The effect of CEO power on bank risk: Do boards and institutional investors matter?
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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In: Finance Research Letters, Vol. 33, 03.2020, p. 101202.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The effect of CEO power on bank risk: Do boards and institutional investors matter?
AU - Altunbaş, Yener
AU - Thornton, John
AU - Uymaz, Yurtsev
PY - 2020/3
Y1 - 2020/3
N2 - We test for a link between CEO power and risk taking in US banks. Banks are more likely to take risks if they have powerful CEOs and relatively poor balance sheets. There is little evidence that executive board size and independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs.
AB - We test for a link between CEO power and risk taking in US banks. Banks are more likely to take risks if they have powerful CEOs and relatively poor balance sheets. There is little evidence that executive board size and independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs.
KW - Banks
KW - Governance
KW - Risk
KW - CEO power
KW - Boards of directors
KW - Institutional investors
U2 - 10.1016/j.frl.2019.05.020
DO - 10.1016/j.frl.2019.05.020
M3 - Article
VL - 33
SP - 101202
JO - Finance Research Letters
JF - Finance Research Letters
SN - 1544-6123
ER -