Mixed methods research has become a staple research approach in a number of academic disciplines and policy areas, from environmental and health sciences to geography and the social sciences. The increase in popularity of mixed methods approaches and research design and its diverse nature has come with a similar growth in debates on how mixed methods research can be justified and explained and a variety of philosophical foundations have been deployed for that purpose. Among the most prominent philosophical approaches seen to underpin mixed methods research has been pragmatism – a philosophical tradition which emerged in North America in the late 19th century that has evolved and been transformed over the decades by a number of contributors (from Peirce and James, to Dewey, and Rorty). This chapter will provide a brief overview of the development of pragmatism as a philosophy but focus in the main on pragmatist approaches to research whilst recognising and reflecting on the multitude of other foundations that provide a basis for mixed methods research. It will contain a discussion of the anti-dualist and anti-representational stance taken by pragmatists, its preference for abduction as an analytical approach, and its practical implications for mixed methods researchers. It will also engage with the limitations of pragmatism and explore what is meant by utility of research and reflexive research practice. Finally, the chapter will identify the areas in the development of pragmatism as a research approach for mixed methods research that require further thought.