Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings?

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolyn › Erthygl › adolygiad gan gymheiriaid

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Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings? / Klusak, Patrycja; Alsakka, Rasha ; ap Gwilym, Owain.
Yn: British Accounting Review, Cyfrol 49, Rhif 2, 03.2017, t. 194-210.

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolyn › Erthygl › adolygiad gan gymheiriaid

HarvardHarvard

Klusak, P, Alsakka, R & ap Gwilym, O 2017, 'Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings?', British Accounting Review, cyfrol. 49, rhif 2, tt. 194-210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2016.08.004

APA

Klusak, P., Alsakka, R., & ap Gwilym, O. (2017). Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings? British Accounting Review, 49(2), 194-210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2016.08.004

CBE

Klusak P, Alsakka R , ap Gwilym O. 2017. Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings?. British Accounting Review. 49(2):194-210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2016.08.004

MLA

Klusak, Patrycja, Rasha Alsakka, a Owain ap Gwilym. "Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings?". British Accounting Review. 2017, 49(2). 194-210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2016.08.004

VancouverVancouver

Klusak P, Alsakka R , ap Gwilym O. Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings? British Accounting Review. 2017 Maw;49(2):194-210. Epub 2016 Awst 20. doi: 10.1016/j.bar.2016.08.004

Author

Klusak, Patrycja ; Alsakka, Rasha ; ap Gwilym, Owain. / Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings?. Yn: British Accounting Review. 2017 ; Cyfrol 49, Rhif 2. tt. 194-210.

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings?

AU - Klusak, Patrycja

AU - Alsakka, Rasha

AU - ap Gwilym, Owain

PY - 2017/3

Y1 - 2017/3

N2 - This paper integrates three themes on regulation, unsolicited credit ratings, and the sovereign-bank rating ceiling. We reveal an unintended consequence of the EU rating agency disclosure rules upon rating changes, using data for S&P-rated banks in 42 countries between 2006 and 2013. The disclosure of sovereign rating solicitation status for 13 countries in February 2011 has an adverse effect on the ratings of intermediaries operating in these countries. Conversion to unsolicited sovereign rating status transmits risk to banks via the rating channel. The results suggest that banks bear a penalty if their host sovereign does not solicit its ratings.

AB - This paper integrates three themes on regulation, unsolicited credit ratings, and the sovereign-bank rating ceiling. We reveal an unintended consequence of the EU rating agency disclosure rules upon rating changes, using data for S&P-rated banks in 42 countries between 2006 and 2013. The disclosure of sovereign rating solicitation status for 13 countries in February 2011 has an adverse effect on the ratings of intermediaries operating in these countries. Conversion to unsolicited sovereign rating status transmits risk to banks via the rating channel. The results suggest that banks bear a penalty if their host sovereign does not solicit its ratings.

U2 - 10.1016/j.bar.2016.08.004

DO - 10.1016/j.bar.2016.08.004

M3 - Article

VL - 49

SP - 194

EP - 210

JO - British Accounting Review

JF - British Accounting Review

SN - 0890-8389

IS - 2

ER -