CEO tenure and corporate misconduct: Evidence from US banks
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Standard Standard
In: Finance Research Letters, Vol. 26, No. September, 09.2018, p. 1-8.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
HarvardHarvard
APA
CBE
MLA
VancouverVancouver
Author
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - CEO tenure and corporate misconduct
T2 - Evidence from US banks
AU - Altunbas, Yener
AU - Thornton, John
AU - Uymaz, Yurtsev
PY - 2018/9
Y1 - 2018/9
N2 - We test for a link between CEO tenure and misconduct by US banks. We find that banks are more likely to commit misconduct when CEOs have a relatively long tenure and banks have relatively poor balance sheets. Large and independent corporate boards can mitigate but not prevent misconduct.
AB - We test for a link between CEO tenure and misconduct by US banks. We find that banks are more likely to commit misconduct when CEOs have a relatively long tenure and banks have relatively poor balance sheets. Large and independent corporate boards can mitigate but not prevent misconduct.
KW - Corporate misconduct
KW - Bivariate
KW - Probit
KW - US banks
KW - CEO tenure
U2 - 10.1016/j.frl.2017.11.003
DO - 10.1016/j.frl.2017.11.003
M3 - Article
VL - 26
SP - 1
EP - 8
JO - Finance Research Letters
JF - Finance Research Letters
SN - 1544-6123
IS - September
ER -