

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  • Mohamed Mekhaimer
    St. John Fisher College, NY
  • Alex Abakah
    Bentley University, MA
  • Awad Ibrahim
    University of Portsmouth
  • Khaled Hussainey
    University of Portsmouth
Motivated by the internal governance theory, we investigate the links between subordinate executives' horizon and firm policies. Using the number of years to retirement to capture subordinate executives' horizon inside the firm, we find that subordinates' horizon is positively associated with firm's risk-taking, long-term investments growth, and research and development productivity, but negatively related to the dividend decision and the payout ratio. We also find a positive relationship between subordinates' horizon and firm value. Our results are robust to controlling for alternative explanations including the pay gap between CEO and subordinate executives, executives' overconfidence, CEO's decision horizon, and other governance mechanisms. The results are also robust to alternative measures of subordinates' horizon, and after addressing potential endogeneity concerns.
Original languageEnglish
Article number102220
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Early online date21 May 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2022
Externally publishedYes
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