The effect of CEO power on bank risk: Do boards and institutional investors matter?
Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolyn › Erthygl › adolygiad gan gymheiriaid
Fersiynau electronig
Dolenni
Dangosydd eitem ddigidol (DOI)
We test for a link between CEO power and risk taking in US banks. Banks are more likely to take risks if they have powerful CEOs and relatively poor balance sheets. There is little evidence that executive board size and independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs.
Allweddeiriau
| Iaith wreiddiol | Saesneg |
|---|---|
| Tudalennau (o-i) | 101202 |
| Nifer y tudalennau | 1 |
| Cyfnodolyn | Finance Research Letters |
| Cyfrol | 33 |
| Dyddiad ar-lein cynnar | 4 Meh 2019 |
| Dynodwyr Gwrthrych Digidol (DOIs) | |
| Statws | Cyhoeddwyd - Maw 2020 |