The effect of CEO power on bank risk: Do boards and institutional investors matter?
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Electronic versions
We test for a link between CEO power and risk taking in US banks. Banks are more likely to take risks if they have powerful CEOs and relatively poor balance sheets. There is little evidence that executive board size and independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs.
Keywords
- Banks, Governance, Risk, CEO power, Boards of directors, Institutional investors
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 101202 |
| Number of pages | 1 |
| Journal | Finance Research Letters |
| Volume | 33 |
| Early online date | 4 Jun 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2020 |