Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings?

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygladolygiad gan gymheiriaid

Fersiynau electronig

Dogfennau

Dangosydd eitem ddigidol (DOI)

This paper integrates three themes on regulation, unsolicited credit ratings, and the sovereign-bank rating ceiling. We reveal an unintended consequence of the EU rating agency disclosure rules upon rating changes, using data for S&P-rated banks in 42 countries between 2006 and 2013. The disclosure of sovereign rating solicitation status for 13 countries in February 2011 has an adverse effect on the ratings of intermediaries operating in these countries. Conversion to unsolicited sovereign rating status transmits risk to banks via the rating channel. The results suggest that banks bear a penalty if their host sovereign does not solicit its ratings.
Iaith wreiddiolSaesneg
Tudalennau (o-i)194-210
CyfnodolynBritish Accounting Review
Cyfrol49
Rhif y cyfnodolyn2
Dyddiad ar-lein cynnar20 Awst 2016
Dynodwyr Gwrthrych Digidol (DOIs)
StatwsCyhoeddwyd - Maw 2017

Cyfanswm lawlrlwytho

Nid oes data ar gael
Gweld graff cysylltiadau